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diff --git a/5246-0.txt b/5246-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2e7719 --- /dev/null +++ b/5246-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11595 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Modern French Philosophy, by J. Alexander Gunn + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have +to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. + +Title: Modern French Philosophy: A Study Of The Development Since Comte + +Author: J. Alexander Gunn + +Release Date: June 09, 2002 [EBook #5246] +[Most recently updated: March 17, 2020] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Modern French Philosophy + +_A study of the Development since Comte._ + +by J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., PH.D. + +_Fellow of the University of Liverpool; Lecturer in Psychology to the +Liverpool University Extension Board_ + +WITH A FOREWORD BY +HENRI BERGSON + +_de l’Academie francaise et de l’Academie des +Sciences morales et politiques_ + +T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD. +LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE + +_First published in 1922._ +_(All rights reserved)_ + +TO +MY TEACHER +ALEXANDER MAIR +PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL +AS A SMALL TOKEN OF ESTEEM +AND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS INSTRUCTION + +Contents + + FOREWORD BY HENRI BERGSON + PREFACE + + CHAPTER I. ANTECEDENTS + CHAPTER II. MAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851 + CHAPTER III. SCIENCE + CHAPTER IV. FREEDOM + CHAPTER V. PROGRESS + CHAPTER VI. ETHICS + CHAPTER VII. RELIGION + CONCLUSION + + BIBLIOGRAPHY + COMPARATIVE TABLE + INDEX + + + + +“Mais il n’y a pas que cette France, que cette France glorieuse, que +cette France révolutionnaire, cette France émancipatrice et initiatrice +du genre humain, que cette France d’une activité merveilleuse et comme +on l’a dit, cette France nourrie des idées générales du monde, il y a +une autre France que je n’aime pas moins, une autre France qui m’est +encore plus chère, c’est la France misérable, c’est la France vaincue +et humiliée, c’est la France qui est accablée, c’est la France qui +traîne son boulet depuis quatorze siècles, la France qui crie, +suppliante vers la justice et vers la liberté, la France que les +despotes poussent constamment sur les champs de bataille, sous prétexte +de liberté, pour lui faire verser son sang par toutes les artères et +par toutes les veines, oh! cette France-là, je l’aime.”—GAMBETTA, +_Discours_, 29 _September_, 1872. + +“Les jeunes gens de tous les pays du monde qui sont venus dans les +campagnes de France combattre pour la civilisation et le droit seront +sans doute plus disposés à y revenir, apres la guerre chercher la +nourriture intellectuelle. Il importe qu’ils soient assurés de l’y +trouver, saine, abondante et forte.”—M. D. PARODI, _Inspecteur de +l’Académie de Paris, 1919_. + + + + +FOREWORD + + +_Je serais heureux que le public anglais sût le bien que je pense du +livre de M. Gunn, sur la philosophie francaise depuis 1851. Le sujet +choisi est neuf, car il n’existe pas, à ma connaissance, d’ouvrage +relatif à toute cette période de la philosophie française. Le beau +livre que M. Parodi vient de publier en français traite surtout des +vingt dernières années de notre activité philosophique. M. Gunn, +remontant jusqu’à Auguste Comte, a eu raison de placer ainsi devant +nous toute le seconde moitié du siècle passé. Cette période de +cinquante ans qui a précédée notre vingtième siècle est d’une +importance capitale. Elle constitue réellement notre dix-neuvième +siècle philosophique, car l’oeuvre même de Maine de Biran, qui est +antérieure, n’a été bien connue et étudiée qu’à ce moment, et la +plupart de nos idées philosophiques actuelles ont été élaborées pendant +ces cinquante ans._ + +_Le sujet est d’ailleurs d’une complication extrême, en raison du +nombre et de la variété des doctrines, en raison surtout de la +diversité des questions entre lesquelles se sont partagés tant de +penseurs. Dr. Gunn a su ramener toutes ces questions à un petit nombre +de problèmes essentiels : la science, la liberté, le progrès, la +morale, la religion. Cette division me paraît heureuse. Elle répond +bien, ce me semble, aux principales préoccupations de la philosophie +francaise. Elle a permis à l’auteur d’être complet, tout en restant +simple, clair, et facile à suivre._ + +_Elle présente, il est vrai, un inconvénient, en ce qu’elle morcelle la +doctrine d’un auteur en fragments dont chacun, pris à part, perd un peu +de sa vitalite et de son individualité. Elle risque ainsi de présenter +comme trop semblable à d’autres la solution que tel philosophe a donnée +de tel problème, solution qui, replacée dans l’ensemble de la doctrine, +apparaîtrait comme propre à ce penseur, originale et plus forte. Mais +cet inconvénient était inévitable et l’envers de l’avantage que je +signalais plus haut, celui de l’ordre, de la continuité et de la +clarté._ + +_Le travail du Dr. Gunn m’apparaît comme tout à fait distingué. Il +témoigne d’une information singulièrement étendue, précise et sûre. +C’est l’oeuvre d’un esprit d’une extrême souplesse, capable de +s’assimiler vite et bien la pensée des philosophes, de classer les +idées dans leur ordre d’importance, de les exposer méthodiquement et +les apprécier à leur juste valeur._ + + H. Bergson + +[These pages are a revised extract from the more formal _Rapport_ which +was presented by M. Bergson to the University of Liverpool]. + + + + +PREFACE + + +This work is the fruit of much reading and research done in Paris at +the Sorbonne and Bibliothèque nationale. It is, substantially, a +revised form of the thesis presented by the writer to the University of +Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, obtained in 1921. The +author is indebted, therefore, to the University for permission to +publish. More especially must he record his deep gratitude to the +French thinkers who gave both stimulus and encouragement to him during +his sojourn in Paris. Foremost among these is M. Henri Bergson, upon +whose _rapport_ the Doctorate was conferred, and who has expressed his +appreciation of the work by contributing a Foreword for publication. + +Mention must also be made of the encouragement given by the late M. +Emile Boutroux and by the eminent editor of the well-known _Revue de +Métaphysique et de Morale_, M. Xavier Léon, a leading spirit in the +_Société de Philosophie_, whose meetings the writer was privileged to +attend by invitation. Then MM. Brunschvicg, Levy-Bruhl, Lalande, Rey +and Lenoir, from time to time discussed the work with him and he must +record his appreciation of their kindness. + +To Professor Mair of Liverpool is due the initial suggestion, and it +has been felt a fitting tribute to his supervision, criticism, +encouragement and sympathy that this book should be respectfully +dedicated to him by one of his grateful pupils. In the labour of +dealing with the proofs, the writer has to acknowledge the co-operation +of Miss M. Linn and Mr. J. E. Turner, M.A. + +* * * * * * * * * + + +The method adopted in this history has been deliberately chosen for its +usefulness in emphasising the development of ideas. A purely +chronological method has not been followed. The biographical system has +likewise been rejected. The history of the development of thought +centres round problems, and it progresses in relation to these +problems. The particular manner in which the main problems presented +themselves to the French thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth +century was largely determined by the events and ideas which marked the +period from 1789 to 1851. For this reason a chapter has been devoted to +Antecedents. Between the Revolution and the _coup d’état_ of Napoleon +III., four distinct lines of thought are discernible. Then the main +currents from the year 1851 down to 1921 are described, with special +reference to the development of the main problems. The reconciliation +of _science_ and _conscience_ proved to be the main general problem, +which became more definitely that of Freedom. This in itself is +intimately bound up with the doctrines of progress, of history, of +ethics and religion. These topics are discussed in a manner which shows +their bearing upon each other. The conclusion aims at displaying the +characteristics of French thought which reveal themselves in the study +of these great problems. Its vitality, concreteness, clearness, +brilliance and precision are noted and a comparison made between French +thought and German philosophy. + +From a general philosophical standpoint few periods could be so +fascinating. Few, if any, could show such a complete revolution of +thought as that witnessed since the year 1851. To bring this out +clearly is the main object of the present book. It is intended to serve +a double purpose. Primarily, it aims at being a contribution to the +history of thought which will provide a definite knowledge of the best +that has been said and thought among philosophers in France during the +last seventy years. Further, it is itself an appeal for serious +attention to be given to French philosophy. This is a field which has +been comparatively neglected by English students, so far as the +nineteenth century is concerned, and this is especially true of our +period, which is roughly that from Comte to Boutroux (who passed away +last month) and Bergson (who has this year resigned his professorship). +It is the earnest desire of the writer to draw both philosophical +students and lovers of France and its literature to a closer study and +appreciation of modern French philosophy. Emotion and sentiment are +inadequate bases for an _entente_ which is to be really _cordiale_ +between any two peoples. An understanding of their deepest thoughts is +also necessary and desirable. Such an understanding is, after all, but +a step towards that iternationalisation of thought, that common fund of +human culture and knowledge, which sets itself as an ideal before the +nations of the world. _La philosophie n’a pas de patrie! Les idées sont +actuellement les forces internationales._ + +J. A. G. + +THE UNIVERSITY, + LIVERPOOL, + _December_, 1921 + + + + +CHAPTER I +(INTRODUCTORY) +ANTECEDENTS + + +HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE MAIN CURRENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1789 UP +TO 1851. + +After the Revolution—The Traditionalists: Chateaubuand, De Bonald, De +Maistre, Lamennais, Lacordaire + +_Main Currents:_ + +1. Maine de Biran. + +2. The Eclectics: Cousin, Jouffroy. + +3. The Socialists: Saint-Simon, Fourier and Cabal, Proudhon and Blanc. + +4.Positivism: Auguste Comte. + + + + +CHAPTER I +ANTECEDENTS + +This work deals with the great French thinkers since the time of +Auguste Comte, and treats, under various aspects, the development of +thought in relation to the main problems which confronted these men. In +the commencement of such an undertaking we are obliged to acknowledge +the continuity of human thought, to recognise that it tends to +approximate to an organic whole, and that, consequently, methods +resembling those of surgical amputation are to be avoided. We cannot +absolutely isolate one period of thought. For this reason a brief +survey of the earlier years is necessary in order to orient the +approach to the period specially placed in the limelight, namely +1851-1921. + +In the world of speculative thought and in the realm of practical +politics we find reflected, at the opening of the century, the work of +the French Revolutionaries on the one hand, and that of Immanuel Kant +on the other. Coupled with these great factors was the pervading +influence of the Encyclopædists and of the thinkers of the +Enlightenment. These two groups of influences, the one sudden and in +the nature of a shock to political and metaphysical thought, the other +quieter but no less effective, combined to produce a feeling of +instability and of dissatisfaction at the close of the eighteenth +century. A sense of change, indeed of resurrection, filled the minds +and hearts of those who saw the opening of the nineteenth century. The +old aristocracy and the monarchy in France had gone, and in philosophy +the old metaphysic had received a blow at the hands of the author of +the Three Critiques. + +No better expression was given to the psychological state of France at +this time than that of Alfred de Musset in his _Confession d’un Enfant +du Siècle_. _Toute la maladie du siècle présent_ (he wrote) _vient de +deux causes; le peuple qui a passé par ’93 et par 1814 porte au cœur +deux blessures. Tout ce qui était n’est plus; tout ce qui sera n’est +pas encore. Ne cherchez ailleurs le secret de nos maux._[1] De Musset +was right, the whole course of the century was marked by conflict +between two forces—on the one hand a tendency to reaction and +conservatism, on the other an impulse to radicalism and revolution. + + [1] The extract is taken from _Première partie_, ch. 2. The book was + published in 1836. Somewhat similar sentiments are uttered with + reference to this time by Michelet. (See his _Histoire du XIXe + Siècle_, vol. i., p. 9). + + +It is true that one group of thinkers endeavoured, by a perfectly +natural reaction, to recall their fellow-countrymen, at this time of +unrest, back to the doctrines and traditions of the past, and tried to +find in the faith of the Christian Church and the practice of the +Catholic religion a rallying-point. The monarchy and the Church were +eulogised by Chateaubriand, while on the more philosophical side +efforts on behalf of traditionalism were made very nobly by De Bonald +and Joseph de Maistre. While they represented the old aristocracy and +recalled the theocracy and ecclesiasticism of the past by advocating +reaction and Ultramontanism, Lamennais attempted to adapt Catholicism +to the new conditions, only to find, as did Renan later, that “one +cannot argue with a bar of iron.” Not the brilliant appeals of a +Lacordaire, who thundered from Notre Dame, nor the modernism of a +Lamennais, nor the efforts in religious philosophy made by De Maistre, +were, however, sufficient to meet the needs of the time. + +The old traditions and the old dogmas did not offer the salvation they +professed to do. Consequently various groups of thinkers worked out +solutions satisfactory to themselves and which they offered to others. +We can distinguish clearly four main currents, the method of +introspection and investigation of the inner life of the soul, the +adoption of a spiritualist philosophy upon an eclectic basis, the +search for a new society after the manner of the socialists and, +lastly, a positive philosophy and religion of humanity. These four +currents form the historical antecedents of our period and to a brief +survey of them we now turn. + +* * * * * * * * * + +I + +To find the origin of many of the tendencies which appear prominently +in the thought of the second half of the nineteenth century, +particularly those displayed by the new spiritualistic philosophy +(which marked the last thirty years of the century), we must go back to +the period of the Revolution, to Maine de Biran (1766-1824)—a unique +and original thinker who laid the foundations of modern French +psychology and who was, we may note in passing, a contemporary of +Chateaubriand. A certain tone of romanticism marks the work of both the +literary man and the philosopher. Maine de Biran was not a thinker who +reflected upon his own experiences in retreat from the world. Born a +Count, a Lifeguardsman to Louis XVI. at the Revolution, and faithful to +the old aristocracy, he was appointed, at the Restoration, to an +important administrative position, and later became a deputy and a +member of the State Council. His writings were much greater in extent +than is generally thought, but only one important work appeared in +publication during his lifetime. This was his treatise, or _mémoire_, +entitled _Habitude_, which appeared in 1803. This work well illustrates +Maine de Biran’s historical position in the development of French +philosophy. It came at a tome when attention and interest, so far as +philosophical problems were concerned, centred round two “foci.” These +respective centres are indicated by Destutt de Tracy,[2] the disciple +of Condillac on the one hand, and by Cabanis[3] on the other. Both were +“ideologues” and were ridiculed by Napoleon who endeavoured to lay much +blame upon the philosophers. We must notice, however, this difference. +While the school of Condillac,[4] influenced by Locke, endeavoured to +work out a psychology in terms of abstractions, Cabanis, anxious to be +more concrete, attempted to interpret the life of the mind by reference +to physical and physiological phenomena. + + [2] Destutt de Tracy, 1754-1836. His _Elements of Ideology_ appeared + in 1801. He succeeded Cabanis in the Académie in 1808, and in a + complimentary _Discours_ pronounced upon his predecessor claimed that + Cabanis had introduced medicine into philosophy and philosophy into + medicine. This remark might well have been applied later to Claude + Bernard. + + + [3] Cabanis, 1757-1808, _Rapports du Physique et du Morale de + l’Homme_, 1802. He was a friend of De Biran, as also was Ampère, the + celebrated physicist and a man of considerable philosophical power. A + group used to meet _chez Cabanis_ at Auteuil, comprising De Biran, + Cabanis, Ampère, Royard-Collard, Guizot, and Cousin. + + + [4] Condillac belongs to the eighteenth century. He died in 1780. His + _Traité des Sensations_ is dated 1754. + + +It is the special merit of De Biran that he endeavoured, and that +successfully, to establish both the concreteness and the essential +spirituality of the inner life. The attitude and method which he +adopted became a force in freeing psychology, and indeed philosophy in +general, from mere play with abstractions. His doctrines proved +valuable, too, in establishing the reality and irreducibility of the +mental or spiritual nature of man. + +Maine de Biran took as his starting-point a psychological fact, the +reality of conscious effort. The self is active rather than +speculative; the self is action or effort—that is to say, the self is, +fundamentally and primarily, will. For the Cartesian formula _Cogito, +ergo sum,_ De Biran proposed to substitute that of _Volo, ergo sum_. He +went on to maintain that we have an internal and immediate perception +of this effort of will through which we realise, at one and the same +time, our self in its fullest activity and the resistance to its +operations. In such effort we realise ourselves as free causes and, in +spite of the doctrine of physical determinism, we realise in ourselves +the self as a cause of its own volitions. The greater the resistance or +the greater the effort, the more do we realise ourselves as being free +and not the absolute victims of habit. Of this freedom we have an +immediate consciousness, it is _une donnée immédiate de la conscience._ + +This freedom is not always realised, for over against the tendency to +action we must set the counter-tendency to passivity. Between these two +exists, in varying degrees of approach to the two extremes, _habitude_. +Our inner life is seen by the psychologist as a field of conflict +between the sensitive and the reflective side of our nature. It is this +which gives to the life of this _homo duplex_ all the elements of +struggle and tragedy. In the desires and the passions, says Maine de +Biran, the true self is not seen. The true self appears in memory, +reasoning and, above all, in will. + +Such, in brief, is the outline of De Biran’s psychology. To his two +stages, _vie sensitive_ and _vie active_ (_ou réflexive_), he added a +third, _la vie divine_. In his religious psychology he upheld the great +Christian doctrines of divine love and grace as against the less human +attitude of the Stoics. He still insists upon the power of will and +action and is an enemy of the religious vice of quietism. In his +closing years De Biran penned his ideas upon our realisation of the +divine love by intuition. His intense interest in the inner life of the +spirit gives De Biran’s _Journal Intime_ a rank among the illuminating +writings upon religious psychology. + +Maine de Biran was nothing if not a psychologist. The most absurd +statement ever made about him was that he was “the French Kant.” This +is very misleading, for De Biran’s genius showed itself in his +psychological power and not in critical metaphysics. The importance of +his work and his tremendous influence upon our period, especially upon +the new spiritualism, will be apparent. Indeed he himself foresaw the +great possibilities which lay open to philosophy along the lines he +laid down. “_Qui sait,_” he remarked,[5] “_tout ce que peut la +réflection concentrée et s’il n’y a pas un nouveau monde intérieur qui +pourra être découvert un jour par quelque ‘Colomb métaphysicien.’_” +With Maine de Biran began the movement in French philosophy which +worked through the writings of Ravaisson, Lachelier, Guyau, Boutroux +and particularly Bergson. A careful examination of the philosophy of +this last thinker shows how great is his debt to Maine de Biran, whose +inspiration he warmly acknowledges. + + [5] Pensées, p. 213. + + +But it is only comparatively recently that Maine de Biran has come to +his own and that his real power and influence have been recognised. +There are two reasons for this, firstly the lack of publication of his +writings, and secondly his being known for long only through the work +of Cousin and the Eclectics, who were imperfectly acquainted with his +work. Upon this school of thought he had some little influence which +was immediate and personal, but Cousin, although he edited some of his +unpublished work, failed to appreciate its originality and value. + +So for a time De Biran’s influence waned when that of Cousin himself +faded. Maine de Biran stands quite in a different category from the +Eclectics, as a unique figure at a transition period, the herald of the +best that was to be in the thought of the century. Cousin and the +Eclectic school, however, gained the official favour, and eclecticism +was for many years the “official philosophy.” + +II + +This Eclectic School was due to the work of various thinkers, of whom +we may cite Laromiguière (1756-1837), who marks the transition from +Condillac, Royer-Collard (1763-1845), who, abandoning Condillac, turned +for inspiration to the Scottish School (particularly to Reid), Victor +Cousin (1792-1867), Jouffroy (1796-1842) and Paul Janet (1823-1899), +the last of the notable eclectics. Of these “the chief” was Cousin. His +personality dominated this whole school of thought, his _ipse dixit_ +was the criterion of orthodoxy, an orthodoxy which we must note was +supported by the powers of officialdom. + +He rose from the Ecole Normale Supérieure to a professorship at the +Sorbonne, which he held from the Restoration (1815 to 1830), with a +break of a few years during which his course was suspended. These years +he spent in Germany, to which country attention had been attracted by +the work of Madame de Staël, _De l’Allemagne_ (1813). From 1830 to the +beginning of our period (1851) Cousin, as director of the Ecole Normale +Supérieure, as a _pair de France_ and a minister of state, organised +and controlled the education of his country. He thus exercised a very +great influence over an entire generation of Frenchmen, to whom he +propounded the doctrines of his spiritualism. + +His teaching was marked by a strong reaction against the doctrines of +the previous century, which had given such value to the data of sense. +Cousin abhorred the materialism involved in these doctrines, which he +styled _une doctrine désolante_, and he endeavoured to raise the +dignity and conception of man as a spiritual being. In the Preface to +his Lectures of 1818, _Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_ (Edition of 1853), +published first in 1846, he lays stress upon the elements of his +philosophy, which he presents as a true spiritualism, for it +subordinates the sensory and sensual to the spiritual. He upholds the +essentially spiritual nature of man, his liberty, moral responsibility +and obligation, the dignity of human virtue, disinterestedness, +charity, justice and beauty. These fruits of the spirit reveal, Cousin +claimed, a God who is both the author and the ideal type of humanity, a +Being who is not indifferent to the welfare and happiness of his +creatures. There is a vein of romanticism about Cousin, and in him may +be seen the same spirit which, on the literary side, was at work in +Hugo, Lamartine and De Vigny. + +Cousin’s philosophy attached itself rather to the Scottish school of +“common sense” than to the analytic type of doctrine which had +prevailed in his own country in the previous century. To this he added +much from various sources, such as Schelling and Hegel among the +moderns, Plato and the Alexandrians among the ancients. In viewing the +history of philosophy, Cousin advocated a division of systems into four +classes—sensualism, idealism, scepticism and mysticism. Owing to the +insufficiency of his _vérités de sens commun_ he was prone to confuse +the history of philosophy with philosophy itself. There is perhaps no +branch of science or art so intimately bound up with its own history as +is philosophy, but we must beware of substituting an historical survey +of problems for an actual handling of those problems themselves. +Cousin, however, did much to establish in his native land the teaching +of the history of philosophy. + +His own aim was to found a metaphysic spiritual in character, based +upon psychology. While he did not agree with the system of Kant, he +rejected the doctrines of the empiricists and set his influence against +the materialistic and sceptical tendencies of his time. Yet he cannot +be excused from “opportunism” not only in politics but in thought. In +order to retain his personal influence he endeavoured to present his +philosophy as a sum of doctrines perfectly consistent with the Catholic +faith. This was partly, no doubt, to counteract the work and influence +of that group of thinkers already referred to as Traditionalists, De +Bonald, De Maistre and Lamennais. Cousin’s efforts in this direction, +however, dissatisfied both churchmen and philosophers and gave rise to +the remark that his teaching was but _une philosophie de convenance_. +We must add too that the vagueness of his spiritual teaching was +largely responsible for the welcome accorded by many minds to the +positivist teaching of Auguste Comte. + +While Maine de Biran had a real influence upon the thought of our +period 1851-1921, Cousin stands in a different relation to subsequent +thought, for that thought is largely characterised by its being a +reaction against eclecticism. Positivism rose as a direct revolt +against it, the neo-critical philosophy dealt blows at both, while +Ravaisson, the initiator of the neo-spiritualism, upon whom Cousin did +not look very favourably, endeavoured to reorganise upon a different +footing, and on sounder principles, free from the deficiencies which +must always accompany eclectic thought, those ideas and ideals to which +Cousin in his spiritualism had vaguely indicated his loyalty. It is +interesting to note that Cousin’s death coincides in date with the +foundation of the neo-spiritual philosophy by Ravaisson’s celebrated +manifesto to idealists, for such, as we shall see, was his _Rapport sur +la Philosophie au Dix-neuvième Siècle_ (1867). Cousin’s spiritualism +had a notable influence upon several important men—e.g., Michelet and +his friend Edgar Quinet, and more indirectly upon Renan. The latter +spoke of him in warm terms as un _excitateur de ma pensée_.[6] + + [6] It is worth noting that two of the big currents of opposition, + those of Comte and Renouvier, arose outside the professional and + official teaching, free from the University which was entirely + dominated by Cousin. This explains much of the slowness with which + Comte and Renouvier were appreciated. + + +Among Cousin’s disciples one of the most prominent was Jouffroy of the +Collège de France. The psychological interest was keen in his work, but +his _Mélanges philosophiques_ (1883) showed him to be occupied with the +problem of human destiny. Paul Janet was a noble upholder of the +eclectic doctrine or older spiritualism, while among associates and +tardy followers must be mentioned Gamier, Damiron, Franke, Caro and +Jules Simon. + +III + +We have seen how, as a consequence of the Revolution and of the cold, +destructive, criticism of the eighteenth century, there was a demand +for constructive thought. This was a desire common not only to the +Traditionalists but to De Biran and Cousin. They aimed at intellectual +reconstruction. While, however, there were some who combated the +principles of the Revolution, as did the Traditionalists, while some +tried to correct and to steady those principles (as De Biran and +Cousin), there were others who endeavoured to complete them and to +carry out a more rigorous application of the Revolutionary watchwords, +_Liberté_, _Egalité_, _Fraternité_. The Socialists (and later Comte) +aimed at not merely intellectual, but social reconstruction. + +The Revolution and the War had shown men that many changes could be +produced in society in a comparatively short time. This encouraged bold +and imaginative spirits. Endeavours after better things, after new +systems and a new order of society, showed themselves. The work of +political philosophers attempted to give expression to the socialist +idea of society. For long there had been maintained the ecclesiastical +conception of a perfect social order in another world. It was now +thought that humanity would be better employed, not in imagining the +glories of a “hereafter,” but in “tilling its garden,” in striving to +realise here on earth something of that blessed fellowship and happy +social order treasured up in heaven. This is the dominant note of +socialism, which is closely bound up at its origin, not only with +political thought, but with humanitarianism and a feeling essentially +religious. Its progress is a feature of the whole century. + +The most notable expression of the new socialistic idea was that of +Count Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a relative of the celebrated +Duke. He had great confidence in the power of science as an instrument +for social reconstruction, and he took over from a medical man, Dr. +Burdin, the notions which, later on, Auguste Comte was to formulate +into the doctrines of Positivism. Saint-Simon’s influence showed itself +while the century was young, his first work _Lettres d’un Habitant de +Genève_ appearing in 1803. In this he outlined a scheme for placing the +authoritative power of the community, not in the hands of Church and +State, but in a freely elected body of thinkers and _artistes_. He then +endeavoured to urge the importance of order in society, as a +counterpart to the order erected by science in the world of knowledge. +To this end was directed his _Introduction aux Travaux scientifiques du +Dix-neuvième Siècle_ (1807-8). He also indicated the importance for +social welfare of abandoning the preoccupation with an imaginary +heaven, and pointed out that the more social and political theory could +be emancipated from the influence of theological dogmas the better. At +the same time he quite recognised the importance of religious beliefs +to a community, and his sociological view of religion foreshadowed +Guyau’s study, an important work which will claim our attention in due +course. + +In 1813, Saint-Simon published his _Mémoire sur la Science de l’Homme_, +in which he laid down notions which were the germ of Auguste Comte’s +_Law of the Three Stages_. With the peace which followed the Battle of +Waterloo, a tremendous stimulus was given in France to industrial +activity, and Saint-Simon formulated his motto “All by industry and all +for industry.” Real power, he showed, lay not in the hands of +governments or government agents, but with the industrial class. +Society therefore should be organised in the manner most favourable to +the working class. Ultimate economic and political power rests with +them. These ideas he set forth in _L’Industrie_, 1817-18, _La +Politique_, 1819, _L’Organisateur_, 1819-30, _Le Système industriel_, +1821-22, _Le Catéchisme des Industriels_, 1822-24. Since 1817 among his +fellow- workers were now Augustin Thierry and young Auguste Comte, his +secretary, the most important figure in the history of the first half +of the century. + +Finding that exposition and reasoned demonstration of his ideas were +not sufficient, Saint-Simon made appeal to sentiment by his _Appel aux +Philanthropes_, a treatise on human brotherhood and solidarity. This he +followed up in 1825 by his last book, published the year of his death, +_Le Nouveau Christianisme_. This book endeavoured to outline a religion +which should prove itself capable of reorganising society by +inculcating the brotherhood of man in a more effective manner than that +of the Christian Church. _Fraternité_ was the watchword he stressed, +and he placed women on an equal political and social footing with men. +He set forth the grave deficiencies of the Christian doctrines as +proclaimed by Catholic and Protestant alike. Both are cursed by the sin +of individualism, the virtue of saving one’s own soul, while no attempt +at social salvation is made. Both Catholics and Protestants he labelled +vile heretics, inasmuch as they have turned aside from the social +teaching of Christianity. If we are to love our neighbour as ourselves +we must as a whole community work for the betterment of our fellows +socially, by erecting a form of society more in accord with Christian +principles. We must strive to do it here and now, and not sit piously +getting ready for the next world. We must not think it religious to +despise the body or material welfare. God manifests Himself as matter +and spirit, so Religion must not despise economics but rather unite +industry and science as Love unites spirit and matter. Eternal Life, of +which Christianity makes so much, is not to be sought, argued +Saint-Simon, in another world, but here and now in the love and service +of our brothers, in the uplift of humanity as a whole. + +Saint-Simon believed in a fated progress and an inevitable betterment +of the condition of the working classes. The influence of Hegel’s view +of history and Condorcet’s social theories is apparent in some of his +writings. His insistence upon organisation, social authority and the +depreciative view of liberty which he held show well how he was the +real father of many later doctrines and of applications of these +doctrines, as for example by Lenin in the Soviet system of Bolshevik +Russia. Saint-Simon foreshadowed the dictatorship of the proletariat, +although his scheme of social organisation involved a triple division +of humanity into intellectuals, artists and industrials. Many of his +doctrines had a definite communistic tendency. Among them we find +indicated the abolition of all hereditary rights of inheritance and the +distribution of property is placed, as in the communist programme, in +the hands of the organising authority. Saint-Simon had a keen insight +into modern social conditions and problems. He stressed the economic +inter-relationships and insisted that the world must be regarded as +“one workshop.” A statement of the principles of the Saint- Simonist +School, among whom was the curious character Enfantin, was presented to +the _Chambre des Députés_ in the critical year 1830. The disciples seem +to have shown a more definite communism than their master. The +influence of Saint-Simon, precursor of both socialism and positivism, +had considerable influence upon the social philosophy of the whole +century. It only diminished when the newer type of socialist doctrine +appeared, the so-called “scientific” socialism of Marx and Engels. +Saint-Simon’s impulse, however, acted powerfully upon the minds of most +of the thinkers of the century, especially in their youth. Renouvier +and Renan were fired with some of his ideas. The spirit of Saint-Simon +expressed itself in our period by promoting an intense interest in +philosophy as applied to social problems. + +Saint-Simon was not, however, the only thinker at this time with a +social programme to offer. In contrast to his scheme we have that of +Fourier (1772-1837) who endeavoured to avoid the suppression of liberty +involved in the organisation proposed by Saint-Simon. + +The psychology of Fourier was peculiar and it coloured his ethical and +social doctrine. He believed that the evils of the world were due to +the repression of human passions. These in themselves, if given liberty +of expression, would prove harmonious. As Newton had propounded the law +of the universal attraction of matter, Fourier endeavoured to propound +the law of attraction between human beings. Passion and desire lead to +mutual attraction; the basis of society is free association. + +Fourier’s _Traité de l’Association domestique et agricole_ (1822), +which followed his _Théorie des Quatre Mouvements_ (1808), proposed the +formation of associations or groups, _phalanges_, in which workers +unite with capital for the self-government of industry. He, like Saint- +Simon, attacks idlers, but the two thinkers look upon the capitalist +manager as a worker. The intense class- antagonism of capitalist and +labourer had not yet formulated itself and was not felt strongly until +voiced on behalf of the proletariat by Proudhon and Marx. Fourier’s +proposals were those of a _bourgeois_ business man who knew the +commercial world intimately, who criticised it and condemned the +existing system of civilisation. Various experiments were made to +organise communities based upon his _phalanges_. + +Cabet, the author of _Icaria_ (1840) and _Le nouveau Christianisme_, +was a further power in the promotion of socialism and owed not a little +of his inspiration to Robert Owen. + +The most interesting and powerful of the early socialist philosophers +is undoubtedly Proudhon (1809- 1865), a striking personality, much +misunderstood. + +While Saint-Simon, a count, came from the aristocracy, Fourier from the +_bourgeoisie_, Proudhon was a real son of the people, a mouthpiece of +the proletariat. He was a man of admirable mental energy and learning, +which he had obtained solely by his own efforts and by a struggle with +poverty and misery. Earnest and passionate by nature, he yet formulated +his doctrines with more sanity and moderation than is usually supposed. +Labels of “atheist” and “anarchist” have served well to misrepresent +him. Certainly two of his watchwords were likely enough to raise +hostility in many quarters. “God,” he said, “is evil,” “Property is +theft.” This last maxim was the subject of his book, published in 1840, +_Qu’est-ce que la propriété_? (_ou, Recherches sur le principe du droit +et du gouvernement_) to which his answer was “_C’est le vol!_” Proudhon +took up the great watchword of _Egalité_, and had a passion for social +justice which he based on “the right to the whole product of labour.” +This could only come by mutual exchange, fairly and freely. He +distinguished between private “property” and individual “possession.” +The latter is an admitted fact and is not to be abolished; what he is +anxious to overthrow is private “property,” which is a toll upon the +labour of others and is therefore ultimately and morally theft. He +hated the State for its support of the “thieves,” and his doctrines are +a philosophy of anarchy. He further enunciated them in _Système des +Contradictions économiques_ (1846) and _De la Justice_ (1858). In 1848 +he was elected a _député_ and, together with Louis Blanc and Pierre +Leroux, figured in the Revolution of 1848. Blanc was a man of action, +who had a concrete scheme for transition from the capitalist régime to +the socialist state. He believed in the organisation of labour, +universal suffrage and a new distribution of wealth, but he disapproved +strongly of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of violent +revolution. Proudhon expressed his great admiration for Blanc. + +The work of both of these men is a contradiction to the assertion put +forward by the Marxian school that socialist doctrine was merely +sentimental, utopian and “unscientific” prior to Marx. Many of the +views of Proudhon and Blanc were far more “scientific” than those of +Marx, because they were closer to facts. Proudhon differed profoundly +from Marx in his view of history in which he saw the influence of ideas +and ideals, as well as the operation of purely economic factors. To the +doctrine of a materialistic determination of history Proudhon rightly +opposes that of a spiritual determination, by the thoughts and ideals +of men.[7] The true revolution Proudhon and Blanc maintained can come +only through the power of ideas. + + [7] Indeed, it is highly probable that with the growing + dissatisfaction with Marxian theories the work of Proudhon will come + into greater prominence, replacing largely that of Marx. + On the personal relations of Proudhon with Marx (1818-1883), who + was nine years younger than the Frenchman, see the interesting + volume by Marx’s descendant, M. Jean Longuet (Député de la Seine), + _La Politique internationale du Marxisme_ (_Karl Marx et la + France_) (Alcan). + On the debt of Marx to the French social thinkers see the account + given by Professor Charles Andler in his special edition of the + Communist Manifesto, _Le Manifeste Communiste_ (_avec introduction + historique et commentaire_), (Rieder), also the last section of + Renouvier’s Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire, vol. iv. + + +All these early socialist thinkers had this in common: they agreed that +purely economic solutions would not soothe the ills of society, but +that moral, religious and philosophic teaching must accompany, or +rather precede, all efforts towards social reform. The earliest of +them, Saint-Simon, had asserted that no society, no system of +civilisation, can endure if its spiritual principles and its economic +organisation are in direct contradiction. When brotherly love on the +one hand and merciless competition on the other are equally extolled, +then hypocrisy, unrest and conflict are inevitable. + +IV + +The rise of positivism ranks with the rise of socialism as a movement +of primary importance. Both were in origin nearer to one another than +they now appear to be. We have seen how Saint-Simon was imbued with a +spirit of social reform, a desire to reorganise human society. This +desire Auguste Comte (1798-1857) shared; he felt himself called to it +as a sacred work, and he extolled his “incomparable mission.” He +lamented the anarchical state of the world and contrasted it with the +world of the ancients and that of the Middle Ages. The harmony and +stability of mediaeval society were due, Comte urged, to the spiritual +power and unity of the Catholic Church and faith. The liberty of the +Reformation offers no real basis for society, it is the spirit of +criticism and of revolution. The modern world needs a new spiritual +power. Such was Comte’s judgment upon the world of his time. Where in +the modern world could such a new organising power be found? To this +question Comte gave an answer similar to that of Saint-Simon: he turned +to science. The influence of Saint-Simon is here apparent, and we must +note the personal relations between the two men. In 1817 Comte became +secretary to Saint-Simon, and became intimately associated with his +ideas and his work. Comte recognised, with his master, the supreme +importance of establishing, at the outset, the relations actually +obtaining and the relations possible between science and political +organisation. This led to the publication, in 1822, of a treatise, +_Plan des Travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la +Société_, which unfortunately led to a quarrel between the two friends, +and finally, in 1824, to a definite rupture by which Comte seems to +have been embittered and made rather hostile to his old master and to +have assumed an ungenerous attitude.[8] Comte, however, being a proud +and ambitious spirit, was perhaps better left alone to hew out his own +path. In him we have one of the greatest minds of modern France, and +his doctrine of positivism is one of the dominating features of the +first half of the century. + + [8] In considering the relations between Saint-Simon and Comte we may + usefully compare those between Schelling and Hegel in Germany. + + +His break with Saint-Simon showed his own resources; he had undoubtedly +a finer sense of the difficulties of his reforming task than had +Saint-Simon; moreover, he possessed a scientific knowledge which his +master lacked. Such equipment he needed in his ambitious task, and it +is one of the chief merits of Comte that he _attempted_ so large a +project as the Positive Philosophy endeavoured to be. + +This philosophy was contained in his _Cours de Philosophie positive_ +(1830-1842), which he regarded as the theoretic basis of a reforming +political philosophy. One of the most interesting aspects of this work, +however, is its claim to be a positive _philosophy_. Had not Comte +accepted the Saint-Simonist doctrine of a belief in science as the +great future power in society? How then comes it that he gives us a +“_philosophie_ positive” in the first place and not, as we might +expect, a “_science_ positive”? Comte’s answer to this is that science, +no less than society itself, is disordered and stands in need of +organisation. The sciences have proceeded to work in a piecemeal +fashion and are unable to present us with _une vue d’ensemble_. It is +the rôle of philosophy to work upon the data presented by the various +sciences and, without going beyond these data, to arrange them and give +us an organic unity of thought, a synthesis, which shall produce order +in the mind of man and subsequently in human society. + +The precise part to be played by philosophy is determined by the +existing state of scientific knowledge in the various departments and +so depends upon the general stage of intelligence which humanity has +reached. The intellectual development of humanity was formulated +generally by Comte in what is known as “The Law of the Three Stages,” +probably that part of his doctrine which is best known and which is +most obvious. “The Law of the Three Stages” merely sets down the fact +that in the race and in the individual we find three successive stages, +under which conceptions are formed differently. The first is the +theological or fictitious stage, in which the explanation of things is +referred to the operations of divine agency. The second is the +metaphysical or abstract stage when, for divinities, abstract +principles are substituted. In the third, the scientific or positive +stage, the human mind has passed beyond a belief in divine agencies or +metaphysical abstractions to a rational study of the effective laws of +phenomena. The human spirit here encounters the real, but it abstains +from pretensions to absolute knowledge; it does not theorise about the +beginning or the end of the universe or, indeed, its absolute nature; +it takes only into consideration facts within human knowledge. Comte +laid great emphasis upon the necessity of recognising the relativity of +all things. All is relative; this is the one absolute principle. Our +knowledge, he insisted (especially in his _Discours sur l’Esprit +positif_, 1844, which forms a valuable introduction to his thought as +expressed in his larger works), is entirely relative to our +organisation and our situation. Relativity, however, does not imply +uncertainty. Our knowledge is indeed relative and never absolute, but +it grows to a greater accord with reality. It is this passion for +“accord with reality” which is characteristic of the scientific or +positivist spirit. + +The sciences are themselves relative and much attention is given by +Comte to the proper classification of the sciences. He determines his +hierarchy by arranging them in the order in which they have themselves +completed the three stages and arrived at positivity. Mathematics, +astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology are his +arrangement. This last named has not yet arrived at the final stage; it +is but a science in the making. Comte, indeed, himself gives it its +name and founds it as the science of society, science applied to +politics, as was first indicated in his scheme of work and early ideas +of reform. + +Comte strongly insists upon the social aspect of all knowledge and all +action. He even goes to the extent of regarding the individual man as +an abstraction; for him the real being is the social being, Humanity. +The study of human society has a double aspect, which is also a feature +of the other sciences. As in biology there is the study of anatomy on +the one hand and of physiology on the other, so in sociology we must +investigate both the laws which govern the existence of a society and +those which control its movements. The distinction is, in short, that +of the static and the dynamic, and it embraces in sociological study +the important conceptions of order and of progress. Comte very rightly +stressed the idea of progress as characteristic of modern times, but he +lamented its being divorced from that of order. He blamed the +conservative view of order as responsible for promoting among +“progressives” the spirit of anarchy and revolution. A positive +sociology would, Comte maintained, reconcile a true order, which does +not exclude change, with real progress, a movement which is neither +destructive nor capricious. Comte here owes a debt in part to +Montesquieu and largely to Condorcet, whose _Esquisse d’un Tableau +historique des Progrès de l’Esprit humain_ (1795) did much to promote +serious reflection upon the question of progress. + +We have already noted Comte’s intense valuation of Humanity as a whole +as a Supreme Being. In his later years, notably after 1845, when he met +his “Beatrice” in the person of Clotilde de Vaux, he gave to his +doctrines a sentimental expression of which the Religion of Humanity +with its ritualism was the outcome. This positivist religion +endeavoured to substitute for the traditional God the Supreme Being of +Humanity—a Being capable, according to Comte, of sustaining our +courage, becoming the end of our actions and the object of our love. To +this he attached a morality calculated to combat the egoism which tends +to dominate and to destroy mankind and intended to strengthen the +altruistic motives in man and to raise them to the service of Humanity. + +We find Comte, at the opening of our period, restating his doctrines in +his _Système de Politique positive_ (1851-54), to which his first work +was meant to serve as an Introduction. In 1856 he began his _Synthèse +subjective_, but he died in 1857. Comte is a singularly desolate +figure; the powers of officialdom were against him, and he existed +mainly by what he could gain from teaching mathematics and by a pension +raised by his admirers in England and his own land. + +The influence of his philosophy has been great and far- reaching, but +it is the _spirit_ of positivism which has survived, not its content. +Subsequent developments in science have rendered much of his work +obsolete, while his Religion has never made a great appeal. Comte’s +most noted disciple, Littré (1801-1881), regarded this latter as a +retrograde step and confined himself to the early part of his master’s +work. Most important for us in the present work is Comte’s influence +upon subsequent thinkers in France, notably Taine, and we may add, +Renan, Cournot, and even Renouvier, although these last two promoted a +vigorous reaction against his philosophy in general. He influenced his +adversaries, a notable testimony. Actually, however, the positivist +philosophy found a greater welcome on the English side of the Channel +from John Stuart Mill, Spencer and Lewes. The empiricism of the English +school proved a more fruitful soil for positivism than the vague +spiritualism of Cousin to which it offered strong opposition. +Positivism, or rather the positivist standpoint in philosophy, turned +at a later date to reseek its fatherland and after a sojourn in England +reappears as an influence in the work of French thinkers near the end +of the century—e.g., Fouillée, Guyau, Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson +express elements of positivism. + +We have now passed in review the four main currents of the first half +of the century, in a manner intended to orient the approach to our +period, 1851-1921. Without such an orientation much of the subsequent +thought would lose its correct colouring and perspective. There is a +continuity, even if it be partly a continuity marked by reactions, and +this will be seen when we now examine the three general currents into +which the thought of the subsequent period is divided. + + + + +CHAPTER II +MAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851 + + +Introductory: Influence of events of 1848-1851—Reactionary character of +Second Empire—Disgust of many thinkers (e.g., Vacherot, Taine, Renan, +Renouvier, Hugo, Quinet)—Effects of 1870, the War, the Commune, and the +Third Republic. + +General character of the Philosophy of the Period—Reaction against both +Eclecticism and Positivism. + +THE THREE MAIN CURRENTS. + + +I. Positivist and naturalist current turning upon itself, seen in +Vacherot, Taine, and Renan. + +II. Cournot, Renouvier, and the neo-critical philosophy. + +III. The New Spiritual Philosophy, to which the main contributors were +Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux, Fouillée, Guyau, Bergson, Blondel, and +Weber. + + + + +CHAPTER II +MAIN CURRENTS + +The year 1851 was one of remarkable importance for France; a crisis +then occurred in its political and intellectual life. The hopes and +aspirations to which the Revolution of 1848 had given rise were +shattered by the _coup d’état_ of Louis Napoleon in the month of +December. The proclamation of the Second Empire heralded the revival of +an era of imperialism and reaction in politics, accompanied by a +decline in liberty and a diminution of idealism in the world of +thought. A censorship of books was established, the press was deprived +of its liberty, and the teaching of philosophy forbidden in +_lycées_.[1] + + [1] The revival of philosophy in the _lycées_ began when Victor Drury + reintroduced the study of Logic. + + +Various ardent and thoughtful spirits, whose minds and hearts had been +uplifted by the events of 1848, hoping to see the dawn of an era +expressing in action the ideals of the first Revolution, _Liberté_, +_Egalité_, _Fraternité_, were bitterly disappointed. Social ideals such +as had been created by Saint-Simon and his school received a rude +rebuff from force, militarism and imperialism. So great was the mingled +disappointment and disgust of many that they left for ever the realm of +practical politics to apply themselves to the arts, letters or +sciences. Interesting examples of this state of mind are to be found in +Vacherot, Taine, Renan and Renouvier, and, we may add, in Michelet, +Victor Hugo and Edgar Quinet. The first of these, Vacherot, who had +succeeded Cousin as Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, lost his +chair, as did Quinet and also Michelet, who was further deprived of his +position as Archivist. Hugo and Quinet, having taken active political +part in the events of 1848, were driven into exile. Disgust, +disappointment, disillusionment and pessimism characterise the attitude +of all this group of thinkers to political events, and this reacted not +only upon their careers but upon their entire philosophy. “With regard +to the Second Empire,” we find Renan saying,[2] “if the last ten years +of its duration in some measure repaired the mischief done in the first +eight, it must never be forgotten how strong this Government was when +it was a question of crushing the intelligence, and how feeble when it +came to raising it up.” + + [2] In his Preface to _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse._ + + +The disheartening end of the Empire in moral degeneracy and military +defeat only added to the gloominess, against which the Red Flag and the +red fires of the Commune cast a lurid and pathetic glow, upon which the +Prussians could look down with a grim smile from the heights of Paris. +Only with the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, and its +ratification a few years later, does a feeling of cheerfulness make +itself felt in the thought of the time. The years from 1880 onwards +have been remarkable for their fruitfulness in the philosophic field—to +such an extent do political and social events react upon the most +philosophical minds. This is a healthy sign; it shows that those minds +have not detached themselves from contact with the world, that the +spirit of philosophy is a living spirit and not merely an academic or +professional product divorced from the fierce realities of history. + +We have already indicated, in the treatment of the “Antecedents” of our +period, the dominance of Eclecticism, supported by the powers of +officialdom, and have remarked how Positivism arose as a reaction +against Cousin’s vague spiritualism. In approaching the second half of +the century we may in general characterise its thought as a reaction +against both eclecticism and positivism. A transitional current can be +distinguished where positivism turns, as it were, against itself in the +work of Vacherot, Taine and Renan. The works of Cournot and the +indefatigable Renouvier with his neo-criticism mark another main +current. Ultimately there came to triumph towards the close of the +century a new spiritualism, owing much inspiration to De Biran, but +which, unlike Cousin’s doctrines, had suffered the discipline of the +positivist spirit. The main contributors to this current are Ravaisson, +Lachelier, Fouillée and Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson, Blondel and Weber. +Our study deals with the significance of these three currents, and +having made this clear we shall then discuss the development of thought +in connection with the various problems and ideas in which the +philosophy of the period found its expression. + +In his _Critique of Pure Reason_ Kant endeavoured, at a time when +speculation of a dogmatic and uncritical kind was current, to call +attention to the necessity for examining the instrument of knowledge +itself, and thereby discovering its fitness or inadequacy, as the case +might be, for dealing with the problems which philosophy proposes to +investigate. This was a word spoken in due season and, however much +subsequent philosophy has deviated from the conclusions of Kant, it has +at least remembered the significance of his advice. The result has been +that the attitude adopted by philosophers to the problems before them +has been determined largely by the kind of answer which they offer to +the problems of knowledge itself. Obviously a mind which asserts that +we can never be sure of knowing anything (or as in some cases, that +this assertion is itself uncertain) will see all questions through the +green-glasses of scepticism. On the other hand, a thinker who believes +that we do have knowledge of certain things and can be certain of +thiss, whether by objective proof or a subjective intuition, is sure to +have, not only a different conclusion about problems, but, what is +probably more important for the philosophic spirit, a different means +of approaching them. + +Writing in 1860 on the general state of philosophy, Renan pointed out, +in his Essay _La Métaphysique el son Avenir_[3] that metaphysical +speculation, strictly so-called, had been in abeyance for thirty years, +and did not seem inclined to continue the traditions of Kant, Hegel, +Hamilton and Cousin. The reasons which he gave for this depression of +the philosophical market were, firstly, the feeling of the +impossibility of ultimate knowledge, a scepticism of the instrument, so +far as the human mind was concerned, and secondly, the rather +disdainful attitude adopted by many minds towards philosophy owing to +the growing importance of science—in short, the question, “Is there any +place left for philosophy; has it any _raison d’être_?” + + [3] Essay published later (1876) in his _Dialogues et Fragments + philosophiques_. Cf. especially pp. 265-266. + + +The progress of the positive sciences, and the assertions of many that +philosophy was futile and treacherous, led philosophy to give an +account of itself by a kind of _apologia pro vita sua_. In the face of +remarks akin to that of Newton’s “Physics beware of metaphysics,” the +latter had to bestir itself or pass out of existence. It was, indeed, +this extinction which the more ardent and devoted scientific spirits +heralded, re-iterating the war-cry of Auguste Comte. + +It was a crisis, in fact, for philosophy. Was it to become merely a +universal science? Was it to abandon the task of solving the problems +of the universe by rapid intuitions and a _priori_ constructions and +undertake the construction of a science of the whole, built up from the +data and results of the science of the parts—_i.e._, the separate +sciences of nature? Was there, then, to be no place for metaphysics in +this classification of the sciences to which the current of thought was +tending with increasing impetuosity? Was a science of primary or +ultimate truths a useless chimera, to be rejected entirely by the human +mind in favour of an all-sufficing belief in positive science? These +were the questions which perplexed the thoughtful minds of that time. + +We shall do well, therefore, in our survey of the half century before +us, to investigate the two problems which were stressed by Renan in the +essay we have quoted, for his acute mind possessed a unique power of +sensing the feeling and thought of his time. Our preliminary task will +be the examination of the general attitude to knowledge adopted by the +various thinkers and schools of thought, following this by an inquiry +into the attitude adopted to science itself and its relation to +philosophy. + +I + +With these considerations in mind, let us examine the three currents of +thought in our period beginning with that which is at once a +prolongation of positivism and a transformation of it, a current +expressed in the work of Vacherot, Taine and Renan. + +Etienne Vacherot (1809-1897) was partially a disciple of Victor Cousin +and a representative also of the positivist attitude to knowledge. His +work, however, passed beyond the bounds indicated by these names. He +remained a convinced naturalist and believer in positive science, but, +unlike Comte, he did not despise metaphysical inquiry, and he sought to +find a place for it in thought. Vacherot, who had won a reputation for +himself by an historical work on the Alexandrian School, became tne +director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, an important position in the +intellectual world. He here advocated the doctrines by which he sought +to give a to metaphysics. His most important book, _La Métaphysique et +la Science_, in three volumes, appeared in 1858. He suffered +imprisonment the following year for His liberal principles under the +Empire which had already deprived him of his position at the Sorbonne. + +The general attitude to knowledge adopted by Vacherot recalls in some +respects the metaphysical doctrines of Spinoza, and he endeavours to +combine the purely naturalistic view of the world with a metaphysical +conception. The result is a profound and, for Vacherot, irreconcilable +dualism, in which the real and the ideal are set against one another in +rigorous contrast, and the gap between them is not bridged or even +attempted to be filled up, as, at a later date, was the task assumed by +Fouillee in his philosophy of _idées-forces_. For Vacherot the world is +a unity, eternal and infinite, but lacking perfection. Perfection, the +ideal, is incompatible with reality. The real is not at all ideal, and +the ideal has no reality.[4] In this unsatisfactory dualism Vacherot +leaves us. His doctrine, although making a superficial appeal by its +seeming positivism on the one hand, and its maintenance of the notion +of the ideal or perfection on the other, is actually far more +paradoxical than that which asserts that ultimately it is the ideal +only which is real. While St. Anselm had endeavoured to establish by +his proof of the existence of God the reality of perfection, Vacherot, +by a reversal of this proof, arrives at the opposite conclusion, and at +a point where it seems that it would be for the ideal an imperfection +to exist. The absolute existence of all things is thus separated from +the ideal, and no attempt is made to relate the two, as Spinoza had so +rigorously done, by maintaining that reality _is_ perfection.[5] + + [4] It is interesting to contrast this with the attitude of the new + spiritualists, especially Fouillée’s conception of idees-forces, of + ideas and ideals realising themselves. See also Guyau’s attitude. + “_L’idéal n’est-il pas, sur la terre où nous sommes + Plus fécond et plus beau que la réalité?” + —Illusion féconde_. + + + [5] Vacherot contributed further to the thought of his time, notably + by a book on religion, 1869, and later in life seems to have become + sympathetic to the New Spiritualism, on which he also wrote a book in + 1884. + + +The influence of Vacherot was in some measure continued in that of his +pupil, Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), a thinker who had considerable +influence upon the development of thought in our period. His ability as +a critic of art and literature was perhaps more marked than his purely +philosophical influence, but this is, nevertheless, important, and +cannot be overlooked. + +Taine was a student of the Ecole Normale, and in 1851 was appointed to +teach philosophy at Nevers. The _coup d’état_, however, changed his +career, and he turned to literature as his main field, writing a work +on La Fontaine for his doctorate in 1853. In the year of Comte’s death +(1857) Taine published his book, _Les Philosophes français du XIXe +Siècle_, in which he turned his powerful batteries of criticism upon +the vague spiritualism professed by Cousin and officially favoured in +France at that time.[6] By his adverse criticism of Cousin and the +Eclectic School, Taine placed his influence upon the side of the +positivist followers of Comte. It would, however, be erroneous to +regard him as a mere disciple of Comte, as Taine’s positivism was in +its general form a wider doctrine, yet more rigorously scientific in +some respects than that of Comte. There was also an important +difference in their attitude to metaphysics. Taine upheld strongly the +value, and, indeed, the necessity, of a metaphysical doctrine. He never +made much of any debt or allegiance to Comte. + + [6] See his chapter xii. on “The Success of Eclecticism,” pp. 283-307. + Cousin, he criticises at length; De Biran, Royer-Collard and Jouffroy + are included in his censures. We might mention that this book was + first issued in the form of articles in the _Revue de l’Instruction + publique_ during the years 1855, 1856. + + +In 1860 a volume dealing with the _Philosophy of Art_ appeared from his +pen, in which he not only endeavoured to relate the art of a period to +the general environment in which it arose, but, in addition, he dealt +with certain psychological aspects of the problem. Largely as a result +of the talent displayed in this work, he was appointed in 1864 to tne +chair of the History of Art and Æsthetics in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. + +Taine’s interest in philosophy, and especially in psychological +problems, was more prominently demon strated in his book _De +l’Intelligence_, the two volumes of which appeared in 1870. In this +work he takes a strict view of the human intelligence as a mechanism, +the workings of which he sets forth in a precise and cold manner. His +treatment of knowledge is akin, in some respects, to the doctrines of +the English Utilitarian and Evolutionary School as represented by John +Stuart Mill, Bain and Spencer. The main feature of the Darwinian +doctrine is set by Taine in the foreground of epistemology. There is, +according to him, “a struggle for existence” in the realm of the +individual consciousness no less than in the external world. This inner +conflict is between psychical elements which, when victorious, result +in sense-perception. This awareness, or _hallucination vraie_, is not +knowledge of a purely speculative character; it is (as, at a later +date, Bergson was to maintain in his doctrine of perception) +essentially bound up with action, with the instinct and mechanism of +movement. + +One of the most notable features of Taine’s work is his attitude to +psychology. He rejects absolutely the rather scornful attitude adopted +with regard to this science by Comte; at the same time he shatters the +flimsy edifice of the eclectics in order to lay the foundation of a +scientific psychology. “The true and independent psychology is,” he +remarks, “a magnificent science which lays the foundation of the +philosophy of history, which gives life to physiology and opens up the +pathway to metaphysics.”[7] Our debt to Taine is immense, for he +initiated the great current of experimental psychology for which his +country has since become famous. It is not our intention in this +present work to follow out in any detail the purely psychological work +of the period. Psychology has more and more become differentiated from, +and to a large degree, independent of, philosophy in a strictly +metaphysical meaning of that word. Yet we shall do well in passing to +note that through Taine’s work the scientific attitude to psychologv +and its many problems was taken up and developed by Ribot, whose study +of English Psychology appeared in the same year as Taine’s +_Intelligence_. Particularly by his frequent illustrations drawn from +abnormal psychology, Taine “set the tone” for contemporary and later +study of mental activity of this type. Ribot’s later books have been +mainly devoted to the study of “the abnormal,”and his efforts are +characteristic of the labours of the Paris School, comprising Charcot, +Paulhan, Binet and Janet.[8] French psychology has in consequence +become a clearly defined “school,” with characteristics peculiar to +itself which distinguish it at once from the psychophysical research of +German workers and from the analytic labours of English psychologists. +Its debt to Taine at the outset must not be forgotten. + + [7] De l’Intelligence, Conclusion. + + + [8] By Charcot (1825-1893), _Leçons sur les Maladies du Système + nerveux faites à la Salpêtrière_ and _Localisation dans les Maladies + du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière_, 1880. + By Ribot (1839-1916), _Hérédité, Etude psychologique_, 1873, Eng. + trans., 1875; _Les Maladies de la Mémoire, Essai dans la + Psychologie positive_, 1881, Eng. trans., 1882; _Maladies de la + Volonté_, 1883, Eng. trans., 1884; _Maladies de la Personnalité_, + 1885, Eng. trans., 1895. Ribot expressed regret at the way in which + abnormal psychology has been neglected in England. See his critique + of Bain in his _Psychologie anglaise contemporaine_. In 1870 Ribot + declared the independence of psychology as a study, separate from + philosophy. Ribot had very wide interests beyond pure psychology, a + fact which is stressed by his commencing in 1876 the periodical _La + Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger_. + By Binet (1857-191!), _Magnétisme animal_, 1886; _Les Altérations + de la personnalité_, 1892; _L’Introduction à la Psychologie + expérimentale_, 1894. He founded the review _L’Année psychologique + in 1895_. + +By Janet (Pierre), born 1859 now Professeur at the Collège de France, +_L’Automatisme psychologique_, 1889; _Etat mental des Hystériques_, +1894; and _Neuroses et Idées-fixes_, 1898. He founded the _Journal de +Psychologie_. + +By Paulhan, _Phénomenes affectifs and L’Activité mentale_. + +To the fame of the Paris School of Psychology must now be added that of +the Nancy School embracing the work of Coué. + + +The War and the subsequent course of events in France seemed to deepen +the sadness and pessimism of Taine’s character. He described himself as +_naturellement triste_, and finally his severe positivism developed +into a rigorous stoicism akin to that of Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza. +This attitude of mind coloured his unfinished historical work, _Les +Origines de la France contemporaine_, upon which he was engaged for the +last years of his life (1876-1894). It may be noticed for its bearing +upon the study of sociological problems which it indirectly encouraged. +Just as Taine had regarded a work of art as the product of social +environment, so he looks upon historical events. This history bears all +the marks of Taine’s rigid, positive philosophy, intensified by his +later stoicism. The Revolution of 1789 is treated in a cold and stern +manner devoid of enthusiasm of any sort. He could not make historical +narrative live like Michelet, and from his own record the Revolution +itself is almost unintelligible. For Taine, however, we must remember, +human nature is absolutely the product of race, environment and +history.[9] + + [9] Michelet (1798-1874), mentioned here as an historian of a type + entirely different from Taine, influenced philosophic thought by his + volumes _Le Peuple_, 1846; _L’Amour_, 1858; _Le Prêtre, La Femme et la + Famille_, 1859; and _La Bible de l’Humanité_, 1864. He and his friend + Quinet (1803-1875), who was also a Professor at the College de France, + and was the author of _Génie des Religions_, 1842, had considerable + influence prior to 1848 of a political and religious character. They + were in strong opposition to the Roman Catholic Church and had keen + controversies with the Jesuits and Ultramontanists. + + +In the philosophy of Taine various influences are seen at work +interacting. The spirit of the French thinkers of the previous +century—sensualists and ideologists—reappears in him. While in a +measure he fluctuates between naturalism and idealism, the +predominating tone of his work is clearly positivist. He was a great +student of Spinoza and of Hegel, and the influence of both these +thinkers appears in his work. Like Spinoza, he believes in a universal +determination; like Hegel, he asserts the real and the rational to be +identical. In his general attitude to the problems of knowledge Taine +criticises and passes beyond the standpoints of both Hume and Kant. He +opposes the purely empiricist schools of both France and England. The +purely empirical attitude which looks upon the world as fragmentary and +phenomenal is deficient, according to Taine, and is, moreover, +incompatible with the notion of necessity. This notion of necessity is +characteristic of Taine’s whole work, and his strict adherence to it +was mainly due to his absolute belief in science and its methods, which +is a mark of all the positivist type of thought. + +While he rejected Hume’s empiricism he also opposed the doctrines of +Kant and the neo-critical school which found its inspiration in Kant +and Hume. Taine asserted that it is possible to have a knowledge of +things in their objective reality, and he appears to have based his +epistemology upon the doctrine of analysis proposed by Condillac. Taine +disagreed with the theory of the relativity of human knowledge and with +the phenomenal basis of the neo-critical teaching, its rejection of +“the thing in itself.” He believed we had knowledge not merely relative +but absolute, and he claimed that we can pass from phenomena and their +laws to comprehend the essence of things in themselves. He endeavours +to avoid the difficulties of Hume by dogmatism. While clinging to a +semi-Hegelian view of rationality he avoids Kant’s critical attitude to +reason itself. We have in Taine not a critical rationalist but a +dogmatic rationalist. While the rational aspect of his thought commands +a certain respect and has had in many directions a very wholesome +influence, notably, as we have remarked, upon psychology, yet it proves +itself in the last analysis self-contradictory, for a true rationalism +is critical in character rather than dogmatic. + +In Taine’a great contemporary, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a very +different temper is seen. The two thinkers both possessed popularity as +men of letters, and resembled one another in being devoted to literary +and historical pursuits rather than to philosophy itself. + +Renan was trained for the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Church. He +has left us a record of his early life in _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de +Jeunesse_. We there have an autobiography of a sincere and sensitive +soul, encouraged in his priestly career by his family and his teachers +to such a degree that he had conceived of no other career for himself, +until at the age of twenty, under the influence of modern scientific +doctrines and the criticism of the Biblical records, he found himself +an unbeliever, certainly not a Roman Catholic, and not, in the ordinary +interpretation of that rather vague term, a Christian. The harsh, +unrelenting dogmatism of the Roman Church drove Renan from +Christianity. We find him remarking that had he lived in a Protestant. +country he might not have been faced with the dilemma.[10] A _via +media_ might have presented itself in one of the very numerous forms +into which Protestant Christianity, is divided. He might have exercised +in such a sphere, his priestly functions as did Schleiermacher. Renan’s +break with Rome emphasises the clear-cut division which exists in +France between the Christian faith (represented, almost entirely by the +Roman Church) and _libre-pensée_, a point which will claim our +attention later, when we come to treat of the Philosophy of Religion. + + [10] Cf. his _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_, p. 292. + + +Having abandoned the seminary and the Church, Renan worked for his +university degrees. The events of 1848-49 inspired his young heart with +great enthusiasm, under the influence of which he wrote his _Avenir de +la Science_. This book was not published, however, until 1890, when he +had lost his early hopes and illusions. In 1849 he went away upon a +mission to Italy. “The reaction of 1850-51 and the _coup d’état_ +instilled into me a pessimism of which I am not yet cured,” so he wrote +in the preface to his _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_.[11] Some +years after the _coup d’état_ he published a volume of essays (_Essais +de Morale et de Critique_), and he showed his acquaintance with Arabic +philosophy by an excellent treatise on _Averroes et l’Averroisme_ +(1859). The following year he visited Syria and, in 1861, was appointed +Professor of Hebrew at the Collège de France. He then began his +monumental work on _Les Origines du Christianisme_, of which the first +volume, _La Vie de Jésus_, appeared in 1863. Its importance for +religious thought we shall consider in our last chapter; here it must +suffice to observe its immediate consequences. These were terrific +onslaughts from the clergy upon its author, which, although they +brought the attention of his countrymen and of the world upon Renan, +resulted in the Imperial Government suspending his tenure of the chair. +After the fall of the Empire, however, he returned to it, and under the +Third Republic became Director of the Collège de France. + + [11] Published only in 1895. The preface referred to is dated 1871. + + +Renan, although he broke off his career in the Church and his +connection with organised religion, retained, nevertheless, much of the +priestly character all his life, and he himself confesses this: “I have +learned several things, but I have changed in nowise as to the general +system of intellectual and moral life. My habitation has become more +spacious, but it still stands on the same ground. I look upon my +estrangement from orthodoxy as only a change of opinion concerning an +important historical question, a change which does not prevent me from +dwelling on the same foundations as before.” He indeed found it +impossible to reconcile the Catholic faith with free and honest +thought. His break with the Church made him an enemy of all +superstition, and his writings raised against him the hatred of the +Catholic clergy, who regarded him as a deserter. In the customary terms +of heated theological debate he was styled an atheist. This was grossly +unfair or meaningless. Which word we use here depends upon our +definition of theism. As a matter of fact, Renan was one of the most +deeply religious minds of his time. His early religious sentiments +remained, in essence if not in form, with him throughout his life. +These were always associated with the tender memories he had of his +mother and beloved sister and his virtuous teachers, the priests in the +little town of Brittany, whence he came. Much of the Breton mysticism +clung to his soul, and much of his philosophy is a restated, +rationalised form of his early beliefs. + +As a figure in the intellectual life of the time, Renan is difficult to +estimate. The very subtilty of his intellect betrayed him into an +oscillation which was far from admirable, and prevented his countrymen +in his own day from “getting to grips” with his ideas. These were +kaleidoscopic. Renan seems a type, reflecting many tendencies of the +time, useful as an illustration to the historian of the ideas of the +period; but for philosophy in the special sense he has none of the +clearly defined importance of men like Renouvier, Lachelier, Guyau, +Fouillée, Bergson or Blondel. His humanism keeps him free from +dogmatism, but his mind fluctuates so that his general attitude to the +ultimate problems is one of reserve, of scepticism and of frequent +paradox and contradiction. Renan seems to combine the positivist scorn +of metaphysics with the Kantian idealism. At times, however, his +attitude is rather Hegelian, and he believes in universal change which +is an evolving of spirit, the ideal or God, call it what we will. We +need not be too particular about names or forms of thought, for, after +all, everything “may be only a dream.” That is Renan’s attitude, to +temper enthusiasm by irony, to assert a duty of doubt, and often, +perhaps, to gain a literary brilliance by contradictory statements. +“The survey of human affairs is not complete,” he reminds us, “unless +we allot a place for irony beside that of tears, a place for pity +beside that of rage, and a place for a smile alongside respect.”