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diff --git a/old/51746-0.txt b/old/51746-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 37df1c4..0000000 --- a/old/51746-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12746 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of My Reminiscences of East Africa, by -General von Lettow-Vorbeck - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: My Reminiscences of East Africa - -Author: General von Lettow-Vorbeck - -Release Date: April 12, 2016 [EBook #51746] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY REMINISCENCES OF EAST AFRICA *** - - - - -Produced by Giovanni Fini, Brian Coe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES: - -—Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected. - - - - - _My Reminiscences of East Africa_ - -[Illustration: General von Lettow-Vorbeck.] - - - - - _MY REMINISCENCES - OF EAST AFRICA_ - - _By General von Lettow-Vorbeck_ - - - _With Portrait, 22 Maps and Sketch-Maps, - ∷ ∷ and 13 Drawings ∷ ∷ - By General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant_ - - - _LONDON: HURST AND BLACKETT, LTD. - PATERNOSTER HOUSE, E.C._ - - - - -PREFACE - - -IN all the German colonies, though but a few decades old, a life -full of promise was discernible. We were beginning to understand the -national value of our colonial possessions; settlers and capital were -venturing in; industries and factories were beginning to flourish. -Compared with that of other nations, the colonizing process of Germany -had progressed peacefully and steadily, and the inhabitants had -confidence in the justice of German administration. This development -had barely commenced when it was destroyed by the world war. In spite -of all tangible proofs to the contrary, an unjustifiable campaign of -falsehood is being conducted in order to make the world believe that -the Germans lacked colonizing talent and were cruel to the natives. - -A small force, mainly composed of these very natives, opposed this -development. Almost without any external means of coercion, even -without immediate payment, this force, with its numerous native -followers, faithfully followed its German leaders throughout the whole -of the prolonged war against a more than hundredfold superiority. When -the armistice came it was still fit to fight, and imbued with the best -soldierly spirit. That is a fact which cannot be controverted, and is -in itself a sufficient answer to the hostile mis-statements. - -It has not been possible for me to give an exhaustive account of the -operations of the German East African Protective Force. The existing -material is insufficient, much has been lost, and even now I am -unacquainted with various events, the actors in which have not yet -returned home. My own records have for the most part been lost, and I -had not the leisure to prepare a detailed description of the campaign -in East Africa in addition to my other duties. My account is therefore -necessarily incomplete. In the main I must rely upon my memory and on -my personal experiences. Errors in detail are unavoidable. - -But in spite of this, the following account may not be without value, -nor perhaps without interest, since it shows how what is up to the -present the greatest drama in our colonial history was enacted in -the head of him who was destined to conduct the military side of it. -I have endeavoured to set down my recollections of East Africa as -they actually are, and thus at least to present what is subjectively -correct. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PART I - - EVENTS PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS - - PAGE - - CHAPTER I.: BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 3 - - Reflections on the duties and purpose of the Protective Force. - Details of the defensive capacity of the Colony. Distribution, - armament and training of the Force. Military employment - and mental attitude of the natives. Economic value of the - country, and furtherance of the economic power of the natives. - Horse-breeding and hunting. Several tours of inspection. - National propaganda on the part of subsequently hostile - Missions in the neighbouring territories. - - CHAPTER II.: THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR 18 - - Arrival of news of mobilization. Participation in the war - or neutrality? The strength of the Protective Force and the - English casualties. The English Consul and his activity. The - Governor of the Colony, the supreme military authority, and the - defence of the coastal towns. Preparations for mobilization. - Lines of communication, maintenance and supplies. Sanitation. - Malaria. - - CHAPTER III.: THE FIRST ACTIONS 27 - - Bombardment of the wireless tower at Dar-es-Salaam. - Negotiations for capitulation by the civil authorities. The - _Königsberg_ and the _Möve_. Capture of Taveta. Transfer - of the main body to the Northern Railway. New telegraphic - communications. Bombardment of Bagamoyo. Attack on the British - Uganda Railway. Attacks on British Karunga on Lake Nyassa. - Guerilla warfare in the North. - - CHAPTER IV.: THE NOVEMBER ACTIONS AT TANGA 35 - - Reconnaissances at Tanga. Appearance of an English landing - corps. Concentration of all available troops. First combats at - Ras-Kasone. Reconnaissance in abandoned Tanga. The surroundings - of the probable field of battle. Disposition of the companies. - The hostile landing. The attack. Unfavourable situation of - the defenders. Counter-attack by the reinforcements. Headlong - flight of the enemy. Failure of the pursuit. Harassing the - enemy at the landing-place. Enormous English losses. The - trained bees. Negotiations for release of the wounded. Great - booty. Our own losses. In the hospitals. Simultaneous events at - Longido Mountain. - - CHAPTER V.: AWAITING FURTHER EVENTS 49 - - Withdrawal of the troops to New Moshi. Work at Headquarters. - Motor transport _versus_ carriers. Reconnaissances by motor. - Supply and transport. Roads on the lines of communication. The - burden of work and the joy of work. Abundant supplies. The - starving Lieutenant. The joys of Sunday sport. Meat supply for - the troops. - - CHAPTER VI.: FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE NORTH-EAST 56 - - Advance of hostile forces at Jassini. Reconnaissance in view of - a possible battle. Advance of the German Companies against the - English positions. Surprise and surrounding of the entrenched - enemy. Bad fighting of the Arab Corps. Gallant defence by the - enemy. Difficult situation of the attackers. The enemy hoists - the white flag. - - CHAPTER VII.: GUERILLA WARFARE AND FURTHER PREPARATIONS 63 - - Necessity for economizing men and stores. Care of the wounded. - A wireless message from home. Raids in the Longido district. - “A damned good piece of work.” Despatch of patrols to destroy - the railway. Suffering and death in the steppe. Arrival of a - relief ship. Feverish manufacture of ammunition. An advance - near Oldorobo Mountain. Abundance of raw material and lack - of finished articles. New industries to supply our needs. - Roadmaking. Increase in numbers and fighting value of the - troops. - - CHAPTER VIII.: AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. ENERGETIC USE OF - THE TIME AVAILABLE 73 - - CHAPTER IX.: THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES OF WAR. GUERILLA WARFARE - ASHORE AND AFLOAT UNTIL NEW YEAR, 1916 82 - - Hostile Masai attack on Lake Victoria. The _Königsberg_ on the - Rufiji. Her glorious end. Another success near Kilimandjaro. - Determined attacks on the English railway. Attack and - occupation of the English Camp on Kasigao Mountain. The enemy’s - measures for protecting the railway. Fighting in the bush. - Consideration of the possibility of resisting an attack by - large hostile forces. Preparations for retiring to the South. - Removal of stores. Determined defence of the position on - Oldorobo Mountain. The new _Mungu_. - - - PART II - - THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCES - - (From the arrival of the South African Troops to the loss of - the Colony) - - CHAPTER I.: THE ENEMY’S ATTACK AT OLDOROBO MOUNTAIN 103 - - Several advances by the enemy. The fantastic armoured cars. - The artillery combat. The South African troops. Alleged cruel - orders by the enemy. Reinforcement of the enemy near Mount - Longido. Fight with an Indian patrol. Chivalry of the white - officers. Our brave Askari and the misleading of the English. - - CHAPTER II.: FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY AND THE ACTION AT - REATA 108 - - Spies at work. The routes of the enemy’s advance. Possibilities - of defence. The enemy attacks at Kitovo Mountain. The strong - position on the line Reata-Kitovo. The _Königsberg’s_ gun. - Reconnaissance by hostile cavalry. The enemy’s attack and - attempt to surround us. Occupation of new defensive positions. - The enemy’s withdrawal to Taveta. After the battle. Renewed - forward movement by the enemy. Headquarters at Neusteglitz. A - second relief ship. - - CHAPTER III.: RETREAT BEFORE OVERWHELMING HOSTILE PRESSURE 119 - - Plans and considerations. Active attempts at reconnaissance by - the enemy. Preparations for fighting. An attack on the hostile - screen of patrols. Heavy losses. Fresh heavy attacks by the - enemy (21st March). Failure of the counter-attack. An alarmist - report: the enemy behind us. Retreat to Kissangire. The - alarmist report proves to be false. Good spirits of the troops. - Condition of the civilian population. Combat and surrender - of the 28th Company at Lokisale (5th April). Bringing up - auxiliaries. Concentration of the troops on the Central Railway. - - CHAPTER IV.: THE ENEMY’S ADVANCE IN THE AREA OF THE NORTHERN - RAILWAY 129 - - Departure for Korogwe. At Handeni. News from Germany. Obstacles - on the road. The swollen river. On horseback and by light - railway to Kimamba. Reconnaissance south of Kondoa. Lines of - communication and commissariat. In touch with the enemy. In - position. The enemy seems to be evacuating his positions. An - unexpected fight in the night. Our heavy losses. Successful - patrols. Artillery duels. Obtaining supplies from the country. - Failure of an attack by the enemy. - - CHAPTER V.: BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL RAILWAYS 140 - - The enemy advances on the whole northern front. Simultaneous - attacks from the South. Slipping away and outflanking the - enemy. Looking for the enemy’s weakest point. The smart patrol - leader. The enemy’s aerial activity increases. Further advance - to the South by General van Deventer. Weak German forces - resist on a long line. Fighting near the Central Railway. - Reconnaissances. Heavy fighting with the advancing enemy. On - the Wami River. - - CHAPTER VI.: CONTINUOUS FIGHTING NEAR THE RUFIJI 149 - - Hostile attacks from the south-west. What will the enemy do? - An attempt to surround us. The action at Mlali. Retreat to - Kissaki. The moral effect of our retreat. The Boma of Kissaki. - Securing our cattle supply. Defeat of the enemy on the 7th - September. Annihilation of another hostile detachment. German - humanity—English gratitude. A surprise attack at Dutumi (9th - September). Dutumi must be abandoned. - - CHAPTER VII.: HOSTILE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE COLONY 159 - - Our unfavourable position at Kilwa. Futile attacks by the - enemy at Kissangire. Fat obtained from hippo and elephants. - At Mpaganya. A pessimist sent about his business. Advance on - Kissangire. The lost patrol. Successes at Kissangire. The - Portuguese defeated at Newala. In Utete Camp. In a strong - position at Kibata. Artillery preparations. Effect of heavy - shell. An unsuccessful infantry attack. The military situation - at the end of 1916. Powerful enemy attacks at Dutumi and - Kissaki. The enemy fails to get behind us. - - CHAPTER VIII.: ANXIETIES AND HARDSHIPS DURING OUR STAY IN THE - RUFIJI COUNTRY 173 - - The march through the Pori. Camp at Ungwara. The troops lose - their way. Useless mouths. Steps to remedy the threatening - shortage of food. Reduction in the number of carriers. - Reduction of rations. Obstruction. The Askari women. Maize our - help in trouble. A supply branch of the commissariat. Minor - actions in the bush at Ungwara. The commencement of the rains. - Measures for the protection of women and children. The troops - continue their march to the South. - - CHAPTER IX.: THE END OF THE FRONTIER DEFENCE IN THE SUBSIDIARY - THEATRES 182 - - On the Ruhuje and Ruaha Rivers. A hostile attack and its sudden - cessation. The enemy’s mistake. Surrender of Major Grabert. - Division of General Wahle’s force. The march to Tabora. - Back to Kilima Njaro. Major Kraut’s march to the Rovuma. - Supply difficulties and plans for the future. In the rich - Portuguese territory. Patrols towards Kilva. A heavy defeat - of the enemy. Experiments with bread-substitute. Primitive - boots. The crowing cocks. Salt, fat and sugar. The medical - service. “Lettow-Schnaps.” Bandages. Operations with primitive - appliances. - - CHAPTER X.: LINDI AND KILWA 190 - - Hostile reinforcements from the direction of Lindi. Flood of - the Mbemkuru. German advance on Lindi. The enemy penetrates - into the German camp at Lutende. A smart counter-attack. - Further minor actions near Ulindi. We march off to the North. - At Narungombe. Another victory. Too late! Enemy spies under - the white flag. An Imperial greeting from home. The attack at - Narunyu. The bomb in the dentist’s study. Removal of women and - children to Lindi. - - CHAPTER XI.: IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY 207 - - Concentric advance of the enemy. At Ruponda and Likangara. The - enemy’s uncertainty. Rumours. Action at Mahiva. A brilliant - victory. Changing the plan of attack. The tactics of the enemy - commander. The end of the battle. Losses and booty. Another - action at Lukuledi. Guerilla warfare. - - CHAPTER XII.: THE LAST WEEKS IN GERMAN TERRITORY 216 - - Consultation with the Governor. Considerations. Departure from - Lukuledi. Minor actions in the bush. Shortage of ammunition - and its consequences. Continuous advance of the enemy to - Chivata. We avoid the blow by moving to Nambindinga. Schemes - for voluntarily restricting the strength of the troops. On - the Makonde Plateau. Shortage of water and food. Whither? - Reorganization of the Force at Newala. The hostile patrol and - its letter. At them! Out of sight of the enemy. - - - PART III - - FIGHTING ON FOREIGN SOIL - - (From the Crossing into Portuguese East Africa to the Armistice) - - CHAPTER I.: ACROSS THE ROVUMA 229 - - Crossing the river. The enemy’s camp at Ngomano. Assault on the - Portuguese defences. The “Day of the old guns.” Rich booty. - Continuing the march up the Lujenda. Looking for supplies. - A transparent offer by the enemy. News of the surrender of - Captain Tafel. Partition of the Force. Difficulties and - unpleasantness. Capture of several Portuguese camps. Heroic - action of Lieutenant Kempner. At Nangvare. Buffalo fat and - forest fruits. Abundant supplies at Chirumba. Patrols. Approach - of the enemy. Skirmishes. Enemy propaganda. Fresh courage and - confidence. - - CHAPTER II.: EAST OF THE LUDJENDA 245 - - Supply questions. In the rain. Tobacco. At Nanungu. Building - pontoons. Patrols across the Msalu River. News of events in - Europe. A pause in the fighting. Patrols to the coast. The - precious Pori-pig. A new hostile deployment. The patriotic - English. Defeat of the enemy at Mahue. Continual skirmishes. - Against the enemy at Kireka Mountain. An action in the bush. - A wrong report and its consequences. Casualties on both sides - in the last actions. Captain Koehl’s successes. Continuation - of the march to Koroma Mountain. A surprise. The Governor in - danger. Unpleasant losses. - - CHAPTER III.: IN THE REGION OF THE LURIO AND LIKUNGO RIVERS 259 - - On the road to Keriva. The sick and wounded. Camp on the Lurio. - Müller’s detachment captures the Boma of Malema. Hostile - forces approach from various sides. In a rich country. General - Edwards’ precautions. Fighting in the bush. The march continued - to Alto Moloque. The Orange-Boma. Continuous fighting by - patrols. Nampepo Station and other settlements. On the Likunga - River. Rich booty. The natives’ powers of estimation. - - CHAPTER IV.: ON TO THE SOUTH 270 - - Where is the enemy’s ammunition dump? Looking for it. - Awkwardness of long columns. Kokosani-Namekurra. Across the - Lukungo. A success. At Namekurra. The fortified railway - station. Artillery preparations and assault. Flight of enemy - across the Namacurra River. The casualties on both sides. - Extraordinary quantities of supplies and ammunition captured. - - CHAPTER V.: BACK NORTH TO THE NAMACURRA RIVER 278 - - Obstacles in the way of continuing the march to the South. - The enemy’s operations and our own plans. Back across the - Likungo. Marching in several parallel columns. A remarkable - military situation. Looking for booty. At Ociva. The English - and Portuguese prisoners. Capture of the Boma of Tipa. March - to Namirrue. Reconnaissance of enemy’s position on the rocky - mountain. Another enemy appears. Victorious battle with him at - night. Confusion of the enemy’s columns. Fruitless pursuit of - the fleeing enemy. The trench mortar and its effect. Assault of - the rocky mountain. We march away to Pekera. Rest in the camp - at Chalau. - - CHAPTER VI.: BACK TO THE LURIO RIVER 289 - - At Chalau. An English flag of truce. Approach of the enemy. - Withdrawal across the Ligonja. At Ili. March to Numarroe. - Preparing bread for the prisoners. A breakfast in the bush. - Boma of Numarroe. Success of Goering’s detachment. Capture of - the Boma. Casualties on both sides. On over the mountains to - Rigona. Skirmishes. What next? Heavy fighting at Lioma. Heavy - losses. No prospect of greater success. On to the North. - Confusion of the detachments. A difficult march through the - mountains. On the Lurio. Bad health of the troops. Heavy - casualties on both sides. The influenza epidemic. - - CHAPTER VII.: ON GERMAN SOIL ONCE MORE 303 - - Rapid march to the North. Across the Lujenda. A rest-day at - Mwemba. Hostile spies. Distant reconnaissance by patrols. - To Ssongea. Homesickness of the Samarunga. Pangire Mission - Station. Change of direction. Grave news from Europe. At Mbozi - Mission Station. Patrol reports. - - CHAPTER VIII.: THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA 309 - - On the march to Fife. The enemy in a fortified position. - Fruitless bombardment and continuation of the march. Patrol - fighting. Abundant supply of quinine captured. Studying the - map. By forced marches into Rhodesia. Kajambi Mission Station - and its frightened inhabitants. Capture of Kasawa. Natives - pillaging by order of the English. On towards the Zambesi. - - CHAPTER IX.: THE ARMISTICE AND OUR RETURN HOME 315 - - The lost English motor-cyclist. Armistice. By cycle to the - Chambezi ferry. Conditions of the Armistice. Conference with - the British Commissioner. Situation in Germany. The Armistice - and the situation of our troops. Release of the prisoners. - Difficulties in paying off the Askari. March to Abercorn. - “Surrender” and “Evacuation.” With General Edwards. Handing - over arms. Fruitless opposition to English interpretation of - agreement. By ship to Kigoma. Belgian hospitality. By rail to - Dar-es-Salaam. Internment. Influenza and its victims. The loyal - Askari. Endeavours to protect private property. Embarkation for - home. At Rotterdam and at home. Retrospect and a glance at the - future. - - - - -LIST OF MAPS - - PAGE - - Figs. i. and iii. Kilima Njaro 5 - - Fig. ii. German East Africa. The Central Railway 5 - - Fig. iv. Battle of Tanga 37 - - Fig. v. The Northern Railway 37 - - Fig. vi. Subsidiary Actions up to August, 1916 83 - - Fig. vii. Battle of Yasin (Jassini) 105 - - Fig. viii. Kilima Njaro and Masai Desert 105 - - Fig. ix. Battle of Reata 105 - - Fig. x. Battle of Kahe 105 - - Fig. xi. Invasion of German East Africa by Belgian and British - columns, middle of 1916 131 - - Fig. xii. Retreat of German Main Force, August, 1916 131 - - Fig. xiii. Battles of Kissaki and Dutumi 161 - - Fig. xiv. March of German Main Force, September, 1916, to - June, 1917 161 - - Fig. xv. March of Major-General Wahle in the West 183 - - Fig. xvi. March of Main Force during operations on interior - lines west of Lindi, June to November, 1917 191 - - Fig. xvii. Battle of Mahiwa 191 - - Fig. xviii. The Action at the Kireka Mountains 257 - - Fig. xix. The Action at Namirrue, July 23rd, 1918 285 - - Fig. xx. Through Portuguese East Africa 297 - - Fig. xxi. The March into Rhodesia 311 - - - - -LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - - - General von Lettow-Vorbeck _Frontispiece_ - - General Map _Facing p._ 32 - - The Fallen ” 33 - - Native Women ” 96 - - Natives Bringing Food ” 97 - - Masai ” 128 - - European Dinner-time ” 129 - - Askari. A Halt ” 160 - - The Banyan Tree ” 161 - - Native Types (1) ” 192 - - Native Types (2) ” 193 - - Native Types (3) ” 224 - - Native Types (4) ” 225 - - Native Types (5) ” 256 - - Native Types (6) ” 257 - - - - -PART I - -EVENTS PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS - - - - -My Reminiscences of East Africa - - - - -CHAPTER I - -BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - - -WHEN I landed at Dar-es-Salaam in January, 1914, I hardly suspected -the nature of the task that was to confront me in a few months’ time. -But during the past ten years the universal war had more than once -seemed so imminent that I was obliged seriously to consider whether the -force under my command would be called upon to take any part in that -conflict, and, if so, what its task might be. Owing to the position -of the Colony and the weakness of the existing forces—the peace -establishment was but little more than two thousand—we could only play -a subsidiary part. I knew that the fate of the colonies, as of all -other German possessions, would only be decided on the battlefields of -Europe. To this decision every German, regardless of where he might be -at the moment, must contribute his share. In the Colony also it was our -duty, in case of universal war, to do all in our power for our country. -The question was whether it was possible for us in our subsidiary -theatre of war to exercise any influence on the great decision at -home. Could we, with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers -of the enemy from intervening in Europe, or in other more important -theatres, or inflict on our enemies any loss of personnel or war -material worth mentioning? At that time I answered this question in the -affirmative. It is true, however, that I did not succeed in interesting -all authorities in this idea to such an extent as to cause all -preparations which a war of this kind rendered desirable to be carried -out. - -It was to be considered that hostile troops would allow themselves to -be held only if we attacked, or at least threatened, the enemy at some -really sensitive point. It was further to be remembered that, with -the means available, protection of the Colony could not be ensured -even by purely defensive tactics, since the total length of land -frontier and coast-line was about equal to that of Germany. From these -considerations it followed that it was necessary, not to split up our -small available forces in local defence, but, on the contrary, to keep -them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ -his forces for self-defence. If this idea could be successfully carried -out, we should at the same time protect our coast and our infinitely -long land frontier in the most effective manner. - -In examining the question where to find a point so vital to the enemy -as to afford us the prospect of a successful attack, or, at any rate, -of a threat of such an attack, one thought at once of the frontier -between German and British East Africa. Parallel with it, at a distance -of a few marches, runs the main artery of the British territory, the -Uganda Railway, an object which, with a length of quite 440 miles, was -extremely difficult for the enemy to protect, and would, therefore, -if effectively threatened, require a large part of his troops for the -purpose. - -[Illustration: Fig i. and iii. Kilima Njaro. - -Fig. ii. German East Africa. The Central Railway.] - -On my first journey of reconnaissance and inspection, commenced in -January, 1914, I went by sea from Dar-es-Salaam to Tanga, thence to -Usambara, and then on into the country round Kilima Njaro and Meru -Mountain. At Usambara I met an old friend whom I had known well -since our military college days (_Kriegschule_), Captain von Prince -(retired). He was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea that, in -case of a war with England, we East Africans should not remain idle -spectators, but should take a hand if there should be even a trace of a -prospect of relieving the pressure in Europe. At the same time, he was -in a position to inform me that in the Usambara country, round Kilima -Njaro, and near Meru Mountain, Volunteer Rifle Corps were being formed, -which in a short time would probably include all the Germans capable of -bearing arms in these northern territories. In view of the density of -the settlements in those parts, this was a fact of great importance. -The main contingent of the three thousand Europeans whom we were able -to enrol in the Protective Force during the course of the war was -furnished from these very territories lying along the Usambara Railway. -It was, indeed, difficult to introduce a workable military organization -among these voluntary associations, and to make effective use of their -abundant good will. Still, it was, on the whole, successfully arranged -that all, even those not legally obliged to do so, should be ready -in case of war to act under the orders of the Protective Force. The -District Commissioners also manifested the greatest sympathy; but they -also expressed the, unfortunately well-founded, doubt whether, in a -universal war which could certainly cut us off completely from the home -country and leave us to our own resources, such voluntary organizations -would possess the requisite cohesion. The armament was also in a bad -way; although almost every European possessed a useful sporting rifle, -the variety of patterns and the consequent difficulty of ammunition -supply had not yet been remedied. The proposals for arming these rifle -clubs with a uniform military weapon were still pending, and remained -undecided until the outbreak of war. - -At Wilhelmstal I found a detachment of native police under an efficient -sergeant-major, who came from Ditmarschen. Whereas the Protective -Force proper was under the Commandant, the various police detachments -were under the civil authorities, and so each District Commissioner -had under his orders a detachment of one hundred to two hundred men, -for the purpose of collecting taxes and supporting his authority. -There prevailed a constant tendency to increase this police force more -and more, to the detriment of the Protective Force. In this manner, -alongside of the latter, a second force of the same strength had come -into being which was in its very nature a travesty of a military -organization, and could hardly be anything better. The District -Commissioner, a civil official, often understood little of military -matters, and handed over the training and command of his Police-Askari -to a sergeant-major of police. The latter often worked zealously, -with the old non-commissioned officer’s usual devotion to duty; but -he seldom received any guidance from a military superior, since the -police inspector, an officer, could only visit each district from time -to time. So the Police-Askari often became slack, and lacked the strict -discipline necessary to keep them fit for their duties, which demanded -reliability. To this was added a further defect which ought to have -been avoided. The police were partly recruited from the native N.C.O.’s -of the Protective Force. The latter was thereby deprived of its best -elements, who, after joining the police, lost their good military -qualities. This, of course, did not obtain in all cases. But, generally -speaking, it was the case that, in order to obtain a police force of -inferior military value which in the circumstances could never be of -any real use, the quality of the Protective Force was steadily impaired. - -From New Moshi, the terminus of the Usambara Railway, I proceeded via -Marangu, where an English planter lived and where I met the English -Consul King, of Dar-es-Salaam, to the Kilima Njaro country, and thence -to Arusha. Several German planters, some of them former officers, whom -I visited at their estates during the march, assured me that the German -settlers in those parts formed a valuable source of military power. - -At that time I made the acquaintance of the charming estate of -Commander Niemeyer (retired), whose wife entertained us with excellent -home-grown coffee. Later on she rather hindered us on one occasion: -when, during the war, her husband was in Engara-Nairobi Camp, -north-west of Kilima Njaro, we had temporarily lent her a telephone, -so that she could call up her husband. Immediately afterwards the -whole telephone service stopped, and after a long, long search, we at -last discovered that our kind former hostess had not switched off her -instrument and displayed no intention of doing so. - -Close by was the plantation of Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld -(retired), who hospitably offered us a glass of very fine Moselle -wine, and did so with a military tone like a word of command which -even then characterized him as the energetic leader who was later to -defend the mouth of the Rufiji River against a superior enemy with such -stubbornness. Just short of Arusha we came to the coffee-plantation -of my old brother-cadet Freiherr von Ledebur, where at table I met -the charming old retired Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Bock. We -talked about the Volunteer Rifle Corps which were being formed near -Meru Mountain, and I did not dream that a few months later this old -gentleman of over sixty would be one of our toughest patrol leaders -on the east side of Kilima Njaro, and would often with his few men, -who were mostly recruits, successfully engage several companies of the -enemy. His true chivalry and fatherly care soon won him the hearts of -his black comrades, to such a degree that he was in their eyes the -bravest of all Germans, and they clung to him with touching loyalty. - -At Arusha the first inspection of a company of Askari was held. -The spirit and discipline of the black unit revealed the admirable -education they had received at the hands of my predecessor, Colonel -Freiherr von Schleuntz; but, in accordance with the hitherto accepted -principles of their employment, their training for fighting against -an enemy with modern armament had been developed to a lesser degree. -Like the majority of the Askari companies, this company was still armed -with the old 1871 pattern rifle, using smoky powder. The opinion was -widely held that for black troops this was more suitable than a modern -rifle with smokeless powder, for they had hitherto never been employed -against an opponent with modern armament, but only in native warfare, -where the larger calibre is an advantage, while the disadvantage of -smoke is of no consequence. After the outbreak of war, indeed, the -enthusiastic supporters of the 1871 rifle changed their minds. Against -an enemy provided with modern smokeless equipment the smoky rifle was, -not only at the long ranges obtaining in the open plain, but also in -bush-fighting, where the combatants are often but a few paces apart, -decidedly inferior. The man using smokeless powder remains invisible, -while the cloud of smoke betrays the enemy with rapidity and certainty, -not only to the sharp eye of the native Askari, but even to the -European accustomed to office work. Thus, at the beginning of the war, -the greatest reward which could be earned by an Askari was to give him -a modern captured rifle in place of his old smoky one. - -In distributing the force by companies throughout the country it had -been necessary to accept the disadvantage that in many cases it was -impossible to employ them in large formations, or to train the senior -officers in this respect. It was evident that in war the movement and -leading in battle of forces greater than a company would be attended -with great difficulty and friction. According to my view, the force -had the double duty of preparing to meet an enemy from outside with -modern armament, as well as a native enemy within our borders; their -training for battle had therefore to take account of two distinct sets -of conditions. The exercises in native warfare presented a spectacle -which differed widely from our European inspections. At Arusha, on this -occasion, the company marched through thick bush, the “Pori,” and was -in native fashion surprised on the march. The enemy was represented -by Meru warriors, who, arrayed in full war-dress, with spears and -head-dress of ostrich feathers, remained concealed, and then at only -a few paces distance fell upon the Safari, the column of route, with -loud war cries. A fight at such close quarters, like the one in which -Zelewski’s expedition had been overwhelmed in 1891 at Iringa, is -decided at short range and in a very few minutes. The troops quickly -rally round their leaders and rush the enemy. In accordance with this -whole character of native warfare, careful and thorough musketry -training in the modern sense had hitherto been unnecessary. It was, -indeed, at a pretty low level, and it may interest the soldier to -hear that in some companies the average at two hundred yards standing -without rest barely attained Ring 3, and that only a few companies -got beyond Ring 5. Neither did the nature of native warfare provide -a sufficient inducement for thorough training with the machine gun. -Fortunately, however, I soon discovered among all Europeans of the -force a complete understanding of the importance of this arm, in -particular in modern battle. In spite of this not particularly high -standard of training, the results of field-firing, even at long ranges, -were not unsatisfactory, and in this the Askari profited in a high -degree by his sharp eyesight, which enabled him to observe his fire and -correct his aim accordingly. - -The journey was continued via Ufiome Mission, where the excellent -Father Dürr was settled, to Kondoa-Irangi, Kilimatinde and back to -Dar-es-Salaam. The impression left by this first inspection was that -from a military point of view there was still a great deal to be done -if we wished to be properly prepared in case the English should make -war on us. Unfortunately I did not succeed in arousing sufficient -interest in the matter on the part of the authorities. The ruling -opinion was that we were on exceptionally good terms with the English, -and that a war, if it came at all, was still in the distant future. -Thus it happened that when war actually did break out but a few months -later we were unprepared. - -For me, a new-comer in East Africa, the journey had not only been of -military interest. At Boma la Ngombe, a place between Moshi and Arusha, -a number of old Askari had been settled by the late Lieutenant-Colonel -Johannes; they were mainly engaged in cattle-dealing, and had become -well-to-do. The news of my coming had preceded me, and the people -appeared in full strength to greet me on my arrival. I had the -impression that this was not a mere show of loyalty; the people not -only told me enthusiastically of Germans under whom they had previously -served, but after the outbreak of war, unasked and without the -slightest pressure, they placed a large sum of money at our disposal to -help the force. In that district I also saw the first Masai, who, in -contrast to the majority of the East African tribes, are pure Hamites, -and live in a special reservation. It may be mentioned that Merker, -the best authority on the Masai,[1] considers them to be the original -Jews. They possess to a marked degree the characteristics of the pure -inhabitant of the prairie. Occasionally, one of these tall, slim, -and very swift men acted as my guide on hunting expeditions; their -vision and skill as trackers are astonishing. In addition, the Masai -is intelligent, and, at any rate towards strangers, an extraordinary -liar. He lives in closed villages of mud huts, and, like all nomads, -wanders with his herds over the prairie. He seldom enlists in the -force. In agriculture the Masai engages hardly at all, whereas among -the other tribes this forms the chief occupation and is a necessary -condition for close settlement. Thus the banana districts on the -eastern slopes of Kilima Njaro support a native Wajagga population -of some twenty-five thousand souls, and this number could easily be -increased. The great wealth of cattle in the neighbourhood of Arusha, -on the Masai prairie, and near Kondoa-Irangi, showed me that the -tse-tse fly, the principal enemy of African cattle, is comparatively -rare in those parts. As a comparison, I may state that the cattle in -the single district of Arusha are estimated to be more numerous than -in the whole of South-West Africa. At Kondoa-Irangi and Singida the -people had come from a great distance, and had lined the road to greet -me. No traveller who visits these countries can fail to observe that -in the fertile, elevated interior there is room for the settlement of -hundreds of thousands of Europeans. Here I would like to record an -impression which I only obtained later, during the war. At times we -passed through fertile districts which were completely forsaken by the -inhabitants, but which were known not to have been occupied even in the -previous year. They had simply moved away, had settled somewhere else -in the abundantly available, empty and fertile country, and had there -begun to cultivate fresh fields. If the country capable of cultivation -were fully utilized, it would probably be possible to support in German -East Africa, which has hitherto been inhabited by about eight millions -only, a population barely less than that of Germany. An Englishman -captured during the war at Mahenge remarked that it would be possible -to make East Africa into a second India, and I think he was right. -My experience in the war has confirmed my opinion that there exist -many possibilities of economic development, of which we had hardly an -inkling before the war. - -At Singida I saw one of the stud-farms of the country. For breeding -purposes there were two horse stallions, no mares, a few Muscat donkey -stallions, and mainly country-bred donkey mares. Of the objects it was -sought to attain I could get no clear idea; in any case, the crossing -of horse stallions and donkey mares had produced no results. But the -district is extraordinarily suitable for horse-breeding, and the -Government Veterinary Officer Hiffmeister, who was stationed there, -was very inclined to settle in the country as a private farmer and -horse-breeder. Similar stud-farms existed at Kilimatinde, Iringa and -Ubena. From Singida to Kilimatinde I followed the Mpondi River; the -sportsman will be interested to know that this is the district in which -the best buffaloes in East Africa are said to be found. A few days -before I had successfully hunted buffalo, but I had not succeeded in -getting a shot at a powerful bull, and so, as far as time permitted, -I was out for buffalo. Besides a native boy, I had as trackers two -excellent Askari of the Konda Company. As soon as I arrived in camp at -the end of a march and dismounted from my mule, I would ask Kadunda, -one of these Askari, who had done the march on foot, whether he was -ready to hunt. He always agreed with the greatest enthusiasm, and -away we went through the bush, which was sometimes so dense that -one had to crawl under the branches in order to get through at all. -For the European not yet accustomed to the African climate it is -extraordinarily fatiguing to follow a trail through dense bush and high -grass reaching over one’s head for hours on end in the blazing sun. The -wounded buffalo is considered to be the most dangerous game in East -Africa; he often charges at once with great determination. At Mpondi, a -short time before, a wounded buffalo had attacked a hunter so suddenly -that the latter did indeed find himself seated on its neck, but would -hardly have escaped with his life unless at the critical moment his -sun-helmet had fallen off. The animal then proceeded to attack the -helmet, and the man managed to get a shot at its heart. From this and -similar tales it will be understood that as the trail gets warmer and -warmer, one’s excitement becomes intense and one’s senses more acute. -But although I often heard the buffalo breathing only a few paces from -me, the bush was so thick that I could not get a shot. I had already -abandoned all hope of success and had marched off with my caravan for -good and all, when at seven in the morning we crossed a perfectly fresh -buffalo trail. At this point the forest was clearer, and the guides -seemed keen to follow the tracks. So we let the caravan go on, and -after four hours of exhausting tracking got a sight of the buffalo. -In a clearing, at one hundred yards, I raised my rifle, but Kadunda -would not allow it, and insisted on our stalking the quarry, which was -passing us in quite open wood without undergrowth, up to within thirty -yards. Luckily the bullet cut the main artery; the buffalo fell at -once, and so any further possible developments of the episode were cut -short. As often happens, we discovered in the animal’s body a bullet -from a native gun. Besides this buffalo I had got a large number of -antelope and gazelle of various kinds; lions we often heard, but never -caught sight of. - -On this march through the “Pori” I learned, to my astonishment, that -even in the interior of Africa it is no easy matter to disappear -without a trace. I had marched off without leaving word what road I -intended to take. Suddenly, in the heart of the bush, a native met us -on the march, and handed me the oversea mail. The fact is that in their -interchange of information the inhabitants tell each other everything -that happens in their vicinity. Calls, fire signals, and the signal -drums serve to exchange and quickly spread all news. The incredible way -in which the innumerable rumours spread abroad, with which I became -acquainted later on, is mainly due to this communicativeness. - -After returning to Dar-es-Salaam from the first journey of inspection, -I immediately made arrangements for re-arming three more companies; up -to date only three companies had been equipped with modern rifles. It -subsequently became a factor of the greatest importance that, at any -rate, these arms, with the necessary ammunition, reached the Colony -just in time for the outbreak of war. - -During a tour of inspection in April to Lindi, where I saw the Third -Field Company, I fell into a rocky hole and got water on the knee -so that I could not start my next long journey till the end of May. -Although the Central Railway was open for public traffic only as far as -Tabora, the construction had proceeded so far that I could reach Kigoma -(on Lake Tanganyika) by rail, and was thus already enabled to acquire a -superficial knowledge of this important means of communication which -connected our coast directly with the Lake and the rich countries -bordering on it, and indirectly with the Congo basin. At Kigoma the -steamer _Coetzen_ was still building, and to reach Bismarckburg I -made use of the small steamer _Hedwig von Wissman_. At Baudouinville, -in the Congo Territory, I paid a short visit to the Bishop of the -White Fathers, without suspecting how soon we would be at war with -that country. The wonderful church would be an ornament to any of our -towns. It had been built by the Fathers themselves and the interior was -decorated with rich carvings. Extensive, splendid orchards surround the -station. The plague of lions must, however, be very great; the Fathers -told me that a short time before a lion had one night jumped the wall -into the court and killed an ox. - -Our reception was very friendly, and we were made welcome with a glass -of fine Algerian wine. We were also well received at Mwasyl Mission -Station in German territory, where there were also White Fathers, -mostly Belgians. During the war, however, we captured correspondence -which proved that the French missionaries, who also lived at stations -in the Tanganyika country, by no means confined themselves to spreading -Christianity but intentionally carried on a national propaganda -as well. One missionary’s letter defines the difference between a -_missionnaire catholique_ and a _missionnaire français_, remarking -that the latter is bound, in addition to spreading the Christian -faith, to carry on French national propaganda. It is well known that -this national propaganda is a work from which the German missionaries -generally refrained. - -These missions, which are naturally to be found in the densely -populated and well-cultivated countries, exercise a remarkable -influence on the education of the natives. The missionary is mostly the -only permanently settled white man; he becomes well acquainted with -the country and people, and wins their confidence. The missions have -deserved extremely well by introducing European handicrafts; everywhere -one finds carpenters’ shops, shoemakers’ shops and brickworks. - -My later tours disclosed that the extremely fertile country around -Langenburg and Ssonga, where there are many wheatfields (the density -of population is indicated even on the map by the numerous mission -stations), was protected by only one company, which was not even -connected by a direct wire. A telegram could only reach Langenburg -from Dar-es-Salaam by the English line through South Africa. The -communication by heliograph from Iringa to Langenburg was too -unreliable to be considered an efficient substitute. It may be -mentioned that in that country the natives have not only been educated -up to agriculture by the Missions and by the German Administration, -but that considerable native industries have been indigenous there for -a long time past. Where iron occurs one finds numerous forges, the -bellows being made in the primitive manner out of hides and perforated -branches. Very beautiful are the native weavers’ products; basket-work -is also done here as almost everywhere else in the Colony, and the -work not only shows good taste, but is so close that the natives use -wickerwork cups for drinking. The large herds owned by a few European -farmers suffered, owing to the poorly developed communications, from -the difficulty of reaching a market; this is especially the case with -Mbeya Farm, between Lake Nyassa and Tanganyika. - -I camped at Mbosi Mission, and the local missionary, Bachmann, who had -known the country and the people intimately for many years past, told -me that a striking change was taking place in the views of the natives. -Foreign Arabs and Swahili were appearing in the country, and were -telling the people that the Germans would soon be going, and that the -English would take possession of the land; that was in June, 1914. - -The continuation of my journey to Iringa brought me to the places where -the great chief Kwawa had defied the Germans in the early days, and at -Rugeno some of the many assembled natives were able to relate to me -what they had witnessed of the annihilation of Zelewski’s expedition on -the spot. - -In the short period of peace-work that was vouchsafed to me, my -endeavours to obtain a thorough grip of all my duties in East Africa -could not produce results sufficient to secure me great personal -authority among Africans of long standing. I was still considered a raw -hand. All the same, my career in the service had prepared me to some -extent for the work that Fate had in store for me. - -It was probably about the time when, as a cadet who had been -transplanted at an early age from my home in Pomerania, I was studying -Cæsar’s Gallic War, that the German Fatherland was presented by -Bismarck with its first colonies. In the year 1899-1900, when employed -on the General Staff, I studied our own colonies as well as many -foreign ones. During the troubles in China (1900-1901) I made the -acquaintance, both officially and socially, of all the contingents -engaged with us in East Asia, particularly the English. The Herero and -Hottentot Rebellion in South-West Africa (1904-1906) introduced me -to the peculiarities of bush warfare. At that time I gained abundant -personal experience, not only of natives, but also of Boers, both -on the Staff of General von Botha and as an independent Company and -Detachment Commander. The excellent qualities of this Low German race, -that had for generations made its home on the African veld, commanded -my respect. That the Boers would later take a decisive—and in a sense -tragic—part in anglicizing the German part of Africa I never dreamt. - -In 1906, in South-West Africa, I was wounded. This brought me to Cape -Town, so that I also acquired a superficial knowledge of Cape Colony. -On my return journey I also touched at the future scene of my work, -German East Africa, for the first time. - -Later, my position as Commander of the Marine Battalion at -Wilhelmshaven afforded me an insight into the inner life of our -thriving and growing navy, which was so closely connected with German -work overseas. I took part in exercises and cruises on large and small -ships, in naval manœuvres, and in a visit by the Fleet to Norway, -during which new views of general and military life continually -presented themselves. - -Even after my return to the Army the alternation between regimental -and staff employment afforded me much inducement and opportunity for -comparison. In this manner my development had rendered me capable of -rapidly accommodating myself to new conditions. Grateful as I was for -every expansion of my horizon, I owe the best of all to the Army at -home, in which I had the privilege, under the guidance of admirable -commanders, of learning to know the spirit of military life and true -discipline, a spirit which was then properly understood. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR - - -EARLY in August, 1914, when on my way via the heliograph station of -Kidodi towards Kilossa, a special messenger brought me a telegram from -the Governor, to say I was to return immediately to Dar-es-Salaam; and -on the following day I received the news that His Majesty had ordered -mobilization, but that the state of war did not extend to the overseas -possessions. A telegram from the Secretary of State of the Imperial -Colonial Office called upon us to reassure the settlers. - -In contrast to this a wireless message from the Admiralty Staff -mentioned England also among our probable enemies. - -At Kilossa I managed to catch a goods train, and so arrived at -Dar-es-Salaam on the 3rd August. Here everyone was busy: the -declaration of war had arrived in the middle of the preparations for a -big exhibition, in the programme of which was included the ceremonial -opening of the Tanganyika Railway; numerous Germans had come on a -visit to Dar-es-Salaam and were now unable to get away. In order to -assist in the preparations for the exhibition, Captain von Hammerstein, -commanding the 6th Field Company in Ujiru, had also arrived there, and -it was very fortunate that I was able at once to employ this energetic -officer, who not only shared my views, but to whom I was also cordially -attached, for the work of mobilization. - -The question which immediately forced itself upon us was whether, -in the now obviously imminent universal war in which England would -almost certainly join, the Colony would remain neutral or not. As I -have already explained, I considered it to be our military object to -detain enemy, that is English forces if it could by any means be -accomplished. This, however, was impossible if we remained neutral. -In that case the situation would be that we, who did not command the -sea, would have to remain inactive, with a force which, though small -at the moment, had behind it a loyal, very efficient population of -eight millions suitable for military service. England, on the other -hand, would have no need to employ a single man in East Africa on our -account; it would be able to take away the very last fit Askari, after -providing for internal security, for employment in other theatres more -important than East Africa. It would, therefore, obviously have been an -advantage for England if any agreement had existed which condemned us -to neutrality. But this was not the case: the Congo Act, which deals -with the Equatorial territories, only says that in case of conflict -between two of the Powers concerned, a third Power may offer its good -services as a mediator. But as far as I know this step was not taken -by any Power. We were therefore not obliged to restrict our operations -out of regard for any agreement. From a military point of view it was -a disadvantage, not for us, but for England, if war occurred in East -Africa. The fact that we were not obliged to remain neutral enabled us -to make use of our favourable coast as a base and refuge for the German -cruiser operations in the Indian Ocean. But, above all, we were able, -with our few thousand men, to contain throughout the whole duration of -the war an enormously superior force of the enemy. - -At the outbreak of war the Protective Force consisted of 216 Europeans -(from whom a part must be deducted as on leave) and 2,540 Askari; there -were, further, in the Police Force, 45 Europeans and 2,154 Askari; -these were later increased by the ships’ company of the _Königsberg_ -(which had put to sea), 322 men, and of the _Möve_, 102 men. The total -numbers enrolled in the Force during the war were about 3,000 Europeans -and 11,000 Askari. - -These figures include all non-combatants, such as those employed on -police duty, medical personnel, supply and maintenance services, etc. -How many milliards it cost to try and crush our diminutive force the -English themselves will presumably some day tell us. We, on the other -hand, could probably have continued the war for years to come. - -For the hostile strengths no authentic figures are at my disposal; -I quote from the statements of English officers and Press reports, -and they must bear the responsibility for them. According to them -over 130 Generals took the field against us, the total strength of -the hostile troops was about 300,000, the losses in European and -Indian dead amounted to 20,000; horses and mules, 140,000. These -numbers, especially those of the General Officers, seem even to me -rather exaggerated; I can therefore only repeat that they are taken -from English sources. In any event, however, their losses were very -considerable; and considering that the number of black soldiers who -were killed or died is not given, the total number of enemy dead can -hardly be under 60,000. - -We should have been compelled, if a cruiser had sought shelter in our -harbours, to refuse to admit her, by reason of our neutrality, whereas -the favourable position and coastal development of East Africa made it -the natural hiding-place in cruiser warfare in the Indian Ocean. As -regards the agreements laid down in the Congo Act, it should be borne -in mind what it would have meant for our Navy if our colonies had been -declared neutral. - -At Dar-es-Salaam it was very interesting during those days of tension -to watch the proceedings of the English Consul King. He was to be seen -everywhere, either in the Officers’ Club at a game of bridge, or at the -Post Office where our telegrams were handed in. The standing orders of -the English Expeditionary Force, which were subsequently captured at -Tanga, and which were mainly based on King’s reports, showed how active -this man had been in the time before the war, and how excellently he -was informed as to the internal conditions in our Colony. His judgment -on relevant matters extended so far that he even compared the relative -fighting value of the Europeans in different districts, and credited -those of Dar-es-Salaam with little “stomach for fighting.” To be -honest, it must be admitted that in the case of a large number of the -Germans in that place (and even of the local Government authorities) -it actually did take some time before they were imbued with that -warlike spirit without which the fulfilment of our task was simply -impossible. - -Very difficult was the position of the coast towns, which were -inhabited by numerous Europeans (among them many women and children), -and which were of course exposed to bombardment by English men-of-war -at any minute. The Governor maintained that such a bombardment must -be avoided under all circumstances. According to an ordinance, which -certainly did not contemplate the case of foreign war, the supreme -military power in the Colony was in the hands of the Governor, and -communication with home having ceased, it was anyhow physically -impossible to get this altered. So I was obliged to make the best of -this, from a military point of view, very serious difficulty and to -reckon with the possibility that, if the Governor’s instructions were -faithfully executed, Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga for instance, the termini -of our railways and the obvious bases for hostile operations from the -coast towards the interior, would fall into the enemy’s hands without a -struggle. - -My view was that we would best protect our colony by threatening the -enemy in his own territory. We could very effectively tackle him -at a sensitive point, the Uganda Railway, and one might almost say -that the numerous German settlers in the country traversed by our -Northern Railway (Tanga-Moshi) were already deployed for this object. -The Governor, however, did not agree with the proposal I had already -previously put forward in case of war, namely, to concentrate our -forces in the North near Kilima Njaro. But, in order to act at all, -it was obviously necessary to collect our troops, who were scattered -all over the country. As this could not be effected in the Kilima -Njaro country, as I wished, the concentration took place on the -heights of Pugu, a day’s march west of Dar-es-Salaam. At this place -the Dar-es-Salaam Company met those from Kilimatinde, Tabora, Ujiji, -Usambara and Kissendji, which came partly by march routes and partly -by rail. The Police, who, in accordance with the scanty preparations -already made, were to join the Protective Force immediately, were in -part, at any rate, placed at my disposal, a number of old Askari were -called up, and in this way four new companies (No.’s 15 to 18) were at -once formed. The German Reservists were mobilized as required, and each -company was brought up to an establishment of about 16 Europeans, 160 -Askari and 2 machine guns. - -In some cases difficulties occurred in calling the Europeans to the -colours. By mistake, the crews of a few ships of the East African Line, -lying in the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, were informed, in response to -their application, by the Officer in Command at the Railway Station, -that there was no room for them in the Protective Force. Then, at -the suggestion of the Governor’s representative, a declaration was -submitted to them, according to which they were to engage in writing -to remain neutral during the war. Later on the men saw that this -constituted an offence against the law relating to liability for -service, and their own sound feeling was opposed to it. They appealed -to me, setting forth the circumstances; I had had no inkling of these -proceedings, and fortunately, as the declaration had not yet fallen -into the hands of the enemy, the intended decision could be reserved. - -The number of carriers allotted to each company varied, and may -have averaged about 250. The stores of arms, ammunition and other -war-material, which were lying unprotected in the harbour of -Dar-es-Salaam, were distributed among various places in the interior -along the railway, where depots were established. The training of -the troops was at once vigorously proceeded with, and even then we -realized the value of rendering our head-dress unrecognizable by -means of grass and leaves, a measure proposed by a practical Company -Commander, Captain Tafel. The question of course was whether we, with -our Askari, would be able to fight modern troops; it was denied by -many an experienced hand. But from what I had seen during the revolt -in South-West Africa, from 1904 to 1906, I believed that courage and -military efficiency could be awakened in the East African native also, -who belongs to that same great family, the Bantu, as the Herero. That -certainly was a proof; but the matter was greatly simplified by the -fact that there was no possible alternative. - -All questions of organization, which are usually carefully prepared -and considered in time of peace, had now to be dealt with and decided -on the spur of the moment. One of them was the extraordinarily -important one of establishing a service of subsistence and a complete -system of supply from the rear. The main point was to consider, in -the first place, the main roads, which were also important in a -military sense. Which roads might these be? It was immediately found -how disadvantageous was the absence of railway communication between -the Central and Usambara Railways. In time of peace, communication -had been effected by sea between Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga; this was -now impossible. Obviously the importance of a military use of the -lines had not been thought of. As a substitute, we had to develop -a road between Morogoro and Korogwe, on the Northern Railway. The -second road ran past the western side of the Masai Reservation, from -Dodoma via Kondoa-Irangi, and Ufiome to Arusha, and the third from the -rich district of Tabora, the capital of the Wanyamwesi country, to -Muansa, on Lake Victoria, into the country of the Wassukume, who were -recognized even by Consul King as the most important of our tribes. -This road was also valuable because by it we could draw on the rice -crops of Lake Victoria as well as on the abundant stocks of cattle. -Other roads connected Kilossa with the rich territory of Mahenge, -Iringa, and even Langenburg, which last provided us with a large part -of our requirements in wheat flour. - -The provisional organization of the supply system having been fixed in -broad and general outline, it was not possible for the details of its -development to be worked out at Headquarters. Someone had to be found -whose past military career rendered him capable of working the system, -not only from the administrative point of view, but also in accordance -with the sometimes very urgent military requirements, and of adapting -it to them. Major-General Wahle, a retired officer, who happened to -have arrived on the 2nd August, on a visit to his son, and to see the -Dar-es-Salaam Exhibition, at once placed himself at the disposal of the -Force, and at my request took charge of the Lines of Communication. His -task was particularly difficult, because where there were no railways, -the bulk of the work had to be performed by native carriers. I have at -my disposal no figures showing the total number of carriers employed -for the service of the troops, and it is very difficult to arrive at it -at all definitely. It included men who only carried the loads from one -place to another before the permanent carriers took them over, but I -am sure I do not exaggerate in saying that, on the whole, hundreds of -thousands of carriers worked for the troops; and all of them had to be -fed and medically looked after. - -Of our many other difficulties one of a special nature may here be -mentioned. The peace-time existence of the Europeans in tropical -colonies had, even for reasons of health, accustomed them to a certain -degree of comfort. When on _safari_ (a journey) in East Africa, it -is generally impossible to buy European food; but few Europeans had -learnt to live on the vegetable products supplied by the natives or by -Nature. Shelter is rarely to be had. Against mosquitos it is, however, -imperative to protect oneself. So the white official or soldier seldom -travelled with less than eleven carriers, who, besides his tent, -camp-bed and clothing, also carried a considerable quantity of food. -Such large numbers of carriers were, however, impossible for a force -which was to be mobile. Another difficulty was that nearly every Askari -had a boy. With these simple people, whose predilection for their -ancient traditions and customs is further confirmed by Islam, and -who are besides very proud and vain, it is particularly difficult to -interfere with such Dusturis (customs). In individual cases it was not -always easy for a Company Commander to find the happy mean. - -In the tropical warfare which was before us medical care is one of the -most important factors. Generally speaking, the native is in a great -measure immune against malaria, and it does not often happen that an -Askari gets really ill with it; some tribes, however, like the Wajagga, -on Kilima Njaro, who inhabit elevated, non-malarial districts, and are -therefore not immune from early youth, suffer severely from malaria -as soon as they come down to the plains. From the evening until well -into the morning mechanical protection against the malaria mosquito -(anopheles), by means of a mosquito net, was strictly enforced for -every European. For many months I slept on the ground, and even then -the mosquito-net afforded me a high degree of protection; even so I -had malaria ten times, for in the field it is not always possible to -employ preventive measures to the extent that is desirable from a -hygienic point of view. In our endeavour to attach a medical officer to -every company we received most welcome assistance from the fact that -there was a considerable number of them on Lake Tanganyika, and in -the Southern territories on the Rovuma, who had come out to study and -combat sleeping-sickness. - -The work entailed by all this business of mobilization not only kept us -going day and night, but also the native telephonist at Pugu, and it -was extraordinary to see the skill with which the black man worked his -instrument, both there and elsewhere. His great technical talent proved -of the greatest value to us. Of difficulties there was, of course, an -infinity. During the early days it happened that cattle coming from the -country north of Tabora for the civilian population at Dar-es-Salaam -met other cattle going in the opposite direction to feed the troops. -To this day I feel something of a physical shock when I think of a -collision at Pugu, between a train laden with the finest show cattle -going at full speed, and another one, which nearly produced a serious -reduction in the personnel required for working out our mobilization -scheme. - -Our place of concentration at Pugu is some twelve miles inland from -Dar-es-Salaam. Our camp was situated on the slopes of the Pugu -Mountains. The forest is extremely thick, and the country densely -covered by plantations of natives and Europeans. In spite of its -somewhat elevated position, Pugu is quite in the hot coastal area, and -although in August we were still in the cold season, the temperature -was still what we describe as “tropical;” it is that oppressive, -somewhat damp heat, which makes long marches so exhausting for the -European. At that time we had tents for the Europeans and a camp-bed -with the inevitable mosquito net for everyone, so that in this respect -there were no difficulties. In case of sickness we had established a -provisional field hospital in the neighbouring Wichmann Plantations. -Our horses did not suffer unduly. But one after another all our animals -went down with tse-tse. In camp it was not possible to provide them, as -we could at Dar-es-Salaam, with tse-tse proof stables, fitted with wire -gauze similar to fly-proof windows. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE FIRST ACTIONS - - -IN this Manner We Were Fully Employed in the Camp at Pugu, when, on -the morning of the 8th August, we heard heavy artillery fire from the -direction of Dar-es-Salaam. According to reports which soon reached us, -it emanated from two English light cruisers, _Astræa_ and _Pegasus_, -who were aiming at the wireless tower. This tower had been erected in -this exposed position because on the coast it could reach further out -to sea; it was of importance to us because the high-power station at -Tabora was not yet finished, and the two smaller ones at Muansa and -Bukoba were of only local use. The tower was not hit by the English, -but blown up by us, from a rather excessive fear of its falling into -the enemy’s hands. A short time later an observation officer reported -that the enemy was apparently preparing to land at Konduchi, a day’s -march north of Dar-es-Salaam. The formation of the coast rendered it -not unlikely. I therefore immediately ordered the seven companies -of Askari[2] available to march off, so as to seize the favourable -opportunity of surprising the enemy in the act of landing. - -Before they marched off I had a conversation at Pugu Station with the -Governor, Dr. Schnee, who was passing through by train to Morogoro. He -seemed quite surprised by the English hostilities, and entirely agreed -with my proposal to attack them at Konduchi. On the way there I met -two gentlemen belonging to the Government at Dar-es-Salaam, who showed -me a document dealing with negotiations for surrendering Dar-es-Salaam -to the English. As the Governor had said nothing to me about it, and -I was also rather in a hurry, I only glanced superficially at it. It -did not occur to me that this might be any kind of agreement drawn -up with the consent of the Governor. But when, during the night, the -force had reached a mountain ten miles north of Dar-es-Salaam, and on -the next morning we obtained a view of the harbour and the English -cruisers lying off it, it became clear that the report of an attempted -landing at Konduchi was a mistake. We were able to establish the fact -that the English ships had communicated with the shore, and now it -did appear to me probable that negotiations with the enemy had taken -place. I now advanced on the town, and, as I could not but fear that -in the confusion of the moment a disadvantageous agreement might be -concluded at Dar-es-Salaam, I sent Captain Tafel on ahead. He was -to announce that I was taking over the executive power, and that -negotiations with the enemy must be conducted through me alone. It was -only from Captain Tafel that I learned that by order of the Governor -negotiations for surrender had actually taken place. My intervention -was not approved by the Governor, in whose hands, according to a -Protective Force Ordinance intended to meet quite different conditions, -supreme military power was actually placed. For the moment this had no -practical consequences. Only a few English Marines had landed, and had -already gone on board again. But for a soldier it was not inspiring -to find that here, under the very eyes of a thousand good troops, an -agreement had been concluded which forbade us to undertake any hostile -act in Dar-es-Salaam, while the enemy was not so bound, and that we had -received no information of a step of such great military importance. - -The _Königsberg_ had already put to sea from Dar-es-Salaam several -days before, and the surveying vessel _Möve_, which was in harbour, -had been blown up by us on the 9th August. This brought the land -forces a valuable military increase, as the captain of the _Möve_, -Lieut.-Commander Zimmer, now came under my orders. Lieutenant Horn at -once proceeded with a few seamen to Kigoma, where he manned and armed -the small steamer _Hedwig von Wissmann_. On Lake Tanganyika he chased -the Belgian steamer _Delcommune_, which he surprised and shot to -pieces after a few days, thereby securing to us the extremely important -command of the lake. The ability rapidly to transfer troops from the -Central Railway towards Bismarckburg or Usambara depended entirely -upon unimpeded transport on Tanganyika, and played a part in the later -course of the operations. - -In the north of the Colony, the 1st Company at Arusha had been -reinforced by the 13th Company, coming by rapid marches from Kondoa, -and by another company formed at Moshi from Police Askari. Further, a -large part of the Europeans of the northern districts had combined to -form a detachment under Captain von Prince. Most of those troops were -in the neighbourhood of Moshi. Taveta, which lies to the eastward, -in English territory, was held by the enemy, who thereby secured a -valuable sally-port against our European settlements in the north; -it was, therefore, an urgent matter for us to capture this important -point without delay. It took considerable time before we were able to -set the force in motion for this purpose. Many people believed that -on the strength of the Congo Act we were bound to remain neutral, and -naturally had little confidence in the instructions they received -from the new Commandant. It was not until the 15th August that the -weakly-held place was taken. The course of the fight proved that -the force still required much further training to render it fit to -carry out combined operations in unison in the dense bush. In this -area the command was assumed by Major Kraut, who happened to be in -the north-eastern frontier district for the purpose of frontier -delimitations. During the next few days the holder of the supreme -military power was successfully persuaded to agree to moving the bulk -of our forces to the Northern Railway. Simple as was this movement in -itself, under the conditions then existing, it required considerable -preparations. There were few Germans to be found who were so well -acquainted with the whole country between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro -on one side, and Tanga and Mombo on the other, that they could give -reliable information about roads and conditions of subsistence. It was -necessary to send out reconnaissance officers in order to determine -the roads on which a suitable quantity of supplies could be found. But -we could not afford to await the results of all these reconnaissances; -the marches had to be begun. According to European ideas the country -was sparsely populated; and on the existing maps the only notes as to -water and food showed whether the supplies available would suffice for -bodies of a strength equal to a company at most. Without preparation -one could therefore hardly put more than one company on each road -without distribution in depth; the training and skill in the collection -of supplies which the force had acquired by the end of the war were -at that time non-existent. Taking it all round, it came to this, that -the march and supply of a single company in the conditions there -prevailing required about the same consideration as would a division in -Germany. It was also necessary in this move to take into account the -risk arising from the fact that companies would for a prolonged period -be out of reach of orders. The only telegraphic communication between -the Central Railway and the north ran close along the coast, and could -therefore be interrupted whenever the enemy intended to do so. - -However, the Director of the Postal Service, Rothe, and Secretary -Krüger displayed such adaptability in meeting the wishes of -the troops, and such energy in starting work on the new line -Morogoro-Handeni-Korogwe, and, under the pressure of circumstances, -temporarily overcame the normal torpor of the Tropics with such -success, that the line was completed in only a few weeks. Owing to the -destructiveness of the termites (white ants) it is the rule in time of -peace to employ iron telegraph poles, which, owing to the prevalence -of giraffe in this particular district, have to be very tall and carry -very heavy conductors. In the first instance, however, the construction -in this case had to be of a provisional nature, and this, and the use -of cable, caused continual breakdowns and repairs. - -In the meantime I received reports of the advance of small hostile -detachments at Jassini, two marches north of Tanga, and this confirmed -me in the belief that the enemy intended to land in that district, -and would then rapidly advance into the interior along the Northern -Railway. Consequently, the various companies had marched off from -different points on the line Dar-es-Salaam-Mpapua, and were for the -most part converging on Handeni, while some were directed on other -points on the line Tanga-Korogwe, when I was called up on the telephone -at Pugu on the afternoon of August 23rd, by Lieutenant von Chappuis, -who was encamped at Bagamoyo with the 17th Field Company. He reported -that an English light cruiser was lying off Bagamoyo, and had called -upon the local Civil Administrator to destroy the telegraph station, -threatening to bombard the place in case of refusal. I ordered him to -assume control of the executive and to prevent a hostile landing by -force of arms. A boat from the man-of-war that attempted to land under -the white flag was therefore sent back, and the place was bombarded -in consequence, to the great amusement of the company and the native -inhabitants, since the enemy scored practically no hits. - -At the end of August, Headquarters moved by rail to Kirnamba, near -Morogoro. On the way, General von Wahle, who was directing the service -on the Lines of Communication from Morogoro, wished me the best of -luck in the decisive action which we expected in the neighbourhood -of Handeni, and to which his son was also proceeding. From there -Headquarters travelled on towards Handeni in two requisitioned motors. -After about twenty miles we had to leave them, as the improvement -of this road had not been completed beyond that point. Captain von -Hammerstein and I went on on bicycles, and gradually caught up the -companies on the march. The anticipated landing of the enemy did not -take place, and early in September we reached Korogwe. In the meantime -an English cruiser had appeared at Tanga and towed away some lighters -lying there. - -Our next duty was to organize the supply and transport services in -the north. Captain Schmid, who had until then directed them as Field -Intendant, had become sick, and it was difficult to find a suitable -successor. Fortunately we discovered one in Captain Feilke, of -the Landwehr, who had for many years directed the Prince Albrecht -Plantations in Usambara, a man of great experience. He was at the time -in the vicinity of Tanga, and had placed himself at the disposal of -the force. He had formerly been Adjutant of the 8th Jäger Battalion, -was fifty-two years of age, a man of much knowledge of the world and a -skilful officer; he thus combined in the happiest manner the military -knowledge and business talent necessary for the difficult post of -Intendant. He came immediately, and we drove to New Moshi together. -There I met Captain Kraut. On Kilima Njaro preparations had been made -for guerilla warfare by establishing supply depots, our patrols were -pushing beyond Taveta towards the British Uganda Railway, and numerous -minor encounters had already taken place. At that time, however, the -force lacked the experience necessary for carrying out distant patrols -like those which at a later stage led so successfully to interruptions -of the line. The first patrols had arrived at the Uganda Railway in -a half-starved condition and had been captured. From New Moshi I -went to Himo Camp, where Captain von Prince was holding a fortified -position. He accompanied me to Taveta, which was held by an advanced -post under an officer. Now we could discuss on the spot the problem of -transferring the main body of the Northern Force to Taveta. The local -native population was very numerous and placed entire confidence in -the European administrators appointed by the force: they continued to -sell their products in the market, and our mutual relationship was -completely satisfactory. - -Directly war broke out the fear of a native rising had been expressed -in many quarters. Along the Central Railway there were wild rumours -about a revolt of the Wahehe—the warlike tribe who had so long defied -German authority in the Iringa country—and around Kilima Njaro a -rising of the Wajagga was feared. The authorities also thought that -the large number of black labourers on the European settlements in -the north were unreliable on account of difficulties of subsistence. -But none of these fears turned out to be justified. Later, a very -intelligent captured Belgian Askari told me outright: “You know quite -well that the natives always side with the stronger party,” and an -English Masai admitted frankly: “It is all the same to us whether the -English or the Germans are our masters.” - -[Illustration: General Map of the Campaign in East Africa. - -—— Track of the German Main Force. 1916-1918.] - -[Illustration: The Fallen. - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -It was not till later, after the enemy had penetrated the country, that -the native became a real danger to us: and then it was, indeed, very -great. The native has a fine sense of the transfer of real power from -one hand to the other. - -After returning for a short time to Korogwe, Headquarters moved to -New Moshi, and shortly afterwards to Taveta. Three companies who had -reached the Northern Railway from the Central Railway were concentrated -at Tanga, the remaining five were moved into the Kilima Njaro country. -At Dar-es-Salaam there remained for the moment only Captain von -Kornatzki with the newly-formed 18th Field Company. - -During the following period several enterprises were carried out by -flying columns, of the strength of one company each, the intention -being to drive away the hostile detachments who were reported to be -guarding the watering-places in the adjoining English territory, to -inflict losses upon them, and so to open the way for our patrols to -operate against the Uganda and Magad Railway. Thus, at the end of -September, Captain Schulz had marched with his company from Kilima -Njaro down the Tsavo River to the Uganda Railway, where he had met -an enemy detachment of several companies, who had probably been -concentrated by means of the railway. North of Kilima Njaro Captain -Tafel had with his company and a detachment of fifty Europeans pursued -a column of English Horse, but had then been attacked by the latter -in his camp in the dense bush on Engito Mountain. This was the first -serious engagement fought by our Askari in the north. Although the -enemy consisted of English and Boer farmers, who were therefore good -horsemen and good shots, our Askari attacked them with the bayonet with -such dash, that out of a strength of eighty Europeans some twenty dead -were left behind, and their total casualties may therefore be estimated -at half their number. - -In the same way the expeditions undertaken by Captain Baumstark, who -commanded the three companies at Tanga, led to fighting in the frontier -districts between Jassini and Mombasa. An equally important object of -all these enterprises was to secure the most indispensable information -about this theatre of operations, as it had not been reconnoitred in -time of peace, and the conditions as to water-supply and cultivation -were unknown to us. In this manner we gradually obtained a clear -idea of the country and its inhabitants. Along the coast the English -frontier district was well settled and highly cultivated. Further -inland it is a dry desert covered with thorn scrub and partly with -thick bush. Out of the desert rise a number of mountain ranges, which -often attain the character of steep masses of rock. The troops were -quartered in several fortified camps east of Kilima Njaro, but, owing -to the difficulty of communication from Taveta, Headquarters were moved -back to Moshi. Later, when the Director of the Field Postal Service -arrived, and I asked him what he thought of the line between Moshi and -Taveta, he could only describe it as “pretty.” The insulators were made -from knocked off bottle-necks, fastened to poles or branches of trees, -the wire had been taken from the fences of the plantations. But the -breakdowns really were so frequent that the great volume of reports and -information in connection with the working of Headquarters could not -have been carried on this line for a prolonged period. - -Since the outbreak of war our communication with the outside world had -been to all intents and purposes cut off; at first, indeed, we did pick -up wireless messages from Kamina (in Togo), and then occasionally, -under favourable weather conditions, from Nauen (Germany); but -otherwise we had to depend for fresh news on picking up enemy wireless -messages, or on obtaining possession of enemy mails or other papers. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE NOVEMBER ACTIONS AT TANGA - - -CAPTURED English newspapers stated that it would be particularly -painful to Germany to lose her beloved colonies, its “little chicks,” -and that German East Africa was the most valuable mouthful. Captured -mails spoke of an impending attack by an Indian expeditionary force of -10,000 men, and, as I had from general considerations always expected a -hostile attack on a large scale in the neighbourhood of Tanga, I went -there at the end of October, drove all over the country in a car I had -brought with me, and discussed the matter on the spot with Captain -Adler, commanding the 17th Company, and with District Commissioner -Auracher. I was pleased to find that the latter was of my opinion that, -in the event of Tanga being seriously threatened, the prime necessity -would be unity of action, and I assured him that I would, of course, -undertake the responsibility for any consequences that might ensue. -This was particularly important for the reason that, according to the -Governor’s instructions, a bombardment of Tanga was to be avoided under -all circumstances. Opinions as to what should be done or left undone in -any given case might therefore differ very widely. - -On the 2nd November, a few days after my return to New Moshi, a wire -from Tanga informed me that fourteen hostile transports and two -cruisers had appeared off the place. They demanded unconditional -surrender of the town; the negotiations were protracted, as District -Commissioner Auracher, who had gone on board, pointed out that he must -obtain special instructions, and prevented the threatened bombardment -by remarking that Tanga was an open and undefended place. Captain -Baumstark, who was with two companies in the frontier district -north of Tanga, was at once moved off towards Tanga. Similarly the -two companies of Europeans and the Askari companies were moved by -forced marches from near Taveta and Kilima Njaro to New Moshi. Two -lorries which were employed on supply work between New Moshi and -Taveta rendered valuable service in this move. My intention to collect -all available troops as rapidly as possible, to meet the obviously -impending landing at Tanga, could only be executed, in spite of -the long marches expected of the troops, if the Northern Railway -exerted its capacity to the utmost limit, and this, with only eight -locomotives, was asking a great deal. The railway is a narrow gauge -line of 190 miles, on which, in a fully-loaded train of 24 to 32 -axles, only one company could be carried with complete baggage, or two -companies without either baggage or carriers. That the transport of the -troops could be carried out at all is entirely due to the willingness -of all those connected with it—I specially mention Railway Commissary -Kröber, who had been called up to the Force as a 2nd Lieutenant, and -the traffic director Kühlwein—who at Tanga conducted the trains up on -to the actual battlefield under fire. As early as the 2nd November the -troops actually at New Moshi, one and a half companies, were pushed -off by train, followed on the morning of the 3rd by Headquarters and -another company. Three other companies followed later. Similarly, all -the smaller detachments employed on railway protection duty were moved -to Tanga. The spirit of the departing troops was magnificent, but this -may have been due, not so much to the fact that the Askari clearly -understood the gravity of the situation, as that for him a trip in a -railway train is at all times a great delight. - -[Illustration: Fig. iv. Battle of Tanga. Fig. v. The Northern Railway.] - -Headquarters reached Korogwe in the evening of the 3rd November. I -went to the hospital that had been established there and talked to -the wounded who had come in from the action at Tanga on the 3rd. One -of them, Lieutenant Merensky, of the Landwehr, reported to me that on -the 2nd November, outpost and patrol encounters had taken place near -Ras-Kasone, and that on the 3rd the enemy, apparently several thousand -strong, who had landed at Ras-Kasone, had attacked the 17th Company -east of Tanga. The latter, reinforced by the Europeans and Police -Askari from Tanga under Lieutenant Auracher, had withstood the attack -until the first one and a half companies coming from New Moshi joined -in, rushing at once to attack the left flank of the enemy and driving -him back. Lieutenant Merensky had the impression that the enemy was -completely defeated, and that the attack was unlikely to be repeated. -The telegrams coming in piecemeal during the railway journey had not -afforded me a clear idea of the situation, when at 3 a.m. on the 4th -November, Headquarters left the railway four miles west of Tanga, -where we met Captain Baumstark. He had formed a different estimate of -the situation, and believed that, owing to the great superiority of -the enemy, Tanga could not be held against another attack. He had, -therefore, on the evening of the 3rd November, collected his own two -companies coming from the north, and the troops who had that day been -in action at Tanga, at a point four miles west of the town, leaving -patrols only in the place itself. - -Whether Tanga was held by the enemy or not was not certain. Strong -officers’ patrols were at once pushed forward beyond Tanga towards -Ras-Kasone. Luckily Headquarters had brought a few bicycles, and so, in -order to satisfy myself quickly by personal observation, I was able to -go off at once with Captain von Hammerstein and Volunteer Dr. Dessel -to the railway station at Tanga, where I found an advanced post of the -6th Field Company. They, however, could give no accurate information -about the enemy, and so I rode on through the empty streets of the -town. It was completely deserted, and the white houses of the Europeans -reflected the brilliant rays of the moon into the streets which we -traversed. So we reached the harbour at the further edge of the town. -Tanga was therefore clear of the enemy. A quarter of a mile out lay the -transports, a blaze of lights, and full of noise: there was no doubt -that the landing was about to commence at once. I much regretted that -our artillery—we had two guns of 1873 pattern—was not yet up. Here, -in the brilliant moonlight, at such close range, their effect would -have been annihilating, the hostile cruisers notwithstanding. - -We then rode on towards Ras-Kasone, left our bicycles in the German -Government Hospital, and went on foot to the beach, close to which, -right in front of us, lay an English cruiser. On the way back, at the -hospital, we were challenged, apparently by an Indian sentry—we did -not understand the language—but saw nothing. We got on our cycles -again and rode back. Day began to break, and on our left we heard -the first shots. This was the officers’ patrol under 2nd Lieutenant -Bergmann, of the 6th Field Company, who had met hostile patrols west -of Ras-Kasone. One of my cyclists now brought Captain Baumstark the -order to advance at once with all the troops to Tanga Station. For -the manner in which I proposed to fight the action, which was now to -be expected with certainty, the nature of the country was one of the -decisive factors. In the north, the houses of the European town at the -harbour provided cover from view, and therefore also from the fire of -the cruisers close by. The town was surrounded by continuous cocoanut -and rubber plantations, which extended almost to Ras-Kasone, and in -which, besides the native town, a few native patches of cultivation -were scattered about. Undergrowth occurred along a few points and the -ground was absolutely flat. It was probable that the enemy, whether he -landed at Ras-Kasone only, or simultaneously at several points, such -as Mwambani, for instance, would press upon our south, or right, wing. -Here, to the south of Tanga, the ground afforded us also the prospect -of greater power of manœuvre. I decided to meet the attack, which I -expected with certainty, on the eastern edge of Tanga, and to echelon -strong reserves behind our right wing for a counter-attack against the -enemy’s flank. - -In allotting the various duties it was necessary to consider the -peculiarities of the different units. At that time each company had -different characteristics, according to its composition and its state -of training. The good 6th Field Company, which had in time of peace -received a careful training at Ujiji with both rifle and machine-gun, -was ordered to hold the eastern edge of Tanga on a broad front. On -its right rear, outside Tanga, was echeloned Baumstark’s battalion, -consisting of the 16th and 17th Companies, formed from the Police, and -several small units amalgamated into one company. To the right rear -again, on the telegraph-road Tanga-Pangani, I kept three good companies -at my own disposal, the 7th and 8th Rifle Companies, with three -machine-guns, composed of Europeans, and the 13th Field Company with -its four machine-guns. Headquarters remained for the present on the -Tanga-Pangani road and connected up to the telegraph line there. The -4th and 9th Field Companies and the two field guns (Captain Hering’s -Battery) were still on the way, and the time of their arrival was -uncertain. So the situation remained essentially until the afternoon. -In the hot sun of the Coast area we suffered not a little from thirst, -but quenched it with the milk of the young cocoanuts. There were other -drinks as well in Tanga at that time; we still had wine and soda-water. -Master-butcher Grabow even brought the troops hot sausages. - -The proceedings on board the hostile ships were kept under constant -close observation. We saw every boat that left them, and its load. -I estimated the total troops landed up to midday at 6,000. But even -on this too low estimate I had to ask myself whether I dared risk a -decisive engagement with my thousand rifles. For various reasons I -decided that I would do so. It was too important to prevent the enemy -from gaining a firm footing in Tanga. Otherwise we should abandon to -him the best base for operations against the Northern territories; in -his advance the Northern Railway would afford him an admirable line -of communication, and he would be enabled continually to surprise -us by bringing up and pushing forward fresh troops and stores. Then -it was certain that we would be unable to hold the Northern Railway -any longer and that we would be obliged to abandon our hitherto so -successful method of warfare. Against these all-important practical -reasons, limited considerations such as the Governor’s order to avoid a -bombardment of Tanga under all circumstances could not prevail. - -A few circumstances there were that favoured us. For one thing, from -personal experience in East Asia, I knew the clumsiness with which -English troops were moved and led in battle, and it was certain that -in the very close and completely unknown country in which the enemy -would find himself directly he landed, these difficulties would grow -to infinity. The slightest disorder was bound to have far-reaching -consequences. With my troops, of whom the Europeans were well -acquainted with the country round Tanga, while the Askari were at home -in the bush, I had a reasonable prospect of taking advantage of the -enemy’s weak points by skilful and rapid manœuvre. - -On the other hand, if the affair miscarried, it would be a bad -business. Already my method of waging active war had met with -disapproval. If on top of that we were to suffer a severe defeat the -confidence of the troops would probably be gone, and it was certain -that my superiors would place insuperable difficulties in the way of my -exercising command. My decision was not easy, and as if the military -situation alone did not render it difficult enough, it was made -unnecessarily harder by the fact that the regulations did not allow -sufficient freedom to the responsible commander. But there was nothing -for it: to gain all we must risk all. - -The same morning I personally ordered Captain von Prince to move into -Tanga with his two companies of Europeans, so that, in case of an -attack on the Askari Company holding the eastern edge of the place, -he could intervene rapidly without orders. I had already begun to -doubt whether the enemy would attack at all on the 4th November, when -at 3 p.m. an Askari reported to me in his simple, smart way: “Adui -tayari.” (The enemy is ready.) Those two short words I shall never -forget. The next moment the rifle fire opened along the whole front, -and one could only judge of the rapid development and the ebb and -flow of the action from the direction of the firing. One heard the -fire draw in from the eastern edge of the town to the middle: so the -6th Company had been driven back at this point. The enemy, with odds -twenty to one in his favour, had penetrated close up to the station -and into the town. Captain von Prince had immediately rushed up his -two companies of Europeans and at once prevailed upon the brave Askari -to stand and then to advance once more. The British North Lancashire -Regiment, consisting only of long-service Europeans, 800 strong, was -driven back with heavy losses, and the houses captured by the Indian -Brigade (Kashmir Rifles), who were advancing between that regiment and -the beach, were re-taken in stubborn street-fighting. But on the south -side of Tanga Captain Baumstark had also brought his companies into -action on the front, and after about one hour’s fighting I observed -the Askari at this point retiring through the palm-trees to the -Tanga-Pangani road. The European members of Headquarters at once ran -there and stopped them. To this day I can see the fiery and determined -Captain von Hammerstein, full of fury, throwing an empty bottle at the -head of a retreating Askari. After all, they were for the most part -young companies, only just formed, who were fighting at this point, -and they had been staggered by the intensity of the enemy’s fire. But -when we Europeans got in front of them and laughed at them they quickly -recovered themselves and saw that every bullet did not hit. But on the -whole the pressure on our front was so strong that I thought I could -not delay the decision any longer and must start my counter-stroke. -For this I had now but one company available, but it was the good 13th -Field Company. The 4th Company, whose arrival I was most anxiously -awaiting every minute, had not yet arrived. - -The course of the action up till now had shown that the enemy’s front, -of which the flank was unprotected, did not reach further south than -the right wing of our own. Here, therefore, the counter-stroke must -prove annihilating, and no witness will forget the moment when the -machine-guns of the 13th Company opened a continuous fire at this -point and completely reversed the situation. The whole front jumped up -and dashed forward with enthusiastic cheers. In the meantime the 4th -Company had arrived; although, in consequence of a misunderstanding, -it did not prolong the outer flank of the 13th, but pushed in between -the latter and our front, still it did take an effective part in the -battle before dark. In wild disorder the enemy fled in dense masses, -and our machine-guns, converging on them from front and flanks, mowed -down whole companies to the last man. Several Askari came in beaming -with delight with several captured English rifles on their backs and an -Indian prisoner in each hand. The handcuffs, however, which we found in -their possession for use with German prisoners, were not used on them -by any of us. - -At this time, in the dense forest, all units, and in many instances -friend and foe, were mixed up together, everybody was shouting at -once in all sorts of languages, darkness was rapidly setting in; it -is only necessary to conjure up this scene in imagination in order to -understand how it was that the pursuit which I set in motion failed -completely. I had been stationed on the right wing, and had quickly -despatched such units as were within reach at the moment to push with -energy towards Ras-Kasone. Then I had gone to the left wing. There -I found hardly any of our people at all; it was not till some time -afterwards, in the night, that I heard the sound of the nailed boots of -a party of Askari. I was glad at last to have a force in hand, but was -somewhat disappointed to find it was a detachment of the right wing, -under 2nd Lieutenant Langen, who had missed the way to Ras-Kasone and -had thus got on to our left wing. But even these difficulties were not -all. In some inexplicable way the troops imagined a Headquarter order -had been issued that they were to return to their old camp west of -Tanga. Only during the course of the night, at Tanga Railway Station, -did it become clear to me that nearly all the companies had marched off -for that destination. Of course they were ordered to return at once. -But unfortunately this caused so much delay that it was impossible -to bring Hering’s Battery, which had arrived later, into action by -moonlight against the ships. - -The troops, whose great exhaustion was quite comprehensible, did not -get back to Tanga until the morning of the 5th November, and occupied -essentially the same position as the day before. It was not now -advisable to advance with all our forces against the enemy, who was -re-embarking at Ras-Kasone, as the country there was entirely open, -and commanded by the cruisers lying in its immediate vicinity. All the -same, the strong patrols and individual companies, who advanced towards -Ras-Kasone, in order to harass the enemy, succeeded in surprising -him by machine-gun fire directed on various detachments, a few boats, -and even the decks of the cruiser lying close to the hospital. During -the day, the impression that the enemy had suffered a tremendous -defeat grew stronger and stronger. It is true, the full extent of his -losses did not become known to us all at once; but the many places -where hundreds and hundreds of dead were piled up in heaps, and the -smell of putrefaction which the tropical sun brought out all over the -district, gave us some indication. Very cautiously we estimated the -killed at about 800, but I believe this number to be far too low. A -senior English officer, who had accurate knowledge of the details, -told me later, on the occasion of an action in which he stated the -English casualties to have been 1,500, that the losses at Tanga had -been considerably greater. I now think that even 2,000 is too low an -estimate. Even greater was the enemy’s loss in _moral_. He almost -began to believe in spirits and spooks; years afterwards I was asked -by English officers whether we had used trained bees at Tanga, but I -may now perhaps betray the fact that at the decisive moment all the -machine-guns of one of our companies were put out of action by these -same “trained bees,” so that we suffered from this new “training” quite -as much as the English. - -The enemy felt himself completely defeated, and he was. His troops -had fled in wild confusion and thrown themselves head over heels -into the lighters. The possibility of renewing the attack was not -even considered. From prisoners’ statements and captured official -English documents it was ascertained that the whole Anglo-Indian -Expeditionary Force of 8,000 men had been thus decisively beaten by -our force of little more than 1,000 men. Not till the evening did we -realize the magnitude of this victory, when an English officer, Captain -Meinertshagen, came under a flag of truce to negotiate with Captain von -Hammerstein, my representative, for the handing over of the wounded. -Captain von Hammerstein proceeded to the hospital, which was full of -severely wounded English officers, and in my name agreed to their being -removed by the English on giving their word of honour not to fight -against us again in this war. - -The booty in arms enabled us to re-arm more than three companies with -modern weapons, for which the sixteen machine-guns were particularly -welcome. The _moral_ of the force and its confidence in its leaders had -enormously increased, and at one blow I was delivered from a great part -of the difficulties which so greatly impeded the conduct of operations. -The continuous fire of the ships’ guns, which the closeness of the -country had rendered ineffective, had lost its terrors for our brave -blacks. The quantity of stores captured was also considerable; besides -600,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition the enemy had left behind -the whole of his telephone gear and such quantities of clothing and -equipment that we were able to meet all our requirements, especially in -warm coats and blankets, for at least a year. Our own losses, painful -though they were, were numerically insignificant. About fifteen (?) -Europeans, among them the splendid Captain von Prince, and fifty-four -(?) Askari and machine-gun carriers, had fallen. The Europeans were -buried in a worthy warriors’ grave in the shade of a fine Buyu tree, -where a simple memorial tablet is inscribed with their names. The work -of clearing up the battlefield and burying the dead meant several -days of most strenuous work for the whole force, as the streets were -literally strewn with dead and badly wounded. In unknown tongues they -begged for help which, with the best will in the world, could not -always be accorded at once. - -At our main dressing station, in Tanga itself, our male and female -nursing personnel had conscientiously cared for friend and foe even -under the fire of the heavy guns of the ships. As recently as the -evening of the 4th November I had been to see the wounded. I little -thought that Lieutenant Schottstaedt, who was sitting there on a chair -with a severe wound in the chest, had but a few minutes to live. The -English Lieutenant Cook, of the 101st Indian Grenadiers, lay there with -a bad gun-shot wound in the leg. This bright young officer, who had -fallen into our hands in the hottest part of the fight on the Indian -left wing, maintained his cheerfulness in spite of his wound. With the -bulk of the other wounded, he was treated for nine months in the Field -Hospital at Korogwe by our best surgeon, _Stabsarzt_ Dr. Müller. He -was already walking about once more, when an unfortunate fall on the -stairs caused his death. - -The fighting at Tanga was the first occasion on which heavy demands -were made on our arrangements for the care of the wounded. For this -purpose, hospitals had been established at Korogwe and at various other -points on the Northern Railway, to which the sick could be taken by -rail without being transferred from one method of transport to another. -No special hospital arrangements of a permanent nature had been made -for transport, but we never had any difficulty in improvising what was -necessary. - -In spite of their undoubted defeat at Tanga it was probable that -British determination would not accept this decision as final. Even -after his defeat the enemy was still several times as strong as we -were, and would not improbably attempt another landing elsewhere. But -a cycle ride on the 6th November to Mansa Bay, in the North, convinced -me that the hostile ships had run in there only for the purpose of -attending to their wounded and burying their dead and had no intention -of landing. And the ships actually did steam off towards Zanzibar soon -after. At that time it was interesting to me to visit our Government -Hospital near Ras-Kasone, which had in the meantime been evacuated by -the English wounded released on parole. Among others I saw here two -German officers who had been wounded at Tanga on the 3rd November, and -others who had been wounded in an earlier action; from the hospital -they had been able to observe events behind the English front on the -4th November, the day when the principal fighting took place. With the -greatest excitement they had watched the landing at Ras-Kasone and the -advance on Tanga; in the afternoon they had heard the opening of our -decisive machine-gun fire and the bombardment by the ships’ guns, and -had then witnessed the wild flight of the enemy close by the hospital. -The numerous shells that had fallen near the hospital had fortunately -done no damage. Quite early on the 5th November they had suddenly heard -guns firing again, this time from the direction of Tanga; they realized -that they must be German guns. They were in fact our two 1873 pattern -field-guns, which, though too late to deal with the English transports -by moonlight, had at least managed to secure a few hits after daybreak. -A prolonged fire for effect was now unfortunately impossible, as the -smoke disclosed the positions of the guns at once and drew the fire of -the ships. - -In the meantime it had become evident that the attack at Tanga was -not an isolated enterprise, but had been intended to form part of a -simultaneous operation on a large scale. Suddenly in the morning mist, -on the 3rd November, English troops appeared north-west of Kilima -Njaro, at Longido Mountain, which was held by Captain Kraut with three -Companies of Askari and a Mounted Company of Europeans. Just as orders -reached Longido Mountain by heliograph directing Captain Kraut to move -off to Moshi, the first shell arrived. The enemy, about 1,000 strong, -had ascended the great mountain, which lies by itself in the open -plain, at several points, being guided by Masai, who called out to -the outposts: “We belong to Captain Kraut’s men.” But our three Field -Companies deployed rapidly and succeeded in working round the enemy -detachment in the rocky ground and quickly repelled them. A hostile -detachment of mounted Europeans who became visible in the plain at the -foot of the mountain, and apparently intended to ascend it from the -south, or to act against our communications, was fired upon with effect -and quickly driven off. - -Probably in connection with these events on the Northern Railway, -hostile enterprises took place on Lake Victoria. At the end of October -numerous Waganda warriors had penetrated from the North into the Bukoba -district. To meet this menace, a force of 570 rifles, 4 machine-guns, -and 2 guns left Muanza on the 31st October on board the small steamer -_Muanza_, with 2 tugs and 10 dhows (boats). Soon after the landing -these transports were attacked by English steamers, but got back to -Muanza without damage. An English attempt to land at Kayense, north of -Muanza, broke down under the fire of our detachment posted there. - -Thus, at the beginning of November we were confronted with a concentric -attack on our Colony, planned on a large scale. Its failure made -everyone expect that we would be able to hold our own as long as the -home country could do so. But such scanty information as we could get -from there gave us confidence. At the time of the action at Tanga we -had, indeed, not heard the name of Hindenburg; but on the other hand we -knew nothing of our reverse on the Marne, and were still buoyed up by -the impression created by our victorious invasion of France. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -AWAITING FURTHER EVENTS - - -THE danger threatening the Kilima Njaro country appeared to me to be -by itself a sufficient reason for rapidly moving the troops back to -the vicinity of New Moshi after the decisive success of Tanga, which -in any event could not be further exploited. The joy of the Northern -settlers, who, it should be noted, had furnished the bulk of the -Europeans who fought at Tanga, was indescribable. The first train, -which carried the European Company, returned to New Moshi bedecked -with flowers. I myself had still enough to do at Tanga, and did not -follow the troops to New Moshi for several days, where Headquarters -was reopened. Shortage of personnel prevented us from having separate -people for each duty. Officers of Headquarters had sometimes in an -emergency to act as riflemen or cyclists, the Intendant occasionally -did duty as an orderly, the clerk went into action with a rifle and -acted as orderly in battle. The work was greatly facilitated by the -fact that the railway station, constructed on European lines, afforded -us accommodation which, in spite of being rather small, enabled us to -settle most matters affecting the Staff only by word of mouth. We had -good telephone and telegraph installations, and were situated centrally -as the telephone and road systems, which we had either made or -perfected, and which led out in both directions towards Tanga, Taveta, -East Kilima Njaro, West Kilima Njaro and Longido, as well as to Arusha. -Sometimes the work would go on for a week at a time almost as in peace, -although the volume of work to be dealt with was greater. But although -hardly anybody at Headquarters was either trained or prepared for his -functions, harmonious and successful co-operation was secured. It was -based upon the best spirit, devotion to the cause, and the support of -good comradeship. - -I myself went by car—for we had made a motor-road right up to Longido -Mountain—to the Engare-Nairobi (cold river), a small stream rising on -the northern slopes of Kilima Njaro, and flowing between it and Longido -through the prairie in a north-westerly direction. In this country -a number of Boer families were settled on farms. Kraut’s detachment -had moved their camp there, as their supplies, if they had remained -on Longido Mountain, would have had to make a two-days’ march across -the prairie, where they could not be protected, and were, therefore, -too uncertain. I satisfied myself that there was at this time no -opportunity for any enterprises north of Kilima Njaro, and returned -to New Moshi. The distance from New Moshi, where we collected a large -proportion of the supplies coming from Usambara and the country further -south by rail to Taveta, is thirty miles. Although we had available -only a few motors, namely, three cars and three lorries all told, they -were in the circumstances a considerable help. The road being well -made, the three-ton lorries could do the trip out and back in one -day in dry weather. As carriers took at least four days for the same -journey a calculation showed that one lorry could do the work of six -hundred carriers, who required subsistence in addition. The principle, -later maintained by the English, of replacing carriers and pack-animals -by mechanical transport, is further supported by the fact that men and -animals suffered severely from tropical diseases, whereas mosquitos -are powerless against automobiles. We, however, could not derive full -benefit from this advantage, since we had so few motors. Even in this -period, which, as far as transport was concerned, was one of quiet -and regularity, we had constantly to fall back upon carriers. To this -day I remember the joy of the Intendant when a column of six hundred -Wassukuma carriers arrived at New Moshi from about Muanza; they brought -rice, which was urgently needed, from Lake Victoria, via Kondoa-Irangi -to Kilima Njaro. If one remembers that this march required at least -thirty days, that the carrier needs one kg. (two lbs.) of food a day, -and that his maximum load is twenty-five kg. (fifty-five lbs.), it -is clear that these marches have to be arranged with great care and -directed through well populated and fertile districts if this method of -transport is to be of any value. If, in spite of these disadvantages, -carrier transport had to be resorted to on a large scale, it only shows -up the supply-difficulties we had to contend with. The Intendant, -Captain Feilke, was, however, a past master in handling the men and -looking after them. The carriers felt that they were well cared for, -and the word “Kommando,” which some of them took as a personal name, -became quite common. I myself was able, by means of the motors, to -carry out many reconnaissances and inspections of the troops. I could -reach Taveta, to which place some of the troops from Tanga returned, in -two hours from New Moshi; this would otherwise have taken four days; -later on I drove in one day from New Moshi to the Engare-Nairobi, round -the west side of the whole of Meru Mountain, and back to New Moshi, a -journey which could hardly have been accomplished with carriers in less -than ten days. - -The success at Tanga called forth and revived the determination to -resist all over the Colony. - -At Morogoro, on the 26th November, the Inspector of Lines of -Communication, Major-General Wahle, succeeded in obtaining the -Governor’s consent to the defence of Dar-es-Salaam in case of -attack. As luck would have it, this consent was given just in time. -On the 28th, two men-of-war, a transport and a tug, appeared off -Dar-es-Salaam, and demanded to inspect our ships lying in the harbour. -Among others, there was the _Tabora_, of the German East African Line, -which had been converted into a hospital-ship. As the English had on a -previous occasion declared that they did not consider themselves bound -by any agreement about Dar-es-Salaam, fresh negotiations would have -been necessary every time we wanted to escape a threatened bombardment. -Thus an endless screw was created. I now wired that the entry into -the harbour of a pinnace, demanded by the English, was to be resisted -by force of arms. Unfortunately, however, it had been conceded by the -German civil authority, against my opinion, and the Senior Officer -present at Dar-es-Salaam felt himself bound. The English, however, -came in, not with the one pinnace which had been agreed to, but with -several small vessels, and then proceeded to carry out demolitions on -board the _Tabora_, and even took some of her crew prisoners. This made -it only too evident, even to those who had hitherto been doubtful, how -misplaced our previous compliance had been. Captain von Kornatzky was -just in time to open effective machine-gun fire on the small English -vessels as they passed out by the narrow English harbour entrance. -Unfortunately, on this occasion, one of the German prisoners was also -hit. The necessary defensive measures had simply not been adopted in -time. This is a small example of the dangers and disadvantages that -arise when, in time of war, the military commander is constantly -interfered with in his decisions, and in the execution of operations -which are in the nature of things inevitable. - -And, after all, the subsequent bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam did no harm -worth mentioning, for the damage done to a few houses can hardly be -considered as serious. - -During the time of comparatively sedentary warfare at New Moshi the -material side of life was also pleasant. The Europeans, who mostly -belonged to the settler community of the northern territories, provided -most of their subsistence themselves; abundant supplies of rice, -wheat-flour, bananas, pineapples, European fruit, coffee and potatoes, -came in from the plantations. Sugar was provided by the numerous -factories, and our principal supply of salt came from the Gottorp salt -works, on the Central Railway, between Tabora and Lake Tanganyika. Many -plantations devoted themselves entirely to supplying the troops, and, -owing to the abundant labour available this change in production caused -no difficulties. But the transport system had also to work at high -pressure. The great road leading from Kimamba to Mombo and Korogwe, -on the Northern Railway, was continuously improved, so as to carry -the transport of the products from the area of the Tanganyika Railway -and further South, to the North. On this line alone at least eight -thousand carriers were continuously employed. It soon proved to be -practical not to make the carriers do the whole distance of a hundred -and ninety miles, but to distribute them on different stages. This made -it possible to quarter them permanently and to look after their health. -Experts in hygiene travelled up and down the road, and did what was -humanly possible for the health of the carriers, especially against -dysentery and typhoid. In this manner we established along this very -frequented route permanent carrier-camps a day’s march apart, in which -the men were accommodated at first in extemporized huts, which were -later properly completed. Camp discipline was strictly regulated. In -order to provide also for the many Europeans passing through, small -houses with concrete floors were put up; and individuals were enabled -to subsist on the supplies held on the line of communication, without -having to burden themselves with provisions to last for a prolonged -period, as is customary on journeys in Africa. The work on this line of -supply was the object of constant attention. Both Europeans and natives -had still to learn how to ensure the co-operation of such masses of -men, and to understand the importance of order and discipline in the -working of the transport for the health of all concerned. - -At New Moshi Station both telephone and telegraph were working day -and night. Where the whole organization had to be improvised friction -was not altogether unavoidable. All the members of Headquarters were -extraordinarily hard-worked. But we did have bright intervals during -the strenuous work. The abundance of creature comforts enjoyed by -the Europeans in the North was shared by us at Headquarters. We were -literally spoilt by the number of gifts sent us by private individuals. -If one of us travelled on the Northern Railway, on which in time of -peace it was difficult to obtain a little food for love or money, he -was now cared for by someone at almost every station. I remember when -Lieut. Freiherr von Schroetter returned to New Moshi, very famished, -after carrying out some very exhausting patrols in the country north of -Erok Mountain. After having, according to normal ideas, been thoroughly -well fed from seven o’clock till eleven, he shyly asked if he might -have some supper. The next morning he started on fourteen days’ leave -to his plantation in Usambara, in order to recuperate and attend to -his business. After breakfast we gave him coffee, bread, butter and -meat, to take with him in the train, and had warned the various railway -stations to look after this completely famished patroller. So, after -half an hour, the station guard at Kahe offered him another breakfast, -at Lembeni the charming wife of the Station Commandant had baked him -a cake, and at Lame he was looked after by the commander of the local -Recruit Depot, Sergt.-Major Reinhardt. At Makanya the guard, Planter -Baroy, who belonged to the country, brought him home-made chocolate and -bullocks’ hearts—a fruit the size of a melon—at Buiko the hospitable -traffic manager of the Northern Railway, Kuehlwein, who had so often -entertained us in passing through, had prepared him a delicate meal. At -Mombo, where the supplies from the Usambara Mountains were collected, -and where we had established most of our workshops, our protégé was met -by Warrant Officer Meyer, of the Navy, with a sustaining supper. But -then we got a telegram: “Please do not order any more, I can’t eat any -more.” - -Although this continuous feeding shows a spirit of sympathetic chaff at -the expense of the starving subaltern, it also proves, better than any -theoretical dissertations, how intimately all classes of the population -of the northern districts worked in with the troops, and how they tried -to anticipate our every wish. This co-operation continued as long as -the troops remained in the North. - -Whenever duty gave us a chance we arranged for change and recuperation. -On Sundays we often went out together near New Moshi for a cheery day’s -shooting. Both carriers and Askari soon picked up their business as -beaters, and drove the game towards us in exemplary order, with loud -shouts of “Huyu, huyu:” “There he is.” For variety of game the country -provided more than one would be likely to find anywhere in Europe: -hare, various dwarf antelopes, guinea-fowl, several relatives of the -partridge, duck, bush-buck, water-buck, lynx, several kinds of wild -boar, small kudu, jackal and many other kinds of game abounded. Once, I -remember, to my astonishment, a lion silently appeared fifteen paces in -front of me. Unfortunately I had my gun in my hand, and before I could -put up my rifle, which was on my knees, he had as silently disappeared. -In the teeming Kilima Njaro country, and even more east of Taveta, our -shooting expeditions provided a welcome increase to our meat supply. -But in the main this depended on the cattle which the Masai brought us -from the Kilima Njaro and Meru country, but which also came from far -away near Lake Victoria. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE NORTH-EAST - - -BY the time we kept Christmas in the Mission Church at New Moshi, and -afterwards in our mess in the Railway Station, the military situation -north of Tanga had become sufficiently acute to indicate that decisive -events in this quarter were probable. During the last days of December, -our patrols, who in that district were on British territory, had been -gradually pushed back, and had concentrated south of Jassini, on German -territory. The combined force amounted to two companies and a corps of -some two hundred Arabs. The enemy had obviously been reinforced, and -occupied the buildings of the German plantation of Jassini. It looked -as though he intended to push gradually forward along the coast to -Tanga, securing the occupied country by a system of block-houses. In -order to investigate matters on the spot, I travelled early in January -with Capt. von Hammerstein to Tanga, and thence by car to Capt. Adler’s -camp at Mwurnoni, using the newly-completed coast road to the north, a -distance of thirty-eight miles. Lieut. Bleeck, of the Reserve, whose -numerous successful patrols in that country rendered him particularly -suitable for the purpose, accompanied me on my reconnaissance, from -which I learned that the country for miles round Jassini consisted -principally of a cocoanut plantation belonging to the German East -African Company, which was also planted with sisal, a species of agave -with sharp thorns. This sisal, which formed a dense undergrowth among -the palms, was in many places so interlaced that one could only force -one’s way through by enduring a quantity of very unpleasant pricks. It -is, of course, always difficult to make plans for an action in country -so totally unknown to one without the aid of a map, and relying only -on the reports of patrols. In this case we got over the difficulty as -Lieut. Schaefer, of the Reserve, who had been called to the colours, -had for years held the post of Assistant on this plantation, and could -therefore furnish exact information. A tolerably accurate sketch was -prepared, and the battle-names allotted to various localities were -entered on it. The general situation appeared to be that Jassini -was an advanced post, and that the main body of the enemy was in -fortified camps further north. It was to be assumed that an attack -on the advanced post of Jassini would entice the main body to leave -its camps and fight in the open (sic!). My plan was to take advantage -of this possibility. In order to engage the enemy while hurrying -from his places of assembly to the assistance of the advanced post, -in favourable tactical conditions, I intended to place my troops in -readiness on his probable lines of advance, in such a manner that he -would have to run up against them. - -In this closely-settled country supply presented no difficulty, and -the necessary carriers could be provided by the numerous European -plantations. So the companies ordered up by telegraph from New Moshi -had only to be accompanied by their machine-gun and ammunition -carriers, a considerable advantage in arranging for their railway -journey. This was accomplished rapidly and without friction, thanks to -the proved capacity of the Commandant of the Line, Lieutenant Kroeber, -retired, of the Landwehr, and the understanding and consuming zeal with -which the whole personnel of the railway bore the unavoidable strain -without a murmur. - -By the 16th January the companies from New Moshi had detrained a couple -of miles west of Tanga, and at once marched off towards Jassini, -as well as the troops from Tanga, for the immediate protection of -which only one company was left behind. On the evening of the 17th -January the force of nine companies, with two guns, was assembled at -Totohown plantation, seven miles south of Jassini, and orders for the -attack were issued for the following morning. Major Kepler, with two -companies, was directed to attack the village of Jassini, working -round by the right, and Captain Adler, with two more companies, -had a similar task on the left. To the north-west, on the road from -Semanya, was posted the Arab corps. Captain Otto, with the 9th Company, -advanced frontally by the main road on Jassini, followed immediately -by Headquarters and the main body, consisting of the European Company, -three Askari Companies, and two guns. The marches were so arranged that -the attacks on Jassini should take place simultaneously at daybreak, -and that all columns should mutually support each other by pushing on -with energy. Even before daybreak the first shots fell in the vicinity -of Kepler’s column, a few minutes later firing began in front of us -with Otto’s column, and then became general. It was impossible in the -endless dense palm forest to obtain an even approximate idea of what -was really happening. We were, however, already so close up to the -hostile position at Jassini, that the enemy seemed to be surprised, -in spite of his excellent intelligence service. This supposition was -afterwards, in part at least, confirmed. Of our rapid concentration -south of Jassini, and our immediate attack with such strong forces, the -enemy had actually had no idea. - -Otto’s column quickly drove back an entrenched post in its front, and -Headquarters now made a circuit to the left through the forest, where -first one, and then two more companies, were put in so as to outflank -Jassini. What seemed curious was that in this move we came under a very -well-aimed fire at short range, possibly no more than 200 yards; and -it was not till much later that we learned that the enemy had not only -a weak post in Jassini, but that four companies of Indians were also -established there in a strongly constructed and excellently concealed -fort. Suddenly Captain von Hammerstein, who was walking behind me, -collapsed; he had been shot in the abdomen. Deeply as this affected me, -at the moment I had to leave my badly-wounded comrade in the hands of -the doctor. A few days later the death of this excellent officer tore a -gap in the ranks of our Staff which was hard to fill. - -The fighting had become very hot. Two companies, although their -commanders, Lieuts. Gerlich and Spalding, had fallen had quickly -captured the fortified buildings of Jassini by a brilliant charge, and -had now established themselves close in front of the enemy’s position. -Soon the intervention of the enemy’s main force made itself felt. From -the direction of Wanga, in the north-east, strong hostile columns -arrived and suddenly appeared close in front of our companies, lying -close to the fortifications of Jassini. The enemy made three strong -attacks at this point and was each time repulsed. Hostile columns also -arrived from the north and north-west. Against that from the west the -Arab corps had done badly; the day before many of them had urgently -demanded their discharge. Now, when they were to lie in ambush on -the enemy’s road of advance, the tension became too great for them. -Instead of surprising the enemy by an annihilating fire, they fired -blindly into the air and then bolted. But luckily these hostile columns -then came on Captain Adler’s two companies, and were repulsed with -slaughter. Up till then the whole action had been in the nature of an -energetic assault; even the last reserve, the European Company, had, at -its urgent request, been sent into action. Towards noon the fighting -had everywhere become stationary before the strong defences of the -enemy. We had, as a matter of fact, no means of making a sufficient -impression on them, and even our field-guns, which we placed in -position at two hundred yards, produced no decisive effect. The heat -was insupportable, and, as at Tanga, everyone quenched his thirst with -young cocoanuts. I myself went with Lieut. Bleeck to the right wing, to -find out how things were going with Major Kepler’s column. At that time -I had not yet obtained a clear idea of the enemy’s defences, and so, on -the sands of a clear and open creek, which was then dry, we again came -under a very well-aimed fire. From a distance of five hundred yards -the bullets fell close to us, and the spurts of sand they threw up -made correction easy. The sand was so deep and the heat so great that -one could only run, or even walk quickly, for a few paces at a time. -Most of the time we had to walk slowly across the open and bear the -unpleasant fire as best we could. Fortunately it did no serious harm, -although one bullet through my hat and another through my arm showed -that it was well meant. On the way back from the right wing our thirst -and exhaustion were so great that several gentlemen, who were usually -by no means on bad terms with each other, had a serious difference of -opinion about a cocoanut, although it would not have been difficult to -get more from the countless trees all round us. - -Headquarters had now returned to the Totohown-Jassini road. Along this -ran a light railway for the work of the plantation, the wagons of which -were now continuously employed in taking wounded back to Totohown, -where a hospital had been established in the European buildings. -Ammunition—of which the Askari carried about 150 rounds—began to -run short, and reports from the firing line that they could not hold -on longer became more frequent. Slightly wounded who had been tied up -and a mass of stragglers collected at Headquarters, whole platoons -had completely lost themselves, or had for other reasons left the -places assigned to them. All these men were collected and reorganized, -and thus a fresh reserve was made available. The ammunition in the -machine-gun belts was to a great extent expended, and fresh supplies -came up from Totohown by the light railway. The belt-filling machines -were fixed to the palm-trees and kept incessantly at work. It was -evident that we had already suffered considerable casualties. A -few wished to break off the action, as there seemed no prospect of -capturing the enemy’s defences. But the thought of the unpleasant -situation of the enemy, shut up in his works, without water, and having -to carry on all the occupations of daily existence in a confined space, -in a burning sun and under hostile fire, made it appear that if we only -held on with determination we might yet achieve success. The afternoon -and night passed in incessant fighting; as is always the case in such -critical situations, all sorts of rumours arose. It was said that the -garrison of the enemy’s works consisted of South African Europeans, who -were excellent marksmen; some people even declared they had understood -their speech perfectly. It was indeed still very difficult to form -a clear idea. My orderly, Ombasha (Lance-Corporal) Rayabu, at once -volunteered to make a close reconnaissance, crawled close up to the -enemy’s line, and was killed there. The native, who is at all times -easily excitable, was doubly so in this critical situation at night, -and I frequently had to take the men severely to task for firing -blindly into the air. - - * * * * * - -Early on the 19th January the fire broke out again with the greatest -intensity. The enemy, who was surrounded on all sides, made a sortie, -which failed, and soon after hoisted the white flag. Four Indian -companies, with European officers and N.C.O.’s, fell into our hands. -We all remarked the warlike pride with which our Askari regarded the -enemy; I never thought our black fellows could look so distinguished. - -Both friend and foe had been in an unpleasant situation, and were near -the end of their nervous strength. That is usually the case with any -soldier who takes his duty seriously. But the Askari now learned that -one must overcome one’s own feelings in order to obtain the superior -moral force necessary for victory. - -I estimated the enemy’s casualties at 700 at least; the captured -documents gave a clear indication of his strength, which was more than -double our own. According to them, General Tighe, commanding the troops -in British East Africa, who had landed a short time before at Wanga, -had more than twenty companies assembled at and near Jassini, most of -whom had come by march route along the coast from the direction of -Mombasa. They were to push forward towards Tanga. - -With the aid of the mechanical transport and the rickshaws, which -worked between the Field Hospital at Totohown and Tanga, the wounded -were moved from Jassini to the hospitals on the Northern Railway -quite easily in a few days. These rickshaws, small spring-carts (like -dog-carts), drawn by one man, which take the place of cabs at Tanga, -had been requisitioned for carrying wounded by the Senior Medical -Officer. The enemy had withdrawn into his fortified camps north of -the frontier, and a fresh attack on them did not seem to me very -promising. We immediately commenced patrol operations, as a support to -which we left a detachment of a few companies at Jassini; the bulk of -the troops was moved off again to the Kilima Njaro country. On the -march to the entraining station on the Northern Railway the troops -passed through Amboni Plantation. There the inhabitants of Tanga had -voluntarily provided food and refreshments; and after the tremendous -exertions entailed by the expedition to Jassini, with its continuous -forced marches, the exhausting heat, and the uninterrupted fighting by -day and night, the sulphur-laden Sigi stream was soon alive with white -and black bathers. All our toil was forgotten, and our spirits rose to -the highest pitch on receiving at this very moment, after a rather long -interval, another wireless message from home. It indicated that news of -the fighting at Tanga had probably just reached Germany, and contained -His Majesty’s appreciation of the success we had gained there. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -GUERILLA WARFARE AND FURTHER PREPARATIONS - - -DOCUMENTS which we captured later proved by figures that the enemy -moved troops from Lake Victoria towards Kilima Njaro. So the battle -actually did relieve other, far distant theatres. This observation -bore out the original contention that the best protection of the whole -territory consisted in taking a firm hold of the enemy at one point. -Whether the remainder of the Colony was also locally protected with -energy was not as important. All the same, I was greatly rejoiced when -in February, 1915, the Governor was persuaded to issue the order that -the coast towns were to be defended if threatened by the enemy. The -successes obtained hitherto had demonstrated that this local defence -was not hopeless, even against the fire of ships’ guns. - -Although the attack carried out at Jassini with nine companies had been -completely successful, it showed that such heavy losses as we also had -suffered could only be borne in exceptional cases. We had to economize -our forces in order to last out a long war. Of the regular officers, -Major Kepler, Lieuts. Spalding and Gerlich, Second-Lieuts. Kaufmann and -Erdmann were killed; Captain von Hammerstein had died of his wound. The -loss of these professional soldiers—about one seventh of the regular -officers present—could not be replaced. - -The expenditure of 200,000 rounds also proved that with the means -at my disposal I could at the most fight three more actions of this -nature. The need to strike great blows only quite exceptionally, and -to restrict myself principally to guerilla warfare, was evidently -imperative. - -The guiding principle of constantly operating against the Uganda -Railway could, however, be resumed, as here it was in any case -impossible to act with larger forces. For it was necessary to make -marches of several days’ duration through the great, waterless and -thinly populated desert, which provided little sustenance beyond -occasional game. Not only food, but water had to be carried. This -alone limited the size of the force to be employed. Such expeditions -through districts providing neither water nor food require a degree of -experience on the part of the troops which could not possibly exist at -that stage of the war. A company even was too large a force to send -across this desert, and if, after several days of marching, it really -had reached some point on the railway, it would have had to come back -again, because it could not be supplied. However, these conditions -improved as the troops became better trained, and as our knowledge of -the country, which was at first mainly _terra incognita_, increased. - -So there was nothing for it but to seek to attain our object by means -of small detachments, or patrols. To these patrols we afterwards -attached the greatest importance. Starting from the Engare-Nairobi, -small detachments of eight to ten men, Europeans and Askaris, rode -round the rear of the enemy’s camps, which had been pushed up as -far as the Longido, and attacked their communications. They made -use of telephones we had captured at Tanga, tapping in on the -English telephone-lines; then they waited for large or small hostile -detachments or columns of ox-wagons to pass. From their ambush they -opened fire on the enemy at thirty yards’ range, captured prisoners -and booty, and then disappeared again in the boundless desert. Thus, -at that time, we captured rifles, ammunition, and war material of all -kinds. One of these patrols had observed near Erok Mountain that the -enemy sent his riding-horses to water at a certain time. Ten of our -horsemen at once started out, and, after a two days’ ride through the -desert, camped close to the enemy. Six men went back with the horses; -the four others each took a saddle, and crept at a distance of a few -paces past the enemy’s sentries close up to the watering-place, which -lay behind the camp. An English soldier was driving the horses, when -suddenly two men of our patrol confronted him out of the bush and -covering him with their rifles ordered “Hands up!” In his surprise he -dropped his clay pipe out of his mouth. At once he was asked: “Where -are the missing four horses?” for our conscientious patrol had noticed -that there were only fifty-seven, whereas the day before they had -counted sixty-one! These four needed light treatment and had been left -in camp. The leading horse and a few others were quickly saddled, -mounted, and off they went at a gallop round the enemy’s camp towards -the German lines. Even in the captured Englishman, who had to take part -in this _safari_ on a bare horse, without much comfort, the innate -sporting instinct of his nation came out. With great humour he shouted: -“I should just like to see my Captain’s face now!” and when the animals -had arrived safely in the German camp he remarked: “It was a damned -good piece of work.” - -This capture, increased by a number of other horses and mules we had -picked up, enabled us to form a second mounted company. We now had -two mounted companies, composed of Askari and Europeans mixed, an -organization which proved successful. They provided us with the means -of sweeping the extensive desert north of Kilima Njaro with strong -patrols who went out for several days at a time; they penetrated even -as far as the Uganda and Magad Railways, destroyed bridges, surprised -guards posted on the railways, mined the permanent way and carried out -raids of all kinds on the land communications between the railways and -the enemy’s camps. In these enterprises our own people did not get -off scot free. One patrol had brilliantly surprised two companies of -Indians by rifle fire, but had then lost their horses, which had been -left behind in hiding, by the fire of the enemy; they had to make their -way back across the desert on foot, which took four days, and they had -no food. Luckily they found milk and cattle in a Masai kraal, and later -on saved themselves from starvation by killing an elephant. But success -whetted the spirit of adventure, and the requests to be sent on patrol, -mounted or on foot, increased. - -The patrols that went out from the Kilima Njaro in a more easterly -direction were of a different character. They had to work on foot -through the dense bush for days on end. The patrols sent out to destroy -the railway were mostly weak: one or two Europeans, two to four Askari, -and five to seven carriers. They had to worm their way through the -enemy’s pickets and were often betrayed by native scouts. In spite of -this they mostly reached their objective and were sometimes away for -more than a fortnight. For such a small party a bit of game or a small -quantity of booty afforded a considerable reserve of rations. But the -fatigue and thirst in the burning sun were so great that several men -died of thirst, and even Europeans drank urine. It was a bad business -when anyone fell ill or was wounded, with the best will in the world it -was often impossible to bring him along. To carry a severely wounded -man from the Uganda Railway right across the desert to the German -camps, as was occasionally done, is a tremendous performance. Even the -blacks understood that, and cases did occur in which a wounded Askari, -well knowing that he was lost without hope, and a prey to the numerous -lions, did not complain when he had to be left in the bush, but of his -own accord gave his comrades his rifle and ammunition, so that they at -least might be saved. - -The working of these patrols became more and more perfect. Knowledge -of the desert improved, and in addition to patrols for destruction -and intelligence work, we developed a system of fighting patrols. -The latter, consisting of twenty to thirty Askari, or even more, and -sometimes equipped with one or two machine-guns, went out to look for -the enemy and inflict losses upon him. In the thick bush the combatants -came upon each other at such close quarters and so unexpectedly, that -our Askari sometimes literally jumped over their prone adversaries and -so got behind them again. The influence of these expeditions on the -self-reliance and enterprise of both Europeans and natives was so great -that it would be difficult to find a force imbued with a better spirit. -Some disadvantages were, however, unavoidable. In particular, our -small supply of ammunition did not enable us to attain such a degree -of marksmanship as to enable us, when we did get the enemy in an -unfavourable situation, completely to destroy him. In technical matters -we were also busy. Skilled artificers and armourers were constantly -engaged with the factory engineers in the manufacture of suitable -apparatus for blowing up the railways. Some of these appliances fired -according as they were set, either at once, or after a certain number -of wheels had passed over them. With the latter arrangement we hoped -to destroy the engines, even if the English tried to protect them by -pushing one or two trucks filled with sand in front of them. There was -abundance of dynamite to be had on the plantations, but the demolition -charges captured at Tanga were much more effective. - -We occasionally got German newspapers, but we had had no private mails -for a long time. On the 12th February, 1915, I was sitting at dinner -in the Railway Station at New Moshi, when I got a letter from Germany. -It was from my sister, who wrote to say she had already repeatedly -informed me of the death of my brother, who had been killed on the -Western Front at Libramont on the 22nd August, 1914. - -In April, 1915, we were surprised by the news of the arrival of a -store-ship. When entering Mansa Bay, north of Tanga, she was chased and -fired at by an English cruiser, and her captain had to run her aground. -Although during the ensuing weeks we salved almost the whole of the -valuable cargo, we found that unfortunately the cartridges had suffered -severely from the sea-water. The powder and caps deteriorated more and -more, and so the number of miss-fires increased. There was nothing for -it but to break up the whole of the ammunition, clean the powder, and -replace some of the caps by new ones. Luckily there were caps in the -Colony, though of a different pattern; but for months all the Askari -and carriers we could lay hands on were employed at Moshi from morning -till night making ammunition. The serviceable cartridges we had left -were kept exclusively for the machine-guns; of the re-made ammunition, -that which gave about 20 per cent. of miss-fires was kept for action, -while that giving a higher percentage was used for practice. - -The arrival of the store-ship aroused tremendous enthusiasm, since it -proved that communication between ourselves and home still existed. -All of us listened with eagerness to the stories of the Captain, -Lieutenant Christiansen, when he arrived at my Headquarters at New -Moshi after his wound was healed. The terrific fighting at home, the -spirit of self-sacrifice and boundless enterprise which inspired the -deeds of the German troops, awakened a response in our hearts. Many -who had been despondent now took courage once more, since they learned -that what appears impossible can be achieved if effort is sustained by -determination. - -Another means of raising the spirit of the force was by promotion. -Generally speaking, I could only make promotions to non-commissioned -rank, and within the commissioned ranks; but the grant of a commission, -which would in many cases have been well-deserved, was beyond my power. -Each case was very carefully considered, so as to determine whether -really good work had been done. In this way unmerited promotions, which -ruin the spirit of the troops, were avoided. On the whole, however, -we had to cultivate the moral factors less by rewards than by other -means. Decorations for war service were practically unknown among -us. It was not personal ambition to which we appealed; we sought to -arouse and maintain a real sense of duty dictated by patriotism, and an -evergrowing feeling of comradeship. Perhaps it was the very fact that -this lasting and pure motive remained unsoiled by any other purpose -that inspired Europeans and Askari with that endurance and energy which -the Protective Force manifested until the end. - -In the Kilima Njaro country the English were not inactive. From -Oldorobo Mountain, seven and a half miles east of Taveta, which was -held by a German detached post under an officer, an attack by two -Indian Companies was reported by telephone one morning. Thereupon -Captain Koehl and the Austrian Lieutenant Freiherr von Unterrichter at -once marched off from Taveta; the two companies had become immobilized -on the steep slopes of the mountain, and our people attacked them on -both flanks with such vigour that they fled, leaving about twenty dead -behind, while one machine-gun and 70,000 rounds fell into our hands. -Other hostile expeditions were undertaken along the Tsavo River to the -north-east side of Kilima Njaro; they were based on Mzima Camp on the -Tsavo, which was strongly fortified and held by several companies. -The patrol encounters that took place north-east of Kilima Njaro all -ended in our favour; even the young Askari of the Rombo Detachment, -which had a strength of sixty and was named after the mission on -the Eastern Kilima Njaro, had unbounded faith in their commander, -Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock, who was over sixty years old. I remember -a wounded man who came from him to New Moshi, with a report for me, -and refused to be attended to so as to lose no time in getting back to -his commanding officer. In several fights, when the enemy occasionally -amounted to two companies, these young troops were victorious, and it -is a significant fact that among the English all manner of tales were -current about these actions. The British Commander-in-Chief sent me a -written complaint, saying that a German woman was taking part in them, -and perpetrating inhuman cruelties, an idea which was, of course, -without any foundation, and merely served to show the degree of nerves -with which the enemy authorities had become afflicted. - -Notwithstanding the great amount of booty taken at Tanga, it was -evident that, as the war seemed likely to be prolonged, the stocks -in the Colony would become exhausted. The natives at New Moshi began -all of a sudden to wear silk: this was by no means a sign of special -extravagance: the stocks of cotton clothing in the Indian shops -were simply coming to an end. We had seriously to think of starting -manufactures ourselves, in order to convert the abundant raw material -into finished products. A curious existence now developed, reminding -one of the industry of the Swiss family Robinson. Cotton fields -existed in plenty. Popular books were hunted up, giving information -about the forgotten arts of hand spinning and weaving; white and -black women took to spinning by hand; at the missions and in private -workshops spinning-wheels and looms were built. In this manner, in -a short time, the first useful piece of cotton cloth was produced. -After various trials, the most suitable dye was obtained from the -root of a tree called Ndaa, which imparted a brownish-yellow colour, -very inconspicuous both in the grass and in the bush, and therefore -specially suitable for uniforms. The rubber gathered by the planters -was vulcanized with sulphur, and we succeeded in producing efficient -tyres for motors and bicycles. At Morogoro a few planters successfully -produced a motor-fuel from cocos, known as trebol, which was like -benzol, and was employed in the automobiles. As in former times, -candles were made out of tallow and wax, both by private persons and by -the troops, and also soap. Then again, the numerous factories on the -plantations in the northern territories and on the Tanganyika Railway -were adapted to produce various means of subsistence. - -A particularly important item was the provision of foot-wear. The raw -material was obtained from the plentiful skins of cattle and game; -tanning materials from the mangroves on the coast. In peace time the -missions had already made good boots; their activity was now further -developed, while the troops also established tanneries and shoemakers’ -shops on a larger scale. It is true some little time elapsed before -the authorities complied with the urgent and inevitable demands of the -troops in an adequate manner, and, in particular, before they placed -at our disposal the buffalo-hides necessary for making sole-leather. -So the old historic fight for the cow-hide revived again, _mutatis -mutandis_, in East Africa. The first boots made in any quantity were -turned out at Tanga. Although at first their shape needed improving, -they at any rate protected the feet of our white and black troops when -marching and patrolling in the thorn bush of the Pori. For the thorns -that fall to the ground bore into the feet again and again. All the -small beginnings of food-stuff production that had already existed on -the plantations in time of peace were galvanized into more extensive -activity by the war, and by the need of subsisting large masses. On -several farms in the Kilima Njaro country butter and excellent cheese -were produced in great quantities, and the slaughter-houses round about -Wilhelmstal could hardly keep up with the demands for sausages and -other smoked meats. - -It was to be anticipated that quinine, which was so important for the -health of the Europeans, would soon become exhausted, and that our -requirements could not be met by capture alone. So it was a matter of -great importance that we succeeded in producing good quinine tablets at -the Amani Biological Institute in Usambara out of bark obtained in the -North. - -The provision of proper communications for ox-wagons and motors -involved the construction of permanent bridges. Engineer Rentell, who -had been called to the colours, built an arched bridge of stone and -concrete, with a heavy pier, over the Kikafu torrent, west of New -Moshi. During the rains, particularly in April, no wooden structure -would have withstood the masses of water coming down the steep -river-bed, which was nearly 70 feet deep. - -These examples will suffice to show the stimulating influence of the -war and its requirements on the economic life of the Colony. - -The organization of the Force was also constantly improved. By -transferring Europeans from the Rifle Companies, when they were -numerous, to the Askari Companies, the losses of Europeans in the -latter were made good; Askari were enrolled in the European Companies. -In this way the Field and Rifle Companies became more similar in their -composition, which during the course of 1915 became identical. At -Muansa, Kigoma, Bismarckburg, Lindi, Langenburg, and elsewhere, small -bodies of troops had been formed under various designations, of the -existence of which in most cases Headquarters only became aware after -a considerable time. These units were also gradually expanded into -companies; in this way, during 1915, the number of Field Companies -gradually rose to 30, that of the Rifle Companies to 10, and that of -other units of company strength to about 20. The maximum total attained -was thus about 60 companies. Owing to the limited number of suitable -Europeans and of reliable Askari N.C.O.’s, it was not advisable still -further to increase the number of companies: it would only have meant -the creation of units without cohesion. In order, however, to increase -the number of combatants the establishment of the companies was raised -from 160 to 200, and the companies were allowed to enrol supernumerary -Askari. To some extent the companies trained their own recruits; but -the great bulk of Askari reinforcements came from the Recruit Depots -established in the populous districts of Tabora, Muansa and the -Northern Railway, which also provided for local security and order. But -owing to the great number of newly-raised companies the depots could -not furnish enough men to bring them all up to their establishment -of 200. The maximum strength attained by the end of 1915 was 2,998 -Europeans and 11,300 Askari, including Naval personnel, administrative -staffs, hospitals and field postal service. - -How necessary were all these military preparations was proved by the -news received at the end of June, 1915, that General Botha was coming -to the East African theatre from South Africa with 15,000 Boers. That -this information was highly probably correct had to be assumed from -the outset. The scanty wireless messages and other communications -about events in the outside world were yet enough to indicate that our -affairs in South-West Africa were going badly, and that the British -troops employed there would probably become available for other -purposes in the immediate future. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. ENERGETIC USE OF THE TIME AVAILABLE - - -AT first, it is true, the anticipated intervention of the South -Africans did not seem to be materializing; the English were evidently -trying to subdue us with their own forces, without their assistance. -In July, 1915, they attacked the Colony at several points. East of -Lake Victoria large bodies of Masai, organized and led by Englishmen, -and said to number many thousands, invaded the country of the German -Wassukuma, which was rich in cattle. However, in the matter of -cattle-lifting the Wassukuma stood no joking; they gave our weak -detachments every assistance, defeated the Masai, recaptured the stolen -cattle, and, as a proof that they had “spoken the truth,” laid out the -heads of ninety-six Masai in front of our police station. - -Against the main body of our force in the Kilima Njaro country the -enemy advanced in considerable strength. In order, on the one hand, -to ensure effective protection of the Usambara Railway, and the rich -plantations through which it passes, and, on the other, to shorten -the distance the patrols had to go to reach the Uganda Railway, a -detachment of three companies had been pushed out from Taveta to -Mbuyuni, a long day’s march east of Taveta. Another day’s march to the -east was the well-fortified and strongly-held English camp of Makatan, -on the main road leading from Moshi, by Taveta, Mbuyuni, Makatan, -and Bura, to Voi, on the Uganda Railway. Vague rumours had led us to -surmise that an attack on a fairly large scale in the direction of -Kilima Njaro was to be expected from about Voi. On the 14th July a -hostile brigade, under General Malleson, appeared in the desert of -Makatan, which is generally covered with fairly open thorn-bush. The -fire of a field battery, which opened on the trenches of our Askari, -was fairly ineffective, but the enemy’s superiority of seven to one was -so considerable that our position became critical. Hostile European -horsemen got round the left wing of our own; however, our line was -held by the 10th Field Company, which had distinguished itself in the -fighting near Longido Mountain, under Lieutenant Steinhäuser, of the -Landwehr, and it is a credit to this officer, who was unfortunately -killed later, that he held on, although our mounted troops fell back -past his flank. Just at the critical moment, Lieutenant von Lewinsky, -who was also killed later, immediately marched off to the scene of -action, arrived with a patrol, and took this dangerous flank attack in -rear. The English troops, consisting of natives, mixed with Europeans -and Indians, had very gallantly attacked our front, over ground -affording very little cover. The failure of the English flank attack, -however, set the seal on their defeat. At New Moshi Station I was kept -accurately informed of the progress of the action, and thus, although -at a distance, I shared in all the excitement from the unfavourable -period at the beginning until complete success was assured. - -This success, together with the considerable booty, still further -increased the spirit of adventure among both Europeans and Askari. -The experience and skill that had by now been acquired enabled us -henceforth to prosecute our plan of sending out a continuous succession -of fighting and demolition patrols. I do not think I exaggerate in -assuming that at least twenty English railway trains were destroyed, -or, at least, considerably damaged. Picked up photographs and our own -observation confirmed the supposition that a railway was actually -being built from Voi to Makatan, which, being so easily accessible to -us, and so important, formed a glorious objective for our patrols. -The construction of this military line proved that an attack with -large forces was in preparation, and that it was to be directed on -this particular part of the Kilima Njaro country. The anticipated -intervention of the South Africans was therefore imminent. It was -important to encourage the enemy in this intention, in order that -the South Africans should really come, and that in the greatest -strength possible, and thus be diverted from other and more important -theatres of war. With the greatest energy, therefore, we continued -our enterprises against the Uganda Railway, which, owing to the -circumstances, had still to be mainly carried out by patrols, and could -only exceptionally be undertaken by a force as large as a company. - -Closer acquaintance with the desert country between the Uganda Railway -and the Anglo-German border had revealed the fact, that of the various -mountain groups rising abruptly out of the plain, the Kasigao was well -watered and moderately populous. Being only from twelve to twenty -miles from the Uganda Railway, Kasigao Mountain was bound to afford a -favourably situated base for patrol work. The patrol of Lieut. Freiherr -Grote had already made a surprise attack on the small Anglo-Indian camp -situated half-way up its slopes. The riflemen of Grote’s patrol had -worked round the camp, which was surrounded by a stone wall, and fired -into it with effect from the dominating part of the mountain. Very -soon the white flag appeared, and an English officer and some thirty -Indians surrendered. A part of the enemy had succeeded in getting away -to the mountain and fired on the patrol as it marched off. It was then -we suffered our only casualties, consisting of a few wounded, among -whom was a German corporal of the Medical Corps. We had also, on one -occasion, surprised the enemy’s post on Kasigao Mountain by the fire of -a 2.4-inch gun. - -Towards the end of 1915, the enemy having in the meantime shifted his -camp on Kasigao Mountain, we attacked him once more. During the night a -German fighting patrol, under Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, had ascended -the mountain in nine hours, and arrived rather exhausted near the -enemy’s work. A second patrol, under Lieutenant Freiherr Grote, which -was co-operating with Ruckteschell’s, had been somewhat delayed by the -sickness and exhaustion of its commander. Lieutenant von Ruckteschell -sent a reliable old coloured N.C.O. to the enemy to demand surrender. -He observed that our Askari was cordially welcomed by the enemy; he had -found a number of good friends among the English Askari. But, in spite -of all friendliness, the enemy refused to surrender. Our situation was -critical, in consequence of exhaustion and want of food. If anything -was to be done at all, it must be done at once. Fortunately, the enemy -in their entrenchments did not withstand our machine-gun fire and the -assault which immediately followed it; they were destroyed, and a -large number of them were killed in their flight by falling from the -steep cliffs. The booty included abundant supplies, also clothing and -valuable camp equipment. - -The feeling of comradeship which our Askari had for us Germans, and -which was tremendously developed by the numerous expeditions undertaken -together, led on this occasion to a curious incident. After climbing -Kasigao Mountain by night, among rocks and thorn-bushes, an Askari -noticed that Lieutenant von Ruckteschell was bleeding from a scratch -on his face. He at once took his sock, which he had probably not -changed for six days, and wiped the “Bwana Lieutenant’s” face with it, -anticipating the somewhat surprised question with the remark: “That is -a custom of war; one only does it to one’s friends.” - -In order to study the situation on the spot and to push on the attacks -on Kasigao, I had gone by rail to Same, thence by car to Sonya Mission, -and then either by cycle or on foot in the direction of the mountain -to the German border, where a company was encamped at a water-hole. -From there we had fair communication to Kasigao by heliograph, and we -were thus enabled to make good the success we had gained there. Troops -were at once pushed up, so that until the arrival of the South Africans -the mountain was held by several companies. It was, indeed, decidedly -difficult to keep them supplied; for although the German frontier -territory west of Kasigao was fertile, it could not permanently support -a force which with carriers amounted to about one thousand. - -I then drove in the car round the South Pare Mountains, on a road -that had been made in time of peace. The construction of this road had -been dropped on account of expense, and for years the heaps of metal -had been lying unused at the roadside. The culverts—consisting of -pipes passing under the road—were to a great extent in good order. -But little work was needed to make this road suitable for supply by -lorry. Supplies were sent from near Buiko on the Northern Railway -by lorry to Sonya, and thence to Kasigao by carriers. The telephone -line was already under construction as far as the frontier, and was -completed in a few days’ time. From then on patrols pushing out from -Kasigao had several encounters with detachments of the enemy, and did -some damage to the Uganda Railway. But the ruggedness of the country -and the dense thorn-bush made movement so difficult that by the time -the South Africans arrived, we had not derived full benefit from -Kasigao as a base for patrols. However, the continual menace to the -railway had, at any rate, obliged the enemy to take extensive measures -for its protection. Wide clearings had been made along it, of which -the outer edges had been closed by thick zarebas (abattis of thorns). -Every couple of miles there were strong block-houses, or entrenchments -with obstacles, from which the line was constantly patrolled. Mobile -supports, of the strength of a company or more, were held in readiness, -so that, whenever the railway was reported to be in danger, they could -at once go off by special train. In addition, protective detachments -were pushed out in our direction, who tried to cut off our patrols on -their way back on receiving reports from spies or from observation -posts on the high ground. We also identified English camps on the high -ground south-east of Kasigao, as far as the coast, and also in the -settled country along the coast. They also received attention from our -patrols and raiders. Our constant endeavour was to injure the enemy, to -force him to adopt protective measures, and thus to contain his forces -here, in the district of the Uganda Railway. - -While thus establishing points of support for our fighting patrols -from the coast to Mbuyuni (on the Taveta-Voi road), we worked in the -same sense further north. The enemy’s camp at Mzima, on the upper -Tsavo River, and its communications, which followed that river, were -frequently the objective of our expeditions, even of fairly large -detachments. On one occasion Captain Augar, with the 13th Company, was -surprised south-west of Mzima Camp in thick bush by three European -companies of the newly-arrived 2nd Rhodesian Regiment. The enemy -attacked from several directions, but being still inexperienced in bush -fighting, failed to secure concerted action. So our Askari Company was -able first to overthrow one part of the enemy’s forces, and then by -quickness and resolution to defeat the other, which had appeared behind -it. - -Further north, also, there was some fighting in the bush which went in -our favour; we worked with whole companies and inflicted painful losses -on the enemy, who was often in greater force. North of the Engare Len -the 3rd Field Company from Lindi worked with special energy, and sent -its fighting patrols out as far as the Uganda Railway. The mere fact -that we were now able to make raids with forces amounting to a company -and more in the midst of a desert devoid of supplies, and in many -places waterless, shows the enormous progress the force had made in -this type of guerilla warfare. The European had learned that a great -many things that are very desirable when travelling in the Tropics -simply have to be dispensed with on patrol in war, and that one can at -a pinch get on for a time with only a single carrier-load. The patrols -also had to avoid camping in such a way as to betray themselves, and -as far as possible to carry food ready prepared. But if food had to be -cooked, this was particularly dangerous in the evening or morning; the -leader had to select a concealed spot, and invariably shift his camp -after cooking before going to rest. Complete hygienic protection was -incompatible with the conditions of patrol duty. A number of cases of -malaria invariably occurred among the members of a patrol after its -return. But as, in spite of the continual damage done to the enemy, -patrol duty only required comparatively few men, only a part of the -companies had to be kept in the front line. After a few weeks each -company was withdrawn to rest camps in healthy regions, European and -Askari were able to recover from their tremendous exertions, and their -training and discipline could be restored. - -Towards the end of 1915 the shortage of water at Mbuyuni Camp had -become so serious, and supply so difficult, that only a post was left -there, the detachment itself being withdrawn to the westward to the -vicinity of Oldorobo Mountain. Meanwhile, the enemy’s camp at Makatan -grew steadily larger. A frequent train service was maintained to it, -and one could clearly see a big clearing being made to the west for -the prolongation of the railway. Our fighting patrols had, indeed, -many opportunities of inflicting losses on the enemy while at work, or -protecting his working parties, but the line continued to make progress -towards the west. - -It was necessary to consider the possibility of the country through -which the Northern Railway passed soon falling into the hands of the -enemy. Steps had, therefore, to be taken to safeguard the military -stores in that district in time. Where railways were available this -was, of course, not difficult; but the further transport by land needed -much preparation. The bulk of our stocks of ammunition, clothing and -medical stores was at New Moshi and Mombo. It was evident that we would -be unable to carry away the factories, or parts of them, by land; -they must, therefore, be made use of and kept working for as long as -possible where they were. Assuming the enemy would attack from the -north, our evacuation would obviously be towards the south, and not -only the preparations, but the movement itself, must be started without -loss of time—that is, as early as August, 1915. - -The Commandant of the Line, Lieutenant Kroeber, retired, therefore, in -an able manner, collected light-railway material from the plantations, -and built a line from Mombo to Handeni, at the rate of about two -kilometres (one and a quarter miles) per day. The trucks were also -brought from the plantations, and after mature consideration, man -draught was decided on in preference to locomotives. Thus our stores -were moved from the north by rail, complete, and in time, to Handeni. -From there to Kimamba, on the Central Railway, we principally used -carriers, except for a few wagons. It was, after all, necessary -not to hurry the movement unduly, for, in spite of all the visible -preparations for a hostile attack on the Kilima Njaro country, I still -thought it possible that the main force of the enemy, or at least a -considerable proportion of it, would not operate there, but in the -Bagamoyo-Dar-es-Salaam area. - -At the end of 1915 the enemy was pushing his rail-head further and -further westward, and Major Kraut, who was opposing him, reinforced -his position on Oldorobo Mountain with three companies and two light -guns. This mountain rises from the flat thorn desert near the main -road, seven and a half miles east of Taveta, and dominates the country -for a great distance all round. Entrenchments and numerous dummy works -had been made, part being cut out of the rock, and formed an almost -impregnable fort. The disadvantage of the position was the complete -lack of water. A planter who had been called to the Colours, Lieutenant -Matuschka, of the Reserve, was an expert water finder; at Taveta he -had discovered excellent wells; but on Oldorobo no water was found, -although at the points he indicated we dug down more than one hundred -feet. Water had therefore to be taken from Taveta on small donkey-carts -to Oldorobo, where it was collected in barrels. This carriage of water -was an extraordinary strain on our transport. Strangely enough, it did -not occur to the enemy to interfere with it, and thus render Oldorobo -Mountain untenable. Instead of that, basing himself on his railway, -he pushed up to within about three miles of the mountain, where he -established strongly fortified camps. We had been unable to prevent -this, as, owing to difficulties of water and transport, larger forces -could only move away from Taveta for short periods. The enemy obtained -his water supply by means of a long pipe-line, which came from the -springs in the Bura Mountains. The destruction of the enemy’s reservoir -by patrols under Lieutenant von S’Antenecai, of the Reserve, only -caused him temporary inconvenience. - -At this time, also, the first hostile aeroplanes appeared, and bombed -our positions on Oldorobo Mountain, and at Taveta and later even -New Moshi. On the 27th January one of these airmen, while on his way -back from Oldorobo, was successfully fired on and brought down by -our advanced infantry. The English had told the natives that this -aeroplane was a new “Munga” (God); but now that this new Munga had been -brought down and captured by us, it rather increased our prestige than -otherwise. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES OF WAR. GUERILLA WARFARE ASHORE AND AFLOAT -UNTIL NEW YEAR, 1916 - - -WHILE employing the bulk of the Protective Force in the regions on the -Northern Railway we could not afford entirely to denude the remainder -of the Colony. In the interior it was essential to remain undisputed -master of the natives, in order, if necessary, to enforce the growing -demands for carriers, agriculture, supplies, and all manner of work. -Accordingly, the 12th Company remained at Mahenge, and the 2nd at -Iringa. In addition to their other duties both of them acted as large -depots, serving to fill vacancies at the front, and providing the -machinery for raising new units. - -The commanders of detachments on the frontiers, who were far away from -Headquarters and beyond the reach of the telegraph, rightly endeavoured -to anticipate the enemy and to attack him in his own territory. Owing -to the lack of communications on our side this fighting resolved itself -into a series of local operations, which were quite independent of -each other. It was different with the enemy, who clearly endeavoured -to establish a proper relationship between his main operations and the -subsidiary enterprises at other points on the frontier. - -In October, 1914, before the fighting at Tanga, Captain Zimmer reported -from Kigoma that there were about 2,000 men on the Belgian frontier; -and Captain Braunschweig sent word from Muansa that at Kisumu on Lake -Victoria there were also strong hostile forces, about two companies -at Kisii, and more troops at Karungu. According to independent native -reports, Indian troops landed at Mombasa in October and were then -transported towards Voi. In the Bukoba District English troops crossed -the Kagera, and the sub-station at Umbulu reported that the enemy was -invading the Ssonyo country. Obviously these movements were preparatory -to the operations which were to be co-ordinated with the great attack -on Tanga in November, 1914. - -[Illustration: Fig. vi. Subsidiary Actions up to August, 1916.] - -The means of intercommunication in the Colony were not sufficiently -developed to enable us rapidly to concentrate our main force, first -against one and then against another of these hostile detachments -deploying along the frontier. We had, therefore, to adhere to the -fundamental idea of our plan, of vigorously attacking the enemy -opposed to us in the area of the Northern Railway and on the Uganda -Railway, and of thus indirectly relieving the other points where -operations were in progress. Of necessity, however, these subsidiary -points had occasionally to be reinforced. Thus, in September, 1914, -Captains Falkenstein and Aumann, with portions of the 2nd Company, -had moved from Iringa and Ubena into the Langenburg District. In -March, 1915, the 26th Field Company was pushed up from Dar-es-Salaam -via Tabora to Muansa. In April, 1915, hostile concentration in the -Mara Triangle (east of Lake Victoria) and at Bismarckburg caused us -to waste much time in moving troops up from Dar-es-Salaam via Muansa -to the Mara Triangle, and via Kigoma to Bismarckburg. The latter move -was particularly delayed on Lake Tanganyika owing to the slow progress -being made on the steamer _Götzen_, which was building at Kigoma. - -At first, the enemy’s attacks were principally directed against the -coast. - -At the commencement of the war our light cruiser _Königsberg_ had left -the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam and had, on the 29th September, surprised -and destroyed the English cruiser _Pegasus_ at Zanzibar. Then several -large enemy cruisers had arrived and industriously looked for the -_Königsberg_. On the 19th October, at Lindi, a pinnace steamed up to -the steamer _Praesident_, of the East African Line, which was concealed -in the Lukuledi river. The local Defence Force raised at Lindi, and the -Reinforcement Company, were at the moment away under Captain Augar, -to repel a landing expected at Mikindani, so that nothing could be -undertaken against the pinnace. - -It was not till the 29th July, 1915, that several whalers went up the -Lukuledi and blew up the _Praesident_. - -After successful cruises in the Indian Ocean the _Königsberg_ had -concealed herself in the Rufiji river, but her whereabouts had become -known to the enemy. The mouth of the river forms an intricate delta, -the view being obstructed by the dense bush with which the islands -are overgrown. The various river-mouths were defended by the “Delta” -Detachment, under Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld; this detachment -consisted of Naval ratings, European reservists, and Askari, and its -strength was about 150 rifles, a few light guns, and a few machine -guns. The enemy made many attempts to enter the river-mouths with light -craft, but was invariably repulsed with severe loss. The _Adjutant_, a -small steamer which the English had taken as a good prize, and armed, -was recaptured on one occasion, and was used thenceforward by us as -an auxiliary man-of-war on Lake Tanganyika. Some English aircraft -had also come to grief in the Rufiji delta. A blockship, which the -English had sunk in the most northerly of the river-mouths, did not -close the fairway. The frequent bombardments by ships’ guns, which he -had no means of opposing, Lieut.-Commander Schoenfeld defeated by the -skilful design of his positions, and by shifting them in time. Early in -July, 1915, the English had brought to the Rufiji two shallow-draught -gun-boats, armed with heavy guns. On the 6th July they made the first -attack with four cruisers and other armed vessels, and two river -gun-boats. The enemy bombarded the _Königsberg_, which was at anchor -in the river with aeroplane observation. The attack was beaten off, -but when it was repeated on the 11th July, the _Königsberg_ suffered -severely. The gun-detachments were put out of action. The severely -wounded captain had the breech-blocks thrown overboard and the ship -blown up. The loss of the _Königsberg_, though sad in itself, had at -least this advantage for the campaign on land, that the whole crew and -the valuable stores were now at the disposal of the Protective Force. - -Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld, who was in command on land at the -Rufiji delta, at once set himself with great forethought to raise the -parts of the guns that had been thrown overboard. Under his supervision -the ten guns of the _Königsberg_ were completely salved and got ready -for action again; five were mounted at Dar-es-Salaam, two each at -Tanga and Kigoma, and one at Muansa. For their transport he made use -of several vehicles constructed for heavy loads which were found on a -neighbouring plantation. In their concealed positions on land these -guns rendered excellent service, and as far as I know not one of them -was damaged on this service, although they were often bombarded by the -enemy’s vessels. - -On the 26th September, by night, the steamer _Wami_ was taken out of -the Rufiji to Dar-es-Salaam. - -At the end of August several boats came to Lindi from Mozambique with -men belonging to the steamer _Ziethen_, in order to join the Force. - -On the 10th January, 1915, about 300 Indian and black troops with -machine guns landed on the island of Mafia. Our police detachment, -three Europeans, fifteen Askari, and eleven recruits, opposed them -bravely for six hours, but surrendered when their commander, Lieutenant -Schiller of the Reserve, was severely wounded, who had been maintaining -a well-aimed fire on the enemy from a mango tree. The English held -Mafia with a few hundred men, and also established posts of observation -on the smaller islands in the vicinity. - -It was apparently from here that the work of rousing the natives -against us was undertaken. On the night of the 29th-30th July, 1915, we -captured a dhow at Kisija carrying propaganda papers. - -The events at Dar-es-Salaam, where, on the 22nd October, the captain of -an English cruiser declined to be bound by any agreement, have already -been discussed. - -On the outbreak of hostilities an aeroplane, which had been sent to -Dar-es-Salaam for the Exhibition, was taken into use, but was destroyed -by an accident at Dar-es-Salaam on the 15th November, when Lieutenant -Henneberger lost his life. - -At Tanga things had been quiet since the big battle of November, 1914. -On the 13th March, 1915, a ship went ashore on a reef, but got off -again on the spring-tide. We at once began salving 200 tons of coal -which had been thrown overboard. - -Several rows of mines which had been made on the spot, and could be -fired from the shore, proved ineffective, and it was found later that -they had become unserviceable. - -On the 15th August, 1915, the _Hyacinth_ and four guard-boats appeared -off Tanga. Our two 2·4-inch guns were quickly moved from their -rest-camp at Gombezi to Tanga, and with one light gun from Tanga, took -an effective part on the 19th August, when the _Hyacinth_ reappeared -with two gun-boats and six whalers, destroyed the steamer _Markgraf_ -and bombarded Tanga. One gun-boat was hit twice, the whalers, of which -one steamed away with a list,[3] four times. - -Bombardments of the coast towns were constantly taking place. On the -20th March a man-of-war bombarded Lindi, when its demand for the -surrender of the troops posted there was refused. Similarly, the -country south of Pangani was bombarded on the 1st April, the island of -Kwale on the 12th, and the Rufiji delta on the night of the 23rd-24th. - -For some months past hostile patrols had been visiting the Ssonyo -country, between Kilima Njaro and Lake Victoria, and the natives -seemed inclined to become truculent. As a result of their treachery, -Sergeant-Major Bast, who was sent there with a patrol, was ambushed -on the 17th November, 1914, and lost his life with five Askari. The -District Commissioner of Arusha, Lieutenant Kaempfe of the Reserve, who -had been called up, undertook a punitive expedition which reduced the -Ssonyo people to submission. - -It was not until July, 1915, that any further patrol encounters -took place in this country; in one of them twenty-two hostile armed -natives were killed. At the end of September and early October, 1915, -Lieutenant Buechsel’s mounted patrol spent several weeks in Ssonyo and -in the English territory without meeting the enemy, as an English post, -which had evidently been warned, had made off. - -On Lake Victoria the 7th Company at Bukoba and the 14th Company at -Muansa could communicate with each other by wireless. The command of -the Lake was undisputedly in the hands of the English, as they had -on it at least seven large steamers. But in spite of this our small -steamer _Muansa_ and other smaller vessels were able to maintain great -freedom of movement. While the Resident at Bukoba, Major von Stuemer, -protected the frontier with his police and with auxiliaries furnished -by friendly sultans, Captain Bock von Wülfingen had marched with -the main body of the 7th Company from Bukoba to Muansa. From here he -marched early in September, 1914, with a detachment composed of parts -of the 7th and 14th Companies, Wassakuma recruits, and auxiliaries, -along the eastern shore of Lake Victoria to the north, in the direction -of the Uganda Railway. On the 12th September he drove back a hostile -detachment at Kisii, beyond the border, but on hearing of the approach -of other forces of the enemy he withdrew again to the south. After -that the frontier east of Lake Victoria was only defended by weak -detachments. - -Warfare near Lake Victoria was for us very difficult; there was always -the danger that the enemy might land at Muansa, or some other place -on the south shore, seize Usukuma and threaten Tabora, the historic -capital of the country. If, however, our troops remained near Muansa, -the country round Bukoba, and therefore also Ruanda, would be in -danger. The best results in this area were to be expected from active -operations under a united command. But the execution of this idea was -not quite easy either, for Major von Stuemer, who was the most obvious -officer to be entrusted with it, was tied by his work as Resident to -the Bukoba District, while that of Muansa was the more important of the -two. - -At the end of October, 1914, an attempt to take back part of the troops -in boats from Muansa to Bukoba had been frustrated by the appearance -of armed English ships at the former place. Apparently the enemy had -deciphered our wireless messages and taken steps accordingly. On the -31st October a force of 570 rifles, 2 guns and 4 machine guns, left -Muansa for the relief of Bukoba on board the steamer _Muansa_, 2 tugs -and 10 dhows, but was scattered the same morning by hostile steamers -which suddenly appeared; they were, however, collected again at Muansa -without loss soon afterwards. On the same day the English tried to land -at Kayense, north of Muansa, but were prevented; a few days later, the -English steamer _Sybil_ was found on shore at Mayita and destroyed. - -On the 20th November, in a twelve-hours’ action, Stuemer’s detachment -repulsed the English troops who had penetrated into German territory, -north of Bukoba, and defeated them again, on the 7th December, -at Kifumbiro, after they had crossed the Kagera river. On the 5th -December, the English bombarded Shirarti from the Lake, without -success, and Bukoba on the 6th. - -Minor encounters between patrols constantly took place east and west of -Lake Victoria. On the 8th January the enemy attempted a more ambitious -operation; he bombarded Shirarti from the Lake with six guns and -with machine guns, and landed two companies of Indians as well as a -considerable number of mounted Europeans. Lieutenant von Haxthausen, -who had only 22 rifles, gave way before this superior force after -fighting 3-1/2 hours. The enemy’s strength was increased during the -next few days to 300 Europeans and 700 Indians. On the 17th January, -von Haxthausen defeated 70 Europeans and 150 Askari with 2 machine -guns on the frontier, and on the 30th January the enemy left Shirarti -and embarked for Karungu. I believe this withdrawal was a result of -the severe defeat sustained by the enemy at Jassini on the 18th. He -considered it desirable to re-concentrate his forces nearer the Uganda -Railway, where they would be more readily available. - -On the west side of the Lake, Captain von Bock surprised a hostile post -of 40 men north of Kifumbiro and drove it off with a loss of 17 killed. - -On the 6th March, 1915, English vessels had attacked the steamer -_Muansa_ in Rugesi Passage. _Muansa_ had sprung a leak and went -ashore close to the land. The enemy attempted to tow her off, but was -prevented by our fire, so that we were able, the next day, to salve -the steamer and get her away to Muansa, where she was repaired. The -difficulty of moving troops by water between Muansa and Bukoba rendered -the continuation of the single command unworkable; the officers -commanding the two Districts were therefore placed directly under -Headquarters. - -The English attempted to land at Mori Bay on the 4th March, at Ukerewe -on the 7th, and at Musoma on the 9th; all these attempts were defeated -by our posts. At the same time, several patrol encounters occurred near -Shirarti, in which the commander, Lieutenant Recke, was killed, and our -patrols were dispersed. On the 9th March, Lieutenant von Haxthausen, -with 100 Europeans and Askari, defeated an enemy many times his -superior at Maika Mountain; the enemy withdrew after having 17 whites -and a considerable number of Askari killed. On our side, one European -and 10 Askari were killed, 2 Europeans and 25 Askari wounded, while one -wounded European was taken prisoner. Besides the 26th Field Company -already mentioned, Muansa was reinforced by 100 Askari from Bukoba -District, who arrived on the 6th April. - -Early in April a few places on the eastern shore were again bombarded -from the Lake; at the same time some Masai made an invasion east -of the lake, killed a missionary and several natives, and looted -cattle. In the middle of April, Captain Braunschweig left Muansa with -110 Europeans, 430 Askari, 2 machine guns, and 2 guns, for the Mara -Triangle, and reinforced Lieutenant von Haxthausen. Over 500 rifles -remained at Muansa. - -On the 4th May, in Mara Bay, an English steamer was hit three times by -a ’73 pattern field-gun, which apparently prevented a landing. On the -12th May 300 men landed at Mayita; but they steamed off again on the -18th June, towing the wreck of the _Sybil_ with them. By the 20th May -the enemy, who had 900 men there, had also evacuated the Mara Triangle, -and entrenched himself on several mountains beyond the frontier. -Bombardments of the shore took place frequently at that time. - -Since early December, 1914, Major von Stuemer had held a very extended -position on the Kagera. Gradually the enemy, who was estimated at about -300 men, became more active. He seemed to be collecting material for -crossing the Kagera, and his ships appeared more frequently in Sango -Bay. - -On the night of the 4th-5th June, on the Shirarti frontier, Becker’s -post of 10 men was surrounded by 10 Europeans and 50 Indians of the -98th Regiment. An armed steamer also took part. But the enemy was -beaten, losing 2 Europeans and 5 Askari killed. - -I may here mention that the enemy’s armed scouts used poisoned arrows -on the Shirarti frontier also. - -On the 21st June the English, with a force of 800 Europeans 400 -Askari, 300 Indians, 3 guns and 8 machine guns, and supported by the -fire of the armed steamers, attacked Bukoba. Our garrison of little -more than 200 rifles evacuated the place after two days of fighting. -The enemy plundered it, destroyed the wireless tower, and left again -on the 24th towards Kissumu. He had suffered severely, admitting 10 -Europeans killed and 22 wounded. The Germans had, however, observed -that a steamer had left with about 150 dead and wounded on board. On -our side 2 Europeans, 5 Askari, and 7 auxiliaries had been killed, 4 -Europeans and 30 coloured men wounded, and we also lost the gun. - -Of the events of the ensuing period it may be remarked that Bukoba was -bombarded without result on the 18th July. In Mpororo a great chief -went over to the English. - -On the 12th September one of the _Königsberg’s_ four-inch guns arrived -at Muansa, where we had in process of time raised five new companies -among the Wassukuma people. - -It seemed as though the enemy were rather holding back at Bukoba, and -moving troops from there to Kissenyi. On the 29th October the English -attacked with some one hundred rifles, machine guns, a gun, and a -trench mortar, but were repulsed, apparently with heavy casualties. -Hostile attacks on the lower Kagera on the 4th and 5th December were -also unsuccessful. Several detachments of the enemy invaded the Karagwe -country. The command at Bukoba was taken over by Captain Gudovius, -hitherto District Commissioner in Tangarei, who marched off from Tabora -on the 21st December, and was followed by the newly-raised 7th Reserve -Company as a reinforcement for Bukoba. - -In Ruanda the energetic measures adopted by the President, Captain -Wintgens, produced good results. On the 24th September he surprised the -island of Ijvi in Lake Kivu, and captured the Belgian post stationed -there, and its steel boat. Another steel boat had been captured by -Lieutenant Wunderlich, of the Navy, who had moved to Lake Kivu with -some men of the _Moewe_, where he had requisitioned a motor-boat. On -the 4th October, Wintgens, with his Police Askari, some auxiliaries, -and a few men of the _Moewe_, drove back several companies of Belgians -north of Kissenyi, inflicting heavy casualties on them. After some -minor engagements, Captain Wintgens then inflicted a partial defeat -on the superior Belgian force of seventeen hundred men and six guns, -north of Kissenyi, on the 20th and 30th November, and again on the 2nd -December, 1914. Near Lake Tshahafi he drove out an English post. One -Englishman and twenty Askari were killed; we had two Askari killed and -one European severely wounded. - -After that, in February, 1915, several minor actions were fought -near Kissenyi and on the frontier. On the 28th May, Lieutenant Lang, -commanding the small garrison of Kissenyi, beat off the Belgians, who -had seven hundred men and two machine guns. The enemy sustained heavy -losses; we had one European killed. - -In June, 1915, it was said that over two thousand Belgian Askari, with -nine guns, and five hundred English Askari were concentrated near Lake -Kivu, the fact that the Belgian Commander-in-Chief, Tombeur, went to -Lake Kivu makes this information appear probable. On the 21st June the -Belgians attacked Kissenyi with nine hundred men, two machine guns and -two guns, but were repulsed. On the 5th July they again attacked the -place by night with four hundred men, and suffered severe losses. On -the 3rd August Kissenyi was ineffectively bombarded by artillery and -machine guns. In consequence of the crushing superiority of the enemy, -the 26th Field Company was transferred from Muansa to Kissenyi. - -Immediately after the arrival of this company at Kissenyi, on the -31st August, Captain Wintgens defeated the Belgian outposts, of whom -ten Askari were killed. On September 2nd he took by storm a position -held by one hundred and fifty Askari, with three guns and one machine -gun. During the next few weeks minor actions were fought every day. On -the 3rd October an attack on Kissenyi by two hundred and fifty Askari -with a machine gun was repulsed, and fourteen casualties were observed -among the enemy. After that, possibly in consequence of the action at -Luwungi on the 27th September, considerable forces of the enemy were -discovered to have marched off for the south. - -On the 22nd October another Belgian detached post of three hundred -Askari, with two guns and two machine guns, was surprised, when -the enemy had ten Askari killed. On the 26th November the Ruanda -Detachment, with one platoon of the 7th Company, which had arrived -from Bukoba, in all three hundred and twenty rifles, four machine guns -and one 1.45-inch gun, drove the enemy, numbering two hundred, out of -a fortified position, when he lost two Europeans and seventy Askari -killed, five Askari prisoners, and many wounded. We had one European -and three Askari killed, four Europeans, five Askari and one auxiliary -wounded. On the 21st December the enemy once more attacked Kissenyi -with one thousand Askari, two machine guns and eight guns, including -four modern 2.75-inch howitzers. He left behind twenty-one dead Askari, -three were captured, wounded, and many wounded were carried away. Our -force of three hundred and fifty rifles, four machine guns and two -guns, had three Askari killed, one European and one Askari severely -wounded. - -On the 12th January, 1916, Captain Wintgens surprised a Belgian -column north of Kissenyi, killing eleven Belgian Askari. On the 27th -January Captain Klinghardt, with three companies, beat off an attack -on the Kissenyi position made by two thousand Belgian Askari with hand -grenades and twelve guns, inflicting severe casualties on them. - - * * * * * - -In the Russissi country there were also numerous engagements. -Successful minor actions between German patrols and Congo troops had -taken place on the 10th and 13th October, 1914, at Changugu, on the -21st and 22nd at Chiwitoke, and on the 24th at Kajagga. - -On the 12th January, 1915, Captain Schimmer attacked a Belgian camp at -Luwungi, but the intended surprise was unsuccessful. Captain Zimmer and -three Askari were killed and five wounded. - -Then, on the 16th, 17th and 20th March small patrol skirmishes took -place, and on the 20th May a Belgian post was surprised. There was thus -incessant fighting, which continued in June and July. In August the -enemy seemed to be increasing his forces in that region. The command on -the Russissi was now taken over by Captain Schulz; the forces we had -there now consisted of four field companies, part of the crew of the -_Moewe_, and the Urundi Detachment, which about equalled one company. -There were also two light guns there. On the 27th September Captain -Schulz attacked Luwungi, when we were able to establish that the enemy -lost fifty-four Askari killed, and we also counted seventy-one Askari -hit. So the enemy’s losses amounted to about two hundred, as confirmed -by native reports received later. We had four Europeans and twenty -Askari killed, nine Europeans and thirty-four Askari wounded. - -Owing to the nature of the country and the relative strengths, we were -unable to achieve a decisive success on the Russissi. Only the Urundi -Detachment and one field company were, therefore, left there; two -companies left on the 18th and 19th December, 1915, to join Captain -Wintgens in Ruanda; three others moved to the Central Railway. - -On the 19th October the enemy met the 14th Reserve Company, and -although outnumbering it by two to one, lost twenty Askari, while we -had three Askari killed and twelve wounded. Although the Belgian main -camp, which reliable natives reported to contain two thousand Askari, -was so near, it was possible to reduce the troops on the Russissi in -favour of other districts, since on both sides the conditions seemed -unfavourable for an offensive. The Urundi Detachment and the 14th -Reserve Company remained on the Russissi under Major von Langenn. - - * * * * * - -On Lake Tanganyika, at the beginning of the war, Captain Zimmer had -collected about one hundred men of the _Moewe_, and in Usambara, about -one hundred Askari; in addition, he had a few Europeans who were called -up in Kigoma, also some one hundred Askari belonging to the posts in -Urundi and from Ruanda (Wintgens)—all told, about four hundred rifles. - -On the 22nd August, 1914, Lieutenant Horn, of the _Moewe_, commanding -the small armed steamer _Hedwig von Wissmann_, fought a successful -action against the Belgian steamer _Delcommune_. The captain of the -_Moewe_, Lieutenant-Commander Zimmer, had gone to Kigoma with his crew, -after destroying his ship, which had been blown up in August, 1914. The -steamer _Kingani_, which had also been transported to the same place by -rail from Dar-es-Salaam, and several smaller craft on Lake Tanganyika, -were then armed and put in commission by Lieutenant-Commander Zimmer. -He also mounted a 3·5-inch naval gun on a raft and bombarded a number -of Belgian stations on the shore. He strongly fortified Kigoma itself, -and developed it into a base for naval warfare on Lake Tanganyika. - -On the 20th November, 1914, the Bismarckburg Detachment (half company), -co-operating with the small armed steamers _Hedwig von Wissmann_ and -_Kingani_, drove off a Belgian company in the bay west of Bismarckburg, -captured four ·43-inch machine guns and over ninety miles of telegraph -wire, which was used to continue the line Kilossa-Iringa up to New -Langenburg, a work which was, from a military point of view, extremely -urgent. - -Early in October attempts were made to complete the destruction of the -Belgian steamer _Delcommune_, which was lying at Baraka, on the Congo -shore, but without success. After bombarding her once more on the 23rd -October, Captain Zimmer looked upon her as permanently out of action. -On the 27th February, 1915, the crew of the _Hedwig von Wissmann_ -surprised a Belgian post at Tombwe, and captured its machine gun. -One Belgian officer and ten Askari were killed, one severely wounded -Belgian officer and one Englishman were captured. We had one Askari -killed, one European mortally wounded, one Askari severely wounded. - -In March, 1915, the Belgians made arrests on a large scale in Ubwari, -the inhabitants of which had shown themselves friendly to us, and -hanged a number of people. - -According to wireless messages which we took in, several Belgian -whale-boats were got ready on Lake Tanganyika during June, and work -was being carried on on a new Belgian steamer, the _Baron Dhanis_. On -our side the steamer _Goetzen_ was completed on the 9th June, 1915, -and taken over by the Force. She rendered good service in effecting -movements of troops on Lake Tanganyika. - -The Police at Bismarckburg, under Lieutenant Haun of the Reserve, -the capable administrator of the Baziots, had joined the Protective -Force. Several skirmishes took place in hostile territory, and in this -district also the enemy was, on the whole, kept successfully at a -distance. - -It was not till early in February, 1915, that several hundred hostile -Askari invaded Abercorn, and some of them penetrated to near Mwasge -Mission, but then retired. - -Then, in the middle of March, Lieutenant Haun’s force was surprised in -camp at Mount Kito by an Anglo-Belgian detachment. The Commander was -severely wounded and taken prisoner, and several Askari were killed. -Lieutenant Aumann, with a force subsequently formed into a company, -was detached from Captain Falkenstein, and covered the German border -in the neighbourhood of Mbozi, where, in February, 1915, detachments -several hundred strong had frequently invaded German territory; at the -end of March an unknown number of Europeans were reported in Karonga, -while at Fife and other places on the frontier there were some eight -hundred men. So the enemy appeared to be preparing to attack. He was -patrolling as far as the country near Itaka, and early in April it was -reported that Kituta, at the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, had been -entrenched by the Belgians. Major von Langenn, who, after recovering -from his severe wound—he had lost an eye—was working on the Russissi -river, was entrusted with the conduct of operations in the well-known -Bismarckburg-Langenburg country. Besides the 5th Field Company, which -he had formerly commanded, and which was stationed at Ipyana and in the -Mbozi country, he was also given the Bismarckburg Detachment, strength -about one company, and three companies which were brought up from -Dar-es-Salaam and Kigoma. During their passage to Bismarckburg on the -Lake successful actions were fought east of that place by our patrols -against hostile raiding parties of fifty to two hundred and fifty men. - -[Illustration: Native Women. - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: Natives bringing food. - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -By the 7th May, 1915, Major von Langenn had assembled four companies at -Mwasge; a Belgian detachment stationed in front of him withdrew. On the -23rd May Lieutenant von Delschitz’s patrol drove off a Belgian company, -of which two Europeans and six Askari were killed. On the 24th orders -were sent to Langenn to move with three companies to New Langenburg to -meet the attack which was reported to be impending in that quarter. -General Wahle took over the command in the Bismarckburg area. The -latter arrived at Kigoma on the 6th June, and collected at Bismarckburg -the Bismarckburg Detachment, now re-formed as the 29th Field Company, -as well as the 24th Field Company and a half-company of Europeans -brought up from Dar-es-Salaam. - -On the 28th June General Wahle attacked Jericho Farm with two and a -half companies, but broke off the engagement on realizing that this -fortified position could not be taken without artillery. We had three -Europeans and four Askari killed, two Europeans and twenty-two Askari -wounded. General Wahle was reinforced by two companies from Langenburg. - -Since the 25th July, 1915, General Wahle was besieging the enemy, -who was strongly entrenched at Jericho, with four companies and two -1873-pattern guns. Relief expeditions from Abercorn were defeated, but -the siege was raised on the 2nd August, as no effect could be produced -with the guns available. General Wahle returned to Dar-es-Salaam with -three companies. The 29th Company remained at Jericho, the two guns at -Kigoma. - -On the 19th June the _Goetzen_ towed off the steamer _Cecil Rhodes_, -which was lying beached at Kituta, and sank her. - -During September and October there were continual skirmishes between -patrols on the border near Bismarckburg; Belgian reinforcements again -invaded the country about Abercorn. On the 3rd December it was observed -that the defences of Jericho had been abandoned and dismantled. A new -fort, north-east of Abercorn, was bombarded by Lieutenant Franken on -the 6th December with one hundred rifles and one machine gun; the enemy -appeared to sustain some casualties. - -The English Naval Expedition, the approach of which, by Bukoma and -Elizabethville, had long been under observation, had reached the -Lukuga Railway on the 22nd October, 1919. We picked up leaflets which -stated that a surprise was being prepared for the Germans on Lake -Tanganyika; this made me think that we might now have to deal with -specially-built small craft which might possibly be equipped with -torpedoes. We had, therefore, to meet a very serious menace to our -command of Lake Tanganyika, which might prove decisive to our whole -campaign. The simultaneous transfer of hostile troops towards Lake Kivu -and Abercorn proved that an offensive by land was to be co-ordinated -with the expedition. In order to defeat the enemy if possible while -his concentration was still in progress, Captain Schulz attacked the -Belgians at Luwungi on the 27th September, inflicting heavy loss. - -On the night of the 28th October the steamer _Kingani_ surprised a -Belgian working-party, who were constructing a telegraph line, and -captured some stores. In the mouth of the Lukuga river a railway -train was observed on the move. At last, the _Kingani_ did not return -from a reconnaissance to the mouth of the Lukuga, and, according to -a Belgian wireless message of the 31st December, she had been lost, -four Europeans and eight natives were said to have been killed, the -remainder to have been captured. Evidently, the favourable opportunity -for interfering with the enemy’s preparations for gaining command of -the Lake had passed. - -Then, on the 9th February, 1916, another of our armed steamers was -captured by the enemy. - -On Lake Nyassa the German steamer _Hermann von Wissmann_, whose captain -did not know that war had broken out, was surprised and taken by the -English Government steamer _Gwendolen_ on the 13th August, 1914. - -On the 9th September, 1914, Captain von Langenn, with his 5th Field -Company, which was stationed at Massoko, near New Langenburg, had -attacked the English station of Karongo. In the action with the -English, who were holding a fortified position, Captain von Langenn -himself was severely wounded. The two company officers were also -severely wounded and taken prisoners. The German non-commissioned -officers and the Askari fought very gallantly, but were obliged to -recognize that they could do nothing against the enemy’s entrenchments, -and, therefore, broke off the hopeless engagement. Over twenty Askari -had been killed, several machine guns and light guns had been lost. -Reinforcements from the 2nd Company at once arrived from Iringa and -Ubena, and several hundred Wahehe auxiliaries were raised. Gradually -it turned out that the enemy had also suffered severely. He avoided -expeditions on a large scale against the Langenburg District, and so -this fertile country, which was so necessary to us as a source of -supply, remained in our possession for eighteen months. - -Later on our company at Langenburg moved its main body nearer the -border to Ipyana Mission. On the 2nd November an affair of outposts -occurred on the Lufira river, and the steamer _Gwendolen_ on Lake -Nyassa was hit several times by our artillery. - -Early in December, 1914, some fighting between patrols took place -north of Karongo, on the Ssongwe river. Lieutenant Dr. Gothein, of -the Medical Corps, who had been returned to us from captivity by the -English in May, 1915, told us that in the first action at Karongo, on -the 9th September, 1914, the enemy had had six Europeans and fifty -Askari killed, and seven Europeans and more than fifty Askari severely -wounded. The English spies were very active, especially through the -agency of the “Vali,” the native administrative official, on the -Ssongwe. - -In May, 1915, we were able to effect several successful surprises -on the frontier. The rains were late, so that we could consider the -southern part of Langenburg District as safe from attack until the end -of June. - -In June, 1915, when Major von Langenn had arrived with his -reinforcements, there were, contrary to our expectations, no -considerable actions. We made use of the time to dismantle a telegraph -line in English territory, and to put it up again in our own, in the -direction of Ubena. In August, the rumours of an intended attack by -the enemy were again falsified. It was not till the 8th October that -considerable hostile forces of Europeans and Askari arrived at Fife. -On this border also there were numerous little skirmishes. Towards the -end of the year the arrival of fresh reinforcements at Ikawa was also -established. In that region, on the 23rd December, 1915, Captain Aumann -repulsed a force of about 60 Europeans with 2 machine guns, who were -attempting a surprise. - -On the shores of Lake Nyassa there were only insignificant encounters. - -On the 30th May the English landed 30 Europeans, 200 Askari, 2 guns -and 2 machine guns at Sphinx Harbour. We had there 13 rifles and one -machine gun, who inflicted on them, apparently, over 20 casualties, -whereupon, after destroying the wreck of the _Hermann von Wissmann_, -they retired. - - - - -PART II - -THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCES - -(From the arrival of the South African troops to the loss of the -Colony) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE ENEMY’S ATTACK AT OLDOROBO MOUNTAIN - - -EAST of Oldorobo the enemy now frequently showed considerable bodies of -troops, amounting to 1,000 or more men, who deployed in the direction -of the mountain at great distances, but did not approach it closely. -These movements, therefore, were exercises, by which the young European -troops from South Africa were to be trained to move and fight in the -bush. - -Early in February the enemy advanced against Oldorobo from the east -with several regiments. For us it was desirable that he should take -so firm a hold there that he could not get away again, so that we -could defeat him by means of a counter-attack with Captain Schulz’ -Detachment, encamped at Taveta. Other German detachments, of several -companies each, were stationed west of Taveta on the road to New Moshi, -and on that to Kaho, at New Steglitz Plantation. - -On the 12th February again, European troops, estimated at several -regiments, advanced to within 300 yards of Oldorobo. Headquarters at -New Moshi, which was in constant telephonic communication with Major -Kraut, considered that the favourable opportunity had now presented -itself, and ordered fire to be opened. The effect of our machine-guns, -and our two light guns, had been reported to be good, when Headquarters -left New Moshi by car for the field of battle. Schulz’ Detachment was -ordered to march from Taveta along the rear of Kraut’s Detachment, -covered from the fire of the enemy’s heavy artillery, and to make a -decisive attack on the enemy’s right, or northern, wing. The troops at -New Steglitz advanced to Taveta, where some fantastic reports came in -about hostile armoured cars, which were alleged to be moving through -the thorn-bush desert. The imagination of the natives, to whom these -armoured cars were something altogether new and surprising, had made -them see ghosts. On arriving on Oldorobo, Headquarters was informed -by telephone that the enemy, who had attacked our strongly entrenched -front, had been repulsed with heavy losses, and that Schulz’ Detachment -was fully deployed and advancing against his right flank. The numerous -English howitzer shells which fell in our position on Oldorobo did -hardly any damage, although they were very well placed. In contrast -to the great expenditure of ammunition by the hostile artillery, our -light guns had to restrict themselves to taking advantage of specially -favourable targets, not only because ammunition was scarce, but also -because we had no shrapnel. The enemy retreated through the bush in -disorder. We buried more than 60 Europeans. According to prisoners’ -statements and captured papers, three regiments of the 2nd South -African Infantry Brigade had been in action. According to the documents -it appeared that in recruiting the men the prospect of acquiring farms -and plantations had been used as a bait. The sudden illness of the -British General Smith-Dorrien, who was already on his way out to take -over command in East Africa, may not have been altogether inconvenient -to the English. The transfer of the command to a South African, General -Smuts, re-acted favourably on recruiting in South Africa. The training -of these newly raised formations was slight, and the conduct of the -Europeans, many of whom were very young, proved that many had never yet -taken part in a serious action. After the action of Oldorobo, however, -we observed that the enemy sought very thoroughly to make good the -deficiencies in his training. - -In spite of pursuit by Schulz’ Detachment, and repeated fire opened -on collections of hostile troops, the enemy, owing to the difficult -and close nature of the country, made good his escape to his fortified -camps. - -[Illustration: Fig. vii. Battle of Yasin (Jassini).] - -[Illustration: Fig. viii. Kilima Njaro and Masai Desert.] - -[Illustration: Fig. ix. Battle of Reata.] - -[Illustration: Fig. x. Battle of Kahe.] - -It was interesting to find, in several diaries we picked up, notes to -the effect that strict orders had been given to take no prisoners. As -a matter of fact the enemy had taken none, but it seemed advisable -nevertheless to address an inquiry to the British Commander, in order -that we might regulate our conduct towards the English prisoners -accordingly. There is no reason to doubt Brigadier-General Malleson’s -statement that no such order was given; but this case, and several -later instances, show what nonsense is to be found in private diaries. -It was quite wrong on the part of the enemy if he accepted the German -notes which fell into his hands as true, without detailed investigation. - -At this time also the hostile troops on Longido Mountain had been -considerably reinforced. This mountain had been evacuated by the -enemy, probably owing to difficulties of supply, but had latterly -been re-occupied. The rock is covered with dense vegetation, and our -patrols had several times ascended it and examined the enemy’s camps at -close quarters. It is at any time difficult correctly to estimate the -strength of troops, but in bush country, where more than a few men are -never to be seen at a time, and where the view is constantly changing, -it is impossible. The reports of the natives were too inaccurate. On -the whole, however, we could but conclude from the general situation, -and from the increased quantity of supplies which were being brought -to Longido from the north, by ox wagon, without interruption, that the -enemy was being considerably reinforced. - -His raids into the Kilima Njaro country had been repulsed with -slaughter. When a squadron of Indian Lancers moved south, between -Kilima Njaro and Meru Mountain, it was at once vigorously attacked -by one of our mounted patrols under Lieutenant Freiherr von Lyncker. -Our Askari had come to understand the great value of saddle-horses in -our operations, and charged the enemy, who was mounted, with the cry: -“Wahindi, kameta frasi!” (“They are Indians, catch the horses!”) The -Indians were so surprised by the rapidity of our people that they fled -in confusion, leaving some of their horses behind. Among others the -gallant European commander had been left dead on the field; he had not -been able to prevent his men from losing their heads. - -I should like to remark generally that during this first period of -the war the conduct of the British regular officers was invariably -chivalrous, and that the respect they paid us was fully reciprocated. -But our Askari also earned the respect of the enemy by their bravery -in action and their humane conduct. On the 10th March the English -Lieutenant Barrett was severely wounded and fell into our hands; -owing to false accounts he thought his last moment had come, and was -surprised when our Askari, who had no European with them, tied him up -as well as they could and carried him to a doctor. In his astonishment -he remarked: “Why, your Askari are gentlemen.” How greatly the English -soldiers had been misled I learned on the 12th February from a young -South African captured on Oldorobo, who asked whether he was going to -be shot. Of course we laughed at him. No doubt, in a long war, cases of -brutality and inhumanity do occur. But that happens on both sides, and -one should not generalize from isolated cases, and exploit them for the -purpose of unworthy agitation, as has been done by the English Press. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY AND THE ACTION AT REATA - - -AT that time we noticed the first parties of hostile spies, and -captured some of them. They were “Shensi” (innocent-looking natives), -who, as a proof of having really reached the objective of their -mission, had to bring back certain objects, such as parts of the -permanent way of the Usambara Railway. The general review of the -situation showed that the enemy was making a detailed reconnaissance -of the Usambara Railway and the approaches to it. A glance at the -map shows that a simultaneous advance by the enemy from Oldorobo and -Longido towards New Moshi was bound to entail the loss of the Kilima -Njaro country, which was of value to us from the point of view of -maintenance. If, however, we wanted to retire before a superior enemy -on our main line of communication, we should be obliged to move our -main forces along the Usambara Railway, thus making almost an acute -angle with the direction of an attack coming from Oldorobo. The -danger of being cut off by the enemy from this, our principal line of -communication, was for us very great. Should the enemy advance north -of Lake Jipe, he would be cramped by Kilima Njaro and by the steep -group of the North Pare Mountains. It is obvious that in that case his -advance directly on Kahe would be the most inconvenient for us, and if -successful, would cut the Usambara Railway, our line of communications. -But it would be even more serious for us if the enemy should pass south -of Lake Jipe, and press forward by the valley leading between the North -and Middle Pare, to the Northern Railway, south of Lembeni. Finally, -he could reach the railway by way of the valley at Same, between the -Middle and South Pare. In his advance on Lembeni and Same the enemy -would be able to make a road suitable for motor traffic with rapidity, -and in places without preparation, across the open plain, and to base -his operations upon it. - -The small forces we had in the Kilima Njaro country—about 4,000 -rifles—rendered it impossible to divide them in order to render -ourselves secure against all these possibilities. Even for purely -defensive reasons we must keep our forces concentrated and maintain -close touch with the enemy, in order to hold him fast where we were, -and thus keep his movements under observation. It was from the outset -very doubtful whether we could in succession defeat the two main -hostile groups, whose advance towards the Kilima Njaro country was to -be expected from Longido and Makatau, and which were each considerably -stronger than ourselves. There was no prospect of doing so unless our -troops could be moved with lightning rapidity, first against one of -the enemy’s forces and then, just as quickly, against the other. The -necessary preparations were made, and after personal reconnaissance, -a number of cross-country tracks in the rugged forest country north -of the great road which leads from New Moshi to the west were decided -upon. As it happened, no considerable use was made of these tracks. -It would not do to be afraid of trying anything ninety-nine times, if -there was a chance of succeeding at the hundredth. In following this -principle we did not do badly. - -The enemy’s activity increased, and he displayed good training in -numerous minor encounters. He had also raised a number of new Askari -formations, largely recruited among the intelligent tribes of the -Wyassa country. Being only sparsely covered with bush, and therefore -very open, the desert country lying to the north-west of Kilima Njaro -did not favour sudden offensive operations by us; for this purpose the -dense bush district between Kilima Njaro and Meru Mountain itself, -which the enemy, coming from Longido, would probably have to traverse, -was more promising. Here we concentrated a detachment of some 1,000 -rifles, composed of five selected Askari Companies. But, owing to the -limited range of vision, this detachment did not succeed in forcing -a decisive engagement on any of the numerous hostile columns which -pushed down to the south in the beginning of March. The enemy, also, -had great difficulty in finding his way; and we only learned from an -Indian despatch-rider, who brought a report to us instead of to his own -people, that the 1st East African Division, under General Stewart, was -in this district. As these encounters took place in the neighbourhood -of Gararagua, and south-west of that place, it was too far away for -our reserves at New Steglitz and Himo to intervene. (It is about two -marches from Gararagua to New Moshi.) Before the chance of doing so -arrived the enemy also advanced from the east. The direction taken by -the enemy’s airmen showed his evident interest in the country one or -two hours north of Taveta. One was bound to hit on the idea that the -enemy encamped east of Oldorobo did not intend to get his head broken -a second time on that mountain, but meant to work round the position -by the north, and so reach the Lumi River, one hour north of Taveta. -On the 8th March observers on Oldorobo noticed huge clouds of dust -moving from the enemy’s camp in that direction. Numerous motors were -also seen. From East Kitovo, a mountain four miles west of Taveta, -Headquarters also observed these movements. Our fighting patrols, who -were able to fire with effect on the hostile columns, and to take a few -prisoners, established with certainty that the enemy’s main force was -approaching at this point, and that General Smuts was present. - -On the afternoon of the 8th March Headquarters observed strong hostile -columns near Lake Dsalla, who advanced from there in a widely extended -line of skirmishers for some distance towards East Kitovo. On this -occasion, and on many others, our want of artillery obliged us to -look on quietly while the enemy executed unskilful movements at no -great distance from our front. But it was evident that this enveloping -movement of the enemy rendered the Oldorobo position, to which we owed -many successful engagements during the course of the war, untenable. -I therefore decided to deploy the troops for a fresh stand on the -mountains which close the gap between the North Pare Mountains and -Kilima Njaro to the westward of Taveta. Kraut’s Detachment was ordered -by telephone to take up a position on the Resta-Latema Mountains, on -the road leading from Taveta to New Steglitz. North-west of Latema -Mountain, on the road from Taveta to Himo, Schulz’s Detachment -occupied the mountains of North Kitovo, and covered the move of -Kraut’s Detachment. These movements were executed by night, without -being interfered with by the enemy. On our extreme left wing, on the -south-eastern slopes of Kilima Njaro, Captain Stemmermann’s Company -blocked the road leading from Rombo Mission to Himo and New Moshi. -Rombo Mission was occupied by the enemy. Some of the natives made no -attempt to conceal the fact that they now adhered to the English. This -lends colour to the supposition that English espionage and propaganda -among the natives had for a long time been going on in this district, -and that the light-signals which had often been seen on the eastern -slopes of Kilima Njaro had some connection with it. - -The mountain position taken up by us was very favourable as regards -ground, but suffered from the great disadvantage that our few thousand -Askari were far too few really to fill up the front, which was some -12 miles in extent. Only a few points in the front line could be -occupied; the bulk of the force was kept at my disposal at Himo, to -be brought into action according to how the situation might develop. -It was a time of great tension. Before us was the greatly superior -enemy; behind us, advancing to the south from Londigo, another superior -opponent, while our communications, which also formed our line of -retreat, were threatened by the enemy in the very unpleasant manner -already described. But, in view of the ground, which we knew, and the -apparently not too skilful tactical leading on the part of the enemy, -I did not think it impossible to give at least one of his detachments -a thorough beating. The positions on the line Reata-North Kitovo were -therefore to be prepared for a stubborn defence. From Tanga, one of -the _Königsberg’s_ guns mounted there was brought up by rail. The -reader will rightly ask why this had not been done long before. But the -gun had no wheels, and fired from a fixed pivot, so that it was very -immobile. It is therefore comprehensible that we delayed bringing it -into action until there could be no doubt as to the precise spot where -it would be wanted. - -The situation now developed so rapidly that the gun could not be used -against Taveta. It was therefore mounted near the railway at Kahe, -on the south bank of the Pangani River, from which position it did -excellent service later in the actions at Kahe. - -On the 10th March the enemy reconnoitred along our whole front. Mounted -detachments of about 50 men rode up, dismounted, and then advanced in -a widely extended line, leading their horses, until they were fired -on. This was their object. The fire disclosed our positions, although -imperfectly. This method of reconnaissance gave us the opportunity for -scoring local successes, which cost the enemy a certain number of men, -and brought us in some score of horses. From North Kitovo Mountain we -could plainly see how portions of our firing line, taking advantage -of favourable situations, rapidly advanced and fired upon the enemy’s -reconnoitring parties from several directions. To me the force employed -by the enemy in these enterprises appeared too large to be explained -by the mere intention of reconnaissance; they looked to me more like -serious but somewhat abortive attacks. It was not yet possible to -form a clear idea of the direction from which the enemy’s main attack -would come. The tactical difficulties of enveloping our left (north) -wing were far less, but this operation would prevent him from exerting -effective pressure on our communications. The direction from Taveta -through Reata towards Kahe would be the worst for us, but entailed -for the enemy a difficult frontal attack on the fortified heights of -Reata and Latema, which promised but little success even if made in -greatly superior strength. I, therefore, thought it advisable to move -Captain Koehl with two companies so close up in rear of Major Kraut’s -Detachment, which was on the high ground between Reata and Latema, that -we could intervene rapidly without waiting for orders. For the moment, -telephonic communication with our detachments was secure. But it was to -be anticipated that it would become at least very difficult, so soon -as any detachment moved away from the existing lines. There was no -material available for rapidly laying a cable that could follow moving -troops. We were also deficient of light wireless apparatus, by means -of which later on the English successfully controlled the movements of -their columns in the bush. - -On the 11th March another aeroplane appeared over New Moshi and dropped -a few bombs. I was just talking to an old Boer about the fight on the -12th February, and saying that the English were incurring a grave -responsibility in ruthlessly exposing so many young men, who were quite -ignorant of the Tropics, to the dangers of our climate and of tropical -warfare. Major Kraut reported from Reata that strong hostile forces -were moving up towards his positions from the direction of Taveta. Soon -after, a powerful attack was made by several thousand men on the three -companies holding our position. Our three light guns could, of course, -not engage in a duel with the heavy artillery, and, as at Oldorobo, had -to restrict themselves to employing their few shells against the denser -masses of the enemy at favourable moments. Knowing the difficulties -of the ground, I thought the attack had little prospect of success, -but the two companies of Captain Koehl held in readiness behind Major -Kraut’s Detachment were, nevertheless, sent in to attack. Captain -Koehl, who had originally intended to attack the enemy in flank, which -would have suited the situation and proved decisive, was obliged to -recognize that in the unknown and dense bush this was impossible. The -time and place, and, therefore, the effectiveness of this attack, -would have become matters of pure chance. He, therefore, quite rightly -marched up to the immediate support of Major Kraut. From what I could -observe for myself from North Kitovo, and according to the reports -that came in, it appeared that the enemy wanted to keep us occupied in -front from Reata to Kitovo, while his decisive movement was being made -round our left wing. In the first instance large bodies of horsemen -were moving in