[12] + + [12] Preface to his _Drames philosophiques_, 1888. + + +It was this versatility which made Renan a lover of the philosophic +dialogue. This literary and dramatic form naturally appealed strongly +to a mind who was so very conscious of the fact that the truths with +which philosophy deals cannot be directly denied or directly affirmed, +as they are not subject to demonstration. All the high problems of +humanity Renan recognised as being of this kind, as involving finally a +rational faith; and he claimed that the best we can do is to present +the problems of life from different points of view. This is due +entirely to the peculiar character of philosophy itself, and to the +distinction, which must never be overlooked, between knowledge and +belief, between certitude and opinion. Geometry, for example, is not a +subject for dialogues but for demonstration, as it involves knowledge +and certitude. The problems of philosophy, on the contrary, involve +“_une nuance de foi_,” as Renan styles it. They involve willed +adhesion, acceptance or choice; they provoke sympathy or hate, and call +into play human personality with its varying shades of colour. + +This state of _nuance_ Renan asserts to be the one of the hour for +philosophy. It is not the time, he thinks, to attempt to strengthen by +abstract reasoning the “proofs” of God’s existence or of the reality of +a future life. “Men see just now that they can never know anything of +the supreme cause of the universe or of their own destiny. Nevertheless +they are anxious to listen to those who will speak to them about +either.”[13] + + [13] From his Preface to _Drames philosophiques_. + + +Knowledge, Renan maintained, lies somewhere between the two schools +into which the majority of men are divided. “What you are looking for +has long since been discovered and made clear,” say the orthodox. “What +you are looking for is impossible to find,” say the practical +positivists, the political “raillers” and the atheists. It is true that +we shall never know the ultimate secret of all being, but we shall +never prevent man from desiring more and more knowledge or from +creating for himself working hypotheses or beliefs. + +Yet although Renan admits this truth he never approaches even the +pragmatist position of supporting “creative beliefs.” He rather urges a +certain passivity towards problems and opinions. We should, he argues +in his _Examen de Conscience philosophique_,[14] let them work +themselves out in us. Like a spectator we must let them modify our +“intellectual retina”; we must let reality reflect itself in us. By +this he does not mean to assert that the truth about that reality is a +matter of pure indifference to us-far from it. Precisely because he is +so conscious of the importance of true knowledge, he is anxious that we +should approach the study of reality without previous prejudices. “We +have no right,” he remarks, “to have a desire when reason speaks; we +must listen and nothing more.”[15] + + [14] In his _Feuilles detachées_, pp. 401-443. + + + [15] _Feuilles détachées_, p. 402. + + +It must be admitted, however, that Renan’s attitude to the problems of +knowledge was largely sceptical. While, as we shall see in the +following chapter, he extolled science, his attitude to belief and to +knowledge was irritating in its vagueness and changeableness. He +appeared to pose too much as a _dilettante_ making a show of subtle +intellect, rather than a serious thinker of the first rank. His +eminence and genius are unquestioned, but he played in a bewitching and +frequently bewildering manner with great and serious problems, and one +cannot help wishing that this great intellect of his—and it was +unquestionably great—was not more steady and was not applied by its +owner more steadfastly and courageously to ultimate problems. His +writings reflect a bewildering variety of contradictory moods, playful, +scathing, serious and mocking. Indeed, he replied in his _Feuilles +detachées_ (1892) to the accusations of Amiel by insisting that irony +is the philosopher’s last word. For him as for his brilliant +fellow-countryman, Anatole France, ironical scepticism is the ultimate +product of his reflection upon life. His _Examen de Conscience_ +philosophique is his Confession of Faith, written four years before his +death, in which he tries to defend his sceptical attitude and to put +forward scepticism as an apology for his own uncertainty and his +paradoxical changes of view. Irony intermingles with his doubt here +too. We do not know, he says, ultimate reality; we do not know whether +there be any purpose or end in the universe at all. There may be, but +on the other hand it may be a farce and fiasco. By refusing to believe +in anything, rejecting both alternatives, Renan argues, with a kind of +mental cowardice, we avoid the consequence of being absolutely +deceived. He recommended an adoption of mixed belief and doubt, +optimism and irony. + +This is a surprising attitude in a philosopher and is not +characteristic of great modern thinkers, most of whom prefer belief +(hypothetical although that be) to non-belief. Doubtless Renan’s early +training had a psychological effect which operated perhaps largely +unconsciously throughout his life, and his literary and linguistic +ability seems to have given him a reputation which was rather that of a +man of letters than a philosopher. He had not the mental strength or +frankness to face alternatives squarely and to decide to adopt one. +Consequently he merited the application of the old proverb about being +between two stools. This application was actually made to Renan’s +attitude in a critical remark by Renouvier in his _Esquisse d’une +Classification des Doctrines philosphiques_.[16] Renouvier had no +difficulty in pointing out that the man who hesitates deprives himself +of that great reality, the exercise of his own power of free choice, in +itself valuable and more akin to reality (whatever be the choice) than +a mere “sitting on the fence,” an attitude which, so far from assuring +one of getting the advantages of both possibilities as Renan claims, +may more justly seem to deprive one of the advantages in both +directions. The needs of life demand that we construct beliefs of some +sort. We may be wrong and err, but pure scepticism such as Renan +advocated is untenable. Life, if it is to be real and earnest, demands +of us that we have faith in _some_ values, that we construct _some_ +beliefs, _some_ hypotheses, by which we may work. + + [16] Vol. ii., p. 395. + + +Both Renan and Taine exercised a considerable influence upon French +thought. While inheriting the positivist outlook they, to a great +degree, perhaps unconsciously, undermined the positive position, both +by their interest in the humanities, in art, letters and religion and +in their metaphysical attitude. Taine, beginning with a rigid +naturalism, came gradually to approach an idealistic standpoint in many +respects, while Renan, beginning with a dogmatic idealism, came to +acute doubt, hypotheses, “dreams” and scepticism. Taine kept his +thoughts in too rigid a mould, solidified, while those of Renan seem +finally to have existed only in a gaseous state, intangible, vague and +hazy. We have observed how the positivist current from Comte was +carried over by Vacherot to Taine. In Renan we find that current +present also, but it has begun to turn against itself. While we may say +that his work reflects in a very remarkable manner the spirit of his +time, especially the positivist faith in science, yet we are also able +to find in it, in spite of his immense scepticism, the indications of a +spiritualist or idealist movement, groping and shaping itself as the +century grows older. + +II + +While the positivist current of thought was working itself out through +Vacherot, Taine and Renan to a position which forms a connecting link +between Comte and the new spiritualism in which the reaction against +positivism and eclecticism finally culminated, another influence was +making itself felt independently in the neo-critical philosophy of +Renouvier. + +We must here note the work and influence of Cournot (1801-1877), which +form a very definite link between the doctrines of Comte and those of +Renouvier. He owed much to positivism, and he contributed to the +formation of neo-criticism by his influence upon Renouvier. Cournot’s +_Essai sur le Fondement de nos Connaissances_ appeared in 1851, three +years before Renouvier gave to the world the first volume of his +_Essais de Critique générale_. In 1861 Cournot published his _Traité de +l’Enchaînement des Idées_, which was followed by his _Considerations +sur le Marche des Idées_ (1872) and _Matérialisme_, _Vitalisme_, +_Rationalisme_ (1875). These volumes form his contribution to +philosophical thought, his remaining works being mainly concerned with +political economy and mathematics, a science in which he won +distinction. + +Like Comte, Cournot opposed the spiritualism, the eclecticism and the +psychology of Cousin, but he was possessed of a more philosophic mind +than Comte; he certainly had greater philosophical knowledge, was +better equipped in the history of philosophy and had much greater +respect for metaphysical theory. He shared with Comte, however, an +interest in social problems and biology; he also adopted his general +attitude to knowledge, but the spirit of Cournot’s work is much less +dogmatic than that of the great positivist, and he made no pretensions +to be a “pontiff” such as Comte aspired to be. Indeed his lack of +pretensions may account partly for the lack of attention with which his +work (which is shrewd, thoughtful and reserved) has been treated. He +aimed at indicating the foundations of a sound philosophy rather than +at offering a system of thought to the public. This temper was the +product of his scientific attitude. It was by an examination of the +sciences and particularly of the principles upon which they depend that +he formulated his group of fundamental doctrines. + +He avoided hasty generalisations or a _priori_ constructions and, true +to the scientific spirit, based his thought upon the data afforded by +experience. He agreed heartily with Comte regarding the relativity of +our knowledge. An investigation of this knowledge shows it to be based +on three principles—order, chance, and probability. We find order +existing in the universe and by scientific methods we try to grasp this +order. This involves induction, a method which cannot give us absolute +certainty, although it approximates to it. It gives us probability +only. There is therefore a reality of chances, and contingency or +chance must be admitted as a factor in evolution and in human history. + +Cournot foreshadows many of the doctrines of the new spiritualists as +well as those of the neo-critical school. Much in his work heralds a +Bergson as well as a Renouvier. This is noticeable in his attitude to +science and to the problem of contingency or freedom. It is further +seen in his doctrine that the _vivant_ is incapable of demonstration, +in his view of the soul or higher instinct which he distinguished from +the intelligence, in the biological interest displayed in his work (due +partly to the work of Bichat[17]), and in his idea of a _Travail de +Création_. Unlike Bergson, however, he admits a teleology, for he +believed this inseparable from living beings, but he regards it as a +hazardous finality, not rigid or inconsistent with freedom. + + [17] Bichat (1771-1802) was a noted physiologist and anatomist. In + 1800 appeared his _Recherches physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort_, + followed in 1801 by _Anatomie générale, appliquée à la Physiologie et + à la Médecine_. + + +The immediate influence of Cournot was felt by only a small circle, and +his most notable affinity was with Renouvier, although Cournot was less +strictly an intellectualist. Like Renouvier he looked upon philosophy +as a “_Critique générale_.” He was also concerned with the problem of +the categories and with the compatibility of science and freedom, a +problem which was now assuming a very central position in the thought +of the period. + +Renouvier, in the construction of his philosophy, was partly influenced +by the work of Cournot. In this lone, stern, indefatigable worker we +have one of the most powerful minds of the century. Charles Renouvier +shares with Auguste Comte the first honours of the century in France so +far as philosophical work is concerned. Curiously enough he came from +Comte’s birth-place, Montpellier. When Renouvier was born in 1815, +seventeen years later than Comte, the great positivist was in his +second year of study at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. To this great +scientific and mathematical institution came Renouvier, to find Comte +as _Répétiteur_ of Higher Mathematics. He was not only a keen student +of the mathematical sciences but also an ardent follower of +Saint-Simon, and although in later life he lost many of the hopes of +his youth the Saint-Simon spirit remained with him, and he retained a +keen interest in social ethics and particularly in the ideas of +Fourier, Proudhon and Blanc. At the Ecole he met as fellow-pupils Jules +Lequier and Felix Ravaisson. + +Instead of entering the civil service Renouvier then applied himself to +philosophy and political science, influenced undoubtedly by Comte’s +work. The year 1848, which saw the second attempt to establish a +republic, gave Renouvier, now a zealous republican, an opportunity, and +he issued his _Manuel républicain de l’Homme et du Citoyen_. This +volume, intended for schoolmasters, had the approval of Carnot, +Minister of Education to the Provisionary Government. Its socialist +doctrines were so criticised by the Chamber of 1849 that Carnot, and +with him the Government, fell from power. Renouvier went further in his +_Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la +République_, in which he collaborated with his socialist friends in +outlining a scheme of communism, making the canton a local power, a +scheme which contained the germ-idea of the Soviet of Bolshevik Russia. +Such ideas were, however, far too advanced for the France of that date +and their proposal did more harm than good to the progressive party by +producing a reaction in wavering minds. Renouvier, through the paper +_Liberté de penser_, launched attacks upon the policy of the +Presidency, and began in the _Revue philosophique_ a serial _Uchronie_, +a novel of a political and philosophical character. It was never +finished. Suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, came, on December and, +the _coup d’état_. The effect of this upon Renouvier was profound. +Disgusted at the power of the monarchy, the shattering of the +republican hopes, the suppression of liberty and the general reaction, +he abandoned political life entirely. What politics lost, however, +philosophy has gained, for he turned his acute mind with its tremendous +energy to the study of the problems of the universe. + +Three years after the _coup d’état_, in the same year in which Comte +completed his _Système de Politique_ positive, 1854, Renouvier +published the first volume of his _magnum opus_, the _Essais de +Critique générale_.[18] The appearance of this work is a notable date +in the development of modern French philosophy. The problems therein +discussed will concern us in later chapters. Here we must point out the +indefatigable labour given to this work by Renouvier. The writing and +revision of these essays covered almost the whole of the half century, +concluding in 1897. In their first, briefer form they occupied the +decade 1854-64, and consisted of four volumes only, which on revision +became finally thirteen.[19] These Essays range over Logic, Psychology, +the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Philosophy of History. + + [18] It is interesting for the comparative study of the thought of the + century to observe that the great work of Lotze in Germany, + _Mikrocosmos_, was contemporaneous with the _Essais_ of Renouvier. + Lotze’s three volumes appeared in 1856, 1858 and 1864. The _Logik_ and + _Metaphysik_ of Lotze should also be compared with Renouvier’s + _Essais_. Further comparison or contrast may be made with reference to + the _Logic_ of both Bradley and Bosanquet in England. + + + [19] Since 1912 the _Essais de Critique générale_ are available in ten + volumes, owing to the publications of new editions of the first three + Essays by A. Colin in five volumes. For details of the original and + revised publication of the work, see our Bibliography, under Renouvier + (pp. 334-335). + + +Having thus laid the foundations of his own throught, Renouvier, in +conjunction with his scholarly friend Pillon, undertook the publication +of a monthly periodical, _L’Année philosophique_, to encourage +philosophic thought in France. This appeared first in 1867, the same +year in which Ravaisson laid the foundations of the new spiritualism by +his celebrated _Rapport_. In 1869 Renouvier published his noteworthy +treatise upon Ethics, in two volumes, _La Science de la Morale_. + +The war of 1870 brought his monthly periodical to an untimely end. The +conclusion of the war in 1871 resulted in the establishment, for the +third time, of a republic, which in spite of many vicissitudes has +continued even to this day. With the restoration of peace and of a +republic, Renouvier felt encouraged to undertake the ambitious scheme +of publishing a weekly paper, not only philosophical in character but +political, literary and religious. He desired ardently to address his +countrymen at a time when they were rather intellectually and morally +bewildered. He felt he had something constructive to offer, and hoped +that the “new criticism,” as he called it, might become the philosophy +of the new republic. Thus was founded, in 1872, the famous _Critique +philosophique_, which aimed primarily at the consolidation of the +republic politically and morally,[20] This paper appeared as a weekly +from its commencement until 1884,then continued for a further five +years as a monthly. Renouvier and his friend Pillon were assisted by +other contributors, A. Sabatier, L. Dauriac, R. Allier, who were more +or less disciples of the neo-critical school. Various articles were +contributed by William James, who had a great admiration for Renouvier. +The two men, although widely different in temperament and method, had +certain affinities in their doctrine of truth and certitude.[21] + + [20] In the early numbers, political articles, as was natural in the + years following 1871, were prominent. Among these early articles we + may cite the one, “Is France morally obliged to carry out the terms of + the Treaty imposed upon her by Prussia?” + + + [21] On this relationship see James’s _Will to Believe_, p. 143, 1897, + and the dedications in his _Some Problems of Philosophy_ (to + Renouvier), and his _Principles of Psychology_ (to Pillon), also + _Letters of William James_, September i8th, 1892. + + +Renouvier’s enthusiasm for his periodical did not, however, abate his +energy or ardour for more lasting work. He undertook the task of +revising and augmenting his great work, the _Essais de Critique +générale_, and added to the series another (fifth) Essay, in four +volumes. He also issued in 1876 the curious work _Uchronie_, a history +of “what might have been” (in his view) the development of European +civilisation. Together with Pillon he translated _Hume’s Treatise on +Human Nature_. + +Meanwhile the _Critique philosophique_ continued to combat any symptoms +of a further _coup d’état_, and “to uphold strictly republican +principles and to fight all that savoured of Caesar or imperialism.” In +1878 a quarterly supplement _La Critique religieuse_ was added to +attack the Roman Catholic Church and to diminish its power in +France.[22] + + [22] The significance of this effort is more fully dealt with in our + last chapter. + + +Articles which had appeared in this quarterly were published as +_Esquisse d’une Classification systématique des Doctrines +philosophiques_ in 1885 in two volumes, the second of which contained +the important Confession of Faith of Renouvier, entitled, _How I +arrived at this Conclusion_. + +His thought assumed a slightly new form towards the close of the +century, at the end of which he published, in conjunction with his +disciple Prat, a remarkable volume, which took a prize at the _Académie +des Sciences morales et politiques_, to which rather late in the day he +was admitted as a member at the age of eighty-five. In its title _La +Nouvelle Monadologie_, and method it reveals the influence of Leibnitz. + +The close of the century shows us Renouvier as an old man, still an +enormous worker, celebrating his eighty-sixth birthday by planning and +writing further volumes (_Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique pure_ and its +sequel, _Histoire et Solution des Problèmes métaphysiques_). This +“grand old man” of modern French philosophy lived on into the early +years of the twentieth century, still publishing, still writing to the +last. His final volume, _Le Personnalisme_, was a restatement of his +philosophy, issued when he was in his eighty-ninth year. He died “in +harness” in 1903, dictating to his friend Prat a _résumé_ of his +thought on important points and leaving an unpublished work on the +philosophy of Kant.[23] + + [23] The _résumé_ was published by Prat a couple of years later as + _Derniers Entretiens_, the volume on the _Doctrine de Kant_, followed + in 1906. + + +Renouvier’s career is a striking one and we have sketched it somewhat +fully here because of its showing more distinctly than that of Taine or +Renan the reflections of contemporary history upon the thinking minds +who lived through the years 1848-51 and 1870-71. Renouvier was a young +spirit in the year of the revolution, 1848, and lived right on through +the _coup d’état_, the Second Empire, the Franco-Prussian War, the +Commune, the Third Republic, and he foresaw and perhaps influenced the +Republic’s attitude to the Roman Church. His career is the most +significant and enlightening one to follow of all the thinkers who come +within our period. Let us note that he never held any academic or +public teaching appointment. His life was in the main a secluded one +and, like Comte, he found the University a limited preserve closed +against him and his philosophy, dominated by the declining eclecticism +which drew its inspiration from Cousin. Only gradually did his +influence make itself felt to such a degree that the University was +compelled to take notice of it. Now his work is more appreciated, but +not as much as it might be, and outside his own country he is little +known. The student finds his writings somewhat difficult owing to the +author’s heavy style. He has none of the literary ease and brilliance +of a Renan. But his work was great and noble, animated by a passion for +truth and a hatred of philosophical “shams” and a current of deep moral +earnestness colours all his work. He had considerable power as a +critic, for the training of the Ecole Polytechnique produced a strictly +logical temper in his work, which is that of a true philosopher, not +that of a merely brilliant _litterateur_ or _dilettante_, and he must +be regarded as one of the intellectual giants of the century. + +While we see in Positivism a system of thought which opposed itself to +Eclecticism, we find in the philosophy of Renouvier a system of +doctrine which is opposed to both Eclecticism and Positivism. Indeed +Renouvier puts up a strong mental fight against both of these systems; +the latter he regarded as an ambitious conceit. He agreed, however, +with Comte and with Cournot upon the relativity of our knowledge. “I +accept,” he says, “one fundamental principle of the Positivist +School—namely, the reduction of knowledge to the laws of +phenomena.”[24] The author of the _Essais de Critique générale_ +considered himself, however, to be the apostolic successor, not of +Comte, but of Kant. The title of _neo-criticisme_[25] which he gave to +his philosophy shows his affinity with the author of the _Kritik der +reinen Vernunft_. This is very noticeable in his method of treating the +problem of knowledge by criticising the human mind and especially in +his giving a preference to moral considerations.[26] It would be, +however, very erroneous to regard Renouvier as a disciple of Kant, for +he amends and rejects many of the doctrines of the German philosopher. +We have noted the fact that he translated Hume; we must observe also +that Hume’s influence is very strongly marked in Renouvier’s +“phenomenalism.”[27] “Renouvier is connected with Hume,” says Pillon, +in the preface he contributed to the translation,[28] “as much as with +Kant. . . . He reconciles Hume and Kant. . . . Something is lacking in +Hume, the notion of law; something is superfluous in Kant, the notion +of substance. It was necessary to unite the phenomenalism of Hume with +the a _priori_ teaching of Kant. This was the work accomplished by +Renouvier.” + + [24] Preface to _Essais de Critique générale_. + + + [25] The English word “_criticism_” is, it should be noted, translated + in French by “_critique_” and not by the word “_criticisme_,” a term + which is used for the philosophy of the _Kritik_ of Kant. + + + [26] In recognising the primacy of the moral or practical reason in + Kant, Renouvier resembles Fichte. + + + [27] Renouvier’s phenomenalism should be compared with that of + Shadworth Hodgson, as set forth in the volumes of his large work on + _The Metaphysic of Experience_, 1899. Hodgson has given his estimate + of Renouvier and his relationship to him in _Mind_ (volume for 1881). + + + [28] _Psychologie de Hume : Traité de la Nature humaine_, Renouvier + Préface par Pillon, p. lxviii. + + +It may be doubted whether Pillon’s eulogy is altogether sound in its +approval of the “reconciliation” of Hume and Kant, for such a +reconciliation of opposites may well appear impossible. Renouvier +himself faced this problem of the reconciliation of opposites when at +an early age he inclined to follow the Hegelian philosophy, a doctrine +which may very well be described as a “reconciliation of opposites,” +_par excellence_. Dissatisfied, however, with such a scheme Renouvier +came round to the Kantian standpoint and then passed beyond it to a +position absolutely contrary to that of Hegel. This position is frankly +that opposites cannot be reconciled, one or the other must be rejected. +Renouvier thus made the law of contradiction the basis of his +philosophy, as it is the basis of our principles of thought or logic. + +He rigorously applied this principle to that very interesting part of +Kant’s work, the antinomies, which he held should never have been +formulated. The reasons put forward for this statement were two: the +principle of contradiction and the law of number. Renouvier did not +believe in what mathematicians call an “infinite number.” He held it to +be an absurd and contradictory notion, for to be a number at all it +must be numerical and therefore not infinite. The application of this +to the Kantian antinomies, as for example to the questions, “Is space +infinite or finite? Had the world a beginning or not?” is interesting +because it treats them as Alexander did the Gordian knot. The admission +that space is infinite, or that the world had no beginning, involves +the admission of an “infinite number,” a contradiction and an +absurdity. Since, therefore, such a number is a pure fiction we _must_ +logically conclude that space is finite,[29] that the world had a +beginning and that the ascending series of causes has a first term, +which admission involves freedom at the heart of things. + + [29] It is interesting to observe how the stress laid by Renouvier + upon the finiteness of space and upon relativity has found expression + in the scientific world by Einstein, long after it had been expressed + philosophically. + + +As Renouvier had treated the antinomies of Kant, so he makes short work +of the Kantian conception of a world of noumena (_Dinge an sich_) of +which we know nothing, but which is the foundation of the phenomena we +know. Like Hume, he rejects all notion of substance, of which Kant’s +noumenon is a survival from ancient times. The idea of substance he +abhors as leading to pantheism and to fatalism, doctrines which +Renouvier energetically opposes, to uphold man’s freedom and the +dignity of human personality. + +In the philosophy of Kant personality was not included among the +categories. Renouvier draws up for himself a new list of categories +differing from those of Kant. Beginning with Relation they culminate in +Personality. These two categories indicate two of the strongholds of +Renouvier’s philosophy. Beginning from his fundamental thesis “All is +relative,” Renouvier points out that as nothing can possibly be known +save by or in a relation of some sort it is evident that the most +general law of all is that of Relation itself. Relation is therefore +the first and fundamental category embracing all the others. Then +follow, Number, Position, Succession, Quality. To these are added the +important ones, Becoming, Causality, Finality proceeding from the +simple to the composite, from the abstract to the concrete, from the +elements most easily selected from our experience to that which +embraces the experience itself, Renouvier comes to the final category +in which they all find their consummation-Personality. The importance +which he attaches to this category colours his entire thought and +particularly determines his attitude to the various problems which we +shall discuss in our following chapters. + +As we can think of nothing save in relation to consciousness and +consequently we cannot conceive the universe apart from personality, +our knowledge of the universe, our philosophies, our beliefs are +“personal” constructions. But they need not be on that account merely +subjective and individualistic in character, for they refer to +personality in its wide sense, a sense shared by other persons. This +has important consequences for the problem of certitude in knowledge +and Renouvier has here certain affinities to the pragmatist standpoint. + +His discussion of certitude is very closely bound up with his treatment +of the problem of freedom, but we may indicate here Renouvier’s +attitude to Belief and Knowledge, a problem in which he was aided by +the work of his friend Jules Lequier,[30] whom he quotes in his second +_Essai de Critique générale_. Renouvier considers it advisable to +approach the problem of certitude by considering its opposite, doubt. +In a famous passage in his second _Essai_ he states the circumstances +under which we do not doubt—namely, “when we see, when we know, when we +believe.” Owing to our liability to error (even seeing is not +believing, and we frequently change our minds even about our “seeing”), +it appears that belief is always involved, and more correctly “we +believe that we see, we believe that we know.” Belief is a state of +consciousness involved in a certain affirmation of which the motives +show themselves as adequate. Certitude arises when the possibility of +an affirmation of the contrary is entirely rejected by the mind. +Certitude thus appears as a kind of belief. All knowledge, Renouvier +maintains, involves an affirmation of will. It is here we see the +contrast so strongly marked between him and Renan, who wished us to +“let things think themselves out in us.” “Every affirmation in which +consciousness is reflective is subordinated, in consciousness, to the +determination to affirm.” Our knowledge, our certitude, our belief, +whatever we prefer to call it, is a construction not purely +intellectual but involving elements of feeling and, above all, of will. +Even the most logically incontrovertible truth are sometimes +unconvincing. This is because certitude is not purely intellectual; it +is _une affaire passionnelle_.[31] Renouvier here not only approaches +the pragmatist position, but he recalls the attitude to will, assumed +by Maine de Biran. For the Cartesian formula De Biran had suggested the +substitution of _Volo, ergo sum_. The inadequacy of the the _Cogito, +ergo sum_ is remarked upon by Lequier, whose treatment of the question +of certainty Renouvier follows. As all demonstration is deductive in +character and so requires existing premises, we cannot expect the +_première vérité_ to be demonstrable. If, from the or certainty, we +must turn to the will to create belief, or certainty, we must turn to +the will to create beliefs, for no evidence or previous truths exist +for us. The _Cogito, ergo sum_ really does not give us a starting +point, as Descartes claimed for it, since there is no proper sequence +from _cogito_ to _sum_. Here we have merely two selves, _moi-pensée_ +and _moi-objet_. We need a live spark to bridge this gap to unite the +two into one complete living self; this is found in _moi-volonté_, in a +free act of will. This free act of will affirms the existence of the +self by uniting in a synthetic judgment the thinking-self to the +object-self. “I refuse,” says Renouvier, quoting Lequier, “to follow +the work of a knowledge which would not be mine. I accept the certainty +of which I am the author.” The _première vérité_ is a free personal act +of faith. Certainty in philosophy or in science reposes ultimately upon +freedom and the consciousness of freedom. + + [30] Jules Lequier was born in 1814 and entered the Ecole + polytechnique in 1834, leaving two years later for a military staff + appointment. This he abandoned in 1838. He died in 1862 after having + destroyed most of his writings. Three Years after his death was + published the volume, _La Recherche d’une première Vérité, fragments + posthumes de Jules Lequier_. The reader should note the very + interesting remarks by Renouvier at the end of the first volume of his + Psychologie rationnelle, 1912 ed., pp. 369-393, on Lequier and his + Philosophy, also the Fragments reprinted by Renouvier in that work, + _Comment trouver, comment chercher_, vol. i., on Subject and Object + (vol. ii.), and on Freedom. + + + [31] Lotze employs a similar phrase, eine Gemüths-sache. + + +Here again, as in the philosophy of Cournot, we find the main emphasis +falling upon the double problem of the period. It is in reality one +problem with two aspects—the relation of science to morality, or, in +other words, the place and significance of freedom. + +The general influence of Renouvier has led to the formation of a +neo-critical “school” of thought, prominent members of which may be +cited: Pillon and Prat, his intimate friends, Séailles and Darlu, who +have contributed monographs upon their master’s teaching, together with +Hamelin, Liard and Brochard, eminent disciples. Hamelin (1856-1907), +whose premature and accidental death deprived France of a keen thinker, +is known for his _Essai sur les Eléments principaux de la +Représentation_ (1907), supplementing the doctrines of Renouvier by +those of Hegel. + +In the work of Liard (1846-1917), _La Science positive et la +Métaphysique_ (1879), we see a combination of the influence of +Vacherot, Renouvier and Kant. He was also perplexed by the problem of +efficient and final causes as was Lachelier, whose famous thesis _De +l’Induction_ appeared eight years earlier. While Lachelier was +influenced by Kant, he, none the less, belongs to the current of the +new spiritualism which we shall presently examine. Liard, however, by +his adherence to many critical and neo-critical standpoints may be +justly looked upon as belonging to that great current of which +Renouvier is the prominent thinker. + +Brochard (1848-1907) is mainly known by his _treatise De l’Erreur_ +(1879) and his volumes on Ethics, _De la Responsabilité morale_ (1876), +and _De l’Universalité des Notions morales_ (1876), in all of which the +primacy of moral considerations is advocated in a tone inspired by +Renouvier’s strong moral standpoint. The work _De l’Erreur_ emphasises +the importance of the problem of freedom as being the crux of the whole +question involved in the relation of science and morality. Adhering to +the neo-critical doctrines in general, and particularly to the value of +the practical reason, Brochard, by his insistence upon action as a +foundation for belief, has marked affinities with the doctrines of +Blondel (and Olle-Laprune), the significance of whose work will appear +at the end of our next section. + +The phenomenalism of Renouvier was followed up by two thinkers, who +cannot, however, be regarded as belonging to his neo-critical school. +In 1888 Gourd published his work entitled _Le Phénomène_, which was +followed six years later by the slightly more coherent attempt of +Boirac to base a philosophy upon the phenomenalism which expresses +itself so rigidly in Hume. In his book _L’Idée du Phénomène_ (1894), he +had, however, recourse to the Leibnitzian doctrines, which had finally +exercised a considerable influence over Renouvier himself. + +III + +The reaction against positivism and against eclecticism took another +form quite apart from that of the neocritical philosophy. This was the +triumphant spiritualist philosophy, as we may call it, to give it a +general name, represented by a series of great thinkers—Ravaisson, +Lachelier, Fouillée, Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson and, we may add, Blondel. +These men have all of them had an influence much greater than that of +Renouvier, and this is true of each of them separately. This is rather +noteworthy for, if we exclude Fouillee, whose writings are rather too +numerous, the works of all the other men together do not equal in +quantity the work of Renouvier. There is another point which is worthy +of notice. While Renouvier worked in comparative solitude and never +taught philosophy in any college or university, being, in fact, +neglected by the University of Paris, all the company—Ravaisson, +Lachelier, Fouillée, Guyau, Boutroux and Bergson—had a connection with +the University of Paris in general, being associated with the Sorbonne, +the Collège de France or the important Ecole Normale Supérieure. + +The initiator of the spiritualistic philosophy was Ravaisson +(1815-1900), who himself drew inspiration from Maine de Biran, to whose +work he had called attention as early as 1840 in a vigorous article +contributed to the _Revue des Deux Mondes_. This roused the indignation +of Victor Cousin and the eclectics, who in revenge excluded Ravaisson +from the Institute. His independent spirit had been shown in his thesis +_De l’Habitude_ (1838)[32] and his remarkable study of the metaphysics +of Aristotle (1837-1846). + + [32] Reproduced in 1894 in the _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. + + +Ravaisson’s chief title to fame, however, lies in his famous +philosophic manifesto of 1867, for such, in fact, was his _Rapport sur +la Philosophie en France au XIXè Siècle_. This Report, prepared for the +_Exposition universelle_ at the request of the Ministry of Education, +marks an epoch, for with it began the current of thought which was to +dominate the close of the century. The “manifesto” was a call to free +spirits to assert themselves in favour of a valid idealism. It, in +itself, laid the foundations of such a philosophy and dealt a blow to +both the Eclectic School of Cousin and the followers of Auguste Comte. +Ravaisson wrote little, but his influence was powerful and made itself +felt in the University, where in his office of president of the +_agrégation en philosophie_ he exercised no little influence over the +minds of younger men. His pupils, among whom are to be found Lachelier, +Boutroux and Bergson, have testified to the profound and inspiring +influence which this thinker exercised. A notable tribute to his memory +is the address given by Bergson when he was appointed to take +Ravaisson’s place at the _Académie des Sciences morales et politiques_ +in 1904. + +Various influences meet in Ravaisson and determine his general attitude +to thought. He reverts, as we have said, to Maine de Biran, whose +insistence upon the inner life he approves. We must examine human +consciousness and make it our basis. We have in it powers of will, of +desire and of love. Ravaisson blends the Aristotelian insistence upon +Thought with the Christian insistence upon Love. In his method he +manifests the influence of the German philosopher, Schelling, whose +lectures he attended at Munich in company with the young Swiss thinker, +Secretan.[33] This influence is seen in his doctrine of synthesis and +his intellectual intuition. Science continues to give us analyses ever +more detailed, but it cannot lead us to the absolute. Our highest, most +sublime knowledge is gained by a synthesis presented in and to our +consciousness, an intuition. Further, he argues that efficient causes, +about which science has so much to say, are really dependent upon final +causes. Spiritual reality is anterior to material reality, and is +characterised by goodness and beauty. Himself an artist, imbued with a +passionate love of the beautiful (he was guardian of sculptures at the +Louvre), he constructs a philosophy in the manner of an artist. Like +Guyau, he writes metaphysics like poetry, and although he did not give +us anything like _Vers d’un Philosophe_, he would have endorsed the +remarks which Guyau made on the relation of poetry and philosophy if, +indeed, it is not a fact that his influence inspired the younger man. + + [33] Charles Secretan (1815-1895), a Swiss thinker with whom Renouvier + had interesting correspondence. His _Philosophie de la Liberté_ + appeared in 1848-1849, followed by other works on religious + philosophy. Pillon wrote a monograph upon him. + + +After surveying the currents of thought up to 1867 Ravaisson not only +summed up in his concluding pages the elements of his own philosophy, +but he ventured to assume the role of prophet. “Many signs permit us to +foresee in the near future a philosophical epoch of which the general +character will be the predominance of what may be called spiritualistic +realism or positivism, having as generating principle the consciousness +which the mind has of itself as an existence recognised as being the +source and support of every other existence, being none other than its +action.”[34] His prophecy has been fulfilled in the work of Lachelier, +Guyau, Fouillée, Boutroux, Bergson, Blondel and Weber. + + [35] _Rapport_, 2nd ed., 1885, p. 275. + + +After Ravaisson the spiritualist philosophy found expression in the +work of Lachelier (1832-1918), a thinker whose importance and whose +influence are both quite out of proportion to the small amount which he +has written.[36] A brilliant thesis of only one hundred pages, _Du +Fondement de l’Induction_, sustained in 1871, together with a little +study on the Syllogism and a highly important article on _Psychologie +et Métaphysique_, contributed to the _Revue philosophique_ in May of +1885, constitute practically all his written work.[37] It was orally +that he made his influence felt; by his teaching at the Ecole Normale +Supérieure (1864-1875) he made a profound impression upon the youth of +the University and the Ecole by the dignity and richness of his +thought, as well as by its thoroughness. + + [36] Dr. Merz, in his admirable _History of European Thought in the + Nineteenth Century_, is wrong in regard to Lachelier’s dates; he + confuses his resignation of professorship (1875) with his death. This, + however, did not occur until as late as 1918. See the references in + Mertz, vol. iii., p. 620, and vol. iv., p. 217. + + + [37] The thesis and the article have been published together by Alcan, + accompanied by notes on Pascal’s Wager. The _Etude sur le Syllogisme_ + also forms a volume in Alcan’s _Bibliothèque de Philosophie + contemporaine_. + + +Lachelier was a pupil of Ravaisson, and owes his initial inspiration to +him. He had, however, a much more rigorous and precise attitude to +problems. This is apparent in the concentration of thought contained in +his thesis. It is one of Lachelier’s merits that he recognised the +significance of Kant’s work in a very profound manner. Until his thesis +appeared the influence of Leibnitz had been more noticeable in French +thought than that of Kant. It was noticeable in Ravaisson, and +Renouvier, in spite of his professed adherence to Kant, passed to a +Leibnitzian position in his _Nouvelle Monadologie_. + +The valuable work _Du Fondement de l’Induction_ is concerned mainly +with the problem of final causes, which Lachelier deduces from the +necessity of totality judgments over and above those which concern +merely efficient causes. On the principle of final causes, or a +ideological conception of a rational unity and order, he founds +Induction. It cannot be founded, he claims, upon a mere empiricism. +This is a point which will concern us later in our examination of the +problem of science. + +Lachelier was left, however, with the dualism of mechanism, operating +solely by efficient causes, and teleology manifested in final causes, a +dualism from which Kant did not manage to escape. In his article +_Psychologic et Métaphysique_ he endeavoured to interpret mechanism +itself as a teleological activity of the spirit.[38] He indicates the +absolute basis of our life and experience, indeed of the universe +itself, to be the absolute spontaneity of spirit. In spirit and in +freedom we live and move and have our being. We do not affirm ourselves +to be what we are, but rather we are what we affirm ourselves to be. We +must not say that our present depends upon our past, for we really +create all the moments of our life in one and the same act, which is +both present to each moment and above them all.[39] Here psychology +appears as the science of thought itself and resolves itself into +metaphysics. Here, too, we find the significance of the new +spiritualism; we see its affinity with, and its contrast to, the +doctrines of the older spiritualism as professed by Cousin. Lachelier +here strikes the note which is so clearly characteristic of this +current of thought, and is no less marked in his work than in that of +Bergson—namely, a belief in the supremacy of spirit and in the reality +of freedom. + + [38] It is interesting to compare this with the attitude taken by + Lotze in Germany. + + + [39] _Psychologie et Métaphysique_, p. 171. + + +The notion of freedom and of the spontaneity of the spirit became +watchwords of the new spiritualist philosophers. Under the work and +influence of Boutroux (1845-1921) these ideas were further emphasised +and worked out more definitely to a position which assumes a critical +attitude to the dogmatism of modern science and establishes a +contingency in all things. Boutroux’s thesis _De la Contingence des +Lois de la Nature_ appeared in 1874 and was dedicated to Ravaisson. His +chief fame and his importance in the development of the spiritualist +philosophy rest upon this book alone. In 1894 he published a course of +lectures given at the Sorbonne in 1892-3, _Sur l’Idée de Loi +naturelle_, which supplements the thesis. Outside his own country +attention has been more readily bestowed upon his writings on the +history of philosophy, of which subject he was Professor. In his own +country, however, great interest and value are attached to his work on +_The Contingency of the Laws of Nature_. In this Boutroux combines the +attitude of Ravaisson with that of Lachelier. The totality of the laws +of the universe manifests, according to him, a contingency. No +explanation of these laws is possible apart from a free spiritual +activity. The stress laid upon contingency in the laws of nature +culminates in the belief in the freedom of man. + +The critique of science which marked Boutroux’s work has profoundly +influenced thinkers like Hannequin, Payot and Milhaud,[40] and in the +following century appears in the work of Duhem and of Henri Poincaré, +the noted mathematician, whose books on _La Science et l’Hypothèse_ +(1902), _La Valeur de la Science_ (1905), and _Science et Méthode_ +(1909) have confirmed many of Boutroux’s conclusions.[41] + + [40] Hannequin’s notable work is the _Essai critique sur L’Hypothèse + des Atomes_ (1896). Payot’s chief book is _La Croyance_ (1896). + Milhaud’s critique of science is contained in his _Essai sur les + Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude logique_ (1894), and in _Le + Rationnel_ (1898). Duhem’s book is _La Théorie physique_ (1906). + + + [41] It is interesting to note that Boutroux married Poincaré’s + sister, and that his son, Pierre Boutroux, whose education was guided + by both his uncle and his father, is now Professor at the Collège de + France. Emile Boutroux was a pupil of Zeller, whose lectures on Greek + philosophy he attended in Heidelberg, 1868. He expressed to the writer + his grief at the later prostitution of German thought to nationalist + and materialist aims. He was Professor of the History of Philosophy in + Paris from 1888, then Honorary Professor of Modern Philosophy. In 1914 + he gave the Hertz Lecture to the British Academy on _Certitude et + Vérité_. He was until his death Directeur de la Fondation Thiers, a + college for post-graduate study, literary, philosophical and + scientific. + + +While the new spiritualist current was thus tending to a position far +removed from that of Taine, at the commencement of our period, a +wavering note was struck by the idealist Fouillée (1838-1912), who, +while maintaining a general attitude in harmony with the new doctrines +endeavoured to effect a reconciliation with the more positive attitude +to science and philosophy. In his _philosophie des ideés-forces_[42] he +endeavoured to combine and reconcile the diverging attitudes of Plato +and of Comte. He shows a scorn of the neo-critical though of Renouvier. +He wrote in his shorter life more books than did Renouvier, and he is +conspicuous among this later group of thinkers for his mass-production +of books, which appeared steadily at the rate of one _per annum_ to the +extent of some thirty-seven volumes, after he gave up his position as +_maître de conférence_ at the Ecole Normale owing to ill-health.[43] + + [42] His _Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces_ appeared in 1890, _La + Psychologie des Idées-forces_ three years later. His _Morale des + Idées-forces_ belongs to the next century (1907), but its principles + were contained already in his thesis _Liberté et Déterminisme_. + + + [43] He only held this for three years, 1872-75. + + +Fouillée, with the noblest intentions, set himself to the solution of +that problem which we have already indicated as being the central one +of our period, the relation of science and ethics, or, in brief, the +problem of freedom. This was the subject of his thesis, undoubtedly the +best book he ever wrote, _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_, which he +sustained in 1872.[44] The attitude which he takes in that work is the +keynote to his entire philosophy. Well grounded in a knowledge of the +history of systems of philosophy, ancient and modern, he recognises +elements of truth in each, accompanied by errors due mainly to a +one-sided perspective.[45] He recalls a statement of Leibnitz to the +effect that most systems are right in their assertions and err in their +denials. Fouillée was convinced that there was reconciliation at the +heart of things, and that the contradictions we see are due to our +point of view. Facing, therefore, in this spirit, the problems of the +hour, he set himself “to reconcile the findings of science with the +reality of spirit, to establish harmony between the determinism upheld +by science and the liberty which the human spirit acclaims, between the +mechanism of nature and the aspirations of man’s heart, between the +True which is the object of all science and the Good which is the goal +of morality.”[46] + + [44] This work created quite a stir in the intellectual and political + world in France just after the war. Fouillée’s book led to an attack + on the ministry, which did not go so far as that occasioned by + Renouvier’s volume in 1849. (See p. 61.) + + + [45] Fouillée stands in marked contrast to Comte in his general + acquaintance with the history of ideas. Comte, like Spencer, knew + little of any philosophy but his own. Fouillée, however, was well + schooled, not only in Plato and the ancients, but had intimate + knowledge of the work of Kant, Comte, Spencer, Lotze, Renouvier, + Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson. + + + [46] This is also the idea expressed at length in his _Avenir de la + Métaphysique_, 1889. + + +Fouillée had no desire to offer merely another eclecticism _à la mode +de Cousin_; he selects, therefore, his own principle of procedure. This +principle is found in his notion of _idée-force_. Following ancient +usage, he employs the term “idea” for _any_ mental presentation. For +Fouillée, however, ideas are not _idées-spectacles_, merely exercising +a platonic influence “remote as the stars shining above us.” They are +not merely mental reproductions of an object, real or hypothetical, +outside the mind. Ideas are in themselves forces which endeavour to +work out their own realisation. Fouillée opposes his doctrine to the +evolutionary theory of Spencer and Huxley. He disagrees with their +mechanism and epiphenomenalism, pointing out legitimately that our +ideas, far from being results of purely physical and independent +causes, are themselves factors, and very vital factors, in the process +of evolution. Fouillée looks upon the mechanistic arrangement of the +world as an expression or symbol of idea or spirit in a manner not +unlike that of Lotze. + +He bears out his view of _idées-forces_ by showing how a state of +consciousness tries to realise its object. The idea of movement is +closely bound up with the physiological and physical action, and, +moreover, tends to produce it. This realisation is not a merely +mechanistic process but is teleological and depends on the vital unity +between the physical and the mental. On this fundamental notion +Fouillée constructs his psychology, his ethic, his sociology and his +metaphysic. He sees in the evolutionary process ideas at work which +tend to realise themselves. One of these is the idea of freedom, in +which idea he endeavours to find a true reconciliation of the problem +of determinism in science and the demands of the human spirit which +declares itself free. The love of freedom arising from the idea of +freedom creates in the long run this freedom. This is Fouillée’s method +all through. “To conceive and to desire the ideal is already to begin +its realisation.” He applies his method with much success in the realm +of ethics and sociology where he opposes to the Marxian doctrine of a +materialist determination of history that of a spiritual and +intellectual determination by ideas. Fouillée’s philosophy is at once +intellectual and voluntarist. He has himself described it as +“spiritualistic voluntarism.” It is a system of idealism which reflects +almost all the elements of modern thought. In places his doctrine of +reconciliation appears to break down, and the psychological law summed +up in _idées-forces_ is hardly sufficient to bear the vast erection +which Fouillée builds upon it. The idea is nevertheless a valuable and +fruitful one. Fouillée’s respect for positive science is noteworthy, as +is also his great interest in social problems.[47] + + [47] At the end of the century these problems received highly + specialised attention in the work of the sociologists inspired by + Comte’s influence. Works of special merit in this direction are: + tspmas, with his _Société’s animales_ (1876) and Tarde, predecessor of + Bergson at the Collège de France (1843-1907), with his _Criminalité + comparée_ (1898) and _Les Lois de l’Imitation_ (1900), also Durkheim’s + work _De la Division du Travail social_ (1893) and _Les Régles de la + Méthode sociologique_ (1894), and Izoulet, with his _La Cité moderne_ + (1894). Note those of Levy-Bruhl, Bouglé, and Le Bon. + + +The importance of the sociological aspect of all problems was +emphasised in a brilliant manner by Guyau (1854-1888), the step-son of +Fouillée. Guyau was a gifted young man, whose death at the early age of +thirty-four was a sore bereavement for Fouillée and undoubtedly a +disaster for philosophy. Guyau was trained by his step-father,[48] and +assisted him in his work. When ill-health forced both men from their +professorships,[49] they lived in happy comradeship at Mentone at the +same time, it is interesting to note, that Nietzsche was residing +there. Equally interesting is it to observe that although Guyau and +Fouillée were unaware of the German thinker’s presence or his work, +Nietzsche was well acquainted with theirs, particularly that of Guyau. +Doubtless he would have been pleased to meet the author of the +_Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_ (1885) and +_L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_ (1887). Editions of these books exist in the +_Nietzsche-Archiv_ bearing Nietzsche’s notes and comments. + + [48] Some authorities are of opinion that Fouillée was actually the + father of Guyau. Fouillée married Guyau’s mother. + + + [49] Guyau taught at the Lycée Condorcet (1874) where young Henri + Bergson was studying (1868-1878). + + +Guyau himself has a certain affinity with Nietzsche, arising from his +insistence upon Life and its power; but the author of the delightful +little collection _Vers d’un Philosophe_ (1881) is free from the egoism +expressed in _Der Wille zur Macht_. Guyau posits as his +_idée-directrice_ the conception of Life, both individual and social, +and in this concept he professes to find a basis more fundamental than +that of force, movement or existence. Life involves expansion and +intension, fecundity and creation. It means also consciousness, +intelligence and feeling, generosity and sociability. “He only lives +well who lives for others.” Life can only exist by extending. It can +never be purely egoistic and endure; a certain giving of itself, in +generosity and in love, is necessary for its continuance. Such is the +view which the French philosopher-poet expresses in opposition to +Nietzsche, starting, however, from the concept of Life did Nietzsche. +Guyau worked out a doctrine of ethics and of religion based upon this +concept which will demand our special attention in its proper place, +when we consider the moral and religious problem. He strove to give an +idealistic setting to the doctrines of evolution, and this alone would +give him a place among the great thinkers of the period. + +In his doctrine of the relation of thought and action Guyau followed +the _philosophie des idées-forces_. On the other hand there are very +remarkable affinities between the thought of Guyau and that of Bergson. +Guyau is not so severely intellectual as Fouillée; his manner of +thought and excellence of style are not unlike Bergson. More noticeably +he has a conception of life not far removed from the _élan vital_. His +“expansion of life” has, like Bergson’s _évolution créatrice_, no goal +other than that of its own activity. After Guyau’s death in 1888 it was +found that he had been exercised in mind about the problem of Time, for +he left the manuscript of a book entitled _La Genèse de l’Idée de +Temps_.[50] He therein set forth a belief in a psychological, +heterogeneous time other than mathematical time, which is really +spatial in character. In this psychological time the spirit lives. The +year following Guyau’s death, but before his posthumous work appeared, +Bergson published his thesis _Les Données immédiates de la Conscience_ +(1889), which is better described by its English title _Time and Free +Will_, and in which this problem which had been present to Guyau’s mind +is taken up and treated in an original and striking manner. In Guyau, +too, is seen the rise of the conception of activity so marked in the +work of Bergson and of Blondel. “It is _action_ and the power of life,” +he insists, “which alone can solve, if not entirely at least partially, +those problems to which abstract thought gives rise.”[51] + + [50] This work was edited and published by Fouillée two years after + Guyau’s death, and reviewed by Bergson in the _Revue philosophique_ in + 1891. + + + [51] _Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 250. + + +Bergson, born in 1859, Professor at the Collège de France from 1901 to +1921, now retired, has had a popularity to which none of the other +thinkers of this group, or indeed of our period, has attained. He is +the only one of the new idealists or spiritualists who is well known +outside his own country. For this reason foreigners are apt to regard +him as a thinker unrelated to any special current of thought, an +innovator. Although much is original and novel in his philosophy, his +thought marks the stage in the development to which the spiritualist +current has attained in contemporary thought. The movement of which he +forms a part we can trace back as far as Maine de Biran, to whom +Bergson owes much, as he does also to Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux +and Guyau. + +Two important books by Bergson came prior to 1900, his _Time and Free +Will_ (1889) and his _Matter and Memory_ (1896). His famous _Creative +Evolution_ appeared in 1907. It is but his first work “writ large,” for +we have in _Time and Free Will_ the essentials of his philosophy. + +He makes, as did Guyau, a central point of Change, a universal +becoming, and attacks the ordinary notion of time, which he regards as +false because it is spatial. We ourselves live and act in _durée_, +which is Bergson’s term for real time as opposed to that fictitious +time of the mathematician or astronomer. He thus lays stress upon the +inward life of the spirit, with its richness and novelty, its eternal +becoming, its self-creation. He has his own peculiar manner of +approaching our central problem, that of freedom, of which he realises +the importance. For him the problem resolves itself into an application +of his doctrine of _la durée_, to which we shall turn in due course. + +Bergson insists with Guyau and Blondel upon the primary significance of +action. The importance attached to action colours his whole theory of +knowledge. His epistemology rests upon the thesis that “the brain is an +instrument of action and not of representation,” and that “in the study +of the problems of perception the starting- point should be action and +not sensation.” This is a psychology far different from that of +Condillac and Taine, and it is largely upon his merit as a psychologist +that Bergson’s fame rests. He devoted his second work, _Matter and +Memory_, to showing that memory is something other than a function of +the brain. His distinction between “pure” memory and mere memorising +power, which is habit, recalls the _mémoire_ of Maine de Biran and of +Ravaisson upon _Habit_. Bergson sees in memory a manifestation of +spirit, which is a fundamental reality, no mere epiphenomenon. Spirit +is ever striving against matter, but in spite of this dualism which he +cannot escape, he maintains that spirit is at the origin of things. +This is a difficulty which is more clearly seen in his later book, +_Creative Evolution_. Matter is our enemy and threatens our personality +in its spiritual reality by a tendency to lead us into habit, away from +life, freedom and creativeness. + +Further we must, he claims, endeavour to see things _sub specie +durationis in a durée_, in an eternal becoming. We cannot expect to +grasp all the varied reality of life in a formula or indeed in any +purely intellectual manner. This is the chief defect of science and of +the so-called scientific point of view. It tries to fix in concepts, +moulds and solid forms a reality which is living and moving eternally. +For Bergson all is Change, and this eternal becoming we can only grasp +by intuition. Intuition and intellect do not, however, oppose one +another. We are thus led to realise that Life is more than logic. The +Bergsonian philosophy concludes with intuitionism and contingency, +which drew upon it the severe criticisms of Fouillée,[52] who termed it +a philosophy of scepticism and nihilism. Of all the spiritualist group +Fouillée stands nearest the positive attitude to science, and his +strong intellectualism comes out in his criticism of Bergson, who well +represents, together with Blondel, the tendency towards +non-intellectual attitudes inherent in the spiritualist development. +Blondel has endeavoured to treat the great problems, a task which +Bergson has not attempted as yet, partly because he (Bergson) shares +Renan’s belief that “the day of philosophic systems has gone,” partly +because he desires to lay the basis of a philosophy of the spirit to +which others after him may contribute, and so he devotes his attention +to method and to those crucial points, such as the problem of freedom +upon which a larger doctrine must necessarily rest.[53] + + [52] Particularly in his work _Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction + contre la Science positive_ (cf. .206), 1896, and later in _La Pensée + et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes_, 1910. + + + [53] For a fuller appreciation of the Bergsonian doctrines than is + possible in such a survey as this, the reader is referred to the + author’s monograph, _Bergson and His Philosophy_, Methuen and Co., + 1920. + + +The current of the new idealism or spiritualism reaches a culminating +point in the work of Blondel (born about 1870), whose remarkable and +noteworthy book _L’Action_ appeared in l893.[54] The fundamental thesis +of the Philosophy of Action[55] is that man’s life is primarily one of +action, consequently philosophy must concern itself with the active +life and not merely with thought. By its nature, action is something +unique and irreducible to other elements or factors. It is not the +result of any synthesis: it is itself a living synthesis, and cannot be +dealt with as the scientist deals with his data. Blondel lays emphasis, +as did Bergson, upon “the living” being unique and inexpressible in +formulae. Intellect cannot grasp action; “one penetrates the living +reality only by placing oneself at the dynamic point of view of the +will.”[56] His words recall Bergson’s attitude to the free act. “The +principle of action eludes positive knowledge at the moment at which it +makes it possible, and, in a word that needs to be better defined, it +is subjectivity.”[57] + + [54] The same year in which the philosophic interest in France, + growing since 1870, and keener in the eighties, led to the foundation + of the famous _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_ by Xavier Léon. In + 1876 (the same year in which Professor Croom Robertson in England + established the periodical _Mind_) Ribot had founded the _Revue + philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger_. These journals, along + with the teaching in the Lycées, have contributed to make the French + people the best educated, philosophically, of any people. + + + [55] It is interesting to note that this designation has been used by + its author to replace his original term “_pragmatisme_,” which he + employed in 1888 and abandoned upon becoming acquainted with the + theory of Peirce and James, and with their use of the term in another + manner, with which he did not agree. See _Bulletin de la Société + française de Philosophie_, 1902. + + + [56] _L’ Action_, p. 100. + + + [57] _Ibid_., p. 87. + + +Blondel, however, leads us beyond this subjectivity, for it is not the +will which causes what is. Far from that, he maintains that in so far +as it wills it implies something which it does not and cannot create of +itself; it wills to be what it is not yet. We do not act for the mere +sake of acting, but for some end, something beyond the particular act. +Action is not self-contained or self- sufficing: it is a striving to +further attainment or achievement. It therefore pre-supposes some +reality beyond itself. Here appear the elements of “passion” and +“suffering” due to resistance, for all action involves some opposition. +In particular moral action implies this resistance and a consciousness +of power to overcome the resistance, and it therefore involves a +reality which transcends the sphere in which we act. + +Owing to this inequality between the power and the wish, we are obliged +to complete our actions or our activity in general by a belief in a +Reality beyond. It is, however, “a beyond that is within,” a Divine +power immanent in man. This view, Blondel claims, unites the idea of +God “transcendent” with the idea of God as “immanent.” Man’s action +partakes of both, for in so far as it results from his own will it is +immanent; transcendence is, however, implied in the fact that the end +of man’s action as a whole is not “given.” Blondel leads us to a +conception of a religious idealism in which every act of our ordinary +existence leads ultimately to a religious faith. Every action is +sacramental. Blondel and his follower Laberthonnière, who has taken up +this idea from his master in his volume of _Essais de Philosophie +réligieuse_ (1901), go beyond a purely pragmatist or voluntarist +position by finding the supreme value of all action, and of the +universe, not in will but in love. For Blondel this word is no mere +sentiment or transient feeling, but a concrete reality which is the +perfection of will and of intellect alike, of action and of knowledge. +The “Philosophy of Action,” asserts Blondel, includes the “Philosophy +of the Idea.” In the fact of love, he claims, is found the perfect +unity between the self and the non-self, the ground of personality and +its relation to the totality of persons, producing a unity in which +each is seen as an end to others as well as to himself. “Love,” says +Laberthonnière, “is the first and last word of all. It is the +principle, the means and the end. It is in loving that one gets away +from self and raises oneself above one’s temporal individuality. It is +in loving that one finds God and other beings, and that one finds +oneself.” It is, in short, these idealists claim, the _Summum Bonum_; +in it is found the Absolute which philosophers and religious mystics of +all ages have ever sought. + +The “philosophy of action” is intimately bound up with the “philosophy +of belief,” formulated by Ollé-Laprune, and the movement in religious +thought known generally as Modernism, which is itself due to the +influence of modern philosophic thought upon the dogmas of the +Christian religion, as these are stated by the Roman Church. Both the +Philosophy of Belief and Modernism are characterised by an intense +spirituality and a moral earnestness which maintain the primacy of the +practical reason over the theoretical reason. Life, insists +Ollé-Laprune in his book _Le Prix de la Vie_ (l885),[58] is not +contemplation but active creation. He urges us to a creative evolution +of the good, to an employment of _idées-forces_. “There are things to +be made whose measure is not determined; there are things to be +discovered, to be invented, new forms of the good, ideas which have +never yet been received—creations, as it were, of the spirit that loves +the good.” This dynamism and power of will is essential. We must not +lose ourselves in abstractions; action is the supreme thing: it alone +constitutes reality. + + [58] This has been followed in the new century by _La Raison et le + Rationalisme_, 1906. As early as 1880, however, he issued his work _La + Certitude morale_, which influenced Blondel, his pupil. + + +A similar note is sounded by the Modernists or Neo-Catholics, +particularly by the brilliant disciple and successor of Bergson, Le +Roy, who in _Dogme et Critique_ (1907) has based the reality of +religious dogma upon its practical significance. We find Péguy (who +fell on the field of battle in 1914) applying Bergsonian ideas to a +fervid religious faith. Wilbois unites these ideas to social ethics in +his _Devoir et Durée_ (1912). In quite different quarters the new +spiritualism and philosophy of action have appeared as inspiring the +Syndicalism of Sorel, who endeavours to apply the doctrines of Bergson, +Ollé-Laprune and Blondel to the solution of social questions in his +_Réflexions sur la Violence_ (1907) and _Illusions du Progrès_ (1911). + +It would be erroneous to regard Bergson’s intuitional philosophy as +typical of all contemporary French thought. Following Renouvier, +Fouillée and Boutroux, there prevail currents of a more intellectualist +or rationalist type, to which we are, perhaps, too close to see in true +and historical perspective. The _élan vital_ of French thought +continues to manifest itself in a manner which combines the work of +Boutroux and Bergson with Blondel’s idealism. A keen interest is being +taken in the works of Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, and this is obviously +influencing the trend of French philosophy at the moment, without +giving rise to a mere eclecticism. French thought is too original and +too energetic for that. In addition to these classical studies we +should note the great and growing influence of the work of Durkheim and +of Hamelin, both of whom we have already mentioned. The former gave an +immense impetus to sociological studies by his earlier work. Further +interest arose with his _Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse_ in +1912. Hamelin indicated a turning-point from _neo-criticisme_ through +the new spiritualist doctrines to Hegelian methods and ideas. +Brunschwicg, who produced a careful study of Spinoza, wrote as early as +1897 on _La Modalité du Jugement_, a truly Kantian topic. This +thinker’s later works, _Les Etapes de la Philosophie mathematique_ +(1912) and the little volume _La Vie de l’esprit_, illustrate a +tendency to carry out the line taken by Boutroux—namely, to arrive at +the statement of a valid idealism disciplined by positivism. The papers +of Berthelot in his _Evolutionnisme et Platonisme_ are a further +contribution to this great end. In the work of Evellin, _La Raison pure +et les Antinomies_ (1907), the interest in Kant and Hegel is again +seen. Noël, who contributed an excellent monograph on Lachelier to the +_Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_ (that journal which is an +excellent witness in itself to the vitality of contemporary French +philosophy), produced a careful study of Hegel’s Logik in 1897. Since +that date interest has grown along the lines of Boutroux, Bergson and +Blondel in an attempt to reach a positive idealism, which would combine +the strictly positivist attitude so dear to French minds with the +tendency to spiritualism or idealism which they also manifest. This +attempt, which in some respects amounts to an effort to restate the +principles of Hegel in modern or contemporary terms, was undertaken by +Weber in 1903 in his book entitled _Vers le Positivisme absolu par +l’Idéalisme_. Philosophy in France realises to-day that the true course +of spiritual development will be at once positive and idealistic. + + + + +CHAPTER III +SCIENCE + + +INTRODUCTION: The scientific outlook—Progress of the sciences—The +positivist spirit, its action on science, philosophy and literature—The +problem as presented to philosophy. + +I. Comte’s positivism—Work of prominent scientists—Position maintained +by Berthelot and Bernard—Renan’s confidence—Vacherot and +Taine—Insufficiency of sciences alone. + +II. Cournot and Renouvier attack the dogmatism of science. + +III. The neo-spiritualist group continue and develop this attack, which +becomes a marked feature in Lachelier, Boutroux, and Bergson. + +Entire change of attitude in the development of the period. + +The problem of freedom opened up in the process. + + + + +CHAPTER III +SCIENCE + +Having thus surveyed the main currents of our period and indicated the +general attitude adopted to knowledge by the various thinkers, we +approach more closely to the problem of the relation of science and +philosophy. The nineteenth century was a period in which this problem +was keenly felt, and France was the country in which it was tensely +discussed by the most acute minds among the philosophers and among the +scientists. French thought and culture, true to the tradition of the +great geometrician and metaphysician Descartes, have produced men whose +training has been highly scientific as well as philosophical. Her +philosophers have been keenly versed in mathematics and physical +science, while her scientists have had considerable power as +philosophical thinkers. + +One of the very prominent tendencies of thought in the first half of +the nineteenth century was the growing belief and confidence in the +natural sciences. In France this was in large measure due to the +progress of those sciences themselves and to the influences of Comte, +which was supported by the foreign influences of Kant’s teaching and +that of the English School, particularly John Stuart Mill. These three +great streams of thought, widely different in many respects, had this +in common—that they tended to confuse philosophy and science to such a +degree that it seemed doubtful whether the former could be granted any +existence by itself. Science, somewhat intoxicated by the praise and +worship bestowed upon her, became proud, arrogant and overbearing. She +scorned facts which could not be adapted to her own nature, she ignored +data which were not quantitative and materialistic, and she regarded +truth as a system of laws capable of expression by strict mathematical +methods and formulae*. Hence science became characterised by a firm +belief in absolute determinism, in laws of necessity operating after +the manner of mathematical laws. This “universal mathematic” +endeavoured also to explain the complex by reference to the simple. +Difficulties were encountered all along the line, for experience, it +was found, did not quite fit into rigid formulae*, “new” elements of +experience presented a unique character and distressing discrepancy. +Confidence in science, however, was not shaken by this, for the perfect +science, it was imagined, was assured in a short time. Patience might +be needed, but no doubt was entertained of the _possibility_ of such a +construction. Doubters were told to look at the rising sciences of +psychology and sociology, which, as Auguste Comte had himself +prophesied, were approaching gradually to the “type” venerated—namely, +an exact and mathematical character. Biology, it was urged, was merely +a special branch of physico-chemistry. As for beliefs in freedom, in +art, morality and religion, these, like philosophy (metaphysics) +itself, belonged to the earlier stages (the theological and +metaphysical) of Comte’s list, stages rapidly to be replaced by the +third and final “positive” era. + +Such, briefly stated, were the affirmations so confidently put forward +on behalf of science by its devoted worshippers. Confidence in science +was a marked feature of the work written by Renan in the years +1848-1849, _L’Avenir de la Science_. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, +Renan himself played a large part in undermining this confidence. Yet +the time of his writing this work is undoubtedly the period when the +confidence in science was most marked. By this it is not implied that +an even greater confidence in science has not been professed since by +many thinkers. That is probably true, but the important point is that +at this time the confidence in science was less resisted than ever in +its history. It seemed to have a clear field and positivism seemed to +be getting unto itself a mighty victory. + +The cult of facts, which is so marked a characteristic of the +scientific or positivist temper, penetrated, it is interesting to note, +into the realm of literature, where it assumed the form of “realism.” +In his Intelligence we find Taine remarking, “_de tout petits fails +bien choisis, importants, significatifs, amplement circonstanciés et +minutieusement notés, voilà aujourd’hui la matière de toute +science_.”[1] It was also, in the opinion of several writers, the +_matière de toute littérature_. The passion for minute details shows +itself in the realism of Flaubert and Zola, in the psychology of +Stendthal* and the novels of the Goncourts. It was no accident that +their works were so loved by Taine. A similar spirit of “positivism” or +“realism” animated both them and him. + + [1] Preface to _Intelligence_. + + +With the turn of the half century, however, a change manifested itself +by the fact that the positivist current began to turn against itself, +and our period is, in some respects, what Fouillée has called _la +réaction centre la science positive_.[2] The function of philosophy is +essentially criticism, and although at that period the vitality of +philosophy was low, it nevertheless found enough energy to criticise +the demands and credentials of Science. + + [2] Compare also Aliotta’s book, _The Idealistic Reaction against + Science_, Eng. trans., 19l4. + + +The publication of Claude Bernard’s volume _Introduction à la Médecine +experimentale_[3] drew from the pen of Paul Janet, the last of the +Eclectic School dominated by Cousin, an article of criticism which +appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, and was later published in his +volume of essays entitled, _Les Problèmes du XIXe Siècle_. Although +Janet’s essay reveals all the deficiencies of the older spiritualism, +he makes a gallant attempt to combat the dogmatism and the assumed +finality of Bernard’s point of view and that of the scientists in +general. Janet regarded the sciences and their relation to philosophy +as constituting an important problem for the century and in this +judgment he was not mistaken. + + [3] _Cf_. Livre III., _Science_, chap, i., on “Method in General”; + chap, ii., on The Experimental Method in Physiology,” pp. 213-279. + +I + +We have, in our Introductory Chapter, reckoned Auguste Comte among the +influential antecedents of our period. Here, in approaching the study +of the problem of science, we may note that the tendency towards the +strictly scientific attitude, and to the promotion of the scientific +_spirit_ in general, was partly due to the influence of his positivism. +Comte’s intended Religion of Humanity failed, his system of positive +philosophy has been neglected, but the SPIRIT which he inculcated has +abided and has borne fruit. We would be wrong, however, if we +attributed much to Comte as the originator of that spirit. His positive +philosophy, although it greatly stimulated and strengthened the +positive attitude adopted by the natural sciences, was itself in large +measure inspired by and based upon these sciences. Consequently much of +Comte’s glory was a reflected light, his thought was a challenge to the +old spiritualism, an assertion of the rights of the sciences to +proclaim their existence and to demand serious consideration. + +Although he succeeded in calling the attention of philosophy to the +natural sciences, yet owing to the mere fact that he based himself on +the sciences of his day much of his thought has become obsolete by the +progress and extension of those very sciences themselves. He tended, +with a curious dogmatism, to assign limits to the sciences by keeping +them in separate compartments and in general by desiring knowledge to +be limited to human needs. Although there is important truth in his +doctrine of discontinuity or irreducible differences, the subsequent +development of the natural sciences has cleared away many barriers +which he imagined to be impassable. There still are, and may always be, +gaps in our knowledge of the progress from inorganic to organic, from +the living creature to self-conscious personality, but we have a +greater conception of the unity of Nature than had Comte. Many new +ideas and discoveries have transformed science since his day, +particularly the doctrines dealing with heat as a form of motion, with +light, electricity, and the radio-activity of matter, the structure of +the atom, and the inter-relation of physics and chemistry. + +Comte’s claim for different methods in the different departments of +science is of considerable interest, in view of present-day biological +problems and the controversies of vitalists, mechanists and +neo-vitalists.[4] Although Comte insisted upon discontinuity, yet he +urged the necessity for an _esprit d’ensemble_, the consideration of +things synthetically, in their “togetherness.” He feared that analysis, +the _esprit de détail_ or mathematisation, was being carried out _à +l’outrance_. This opinion he first stated in 1825 in his tract entitled +_Considérations sur les Sciences et les Savants_. On the social side he +brought this point out further by insisting on the _esprit d’ensemble_ +as involving the social standpoint in opposition to a purely +individualistic view of human life. + + [4] See, for example, _The Mechanism of Life_, by Dr. Johnstone, + Professor of Oceanography in the University of Liverpool. (Arnold, + 1921.) + + +Comte was slow to realise the importance of Ethics as an independent +study. Psychology he never recognised as a separate discipline, deeming +it part of physiology. He gave a curious appreciation to phrenology. +Unfortunately he overlooked the important work done by the +introspectionist psychologists in England and the important work of +Maine de Biran in his own country. One is struck by Comte’s inability +to appreciate the immense place occupied by psychology in modern life +and in particular its expression in the modern novel and in much modern +poetry. An acquaintance with the works of men like De Regnier, Pierre +Loti and Anatole France is sufficient to show how large a factor the +psychological method is in French literature and life. It is to be put +down to Comte’s eternal discredit that he failed to appreciate +psychology. Here lies the greatest defect in his work, and it is in +this connection that his work is now being supplemented. Positivism in +France to-day is not a synonym for “Comtism” at all; the term is now +employed to denote the spirit and temper displayed in the methods of +the exact sciences. For Comte, we must never forget, scientific +investigation was a means and not an end in itself. His main purpose +was social and political regeneration. Positivism since Comte differs +from his philosophy by a keen attention bestowed upon psychology, and +many of Comte’s inadequate conceptions have been enriched by the +introduction of a due recognition of psychological factors. + +It is to be noted that Comte died two years before Darwin’s +_chef-d’œuvre_ appeared, and that he opposed the doctrine of evolution +as put forward by Lamarck. Although Comte’s principle of discontinuity +may in general have truth in it, the problem is a far more complicated +one than he imagined it to be. Again, while Comte’s opposition to the +subjectivism of Cousin was a wholesome influence, he did not accord to +psychology its full rights, and this alone has been gravely against the +acceptance of his philosophy, and explains partly the rise and progress +of the new spiritualist doctrines. His work served a useful purpose, +but Comte never closed definitely with the problem of the precise +significance of “positivism” or with its relation to a general +conception of the universe; in short, he confined himself to increasing +the scientific spirit in thought, leaving aside the difficulty of +relating science and philosophy. + +Comte stated in his _Philosophie positive_[5] that he regarded attempts +to explain all phenomena by reference to one law as futile, even when +undertaken by the most competent minds well versed in the study of the +sciences. Although he believed in discontinuity he tried to bridge some +gaps, notably by his endeavour to refer certain physiological phenomena +to the law of gravitation. + + [5] Vol. i., pp. 53-56. + + +The chief work which this undoubtedly great mind accomplished was the +organisation of the scientific spirit as it appeared in his time. Renan +hardly does justice to him in his sarcastic remark in his _Souvenirs +d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_. “I felt quite irritated at the idea of +Auguste Comte being dignified with the title of a great man for having +expressed in bad French what all scientific minds had seen for the last +two hundred years as clearly as he had done.” His work merits more than +dismissal in such a tone, and we may here note, as the essence of the +spirit which he tried to express, his definition of the positive or +scientific attitude to the universe given at the commencement of his +celebrated Cours de _Philosophie positive_. There, in defining the +positive stage, Comte speaks of it as that period in which “the human +spirit, recognising the impossibility of obtaining absolute +conceptions, abandons the search for the origin and the goal of the +universe and the inner causes of things, to set itself the task merely +of discovering, by reasoning and by experience combined, the effective +laws of phenomena—that is to say, their invariable relations of +succession and of similarity.”[6] This positive spirit Comte strove to +express rather than to originate, for it was already there in the +sciences. Undoubtedly his work made it more prominent, more clear, and +so we have to note an interaction between positivism in the sciences +and in philosophy. + + [6] Leçon i. + + +It is equally important for our purpose to notice that the period was +one rich in scientific thought. The work of Lavoisier and Bichat, both +of whom as contemporaries of Maine de Biran, belong to the former +century, was now bearing fruit. Lavoisier’s influence had been great +over chemistry, which he established on a modern basis, by formulating +the important theory of the conservation of mass and by clearing away +false and fan- tastic conceptions regarding combustion.[7] Bichat, the +great anatomist and physiologist, died in 1802, but the publication of +his works in a completed form was not accomplished until 1854. The work +and influence of the _Académie des Sciences_ are noteworthy features of +French culture at this time. There stands out prominently the highly +important work of Cuvier in anatomy, zoology and palæontology.[8] The +nineteenth century was a period of great scientists and of great +scientific theories. Leverrier, applying himself to the problem of the +motions of Uranus, found a solution in the hypothesis of another +planet, Neptune, which was actually discovered from his calculations in +1846. This was a notable victory for logical and scientific method. In +1809 Lamarck had outlined, prior to Spencer or Darwin, the scheme of +the evolutionary theory (Transformism).[9] Spencer’s work, which +appeared from 1850 onwards, has always commanded respect and attention +in France even among its critics.[10] Interest increased upon the +publication of Darwin’s _Origin of Species_ in 1859, and its +translation into French in 1862. These dates coincide with the rise of +the _Société d’Anthropologie_ de Paris, founded by Broca in the same +year that Darwin’s book appeared. Another translation from Darwin’s +work followed in 1872, _Descendance de l’Homme_, which aroused further +interest in the evolutionary theory. At the same time the work of men +such as Pasteur, Bertrand, Berthelot and Bernard gave an impetus and a +power to science. Poincare belongs rather to the twentieth century. +Pasteur (1822-1895) showed mankind how science could cure its ills by +patient labour and careful investigation, and earned the world’s +gratitude for his noble work. His various _Discours_ and his volume, +_Le Budget de la Science_ (1868), show his faith in this progressive +power of science. In Bertrand (1822-1900), his contemporary who held +the position of Professor of Mathematics at the College de France, a +similar attitude appears. + + [7] Lavoisier perished at the guillotine in 1794, and his death was a + tragic loss to science. + + + [8] Cuvier’s _Anatomie comparée_ appeared in the years 1800-1805, + following his _Histoire naturelle_ (1798-1799). Later came his + _Rapport sur les Sciences naturelles_ (1810) and his work _Le Regne + animal_ (1816).He died in 1832. We may note that Cuvier opposed the + speculative evolutionary doctrines of Lamarck, with whom he indulged + in controversy. + + + [9] In his work, _Philosophie zoologique, ou Exposition des + Considérations relatives a l’Histoire naturelle des Animaux_, 2 vols + Paris, Dentu, 1809. + + + [10] His _Social Statics_ was published in 1850, and his _Psychology_ + five years later. His life work, _The Synthetic Philosophy_, extends + over the period 1860-1896. + + +One of the foremost scientific minds, however, was Claude Bernard +(1813-1878), a friend of Renan, who held the Chair of Medicine at the +College de France, and was, in addition, the Professor of Physiology at +the Faculté des Sciences at the Sorbonne. Science, Bernard maintained, +concerns itself only with phenomena and their laws. He endeavoured in +his celebrated _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médécine expérimentale_, +published in 1865, to establish the science of physiology upon a sound +basis, having respect only to fact, not owning homage to theories of a +metaphysical character or to the authority of persons or creeds. He +desired to obtain by such a rigorous and precise method, objectivity. +“The experimental method is,” he insists, “the really scientific +method, which proclaims the freedom of the human spirit and its +intelligence. It not only shakes off the yoke of metaphysics and of +theology, in addition it refuses to admit personal considerations and +subjective standpoints.”[11] + + [11] _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médécine expérimentale_, chap. ii, + sect. 4. + + +Bernard’s attitude is distinctly that of a positivist, and the general +tone of his remarks as well as his attitude on many special points +agrees with that of Comte. His conclusions regarding physiology are +akin to those expressed by Comte concerning biology. Bernard excludes +any metaphysical hypothesis such as the operation of a vital principle, +and adheres strictly to physicochemical formulas. He accepts, however, +Comte’s warning about the reduction of the higher to terms of the +lower, or, in Spencerian phraseology, the explanation of the more +complex by the less complex. Consequently, he carefully avoids the +statement that he desires to “reduce” physiology to physics and +chemistry. He makes no facile and light-hearted transition as did +Spencer; on the contrary, he claims that the living has some specific +quality which cannot be “reduced” to other terms, and which cannot be +summed up in the formulae of physics or chemistry. The physiologist and +the medical practitioner must never overlook the fact that every living +being forms an organism and an individuality. The physiologist, +continues Bernard, must take notice of this unity or harmony of the +whole, even while he penetrates the interior to know the mechanism of +each of its parts. The physicist and the chemist can ignore any notion +of final causes in the facts they observe, but the physiologist must +admit a harmonious finality, a harmony pre-established in the organism, +whose actions form and express a unity and solidarity, since they +generate one another. Life itself is _creation_; it is not capable of +expression merely in physico-chemical formulae. The creative character, +which is its essence, never can be so expressed. Bernard postulated an +abstract, _idée directrice et créatrice_, presiding over the evolution +of an organism. “_Dans tout germe vivant, il y a une idée créatrice qui +se développe et se manifeste par l’organisation. Pendant toute sa durée +l’être vivant reste sous l’influence de cette même force vitale, +créatrice, et la mort arrive lorsqu’elle ne peut plus se réaliser. Ici +comme partout, tout dérive de l’idée, qui, seule, crée et dirige_.”[12] + + [12] _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médécine expérimentale_, p.151 ff. + + +The positivist spirit is again very marked in the doctrines of +Berthelot (1827-1907), another very great friend of Renan, who, in +addition to being a Senator, and Minister of Education and of Foreign +Affairs, held the Chair of Organic Chemistry at the Collège de France. +In 1886 he published his volume, Science et Philosophie, which contains +some interesting and illuminating observations upon _La Science idéale +et la Science positive_. Part of this, it may be noted, was written as +early as 1863, in correspondence with Renan, and as a reply to a letter +of his of which we shall speak presently.[13] Berthelot states his case +with a clearness which merits quotation. + + [13] See the _Fragments_ of Renan, published 1876, pp 193-241. + _Reponse de M. Berthelot_. + + +“Positive science,” he says, “seeks neither first causes nor the +ultimate goal of things. In order to link together a multitude of +phenomena by one single law, general in character and conformable to +the nature of things, the human spirit has followed a simple and +invariable method. It has stated the facts in accordance with +observation and experience, compared them, extracted their relations, +that is the general facts, which have in turn been verified by +observation and experience, which verification constitutes their only +guarantee of truth. A progressive generalisation, deduced from prior +facts and verified unceasingly by new observations, thus brings our +knowledge from the plane of particular and popular facts to general +laws of an abstract and universal character. But, in the construction +of this pyramid of science, everything from base to summit rests upon +observation and experience. It is one of the principles of positive +science that no reality can be established by a process of reasoning. +The universe cannot be grasped by a _priori_ methods.” + +Like Comte, Berthelot believed in the progress of all knowledge through +a theological and metaphysical stage to a definitely scientific or +positive era. The sciences are as yet young, and we cannot imagine the +development and improvement, social and moral, which will accrue from +their triumph in the future. For Berthelot, as for Renan, the idea of +progress was bound up essentially with the triumph of the scientific +spirit. In a Discourse at the Sorbonne given in commemoration of the +fiftieth anniversary of his being appointed Professor at the Collège de +France, we find this faith in science reiterated. “To-day,” he remarks, +“Science claims a triple direction of societies, materially, +intellectually and morally. By this fact the role of the men of +science, both as individuals and as a class, has unceasingly come to +play a great part in modern states.” + +These scientific men, Berthelot and Bernard, with whom Renan was on +terms of friendship, had a large influence in the formation of his +thought, after he had quitted the seminary and the Church. As a young +man Renan possessed the positive spirit in a marked degree, and did not +fail to disclose his enthusiasm for “Science” and for the scientific +method. His book _L’Avenir de la Science_, which we have already noted, +was written when he was only twenty-five, and under the immediate +influence of the events of 1848, particularly the socialist spirit of +Saint-Simon and the “organising” attitude of Auguste Comte. It did not, +however, see publication until 1890, when the Empire had produced a +pessimistic temper in him, later accentuated by the Commune and the +Prussian War. The dominant note of the whole work is the touching and +almost pathetic belief in Science, which leads the young writer to an +optimism both in thought and in politics. “Science” constitutes for him +the all-in-all. Although he had just previously abandoned the seminary, +his priestly style remained with him to such a degree that even his +treatment of science is characterised by a mixture of the unction of +the _curé_ and the subtilty of the dialectician. Levites were still to +be necessary to the people of Israel, but they were to be the priests +of the most High, whose name, according to Renan, was “Science.” + +His ardour for Science is not confined to this one book: it runs +through all his writings. Prospero, a character who personifies +rational thought in _L’Eau de Jouvence_, one of Renan’s _Drames +philosophiques_, expresses an ardent love for science continually. In +his preface to _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_ we find Renan upon +the same theme. Quaintly enough he not only praises the objectivity +which is characteristic of the scientific point of view, but seems to +delight in its abstraction. The superiority of modern science consists, +he claims, in this very abstraction. But he is aware that the very +indefatigability with which we fathom nature removes us, in a sense, +further from her. He recognises how science leads away from the +immediacy of vital and close contact with nature herself. “This is, +however, as it should be,” asserts Renan, “and let no one fear to +prosecute his researches, for out of this merciless dissection comes +life.” He does not stay to assure us, or to enlighten us, as to how +that life can be infused into the abstract facts which have resulted +from the process of dissection. Fruitful and suggestive as many of his +pages are, they fail to approach the concrete difficulties which this +passage mentions. + +Writing from Dinant in Brittany in 1863 to his friend, Berthelot, Renan +gives his view of the Sciences of Nature and the Historical Sciences. +This letter, reprinted in his _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_, +in 1876, expresses Renan’s.views in a clear and simple form upon the +place of science in his mind and also upon the idea of progress, as for +him the two are intimately connected. Extreme confidence is expressed +in the power of science. Renan at this time had written, but not +published, his _Avenir de la Science_. In a brief manner this letter +summarises much contained in the larger work. The point of view is +similar. Science is to be the great reforming power. + +The word “Science” is so constantly upon Renan’s lips that we can see +that it has become an obsession with mm to employ it, or a device. +Certainly Renan’s extensive and ill-defined usage of it conceals grave +difficulties. One is tempted frequently to regard it as a synonym for +philosophy or metaphysics, a word which he dislikes. That does not, +however, add to clearness, and Renan’s usage of “Science” as a term +confuses both science and philosophy together. Even if this were not +the case, there is another important point to note— namely, that even +on a stricter interpretation Renan, by his wide use of the term, +actually undermines the confidence in the natural sciences. For he +embraces within the term “Science” not merely those branches of +investigation which we term in general the sciences of nature, but also +the critical study of language, of history and literature. He expressly +endeavours to show in the letter to Berthelot that true science must +include the product of man’s spirit and the record of the development +of that spirit. + +Renan assumed quite definitely a positivist attitude to metaphysics. +“Philosophy,” he remarks, “is not a separate science; it is one side of +every science. In the great optic pencil of human knowledge it is the +central region where the rays meet in one and the same light.” +Metaphysical speculation he scorned, but he admitted the place for a +criticism of the human mind such as had been given by Kant in _The +Critique of Pure Reason_. + +Kantian also, in its professions at least, was the philosophy of +Vacherot, who stated that the aim of his work, _La Métaphysique et la +Science_, was “the reconciliation of metaphysics with science.”[14] +These dialogues between a philosopher and a man of science, for of such +discussions the book is composed, never really help us to get close to +the problem, for Vacherot’s Kantianism is a profession which merely +covers an actual positivism. His metaphysical doctrines are +superimposed on a severe and rigid naturalism, but are kept from +conflict with them, or even relation with them, by being allotted to a +distant limbo of pure ideals, outside the world which science displays +to us. + + [14] See particularly his statements to this effect in his Preface, + pp. xxxvii-xl. + + +Taine, in spite of his severely positive attitude, was a strong +champion of metaphysics. The sciences needed, he claimed, a science of +first principles, a metaphysic. Without it, “the man of science is +merely a _manœuvre_ and the artist a _dilettante_.” The positive +sciences he re- garded as inferior types of analysis. Above them “is a +superior analysis which is metaphysics, and which reduces or takes up +these laws of the sciences into a universal formula.” This higher +analysis, however, does not give the lie to the others: it completes +them. + +It was indeed a belief and hope of Taine that the sciences will be more +and more perfected until they can each be expressed in a kind of +generic formula, which in turn may be capable of expression in some +single formula. This single law is being sought by science and +metaphysic, although it must belong to the latter rather than to the +former. From it, as from a spring, proceeds, according to Taine, the +eternal roll of events and the infinite sea of things. + +Taine’s antagonism to the purely empirical schools centres round his +conception of the law of causality. He disagrees with the assertion +that this law is a synthetic, a _posteriori_ judgment, a habit, as Hume +said, or a mechanical _attente_, as Mill thought, or a generalisation +of the sensation of effort which we feel in ourselves, as was suggested +by Maine de Biran. Yet he also opposes Kant’s doctrine, in which +causality is regarded as a synthetic _a priori_ judgment. His own +criticism of Hume and Kant was directed to denial of the elements of +heterogeneity in experience, which are so essential to Hume’s view, and +to a denial of the distinction maintained by Kant between logical and +causal relations. Taine considered that all might be explained by +logical relations, that all experience might some day be expressed in +one law, one formula. The _more geometrico_ of Spinoza and the +“universal mathematic” of Descartes reappear in Taine. He even essays +in _L’Intelligence_ to equate the principle of causality (_principe de +raison explicative_) with that of identity. + +His attempt to reduce the principle of causality to that of identity +did not succeed very well, and from the nature of the case this was to +be expected. As Fouillée well points out in his criticism of Taine, +both in _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_ and the concluding pages of his +earlier work on Plato,[15] the notion of difference and heterogeneity +which arises in the action of cause and effect can never be reducible +to a mere identity, for the notion of identity has nothing in common +with that of difference. Differences cannot be ignored; variety and +change are undeniable facts of experience. Fouillée here touches the +weak spot of Taine’s doctrine. In spite of a seemingly great power of +criticism there is an underlying dogmatism in his work, and the chief +of those dogmas, which he does not submit to criticism, is the +assertion of the universal necessity of all things. To this postulate +he gives a false air of objectivity. He avoids stating why we do +objectify causality, and he diverts discussion from the position that +this postulate may itself be subjective. + + [15] Vol. 4. + + +The particular bearing of Taine’s psychology upon the general problem +of knowledge is interesting. He defines perception in _L’Intelligence_ +as _une hallucination vraie_. His doctrine of the “double aspect,” +physical and mental, recalls to mind the Modes of Spinoza. In his +attitude to the difficult problem of movement and thought he rests in +the dualism of Spinoza, fluctuating and not enunciating his doctrine +clearly. The primacy of movement to thought he abandoned as too +mechanical a doctrine, and regarded the type of existence as mental in +character. Taine thus passes from the materialism of Hobbes to the +idealism of Leibnitz. “The physical world is reducible to a system of +signs, and no more is needed for its construction and conception than +the materials of the moral world.” + +When we feel ourselves constrained to admit the necessity of certain +truths, if we are inclined to regard this as due to the character of +our minds themselves (_notre structure mentale_), as Kant maintained, +Taine reminds us that we must admit that our mind adapts itself to its +environment. He here adopts the view of Spencer, a thinker who seems to +have had far more influence upon the Continent than in his own country. +Although Taine thus reposes his epistemology upon this basis, he does +not answer the question which the Kantian can still put to him—namely, +“How do we know the structure of things?” He is unable to escape from +the difficulty of admitting either that it is from experience, an +admission which his anti-empirical attitude forbids him to make (and +which would damage his dogma of universal logical necessity), or that +our knowledge is obtained by analysing our own thoughts, in which case +he leaves us in a vicious circle of pure subjectivity from which there +is no means of escape. + +The truth is that Taine vainly tried to establish a phenomenal +doctrine, not purely empirical in character like that of Hume, but a +phenomenalism wedded to a necessity which is supposed to be +self-explanatory. Such a notion of necessity, however, is formal and +abstract. Rather than accept Taine’s view of a law, a formula, an +“eternal axiom” at the basis of things, we are obliged to postulate an +activity, creative in character, of whose action universal laws are but +expressions. Law, formula, axiom without action are mere abstractions +which can of themselves produce nothing. + +Taine’s positivism, however, was not so rigid as to exclude a belief in +the value of metaphysics. It is this which distinguishes him from the +Comtian School. We see in him the confidence in science complemented by +an admission of metaphysics, equivalent to a turning of “positivism” in +science and philosophy against itself. Much heavier onslaughts upon the +sovereignty of science came, however, from the thinker who is the great +logician and metaphysician of our period, Renouvier. To him and to +Cournot we now turn. + +II + +While Taine had indeed maintained the necessity of a metaphysic, he +shared to a large degree the general confidence in science displayed by +Comte, Bernard, Berthelot and Renan. But the second and third groups of +thinkers into which we have divided our period took up first a critical +attitude to science and, finally, a rather hostile one. + +Cournot marks the transition between Comte and Renouvier. His _Essai +sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la +Critique philosophique_ contains some very calm and careful thought on +the relation of science and philosophy, which is the product of a +sincere and well-balanced mind.[16] He inherits from the positivists an +intense respect for scientific knowledge, and remarks at the outset +that he is hostile to any philosophy which would be so foolish as to +attempt to ignore the work of the modern sciences. + + [16] See in particular the second chapter of vol. 2, _Du Contraste de + la Science et de la Philosophie et de la Philosophie des Sciences_, + pp. 216-255. + + +His work _Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisme_ is a striking example +of this effort on Cournot’s part, being devoted to a study of the use +which can be made in philosophy of the data afforded by the sciences. +Somewhat after the manner of Comte, Cournot looks upon the various +sciences as a hierarchy ranging from mathematics to sociology. Yet he +reminds the scientists of the insufficiency of their point of view, for +the sciences, rightly pursued, lead on to philosophy. He laments, +however, the confusion of the two, and thinks that such confusion is +“partly due to the fact that in the realm of speculations which are +naturally within the domain of the philosopher, there are to be found +here and there certain theories which can actually be reduced to a +scientific form”[17] He offers, as an instance of this, the theory of +the syllogism, which has affinities to algebraical equations—but this +interpenetration should not cause us, he argues, to abandon or to lose +sight of the distinction between science and philosophy. + + [17] _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances_, vol. 2, p. 224. + + +This distinction, according to Cournot, lies in the fact that science +has for its object that which can be measured, and that which can be +reduced to a rigorous chain or connection. In brief, science is +characterised by quantity. Philosophy, on the other hand, concerns +itself with quality, for it endeavours not so much to measure as to +appreciate. + +Cournot reminds the apostles of science that quantity, however +intimately bound up with reality it may be, is not the essence of that +reality itself. He is afraid, too, that the neglect of philosophy by +science may cause the latter to develop along purely utilitarian lines. +As an investigation of reality, science is not ultimate. It has limits +by the fact that it is concerned with measurement, and thus is excluded +from those things which are qualitative and incapable of quantitative +expression. Science, moreover, has its roots in philosophy by virtue of +the metaphysical postulates which it utilises as its basis. Physics and +geometry, Cournot maintains, both rest upon definitions which owe their +origin to speculative thought rather than to experience, yet these +sciences claim an absolute value for themselves and for those +postulates as being descriptions of reality in an ultimate sense. + +Following out his distinction between philosophy and the sciences, +Cournot claims in a Kantian manner that while the latter are products +of the human understanding the former is due to the operation of +reason. This apparent dualism Cournot does not shrink from maintaining; +indeed, he makes it an argument for his doctrine of discontinuity. The +development of a science involves a certain breach with reality, for +the progress of the science involves abstraction, which ever becomes +more complicated. Cournot here brings out the point which we noticed +was stressed by Renan.[18] + + [18] See above, p. 105. + + +Reason produces in us the idea of order, and this “idea of order and of +reason in things is the basis of philosophic probability, of induction +and analogy.”[19] This has important bearings upon the unity of science +and upon the conception of causality which it upholds. In a careful +examination of the problems of induction and analogy, Cournot +emphasises the truth that there are facts which cannot be fitted into a +measured or logical sequence of events. Reality cannot be fitted into a +formula or into concepts, for these fail to express the infinite +variety and richness of the reality which displays itself to us. +Science can never be adequate to life, with its pulsing spontaneity and +freedom. It is philosophy with its _vue d’ensemble_ which tries to +grasp and to express this concreteness, which the sciences, bound to +their systematic connection of events within separate compartments, +fail to reach or to show us. Referring to the ideas of beauty and of +goodness, Cournot urges a “transrationalism,” as he calls it, which, +while loyal to the rational requirements of science, will enable us to +take the wider outlook assumed by philosophy.[20] + + [19] _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances_, p. 384. + + + [20] The parallelism of some of Cournot’s ideas here with those + expressed by Bergson, although they have been enunciated by the later + thinker in a more decided manner, is so obvious as hardly to need to + be indicated. + + +Like Cournot, the author of the _Essais de Critique générale_ was a +keen antagonist of all those who sought to deify Science. It was indeed +this which led Renouvier to give this title to his great work, the +first part of which was published at a time when the confidence in +Science appeared to be comparatively unassailed. We find him defending +philosophy as against the scientists and others by an insistence upon +its critical function. + +In examining Comte’s positivism in his work _Histoire et Solution des +Problèmes métaphysiques_, Renouvier points out that its initial idea is +a false one—namely, that philosophy can be constituted by an assembling +together of the sciences.[21] Such an assembly does not, he objects, +make a system. Each science has its own postulates, its own data, and +Science as a whole unity of thought or knowledge does not exist. He +attacks at the same time the calm presumption of the positivist who +maintains that the scientific stage is the final and highest +development. Renouvier is considerably annoyed at this unwarranted +dogmatism and assumed air of finality. + + [21] Book X.: _De l’Etat actuel de la Philosophie en France_, chap. + 1., _De l’Aboutissement des Esprits au Positivisme_, pp. 416-417. + + +Owing to the excellent training he had received at the Ecole +Polytechnique, and by his own profound study, Renouvier was able on +many technical points to meet the scientists on their own ground. His +third _Essai de Critique générale_ is devoted to a study of “the +Principles of Nature,” in which he criticises many of the principles +and assumptions of mechanism, while many pages of his two previous +_Essais_ are concerned with the discussion of questions intimately +affecting the sciences.[22] + + [22] This is particularly noticeable in the matter printed as + appendices to his chapters. (_Cf_. the _Logic_, vol 2.) + + +An important section of his second Essay, _Psychologie rationnelle_, +deals with the “Classification of the Sciences.”[23] Renouvier there +points out that the attempt to classify the sciences in accordance with +their degrees of certainty ends in failure. All of them, when loyal to +their own principles, endeavour to display equal certainty. By loyalty +Renouvier shows that he means adherence to an examination of certain +classes of phenomena, the observation of facts and laws, with the +proposal of hypotheses, put forward frankly as such. He draws a line +between the logical and the physical sciences—a division which he +claims is not only a division according to the nature of their data, +but also according to method. Following another division, we may draw a +line between sciences which deal with objects which are organic, living +creatures, and those which are not. + + [23] Vol. 2, chap. xviii., _De la Certitude des Sciences et leur + Classification rationnelle_, pp. 139-186, including later observations + on Spencer. + + +Renouvier’s line is not, it must be remembered in this connection, a +purely imaginary one. It is a real line, an actual gap. For him there +is a real discontinuity in the universe. Taine’s doctrine of a +universal explanation, of a rigid unity and continuity, is, for +Renouvier, anathema, _c’est la mathématisation a l’outrance_. This +appears most markedly in the pages which he devotes to the +consideration of _la synthèse totale_. + +An important section of his _Traité de Logique_ (the first _Essai de +Critique générale_) deals with the problem of this Total Synthesis of +all phenomena.[24] This is a conception which Renouvier affirms to be +unwarrantable and, indeed, in the last analysis impossible. A general +synthesis, an organisation or connected hierarchy of sciences, is a +fond hope, an illusion only of a mind which can overlook the real +discontinuity which exists between things and between groups of things. + + [24] Vol. I, pp. 107-115, and also vol. 2, pp. 202-245. + + +He sees in it the fetish of the Absolute and the Infinite and the lure +of pantheism, a doctrine to which he opposes his “Personalism.” He +reminds the scientists that personality is the great factor to which +all knowledge is related, and that all knowledge is relative. A law is +a law, but the guarantee of its permanence is not a law. It is no more +easy, claims Renouvier, to say why phenomena do not stop than it is to +know why they have begun. Laws indeed abide, but “not apart from +conscious personalities who affirm them.”[25] Further, attacking the +self-confident and dogmatic attitude in the scientists, Renouvier +reminds them that it is impossible to demonstrate _every_ proposition; +and in an important note on “Induction and the Sciences”[26] he points +out that induction always implies a certain _croyance_. This is no +peculiar, mystical thing; it is a fact, he remarks, which colours all +the interesting acts of human personality. He here approaches Cournot +in observing that all speculation is attended by a certain coefficient +of doubt or uncertainty and so becomes really rational belief. With +Cournot, too, Renouvier senses the importance of analogy and +probability in connection with hypotheses in the world of nature and of +morals. In short, he recognises as central the problem of freedom. + + [25] _Logique_, vol. 2, p. 321. + + + [26] Note B to chap. xxxv. of the _Logique_, vol. 2, p. 13. + + +Renouvier attacks Comte’s classification or “hierarchy” of the sciences +as mischievous and inexact. It is not based, he claims, upon any +distinction in method, nor of data. It is not true that the sciences +are arranged by Comte in an order where they successively imply one +another, nor in an order in which they have come to be constituted as +“positive”.[27] + + [27] This outburst of attack is a sample of Renouvier’s usual attitude + to Positivism. (_Deuxième Essai_, vol. 2, pp. 166-170.) + + +He justifies to the scientist the formulation of hypothesis as a +necessary working method of co-ordinating in a provisional manner +varying phenomena. Many hypotheses and inductions of science are, +however, unjustifiable from a strictly logical standpoint, Renouvier +reminds us. His chief objection, however, is that those hypotheses and +inductions are put forward so frequently as certainties by a science +which is dogmatic and surpasses its limits. + +Science, Renouvier claims, does not give us a knowledge of the +absolute, but an understanding of the relative. It is in the light of +his doctrine of relativity and of the application of the law of number +that he criticises many of the attitudes adopted by the scientists. +Whatever savours of the Absolute or the Infinite he opposes, and his +view of cause depends on this. He scorns the fiction of an infinite +regress, and affirms real beginnings to various classes of phenomena. +Causality is not to be explained, he urges in his _Nouvelle +Monadologie_, save by a harmony. He differs from Leibnitz, however, in +claiming in the interests of freedom that this harmony is not +pre-established. In meeting the doctrine of the reduction of the +complex to the simple, Renouvier cites the case of “reducing” sound, +heat, light and electricity to movement. This may be superficially +correct as a generality, but Renouvier aptly points out that it +overlooks the fact that, although they may all be abstractly +characterised as movement, yet there are differences between them as +movements which correspond to the differences of sensation they arouse +in us. + +Renouvier upholds real differences, real beginnings, and, it must be +added, a reality behind and beyond the appearances of nature. His +_Monadologie_ admits that “we can continue to explain nature +mathematically and mechanically, provided we recognise that it is an +external appearance—that thought, mind or spirit is at the heart of +it.” This links Renouvier to the group of new spiritualists. His +attitude to science is akin to theirs. He does not fear science when it +confines itself to its proper limits and recognises these. It has no +quarrel with philosophy nor philosophy with it. Advance in science +involves, he believes, an advance also in theology and in metaphysics. + +The sciences are responsible for working out the laws determining the +development of the Universe. But between Science, an ideal unachieved, +and the sciences which in themselves are so feeble, imperfect and +limited, Renouvier claims that General Criticism, or Philosophy, has +its place. “In spite of the discredit into which philosophy has fallen +in these days, it can and ought to exist. Its object has been always +the investigation of God, man, liberty, immortality, the fundamental +laws of the sciences. ‘All these intimately connected and +interpenetrating problems comprise the domain of philosophy.” In those +cases where no science is possible, this seeming impossibility must +itself be investigated, and philosophy remains as a “General Criticism” +(_Critique générale_) of our knowledge. “It is this notion,” he says, +“which I desired to indicate by banishing the word ‘Philosophy’ from +the title of my Essays. The name ought to change when the method +changes.”[28] Thus Renouvier seeks to establish a “critique” midway +between scepticism and dogmatism, and endeavours to found a philosophy +which recognises at one and the same time the demands of _science et +conscience_. + + [28] _Logique_, vol. 2, p. 352. + +III + +On turning to the spiritualist current of thought we find it, like the +neo-criticism, no less keen in its criticism of science. The inadequacy +of the purely scientific attitude is the recurring theme from Ravaisson +to Boutroux, Bergson and Le Roy. The attitude assumed by Ravaisson +coloured the whole of the subsequent development of the new +spiritualist doctrines, and not least their bearing upon the problem of +science and its relation to metaphysics. + +Mechanism, Ravaisson pointed out, quoting the classical author upon +whom he had himself written so brilliantly (Aristotle), does not +explain itself, for it implies a “prime mover,” not itself in motion, +but which produces movement by spiritual activity. Ravaisson also +refers to the testimony of Leibnitz, who, while agreeing that all is +mechanical, carefully added to this statement one to the effect that +mechanism itself has a principle which must be looked for outside +matter and which is the object of metaphysical research. This spiritual +reality is found only, according to Ravaisson, in the power of goodness +and beauty—that is to say, in a reality which is not non-scientific but +rather ultra-scientific. There are realities, he claims, to which +science does not attain. + +The explanation of nature presupposes soul or spirit. It is true, +Ravaisson admits, that the physical and chemical sciences consider +themselves independent of metaphysics; true also that the metaphysician +in ignoring the study of those sciences omits much from his estimate of +the spirit. Indeed, he cannot well dispense with the results of the +sciences. That admission, however, does not do away with the +possibility of a true “apologia” for metaphysics. To Newton’s sarcastic +remark, “Physics beware of metaphysics,” Hegel replied cogently that +this was equivalent to saying, “Physics, keep away from thought.” +Spirit, however, cannot be omitted from the account; it is the +condition of all that is, the light by which we see that there is such +a thing as a material universe. This is the central point of +Ravaisson’s philosophy. The sciences of nature may be allowed and +encouraged to work diligently upon their own principles, but the very +fact that they are individual sciences compels them to admit that they +view the whole “piecemeal”. Philosophy seeks to interpret the whole as +a whole. Ravaisson quotes Pascal’s saying, “_Il faut avoir une pensée +de derrière la tête et juger de tout par là_.” This _pensée de derrière +la tête_, says Ravaisson, while not preventing the various sciences +from speaking in their own tongue, is just the metaphysical or +philosophical idea of the whole. + +It is claimed, Aristotle used to say, that mathematics have absolutely +nothing in common with the idea of the good. “But order, proportion, +symmetry, are not these great forms of beauty?” asks Ravaisson. For him +there is spirit at the heart of things, an activity, _un feu primitif +qui est l’âme_, which expresses itself in thought, in will and in love. +It is a fire which does not burn itself out, because it is enduring +spirit, an eternal cause, the absolute substance is this spiritual +reality. Where the sciences fall short is that they fail to show that +nature is but the refraction of this spirit. This is a fact, however, +which both religion and philosophy grasp and uphold. + +These criticisms were disturbing for those minds who found entire +satisfaction in Science or rather in the sciences, but they were +somewhat general. Ravaisson’s work inculcated a spirit rather than +sustained a dialectic. Its chief value lay in the inspiration which it +imparted to subsequent thinkers who endeavoured to work out his general +ideas with greater precision. + +It was this task which Lachelier set himself in his _Induction_. He had +keenly felt the menace of science, as had Janet;[29] he had appreciated +the challenge offered to it by Ravaisson’s ideas. Moreover, Lachelier’s +acute mind discovered the crucial points upon which the new +spiritualism could base its attack upon the purely scientific +dogmatism. Whatever Leibnitz might have said, creative spontaneity of +the spirit, as it was acclaimed by Ravaisson, could not easily be +fitted into the mechanism and determinism upheld by the sciences. +Ravaisson had admitted the action of efficient causes in so far as he +admitted the action of mechanism, which is but the outcome of these +causes. In this way he endeavoured to satisfy the essential demands of +the scientific attitude to the universe. But recognising the inadequacy +of this attitude he had upheld the reality of final causes and thus +opposed to the scientists a metaphysical doctrine akin to the religious +attitude of Hellenism and Christianity. + + [29] We refer here to the quotation from Janet’s _Problèmes du XIXe + Siècle_, given above on p. 95. Janet himself wrote on _Final Causes_ + but not Wlth the depth or penetration of Lachelier. + + +Lachelier saw that the important point of Ravaisson’s doctrine lay in +the problem of these two types of causality. His thesis is therefore +devoted to the examination of efficient and final causes. This little +work of Lachelier marks a highly important advance in the development +of the spiritualist philosophy. He clarifies and re-affirms more +precisely the position indicated by Ravaisson. Lacheher tears up the +treaty of compromise which was drafted by Leibnitz to meet the rival +demands of science with its efficient causes and philosophy with its +final causes. The world of free creative spontaneity of the spirit +cannot be regarded, Lachelier claims (and this is his vital point), as +merely the complement of, or the reflex from, the world of mechanism +and determinism. + +He works out in his thesis the doctrine that efficient causes can be +deduced from the formal laws of thought. This was Taine’s position, and +it was the limit of Taine’s doctrine. Lachelier goes further and +undermines Taine’s theories by upholding final causes, which he shows +depend upon the conception of a totality, a whole which is capable of +creating its parts. This view of the whole is a philosophical +conception to which the natural sciences never rise, and which they +cannot, by the very nature of their data and their methods, comprehend. +Yet it is only such a conception which can supply any rational basis +for the unity of phenomena and of experience. Only by seeing the +variety of all phenomena in the light of such an organic unity can we +find any meaning in the term universe, and only thus, continues +Lachelier, only on the principle of a rational and universal order and +on the reality of final causes, can we base our inductions. The +“uniformity of nature,” that fetish of the scientists which, as +Lachelier well points out, is merely the empirical regularity of +phenomena, offers no adequate basis for a single induction. + +Lachelier developed his doctrines further in the article, _Psychologie +et Métaphysique_. We can observe in it the marks which so profoundly +distinguish the new spiritualism from the old, as once taught by +Cousin. The old spiritualism had no place between its psychology and +its metaphysics for the natural sciences. Indeed it was quite incapable +of dealing with the problem which their existence and success +presented, and so it chose to ignore them as far as possible. The new +spiritualism, of which Lachelier is perhaps the profoundest speculative +mind, not only is acquainted with the place and results of the +sciences, but it feels itself equal to a criticism of them, an advance +which marks a highly important development in philosophy. + +In this article Lachelier endeavours to pass beyond the standpoint of +Cousin, and in so doing we see not only the influence of Ravaisson’s +ideas of the creative activity of the spirit, but also of the +discipline of the Kantian criticism, with which Lachelier, unlike many +of his contemporaries in France at that time, was well acquainted. + +He first shows that the study of psychology reveals to us the human +powers of sensation, feeling and will. These are the immediate data of +consciousness. Another element, however, enters into consciousness, not +as these three, a definite content, but as a colouring of the whole. +This other element is “objectivity,” an awareness or belief that the +world without exists and continues to exist independently of our +observation of it. Lachelier combats, however, the Kantian conception +of the “thing-in-itself.” If, he argues, the world around us appears as +a reality which is independent of our perception, it is _not_ because +it is a “thing-in-itself,” but rather it appears as independent because +we, possessing conscious intelligence, succeed in making it an object +of our thought, and thus save it from the mere subjectivity which +characterises our sense-experience. It is upon this fact, Lachelier +rightly insists, that all our science reposes. A theory of knowledge as +proposed by Taine, based solely on sensation and professing belief in +_hallucination vraie_, is itself a contradiction and an abuse of +language. “If thought is an illusion,” remarks Lachelier, “we must +suppress all the sciences.”[30] + + [30] _Psychologie et Métaphisique_, p.151.(See especially the passages + on pp.150-158.) + + +He then proceeds to show that if we admit thought to be the basis of +our knowledge of the world, that is, of our sciences, then we admit +that our sciences are themselves connstructions, based upon a +synthetic, constructive, creative activity of our mind or spirit. For +our thought is not merely another “thing” added to the world of things +outside us. Our thought is not a given and predetermined datum, it is +“a living dialectic,” a creative activity, a self-creative process, +which is synthetic, and not merely analytic in character. “Thought,” he +says, “can rest upon itself, while everything else can only rest upon +it; the ultimate _point d’appui_ of all truth and of all existence is +to be found in the absolute spontaneity of the spirit.”[31] Here, +Lachelier maintains, lies the real _a priori_; here, too, is the very +important passage from psychology to metaphysics. + + [31] _Psychologie et Métaphysique_, p. 158. + + +Finally his treatment of the problems of knowledge and of the +foundations of science leads him to reemphasise not only the reality of +spirit but its spontaneity. He recognises with Cournot and Renouvier +that the vital problem for science and philosophy is that of freedom. +The nature of existence is for Lachelier a manifestation of spirit, and +is seen in will, in necessity and in freedom. It is important to note +that for him it is _all_ these simultaneously. “Being,” he remarks in +concluding his brilliant essay,[32] “is not first, a blind necessity, +then a will which must be for ever bound down in advance to necessity +and, lastly, a freedom which would merely be able to recognise such +necessity and such a bound will; being is entirely free, in so far as +it is self-creative; it is entirely an expression of will, in so far as +it creates itself in the form of something concrete and real; it is +also entirely an expression of necessity, in so far as its +self-creation is intelligible and gives an account of itself.” + + [32] _Ibid_., p. 170. + + +At this stage something in the nature of a temporary “set-back” is +given to the flow of the spiritualist current by Fouillee’s attitude, +which takes a different line from that of Ravaisson and Lachelier. The +attitude towards Science, which we find adopted by Fouillee, is +determined by his two general principles, that of reconcilation, and +his own doctrine of _idées-forces_. His conciliatory spirit is well +seen in the fact that, although he has a great respect for science and +inherits many of the qualities contained in Taine’s philosophy, +particularly the effort to maintain a regular continuity and solidarity +in the development of reality, nevertheless he is imbued with the +spirit of idealism which characterises all this group of thinkers. The +result is a mixture of Platonism and naturalism, and to this he himself +confesses in his work, _Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la +Science positive_, where he expresses a desire “to bring back Plato’s +ideas from heaven to earth, and so to make idealism consonant with +naturalism.”[33] + + [33] _Le Mouvement idéaliste el la Réaction contre la Science + positive_, p. xxi. + + +Fouillée claims to take up a position midway between the materialists +and the idealists. Neither standpoint is, in his view, adequate to +describe reality. He is particularly opposed to the materialistic and +mechanistic thought of the English Evolutionary School, as presented by +Spencer and Huxley, with its pretensions to be scientific. Fouillee +accepts, with them, the notion of evolution, but he disagrees entirely +with Spencer’s attempt to refer everything to mechanism, the mechanism +of matter in motion. In any case, Fouillée claims, movement is a very +slender and one-sided element of experience upon which to base our +characterisation of all reality, for the idea of motion arises only +from our visual and tactual experience. He revolts from the +epiphenomenalism of Huxley as from a dire heresy. Consciousness cannot +be regarded as a mere “flash in the pan.” Even science must admit that +all phenomena are to be defined by their relation to, and action upon, +other phenomena. Consciousness, so regarded, will be seen, he claims, +as a unique power, possessing the property of acting upon matter and of +initiating movement. It is itself a factor, and a very vital one, in +the evolutionary process. It is no mere reflex or passive +representation. On this point of the irreducibility of the mental life +and the validity of its action, Fouillée parts company with Taine. On +the other hand, he disagrees with the idealistic school of thought, +which upholds a pure intellectualism and for whom thought is the +accepted characterisation of reality. This, complains Fouillée, is as +much an abstraction and a one-sided view as that of Spencer. + +In this manner Fouillée endeavours to “rectify the scientific +conception of evolution” by his doctrine of _idées-forces_. “There is,” +he says,[34] “in every idea a commencement of action, and even of +movement, which tends to persist and to increase like an _élan_. . . . +Every idea is already a force.” Psychologically it is seen in the +active, conative or appetitive aspect of consciousness. To think of a +thing involves already, in some measure, a tendency toward it, to +desire it. Physiologically considered, _idées-forces_ are found to +operate, not mechanically, but by a vital solidarity which is much more +than mere mechanism, and which unites the inner consciousness to the +outer physical fact of movement. From a general philosophical point of +view the doctrine of _idées-forces_ establishes the irreducibility of +the mental, and the fact that, so far from the mental being a kind of +phosphorescence produced as a result of the evolutionary process, it is +a prime factor in that evolution, of which mechanism is only a symbol. +Here Fouillée rises almost to the spiritualism of Ravaisson. Mechanism, +he declares, is, after all, but a manner of representing to ourselves +things in space and time. Scientists speak of forces, but the real +forces are ideas, and other so-called “forces” are merely analogies +which we have constructed, based upon the inner mental feeling of +effort, tendency, desire and will.[35] + + [34] _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_, p. 97, 4e ed. + + + [35] This was a point upon which Maine de Biran had insisted. (See p. + 20.) + + +The scientists have too often, as Fouillée well points in his work on +_L’Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces_, regarded the concept of Evolution +as all-sufficing, as self-explanatory. Philosophy, however, cannot +accept such dogmatism from science, and asserts that evolution is +itself a result and not in itself a cause. With such a view Fouillée is +found ultimately in the line of the general development of the +spiritual philosophy continuing the hostility to science as ultimate or +all-sufficing. Further developments of this attitude are seen in +Boutroux and in Bergson. + +In the work of Boutroux we find a continuation of that type of +criticism of science which was a feature in Ravaisson and Lachelier. He +has also affinities with Renouvier (and, we may add, with Comte), +because of his insistence upon the discontinuity of the sciences; upon +the element of “newness” found in each which prevents the higher being +deduced from the lower, or the superior explained by reference to the +inferior. Boutroux opposes Spencer’s doctrines and is a keen antagonist +of Taine and his claim to deduce all from one formula. Such a notion as +that of Taine is quite absurd, according to Boutroux, for there is no +necessary bond between one and another science. This is Boutroux’s main +point in _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_. + +By a survey of laws of various types, logical, mathematical, +mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, psychological and +sociological, Boutroux endeavours to show that they are constructions +built up from facts. Just as nature offers to the scientist facts for +data, so the sciences themselves offer these natural laws as data to +the philosopher, for his constructed explanation of things which is +metaphysics or philosophy. + +“In the actual condition of our knowledge,” he remarks, “science is not +one, but multiple; science, conceived as embracing all the sciences, is +a mere abstraction.” This is a remark which recalls Renouvier’s witty +saying, “I should very much like to meet this person I hear so much +about, called ‘science.’” We have only sciences, each working after its +own manner upon a small portion of reality. Man has a thirst for +knowledge, and he sees, says Boutroux, in the world an “ensemble” of +facts of infinite variety. These facts man endeavours to observe, +analyse, and describe with increasing exactness. Science, he points +out, is just this description. + +It is futile to attempt a resolution of all things into the principle +of identity. “The world is full of a number of things,” and, therefore, +argues Boutroux, the formula A = B can never be strictly and absolutely +true. “Nature never offers to us identities, but only resemblances.” +This has important bearing upon the law of causality, of which the +sciences make so much. For there is such a degree of heterogeneity in +the things to which the most elementary and general laws of physics and +chemistry are applied that it is impossible to say that the consequent +is proportional to the antecedent—that is to say, it is impossible to +work out absolutely the statement that an effect is the unique result +of a certain invariable cause. The fundamental link escapes us and so, +for us, there is a certain contingency in experience. There is, +further, a creativeness, a newness, which is unforeseeable. The passage +from the inorganic to the organic stresses this, for the observation of +the former would never lead us to the other, for it is a creation, a +veritable “new” thing. Boutroux is here dealing hard blows at Taine’s +conception. He continues it by showing that in the conscious living +being we are introduced to a new element which is again absolutely +irreducible to physical factors. Life, and consciousness too, are both +creators. The life of the mind is absolutely _sui generis_; it cannot +be explained by physiology, by reflex action, or looked upon as merely +an epiphenomenon. Already Boutroux finds himself facing the central +problem of Freedom. He recognises that as psychological phenomena +appear to contain qualities not given in their immediate antecedents, +the law of proportion of cause to effect does not apply to the actions +of the human mind. + +The principle of causality and the principle of the conservation of +energy are m themselves scientific “shibboleths,” and neither of them, +asserts Boutroux, can be worked out so absolutely as to justify +themselves as ultimate descriptions of the universe. They are valuable +as practical maxims for the scientist, whose object is to follow the +threads of action in this varied world of ours. They are incomplete, +and have merely a relative value. Philosophy cannot permit their +application to the totality of this living, pulsing universe. For +cause, we must remember, does not in its strictly scientific meaning +imply creative power. The cause of a phenomenon is itself a phenomenon. +“The positive sciences in vain pretend to seize the divine essence or +reason behind things.”[36] They arrive at descriptive formulæ and there +they leave us. But, as Boutroux well reminds us in concluding his +thesis, formulas never explain anything because they cannot even +explain themselves. They are simply constructions made by observation +and abstraction and which themselves require explanation. + + [36] _Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p 154. + + +The laws of nature are not restrictions which have been, as it were, +imposed upon her They are themselves products of freedom; they are, in +her, what habits are to the individual. Their constancy is like the +stability of a river-bed which the freely running stream at some early +time hollowed out. + +The world is an assembly of beings, and its vitality and nature cannot +be expressed in a formula. It comprises a hierarchy of creatures, +rising from inorganic to organic forms, from matter to spirit, and in +man it displays an observing intelligence, rising above mere +sensibility and expressly modifying things by free will. In this +conception Boutroux follows Ravaisson, and he is also influenced by +that thinker’s belief in a spiritual Power of goodness and beauty. He +thus leads us to the sphere of religion and philosophy, both of which +endeavour, in their own manner, to complete the inadequacy of the +purely scientific standpoint. He thus stands linked up in the total +development with Cournot and Renouvier, and in his own group with +Lachelier, in regard to this question of the relation of philosophy and +the sciences. + +The critique of science, which is so prominent in Boutroux, was +characteristic of a number of thinkers whom we cannot do more than +mention here in passing, for in general their work is not in line with +the spiritualist development, but is a sub-current running out and +separated from the main stream. This is shown prominently in the fact +that, while Boutroux’s critique is in the interests of idealism and the +maintenance of some spiritual values, much subsequent criticism of +science is a mere empiricism and, being divorced from the general +principles of the spiritualist philosophy, tends merely to accentuate a +vein of uncertainty—indeed, scepticism of knowledge. Such is the +general standpoint taken by Milhaud, Payot, and Duhem. Rather apart +from these stands the works of acute minds like Poincaré, Durand de +Gros, and Hannequin, whose discussion of the atomic doctrines is a work +of considerable merit. To these may be added Lalande’s criticism of the +doctrine of evolution and integration by his opposing to it that of +dissolution and disintegration. Passing references to these books must +not, however, detain us from following the main development which, from +Boutroux, is carried on by Bergson. + +We find that Bergson, like Boutroux, holds no brief for science, and in +particular he opposes some of its doctrines which have been +dogmatically and uncritically accepted. His work, _Matiére et Mémoire_, +is a direct critique of the scientific postulate of psycho-physical +parallelism which Bergson regards as the crux of the problem at issue +between science and philosophy—namely, that of freedom. He shows that +this theory, which has been adopted by science because of its +convenience, ought not to be accepted by philosophy without criticism. +In his opinion it cannot stand the criticism which he brings against +it. A relation between soul and body is undeniable, but he does not +agree that that relation is one of absolute parallelism. To maintain +parallelism is to settle at once and beforehand, in an unwarrantably _a +priori_ manner, the whole problem of freedom. His intense spiritualism +sees also in such a doctrine the deadly enemy Epiphenomenalism, the +belief that the spiritual is only a product of the physical. He +maintains the unique and irreducible nature of consciousness, and +claims that the life of the soul or spirit is richer and wider than the +mere physical activity of the brain, which is really its instrument. +Bergson asks us to imagine the revolution which might have been, had +our early scientists devoted themselves to the study of mind rather +than matter, and claims that we suffer from the dogmatism of +materialistic science and the geometrical and mathematical conceptions +of “a universal science” or “mathematic” which come from the +seventeenth century, and are seen later in Taine. + +The inadequacy of the scientific standpoint is a theme upon which +Bergson never tires of insisting. Not only does he regard a metaphysic +as necessary to complete this inadequacy, but he claims that our +intellect is incapable of grasping reality in its flux and change. The +true instrument of metaphysics is, according to him, intuition. +Bergson’s doctrine of intuition does not, however, amount to a pure +hostility to intellectual constructions. These are valuable, but they +are not adequate to reality. Metaphysics cannot dispense with the +natural sciences. These sciences work with concepts, abstractions, and +so suffer by being intellectual moulds. We must not mistake them for +the living, pulsing, throbbing reality of life itself which is far +wider than any intellectual construction. + +By his insistence upon this point, in which he joins hands with several +of his predecessors, Bergson claims to have got over the Kantian +difficulties of admitting the value and possibility of a metaphysic. +There is nothing irrational, he insists, in his doctrine of +metaphysical intuition or “intellectual sympathy”; it is rather +super-rational, akin to the spirit of the poet and the artist. The +various sciences can supply data and, as such, are to be respected, for +they have a relative value. What Bergson is eager to do is to combat +their absolute value. His metaphysic is, however, no mere “philosophy +of the sciences” in the sense of being a mere summary of the results of +the sciences. His intuition is more than a mere generalisation of +facts; it is an “integral experience,” a penetration of reality in its +flux and change, a looking upon the world _sub specie durationis_. It +is a vision, but it is one which we cannot obtain without intellectual +or scientific labour. We can become better acquainted with reality only +by the progressive development of science _and_ philosophy. We cannot +live on the dry bread of the sciences alone, an intuitional philosophy +is necessary for our spiritual welfare. Science promises us well-being +or pleasure, but philosophy, claims Bergson, can give us joy, by its +intuitions, its super-intellectual vision, that vital contact with life +itself in its fulness, which is far grander and truer than all the +abstractions of science. This is the culmination of much already +indicated in Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux, +which Bergson presents in a manner quite unique, thus closing in our +period the development of that criticism and hostility to the finality +and absoluteness of the purely scientific attitude which is so marked a +feature of both our second and third groups, the neo-critical thinkers +and the neo-spiritualists. + +* * * * * * * * * + + +Beginning with a glowing confidence in the sciences as ultimate +interpretations of reality, we thus have witnessed a complete turn of +the tide during the develop-* since 1851. Also, in following out the +changes in the attitude adopted to Science, we have been enabled to +discover in a general manner that the central and vital problem which +our period presents is that of Freedom. It will be interesting to find +whether in regard to this problem, too, a similar change of front will +be noticeable as the period is followed to its close. + +NOTE.—The reader may be interested to find that Einstein has brought +out some of Boutroux’s points very emphatically, and has confirmed the +view of geometry held by Poincaré. Compare the following statements: + Boutroux: “Mathematics cannot be applied with exactness to + reality.” “Mathematics and experience can never be exactly fitted + into each other.” + Poincaré: “Formulæ are not true, they are convenient.” + Einstein: “If we deny the relation between the body of axiomatic + Euclidean geometry or the practically rigid body of reality, we + readily arrive at the view entertained by that acute and profound + thinker, H. Poincaré . . . _Sub specie æterni_, Poincaré, in my + opinion, is right” (_Sidelights on Relativity_, pp. 33-35). + + + + +CHAPTER IV +FREEDOM + + +INTRODUCTORY: The central problem of our period—The reconciliation of +science with man’s beliefs centres around the question of +Freedom—Unsatisfactoriness of Kant’s solution felt. + +I. The positivist belief in universal and rigid determinism, especially +shown in Taine. Renan’s view. + +II. Cournot and Renouvier uphold Freedom—Strong logical and moral case +put forward for it. + +III. The new spiritualists, Ravaisson and Lacheher, set Freedom in the +forefront of their philosophy—Fouillée attempts a reconciliation by the +idea of Freedom as a determining force—Guyau, Boutroux, Blondel and +Bergson insist on the reality of Freedom—They surpass Cournot and +Renouvier by upholding contingency —This is especially true of Guyau, +Boutroux and Bergson. + +Belief in creativeness and spontaneity replace the older belief in +determinism. + + + + +CHAPTER IV +FREEDOM + +The discussions regarding the relation between science and philosophy +led the thinkers of our period naturally to the crucial problem of +freedom. Science has almost invariably stood for determinism, and men +were becoming impatient of a dogmatism which, by its denial of freedom, +left little or no place for man, his actions, his beliefs, his moral +feelings. + +“_La nature fatale offre à la Liberté +Un problème_.”[1] + + + [1] Guyau, in his _Vers d’un Philosophe_, “_Moments de Foi_—I.,” _En + lisant Kant_, p. 57. + + +It was precisely this problem which was acutely felt in the philosophy +of our period as it developed and approached the close of the century. + +In a celebrated passage of his _Critique of Judgment_ the philosopher +Kant had drawn attention to the necessity of bringing together the +concept of freedom and the concept of nature as constructed by modern +science, for the two were, he remarked, separated by an abyss. He +himself felt that the realm of freedom should exercise an influence +upon the realm of science, but his own method prohibited his attempting +to indicate with any preciseness what that influence might be. The +fatal error of his system, the artificial division of noumena and +phenomena, led him to assign freedom only to the world of noumena. +Among phenomena it had no place, but reigned transcendent, unknown and +unknowable, beyond the world we know. + +The artificiality of such a solution was apparent to the thinkers who +followed Kant, and particularly was this felt in France. “Poor +consolation is it,” remarked Fouillée, in reply to Kant’s view, “for a +prisoner bound with chains to know that in some unknown realm afar he +can walk freely devoid of his fetters.” + +The problem of freedom, both in its narrow sphere of personal free-will +and in its larger social significance, is one which has merited the +attention of all peoples in history. France, however, has been +pre-eminently a cradle for much acute thought on this matter. It loomed +increasingly large on the horizon as the Revolution approached, it +shone brilliantly in Rousseau. Since the Revolution it has been equally +discussed, and is the first of the three watchwords of the republic, +whose philosophers, no less than its politicians, have found it one of +their main themes. + +The supreme importance of the problem of freedom in our period was due +mainly to the need felt by all thinkers for attempting, in a manner +different from that of Kant, a reconciliation between science and +morals (_science et conscience_), and to find amid the development of +scientific thought a place for the personality of the thinker himself, +not merely as a passive spectator, but as an agent, a willing and +acting being. Paul Janet, in his essays entitled _Problèmes du XIXe +Siècle_,[2] treating the question of science, asks whether the growing +precision of the natural sciences and “the extension of their +‘positive’ methods, which involve a doctrine or assumption of +infallible necessity, do not imperil gravely the freedom of the moral +agent?” While himself believing that, however closely the sciences may +seem to encroach upon the free power of the human soul, they will only +approach in an indefinite “asymptote,” never succeeding in annulling +it, he senses the importance of the problem. Science may endeavour to +tie us down to a belief in universal and rigid determinism, but the +human spirit revolts from the acceptance of such a view, and acclaims, +to some degree at least, the reality of a freedom which cannot be +easily reconciled with the determinist doctrines. + + [2] Published in 1872. + + +In the period which we have under review the central problem is +undoubtedly that of freedom. Practically all the great thinkers in +France during this period occupied themselves with this problem, and +rightly so, for they realised that most of the others with which +philosophy concerns itself depend in a large degree upon the attitude +adopted to freedom. Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Fouillée, +Boutroux, Blondel and Bergson have played the chief part in the arena +of discussion, and although differing considerably in their methods of +treatment and not a little in the form of their conclusions, they are +at one in asserting the vital importance of this problem and its +primacy for philosophy. The remark of Fouillée is by no means too +strong: “The problem which we are going to discuss is not only a +philosophical problem; it is, _par excellence_, _the_ problem for +philosophy. All the other questions are bound up with this.”