that direction who appeared and disappeared again among -the heights and gullies of the south-east slopes of Kilima Njaro. The -11th Company, under Captain Stemmermann, which was on the slopes -above these horsemen, prevented them from reaching the summit. During -the course of the afternoon the leading horsemen had worked their way -through the dense banana-plantations to near Marangu. They appeared -to be very exhausted. Some of them were seen to be eating the unripe -bananas. - -During the afternoon it became evident that the enemy was making a -strong frontal attack against Kraut’s Detachment on Reata and Latema -Mountain. But the telephonic reports were favourable: the enemy was -obviously suffering heavy casualties; hundreds of stretchers were -being employed in getting away the wounded. By evening all the enemy’s -attacks on our front had been repulsed with heavy losses. In the -darkness Captain Koehl’s two companies had pursued with energy and -opened machine-gun fire on the enemy when he tried to make a stand. -In the evening I had gone to Himo, and about 11 p.m. I was engaged -in issuing orders for an attack to be made early on the 12th on the -enemy’s horsemen, whose presence had been established at Marangu. Just -then Lieutenant Sternheim, commanding the guns with Kraut’s Detachment, -telephoned that the enemy had attacked once more in the night and had -penetrated into the Reata position in great force. This report made -it appear probable that this strong hostile force would now press -forward from Reata in the direction of Kahe, and cut us off from our -communications. To accept this risk, and still carry out the attack -on the enemy at Marangu, appeared to be too dangerous. I therefore -ordered the troops at Kitovo and Himo to fall back during the night -to the Reata-Kahe road. As a covering force Stemmermann’s Company was -for the time being to remain at Himo. This march was bound to entail -the unpleasant consequence that, at the very best, all communication -between Headquarters and the various units would cease. Anyone who has -experienced these night marches knows also how easily some parts of the -force may become entirely detached and cannot be reached for ever and -a day. Fortunately I had at least some knowledge of the ground, as we -moved across country to the new road, while we heard continuous heavy -firing going on on Reata and Latema Mountains. A few stragglers who -had lost their way in the bush came towards us; when we said we were -Germans they did not believe us, and disappeared again. On the new road -we found the dressing station. Here, too, the reports of the numerous -wounded were so contradictory and obscure that one could only gather -the impression of very heavy fighting in the bush at close quarters, -but failed to learn anything of its various phases or results. By and -by we got through on the telephone to Major Kraut, who, with part -of his detachment, was on the Kahe-Taveta road, on the south-west -slope of Reata Mountain. On the heights the fire had gradually died -down, and his patrols had found no more trace of the enemy on Reata -Mountain. Early in the morning of the 12th Major Kraut found some of -his detachment again in their old positions on the hills: the enemy had -fallen back to Taveta. - -When I arrived at Reata Mountain at six in the morning the great -quantity of booty was being collected. Very great confusion had -occurred in the close-quarter fighting by night. English dead, who -were lying in the bush far in rear of the front of Kraut’s Detachment, -proved that certain detachments of the enemy had got behind our -line. Individual snipers, hidden away among the rocks, maintained a -well-aimed fire, and could not be dislodged. It was, however, clear -that the enemy had been repulsed with heavy casualties. Both our own -wounded and those of the enemy were got away without a hitch, and so -were the prisoners. With the detachments that were moving from the -vicinity of Himo through the dense bush to the Kahe-Reata road we had -no communication, and could expect to have none for several hours more. - -In this situation it was regrettable that I had ordered the troops -forming our left wing, who had been posted between Kitovo and Himo, to -withdraw to the Kahe-Reata road. After giving up the high ground held -by our left wing the Reata position would in time become untenable, the -more so as it had no supply of water, which had to be brought up from -a place an hour’s march further back. It was impossible to turn back -the units of the left wing to reoccupy the Himo-Kitovo area, as we -were at the moment completely out of touch with them, and, as has been -mentioned, there was no expectation of regaining it for hours to come. -I decided to evacuate the Reata position, and after the battlefield was -cleared I returned with the line that was nearest to the enemy to the -water south-west of Reata Mountain. In the course of the day the other -detachments reached the Kahe-Reata road at different points further to -the rear and encamped. - -Headquarters moved to New Steglitz Plantation. The buildings are -situated half-way between Kahe and Reata, on a slight elevation -affording a distant view over the forest, which is particularly dense -along the Kahe-Reata road. On the way I met Captain Schoenfeld, who -reported that he had mounted his 4-inch gun out of the _Königsberg_ -near Kahe village on the south bank of the Pangani. After our -withdrawal the enemy occupied Reata Mountain and for a while fired into -the blue with light guns and rifles. - -During the next few days we observed the advance of strong hostile -forces from the direction of Taveta to Himo, and the pitching of large -camps at that place. Against the Little Himo, a mountain in front of -our line which we were not holding, the enemy developed a powerful -attack from the east, across a perfectly open plain, which, after a -long and heavy bombardment of the empty hill, ended in its capture. -Unfortunately, we were unable to move our troops sufficiently rapidly -to come down upon this attack out of the thick bush. From the Little -Himo the enemy frequently bombarded the Plantation building of New -Steglitz with light artillery. Some weeks before, after a successful -buffalo-hunt, I had enjoyed a hospitable hour in the few rooms of this -building. The native who had guided us on that occasion had deserted -to the English. Now it provided decidedly cramped accommodation for -Headquarters and the telephone exchange. I myself was lucky enough to -find a fairly comfortable shake-down on the sofa, with the cloth off -the dining-table. Telephone messages and reports came in day and night -without ceasing; but they did not prevent us from making the material -side of our existence tolerably comfortable. We had a roof over our -heads, and the use of a kitchen equipped in European style, and carried -on our combined mess as previously at New Moshi. The circumstances -peculiar to East Africa make it necessary for the European to maintain -a number of servants which to home ideas seems excessive. Even now, -on active service, nearly everyone had two “Boys” who took charge -of the cooking utensils and provisions we carried with us, cooked -excellently, baked bread, washed, and generally provided us in the bush -with a good proportion of the comforts which in Europe are only to be -found in dwelling houses. Even in the heart of the bush I restricted -these alleviations as little as possible, out of consideration for the -strength, health and spirit of the Europeans. If, in spite of this, -Headquarters often preferred to occupy buildings, this was done less -for the sake of comfort than in order to facilitate the unavoidable -work of writing and drawing. - -While we were at New Steglitz we received the surprising news -that a second store-ship had reached the Colony, with arms, -ammunition—including several thousand rounds for the 4-inch -_Könisgberg_ guns, which were now employed on land—and other warlike -stores. The ship had run into Ssudi Bay, at the extreme south of our -coast, and had immediately begun to discharge her cargo. In spite of -the great distance, and the exclusive use of carriers, the whole of -it was made available for the troops. This achievement was indeed -surprising, in view of the large number of hostile ships that were -blockading and searching our coast-line, and which were aware of the -arrival of the store-ship. But she probably surprised the English also, -for after discharging her cargo, she put to sea again, and disappeared, -much to the astonishment of the enemy. Chaff between the Navy and the -Army is not unknown even in England, and if the latter is reproached -for not having been able to finish us off, the former may be silenced -with the justifiable retort that it should not have allowed us to -obtain such great supplies of arms and ammunition. The bulk of the -stores was transported by land to the Central Railway, and was stored -along, or near it, at the disposal of Headquarters. Owing to our lack -of suitable artillery it was particularly advantageous that we were -quickly able to bring up the four field-howitzers and two mountain guns -which had come in the ship. - -The store-ship had also brought out decorations for war service: one -Iron Cross of the First Class for the Captain of the _Königsberg_, -and enough of the Second Class to enable half her company to have one -each. For the Protective Force there were an Iron Cross of the First -Class, and one of the Second Class, which were for me, and a number of -decorations for the Askari. As regards the Europeans, we only heard -in September, 1916, by wireless that the decorations recommended by -Headquarters had been approved. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -RETREAT BEFORE OVERWHELMING HOSTILE PRESSURE - - -IN our rear, Major Fischer, who with five companies had been employed -between Kilima Njaro and Meru, had evaded the enemy’s superior forces -by moving on New Moshi, and had been ordered up to Kahe. Captain -Rothert, who had been acting under his orders with his company and the -Arusha Detachment (strength about one company), had been energetically -pursued by the enemy, and had made his way by Arusha towards -Kondoa-Irangi. We could only expect to get into touch with him by the -wire which had been put up from Dodome, by Kondoa-Irangi to Umbulu, -and that only after a considerable time. By abandoning New Moshi we, -of necessity, left the road Taveta-New Moshi-Arusha open to the enemy. -The latter was thus also enabled to penetrate into the interior of -the Colony with his troops from Taveta by Arusha and Kondoa-Irangi, -and to act there against our communication at an extremely dangerous -point. From our troops concentrated in the neighbourhood of Kahe and -New Steglitz he had not much to fear during this operation. Although -we had brought up all our companies from Tanga, leaving there only the -troops absolutely indispensable for security, all we could do with our -four thousand rifles was to let the enemy run up against us on suitable -ground, and, possibly, to take advantage of any mistakes he might make -by skilful and rapid action; but the odds against us being seven to -one we could attempt no more. From an attack on an enemy superior not -only in numbers, but also in equipment, and holding fortified positions -into the bargain, I could not possibly hope for success. I could not, -therefore, accede to the requests of my company commanders that we -should attack, but this expression of a bold soldierly spirit gave me -strength and hope in the serious situation in which we were placed. -Minor enterprises, undertaken against the enemy’s camps by patrols -and small detachments, produced no results of consequence; but they -may have helped to make the enemy’s main force take some notice of us -instead of simply marching on past us. He certainly did push on to -the west from Himo, and heavy clouds of dust were seen moving to New -Moshi and further on to the west. But a large part of the enemy coming -from Himo turned in our direction. For the commander such situations -are extraordinarily trying; he is not master of the situation, and -must, of necessity, renounce the initiative. Only the most careful -reconnaissance may perhaps reveal some weakness of the opponent, and in -order to utilize this weakness and regain the initiative, not a moment -must be lost. Fortunately, however, the enemy did expose weak points of -which we were able to take at least partial advantage. - -Owing to the dense bush and high forest in which our camps were hidden, -aerial reconnaissance can hardly have been any use to the enemy. The -bombs dropped by the enemy caused only a few casualties at Kahe, and -did not interfere with us in getting away our stores through that -place. In order to draw our fire, the well-known English horsemen -appeared once more north-west of New Steglitz in a widely-extended -skirmishing line. In front of them, hidden in the bush, were our -companies, ready to take hold immediately larger bodies should appear. -A counter-attack of this description was made late in the afternoon on -the 15th March, and with fair success. In order to become thoroughly -acquainted with the ground, European patrols were constantly moving -about, and I also made use of every available minute. Through the bush -we cut and marked tracks. By this means we could clearly indicate any -point to which a detachment was required to go. - -On the main road leading from Himo to Kahe a strong hostile force -had also appeared and pushed close up to the front of Stemmermann’s -Detachment, which occupied a fortified position on this road at Kahe, -facing north. With considerable skill patrols worked close up to the -detachment, and so concealed the movements of the enemy. When I arrived -there in the afternoon of the 20th March, it was not at all clear what -was really going on in front. It was quite possible that the enemy was -merely making a demonstration in order to attack at some other, more -dangerous, spot. Such a manœuvre would have been very menacing to us, -as the close nature of the bush country would prevent us from detecting -it until very late, probably too late. I decided to drive the enemy’s -screen back on his position proper. Earlier in the day it had been -given out that the companies were to move off to their former positions -at one a.m.; the machine guns were left in our entrenchments so as not -to lose them, and as a measure of protection. It was bright moonlight -when the leading company was fired on, apparently by a hostile outpost, -or patrol, which moved off. After that we encountered several patrols, -but then, about three miles north of our own trenches, we came upon a -stronger opponent with machine guns. The very severe action which now -developed proved that we had come up against the enemy’s main position; -to assault it seemed hopeless. Leaving patrols out, I withdrew step -by step. Our casualties were not inconsiderable, and unfortunately -included three company commanders, who were difficult to replace; of -the three, Lieutenant von Stosch and Freiherr Grote died of their -wounds a few days later, while Captain Augar only became fit for duty -again after a long time and when provided with an artificial foot. - -Our withdrawal, which the enemy probably took to be involuntary, -apparently led him to believe that he would be able to rout us next day -by a vigorous attack. The attacks made by powerful hostile forces on -the front of Stemmermann’s Detachment at Kahe on the 21st March were -unsuccessful; the enemy, composed mainly of South African infantry, was -beaten off with heavy loss. Our four-inch _Königsberg_ gun, directed -from elevated sites affording a good view, fired on the approaching -enemy, apparently with good effect. It may be assumed that part of -their severe casualties, which the English stated to have amounted on -this day to several hundred among the South African Europeans alone, -were caused by this gun. The enemy realized that he could not advance -over the field of fire extending for five hundred yards in front of -our trenches with any hope of success, and endeavoured to envelop our -right flank. But having previously reconnoitred and determined tracks, -we were also well prepared to execute a counter-attack, and in the -afternoon Schulz’s Detachment effectively struck at the enemy’s flank. -The last part of Schulz’s advance had, indeed, been very arduous owing -to the thick bush. The Askari could only work through it step by step, -when they suddenly heard the enemy’s machine guns at work only a few -paces in front of them. - -Unfortunately, however, this counter-attack was not completed owing to -the events which occurred in the meantime on our left. The activity -displayed by patrols during the preceding days, and the clouds of -dust, had shown that strong detachments of the enemy’s horse, coming -from near New Moshi and keeping to westward of the Kahe-New Moshi -railway, were trying to work round our front, which faced north, and -of which the left wing was at Kahe Station. The continuation of this -movement would have brought them on to the railway in our rear, and -cut us from our communications while we were engaged with a superior -opponent with our front to the north. I had, therefore, posted a strong -reserve of eight companies in readiness at Kahe Station. But as I -thought it necessary during the action to remain at Kahe village, near -Stemmermann’s Detachment, I was unable to exercise rapid and direct -control over the reserves at Kahe. The dense vegetation prevented any -distant observation. The control of the reserve at Kahe had to be left -to the initiative of the commander on the spot and his subordinates. -The latter had observed that hostile troops had advanced through the -bush and occupied a hill south-west of Kahe Railway Station. One -company had, on its own initiative, attacked this force, but the -advance had broken down under shrapnel fire. Thereupon our four-inch -gun opened fire on these light guns and drove them off. - -Late in the afternoon I received an urgent message that strong -forces of the enemy were advancing in our rear towards the railway -at Kissangire, and that the event we feared had actually occurred. I -was, therefore, compelled to issue orders for an immediate withdrawal -towards Kissangire. The enemy could not yet have reached there -in strength, and I hoped to defeat him there by rapidly throwing -all my forces against him. Thus it happened that Captain Schulz’s -well-directed counter-attack could not be carried through, or produce -its full effect. The transfer by night of our force across the Pangani, -which was close behind us, and over which we had previously made a -number of bridges and crossings, was effected smoothly and without -interference. Even on the following day the patrols we had left behind -found its north bank clear of the enemy. Our good four-inch gun, which -we could not take away owing to its lack of mobility, was blown up. -After midnight, that is, quite early on the 22nd March, I arrived at -Kissangire Station, and discovered to my very great astonishment that -all the reports about strong hostile forces moving on that place were -erroneous, and that our withdrawal had therefore been unnecessary. This -incident afforded me a remarkably striking proof of the extraordinary -difficulty of observing the movements of troops in thick bush, and of -the great care every commander must exercise in estimating the value -of such reports. But it also demonstrates how difficult it is for any -commander to combine his own powers of reasoning and his judgment of -the situation with the constantly conflicting reports, both of Askari -and Europeans, in order to base his decision on a foundation that -even approximately resembles the reality. In the African bush it is -particularly important, whenever possible, to supplement the reports -one receives by personal observation. - -However, our withdrawal could not now be altered, and the most -important thing was to re-group our forces. In this operation the -decisive factor was water-supply. This, and the necessity for -distribution in depth, caused me to leave only a detachment of a few -companies on the high ground at Kissangire, from where it observed -the seven and a half miles of waterless thorn desert extending to -the Pangani. To the east of this detachment at Kissangire, under -Major von Boehmken, was Otto’s detachment, pushed up on to the North -Pare Mountains in order to close the passes leading over them. Major -Kraut took up a position on Ngulu Pass, between the North Pare and -Middle Pare ranges. The main body of the force settled down in several -fortified camps in the fertile Lembeni country. - -In spite of the various withdrawals we had recently carried out, the -spirit of the troops was good, and the Askaris were imbued with a -justifiable pride in their achievements against an enemy so greatly -superior. Only a very few individuals deserted, and they were almost -without exception men whose cattle was in the territory now occupied by -the enemy, and who were therefore afraid of losing their property. - -Almost the entire German civil population had left the Kilima Njaro -country; most of them had moved to Usambara into the Wilhelmstal -district. The Arusha country had also been evacuated, and the farmers -had moved off by ox-wagon by Kondoa-Irangi to Dodoma. The numerous -Greeks had for the most part remained on their coffee-plantations on -Kilima Njaro, and the Boers of British nationality had stayed in their -cattle farms, which extended from the north-west slopes of Kilima -Njaro northwards round Meru Mountain and along the western slopes of -the latter to the vicinity of Arusha. At Lembeni the regular course -of existence had not been interrupted; supply trains rolled right up -to the station; the companies which were not in the front line worked -diligently at their training, and Headquarters continued its work in -the railway station buildings of Lembeni just as it had done previously -at Moshi. Airmen appeared and dropped bombs, just as before. - -The country was carefully prepared to meet various possible battle -conditions, passages were cut through the dense rhinoceros bush, and -a field of fire cleared where necessary. Personal reconnaissance took -up much of my time, and often led me to the companies encamped in -the thick bush and on the dominating heights. The troops had already -developed to a tolerable degree in adaptability, and in the art of -making the material side of their existence as comfortable as possible. -I remember with pleasure the occasions when, in a comfortably arranged -grass hut, I was offered a cup of coffee with beautiful rich milk, -prepared from the ground-down kernel of a ripe cocoanut. The North Pare -Mountains also were frequently the goal of my expeditions. Up there I -found a rich and well-watered area of primeval forest, through which -it was hardly possible to penetrate off the roads. The water-supply of -the country proved to be far more plentiful than the results of former -surveys had led us to expect; in this respect also it was shown how the -necessities of war cause the resources of a country to be opened up, -and utilized to an extent greatly exceeding previous estimates. The -natives of North Pare are, like those of Kilima Njaro, masters in the -art of irrigating their fields by means of the water coming down from -the mountains. - -On the 4th April, one of my reconnaissances took me to Otto’s -Detachment on the Pare Mountains. From the north-west corner one had -a clear view of the enemy’s camp, lying down below at Kahe Station. -The obvious idea of bombarding it with one of our long-range guns—in -the meantime we had brought to Lembeni one 4-inch _Königsberg_ gun on -wheels, and one 3·5-inch gun mounted on a ’73 pattern carriage—could -unfortunately not be carried out. With rather too much zeal the -troops had thoroughly destroyed the permanent way of the line between -Lembeni and Kahe. With the means at our disposal it could not be made -sufficiently fit for traffic to enable us to move one of our guns up -and down on it with rapidity. All our observations and reports agreed -that the enemy, who had formerly often sent patrols and even stronger -forces to the south of Jipe Lake, no longer displayed any interest in -that district. He had in any case moved his principal forces towards -Kahe and also beyond New Moshi westward towards Arusha. - -After passing a cold night on the damp height at North Pare I descended -to Lembeni on the 5th April. Here I found a report that on the -previous day Captain Rothert, who was encamped with the 28th Company -beside the Lolkisale, a high mountain in the Masai desert, two days’ -march south-west of Arusha, had been attacked by superior forces. The -heliograph communication with Lolkisale from the south-west had then -been interrupted. It was not till later that the following facts became -known. Several mounted companies of the enemy, coming across the desert -from Arusha, had attacked the 28th Company, who were in position on the -mountain, from several directions. As our people were in possession of -the water they could well sustain the fight against the enemy, who had -none. On the second day of the action the situation became critical -for the enemy, because of this very absence of water. Unfortunately, -however, after Captain Rothert was severely wounded, this circumstance -was not properly appreciated on our side. The situation was thought to -be so hopeless that the company surrendered with its machine guns and -ammunition. On this occasion also some of the Askari gave evidence of -sound military education by refusing to join in the surrender. They, -together with the wounded, rejoined our forces near Ufiome, without -being interfered with by the enemy. There they met a new rifle company -and the Arusha Detachment, of which the former had arrived from the -Central Railway, the latter from the direction of Arusha. - -The road to Kondoa-Irangi and the interior of the Colony was now hardly -closed to the enemy coming from Arusha. There were three companies -in the neighbourhood of Lake Kivu, in the north-west corner of the -Colony, under Captain Klinghardt, retired, who had done so well in the -actions at Kissenyi; they were moved by march route and on Tanganyika -steamer to Kigoma, and from there by rail to Saranda. From there again -they marched up towards Kondoa-Irangi. Captain Klinghardt was also -given command of the troops already north of Kondoa-Irangi (about two -companies) and of another company that came by rail from Dar-es-Salaam. -These movements would take a long time. Consequently, the good and -well-tried 13th Company, whose peace-station had been Kondoa-Irangi, -was at once brought by rail to near Buiko, whence it marched through -the Masai desert to Kondoa-Irangi. The march through this waterless -and little-known country had to be undertaken before the completion of -the reconnaissances, which were in progress; and to do so with what -was, according to African ideas, the large force of one company with -carriers, in the dry season, and before the heavy rains had set in, -involved some risk. - -But this risk had to be run; for the force facing us at Kahe, after -its reconnoitring parties had been several times repulsed, was showing -no signs of advancing against us. At the time, therefore, the enemy -was evidently directing his principal effort towards Kondoa-Irangi. -As, for the reasons already set forth, it appeared unsound for us -to attack from Lembeni towards Kahe, I decided merely to occupy the -enemy station in the Kilima Njaro country, and to direct my main force -against the hostile group which had meanwhile pushed forward to near -Kondoa-Irangi. The execution of this project was not quite easy; much -time was needed to cover the distance of 125 miles from the detraining -stations on the Northern Railway to the Central Railway on foot, and -at any moment a change in the situation might render it necessary for -Headquarters immediately to make fresh dispositions. All the troops -must therefore be kept within reach. The various detachments could -not, as on the march from the Central to the Northern Railway, be set -in motion on different and widely-separated roads. The march of our -fifteen field and two mounted companies had to be made on one road. The -Force was thus confronted with an entirely novel and difficult task. -There was no time to lose. The detachments of Captain von Kornatzky, -Captain Otto, Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock and Captain Stemmermann, -each of four or three companies, were moved by rail at intervals of -one day, from Lembeni to Mombo and Korogwe. Thence they marched on to -Kimamba (station west of Morogoro) to the Central Railway. Manifold -difficulties arose. Hard and fast destinations could not be laid down -for the detachments for each day, more especially because heavy rains -set in which in places so softened the black soil that the troops could -literally hardly get along. - -Thus it happened that one detachment made quite short marches, and -the one behind got jammed on top of it. This, however, was very -inconvenient, and interfered both with the regular service of supply -on the line of communication, and with the transport of the company -baggage, in which the relay-carriers belonging to the line of -communication had to be called in to assist. The companies now began, -according to ancient African custom, to help themselves, seized the -line of communication carriers, regardless of other orders, and simply -kept them. As the whole service on the communications depended upon -the regular working of the relay-carriers, it also became seriously -dislocated. - -[Illustration: Masai. - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: European Dinner-time - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE ENEMY’S ADVANCE IN THE AREA OF THE NORTHERN RAILWAY - - -AFTER the trains had left Lembeni I handed over the command of all -the troops on the Northern Railway to Major Kraut. An independent -administrative service was also organized for them. Our railway journey -to Korogwe proved to us once more how closely the German population -of the Northern Territories were knit to the Force, and how they -appreciated its work. At every station the people had assembled, -sometimes from great distances; every one of them knew that our -departure from the Northern Territories was final, and that they -would fall into the enemy’s hands. In spite of this, their spirit was -gallant. A large part of the few remaining European provisions was -brought to us. The widow of the former Line-Commandant Kroeber, who had -recently been buried at Buiko, insisted on offering us the last bottles -of the stock in her cellar. - -Major Kraut and Captain Schoenfeld accompanied me to Buiko, from where -we were able to view several portions of the ground which I thought -might become of importance in our future operations. These gentlemen -remained there in order to make more detailed personal reconnaissances. -From Korogwe our cars rapidly took us to Handeni, the head of the -light railway that had been laid from Mombo. On the way we caught up -our mounted companies, and the exclamation of the Civil Administrator -of Handeni: “Why, that’s the notorious poacher of Booyen,” showed me -once more that there were among our mounted troops men accustomed -to danger and sport, on whom I could rely in the troubles that were -to come. Handeni was the first collecting station for the stores -withdrawn from the north; Major von Stuemer, who had left his former -post at Bukoba in order to take charge of this line of communication, -which was for the moment the most important one, complained not a -little of the way in which the troops marching through had interfered -with the further dispatch of the stores. At Handeni, the seat of the -Civil Administration, where the supply routes from Morogoro, Korogwe -and Kondoa-Irangi met at the rail-head of the Mombo-Handeni line, -the war had called into being a European settlement that had almost -the appearance of a town. Lieutenant Horn, of the Navy, had built -cottages in the Norwegian style, which were quite charming to look at, -although at the moment the rain was rather against them. The interiors, -consisting for the most part of three rooms, were comfortably arranged -for the accommodation of Europeans. What was unpleasant was the -enormous number of rats, which often ran about on one when trying to -sleep at night. Captain von Kaltenborn, who had arrived in the second -store-ship which put into Ssudi Bay, reported himself to me here, and -was able to supplement the home news he had already transmitted in -writing by verbal accounts. - -Proceeding the next day by car, we caught up a number of our -detachments on the march, and were able to remove at least some of the -various causes of friction between them. Telephonic communication was -rarely possible on account of earths caused by the heavy rain, and -breakages caused by columns of carriers, wagons and giraffes. It was -all the more important for me to traverse this area of breakdowns, -which cut me off from the troops and prevented my receiving reports as -quickly as possible. But that became increasingly difficult. - -[Illustration: Fig. xi. Invasion of German East Africa by Belgian and -British columns, middle of 1916. Fig. xii. Retreat of German Main -Force, August, 1916.] - -The rain came down harder and harder, and the roads became deeper -and deeper. At first there were only a few bad places, and twenty or -more carriers managed to get us through them by pulling and pushing. -The _niempara_ (headmen of carriers) went ahead, dancing and singing. -The whole crowd joined in with “_Amsigo_,” and “_Kabubi_, _kabubi_,” -and to the rhythm of these chants the work went on cheerily, and at -first easily enough. But on passing through Tulieni we found that the -rains had so swollen an otherwise quite shallow river, that during -the morning its torrential waters had completely carried away the -wagon bridge. We felled one of the big trees on the bank, but it was -not tall enough for its branches to form a firm holdfast on the far -side. It was three feet thick, but was carried away like a match. The -Adjutant, Lieutenant Mueller, tried to swim across, but was also swept -away, and landed again on the near bank. Now Captain Tafel tried, who -had recovered from his severe wound, and was now in charge of the -operations section at Headquarters. He reached the far side, and a few -natives who were good swimmers also succeeded in doing so. But we could -not manage to get a line across by swimming, and so there we were, -Captain Tafel without any clothes on the far side, and we on this one. -The prospect of having to wait for the river to fall was not enticing, -for I could not afford to waste one minute in reaching the head of -the marching troops. At last, late in the afternoon, a native said he -knew of a ford a little lower down. Even there it was not altogether a -simple matter to wade across, and took at least three-quarters of an -hour; we had to follow our guide carefully by a very devious route, -and work cautiously on from one shallow to the next. The water reached -our shoulders, and the current was so strong that we needed all our -strength to avoid falling. At last, in the dark, and with our clothes -thoroughly wet, we reached the far side, where we were met by three -mules and an escort of Askari sent back by a detachment which we had -luckily been able to reach by telephone. - -We continued our journey the whole night through in pouring rain, and -had several times to ride for hours at a time with the water up to our -saddles, or to wade with it up to our necks; but at last, still in -the night, we reached the great bridge over the Wami, which had been -put up during the war. That, too, was almost entirely carried away, -but part was left, so that we were able to clamber across and reach -the light railway leading to Kimamba Station. This line, like that -from Mombo to Handeni, had been constructed during the war and was -worked by man-power. In their endeavour to do the job really well, the -good people took several curves rather too fast, and the trucks, with -everything on them—including us—repeatedly flew off into the ditch -alongside, or beyond it. At any rate, we had had enough and to spare of -this journey by water by the time we arrived in the early morning at -Kimamba. Vice-Sergeant-Major[4] Rehfeld, who was stationed there and -had been called to the Colours, received us most kindly. As there was a -clothing depot at Kimamba, we were, at any rate, able to obtain Askari -clothing to change into. When the remainder of Headquarters would turn -up with our kits it was, of course, impossible to say. - -After discussing the situation with the Governor, who had come to -Kimamba for the purpose, I went next day to Dodoma. On the Central -Railway, quick working under war conditions, which in the north had -become everyone’s second nature, had hardly been heard of. Captain von -Kornatzky’s detachment, which had arrived at Dodoma shortly before us, -had some difficulty in obtaining supplies, although Dodoma was on the -railway, and could be supplied quickly. I got in touch by telephone -with Captain Klinghardt, who had occupied the heights of Burungi, one -day’s march south of Kondoa-Irangi, and on the next morning, with a few -officers of Headquarters, I rode off to see him. The road lay through -uninhabited bush-desert; it had been made during the war, its trace was -governed by the need for easy construction, and it touched settlements -but seldom. The Ugogo country is distinguished for its great wealth -of cattle. The inhabitants belong to the nomad tribes, who copy the -customs of the Masai, and are, therefore, often called Masai-apes. -We met many ox-wagons in which German and Boer farmers, with their -families, were driving from the country around Meru Mountain to Kondoa. -It was a scene, so well known in South-West Africa, of comfortable -“trekking,” in these vehicles so eminently suited to the conditions of -the veld. - -The supply service of Klinghardt’s Detachment was not yet in working -order; we camped that night in the first of the small posts on the -line of communication. It was evident that the work of transport and -supply would have to be greatly increased if it was to maintain the -large number of troops now being pushed forward in the direction of -Kondoa-Irangi. There was another difficulty: up to date the various -Field Intendants had not been physically equal to the enormous demands -which the whole field of the work of maintenance made upon the head -of the service. Captain Schmid, of the Landwehr, had very soon been -succeeded by Captain Feilke, of the Landwehr, he again by Captain -Freiherr von Ledebur, of the Reserve, and this officer by Captain -Richter, retired, an elderly gentleman. The latter, unfortunately, had -just now, at the commencement of an important fresh operation, reached -the limit of his strength. Major Stuemer, retired, who had been working -on the line of communication at Handeni, had been obliged to take over -his duties, but had not yet had time to become thoroughly at home in -them. - -By the evening of the following day we had completed our journey of -four marches, and reached Captain Klinghardt at the Burungi Mountains. -The detachments coming from the country of the Northern Railway were -following on behind us, and some days were bound to elapse before -they would all have arrived; so we had the opportunity of making -extensive reconnaissances. Here we had the great good fortune to make -the acquaintance of a perfectly new and excellent map. The District -Commissioner of Kondoa-Irangi had, when leaving his district, given -it with other things to a _yumbe_ (chief), who lived on the Burungi -Mountains, to take care of. It was in his possession that we found this -valuable property, the secrecy of which had thus remained intact. - -Patrols of mounted English Europeans often came near our positions, -and it was known that stronger mounted forces were behind them. But -where they were was not known. Some reports stated that they were in -Kondoa-Irangi; others said south of that place, and others again placed -them on the road leading from Kondoa-Irangi to Saranda. An important -factor was that there were considerable native plantations at Burungi, -so that supplies were plentiful. It was, therefore, not necessary to -wait until the transport of supplies from Dodoma was in full swing. -The troops were more independent of the line of communication than -hitherto, and could draw the bulk of their subsistence from the -country. As soon as the rear detachments had closed up the advance -on Kondoa was started. South of that place we met only fairly strong -mounted protective detachments, who were quickly driven back, and -at the beginning of May, without any serious fighting, we obtained -possession of the great heights which lie four miles in front of Kondoa -village. - -We had brought with us two naval guns, one 3·5-inch and one 4-inch, -on travelling carriages, and at once got them into action. From our -dominating position they bombarded, apparently with good effect, the -enemy’s camps south of Kondoa. The tents were at once struck. We -could see the enemy hard at work entrenching his positions, and his -vehicles hurrying away towards Kondoa. Several patrol encounters went -in our favour, and small hostile posts, that had been left out in -various places, were quickly driven in. From the south—that is, from -behind us—we saw a mounted patrol riding towards our positions. As -our mounted patrols were also out, I thought at first that they were -Germans. But soon the regular carriage of their carbines in the buckets -proved that they were English. They evidently had no idea of our -presence. They were allowed to approach quite close, and at the short -range they lost about half their number. From what we had hitherto -observed, it seemed probable that the enemy in our front was evacuating -his positions. On the 9th May, 1916, I decided, if this expectation -proved correct, immediately to take possession of the low hills now -held by the enemy. The conditions did not favour an attack, as our -advance was sure to be observed, and a surprise assault was out of the -question. But without surprise the attempt to capture the occupied -position by assault had no hope of success; the enemy was sufficiently -entrenched on the small hills, and the latter completely commanded the -ground over which the attack would have to be pushed home, and which -could only be traversed slowly owing to the low thorn-bush and the -numerous rocks. - -I was with the companies that were following the advanced patrols; -the latter reported, shortly before dark, that the hills were -unoccupied. So our companies proceeded, and the commanders ordered up -the baggage in order to settle down for the night. I myself went to -the Headquarters Camp, which had remained on the big hills a little -further back. I tried to relieve my great exhaustion with a cup of -coffee and a little rum; but, knowing that I had no more orders to -issue, I soon fell fast asleep. Next to my sleeping place was the -3·5-inch gun. Towards eleven p.m. I was awakened by remarks made by -Lieutenant Wunderlich, of the Navy, who was in command of the gun; he -could not make out the frequent flashes he saw in the direction of the -enemy. Neither, at first, was I quite certain about them. But soon -there could be no doubt that these flashes, which became more and more -frequent, were caused by rifles and machine guns. When the wind shifted -the sound of the fighting became clearly audible. Contrary to all our -expectations, therefore, a stiff fight was taking place in our front, -but owing to the great distance, and the bushy and rocky country that -would have to be traversed, I did not think I could engage the reserves -I still had in hand with any prospect of success. It would take hours -to obtain even the very roughest idea of the situation, and the moon -would be up for barely an hour more. For well or ill, therefore, I had -to leave the fight in front to take its course. - -Our companies had, indeed, found the high ground, which had been -examined by the patrols, to be clear of the enemy; but immediately -in rear of it was another rise, and on this was the enemy, in an -entrenched position, which our companies ran up against. In the close -country and the darkness no general survey of the situation was -possible, and connection between the various units was lost. Our Askari -established themselves in front of the enemy, and Captain Lincke, -who had assumed command after Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock had been -severely wounded and Captain von Kornatzky had been killed, came to the -conclusion that, although he could remain where he was, he would, after -daybreak, be obliged to abandon all hope of being able to move, on -account of the dominating fire of the enemy. As, therefore, no success -appeared attainable, he cautiously broke off the action while it was -still dark, and fell back on the position he had started from. The -enemy, consisting mainly of the 11th South African Infantry Regiment, -had fought well, and had repeatedly brought effective machine-gun fire -to bear on our companies. Considering the small number of rifles that -actually took part in the fight—about four hundred—our casualties, -amounting to about fifty killed and wounded, must be considered heavy. - -During the following days we also proceeded to take possession of the -high hills lying further to the eastward, and drove off the mounted -detachments working in the foreground, inflicting quite unpleasant -casualties on them. It happened several times that out of parties of -about twenty men, none, or only a few, got away, and in the foreground -also a whole series of encounters ended in our favour. The heights held -by us afforded an extensive view, and with good glasses we several -times observed columns of hostile troops and wagons approaching -Kondoa from the north, and then turning east and disappearing into -the mountains. Our patrols, whom we sent far away to the enemy’s -rear, reported considerable bodies marching from about Arusha in the -direction of Kondoa-Irangi. - -The English had at once taken over the civil administration at Kondoa, -and had cleverly ordered the _yumbi_ (chiefs) to come to that place and -given them instructions. Among other things, they imposed on them the -duty of reporting the movements of German troops. It was, therefore, -often advantageous for our patrols to pretend to be English while in -enemy country. The differences in uniform were not great, and the -prolonged period of active service had further diminished them; uniform -coats were often not worn at all, but only blouse-like shirts, and the -little cloth badges which the English wore on their sun-helmets were -not conspicuous. The difference in armament had often disappeared, as -some of the Germans carried English rifles. - -On the whole, the enemy in Kondoa did not seem to be in great strength -as yet; but, even if successful, our attack would have to be made -over open ground against defences which with our few guns we could -not sufficiently neutralize. The certainty of suffering considerable -and irreplaceable losses decided me to refrain from a general attack, -and instead to damage the enemy by continuing the minor enterprises, -which had hitherto proved so advantageous. Our artillery—the two -mountain guns and two field howitzers, which had come out in the second -store-ship, had also arrived—fired upon such favourable targets as -presented themselves. The buildings of Kondoa-Irangi, where General van -Deventer had arrived, were also fired at occasionally by our four-inch -gun. To the west of our main force, on the Saranda-Kondoa-Irangi -road, our newly-raised 2nd Rifle Company had had several successful -engagements with portions of the 4th South African Horse, and had -gradually forced them back to the neighbourhood of Kondoa-Irangi. - -The enemy now grew continually stronger. Early in June he also shelled -us at long range, about thirteen thousand yards, with heavy guns of -about four-inch and five-inch calibre. His observation and fire-control -were worthy of all respect; anyhow, on the 13th June his shell soon -fell with great accuracy in our Headquarters camp. I stopped my work -which I had commenced under cover of a grass roof, and took cover a -little to one side behind a slab of rock. No sooner had the orderly -officer, Lieutenant Boell, also reached the spot, than a shell burst -close above us, wounded Lieutenant Boell severely in the thigh, and -myself and a few other Europeans slightly. Otherwise the fire of the -enemy’s artillery did us hardly any material damage, but it was a -nuisance, all the same, to have his heavy shell pitching into our camp -every now and then. - -We dispensed with the heavy work which the provision of good protection -against fire would have entailed, as the whole strength of our people -was required for patrols and outposts, and for collecting supplies. As -far as the eye could reach, the whole country was covered by native -cultivation. The principal crop—which formed the main supply of the -troops—was _mtema_, a kind of millet, which was just ripening. Most -of the natives had run away; the supplies from Dodoma had been unable -to keep up with us, and so our subsistence depended almost entirely on -the stuff which the foraging-parties of the companies were able to -bring in. In the hot sun the sheaves quickly dried on the rocks. All -the companies were busy making flour, either by grinding the threshed -grain between stones, or by stamping it into meal with poles in vessels -of hard wood, called _kinos_. The Europeans at that time could still -get wheat flour, which came up on the line of communication. The bread -we made before Kondoa out of a mixture of wheat flour and native flour -was of really excellent quality. Besides _mtema_ and other grains there -were also sugar-cane, _muhogo_ (a plant with a pleasant-tasting, edible -root), yams, various kinds of peas, and other native produce, besides -sufficient cattle. In this extremely rich Kondoa country the troops -could obtain a variety of food in abundance. - -The enemy’s extension from Kondoa to the east drew our attention also -to this hitherto little-known country. Captain Schulz was sent there -with several companies, and found it to be an extraordinarily difficult -and densely-wooded mountain district, interspersed with settlements -of great fertility. A whole series of actions, in which one or more -of our companies were engaged, and which resulted in severe loss to -the enemy, now took place in this district. A strong hostile force -tried to penetrate between the companies of Schulz’s Detachment and -ourselves, probably with the intention of cutting off the detachment. -But this attempt failed completely. Our troops pressed forward against -this force from both sides and repulsed it. The old _Effendi_ (native -officer), Yuma Mursal, acted with great skill on this occasion; he -lay in ambush at a water-place, and fired at the English, who came -there for water, with good effect; according to his observation, six -of them were killed. During this period of fighting at Kondoa-Irangi -the enemy’s battle casualties gradually mounted up to a considerable -figure. If we add to them his losses by sickness, due to the youth -of his white troops, who were not used to the Tropics, and were -extraordinarily careless about precautions against tropical diseases, -the total losses incurred by him during the Kondoa-Irangi period can -hardly have been less than one thousand Europeans. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL RAILWAYS - - -I ASK the reader to imagine himself in the position of a Commander, -with insufficient means, exposed to attack by superior numbers, who has -continually to ask himself: What must I do in order to retain freedom -of movement and hope? - -At the end of June, 1916, events in the other theatres of war began -to exercise a decisive influence on our operations at Kondoa. The -Belgians pushed in from near Lake Kivu and from Russisi, the English -from the Kagera, west of Lake Victoria, and, since the middle of July, -from Muansa also, and all these forces were converging on Tabora. Our -troops stationed in the north-west were all combined under the command -of General Wahle, who was at Tabora; and he gradually drew in his -detachments from the frontiers towards that place. - -Owing to the difficulties of communication Headquarters had but meagre -information of these events. Hostile detachments were also pressing -in from the south-west, from the country between Lakes Tanganyika and -Nyassa. Before them, our company fighting in the neighbourhood of -Bismarckburg fell back slowly in a north-easterly direction towards -Tabora. The two companies left behind to secure the Langenburg district -gradually retreated on Iringa, followed by General Northey, whose -division was equipped with all the appliances of modern warfare. - -On the Northern Railway, Major Kraut’s patrols, who started out from -his fortified position at Lembeni, had occasionally scored pleasing -successes. Several aeroplanes were brought down, or came to grief, -the passengers being captured and the machines destroyed. When the -heavy rains had ceased, the enemy commenced his advance from Kahe -along the Northern Railway, as well as east of it through the Pare -Mountains, and west of it along the Pangani. Hundreds of automobiles -and large numbers of mounted troops were observed. In order to avoid -the danger of being cut off by the greatly superior enemy, Major Kraut -withdrew his main body by rail to Buiko, leaving small detachments in -contact with the enemy. In this vicinity, as well as near Mombo, a -few actions took place, in some of which our companies drove through -the enemy, who tried to block the line, and fired on him from the -train. Being in superior force, the enemy was always able, with little -trouble, to execute outflanking movements with fresh troops, but their -effectiveness was greatly reduced by the difficulty of the country. It -seemed, therefore, as though the enemy frequently departed from this -idea and adopted a sort of tactics of attrition instead. To-day he -would attack with one portion of his force, then let that rest, and put -in another the next day, and a different portion again on the third. -In spite of all his obvious urging, and his favourable conditions of -supply, his advance was fairly slow. Major Kraut’s troops never got -into a really difficult situation; on the contrary, they were often -able to catch the enemy under fire unawares, and to gain partial -successes, which occasionally caused him very considerable losses, such -as Captain Freiherr von Bodecker’s rearguard action near Handeni. - -In view of this concentric advance from all directions, the question -arose, what should be done with the main body of the Protective Force -now before Kondoa? For an attack the situation was altogether too -unfavourable. The problem, therefore, was, what should be the general -direction of our retreat? I decided on the Mahenge country. By moving -there we should avoid being surrounded, it was fertile, and suitable -for guerilla warfare. From there also it would be possible to withdraw -further to the south and to continue the war for a long time to come. - -Another important consideration was the safeguarding of our stores -deposited along the Central Railway, particularly in the vicinity -of Morogoro. These were greatly endangered by the rapid advance of -General Smuts, who was opposing Major Kraut, and had penetrated far to -the south beyond Handeni. Although it was to be assumed that General -Smuts would be delayed by the continually increasing length of his -communications, he seemed to me to be the most dangerous and important -of our opponents. I therefore decided to leave in front of the Kondoa -force only a detachment at Burungi, under Captain Klinghardt, but to -march my main body back to Dodoma, proceed thence by rail to Morogoro, -and move up in support of Major Kraut. It turned out afterwards that -the English were informed of this movement down to the smallest -details, and that, for instance, they knew all about a railway accident -that happened to one company during its progress. When our companies -arrived at Morogoro and the Europeans there saw the splendid bearing -of the Askari they lost the last traces of their depression; every man -and woman had comprehended that our situation was indeed difficult, but -also that there was nothing for it but to go on fighting, and that our -Force was, from its whole quality and nature, capable of carrying on -for a long time to come. - -Early in July I reached Major Kraut, who was holding a fortified -position on Kanga Mountain, north-east of Tuliani. I had expected the -Askari to be depressed by their retreat, but found them in excellent -spirits and full of confidence. In front of their position they had -cleared the foreground for 50 to 100 yards and were fully convinced -that they could beat off an attack. - -I employed the time that elapsed before the arrival of the other -detachments in reconnaissance, and soon formed a mental picture of the -passes which led across the difficult rock and forest country westward -of our line of communication. - -Owing to the remarkably dense bush an attempt to send a strong -detachment round the enemy’s camp to attack it in rear was -unsuccessful. But the enemy did sustain casualties through numerous -minor enterprises by our patrols, who fired at his transport columns -and the automobiles working behind his front. In this way also a Staff -car was once effectively fired on. The enemy’s patrols were also active -and several of his distant patrols had got behind us. One of them, -commanded by Lieutenant Wienholt, betrayed its presence by surprising a -column of our carriers and burning the loads. Among other things these -contained a quantity of trousers which had come out in the store-ship -and were anxiously expected. Wienholt, therefore, aroused painful -interest on the part of everyone. His patrol was discovered in camp in -the dense bush and surprised. He himself got away, and trusting to the -fact that it is not easy to find anyone in the African bush, wanted -to work his way alone through our lines and back to the English. Our -well-tried men, zan Rongew, Nieuwenhudgu and Trappel, who had effected -the clever capture of the horses near Longido Mountain, succeeded -in tracking and capturing him. On my return from a reconnaissance I -met Wienholt in our camp at Tuliani enjoying a cheery meal with his -captors. We could none of us help honestly admiring the excellent work -of his patrol, whose route was accurately marked on the map that was -captured in his possession. Wienholt was then taken to a prisoners’ -camp in the interior, from which he escaped some months later while -bathing. In 1917 he did excellent work on patrol round Kilwa and -Livale, and also later on, in 1918, in Portuguese East Africa. I was -greatly interested in his description of an attack by a leopard which, -with great boldness, killed his companion in camp. I presume he has by -now given friends and acquaintances the benefit of his vivid account, -of which he unfortunately lost the original later on in a patrol -encounter. - -Weeks now passed, during which the English annoyed us mainly by bombs -from aircraft. They had evidently found out the exact site of our -Headquarter camp at Tuliani. I remember one day when four aeroplanes, -against which we could do nothing, circled over our camp for hours and -dropped bombs. But we had learned to make ourselves invisible, and -only the European employed in the telephone hut was so badly hurt that -he lost his hand. An adjoining hut full of valuable documents was set -alight by an incendiary bomb. - -My cars were then still working, and from Tuliani I was often -able quickly to reach Kraut’s Detachment in front by the good -line-of-communication road. Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld had there -made excellent arrangements for directing the fire of the 4-inch and -3·5-inch naval guns. From his observation posts on the heights of -Kanga Mountain one had a good view of the English camps. Some weak -German detachments had not followed Major Kraut from Usambara towards -Tuliani, but had escaped along the Usambara Railway towards Tanga. -There, and also near Korogwe, they had minor encounters with the enemy -and gradually fell back towards the south, on the east side of Kraut’s -Detachment. They were followed by more considerable portions of the -enemy. Gradually the force at Tuliani became liable to be circumvented -on the east, and to lose its communication with the Morogoro country, -which was so important for the supply of stores, ammunition and -food. At the same time General van Deventer, whose force had been -augmented to a division, advanced from Kondoa to the south, and Captain -Klinghardt retired before him, first to the south, and then towards -Mpapua. - -The closeness and difficulty of the country caused Captain Klinghardt -to still further subdivide his already small force (five companies) -in order to watch and block important passes. The enemy followed -with a large number of automobiles, and occasionally one of them -was successfully blown up by mines sunk in the roads. Owing to the -unavoidable dissemination of Captain Klinghardt’s troops, and the -difficulty of maintaining touch between them, one part often could -not know what was happening to its neighbours. A large German mounted -patrol was attempting to connect up from the east with a detachment -believed to be at Meiameia, on the road from Dodoma to Kondoa-Irangi. -All unconsciously it rode straight into a hostile camp and was captured -almost without exception. The retirement of our troops from Kondoa, -who had not merely to escape, but also to inflict damage on the enemy, -was a very difficult manœuvre; the right moment to fall back, to halt -again, to advance for a sudden counter-stroke, and then break off -again quickly, and in sufficient time, is difficult to gauge. Reliable -reports were lacking. Owing to the scarcity of means of communication -the difficulties attending the retirement of several columns through -unknown country grew infinitely great. The influence of the commander -was often eliminated, and too much had to be left to chance. On the -31st July, 1916, the enemy reached the Central Railway at Dodoma. -Captain Klinghardt slipped off to the east along the railway. In -the actions which took place west of Mpapua several favourable -opportunities were not recognized, and neighbouring detachments, whose -assistance had been relied on, did not arrive in time. Such things -easily give rise to a feeling of insecurity among the troops and weaken -confidence and enterprise. The difficulties were accentuated in this -case by the fact that Captain Klinghardt was taken ill with typhoid and -became a casualty just at the critical moment. Captain Otto was sent -from Tuliani to replace him, and succeeded in once more collecting the -scattered parties and in establishing united control. - -The 2nd Rifle Company also, which had been obliged to retire on Saranda -by the Kondoa-Saranda road, and with which all touch had been lost, -made a great circuit on the south side of the railway and rejoined -Otto’s Detachment. Owing to the numerical superiority of the enemy, in -the actions which now took place, Otto’s Detachment frequently found -itself exposed to an attack on its front while being enveloped on both -flanks. The enemy did not always succeed in timing these movements -correctly. Thus, at Mpapua, the frontal attack got too close to our -line and suffered severely; and the flank attack, even when directed -on the rear of our positions, produced no decisive effect. The short -range of visibility always enabled us either to avoid the danger, or, -if the opportunity was favourable, to attack the troops outflanking us -in detail. In any event, these outflanking tactics of the enemy, when -followed, as in this case, in extraordinarily thick bush, and among -numerous rocks, demanded great exertions and used up his strength. -Every day Captain Otto fell back only a couple of miles further to the -east, and in these operations the railway enabled him to change the -position of his big gun at will. When Otto’s Detachment approached -Kilossa it became necessary to move the main body at Tuliani also. -Headquarters and a part of the force moved to Morogoro, Major Kraut, -with several companies and a 4-inch gun, to Kilossa. At Tuliani Captain -Schulz took command. - -I now considered that columns pressing on from the north would soon -reach the country west of Bagamoyo, and that at this place also troops -would be landed. In order to reconnoitre personally, I travelled to -Ruwa Station and thence by bicycle over the sandy, undulating road -to Bagamoyo. One day’s march south of Bagamoyo I came on the camp of -two Europeans: it was District Commissioner Michels, who wanted to -remove his threatened District Headquarters from Bagamoyo towards the -interior. The inhabitants were confiding and were living as in peace. -So far the universal war had passed them by without a trace. As time -pressed I had to turn back and Herr Michels’ fast Muscat donkey carried -me back to Ruwa in a few hours. On the next day, from Kidugallo, I -reconnoitred the supply depots established there and further to the -north by cycle and then returned to Morogoro. Other reconnaissances, -mostly also by cycle, took me to the mountains lying to westward in the -direction of Kilossa, and along the roads leading round the Uluguru -Mountains on the west and east. The passes leading from Morogoro up -the northern slopes of the gigantic Uluguru group, and down again on -the south side towards Kissaki, had to be examined on foot. Owing -to the pressure exerted by General van Deventer on Kilossa, and the -danger that Captain Schulz might also be circumvented at Tuliani, it -was imperative not to miss the right moment for withdrawing Captain -Schulz to Morogoro. But in order to retain the power of delivering -counter-strokes we had to hold on to the Tuliani area as long as -possible. - -Captain Stemmermann’s Detachment, which had been pushed out a short -day’s march due north of Tuliani, was attacked at Maomondo by a strong -force of Europeans and Indians. The enemy was very skilful. A machine -gun of the 6th Company, placed on a rocky slope, was seized by a few -Indians, who had crept up to it from the front unobserved, and thrown -down the steep slope, so that it could not be found again. The enemy, -who had penetrated our lines, was thrown out again with heavy loss by -a counter-attack by the 21st Company. At close quarters the English -Major Buller, a son of the well-known General of the South African War -days, put a bullet through the hat of the Company Commander, Lieutenant -von Ruckteschell, but was then severely wounded by the latter. Major -Buller was got away to the German hospital at Dar-es-Salaam and nursed -back to health by the wife of his opponent, who was working there as -a nurse. During the actions at Maternondo English horsemen had worked -round farther to the west, and suddenly appeared in one of the mountain -passes leading from the west to Tuliani. In the dense bush the 2nd -Mounted Brigade, which had come from South Africa under General Brits, -apparently sustained heavy casualties. - -With the consent of Headquarters, Captain Schulz now withdrew to -Derkawa, which is situated in dense bush on the Wami river, on the -road from Tuliani to Morogoro. Here he occupied a fortified position -on the south bank, where he was attacked on the 13th August by the -enemy pursuing from Tuliani, with a force of at least one brigade of -infantry, and General Brits’ Mounted Brigade, while simultaneously -another brigade, which had marched up the right bank of the Wami, -attacked him from the east. During the action continuous telephonic -communication was maintained with Captain Schulz from Morogoro. The -enemy’s losses were estimated at several hundred, and were afterwards -confirmed by the English. The attacks were beaten off, but in the dense -bush it was so difficult to obtain a clear idea of the situation that -it did not seem possible to achieve a decisive success. Captain Schulz -was chary of putting in the one formed company he had left. I approved -his intention of falling back to Morogoro at the end of the action, -as the general situation made it desirable for me to concentrate my -forces. After Major Kraut’s arrival at Kilossa I also brought Captain -Otto in to Morogoro, with part of his companies. Major Kraut had passed -behind Otto’s Detachment through Kilossa and after some engagements -at that place, he took up a position immediately to the south of it, -on the road to Mahenge. Even after the enemy had moved into Kilossa -telephonic communication with Kraut’s Detachment had continued to work -for a few hours through the enemy. - -From that time on direct communication with Major Kraut was -interrupted. Signalling by helio did not work, and the wires which -led from Kissaki, and later from the Rufiji, to Mahenge, and thence -to Major Kraut, were not yet completed—in some cases not even begun. -With General Wahle at Tabora we had also had no communication since the -second half of July, that is, for over a month. Bagamoyo had fallen -into the enemy’s hands; and every day we expected to hear of the fall -of Dar-es-Salaam and to lose touch with that place. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -CONTINUOUS FIGHTING NEAR THE RUFIJI - - -IN order to oppose the troops of General Northey, who were advancing -from the direction of New Langenburg, Captain Braunschweig had -been dispatched from Dodoma at the end of June. He had taken up -reinforcements from Kondoa and Dar-es-Salaam to the two German Askari -companies that had slipped away from the New Langenburg country, and -had concentrated his own troops, totalling five companies and one field -howitzer, at Malangali. At that place his force had fought a brave -action with a superior force of the enemy, but had been obliged to fall -back towards Mahenge. - -As the converging hostile columns were now approaching each other in -the direction of Morogoro, it became necessary to consider our future -plan of operations. The enemy expected us to stand and fight a final -decisive engagement near Morogoro, on the northern slopes of the -Uluguru Mountains. To me, this idea was never altogether intelligible. -Being so very much the weaker party, it was surely madness to await -at this place the junction of the hostile columns, of which each one -individually was already superior to us in numbers, and then to fight -with our back to the steep and rocky mountains, of which the passes -were easy to close, and which deprived us of all freedom of movement -in our rear. I thought it sounder so to conduct our operations that we -should only have to deal with a part of the enemy. Knowing that the -enemy, and General Brits in particular, had a liking for wide turning -movements, I felt sure that one column would move off from Dakawa, -where large hostile camps had been identified, or from Kilossa, in -order to reach our rear by working round the west side of the Uluguru -Mountains. This possibility was so obvious that I cycled out every day -to the mountains west of Morogoro, so as to get the reports from the -patrols in good time, and to supplement them by personal observation -of the clouds of smoke and dust. The latter soon put it beyond doubt -that a strong column was moving from near Dakawa towards the railway -between Morogoro and Kilossa. Patrols identified enemy troops that had -crossed the railway and were marching further south. The observers on -the mountains reported the clouds of dust to be moving towards Mlali. - -As I meant to let this movement run its full course and then attack -the isolated detachment with the whole of my forces, I waited until I -thought it was near Mlali. On the evening of the 23rd August, Captain -Otto, who was encamped at Morogoro, was ordered to march off for Mlali -during the night with three companies. He arrived there early on the -24th, just as English horsemen had taken possession of the depot. When -I reached Otto’s Detachment the fight was in full swing. The country -was, however, unsuitable for short decisive strokes, owing to the many -steep hills which impeded movement. The other troops at Morogoro, -except Captain Stemmermann’s Detachment, were ordered up by telephone. -I myself went back again to Morogoro to talk things over. Stemmermann’s -Detachment, to which, on account of the roads, the 4-inch _Königsberg_ -gun and the howitzer battery were attached, was ordered to fall back -along the eastern slopes of the Uluguru Mountains, and to delay the -enemy there. The passes over the mountains themselves were closed by -weak patrols. When I arrived once more at Mlali in the afternoon, the -fight was still undecided. At several points the enemy had been driven -back, and several people thought they had seen him suffer considerably. -But by nightfall we had got so entangled in the mountains, and every -movement had become so difficult and took so much time, that we -halted. We found the night very cold, lying out on the hills without -the carriers’ loads. Luckily, however, this fertile region had so far -hardly suffered at all from the war, and a fowl roasted on a spit soon -appeased our hunger. - -The next morning numerous explosions in the German depots, which had -been surprised by the enemy, indicated that he had moved off and had -destroyed the 4-inch shells stored there. We surmised that he was -moving south-west, which eventually turned out to be the case. The -enemy was probably making a turning movement so as to reach Kissaki -before us. At the wealthy Administration Office at that place, 600 tons -of food supplies and the military stores removed from Morogoro had been -collected. Wild rumours exaggerated the actual facts, and stated that -strong forces had already reached the roads leading to Kissaki before -us. Although the wagon road stopped at Mlali, and the remainder of the -route to Kissaki consisted only of paths broken by many ravines and -obstacles, the possibility that the enemy might make a rapid march on -Kissaki had to be taken very seriously, and we had no time to waste. In -the evening we were most hospitably entertained by the Father at Mgeta -Mission. The buildings are charmingly situated in the deep ravine of -the Mgeta river, which in this part comes down very swiftly. The many -lights on the slope of the hill made one think one was approaching some -small watering-place in Germany. A few European women from Morogoro -were also staying there, and bade farewell to the Force for the last -time. With the exception of a few nurses all women had to stay behind. - -The removal of our loads was carried out fairly satisfactorily. -The Force profited by the fact that owing to the insistence of the -energetic Captain Feilke, about a thousand native labourers, who had -until a few days previously been working in the forestry department at -Morogoro, were placed at its disposal. But the carrier question was -beginning to be difficult. The natives saw that we were evacuating -the country; a number of them, who had promised to come, stayed away, -to the despair of the sensible Chiefs, who would gladly have helped -us. As only small parties of the enemy appeared in the country round -Mgeta, it began to seem probable that his principal forces were making -a turning movement. Leaving a rearguard behind, which only followed us -slowly, our main body was, during the ensuing days, moved nearer to -Kissaki. One night an Askari appeared at my bedside, bearing himself -in a smart military manner: it was the Effendi Yuma Mursal, of the 4th -Field Company, who had been left behind sick at Morogoro. He reported -that a force of the enemy, as strong as that at Kahe had been, had -marched round the west side of the Uluguru Mountains from Morogoro, and -that a number of German Askari had found the recent fighting too much -for them. They had deserted, and were now plundering the plantations -south-west of Morogoro. - -A telephone line was laid from Kissaki to us, by means of which Captain -Tafel kept us continually informed; up to date no enemy had been seen -at Kissaki. But to the west of us, patrols reported the enemy to be -marching to the south. I therefore moved to Kissaki, and had to destroy -some of our stores, which were collected in small depots along our -route. Unfortunately, in carrying this out, an efficient Ordnance -N.C.O. was accidentally killed, as had happened before on a similar -occasion at Morogoro. At Kissaki, several days passed before we came -seriously into collision with the enemy. It was not advisable to occupy -the Boma Fort itself; it consisted of a group of buildings surrounded -by a massive high wall, and was situated in the middle of a completely -cleared bit of country. The enemy could, therefore, only capture it by -a costly attack; but he had no need to assault it at all; by means of -artillery and bombs from aircraft, he could have made it intolerable -for us to remain in the cramped Boma, and we ourselves should then have -been forced to make a sortie over the open and to endure the fire which -the enemy would have been able to pour into us in perfect security. Our -defences were, therefore, placed a long way outside the Boma, covered -from the view of aircraft, and so arranged that they could be occupied -and evacuated unobserved. - -It was not until I arrived at Kissaki myself that I obtained a proper -idea of the abundance of stores and supplies available there. I learned -that, contrary to my belief, practically nothing was stored further -south at Behobeho or at Kungulio, on the Rufiji. At Kissaki there -were large stocks, but notwithstanding the dense native population, -it was impossible to get them away. The numerous inhabitants, to whom -the war and the many Askari were something quite new, lost their heads -and ran away into the bush. The Civil Administration, which enjoyed -the complete confidence of the people, proved powerless against the -overwhelming influences now bursting in upon them. Even presents of -clothing, which were ordinarily so highly valued, failed to hold them. -It seemed as if all the evil spirits had conspired together to deprive -us of transport. Our column of several hundred pack-donkeys had been -driven over the mountains from Morogoro. It arrived at Kissaki late and -completely exhausted. Our ox-wagons, which had to go round the east -side of the Uluguru Mountains on account of the state of the roads, -seemed to be never going to arrive. The head of the Communications -Service could not find any other means of carrying away the stocks -which were essential to us for continuing the war. And yet it was -obvious that we must continue to fall back further south, towards the -Rufiji, before the superior numbers of the enemy. - -One circumstance that brightened the gloom was that our great herds of -cattle, which had been grazing east of Mpapua, had been brought away -in good time. Several thousand head, mostly beautiful cattle, arrived -at Kissaki, and would have formed a most welcome mobile reserve of -supplies. But, unfortunately, our pleasure at this was diminished by -the frequent occurrence of the tse-tse fly at some places; if the -animals got stung by them they lost condition badly, and mostly died -after a few weeks. The bulk of the cattle was, therefore, driven on -into the healthy districts on the Rufiji. As for the rest, we simply -worked with energy at getting away the stores to Behobeho and on to -Kungulio, using the carriers belonging to the troops, all the people -we could raise in the district, and our few wagons. In order to effect -this, we had to gain time, and Captain Stemmermann, who was marching -round the Uluguru Mountains by the eastern road, could only be allowed -to fall back quite slowly before the hostile division which was pushing -after him with all its might. - -I waited at Kissaki with the main body, in order to be able quickly -to recognize and make use of any favourable opportunity. As was to be -expected, the enemy had, owing to our withdrawal to Kissaki, abandoned -his concentration on Morogoro; he had sent a few detachments direct -over the Uluguru Mountains, but his other columns had separated and -followed us, extending far to the east and west. The hope of being able -to defeat one or more of these columns separately was fulfilled beyond -expectation. West of the Uluguru Mountains General Brits had divided -his division into brigade columns (two mounted and one infantry), -which had difficulty in keeping touch. Soon large hostile camps were -discovered a day’s march west of Kissaki, and on the 7th September, -1916, Captain Otto’s Detachment, which was encamped at a plantation -near Kissaki, was attacked by a large force of European horse, and -by native and white infantry. It turned out later that this force -consisted of General Enslin’s Mounted Brigade, and of portions of the -infantry brigade of General Brits’s Division. The turning movement -which the enemy was making round the left wing of Otto’s Detachment -was allowed to continue until the outflanking detachment had got right -round in rear of Captain Otto, near the Boma of Kissaki. Evidently the -enemy did not expect German reserves to be posted under cover still -further back. These reserves were now loosed upon him. The gallant 11th -Field Company, under Lieutenant Volkwein of the Reserve, worked through -the dense bush close up to the outflanking enemy, and immediately -attacked with the bayonet, cheering. With that the enemy’s beautiful -plans completely collapsed; our further advance simply rolled him up, -and he was completely defeated. The almost impenetrable bush made it -impossible vigorously to push the enemy, or to undertake a pursuit -on a large scale; but the bulk of his troops was broken up, and the -small fragments were scattered in the bush in hopeless confusion. The -led-horses and horse-holders were captured, and about fifteen Europeans -taken prisoner. Even the next day an English soldier arrived from quite -another direction; he had lost himself with his led-horses in the dense -bush and had no idea where to go. The man had plenty of humour; he -threw his rifle and ammunition across a small stream and said: “It’s -just luck; I might have taken the right road or the wrong one. I had -the bad luck to take the wrong one. That’s my fault.” - -Tafel’s Detachment, which was encamped north of Kissaki, on the road -we had come by, had only partially joined in the fight on the evening -of the 7th. I had kept it back, as I thought that, simultaneously with -the attack on the 7th from the west, another one would be made from -the north along the road. And General Brits undoubtedly did hold this -perfectly sound intention; but the execution failed. General Nussy’s -Mounted Brigade, without having any idea of the action of the 7th, -marched along towards Tafel’s Detachment from the north on the 8th. It -was just as thoroughly beaten as its friends had been the day before. -In the dense bush it was, on the 8th, even more difficult to survey -the fighting, and a considerable number of prisoners taken by the 1st -Company managed to escape. - -In the two days we took some thirty European prisoners, and some of -them were sent back to the enemy, on taking an oath not to fight again -in this war against the Germans or their allies. The humanity of this -step, which was, under tropical conditions, in the best interest of the -prisoners themselves, was not recognized by the English. They suspected -spying, seized the German envoy who brought back the prisoners, sent -him far into the bush with his eyes bound, and then let him go where -good luck might take him. It was a wonder that the man, who was -exhausted by prolonged wandering about, found his way back. This shows -how difficult the English made it for us to avoid unnecessary severity -towards the enemy. At the same time, the English private soldiers -had faith in the treatment we meted out to our prisoners. While the -battlefield was being cleared, in which both English and German medical -officers took part, wounded Englishmen begged to be treated by the -German doctor. And later on, also, wounded men remarked that they would -hardly have been cured if they had been treated by English medical -personnel. - -It was my opinion that these satisfactory successes at Kissaki had -not brought us a final decision against the troops of General Brits, -and I still believe that in the dense bush and the rugged country an -energetic pursuit, which alone would have secured the desired result, -was impossible of execution. My attention was all the more drawn -towards the force pursuing Stemmermann’s Detachment, as it had already -come within two days’ march north-east of Kissaki. During the last few -days the situation there had not been favourable; the broken ground had -in several instances caused our already weak forces to be disseminated. -Some portions had been ambushed, the troops were very fatigued, and -several people were suffering badly from nerves. On the 9th September -Stemmermann’s Detachment approached the village of Dutumi, which -was known to me from previous reconnaissance. I thought the enemy -would press on on the following day, and considered the opportunity -favourable for achieving a success at Dutumi by rapidly moving my main -body there from Kissaki. In the evening we marched away from Kissaki -by the fine broad road, and reached Dutumi that night. Captain Otto -remained at Kissaki with five companies. On arrival I decided to make -use of the factor of surprise, and to make an enveloping attack in the -early morning on the enemy’s left wing, which was identified close -in front of Stemmermann’s Detachment. I knew that this wing was in -the plain, while, looking from our side, the enemy’s centre and right -stretched away to the left up the foot-hills of the Uluguru Mountains. -It was because of these foot-hills that the chances of attack were less -favourable on our left. - -Early on the 9th September, Schulz’s Detachment attacked from our -right. Rifle and machine-gun fire soon started, and the enemy’s light -artillery also opened fire; but the thick high elephant grass, with -which the plain was covered, made it impossible to form a clear idea of -things. I thought the attack was going well, and proceeded to the left -in order to get a view of the situation. The heights there were also -densely overgrown. It was very fatiguing to get along and difficult to -find anybody. I was clambering about, fairly exhausted in the heat of a -tropical noon, when I luckily heard the sound of tin pots, and found -I was right in concluding that some European was just having lunch. It -was Captain Goering, who had taken up his post in the bush on a height -which afforded a good view. Here, towards three p.m., I received the -unwelcome news that the attack by Schulz’s Detachment on our right had -not attained its object. It had been simply impossible to get at the -enemy through the dense elephant grass. If, therefore, any decisive -action was to be taken on that day at all, it could only be done on our -left. Even here, owing to the difficult country, success was not very -probable. The advancing companies got into a very intersected mountain -tract, in which they shot at the enemy, and were shot at by him without -any result, and at dusk returned to their original positions. - -During the following days the enemy directed his attacks mainly against -our left, and was frequently driven back by counter-strokes. But, on -the whole, it was evident that success was only possible if the enemy -proved very unskilful. On the other hand, our communications, which -from now on no longer ran to Kissaki, but towards Behobeho in the -south-east, were in a great degree threatened by the enemy. I therefore -abandoned Dutumi, and withdrew the main body an hour’s march to the -south, across the Mgeta river, where the Force occupied an extensive -fortified camp, which it continued to hold for months. By this move the -rich fields of Dutumi were unfortunately given up. In the poor country -of Kiderengwa we had to depend mainly on supplies from the rear, which -were sent up from the Rufiji. Unfortunately the fatigues of this -transport work, combined with sickness caused by tse-tse, very soon led -to the almost complete loss of our pack-donkeys. From Kiderengwa our -fighting patrols attacked the enemy’s communications, which ran to the -north-east from Dutumi, as well as the Dutumi-Kissaki road, which soon -became alive with enemy detachments and transport. - -Various observations now concurred in disclosing remarkable movements -on the part of the enemy. Both east and west of the Uluguru Mountains -movements of troops in such strength were seen to be taking place -towards Morogoro, that the natives said: “_Wana hama_” (“They are -moving elsewhere”). A large number of the South African Europeans, of -whom, by the way, many had come to the end of their strength, were -sent home. Other observations disclosed a movement of troops towards -the east. Generally speaking, a period of rest ensued, which was only -interrupted by minor expeditions of patrols and occasional artillery -bombardments. - -General Smuts realized that his blow had failed. He sent me a letter -calling upon me to surrender, by which he showed that, as far as force -was concerned, he had reached the end of his resources. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -HOSTILE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE COLONY - - -MEANWHILE, the situation at Kilwa began to demand increased attention. -We had there only weak detachments for protecting the coast, which -consisted mainly of young, newly-enlisted Askari, and had been -organized as a company. This company was not sufficient, and there -was a danger that the enemy might march from Kilwa to the Rufiji, -or to Livale, and get in our rear. No doubt the enemy had some such -intention, and something had to be done to prevent it. Major von -Boemken, with three companies, had already marched off from the -battlefield of Dutumi for Kunguliu on the Rufiji, proceeding thence to -Utete by route march and on the stern-wheeler _Tomondo_. The _Tomondo_ -was the only shallow-draught steamer on the Rufiji, and carried most -of the supplies, which came from the lower Rufiji to Kunguliu, whence -they were carried to the troops at Kiderengwa by donkeys and carriers. -It now required a certain amount of discussion before the civil -authorities would place the _Tomondo_ at my disposal for carrying the -necessary troops. At Kilwa the situation did not develop altogether -satisfactorily. It is true that a few minor engagements were more or -less in our favour, but, as so often happened during the war, we did -not manage to secure united control of our forces. Among other things, -the enemy succeeded in destroying a supply depot west of Kilwa, which -was too near the coast. The enemy cleverly incited the natives to -rebellion, and they rendered him valuable service as spies. Several -German reconnoitring detachments were ambushed and suffered severely. -The District Commissioner of Kilwa was taken prisoner. The awkwardness -of the already difficult situation at Kilwa was increased by the fact -that the District Commissioner’s Askari were not placed under the -orders of the military commander. - -At the same time, the pressure of hostile forces was felt from the -direction of Dar-es-Salaam, in the north, towards the lower Rufiji. -Our weak detachments, which had fallen back from Dar-es-Salaam in a -southerly direction towards the Rufiji, and consisted principally -of a young company of Askari and part of the ship’s company of -the _Königsberg_, were not enough to protect the rich sources of -subsistence in the lower Rufiji country. But at the time this country -was what the Force depended on, for the middle Rufiji country was but -sparsely settled, and could not maintain both troops and carriers for -any length of time. In view of this necessitous situation, we had at -once started to grow maize in the fertile lowlands of Logeloge and -Mpanganya, but the harvest could not be expected before March, 1917. We -were, therefore, threatened by a great danger when several companies of -Indians attacked our advanced officers’ post in the Boma of Kissengire. -The enemy, who assaulted the steep walls without sufficient preparatory -fire, was driven off with considerable loss. Unfortunately, the -German commander, Lieutenant Baldamus, of the Reserve, who exposed -himself too freely to the enemy projectiles, was killed. But his -resolute and gallant defence secured us in the possession of the -seat of administration at Kissengire until the arrival of adequate -reinforcements; it is, therefore, due to this officer that we retained -control of the rich supply area of the lower Rufiji for months to come. - -[Illustration: Askari. A halt. - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: The Banyan Tree. - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: Fig. xiii. Battles of Kissaki and Dutumi.] - -[Illustration: Fig. xiv. March of German Main Force, September, 1916, -to June, 1917.] - -It has already been mentioned that a pause in the operations had -occurred at Kiderengwa; an attack on the enemy, who was entrenched in -a strong position, promised no success. Headquarters accordingly left -only eight companies, under Captain Tafel, in the Kissaki-Kiderengwa -area (and this force was reduced later), moving with the bulk of the -troops to the lower Rufiji. The road to Kunguliu led past large lakes, -which, like the Rufiji, were full of hippopotami. Owing to the general -demand for fat, hippopotamus shooting became a question of existence. -One has to watch until the animal’s head is clearly visible, so as to -hit in a spot that will cause instantaneous death. The animal then -sinks, and comes up again after a little time when it can be drawn to -the bank by means of a rope, quickly made of bark. There it is cut up, -and the expert knows exactly where to find the white, appetizing fat. -The quantity varies: a well-fed beast provides over two bucketfuls. But -one has to learn, not only how to prepare the fat, but also how to kill -immediately with the first shot. Some foolish people had been reckless, -and in many places the dead bodies of wounded animals were to be seen, -which quickly decompose and become unfit for food. The elephant also -was now regarded in a new light; ordinarily the elephant hunter gauges -the length and weight of the tusk before firing; now the pressing -question was: how much fat will the beast supply? For elephant fat is -very good, and possibly tastes even better than that of the hippo. - -At Kunguliu the herds of cattle we had brought along were driven -into the river, and swam across. Up till then the troops had crossed -by ferry, on which Herr Kühlwein, the former traffic manager of our -lost Northern Railway, now contented himself with the more modest -post of “Traffic Manager, Kunguliu Ferry.” When we arrived, a bridge, -three hundred and thirty yards long, had been completed, which was -also capable of taking vehicles. On the south bank we went into camp -near Niakisiku Plantation, belonging to Lieutenant Bleeck, of the -Reserve, who had been called up. The Europeans’ houses had been fitted -up as hospitals, and were fully occupied. At Logeloge we found the -Headquarters of the Line of Communication, where a large number of -roomy grass huts had been put up for the troops. The plantation itself, -belonging to a company, comprised extensive sisal fields. Food also was -cultivated in plenty. The country being free of tse-tse, supported a -large amount of cattle, and the survivors of our pack-donkeys had been -brought there from the tse-tse country north of the Rufiji. Here the -families of the Europeans still lived in their solidly-built houses, -and were thankful that the course of the operations had enabled them -to continue their home and business life undisturbed for more than two -years. - -At Logeloge, and at the agricultural experimental establishment -of Mpanganya, which we reached next day, other Europeans of the -neighbourhood had also collected, and, where the existing buildings -failed to accommodate them, had built themselves houses with poles and -cane, or grass. Here an unpleasant symptom also made its appearance. -While the troops at the front were animated by the best spirit and -great enterprise, things behind the front were not always the same. -The people who understood least of the business always knew everything -better, and fostered a certain amount of discontent. That kind of thing -is catching, and in the long run undermines right feeling. Fortunately, -however, many of the troops behind the front had enough soldierly -pride to shut up the grousers pretty bluntly on occasion. In one of -the hospitals there someone was becoming rather too free with his -destructive criticism, and a wounded man answered: “I tell you what, -the Commandant is the brain of the Force, but you’re its backside!” -This unvarnished epithet was so apt, that it at once turned the laugh -on the side of the speaker, and polished away the spot of tarnish that -threatened to spread. - -The question now was, whether we should first turn to the north against -the force at Kissengire, or against the one at Kilwa. The latter had -not, as Major von Boemken had feared, moved on towards Livale, but, -possibly influenced by the movements of our troops, had turned towards -the north. It thus worked into the Kibata country, which, though rich, -was very mountainous, and difficult for manœuvre, and as long as it -remained there I did not think it would be very dangerous. I considered -it sufficient merely to prevent it from pushing further towards the -Rufiji, for which a weak force of five companies, under Major Schulz, -was enough. Major von Boemken, who was anxious about Livale, had, with -two companies and a 4-inch gun, made his way into the neighbourhood of -Mpotora, a chance circumstance, from which, as will be seen, we later -reaped great benefit. I had, therefore, a free hand to move on towards -Kissengire. That was important, and enabled us to secure the rich -supply country north of the lower Rufiji, and to get away the valuable -stocks from thence to the middle Rufiji. Whether there would be an -opportunity of obtaining a success in the field it was not possible to -tell; but I thought that the enemy, since he had pushed troops from the -Uluguru Mountains in an easterly direction to the neighbourhood of -Kissengire, would exert some pressure from the north. So it was quite -possible that we might find a favourable opportunity for a fight. We -crossed the Rufiji at Utete in boats, and in a few days reached Makima, -one day’s march south of Kissengire. By that time a sufficient garrison -of two companies had been assembled at Kissengire, where it was -actively employed in strengthening the position. A little to the north, -at Maneromango, was a strong force of the enemy, and a European patrol, -which had started out from Kiderengwa, reported that hostile troops had -been moved from the west towards the Maneromango-Kissengire area. - -A few days after leaving Kiderengwa this patrol had got into a -waterless country in terrible heat, and the various members had lost -each other in the dense bush. They made their presence known by firing, -and had no choice but to surrender to the English. Only the determined -patrol-leader had managed to escape to a native village, where the -inhabitants greeted him with apparent friendliness and brought him -eggs. As he bent down to take them, they fell upon him, and handed him -over to a patrol of English Askari concealed close by. An Askari with a -mule, who behaved rather arrogantly, was to escort the German back. On -the way the German, during conversation, drew his attention to faults -in his bridle, and succeeded in seizing the mule and riding off on it -with all speed. In the struggle which took place, he had seized the -Askari’s rifle and shot him with it. - -To the east of Kissengire our patrols also pushed on to the north, and -quite a number of minor engagements took place in the bush, in which -the enemy at times suffered very severely. Further to the east, on -the coast near Kissiju, other hostile detachments were also roaming -about, and a small English man-of-war was there too. One morning -Captain von Lieberman, with the 11th Company, surprised this opponent, -and our Askari went for him with a will, cheering. The man-of-war was -also fired upon with the field gun, and apparently several hits were -obtained. After driving the enemy out of Kissiju, Captain von Lieberman -returned. We also operated against the enemy’s communications, and -small fights occurred almost daily. - -The closely-settled country is of simply fabulous fertility. Besides -abundant flour, both Europeans and Askari had mangos, paw paws, -mustapheles, cocoanuts, and other tropical fruits. We were surprised -to see the large rice-fields, which were here close to the south side -of Dar-es-Salaam, seeing that in peace-time most of the rice had come -from India. Of cattle there was but little, but the companies began to -send out shooting parties into the prairie, which was full of game, and -extended especially on the western side of our positions. That there -must be game in the vicinity was proved by the presence of numerous -lions. Frequently a family of five lions wandered through our camp at -night, and occasionally killed animals in it. - -While Headquarters was at Makima in October, a report came in which -caused me to suppose that the landing of strong enemy forces at Kilwa, -and the appearance of hostile detachments which, coming from the west -towards Livale, had arrived on the Mbaranganda river, formed part of a -big converging movement by the enemy against Livale. Strong forces of -Portuguese had crossed the Rovuma, invaded the highlands of Makonde, -and established themselves in the district of Nevala. The captain -of the _Königsberg_, Captain Looff, had, after the evacuation of -Dar-es-Salaam, proceeded by land, first to the _Königsberg’s_ old area -on the Rufiji, and then to Lindi. He had now taken over command in the -south. With the three newly-raised companies of Askari, the only troops -available there at the moment, he had entrenched himself in front of -the strong positions of the enemy who had landed at Lindi, covered the -removal of the cargo of the store-ship from Ssudi to the north, and -inflicted damage on the Portuguese, who had shown themselves on the -lower Rovuma, by means of minor expeditions. His force was, however, -rather too weak to enable him to turn against the Portuguese, who were -advancing in his rear about Nevala, with any prospect of a rapid and -decisive success. - -It was, therefore, very convenient that, as already mentioned, two -companies and the 4-inch _Königsberg_ gun of von Boemken’s Detachment -happened to be at Mpotora. To command this detachment, Captain -Rothe, of the Reserve, was sent from the Rufiji, as he could in -the circumstances be spared from his duties as Principal Postmaster -(_Oberpostdirektor_), and had, at his urgent request, been placed at -the unrestricted disposal of the Protective Force. In a few days he -arrived from Niakisiku by cycle, took over his detachment, and led it -towards Nevala. Captain Looff took command of the whole force, the -Portuguese were thoroughly well hammered by the _Königsberg_ gun, -and their positions were captured by assault. We took a really very -considerable amount of booty, including four mountain guns, a number -of machine guns, several hundred rifles, much ammunition, several -automobiles, supplies, and all kinds of equipment. During the following -weeks we continually found quantities of buried stores and ammunition. -The very secret places were particularly well stocked. The Portuguese -were driven completely out of German territory, and pursued for some -distance into their own country. But consideration of the general -situation prevented me from carrying on the pursuit to the uttermost. -Rothe’s Detachment was brought back to Mpotora, in order to keep an -eye on the enemy at Kilwa, who grew continually stronger. Even before -this movement was executed, I considered it necessary to transfer -strong forces from the neighbourhood of Kissengire towards Kibata. No -opportunity had presented itself of fighting a decisive successful -battle north of the lower Rufiji; as I had expected, I was obliged to -proceed to a prolonged operation in the mountains of Kibata, which -offered but little prospect of leading to a decision. - -The transfer of the troops towards Kibata took place at the end of -November, 1916. On the way we encamped at Utete, where roomy hospitals -had been established in the building of the Civil Government, and where -an officers’ mess had been established on a _baraza_ (an airy veranda). -The place was situated on dominating heights, and had been strongly -fortified with trenches and abatis, and commanded the lower-lying -and very extensive native town. Almost all night one heard the deep -grunting of the hippo, and one impudent lion, having failed in his -attack on a native, tried to kill another man in our camp. Fortunately -his quarry was taken from him at the last moment by a European, who -hurried to the spot, and several natives. Continuing, we reached -the Moboro-Kibata road. Captain Schulz, who had with his detachment -occupied a strong position two hours north of Kibata, was drawing his -supplies from the country round Moboro. Several depots on this road -were filled from the fertile country immediately surrounding them. -In addition, Captain Schulz sent out parties to buy supplies in the -districts near his camp, in which the whole wealth of the country is -revealed. - -From a mountain near Mbindia, the camp of Schulz’s Detachment, one -could see a broad forest track passing over the heights. This was the -road for a 4-inch _Königsberg_ gun, which was being brought up to its -position before Kibata by Lieut.-Commander Apel. Chanting in rhythm, -hundreds of natives dragged the heavy load up and down the steep -slopes, over which a suitable track had been surveyed and cut through -the thick bush. Shortly after its arrival at Mbindia, the gun had been -placed in position on a mountain saddle from which, later on, the -bombardment was successfully carried out. One of the 4-inch howitzers -was also got into position further forward in a valley, so as to fire -over the high ground in front and reach the enemy’s camps. Detailed -reconnaissances had disclosed the possibility of moving our infantry, -concealed by the dense bush, into some high ground which commanded -the country north of Kibata. The weak hostile force holding this high -ground was surprised by an attack from the rear and quickly driven off. -Then another height was attacked, situated at a water-hole immediately -to the north of the solid European buildings. We could soon see our -Askari climbing up it, and establishing themselves on it about eighty -yards in front of a hostile position. - -By this time the deployment of our artillery was completed; besides the -4-inch _Königsberg_ gun and the field-howitzer the two mountain guns -had been brought into action, in line with our infantry. We had delayed -opening fire on the buildings, where we saw numbers of men and animals -walking about on the bare hill-top, until everything was ready. One -company which had got round the enemy’s rear, and established itself -on his main line of communication, running from Kibata to Kilwa, -observed that the heavy shells falling near the Boma (Fort) caused a -frightful panic. Heaps of the enemy’s Askari ran away as fast as they -could, across the front of the company which was lying in concealment. -But unfortunately the company allowed itself to be deterred from taking -advantage of this favourable opportunity. It hoped that the scattered -parties of Askari would soon be followed by larger bodies, and did -not want to give away the chance of a surprise prematurely. But the -expected large bodies did not come, and thus, as unfortunately happened -often, a good opportunity was lost through waiting for a better. The -infantry attack on the above-mentioned heights immediately north of -Kibata had involved the loss of several very efficient Europeans. -Sergeant-Major Mirow was killed, Vice-Sergeant-Major Jitzmann was -shot in the leg and sustained a severe and very painful injury to the -nerve of his leg. He had previously often distinguished himself by his -untiring and successful raids on the Uganda Railway. Through prolonged -detention in hospital he was now lost to the Service, and fell into the -enemy’s hands before he was recovered. - -It was very difficult to find one’s way in the extraordinarily rugged -mountains of Kibata. A number of reconnoitring expeditions were sent -out and after a few days we felt more or less at home. It was possible -to obtain a good view of Kibata and of the enemy’s communications, and -we ascertained that he was reinforcing his troops more and more. As -a matter of fact he employed at Kibata the main body of the division -landed at Kilwa. Our observations and the peculiarities of the ground -led us to expect that the enemy intended to work from Kibeta round our -right, or western, flank, and thus force us to evacuate the heights -commanding Kibata and its water-supply from the north. A direct attack -by the 120th Baluchis had been defeated with great loss to the enemy. -During the opening days of December we observed at first weak, and then -stronger detachments, which pushed forward from hill to hill towards -our right flank, and whose advanced parties soon reached a commanding -mountain, known to the English as Gold Coast Hill. Our counter-stroke -against this force was at first favoured by ravines and forests, and -our Askari surprised even us when they became visible close in front of -the enemy’s positions. Our guns were ready to fire, but unluckily the -first shell pitched among our own men, and the infantry attack, which -could only succeed by rapidity and surprise, failed. However, the fire -of our two mountain guns at under 1,800 yards, and of our howitzers, -which were further back, caused quite considerable casualties among -the Gold Coast Regiment. The enemy was on a narrow hog’s-back, the -steep slopes of which were for the most part bare. He could, therefore, -hardly withdraw, and in the hard ground entrenching took a long time. -We then surrounded the hill with infantry, and poured a converging -fire on the good targets presented to us. It became impossible for the -enemy to hold this highly important position any longer. After it was -evacuated we found a large number of graves, each for many bodies, and -at this point the enemy must have lost not less than 150 killed. - -The advance of the Gold Coast Regiment had nevertheless been of -advantage to the enemy. My force being so weak—we had, all told, about -nine companies—I had withdrawn one of the two companies stationed in -the immediate vicinity of Kibata in order to employ it against Gold -Coast Hill. After I had returned to camp that night I heard the sound -of a number of small detonations emanating from the one company left -alone to face the enemy. It was only after some time that we recognized -this as a grenade attack, a manœuvre then unknown to us. Several -companies of the enemy attacked with such rapidity and skill, that they -penetrated the trenches of our weak company by surprise and drove it -out. The loss of this position deprived us of the possibility of firing -at close range from that very suitable height at hostile troops moving -about, or proceeding to their water-supply. Until then I had done so -with success, and had even occasionally sent up a light gun to the -place, withdrawing it again after it had ceased fire. - -But the loss of this high ground and the casualties sustained in it -faded into insignificance beside the success achieved on Gold Coast -Hill. In spite of our inferiority in numbers, we completely dominated -the situation. Our patrols and stronger raiding parties worked right -round the enemy’s rear and pushed on to his communications. Minor -enterprises on his part produced no results. On the whole, the enemy -suffered very considerable casualties at Kibata, and I think they -should be estimated at not less than four hundred men. The operations -intended by him were also completely wrecked. There can be no doubt -that he waited to advance from Kilwa on Livale. Our vigorous action at -Kibata forced him to move from Kilwa against us, and to leave the rest -of the country and the whole of our supply and transport apparatus in -peace. Towards the end of December hostile planes appeared, cruising -about over our positions and dropping bombs. Although they now used -far more powerful bombs than formerly, they hardly inflicted any -casualties. On Christmas Day we saw a larger mass than usual falling on -the Boma of Kibata. We were disappointed in our hope that the enemy was -bombing his own camp; it was only a large quantity of cigarettes as a -Christmas present for the troops. - -One day, during that period, I received a personal letter from the -British Commander-in-Chief, General Smuts, in which he informed me -that I had been awarded the Order Pour le Mérite, and expressed the -hope that his cordial congratulations would not be unacceptable to -me. I thanked him equally politely, although I at first believed that -he was confusing it with the Second Class of the Order of the Crown -with Swords, which I had received a short time before. I mention this -letter from General Smuts as a proof of the mutual personal esteem and -chivalry which existed throughout in spite of the exhausting warfare -carried on by both sides. On many other occasions also the enemy -intimated his great appreciation of the achievements of the German -forces. - -At the end of 1916 I regarded the military situation in the Colony as -remarkably favourable, for I knew that the South African troops were -for the most part worn out with battle-casualties and sickness, while -a large proportion of the remainder were returning to South Africa at -the end of their engagements. Prisoners had repeatedly assured us that -they had had enough of the “picnic” in East Africa. The Indian troops -also, who had been in the field in East Africa for some length of time, -were reduced in numbers, while the late arrivals—we identified Indian -Pathan Regiments at Kibata—consisted largely of young soldiers. Other -regiments, like the 129th Baluchis, who had fought in Flanders, were no -doubt very good, but they might not be expected to stand the fatigues -of African warfare for a very prolonged period. The enemy’s Askari -were, generally speaking, new troops, and only a small proportion of -them had at that time been in the field. So we could continue calmly -to contemplate the continuation of the war for a considerable time. -I still believe that we would have succeeded not only in holding our -own, but even in beating the enemy, if he had not enjoyed the power of -continually filling up his reduced units and of bringing up fresh ones. -At the end of 1916 I did not know that this had already been effected -on an extensive scale. Among other reinforcements a strong brigade of -black troops had been brought from Nigeria to Dar-es-Salaam, whence it -had been moved on without delay to Dutumi and Kissaki. - -In the early days of January, 1917, the five companies encamped -there under Captain Otto were attacked by General Smuts with at -least two brigades. In planning his attack the enemy had provided -for simultaneous wide turning movements, which, with his greatly -superior numbers, enabled him to bar the retreat of our troops towards -Kungulio. More than once our Askari had to clear their way with the -bayonet, and in the close country some of our companies got into very -awkward situations. In withdrawing to Behobeho our field howitzer, -having only a weak escort, was ambushed by a hostile force of several -companies, and was lost, after the whole detachment had been killed. -But in the end all portions of the detachment successfully avoided -being surrounded, and in assembling at Behobeho. At this place very -heavy fighting immediately took place, in which the enemy also fought -with great bravery. It was in this action that the old hunter Selous -was killed, who was well known even among Germans, on account of his -charming manner and his exciting stories. He had joined as a subaltern. -With a superior enemy before him and on both flanks, and behind him the -mighty Rufiji, crossed only by the one frail bridge, Captain Otto yet -succeeded in reaching the south bank of the river, with all his troops, -and in destroying the bridge, in accordance with his instructions. - -We had also observed a wide turning movement which the enemy was making -from Kissaki further west towards Mkalinzo on the Rufiji, which now -became ineffective. The hostile brigade undertaking it did not reach -the south bank of the Rufiji in time to oppose Captain Otto’s passage, -and thus render his situation desperate; on the contrary, we gained -partial successes which were quite considerable. The enemy following -us from Behobeho came on very vigorously and passed a large part of -his force over the Rufiji at Kungulio in boats. Captain Otto held his -detachment in readiness a little to the south of the river, and now -attacked the enemy, of whom part only had crossed over, and completely -defeated him with heavy loss. This partial success was favoured by -the inaction of the hostile column, which, as already mentioned, was -making the turning movement by Mkalinzo. It consisted principally of -whites, and a part of the black Nigerian troops. Neither of them were -equal to the long march involved, and had therefore reached the Rufiji -exhausted and unfit for further operations. They remained out of action -for quite a long time, and the unity of General Smuts’ otherwise quite -well-planned operation was wrecked. - -In consequence of the enemy’s advance in force at Kungulio, the danger -arose that he might gain possession of the middle Rufiji, and of the -country to the south of it. He might then easily seize the bulk of -our stores, and our whole system of communications, which for the -most part ran from the middle Rufiji towards Livale. It was therefore -necessary for me to meet his movements with our main body, which was -before Kibeta, and so I marched off with the greater part of it to Lake -Utungi, where I would be in a position to help Captain Otto, or to -seize any favourable opportunity that might offer. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -ANXIETIES AND HARDSHIPS DURING OUR STAY IN THE RUFIJI COUNTRY - - -OUR march from Kibata was on the first day carried out according to -plan. On the following day I rode ahead with a few companions, in -the expectation that the troops who had several native guides with -them would not fail to find the way. In the Kissi mountains we came -upon large numbers of natives who, however, were very timid and often -deserted their flourishing rice plantations on our approach. Later in -the day I regretted that I did not appropriate some of this abundant -produce for our own use. During the midday heat we rested at Pori. -Some of my companions who knew the country called my attention to the -acid Mbinji fruit, which we found very refreshing. Unfortunately we -did not know at that time that the stone of this fruit, when roasted, -makes an excellent dish, tasting like our hazel-nut. The heat was -overpowering, but as we were in the neighbourhood of the enemy patrols -we had to keep a sharp look-out. The springs and water-courses were -now dried up; after a long search we at last found a small pool of -dirty water, which, however, we were told was not injurious to health. -Towards evening we reached the great deserted settlement. Here we -were fortunate enough to find a negro in the employ of the German -Government, who informed us that we were at Ungwara, our destination -for that day. After we had walked through the place, the man showed -us a pool near which we pitched our camp. My old black cook, the -bearded Baba, well known to many East Africans, had very nearly kept up -with our horses, and, following our trail, soon arrived. He had soon -prepared his _uzeli_ (boiled rice), and was sitting contentedly by the -fire. We watched him enviously, for we had nothing, and were waiting -for our baggage and the troops. But no one came and we lay down, -hungry, to sleep. The friend in need, however, was approaching in the -shape of a splendid sable-antelope, which in the brilliant moonlight -was coming down to drink. Almost simultaneously the rifles of two of -my companions, van Booyen and Nieuwenhuizen, experienced Boer hunters, -who had become Germans, rang out. We sprang from our blankets as though -we had received an electric shock, and within a short time the first -pieces of delicate flesh were roasting on the spit. - -On the following day we reached Lake Utungi, where Captain Feilke was -awaiting us, and we refreshed ourselves with bread, coffee and sausage -made from antelope flesh. There was still no trace of the troops. They -had lost us in Pori, and almost all completely lost their bearings. One -detachment did not get into touch with us until several days later, -when they came upon our telephone line in the neighbourhood of Utete. -In view of the difficulty of communication, it had hitherto been -impossible to get an accurate estimate of the state of our supplies. -I had expected to find well-filled depots at Mpanganya on Lake Utungi -and in the neighbourhood of Madaba. This was why I had pressed on out -of the fertile country north of the lower Rufiji through Mpanganya to -the line-of-communication area. The question of supplies had developed -quite differently from my expectations. - -In the line-of-communication area, in addition to the large numbers of -bearers necessary for the transport of war material to the south, a -numerous _personnel_ was maintained, who were employed on road-making, -building grass huts and for other purposes. Even in the small depots -there were always a number of men who, whenever possible, did nothing -but fetch supplies, which they ate themselves. Often the supplies -were even fetched by others who, in their turn, had to be fed. In -many places it was almost the case that a load of supplies collected -and forwarded by the fighting troops in the north finally landed in -a small depot, and were devoured by these people who had nothing -else to do. In view of the difficulties of transport, and the great -distances, even the energy and thoroughness of Captain Stemmermann, -who had taken charge of the depots, did not succeed in detecting and -putting a stop to these abuses. Further, there were too many people in -Africa whose propensity for diverting valuable energy to non-essentials -to the prejudice of the really important things that it would take a -very strong broom to sweep them away. The general result of all these -obstacles was that thousands and thousands of useless mouths were -devouring the supplies which had been collected with great effort in -the region occupied by the fighting forces. The depot did nothing for -the supplies, but, on the other hand, lived on them, and the most -serious point was that the moment was at hand when the areas from which -the supplies were drawn would have to be evacuated by the fighting -forces. It was a difficult situation. It was necessary to lose no time -in putting under cultivation the territory we were then occupying—that -is to say, the country round Madaba and Livale, and in the southern -parts of the Protectorate, which were likely to be the scene of the -subsequent operations. But months must elapse before any results could -be obtained from these measures. During these months we should have to -remain on the Rufigi and live there. Here, it is true, some hundreds of -acres of maize were standing, but even these would require months to -ripen. Until this time came the force could not move south; it would -have to remain in the unproductive area which it was then occupying. - -The accomplishment of this task was difficult. The order had -at once to be given for the removal of every man who was not -absolutely indispensable for carrying on the war during the next -few months. This meant that thousands of bearers and workmen in the -line-of-communication area were sent home. The most serious drawback -to this step had to be reckoned with; we were sending over to the -enemy thousands of men from whom he was bound to gain detailed -information as to our strength, the condition of our supplies and our -internal organization. Nor was it enough to cut down the _personnel_ -of our lines of communication. The non-combatant _personnel_ of the -companies was also reduced. Among other things, it was laid down that -henceforward no European should have more than five native attendants. -That sounds a generous allowance to European ears, but under African -conditions native attendance is really indispensable to the European. -He requires at least one man or boy to cook for him and attend to -his personal needs, and, in addition, it must be remembered that all -baggage, kit, rations, blankets and tent-material, has to be carried -whenever he moves. When one considers that in peace-time a travelling -official on a long _safari_ (journey) took with him from eleven to -thirteen bearers, in addition to two or three personal servants, it -will be understood how drastic this new order was and what a storm of -indignation it aroused. Fortunately I was in a position, when appealed -to on grounds of health and decency, to point to the fact that I myself -had for months managed with three, or at a pinch two, loads—that is, -four negroes—and had kept in good health. I am still particularly -grateful to those regimental officers who, as on so many other -occasions, saw the necessity of this vexatious regulation and set the -example. They upheld the tradition of our officer-corps by not claiming -any special comforts for themselves, and were the first to submit to -the unavoidable discomfort. I believe that among all the soldiers and -non-combatants up to the highest civilian official, there is not one -who still condemns this order, at first so strongly opposed. - -But reduction of the number of food-consumers alone was not sufficient -to solve the problem of existence; the supplies would not go round. It -was already obvious that the supplies from the area of the fighting -force, which were, of course, being worked at high pressure, would not -suffice to feed us until the new harvest at the end of March. After -close and mature consideration, we found it impossible to avoid the -necessity of cutting down the rations, a measure which went very much -against the grain, as even the native, if he is to be relied on, must -be well fed. This gave rise to a fresh and much stronger outburst of -indignation. From all sides came telegrams and messages to say that -it was impossible to get the calories of nourishment necessary for a -fighting man from the daily cereal ration, fixed at six hundred grammes -of meal. But the hard fact had to be faced that only a certain quantity -was available, and we must make the best of it. The reduction of the -cereal ration could not be avoided. For the rest, each man and each -company would have to try to make good the shortage by hunting, which -in this region, where game abounded, could be managed with the exercise -of a little agility. But logic is apt to go to pieces with many people -when it comes to a question of daily food, and many did not scruple to -lay the whole blame for the at times barely sufficient ration at the -door of the wicked commander-in-chief, and even to do all they could -to have the daily ration increased to its former amount. This I had to -bear calmly, and I made my own observations as to who were the men to -make the best of an unavoidable necessity and who were not. - -In carrying out these drastic measures new difficulties were -encountered. A crowd of Askari women had followed the force, and had -attached themselves to various camps on the Rufiji, where they were -very comfortable. I was most anxious to send them south, where the -question of supplies was less difficult. The necessary transport was -arranged for, and the women were given rations for the march. After one -short day’s march, however, the women simply lay down, and declared -that they could go no further. Their rations, which were intended to -last a considerable time, were all eaten by the third day, and they -were crying out for more. Some even went so far as to attack and beat -the European who was in charge of the transport. Even under a dark -skin the gentler sex did not always scruple to make full use of their -prerogatives, which are usually justified. - -Finally we got over this difficulty, and a tolerable solution was found -to the ration problem. The Askari, to whom the position was explained, -saw the difficulty and were very reasonable. Skilled hunters were sent -to the different hunting-grounds, and the empty stomachs from time to -time more generously filled. I remember that with us on Lake Utungi our -two hundred blacks in one day completely devoured a big buffalo and an -elephant. It was often found possible to give a piece of antelope to -the passing caravans of bearers. - -In the course of February the stores in our supply dumps, of which I -took stock every day, ran out. I began to fear that for reasons of -supply we would not be able to wait for the ripening of the corn on -the Rufiji. In that case, not only would the harvest be lost, but the -crops growing further south could not be used to the best advantage. -There we should have to use the grain that was actually ripe and pass -on, leaving the unripe portion standing. A lucky chance came to my aid -in this dilemma. I went one day from Lake Utungi to Mpanganya to see -Captain Tafel, who was handling the tactical and commissariat problems -there with admirable efficiency. I spent the night in his camp, and -he set before me an excellent dish of young maize prepared like -asparagus. This led us to speak of the maize fields of Mpanganya and -the neighbourhood. These were full of women and other natives who had -swarmed over them like a flock of birds, and were living on the young, -unripe corn. This was as bad economy as well could be, but it gave me -the idea that in case of need the maize crops could be largely used -before they were ripe. This need very soon occurred, and an experiment -with the ears which had ripened most showed that these could be -artificially dried and a very good meal made from them. After this, the -ripest ears were gathered daily, and as the whole crop ripened the food -situation improved from day to day. By 1st March it was found possible -to increase the ration to seven hundred grammes, or nearly the normal -allowance. - -The increasing severity of the whole campaign called for a more -intensive and energetic exploitation of our food resources; the slow, -deliberate supply methods of the civil authorities, which had sufficed -for the first phase of the campaign, were no longer adequate. Twice, at -Kissaki and on the Rufiji I had been put in a most difficult position -with regard to supplies, which had almost made it impossible to carry -on the operations. A more efficient supply service which would know -the military needs, look ahead and work more quickly and energetically -was a vital necessity for the further carrying on of the campaign. -Fortunately I was able to convince the Governor on this point, and, as -a result, a new supply detachment was raised from the force, and sent -ahead to Massassi, via Livale. They established several subsidiary -detachments, which were attached to the administrative stations in -the Lindi area, and in this way worked side by side with the civil -authorities in organizing, and, later, in carrying out, the cultivation -and storing of food. In this way the desired impregnation of the -supplies and transport service with the necessary military spirit was -completely attained. - -At this time there was no appreciable shortage of kit, and there was -also an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. - -With a view to the envelopment of the enemy at Mkalinzo, where he -was reported to be in strong force, Captain Otto had marched his -detachment south from Kungulio. North of Mawa he covered the fertile -area of Madaba, and the line of transport and telephone communication -running from Lake Utungi, via Mawa to Madaba. On 24th January, 1917, -Captain Otto was attacked north of Mawa by several battalions of the -Nigerian brigade. The enemy was beaten off with heavy losses and -pursued several miles through the bush to an entrenched position, where -he took refuge. The troops under Captain Schulz, who had been left -behind after our departure from Kibeta, were gradually withdrawn to -Ungwara. They had been reinforced and relieved from time to time after -the fighting in the region of the Kibeta-Utete-Kissi mountains. Strong -enemy forces—identified as an infantry brigade—had followed them. In -spite of his numerical superiority, the single engagements were very -costly, and for the most part unfavourable for the enemy. Captains -von Lieberman, Goering and Koehl, and numerous patrol leaders on many -occasions completely routed more than twice their number of Indian or -negro troops, and captured rifles, machine guns and ammunition. The -long war had produced a large number of capable leaders, and their -example, as in the case of Lieutenant Kroeger, who was afterwards -killed, roused unbounded enterprise and daring. Over and over again, -and without stopping to ask the strength of the opposing force, this -officer, followed by a handful of men with fixed bayonets and cheering -loudly, had charged the enemy in the thick of the bush. He had even -trained the Askari. Several of these distinguished themselves as patrol -leaders, and when later the brave Effendi, of the 4th Field Company, -with his patrol, routed an entire Indian company, we owed the success -to this training at Ungwara. - -Our line of communication to the south, passing through Madeba and -Livale, was in danger from a strong enemy force west of Kibata, and it -was necessary that we should afford it adequate protection. This meant -a gradual move south of our forces from the Rufiji, especially as our -supplies on this part of the river were coming to an end and the rainy -season was at hand. - -It was particularly important that we should not evacuate this part of -the Rufiji until the rains had set in. This would mean a considerable -gain in time for us, as, during the actual rainy season and immediately -after, the operations would, of necessity, come to a standstill, and -the corn, particularly the _mtema_ (millet), would have time to ripen. - -When the migrations of the ants warned us that the rains were at hand, -orders were given, as a precautionary measure, that the women, children -and non-combatants should as far as possible be transferred to the -north bank of the Rufiji, and thence transported to Dar-es-Salaam. This -step, which the approaching rains and the state of the supplies made -necessary, aroused much discontent, which I was obliged to treat with -the same indifference as the previous outbursts of indignation. I am, -however, still of the opinion that the timely removal of these people -was much better for them than spending part of the rainy season on the -drenched ground or in flooded dwellings with insufficient food. - -The rains, which set in at the end of March, were particularly heavy -in 1917. The site of our camp, which was slightly elevated, became an -island, from which access to the outer world was only possible by boat -through the Rufiji wood. A number of people were drowned in the wood -during the rains; others had to take refuge for days in the trees. -The water rose so high that in Mpanganya it reached the high-lying -dwellings of the Europeans, and invaded the hospitals and disturbed -every kind of filth. It was impossible for women and children, sick -and wounded to remain, and after the withdrawal of the troops they had -to give themselves up to the English, who took pity on their need, and -provided them with food and transport. - -The majority of the troops marched south out of the flooded districts -on the Rufiji and Lake Utungi in good time, after using up the -available crops almost to the last grain. The evacuation was carried -out gradually and in echelon; the greater part of the troops were -assembled in Mpotora, which was occupied by Captain Rothe, in a -fortified camp, with his two companies which had defeated the -Portuguese at Nevala. Only a few small detachments were left on the -Rufiji, and these were gradually reduced to the strength of patrols. -Four days’ march east of Madaba the detachments of Koehl and Goering -had the opportunity of some successful skirmishes against enemy -detachments on the western edge of the Matumbi Mountains. Gradually, -however, all these detachments were brought to Mpotora, and only -Captain Otto remained in the higher regions of Madaba. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE END OF THE FRONTIER DEFENCE IN THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES - - -IN August, 1916, Major Kraut had gradually retired from Kilossa on -Mahenge, leaving only Schoenfeld’s division at Kidodi, on the Ruaha. -Captain Braunschweig’s force was embodied in Major Kraut’s command. Of -these Captain Falkenstein, with the 5th Field Company, had retired, -at the end of May, 1916, from Ipyana, and Captain Aumann, with his -company, from the Mbozi region in the direction of Lupembe and Maubire. -During the retirement there was continual skirmishing. Our weak -divisions had to make a stand against the pursuing enemy, at least a -brigade strong. - -At the end of June, 1916, Captain Braunschweig, who was then at -Dodoma, was sent through Iringa, and his force was strengthened to -five companies by the addition of the Kondoa troops and others brought -from Dar-es-Salaam, including the two companies from Langenburg. One -hundred of the crew of the _Königsberg_ from Dar-es-Salaam and a field -howitzer were added to this force. At Malangali he accepted battle with -the enemy, and apparently inflicted heavy losses. Then, however, he -evacuated the position, and abandoned the howitzer, which was difficult -to move, first making it useless. The difficulties of Braunschweig’s -position were increased by the action of an important Wahehe chief in -his rear, who rebelled and went over to the enemy with all his people -and cattle. Captain Braunschweig then retired on Mahenge, fighting a -succession of minor rearguard skirmishes, and put himself under the -orders of Major Kraut. - -[Illustration: Fig. xv. March of Major-General Wahle in the West] - -After numerous minor engagements Major Kraut’s retiring divisions -established themselves on the line of the Ruhudje and Ruaha rivers. -In the fertile region round Mahenge the supplies were excellent, even -after the evacuation of a large part of the rice-field west of the -Ruhudje. On this river the enemy had established a strongly fortified -camp at Mkapira. With our insufficient resources it was impossible to -take this position by force, but there was a chance that by cutting -the enemy’s line of communication with Lupembe, we might force him to -evacuate the camp owing to shortage of food. - -Major Kraut crossed the river with five companies and a light field -gun, and occupied a position in a semi-circle of hills in the enemy’s -rear and right across his line of communication. In the enemy’s front -weak forces covered the river bank on the Mahenge side. Unfortunately -the fortified positions of our companies were so extended that, owing -to the difficulties of the country, there was no guarantee that support -could be brought up in time. On the——, before daybreak, the 10th -Company on the right wing was surprised by a heavy enemy attack. The -enemy also cleverly took the company’s position in the rear and, after -inflicting heavy losses, put the machine guns out of action. On the -left wing Lieutenant von Schroetter’s company was also attacked from -all sides, and had to cut its way out with the bayonet, losing the -light field gun and a machine gun. In view of the heavy casualties of -the enemy, Major Kraut would have been able to remain on the west bank -of the Ruhudje, in spite of this partial disaster, but fighting could -be heard from the direction of Lupembe, where the 25th Field Company -was covering his rear. Major Kraut thought, wrongly, that there, -too, a sharp attack had been made, and, therefore, retired again to -the east bank of the Ruhudje. To his astonishment the enemy’s strong -entrenchments at Mkapira were found to be evacuated a few days later, -the enemy having withdrawn in the night. Closer inspection showed that -he had suffered heavy losses in the recent fighting. This, however, was -not enough to explain his withdrawal; this riddle was not solved until -later, on the appearance of General Wahle, with whom no communication -had been established. - -In expectation of the opening of the big operations of 1916 the -reinforcements that had been provisionally sent to Victoria Nyanza, -Ruanda, the Russissi and the Tanganyika area were brought back and -embodied into our main forces along the North railway. A single command -for these minor theatres of war was required, and with this object a -“western command” was established under Major-General Wahle, who for -the most part co-ordinated and directed these operations from Tabora. -In April and May, 1916, when the British main forces in the Kilima -Njaro area had completed their march, and, after the rainy season, -were beginning a fresh advance to the south, English and Belgians from -Muansa, Lake Kiwu, the Russissi and Bismarckburg began to advance -concentrically on Tabora through these minor theatres of war. Our weak -divisions retired on this place. - -Major von Langenn retired at once from Tschangugu to Issawi, followed -by Captain Wintgens from Kissenji. Heavy casualties were inflicted on -the pursuing Belgian brigades in successful rearguard actions. The -German detachment later continued its retirement on Mariahilf. The -danger to our district from the strong Belgian forces on our heels -had been correctly estimated by Captain Gudovius. When in June, 1916, -strong English forces advanced across the Kagera, he retired south from -Bukoba with his division. Owing to the difficulties of communication -and getting information, a part of his force unfortunately ran upon -strong Belgian forces in Ussuwi district. Captain Gudovius himself was -wounded in the abdomen and fell into the enemy’s hands. The engagement -went badly for us and cost us heavy losses. Individual bodies of the -detachment, however, managed to fight their way through to Muansa and -Uschirombo. - -In the middle of July, 1916, the English succeeded in effecting a -surprise landing with about a brigade in the neighbourhood of Muansa. -There, too, there was some skirmishing, favourable to us, and there the -Commanding Officer, Captain von Chappuis, retired in the direction of -Tabora. The troops from Muansa and those under Major von Langenn and -Captain Wintgens established a new front, approximately on the line -Schinjanga-St. Michael, and repulsed several Belgian attacks. Captain -Zimmer had sunk the steamer _Goetzen_ at Kigoma and blown up the Wami. -He then retired slowly along the railway to Tabora. Captain Hering -von Usumbura followed suit. The fact that the operations were nearing -Tabora gave General Wahle the opportunity to bring up quickly part of -the troops from the north of Tabora, to make a dash west by rail and -retire again at once. In this raid the 8th Field Company completely -routed a Belgian battalion west of Tabora, and Wintgens’ detachment -brought off a successful surprise attack west and north of Tabora. -These minor victories were often considerable, and on several different -days of skirmishing the enemy losses amounted to hundreds; several -light howitzers were also captured in these raids. - -On 2nd June, 1916, the 29th Field Company was surrounded in its -fortified position in the Namema mountains. In fighting his way -through, the brave company commander, Lieutenant Franken, was severely -wounded and taken prisoner. Lieutenant Hasslacher retired step by step -on Tabora. In an affair of patrols south of this place he met with a -hero’s death. - -In this way the troops of the western command were actually assembled -at Tabora, and the moment had come for a systematic retirement to the -south-east. These last operations and the capture of Tabora were not -known at Headquarters until long afterwards. There was no means of -communication with the western command. Major-General Wahle was aware -that this retirement of our main forces was of first importance for -the Mahenge area. Accordingly he gave orders for the march. At first -the railway could be used for supplies and transport. The eastern -column, under Major von Langenn, marched on Iringa, the centre column, -under Captain Wintgens, on Madibira, and the western column, under -Lieutenant Huebener, on Ilembule. Major Wahle accompanied the centre -column. In this way they came upon the line of communication between -Neu-Langenburg and Iringa, and the enemy’s dumps along this line. -Huebener’s detachment lost touch, and surrendered, being enveloped by -a superior force of the enemy at Ilembule. Langenn’s detachment was -most unfortunately surprised by a burst of fire while crossing a ford -near Iringa and lost heavily. The subsequent attack on Iringa was also -costly and without success. - -Wintgens’ detachment surprised enemy dumps and columns near Madibira, -and also captured a gun and some wireless apparatus. In spite of -several days of stubborn fighting, they were unable to take Lupembe and -the surrounding farms. The influence of Wahle’s advance immediately -made itself felt in the Mahenge district. The apparently strong enemy -troops, who from their fortified positions at Mkapira had carried out -the successful raid against Major Kraut, now felt themselves seriously -threatened in their rear. They evacuated their strong positions and -retired on Lupembe. General Wahle took over the command of all the -forces at Mahenge. - -At the end of 1916 the troops of General Wahle’s western command were -grouped round Mahenge. From here he directed the operations extending -approximately to the line Ssongea—Lupembe—Iringa—Kidodi. - -It has been said that all touch with General Wahle had been lost since -July, 1916, until in October, 1916, his patrols joined up with those of -Major Kraut south of Iringa. - -It was not, therefore, until after the fighting at Mkapira that Major -Kraut, and through him Headquarters, learned of General Wahle’s -advance; the development of the situation made a very different -impression on the enemy. He must have regarded the advance of General -Wahle’s columns against the English line of communication from Iringa -to Langenburg, and Major Kraut’s accidentally simultaneous threat to -Mkapira, as a widely-planned joint operation, which was seriously -endangering his troops at Mkapira, even after Major Kraut had withdrawn -to the east bank of the Ruhudje. He avoided this danger by a hasty -retirement from Mkapira in a westerly direction. - -General Wahle’s columns at once concentrated in the Lupembe-Mkapira -area. No news was received of Huebener’s western column. Its -capitulation was not known until much later. - -Welcome though this reinforcement of the forces in the west was, -there were difficulties of supplies, and it became necessary to put -under cultivation a considerable area, stretching almost to Ssongea. -Major Grawert’s detachment advanced to Likuju on the Ssongea—Liwale -road, that of Major Kraut to the Mpepo region and Captain Wintgens’ -surrounded an enemy detachment in a fortified camp at Kitenda. The -enemy quickly marched to the relief of this force, but the relieving -troops were driven off with heavy losses. At the same time the position -of Grawert’s detachment took a very unfavourable turn. The enemy had -succeeded in driving off this force’s live-stock. As other supplies -in the district were scanty, Major von Grawert, exaggerating the -difficulties of supply, thought his position hopeless and surrendered -in January, 1917. A transportable 8.8 air naval gun which had been -brought to Lihuju with great difficulty fell into the enemy’s hands, -as well as a number of good machine guns. In reality the position -of Grawert’s force does not appear to have been so desperate as he -supposed; at any rate, a strong patrol under Sergeant-Major Winzer, who -refused to surrender, made its way south without being molested by the -enemy, and, a few days later, found abundant supplies at small cost in -the districts west of Tunduru. The conduct of this patrol gave further -proof that there is almost always a way out, even of an apparently -hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind to face the risks. - -Meanwhile General Wahle’s supply difficulties were increasing. Whether -they could have been modified by ruthlessly reducing the number of -non-combatants, as had been done on the Rufiji, or whether the material -welfare of the western command could have been substantially improved -by greater care in procuring and rationing the available resources, -could not be decided from my position on Lake Utungi. The temporary -telegraph to Mahenge was very inefficient and often interrupted, and -it took several days to get a despatch through from General Wahle in -Mahenge to the troops. This made it difficult for me to get a view of -the situation from the incomplete information at hand. Suffice it to -say that the difficulties of supply in Mahenge were regarded as so -acute that it was not considered possible to keep such strong forces -concentrated there, and part of them would have to be withdrawn. - -Kraut’s and Wintgens’ forces were marched west to Gumbiro, whence -they were to press on across the Ssongea-Wiedhafen road. It was -thought that they would find adequate supplies in the mountains south -of Ssongea. The report of this move reached me too late for me to -interfere. From Gumbiro Captain Wintgens turned north and, near Lake -Rukwa, successfully engaged an enemy column which had been following -him; on nearing Tabora he got typhus and was taken prisoner. Captain -Naumann led the force on until finally he surrendered to the pursuing -enemy column near Kilima-Njaro towards the end of 1917. It is to be -regretted that this operation, carried out with so much initiative and -determination, became separated so far from the main theatre of war as -to be of little use. - -Major Kraut had separated from Captain Wintgens in Gumbiro, and, -carrying out General Wahle’s orders, had marched south. There was no -difficulty about crossing the line of communication Ssongea-Wiedhafen, -but as the enemy had strongly entrenched and secured his supply -dumps, no booty was captured. In the open little was to be found in -March, 1917, the poorest season of the year, a few months before the -new harvest. After some rearguard actions against English troops a -success was scored in a surprise attack on the small Portuguese camp at -Mitomoul, on the Rovuma. Major Kraut then followed the river downstream -to Tunduru and himself came to Headquarters to report. Two of his -companies remained at Tunduru to guard the fertile district. The other -three marched further east and were temporarily taken over by Captain -Loof at Lindi. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -LINDI AND KILWA - - -THE operations of the last few months had narrowed the area from which -supplies for the troops could be obtained. The productive areas of -Lupembe, Iringa, Kissaki and the lower Rufiji had been lost, and the -newly-occupied districts included wide stretches of barren land. The -productivity of the more fertile areas was for the most part unknown; -for instance, it was not known until during the subsequent operations -what yield could be expected south-west of Kilwa and south-west of -Livale, for example. At that time I only had a general idea that the -eastern part of the Lindi area was very fertile and known as the -granary of the colony. But this fertile region, owing to its nearness -to the coast, was in a very precarious position, and it was already -necessary to consider what should be done if it were lost. - -Our eyes naturally turned to the Portuguese territory across the -Rovuma, but we had even less information about this than about parts -of the German colony. Fortunately, however, a number of Portuguese -chiefs had immigrated into German territory out of hatred for their -oppressors, and, apart from this, we Germans enjoyed a very good -reputation among the intelligent natives of Portuguese East Africa, -many of whom worked on German plantations. Thus we were able to get -at least an approximate picture of the district east of Lake Nyassa, -and to take it as probable that south of the steppe-like zone of the -Rovuma, in the neighbourhood of Mwembe, several days’ march, broad and -thinly populated, lay a fertile region. An expeditionary force of a few -hundred rifles under Major von Stuemer, crossed the Rovuma south of -Tundura, and quickly took possession of Mwembe from where our patrols -explored the banks of Lake Nyassa as far as the neighbourhood of Fort -Jackson, and east half-way to Port Amelia. - -[Illustration: Fig. xvi. March of Main Force during operations on -interior lines west of Lindi, June to November, 1917.] - -[Illustration: Fig. xvii. Battle of Mahiwa.] - -In view of the difficulty of communication—messengers from the -telegraph station at Livale took about three days to get to Tunduru -and five from there to Mwembe—it was difficult to get a clear idea -of the situation at Mwembe. We had no definite news until Lieutenant -Brucher personally reported at Headquarters in January, 1917. The -European potatoes he brought with him gave us good hopes that supplies -could be expected there. He reported that the country was fertile, as -was also the region round Tunduru, where the war had so far hardly been -felt. There were still large numbers of eggs and fowls in the richly -cultivated district. When Brucher slept on the ground in Tunduru, this -was regarded as a piece of bravado by the inhabitants, so little did -they know about war. In view of the difficulties of transport and the -constant movement of the troops, it became increasingly necessary to -make the force less and less dependent on their inadequate line of -communication. With this object the forces of Captains Goering and -von Lieberman were also moved to the region south of Kilwa, where, -according to the stories of some Europeans in the Kiturika mountains, -there was plenty of food. In order to relieve the transport of supplies -from the rear the troops were marched off to Kilwa without waiting for -further investigation, and it was fortunate that the reports as to the -fertility of this district were realized. In order to take the enemy, -who had already moved some small forces half-way to Livale, as far as -possible from south of his point of debarkation, and at the same time -to secure the fertile districts south of Kilwa to Mbemkuru, Goering’s -and von Lieberman’s divisions made a détour from Mpotora southwards and -pressed forward, Goering’s force following the coast straight to Kilwa, -and von Lieberman keeping further west and making for the Kilwa-Livale -road. A weaker force followed this road to Kilwa and served as a -reserve for the patrols, which several times surprised the enemy in -his camps and threw him back. Our patrols were soon swarming in the -neighbourhood of Kilwa. Several enemy dumps were surprised and part of -the garrisons killed. On one of these occasions brave Sergeant-Major -Struwe, who was afterwards killed, skilfully forced his way, with a -large part of the 3rd Field Company, inside a dump, and, taking cover -behind the sacks of flour, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, who -appeared from outside in great force. It was difficult to get much away -from the dump, so the patrol had to content itself with destroying the -greater part of the stores. One patrol took a field gun with it—a -strange weapon for a patrol. After careful reconnaissance this reached -the coast at Kilwa—Kissiwami, and bombarded some of the transports -lying there. - -[Illustration: Native Types (1). - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: Native Types (2). - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -In May, 1917, Captain von Lieberman, who, with the 11th and 17th -Companies, was occupying an entrenched position at Ngaula, a day’s -march south of Kilwa on the Kilwa-Livale road, was attacked by eight -companies with two guns. Lieutenant Buechsel, with his 17th Company, -made such a heavy flank attack that he completely routed, one after -the other, several of the enemy’s Askari companies, who took to -their heels, followed by the 40th Indian Pathan Regiment. The enemy -left about seventy dead on the field, and, as the English related -afterwards, it was only by chance that we did not find his guns, which -had stuck fast in a river. - -On the whole it seemed to us that the enemy’s forces were once -more getting exhausted. Unless he brought over very considerable -reinforcements it was obvious that the forces available would before -long be worn out and his operations end in failure. It was already -apparent that they were involving a great strain. It had been -ascertained that a battery from the Indian interior had been brought to -Kilwa and that a large number of new Askari companies were being raised. - -More dangerous than the enemy seemed to me the material position of -our men. The cargo of wheat from the relief ship was coming to an end, -and I thought it questionable whether bread could be baked from Mtama -flour alone, without the addition of wheat flour. At that time I still -regarded bread as an indispensable necessity for the nourishment of -Europeans, and therefore I made experiments personally in baking bread -without wheat flour. Unfortunately the results were unsatisfactory. -Afterwards, under the stress of necessity, we all produced excellent -bread without wheat. The methods differed widely. Later we made bread -not only with mtama, but also with muhogo, sweet potatoes, maize, in -short, with nearly every kind of meal, and with mixtures of all sorts -of combinations, and later still improved the quality by the addition -of boiled rice. - -The necessary kit also required attention. A shortage of boots was in -sight. My experiments showed me that a European can go barefoot where -there are tolerable paths, but never through the bush. Sandals, which -anyone can make, given an odd bit of leather, proved helpful, but did -not take the place of boots. To be ready for any emergency, I had some -lessons in boot-making, and succeeded, with supervision, in producing -an object that at a push could be taken for a left boot, though it was -intended to be a right. It is very convenient for a European who knows -the simplest rudiments of this craft to be able to kill an antelope and -make a boot, or at any rate repair one, from his skin a few days later, -without the help of any of the tools of civilization. A nail must -serve as an awl, a tent-pole as a last, and the thread he can cut from -the tough leather of a small antelope. As a matter of fact, however, -we were never driven to these extremities, as we were always able to -obtain the necessary kit and equipment from captured stores, and many -captured saddles were cut up to make soles and heels for boots. - -Every European was becoming more and more like a South-African -“Trekker” and was his own workman. Naturally, not always in person, but -within the small independent household, consisting of his black cook -and his black servant, which followed him about. Many had even provided -themselves with a few hens which they took about with them, and the -noise of these betrayed the position of German camps even as far as the -native settlements. An order issued in one force that the crowing of -cocks before 9 a.m. was forbidden brought no relief. - -The important question of salt was very simply solved by the troops -at Kilwa, by the evaporation of sea-water. In order to secure the -supply, which was beginning to run short, against the loss of the -coast, salt-yielding plants were collected and the salt obtained from -their ashes by lixiviation. We got this idea from the natives of the -district, who supplied themselves with salt in this way. The salt thus -obtained was not bad, but was never required to any extent, as we were -always able to meet our requirements from the captured stores. The -large numbers of elephants in this district furnished us with fat; -sugar was replaced by the excellent wild honey which was found in large -quantities. The troops had made an important step forward as regards -supplies of grain. They found out how to ripen it artificially, and in -this way provided against want. - -It should be noted here particularly that the Medical Corps, in spite -of the difficult and constantly changing circumstances of life in the -field, had succeeded in satisfactorily solving the important questions -of quinine and material for bandages. It has already been mentioned -that in the north quinine tablets of better quality than the English -had been added to the stock of Peruvian bark. After the evacuation of -the northern area a large consignment of Peruvian bark had been sent -to Kilossa. Through the efforts of the Deputy Staff Medical Officer, -Staff-Surgeon Teute, a part of this was transported further south. It -was of course impossible without the necessary apparatus to manufacture -tablets, but liquid quinine was produced by boiling Peruvian bark. This -had an infernal taste and was drunk unwillingly but with beneficial -results by the patients, among whom it was known as “Lettow-Schnaps.” - -The other difficulty was the supply of bandages. To supplement the -stock of linen, which was beginning to give out, not only was clothing -of all kinds disinfected and used for this purpose, and then after -being boiled used again, but quite a good bandage-material was made -from bark. This idea, too, we got from the methods of the natives, -who for a long time had made clothing and sacks from Myombo bark. -The medical service had done everything humanly possible to keep the -troops alive and well. The great resource of this service and the -necessary husbanding of the primitive material available deserve -special recognition, as this service had always been accustomed under -the special conditions of a tropical climate, and rightly so, to be -very free with their stocks. The Staff Medical Officer, Staff-Surgeon -Stolowsky, and later his successor, Staff-Surgeon Teute, showed -exemplary devotion, energy and foresight. - -The surgery was on an equally high level. The hospitals which, during -the early part of the campaign, had been accommodated for the most -part in solid buildings, and had worked the whole year round without -moving their quarters, had now to turn themselves into movable columns, -which might at any moment be called upon to pack up, with patients -and baggage, and keep up with the march in various directions of the -troops. All not absolutely indispensable material had to be eliminated, -so that the preparations for a surgical operation had always to be more -or less improvised. The operating-theatre was as a rule a newly-erected -grass hut. In spite of all this, Staff-Surgeon Müller, Dr. Thierfelder, -of the Imperial Medical Service, and others successfully performed even -serious operations, including several for appendicitis. - -As has already been mentioned, the confidence even of the enemy in the -German medical service was fully justified. The successful and devoted -activity of these men went far to strengthen the mutual confidence -between white and black. In such ways as this the strong bond was -formed which united the different elements of our force. - -At Lindi the enemy had strengthened himself more and more, and it was -reported that detachments were being transported by sea to Lindi, -which hitherto had been posted west of Kilwa. General O’Grady, who had -commanded a brigade at Kibata, also appeared at Lindi. The obvious idea -that the enemy would advance from Lindi against our weak forces and our -main supply area, as had been his intention earlier at Kilwa, appeared -to be materializing. Several attacks had been beaten off by Captain -Looff’s force west of Lindi. At the request of the Governor three of -the companies which had arrived under Major Kraut were not, as had -been the original intention, used to subjugate quickly and thoroughly -the rebellious inhabitants of Makonde, in the south-east corner of our -Protectorate, but were put under the command of Captain Looff. Two of -them took part in an attack on Sudi, south of Lindi, where the enemy -was strongly entrenched. The attack on the fortified position was -bravely launched, but suffered heavy losses, and could not be brought -to a successful conclusion. - -Later, Captain Rothe was ordered to Lindi with reinforcements -consisting of three companies from Mpotora. But the rains spoiled our -plans. The crossing of the Matendu had already become difficult. All -the rain that had fallen in Donde district collected ultimately in -the valley of the Matendu, which in the dry season is simply a series -of pools. It had become a strong, rushing torrent, like the Fulda in -spate at Cassel, and tore up great trees in its course. By making use -of some islands, tree-trunks were got into position under the direction -of skilled engineers and a bridge to take transport was built; but -a sudden rise in the stream repeatedly swept it away, several men -being drowned. A footbridge further downstream met with the same -fate; a narrow suspension-bridge of ropes made from twisted bark was -only of slight service and was somewhat uncertain as, in view of the -alternation of strong sunlight and wet, there was always a danger of -the ropes rotting and giving way. - -At Nahungu, on the Mbemkuru, similar conditions hindered Captain -Rothe’s march. The stream was so strong that the first attempt to -cross by the few ferry-boats available failed. Driven out of Nahungu -by scarcity of supplies, Captain Rothe marched into the fertile region -to the north-east, in this way seriously compromising the plans of -Headquarters. It was necessary that this fertile country north-east of -Nahungu should be spared to serve as a reserve for the forces south of -Kilwa and to provide for a strong reinforcement of these troops should -tactical reasons make this necessary. The time that was lost before a -message could be got through to Captain Rothe was very vexatious, but -finally his division was diverted towards Lindi again in time to take -part in some of the fighting. - -In view of the need for reinforcement of our troops at Lindi owing -to increased tension of the military situation and the projected -transference of fresh troops to that area, General Wahle had been -withdrawn from Mahenge and had taken over the command of the Lindi -front; Captain Tafel succeeded him at Mahenge. In the middle of June, -1917, General Wahle had, after several engagements which had brought -to light a considerable increase in the enemy’s strength, retired so -far up the Lukuledi river that the enemy seemed to be incautiously -exposing his north flank. - -I decided to make use of this advantage without, indeed, knowing -exactly how it was to be done. So much was clear: that only a surprise -attack promised success. I therefore advanced, with four companies and -the mountain-battery consisting of two guns, through Nahungu, along -the main road leading via Lutende to Lindi. At Lutende were encamped -Captain von Chappuis’ company and Lieutenant Wunder’s company, and -the rest were further back. I went on ahead to reconnoitre, with my -able companion Nieuwenhuizen, who had played the chief part in the -horse-drive on Erok mountain. From the height on which Chappuis’ -company lay, there was an extensive view: one could see the different -farmhouses round Lindi and the Lukuledi river with the steamer -_President_, which had taken refuge there and been rendered useless. It -was, perhaps, fortunate that no wild pigs or bush deer had come within -range of our guns in this otherwise gameless district, for not far from -Chappuis’ camp we crossed the trail of a strong enemy patrol which must -only just have passed. The talk of the natives, too, led us to suppose -that they had recently seen something interesting. When we questioned -them they would tell us nothing. Making a wide détour, we arrived in -the evening, after dark, at the camp of Wunder’s company. We reported -our observations to the company commander and the capable guide -Inkermann, who died a hero’s death a few days later, warning them to -keep a sharp look-out. Orders were also given that this camp, situated -as it was in an open plain and exposed to fire from the surrounding -bush, should be moved. After a cup of tea we returned to our main force -about a quarter of an hour’s march to the rear. - -On the morning of 30th June we heard increasing rifle-fire from the -direction of Wunder’s company. Assuming that the enemy had taken -advantage of the lie of the ground and was firing on the camp from -the surrounding bush, I immediately advanced with the three companies -to the right through the bush, so as to strike the road further south -and so take the enemy in the rear. Soon, however, we met some Askari, -who told us that a strong force of the enemy had forced its way into -the camp, taking the company by surprise and driving it out. A young -Askari complained to an old “Betschausch” (sergeant) of the third -company that the enemy had taken everything from them. “Niemaza we, -tutawafukuza” (shut your mouth, we’ll soon have ’em out), was the -defiant answer which at once shamed the excited youth into silence. The -sergeant’s answer indeed hit off the position. The enemy, consisting -of the 5th Indian Regiment and a few natives, had thought to find only -a weak German outpost. He had rashly penetrated into our badly-placed -entrenchments and was now in his turn exposed on all sides to a -concentrated fire from the bush. - -The position was so clear that it called for the quickest possible -independent action by the subordinate leaders, and Captain von Chappuis -also attacked at once. Staff-Surgeon Mohn (afterwards killed), who had -remained in Wunder’s camp and had temporarily fallen into the enemy’s -hands, described the very harassing effect of our concentrated fire -at short range and the panic it caused among the enemy. Nevertheless, -the cover afforded by a few ravines and the undergrowth enabled some -of the enemy to get away. These fled wildly. A number so entirely lost -themselves that they were picked up in the bush days afterwards by our -patrols in a half-starved condition. We inflicted about 120 casualties. -In addition to recovering our own ammunition, which had fallen -temporarily into the enemy’s hands, we captured the enemy’s ammunition -which he had just brought into the camp, about a hundred rifles and -some machine guns. Among the severely wounded whom we took to the -English camp at Naitiwi, and there handed over, was the commanding -officer of the English regiment. He afterwards died of his wound. - -We stayed a few weeks longer in the fertile district of Lutende and -tried with our patrols to inflict losses on the enemy, whose fortified -camps at, and south of, Naitiwi offered no prospect of successful -attack. Far to the south we often heard the explosion of air-bombs -and of the heavy guns which were bombarding Wahle’s division. Von -Chappuis’ company was marched to reinforce Wahle’s force. Apart from -some skirmishing our success at Lindi was followed by a lull in the -operations. - -That this was only the prelude to new efforts on the enemy’s part was -borne out not only by the reports of the transport of strong forces to -Kilwa, and also by the fact that at the end of May General Hoskins, -who had taken over command from General Smuts, had been relieved by -General van Deventer. Once more a Boer was in command, and the rumours -that fresh European troops were being brought from South Africa seemed -to be confirmed. South of Kilwa the enemy attacked our nine companies -with three brigades, but Captain von Lieberman, who had taken over -from Captain Goering, the latter being seriously ill, succeeded with -extraordinary skill in beating off the superior forces of the enemy. On -July 6th, at least a brigade made a frontal attack on Captain Lieberman -at Unindi and was repulsed with heavy losses. The bold charge of our -companies cost us heavily too; among the casualties was Lieutenant -Bleeck, who received a mortal wound in the stomach while leading his -company. This brave and upright personality had done excellent service -both as a fearless patrol-leader and on the Headquarters Staff, and I -knew him intimately. Von Lieberman’s right flank was covered against -another enemy brigade by Captain Spangenberg with two of the nine -companies. He carried out his task and attacked the enemy brigade so -energetically with his two companies that, as we heard later, the -English reports spoke of an attack by very strong enemy forces. - -In spite of this success at Unindi, the great superiority of the enemy -and the danger from enveloping movements to our supplies in the rear, -induced Captain von Lieberman to withdraw gradually south, fighting all -the time. I thought the moment had come to make a rapid counter-march -with the available companies at Lutende, and the mountain-battery come -unexpectedly to the aid of Captain von Lieberman and perhaps seize a -favourable opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat upon the enemy. -We moved due north from Lutende by forced marches and crossed the -Mbemkuru, now once more an insignificant stream, without difficulty, -two days’ march below Nahungu. The only opposition we encountered was -from swarms of wild bees which forced us to make a slight détour. North -of Mbemkuru we continued our march north into the Ruawa hills. - -I made use of the two days required to muster the force again to -reconnoitre thoroughly the surrounding country, and on the 28th July, -to my astonishment, I learned accidentally from some natives that a -road through the mountains led almost in a straight line from our camp -to Captain Lieberman’s camp at the Narungomba water-hole, about six -hours’ march. A patrol of Europeans was sent at once to reconnoitre -this road. In the morning of the 29th July I heard from my camp at -Ruawa some explosions from the direction of Lieberman’s force. I did -not think this could denote serious fighting, as the sounds ceased and, -further, the patrol which I had sent to Lieberman’s force, and which -had returned that morning, reported that everything was quiet there. I -had, however, to change my mind when at noon van Rooyen, who was very -reliable, returned from a hunting expedition and reported that he had -certainly heard continuous machine-gun fire. The reader will, perhaps, -wonder that I had not already begun the march to Lieberman’s camp, -but it must be remembered that there was no water on the way, and my -men were very exhausted, while some had only just reached Ruawa. By -nightfall I was just three hours’ march nearer the scene of action, but -it was not until the night was well advanced that my companies had all -come up. A continuance of the march through the bush in pitch darkness -was hopeless; it was bound to lead to a good deal of misunderstanding -and would have meant a useless waste of the men’s strength, which had -already been severely tried. - -At 3 a.m. the march was continued and soon after a report came from -the advance officer patrol that Captain von Lieberman had certainly -defeated the enemy, but, owing to shortage of ammunition, had marched -to Mihambia during the