[3] This +truth will be apparent when, after showing the development of the +doctrines concerning freedom, we come, in our subsequent chapters, to +consider its application to the questions of progress, of ethics and of +the philosophy of religion. + + [3] In his preface to his Thesis _Liberté et Déterminisme_, later + editions, p. vii. + +I + +We find in the thought of our period a very striking development or +change in regard to the problem of freedom. Beginning with a strictly +positivist and naturalist belief in determinism, it concludes with a +spiritualism or idealism which not only upholds freedom but goes +further in its reaction against the determinist doctrines by +maintaining contingency. + +Taine and Renan both express the initial attitude, a firm belief in +determinism, but it is most clear and rigid in the work of Taine. His +whole philosophy is hostile to any belief in freedom. The strictly +positivist, empiricist and naturalist tone of his thought combined with +the powerful influence of Spinoza’s system to produce in him a firm +belief in necessity—a necessity which, as we have seen, was severely +rational and of the type seen in mathematics and in logic. Although it +must also be admitted that in this view of change and development Taine +was partly influenced by the Hegelian philosophy, yet his formulations +were far more precise and mathematical than those of the German +thinker. + +We have, in considering his attitude to science, seen the tenacious +manner in which he clings to his dogma of causality or universal +necessity. All living things, man included, are held in the firm grip +of “the steel pincers of necessity.” Every fact and every law in the +universe has its _raison explicative_, as Taine styles it. He quotes +with approval, in his treatment of this question at the close of his +work _De l’Intelligence_, the words of the great scientist and +positivist Claude Bernard: “_Il y a un déterminisme absolu, dans les +conditions d’existence des phénomènes naturels, aussi bien pour les +corps vivants que pour les corps bruts_.”[4] In Taine and the school of +scientists like Bernard, whose opinions on this matter he voices, no +room is accorded to freedom. + + [4] _De l’Intelligence_, vol. 2, p. 480, the quotation from Bernard is + to be found in his _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médecine + expérimentale_, p. 115. + + +Taine’s belief in universal necessity and his naturalistic outlook led +him to regard man from the physical standpoint as a mechanism, from the +mental point of view a theorem. Vice and virtue are, to quote his own +words, “products just as vitriol or sugar.” This remark having appeared +to many thinkers a scandalous assertion, Taine explained in an article +contributed to the _Journal des Débats_[5] that he did not mean to say +that vice and virtue were, like vitriol or sugar, _chemical_ but they +are nevertheless products, _moral_ products, which moral elements bring +into being by their assemblage. And, he argues, just as it is necessary +in order to make vitriol to know the chemical elements which go to its +composition, so in order to create in man the hatred of a lie it is +useful to search for the psychological elements which, by their union, +produce truthfulness. + + [5] On December 19th, 1872. + + +Even this explanation of his position, however, did not prevent the +assertion being made that such a view entirely does away with all +question of moral responsibility. To this criticism Taine objected. “It +does not involve moral indifference. We do not excuse a wicked man +because we have explained to ourselves the causes of his wickedness. +One can be determinist with Leibnitz and nevertheless admit with +Leibnitz that man is responsible —that is to say, that the dishonest +man is worthy of blame, of censure and punishment, while the honest man +is worthy of praise, respect and reward.” + +In one of his _Essais_ Taine further argued in defence of his doctrine +of universal determination that since WE ourselves are determined—that +is to say, since there is a psychological determinism as well as a +physical determinism—we do not feel the restriction which this +determinism implies, we have the illusion of freedom and act just as if +we were free. To this Fouillée replied that the value of Taine’s +argument was equal to that of a man who might say, “Because _I_ am +asleep, all of me, all my powers and faculties, therefore I am in a +state where I am perfectly free and responsible.” Certainly Taine’s +remark that _we_ are determined had nothing in common with the belief +in that true determinism, which is equally true freedom, since it is +_self_-determination. Taine professed no such doctrine, and rested in a +purely naturalistic fatalism, built upon formulæ of geometry and logic, +in abstraction from the actual living and acting of the soul, and this +dogma of determinism, to which he clung so dearly, colours his view of +ethics and of history. For Taine, “the World is a living geometry” and +“man is a theorem that walks.” + +Like Taine, Renan set out from the belief in universal causation, but +he employed the conception not so much in a warfare against man’s +freedom of action as against the theologians’ belief in miracle and the +supernatural. There is none of Taine’s rigour and preciseness in Renan, +and it is difficult to grasp his real attitude to the problem of +freedom. If he ever had one, may be doubted. The blending of +viewpoints, the paradox so characteristic of him, seems apparent even +in this question. + +His intense humanism prompted him to remarks in praise of freedom, and +he seems to have recognised in man a certain power of freedom; but in +view of his belief in universal cause he is careful to qualify this. +Further, his intensely religious mind remained in love with the +doctrine of divine guidance which is characteristic of Christian and +most religious thought. Although Renan left the Church, this belief +never left Renan. He sees God working out an eternal purpose in +history, and this he never reconciled with the problem of man’s free +will. The humanist in him could remark that the one object of life is +the development of the mind, and the first condition for this is +freedom. Here he appears to have in view freedom from political and +religious restrictions. He is thinking of the educational problem. His +own attitude to the ultimate question of freedom in itself, as opposed +to determinism, is best expressed in his _Examen d’une Conscience +philosophique_. He there shows that the universe is the result of a +lengthy development, the. beginnings of which we do not know. “In the +innumerable links of that chain,” says Renan, “we find not one free act +before the appearance of man, or, if you like, living beings.” With +man, however, freedom comes into the scheme of things. A free cause is +seen employing the forces of nature for willed ends. Yet this is but +nature itself blossoming to self-consciousness; this free cause +emanates from nature itself. There is no rude break between man with +his free power and unconscious nature. Both are interconnected. Freedom +is indeed the appearance of something “new,” but it is not, insists +Renan, something divorced from what has gone before. + +We see in Renan a rejection of the severely deterministic doctrine of +Taine, but it is by no means a complete rejection or refutation of it. +Renan adheres largely to the scientific and positivist attitude which +is such a feature of Taine’s work. His humanism, however, recognises +the inadequacy of such doctrines and compels him to speak of freedom as +a human factor, and he thus brings us a step nearer to the development +of the case for freedom put forward so strongly by Cournot and +Renouvier and by the neo-spiritualists. + +II + +A very powerful opposition to all doctrines based upon or upholding +determinism shows itself in the work of Cournot and the neo-critical +philosophy. The idea of freedom is a central one in the thought of both +Cournot and Renouvier. + +Cournot devoted his early labours to a critical and highly technical +examination of the question of probability, considered in its +mathematical form, a task for which he was well equipped.[6] Being not +only a man of science but also a metaphysician, or rather a philosopher +who approached metaphysical problems from the impulse and data accorded +him by the sciences, Cournot was naturally led to the wider problem of +_probabilité philosophique_. He shows in his _Essai sur les Fondements +de nos Connaissances_ that hazard or chance are not merely words which +we use to cover our ignorance, as Taine would have claimed. Over +against the doctrine of a universal determinism he asserts the reality +of these factors. The terms chance and hazard represent a real and +vital element in our experience and in the nature of reality itself. +Probability is a factor to be reckoned with, and this is so because of +the elements of contingency in nature and in life. Freedom is bound up +essentially with the vitality which is nature itself. + + [6] See his _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances: “Hazard,”_ + chap. iii.; “_Probabilité Philosophique_,” chap, iv., pp. 71-101; and + chap. v., “_De l’Harmonie et de la Finalité_,” pp. 101-144. + + +The neo-critical philosopher, Renouvier, is a notable champion of +freedom. We have already seen the importance he attaches to the +category of personality. For him, personality represents a +consciousness in possession of itself, a free and rational harmony—in +short, freedom personified. + +From a strictly demonstrative point of view Renouvier thinks it is +impossible to prove freedom as a fact. However, he lays before us with +intense seriousness various. considerations of a psychological and a +moral character which have an important bearing upon the problem. This +problem, he asserts, not only concerns our actions but also our +knowledge. To bring out this point clearly, Renouvier develops some of +the ideas of his friend, Jules Lequier, on the notion of the autonomy +of the reason, or rather of the reasonable will. In this way he shows +doubt and criticism to be themselves signs of freedom, and asserts that +we form our notions of truth freely, or that at least they are +creations of our free thought, not laid upon us by an external +authority. + +More light is thrown on the problem by considering what Renouvier calls +_vertige mental_, a psychopathological condition due to a disturbance +of the rational harmony or self-possession which constitutes the +essence of the personal consciousness. This state is characterised by +hallucination and error. It is the extreme opposite of the +self-conscious, reflective personality in full possession of itself and +exercising its will rationally. Renouvier shows that between these two +extremes there are numerous planes of _vertige mental_ in which the +part played by our will is small or negligible, and we are thus victims +of habit or tendency. Is there, then, any place for freedom? There most +certainly is, says Renouvier, for our freedom manifests itself whenever +we inhibit an action to which we are excited by habit, passion or +imagination. Our freedom is the product of reflection. We are at +liberty to be free, to determine ourselves in accordance with higher +motives. This power is just our personality asserting itself, and it +does not contradict our being, more often than not, victims of habit. +We have it in our power to make fresh beginnings. Renouvier’s disbelief +in strict continuity is here again apparent. We must admit freedom of +creation in the personality itself, and not seek to explain our actions +by trying to ascend some scale of causes to infinity. There is no such +thing as a sum to infinity of a series; there is no such thing as the +influence of an infinite series of causes upon the performance of a +consciously willed act in which the personality asserts its initiative— +that is, its power of initiation of a new series, in short, its +freedom. + +Passing from these psychological considerations, Renouvier calls our +attention to some of a moral nature, no less important, in his opinion, +for shedding light upon the nature of freedom. If, he argues, all is +necessary, if all human actions are predetermined, then popular +language is guilty of a grave extravagance and appears ridiculous, +insinuating, as it does, that many acts might have been left undone and +many events might have occurred differently, and that a man might have +done other than he did. In the light of the hypothesis of rigorous +necessity, the mention of ambiguous futures and the notion of “being +otherwise” (_le pouvoir être autrement_) seem foolish. Science may +assert the docrine of necessity and preach it valiantly, but the human +conscience feels it to be untrue and will not be gainsaid. The +scientist himself is forced to admit that man does not accept his +gospel of universal predestination or fatalism. This Renouvier +recognises as an important point in the debate. Strange, is it not, he +remarks, that the mind of the philosopher himself, a sanctuary or +shrine for truth, should appear as a rebellious citadel refusing to +surrender to the truth of this universal necessity. We believe +ourselves to be free agents or, at least beings who are capable of some +free action. However slight such action, it would invalidate the +hypothesis of universal necessity. + +If all things are necessitated, then moral judgments, the notions of +right and of duty, have no foundation in the nature of things. Virtue +and crime lose their character; the sentiments and feelings, such as +regret, hope, fear, desire, change their meaning or become meaningless. +Renouvier lays great stress upon these moral considerations. + +Again, if everything be necessitated, error is as necessary as truth. +The false is indeed true, being necessary, and the true may become +false. Disputes rage over what is false or true, but these disputes +cannot be condemned, for they themselves are, by virtue of the +hypothesis, necessary, and the disputes are necessarily absurd and +ridiculous from this point of view. Where then is truth? Where is +morality? We have here no basis for either. Looking thus at history, +all its crimes and infamies are equally lawful, for they are +inevitable; such is the result, Renouvier shows, of viewing all human +action as universally predetermined. + +The objections thus put forward by Renouvier against the doctrine of +universal necessity are powerful ones. They possess great weight and +result in the admission, even by its upholders, that “the judgment of +freedom is a natural datum of consciousness and is bound up with our +reflective judgments upon which we act, being itself the foundation of +these.” + +Yet, we have, Renouvier reminds us, no logical proof of the reality of +freedom. We feel ourselves moved, spontaneously and unconstrained. The +future, in so far as it depends upon ourselves, appears not as +prearranged but ambiguous, open.[7] Whether our judgment be true or +false, we in practical life act invariably on the belief in freedom. +That, of course, as Renouvier admits at this stage of his discussion, +does not prove that our belief is not an illusion. It is a feeling, +natural and spontaneous. + + [7] Cf., later, Bergson’s remark: “The portals of the future stand + wide open, the future is being made.” + + +One of the most current forms of the doctrine of freedom has been that +known as the “liberty of indifference.” The upholders of this theory +regard the will as separated from motives and ends. The operation of +the will is regarded by them as indifferent to the claims or influence +of reason or feeling. Will is superadded externally to motives, where +such exist, or may be superimposed on intellectual views even to the +extent of annulling these. Judgment and will are separated in this +view, and the will is a purely arbitrary or indifferent factor. It can +operate without reason against reason. The opponents of freedom find +little difficulty in assailing this view, in which the will appears to +operate like a dice or a roulette game, absolutely at hazard, reducing +man to a non-rational creature. Such a type of will, however, Renouvier +declares to be non-existent, for every man who has full consciousness +of an act of his has at the same time a consciousness of an end or +purpose for this act, and he proposes to realise by this means a good +which he regards as preferable to any other. In so far as he has doubts +of this preference the act and the judgment will be suspended. He must, +however, if he be an intelligent being, pursue what he deems to be his +good—that is to say, what he deems to be good at the time of acting. +Renouvier here agrees with Socrates and Plato in the view that no man +deliberately and knowingly wills what he considers to be evil or to be +bad for him. Virtue involves knowledge, and although there is the +almost proverbial phrase of Ovid and of Paul, about seeing and +approving the better, yet nevertheless doing the worse, it is a general +statement which does not express an antithesis as present to +consciousness at the time of action. The agent may afterwards say + +. . . “_Video meliora proboque +deteriora sequor_.” + + +but at the time of action “the worse” must appear to him as a good, at +any rate then and in his own judgment. Further, beyond these +psychological considerations there are grave moral objections, +Renouvier points out, to admitting “an indifferent will,” for the acts +of such a will being purely arbitrary and haphazard, the man will be no +moral agent, no responsible person. A man who wills apart from the +consideration of any motive whatever can never perform any meritorious +action. Under the conception of an indifferent will the term “merit” +ceases to have a meaning. The theologians who have asserted the +doctrine (indeed, it seems to have originated, Renouvier thinks, with +them) have readily admitted this point, for it opens up the way for +their theory of divine grace or the good will of God acting directly +upon or within the agent. Will and merit are for them quite separate, +the latter being due to the mystical operations of divine favour or +grace, in honour of which the indifference of the will has been +postulated. Philosophers not given to appeals to divine grace, who have +upheld the doctrine of the indifferent will, have really been less +consistent than the theoloians and have fallen into grave error. + +Renouvier appeals to the testimony of the penal laws of all nations in +favour of his criticism of an indifferent will. Motive _is_ deemed a +real factor, for men are not deemed to have acted indifferently. Some +deliberation, indeed, is implied in all action which is conscious and +human, some comparison of motives and a conscious, decision. The values +of truth, as well as those of morality are equally fatal to the +indifferentist; for, asks Renouvier, is a man to be regarded as not +determined to affirm as true what he judges to be true? + +The doctrine of freedom as represented by that of an indifferent will +is no less vicious, Renouvier affirms, than the opposing doctrine of +universal necessity. The truth is that they both rest on fictions. +“Indifferentism” imagines a will divorced from judgment, separated from +the rational man himself, an unseizable power, a mysterious absolute +cause unconnected with reflection or deliberation, a mere chimera. For +determinism the will is equally a fiction. + +A way out of this difficulty is to be found, according to Renouvier, in +viewing the will in a manner different from that of the +“indifferentists.” Let us suppose the will bound up with motive, a +motive drawn from the intellectual and moral equipment of the man. +This, however, gives rise to psychological determinism. The will, it is +argued, follows always the last determination of the understanding. +Greater subtilty attends on this argument against freedom than those +put forward on behalf of physical determinism. Renouvier sees that +there is no escape from such a doctrine as psychological determinism +unless we take a view of the will as bound up with the nature of man as +a whole, with his powers of intellect and feeling. Such a will cannot +be characterised as indifferent or as the mere resultant of motives. + +The Kantian element in Renouvier’s thought is noticeable in the strong +moral standpoint from which he discusses all problems, and this is +particularly true of his discussion of this very vital one of freedom. +He is by no means, however, a disciple of Kant, and he joins battle +strongly with the Kantian doctrine of freedom. This is natural in view +of his entire rejection of Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” or noumena, and it +follows therefrom, for Kant attached freedom only to the noumenal +world, denying its operation in the world of phenomena. The rejection +of noumena leaves Renouvier free to discuss freedom in a less remote or +less artificial manner than that of Kant. + +If it be true, argues Renouvier, that necessity rules supreme, then the +human spirit can find peace in absolute resignation; and in looking +back over the past history of humanity one need not have different +feelings from those entertained by the geologist or paleontologist. +Ethics, politics and history thus become purely “natural” sciences (if +indeed ethics could here have meaning, would it not be identical with +anthropology? At any rate, it would be purely positive. A normative +view of ethics would be quite untenable in the face of universal +necessity). Any inconvenience, pain or injustice would have to be +accepted and not even named “evil,” much less could any effort be truly +made to expel it from the scheme of things. To these accusations the +defenders of necessity object. The practical man, they say, need not +feel this, in so far as he is under the illusion of freedom and unaware +of the rigorous necessity of all things. He need not refrain from +action. + +But this defence of necessity leads those who wish to maintain the case +against it to continue the argument. Suppose that the agent does _not_ +forget that all is necessitated, what then? Under no illusion of the +idea of freedom, he then acts at every moment of his existence in the +knowledge that he cannot but do what he is doing, he cannot but will +what he wills, he cannot but desire what he desires. In time this must +produce, says Renouvier, insanity either of an idle type or a furious +kind, he will become an indifferent imbecile or a raving fanatic, in +either case a character quite abnormal and dangerous. These are extreme +results, but between the two extremes all degrees of character are to +be, found. The most common type of practical reason presents an +antinomy in the system of universal necessity. The case for necessity +must reckon with this fact—namely, that the operation of necessity has +itself given rise to ethics which exists, and, according to the case, +its existence is a necessary one; yet ethics constitutes itself in +opposition to necessity, and under the sway of necessity is quite +meaningless. Here is a paradox which is not lessened if we suppose the +ethical position to be an absurd and false one. Whether false or not, +morality in some form is practically as universal as human nature. That +nature, Renouvier insists, can hardly with sincerity believe an +hypothesis or a dogma which its own moral instincts belie continually. + +If, on the other hand, truth lies with the upholders of freedom, then +man’s action is seen to have great value and significance, for man then +appears as creating a new order of things in the world. His new acts, +Renouvier admits, will not be without preceding ones, without roots or +reasons, but they will be without _necessary_ connection with the whole +scheme of things. He is thus creating a new order; he is creating +himself and making his own history. Conscious pride or bitter remorse +can both alike be present to him. The great revolutions of history will +be regarded by him not as mystical sweepings of some unknown force +external to himself, but as results of the thought and work of humanity +itself. A philosophy which so regards freedom will thus be a truly +“human” philosophy. Renouvier rightly recognises that the whole +philosophy of history turns upon the attitude which we adopt to +freedom. + +In view of the many difficulties connected with the problem of freedom +many thinkers would urge us to a compromise. Renouvier is aware of the +dangers of this attitude, and he brings into play against it his +logical method of dealing with problems. This does not contradict his +statement about the indemonstrability of freedom, nor does it minimise +the weight and significance of the moral case for freedom: it +complements it. Between contradictories or incompatible propositions no +middle course can be followed. Freedom and necessity cannot be both at +the same time true, or both at the same time false, for of the two +things one must be true—namely, either human actions are all of them +totally predetermined by their conditions or antecedents, or they are +not all of them totally predetermined. It is to this pass that we are +brought in the logical statement of the case. Now sceptics would here +assert that doubt was the only solution. This would not realh be a +solution, and however legitimate doubt is in front of conflicting +theories, it involves the death of the soul if it operates in practical +affairs and in any circumstances where some belief is absolutely +necessary to the conduct of life and to action. + +The freedom in question, as Renouvier is careful to remind us, does not +involve our maintaining the total indetermination of things or denial +of the operations of necessity within limits. Room is left for freedom +when it is shown that this necessity is not universal. Many +consequences of free acts may be necessitated. For example, says +Renouvier, I have a stone in my hand. I can freely will to hurl it +north or south, high or low, but once thrown from my hand its path is +strictly determined by the law of gravity. The voluntary movement of a +man on the earth may, however slightly, alter the course of a distant +planet. Freedom, we might say, operates in a sphere to which necessity +supplies the matter. Ultimately any free act is a choice between two +alternatives, equally possible, but both necessitated as possibilities. +The points of free action may seem to take up a small amount of room in +the world, so to speak, but we must realise how vital they are to any +judgment regarding its character, and how tremendously important they +are from a moral point of view. So far, claims Renouvier, from the +admittance of freedom being a destruction of the laws of the universe, +it really shows us a special law of that universe, not otherwise to be +explained—namely, the moral law. Freedom is thus regarded by Renouvier +as a positive fact, a moral certainty. + +Freedom is the pillar of the neo-critical philosophy; it is the first +truth involved at once in all action and in all knowledge. Truth and +error are not well explained, or, indeed, at all explained, by a +doctrine which, embracing them both as equally necessary, justifies +them equally, and so in a sense verifies both of them. It was this +point which Brochard developed in his work _L’Erreur_, which has +neo-critical affinities. Man is only capable of science because he is +free; it is also because he is free that he is subject to error.[8] +Renouvier claims that “we do not avoid error always, but we always +_can_ avoid it.”[9] Truth and error can only be explained, he urges, by +belief in the ambiguity of futures, movements of thought involving +choice between opinions which conflict—in short, by belief in freedom. +The calculation of probabilities and the law of the great numbers +demonstrates, Renouvier claims, the indetermination of futures, and +consciousness is aware of this ambiguity in practical life. This belief +in the ambiguity of futures is a condition, he shows, of the exercise +of the human consciousness in its moral aspect, and this consciousness +in action regards itself as suspended before indetermination—that is, +it affirms freedom. This affirmation of freedom Renouvier asserts to be +a necessary element of any rational belief whatever. It alone gives +moral dignity and supremacy to personality, whose existence is the +deepest and most radical of all existences. The personal life in its +highest sense and its noblest manifestation is precisely Freedom. +Renouvier assures us that there is nothing mysterious or mystical about +this freedom. It is not absolute liberty and contingency of all things; +it is an attribute of persons. The part played thus freely by +personality in the scheme or order of the universe proves to us that +that order or scheme is not defined or formed in a predetermined +manner; it is only in process of being formed, and our personal efforts +are essential factors in its formation. The world is an order which +becomes and which is creating itself, not a pre-established order which +simply unrolls itself in time. For a proper understanding of the nature +of this problem “we are obliged to turn to the practical reason. It is +a moral affirmation of freedom which we require; indeed, any other kind +of affirmation would, Renouvier maintains, presuppose this. The +practical reason must lay down its own basis and that of all true +reason, for reason is not divided against itself reason is not +something apart from man; it is man, and man is never other than +practical—_i.e._, acting.”[10] Considered from this standpoint there +are four cases which present themselves to the tribunal of our +judgment—namely, the case for freedom, the case against freedom, the +case for necessity and the case against necessity. + + [8] _De L’Erreur_, p. 47. + + + [9] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 96. + + + [10] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p 78. + + +The position is tersely put in the Dilemma presented by Jules Lequier, +the friend of Renouvier, quoted in the _Psychologie rationnelle_. There +are four possibilities: + +To affirm necessity, necessarily. To affirm necessity, freely. To +affirm freedom, necessarily. To affirm freedom, freely. + +On examining these possibilities we find that to affirm necessity, +necessarily, is valueless, for its contradictory, freedom, is equally +necessary. To affirm necessity, freely, does not offer us a better +position, for here again it is necessity which is affirmed. If we +affirm freedom necessarily, we are in little better case, for necessity +operates again (although Renouvier notes that this gives a certain +basis for morality). In the free affirmation of freedom, however, is to +be found not only a basis for morals, but also for knowledge and the +search for truth. Indeed, as we are thus forced “to admit the truth of +either necessity or freedom, and to choose between the one and the +other with the one or with the other,”[11] we find that the affirmation +of necessity involves contradiction, for there are many persons who +affirm freedom, and this they do, if the determinist be right, +necessarily. The affirmation of freedom, on the other hand, is free +from such an absurdity. + + [11] _Ibid_., p. 138. + + +Such is the conclusion to which Renouvier brings us after his wealth of +logical and moral considerations. He combines both types of discussion +and argument in order to undermine the belief in determinism and to +uphold freedom, which is, in his view, the essential attribute of +personality and of the universe itself. He thus succeeded in altering +substantially the balance of thought in favour of freedom, and further +weight was added to the same side of the scales by the new spiritualist +group who placed freedom in the forefront of their thought. + +III + +The development of the treatment of this problem within the thought of +the new spiritualists or idealists is extremely interesting, and it +proceeded finally to a definite doctrine of contingency as the century +drew to its close. The considerations set forth are usually +psychological in tone, and not so largely ethical as in the +neo-critical philosophy. + +Ravaisson declared himself a champion of freedom. He accepted the +principle of Leibnitz, to the effect that everything has a reason, from +which it follows that everything is necessitated, without which there +could be no certitude and no science. But, says Ravaisson, there are +two kinds of necessity—one absolute, one relative. The former is +logical, the type of the principle of identity, and is found in +syllogisms and in mathematics, which is just logic applied to quantity. +The other type of necessity is moral, and is, unlike the former, +perfectly in accord with freedom. It indeed implies freedom, the +freedom of self-determination. The truly wise man can- not help doing +what is right and good. The slave of Passion and caprice and evil has +no freedom. The wise man selecting the good chooses it infallibly, but +at the time with perfect free-will. “It is perhaps because the good or +the beautiful is simply nothing other than love—that is, the power of +will in all its purity, and so to will what is truly good is to will +oneself (_c’est se vouloir soi-même_).”[12] + + [12] _La Philosophie en France_, p. 268. + + +Nature is not, as the materialists endeavour to maintain, entirely +geometrical—that is to say, fatalistic in character. Morality enters +into the scheme of things and, with it, ends freely striven for. There +is present a freedom which is a kind of necessity, yet opposed to +fatalism. This freedom involves a determination by conceptions of +perfection, ideals of beauty and of good. “Fatality is but an +appearance; spontaneity and freedom constitute reality.”[13] So far, +continues Ravaisson, from all things operating by brute mechanism or by +pure hazard, things operate by the development of a tendency to +perfection, to goodness and beauty. Instead of everything submitting to +a blind destiny, everything obeys, and obeys willingly, a divine +Providence. + + [13] _Ibid_., p. 270. + + +Ravaisson’s fundamental spiritualism is clear in all this, and it +serves as the starting-point for the thinkers who follow him. +Spiritualism is bound up with spontaneity, creation, freedom, and this +is his central point, this insistence on freedom. While resisting +mechanical determination he endeavours to retain a determination of +another kind—namely, by ends, a teleology or finalism. This is +extremely interesting when observed in relation to the subsequent +development in Lachelier, Boutroux, Blondel and Bergson. + +Lachelier’s treatment of freedom is an important landmark in the +spiritualist development. By his concentrated analysis of the problem +of induction he brought out the significance of efficient and final +causes respectively. He appears as the pupil of Ravaisson, whose +initial inspiration is apparent in his whole work, especially in his +treatment of freedom. He dwells upon the fact of the spontaneity of the +spirit—a point of view which Ravaisson succeeded in imparting to the +three thinkers, Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson. Besides the influence +of Ravaisson, however, that of Kant and Leibnitz appears in Lachelier’s +attitude to freedom. Yet he passes beyond the Kantian position, and he +rejects the double-aspect doctrine which Leibnitz maintained with +regard to efficient and final causes. Lachelier insists that the +spontaneity of spirit stands above and underlies the whole of nature. +This is the point which Boutroux, under Lachelier’s influence, took up +in his _Contingence des Lois de la Nature_. Lachelier, in attacking the +purely mechanistic conception of the universe, endeavoured, as he +himself put it, “to substitute everywhere force for inertia, life for +death and freedom for fatalism.” Rather than universal necessity it is +universal contingence which is the real definition of existence. We are +free to determine ourselves in accordance with ends we set before us, +and to act in the manner necessary to accomplish those ends. Our life +itself, as he shows in the conclusion of his brilliant little article +_Psychologie et Métaphysique_, is creative, and we must beware of +arguing that what we have been makes us what we are, for that character +which we look upon as determining us need not do so if we free +ourselves from habit, and, further, this character is, in any case, +itself the result of our free actions over extended time, the free +creation of our own personality. + +While with Ravaisson and Lachelier the concept of freedom was being +rather fully developed in opposition to the determinist doctrines, +Fouillée, in his brilliant and acute thesis on _Liberté et +Déterminisme_, endeavoured to call a halt to this supremacy of Freedom, +and to be true to the principles of reconciliation which he laid down +for himself in his philosophy. He confesses himself, at the outset, to +be a pacifist rather than a belligerent in this classic dispute between +determinists on the one hand and partisans of freedom on the other. He +believes that, on intimate investigation pursued sufficiently far, the +two opposing doctrines will be seen to converge. Such a declaration +would seem to be dangerously superficial in a warfare as bitter and as +sharp as this. It must be admitted that, as is the case with many who +profess to conciliate two conflicting views, Fouillée leaves us at +times without precise and definite indication of his own position. + +In contrast to the attitude of Ravaisson and Lachelier Fouillée +inclines in some respects to the attitude of Taine and many passages of +his book show him to be holding at least a temporary brief for the +partisans of determinism. He agrees notably with Taine in his objecting +to the contention that under the determinist theory moral values lose +their significance. Fouillée claims that it is both incorrect and +unfair to argue that “under the necessity-hypothesis a thing being all +that it can be is thereby all that it should be.”[14]. + + [14] _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_, p. 51 (fourth edition). + + +He goes on to point out that the consciousness of independence, which +is an essential of freedom, may be nothing more than a lack of +consciousness of our dependence. Motives he is inclined to speak of as +determining the will itself, while he looks upon the “liberty of +indifference” or of hazard as merely a concession to the operations of +mechanical necessity. The “liberty of indifference” is often the mere +play of instinct and of fatality, while hazard, so far from being an +argument in the hands of the upholders of freedom, is really a +determination made previously by something other than one’s own will. + +This is a direct attack upon the doctrines put forward by both Cournot +and Renouvier. Fouillée is well aware of this, and twenty pages of his +thesis are devoted to a critical and hostile examination of the +statements of both Renouvier and his friend Lequier.[15] Fouillée +claims that these two thinkers have only disguised and misplaced the +“liberty of indifference”; they have not, he thinks, really suppressed +it, although both of them profess to reject it absolutely. A keen +discussion between Fouillée and Renouvier arose from this and continued +for some time, being marked on both sides by powerful dialectic. +Renouvier used his paper the _Critique philosophique_ as his medium, +while Fouillée continued in subsequent editions of his thesis, in his +_Idée moderne du Droit_ and also in his acute study _Critique des +Systèmes de Morale contemporains_. Fouillée took Renouvier to task +particularly for his maintaining that if all be determined then truth +and error are indistinguishable. Fouillée claims that the distinction +between truth and error is by no means parallel to that between +necessity and freedom. An error may, he points out, be necessitated, +and consequently we must look elsewhere for our doctrine of certitude +than to the affirmation of freedom. In the philosophy of Renouvier, as +we have seen, these two are intimately connected. Fouillée criticises +the neo-critical doctrine of freedom on the ground that Renouvier mars +his thought by a tendency to look upon the determinist as a passive and +inert creature. This, he says, is “the argument of laziness” applied to +the intelligence. “One forgets,” says Fouillée, “that if intelligence +is a mirror, it is not an immovable and powerless mirror: it is a +mirror always turning itself to reality.”[16] + + [15] _Ibid_., pp. 117-137. + + + [16] _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_, p. 129. + + +On examining closely the difference between Renouvier and Fouillée over +this problem of freedom, we may attribute it to the fact that while the +one thinker is distinctly and rigorously an upholder of continuity, the +other believes in no such absolute continuity. For Fouillée there is, +in a sense, nothing new under the sun, while Renouvier in his thought, +which has been well described as a philosophy of discontinuity, has a +place for new things, real beginnings, and he is in this way linked up +to the doctrine of creative development as set forth ultimately by +Bergson. It will be seen also as we proceed that Fouillée, for all he +has to say on behalf of determinism, is not so widely separated in his +view of freedom from that worked out by Bergson, although at the first +glance the gulf between them seems a wide one. + +Fouillée, while attacking Renouvier, did not spare that other acute +thinker, Lachelier, from the whip of his criticism. He takes objection +to a passage in that writer’s _Induction_ where he advocates the +doctrine that the production of ideas “is free in the most rigorous +sense of that word, since each idea is in itself absolutely independent +of that which precedes it, and is born out of nothing, as is a world.” +To this view of the spontaneity of the spirit Fouillée opposes the +remark that Lachelier is considering only the _new forms_ which are +assumed by a mechanism which is always operating under the same laws of +causality. He asks us in this connection to imagine a kaleidoscope +which is being turned round. The images which succeed each other will +be in this sense a formal creation, a form _independent_ of that which +went before, but, as he is anxious to remind us, the same mechanical +and geometrical laws will be operating continually in producing these +forms. + +Having had these encounters with the upholders of freedom, and thus to +some degree having conveyed the impression of being on the side of the +determinists, Fouillée proceeds to the task he had set himself—namely, +that of reconciliation. He felt the unsatisfactoriness of Kant’s +treatment of freedom,[17] and he endeavours to remedy the lack in Kant +of a real link between the determinism of the natural sciences and the +human consciousness of freedom, realised in the practical reason. +Fouillée proposes to find in his _idées-forces_ a middle term and to +offer us a solution of the problem at issue in the dispute. + + [17] See above, p. 136. + + +He begins by showing that there has been an unfortunate neglect of one +important factor in the case—a factor whose reality is frankly admitted +by both parties. This central, incontestable fact is the _idea_ of +freedom. This idea, according to Fouillée, arises in us as the result +Of a combination of various psychological factors, such as notions of +diversity, possibility, with the tendency to action arising from the +notion of action, which thus shows itself as a force. The combination +of these results in the genesis of the idea of freedom. Now the +stronger this idea of freedom is in our minds the more we make it +become a reality. It is an “idea-force” which by being thought tends to +action and thus increases in power and fruitfulness. The idea of +freedom becomes, by a kind of determinism, more powerful in proportion +to the degree with which it is acted upon. Determinism thus reflects +upon itself and in a curious way turns to operate against itself. This +directing power of the idea of freedom cannot be denied even by the +most rigorous upholders of determinism. They at least are forced to +find room in their doctrine for _the idea_ of freedom and its practical +action on the lives of men, both individually and in societies. The +vice of the doctrines of determinism has been the refusal to admit the +reality of the liberating idea of freedom, which is tending always to +realise itself. + +The belief in freedom is, therefore, Fouillée claims, a powerful force +in the world. Nothing is a more sure redeemer of men and societies from +evil ways than the realisation of this idea of freedom. So largely is +this the case that indeed the extinction of the _belief_ in freedom +would, he argues, not differ much in consequence from the finding that +freedom was an illusion, or, if it be a fact, its abolition. + +Having thus rectified the doctrine of determinism by including a place +within it for _the idea_ of freedom, Fouillée proceeds by careful +analysis to show the error of belief in freedom understood as that of +an indifferent will. This raises as many fallacious views as that of a +determinism bereft of the idea of freedom. The capricious and +indifferent liberty he rejects, and in so doing shows us the importance +of the intelligent power of willing, and also reaffirms the +determinists’ thesis of inability to do certain things. The psychology +of character shows us a determined freedom, and in the intelligent +personality a reconciliation of freedom and determinism is seen to be +effected. Fouillée shows that if it were not true that very largely +what we have been makes us what we are, and that what we are determines +our future actions, then education, moral guidance, laws and social +sanctions would all be useless. Indifferentism in thought is the +reversal of all thought. + +Fouillée sees that the antithesis between Freedom and Necessity is not +absolute, and he modifies the warmth of Renouvier’s onslaughts upon the +upholders of determinism. But he believes we can construct a notion of +moral freedom which will not be incompatible with the determinism of +nature. To effect this reconciliation, however, we must abandon the +view of Freedom as a decision indifferently made, an action of sheer +will unrelated to intelligence. Freedom is not caprice; it is, Fouillée +claims, a power of indefinite development. + +Yet, in the long and penetrating Introduction to his volume on the +_Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces_, Fouillée points out that however +much science may feel itself called upon to uphold a doctrine of +determinism for its own specific purposes, we must remember that the +sphere of science is not all-embracing. There is the sphere of action, +and the practical life demands and, to a degree demonstrates, freedom. +Fouillee admits in this connection the indetermination of the future, +_pour notre esprit_. We act upon this idea of relative indeterminism, +combining with it the idea of our own action, the part which we +personally feel called upon to play. He recognises in his analysis how +important is this point for the solution of the problem. We cannot +overlook the contribution which our personality is capable of making to +the whole unity of life and experience, not only by its achievements in +action, but by its ideals, by that which we feel both _can_ and +_should_ be. Herein lies, according to Fouillée’s analysis, the secret +of duty and the ideal of our power to fulfil it, based upon the central +idea of our freedom. By thus acting on these ideas, and by the light +and inspiration of these ideals, we tend to realise them. It is this +which marks the point where a doctrine of pure determinism not only +shows itself erroneous and inadequate, but as Fouillee puts it, the +human consciousness is the point where it is obliged to turn against +itself “as a serpent which bites its own tail.”[18] Fatalism is a +speculative hypothesis and nothing else. Freedom is equally an +hypothesis, but, adds Fouillée, it is an hypothesis which is at work in +the world. + + [18] _Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces_, Introduction, p. lxxiv. + + +In the thought of Guyau there is a further insistence upon freedom in +spite of the fact that his spiritualism is super-added to much which +reveals the naturalist and positive outlook. He upholds freedom and, +indeed, contingency, urging, as against Ravaisson’s teleology, that +there is no definite tendency towards truth, beauty and goodness. At +all times, too, Guyau is conscious of union with nature and with his +fellows in a way which operates against a facile assertion of freedom. +In his _Vers d’un Philosophe_ he remarks: + +“_Ce mot si doux au coeur et si cher, Liberté, +J’en préfèrs encore un: c’est Solidarité._”[19] + + + [19] _Vers d’un Philosophe, “Solidarité,”_ p. 38. + + +The maintenance of the doctrine of liberty, which in view of the facts +we are bound to maintain, does away, Guyau insists, with the doctrine +of Providence; for him, as for Bergson, there is no _prévision_ but +only _nouveauté_ in the universe. Guyau indeed is not inclined to admit +even that end which Bergson seems to favour—namely, “spontaneity of +life itself.” The world does not find its end in us, any more than we +find our “ends” fixed for us in advance. Nothing is fixed, arranged or +predetermined; there is not even a primitive adaptation of things to +one another, for such adaptation would involve the pre-existence of +ideas prior to the material world, together with a demiurge arranging +things upon a plan in the manner of an architect. In reality there is +no plan; every worker conceives his own. The world is a superb example, +not of order, such as we associate with the idea of Providence in +action, but the reverse, disorder, the result of contingency and +freedom. + +The supreme emphasis upon the reality of freedom appears, however, in +the work of Boutroux and of Bergson at the end of our period. They +arrive at a position diametrically opposed to that of the upholders of +determinism, by their doctrines of contingency as revealed both in the +evolution of the universe and in the realm of personal life. There is +thus seen, as was the case with the problem of science, a complete +“turn of the tide” in the development since Comte. + +Boutroux, summing up his thesis _La contingence des Lois de la Nature_, +indicates clearly in his concluding chapter his belief in contingency, +freedom and creativeness. The old adage, “nothing is lost, nothing is +created,” to which science seems inclined to attach itself, has not an +absolute value, for in the hierarchy of creatures contingency, freedom, +newness appear in the higher ranks. There is at work no doubt a +principle of conservation, but this must not lead us to deny the +existence and action of another principle, that of creation. The world +rises from inorganic to organic forms, from matter to spirit, and in +man himself from mere sensibility to intelligence, with its capacity +for criticising and observing, and to will capable of acting upon +things and modifying them by freedom. + +Boutroux inclines to a doctrine of finalism somewhat after the manner +of Ravaisson. The world he conceives as attracted to an end; the +beautiful and the good are ideals seeking to be realised; but this +belief in finality does not, he expressly maintains, exclude +contingency. To illustrate this, Boutroux uses a metaphor from +seamanship: the sailors in a ship have a port to make for, yet their +adaptations to the weather and sea en route permit of contingency along +with the finality involved in their making for port. So it is with +beings in nature. They have not merely the one end, to exist amid the +obstacles and difficulties around them, “they have an ideal to realise, +and this ideal consists in approaching to God, to his likeness, each +after his kind. The ideal varies with the creatures, because each has +his special nature, and can only imitate God in and by his own +nature.”[20] + + [20] _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 158. + + +Boutroux’s doctrine of freedom and contingency is not opposed to a +teleological conception of the universe, and in this respect he stands +in contrast to Bergson, who, in the rigorous application of his theory +of freedom, rules out all question of teleology. With Renouvier and +with Bergson, however, Boutroux agrees in maintaining that this +freedom, which is the basis of contingency in things, is not and cannot +be a datum of experience, directly or indirectly, because experience +only seizes things which are actually realised, whereas this freedom is +a creative power, anterior to the act. Heredity, instinct, character +and habit are words by which we must not be misled or overawed into a +disbelief in freedom. They are not absolutely fatal and fully +determined. The same will, insists Boutroux, which has created a habit +_can_ conquer it. Will must not be paralysed by bowing to the assumed +supremacy of instincts or habits. Habit itself is not a contradiction +of spontaneity; it is itself a result of spontaneity, a state of +spontaneity itself, and does not exclude contingency or freedom. + +Metaphysics can, therefore, according to Boutroux, construct a doctrine +of freedom based on the conception of contingency. The supreme +principles according to this philosophy will be laws, not those of the +positive sciences, but the laws of beauty and goodness, expressing in +some measure the divine life and supposing free agents. In fact the +triumph of the good and the beautiful will result in the replacement of +laws of nature, strictly so called, by the free efforts of wills +tending to perfection—that is, to God. + +Further studies upon the problem of freedom are to be found in +Boutroux’s lectures given at the Sorbonne in 1892-93 in the course +entitled _De l’Idée de la Loi naturelle dans la Science et la +Philosophie contemporaines_. He there recognises in freedom the crucial +question at issue between the scientists and the philosophers, for he +states the object of this course of lectures as being a critical +examination of the notion we have of the laws of nature, with a view to +determining the situation of human personality, particularly in regard +to free action.[21] Boutroux recognises that when the domain of science +was less extensive and less rigorous than it is now it was much easier +to believe in freedom. The belief in Destiny possessed by the ancients +has faded, but we may well ask ourselves, says Boutroux, whether modern +science has not replaced it by a yet more rigorous fatalism.[22] He +considers that the modern doctrine of determinism rests upon two +assumptions—namely, that mathematics is a perfectly intelligible +science, and is the expression of absolute determinism; also that +mathematics can be applied with exactness to reality. These assumptions +the lecturer shows to be unjustifiable. Mathematics and experience can +never be fitted exactly into each other, for there are elements in our +experience and in our own nature which cannot be mathematically +expressed. This Boutroux well emphasises in his lecture upon +sociological laws, where he asserts that history cannot be regarded as +the unrolling of a single law, nor can the principle of causality, +strictly speaking, be applied to it.[23] An antecedent certainly may be +an influence but not a cause, as properly understood. He here agrees +with Renouvier s position and attitude to history, and shows the vital +bearing of the problem of freedom upon the philosophy of history, to +which we shall presently give our special attention. + + [21] _De l’Idée de la Loi naturelle_, Lecture IV., p. 29. + + + [22] Compare Janet’s remark, given on p. 136. + + + [23] Lecture XIII. + + +Instead of the ideal of science, a mathematical unity, experience shows +us, Boutroux affirms, a hierarchy of beings, displaying variety and +spontaneity—in short, freedom. So far, therefore, from modern science +being an advocate of universal determinism, it is really, when rightly +regarded, a demonstration, not of necessity, but of freedom. Boutroux’s +treatment of the problem of freedom thus demonstrates very clearly its +connection with that of science, and also with that of progress. It +forms pre-eminently the central problem. + +The idea of freedom is prominent in the “philosophy of action” and in +the Bergsonian philosophy; indeed, Bergson’s treatment of the problem +is the culmination of the development of the idea in Cournot, Renouvier +and the neo-spiritualists. In Blondel the notion is not so clearly +worked out, as there are other considerations upon which he wishes to +insist. Blondel is deeply concerned with the power of ideals over +action, and his thought of freedom has affinities to the psychology of +the _idées-forces_. This is apparent in his view of the will, where he +does not admit a purely voluntarist doctrine. His insistence on the +dynamic of the will in action is clear, but he reminds us that the will +does not cause or produce everything, for the will wills to be what is +not yet; it strives for achievement, to gain something beyond itself. +Much of Blondel’s treatment of freedom is coloured by his religious and +moral psychology, factors with which Bergson does not greatly concern +himself in his writings. Blondel endeavours to maintain man’s freedom +of action and at the same time to remain loyal to the religious notion +of a Divine Providence, or something akin to that. Consequently he is +led to the dilemma which always presents itself to the religious +consciousness when it asserts its own freedom—namely, how can that +freedom be consistent with Divine guidance or action? Christian +theology has usually been determinist in character, but Blondel +attempts to save freedom by looking upon God as a Being immanent in +man. + +Bergson makes Freedom a very central point in his philosophy, and his +treatment of it bears signs of the influence of De Biran, Ravaisson, +Lachelier, Guyau and Boutroux. He rejects, however, the doctrine of +finality as upheld by Ravaisson, Lachelier and Boutroux, while he +stresses the contingency which this last thinker had brought forward. +His solution of the problem is, however, peculiarly his own, and is +bound up with his fundamental idea of change, or LA DURÉE. + +In his work _Les Données immédiates de la Conscience_, or _Time and +Free-Will_, he criticises the doctrine of physical determinism, which +is based on the principle of the conservation of energy, and on a +purely mechanistic conception of the universe. He here points out, and +later stresses in his _Matiere et Mémoire_, the fact that it has not +been proved that a strictly determined psychical state corresponds to a +definite cerebral state. We have no warrant for concluding that because +the physiological and the psychological series exhibit some +corresponding terms that therefore the two series are absolutely +parallel. To do so is to settle the problem of freedom in an entirely +_a priori_ manner, which is unjustifiable. + +The more subtle and plausible case for psychological determinism +Bergson shows to be no more tenable than that offered for the physical. +It is due to adherence to the vicious Association-psychology, which is +a psychology without a self. To say the self is determined by motive +will not suffice, for in a sense it is true, in another sense it is +not, and we must be careful of our words. If we say the self acts in +accordance with the strongest motive, well and good, but how do we know +it is the strongest? Only because it has prevailed—that is, only +because the self acted upon it, which is totally different from +claiming that the self was determined by it externally. To say the self +is determined by certain tives is to say it is self-determined. The +essential thing in all this is the vitality of the self. + +The whole difficulty, Bergson points out, arises from the fact that all +attempts to demonstrate freedom tend only to strengthen the artificial +case for determinism, because freedom is only characteristic of a self +_in action_. He is here in line on this point with Renouvier and +Boutroux, although the reasons he gives for it go beyond in +psychological penetration those assigned by these thinkers. When our +action is over, says Bergson, it seems plausible to argue a case for +determinism because of our spatial conception of time and the +relationships of events in time. We have a habit of thinking in terms +of space, by mathematical time, not in real time or _la durée_ as +Bergson calls it, the time in which the living soul acts. + +Bergson thus makes room in the universe for a freedom of the human +will, a creative activity, and thus delivers us from the bonds of +necessity and fatalism in which the physical sciences and the +associationist psychology would bind us. We perceive ourselves as +centres of indetermination, creative spirits. We must guard our +freedom, for it is an essential attribute of spirit. In so far as we +tend to become dominated by matter, which acts upon us in habit and +convention, we lose our freedom. It is not absolute, and many never +achieve it, for their personality never shines forth at all: they live +their lives in habit and routine, victims of automatism. We have, +however, Bergson urges, great power of creation. He stresses, as did +Guyau, the Conception of Life, as free, expanding, and in several +respects his view of freedom is closer to that of Guyau than to that of +Boutroux, in spite of the latter’s contingency. There is no finalism +admitted by Bergson, for he sees in any teleology only “a reversed +mechanism.” + +Obviously the maintenance of such a doctrine of freedom as that of +Bergson is of central importance in any philosophy which contains it. +Our conceptions of ethics and of progress depend upon our view of +freedom. For Bergson “the portals of the future stand wide open, the +future is being made.” He is an apostle of a doctrine of absolute +contingency which he applied to the evolution of the world, in his +famous volume _L’Evolution Créatrice_ (published in 1907). His +philosophy has been termed pessimistic by some in view of his rejection +of any teleological conception. Such a doctrine would conflict with his +“free” universe and his absolute contingency. On the other hand, it +leaves open an optimistic view, because of its freedom, its insistence +upon the possibilities of development. It is not only a reaction +against the earlier doctrines of determinism, it is a deliverance of +the human soul which has always refused, even when religious, to +abandon entirely the belief in its own freedom. + +Such is the doctrine of freedom which closes our period, a striking +contrast to the determinism which, under the influence of modern +science, characterised its opening. The critique of science and the +assaults upon determinism proceeded upon parallel lines. In many +respects they were two aspects of the one problem, and in themselves +were sufficient to describe the essential development in the thought of +our half century, for the considerations of progress, ethics and +religion to which we now turn derive their significance largely from +what has been set forth in these chapters on Science and Freedom. + + + + +CHAPTER V +PROGRESS + + +INTRODUCTORY : Freedom and Progress intimately connected—Confidence in +Progress, a marked feature of the earlier half of the nineteenth +century, was bound up with confidence in Science and Reason, and in a +belief in determinism, either natural or divine—Condorcet, Saint-Simon, +Comte and others proclaim Progress as a dogma. + +I. The idea of progress in Vacherot, Tame and Renan—Interesting +reflections of Renan based on belief in Reason. + +II. Cournot and Renouvier regard Progress in a different light, owing +to their ideas on Freedom—They look upon it as a possibility only, but +not assured, not inevitable—Renouvier’s study of history in relation to +progress and his view of immortality as Progress—No law of progress +exists. + +III. The new spiritualist group emphasise the lack of any law of +progress, by their insistence on the spontaneity of the spirit, +creativeness and contingency—Difficulties of finalsm or teleology in +relation to progress as free—No law or guarantee of progress. + +CONCLUSION : Complete change from earlier period regarding Progress—New +view of it developed—Facile optimism rejected. + + + + +CHAPTER V +PROGRESS + +Intimately bound up with the idea of freedom is that of progress. For, +although our main approach to the discussion of freedom was made by way +of the natural sciences, by a critique of physical determinism, and +also by way of the problem of personal action, involving a critique of +psychological determinism, it must be noted that there have appeared +throughout the discussion very clear indications of the vital bearing +of freedom upon the wide field of humanity’s development considered as +a whole—in short, its history. The philosopher must give some account +of history, if he is to leave no gap in his view of the universe. The +philosophy of history will obviously be vastly different if it be based +on determinism rather than on freedom. When the philosopher looks at +history his thoughts must inevitably centre around the idea of +progress. He may believe in it or may reject it as an illusion, but his +attitude to it will be very largely a reflection of the doctrine which +he has formed regarding freedom. + +The notion of progress is probably the most characteristic feature +which distinguishes modern civilisation from those of former times. It +would have seemed to the Greeks foolishness. We owe it to the people +who, in the modern world, have been what Greece was in the ancient +world, the glorious mother of ideas. The eighteenth century was marked +in France by a growing belief in progress, which was encouraged by the +Encyclopaedists and rose to enthusiasm at the Revolution. Its best +expression was that given by Condorcet, himself an Encyclopaedist, and +originally a supporter of the Revolution. His _Sketch of an Historical +Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind_ was written in 1793 (while +its author was threatened with the guillotine[1]), published two years +later, and became, in the early years of the nineteenth century, a +powerful stimulus to thought concerning progress. Much of the work is +defective, but it had a great influence upon Saint-Simon, the early +socialists, and upon the doctrines of Auguste Comte, which themselves +are immediate antecedents of our own period. We may note briefly here, +that Condorcet believed in a sure and infallible progress in knowledge +and in social welfare. This is the important doctrine which Saint-Simon +and Comte both accepted from him. His ideal of progress is contained in +the three watchwords of the Revolution, _Liberté_, _Egalité_, +_Fraternité_, particularly the last two. He forecasts an abandonment of +militarism, prophesies an era of universal peace, and the reign of +equality between the sexes. Equality is a point which he insists upon +very keenly, and, although he did not speak of sociology as did Comte, +nor of socialism as did Saint-Simon, he claimed that the true history +of mankind is the history of the great mass of workers: it is not +diplomatic and military, not the record of dazzling deeds of great men. +Condorcet, however, was dogmatic in his belief in progress, and he did +not work out any “law” of progress, although he believed progress to be +a law of the universe, in general, and an undeniable truth in regard to +the life-history of mankind. + + [1] He was ultimately imprisoned and driven to suicide. + + +Later, his friend Cabanis upheld a similarly optimistic view, and +endeavoured to argue for it, against the Traditionalists, who we may +remember endeavoured to restate Catholicism, and to make an appeal to +those whom the events of the Revolution had disturbed and +disillusioned. The outcome of the Terror had somewhat shaken the belief +in a straightforward progress, but enthusiastic exponents of the +doctrine were neither lacking nor silent. Madame de Staël continued the +thought of Condorcet, thus forming a link between him and Saint-Simon +and Comte. The influence of the Traditionalists and the general current +of thought and literature known as Romanticism, helped also to solve a +difficulty which distinguishes Condorcet from Comte. This difficulty +lay in the eighteenth-century attitude to the Middle Ages, which +Condorcet had accepted, and which seriously damaged his thesis of +general progress, for in the eighteenth century the Middle Ages were +looked upon as a black, dark regress, for which no thinker had a good +word to say. The change of view is seen most markedly when we come to +Comte, whose admiration of the Middle Ages is a conspicuous feature of +his work. While, however, Saint-Simon and Comte were working out their +ideas, great popularity was given to the belief in progress by the +influence of Cousin, Jouffroy, Guizot, and by Michelet’s translation of +the _Scienza nuova_ of the Italian thinker Vico, a book then a century +old but practically unknown in France. For Cousin, the world process +was a result of a necessary evolution of thought, which he conceived in +rather Hegelian fashion. Jouffroy agreed with this fatal progress, +although he endeavoured to reconcile it with that of personal freedom. +Guizot’s main point was that progress and civilisation are the same +thing, or rather, that civilisation is to be defined only by progress, +for that is its fundamental idea. His definition of progress is not, +however, strikingly clear, and he calls attention to two types of +progress—one involving an improvement in social welfare, the other in +the spiritual or intellectual life. Although Guizot tried to show that +progress in both these forms is a fact, he did not touch ultimate +questions, nor did he successfully show that progress is the universal +key to human history. He did not really support his argument that +civilisation _is_ progress in any convincing way, but he gave a +stimulus to reflection on the question of the relationship of these +two. Michelet’s translation of Vico came at an appropriate time, and +served a useful purpose. It showed to France a thinker who, while not +denying a certain progress over short periods, denied it over the long +period, and reverted rather to the old notion of an eternal recurrence. +For Vico, the course of human history was not rectilineal but rather +spiral, although he, too, refrained from indicating any law. He claimed +clearly enough that each civilisation must give way to barbarism and +anarchy, and the cycle be again begun. + +Such were the ideas upon progress which were current at the time when +Saint-Simon, Fourier and Comte were busily thinking out their +doctrines, the main characteristics of which we have already noted in +our Introduction on the immediate antecedents of our period. The +thought given to the question of progress in modern France is almost +unintelligible save in the light of the doctrines current from +Condorcet, through Saint-Simon to Comte, for the second half of the +century is again characterised by a criticism and indeed a reaction +against the idea professed in the first half. This was true in regard +to Science and to Freedom. We shall see a similar type of development +illustrated again respecting Progress. + +Already we have noted the general aim and object which both Saint-Simon +and Comte had in view. The important fact for our discussion here is +that Saint-Simon, by his respect for the Middle Ages, and for the power +of religion, was able to rectify the defects which the ideas of the +eighteenth century had left in Condorcet’s doctrine of progress. +Moreover, he claimed, as Condorcet had not done, to indicate a “law of +progress,” which gives rise alternately to “organic” and to “critical” +periods. The Middle Ages were, in the opinion of Saint-Simon, an +admirable period, displaying as they did an organic society, where +there was a temporal and spiritual authority. With Luther began an +anarchical, critical period. According to Saint-Simon s law of progress +a new organic period will succeed this, and the characteristic of that +period will be socialism. He advocated a gradual change, not a violent +revolutionary one, but he saw in socialism the inevitable feature of +the new era. With its triumph would come a new world organisation and a +league of peoples in which war would be no more, and in which the lot +of the proletariat would be free from oppression and misery. The +Saint-Simonist School became practically a religious sect, and the +chief note in its gospel was “Progress.” + +That the notion of progress was conspicuous in the thought of this time +is very evident. It was, indeed, in the foreground, and a host of +writers testify to this, whom we cannot do much more than mention here. +A number of them figured in the events of 1848. The social reformers +all invoked “Progress” as justification for their theories being put +into action. Bazard took up the ideas of Saint-Simon and expounded them +in his _Exposition de la Doctrine saint-simonienne_ (1830). Buchez, in +his work on the philosophy of history, assumed progress (1833). The +work of Louis Blanc on _L’Organisation du Travail_ appeared in 1839 in +a periodical calling itself _Revue des Progrès_. The brochure from +Proudhon, on property, came in 1840, and was followed later by _La +Philosophie du Progrès_ (1851). Meanwhile Fourier’s _Théorie des Quatre +Mouvements et des Destinées générales_ attempted in rather a fantastic +manner to point the road to progress. Worthless as many of his quaint +pages are, they were a severe indictment of much in the existing order, +and helped to increase the interest and the faith in progress. +Fourier’s disciple, Considérant, was a prominent figure in 1848. The +Utopia proposed by Cabet insisted upon _fraternité_ as the keynote to +progress, while the volumes of Pierre Leroux, _De l’Humanité_, which +appeared in the same year as Cabet’s volume, 1840, emphasised _égalité_ +as the essential factor. His humanitarianism influenced the +woman-novelist, George Sand. This same watchword of the Revolution had +been eulogised by De Tocqueville in his important study of the American +Republic in 1834, and that writer had claimed _égalité_ as the goal of +human progress. All these men take progress as an undoubted fact; they +only vary by using a different one of the three watchwords, _Liberté_, +_Egalité_, _Fraternité_, to denote the kind of progress they mean. +Meanwhile, Michelet and his friend Quinet combated the Hegelian +conception of history maintained by Cousin, and they claimed _liberté_ +to be the watchword of progress. The confidence of all in progress is +almost pathetic in its unqualified optimism. It is not remarkable that +the events of 1851 proved a rude shock. Javary, a writer who, in 1850, +published a little work, _De l’Idée du Progrès_, claimed that the idea +is the supremely interesting question of the time in its relation to a +general philosophy of history and to the ultimate destiny of mankind. +This is fairly evident from the writers we have cited, without Javary’s +remark, but it is worth noting as being the observation of a +contemporary. With the mention of Reynaud’s _Philosophie religieuse_, +upholding the principle of indefinite perfectability and Pelletan’s +_Profession du Foi du XIXe Siècle_, wherein he maintained confidently +and dogmatically that progress is the general law of the universe, we +must pass on from these minor people to consider one who had a +profounder influence on the latter half of the century, and who took +over the notion of progress from Saint-Simon. + +This was Comte, whose attitude to progress in many respects resembles +that of Saint-Simon, but he brought to his work a mental equipment +lacking in the earlier writer and succeeded, by the position he gave to +it in his Positive Philosophy, in making the idea of progress one which +subsequent thinkers could not omit from consideration. + +According to Comte, the central factor in progress is the mental. +Ideas, as Fouillée was later to assert, are the real forces in +humanity’s history. These ideas develop in accordance with the “Law of +the Three Stages,” already explained in our Introduction. In spite of +the apparent clearness and simplicity of this law, Comte had to admit +that as a general law of all development it was to some degree rendered +difficult in its application by the lack of simultaneity in development +in the different spheres of knowledge and social life. While +recognising the mental as the keynote to progress, he also insisted +upon the solidarity of the physical, intellectual, moral and social +life of man, and to this extent admitted a connection and interaction +between material welfare and intellectual progress. The importance of +this admission lay in the fact that it led Comte to qualify what first +appears as a definite and confident belief in a rectilineal progress. +He admits that such a conception is not true, for there is +retrogression, conflict, wavering, and not a steady development. Yet he +claims that there is a general and ultimate progress about a mean line. +The causes which shake and retard the steady progress are not +all-powerful, they cannot upset the fundamental order of development. +These causes which do give rise to variations are, we may note in +passing, the effects of race, climate and political and military feats +like those of Napoleon, for whom Comte did not disguise his hatred, +styling him the man who had done most harm to humanity. Great men upset +his sociological theories, but Comte was no democrat and strongly +opposed ideas of Liberty and Equality. We have remarked upon his +general attitude to his own age, as one of criticism and anarchy. In +this he was probably correct, but he quite underestimated the extent +and duration of that anarchy, particularly by his estimate of the +decline and fall of Catholicism and of militarism, which he regarded as +the two evils of Europe. The events of the twentieth century would have +been a rude shock to him, particularly the international conflagration +of 1914-1918. It was to Europe that Comte confined his philosophy of +history and consequently narrowed it. He knew little outside this +field. + +He endeavoured, however, to apply his new science of sociology to the +development of European history. His work contains much which is good +and instructive, but fails ultimately to establish any law of progress. +It does not seem to have occurred to Comte’s mind that there might not +be one. This was the question which was presented to the thinkers after +him, and occupies the chief place in the subsequent discussion of +progress. + +I + +In the second half of the century the belief in a definite and +inevitable progress appears in the work of those thinkers inspired by +the positivist spirit, Vacherot, Taine and Renan. Vacherot’s views on +the subject are given in one of his _Essais de Philosophie +critique_,[2] entitled “_Doctrine du Progrès_.” These pages, in which +sublime confidence shines undimmed, were intended as part of a longer +work on the Philosophy of History. Many of Renan’s essays, and +especially the concluding chapters of his work _L’Avenir de la +Science_, likewise profess an extreme confidence in progressive +development. Yet Taine and Renan are both free from the excessive and +glowing confidence expressed by Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte. +Undoubtedly the events of their own time reacted upon their doctrine of +progress, and we have already noted the pessimism and disappointment +which coloured their thoughts regarding contemporary political events. +Both, however, are rationalists, and have unshaken faith in the +ultimate triumph of reason. + + [2] Published in 1864. + + +The attitude which Taine adopts to history finds a parallel in the +fatalism and determinism of Spinoza, for he looks upon the entire life +of mankind as the unrolling of a rigidly predetermined series of +events. “Our preferences,” he remarks, “are futile; nature and history +have determined things in advance; we must accommodate ourselves to +them, for it is certain that they will not accommodate themselves to +us.” Taine’s view of history reflects his rejection of freedom, for he +maintains that it is a vast regulated chain which operates +independently of individuals. Fatalism colours it entirely. It is +precisely this attitude of Taine which raises the wrath of Renouvier, +and also that of both Cournot and Fouillée, whose discussions we shall +examine presently. They see in such a doctrine an untrue view of +history and a theory vicious and detestable from a moral standpoint, +although it doubtless, as Fouillée sarcastically remarks, has been a +very advantageous one for the exploiters of humanity in all ages to +teach and to preach to the people. + +In passing from Taine’s fatalistic view of history to note his views on +progress we find him asserting that man’s nature does not in itself +inspire great optimism, for that nature is largely animal, and man is +ever ready, however “civilised” he may appear to be, to return to his +native primitive ferocity and barbarism. Man is not, according to +Taine, even a sane animal, for he is by nature mad and foolish. Health +and wisdom only occasionally reign, and so we have no great ground for +optimism when we examine closely the nature of man, as it really is. +Taine’s treatment of the French Revolution[3] shows his hostility to +democracy, and he is sceptical about the value or meaning of the +watchwords, “Rights of Man,” or _Liberté_, _Egalité_, _Fraternité_. +This last, he claims, is merely a verbal fiction useful for disguising +the reality, which is actual warfare of all against all. + + [3] _“La Révolution,”_ in his large work, _Les Origines de la France + contemporaine_. + + +Yet in spite of these considerations Taine believes in a definitely +guaranteed progress. Man’s lower nature does not inspire optimism, but +his high power of reason does, and it is on this faith in reason that +Taine confidently founds his assertions regarding progress. He sees in +reason the ultimate end and meaning of all else. The triumph of reason +is an ideal goal to which, in spite of so many obstacles, all the +forces of the universe are striving. In this intellectual progress, +this gradual rationalisation of mankind, Taine sees the essential +element of progress upon which all other goods depend. The betterment +of social conditions will naturally follow; it is the spiritual and +mental factor which is the keynote of progress Reason, he contends, +will give us a new ethic, a new politic and a new religion. + +Renan shares with Taine the belief in reason and its ultimate triumph. +His views on progress are, however, more discursive, and are extremely +interesting and suggestive. He was in his later years shrewd enough to +discover the difficulties of his own doctrine. Thus although he +believed in a “guaranteed” progress, Renan marks a stage midway between +the idea of progress as held by Comte and Taine on the one hand, and by +Cournot and Renouvier on the other. + +His early book, _L’Avenir de la Science_, glows with ardent belief in +this assured progress, which is bound up with his confidence in science +and rationality. “Our creed,” he there declares, “is the reasonableness +of progress.” This idea of progress is almost as central a point in +Renan’s thought as it was in that of Comte, and he gave it a more +metaphysical significance. His general philosophy owes much to history, +and for him the philosophy of history is the explanation of progress. +By this term he means an ever-growing tendency to perfection, to fuller +consciousness and life, to nobler, better and more beautiful ends. He +thinks it necessary to conceive of a sort of inner spring, urging all +things on to fuller life. He seems here to anticipate vaguely the +central conception of Guyau and of Bergson. But, like Taine, Renan +founds his doctrine of progress on rationalism. He well expresses this +in one of his _Drames philosophiques (L’Eau de Jouvence)_, through the +mouth of Prospero, who represents rational thought. This character +declares that “it is science which brings about social progress, and +not progress which gives rise to science. Science only asks from +society to have granted to it the conditions necessary to its life and +to produce a sufficient number of minds capable of understanding +it.”[4] In the preface written for this drama he declares that science +or reason will ultimately succeed in creating the power and force of +government in humanity. + + [4] _L’Eau de Jouvence_, Act 4, Scene I., Conclusion. + + +These thoughts re-echo many of the sentiments voiced on behalf of +progress by Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte. It is interesting, +however, to note an important point on which Renan not only parts +company with them, but ranges himself in opposition to them. This point +is that of socialism or democracy, call it what one will. + +In the spring of 1871 Renan was detained at Versailles during the +uproar of the Commune in Paris, and there wrote his _Dialogues et +Fragments philosophiques_, which were published five years later. In +these pages certain doctrines of progress and history are set forth, +notably in the “dialogues of three philosophers of that school whose +ground-principles are the cult of the ideal, the negation of the +supernatural and the investigation of reality.” Renan raises a +discussion of the end of the world’s development. The universe, he +maintains, is not devoid of purpose: it pursues an ideal end. This goal +to which the evolutionary process moves is the reign of reason. But +there are striking limitations to this advance. From this kingdom of +reason on the earth the mass of men are shut out. Renan does not +believe in a gradual improvement of the mass of mankind accompanied by +a general rationalisation which is democratic. The truth is that Renan +was an intellectual aristocrat and, as such, he abhorred Demos. His +gospel of culture, upon which he lays the greatest stress, is for the +few who are called and chosen, while the many remain outside the pale, +beyond the power of the salvation he offers. The development of the +democratic idea he looks upon as thoroughly mischievous, inasmuch as it +involves, in his opinion, degeneration, a levelling down to mediocrity. +In his philosophy of history he adopts an attitude somewhat akin to +that of Carlyle in his worship of Great Men. The end of history is, +Renan states, the production of men of genius. The great mass of men, +the common stuff of humanity, he likens to the soil from which these +Great Ones grow. The majority of men have their existence justified +only by the appearance upon the scene of “Heroes of Culture.” In this +teaching the parallelism to the gospel of the Superman is apparent, yet +it seems clear that although Renan’s man of culture despises the +ignorance and vulgarity of the crowd, he does so condescendingly as a +benefactor, and is free from the passionate hatred and scorn to which +Nietzsche’s Superman is addicted. Nevertheless, Renan’s attitude of +uncompromising hostility to democratic development is very marked. He +couples his confidence in Science to his anti-democratic views, and +affirms the “Herd” to be incapable of culture. Although the process of +rationalisation and the establishment of the kingdom of reason is +applicable only to the patrician and not to the _plebs_, this process +is claimed by Renan to be capable of great extension, not in the number +of its adherents but in the extent of culture. In this final reign of +reason, instinctive action and impulse will be replaced by +deliberation, and science will succeed religion. + +His famous letter to Berthelot includes a brief statement of his views +on progressive culture, which, for him, constitutes the sign of +progress. “One ought never,” he writes, “to regret seeing clearer into +the depths.” By endeavouring to increase the treasure of the truths +which form the paid-up capital of humanity, we shall be carrying on the +work of our pious ancestors, who loved the good and the true as it was +understood in their time. The true men of progress, he claims, are +those who profess as their starting-point a profound respect for the +past. Renan himself was a great lover of the past, yet we find him +remarking in his _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_ that he has no +wish to be taken for an uncompromising reactionist. “I love the past, +but I envy the future,” and he thinks that it would be extremely +pleasant to live upon this planet at as late a period as possible. He +appears jealous of the future and of the young, whose fate it will be +to know what will be the outcome of the activities of the German +Emperor, what will be the climax of the conflict of European +nationalities, what development socialism will take. His shrewd mind +had alreadv foreseen in a measure the possible development of German +militarism and of Bolshevism. He regards the world as moving towards a +kind of “Americanism,” by which he means a type of life in which +culture and refinement shall have little place. Yet, although he has a +horror and a dread of democracy, he feels also that the evils +accompanying it may be, after all, no worse than those involved in the +reactionary dominance of nobles and clergy. + +Humanity has not hitherto marched, he thinks, with much method. Order +he considers to be desirable, but only in view of progress. Revolutions +are only absurd and odious, he asserts in _L’Avenir de la Science_, to +those who do not believe in progress. Yet he claims that reaction has +its place in the plan of Providence, for it works unwittingly for the +general good. “There are,” to quote his metaphor, “declivities down +which the _rôle_ of the traction engine consists solely in holding +back.” + +Renan thinks that if democratic ideas should secure a clear triumph, +science and scientific teaching would soon find the modest subsidies +now accorded them cut off. He fears the approach of an era of +mediocrity, of vulgarity, in fact, which will persecute the +intellectuals and deprive the world of liberty. He is not thoughtlessly +optimistic; he was far too shrewd an intellect for that. Our age, he +suggests, may be regarded in future as the turning point of humanity’s +history, that point where its deterioration set in, the prelude to its +decline and fall. But he asserts, as against this, that Nature does not +know the meaning of the word “discouragement.” Humanity, proving itself +incapable of progress, but only capable of further deterioration, would +be replaced by other forms. “We must not, because of our personal +tastes, our prejudices perhaps, set ourselves to oppose the action of +our time. This action goes on without regard to us and probably is +right.”[5] The future of science is assured. With its progress, Renan +points out, we must reckon upon the decay of organised religion, as +professed by sects or churches. The disappearance of this organised +religion will, however, result most assuredly in a temporary moral +degeneration, since morality has been so conventionally bound up with +the Church. An era of egoism, military and economic in character, will +arise and for a time prevail. + + [5] Preface to _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_. + + +Yet we must not, Renan reminds us, grumble at having too much unrest +and conflict. The great object in life is the development of the mind, +and this requires liberty or freedom. The worst type of society is the +theocratic state, or the ancient pontifical dominion or any modern +replica of these where dogma reigns supreme. A humanity which could not +be revolutionary, which had lost the attraction of “Utopias,” believing +itself to have established the perfect form of existence would be +intolerable. This raises also the query that if progress be the main +feature of our universe, then we have a dilemma to face, for either it +leads us to a _terminus ad quem_, and so finally contradicts itself, or +else it goes on for ever, and it is doubtful then in what sense it can +be a progress. + +Renan’s own belief was essentially religious, and was coloured by +Christian and Hebrew conceptions. It was a rationalised belief in a +Divine Providence. He professed a confidence in the final triumph of +truth and goodness, and has faith in a dim, far-off divine event which +he terms “the complete advent of God.” The objections which are so +frequently urged by learned men against finalism or teleology of any +kind whatsoever Renan deemed superficial and claimed, rightly enough, +that they are not so much directed against teleology but against +theology, against obsolete ideas of God, particularly against the dogma +of a deliberate and omnipotent Creator. Renan’s own doctrine of the +Deity is by no means clear, but he believed in a spiritual power +capable of becoming some day conscious, omniscient and omnipotent. God +will then have come to himself. From this point of view the universe is +a progress to God, to an increasing realisation of the Divinity in +truth, beauty and goodness. + +The universe, Renan claims, must be ultimately rooted and grounded in +goodness; there must be, in spite of all existing “evils,” a balance on +the side of goodness, otherwise the universe would, like a vast +banking-concern, fail. This balance of goodness is the _raison d’être_ +of the world and the means of its existence. The general life of the +universe can be illustrated, according to Renan, by that of the oyster, +and the formation within it of the pearl, by a malady, a process vague, +obscure and painful. The pearl is the spirit which is the end, the +final cause and last result, and assuredly the most brilliant outcome +of this universe. Through suffering the pearl is formed; and likewise, +through constant pain and conflict, suffering and hardship, the spirit +of man moves intellectually and morally onward and upward, to the +completed realisation of justice, beauty, truth and infinite goodness +and love, to the complete and triumphant realisation of God. We must +have patience, claims Renan, and have faith in these things, and have +hope and take courage. “One day virtue will prove itself to have been +the better part.” Such is his doctrine of progress. + +II + +With Cournot and Renouvier our discussion takes a new form. Renan, +Taine, Vacherot and the host of social and political writers, together +with August Comte himself, had accepted the fact of progress and clung +to the idea of a law of progress. With these two thinkers, however, +there is a more careful consideration given to the problem of progress. +It was recognised as a problem and this was an immense advance upon the +previous period, whose thinkers accepted it as a dogma. + +True to the philosophic spirit of criticism and examination which +involves the rejection of dogma as such, Cournot and Renouvier approach +the idea of progress with reserve and free from the confidently +optimistic assertions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. +Scorning the rhetoric of political socialists, positivists and +rationalists, they endeavour to view progress as the central problem of +the philosophy of history, to ascertain what it involves, and to see +whether such a phrase as “law of progress” has a meaning before they +invoke it and repeat it in the overconfident manner which characterised +their predecessors. We have maintained throughout this work that the +central problem of our period was that of freedom. By surveying the +general character of the thought of the time, and in following this by +an examination of the relation of science and philosophy, we were able +to show how vital and how central this problem was. From another side +we are again to emphasise this. Having seen the way in which the +problem of freedom was dealt with, we are in a position to observe how +this coloured the solutions of other problems. The illustration is +vivid here, for Cournot and Renouvier develop their philosophy of +history from their consideration of freedom, and base their doctrines +of progress upon their maintenance of freedom. + +It is obvious that the acceptance of such views as those expressed on +freedom by both Cournot and Renouvier must have far-reaching effects +upon their general attitude to history, for how is the dogma of +progress, as it had been preached, to be reconciled with free action? +It is much easier to believe in progress if one be a fatalist. The +difficulty here was apparent to Comte when he admitted the influence of +variations, disturbing causes, which resulted in the development of +mankind assuming an oscillating character rather than that of a +straight-forward progress. He did not, however, come sufficiently close +to this problem, and left the difficulty of freedom on one side by +asserting that the operation of freedom, chance or contingency (call it +what we will), issuing in non-predetermined actions, was so limited as +not to interfere with the general course of progress. + +Cournot and Renouvier take up the problem where Comte left it at this +point. Each of them takes it a stage further onward in the development. +The fundamental ideas of Cournot we have briefly noted as being those +of order, chance and probability. The relation of these to progress he +discusses, not only in his _Essai sur les Fondements de nos +Connaissances_ and the _Traité de l’Enchaînement d’Idées_, but also in +a most interesting manner in his two volumes entitled _Considérations +sur la Marche des Idées et des Evènements dans les Temps modernes_. +Like Comte, he is faithful, as far as his principles will allow, to the +idea of order. There is order in the universe to a certain degree; +science shows it to us. There is also, he maintains, freedom, hazard or +chance. Looking at history he sees, as did Comte, phenomena which, upon +taking a long perspective, appear as interferences. Pure reason is, he +claims, really incapable of deciding the vital question whether these +disturbances are due to a pure contingency, chance or freedom, or +whether they mark the points of the influence of the supernatural upon +mankind’s development. He refers to the _enchaînement de circonstances +providentielles_ which helped the early Jews and led to the propagation +of their monotheism; which helped also the development of the Christian +religion in the Roman Empire. Hazard itself, he claims,[6] may be the +agent or minister of Providence. Such a view claims to be loyal at once +to freedom and to order. + + [6] _Essai sur les Fondaments de nos Connaissances_, vol. i, chap. 5. + + +Cournot continues his discussion further and submits many other +considerations upon progress. He claims that it is absurd to see in +every single occurrence the operations of a divine providence or the +work of a divine architect. Such a view would exalt his conception of +order, undoubtedly, but only at the expense of his view of freedom. He +will not give up his belief in freedom, and in consequence declares +that there is no pre-arranged order or plan in the sense of a “law.” He +sets down many considerations which appear as dilemmas to the pure +reason, and which only action, he thinks, will solve. He points out the +difficulty of economic and social progress owing to our being unable to +test theories until they are in action on a large field. He shows too +how conflicting various developments may be, and how progress in one +direction may involve degeneration in another. Equality may be good in +some ways, unnatural and evil in others. Increase of population may be +applauded as a progress from a military standpoint, but may be an +economic evil with disastrous suffering as its consequence. The +“progress” to peace and stability in a society usually involves a +decrease in vitality and initiative. By much wealth of argument, no +less than by his general attitude, Cournot was able to apply the breaks +to the excessive confidence in progress and to call a halt for sounder +investigation of the matter. + +Renouvier did much more in this direction. In his _Second Essay of +General Criticism_ he touched upon the problem of progress in relation +to freedom, and his fourth and fifth essays constitute five large +volumes dealing with the “Philosophy of History.” He also devotes the +last two chapters of _La Nouvelle Monadologie_ to progress in relation +to societies, and brings out the central point of his social ethics, +that justice is the criterion of progress. Indeed, all that Renouvier +says regarding history and progress leads up, in a manner peculiarly +his own, to his treatment of ethics, which will claim attention in our +next chapter. + +_The Analytic Philosophy of History_ forms an important item in the +philosophical repertoire of Renouvier. He claims it to be a necessary +feature of the neo-critical, and indeed of any serious, philosophy. It +is, he claims, not a branch of knowledge which has an isolated place, +for it is as intimately connected to life as is any theory to the facts +which it embraces. That is not to say, and Renouvier is careful to make +this clear, that we approach history assuming that there are laws +governing it, or a single law or formula by which human development can +be expressed. The “Philosophy of History” assumes no such thing; it is +precisely this investigation which it undertakes, loyal to the +principles of General Criticism of which it, in a sense, forms a part. +In a classification it strictly stands between General Criticism or +Pure Philosophy and History itself. + +“History,” says Renouvier, “is the experience which humanity has of +itself,”[7] and his conclusions regarding progress depend on the views +he holds regarding human personality and its essential attribute, +freedom. The philosophy of history has to consider whether, in +observing the development of humanity on the earth, one may assert the +presence of any general law or laws. Can one say legitimately that +there has been development? Is there really such a thing as progress? +If so, what is our idea of progress? What is the trend of humanity’s +history? These are great questions. + + [7] _Introduction à la Philosophie de l’Histoire_, Préface. + + +The attitude which Renouvier adopts to the whole course of human +history is based upon his fundamental doctrines of discontinuity, +freedom and personality. There are, he claims, real beginnings, +unpredicable occurrences, happenings which cannot be explained as +having been caused by preceding events. We must not, he urges, allow +ourselves to be hypnotised by the name “History,” as if it were in +itself some great power, sweeping all of us onward in its course, or a +vast ocean in which we are merely waves. Renouvier stands firm in his +loyalty to personality, and sees in history, not a power of this sort, +but simply the total result of human actions. History is the collective +work of the human spirit or of free personalities.[8] + + [8] Renouvier’s great objection to Comte’s work was due to his + disagreement with Comte’s conception of Humanity. To Renouvier, with + his intense valuation of personality, this Comtian conception was too + much of an abstraction. + + +It is erroneous to look upon it as either the fatalistic functioning of +a law of things or as the results of the action of an all-powerful +Deity or Providence. Neither the “scientific” view of determinism nor +the theological conception of God playing with loaded dice, says +Renouvier, will explain history. It is the outcome of human action, of +personal acts which have real worth and significance in its formation. +History is no mere display of marionettes, no Punch-and-Judy show with +a divine operator pulling strings from his concealed position behind +the curtain. Equally Renouvier disagrees with the view that history is +merely an unrolling in time of a plan conceived from eternity. Human +society and civilisation (of which history is the record) are products +of man’s own thought and action, and in consequence manifest +discontinuity, freedom and contingency. Renouvier thus opposes strongly +all those thinkers, such as the Saint-Simonists, Hegelians and +Positivists, who see in history only a fatalistic development. He joins +battle especially with those who claim that there is a fatalistic or +necessitated progress. History has no law, he claims, and there is not +and cannot be any law of progress. + +The idea of progress is certainly, he admits, one with which the +philosopher is brought very vitally into contact in his survey of +history. Indeed an elucidation of, this notion might itself be a part +of the historian’s task. If so, the historians have sadly neglected +part of their work. Renouvier calls attention to the fact that all +those historians or philosophers who accept a comforting doctrine of +humanity’s assured progress make very plausible statements, but they +never seem able to state with any clearness or definiteness what +constitutes progress, or what significance lies in their oft-repeated +phrase, “the law of progress.” He rightly points out that this +insistence upon a law, coupled with a manifest inability to indicate +what it is, causes naturally a certain scepticism as to there being any +such law at all. + +Renouvier brands the search for any law of progress a futile one, since +we cannot scientifically or logically define the goal of humanity or +the course of its development because of the fact of freedom and +because of our ignorance. We must realise that we, personally at +firsthand, see only an infinitesimal part of humanity’s life on this +planet alone, not to speak of a destiny possible beyond this globe, and +that, at second-hand, we have only evidence of a portion of the great +procession of human events. We do not know humanity’s beginning and +primitive history, nor do we know its goal, if it has one. These +factors alone are grave hindrances to the formulation of any conception +of progress. Reflection upon them might have saved men, Renouvier +observes, from the presumptuous belief in assured progress. We cannot +presume even to estimate the tendencies, the direction of its course, +because of the enormous and ever-increasing complexity of free human +activity. + +By his large work on the “Philosophy of History,” Renouvier shows that +the facts of history themselves are against the theory of a universal +and continuous progress, for the record shows us conflict, advance, +retrogression, peoples rising, others degenerating, empires +establishing themselves and passing away by inward ruin or outer +assaults, or both, and civilisations evolving and disintegrating in +their turn. The spectacle does not readily promote an optimistic view +of human development at all, much less support the doctrine of a sure +and certain progress. Renouvier does not blind himself to the constant +struggle and suffering. The theatre, or rather the arena, of history +presents a curious spectacle. In politics and in religion he shows us +that there are conflicts of authority and of free thought, a warfare of +majorities with minorities, a method of fighting issues slightly less +savage than the appeal to pure force, but amounting to what he terms “a +pacific application of the principle of force.” History shows us the +corruption, tyranny and blindness of many majorities, and the tragic +and necessary resort to force as the only path to liberty for +down-trodden minorities. How, Renouvier asks, can we fit this in with a +doctrine of assured progress, or, indeed, progress at all? + +Further, he does not find it difficult to show that much unthinking +utterance on the part of the optimists may be somewhat checked by calm +reflection on even one or two questions. For example, Was progress +involved in the change from ancient slavery to the wage-slavery of +modern industrialism? Was Christianity, as Nietzsche and others have +attempted to maintain, a retrogression? Or, again, Was the change from +Greek city life to the conditions of the Middle Ages in any way to be +regarded as a progress? + +Renouvier considers it quite erroneous to assert, as did Comte, that +there is a steady and continuous development underlying the +oscillations, and that the variations, as it were, from the direct line +of progress cancel one another or balance each other, leaving, as Renan +claimed, a balance always and inevitably on the side of goodness. + +Such a confidence in the great world banking concern Renouvier does not +possess. There is no guarantee that the account of goodness may not be +overdrawn and found wanting. He reminds us sternly and solemnly of the +terrible solidarity which characterises evil. Deceit, greed, lust, +violence and war have an enormous power of breeding each other and of +supporting one another increasingly. The optimistic doctrines of +progress are simply untrue statements of the facts of history, and +falsely coloured views of human nature. It is an appalling error in +“social dynamics” to overlook the clash of interest, the greed of +nation and of class, the fundamental passionate hate and war. With it +is coupled an error in “social statics,” in which faith is put in +institutions, in the mechanism of society. These, declares Renouvier, +will not save humanity; they will, indeed, ruin it if it allow itself, +through spiritual and moral lethargy, to be dominated by them. They +have been serviceable creations of humanity at some time or other, and +they must serve men, but men must not be bound down to serve them. This +servitude is evil, and it has profoundly evil consequences. + +Having attacked Comte’s view of progress and of order in its static and +dynamic point of view, Renouvier then brings up his heavy artillery of +argument against Comte’s idealisation of the Middle Ages. To assert +that this period was an advance on the life of the Greek city, +Renouvier considers to be little short of impudence. The art and +science and philosophy of the Greeks are our best heritage, while the +Middle Ages, dominated by a vicious and intolerant Church, with its +infallible theology and its crushing power of the clergy, was a “dead +hand” upon the human spirit. While it provided an organic society, it +only succeeded in doing so by narrowing and crushing the human +intellect. The Renascence and the Reformation proved that there were +essential elements of human life being crushed down. They reached a +point, however, where they exploded. + +Not only does Renouvier thus declare the Middle Ages to be a regress, +but he goes the length of asserting that the development of European +history _could_ have been different. This is his doctrine of freedom +applied to history. There is no reason at all for our regarding the +Middle Ages or any such period as necessitated in the order of +mankind’s development. There is no law governing that development; +consequently, had mankind, or even a few of its number, willed and +acted upon their freedom differently, the whole trend of the period we +call the Dark Ages might have been quite other than it was. Renouvier +does not shirk the development of this point, which is a central one +for his purpose. It may seem fantastic to the historians, who must of +course accept the past as given and consequently regard reflection on +“what might have been” as wasted time. Certainly the past cannot be +altered—that is not Renouvier’s point. He intends to give a lesson to +humanity, a stern lesson to cure it of its belief in fatalism in regard +to history. This is the whole purpose of the curious volume he +published in 1876, entitled _Uchronie_, which had as its explanatory +sub-title _L’Utopie dans l’Histoire, Esquisse historique du +Développement de la Civilisation européenne, tel qu’il n’a pas été, tel +qu’il avail pu être_. The book, consisting of two manuscripts supposed +to be kept in the care of an old Dutch monk, is actually an imaginary +construction by Renouvier himself of European history in the period 100 +to 800 A.D., written to show the real possibility that the sequence of +events from the Emperor Nerva to the Emperor Charlemagne might have +been radically different from what it actually was. + +All this is intended by Renouvier to combat the “universal +justification of the past.” He sees that the doctrine of progress as +usually stated is not only a lie, but that it is an extremely dangerous +one, for it justifies the past, or at least condones it as inevitable, +and thus makes evil a condition of goodness, demoralises history, +nullifies ethics and encourages the damnation of humanity itself. This +fatalistic doctrine, asserts Renouvier with great earnestness, must be +abandoned; freedom must be recognised as operative, and the human will +as making history.There is no law of progress, and the sooner humanity +can come to realise this the better it will be for it. Only by such a +realisation can it work out its own salvation. “The real law lies”, +declares Renouvier,”only in an equal possibility of progress or +deterioration for both societies and individuals.” If there is to be +progress it can only come because, and when, humanity recognises itself +as collectively responsible for its own history, and when each person +feels his own responsibility regarding that action. No acceptance of +events will avail; we must _will_ progress and consciously set +ourselves to realise it. It is possible, but it depends on us. Here +Renouvier’s considerations lead him from history to ethics. “Almost all +the Great Men, men of great will, have been fatalists. So slowly does +humanity emerge from its shadows and beget for itself a just notion of +its autonomy. The phantom of necessity weighs heavily,” he laments, +“over the night of history.”[9] With freedom and a recognition of its +freedom by humanity generally we may see the dawn of better things. +Humanity will then consciously and deliberately make its history, and +not be led by the operations of herd-instinct and fatalistic beliefs +which in the past have so disgraced and marred its record. + + [9] _Psychologie ralionnelle_, vol. 2, p. 91. + + +The existing condition of human society can only be described frankly, +in Renouvier’s opinion, as a state of war. Each individual, each class, +each nation, each race, is actually at war with others. It matters not +whether a diplomatic state of peace, as it is called, exists or not; +that must not blind us to the facts. By institutions, customs, laws, +hidden fraud, diplomacy, and open violence, this conflict is kept up. +It is all war, says Renouvier. Modern society is based on war, +economic, military or judicial. Indeed, military and naval warfare is a +clear issue, but only a symbol of what always goes on. Might always has +the upper hand, hence ordinary life in modern society is just a state +of war. Our civilisation does not rest on justice, or on the conception +of justice; it rests on power and might. Until it is founded on +justice, peace, he urges, will not be possible; humanity will be +enslaved in further struggles disastrous o itself. This doctrine of the +_état de guerre_, as descriptive of modern society, he makes a feature +of his ethics, upon which we must not here encroach, but may point out +that he insists upon justice as the ultimate social criterion, and +claims that this is higher than charity, which is inadequate as a basis +for society, however much it may alleviate its ills. One of the chief +necessities, he points out, an essential to any progressive measure +would be to moralise our modern notion of the state.[10] In the notes +to his last chapter of the _Nouvelle Monadologie_ Renouvier attacks the +Marxian doctrine of the materialistic determination of history. + + [10] This point was further emphasised by Henri Michel in his work, + _L’Idée de l’Etat_. + + +This same book, however, we must note, marks a stage in Renouvier’s own +thought different from his doctrines in the earlier _Essais de Critique +générale_, and this later philosophy, of which the _Monadologie_ and +_Personnalisme_ are the two most notable volumes, displays an attempt +to look upon progress from a more ultimate standpoint. His _théodicée_ +here involves the notion, seen in Ravaisson, of an early perfection, +involving a subsequent “fall,” the world now, with its _guerre +universelle_, being an intermediate stage between a perfect or +harmonious state in the past and one which lies in the future. + +The march of humanity is an uncertain one because it is free. The +philosophy of history thus reiterates the central importance of +freedom. The actual end or purpose of this freedom is not simply, says +Renouvier, the attainment of perfection, but rather the possibility of +progress. It was this thought which led him on in his reflections +further than any of the thinkers of our period, or at least more +deliberately than any, to indicate his views on the doctrine of a +future life for humanity. So far from this being a purely religious +problem, Renouvier rightly looks upon it as merely a carrying further +afield of the conception of progress. + +For him, and this is the significant point for us here, any notion of a +future life for humanity, in the accepted sense of immortality, is +bound up with, and indeed based upon, the conception of progressive +development. It is true that Renouvier, like Kant, looks upon the +problems of “God, Freedom and Immortality” as the central ones in +philosophy, true also that he recognises the significance of this +belief in a Future Life as an extremely important one for religious +teaching; but his main attitude to the question is merely a +continuation of his general doctrine of progress, coupled with his +appreciation of personality. It is in this light only that Renouvier +reflects upon the problem of Immortality. He makes no appeal to a world +beyond our experience—a fact which follows from his rejection of the +Kantian world of “noumena”; nor does he wish the discussion to be based +on the assertions of religious faith. He admits that belief in a Future +Life involves faith, in a sense, but it is a rational belief, a +philosophical hypothesis and, more particularly, according to +Renouvier, a moral hypothesis. He asserts against critics that the +undertaking of such a discussion is a necessary part of any Critical +Philosophy, which would be incomplete without it, as its omission would +involve an inadequate account of human experience. + +Renouvier claims that, in the first instance, the question of a future +existence arises naturally in the human mind from the discrepancy which +is manifest in our experience between nature on the one hand and +conscience on the other. The course of events is not in accord with +what we feel to be morally right, and the demands of the moral law are, +to Renouvier’s mind, supreme. He realises how acutely this discrepancy +is sometimes felt by the human mind, and his remarks on this point +recall those of the sensitive soul, who, feeling this acutely, cried +out: + +“Ah, Love! could thou and I with Fate conspire +To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire, +Would we not shatter it to bits—and then +Re-mould it nearer to the heart’s desire.” + + +These lines well express the sharpness of Renouvier’s own feelings, and +he claims that, such a conspiracy being impossible, the belief in +Immortality becomes a necessary moral postulate or probability. + +The grounds for such a postulate are to be found, he claims, even in +the processes of nature itself. The law of finality or teleology +manifests itself throughout the universe: purpose is to be seen at work +in the Cosmos. It is true that in the lower stages of existence it +seems obscure and uncertain, but an observer cannot fail to see “ends” +being achieved in the biological realm. The functions of organisms, +more particularly those of the animal world, show us a realm of ends +and means at work for achieving those ends. This development in the +direction of an end, this teleology, implies, says Renouvier, a +destiny. The whole of existence is a gradual procession of beings at +higher and higher levels of development, ends and means to each other, +and all inheriting an immense past, which is itself a means to their +existence as ends in themselves. May one not then, suggests Renouvier, +make a valid induction from the destiny thus recognised and partially +fulfilled of certain individual creatures, to a destiny common to all +these creatures indefinitely prolonged?[11] + + [11] _Psychologic rationnelle_, vol. 2, pp. 220-221. + + +The objection is here made that Nature does not concern herself with +individuals; for her the individual is merely a means for the carrying +on and propagation of the species. Individuals come into being, live +for a time and pass away, the species lives on perpetually; only +species are in the plan of the universe, individuals are of little or +no worth. To this Renouvier replies that species live long but are not +perpetual; whole species have been wiped out by happenings on our +planet, many now are dying out. The insinuation about the worthlessness +of individuals rouses his wrath, for it strikes at the very root of his +philosophy, of which personality is the keynote. This, he says, is to +lapse into Pantheism, into doctrines of Buddhists and of Spinoza. +Pantheism and all kindred views are to be rejected. It is not in the +indefinable, All-existing, the eternal and infinite One, that we find +help with regard to the significance of ends in nature. Ends are to be +sought in the individuals or the species. But while it behoves us to +look upon the world as existing for the species and not the species for +the sake of the world, we must remember that the species exists for the +sake of the individuals in it. It is false to look upon the individuals +as existing merely for the sake of the species. + +If we subordinate the individual to the species, sacrificing his +inherent worth and unique value, and then subordinate species to genus +and all genera to the All, we lose ourselves in the Infinite substance +in which everything is swallowed up. Again, Pantheism tends to speak of +the perfection of individuals, and speaks loudly of progress from one +generation to another. But it tells only of a future which involves the +entire sacrifice of all that has worth or value in the past. It shows +endless sacrifice, improvement too, but all for naught. “What does it +matter to say that the best is yet to be, if the best must perish as +the good, to give place to a yet better ‘best’ which will not have the +virtue of enduring any more than the others? Do we offer any real +consolation to Sisyphus,” asks Renouvier, “by promising him +annihilation, which is coupled with the promise of successors capable +of lifting his old rock higher and still higher up the fatal slope, by +offering him the eternal falling of this rock and successors who will +continually be annihilated and endlessly be replaced by others?” The +rock is the personal life. On this theory, however high the rock be +pushed, it always is destined to fall back to the same depth, as low as +if it had never been pushed up hill at all. We refuse to reconcile a +world containing real ends and purposes within it with such a game, +vast and miserable, in which no actor plays for his own sake, and all +the false winners lose all their gains by being obliged to leave the +party while the play goes on for ever. This is to throw away all +individual worth, the value of all personal work and effort, to declare +individuality a sham, and to embrace fatality. It is this mischievous +Pantheism which is the curse of many religions and many philosophies. +Against it Renouvier wages a ceaseless warfare. The individuals, he +asserts exist both for their own sake and worth, also for the sake and +welfare of others. In the person, the law of finality finds its highest +expression. Personality is of supreme and unique value. + +This being so, it becomes a necessary postulate of our philosophy, if +we really believe in the significance of personalities and in progress +(which Renouvier considers to have no meaning apart from them), to +conclude that death is but an event in the career of these +personalities. They are perpetuated beyond death. + +For Renouvier, as for Kant, the chief arguments for survival are based +on considerations of a moral character, upon the demands of the moral +ideal for self- realisation, for the attainment of holiness or, more +properly, “wholeness.” This progress can only be made possible by the +continued existence after bodily death of the identical personality, +unique and of eternal worth in the scheme of things, capable of further +development than is possible amid the conditions of life as we know it. + +We must, however, present to ourselves Immortality as given by the +development of appearances in this world of phenomena, under the +general laws with which we are acquainted to-day, thus correcting the +method of Kant, who placed Immortality in a noumenal world. The +salvation of a philosopher should not be of such a kind. We must treat +Immortality as a Law, not as a miracle. The thinker who accepts the +latter view quits the realm of science—that is, of experience and +reason—to establish a mystic order in contradiction with the laws of +nature. The appeal to the “supernatural” is the denial of nature, and +the appellant ruins his own case by his appeal. If Immortality is a +fact, it must be considered rationally. + +Is Death—that is, the destruction of individuals as such, or the +annihilation of personalities—a reality? Renouvier reminds those who +jeer at the doctrine of Immortality that “the reality of death (as so +defined) has not been, and cannot be, proved.” Our considerations must +of necessity be hypothetical, but they can be worthy of rational +beings. We must then keep our hopes and investigations within the realm +of the universe and not seek to place our hope of immortality in a +region where nothing exists, “not even an ether to support the wings of +our hope.” + +Renouvier’s general considerations led him to view all individuals as +having a destiny in which their individuality should be conserved and +developed. When we turn in particular to man, these points are to be +seen in fuller light. The instinctive belief in Immortality is bound up +with his nature as a thinking being who is capable of setting up, and +of striving after, ends. This continual striving is a marked +characteristic of all human life, a counting oneself not to have +attained, a missing of the mark. + +The human consciousness protests against annihilation. At times this is +very keenly expressed. “At the period of the great aspirations of the +heart, the ecstasy of noble passions is accompanied by the conviction +of Immortality. Life at its highest, realising its richest personality, +protests, in virtue of its own worth, and in the name of the depths of +power it still feels latent in itself, against the menace of +annihilation.”[12] It cries out with its unconquerable soul: + +“Give me the glory of going on and not to die!” + + + [12] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 249. + + +Renouvier finds a further witness in the testimony of Love—that is to +say, in nature itself arrived at the consciousness of that passion in +virtue of which it exists and assuring itself by this passion, of the +power to surmount all these short-comings and failures. Love casteth +out fear, the dread of annihilation, and shows itself “stronger than +death.” Hope and Love unite in strengthening the initial belief in +Immortality and the “will to survive.” + +Renouvier admits that this is _a priori_ reasoning, and speedily _a +posteriori_ arguments can be brought up as mighty battering-rams +against the fortress of immortal life, but although they mav shake its +walls, they are unable to destroy the citadel. Nothing can demonstrate +the impossibility of future existence, whereas the whole weight of the +moral law and the teleological elements at work in the universe are, +according to Renouvier, in favour of such a belief. + +Morality, like every other science, is entitled to, nay obliged to, +employ the hypothesis of harmony. Now in this connection the hypothesis +of harmony (or, as Kant styled it, the concurrence of happiness and +virtue necessary to a conception of order) finds reinforcement from the +consideration of the meaning and significance of freedom. For the +actual end or purpose of freedom is not simply the attainment of +perfection, but rather the possibility of progress. Immortality becomes +a necessary postulate, reinforced by instinct, reason, morality, by the +fact of freedom, and the notion of progress. Further, Renouvier feels +that if we posit death as the end of all we thereby give an absolute +victory to physical evil in the universe. + +The postulate of Immortality has a certain dignity and worth. The +discussion of future life must, however, be kept within the +possibilities of law and phenomena. Religious views, such as those of +Priestley, by their appeal to the miraculous debase the notion of +Immortality itself. Talk of an immortal essence, and a mortal essence +is meaningless, for unless the same identical person, with his unique +character and memory, persists, then our conception of immortality is +of little or no value. The idea of an indestructible spiritual +substance is not any better or more acceptable. Our notion of a future +life must be based upon the inherent and inalienable rights of the +moral person to persistence and to chances of further development or +progress. Although we must beware of losing ourselves in vain +speculations, which really empty our thought of all its content, +Renouvier claims that we are quite entitled to lay down hypotheses. + +The same general laws which we see in operation and which have brought +the universe and the beings in it to the stage of development in which +they now are may, without contradiction, be conceived as operating in +further developments after the change we call bodily death. There is no +incongruity in conceiving the self-same personality continuing in a +second and different organism. Renouvier cites the case of the grub and +the butterfly and other metamorphoses. In man himself he points to +organic crises, which give the organism a very different character and +effect a radical change in its constitution. For example, there is the +critical exit from the mother’s womb, involving the change from a being +living in an enclosure to that of an independent creature. When once +the crisis of the first breath be passed the organism starts upon +another life. There are other crises, as, for instance, the radical +changes which operate in both sexes at the stage of puberty. Just as +the personality persists in its identity through all these changes, may +it not pass through that of bodily death? + +The Stoics believed in a cosmic resurrection. Substituting the idea of +progress for their view of a new beginning, Renouvier claims that we +may attain the hypothesis that all human history is but a fragment in a +development incomparably greater and grander. Again, we may conceive of +life in two worlds co-existing, indeed interpenetrating, so that the +dead are not gone far from us into some remote heaven. + +But, whatever form we give to our hypothesis regarding progress into +another existence beyond this present one, Renouvier does not easily +allow us to forget that it must be based upon the significance of +freedom, progress and personality supported by moral considerations. +Even this progress is not guaranteed, and even if it should be the +achievement of some spirits there is no proof that it is universal. Our +destiny, he finally reminds us, lies in our own hands, for progress +here means an increased capacity for progress later, while spiritual +and moral indifference will result finally, and indeed, necessarily, in +annihilation. Here, as so often in his work, Renouvier puts moral +arguments and appeals in the forefront of his thought. Progress in +relation to humanity’s life on earth drew from him an appeal for the +establishment of justice: progress in a further world implies equally a +moral appeal. Our duty is to keep the ideal of progress socially and +individually ever before us, and to be worthy of immortality if it be a +fact, rather than to lose ourselves in the mistaken piety of “other- +worldliness.” About neither progress can we be dogmatic; it is not +assured, Renouvier has shown, and we must work for it by the right use +of our freedom, our intelligence and our will. + +III + +No thinker discussed the problem of progress with greater energy or +penetration than Renouvier. The new spiritualist group, however, +developed certain views arising from the question of contingency, or +the relation of freedom to progress. These thinkers were concerned more +with psychological and metaphysical work, and with the exception of +Fouillée and Guyau, they wrote little which bore directly upon the +problem of progress. Many of their ideas, however, have an indirect +bearing upon important points at issue. + +In Ravaisson, Lachelier and Boutroux, we find the question of teleology +presented, and also that of the opposition of spirit and matter. From +the outset the new spiritualism had to wrestle with two difficulties +inherent in the thought of Ravaisson. These were, firstly, the +reconciliation of the freedom and spontaneity of the spirit with the +operations of a Divine Providence or teleology of some kind; and, +secondly, the dualism assumed in the warfare of spirit and matter, +although spirit was held to be superior and anterior to matter. This +last involved a complication for any doctrine of progress, as it +required a primitive “fall” to account for matter, even a fall of the +Deity himself. This Ravaisson himself admits, and he thinks that in +creating the world God had to sacrifice some of his own being. In this +case “progress” is set over against a transcendental existence, and is +but the reawakening of what once existed in God, and in a sense now and +eternally exists. Progress there is, claims Ravaisson, towards truth +and beauty and goodness. This is the operation of a Divine Providence +acting by attracting men freely to these ideals, and as these are +symbols of God himself, progress is the return of the spirit through +self-conscious personalities to the fuller realisation of harmony, +beauty and love—that is, to the glory of God, who has ever been, now +is, and ever shall be, perfect beauty, goodness and love. + +Thus, although from a temporal and finite standpoint Ravaisson can +speak of progress, it is doubtful if he is justified in doing so +ultimately, _sub specie æternitatis_. To solve the problem in the way +he presents it, one would need to know more about the ultimate value +and significance of the personalities themselves, and their destiny in +relation to the Divinity who is, as he claims, perfect harmony, beauty +and love. It was this point, so dear to an upholder of personality, +which had led Renouvier to continue his discussion of progress in +relation to history as generally understood, until it embraced a wider +field of eternal destiny, and to consider the idea of a future life as +arising from, and based upon, the conception of progress. It is this +same point which later perplexes Bergson, when he recognises this +self-conscious personality as the ultimate development of the évolution +créatrice, and so constituting in a sense the goal of the spirit, +although he is careful to state that there is no finalism involved at +all. Ravaisson stands for this finalism, however, in claiming that +there are ends. He does not see how otherwise we could speak of +progress, as we should have no criterion, no _terminus ad quem_; all +would be simply process, not progress. + +_“Détachement de Dieu, retour à Dieu, clôture du grand cercle cosmique, +restitution de l’universel équilibre, telle est l’histoire du monde.”_ +Such is Ravaisson’s doctrine, much of which is akin to, and indeed +re-echoes, much in Christian theology from St. Augustine, with his idea +of an eternal and restless movement of return to the divinity, to the +Westminster divines in their answer to the important query about the +chief end of man, which they considered to be not only to glorify God +but to enjoy Him for ever. This last and rather strange phrase only +seems to have significance if we conceive, in Ravaisson’s manner, of +beauty, truth and goodness as expressions or manifestations of the +Divinity to whom the world-process may freely tend. + +For Lachelier the universal process presents a triple aspect, mechanism +which is coupled with finalism and with freedom. These three principles +are in action simultaneously in the world and in the individual. Each +of us is at once matter, living soul and personality—that is, +necessity, finality and freedom. The laws of the universe, so far from +being expressed entirely by mechanical formulae, can only be expressed, +as Ravaisson had claimed, by an approach to harmony and beauty, not in +terms of logic or geometry. All this involves a real progress, a +creativeness, which differs from Ravaisson’s return, as it were, to the +bosom of God. + +Boutroux combines the views of Ravaisson and Lachelier by insisting on +freedom and contingency, but maintaining at the same time a +teleological doctrine. Already in discussing his conception of freedom +we have referred to his metaphor of the sailors in the ship. His +doctrine of contingency is directly opposed to any rigid pre-ordained +plan of reality or progress, but it does not prevent the spirit from a +creative teleology, the formation of a plan as it advances. This is +precisely, is it not, the combination of free action and of teleology +which we find in our own lives? Boutroux is thus able to side with +Ravaisson in his claim to see tendencies to beauty and truth and +goodness, the fruits of the spirit, which it creates and to which it +draws us, while at the same time he maintains freedom in a manner quite +as emphatic as Lachelier. He is careful to remind us that “not all +developments are towards perfection.”[13] In particular he dislikes the +type of social theory or of sociology which undervalues the personal +life.[14] + + [13] _Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 127. + + + [14] Thus he agrees with Renouvier’s objection to Comte’s view and to + Communism. + + +Similar in many ways to the ideas of Ravaisson and of Boutroux are +those expressed by Blondel. He is concerned deeply with the problem of +God and progress, which arises out of his view of the Deity as immanent +and as transcendent. He is quite Bergsonian in his statement that God +creates Himself in us, but he qualifies this by asking the significant +question, “If he does not EXIST how can He create Himself in us.” This +brings us back to Ravaisson’s view. Other remarks of Blondel, however, +recall the doctrine of Vacherot and of Renan, that God is the ideal to +which we are ever striving. “It is a necessity that we should be moving +on, for He is always beyond.” All action is an advance, a progress +through the realm of materialistic determinism to the self-conscious +personality in man, but it is from a transcendent teleology, a Divine +Providence, that this action proceeds. + +This is the line of thought pursued by Fouillée, who in many of his +writings gives considerable attention to the doctrines of progress. It +may be doubted, however if he ever surpassed the pages in his _Liberté +et Déterminisme_ and _L’Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces_, which deal +with this point. These are the best expressions of his philosophy, and +Fouillée repeated himself a great deal. We might add, however, his +_Socialism_ and his book on _L’Avenir de la Métaphysique_. + +We have observed the importance attached by Comte to his new science of +sociology. Fouillée endeavours to give to it a metaphysical +significance with which Comte did not concern himself. He suggests in +his volume on _La Science sociale contemporaine_ that as biology and +sociology are closely related, the laws common to them may have a +cosmic significance. Is the universe, he asks, anything more than a +vast society in process of formation, a vast system of conscious, +striving atoms? Social science which Fouillée looks upon, as did Comte, +as constituting the crown of human knowledge, may offer us, he thinks, +the secret of universal life, and show us the world as the great +society in process of development, erring here and blundering there in +an effort to rise above the sphere of physical determinism and +materialism to a sphere where justice shall be supreme, and brotherhood +take the place of antagonism, greed and war. The power at the heart of +things, which is always ready to manifest itself in the human +consciousness when it can, might be expressed, says Fouillée, in one +word as “sociability.” + +Life in its social aspect displays a _conspiration_ to a common end. +The life of a community resembles a highly evolved organism in many +respects, as Fouillée shows; but although he thus partially adopts the +biological and positivist view of the sociologists, Fouillée does not +overlook the idealistic conceptions of Renouvier and his plea for +social justice. He rather emphasises this plea, and takes the +opportunity to point out that it represents the best political thought +of his country, being founded on the doctrine of the _contrat social_ +of Rousseau, of which social theory it is a clear and modern +interpretation. + +We may take the opportunity afforded here by Fouillée’s mention of +sociology, in which he was so keenly interested, to observe that the +positivist tendency to emphasise an indefinite progress remained with +most of the sociologists and some of the historians. It is seen in the +two famous sociological works of Tarde and Durkheim respectively, _Les +Lois de l’Imitation_ and _La Division du Travail social_. Two writers +on history deserve mention as illustrating the same tendency: Lacombe, +whose work _De l’Histoire considérée comme Science_ (1894) was very +positivist in outlook, and Xénopol. This last writer, treating history +in 1899 in his _Principes fondamentaux de l’Histoire_,[15] +distinguished cause in history from causality in science, and showed +that white the latter leads to the formation of general laws the former +does not. History has no laws, for it is succession but never +repetition. Much of his book, however, reflects the naturalism and +positivism which is a feature of the sociological writers.[16] + + [15] This work, revised and considerably augmented, was re-issued in + 1905 with the new title, _La Théorie de l’Histoire_. + + + [16] It was this which made Enouvier criticise sociology. He disagreed + with its principles almost entirely. On this, see his notes to “_La + Justice_,” Part VII. of _La Nouvelle Monadogie_, pp. 527-530. + + +It was his doctrine of _idées-forces_ and its essential spiritualism or +idealism which distinguished Fouillée’s attitude from that of these +sociologists who were his contemporaries. It was the basis, too, of his +trenchant criticisms of socialism, particularly its Marxian forms. +Fouillée agrees with Comte’s doctrine that speculation or thought is +the chief factor and prime mover in social change. For Fouillée the +idea is always a force; and it is, in this connection, the supreme +force. The history of action can only be understood, he asserts, in +relation to the history of ideas. This is the central gospel of the +_évolutionnisme des idées-forces_. The mental or spiritual is the +important factor. This he opposes to the Marxian doctrine of economic +determinism. Will is, he claims a greater reality than brute forces, +and in will lies the essence of the human spirit. It is a will, +however, which is bound up with reason and self-consciousness, and +which is progressive in character. + +Summing up his work, _Histoire générale de la Philosophie_, Fouillée +refers in his Conclusion to the idea of progress as having become the +dominant note in philosophy. He looks upon the history of philosophy +as, in some measure, witness to this. Above the ebb and flow of the +varied systems and ideas which the ages have produced he sees an +advance accomplished in the direction to which humanity is +tending—perfect knowledge of itself or collective self-consciousness +and perfect self- possession. This type of progress is not to be +equated with scientific progress. He points out that in the development +of philosophy, which is that of human reflection itself, two +characteristics appear. The distinction of two kinds or aspects of +truth is seen in philosophy; one section, dealing with logic, +psychology, aesthetic and applied ethics, or sociology, approaches to a +scientific character of demonstrability, while the other section, which +constitutes philosophy in the strict sense of metaphysic, deals with +ultimate questions not capable of proof but demanding a rational faith. +Obviously the same kind of progress cannot be found in each of these +sections. This must be realised when progress in knowledge is spoken +about. He suggests, as illustrative of progress even in the speculative +realm, the fact that humanity is slowly purifying its conception of +God—a point for further notice in our last chapter. + +However much Fouillée is concerned with establishing; a case for +progress in knowledge, it is clear that his main stress is on the +progress in self-consciousness or that self- determination which is +freedom. This freedom can only grow as man consciously realises it +himself. It is an _idée-force_, and has against it all the forces of +fatalism and of egoism. For Fouillée quite explicitly connects his +doctrine of freedom with that of altruism. The real freedom and the +real progress are one, he claims, since they both are to be realised +only in the increasing power of disinterestedness and love. He believes +in the possibility of a free progress. Fatality is really egoism, or +produces it. + +Fouillée has a rather clear optimism, for he finds in the development +of real freedom a movement which will involve a moral and social union +of mankind. The good- will is more truly human nature than egoism and +selfishness. These vices, he maintains in his _Idée moderne du +Droit_,[17] are largely a product of unsatisfied physical wants. The +ideal of the good-will is not a contradiction of human nature, because, +he asserts, that nature desires and wills its good. More strikingly, he +states that the human will tends ultimately not to conflict but to +co-operation as it becomes enlightened and universalised. He disagrees +with the pessimists and upholds a comparatively cheerful view of human +nature. Egoism is much less deeply rooted than sympathy, and therefore, +he says, war and strife are transitory features of human development. +One contrasts the views of Taine and Renouvier with this, and feels +that man’s history has been, as far as we know it, entirely of this +“transitory” nature, and is long likely to be so. + + [17] _L’Idée moderne du Droit_, Livre IV. + + +Fouillée’s optimism seems to be overdrawn mainly because of his +doctrine of the _idée-force_. He exaggerates the response which human +nature is likely to make to the ideal good. Even if it be lifted up, it +is not likely to draw _all_ men to it. Yet Fouillée’s social and +ethical doctrines stand entirely upon this foundation. They are +valuable views, and Fouillée is never better than when he is exhorting +his fellows to act upon the ideas of freedom, of justice, of love and +brotherhood. He is right in his insistence upon humanity’s power to +create good- will, to develop a new order. For the good man, he says, +fatality and egoism are obstacles to be overcome Believing in freedom +and in sympathy, he acts to others in a spirit of freedom and love. By +his very belief in universal good-will among men, he assists largely in +creating it and realising it in the world.[18] + + [18] Conclusion to _Liberté et Déterminisme_. + + +But did not Fouillée, one asks, overrate the number of good men (as +good in his sense), or rather did he not exaggerate the capacities of +human nature to respond to the ideal which he presents? Much of his +confidence in moral and social progress finds its explanation here. + +His step-son, Guyau, was not quite so optimistic, although he believed +in a progress towards “sociability” and he adopted many of the +doctrines of the _philosphie des idées-forces_. He attacks cheerful +optimism in his _Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, +where he remarks[19] that an absolute theory of optimism is really an +immoral theory, for it involves the negation of progress in the strict +and true sense. This is because, when it dominates the mind, it +produces a feeling of entire satisfaction and contentment with the +existing reality, resulting in resignation and acceptance of, if not an +actual worship of, the _status quo_. In its utter obedience to all +“powers that be,” the notions of right and of duty are dimmed, if not +lost. A definitely pessimistic view of the universe would, he suggests, +be in many respects better and more productive of good than an +outrageous optimism. Granting that it is a wretched state in which a +man sees all things black, it is preferable, Guyau thinks, to that in +which all things appear rosy or blue. + + [19] _Esquisse d’une Morale_, p. 10. + + +Guyau concludes his _Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_ +by remarking: “We are, as it were, on the _Leviathan_, from which a +wave has torn the rudder and a blast of wind carried away the mainmast. +It is lost in the ocean as our earth is lost in space. It floats thus +at random, driven by the tempest, like a huge derelict, yet with men +upon it, and yet it reaches port. Perhaps our earth, perhaps humanity, +will also reach that unknown end which they will have created for +themselves. No hand directs us; the rudder has long been broken, or +rather it has never existed; we must make it: it is a great task, and +it is our task.” This paragraph speaks for itself as regards Guyau’s +attitude to the doctrine of an assured progress. + +In his notable book _L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_, the importance of which +we shall note more fully when we deal with the religious problem in our +last chapter, Guyau indicates the possibilities of general intellectual +progress in the future. The demand of life itself for fuller expression +will involve the decay of cramping superstitions and ecclesiastical +dogmas. The aesthetic elements will be given a larger place, and there +will be intellectual freedom. Keen as Guyau is upon maintaining the +sociological standpoint, he sees the central factor in progress to be +the mental. “Progress,” he remarks,[20] “is not simply a sensible +amelioration of life—it is also the achievement of a better +intellectual formulation of life, it is a triumph of logic. To progress +is to attain to a more complete consciousness of one’s self and of the +world, and by that very fact to a more complete inner consistency of +one’s theory of the world.” Guyau follows his stepfather in his view of +“sociability” or _fraternité_ (to use the watchword of the Revolution) +as the desirable end at which we should progressively aim—a conclusion +which is but the social application of his central concept of Life. + + [20] Introduction to _L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_. + + +The next step in human progress must be in the direction of human +solidarity. Guyau thinks it will arise from collective, co-operative +energy (_synergie sociale_). Further progress must involve +simultaneously _sympathie sociale_, a community of fellowship or +comradeship, promoted by education of a true kind, not mere +instruction, but a proper development and valuation of the feelings. +Here art will play its part and have its place beside science, ethics +and philosophy in furthering the ideal harmony in human society. Such +Progress involves, therefore, that the Beautiful must be sought and +appreciated no less than the True and the Good, for it is a revelation +of the larger Life of which we ourselves are part. These ideals are in +themselves but manifestations of the Supreme Vitality. + +The same spontaneous vital activity of which Guyau makes a central +doctrine characterises Bergson’s view of reality. He upholds, like +Boutroux, freedom and contingency, but he will not admit finalism in +any shape or form, not even a teleology which is created in the process +of development. He refuses to admit as true of the universal process in +nature and in human history what is certainly true of human life—the +fact that we create ends as we go on living. For Bergson there is no +end in the universe, unless it be that of spontaneity of life such as +Guyau had maintained. There is no guarantee of progress, no law of +development, but endless possibility of progress. Such a view, as we +have already insisted, is not pessimistic. It is, however, a warning to +facile optimism to realise that humanity, being free, may go “dead +wrong.” While Boutroux maintains with Ravaisson that there is at the +heart of things a tendency to superior values such as beauty, goodness +and truth, and while Renan assures us that the balance of goodness in +the world is a guarantee of its ultimate triumph, Bergson, like +Renouvier, gives us stern warning that there is no guarantee in the +nature of things that humanity should not set its heart on other +values, on materialistic and egoistic conceptions, and go down in ruin +quarrelling and fighting for these things. There is no power, he +reminds us, keeping humanity right and in the line of desirable +progress. All is change, but that is not to say that all changes are +desirable or progressive. Here we arrive at a point far removed from +the rosy optimism of the earlier thinkers. Progress as a comfortable +doctrine, confidently accepted and dogmatically asserted, no longer +holds ground; it is seen to be quite untenable. + +In Bergson the difficulty which besets Ravaisson reappears more +markedly—namely, the relation of spirit and matter to one another, and +to the power at the heart of things, which, according to Bergson +himself, is a spiritual principle. Here we seem forced to admit +Ravaisson’s view of a “fall” or, as the theologians would say, a +“Kenosis” of the deity in order to create the material universe. Yet in +the processes of nature we see spirit having to fight against matter, +and of this warfare Bergson makes a great point. These considerations +lead to discussions which Bergson has not touched upon as yet. He does +not follow Ravaisson and Boutroux into the realm of theological ideas. +If he did he might have to make admissions which would compromise, or +at least modify, other doctrines expressed by him. He will have none of +Hegel or of the Absolute Idealism which sees the world process as a +development of a Divine Idea. It is new and it is creation; there is no +repetition. Even God himself _se fait_ in the process, and it may be, +suggests Bergson, that love is the secret of the universe. If so we may +well ask with Blondel, “If God _se fait_ in the process, then does he +not already exist and, in a sense, the process with him?” Instead, +however, of reverting to Ravaisson’s view of the whole affair being a +search for, and return to God, Bergson claims that the development is a +purely contingent one, in which a super-consciousness develops by +experiment and error. + +Bergson’s God, if he may be so-called, is not so much a Creator, but a +power creative of creators—that is, human personalities capable of free +action. The Deity is immanent in man, and, like man, is ignorant of the +trend of the whole process. The universe, according to Bergson, is a +very haphazard affair, in which the only permanence is change. There is +no goal, and progress has little meaning if it be only and merely +further change, which may be equally regress rather than progress. To +live is not merely to change, but to triumph over change to set up some +values as of absolute worth, and to aim at realising and furthering +these. Apart from some philosophy of values the conception of progress +has little meaning. + +Interesting discussions of various aspects of the problem are to be +found in the writings of the sociologist we have mentioned, Durkheim, +particularly _La Division du Travail sociale_, _Le Suicide_ and _Les +Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse_. There is an interesting +volume by Weber, entitled _Le Rythme du Progres_, and there are the +numerous books of Dr. Gustave Le Bon. + +Although he is not strictly a philosopher in the academic or +professional sense, and his work belongs to literature rather than to +the philosophy of the period, we cannot help calling attention briefly +here, at the conclusion of this chapter, to the genial pessimism of +Bergson’s great literary contemporary, Anatole France, the famous +satirist of our age. His irony on questions like that of progress is +very marked in _L’Ile des Penguins_ and in _Jérôme Coignard_. A remark +from one of his works, this latter, will sufficiently illustrate his +view on progress. “I take little interest,” remarks his character, the +Abbé Coignard, “in what is done in the King’s Cabinet, for I notice +that the course of life is in no way changed, and after reforms men are +as before, selfish, avaricious, cowardly, cruel, stupid and furious by +turns, and there is always a nearly even number of births, marriages, +cuckolds and gallows-birds, in which is made manifest the beautiful +ordering of our society. This condition is stable, sir, and nothing +could shake it, for it is founded on human misery and imbecility, and +those are foundations which will never be wanting.” The genial old Abbé +then goes on to remind socialist revolutionaries that new economic +schemes will not radically change human nature. We easily see the ills +in history and blind ourselves with optimism for the future. Even in +Sorel, the Syndicalist, who has added to his articles on _Violence_ +(which appeared in 1907 in the periodical _Le Mouvement socialiste_) a +work on _Les Illusions du Progrès_, we find the same doctrines about +the vices of modern societies, which he considers no better than +ancient ones in their morality; they are filled with more hypocrisy, +that is all. France and Sorel only add more testimony to the utter +collapse of the old doctrine of assured and general progress. + +* * * * * * * * * + + +To such a final position do we come in following out the development of +the idea of progress. The early assurance and dogmatic confidence which +marked the early years of the century are followed by a complete +abandonment of the idea of a guaranteed or assured progress, whether +based on the operations of a Divine Providence, or on faith in the +ultimate triumph of reason, or on merely a fatalistic determinism. +Progress is only a possibility, and its realisation depends on +‘humanity’s own actions. Further, any mention of progress in future +must not only present it as quite contingent, but we have to reckon +with the fact that the idea of progress may itself progress until it +resolves itself into another conception less complicated and less +paradoxical, such as “the attainment of a new equilibrium.” Some effort +must be devoted also to a valuation of criteria. Various values have in +the past been confused together, scientific, materialistic, hedonistic, +moral, aesthetic. Ultimately it seems that we shall find difficulty in +settling this apart from the solution offered by Renouvier—namely, that +true progress is not merely intellectual, but moral. It involves not +merely a conquest of material nature but of human nature—a self- +mastery. Progress is to be measured not by the achievements of any +aristocracy, intellectual or other, but by the general social status, +and our criterion of progress must be ultimately that of social +justice. This itself is a term needing interpretation, and to this +question of ethics we now turn. + + + + +CHAPTER VI +ETHICS + + +INTRODUCTION : Difficulties of the moral problem as presented in the +nineteenth century—Recognised as a social problem—Influence of Comte +important in this connection—Other influences—Christianity—Kant—The +practical reason. + +I. Taine and Renan—Renan’s critique of Christian morality—Early +socialistic views—Change in his later life—Prefers criterion of beauty +to that of goodness. + +II. Renouvier the great moralist of our period—Relation to Kant —His +Science de la Morale—Personality in Ethics—Justice. + +III. Fouillée, Guyau, Ollé-Laprune and Rauh pass further from the +Kantian rigorism to an ethic in harmony with the philosophy of +idées-forces of life and action—Humanitarianism of Fouillée and +Guyau—Idées-forces and Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction —Rauh’s +doctrines—Other thinkers. + +CONCLUSION: Action and belief—Ethics and Religion. + + + + +CHAPTER VI +ETHICS + +Moral philosophy is probably the most difficult branch of those various +disciplines of the human spirit summed up in the general conception of +philosophy. This difficulty is one which all the thinkers of our period +recognised. Many of them, occupied with other problems on the +psychological or metaphysical side, did not write explicitly upon +ethics. Yet the problem of ethics, its place, significance and +authority, is but the other side of that problem of freedom which has +appeared throughout this development as central and vital. The ethical +consciousness of man has never been content for long with the assertion +that ethics is a purely positive science, although it has obviously a +positive side. The essence of morality has been regarded as not merely +a description of what exists, but what might, should or ought to exist. +Ethics is normative, it erects or endeavours to outline a standard +which is an ideal standard. This is the characteristic of ethics, and +so long as the moral conscience of humanity, individually and +collectively, does not slumber nor die, it will remain so. This +conflict between the ideal and the real, the positive and normative is +indeed the chief source of pain and conflict to man, but without it he +would cease to be human. + +Whatever the difficulties, the philosopher who aspires to look upon +human life as a whole must give _some_ interpretation of this vital +aspect of human consciousness. It is in this connection that a solution +of the problem of freedom is so valuable, for under a purely +determinist and positivist reading of life, the moral sentiments become +mere data for an anthropological survey, the hope and tragedy of human +life are replaced, comfortably perhaps for some, by an interpretation +in which the true significance of ethics is lost. + +One of the outstanding features of the discussion upon ethics in our +period is the fact that the social standpoint colours most of the +discussion. This was largely due to the impulse given by Comte and +continued by the sociologists. We have already remarked the importance +which he attached to his new science of society or “sociology.” However +much the development of this branch of study may have disappointed the +hopes of Comte, it has laid a powerful and necessary emphasis upon the +solidarity of the problems of society. As Comte claimed that psychology +could not be profitably studied in the isolated individual alone, so he +insisted that ethics could only be studied with profit from a social +standpoint. This was not forgotten by subsequent thinkers, even by +those who were not his followers, and the main development of the +ethical problem in our period is marked by an increasing insistence +upon sociability and solidarity. Comte was able to turn the thoughts of +philosophers away from pre-occupation with the isolated individual, +conceived as a cold and calculating intellectual machine, a “fiction” +which had engrossed the minds of thinkers of the previous century. He +was able also to indicate the enormous part played by instincts, +particularly “herd-instincts,” by passion and feelings of social hatred +and social sympathy. It was the extension of social sympathy upon which +Comte insisted as the chief good. The great defect of Christianity from +an ethical standpoint was, Comte pointed out, due to its +individualistic ethic. To the doctrine of “saving one’s own soul” Comte +opposed that of the salvation of humanity. The social unit is not the +individual man or woman, it is the family. In that society which is not +a mere association but a union, arising from common interests and +sympathy, the individual realises himself as part of society. The +highest ethical conception, however, arises when the individual, +transcending himself and his family, feels and acts as a member of +humanity itself, not only in his public, but also in his private life. +In the idea of humanity Comte finds the concrete form of that universal +which in the ethic of Kant was the symbol of duty itself. + +It was by this insistence on human social solidarity that Comte left +his mark upon the ethical problem. Many of the details of social ethics +given in the last three large volumes of his work are extremely +thoughtful and interesting, in spite of their excessive optimism, but +we can only here indicate what is sufficient for our purpose, his +influence over subsequent thought. That is summed up in the words +“solidarity” and “social standpoint.” + +We may observe that the supreme problems in social ethics Comte +regarded as being those of education or mental development and the +“right to work.”[1] He foresaw, as did Renan, that Culture and Economic +Justice were the two _foci_ around which the ethical problems were to +be ranged in the immediate future. He regretted that the proletariat in +their cry for justice had not sufficient culture to observe that they +themselves are not a class apart, however class-conscious they be. They +stand solid with the community, and Comte prophesied that, finding this +out sooner or later, they would have to realise the folly of violent +revolution. Only a positive culture or education of the democracy +could, he believed, solve this social problem, which is there precisely +because the proletariat are not sufficiently, and do not feel +themselves to be, incorporated in the life of the community or of +humanity. Only when they realise this will work be ennobled by a +feeling of service. The Church has a moral advantage here, in that she +has her organisation complete for furthering the conception of service +to God. Comte realised this advantage of religious morality, but he +thought it would come also to “positive” morality when men came to a +conception of service for humanity To this great end, he urged, our +education should be directed, and it should aim, he thought, at the +decline and elimination of militarism which, in Comte’s view +corresponds to the second stage of development (marked also by +theology), a stage to be superseded in man’s development, by an era in +which the war-spirit will be replaced by that of productive service +performed not only _pour la patrie_, but _pour l’humanité_. + + [1] Comte criticised the teaching given to the young in France as + being “instruction” rather than “education.” This has frequently been + insisted upon since his time. + + +In viewing the general influences which bore upon the study of the +ethical problem in our period this stress upon the social character of +morality is supreme, and is the most distinctly marked. But in addition +to the sociological influence there are others which it is both +interesting and important to note briefly. There is the influence of +traditional religious morality, bound up with Christianity as presented +by the Roman Catholic Church. The deficiencies of this are frequently +brought out in the discussion, but in certain of the thinkers, chiefly +the “modernists,” it appears as an influence contributing to a +religious morality and as offering, indeed, the basis of a religion. +Other writers, however, while rejecting the traditional morality of the +Church, lay stress upon a humanitarian ethic which has an affinity to +the idealistic morality preached by the founder of Christianity, a +morality which manifests a spirit different from that which his Church +has usually shown. Indeed, the general tendency of the ethical +development in our period is one of opposition to the ecclesiastical +and traditional standpoint in ethics. + +Then there is the influence of Kant’s ethics, and here again, although +Renouvier owed much to Kant, the general tendency is to get away from +the formalism and rigorism of his “categorical imperative.” The current +of English Utilitarian ethics appears as rather a negative influence, +and is rather scorned when mentioned. The common feature is that of the +social standpoint, issuing in conceptions of social justice or +humanitarianism and finding in action and life a concrete morality +which is but the reflection of the living conscience of mankind +creating itself and finding in the claims of the practical reason that +Absolute or Ideal to which the pure reason feels it cannot alone +attain. + +I + +Taine and Renan were influenced by the outlook adopted by Comte. It +might well be said that Taine was more strictly positivist than Comte. +In his view of ethics, Taine, as might be expected from the general +character of his work and his philosophical attitude, adheres to a +rigidly positivist and naturalist conception. He looks upon ethics as +purely positive, since it merely states the scientific conditions of +virtue and vice, and he despairs of altering human nature or conduct. +This is due almost entirely to his doctrine of rigid determinism which +reacts with disastrous consequences upon his ethical outlook. This only +further confirms our contention that the problem of freedom is the +central and vital one of the period. We have already pointed out the +criticism which Fouillée brought against Taine’s dogmatic belief in +determinism, as an incomplete doctrine, a half-truth, which involves +mischievous consequences and permits of no valuable discussion of the +ethical problem. + +More interesting and useful, if we are to follow at all closely the +ethical thought of our period, is it to observe the attitude adopted to +ethics by Taine’s contemporary, Renan. + +The extreme confidence which Renan professed to have in “science,” and +indeed in all intellectual pursuits, led him to accord to morality +rather a secondary place. “There are three great things,” he remarks in +his _Discours et Conférences_,[2] “goodness, beauty and truth, and the +greatest of these is truth.” Neither virtue, he continues, nor art is +able to exclude illusions. Truth is the representation of reality, and +in this world the search for truth is the most serious occupation of +all. One of his main charges against the Christian Church in general is +that it has insisted upon moral good to such an extent as to undervalue +and depreciate the other goods, expressed in beauty and in truth. It +has looked upon life from one point of view only—namely, the moral—and +has judged all action by ethical values alone, despising in this way +philosophy, science, literature, poetry, painting and music. In its +more ascetic moods it has claimed that these things are “of the devil.” +Thus Christianity has introduced a vicious distinction which has done +much to mutilate human nature and to cramp the wholesome expression of +the life of the human spirit. Whatever is an expression of spirit is, +claims Renan, to be looked upon as sacred. If such a distinction as +that of sacred and profane were to be drawn it should be between what +appertains to the soul and what does not. The distinction, when made +between the ethical and the beautiful or true, is disastrous. + + [2] _Discours_, dated November 26th, 1885. + + +Renan considers that of the two, the ethical and the beautiful, the +latter may be the finer and grander distinction, the former merely a +species of it. The moral, he thinks, will give place to the beautiful. +“Before any action,” he himself says in _L’Avenir de la Science_, “I +prefer to ask myself, not whether it be good or bad, but whether it be +beautiful or ugly, and I feel that I have in this an excellent +criterion.” + +Morality, he further insists, has been conceived up to now in far too +rigid a manner as obedience to a law, as a warfare and strife between +opposing laws. But the really virtuous man is an artist who is creating +beauty, the beauty of character, and is fashioning it out of his human +nature, as the sculptor fashions a statue out of marble or a musician +composes a melody from sounds. Neither the sculptor nor the musician +feels that he is obeying a law. He is expressing and creating beauty. + +Another criticism which Renan brings against the ethic of Christianity +is its insistence upon humility as a virtue. He sees nothing virtuous +in it as it is generally interpreted: quite rightly he suspects it of +hypocritically covering a gross pride, after the manner of the +Pharisees. He gives a place to honest asceticism which has its +nobility, even although it be a narrow, misconceived ideal. Much nobler +is it, he thinks, than the type of life which has only one object, +getting a fortune. + +This leads him to another remark on the moral hypocrisy of so many +professedly religious folk. Having an easy substance and possessing +already a decent share of this world’s goods, they devote all their +energies to the pursuit of pleasure or of further superfluous wealth. +From this position they criticise the worker who endeavours to improve +his lot, and have the audacity to tell him in pious fashion that he +must not be materialistic, and must not set his heart on this world’s +goods. It would be laughable were it not so tragic. The whole question +of the relativity of the two positions is overlooked, the whole ethic +of the business ignored. Material welfare is good and valuable, says +Renan, in so far as it frees man’s spirit from mean and wretched +dependence and a cramped life which injures development, physical and +spiritual. These goods are a means to an end. When, therefore, a man, +already comfortably endowed, amasses more and more for its own sake, he +commits both a profane and immoral act. But when a worker endeavours to +augment his recompense for his labour, he is but demanding “what is the +condition of his redemption. He is performing a virtuous action.”[3] + + [3] _L’Avenir de la Science_, p. 83. + + +Sound as many of these considerations undoubtedly are, they come from +the Renan, who wrote in the years 1848-9 _L’Avenir de la Science_. He +lived long enough to see that these truths had complements, that there +might be, even ethically, another side. In speaking of Progress this +has been noted: in his later years he forecasted the coming of an era +of egoism, of national and industrial selfishness, working itself out +in policies of military imperialism among the nations, and of economic +greed and tyranny among the proletariat. His remarks about the virtuous +action of the worker bettering his lot were inspired by the socialism +of Saint-Simon. Renan did not at that time raise in his own mind the +question of the workers themselves carrying their reaction so far, that +it, although just at first, might reach a point where it became a +dictatorship decreed by self-interest alone. It is in Renouvier that we +find this danger more clearly indicated. In so far as Renan felt it, +his solution was that which he suggested for the elimination of all +social wickedness— namely, the increase of education. He looked upon +wickedness as a symptom of a lack of culture, particularly the lack of +any moral teaching. + +It was precisely this point, the education of the democracy, morally no +less than intellectually, which presented a certain difficulty to the +French Republic when, after several unsuccessful attempts, the plan for +state education of a compulsory, gratuitous and secular character was +carried in 1882, largely through the efforts of Jules Ferry.[4] + + [4] In 1848 Hippolyle Carnot had this plan ready. The fall of the + Ministry, in which he was Minister of Education, was due partly to the + discussion raised by Renouvier’s book (see p. 61 of the present work). + With the fall of the Ministry, and in 1851, of the Republic, the + scheme went too. France had to wait eleven years longer than England + for free, compulsory education. Her educational problem has always + been complicated by the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to + religious education and its hostility to “lay” schools. Brilliant as + France is intellectually, there are numbers of her people who do not + read or write owing to the delay of compulsory state education. The + latest census, that of 1921, asked the question, “_Savez-vous à la + fois lire et écrire?_” in order to estimate this number. + +II + +The great moralist of our period was Renouvier. Not only, as we have +already seen, did ethical considerations mark and colour his whole +thought, but he set forth those considerations themselves with a +remarkable power. His treatise in two volumes on _The Science of +Ethics_ is one of the most noteworthy contributions to ethical thought +which has been made in modern times. Although half a century has +elapsed since its publication on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, +its intense pre-occupation with the problems which beset our modern +industrial civilisation, its profound judgments and discussions +concerning subjects so vital to the world of to-day (such as the +relations of the sexes, marriage, sex-ethics, civil liberty, property, +communism, state intervention, socialist ideals, nationalism, war, the +modern idea of the State, and international law), give to it a value, +which very few works upon the subject possess. Long as the work is, it +has the merit of thoroughness, and difficulties are not slurred over, +but stated frankly, and some endeavours are made to overcome them. +Consequently, it is a work which amply repays careful study. It is +almost presumption to attempt in a few pages to summarise Renouvier’s +important treatise. Some estimate of its significance is, however, +vital to our history. + +The title itself is noteworthy and must at that date have appeared more +striking than it does to us now by its claim that there is a _science_ +of ethics.[5] We are accustomed to regard physics, mathematics and even +logic as entitled to the name Sciences. Can we legitimately speak of a +Science of Ethics? + + [5] It is interesting for comparative study to note that Leslie + Stephen’s _Science of Ethics_ was a much later production than + Renouvier’s treatise, appearing thirteen years later. + + +Renouvier insists that we can. Morality deals with facts, although they +are not embraced by the categories of number, extension, duration or +becoming (as mathematical and physical data), but rather by those of +causality, finality and consciousness. The facts “are not the natural +being of things, but the _devoir-être_ of the human will, the +_devoir-faire_ of persons, and the devoir-être of things in so far as +they depend upon persons.”[6] Personal effort, initiative and +responsibility lie at the basis of all ethics. Morality is a +construction, like every science, partly individual and partly +collective; it must lay down postulates, and if it is to justify the +claim to be a science, these postulates must be such as to command a +_consensus gentium_. Further, if ethics is to be scientifically based +it must be independent. In the past this has unfortunately not been the +case, for history shows us ethics bound up with some system of religion +or metaphysics. If ethics is to be established as a science, Renouvier +points out that it must be free from all hypothesis of an irrelevant +character, such as cosmological speculations and theological dogmas. +Renouvier’s insistence upon the independence of ethics was followed up +in an even clearer and more trenchant manner by Guyau in his famous +_Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_. + + [6] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 10. + + +Although, generally, ethics has suffered by reason of its alliance to +theological and metaphysical systems, Renouvier affirms that, in this +connection, there is one philosophy which is not open to +objection—namely, the Critical Philosophy of Kant. This is because it +subordinates all the unknown to phenomena, all phenomena to +consciousness, and, within the sphere of consciousness itself, +subordinates the speculative reason (_reinen Vernunft_) to the +practical reason (_praktischen Vernunft_). Its chief value, according +to Renouvier, lies precisely in this maintenance of the primacy of +moral considerations. + +Two standpoints or lines of thought which are characteristic of +Renouvier, and whose presence we have already noted in our first +chapter, operate also in his ethics and govern his whole treatment of +the nature of morality and the problems of the moral life. Briefly +stated these are, firstly, his regard for the Critical Philosophy of +Kant; secondly, his view of man as “an order, a harmony of functions +reciprocally conditioned, and, by this fact, inseparable.”[7] As in his +treatment of Certitude, Renouvier showed this to be a psychological +complex into which entered elements not only of cognition, but of +feeling and will, the same insistence upon this unity of human nature +meets us again in his ethics. “Any ethical doctrine which definitely +splits up the elements of human nature is erroneous.”[8] Abstraction is +necessary and useful for any science, even the science of ethics, but +however far we may carry our scientific analysis, we must never lose +sight of the fact that we are dealing with abstractions. To lose sight +of the relationship of the data under observation or discussion is, +indeed, working away from the goal of scientific knowledge. + + [7] _Science de la Morale_ (first edition, 1869), vol. I, p. 189. + + + [8] _Ibid_. + + +“Nothing,” remarks Renouvier in this connection, “has done more to +hinder the spread of Kant’s doctrines in the world than his assertion +that the morally good act must be performed absolutely without +feeling.” In view of man as he is, and in so far as we understand human +nature at all, it seems a vain and foolish statement. For Kant, Duty +was supreme, and the sole criterion of a good act was, for him, its +being done from a consciousness of Duty. He himself had to confess that +he did not know of any act which quite fulfilled this ideal of moral +action. With this view of morality Renouvier so heartily disagrees that +he is inclined to think that, so far from a purely rational act (if we +suppose such an act possible) being praiseworthy, he would almost give +greater moral worth to an act purely emotional, whose “motive” lay, not +in the idea of cold and stern Duty, but in the warm impulses of the +human heart, springing from emotion or feeling alone. Emotion is a part +of our nature—it has its role to play; the rational element enters as a +guide or controlling power. It is desirable that all acts should be so +guided, but that is far from stating, as does Kant, that they should +proceed solely from rational considerations. Ultimately reason and +sentiment unite in furthering the same ends. No adequate conception of +justice can be arrived at which is not accompanied by, and determined +by, correlatively, love of humanity. Kant rigorously excluded from +operation even the most noble feelings, whose intrusion should dim the +worth and glory of his moral act, devoid of feeling. But “without +good-will and mutual sympathy of persons, no society could ever have +established itself beyond the family, and scarcely the family +itself.”[9] + + [9] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 184. + + +Renouvier confesses that in most of this treatment of the problem of +ethics he follows Kant[10] and although his admiration for Kant’s work +is not concealed, nevertheless he is not altogether satisfied with it, +and does not refrain from criticism. Indeed this reconstruction of the +Critical Philosophy in a revised version is the main effort of the +neo-critical philosopher, and it is constantly manifest. + + [10] On p. 108 (vol. I) he refers to “_le philosophie que je suis, et + que j’aimerais de pouvoir suivre toujours_.” + + +He complains that Kant did not adhere rigorously to his own principles, +but vainly strove to give an objectivity to the laws of the practical +reason by connecting them to metaphysics. But, he says, “on the other +hand I maintain that the errors of Kant can be corrected in accordance +with the actual principles of his own philosophy. I continue my serious +attachment to this great reformer in spite of the very serious +modifications I am endeavouring to make in his work.”[11] + + [11] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. no. 110. + + +In the opinion of Renouvier, Kant’s work, the _Metaphysic of Morals_, +is marred by its neglect of history in its relation to ethics, by a +disfigured picture of right which does not make it any more applicable +to existing human conditions, also by the rather artificial and +complicated nature of its doctrines. He further reproaches Kant for +excessive rigorism and formalism, accompanied by a vagueness which +prevents the application of much of his teaching. This, it seems to us, +is a reproach which can be hurled easily at most of the ethical +teachers whom the world has seen. The incessant vagueness of +paradoxical elements in the utterances of such teachers has inevitably +compelled their disciples to find refuge in insisting upon a “right +spirit” of action, being devoid of any clear teaching as to what might +constitute right action in any particular case. + +The rudiments of morality, according to Renouvier, are found in the +general notion of “obligation,” the sense of ought (_devoir-faire_) +which the human consciousness cannot escape. Any end of action is +conceived as a good for the agent himself; and because of liberty of +choice between actions or ends, or between both, certain of these are +deemed morally preferable. There are certain obligations which are +purely personal, elementary virtues demanded from any rational being. +It is his interest to preserve his body by abstaining from excesses; it +is his interest also to conserve and develop the faculties of his +nature. This is the point upon which Guyau makes such insistence in +common with Nietzsche—the development, expansion and intensification of +life. There are, Renouvier points out, duties towards oneself, +involving constant watchfulness and intelligence, so that the agent may +be truly self-possessed under all circumstances, maintaining an empire +over himself and not falling a constant victim to passion. “Greater is +he that ruleth himself than he that taketh a city,” are not vain words. +This is the rudimentary but essential virtue which Renouvier calls +“virtue militant”—moral courage. Intellectually it issues in Prudence +or Wisdom; on the side of sense and passion it is represented by +Temperance. These duties are present to conscience, which itself arises +from a doubling of consciousness. “We have the empirical person with +his experience of the past, and we have the ideal person—that is to +say, that which we wish to be,”[12] our ideal character. In so far as +we are conscientious we endeavour to bring “what we are” into line with +“what we conceive we should be.” The moral agent thus has duties +towards himself, obligations apart from any relation to or with others +of his kind. + + [12] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 25. + + +This elementary morality is “essentially subjective,”[13] but this only +shows us that the most thorough-going individualism does not by its +neglect of others, its denial of altruism, thereby escape entirely from +moral obligations. There are always duties to one’s higher self, even +for a Robinson Crusoe. Frequently it is stated that duties and rights +are co-relative; but Renouvier regards Duty as more fundamental than +Right, which he uses only of man in association with his fellows. +Between persons, right and duty are in a synthesis, but the person +himself has no rights as distinct from duties to himself; he has no +right not to do what it is his duty to perform. From this it follows +that if his personal notion of obligation changes, he has no right +whatever to carry out actions in accordance with his judgments made +prior to his change of conscience, merely for the sake of consistency. +He is in this respect a law to him- self, for no man can act as a +conscience for another. The notion of rights only arises when others +are in question, and only too often the word has been abused by being +employed where simply power is meant, as, for example, in many views of +“natural right.” This procedure both sullies the usage of the term +Right and lowers the status of personality. It is always, Renouvier +claims, to “the inherent worth and force of personality, with its +powers of reflection, deliberation, liberty, self-possession and +self-direction, that one must return in order to understand each and +every virtue.” + + [13] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 81. + + +Renouvier’s insistence upon the inherent worth, the dignity and moral +value of personality becomes clearer as he proceeds from his treatment +of the lonely individual (who, it may be objected, is to such an extent +an abstraction, as to resemble a fiction) to associated persons. The +reciprocal relation of two persons brings out the essential meaning of +Justice. Two personalities co-operating for a common end find +themselves each possessed of duties and, inversely therefore, of rights +which are simply duties regarded from the point of view not of the +agent, but of the other party. The neo-critical ethic here brings +itself definitely into line with the principle of practical reason of +the Critical Philosophy. This, says Renouvier,[14] is the profound +meaning of Justice, which consists in the fact that the moral agent, +instead of subordinating the ends of other people to his own, considers +the personalities[15] of others as similar to his own and possessing +their own ends which he must respect. This principle is that which Kant +formulated under the name of “practical obligation” or “supreme +principle.”[16] “Recognise the personality of others as equal in nature +and dignity, as being an end in itself, and consequently refrain from +employing the personality of others merely as a means to achieve your +own ends.” + + [14] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, pp. 82-83. + + + [15] Personality is a better translation, as it avoids the rather + legal and technical meaning of “person” in English. + + + [16] In a footnote to this passage, Renouvier states his own + preference for “moral obligation” rather than “imperative of + conscience.” + + +This doctrine of Personalism is an assertion not only of _Liberté_, +_Egalité_, _Fraternité_ as necessary and fundamental principles, but +also of the value of personality in general and the relativity of +“things.” It constitutes an ethical challenge to the existing state of +society which is not only inclined, in its headlong pursuit of wealth, +its fanatical worship of Mammon, to treat its workers as purely “means” +to the attainment of its end, but further minimises personality by its +legal codes and social conventions, which both operate far more readily +and efficiently in the defence of property than in the defence or +protection of personality. From the ethical standpoint the world is a +realm of ends or persons and all other values must be adjusted in +relation to these. + +We have been told by religious ethical teachers that we must love our +neighbour as ourself, and have been reminded by moralists continually +of the conflict between Egoism and Altruism. Renouvier points out that +ultimately obligation towards others is reducible to a duty to oneself. +He does not do this from the point of view of Hobbes, who regarded all +actions, however altruistic they appeared to be, as founded purely upon +self-interest, but rather from the opposite standpoint. “We should make +our duty to others rank foremost among our duties to ourselves.”[17] +This is the transcendent duty through the performance of which we +achieve a realisation of the solidarity of persons, demonstrate an +objective value for our own existence, and gain a fuller and richer +life. + + [17] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 85. + + +The idea of personal and moral reciprocity was formulated by the +Chinese and the Greeks; at a later date it reappeared in the teaching +of Jesus. This ancient and almost universal maxim has been stated both +positively and negatively: “Do not to others what you would not have +them do unto you,” “Do as you would be done by.” The maxim itself, +however, beyond a statement of the principle of reciprocity rather +vaguely put, has no great value for the science of ethics. Renouvier +regards it not as a principle of morality but a rule-of-thumb, and he +considers the negative statement of it to be more in harmony with what +was intended by the early ethical teachers—namely, to give a practical +warning against the committing of evil actions rather than to establish +a scientific principle of right action. + +Renouvier has shown the origin of the notion of Justice as arising +primarily from an association of two persons. “Reason established a +kind of community and moral solidarity in this reciprocity.”[18] This +right and duty unite to constitute Justice. It is truly said that it is +just to fulfil one’s duty, just to demand one’s right, and Justice is +formed by a union of these two in such a manner that they always +complement one another. Bearing in mind the doctrine of personality as +an end, we get a general law of action which may be stated in these +terms: “Always act in such a way that the maxim applicable to your act +can be erected by your conscience into a law common to you and your +associate.” Now to apply this to an association of any number of +persons—_e g._, human society as a whole—we need only generalise it and +state it in these terms: “Act always in such a way that the maxim of +your conduct can be erected by your conscience into a universal law or +formulated in an article of legislation which you can look upon as +expressing the will of every rational being.” This “categorical +obligation” is the basis of ethics. It stands clear of hypothetical +cases as a general law of action, and “there is no such thing really as +practical morality,” remarks Renouvier, “except by voluntary obedience +to a law.”[19] + + [18] _Ibid_., pp. 79-80. + + + [19] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 100. + + +The fulfilment of our duties to ourselves generally tends to fit us for +fulfilling our duties to others, and the neglect of the former will +lead inevitably to inability to perform these latter. Our duty to +others thus involves our duty to ourselves.[20] + + [20] The notion of self-sacrifice itself involves also, to a degree, + the maintenance of self, without which there could be no self to + sacrifice. History has frequently given examples of men of all types + refusing to sacrifice their lives for a certain cause because they + wished to preserve them for some other (and possibly better—in their + minds at any rate, better) form of self-sacrifice. + + +Personality which lies at the root of the moral problem demands Truth +and Liberty, and it has a right to these two, for without them it is +injured. They are essential to a society of persons. Another vital +element in society is Work, the neglect of which is a grave immoral +act, for as there is in any society a certain amount of necessary work +to be performed, a “slacker” dumps his share upon his fellows to +perform in addition to their own share. With industrial or general +laziness, and the parasitism of those whose riches enable them to live +without working, is to be condemned also the shirking of intellectual +work by all. Quite apart from those who are “intellectuals” as such, a +solemn duty of work, of thought, reflection and reasoning lies on each +person in a society. Apathy among citizens is really a form of culpable +negligence. The duty of work and thought is so vital and of such +ethical, political and social importance that Renouvier suggests that +the two words, work and duty, be regarded as synonyms. It might, he +thinks, make clearer to many the obligation involved. + +Justice has been made clear in the foregoing remarks, but in view of +Kant’s distinction of “large” and “strict” duties, Renouvier raises the +question of the relation of Justice and Goodness. He concludes that +acts proceeding from the latter are to be distinguished from Justice. +They proceed not from considerations of persons as such, but from their +“nature” or common humanity, and are near to being “duties to oneself.” +They are of the heart rather than of the head, proceeding from +sentiments of humanity, and sentiment is not, strictly speaking, the +foundation of justice, which is based on the notions of duties and +rights. There can be, therefore, an opposition of Justice and of +Goodness (Kindness or Love), and the sphere of the latter is often +limited by considering the former. Renouvier recognises the fact that +Justice in the moral sense of recognition and respect for personality +is itself often “constitutionally and legally” violated in societies by +custom, laws and institutions as well as by members of society in their +actions, and he notes that this “legal” injustice makes the problem of +the relation of Justice and Charity excessively difficult. + +The science of ethics is faced with a double task owing to the nature +of man’s evolution and history. Human societies have been built upon a +basis which is not that of justice and right, but upon the basis of +force and tyranny—in short, upon war. There is, therefore, for the +moralist the twin duty of constructing laws and principles for the true +society founded upon an ethical basis, that is to say on conceptions of +Justice, while at the same time he must give practical advice to his +fellows living and striving in present society, where a continual state +of war exists owing to the operation of force and tyranny in place of +justice, and he must so _apply_ his principles that they may be capable +of moving this unjust existing society progressively towards the ideal +society. + +In our account of Renouvier’s “Philosophy of History” we brought out +his insistence upon war as the essential feature of man’s life on this +planet, as the basis of our present “civilisation.” Here he proclaims +it again in his ethics.[21] War reigns everywhere: it is around us and +within us—individuals, families, tribes, classes, nations and races. He +includes in the term much more than open fighting with guns. The +distribution of wealth, of property (especially of land), wages, custom +duties, diplomacy, fraud, violence, bigotry, orthodoxy, and +persecution, lies themselves, are all, to him, forms of war. Its most +ludicrous stronghold is among men who pride themselves on being at +peace with all men, while they force their idea of God upon other men’s +consciences. Religious intolerance is one, and a very absurd kind of +warfare.[22] + + [21] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 332. + + + [22] Renouvier sums up its spirit in the words: “_Crois ce que je + crois moi, où je te tue_” (_La Nouvelle Monadologie_). + + +The principle of justice confers upon the person a certain “right of +defence” in the midst of all this existing varied warfare of mankind. +It involves, according to Renouvier, resistance. The just man cannot +stand by and see the unjust man oppress his fellow so that the victim +is “obliged to give up his waistcoat after having had his coat torn +from him.” Otherwise we must confuse the _just_ with the _saintly_ man +who only admits one law—namely, that of sacrifice. But Renouvier will +have us be clear as to the price involved in all this violent +resistance. It means calling up powers of evil, emissaries of +injustice. He does not found his “right of defence” on rational right; +it is to misconceive it so to found it. We must recognise the use of +violence and force, even in self-defence, as in itself evil, an evil +necessitated by facts which do not conform to the rules of peace and +justice themselves. It is to a large degree necessary, unfortunately, +but is none the less evil and to be frankly regarded as evil, and +likely to multiply evil in the world, owing to the tremendous +solidarity of wickedness of which Renouvier has already spoken in +history. It is the absence of the reign of justice which necessitates +these conflicts, and we have to content ourselves with a conception of +actual “right,” a conception already based on war, not with one of +“rational right” or justice. + +Right in the true sense, Renouvier insists, belongs to a state of +peace; in a state of war, such as our civilisation is perpetually in, +it cannot be realised. The objection may be made that Renouvier is then +justifying the means by the end. He emphatically denies this. By no +means is this the case, for “the evil,” he remarks, “which corrects +another evil does not therefore become good; it may be useful, but it +is none the less evil, immoral, or unjust, and what is not just is not +justifiable. Wars, rebellions, revolutions may lessen certain evils, +but they do not thereby cease to be any the less evils themselves. +Morally we are obliged to avoid all violence; a revolution is only +justified if its success gives an indication of its absolute necessity. +We must lament, from the standpoint of ethics or justice, the evil +state of affairs which gives rise to it.[23] + + [23] On this point, it is interesting to compare with the above the + views of Spinoza in his _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_ and + _Tractatus-politicus_, and those of T. H. Green in his _Lectures on + Political Obligation_. + + +Renouvier devotes a considerable portion of his treatise to problems of +domestic morals, economic questions and problems of a political and +international character. In all these discussions, however, he +maintains as central his thesis of the supremacy of personality. + +Under _droit domestique_ he defends very warmly the right of the woman +and the wife to treatment as a personality. He laments particularly the +injustice which usually rules in marriage, where, under a cloak of +legality, the married man denies to his wife a personal control of her +own body and the freedom of self-determination in matters of sexual +intercourse. So unjust and loathsome in its violation of the +personality of woman is the modern view of marriage that Renouvier +considers it little better than polygamy (which is often a better state +for women than monogamy) or prostitution. It is less just than either, +owing to its degradation of the personality of the wife. He remarked +too in his _Nouvelle Monadologie_ that love (in the popular sense), +being so largely an affair of passion and physical attraction, is +usually unjust, and that friendship is a better basis for the +relationship of marriage, which should be, while it lasts among +mankind, one of justice.[24] Consequently, it should involve neither +the idea of possession nor of obedience, but of mutual comradeship. + + [24] See particularly the notes in _La Nouvelle Monadologie_ appended + to the fourth part, “Passion,” pp. 216-222. + + +In the economic sphere Renouvier endeavours to uphold freedom, and for +this reason he is an enemy of communism. Hostile to the communistic +doctrine of property, he is a definite defender of property which he +considers to be a necessity of personality. He considers each person in +the community entitled to property as a guarantee of his own liberty +and development. While disagreeing with communism, Renouvier is +sympathetic to the socialist view that property might be, and should +be, more justly distributed, and he advocates means to limit excessive +possession by private persons and to “generalise” the distribution of +the goods of the community among its members. Progressive taxation, a +guarantee of the “right to work” and a complete system of insurance are +among his suggestions. He is careful, however, to avoid giving to the +state too much power. + +Renouvier was no lover of the state. While regarding it as necessary +under present conditions, he agrees with the anarchist idealists, to +whom government is an evil. He admits its use, however, as a guarantor +of personal liberty, but is against any semblance of state- worship. +The state is not a person, nor is it, as it exists at present, a moral +institution. One of the needs of modern times is, he points out, the +moralising of the conception of the state, and of the state itself. +Although, therefore, he has no _a priori_ objection to state +interference in the economic sphere, and would not advocate a mere +_laissez-faire_ policy, with its vicious consequences, yet he does not +look with approval upon such interference unless it be “the collective +expression of the personalities forming the community.” + +The fact of living in a society, highly organised although it be, does +not diminish at all the moral significance of personality. Rights and +duties belong essentially to persons and to them only. We must beware +of the political philosophy which regards the citizens as existing only +for the state. Rather the state exists, or should exist, for the +welfare of the citizens. In the past this was a grave defect of +military despotisms, and was well illustrated by the view of the state +taken, or rather inculcated, by German political philosophy. In the +future the danger of the violation of personality may lie, Renouvier +thinks, in another direction—namely, in the establishment of +Communistic states. The basic principle of his ethic is the person as +an end in himself, and the treatment of persons as ends. If this be so, +a Communistic Republic which has as its motto “Each for all,” without +also “All for each,” may gravely violate personality and the moral law +if, by constraint, it treats all its citizens and their efforts not as +ends in themselves, but merely means to the collective ends of all. + +The moral ideal demands that personality must not be obliterated. +Personality bound up with “autonomy of reason” is the fundamental +ethical fact.[25] In the last resort, responsibility rests upon the +individuals of the society for the evils of the system of social +organisation under which they live. The state itself cannot be regarded +as a moral person. Renouvier opposes strongly any doctrine which tends +to the personalisation or the deification of the state. + + [25] Note that Renouvier prefers this term to Kant’s “autonomy of + will,” which he thinks confuses moral obligation and free-will. + + +He combats also the modern doctrines of “nationality,” and claims that +even the idea of the state is a higher one, for it at any rate involves +co-operating personalities, while a nation is a fiction, of which no +satisfactory definition can be given. He laughs at the “unity of +language, race, culture and religion,” and asks where we can find a +nation?[26] War and death have long since destroyed such united and +harmonious groups as were found in ancient times. + + [27] _Science de la Morale_, vol. 2, chap. xcvi, “_Idées de la + Nationalité et d’Etat_,” pp. 416-427. + + +In approaching the questions of international morality Renouvier makes +clear that there is only one morality, one code of justice. Morality +cannot be divided against itself, and there cannot be an admission that +things which are immoral in the individual are justifiable, or +permissible, between different states. Morality has not been applied to +these relationships, which are governed by aggressive militarism and +diplomacy, the negation of all conceptions of justice. Ethical +obligation has only a meaning and significance for personalities, and +our states do but reflect the morality of those who constitute them; +our world reflects the relationships and immorality of the states. War +characterises our whole civilisation, domestic, economic and +international. To have inter- national peace, internal peace is +essential, and this pre- supposes the reign of justice within states. +War we shall have with us, Renouvier reminds us, in all its forms, in +our institutions, our laws and customs, until it has disappeared from +our hearts. Treaties of “peace” and federations or leagues of nations +are themselves based on injustice and on force, and in this he sees but +another instance of the “terrible solidarity of evil.”[28] Better it is +to recognise this, thinks Renouvier, than to consider ourselves in, or +even near, a Utopia, whence human greed and passion have fled. + + [28] _Science de la Morale_, vol. 2, p. 474. + + +We find in Renouvier’s ethics a notable reversion to the individualism +which characterised the previous century. Much of the individualistic +tone of his work is, however, due to his finding himself in opposition +to the doctrines preached by communists, positivists, sociologists, +pessimistic and fatalistic historians, and supporters of the deified +state. Renouvier acclaims the freedom of the individual, but his +individualism is “personalism.” In proclaiming that the basis of +justice and of all morality is respect for personality, as such, he has +no desire to set up a standard of selfish individualism; he wishes only +to combat those heretical doctrines which would minimise and crush +personality. For him the moral “person” is not an isolated +individual—he is a social human being, free and responsible, who lives +with his fellows in society. Only upon a recognition of personality as +a supreme value can justice or peace ever be attained in human society; +and it is to this end that all moral education, Renouvier advocates, +should tend. The moral ideal should be, in practice, the constant +effort to free man from the terrible solidarity of evil which +characterises the civilisation into which he is born, and to establish +a community or association of personalities. Such an ideal does not lie +necessarily at the end of a determined evolution; Renouvier’s views on +history and progress have shown us that. Consequently it depends upon +us; it is our duty to believe in its possibility and to work, each +according to his or her power, for its realisation. The ideal or the +idea, will, in so far as it is set before self-conscious personalities +as an end, become a force. Renouvier agrees on this point with +Fouillée, to whose ethic, founded on the conception of _idées-forces_, +we now turn. + +III + +The philosophy of _idée-forces_ propounded by Fouillée assumes, in its +ethical aspect, a role of reconciliation (which is characteristic, as +we have noted, of his whole method and his entire philosophy) by +attempting a synthesis of individualism and humanitarianism. It is +therefore another kind of _personnalisme_, differing in type from that +of Renouvier. Fouillée’s full statement of his ethical doctrines was +not written until the year 1907,[29] but long before the conclusion of +the nineteenth century he had already indicated the essential points of +his ethics. The conclusion of his thesis _La Liberté et le +Déterminisme_ (1872) is very largely filled with his ethical views and +with his optimism. Four years later appeared his study _L’Idée moderne +du Droit en Allemagne, en Angleterre et en France_, which was followed +in 1880 by _La Science sociale contemporaine_, where the relation of +the study of ethics to that of sociology was discussed. A volume +containing much acute criticism of current ethical theories was his +_Critique des Systèmes de Morale contemporains_ (1883), which gave him +a further opportunity of offering by way of contrast his application of +the doctrine of _idées-forces_ to the solution of moral problems. To +this he added in the following year a study upon _La Propriété sociale +et la Démocratie_, where he discussed the ethical value and +significance of various political and socialist doctrines. Ethical +questions raised by the problems of education he discussed in his +_L’Enseignement au Point de Vue national_ (1891). At the close of the +century he issued his book on morality in his own country, _La France +au Point de Vue morale_ (1900).[30] + + [29] His _Morale des Idées-forces_ was then published. + + + [30] It is interesting to note the wealth of Fouillée’s almost annual + output on ethics alone in his later years. We may cite, in the + twentieth century: _La Réforme de l’Enseignement par la Philosophie_, + 1901; _La Conception morale et critique de l’Enseignement_; _Nietzsche + et l’Immoralisme_, 1904; _Le Moralisme de Kant et l’Amoralisme + contemporaine_, 1905; _Les Eléments sociologiques de la Morale_, 1905; + _La Morale des Idées-forces_, 1907; _Le Socialisme_, 1910; _La + Démocratie politique et sociale en France_, 1910; and the posthumous + volume, _Humanitaires et Libertaires au Point de Vue sociologique et + morale_, 1914. + + +Fouillée endeavours to unite the purely ideal aspect of ethics—that is +to say, its notion of what ought to be, with the more positive view of +ethics as dealing with what now is. His ethic is, therefore, an attempt +to relate more intimately the twin spheres of Renouvier, _l’état de +guerre_ with _l’état de paix_, for it is concerned not only with what +_is_, but with that which _tends_ to be and which _can_ be by the +simple fact that it is _thought_. As, however, what _can_ be is a +matter of intense interest to us, we are inevitably led from this to +consider what _ought_ to be—that is to say, what is better, or of more +worth or value. The ethical application of the philosophy of +_idées-forces_ is at once theoretical and practical, that philosophy +being concerned both with ideas and values. + +As in his treatment of freedom we found Fouillée beginning with the +_idea_ of freedom, so here in a parallel manner he lays down the _idea_ +of an end of action as an incontestable fact of experience, although +the existence of such an end is contested and is a separate question. +This idea operates in consciousness as a power of will (_volonté de +conscience_). Intelligence, power, love and happiness-in short, the +highest conscious life—are involved in it, not only for us, but for +all. Thus it comes about that the conscious subject, just because he +finds himself confronted by nature and by over-individual ends, +proposes to himself an ideal, and imposes at the same time upon himself +the obligation to act in conformity with this full consciousness which +is in all, as in him, and thus he allows universal consciousness to +operate in his own individual life. Here we have conscience, the idea +of duty or obligation, accounted for, and the principle of autonomy of +the moral person laid down. The ethical life is shown as the conscious +will in action, finding within itself its own end and rule of action, +finding also the conscious wills of others like itself. Morality is the +indefinite extension of the conscious will which brings about the +condition that others tend to become “me.” Through the increasing power +of intellectual disinterestedness and social sympathy, the old formula +“_cogito, conscius sum_” gives place to that of “_conscii sumus_,” and +this is no mere intellectual speculation, but a concrete principle of +action and feeling which is itself akin to the highest and best in all +religions. + +One of the features of this ethic is its insistence upon the primacy of +self-consciousness. Indeed, it has its central point in the doctrine of +self-consciousness, which, according to Fouillée, implies the +consciousness of others and of the whole unity of mankind. Emphasising +his gospel of _idées-forces_, he outlines a morality in which the ideal +shall attract men persuasively, and not dominate them in what he +regards as the arbitrary and rather despotic manner of Kant. + +By advocating the primacy of self-consciousness Fouillée claims to +establish an ethic which towers above those founded upon pleasure, +happiness and feeling. The morality of the _idées-forces_ is not purely +sentimental, not purely intellectual, not purely voluntarist; it claims +to rest on the totality of the functions of consciousness, as revealed +in the feelings, in intellect and will, acting in solidarity and in +harmony. + +He endeavours to unite the positive and evolutionary views of morality +to those associated with theological or metaphysical doctrines, +concerning the deity or the morally perfect absolute. He claims, +against the theologians and on behalf of the positivists, that ethics +can be an independent study, that it is not necessarily bound up with +theological dogmas. There is no need to found the notion of duty upon +that of the existence of God. Our own existence is sufficient; the +voice of conscience is within our human nature. He objects, as did +Nietzsche, to the formality and rigour of Kant’s “categorical +imperative.” His method is free from the legalism of Kant, and in him +and Guyau is seen an attempt to relate morality itself to life, +expanding and showing itself creative of ideals and tending to their +fulfilment. + +From the primacy of self-consciousness which can be expressed in the +notion, _Je pense, donc j’ai une valeur morale_, a transition is made +to a conception of values. _Je pense, donc j’evalue des objets_. The +essential element in the psychology of the _idees-forces_ then comes +into play by tending to the realisation of the ideals conceived and +based on the valuation previously made. Finally, Fouillée claims that +on this ethical operation of the _idées-forces_ can be founded the +notion of a universal society of consciences. This notion itself is a +force operating to create that society. The ideal is itself persuasive, +and Fouillee’s inherent optimism, which we have observed in his +doctrine of progress, colours also his ethical theory. He has faith in +men’s capacity to be attracted by the ideals of love and brotherhood, +and insists that in the extension of these lies the supreme duty, and +the ideal, like the notion of duty itself, is a creation of our own +thought. The realisation of the universality, altruism, love and +brotherhood of which he speaks, depends upon our action, our power to +foster ideas, to create ideals, particularly in the minds of the young, +and to strive ever for their realisation. This is the great need of our +time, Fouillée rightly urges.[31] Such a morality contains in a more +concentrated form, he thinks, the best that has been said and thought +in the world-religions; it achieves also that union of the scientific +spirit with the aspirations of man, which Fouillée regards as so +desirable, and he claims for it a philosophical value by its success in +uniting the subjective and personal factors of consciousness with those +which are objective and universal. + + [31] The work of Benjamin Kidd should be compared in this connection, + particularly his _Social Evolution_, 1894; _Principles of Western + Civilisation_, 1902; and _The Science of Power_, 1918 (chap, v., “The + Emotion of the Ideal”). + + +Similar in several respects to the ethical doctrines of Fouillée are +those of his step-son. Guyau insists more profoundly, however, upon the +“free” conception of morality, as spontaneous and living, thus marking +a further reaction from Kant’s doctrine. Both Fouillée and Guyau +interacted upon one another in their mental relationship, and both of +them (particularly Guyau) have affinities with Nietzsche, who knew +their work. While the three thinkers are in revolt against the Kantian +conception of ethics, the two Frenchmen use their conceptions to +develop an ethic altruistic in character, far removed from the egoism +which characterises the German.[32] + + [32] We find the optimism and humanitarian idealism of the Frenchmen + surprising. May not this be piecisely because the world has followed + the gospel of Nietzsche? We may dislike him, but he is a greater + painter of the real state of world-morality than are the two + Frenchmen. They, with their watchword of _fraternité_, are proclaiming + a more excellent way they are standing for an ethical ideal of the + highest type. + + +Guyau, after showing in his critique of English Ethics (_La Morale +anglaise contemporaine_, 1879) the inadequacies of a purely utilitarian +doctrine of morality, endeavoured to set forth in a more constructive +manner the principles of a scientific morality in his _Esquisse d’une +Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_. + +He takes as his starting-point the position where John Stuart Mill fell +foul of the word “desirable.” What, asks Guyau, is the supreme desire +of every living creature? The answer to this question is “Life.” What +we all of us desire most and constantly is Life, the most intensive and +extensive in all its relationships, physical and spiritual. In the +principle of Life we find cause and end—a unity which is a synthesis of +all desires and all desirables. Moreover, the concept or the principle +of Life embraces all functions of our nature—those within consciousness +and those which are subconscious or unconscious. It thus relates +intimately purely instinctive action and reflective acts, both of which +are manifestations of Life and can enrich and increase its power. + +The purely hedonistic views of the Utilitarians he considers untrue. +Doubtless, he admits, there is a degree of truth in the doctrine that +consciousness tends to pursue the line of greatest pleasure or least +resistance, but then we must remember how slight a part this +consciousness actually plays. Instincts and an intensive subconscious +“will-to-live” are constantly operating. A purely scientific ethic, if +it is to present a complete scheme, must allow for this by admitting +that the purely hedonistic search after pleasure is not in itself a +cause of action, but is an effect of a more fundamental or dominating +factor. This factor is precisely the effort of Life to maintain itself, +to intensify itself and expand. The chief motive power lies in the +“intensity of Life.” “The end which actually determines all conscious +action is also the cause which produces every unconscious action; it is +Life itself, Life at once the most intense and the most varied in its +forms. From the first thrill of the embryo in its mother’s womb to the +last convulsion of the old man, every movement of the being has had as +cause Life in its evolution; this universal cause of actions is, from +another point of view, its constant effect and end.”[33] + + [33] _Esquisse d’une Morale_, p. 87. + + +A true ethic proceeding upon the recognition of these principles is +scientific, and constitutes a science having as its object all the +means by which Life, material and spiritual, may be conserved and +expanded. Rising in the evolutionary development we find the variety +and scope of action increased. The highest beings find rest not in +sleep merely, but in variety and change of action. The moral ideal lies +in activity, in all the variety of its manifestations. For Guyau, as +for Bergson, the worst vice is idleness, inertia, lack of _élan vital_, +decay of personal initiative, and a consequent degeneration to merely +automatic existence. + +Hedonism is quite untenable as a principle; pleasure is merely a +consequence, and its being set in the van of ethics is due to a false +psychology and false science. Granting that pleasure attends the +satisfaction of a desire, pain its repression, recognising that a +feeling of pleasure accompanies many actions which expand life, we must +live, as Guyau reminds us, before we enjoy. The activity of life surges +within us, and we do not act with a view to pleasure or with pleasure +as a motive, but life, just because it is life, seeks to expand. Man in +acting has created his pleasures and his organs. The pleasure and the +organ alike proceed from function—that is, life itself. The pleasure of +an action and even the consciousness of it are attributes, not ends. +The action arises naturally from the inherent intensity of life. + +The hedonists, too, says Guyau, have been negligent of the widest +pleasures, and have frequently confined their attention to those of +eating and drinking and sexual intercourse, purely sensitive, and have +neglected those of living, willing and thinking, which are more +fundamental as being identical with the consciousness of life. But +Guyau asserts that, as the greatest intensity of life involves +necessarily its widest expansion, we must give special attention to +thought and will and feeling, which bring us into touch universally +with our fellows and promote the widest life. This expansiveness of +life has great ethical importance. With the change in the nature of +reproduction, involving the sexual union of two beings, “a new moral +phase began in the world.” It involved an expansion not merely +physical, but mental—a union, however crude, of soul. + +It is in the extension of this feature of human life that Guyau sees +the ethical ideal. The most perfect organism is the most sociable, for +the ideal of the individual life is the common or social life. Morality +is for him almost synonymous with sociability, disinterestedness, love +and brotherhood, and in it we find, he says, “the flower of human +life.” + +All our action should be referred to this moral ideal of sociability. +Guyau sees in the phrase “social service” a conception which should not +be confined to those who are endeavouring in some religious or +philanthropic manner to alleviate the suffering caused by evil in human +society, but a conception to which the acts, all acts, of all members +of society should be related. Like Renouvier, he gives to work an +important ethical value. “To work is to produce—that is, to be useful +to oneself and to others.” In work he sees the economic and moral +reconciliation of egoism and altruism. It is a good and it is +praiseworthy. Those who neglect and despise it are parasites, and their +existence in society is a negation of the moral ideal of sociability +and social service. In so far as the work of certain persons leads to +the accumulation of excessive capital in individual hands, it is likely +to annul itself sooner or later in luxury and idleness. Such an immoral +state of affairs, it is the concern of society, by its laws of +inheritance and possession, to prevent. + +Having made clear his principle of morality, Guyau then has to face the +question of its relation to the notion of duty or obligation. Duty in +itself is an idea which he rejects as vague, and he disapproves of the +external and artificial element present in the Kantian “rigorism.” For +Guyau the very power of action contained in life itself creates an +impersonal duty. While Emerson could write: + +“Duty says, ‘I must,’ +The youth replies, ‘I can,’” + + +the view of Guyau is directly the converse; for him “I can” gives the +“I must”; it is the power which precedes and creates the obligation. +Life cannot maintain itself unless it grows and expands. The soul that +liveth to itself, that liveth solely by habit and automatism, is +already dead. Morality is the unity of the personality expanding by +action and by sympathy. It is at this point that Guyau’s thought +approaches closely to the _philosophie des idées-forces_ of his +step-father, by his doctrine of thought and action. + +Immorality is really unsociability, and Guyau thinks this a better +key-note than to regard it as disobedience. If it is so to be spoken +of, it is disobedience to the social elements in one’s own self—a +mischievous duplication of personality, egoistic in character and +profoundly antisocial. The sociological elements which characterise all +Guyau’s work are here very marked. In the notion of sociability we find +an equivalent of the older and more artificial conception of Duty—a +conception which lacks concreteness and offers in itself so little +guidance because it is abstract and empty. The criterion of +sociability, Guyau claims, is much more concrete and useful. He asks us +to observe its spirituality, for the more gross and materialistic +pleasures fall short of the criterion by the very fact that they cannot +be shared. Guyau’s thought is here at its best. The higher pleasures, +which are not those of bodily enjoyment and satisfaction, but those of +the spirit, which thinks, feels, wills and loves, are precisely those +which come nearest to fulfilling the ideal of sociability, for they +tend less to divide men than to unite them and to urge them to a closer +co-operation for their spiritual advancement. Guyau writes here with +sarcasm regarding the lonely imbecile in the carriage drawn by four +horses. For his own part it is enough to have— + +“. . . a Loaf of Bread beneath the Bough, +A Flask of Wine, a Book of Verse—and Thou +Beside me singing in the Wilderness— +And Wilderness is Paradise enow.” + + +He knows who really has chosen the better part. One cannot rejoice much +and rejoice alone. Companionship and love are supremely valuable +“goods,” and the pleasure of others he recognises as a very real part +of his own. The egoist’s pleasure is, on the other hand, very largely +an illusion. He loses, says Guyau, far more by his isolated enjoyment +than he would gain by sharing. + +Life itself is the greatest of all goods, as it is the condition of all +others, but life’s value fades if we are not loved. It is love, +comradeship and the fellowship of kindred souls which give to the +humblest life a significance and a feeling of value. This, Guyau points +out with some tenderness, is the tragedy of suicides. These occurrences +are a social no less than an individual tragedy. The tragic element +lies in the fact that they were persons who were unable to give their +devotion to some object, and the loss of personalities in this way is a +real loss to society, but it is mainly society itself which is to blame +for them. + +We need not fear, says Guyau, that such a gospel will promote unduly +the operation of mere animality or instinctive action, for in the +growth of the scientific spirit he sees the development of the great +enemy of all instinct. It is the dissolving force _par excellence_, the +revolutionary spirit which incessantly wages warfare within society +against authority, and in the individual it operates through reason +against the instinctive impulses. Every instinct tends to lapse in so +far as it is reflected upon by consciousness. + +The old notion of duty or obligation must, in Guyau’s opinion, be +abandoned. The sole commandment which a scientific and positive ethic, +such as he endeavours to indicate, can recognise, is expressible only +in the words, “Develop your life in all directions, be an individual as +rich as possible in energy, intensive and extensive”—in other words, +“Be the most social and sociable being you can.” It is this which +replaces the “categorical imperative.” + +He aptly points out the failure of modern society to offer scope for +devotion, which is really a superabundance of life, and its proneness +to crush out opportunities which offer a challenge to the human spirit. +There is a claim of life itself to adventure; there is a pleasure in +risk and in conflict; and this pleasure in risk and adventure has been +largely overlooked in its relation to the moral life. Such risk and +adventure are not merely a pure negation of self or of personal life, +but rather, he considers, that life raised to its highest power, +reaching the sublime. By virtue of such devotion our lives are +enriched. He draws a touching picture of the sacrifice upon which our +modern social life and civilisation are based, and draws an analogy +between the blood of dead horses used by the ploughman in fertilising +his field, and the blood of the martyrs of humanity, _qui ont fécondé +l’avenir_. Often they may have been mistaken; later generations may +wonder if their cause was worth fighting for; yet, although nothing +truly is sadder than to die in vain, that devotion was valuable in and +for itself. + +With the demand of life for risk in action is bound up the impetus to +undertake risk in thought. From this springs the moral need for faith, +for belief and acceptance of some hypotheses. The very divergence or +diversity of the world-religions is not discouraging but rather the +reverse. It is a sign of healthy moral life. Uniformity would be highly +detrimental; it would cease to express life, for with conformity of +belief would come spiritual decline and stagnation. Guyau anticipates +here his doctrine of a religion of free thought, a “non-religion” of +the future, which we shall discuss in our next chapter, when we examine +his book on that subject. In the diversity of religious views Guyau +sees a moral good, for these religions are themselves an expression of +life in its richness, and the conservation and expansion of this rich +variety of life are precisely the moral ideal itself. + +We must endeavour to realise how rich and varied the nature of human +life really is. Revolutionaries, Guyau points out, are always making +the mistake of regarding life and truth as too simple. Life and truth +are so complex that evolution is the key-note to what is desirable in +the individual intellect and in society, not a revolution which must +inevitably express the extreme of one side or the other. The search for +truth is slow and needs faith and patience, but the careful seekers of +it are making the future of mankind. But truth will be discovered only +in relation to action and life and in proportion to the labour put into +its realisation. The search for truth must never be divorced from the +active life, Guyau insists, and, indeed, he approaches the view that +the action will produce the knowledge, “He that doeth the will shall +know of the doctrine.” Moreover he rightly sees in action the wholesome +cure for pessimism and that cynicism which all too frequently arises +from an equal appreciation of opposing views. “Even in doubt,” he +exclaims, “we can love; even in the intellectual night, which prevents +our seeing any ultimate goal, we can stretch out a hand to him who +weeps at our feet.”[34] In other words, we must do the duty that lies +nearest, in the hope and faith that by that action itself light will +come. + + [34] _Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 178. + + +In the last part of his treatise Guyau deals with the difficult problem +of “sanction,” so ultimately connected with ethics, and, it must be +added, with religion. The Providence who rewards and punishes us, +according to the orthodox religious creed of Christendom, is merely a +personified “sanction” or distributive justice, operating in a +terrestrial and celestial court of assize. Guyau condemns this as an +utterly immoral conception. Religious sanctions, as he has not much +difficulty in showing, are more cruel than those which a man could +imagine himself inflicting upon his mortal enemy. The “Heavenly Father” +ought at least to be as good as earthly ones, who do not cruelly punish +their children. Guyau touches upon an important point here, which will +be further emphasised—namely, the necessity for making our idea of God, +if we have one at all, harmonious with our own ethical conceptions. The +old ideas of the divinity are profoundly immoral and are based on +physical force. This is natural because those views which have survived +in modern times are those of primitive and savage people to whom the +most holy was the most powerful and physically majestic. But, says +Guyau, now that we see that “all physical force represents moral +weakness,” the idea of God the All-terrible, with his hell-fire ready +for the sinful soul, must be condemned as immoral blasphemy itself. +“God,” he remarks, “in damning any soul might be said to damn himself.” + +Virtue is really its own reward. No one should be or do good in order +to gain an entry into paradise or to escape the torments of hell. That +is to build morality on an immoral principle and on a belief, not in +goodness as valuable in and for itself, but on a basis of material +self-interest alone, “the best policy.” It is true, Guyau admits, that +virtue involves happiness, but it is not in this sense. A conflict +between “pleasure” and virtue is usually one of higher _versus_ lower +ideals. Virtue is not a precedent to sense-happiness, and in this sense +is not at all equivalent or bound up with happiness, but, as the facts +of life reveal, very often opposed to it. + +Guyau opposes the ordinary view of punishment in society and shows that +it is both immoral and socially harmful in its application. It adds +evil to evil, and legal murder is really more absurd than the illegal +murder. Punishment, capital or other, is no “compensation” exacted for +the crime committed, and it never can be such. Attempts to treat and +cure the guilty one would, Guyau suggests, be far more rational, humane +and really beneficial to society itself, which at present creates by +its punishments, especially those inflicted for first offences, a +“criminal class.” One should convert the criminal before punishing him, +and then, Guvau asks, if he is converted, why punish him? + +The appeal to justice denoted in the words “To everyone according to +his works” is frequently heard in the defence of punishment. This is an +excellent maxim in Guyau’s opinion, but he is careful to point out that +it is purely one of social economics. It is a plea for a just +distribution of the products of labour, but does not apply at all to +the problem of punishment. In a manner which recalls the remarks of +Renan, Guyau sees in evil-doing a lack of culture, or rather of that +sociability, which comes of social culture, from consciousness of a +membership of society and a solidarity with one’s fellows. In vice and +in virtue alike the human will appears aspiring to better things +according to its lights. As virtue is its own reward, so is evil; and +the moralist must say to the wicked: “Verily they have their reward” +(_Comme si ce n’était pas assez pour eux d’être méchants_). + +Guyau comments upon the gradual modifications of punishment from a +social point of view. There was the day when the chastisement was +infinitely worse than the crime itself. Then came the morality of +reciprocity, “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,” an ethic +which represented a high ideal for primitive man to reach, and one to +which, Guyau thinks, we have yet to reach to-day in some spheres of +life. Yet a further moral development will show how foolish, in a +civilised society, are wrath and hatred of the criminal and the cry for +vengeance. Society must aim at ensuring protection for itself with the +minimum of individual suffering. Punishment must be regarded as an +example for the future rather than as revenge or compensation. In the +individual himself Guyau observes how powerful can be the inner +sanction of remorse, the suffering caused by the unrealised ideal. This +is perhaps the only real moral punishment, and it is one which society +cannot itself directly enforce. Only by increasing “sociability” and +social sensitiveness can this sanction be indirectly developed. + +Herein lies the highest ethical ideal, far more concrete and living, in +Guyau’s opinion, than the rigorism of a Kant or the “scholastic”[35] +temper of a Renouvier. Charity or love for all men, whatever their +value morally, intellectually or physically, must, he claims, “be the +final end pursued even by public opinion.”In co-operation and +sociability, he finds the vital moral ideal; in love and brotherhood, +he finds the real sanction which should operate.”Love supposes +mutuality of love,” he says; and there is one idea superior to that of +justice, that is the idea of brotherhood, and he remarks with a humane +tenderness “the guilty have probably more need for love than anyone +else.” “I have,” he cries, “two hands—the one for gripping the hand of +those with whom I march along in life, the other to lift up the fallen. +Indeed, to these I should be able to stretch out both hands +together.”[36] + + [35] This is Guyau’s word to describe Renouvier, whom he regards as + far too much under the influence of Kant. + + + [36] _Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 223. + + +While Fouillée and, more especially, Guyau were thus outlining an ethic +marked by a strong humanitarianism, a more definitely religious ethic +was being proclaimed by that current of philosophy of belief and of +action which has profoundly associated itself in its later developments +with “Modernism” in the Roman Church. The tendency to stress action and +the practical reason is noticeable in the work of Brochard, +Ollé-Laprune and Blondel, also in Rauh. They agree with Renouvier in +advocating the primacy of the practical reason, but their own reasons +for this are different from his, or at least in them the reasons are +more clearly enunciated. Plainly these reasons lie in the difficulties +of intellectualism and the quest of truth. They propose the quest of +the good in the hope of finding in that sphere some objectivity, some +absolute, in fact, which they cannot find out by intellectual +searching. They correspond in a somewhat parallel fashion to the +philosophy of intuition with its rejection of intellectualism as +offering a final solution. These thinkers desire by action, by doing +the will, to attain to a knowledge of the doctrine. The first word in +their gospel is— + +“Im Anfang war die That.” + + +It is for them the beginning and the end. Their certainty is an act of +belief, which grows out of action and life. It is a curious mixture of +insistence upon life and action, such as we find in Guyau and in +Bergson, coupled with a religious Platonism. Brochard’s work is of this +type. He wrote as early as 1874 on _La Responsabilité morale_, and in +1876 on _L’Universalité des Notions morales_. Three years later +appeared his work _L’Erreur_. Ollé-Laprune and Blondel, who best +represent this tendency, do not like Guyau’s ethics, which lacks the +religious idealism which they consider should be bound up with +morality. This was the thesis developed in the volume _La Certitude +morale_, written by Ollé-Laprune in 1881. “By what right,” says +Ollé-Laprune in his subsequent book _Le Prix de la Vie_ (1895), “can +Guyau speak of a high exalted life, of a moral ideal? It is impossible +to speak so when you have only a purely naturalistic ethic; for merely +to name these things is an implication that there is not only intensity +in life, but also quality. You suppress duty because you can see in it +only a falsely mystical view of life and of nature. What you fail to +realise is that between duty and life there is a profound agreement. +You reduce duty to life, and in life itself you consider only its +quantity and intensity, and regard as illusion everything that is of a +different order from the natural physical order in which you imprison +yourself.”[37] + + [37] _Le Prix de la Vie_, p. 139. + + +Such a criticism is not altogether fair to Guyau who, as we noted, +proclaimed the superiority of the higher qualities of spiritual life. +It does, however, attack his abandonment of the idea of Duty; and we +must now turn to examine a thinker, who, by his contribution to ethics, +endeavoured to satisfy the claims of life and of duty. + +This was Rauh, whose _Essai sur le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale_ +appeared in 1890. It had been preceded by a study of the psychology of +the feelings, and was later followed by _L’Expérience morale_ (1903). +In seeking a metaphysical foundation for morality, Rauh recalls Kant’s +_Metaphysic of Morals_. He, indeed, agrees with Kant in the view that +the essence of morality lies in the sentiment of obligation. Belief or +faith in an ideal, by which it behoves us to act, imposes itself, says +Rauh, upon the mind of man as essential. It is as positive a fact as +the laws of the natural sciences. Man not only states facts and +formulates general laws in a scientific manner, he also conceives and +believes in ideals, which become bound up in his mind with the +sentiment of obligation—that is, the general feeling of duty. But +beyond a general agreement upon this point, Rauh does not follow Kant. +He tends to look upon the ethical problem in the spirit which Guyau, +Bergson and Blondel show in their general philosophic outlook. In life, +action and immediacy alone can we find a solution. Nothing practical +can be deduced from the abstract principle of obligation or duty in +general. The moral consciousness of man is, in Rauh’s opinion, akin to +the intuitional perceptions of Bergson’s philosophy. Morality, +moreover, is creating itself perpetually by the reflection of sensitive +minds on action and on life itself. “Morality, or rather moral action, +is not merely the crown of metaphysical speculation, but itself the +true metaphysic, which is learnt only in living, as it is naught but +life itself.”[38] In concluding his thesis, Rauh reminds us that “the +essential and most certain factor in the midst of the uncertainties of +life and of duty lies in the constant consciousness of the moral +ideal.” In it he sees a spiritual reality which, if we keep it ever +before us, may inspire the most insignificant of our actions and render +them into a harmony, a living harmony of character. + + [38] _Essai sur le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale_, p. 255. + + +Rauh’s doctrines, we claim, have affinities to the doctrines of action +and intuition. That does not imply, however, that the intelligence is +to be minimised—far from this; but the intelligence triumphs here in +realising that it is not all-sufficing or supreme. “The heart hath +reasons which the reason cannot know.” While Fouillée had remarked that +morality is metaphysics in action, Rauh points out that “metaphysics in +action” is the foundation of our knowledge. We must, he insists, seek +for certitude in an immediate and active adaptation to reality instead +of deducing a rule or rules of action from abstract systems. + +He separates himself from the sociologists[39] by pointing out that, +however largely social environment may determine our moral ideals and +rules of conduct, nevertheless the ethical decision is fundamentally an +absolutely personal affair. The human conscience, in so far as active, +must never _passively_ accept the existing social morality. It finds +itself sometimes in agreement, sometimes obliged to give a newer +interpretation to old conventions, and at times is obliged to revolt +against them. In no case can the idea of duty be equated simply and +calmly with acquiescence in the collective general will. It must demand +from social morality its credentials and hold itself free to criticise +the current ethic of the community. More often than not society acts, +Rauh thinks, as a break rather than a stimulus; and social interest is +not a measure of the moral ideal, but rather a limitation of it. + + [39] The relation of ethics and sociology is well discussed, not only + by Durkheim (who, in his _Division du Travail social_, speaks of the + development of democracy and increasing respect for human + personality), but also by Lévy-Bruhl, who followed his thesis on + _L’Idée de Responsabilité_, 1883, by the volume, _La Morale el la + Science des Moeurs_. + + +Although the moral ideal is one which must be personally worked out, it +is not a merely individualistic affair. Rauh does not abandon the +guidance of reason, but he objects equally to the following of instinct +or a transcendent teaching divorced from the reality of life. Our guide +must be reflection upon instinct, and this is only possible by action +and experience, the unique experience of living itself. Reason itself +is experience; and it is our duty to face problems personally and +sincerely, in a manner which the rational element in us renders +“impersonal, universal and disinterested.” + +Any code of morality which is not directly in contact with life is +worthless, and all ethical ideas which are not those of our time are of +little value. Only he is truly a man who lives the life of his time. +The truly moral man is he who is alive to this spirit and who does not +unreflectingly deduce his rules of conduct from ancient books or +teachers of a past age. The art of living is the supreme art, and it is +this which the great moralists have endeavoured to show humanity. +Neither Socrates nor Jesus wrote down their ethical ideas: they lived +them. + +Rauh thus reminds us partly of Guyau in his insistence upon life. He +regards the ethical life at its highest, as one _sans obligation ni +sanction_. Rather than the Kantian obligation of duty, of constraint, +he favours in his second book, _L’Expérience morale_, a state of +spontaneity, of passion and exaltation of the personal conscience which +faces the issue in a disinterested manner. The man who is morally +honest himself selects his values, his ideals, his ends, by the light +which reason gives him. Ethics becomes thus an independent science, a +science of “ends,” which Reason, as reflected in the personal +conscience, acclaims a science of the ideal ordering of life. + +Such was Rauh’s conception of rational moral experience, one which he +endeavoured to apply in his lectures to the two problems which he +considered to be supreme in his time, that of patriotism and of social +justice. + +These problems were further touched upon in 1896, when Léon Bourgeois +(since noted for his advocacy of the “League of Nations”) published his +little work _Solidarité_, which was also a further contribution to an +independent, positive and lay morality. In the conception of the +solidarity of humanity throughout the ages, Bourgeois accepted the +teaching of the sociologists, and urges that herein can be found an +obligation, for the present generation must repay their debt to their +ancestors and be worthy of the social heritage which has made them what +they are. Somewhat similar sentiments had Been expressed by Marion in +his Solidarité morale (1880). Ethical questions were kept in the +forefront by the society known as _L’Union pour l’Action morale_, +founded by Desjardins and supported by Lagneau (1851- 1894). After the +excitement of the Dreyfus case (1894- 1899) this society took the name +_L’Union pour la Verité_. In 1902 Lapie made an eloquent plea for a +rational morality in his _Logique de la Volonté_, and in the following +year Séailles published his _Affirmations de la Conscience moderne_. +The little _Précis_ of André Lalande, written in the form of a +catechism, was a further contribution to the establishment of a +rational and independent lay morality, which the teaching of ethics as +a subject in the _lycées_ and lay schools rendered in some degree +necessary.[40] This little work appeared in 1907, the same year in +which Paul Bureau wrote his book _La Crise morale des Temps nouveaux_. +Then Parodi (who in 1919 produced a fine study of French thought since +1890[41]) followed up the discussion of ethical problems by his work +_Le Problème morale et la Pensée contemporaine_ (1909), and in 1912 +Wilbois published his contribution entitled _Devoir et Durée: Essai de +Morale sociale_. + + [40] The teaching of a lay morality is a vital and practical problem + which the Government of the Republic is obliged to face. The urgent + need for such lay teaching will be more clearly demonstrated or + evident when our next chapter, dealing with the religious problem, has + been read. + + + [41] _La Philosophie contemporaine en France_. + + +Thus concludes a period in which the discussion, although not marked by +a definite turning round of positions as was manifested in our +discussions of science, freedom and progress, bears signs of a general +development. This development is shown by the greater insistence upon +the social aspects of ethics and by a turning away from the formalism +of Kant to a more concrete conception of duty, or an ethic in which the +notion of duty itself has disappeared. This is the general tendency +from Renan with his insistence upon the aesthetic element, Renouvier +with his claim for justice in terms of personality, to Fouillée, Guyau, +Ollé-Laprune and Rauh with their insistence upon action, upon love and +life. + +Yet, although the departure from an intense individualism in ethics is +desirable, we must beware of the danger which threatens from the other +extreme. We cannot close this chapter without insisting upon this +point. Good must be personally realised in the inner life of +individuals, even if they form a community. The collective life is +indeed necessary, but it is not collectively that the good is +experienced. It is personal. In the neglect of this important aspect +lies the error of much Communistic philosophy and of that social +science which looks on society as purely an organism. This analogy is +false, for however largely a community exhibits a general likeness to +an organism, it is a superficial resemblance. There is not a centre of +consciousness, but a multitude of such centres each living an inner +life of personal experience which is peculiarly its own; and these +personalities, we must remember, are not simply a homogeneous mass of +social matter, they are capable of realising the good each in his or +her own manner. This is the only realisation of the good. + +In this chapter we have traced the attempt to reconcile _science et +conscience_, after the way had been opened up by the maintenance of +freedom. It was recognised that reason is not entirely pure +speculation: it is also practical. Human nature seeks for goodness as +well as for truth. It is noticeable that while the insistence upon the +primacy of the practical reason developed, on the one hand, into a +philosophy of action (anti-intellectual action in its extreme +development as shown in Syndicalism), the same tendency, operating in a +different manner and upon different data, essayed to find in action, +and in the belief which arises from action, that Absolute or Ideal to +which the pure reason feels it cannot alone attain—namely, the +realisation of God. To this problem of religion we devote our next +chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER VII +RELIGION + + +INTRODUCTION: The religious situation in France in the nineteenth +century—The intellectual and political forces against the Roman +Catholic Church—Its claims, its orthodoxy and tyranny—The +humanitarians—The power of Rome—Church and State—The educational +problem—Clericalism—The cult of Jeanne d’Arc—The lack of a _via media_ +between Roman orthodoxy and _libre pensée_—Protestantism negligible. + +I. Comte’s effort in his “Religion of Humanity”—Renan and the +Church—Freedom—Denial of supernatural elements in Christianity—_Vie de +Jésus_—Renan not irreligious—Piety—Love and Goodness reveal the +Divine—God the “ideal”—Vacherot and Taine. + +II. Renouvier’s efforts, with Pillon, in the _Critique philosophique_ +and _Critique religieuse_—His republican theology—Freedom, personality +and God—The deity as finite—God as Goodness and as a Person. + +III. Ravaisson’s blend of Hellenism and Christian +thought—Boutroux—Fouillée on the Idea of God—The importance of Guyau’s +_L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_—The decay of dogma and ecclesiasticism—The +term “irreligion” misleading—Sociology and religion-Freedom—Religious +education and tolerance—Modernism and the Church—Loisy and +others—Symbolism and _Fidéisme_. + +CONCLUSION: The personal factor in faith—Freedom vital to +religion—Change of attitude since the eighteenth century—Value of +religion—Tendency towards a free religion devoid of dogmas, expressive +of the best aspirations of man’s mind. + + + + +CHAPTER VII +RELIGION + +It is outside our purpose to embark upon discussions of the religious +problem in France, in so far as this became a problem of politics. Our +intention is rather to examine the inner core of religious thought, the +philosophy of religion, which forms an appropriate final chapter to our +history of the development of ideas. + +Yet, although our discussion bears mainly upon the general attitude to +religion, upon the development of central religious ideas such as the +idea of God, and upon the place of religion in the future—that is to +say, upon the philosophy of religion—it is practically impossible to +understand the religious attitude of our thinkers without a brief +notice of the religious situation in France during the nineteenth and +twentieth centuries. + +In our Introduction we briefly called attention to the attempt of the +Traditionalists after the Revolution to recall their countrymen to the +Christian faith as presented in and by the Roman Catholic Church. The +efforts made by De Bonald, De Maistre, Chateaubriand, Lamennais and +Lacordaire did not succeed as they had hoped, but, nevertheless, a +considerable current of loyalty to the Church and the Catholic religion +set in. Much of this loyalty was bound up with sentimental affection +for a monarchy, and arose partly from anti-revolutionary sentiments.[1] +It cannot, however, be entirely explained by these political feelings. +There was the expression of a deeper and more spiritual reaction +directed against the materialistic and sceptical teachings of the +eighteenth century. Man’s heart craved comfort, consolation and warmth. +It had been starved in the previous century, and revolution and war had +only added to the cup of bitterness. Thus there came an epoch of +Romanticism in religion of which the sentimental and assumed orthodoxy +of Chateaubriand was a sign of the times. His _Génie du Christianisme_ +may now appear to us full of sentimentality, but it was welcomed at the +time, since it expressed at least some of those aspirations which had +for long been denied an expression. It was this which marked the great +difference between the two centuries in France. The eighteenth was +mainly concerned with scoffing at religion. Its rationalism was that of +Voltaire. In the first half of the nineteenth century the pendulum +swung in the opposite direction. Romanticism, in poetry, in literature, +in philosophy and in religion was _à la mode_, and it led frequently to +sentimentality or morbidity. Lamartine, Victor Hugo and De Vigny +professed the Catholic faith for many years. We may note, and this is +important, that in France the only form of Christianity which holds any +sway over the people in general is the Roman Catholic faith. Outside +the Roman Church there is no religious organisation which is of much +account. This explains why it is so rare to find a thinker who owns +allegiance to any Church or religion, and yet it would be wrong to deem +them irreligious. There is no _via media_ between Catholicism and free +personal thought. This was a point which Renan quite keenly felt, and +of which his own spiritual pilgrimage, which took him out of the bounds +of the Church of his youth, is a fine illustration. Many of France’s +noblest sons have been brought up in the religious atmosphere of the +Church and owe much of their education to her, and Rome believes in +education. The control of education has been throughout the century a +problem severely contested by Church and State. More important for our +purpose than the details of the quarrels of Church and State is the +intellectual condition of the Church itself. + + [1] De Maistre regarded the Revolution as an infliction specially + bestowed upon France for her national neglect of religion—his + religion, of course. The same crude, misleading, and vicious arguments + have since been put forward by the theologians in their efforts to + push the cause of the Church with the people. This was very noticeable + both in the war of 1870 and that of 1914. In each case it was argued + that the war was a punishment from God for France’s frivolity and + neglect of the Church. In 1914, in addition, it was deemed a direct + divine reply to “Disestablishment.” + + +This reveals a striking vitality, a vigour and initiative at war with +the central powers of the Vatican, a seething unrest which uniformity +and authority find annoying. How strong the power of the central +authority was, the affair of the Concordat had shown, when forty +bishops were deposed for non-acceptance of the arrangement between +Napoleon and the Pope.[2] Stronger still was the iron hand of the Pope +over intellectual freedom. + + [2] The Revolution had separated Church and State and suppressed + clerical privilege by the “Civil Constitution of the Clergy” enactment + of 1790. Napoleon, alive to the patriotic value of a State Church, + repealed this law and declared the divorce of Church and State to be + null and void. His negotiations with the Pope (Pius VII.) resulted, in + 1801, in the arrangement known as the _Concordat_, by which the Roman + Catholic Church was again made the established national Church, its + clergy became civil servants paid by the State, and its worship became + a branch of public administration. + + +Lamennais was not a “modernist,” as this term is now understood, for +his theology was orthodox. His fight with the Vatican was for freedom +in the relations of the Church to society. He pleaded in his _Essai sur +L’indifference en Matière de Religion_ for the Church to accept the +principle of freedom, to leave the cherished fondling of the royalist +cause, and to present to the world the principles of a Christian +democracy. Lamennais and other liberal-minded men desired the +separation of Church and State, and were tolerant of those who were not +Catholic. They claimed, along with their own “right to believe,” that +of others “not to believe.” His was a liberal Catholicism, but its +proposals frightened his co-religionists, and drew upon him in 1832 an +encyclical letter (_Mirari vos_) from the Vatican. The Pope denounced +liberalism absolutely as an absurd and an erroneous doctrine, a piece +of folly sprung from the “fetid source of indifferentism.” Lamennais +found he could not argue, as Renan himself later put it, “with a bar of +iron.” It was the reactionary De Maistre, with his principle of papal +authority,[3] and not Lamennais, whom the Vatican, naturally enough, +chose to favour, or rather to follow. + + [3] As stated in _Du Pape_, 1819. + + +Thus Lamennais found himself, by an almost natural and inevitable +process, outside the Church, and this in spite of the fact that his +theology was orthodox. He endeavoured to present his case in his paper +_L’Avenir_ and in an influential brochure, _The Words of a Believer_, +which left its mark upon Hugo, Michelet, Lamartine, and George Sand. +His views blended with the current of humanitarian and democratic +doctrines which developed from the Saint-Simonists, Pierre Leroux and +similar thinkers. We have already noted that these social reformers +held to their beliefs with the conviction that in them and not in the +Roman Church lay salvation. + +This brings us to a crucial point which is the clue to much of the +subsequent thought upon religion. This is the profound and seemingly +irreconcilable difference between these two conceptions of religion. + +The orthodox Catholic faith believes in a supernatural revelation, and +is firmly convinced that man is inherently vile and corrupt, born in +sin from which he cannot be redeemed, save by the mystical operations +of divine grace, working only through the holy sacraments and clergy of +the one true Church, to whom all power was given, according to its +view, by the historic Jesus. Its methods are conservative, its +discipline rigid and based on tradition and authority. Its system of +salvation is excessively individualistic. It holds firmly to this +pessimistic view of human nature, based on the doctrine of original +sin, thus maintaining a creed which, in the hands of a devoted clergy, +who are free from domestic ties, works as a powerful moral force upon +the individual believer. His freedom of thought is restricted; he can +neither read nor think what he likes, and the Church, having made the +thirteenth-century doctrines of Aquinas its official philosophy, hurls +anathema at ideas scientific, political, philosophical or theological +which have appeared since. No half-measures are allowed: either one is +a loyal Catholic or one is not a Catholic at all. In this relentlessly +uncompromising attitude lies the main strength of Catholicism; herein +also is contained its weakness, or at least that element which makes it +manufacture its own greatest adversaries. + +While claiming to be the one Church of Jesus Christ, it does not by any +means put him in the foreground of its religion. Its hierarchy of +saints is rather a survival of polytheism; its worship of the Virgin +and cult of the _Sacré Cœur_ issue often in a religious sentimentality +and sensuality promoted by the denial of a more healthy outlet for +instincts which are an essential part of human nature. Tribute, +however, must be paid—high tribute—to the devotion of individuals, +particularly to the work done by the religious orders of women, whose +devotion the Church having won by its intense appeal to women keeps, +consecrates and organises in a manner which no other Church has +succeeded in doing. This is largely the secret of the vigorous life of +the Church, for as a power of charity the Roman Church is remarkable +and deserves respect. Her educational efforts, her missions, hospitals, +her humbler clergy, and her orders which offer opportunity of service +or of sanctuary to all types of human nature—these constitute Roman +Catholicism in a truer manner than the diplomacy of the Jesuits or the +councils of the Vatican. It is this pulsing human heart of hers which +keeps her alive, not the rigid intellectual dogmatism and antiquated +theology which she expounds, nor her loyalty to the established +political order, which, siding with the rich and powerful, frequently +gives to this professedly spiritual power a debasing taint of +materialism. + +Against all this, and in vital opposition to this, we have the +humanitarians who, rejecting the doctrine of corruption, believe that +human instincts and human reason themselves make for goodness and for +God. While Catholicism looks to the past, humanitarianism looks +forward, believes in freedom and in progress, and regards the immanent +Christ-spirit as working in mankind. Its gospel is one of love and +brotherhood, a romantic doctrine issuing in love and pity for the +oppressed and the sinful. In the collective consciousness of mankind it +sees the incarnation, the growth of the immanent God. Therefore it +claims that in democracy, socialism and world brotherhood lies the true +Christianity. This, the humanitarians claim, is the true religious +idealism—that which was preached by the Founder himself and which his +Church has betrayed. The humanitarians make service to mankind the +essence of religion, and regard themselves as more truly Christian than +the Church. + +In those countries where Protestantism has a large following, the two +doctrines of humanitarian optimism and of the orthodox pessimism +regarding human nature are confused vaguely together. The English mind +in particular is able to compromise and to blend the two conflicting +philosophies in varying degrees; but in the French mind its clearer +penetration and more logical acumen prevent this. The Frenchman is an +idealist and tends to extremes, either that of whole-hearted devotion +to a dominating Church or that of the abandonment of organised +religion. In Protestantism he sees only a halfway house, built upon the +first principles of criticism, and unwilling to pursue those principles +to their conclusion—namely, the rejection of all organised Church +religion, the adoption of perfect freedom for the individual in all +matters of belief, a religion founded on freedom and on personal +thought which alone is free. + +Such were the two dominant notes in religious thought in France at the +opening of our period. + +Catholicism resisted the humanitarianism of 1848 and strengthened its +power after the _coup d’état_. The Church and the Vatican became more +staunch in their opposition to all doctrines of modern thought. The +French clergy profited by the alliance with the aristocracy, while +religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, increased in number and in +power. Veuillot proclaimed the virtues of Catholicism in his writings. +Meanwhile the Pope’s temporal power decreased, but his spiritual power +was increasing in extent and in intensity. Centralisation went on +within the Church, and Rome (_i.e._, the Pope and the Vatican) became +all-powerful. + +Just after the half-century opens the Pope (Pius IX.), in 1854, +proclaimed his authority in announcing the dogma of the Immaculate +Conception of the Virgin Mary.[4] As France had heard the sentence, +_L’Etat, c’est moi_, from the lips of one of its greatest monarchs, it +now heard from another quarter a similar principle enunciated, +L’Eglise, c’est moi. As democracy and freedom cried out against the +one, they did so against the other. Undaunted, the Vatican continued in +its absolutism, even although it must have seen that in some quarters +revolt would be the result. Ten years later the Pope attacked the whole +of modern thought, to which he was diametrically opposed, in his +encyclical _Quanta Cura_ and in his famous _Syllabus_, which +constituted a catalogue of the modern errors and heresies which he +condemned. This famous challenge was quite clear and uncompromising in +its attitude, concluding with a curse upon “him who should maintain +that the Roman Pontiff can, and must, be reconciled and compromise with +progress, liberalism and modern civilisation!” To the doctrine of +_L’Eglise, c’est moi_ had now been added that of _La Science, aussi, +c’est moi_. This was not all. In 1870 the dogma of Papal Infallibility +was proclaimed. By a strange irony of history, however, this +declaration of spiritual absolutism was followed by an entire loss of +temporal power. The outbreak of the war in that same year between +France and Prussia led to the hasty withdrawal of French troops from +the Papal Domain and the Eternal City fell to the secular power of the +Italian national army under Victor Emmanuel. + + [4] This new dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin must + not, of course, be confused, as it often is by those outside the + Catholic Church, with the quite different and more ancient proposition + which asserts the Virgin Birth of Jesus. + + +The defeat of France at the hands of Prussia in 1871 issued in a +revival of religious sentiment, frequently seen in defeated nations. A +special mission or crusade of national repentance gathered in large +subscriptions which built the enormous Church of the Sacré Coeur +overlooking Paris from the heights of Montmartre.[5] + + [5] The anti-Catholic element, however, have had the audacity, and + evidently the legal right, to place a statue to a man who, some + centuries back, was burned at the stake for failing to salute a + religious procession, in such a position immediately in front of this + great church that the plan for the large staircase cannot be carried + out. + + +Seeking for religious consolation, the French people found a +Catholicism which had become embittered and centralised for warfare +upon liberal religion and humanitarianism. They found that the only +organised religion they knew was dominated by the might of Rome and the +powers of the clergy. These even wished France, demoralised as she was +for the moment, to undertake the restoration of the Pope’s temporal +power in Italy. Further, they were definitely in favour of monarchy: +“the altar and the throne” were intimately associated in the +ecclesiastical mind. + +It was the realisation of this which prompted Gambetta to cry out to +the Third Republic with stern warning, “Clericalism is your enemy.” +Thus began the political fight for which Rome had been strengthening +herself. With the defeat of the clerical-monarchy party in 1877 the +safety of the Republic was assured. From then until 1905 the Republic +and the Church fought each other. Educational questions were bitterly +contested (1880). The power of the Jesuits, especially, was regarded as +a constant menace to the State. The Dreyfus affair (1894- 1899) did not +improve relations, with its intense anti-semitism and anti-clericalism. +The battle was only concluded by the legislation of Waldeck-Rousseau in +1901 and Combes in 1903, expelling religious orders. Combes himself had +studied for the priesthood and was violently anti-clerical. The +culmination came in the Separation Law of 1905 carried by Briand, in +the Pope’s protest against this, followed by the Republic’s +confiscation of much Church property, a step which might have been +avoided if the French Catholics had been allowed to have their way in +an arrangement with the State regarding their churches. This was +prevented by the severance of diplomatic relations between France and +the Vatican and by the Pope’s disagreement with the French Catholics +whose wishes he ignored in his policy of definite hostility to the +French Government.[6] + + [6] Relations with the Vatican, which were seen to be desirable during + the Great European War, have since been resumed (in 1921) by the + Republic. + + +During our period a popular semi-nationalist and semi-religious cult of +Jeanne d’Arc, “the Maid of Orleans,” appeared in France. The clergy +expressly encouraged this, with the definite object of enlisting +sentiments of nationality and patriotism on the side of the Church. +Ecclesiastical diplomacy at headquarters quickly realised the use which +might be made of this patriotic figure whom, centuries before, the +Church had thought fit to burn as a witch. The Vatican saw a +possibility of blending French patriotism with devotion to Catholicism +and thus possibly strengthening, in the eyes of the populace at least, +the waning cause of the Church. + +The adoration of Jeanne d’Arc was approved as early as 1894, but when +the Church found itself in a worse plight with its relation to the +State, it made preparations in 1903 for her enrolment among the +saints.[7] She was honoured the following year with the title of +“Venerable,” but in 1908, after the break of Church and State, she was +accorded the full status of a saint, and her statue, symbolic of +patriotism militant, stands in most French churches as conspicuous +often as that of the Virgin, who, in curious contrast, fondles the +young child, and expresses the supreme loveliness of motherhood.[8] The +cult of Jeanne d’Arc flourished particularly in 1914 on the sentiments +of patriotism, militarism and religiosity then current. This was +natural because it is for these very sentiments that she stands as a +symbol. She is evidently a worthy goddess whose worship is worth while, +for we are assured that it was through _her_ beneficent efforts that +the German Army retired from Paris in 1914 and again in 1918. The +saintly maid of Orleans reappeared and beat them back! Such is the +power of the “culte” which the Church eagerly fosters. The Sacré Coeur +also has its patriotic and military uses, figuring as it did as an +emblem on some regimental flags on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the +celebrations of Napoleon’s centenary (1921) give rise to the conjecture +that he, too, will in time rank with Joan of Arc as a saint. His +canonisation would achieve absolutely that union of patriotic and +religious sentimentality to which the Church in France directs its +activities. + + [7] t is interesting to observe the literature on Jeanne d’Arc + published at this time: Anatole France, _Vie de Jeanne d’Arc_ (2 + vols., 1908); Durand, _Jeanne d’Arc et l’Eglise_ (1908). These are + noteworthy, also Andrew Lang’s work, _The Maid of Orleans_ (also + 1908). + + + [8] Herein, undoubtedly, lies the strong appeal of the Church to + women. + + +The vast majority of the 39,000,000 French people are at least +nominally Catholic, even if only from courtesy or from a utilitarian +point of view. Only about one in sixty of the population are +Protestant. Although among cultured conservatives there is a real +devotion to the Church, the creed of France is in general something far +more broad and human than Catholicism, in spite of the tremendously +human qualities which that Church possesses. The creed of France is +summed up better in art, nature, beauty, music, science, _la patrie_, +humanity, in the worship of life itself.[9] + + [9] Those who desire to study the religious psychology of France + during our period cannot find a better revelation than that given in + the wonderful novel by Roger Martin du Card, entitled Jean Barois. + +I + +It was against such a background of ecclesiastical and political +affairs that the play of ideas upon religion went on. Such was the +environment, the tradition which surrounded our thinkers, and we may +very firmly claim that only by a recognition that their religious and +national _milieu_ was of such a type as we have outlined, can the real +significance of their religious thought be understood. Only when we +have grasped the essential attitude of authority and tradition of the +Roman Church, its ruthless attitude to modern thought of all kinds, can +we understand the religious attitude of men like Renan, Renouvier and +Guyau. + +We are also enabled to see why the appeal of the Saint-Simonist group +could present itself as a religious and, indeed, Christian appeal +outside the Church. It enables us to understand why Cousin’s +spiritualism pleased neither the Catholics nor their opponents, and to +realise why the “Religion of Humanity,” which Auguste Comte +inaugurated, made so little appeal.[10] This has been well styled an +“inverted Catholicism,” since it endeavours to preserve the ritual of +that religion and to embody the doctrines of humanitarianism. Naturally +enough it drew upon itself the scorn of both these groups. The Catholic +saw in it only blasphemy: the humanitarian saw no way in which it might +further his ends. + + [10] Littré, his disciple, as we have already noted, rejected this + part of his master’s teaching. Littré was opposed by Robinet, who laid + the stress upon the “Religion of Humanity” as the crown of Comte’s + work. + + +Comte’s attempt to base his new religion upon Catholicism was quite +deliberate, for he strove to introduce analogies with “everything great +and deep which the Catholic system of the Middle Ages effected or even +projected.” He offered a new and fantastic trinity, compiled a calendar +of renowned historical personalities, to replace that of unknown +saints. He proclaimed “positive dogmas “and aspired to all the +authority and infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, supported by a +trained clergy, whose word should be law. Curiously enough he, too, had +his anathemas, in that he had days set apart for the solemn cursing of +the great enemies of the human race, such as Napoleon. It was indeed a +reversed Catholicism, offering a fairly good caricature of the methods +of the Roman Church, and it was equally obnoxious in its tyrannical +attitude.[11] While it professed to express humanity and love as its +central ideas it proceeded to outline a method which is the utter +negation of these. Comte made the great mistake of not realising that +loyalty to these ideals must involve spiritual freedom, and that the +religion of humanity must be a collective inspiration of free +individuals, who will in love and fellowship tolerate differences upon +metaphysical questions. Uniformity can only be mischievous. + + [11] Guyau’s criticisms of Comte’s “Religion of Humanity” in his + _L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_ are interesting. “The marriage of positive + science and blind sentiment cannot produce religion” (p. 314; Eng. + trans., p. 366). “Comtism, which consists of the rites of religion and + nothing else, is an attempt to maintain life in the body after the + departure of the soul” (p. 307; Eng. trans., p. 359). + + +It was because he grasped this vital point that Renan’s discussion of +the religious question is so instructive. For him, religion is +essentially an affair of personal taste. Here we have another +indication of the clear way in which Renan was able to discern the +tendencies of his time. He published his _Etudes d’Histoire religieuse_ +in 1857, and his Preface to the _Nouvelles Etudes d’Histoire +religieuse_ was written in 1884. He claims there that freedom is +essential to religion, and that it is absolutely necessary that the +State should have no power whatever over it. Religion is as personal +and private a matter as taste in literature or art. There should be no +State laws, he claims, relating to religion at all, any more than dress +is prescribed for citizens by law. He well points out that only a State +which is strictly neutral in religion can ever be absolutely free from +playing the _rôle_ of persecutor. The favouring of one sect will entail +some persecution or hardship upon others. Further, he sees the iniquity +of taxing the community to pay the expenses of clergy to whose +teachings they may object, or whose doctrines are not theirs. Freedom, +Renan believed, would claim its own in the near future and, denouncing +the Concordat, he prophesied the abolition of the State Church. + +The worst type of organisation Renan holds to be the theocratic state, +like Islam, or the ancient Pontifical State in which dogma reigns +supreme. He condemns also the State whose religion is based upon the +profession of a majority of its citizens. There should be, as Spinoza +was wont to style it, “liberty of philosophising.” The days of the +dominance of dogma are passing, in many quarters gone by already, +“Religion has become for once and all a matter of personal taste.” + +Renan himself was deeply religious in mind. He was never an atheist and +did not care for the term “free-thinker” because of its implied +associations with the irreligion of the previous century. He stands +out, however, not only in our period of French thought, but in the +world development of the century as one of the greatest masters of +religious criticism. His historical work is important, and he possessed +a knowledge and equipment for that task. His distinguished Semitic +scholarship led to his obtaining the chair of Hebrew at the Collège de +France, and enabled him to write his Histories, one of the Jews and one +of Christianity. + +It was as a volume of this _Histoire des Origines du Christianisme_ +that his _Vie de Jésus_ appeared in 1863. This life of the Founder of +Christianity produced a profound stir in the camps of religious +orthodoxy, and drew upon its author severe criticisms. Apart from the +particular views set forth in that volume, we must remember that the +very fact of his writing upon “a sacred subject,” which was looked upon +as a close preserve, reserved for the theologians or churchmen alone, +was deemed at that time an original and daring feat in France. + +His particular views, which created at the time such scandal, were akin +to those of Baur and the Tubingen School, which Strauss (Renan’s +contemporary) had already set forth in his _Leben Jesu_.[12] Briefly, +they may be expressed as the rejection of the supernatural. Herein is +seen the scientific or “positive” influence at work upon the dogmas of +the Christian religion, a tendency which culminated in “Modernism” +within the Church, only to be condemned violently by the Pope in 1907. +It was this temper, produced by the study of documents, by criticism +and historical research which put Renan out of the Catholic Church. His +rational mind could not accept the dogmas laid down. Lamennais (who was +conservative and orthodox in his theology, and possessed no taint of +“modernism” in the technical sense) had declared that the +starting-point should be faith and not reason. Renan aptly asks in +reply to this, “and what is to be the test, in the last resort, of the +claims of faith is not reason?” + + [12] Written in 1835. Littré issued a French translation in 1839, a + year previous to the appearance of the English version by George + Eliot. Strauss’s life covers 1808-1874. + + +In Renan we find a good illustration of the working of the spirit of +modern thought upon a religious mind. Being a sincere and penetrating +intellect he could not, like so many people, learned folk among them, +keep his religious ideas and his reason in separate watertight +compartments. This kind of people Renan likens in his _Souvenirs +d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_ to mother-o’-pearl shells of Francois de +Sales “which are able to live in the sea without tasting a drop of salt +water.” Yet he realises the comfort of such an attitude. “I see around +me,” he continues, “men of pure and simple lives whom Christianity has +had the power to make virtuous and happy. . . . But I have noticed that +none of them have the critical faculty, for which let them bless God!” +He well realises the contentment which, springing sometimes from a +dullness of mind or lack of sensitiveness, excludes all doubt and all +problems. + +In Catholicism he sees a bar of iron which will not reason or bend. “I +can only return to it by amputation of my faculties, by definitely +stigmatising my reason and condemning it to perpetual silence.” Writing +of his exit from the Seminary of Saint Sulpice, where he was trained +for the priesthood, he remarks in his _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de +Jeunesse_ that “there were times when I was sorry that I was not a +Protestant, so that I might be a philosopher without ceasing to be a +Christian.” For Renan, as for so many minds in modern France, severance +from the Roman Church is equivalent to severance from Christianity as +an organised religion. The practical dilemma is presented of +unquestioning obedience to an infallible Church on the one hand, or the +attitude of _libre-penseur_ on the other. There are not the +accommodating varieties of the Protestant presentation of the Christian +religion. Renan’s spiritual pilgrimage is but an example of many. In a +measure this condition of affairs is a source of strength to the Roman +Church for, since a break with it so often means a break with +Christianity or indeed with all definite religion, only the bolder and +stronger thinkers make the break which their intellect makes +imperative. The mass of the people, however dissatisfied they may be +with the Church, nevertheless accept it, for they see no alternative +but the opposite extreme. No half-way house of non-conformity presents +itself as a rule. + +Yet, as we have insisted, Renan had an essentially religious view of +the universe, and he expressly claimed that his break with the Church +and his criticism of her were due to a devotion to pure religion, and +he even adds, to a loyalty to the spirit of her Founder. Although, as +he remarks in his _Nouvelles Etudes religieuses_, it is true that the +most modest education tends to destroy the belief in the superstitious +elements in religion, it is none the less true that the very highest +culture can never destroy religion in the highest sense. “Dogmas pass, +but piety is eternal.” The external trappings of religion have suffered +by the growth of the modern sciences of nature and of historical +criticism. The mind of cultivated persons does not now present the same +attitude to evidence in regard to religious doctrines which were once +accepted without question. The sources of the origins of the Christian +religion are themselves questionable. This, Renan says, must not +discourage the believers in true religion, for that is not the kind of +foundation upon which religion reposes. Dogmas in the past gave rise to +divisions and quarrels, only by feeling can religious persons be united +in fellowship. The most prophetic words of Jesus were, Renan points +out, those in which he indicated a time when men “would not worship God +in this mountain nor in Jerusalem, but when the true worshippers would +worship in spirit and in truth.” It was precisely this spirit which +Renan admired in Jesus, whom he considered more of a philosopher than +the Church, and he reminds the “Christians”[13] who railed against him +as an unbeliever that Jesus had had much more influence upon him than +they gave him credit for, and, more particularly, that his break with +the Church was due to loyalty to Jesus. By such loyalty Renan meant not +a blind worship, but a reverence which endeavoured to appreciate and +follow the ideals for which Jesus himself stood. It did not involve +slavish acceptance of all he said, even if that were intelligible, and +clear, which it is not. “To be a Platonist,” remarks Renan, “I need not +adore Plato, or believe _all_ that he said.”[14] + + [13] Renan complains of the ignorance of the clergy of Rome regarding + his own work, which they did not understand because they had not read + it, merely relying on the Press and other sources for false and + biassed accounts. + + + [14] _Cf._ Renan’s Essay in _Questions contemporaines_ on “_L’Avenir + religieux des Sociétés modernes_.” + + +Renan is in agreement with the central ideas of Jesus’ own faith, and +he rightly regards him as one of the greatest contributors to the +world’s religious thought. Renan’s religion is free from +supernaturalism and dogma. He believes in infinite Goodness or +Providence, but he despises the vulgar and crude conceptions of God +which so mar a truly religious outlook. He points out how prayer, in +the sense of a request to Heaven for a particular object, is becoming +recognised as foolish. ‘As a “meditation,” an interview with one’s own +conscience, it has a deeply religious value. The vulgar idea of prayer +reposes on an immoral conception of God. Renan rightly sees the central +importance for religion of possessing a sane view of the divinity, not +one which belongs to primitive tribal wargods and weather-gods. He +aptly says, in this connection, that the one who was defeated in 1871 +was not only France but _le bon Dieu_ to which she in vain appealed. In +his place was to be found, remarks Renan with a little sarcasm, “only a +Lord God of Hosts who was unmoved by the moral ‘délicatesse’ of the +Uhlans and the incontestable excellence of the Prussian shells.”[15] He +rightly points to the immoral use made of the divinity by pious folk +whose whole religion is utilitarian and materialistic. They do good +only in order to get to heaven or escape hell,[16] and believe in God +because it is necessary for them to have a confidant and sonsoler, to +whom they may cry in time of trouble, and to whose will they may +resignedly impute the evil chastisement which their own errors have +brought upon them individually or collectively. But, he rightly claims, +it is only where utilitarian calculations and self-interest end, that +religion begins with the sense of the Infinite and of the Ideal +Goodness and Beauty and Love. + + [15] _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_, p. ix. + + + [16] One pious individual thought to convert Renan himself by writing + him every month, quite briefly, to this effect “There is a hell.” + + +He endeavours in his _Examen de Conscience philosophique_ (1888) to sum +up his attitude upon this question. There he affirms that it is beyond +dispute or doubt that we have no evidence whatever of the action in the +universe of one or of several wills superior to that of man. The actual +state of this universe gives no sign of any external intervention, and +we know nothing of its beginning. No beneficent interfering power, a +_deus ex machinâ_, corrects or directs the operation of blind forces, +enlightens man or improves his lot. No God appears miraculously to +prevent evils, to crush disease, stop wars, or save his children from +peril. No end or purpose is visible to us. God in the popular sense, +living and acting as a Divine Providence, is not to be seen in our +universe. The question is, however, whether this universe of ours is +the totality of existence. Doubt comes into play here, and if our +universe is not this totality, then God, although absent from his +world, might still exist outside it. Our finite world is little in +relation to the Infinite, it is a mere speck in the universe we know, +and its duration to a divine Being might be only a day. + +The Infinite, continues Renan, surrounds our finite world above and +below. It stretches on the one hand to the infinitely large concourse +of worlds and systems, and, on the other, to the infinitely little as +atoms, microbes and the germs by which human life itself is passed on +from one generation to another. The prospect of the world we know +involves logically and fatally, says Renan, atheism. But this atheism, +he adds, may be due to the fact that we cannot see far enough. Our +universe is a phenomenon which has had a beginning and will have an +end. That which has had no beginning and will have no end is the +Absolute All, or God. Metaphysics has always been a science proceeding +upon this assumption, “Something exists, therefore something has +existed from all eternity.” which is akin to the scientific principle, +“No effect with- out a cause.”[17] + + [17] _Examen de Conscience philosophique_, p. 412 of the volume + _Feuilles détachées_. + + +We must not allow ourselves to be misled too far by the constructions +or inductions about the uniformity and immutability of the laws of +nature. “A God may reveal himself, perhaps, one day.” The infinite may +dispose of our finite world, use it for its own ends. The expression, +“Nature and its author,” may not be so absurd as some seem to think it. +It is true that our experience presents no reason for forming such an +hypothesis, but we must keep our sense of the infinite. “Everything is +possible, even God,” and Renan adds, “If God exists, he must be good, +and he will finish by being just.” It is as foolish to deny as to +assert his existence in a dogmatic and thoughtless manner. It is upon +this sense of the infinite and upon the ideals of Goodness, Beauty and +Love that true faith or piety reposes. + +Love, declares Renan, is one of the principal revelations of the +divine, and he laments the neglect of it by philosophy. It runs in a +certain sense through all living beings, and in man has been the school +of gentleness and courtesy—nay more, of morals and of religion. Love, +understood in the high sense, is a sacred, religious thing, or rather +is a part of religion itself. In a tone which recalls that of the New +Testament and Tolstoi, Renan beseeches us to remember that God _is_ +Love, and that where Love is there God is. In loving, man is at his +best; he goes out of himself and feels himself in contact with the +infinite. The very act of love is veritably sacred and divine, the +union of body and soul with another is a holy communion with the +infinite. He remarks in his _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_, +doubtless remembering the simple purity and piety of his mother and +sister, that when reflection has brought us to doubt, and even to a +scepticism regarding goodness, then the spontaneous affirmation of +goodness and beauty which exists in a noble and virtuous woman saves us +from cynicism and restores us to communication with the eternal spring +in which God reflects himself. Love, which Renan with reason laments as +having been neglected on its most serious side and looked upon as mere +sentimentality, offers the highest proof of God. In it lies our +umbilical link with nature, but at the same time our communion with the +infinite. He recalls some of Browning’s views in his attitude to love +as a redeeming power. The most wretched criminal still has something +good in him, a divine spark, if he be capable of loving. + +It is the spirit of love and goodness which Renan admires in the simple +faith of those separated far from him in their theological ideas. “God +forbid,” he says,[18] “that I should speak slightingly of those who, +devoid of the critical sense, and impelled by very pure and powerful +religious motives, are attached to one or other of the great +established systems of faith. I love the simple faith of the peasant, +the serious conviction of the priest.” + + [18] _L’Avenir de la Science_, pp. 436, 437; Eng. trans., p. 410. + + +“Supprimer Dieu, serait-ce amoindrir l’univers?” + + +asks Guyau in one of his _Vers d’un Philosophe_.’[19] Renan observes +that if we tell the simple to live by aspiration after truth and +beauty, these words would have no meaning for them. “Tell them to love +God, not to offend God, they will understand you perfectly. God, +Providence, soul, good old words, rather heavy, but expressive and +respectable which science will explain, but will never replace with +advantage. What is God for humanity if not the category of the +_ideal_?”[20] + + [19] _“Question,” Vers d’un Philosophe_, p. 65. + + + [20] _L’Avenir de la Science_,” p. 476; Eng. trans., p. 445. + + +This is the point upon which Vacherot insisted in his treatment of +religion. He claimed that the conception of God arises in the human +consciousness from a combination of two separate ideas. The first is +the notion of the Infinite which Science itself approves, the second +the notion of perfection which Science is unable to show us anywhere +unless it be found in the human consciousness and its thoughts, where +it abides as the magnetic force ever drawing us onward and acts at the +same time as a dynamic, giving power to every progressive movement, +being “the Ideal” in the mind and heart of man. + +Similar was the doctrine of Taine, who saw in Reason the ideal which +would produce in mankind a new religion, which would be that of Science +and Philosophy demanding from art forms of expression in harmony with +themselves. This religion would be free in doctrine. Taine himself +looked upon religion as “a metaphysical poem accompanied by belief,” +and he approached to the conception of Spinoza of a contemplation which +may well be called an “intellectual love of God.” + +II + +Like Renan, Renouvier was keenly interested in religion and its +problems; he was also a keen opponent of the Roman Catholic Church and +faith, against which he brought his influence into play in two ways—by +his _néo-criticisme_ as expressed in his written volumes and by his +energetic editing of the two periodicals _La Critique philosophique_ +and _La Critique religieuse_. + +In undertaking the publication of these periodicals Renouvier’s +confessed aim was that of a definite propaganda. While the Roman Church +profited by the feelings of disappointment and demoralisation which +followed the Franco-Prussian War, and strove to shepherd wavering souls +again into its fold, to find there a peace which evidently the world +could not give, Renouvier (together with his friend Pillon) endeavoured +to rally his countrymen by urging the importance, and, if possible, the +acceptance of his own political and religious convictions arising out +of his philosophy. The _Critique philosophique_ appeared weekly from +its commencement in 1872 until 1884, thereafter as a monthly until +1889. Among its contributors, whose names are of religious +significance, were A. Sabatier, L. Dauriac, R. Allier[21] and William +James. + + [21] Now Dean of the Protestant Faculty of Theology in Paris. + + +Renouvier’s great enthusiasm for his periodical is the main feature of +this period of his life, although, owing to his tremendous energy, it +does not seem to have interfered with the publication of his more +permanent works. The political and general policy of this journal may +be summed up in a sentence from the last year’s issue,[22] where we +find Renouvier remarking that it had been his aim throughout “to uphold +strictly republican principles and to fight all that savoured of +Caesar, or imperialism.” The declared foe of monarchy in politics, he +was equally the declared foe of the Pope in the religious realm. His +attitude was one of very marked hostility to the power of the Vatican, +which he realised to be increasing within the Roman Church, and one of +keen opposition to the general power of that Church and her clergy in +France. Renouvier’s paper was quite definitely and aggressively +anti-Catholic. He urged all Catholic readers of his paper who professed +loyalty to the Republic to quit the Roman Church and to affiliate +themselves to the Protestant body. + + [22] _La Critique philosophique_, 1889, tome ii., p. 403. + + +It was with this precise object in view that, in 1878, he added to his +_Critique philosophique_ a supplement which he entitled _La Critique +religieuse_, a quarterly intended purely for propaganda purposes. +“Criticism,” he had said, “is in philosophy what Protestantism is in +religion.”[23] As certitude is, according to Renouvier’s doctrines, the +fruit of intelligence, heart and will, it can never be obtained by the +coercion of authority or by obedience such as the Roman Church demands. +He appealed to the testimony of history, as a witness to the conflict +between authority and the individual conscience. Jesus, whom the Church +adores, was himself a superb example of such revolt. History, however, +shows us, says Renouvier, the gradual decay of authority in such +matters. Thought, if it is really to be thought in its sincerity, must +be free. This Renouvier realised, and in this freedom he saw the +characteristic of the future development of religion, and shows +himself, in this connection, in substantial agreement with Renan and +Guyau. + + [23] _Ibid_., 1873, pp. 145-146. + + +Renouvier’s interest in theology and religion, and in the theological +implications of all philosophical thought, was not due merely to a +purely speculative impulse, but to a very practical desire to initiate +a rational restatement of religious conceptions, which he considered to +be an urgent need of his time. He lamented the influence of the Roman +Church over the minds of the youth of his country, and realised the +vital importance of the controversy between Church and State regarding +secular education. Renouvier was a keen supporter of the secular +schools (_écoles laïques_). In 1879, when the educational controversy +was at its height, he issued a little book on ethics for these +institutions (_Petit Traité de Morale pour les Ecoles laïques_), which +was republished in an enlarged form in 1882, when the secular party, +ably led by Jules Ferry, triumphed in the establishment of compulsory, +free, secular education. That great achievement, however, did not solve +all the difficulties presented by the Church in its educational +attitude, and even now the influence of clericalism is dreaded. + +Renouvier realised all the dangers, but he was forced also to realise +that his enthusiastic and energetic campaign against the power of the +Church had failed to achieve what he had desired. He complained of +receiving insufficient support from quarters where he might well have +expected it. His failure is a fairly conclusive proof that +Protestantism has no future in France: it is a stubborn survival, +rather than a growing influence. With the decline in the power and +appeal of the Roman Catholic Church will come the decline of religion +of a dogmatic and organised kind. Renouvier probably had an influence +in hastening the day of the official severance of Church and State, an +event which he did not live long enough to see.[24] + + [24] It occurred, however, only two years after his death. + + +Having become somewhat discouraged, Renouvier stopped the publication +of his religious quarterly in 1885 and made the _Critique +philosophique_ a monthly instead of a weekly Journal. It ceased in +1889, but the following year Renouvier’s friend, Pillon, began a new +periodical, which bore the same name as the one which had ceased with +the outbreak of the war in 1870. This was _L’Année philosophique_, to +which Renouvier contributed articles from time to time on religious +topics. + +Some writers are of the opinion that Renouvier’s attacks on the Roman +Catholic Church and faith, so far from strengthening the Protestant +party in France, tended rather to increase the hostility to the +Christian religion generally or, indeed, to any religious view of the +universe. + +Renouvier’s own statements in his philosophy, in so far as these +concern religion and theology, are in harmony with his rejection of the +Absolute in philosophy and the Absolute in politics. His criticism of +the idea of God, the central point in any philosophy of religion, is in +terms similar to his critique of the worship of the Absolute or the +deification of the State. + +In dealing with the question of a “Total Synthesis” Renouvier indicated +his objections to the metaphysical doctrine of an Absolute, which is +diametrically opposed to his general doctrine of relativity. He is +violently in conflict with all religious conceptions which savour of +this Absolute or have a pantheistic emphasis, which would diminish the +value and significance of relativity and of personality. The +“All-in-All” conception of God, which represents the pantheistic +elements in many theologies and religions, both Christian and other, is +not really a consciousness, he shows, for consciousness itself implies +a relation, a union of the self and non-self. In such a conception +actor, play and theatre all blend into one, God alone is real, and he +is unconscious, for there is, according to this hypothesis, nothing +outside himself which he can know. Renouvier realises that he is faced +with the ancient problem of the One and the Many, with the alternative +of unity or plurality. With his usual logical decisiveness Renouvier +posits plurality. He does not attempt to reconcile the two opposites, +and he deals with the problem in the manner in which he faced the +antinomies of Kant. Both cannot be true, and the enemy of pantheism and +absolutism acclaims pluralism, both for logical reasons and in order to +safeguard the significance of personality. In particular he directly +criticises the philosophy of Spinoza in which he sees the supreme +statement of this philosophy of the eternal, the perfect, necessary, +unchanging One, who is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. He +admits that the idea of law or a system of laws leads to the +introduction of something approaching the hypothesis of unity, but he +is careful to show by his doctrine of freedom and personality that this +is only a limited unity and that, considered even from a scientific +standpoint, a Total Synthesis, which is the logical outcome of such an +hypothesis, is ultimately untenable. He overthrows the idols of Spinoza +and Hegel. Such absolutes, infinite and eternal, whether described as +an infinite love which loves itself or a thought thinking thought, are +nothing more to Renouvier than vain words, which it is absurd to offer +as “The Living God.” + +Against these metaphysical erections Renouvier opposes his doctrines of +freedom, of personality, relativity and pluralism. He offers in +contrast the conception of God as a Person, not an Absolute, but +relative, not infinite, but finite, limited by man’s freedom and by +contingency in the world of creatures. God, in his view, is not a Being +who is omnipotent, or omniscient. He is a Person of whom man is a type, +certainly a degraded type, but man is made in the image of the divine +personality. Our notion of God, Renouvier reminds us, must be +consistent with the doctrine of freedom, hence we must conceive of him +not merely as a creator of creatures or subjects, but of creative power +itself in those creatures. The relation of God to man is more complex +than that of simple “creation” as this word is usually comprehended, +“It is a creation of creation,” says Renouvier,[25] a remark which is +parallel to the view expressed by Bergson, to the effect that, we must +conceive of God as a “creator of creators.”[26] The existence of this +Creative Person must be conceived, Renouvier insists, as indissolubly +bound up with his work, and it is unintelligible otherwise. That work +is one of creation and not emanation—it involves more than mere power +and transcendence. God is immanent in the universe. + + [25] _Psychologie ralionnelle_, vol. 2, p. 104. + + + [26] In his address to the Edinburgh Philosophical Society, 1914. + + +Theology has wavered between the two views—that of absolute +transcendence and omnipotence and that of immanence based on freedom +and limitation. In the first, every single thing depends upon the +operation of God, whose Providence rules all. This is pure determinism +of a theological character. In the other view man’s free personality is +recognised; part of the creation is looked upon as partaking of freedom +and contingency, therefore the divinity is conceived as limited and +finite. + +Renouvier insists that this view of God as finite is the only tenable +one, for it is the only one which gives a rational and moral +explanation of evil. In the first view God is responsible for all +things, evil included, and man is therefore much superior to him from a +moral standpoint. The idea of God must be ethically acceptable, and it +is unfortunate that this idea, so central to religion, is the least +susceptible to modification in harmony with man’s ethical development. +We already have noticed Guyau’s stress upon this point in our +discussion of ethics. Our conception of God must, Renouvier claims, be +the affirmation of our highest category, Personality, and must express +the best ethical ideals of mankind. Society suffers for its immoral and +primitive view of God, which gives to its religion a barbarous +character which is disgraceful and revolting to finer or more +thoughtful minds. + +It is true that the acceptance of the second view, which carries with +it the complete rejection of the ideas of omnipotence and omniscience, +modifies profoundly many of the old and primitive views of God. +Renouvier recognises this, and wishes his readers also to grasp this +point, for only so is religion to be brought forward in a development +harmonious with the growth of man’s mind in other spheres. Man should +not profess the results of elaborate culture in science while he +professes at the same time doctrines of God which are not above those +of a savage or primitive people. This is the chief mischief which the +influence of the Hebrew writings of the Old Testament has had upon the +Christian religion. The moral conscience now demands their rejection, +for to those who value religion they can only appear as being of pure +blasphemy. God is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, consequently many +things must be unknown to him until they happen. Foreknowledge and +predetermination on his part are impossible, according to Renouvier. +God is not to be conceived as a consciousness enveloping the entire +universe, past, present and future, in a total synthesis. Such a belief +is mischievous to humanity because of its fatalism, in spite of the +comfortable consolation it offers to pious souls. Moreover, it presents +the absurd view of God working often against himself. + +The idea of God, Renouvier shows, arises out of the discussions of the +nature of the universal laws of the universe and from the progress of +personalities. The plausible conceptions of God based on causality and +on “necessary essence” have not survived the onslaughts of Criticism. +The personality of God seems to us, says Renouvier, indicated as the +conclusion and the almost necessary culmination of the consideration of +the probabilities laid down by the practical reason or moral law. The +primary, though not primitive, evidence for the existence of God is +contained in, and results from, the generalisation of the idea of +“ends” in the universe. We must not go bevond phenomena or seek +evidence in some fictitious sphere outside of our experience. In its +most general and abstract sense the idea of God arises from the +conception of moral order, immortality, or the accord of happiness and +goodness. We cannot deny the existence of a morality in the order and +movements of the world, a physical sanction to the moral laws of virtue +and of progress, an external reality of good, a supremacy of good, a +witness of the Good itself. Renouvier does not think that any man, +having sufficiently developed his thought, would refuse to give the +name God to the object of this supreme conception, which at first may +seem abstract because it is not in any way crude, many of its intrinsic +elements remaining undetermined in face of our ignorance, but which, +nevertheless, or just for that very reason, is essentially practical +and moral, representing the most notable fact of all those included in +our belief. This method of approaching the problem of God is, he +thinks, both simple and grand. It is a noble contrast to the scholastic +edifice built up on the metaphysical perfection of being, called the +Absolute. In this conception all attributes of personality are replaced +by an accumulation of metaphysical properties, contradictory in +themselves and quite incompatible with one another. This Absolute is a +pure chimerical abstraction; its pure being and pure essence are +equivalent to pure nothing or pure nonsense. + +The fetish of pure substance, substantial cause, absolute being, +whatever it be called, is vicious at all times, but particularly when +we are dealing with the fundamental problems of science. It would be +advisable here that the only method of investigation be that of +atheism, for scientific investigation should not be tainted by any +prejudices or preconceived ideas upon the nature of the divinity. + +What really is Atheism? The answer to this query, says Renouvier, is +clear. The idea of God is essentially a product of the moral law or +conscience. An atheist is, strictly speaking, one who does not admit +the reality of this moral order of ends and of persons as valuable in +themselves. Verily, he himself may personally lead a much more upright +life than the loud champions of theism, but he denies the general moral +order, which is God. With the epithet of atheist as commonly used for +those who merelv have a conception of God which differs from the +orthodox view, we are not here concerned. That may be dismissed as a +misuse of the word due to religious bigotry. The fruits of true atheism +are materialism, pantheism and fatalism. Indeed any doctrine, even a +theological doctrine, which debases and destroys the inherent value of +the human consciousness and personality, is rightly to be regarded, +whatever it may _say_ about God, however it may repeat his name (and +two of these doctrines are very fond of this repetition, but this must +not blind us to the real issue)—that doctrine is atheistic. The most +resolute materialists, the most high-minded worshippers of Providence +and the great philosophers of the Absolute, find themselves united here +in atheism. God is not a mere totality of laws operating in the +universe. Such a theism is but a form of real atheism. We must, insists +Renouvier, abandon views of this type, with all that savours of an +Absolute, a Perfect Infinite, and affirm our belief in the existence of +an order of Goodness which gives value to human personality and assures +ultimate victory to Justice. This is to believe in God. We arrive at +this belief rationally and after consideration of the world and of the +moral law of persons. Through these we come to God. We do not begin +with him and pretend to deduce these from his nature by some +incomprehensible _a priori_ propositions. The methods of the old +dogmatic theology are reversed. Instead of beginning with a Being of +whom we know nothing and can obviously deduce nothing, let us proceed +inductively, and by careful consideration of the revelation we have +before us in the world and in humanity let us build up our idea of God. + +Renouvier is anxious that we should examine the data upon which we may +found “rational hypotheses” as to the nature of God. The Critical +Philosophy has upset the demonstrations of the existence of God, which +were based upon causality and upon necessary existence (the +cosmological and ontological proofs). Neo-criticism not only +establishes the existence of God as a rational hypothesis, but “this +point of view of the divine problem is the most favourable to the +notion of the personality of God. The personality of God seems to us to +be indicated as the looked-for conclusion and almost necessary +consummation of the probabilities of practical reason.”[27] + + [27] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 300. + + +The admission of ends, of finality, or purpose in the universe is +frequently given as involving a supreme consciousness embracing this +teleology. Also it is argued that Good could not exist in its +generality save in an external consciousness—that is, a divine mind. By +recalling the objections to a total synthesis of phenomena, Renouvier +refutes both these arguments which rest upon erroneous methods in +ontology and in theology. The explanation of the world by God, as in +the cosmological argument, is fanciful, while the ontological argument +leads us to erect an unintelligible and illogical absolute. Renouvier +regards God as existing as a general consciousness corresponding to the +generality of ends which man himself finds before him, finite, limited +in power and in knowledge. But in avowing this God, Renouvier points +him out to us as the first of all beings, a being like them, not an +absolute, but a personality, possessing (and this is important) the +perfection of morality, goodness and justice. He is the supreme +personality in action, and as a perfect person he respects the +personality of others and operates on our world only in the degree +which the freedom and individuality of persons who are not himself can +permit him, and within the limits of the general laws under which he +represents to himself his own enveloped existence. This is the +hypothesis of unity rendered intelligible, and as such Renouvier claims +that it bridges in a marvellous manner the gap always deemed to exist +between monotheism and polytheism—the two great currents of religious +thought in humanity. The monotheists have appeared intolerant and +fanatical in their religion and in their deity (not in so far as it was +manifest in the thoughts of the simple, who professed a faith of the +heart, but as shown in the ambitious theology of books and of schools), +bearing on their banner the signs of a jealous deity, wishing no other +gods but himself, declaring to his awed worshippers: “I am that I am; +have no other gods but me!” On the other hand, the polytheistic peoples +have been worshippers of beauty and goodness in all things, and where +they saw these things they created a deity. They were more concerned +with the immortality of good souls than the eternal existence of one +supreme being; they were free-thinkers, creators of beauty and seekers +after truth, and believers in freedom. The humanism of Greece stands in +contrast to the idolatrous theocracy of the Hebrews. + +The unity of God previously mentioned does not exclude the possibility +of a plurality of divine persons. God the one would be the first and +foremost, _rex hominum deorumque_. Some there may be that rise through +saintliness to divinity, Sons of God, persons surpassing man in +intelligence, power and morality. To take sides in this matter is +equivalent to professing a particular religion. We must avoid the +absolutist spirit in religion no less than in philosophy. By this +Renouvier means that brutal fanaticism which prohibits the Gods of +other people by passion and hatred, which aims at establishing and +imposing its own God (which is, after all, but its own idea of God) as +the imperialist plants his flag, his kind and his customs in new +territory, in the spirit of war and conquest. Such a “holy war” is an +outrage, based not upon real religion, but on intolerant fanaticism in +which freedom and the inherent rights of personality to construct its +own particular faith are denied. + +Renouvier finds a parallelism between the worship of the State in +politics and of the One God in religion. The systems in which unity or +plurality of divine personality appears differ from one another in the +same way in which monarchal and republican ideas differ. Monarchy in +religion offers the same obstacles to progress as it has done in +politics. It involves a parallel enslavement of one’s entire self and +goods, a conscription which is hateful to freedom and detrimental to +personality. To this supreme and regal Providence all is due; it alone +in any real sense exists. Persons are shadows, of no reality, serfs +less than the dust, to whom a miserable dole is given called grace, for +which prayer and sacrifice are to be unceasingly made or chastisements +from the Almighty will follow. This notion is the product of monarchy +in politics, and with monarchy it will perish. The two are bound up, +for “by the grace of God” we are told monarchs hold their thrones, by +his favour their sceptre sways and their battalions move on to victory. +This monarchal God, this King of kings and Lord of hosts, ruler of +heaven and earth, is the last refuge of monarchs on the earth. +Confidence in both has been shaken, and both, Renouvier asserts, will +disappear and give place to a real democracy, not only to republics on +earth, but to the conception of the whole universe as a republic. Men +raise up saints and intercessors to bridge the gulf between the divine +Monarch and his slaves. They conceive angels as doing his work in +heaven; they tolerate priests to bring down grace to them here and now. +The doctrine of unity thus gives rise to fanatical religious devotion +or philosophical belief in the absolute, which stifles religion and +perishes in its own turn. The doctrine of immortality, based on the +belief in the value of human personality, leads us away from monarchy +to a republic of free spirits. A democratic religion in this sense will +display human nature raised to its highest dignity by virtue of an +energetic affirmation of personal liberty, tolerance, mutual respect +and liberty of faith—a free religion without priests or clericalism, +not in conflict with science and philosophy, but encouraging these +pursuits and in turn encouraged by them.[28] + + [28] The fullest treatment of this is the large section in the + conclusion to the _Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire_ (tome iv.). + _Cf_. also the discussion of the influence of religious beliefs on + societies in the last chapter of _La Nouvelle Monadologie_. + +III + +Ravaisson, in founding the new spiritual philosophy, professed certain +doctrines which were a blending of Hellenism and Christianity. In the +midst of thought which was dominated by positivism, naturalism or +materialism, or by a shallow eclecticism, wherein religious ideas were +rather held in contempt, he issued a challenge on behalf of spiritual +values and ideals. Beauty, love and goodness, he declared, were divine. +God himself is these things, said Ravaisson, and the divinity is “not +far from any of us.” In so far as we manifest these qualities we +approach the perfect personality of God himself. In the infinite, in +God, will is identical with love, which itself is not distinguished +from the absolutely good and the absolutely beautiful. This love can +govern our wills; the love of the beautiful and the good can operate in +our lives. In so far as this is so, we participate in the love and the +life of God. + +Boutroux agrees substantially with Ravaisson, but he lays more stress +upon the free creative power of the deity as immanent. “God,” he +remarks in his thesis, “is not only the creator of the world, he is +also its Providence, and watches over the details as well as over the +whole.”[29] God is thus an immanent and creative power in his world as +well as the perfect being of supreme goodness and beauty. Boutroux here +finds this problem of divine immanence and transcendence as important +as does Blondel, and his attitude is like that of Blondel, midway +between that of Ravaisson and Bergson. + + [29] _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 150. + + +Religion, Boutroux urges, must show man that the supreme ideal for him +is to realise in his own nature this idea of God. There is an +obligation upon man to pursue after these things-goodness, truth, +beauty and love—for they are his good, they are the Good; they are, +indeed, God. In them is a harmony which satisfies his whole nature, and +which does not neglect or crush any aspect of character, as narrow +conceptions of religion inevitably do. Boutroux insists upon the +necessity for intellectual satisfaction, and opposes the “philosophy of +action” in ils doctrine of “faith for faith’s sake.” At the same time +he conceives Reason as a harmony, not merely a coldly logical thing. +Feeling and will must be satisfied also.[30] + + [30] Boutroux has in his volume, _Science et Religion dans la + Philosophie contemporaine_, contributed a luminous and penetrating + discussion of various religious doctrines from Comte to William James. + This was published in 1908. + + +We have observed already how Fouillée claimed that the ethics of his +_idées-forces_ contained the gist of what was valuable in the world +religions. He claims that philosophy includes under the form of +rational belief or thought what the religions include as instinctive +belief. In religion he sees a spontaneous type of metaphysic, while +metaphysic or philosophy is a rationalised religion. + +Nothing in this connection is more important than a rational and +harmonious view of God. This he insists upon in his thesis and in his +_Sketch of the Future of a Metaphysic founded on Experience_. The old +idea of God was that of a monarch governing the world as a despot +governs his subjects. The government of the universe may still be held +to be a monarchy, but modern science is careful to assure us that it +must be regarded as an absolutely constitutional monarchy. The monarch, +if there be one, acts in accordance with the laws and respects the +established constitution. Reason obliges us to conceive of the +sovereign: experience enlightens us as to the constitution. + +There can be little doubt that one of the world’s greatest books upon +religion is the work of Guyau, which appeared in 1886, bearing the +arresting title, _L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_. Its sub-title describes it +as an Etude sociologique, and it is this treatment of the subject from +the standpoint of sociology which is such a distinctive feature of the +book. The notion of a _social bond_ between man and the powers superior +to him, but resembling him, is, claims Guyau, a point of unity in which +all religions are at one. The foundation of the religious sentiment +lies in sociality, and the religious man is just the man who is +disposed to be sociable, not only with all living beings whom he meets, +but with those whom he imaginatively creates as gods. Guyau’s thesis, +briefly put, is that religion is a manifestation of life (again he +insists on “Life,” as in his Ethics, as a central conception), becoming +self-conscious and seeking the explanation of things by analogies drawn +from human society. Religion is “sociomorphic” rather than merely +anthropomorphic; it is, indeed, a universal sociological hypothesis, +mythical in form. + +The religious sentiment expresses a consciousness of dependence, and in +addition, adds Guyau, it expresses the need of affection, tenderness +and love—that is to say, the “social” side of man’s nature. In the +conception of the Great Companion or Loving Father, humanity finds +consolation and hope. Children and women readily turn to such an ideal, +and primitive peoples, who are just like children, conceive of the +deity as severe and all- powerful. To this conception moral attributes +were subsequently added, as man’s own moral conscience developed, and +it now issues in a doctrine of God as Love. All this development is, +together with that of esthetics and ethics, a manifestation of life in +its individual and more especially social manifestations. + +It is the purpose of Guyau’s book not only to present a study of the +evolution of religion in this manner, from a sociological point of +view, but to indicate a further development of which the beginnings are +already manifest—namely, a decomposition of all systems of dogmatic +religion. It is primarily the decay of dogma and ecclesiasticism which +he intends to indicate by the French term _irréligion_. The English +translation of his work bears the title _The Non-religion of the +Future_. Had Guyau been writing and living in another country it is +undoubtedly true that his work would probably have been entitled _The +Religion of the Future_. Owing to the Roman Catholic environment and +the conception of religion in his own land, he was, however, obliged to +abandon the use of the word religion altogether. In order to avoid +misunderstanding, we must examine the sense he gives to this word, and +shall see then that his title is not meant to convey the impression of +being anti-religious in the widest sense, nor is it irreligious in the +English meaning of that word. + +Guyau considers every positive and historical religion to present three +distinct and essential elements: + +An attempt at a mythical and non-scientific explanation of (_a_) +natural phenomena—_e.g._, intervention, miracles, efficacious prayer; +(_b_) historical facts—_e.g._, incarnation of Buddha or Jesus. +A system of dogmas—that is to say, symbolic ideas or imaginative +beliefs—forcibly imposed upon one’s faith as absolute verities, even +though they are susceptible to no scientific demonstration or +philosophical justification. +A cult and a system of rites or of worship, made up of more or less +immutable practices which are looked upon as possessing a marvellous +efficacy upon the course of things, a propitiatory virtue.[31] + + [31] _L’Irréligion de l’Avenir_, p. xiii; Eng. trans., p. 10. + + +By these three different and really organic elements, religion is +clearly marked off from philosophy. Owing to the stability of these +elements religion is apt to be centuries behind science and philosophy, +and consequently reconciliation is only effected by a subtle process +which, while maintaining the traditional dogmas and phrases, evolves a +new interpretation of them sufficiently modern to harmonise a little +more with the advance in thought, but which presents a false appearance +of stability and consistency, disguising the real change of meaning, of +view-point and of doctrine. Of this effort we shall see the most +notable instance is that of the “Modernists” or Neo-Catholics in France +and Italy, and the Liberal Christians in England and America. + +Guyau claims that these newer interpretations, subtle and useful as +they are, and frequently the assertions of minds who desire sincerely +to adapt the ancient traditions to modern needs, are in themselves +hypocritical, and the Church in a sense does right to oppose them. +Guyau cannot see any satisfactoriness in these compromises and +adaptations which lack the clearness of the old teaching, which they in +a sense betray, while they do not sufficiently satisfy the demands of +modern thought. + +With the decay of the dogmatic religion of Christendom which is +supremely stated in the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, there must +follow the non-religion of the future, which may well preserve, he +points out, all that is pure in the religious sentiment and carry with +it an admiration for the cosmos and for the infinite powers which are +there displayed. It will be a search for, and a belief in, an ideal not +only individual, but social and even cosmic, which shall pass the +limits of actual reality. Hence it appears that “non-religion” or +“a-religion,” which is for Guyau simply “the negation of all dogma, of +all traditional and supernatural authority, of all revelation, of all +miracle, of all myth, of all rite erected into a duty,” is most +certainly not a synonym for irreligion or impiety, nor does it involve +any contempt for the moral and metaphysical doctrines expressed by the +ancient religions of the world. The non-religious man in Guyau’s sense +of the term is simply the man without a religion, as he has defined it +above, and he may quite well admire and sympathise with the great +founders of religion, not only in that they were thinkers, +metaphysicians, moralists and philanthropists, but in that they were +reformers of established belief, more or less avowed enemies of +religious authority and of every affirmation laid down by an +ecclesiastical body in order to bind the intellectual freedom of +individuals. Guyau’s remarks in this connection agree with the tone in +which Renan spoke of his leaving the Church because of a feeling of +respect and loyalty to its Founder. Guyau points out that there exists +in the bosom of every great religion a dissolving force—namely, the +very force which in the beginning served to constitute it and to +establish its triumphant revolt over its predecessor. That force is the +absolute right of private judgment, the free factor of the personal +conscience, which no external authority can succeed, ultimately, in +coercing or silencing. The Roman Church, and almost every other +organised branch of the Christian religion, forgets, when faced with a +spirit which will not conform, that it is precisely to this spirit that +it owes its own foundation and also the best years of its existence. +Guyau has little difficulty in pressing the conclusions which follow +from the recognition of this vital point. + +Briefly, it follows that the hope of a world-religion is an illusion, +whether it be the dream of a perfect and world-wide Judaism, Buddhism, +Christianity, or Mohammedanism. The sole authority in religious +matters, that of the individual conscience, prevents any such +consummation, which, even if it could be achieved, would be +mischievous. The future will display a variety of beliefs and +religions, as it does now. This need not discourage us, for therein is +a sign of vitality or spiritual life, of which the world-religions are +examples, marred, however, by their profession of universality, an +ideal which they do not and never will realise. + +The notion of a Catholic Church or a great world- religion is really +contrary to the duty of personal thought and reflection, which must +inevitably (unless they give way to mere lazy repetition of other +people’s thoughts) lead to differences. The tendency is for humanity to +move away from dogmatic religion, with its pretensions to universality, +catholicity, and monarchy (of which, says Guyau, the most curious type +has just recently been achieved in our own day, by the Pope’s +proclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility), towards religious +individualism and to a plurality of religions. There may, of course, be +religious associations or federations, but these will be free, and will +not demand the adherence to any dogma as such. + +With the decay of dogmatic religion the best elements of religious life +will have freer scope to develop themselves, and will grow both in +intensity and in extent. “He alone is religious, in the philosophical +sense of the word, who researches for, who thinks about, who loves, +truth.” Such inquiry or search involves freedom, it involves conflict, +but the conflict of ideas, which is perfectly compatible with +toleration in a political sense, and is the essence of the spirit of +the great world teachers. This is what Jesus foresaw when he remarked: +“I did not come to bring peace, but a sword.” More fully, he might have +put it, Guyau suggests: “I came not to bring peace into human thought, +but an incessant battle of ideas; not repose, but movement and progress +of spirit; not universal dogma, but liberty of belief, which is the +first condition of growth.” Well might Renan remark that it was loyalty +to such a spirit which caused him to break with the Church. + +While attacking religious orthodoxy in this manner, Guyau is careful to +point out that if religious fanaticism ls bad, anti-religious +fanaticism is equally mischievous, wicked and foolish.[32] While the +eighteenth century could only scoff at religion, the nineteenth +realised the absurdity of such raillery. We have come to see that even +although a belief may be irrational and even erroneous, it may still +survive, and it may console multitudes whose minds would be lost on the +stormy sea of life without such an anchor. While dogmatic or positive +religions do exist they will do so, Guyau reminds us, for quite +definite and adequate reasons, chiefly because there are people who +believe them, to whom they mean something and often a great deal. These +reasons certainly do diminish daily, and the number of adherents, too, +but we must refrain from all that savours of anti- religious +fanaticism.[33] He himself speaks with great respect of a Christian +missionary. Are we not, he asks, both brothers and humble collaborators +in the work and advance of humanity? He sees no real inconsistency +between his own dislike of orthodoxy and dogma and the missionary’s +work of raising the ignorant to a better life by those very dogmas. It +is a case of relative advance and mental progress. + + [32] He cites a curious case of anti-religious fanaticism at + Marseilles in 1885, when all texts and scripture pictures were removed + fromthe schools. + + + [33] Guyau’s book abounds in illustrations. He mentions here Huss’s + approval of the sincerity of one man who brought straw from his own + house to burn him. Huss admired this act of a man in whom he saw a + brother in sincerity. + + +It is with great wealth of discussion that Guyau recounts the genesis +of religions in primitive societies to indicate the sociological basis +of religion. More important are his chapters on the dissolution of +religions in existing societies, in which he shows the +unsatisfactoriness of the dogmas of orthodox Protestantism equally with +those of the Catholic Church. As mischievous as the notion of an +infallible Church is that of an infallible book, literally—that is to +say, foolishly-interpreted. He recognises that for a literal +explanation of the Bible must be substituted, and is, indeed, being +substituted, a literary explanation. Like Renan, he criticises the +vulgar conception of prayer and of religious morality which promotes +goodness by promise of paradise or fear of hell. He urges in this +connection the futility of the effort made by Michelet, Quinet and, +more especially, by Renouvier and Pillon to “Protestantise” France. +While admitting a certain intellectual, moral and political superiority +to it, Guyau claims that for the promotion of morality there is little +use in substituting Protestantism for Catholicism. He forecasts the +limitation of the power of priests and other religious teachers over +the minds of young children. Protestant clergymen in England and +America he considers to be no more tolerant in regard to the +educational problem than the priests. Guyau urges the importance of an +elementary education being free from religious propaganda. He was +writing in 1886, some years after the secular education law had been +carried. There is, however, more to be done, and he points out “how +strange it is that a society should not do its best to form those whose +function it is to form it.”[34] In higher education some attention +should be given to the comparative study of religions. “Even from the +point of view of philosophy, Buddha and Jesus are more important than +Anaximander or Thales.”[35] It is a pity, he thinks, that there is not +a little more done to acquaint the young with the ideas for which the +great world-teachers, Confucius, Zoroaster, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed, +stood, instead of cramming a few additional obscure names from early +national history. It would give children at least a notion that history +had a wider range than their own country, a realisation of the fact +that humanity was already old when Christ appeared, and that there are +great religions other than Christianity, religions whose followers are +not poor ignorant savages or heathen, but intelligent beings, from whom +even Christians may learn much. It is thoroughly mischievous, he aptly +adds, to bring up children in such a narrow mental atmosphere that the +rest of their life is one long disillusionment. + + [34] _L’Irréligion de l’Avenir_, p. 232; Eng. trans., p. 278. + + + [35] _Ibid_., p. 236; Eng. trans., p. 283. + + +With particular reference to his own country, Guyau criticises the +religious education of women, the question of “mixed marriages,” the +celibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy, and the influence of religious +beliefs upon the limitation or increase of the family. + +After having summed up the tendency of dogmatic religion to decay, he +asks if any unification of the great religions is to-day possible, or +whether any new religion may be expected? The answer he gives to both +these questions is negative, and he produces a wealth of very valid +reasons in support of his finding. He is, of course, here using the +term religion as he has himself defined it. The claim to universality +by all world-religions, the insistence by each that it alone is the +really best or true religion, precludes any question of unity. As well +might we imagine unity between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic +Church. + +In the “non-religious” state, dogma will be replaced by individual +constructions. Religion will be a free, personal affair, in which the +great philosophical hypotheses (_e.g._, Theism and Pantheism) will be +to a large extent utilised. They will, however, be regarded as such by +all, as rational hypotheses, which some individuals will accept, others +will reject. Certain doctrines will appeal to some, not to others. The +evidence for a certain type of theism will seem adequate to some, not +to others. There will be no endeavour to impose corporately or singly +the acceptance of any creed upon others. + +With Guyau’s conception of the future of religion or non-religion, +whichever we care to call it, we may well close this survey of the +religious ideas in modern France. In the Roman Church on the one hand, +and, on the other, in the thought of Renan, Renouvier and Guyau, +together with the multitude of thinking men and women they represent, +may be seen the two tendencies—one conservative, strengthening its +internal organisation and authority, in defiance of all the influences +of modern thought, the other a free and personal effort, issuing in a +genuine humanising of religion and freeing it from ecclesiasticism and +dogma. + +A word may be said here, however, with reference to the “Modernists.” +The Modernist movement is a French product, the result of the +interaction of modern philosophical and scientific ideas upon the +teaching of the Roman Church. It has produced a philosophical religion +which owes much to Ollé-Laprune and Blondel, and is in reality modern +science with a veneer of religious idealism or platonism. It is a +theological compromise, and has no affinities with the efforts of +Lamennais. As a compromise it was really opposed to the traditions of +the French, to whose love of sharp and clear thinking such general and +rather vague syntheses are unacceptable. It must be admitted, however, +that there is a concreteness, a nearness to reality and life, which +separates it profoundly from the highly abstract theology of Germany, +as seen in Ritschl and Harnack. + +The Abbé Marat of the Theological School at the Sorbonne and Father +Gratry of the Ecole Normale were the initiators of this movement, as +far back as the Second Empire. “Modernism” was never a school of +thought, philosophical or religious, and it showed itself in a freedom +and life, a spirit rather than in any formula;. As Sorel’s syndicalism +is an application of the Bergsonian and kindred doctrines to the left +wings, and issues in a social theory of “action,” so Modernism is an +attempt to apply them to the right and issues in a religion founded on +action rather than theology. The writings of the Modernists are +extensive, but we mention the names of the chief thinkers. There is the +noted exegetist Loisy, who was dismissed in 1894 from the Catholic +Institute of Paris and now holds the chair of the History of Religions +at the College de France. His friend, the Abbé Bourier, maintained the +doctrine, “ Where Christ is there is the Church,” with a view to +insisting upon the importance of being a Christian rather than a +Catholic or a Protestant. + +The importance of the Catholic thinker, Blondel, both for religion and +for philosophy, has already been indicated at an earlier stage in this +book. His work inspires most.Modernist thought. Blondel preaches, with +great wealth of philosophical and psychological argument, the great +Catholic doctrine of the collaboration of God with man and of man with +God. Man at one with himself realises his highest aspirations. Divine +transcendence and divine immanence in man are reconciled. God and man, +in this teaching, are brought together, and the stern realism of +every-day life and the idealism of religion unite in a sacramental +union. The supreme principle in this union Laberthonnière shows to be +Love. He is at pains to make clear, however, that belief in Love as the +ultimate reality is no mere sentimentality, no mere assertion of the +will-to-believe. For him the intellect must play its part in the +religious life and in the expression of faith. No profounder +intellectual judgment exists than just the one which asserts “God is +Love,” when this statement is properly apprehended and its momentous +significance clearly realised. We cannot but lament, with +Laberthonnière, the abuse of this proposition and its subsequent loss +of both appeal and meaning through a shallow familiarity. The +reiteration of great conceptions, which is the method by which the +great dogmas have been handed down from generations, tends to blurr +their real significance. They become stereotyped and empty of life. It +is for this reason that Le Roy in _Dogme et Critique_ (1907) insisted +upon the advisability of regarding all dogmas as expressions of +practical value in and for action, rather than as intellectual +propositions of a purely “religious” or ecclesiastical type, belonging +solely to the creeds. + +To Blondel, Laberthonnière, and Le Roy can be added the names of +Fonsegrive, Sertillanges, Loyson and Houtin, the last two of whom +ultimately left the Church, for the Church made up its mind to crush +Modernism. The Pope had intimated in 1879 that the thirteenth-century +philosophy of Aquinas was to be recognised as the only official +philosophy.[36] Finally, Modernism was condemned in a Vatican +encyclical (_Pascendi Dominici Gregis_) in 1907, as was also the social +and educational effort, _Le Sillon_. + + [36] This led to revival of the study of the _Summa Theologiæ_ and to + the commencement of the review of Catholic philosophy, _Revue + Thomiste_. + + +Such has been Rome’s last word, and it is not surprising, therefore, +that France is the most ardent home of free thought upon religious +matters, that the French people display a spirit which is unable to +stop at Protestantism, but which heralds the religion or the +_non-religion_ of the future to which Guyau has so powerfully indicated +the tendencies and has by so doing helped, in conjunction with Renan +and Renouvier, to hasten its realisation. + +A parallel to the “modernist” theology of the Catholic thinkers was +indicated on the Protestant side by the theology of Auguste Sabatier, +whose _Esquisse d’une Philosophie de la Religion d’après la Psychologie +et l’Histoire_ appeared in 1897[37] and of Menegoz,[38] whose +_Publications diverges sur le Fidéisme et son Application a +l’Enseignement chrétien traditionnel_ were issued in 1900. Sabatier +assigns the beginning of religion to man’s trouble and distress of +heart caused by his aspirations, his belief in ideals and higher +values, being at variance with his actual condition. Religion arises +from this conflict of real and ideal in the soul of man. This is the +essence of religion which finds its expression in the life of faith +rather than in the formation of beliefs which are themselves accidental +and transitory, arising from environment and education, changing in +form from aee to age both in the individual and the race. While LeRoy +on the Catholic side, maintained that dogmas were valuable for their +practical significance, Sabatier and Ménégoz claimed that all religious +knowledge is symbolical. Dogmas are but symbols, which inadequately +attempt to reveal their object. That object can only be grasped by +“faith” as distinct from “belief”—that is to say, by an attitude in +which passion, instinct and intuition blend and not by an attitude +which is purely one of intellectual conviction. This doctrine of +“salvation by faith independently of beliefs” has a marked relationship +not only to pragmatism and the philosophy of action, but to the +philosophy of intuition. A similar anti-intellectualism colours the +“symbolo-fidéist” currents within Catholicism, which manifest a more +extreme character. A plea voiced against all such tendencies is to be +found in Bois’ book, _De la Connaissance religieuse_ (1894), where an +endeavour is made to retain a more intellectual attitude, and it again +found expression in the volume by Boutroux, written as late as 1908, +which deals with the religious problem in our period. + + [37] It was followed after his death in 1901 by the volume _Les + Religions d’Authorité et la Religion de l’Esprit_, 1904. + + + [38] This is the late Eugene Ménégoz, Professor of Theology in Paris, + not Ferdinand Ménégoz, his nephew, who is also a Professor of Theology + now at Strasbourg. + + +Quoting Boehme in the interesting conclusion to this book on _Science +and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy_ (1908) Boutroux sums up in the +words of the old German mystic his attitude to the diversity of +religious opinions. “Consider the birds in our forests, they praise God +each in his own way, in diverse tones and fashions. Think you God is +vexed by this diversity and desires to silence discordant voices? All +the forms of being are dear to the infinite Being himself!”[39] + + [39] It is interesting to compare with the above the sentiments + expressed in Matthew Arnold’s poem, entitled Progress: + +“Children of men! the unseen Power, whose eye +For ever doth accompany mankind, +Hath look’d on no religion scornfully +That men did ever find. + + +This survey of the general attitude adopted towards religion and the +problems which it presents only serves to emphasise more clearly those +tendencies which we have already denoted in previous chapters. As the +discussion of progress was radically altered by the admission of the +principle of freedom, and the discussion of ethics passes bevond rigid +formulae to a freer conception of morality, so here in religion the +insistence upon freedom and that recognition of personality which +accompanies it, colours the whole religious outlook. Renan, Renouvier +and Guyau, the three thinkers who have most fully discussed religion in +our period, join in proclaiming the importance of the personal factor +in religious belief, and in valiant opposition to that Church which is +the declared enemy of freedom, they urge that in freedom of thought +lies the course of all religious development in the future, for only +thus can be expressed the noblest and highest aspirations of man’s +spirit. + + + +CONCLUSION + + +The foregoing pages have been devoted to a history of ideas rather than +to the maintenance of any special thesis or particular argument. +Consequently it does not remain for us to draw any definitely logical +conclusions from the preceding chapters. The opportunity may be justly +taken, however, of summing up the general features of the development. + +Few periods in the history of human thought can rival in interest that +of the second half of the nineteenth century in France. The discussion +covers the principal problems with which man’s mind is occupied in +modern times and presents these in a manner which is distinctly human +and not merely national. This alone would give value to the study of +such a period. There is, however, to be added the more striking fact +that there is a complete “turning of the tide” manifested during these +fifty years in the attitude to most of the problems. Beginning with an +overweening confidence in science and a belief in determinism and in a +destined progress, the century closed with a complete reversal of these +conceptions. + +Materialism and naturalism are both recognised as inadequate, a +reaction sets in against positivism and culminates in the triumph of +spiritualism or idealism. This idealism is free from the cruder aspects +of the Kantian or Hegelian philosophy. The Thing-in-itself and the +Absolute are abandoned; relativity is proclaimed in knowledge, and +freedom in the world of action. Thoughts or ideas show themselves as +forces operating in the evolution of history. This is maintained in +opposition to the Marxian doctrine of the purely economic or +materialistic determination of history. A marked tendency, however, is +manifested to regard all problems from a social stand point. The +dogmatic confidence in science gives way to a more philosophical +attitude, while the conflict of science and religion resolves itself +into a decay of dogma and the conception of a free religion. + +We have indicated the problem presented by “_science et conscience_,” +and in so far as we have laid down any thesis or argument in these +pages, as distinct from an historical account of the development, that +thesis has been, that the central problem in the period was that of +freedom. It was to this point which the consideration of science, or +rather of the sciences, led us. We have observed the importance of the +sciences for philosophy, and it is clear that, so far from presenting +any real hostility to philosophy, it can acclaim their autonomy and +freedom, without attempting by abstract methods to absorb them into +itself. They are equally a concrete part of human thought, and in a +deep and real sense a manifestation of the same spirit which animates +philosophy. + +By recognising the sciences philosophy can avoid the fallacy of +ideology on the one hand and naturalism on the other. Unlike the old +eclecticism, the new thought is able to take account of science and to +criticise its assertions. We have seen how this has been accomplished, +and the rigidly mechanical view of the world abandoned for one into +which human freedom enters as a real factor. This transforms the view +of history and shows us human beings creating that history and not +merely being its blind puppets. History offers no cheerful outlook for +the easy-going optimist; it is not any more to be regarded as mere data +for pessimistic reflections, but rather a record which prompts a +feeling of responsibility. The world is not ready-made, and if there is +to be progress it must be willed by us and achieved by our struggle and +labour. + +The doctrine of immanence upon which the modern tendency is to insist, +in place of the older idea of transcendence, makes us feel, not only +that we are free, but that our freedom is not in opposition to, or in +spite of, the divine spirit, but is precisely an expression of divine +immanence. Instead of the gloomy conception of a whole which determines +itself apart from us, we feel ourselves part, and a very responsible +part, of a reality which determines itself collectively and creatively +by its own action, by its own ideals, which it has itself created. This +freedom must extend not only to our conceptions of history but also to +those of ethics and of religion. + +“English philosophy ends in considering nature as an assemblage of +facts; German philosophy looks upon it chiefly as a system of laws. If +there is a place midway between the two nations it belongs to us +Frenchmen. We applied the English ideas in the eighteenth century; we +can in the nineteenth give precision to the German ideas. What we have +to do is to temper, amend and complete the two spirits, one by the +other, to fuse them into one, to express them in a style that shall be +intelligible to everybody and thus to make of them the universal +spirit.” + +Such was Taine’s attitude, and it indicates clearly the precise +position of French thought. We are apt to consider Taine purely as an +empiricist, but we must remember that he disagreed with the radical +empiricism of John Stuart Mill. His own attitude was largely that of a +reaction against the vague spiritualism of the Eclectic School, +especially Cousin’s eclecticism, a foreign growth on French soil, due +to German influence. The purely _a priori_ constructions of the older +spiritualism could find no room, and allowed none, for the sciences. +This was sufficient to doom it, and to lead naturally to a reaction of +a positive kind, revolting from all _a priori_ constructions. + +It was to combat the excessive positive reaction against metaphysics +that Renouvier devoted his energies, but while professing to modernise +Kant and to follow out the general principles of his Critical +Philosophy, Renouvier was further removed from the German thinker than +he at times seems to have observed. Renouvier must undoubtedly share +with Comte the honours of the century in French Philosophy. Many +influences, however, prevented the general or speedy acceptance of +Renouvier’s doctrines. The University was closed against him, as +against Comte. He worked in isolation and his style of presentation, +which is heavy and laborious, does not appeal to the _esprit_ of the +French mind. Probably, too, his countrymen’s ignorance of Kant at the +time Renouvier wrote his _Essais de Critique générale_ prevented an +understanding and appreciation of the neo-critical advance on +Criticism. + +Renouvier commands respect, but he does not appear to be in the line of +development which manifests so essentially the character of French +thought. This is to be found rather in that spiritualism, which, unlike +the old, does not exclude science, but welcomes it, finds a place for +it, although not by any means an exclusive place. The new spiritualists +did not draw their inspiration, as did Cousin, from any German source, +their initial impulse is derived from a purely French thinker, Maine de +Biran, who, long neglected, came to recognition in the work of +Ravaisson and those subsequent thinkers of this group, right up to +Bergson. + +This current of thought is marked by a vitality and a concreteness +which are a striking contrast to the older eclectic spiritualism. +Having submitted itself to the discipline of the sciences, it is +acquainted with their methods and data in a manner which enables it to +oppose the dogmatism of science, and to acclaim the reality of values +other than those which are purely scientific. Ignoring _a priori_ +construction, or eclectic applications of doctrines, it investigates +the outer world of nature and the inner life of the spirit. + +We have said that these ideas are presented, not merely from a national +standpoint, but from one which is deeply human and universal. “_La +Science_,” re-marked Pasteur, “_n’a pas de patrie_.” We may add that +philosophy, too, owns no special fatherland. There is not in +philosophy, any more than in religion, “a chosen people,” even although +the Jews of old thought themselves such, and among moderns the Germans +have had this conceit about their _Kultur_. In so far as philosophy +aims at the elucidation of a true view of the universe, it thereby +tends inevitably to universality. But just as a conception of +internationalism, which should fail to take into account the factors of +nationality, would be futile and disastrous, so a conception of the +evolution of thought must likewise estimate the characteristics which +nationality produces even in the philosophical field. + +Such characteristics, it will be found, are not definite doctrines, for +these may be transferred, as are scientific discoveries, from one +nation to another, and absorbed in such a manner that they become part +of the general consciousness of mankind. They are rather differences of +tone and colour, form or expression, which express the vital genius of +the nation. There are features which serve to distinguish French +philosophy from the development which has occurred in Germany, Italy, +England and America. + +Modern French thought does not deliberately profess to maintain +allegiance to any past traditions, for it realises that such a +procedure would be inconsistent with that freedom of thought which is +bound up with the spirit of philosophy. It does, however, betray +certain national features, which are characteristic of the great French +thinkers from Descartes, Pascal and Malebranche onwards. + +One of the most remarkable points about these thinkers was their +intimacy with the sciences. Descartes, while founding modern +philosophy, also gave the world analytic geometry; Pascal made certain +physical discoveries and was an eminent mathematician. Malebranche, +too, was keenly interested in science. In the following century the +Encyclopaedists displayed their wealth of scientific knowledge, and in +the nineteenth century we have seen the work of Comte based on science, +the ability of Cournot and Renouvier in mathematics, while men like +Boutroux, Hergson and Le Roy possess a thorough acquaintance with +modern science. + +These facts have marked results, and distinguish French philosophy from +that of Germany, where the majority of philosophers appear to haye been +theological students in their youth and to have suffered from the +effects of their subject for the remainder of their lives. Theological +study does not produce clearness; it does not tend to cultivate a +spirit of precision, but rather one of vagueness, of which much German +philosophy is the product. On the other hand, mathematics is a study +which demands clearness and which in turn increases the spirit of +clarity and precision. + +There is to be seen in our period a strong tendency to adhere to this +feature of clearness. Modern French philosophy is remarkably lucid. +Indeed, it is claimed that there is no notion, however profound it may +be, or however based on technical research it may be, which cannot be +conveyed in the language of every day. French philosophy does not +invent a highly technical vocabulary in order to give itself airs in +the eyes of the multitude, on the plea that obscurity is a sign of +erudition and learning. On the contrary, it remembers Descartes’ +intimate association of clearness with truth, remembers, too, his clear +and simple French which he preferred to the scholastic Latin. It knows +that to convince others of truth one must be at least clear to them +and, what is equally important, one must be clear in one’s own mind +first. Clarity does not mean shallowness but rather the reverse, +because it is due to keen perceptive power, to a seeing further into +the heart of things, involving an intimate contact with reality. + +French thought has always remained true to a certain “common sense.” +This is a dangerous and ambiguous term. In its true meaning it +signifies the general and sane mind of man free from all that prejudice +or dogma or tradition, upon which, of course, “common sense” in the +popular meaning is usually based. A genuine “common sense” is merely +“_liberté_” for the operation of that general reason which makes man +what he is. It must be admitted that, owing to the fact that philosophy +is taught in the _lycées_, the French are the best educated of any +nation in philosophical ideas and have a finer general sense of that +spirit of criticism and appreciation which is the essence of +philosophy, than has any other modern nation. Philosophy in France is +not written in order to appeal to any school or class. Not limited to +an academic circle only, it makes its pronouncements to humanity and +thus embodies in a real form the principles of _egalité_ and +_fraternité_. It makes a democratic appeal both by its _clarté_ and its +belief that _la raison commune_ is in some degree present in every +human being. + +Not only was clearness a strong point in the philosophy of Descartes, +but there was also an insistence upon method. Since the time of his +famous _Discours de la Méthode_ there has always been a unique value +placed upon method in French thought, and this again serves to +distinguish it profoundly from German philosophy, which is, in general, +concerned with the conception and production of entire systems. The +idea of an individual and systematic construction is an ambitious +conceit which is not in harmony with the principles of _liberté_, +_egalité_, _fraternité_. Such a view of philosophical work is not a +sociable one, from a human standpoint, and tends to give rise to a +spirit of authority and tradition. Apart from this aspect of it, there +is a more important consideration. All those systems take one idea as +their starting-point and build up an immense construction _a priori_. +But another idea may be taken and opposed to that. There is thus an +immense wastage of labour, and the individual effort is never +transcended. Yet an idea is only a portion of our intelligence, and +that intelligence itself is, in turn, only a portion of reality. A +wider conception of philosophy must be aimed at, one in which the _vue +d’ensemble_ is not the effort of one mind, but of many, each +contributing its share to a harmonious conception, systematic in a +sense, but not in the German sense. Modern French thought has a dislike +of system of the individualistic type; it realises that reality is too +rich and complex for such a rapid construction to grasp it. It is +opposed to systems, for the French mind looks upon philosophy as a +manifestation of life itself—life blossoming to self-consciousness, +striving ever to unfold itself more explicitly and more clearly, +endeavouring to become more harmonious, more beautiful, and more noble. +The real victories of philosophical thought are not indicated by the +production of systems but by the discovery or creation of ideas. Often +these ideas have been single and simple, but they have become veritable +forces, in the life of mankind. + +French thinkers prefer to work collectively at particular problems +rather than at systems. Hence the aim and tone of their work is more +universal and human, and being more general is apt to be more generous. +This again is the expression of _liberte_, _égalité_ and _fraternité_ +in a true sense. The French prefer, as it were, in their philosophical +campaign for the intellectual conquest of reality diverse batteries of +_soixante-quinze_ acting with precision and alertness to the clumsy +production of a “Big Bertha.” The production of ambitious systems, each +professing to be the final word in the presentation of reality, has not +attracted the French spirit. It looks at reality differently and +prefers to deal with problems in a clear way, thereby indicating a +method which may be applied to the solution of others as they present +themselves. This is infinitely preferable to an ambitious unification, +which can only be obtained at the sacrifice of clearness or meaning, +and it arises from that keen contact with life, which keeps the mind +from dwelling too much in the slough of abstraction, from which some of +the German philosophers never succeed in escaping. Their pilgrimage to +the Celestial City ends there, and consequently the account of their +itinerary cannot be of much use to other pilgrims. + +Another feature of modern French thought is the intimacy of the +connection between psychology and metaphysics, and the intensive +interest in psychology, which is but the imestigation of the inner life +of man. While in the early beginnings of ancient Greek philosophy some +time was spent in examining the outer world before man gave his +attention to the world within, we find Descartes, at the beginning of +modern philosophy, making his own consciousness of his own existence +his starting-point. Introspection has always played a prominent part in +French philosophy. Pascal was equally interested in the outer and the +inner world. Through Maine de Biran this feature has come down to the +new spiritualists and culminates in Bergson’s thought, in which +psychological considerations hold first rank. + +The social feature of modern French thought should not be omitted. In +Germany subsequent thought has been coloured by the Reformation and the +particular aspects of that movement. In France one may well say that +subsequent thought has been marked by the Revolution. There is a +theological flavour about most German philosophy, while France, a +seething centre of political and social thought, has given to her +philosophy a more sociological trend. + +The French spirit in philosophy stands for clearness, concreteness and +vitality. Consequently it presents a far greater brilliance, richness +and variety than German philosophy displays.[1] This vitality and even +exuberance, which are those of the spirit of youth manifesting a _joie +de vivre_ or an _élan vital_, have been very strongly marked since the +year 1880, and have placed French philosophy in the van of human +thought. + + [1] It is, therefore to be lamented that French thought has not + received the attention which it deseives. In England far more + attention has been given to the nineteenth-century German philosophy, + while the history of thought in France, especially in the period + between Comte and Bergson, has remained in sad neglect. This can and + should be speedily remedied. + + +It would be vain to ask whither its advance will lead. Even its own +principles prevent any such forecast; its creative richness may blossom +forth to-morrow in forms entirely new, for such is the characteristic +of life itself, especially the life of the spirit, upon which so much +stress is laid in modern French philosophy. The New Idealism lays great +stress upon dynamism, voluntarism or action. Freedom and creative +activity are its keynotes, and life, ever fuller and richer, is its +aspiration. _La Vie_, of which France (and its centre, Paris) is such +an expression, finds formulation in the philosophy of contemporary +thinkers.[2] + + [2] The student of comparative thought will find it both interesting + and profitable to compare the work done recently in Italy by Croce and + Gentile. The intellectual kinship of Croce and Bergson has frequently + been pointed out, but Gentile’s work comes very close to the + philosophy of action and to the whole positive-idealistic tendency of + contemporary French thought. This is particularly to be seen in + _L’atto del pensare come atto puro_ (1912), and in _Teoria generalo + dello spirito come atto puro_ (1916). Professor Carr, the well-known + exponent of Bergson’s philosophy, remarks in his introduction to the + English edition of Gentile’s book, “We may individualise the mind as a + natural thing-object person. . . . Yet our power to think the mind in + this way would be impossible were not the mind with and by which we + think it, itself not a thing, not a _fact_, but _act_; . . . never + _factum_, but always _fieri_.” This quotation is from p. xv of the + _Theory of Mind as Pure Act_. With one other quotation direct from + Gentile we must close this reference to Italian neo-idealism. “In so + far as the subject is constituted a subject by its own act it + constitutes the object. . . . Mind is the transcendental activity + productive of the objective world of experience” (pp. 18, 43). Compare + with this our quotation from Ravaisson, given on p. 75 of this work, + and the statement by Lachelier on p. 122, both essential principles of + the French New Idealism. + + +One word of warning must be uttered against those who declare that the +tendency of French thought is in the direction of anti-intellectualism. +Such a declaration rests on a misunderstanding, which we have +endeavoured in our pages to disclose It is based essentially upon a +doctrine of Reason which belongs to the eighteenth century. The severe +rationalism of that period was mischievous in that it rested upon a +one-sided view of human nature, on a narrow interpretation of “Reason” +which gave it only a logical and almost mathematical significance. To +the Greeks, whom the French represent in the modern world, the term +“NOUS” meant more than this—it meant an intelligible harmony. We would +do wrong to look upon the most recent developments in France as being +anti-rational, they are but a revolt against the narrow view of Reason, +and they constitute an attempt to present to the modern world a +conception akin to that of the Greeks. Human reason is much more than a +purely logical faculty, and it is this endeavour to relate all problems +to life itself with its pulsing throb, which represents the real +attitude of the French mind. There is a realisation expressed +throughout that thought, that life is more than logic. The clearness of +geometry showed Descartes that geometry is not all-embracing. Pascal +found that to the logic of geometry must be added a spirit of +appreciation which is not logical in its nature, but expresses another +side of man’s mind. To-day France sees that, although a philosophy must +endeavour to satisfy the human intelligence, a merely intellectual +satisfaction is not enough. The will and the feelings play their part, +and it was the gteat fault of the eighteenth century to misunderstand +this The search to-day is for a system of values and of truth in action +as well as a doctrine about things in their purely theoretical aspects. + +This is a serious demand, and it is one which philosophy must endeavour +to appreciate Salvation will not be found in a mere dilettantism which +can only express ieal indifference, nor in a dogmatism which results in +bigotry and pride. Criticism is required, but not a purely destructive +criticism, rather one which will offer some acceptable view of the +universe. Such a view must combine true positivism or realism with a +true idealism, by uniting fact and spirit, things and ideas. Its +achievement can only be possible to minds possessing some creative and +constructive power, yet minds who have been schooled in the college of +reality. This is the task of philosophy in France and in other lands. +That task consists not only in finding values and in defining them but +in expressing them actively, and in endeavouring to realise them in the +common life. + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + + +I. Works of the Period classified under Authors. (The more important +monographs are cited.) Names of philosophical journals. + +II. Books on the Period. + +III. Comparative Table showing contemporary German and Anglo-American +Works from 1851 to 1921. + +I +WORKS OF THE PERIOD CLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORS. + +BERGSON: _Les Données immédiates de la Conscience_. 1889. English +Translation—_Time and Free-Will._ 1910. +_Matière et Mémoire_. 1896. (E.T.[1] 1911.) +_Le Rire_. 1901. (E.T. 1911.) +_Introduction a la Métaphysique_. 1903. _Revue de Métaphysique et de +Morale_. (E.T. 1913.) +_L’Evolution créatrice_. 1907. (E.T. 1911.) +_L’Energie spirituelle_. 1919. (E.T. 1920.) +Some monographs on Bergson: Le Roy (1912), Maritain (1914) in France, +Meckauer (1917) in Germany, and for the English reader Lindsay (1911), +Stewart (1911), Carr (1912), Cunningham (1916), and Gunn (1920). +BERNARD: _Introduction a l’Etude de la Médecine expérimental_. 1865. +BERTHELOT: _Science et Philosophie_. 1886. BINET: _Magnétisme animal_. +1886. +_Les Altérations de la Personnalité_. 1892. +_L’Introduction à la Psychologie expérimental_. 1894. +(Founded the _Année psychologique_ in 1895.) BLONDEL: _L’Action, Essai +d’une Critique de la Vie et d’une Science de la Pratique_. 1893. +_Histoire et Dogme_. 1904. BOIRAC: _L’Idée du Phénomène_. 1894. BOIS: +_De la Connaissance religieuse_. 1894. BOURGEOIS: _Solidarité_. 1896. +BOUTROUX (EMILE): _De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature_ 1874. (E.T. +1916.) +_De l’Idée de Loi naturelle dans la Science et la Philosophie +contemporaines_. 1895. (E.T. 1914.) +_Questions de Morale et d’Education_. 1895. (E.T. 1913.) +_De l’Influence de la Philosophie écossaise sur la Philosophie +française_. 1897. +_La Science et la Religion dans la Philosophie contemporaine_. 1908. +(E.T. 1909.) +_Rapport sur la Philosophie en France depuis_ 1867. Paper read to Third +Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg in 1908. _Revue de Métaphysique et +de Morale_. Nov., 1908. +_Etudes d’Histoire de la Philosophie_. (E.T. 1912.) +_The Beyond that is Within_. E.T. 1912. (Addresses.) BROCHARD: _De la +Responsabilité morale_. 1874. +_De l’Universalité des Notions morales_. 1876. +_De L’Erreur_. 1879. BRUNSCHWICG: _La Modalité du jugement_. 1897. +_La Vie de l’Esprit_. 1900. +_Les Etapes de la Philosophie mathématique_. 1912. BUREAU: _La Crise +morale des Temps nouveau_. 1907. CARO: _Le Matérialisme et la Science_. +1868. +_Problèmes de Morale sociale_. 1876. COMTE: _Cours de Philosophie +positive_. 6 vols. 1830-42. +_Discours sur l’Esprit positive_. 1844. +_Système de Politique positive_. 4 vols. 1851-4. +_Catéchisme positiviste._ _Synthèse subjective_ (vol. i.). 1856. +_Note_.—The Free and Condensed Translation of Comte’s Positive +Philosophy in English by Miss Martineau, appeared in two volumes in +1853. Monograph by Lévy-Bruhl. COURNOT: _Essai sur les Fondements de +nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la Critique philosophique_ +(2 vols.). 1851. +_Traité de l’Enchaînement des Idées fondamentales dans les Sciences et +dans l’Histoire_ (2 vols.). 1861. +_Considérations sur la Marche des Idées et des Evénements dans les +Temps modernes_ (2 vols.). 1872. +_Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisine: Etude sur l’Emploi des Données +de la Science en Philosophie_. 1875. +_Note_.—A number of the _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_ was +devoted to Cournot in 1905. See also the Monograph by Bottinelli and +his _Souvenirs de Cournot_. 1913. COUTURAT: _De l’Infini mathématique_. +_Les Principes des Mathématiques_. CRESSON: _Le Malaise de la pensée +philosophique contemporaine_. 1905. DAURIAC: _Croyance et Realité_. +1889. +_Motions de Matière et de Force_. 1878. DELBOS: _L’Esprit philosophique +de l’Allemagne et la Pensée française_. 1915. DUHEM: _La Théorie +physique_. 1906. DUNAN: _Les deux Idéalismes_. 1911. DURKHEIM: _De la +Division du Travail social_. 1893. +_Les Regles de la Méthode sociologique_. 1894. +_Le Suicide_. 1897. +_Les Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse_. 1912. (E. T.) ESPINAS: +_Societés animales_. 1876. EVELLlN: _La Raison pure et les Antinomies_. +1907. FONSEGRIVE: _Morale et Société_. 1907. FOUILLÉE: _La Philosophie +de Platon 2 vols_. 1869. Prize for competition in 1867, on the. Theory +of Ideas, offered by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. +“Crowned” after publication by the Académie française. 1871. Second +Edition, revised, and enlarged to four volumes. 1888-9. +_La Liberté et le Determinisme_. 1872. (Doctorate Thesis) +_La Philosophie de Socrate_. 2 vols 1874. Prize in 1868, Académie des +Sciences morales et politiques. +_Histoire générale de la Philosophie_. 1875. New Edition revised and +augmented, 1910. +_Extraits des grands Philosophes_. 1877. +_L’Idée moderne du Droit en Allemagne, en Ingleterre et en France_. +1878. +_La Science sociale contemporaine_. 1880. +_Critique des Systèmes contemporains_. 1883. +_La Propriété sociale et la Démocratie_. 1884. +_L’Avenir de la Métaphysique fondée sur l’Expérience_. 1889. +_L’Evolutionisme des Idées-forces_. 1890. +_L’Enseignement au Point de Vue national_. 1891 (E. T. 1892.) +_La Psychologie des Idées-forces_. 2 vols. 1893. +_Tempérament et Caractère selon les Individus, les Sexes et les Races_. +1895. +_Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la Science positive_. +1895. +_Le Mouvement positiviste et la Conception sociologique du Monde_. +1896. +_Psychologie du Peuple français_. 1898. +_Les Etudes classiques et la Démocratie_. 1898. +_La France au Point de Vue moral_. 1900. +_La Reforme de l’Enseignement par la Philosophie_. 1901. +_La Conception morale et civique de L’Enseignement_. +_Nietzsche et l’Immoralisme_. 1904. +_Esquisse psychologique des Peuples européens_. 1903. +_Le Moralisme de Kant et l’Amoralisme contemporain_. 1905. +_Les Elements sociologiques de la Morale_. 1905. +_La Morale des Idées-forces_. 1907. +_Le Socialisme et la Sociologie réformiste_. 1909. +_La Démocratie politique et sociale en France_. 1911. +_La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intéllectualistes_. 1912. +Posthumous: _Esquisse d’une Interprétation du Monde_. +_Humanitaires et Libertaires_. 1914. +_Equivalents philosophiques des Religions_. +On Fouillée, monograph by Augustin Guyau, son of J. M. Guyau. GOBLOT: +_Traité de Logique_. 1918. GOURD: _Le Phénomène_. 1888. +_La Philosophie de la Religion_. 1911. GUYAU: _La Morale d’Epicure et +ses Rapports avec les Doctrines contemporaines_. 1878. “Crowned” four +years before by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. +_La Morale anglaise contemporaine_. 1879. An extension of the Prize +Essay (Second Part). +_Vers d’un Philosophe_. 1881. +_Problèmes de l’Esthétique contemporaine_. 1884. +_Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_. 1885. (E.T. 1898.) +_L’Irréligion de l’Avenir_. 1887. (E.T. 1897.) +Posthumous: _Education et Hérédité_. (E.T. 1891.) +_L’Art au Point de Vue sociologique_. +_La Genèse de l’Idée de Temps_. 1890. +There is a monograph on Guyau by Fouillée. HAMELIN: _Essai sur les +Eléments principaux de la Représentation_. 1907. HANNEQUIN: _Essai +critique sur l’Hypothèse des Atomes_. 1896. IZOULET: _La Cité moderne_. +1894. JANET (PAUL): _La Famille_. 1855. +_Histoire de la Philosophie morale et politique dans L’Antiquité et +dans les Temps modernes._ 2 vols. 1858. Republished as _Histoire de la +Science politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale_. 1872. +_La Philosophie du Bonheur_. 1862. +_La Crise philosophique_. 1865. +_Le Cerveau et la Pensée_. 1867. +_Eléments de Morale_. 1869. +_Les Problèmes du XIXe Siècle_. 1872. +_La Morale_. 1874 (E T. 1884.) +_Philosophie de la Révolution française_. 1875. +_Les Causes finales_. 1876. (E.T. 1878.) +JANET (PIERRE): _L’Automatisme psychologique_. 1889 +_L’Etat mental des Hystériques_. 1894. +_Névroses et Idées-fixes_. 1898. +(Janet founded the _Journal de Psychologie_. 1904). JAVARY: _L’Idée du +Progrès_. 1850. LABERTHONNIÈRE. _Le Dogmatisme morale_. 1898. +_Essais de Philosophie religieuse_. 1901. +_Le Réalisme chrétien et l’Idéalisme grec_. LACHELIER: _Du Fondement de +l’Induction_. 1871. +_Psychologie et Métaphysique_. 1885. Article in _Revue de Métaphysique +et de Morale_, now published with the above. +_Etude sur le Syllogisme_. 1907. +Monograph by Séailles, article by Noël. LACOMBE: _De l’Histoire +considérée comme Science_. 1894. LALANDE: _La Dissolution opposée à +l’Evolution, dans les Sciences physiques et morales_. 1899. +_Précis raisonné de Morale pratique par Questions et Réponses_. 1907. +LAPIE: _Logique de la Volonté_. 1902. LE BON: _Lois psychologiques de +l’Evolution des Peuples_. +_Les Opinions et les Croyances._ 1911. +_Psychologie du Socialisme_. 1899. +_Psychologie des Foules._ (E.T.) +_La Vie des Vérités_. 1914. LEQUIER: _La Recherche d’une Première +Vérité (Fragments posthumes)_. 1865. LE ROY: _Dogme et Critique_. 1907. +LIARD: _Des Définitions géometriques et des Définitions empiriques_. +1873. +_La Science positive et la Métaphysique_. 1879. +_Morale et Enseignement civique_. 1883. +_L’Enseignement supérieure en France_, 1789 à 1889. 1889. LOISY: +_L’Evangile et l’Eglise_. (E.T.) MARION: _La Solidarité morale_. 1880. +MÉNÉGOZ: _Publications diverses sur le Fidéisme et son Application à +l’Enseignement chrétien traditionnel_. 1900. Two additional volumes +later. MEYERSON: _Identité et Réalité_. 1907 MICHELET: _L’Amour_. 1858 +_Le Prêtre la Femme et la Famille_. 1859. +_La Bible de l’Humanité._ 1864 +MILHAUD: _Essai sur les Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude +logique._ 1894 +_Le Rationnel_. 1898. OLLÉ-LAPRUNE: _La Certitude morale_. 1880. +_Le Prix de la Vie_. 1885 +_La Philosophie et le Temps présent_. 1895. +_La Raison et le Rationalisme_. 1906. PARODI: _Le Problème morale et la +Pensée contemporaine_. 1910. PASTEUR: _Le Budget de la Science_. 1868 +PAULHAN: _Phénomènes affectifs_. +_L’Activité mentale_. 1889 PAYOT: _La Croyance_. 1896. PELLETAN: +_Profession da Foi du XIXe Siècle_. 1852. POINCAIRÉ: _La Science et +l’Hypothèse_. 1902. (E.T. 1905.) +_La Valeur de la Science_. 1905. +_Science et Méthode_. 1909 +_Dernières pensées_. PROUDHON: _Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?_ 1840 +_Système des Contradictions économiques_. 1846 +_La Philosophie du Progrès_. 1851. +_De la Justice_. 1858. RAUH: _Psychologie appliquée à la Morale et à +l’Education_. +_De la Méthode dans la Psychologie des Sentiments_. +_Essai sur le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale_. 1890. +_L’Expérience morale_. 1903. RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN (1813-1900): _Habitude_. +1838. (Thesis.) Reprinted 1894 in _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. +_Aristote_. 1837. Vol. I. Vol. II. in 1846. Development of work crowned +by Académie des Sciences morales et politiques in 1833, when the author +was twenty. +_Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle_. 1867. +_La Philosophie de Pascal (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1887) +_L’Education (Revue bleue_. 1887). +_Métaphysique et Morale (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1893). +_Le Testament philosophique (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1901). +_Cf_. Boutroux on Ravaisson (_Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. +1900). +Bergson : _Discours à l’Académie des Sciences morales et politiques_. +1904. RENAN: _Averroès et l’Averroisme_. 1852. +_Etudes d’Histoire religieuse_. 1857. +_Essais de Morale et de Critique_. 1851). +_Les Origines du Christianisme_. 1863-83. 8 vols., of which: _Vie de +Jésus_. 1863. (E.T.) +_Questions contemporaines_. 1868. +_La Réforme intellectual et morale_. 1871. +_Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_. 1870. (E.T. 1883.) +_Drames philosophiques_. +_Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_. 1883. (E.T. 1883.) +_Nouvelles Etudes d’Histoire religieuse_. 1884. (E.T. 1886.) +_Histoire du Peuple d’Israël_. 5 vols. 1887-04. (E.T. 1888-91. 3 vols.) +_L’Avenir de la Science_. 1890. Written 1848-9. (E.T.) +_Feuilles détachées_. 1802. +For monographs on Renan: Allier: _La Philosophie de Renan_. 1895. +Monod: _Renan, Taine, Michelet_. 1894. +Séailles: _Renan_. 1894*. RENOUVIER: _Manuel de Philosophie moderne_. +1842. +_Manuel de Philosophie ancienne_. 1844. +_Manuel républicaine de l’Homme et du Citoyen_. 1848. +_Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la +République_. 1851. +_Essais de Critique générale_. 4 vols. 1854, 1859, 1864, 1864. (On +revision these four became thirteen vols.) +_La Science de la Morale_. 2 vols. 1869. +_1er Essai_, revised: _Traité de Logique général et de Logique +formelle_. 3 vols. 1875. +_2e Essai_, revised: _Traité de Psychologie rationnelle_. 3 vols. 1875. +_Uchronie (L’Utopie dans l’Histoire), Esquisse historique du +Développement de la Civilisation européenne, tel qu’il n’a pas été, tel +qu’il aurait pu être_. 1876. +_Petit Traité de Morale pour les Ecoles laïques_. 1879. +_Esquisse d’une Classification systématique des Doctrines +philosophiques_. 2 vols. 1886. +_3e Essai_, revised: _Les Principes de la Nature_. 1892. +_Victor Hugo, le Poète_. 1893. +_4e Essai_, revised: _L’lntroduction à la Philosophie analytique de +l’Histoire_. 1896. +_5e Essai_, new: _La Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire_. 4 vols. I. +and II. 1806. III. and IV. 1897. (This brought the Essais up to +thirteen volumes.) +_La Nouvelle Monadologie_. 1891). (With L. Prat.) (“Crowned” by the +Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.) +_Victor Hugo, le Philosophe_. 1900. +_Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique pure_. 1901. +_Histoire et Solution des Problèmes métaphysiques_. 1901. +_Le Personnalisme, suivi d’une Etude sur la Perception externe et sur +la Force_ 1903. +Posthumous: +_Derniers entretiens_. 1905. +_Doctrine de Kant_. 1906. +For his two journals, see under “Periodicals.” +In the latest edition the complete _Essais de Critique générale_ are +only ten volumes, as follows: _Logic_, 2; _Psychology_, 2; _Principles +of Nature_, 1; _Introduction to Philosophy of History_, 1; _and the +Philosophy of History_, 4. +The best monograph is that of Séailles, 1905. +Renouvier’s Correspondence with the Swiss Philosopher, Sécretan, has +been published; _cf_. also _The Letters of William James_. REYNAUD: +_Philosophie religieuse_. 1858. (Third Edition.) RIBOT: _La Psychologie +anglaise contemporaine_. 1870. (E.T. 1873.) +_Hérédité, Etude psychologique_. 1873. (E.T. 1875.) +_La Psychologie allemande contemporaine_. 1879. (E.T. 1886.) +_Les Maladies de la Mémoire, Essai dans la Psychologie positive_. 1881. +(E.T. 1882.) +_Les Maladies de la Volonté_. 1883. (E.T. 1884.) +_Les Maladies de la Personnalité_. 1885. (E.T. 1895.) +_La Psychologie de l’Attention_. 1889. (E.T. 1890.) +_La Psychologie des Sentiments._ 1896. (E.T. 1897.) +_L’Evolution des Idées générales._ 1897. (E.T. 1899.) +_Essai sur l’Imagination créatrice_. 1900. +_La Logique des Sentiments_. 1904. +_Essai sur les Passions_. 1906. +_La Vie inconsciente et les Mouvements_. SABATIER (AUGUSTE): _Esquisse +d’une Philosophie de Religion d’après la Psychologie et l’Histoire_. +1897. +_Les Religions d’Autorité et la Religion de l’Esprit_. 1904. (E.T.) +SABATIER (PAUL): _A propos de la Séparation des Eglises de l’Etat_. +1905. E.T., Robert Dell, 1906 (with Text of the Law). SÉAILLES: +_Affirmations de la Conscience moderne_. 1903. SIMON: _La Liberté de +Conscience_. 1859. +_Dieu, Patrie, Liberté_. 1883. SOREL: _Reflexions sur la Violence_. +1907. (E.T 1916.) +_Illusions du Progrès_. 1911. TAINE: _Les Philosophes français au XIXe +Siecle_. 1857. +_Essais de Critique et d’Histoire_. 1858. +_Philosophie de l’Art_. 2 vols. 1865. (E.T. 1865.) +_Nouveaux Essais de Critique et d’Histoire_. 1865. +_De l’Intélligence_. 2 vols. 1870. (E T. 1871.) +The work _Origines de la France contemporaine_ in 5 vols, 1876-93. +_Histoire de la Littérature anglaise_. 5 vols. 1863. (E.T. by Van Laun. +1887.) +Monographs: De Margerie: _Taine_. 1894. +Monod: _Renan, Taine, et Michelet_. 1894. +Barzellotti: _La Philosophie de Taine._ +Boutmy: _H. Taine_. 1897. +Giraud: _Essai sur Taine_. 1901. TARDE: _Criminalité comparée_. 1898. +_Les Lois de l’Imitation_. 1900. VACHEROT: _Histoire de l’Ecole +d’Alexandrie_. 1846-51. +_La Métaphysique et la Science_. 3 vols. 1858. +_La Démocratie_. 1860. +_Essais de Philosophie critique_. 1864. +_La Religion_. 1868. +_La Science et la Conscience_. 1870. +_Le Nouveau Spiritualisme_. 1884. +_Cf_. Parodi on Vacherot, _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. 1899. +WEBER: _Le Rythme du Progrès_. +_Vers le Positivisme absolu par l’Idéalisme_. 1903. WlLBOIS: _Devoir et +Durée: Essai de Morale sociale_. 1912. XÉNOPOL: _Principes fondamentaux +de l’Histoire_. 1899. Revised and reissued in larger form in 1905 as +_La Théorie de l’Histoire_. + + [1] This abbreviation is used throughout for “English Translation.” + +PERIODICALS + +“LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE,” of Renouvier and Pillon, 1872. to 1884, +weekly; monthly from 1885 to 1889. +“LA CRITIQUE RELIGIEUSE,” 1878-1884 (quarterly). Renouvier. +“REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L’ÉTRANGER,” founded by Ribot +in 1876. +“L’ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE.” 1867-1869. Renouvier and Pillon, refounded in +1890 by Pillon. +“REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE,” founded by Xavier Leon in 1893. +“Crowned” by Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, 1921. +“ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE,” founded by Beaunet and Binet, 1895. +“REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE,” founded by Peillaube, 1900. +“REVUE THOMISTE.” +“ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE.” Laberthonnière. +“ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE.” 1896-1912. Durkheim. +“JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE.” Founded 1904 by Janet +and Dumas. +“BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE.” From 1901. + +II +GENERAL BOOKS ON THE PERIOD. + +ALIOTTA: _The Idealistic Reaction against Science_. (E.T. from Italian. +1914.) BARTH: _Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie_. 1897. +BERGSON: _La Philosophie française_. 1915. BOUTROUX: _Philosophie en +France depuis_ 1867. Report to Congress of Philosophy given in the +_Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. 1908. +_La Philosophie_: an Essay in the volume of collected Essays entitled: +_Un Demi-Siècle de la Civilisation française_. 1870- 1915. Pp. 25-48. +(Paris: Hachette. 1916.) DWELSHAUVERS: _La Psychologie française +contemporaine_. 1920. FAGUET: _Dix-Neuvième Siècle_. 1887. +_Politiques et Moralistes du XIXe Siècle_. 1881. FERRAZ: _Etudes sur la +Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle_. 3 vols. 1882-9. +It is interesting to notice the triple division adopted by Ferraz: +Socialism (under which heading he also groups Naturalism and +Positivism). Traditionalism (Ultramontanism). Spiritualism (together +with Liberalism). +FISCHER: _Geschichte der neuern Philosophie_. 9 vols. FOUILLÉE: +_Histoire de la Philosophie_, Latest Edition, last Chapter. +_Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la Science positive._ +1896. +_La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes_. 1912. +HÖFFDING: _Modern Philosophers._ (E.T. from Danish. 1915.) LÉVY-BRUHL: +_Modern Philosophy in France_. Chicago, 1899. MERZ: _History of +European Thought in the Nineteenth Century_. 4 vols. +A great work. Very comprehensive, particularly for German and British +thought. PARODI: _La Philosophie contemporaine en France_. 1919. +An excellent treatment of the development from 1890 onwards by a French +thinker. (“Crowned” by Académie.) RAVAISSON: _Rapport sur la +Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle_. 1867. (Second Edition, 1889.) +This has become an acknowledged classic. RENOUVIER: _Philosophie +analytique de l’Histoire_. (Vol. IV. latest sections.) 1897. +RUGGIERO: _Modern Philosophy_. 1912. (E.T. from Italian. 1921.) +Gives a stimulating account of German, French, Anglo- American and +Italian thought. STEBBING: _Pragmatism and French Voluntarism_. 1914. +TAINE: _Les Philosophes français du XIXe Siècle_. 1857. TURQUET-MILNES, +G.: _Some Modern French Writers: A Study in Bergsonism_. 1921. +Deals mainly with literary figures-e.g., Barres, Péguy, France, +Bourget, Claudel. VILLA: _Contemporary Psychology_. (E.T. from Italian. +1903.) +_L’Idealismo moderno_. 1905. WEBER: _Histoire de la Philosophie +européenne_. (Eighth Edition, 1914.) + +* * * * * + +The article contributed by Ribot to _Mind_ in 1877 is worthy of notice, +while much light is thrown on the historical development by articles in +the current periodicals cited on p. 338, especially in the _Revue +philosophique_ and the _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. + + + +IIII +COMPARATIVE TABLE + +THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND AMERICA +FROM 1851 TO 1921. + + +_FRANCE._ _GERMANY._ _ENGLAND AND AMERICA._ l851 COURNOT: “Essai +sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances.” 1851 FECHNER: “Zend +Avesta.” 1851 MANSEL: “Prolegomena to Logic.” RENOUVIER: +“Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale.” + +PROUDHON: “La Philosophie du Progrès.” + +1852 MOLESCHOTT: “Der Kreislauf des Lebens.” LOTZE: “Medizinische +Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele.” 1854 RENOUVIER: “Essai de +Critique générale”(Ier Essai). +1854 FERRIER: “Institutes of Metaphysic.” COMTE completes “Systeme +de Politique positive.” + +1855 BÜCHNER: “Kraft und Stoff.” 1855 BAIN: “The Senses and +the Intellect.” FECHNER: “Uber die physikalische und die philosophische +Atomlehre.” SPENCER: “Principles of Psychology.” CZOLBE: “Neue +Darstellung des Sensualismus.” +1856 COMTE: “Synthèse subjective,” vol. i. 1856 LOTZE: +“Mikrokosmos” (1856-1864). + +CZOLBE: “Die Enstehung des Selbstbewusstseins.” 1857 TAINE: +“Philosophes rançais du XIXe Siecle.” +1857 BUCKLE: “History of Civilization in England” (vol. i.). RENAN: +“Etudes d’Histoire religieuse.” MANSEL: “The Limits of Religious +Thought.” 1858 VACHEROT: “La Métaphysique et la Science.” 1858 + HAMILTON: “Lectures” (1858-1860). 1859 RENOUVIER: “Deuxième +Essai de Critique generale.” I859 DARWIN: “Origin of Species.” + +1860 FECHNER: “Elemente der Psychophysik.” +1861 COURNOT: “Traité de l’Enchaînement des Idees.” 1861 +FECHNER: “Uber die Seelenfrage.” + +1862 HÄCKEL: “Generalle Morphologie” (1862-1866). 1862 +SPENCER: “First Principles.” 1863 RENAN: “Vie de Jésus.” 1863 + VOGT: “Vorlesungen iiber den Menschen.” 1863 MILL (J. S.): +“Utilitarianism.” + +FECHNER: “Die Drei Motive des Glaubens.” +1864 RENOUVIER: “Troisième Essai de Critique générale”; “Quatrième +Essai de Critique générale.” +1865 BERNARD: “Introduction à l’Etude de la Médecine +expérimentale.” 1865 DÜHRING: “Der Wert des Lebens.” 1865 + HODGSON: “Time and Space.” + +CZOLBE: “Die Grenzen und der Ursprung der Menschlichen Erkenntnis.” +MILL (J. S): “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.” + +HAMILTON: “Lectures on Metaphysics.” STIRLING: “Secret of Hegel.” 1866 + LANGE: “Geschichte des Materialismus.” +1867 RAVAISSON: “Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe +Siecle.” 1867 MARX: “Das Kapital.” 1867 BUCKLE: +“History of Civilization in England” ( vol. ii.). 1868 RENAN: +“Questions contemporaines.” 1868 LOTZE: “Geschichte der +Asthetik in Deutschland.” + +HÄCKEL: “Natürliche Schöpftungsgeschichte 1869 RENOUVIER: “Science +deU Morale.” 1869 HARTMANN: “Philosophic des Unbewussten.” 1870 + TAINE: “De l’Intelligence.” 1870 RITSCHL: “Lehre von der +Rechfertigung”(1870-1874). 1871 LACHELIER: “Du Fondement de +l’Induction.” +1872 FOUILLÉE: “La LibertcS et la Determinisme,” 1872 +STRAUSS: “Der Alte und der neue Glaube.” 1872 MAURICE: “Moral +and Metaphysical Philosophy.” JANET: “Problemes du XIXe Siecle.” +NIETZSCHE: “Die Geburt der Tragödie” WALLACE: “Logic of Hegel.” +COURNOT: “Considerations sur la Marche des Idees.” +1873 RIBOT: “IWredite.” 1873 1973 SIGWART: “Logik” +(1873-1878). 1873 1973 STEPHEN (J. F.): “Liberty, +Equality,Fraternity.” 1874 BOUTROUX: “La Contingence des Lois de la +Nature.” 1874 LOTZE: “Drei Bucher der Logik.” 1874 +SIDGWICK: “Method of Ethics.” + +WUNDT: “Physiologische Psychologie.” +BRENTANO: “Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.” 1875 COURNOT: +“Materialisme, Vitalisme,Rationalisme.” +RENOUVIER: Revises first and second “Essais.” 1876 RENAN: +“Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques.” 1876 FECHNER: +“Vorschule der Asthetik.” 1876 BRADLEY: “Ethical Studies.” +JANET: “Les Causes finales.” +GROTE: “Moral Ideals.” + + +1877 FLINT: “Theism.” 1878 FOUILLEE: “L’Idee du Droit.” +1878 NIETZSCHE: “Menschliches Allzumenschhches “(1878-1880). +1878 HODGSON: “Philosophy of Reflection.” 1879 BROCHARD: “De +l’Erreur.” 1879 LOTZE: “Drei Bucher der Metaphysik.” 1879 + SPENCER: “Data of Ethics.” + +HARTMANN: “Phanomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins.” BALFOUR: +“Defence of Philosophic Doubt.” 1880 AVENARIUS: “Kritik der reinen +Erfahrung”(1880-1890) 1880 CAIRD: “Philosophy ol Religion.” +1881 GUYAU: “Vers d’un Philosophe.” 1881 NIETZSCHE: +“Morgenrote.” + +1882 NIETZSCHE: “Die frohliche Wissenschaft.” 1882 STEPHEN +(L.): “Science of Ethics.” 1883 NIETZSCHE: “Also sprach +Zarathustra”(1883-1891) 1883 GREEN: “Prolegomena to Ethics.” +DUHRING: “Der Ersatz der Religion.” BRADLEY: “Principles of Logic.” +WUNDT: “Logik.” +MACH: “Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung.” 1885 GUYAU: “Esquisse +d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction.” +1885 MARTINEAU: “Types o. Ethical Theory.” LACHELIER: “Psychologic +et Métaphysique.” BOSANQUET: “Knowledge and Reality.” 1886 +GUYAU: “L’Irreligion de l’Avenir.” 1886 MACH: “Analyse der +Empfindungen.” 1886 WARD: “Psychology” (article). + +WUNDT: “Ethik.” +NIETZSCHE: “Jenseits von Gut und Böse.” 1887 NIETZSCHE: “Zur +Genealogie der Moral.” 1887 SETH (Pringle-Pattison): +“Hegelianism and Personality.” 1888 EUCKEN: “Die Einheit des +Geisteslebens.” 1888 BOSANQUKT: “Logic.” 1889 BERGSON: “Les +Donnees immediates de la Conscience.” 1889 WUNDT: “System der +Philosophie.” 1889 MARTINEAU: “Study of Religion.” FOUILLEE: +“L’Avenir de la Metaphysique.” LIPPS: “Grundthatsachen des +Seelenlebens.” ALEXANDER: “Moral Order and Progress.” JANET +(Pierre): “L’Automatisme psychologique.” + +PAULHAN: “L’Activité mentale.” 1890 RENAN: “L’Avenir de la +Science.” 1890 JAMES: “Principles of Psychology.” FOUILLÉE: +“L’Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces.” +RAUH: “Le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale” + +1891 SIMMEL: “Moralwissenschaft.” AVENARIUS: “Der menschliche +Weltbegriff.” 1892 RENOUVIER Revises third “Essai.” +1892 PEARSON: “Grammar Of Science.” RENAN “Feuilles détachées.” +1893 DURKHEIM: “De la Division du Travail social.” 1893 +HUXLEY: “Evolution and Ethics.” BLONDEL: “L’Action.” CAIRD: +“Evolution of Religion” FOUILLÉE: “Psychologie des Idées-forces.” +BRADLEY: “Appearance and Reality.” + +1894 MEINONG: “Werththeorie” (Psychologisch-ethische +Untersuchungen). 1894 FRASER: “Philosophy of Theism” HERTZ: +“Prinzipien der Mechanik.” +1895 FOUILLÉE: “Le Mouvement idéaliste.” +1895 BALFOUR: “Foundations of Belief.” 1896 BERGSON: “Matière +et Mémoire” 1896 EUCKEN: “Der Kampf um einen geistigen +Lebensinhalt.” 1896 STOUT: “Analytic Psychology.” RENOUVIER: +Revises fourth “Essai.” +HOBHOUSE: “Theory of Knowledge.” RENOUVIER: Publishes fifth “Essai” (La +Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire), vols. 1 and 2. MERZ: +“History of Thought in the Nineteenth Century” (1896-1914). + +MACTAGGART: “Hegelian Dialectic.” 1897 RENOUVIER: Ditto, vols. 3 +and 4. 1897 HARTMANN: “Kategorienlehre.” 1897 JAMES: +“The Will to Believe SABATIER: “Esquisse d’une Philosophie de +Religion.” DREWS: “Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik.” + +EHRENFELS: “System der Werttheorie” (1897-1898). + +1898 WALLACE: “Natural Theology and Ethics.” 1899 RENOUVIER +(and Prat): “La Nouvelle Monadologie.” 1899 MEINONG: “Uber +gegenstände höheren Ordnung.” 1899 WARD: “Naturalism and +Agnosticism.” + + +BOSANQUET: “Philosophical Theory of the State.” HODGSON: “Metaphysic of +Experience.” 1900 TARDE: “Les Lois de l’Imitation.” 1900 +PETZOLDT: “Die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung.” 1900 ROYCE: +“The World and the Individual.” BRUNSCHWICG: “La Vie de l’Esprit.” + + +1901 EUCKEN: “Das Wesen der Religion.” EUCKEN: “Das Wahrheitsgehalt +der Religion.” 1902 POINCARÉ 1902 COHEN: “System der +Philosophie: Logik.” 1902 JAMES: “Varieties of Religious +Experience.” + + +CLIFFORD: “Essays and Lectures.” 1903 WEBER: “Vers le Positivisme +absolu par l’Idéalisme.” 1903 BERGMANN: “System des objectiven +Idealismus.” 1903 RUSSELL: “Principles of Mathematics.” RAUH: +“L’Expérience morale.” +SCHILLER: “Humanism.” RENOUVIER: “Le Personnalisme.” + +1904 COHEN: “System der Philosophie: Ethik.” 1904 +MACTAGGART: “Hegelian Cosmology.” 1905 POINCARÉ: “Valeur de la +Science.” 1905 MACH: Erkenntnis und Irrtum.” +1906 OLLÉ-LAPRUNE: “La Raison et le Rationalisme.” 1906 +MEINONG: “Die Stellung der Gegenstandtheorie ein System der +Wissenschaften.” 1906 BAILLIE: “Idealistic Construction of +Experience.” DUHEM: “La Théorie physique.” +BALDWIN: “Thought and Things.” 1907 HAMELIN: “Les Eléments +principaux de la Répresentation.” 1907 EUCKEN: “Grundlinien +einer neuen Lebensauschauung.” 1907 SCHILLER: “Studies in +Humanism.” BERGSON: “L’Evolution créatrice.” EUCKEN: “Hauptprobleme +der Religionsphilosophie.” +EVELLIN: “La Raison pure et les Antinomies.” +LALANDEL “Précis de Morale.” FOUILLÉE: “Morale des Idées-forces.” 1908 + BOUTROUX: “Science et Religion.” 1908 EUCKEN: “Sinn und +Wertdes Lebens.” + +EUCKEN: “Philosophie des Geisteslebens.” MÜNSTERBERG: “Philosophie der +Werte.” 1909 POINCARÉ: “Science et Méthode.” +1909 DEWEY: “Logical Theory.” + +1910 REMKHE: “Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft” +1911 DUNAN: “Les Deux Idéalismes.” 1911 EUCKEN: “Konnen wir +noch Christen sein?” 1911 WARD: “Realm of Ends.” 1912 +FOUILLÉE: “La Pensée.” 1912 COHEN: “System der Philosophie: +Æsthetik.” 1912 BOSANQUET: “Value and Destiny of the +Individual” DURKHEIM: “Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse.” +EUCKEN: “Erkennen und Leben.” + + +1913 BOSANQUET: “Value and Destiny of the Individual.” 1914 +FOUILLÉE: “Humanitaires et Libertaires.” + +1915 SORLEY: “Moral Values and the Idea of God.” 1917 LOISY: +“La Religion.” +1918 GOBLOT: “Traité de Logique.” 1919 BERGSON: “L’Energie +spirituelle.” + +1920 ALEXANDER: “Space, Time and Deity.” 1921 RUSSELL: +“Analysis of Mind.” MACTAGGART: “Nature of Existence.” + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Modern French Philosophy, by J. 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