night. The rearguard had evacuated the springs -and at the time of the report was following the rest. My order to -hold the springs at all costs until my arrival at 6 a.m. to join in -the battle had, therefore, been disregarded owing to pressure of -circumstances. I now thought that the enemy, who was stronger than we, -would have strongly entrenched the springs position, as was his habit, -and that I should have to carry out any attack with thirsty troops. -That seemed to offer little prospect of success. Later, when I learned -the enemy’s real position, I inclined to the opposite view. In spite -of his superiority the enemy had suffered a severe defeat. His 7th -South African and 8th European regiments were almost broken up. Again -and again his infantry had hurled themselves in deep waves against the -front of our Askari regiments, and each time they had been driven back -by counter-attacks. A forest fire had broken out and spread among his -ranks. Finally the main body of his troops had broken away and fled -in wild disorder through the bush. Machine guns, masses of rifles and -hundreds of cases of ammunition had been left on the field. In this -condition, my attack, even after the withdrawal of Lieberman’s force, -would perhaps have sealed the doom of the enemy’s main body. It is -much to be regretted that at that time large numbers of the troops did -not show sufficient initiative to make good the shortage of German -ammunition during the battle itself, by using the enemy rifles and -cartridges which were lying about in quantities. We had been within -reach of a most important success which was snatched from our grasp by -accident. We must, however, be grateful for the feat of arms which the -7th Askari Company performed under the doubtless brilliant leadership -of Captain von Lieberman, against overwhelming odds. - -I did not get a clear report of this action, however, until later. For -the moment I thought it right to march to Mihambia in order, by joining -with Lieberman’s detachment, to secure unity of command, to supply it -with sufficient ammunition to carry on and, if necessary, to raise -its _moral_ after the severe battle by a visible reinforcement. This -last turned out to be unnecessary; when I arrived I found Lieberman’s -detachment in excellent spirits, all the companies being proud to have -dealt such a heavy blow to the superior enemy. For me the operation -at Narungombe was a further proof how difficult it is in the unknown -African bush and in face of the uncertainty of communication, even -if other circumstances are favourable, to carry through an operation -in which several columns are taking part, so as to secure the -necessary unity of action on the battlefield. At Narungombe, where -all the conditions were as favourable as could have been hoped, the -decision was finally thwarted by slight mischances, and my belief was -strengthened that if I wanted to use different bodies of troops in one -operation it was necessary to secure the closest connection first. - -The engagement at Narungombe brought the enemy at Kilwa to a standstill -for a considerable time, and the fighting was confined to patrols, who -inflicted losses on the enemy’s lines of communication, firing out -of the bush on his detachments and motor transport and attacked at -close quarters when a favourable opportunity offered. In order, for -one thing, to put this patrol work on a broader basis, but also to -counter the moving of enemy troops westward, and finally for reasons -of supply, I deployed the force laterally on the line Mihambia-Ndessa. -A large number of aircraft appeared over the fertile Ndessa district -against whose bombs we were defenceless, and some severe wounds -resulted; from this air-reconnaissance we could infer the enemy’s keen -interest in the district and soon it was reported that he was moving -still further west. Our patrols did such good work that from time -to time whole companies of the enemy were put to flight with heavy -losses. But the enemy continued his efforts to obtain information. He -hardly took the trouble to hide his intention when sending flags of -truce. I remember one occasion when the party bearing the white flag -arrived at our camp out of the bush; they had, therefore, not only -avoided the roads leading to it but had deliberately crossed them. The -closer proximity of the enemy made it more difficult for us to get up -our supplies, which were gradually running out. It was unavoidable -that the position of our requisitioning and hunting-parties should -become known to the enemy and that they should be surprised. The -influence of the enemy on the natives was shown by the fact that south -of Mihambia several villages had been suddenly deserted. I had long -regarded this phenomenon as a sign of the enemy’s intention to advance -in that direction. The state of our supplies made it impossible for -us to maintain so strong a force in the Mihambia-Ndessa area. As in -any case the evacuation of this area could not long be delayed, and -as the enemy west of Lindi was at the same time developing increased -activity in strong force on General Wahle’s front, I decided to join -General Wahle with some of the companies from Ndessa and perhaps bring -off the operation that had failed at Narungombe; a decisive success -by an unexpected reinforcement. On the 3rd August General O’Grady’s -forces had certainly suffered a serious defeat. An Indian regiment, -which had advanced through the gap between two strongly fortified -German outposts, was attacked by our reserves, held ready for such -a contingency, and almost annihilated. In the pursuit much valuable -material fell into our hands. The enemy, however, had renewed the -attack a few days later, and in face of the enveloping movement of his -strong detachments, General Wahle had fallen back on Narunyu and a -mountain of equal height south of the Lukuledi river. - -Captain Koehl, with six companies and a battery, remained behind at -Ndessa; I crossed the river Mbemkuru below Nahungu with four companies -and two mountain-guns, and then marched diagonally across the Muera -plateau to the mission-station at Namupa. The prefect in charge -entertained us, among other things, with muhogo (a species of corn -with edible roots), prepared like fried potatoes, and supplemented the -scanty provisions of our Europeans with bananas and other fruit out of -his extensive gardens. - -In the camp at Njangao the receipt of part of a German wireless message -directed to me, expressing his Majesty’s acknowledgments on the -occasion of the third anniversary of the outbreak of war, delighted us -all. - -We pitched our camp with the first company at Njengedi, on the main -road between Njangao and Lindi, in the rear of Wahle’s division, in -unpleasant, rainy weather. I immediately set out for Narunyu to inform -General Wahle of our arrival. Here, in an almost impenetrable country -broken by numerous ravines, at the bottom of which lay deep swamps, -friend and foe faced one another in close proximity. Our men were -working at dug-outs covered by branches cut from the trees. Only five -of General Wahle’s seven companies were at Narunyu, the two others -being on Ruho Mountain on the south bank of the Lukuledi river. In -view of the danger of a surprise attack on our weak forces at Narunyu -I ordered them to be reinforced by the companies on Ruho Mountain and -marched two of those that had come with me to take their place. The -enemy attack on Narunyu occurred the following day. Captain Lieberman’s -Company from Ruho Mountain and the two companies I had brought with -me all took part in the engagement. The third company had literally -started their forced march to Karungu immediately after their arrival -at Njengedi. I can still see the Askari coming up just before dawn and -hear their shouts of delight at the thought of once more routing the -enemy. - -Our attempt to envelop the enemy’s right wing, however, only served to -press it back; the bush was too thick for an offensive movement which -had to be developed at short range under a continuous machine-gun -and rifle fire. The darkness made it still more difficult to direct -the operations, and there is no doubt that in the confusion of the -two fronts in this broken country our detachments often fired on one -another: it was almost impossible to recognize friend or foe. For -instance, hearing loud sounds of shouting in front of me, in the -complete darkness of the bush, I thought this came from our enveloping -attack driving back the enemy. It was not discovered till some time -afterwards that this was the enemy and soon we heard him working at his -trenches. The exact location of his trenches gave us the advantage of -being able to get the range for the 10·5 cm. gun of the _Königsberg_, -which was with Wahle’s force. This was done with good results; at any -rate the enemy evacuated his trenches on the following day and retired. - -The complete victory desired had not been attained and, in view of the -difficulties of the ground, could not be expected, as we had discovered -our strength to the enemy in the fighting of the 18th, and lost the -advantage of a surprise. Once more I had to content myself with delay. -In this fertile country there was no difficulty about holding our -ground from the point of view of supplies. The force has rarely been -so well fed as in the Lindi area. Great fields of sweet-potatoes -and muhogo stretched as far as the eye could see, and there was an -abundant supply of sugar-cane. The numerous Arab plantations indicated -the fertility and the ancient civilization of the country. We made -ourselves at home, and though rifle bullets often whistled through our -camp and aircraft dropped bombs on us, not much harm was done. On one -occasion the dentist, who had set up his surgery in a European house -and was giving us the attention we had long needed, was attending to a -patient when a bomb fell into the room. It was discovered later, when -the place was examined, that the planter kept his store of dynamite -in this very room. Fortunately the bomb did not touch this or both -patients and dentist would have been permanently freed from toothache. - -It was no easy matter to decide what to do with the German women and -children, some of whom had fled from Lindi and did not know what to -do. A number of them had taken refuge in the planters’ houses, which -were within range of the enemy’s guns. In view of the restriction of -supplies and the difficulties of transport and accommodation, it was -desirable that these women and children should be sent back to Lindi. -Some were intelligent enough to see this. By means of a parley their -transference behind the British lines was duly arranged, and they were -able to leave for Lindi. For reasons unknown to me the English then -refused to keep to the arrangement, and the women and children, as well -as male non-combatants, gradually collected in the Catholic mission at -Ndanda. A military convalescent home had been quartered there for some -time and had developed into an important hospital. All the people who -were brought here found good food and accommodation in the spacious -buildings of the mission with its extensive gardens. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY - - -WHILE at Narunyu there was a lull in the fighting for several weeks, -the enemy had shown considerable activity in the section of Portuguese -territory occupied by Stuemer’s force. Several English columns from the -south-west and south had concentrated on Mwembe, and Major von Stuemer, -not thinking himself strong enough to resist, had evacuated Mwembe. -The different companies had then gradually retired on the Rovuma. -North of this river Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen, who had been sent -from Headquarters to Tunduru, and under whom the various companies of -Stuemer’s force had re-formed, had taken over the command. Enemy forces -were also advancing on Tunduru from Ssongea. - -It was difficult to obtain detailed information about the enemy. My -impression was that he wanted to bring our main force to a halt, invade -our supply-area in the Tunduru-Massassi-Ruponda district with strong -forces, and carry off our supplies. I did not then think it out of -the question that we might score a success, and I, therefore, marched -on the 10th September, 1917, with five companies, from our camps at -Narunyu towards Massassi. From there Captain Goering immediately -marched with three companies towards Tunduru; Jantzen’s division -stood north-east of this place. I reconnoitred the road to Tunduru on -a bicycle and feared that the difficulties of supply would be very -serious. These fears were unfortunately realized. Supplies from the -land could not be brought up and there was no time for a prolonged -operation that would allow of additional supplies being obtained from -Massassi. - -The small English and Portuguese patrols which attacked our supplies -and transport from across the Rovuma to the south did not cause us to -hurry our movements. But the enemy from Kilwa, whom Captain Koehl’s -heavy attack from Mbeo-Chini and a number of lesser encounters had not -been able to stop, reached the neighbourhood of Nahungu. His flying -columns, for the most part mounted, outflanked Koehl’s force, and -pressed forward up the Mbemkuru river to Nangano. Communication with -Captain Koehl by means of the telephone-line from Nahungu to Nangano -was first interrupted for a few days, and then broken off completely. -The supply dumps fell into the enemy’s hands and were destroyed. To -provide against the interruption of the exposed telephone-line a new -line had been laid from Ruponda, running north-east, but connection by -messenger between this line and Koehl’s division took several days. - -In view of the slow means of communication with Koehl’s detachment, it -was not possible to get an accurate view of the situation in time, and -as the intended success at Tunduru could not in any case be attained, -I marched the five companies from Massassi to Ruponda at the beginning -of October, and then further north-east, joining forces with Koehl’s -force at Likangara. On receiving the report that enemy detachments -were approaching Ruponda, I ordered the removal of the sick and the -stores from Ruponda to Lukuledi and Mnacho. On 9th October, 1917, -an enemy patrol was beaten off with some losses at Ruponda. On 10th -October a considerable force of the enemy—the 25th Indian Cavalry -Regiment was identified—assaulted Ruponda from several sides. The -withdrawal of our companies had, therefore, unfortunately been rather -premature; otherwise the enemy might have encountered some of our -passing companies at Ruponda and perhaps suffered a serious defeat. As -it was, there were no troops in Ruponda except a few of our patrols; -most of the sick fell into the enemy’s hands, and also some 90,000 kg. -of supplies. At Likangara there was no fighting worthy of notice. Some -enemy patrols and weak detachments did appear, but our fighting-force, -which was attacking the enemy’s main line of communication along -the Mbemkuru river, firing on and destroying motor-transport, and -capturing mails and supplies, led me to suppose that the strongest part -of the Kilwa force was recuperating further west in the direction of -Ruponda. - -The increased enemy activity a few days’ march east of Likangara, where -he established requisitioning stations, as well as the stories of the -natives, made it seem probable that considerable enemy forces were -marching from Nahungu towards the south, and therefore against General -Wahle. Captured mails revealed the fact that in spite of his extensive -intelligence and spy systems the enemy was groping in the dark. He did -not know, for instance, where I was, although he seemed to place the -greatest importance upon knowing. The knowledge of my Headquarters -would tell him the probable position of our main force. While one -letter thought that I was in the neighbourhood of Lukuledi, another -professed to know that I was at Tunduru, and according to a third I was -at Mahenge. The talkativeness of these Europeans, who, in spite of all -warnings, cannot refrain from communicating to one another in their -private letters their knowledge and their conjectures about the war -situation, had in this case done good: there was so much gossip, the -rumours were so contradictory, and even the most improbable things were -so indiscriminately believed, that anything at all could be read into -the German correspondence. In spite of this unintentional misleading -of the enemy, it is difficult to understand how intelligent people can -entrust to the post important matters, the knowledge of which must be -kept from the enemy, knowing how unreliable the post is, and that the -letters often fall into the enemy’s hands. - -It was clear to me that the enemy’s obvious uncertainty about the -situation would give me a great opportunity if it could be used quickly -and decisively. I ventured to hope that the intended decisive blow -might now be struck for which I had tried twice near Lindi and once at -Tunduru, and the success of which at Narungombe had hung on a hair. The -development of the situation on Wahle’s front seemed favourable for -this attempt. His forces had gradually withdrawn from the Mtua district -to Mahiwa. The enemy’s whole handling of the campaign suggested that -his various columns would press forward with all their weight and -try to crush us by a concentration from all sides. The enemy’s Lindi -Division was advancing energetically with the rest. General Wahle’s -nine companies, fighting stubbornly, had retired before them to Mahiwa. -I had a fair personal knowledge of the country at Mahiwa. It was very -probable that my march in that direction would not be observed by the -enemy in time. - -On the 10th October, 1917, trusting in the fortune of war, I crossed -the Linkangara mountains to Mnacho with five companies and two mountain -guns. I arrived there at dark and left again at daybreak on the 15th. -On the narrow mountain paths the force got very scattered. The guns -were left far behind, and the pack-animals gave trouble. Askari and -bearers came to the rescue, and again and again Sergeant-Major Sabath -rose superior to the difficulties and brought his guns forward. It -surprised me that we were unable to get any information from Mahiwa, -but the rifle and machine-gun fire indicated that fighting was in -progress. Before dark I reached Lieutenant Methner’s company, which was -in reserve behind Wahle’s left wing. The enemy seemed to be attacking -this company with a view to enveloping it. His fire had the unfortunate -effect of causing the disappearance of my bearer, with my dispatch-box, -containing most important dispatches and maps: he did not return for -two days. The first two companies to come up were immediately thrown -against the enemy’s enveloping movement, and the enemy was thrown back. -The companies then dug themselves in. On the morning of the 16th I went -to reconnoitre, and found that the enemy had also entrenched himself -immediately in front, at a distance of sixty to a hundred metres. When -Lieutenant von Ruckteschell offered me a cup of coffee, care had to -be taken, as the enemy was keeping a fairly sharp look-out, and shot -with tolerable accuracy. I thought the opportunity favourable for a -determined surprise attack. It was decided to launch the attack at -noon, on the left (north) wing, and try to turn the enemy’s flank. -Goering’s detachment was to lead the attack. - -After we had eaten our midday meal undisturbed, I went at once to -the left wing, where Captain Goering had just begun his advance with -his two companies. When he had crossed a wide depression in the -ground, to my surprise he changed direction still further to the -left. The companies were soon in action. Only gradually I realized -the significance of this surprising move. Captain Goering had come -unexpectedly upon a new enemy who had come from Nahungu and was now -attacking from the north. The force consisted of several battalions -and two guns of the Nigerian Brigade who knew nothing of our arrival -at Mahiwa and were expecting to smash General Wahle’s force by an -attack on his left flank and rear, while his front, facing east, was -vigorously attacked by a division. The Nigerian Brigade was as much -taken by surprise as Captain Goering and was not so quick to adapt -itself to the new situation. Captain Goering, closely supported by -the reserves, threw himself so vigorously against the enemy in the -bush that he ran through some of his detachments, threw them into -confusion, and finally put them to flight. An enemy officer in command -of an ammunition column took our men for his own, with the result that -we captured about 150,000 rounds of ammunition. A gun with ammunition -was taken by assault, and the killed did not consist wholly of -Nigerian Askari. On Captain Goering’s right, where two companies under -Lieutenant von Ruckteschell and Lieutenant Brucker, wounded in this -action, were fighting, the enemy was also thrown back some way into the -bush. - -While this fighting was going on on the flank, and on the following -day also, the enemy attacked Wahle’s force with all his strength. -Here the enemy was in great superiority; wave after wave of fresh -troops were thrown against our front. There was a danger that General -Wahle’s front would give way, and the fighting was very severe. There -was also serious danger that our enveloping movement, in the very -difficult swampy ground of the bush, would be held up so long by weak -enemy forces that a defeat would be inflicted upon our front before it -could make itself felt. In that case the battle was lost. I thought it -expedient to increase the disadvantages that the enemy was bringing -upon himself by his costly frontal attack and used all my available -strength in such a way that the enemy by the increasing fierceness of -his frontal attack was bleeding himself to death. - -The original intention of enveloping the enemy’s left wing was not -developed further on the following days, but, on the contrary, every -available company was withdrawn from the left wing to stiffen General -Wahle’s front. In this way we not only succeeded in holding our -ground, but, by immediately taking advantage of the enemy’s moments -of weakness to make heavy counter-attacks with our reserves, we were -able to inflict a real defeat. My, perhaps surprising, tactics were -prompted by the personality of the enemy commander. I had learned in -the engagement at Reata (11th March, 1916) that General Beves threw his -men into action regardless of loss of life and did not hesitate to try -for a success, not by skilful handling and small losses, but rather by -repeated frontal attacks which, if the defence held its ground and had -anything like adequate forces, led to severe losses for the attack. I -guessed that here at Mahiwa he was carrying out the same tactics. I -think it was by taking advantage of the enemy leader’s mistaken tactics -in this way that we were able to win this splendid victory. Until the -18th October, for four days therefore, wave after wave of the attack -broke on our front, but my own observation told me that the weight of -the attack here on the right wing was diminishing and that the enemy’s -defeat was absolute. - -On the evening of the 18th October we had, with some 1,500 men, -completely defeated a whole enemy detachment at least 4,000, and -probably not less than 6,000, strong. With the exception of Tanga, it -was the most serious defeat he had suffered. - -According to a high English officer the enemy lost 1,500 men; but -I have reason to believe that this estimate is much too low. Our -casualties were: 14 Europeans and 81 Askari killed, 55 Europeans and -367 Askari wounded, 1 European and 1 Askari missing. Considering the -smallness of our forces these losses were for us very considerable, and -were felt all the more seriously because they could not be replaced. -We captured a gun, six heavy and three light machine guns, and 200,000 -rounds of ammunition. - -The situation, unfortunately, did not allow us to take full advantage -of our victory; in our rear was the enemy who had occupied Ruponda -on the 10th October, advanced in strong force further south and on -18th October attacked Major Kraut at Lukuledi. It must be remarked in -passing that our troops which had fought under Lieutenant-Commander -Jantzen near Tunduru had gradually retired north-east to the upper -Mbenkuru and had reached Headquarters above Ruponda before the -occupation of that place by the enemy on the 10th October. Two of these -companies had reinforced the company which was guarding our supplies -near Lukuledi, and it was these three companies, under the command of -Major Kraut, which were attacked by a superior enemy from the north on -the 18th October. - -The enemy, believed to be six companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, was -driven off, but in order to protect our supplies and material lying at -Chigugu and Chiwata, Major Kraut retired to the first of these places. -As well as Chigugu and Chiwata, Ndanda, where we had large stores of -war material, was also threatened by the enemy, who had doubtless, in -my opinion, been reinforced at Lukuledi. The enemy from Lukuledi might -at any moment attack our lines of communication, capture our stores and -supplies, and so put us out of action. We had no means of protecting -our lines of communication locally, for the few thousand men we had -were required for fighting. As, however, the force had to be kept -alive, the danger had to be overcome in some other way. - -There was only one way: to beat the enemy decisively at Lukuledi. It -was necessary therefore to lose no time at Mahiwa, and, hard though -it was, I had to abandon the idea of an annihilating pursuit. When, -early on the 19th October, a few scattered detachments of the enemy -were seen and fired on, I had already begun my march with six companies -and two guns. On the next day at two o’clock we entered Lukuledi from -the east, and on 21st of October at dawn we attacked the enemy, who -was apparently taken completely by surprise. North of Lukuledi, on -the Ruponda road, Major Kraut’s column surprised the camp of the 25th -Indian Cavalry Regiment, which, with transport harnessed, stood ready -for the march on Massassi; the camp was taken by storm and the regiment -lost almost the whole of its transport horses, altogether 350. Whilst I -was engaged with the detachments of Koehl and Ruckteschell in a fairly -serious action against the enemy entrenched at Lukuledi, I waited in -vain for the intervention of Kraut’s force. An attack on the camp -without the advantage of surprise had little hope of success. When the -force began to come under the fire of the enemy’s mine-throwers on -the flank, I withdrew the greater part from the zone of the effective -cross-fire, after beating off a strong enemy attack, in order to avoid -unnecessary losses. A fresh enemy, in the shape of a company of King’s -African Rifles (English East African Askari), who appeared unexpectedly -from the bush, was quickly driven off. In this engagement Lieutenant -Kroeger fell at the head of his company. The action was then broken -off. No news came of Major Kraut until night; thinking he could no -longer attack successfully at Lukuledi, and hearing no sounds of -fighting, he had made a détour and then approached Lukuledi from the -south. - -Owing to unfavourable circumstances we had not succeeded in inflicting -a decisive defeat on the enemy at Lukuledi, and the operation had -only in part gained its objective, but the enemy’s losses must be -regarded as serious. The impression made on him was even greater than -I had supposed. At any rate, it was reported that he had evacuated -Lukuledi and withdrawn to the north. Among our casualties were three -company-commanders killed. I can still see Lieutenant Volkwein, -severely wounded in the leg, limping through the bush at the head of -his company. I had also spoken with Lieutenant Batzner and Lieutenant -Kroeger shortly before they fell. Sergeant-Major Klein also fell, who -had so often led his patrol on the Uganda railway. He was a capable -machine gun leader. But our losses were not in vain. Our patrols -pursued the enemy and fired on his camp near Ruponda and also his lines -of communication. The impossibility of maintaining large bodies of -troops in the neighbourhood of Ruponda—our supplies collected there -had fallen into the enemy’s hands—forced me to give up all idea of -pursuing the enemy. - -At that time I thought it possible that the enemy’s withdrawal from -Lukuledi might have been due to the movements of Captain Tafel’s force, -which was marching from Mahenge to join us. We had lost touch with -him since the beginning of October. He had received orders to retire -gradually before the strong enemy columns which were advancing on -Mahenge from the north (Ifakara), west and south-west (Likuju, Mponda), -and to try to get into touch with the main force under my command. I -thought it quite possible that he had already arrived in the district -of Nangano, or west of that place, and that the enemy had turned about -again out of anxiety for his lines of communication. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE LAST WEEKS IN GERMAN TERRITORY - - -ON 24th October, the Governor of Chiwata, which had become the -centre of the Administration, arrived at my camp east of Lukuledi -for a conference. I firmly stated my opinion that, in spite of all -difficulties of supply which must shortly arise in German East Africa, -the war could and must be carried on. One possibility that offered was -to base the operations on Portuguese territory. This could only be done -by evacuating German East Africa and invading Portuguese East Africa. - -The question of supplies was becoming very serious; we had in our -stores only about 500,000 kg. of supplies. That would last us about -six weeks. But it had been found that these figures were deceptive. -The piled-up sacks had to a great extent lost weight and the grain had -been eaten by insects. The new harvest could not be expected until -March at the earliest. If the operations were to be continued it was -necessary from this point of view alone to move south. I was still -reckoning with the possibility that Captain Tafel’s force might arrive -in the neighbourhood of Massassi and Chiwata, in which case I should -hand over to him the supplies at Chiwata, while I crossed the Makonda -hills in the direction of Lindi with part of the Chiwata force and -attacked the enemy’s main line of communication on the Lukuledi river. -In whichever way the situation might develop, the Chiwata district was, -on account of its fertility, of the greatest importance to us. Chiwata -was, however, not protected and was further threatened by the fact that -enemy operations were taking place in the north against Mnacho, and -enemy mounted forces had been seen on the Lukuledi-Lindi road in the -neighbourhood of Ndanda. Also enemy aircraft were paying our camp at -Chiwata increasing attention. - -These were my reasons for withdrawing from Lukuledi at the end of -October with the main part of my forces. It could not be foreseen -whether another opportunity would offer of making another attack from -Chiwata on one of the enemy columns that would be passing before long. -For the next few weeks the enemy’s pressure was again directed against -Wahle. Quite fresh troops were appearing there, among them the Cape -Corps of South African half-castes. This corps had been stationed along -the Central railway and had been brought up to reinforce General Beves’ -troops, apparently via Dar-es-Salaam and Lindi. Fortunately General -Beves had not waited for this reinforcement before his defeat at Mahiwa. - -General Wahle was retiring step by step up the Lukuledi river. I was, -unfortunately, not able to send him any support, but even had to draw -on his forces to have troops in hand ready for a favourable opportunity -for an attack and to protect the supplies. In the almost daily -bush-fighting of General Wahle’s force heavy losses were apparently -inflicted on the enemy, and he was held severely in check. There was, -however, no defeat and no considerable capture of booty, and meanwhile -our supplies were getting lower and lower. On 6th November, I rode -from Chiwata to Nangoo, near Ndanda, where, close behind Wahle’s -force, I found a suitable point of attack for the Chiwata troops. On -7th November I rode back from Nangoo to Chiwata, making a détour south -across the Makonde hills. On the same day enemy troops were again -reported at Lukuledi, and on 9th November an affair of patrols took -place at Chigugu, just west of Chiwata. - -At this critical time, when the heads of the enemy columns were nearing -Chiwata, it was urgently necessary for us to throw all our strength -against one of these columns as soon as possible before the others -could intervene. The first essential to make this blow effective -was to bring the whole strength of our all too weak forces to bear -simultaneously. This depended chiefly on the supply of ammunition. -Our whole supply had dwindled to about 400,000 rounds, a very scanty -allowance for our 25,000 rifles and 50 machine guns in a serious -engagement, after which it would only be possible to continue the -struggle if ammunition were captured. For this the nature of the ground -was unfavourable. In the thick bush there was a tendency for each -individual to fire many rounds and make few hits, so that the supply of -cartridges was quickly used up without producing the decisive results -we needed. What made a satisfactory solution of the ammunition question -still more impossible was that the cartridges were for the most part -the smoky ’71 type, whereas only about one-third of the troops were -armed with ’71 rifles; the other two-thirds had modern German, English -or Portuguese rifles, and for these the supply of cartridges was very -small. What there were were required for our most important weapon, the -machine gun. It was a difficult position. There was nothing else for it -but to make the attack with only those troops who were armed with the -’71 rifle and to hold in reserve the rest, who had only twenty rounds -of ammunition suitable for their modern rifles, the rest being the -smoky ’71 type. The two forces would then be interchanged so that the -first, armed with the ’71 rifles, could hand them over to the relieving -force, taking the modern weapons in exchange. This meant that at the -best only one-third of the available strength could be in action at -the same time and even then would have to be very sparing with their -ammunition. - -Our artillery ammunition had already been exhausted with the exception -of a few rounds for the two mountain guns and some Portuguese -ammunition. Our last field-howitzer, as well as the English gun -captured at Mahiwa, had burst. The last two 10·5 cm. guns from the -_Königsberg_ had been destroyed a few days before. On the day after a -German mountain gun had been destroyed and sunk at Kitangari. We were -thus left with one German and one Portuguese mountain gun. During the -last few months the lack of artillery ammunition had been so serious -that we had rarely more than three hundred rounds all told. That was -about the allowance per engagement for one of the numerous English guns. - -Under such circumstances an attack could only promise success if the -situation was exceptionally favourable. This was never the case. The -patrols were kept active, and the enemy harassed as much as possible, -but otherwise there was nothing left but for General Wahle’s force and -the 11th Field Company, which had been left at Mnacho to bring away the -supplies, gradually to give way before the pressure of the enemy and -retire to Chiwata. On 10th November the Ndanda mission, immediately in -the rear of General Wahle, who was at Nangoo, was surprised by a strong -enemy force and captured. The field-hospital quartered there, and part -of our stores, fell into the enemy’s hands. Lieberman’s force, south of -Ndanda, ensured the retreat of General Wahle’s force, which ascended to -the Makonda plateau, by the road south-east of Nangoo, the road I had -reconnoitred on 7th November, and, by crossing the plateau diagonally -to Chiwata, escaped from the enemy’s trap. The 11th Company also found -its way to Chiwata from Mnacho, so that, with the exception of Captain -Tafel’s Detachment and some small bodies of troops further south, the -whole force was concentrated at Chiwata. The gradual transport of our -supplies from Chiwata east to Nambindinga had begun, and with that -our march to Kitangari. Meanwhile I kept an anxious look-out for a -vulnerable point in one of the enemy columns. On the 14th November I -thought I had discovered one. - -A strong enemy column, to which belonged the 10th South African -Mounted Infantry, had passed close to our position while marching from -Lukuledi via Massassi, and had attacked Mwiti, two hours’ march south -of Chiwata. In this place, which until then had been only weakly held, -Lieberman’s force (three companies) had arrived the day before. In -spite of the shortage of ammunition there was, I thought, a chance that -by unexpectedly throwing into the fight Koehl’s force from Chiwata, -this enemy might be defeated separately. I was, however, very busy with -the preparations for the withdrawal to Nambindinga and unfortunately -let the opportunity at Mwiti pass without taking advantage of it. - -There was nothing for it, then, but to retire gradually to Nambindinga. - -Through the evacuation of Chiwata the European prisoners, as well as -the Indians, who had been carried to the hospital, and the hospital -itself, full for the most part of seriously wounded, fell into -the enemy’s hands. The march to Nambindinga was carried out under -continuous fighting between the 15th and 17th November. I wanted to -make the enemy complete the concentric march of his columns, advancing -north-west and south, so as to effect a junction; then, when the -enemy’s masses were helplessly crowded on a narrow area, I could march -where I liked. On November 17th I had to take a fateful decision at -Nambindinga. The continual bush-fighting was threatening to consume all -our ammunition. It would have been madness to go on with this fighting, -which could not bring about a favourable decision. We had therefore to -withdraw. - -The supply question pointed the same way. Only by a drastic reduction -of strength could we carry on with the stores in hand. Our supply area -had been narrowed, fresh requisitioning had been interfered with by the -enemy, and the produce of the land exhausted. The supply of quinine -would last the Europeans a month longer. After the consumption of this -the Europeans would certainly fall victims to malaria and its attendant -evils; they would no longer be able to contend with the rigours of -a tropical campaign. Only by reducing the number of Europeans to a -minimum could enough quinine be ensured for each man to enable us to -carry on the operations for months. - -At the same time we had to reduce our total strength. Our large force -with little ammunition was of less value in the field than a smaller -number of picked men with plenty of ammunition. It amounted to the -reduction of our strength to about 2,000 rifles, including not more -than 2,000 Europeans. All above this number had to be left behind. -It could not be helped that among the several hundred Europeans and -600 Askari that we were compelled to leave behind in the hospital at -Nambindinga, there were men who would have liked to go on fighting -and were physically fit to do so. Unfortunately, it must be admitted -that among those who were left behind at Nambindinga, even among the -Europeans, there were many who were not unwilling to lay down their -arms. It is, however, worthy of mention that not only the majority -of the Europeans, but also many Askari, were bitterly disappointed -at having to remain. We had repeatedly to refuse the request of a -brave Askari that he might come and fight for us. But when, two days -later, Lieutenant Grundmann, though severely wounded and scarcely -able to walk, reported himself, saying that he could not, in spite -of orders, bring himself to surrender, I have seldom been so pleased -as at this breach of discipline. It may be mentioned here that in -general the enemy, as far as I am in a position to judge, treated our -prisoners with humanity, but it seems to me that he was anxious to -convict us of cruelty to English prisoners, perhaps in order to justify -reprisals, perhaps for other reasons. Lieutenant Cutsch had been left -sick in Nandanda, and fell into the enemy’s hands. On the totally -unfounded and unproved evidence of a negro that Lieutenant Cutsch had -on one occasion, when commanding a patrol, burned to death a wounded -Englishman, he was put in irons and sent by sea to Dar-es-Salaam, -being imprisoned during the voyage just outside the ship’s roundhouse. -At Dar-es-Salaam he was locked up for several weeks in the prison -without a trial. When at last he was tried, it came out that the -charge of senseless cruelty rested purely on the lying evidence of -the negro. Again, General Deventer informed me that Captain Naumann, -who had surrendered near Kilima Njaro, had been tried for murder. He, -too, as I heard later, was kept imprisoned for a long time without a -hearing, until his innocence was finally established. I find it all the -more difficult to understand this mockery of justice, as the English -prisoners were always humanely treated by us, and were often better -cared for materially than our own people.[5] - -These decisions placed the conduct of the war on an entirely different -basis. Hitherto we had stored the supplies in dumps and for the most -part had been able to satisfy our demands from these; the ammunition -also had been maintained from stores. This system had laid us more -open to attack and offered the enemy points of attack which we could -not protect. But by the methods adopted hitherto it had been possible -to keep the troops in the field at great strength, considering our -position, and to employ a great part of them on a small area for a -considerable period. It had further been possible to give a permanent -character, at any rate to some of our hospitals, where sick and wounded -could recuperate in peace, and in this way we could fill the gaps in -our front with refreshed and experienced men. This system had made -our operations dependent to a great extent on the situation of the -supplies and reinforcements, and had hindered freedom of movement. -The advantage, however, in our position of being able to employ -strong troops and with them successfully to engage, and often defeat -decisively, superior enemy forces was so great that I held to this -system as long as it was at all possible. - -It was now no longer possible, and the advantages I have mentioned -had to be sacrificed under the pressure of necessity. It was -certainly questionable whether the reduced force could be maintained -without supply dumps, and without reinforcements the prospect of -remaining, after twelve days in the plains, with five thousand hungry -negroes and without supplies was not attractive. Should we succeed -in satisfying those requirements of the force which could not be -obtained on the spot, especially ammunition and arms, by means of -capture from the enemy—for the only possibility of renewing our -supplies lay in capturing the enemy’s—in sufficient quantities to -make the continuation of the war possible? That was the all-important -question. If we succeeded, however, in maintaining the force on the -new territory the increased independence and mobility, used with -determination against the less mobile enemy, would give us a local -superiority in spite of the great numerical superiority of the enemy. -In the unlimited territory at our disposal it would be possible to -withdraw from unfavourable positions. The enemy would be compelled to -keep an enormous amount of men and material continually on the move, -and to exhaust his strength to a greater extent proportionately than -ourselves. There was also the prospect of tying down strong enemy -forces and protracting the operations indefinitely if—my forecast -proved correct. This was at that time doubtful, but the risk had to be -taken. - -We did not stay long at Nambindinga; this place situated on the -plateau had no water and the springs in the valley were within range -of the enemy’s guns and machine guns. Under the protection of patrols, -which held back the enemy at Nambindinga, Headquarters and the main -part of the forces arrived at Kitangari on 18th November. The enemy -did not follow, probably he could not. As had been foreseen, he had -strained every nerve to strike the so long hoped-for knockout blow at -Chiwata and had to re-form before undertaking further operations. At -Kitangari the old experience was repeated of finding that the supplies -stored there had been estimated much too highly. The supplies at all -serviceable would, all told, only feed the force for about ten days; we -could reckon on no appreciable addition to these stores from the region -south of Kitangari. The question in which direction the march should be -continued focussed itself in the main on the prospect of again finding -the means of adequately feeding the force. There was no time to be lost. - -I knew that in the area along the Rovuma the English and Portuguese had -systematically destroyed our supplies. Our small dumps, requisitioning -stations and supply columns had been attacked and the supplies -destroyed. The natives had been influenced against us. The north -and south banks of the middle Rovuma were only thinly populated; at -Tunduru, further up the Rovuma, strong forces of both sides had been -engaged and the supplies there were probably exhausted. I could get -no reliable information about the Mafia plateau south of the lower -Rovuma. Even if, as many reported, this had been a richly-cultivated -district before the war it was very doubtful whether now, after strong -Portuguese forces had been billeted there for years, there would be -any food left. The most probable place for finding supplies seemed to -me at that time to be the district where Major Stuemer’s operations -had taken place: the corner between the Rovuma and the Ludjenda rivers -and further south in the region of Nangware and Mwembe. Even this was -doubtful, for here, too, war had interfered with the agriculture of the -natives. Meanwhile, of the various improbabilities this last seemed to -me the least improbable, and I decided to march at once up the Rovuma. - -A determining factor in the choice of this direction was my wish to -equip my force for a prolonged period of action by a large capture of -ammunition and other war material. Previous observation and the reports -of the natives led me to believe that somewhere near the Rovuma the -enemy still possessed large stores. On 20th November we reached Nevale, -where we were joined by the patrols which had secured our southern -flank, and the reorganization of the force was finally carried through. -At Nevale the last men unfit for marching were left behind, and on -21st November we marched south to the Rovuma with 300 Europeans, 1,700 -Askari, and 3,000 bearers and other natives. Every man was loaded to -his full capacity. In general, as the supplies were consumed, the -bearers no longer required were left behind, so as to keep the number -of consumers as low as possible. In many cases we had to refuse the -urgent requests of our good old bearers to remain with us, a large -number offering to carry on without pay, some even without either pay -or rations; these were ready to provide their own rations from what -we threw away and Pori fruit. The quartermaster at that time, Naval -Lieutenant Besch, reorganized the supplies and transport service very -efficiently. He deserves the chief credit for the force’s ability to -carry on. - -As was to be expected, only small detachments of the enemy were -reported in the neighbourhood of the Rovuma. On 21st November we -arrived at Mpili, on the bank of the river, and were about to pitch -our camp when several shots passed close to a hunting party. On -reconnoitring we found in front of us a large pond, on the opposite -side of which horses were being watered. Behind rose a rocky mountain. -Soon afterwards a native, apparently a spy, appeared, bringing a -written message: “We are English cavalry, and we want to get into touch -with Portuguese infantry regiments.” Whether this was a ruse could not -be ascertained. It was clear that for the moment we had only to do -with a small squadron of cavalry. By a sharp attack the enemy was soon -routed and in the pursuit sustained several casualties: five European -prisoners belonging to the 10th South African Mounted Infantry were, -for reasons of supply, sent back to the enemy. The captured horses were -welcome as chargers and as a possible addition to our rations. - -[Illustration: Native Types (3). - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: Native Types (4). - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -The rest of the march up the Rovuma progressed very slowly. A great -part of the force were unaccustomed to long route-marches. The columns -straggled endlessly. The Askari women followed singly, several hundred -yards apart. It was some time before they learned to keep to a regular -marching order. Incidentally it became obvious that in some companies -the Askari who had come with us had not been selected from the most -suitable point of view. In the reorganization of the companies which -had had to be carried out during the fighting, many good and reliable -men had been left behind, and replaced by others, stronger perhaps, -but less reliable. Many went into battle with their children on their -shoulders; it would have been better to choose an equally reliable man -who was not burdened by having to drag about a wife and family. - -But it was too late now to alter anything. - -Apparently we had quite got outside the enemy’s range of observation. -The aircraft which usually followed our marches were absent and no -bombs fell on our camps. Once an enemy supply column crossed the Rovuma -right into our camp. It was a welcome capture. Of grain we found -practically none in this district, but on the other hand, we shot -plenty of game. Several buffaloes and quite a number of antelopes, -particularly Wasserbok, fell to our guns. But we dared not delay; our -shrinking supplies urged us continually forward. Fortunately I had with -me a few Europeans who knew the country, and who, shortly before, had -been working near the confluence of the Ludjenda and the Rovuma. In -peace time a Portuguese station had been situated there, and even in -war a more or less strong garrison had been reported there. It might -be assumed that even now we should find some traces of the enemy. The -few natives we came across even spoke of a stronger garrison, amounting -to two thousand English or Portuguese. The natives’ figures could not, -of course, be relied on, but they strengthened my belief that in the -neighbourhood of Ngomano something might be done. - - - - - PART III - - FIGHTING ON FOREIGN SOIL - - (From the Crossing into Portuguese East Africa to the Armistice) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -ACROSS THE ROVUMA - - -EARLY in the morning of November 25th, 1917, our advance guard waded -across the Rovuma, a little above the Ludjenda confluence; the main -force of nine companies followed in the course of the forenoon, the -rearguard about two days’ march in the rear. Captain Goering with three -companies had crossed much further downstream to surprise a Portuguese -camp reported there. We had no news of Captain Tafel, and I thought it -probable that he would strike the Rovuma much further west. - -The feeling that we were cut off from all support, as well as the -absolute uncertainty as to the fate before us, had produced what is -popularly known as “_allgemeine Wurschtigkeit_” (absolute callousness). -Undisturbed by the tactical situation, our hunting parties went on with -their work, and their shots were, as afterwards transpired, distinctly -heard by the enemy. - -While crossing the river, many took a careful bath in full view of -the enemy; in many cases it required some effort to make clear the -requirements of the state of war. - -On the south bank we soon came under fire. The company acting as -advance guard came upon enemy scouts, several of whom were killed. I -employed the next few hours, while the troops gradually came up and -covered the crossing of the rest, to reconnoitre. Not far from our -front, on the far bank of the Ludjenda river, signals could be heard -and men could be seen. We came close to the enemy camp and saw men -in white suits moving about, a few hundred yards away. Others were -building earthworks and a transport column was also observed. The -troops were certainly in great force. - -While I was still considering whether, and in what way, a prospect -of attack offered, a column of Askari in khaki advanced from the -camp towards our troops. About a company of the enemy left the camp. -Guessing that the enemy was wisely about to attack our troops with all -his force while they were still occupied in crossing the river, I ran -back quickly and ordered those of our companies who had crossed first -to put themselves in a defensive position. The favourable opportunity -I had hoped for did not, however, materialize: the enemy did not come. -Thus I was again faced with the question what to do. I was doubtful -whether, in view of our large numbers of bearers, it would not be more -expedient to march past the enemy stationed here at Ngomano and advance -further up the Ludjenda river. Either the enemy would not hinder us, -or, if he did, he would have to emerge from his entrenched positions -and make up his mind for a difficult attack. - -On the other hand, it was not unlikely that an attack by us on -the enemy camp would be successful, for its defences were not yet -especially strong. Reconnaissance had established that on the far bank -of the Ludjenda river a belt of thick wood led right up to the camp and -offered the opportunity of surprising the enemy here in strength, and -bringing off a decisive attack. I had not yet fully made up my mind -when Captain Müller decided me to take that one of the two decisions -which, though very risky, offered a prospect of the long awaited -decisive success and the capture of ammunition and war material which -had become an urgent necessity. No time was to be lost. - -The attack was, therefore, made while part of the force was still -crossing the river. While our light mountain-gun fired on the enemy’s -entrenchments from the west, and while at the same time several -companies engaged the enemy on this side as also from the north, -Captain Koehl’s detachment crossed the Ludjenda half a mile above -Ngomano, marched through the high wood on that bank and made a -determined attack on the enemy’s camp from the south. I took up my -position on a little hill west of the camp, near our guns. Immediately -behind me the last company of General Wahle’s force to cross the river -was advancing along a valley. In front I had a fairly good view of -the enemy’s entrenched positions. The enemy’s machine guns were not -shooting badly, and their fire was at times directed upon our little -sand hill, from which I had to send into cover a number of Europeans -and Askari, who had collected there immediately and were visible to -the enemy. The clear ring of the enemy rifles, which we had heard -before, and the absence of trench-mortars, made it probable that the -enemy were Portuguese. We had already learned to distinguish clearly -between the dull, full detonation of our ’71, the sharp crack of our -S-rifle, the double report of the English rifle and the clear ring of -the Portuguese rifle of a little over 6 mm. calibre. Even our Askari -had noticed at once that in short skirmishes the speed with which the -enemy trench-mortars always got the range of our positions had been -very harassing. - -Our ’71 rifles threw up so much smoke that it was impossible to guard -against this. To-day, however, there were no mine-throwers, and the -treacherous smoke of our good old rifles was not so bad. On the other -hand, when they did hit their target they made a very considerable -hole. Our Askari soon realized that to-day they were able to bring -their soldierly superiority to bear without being handicapped by -inferior weapons. “To-day is the day of the old rifles!” they shouted -to the German leaders, and from my hill I soon saw the firing line of -Koehl’s detachment storm the enemy’s entrenchments at the double and -capture them. - -This was the signal for attack on the other fronts also. From all sides -they charged the enemy, who was badly shaken by the concentrated fire. -Scarcely more than 200 of the enemy force, about 1,000 strong, can -have survived. Again and again our Askari troops, in search of booty, -threw themselves ruthlessly upon the enemy, who was still firing; in -addition, a crowd of bearers and boys, grasping the situation, had -quickly run up and were taking their choice of the pots of lard and -other supplies, opening cases of jam and throwing them away again -when they thought they had found something more attractive in other -cases. It was a fearful _mêlée_. Even the Portuguese Askari already -taken prisoner, joined in the plunder of their own stores. There was -no alternative but to intervene vigorously. I became very eloquent, -and, to make an example, dashed at least seven times at one bearer I -knew, but each time he got away and immediately joined in the looting -somewhere else. At last I succeeded in restoring discipline. - -We buried about 200 enemy dead, and about 150 European prisoners -were released after taking an oath not to fight again during this -war against Germany or her Allies; several hundred Askari were taken -prisoner. Valuable medical stores, so necessary to us, and, as a result -of the Portuguese experience of centuries of colonial campaigning, of -excellent quality, were captured, as well as several thousand kilos of -European supplies, large numbers of rifles, six machine-guns and about -thirty horses. Unfortunately we captured no native supplies. Almost -half of our force was re-armed this time with Portuguese rifles; and a -plentiful supply of ammunition was served out. A quarter of a million -rounds of ammunition were captured, and this number was increased in -the course of December to nearly a million. From captured dispatches we -learned that the Portuguese-European companies had only reached Ngomano -a few days before, in order to carry out the impossible English order -to prevent a German crossing of the Rovuma. It was really a perfect -miracle that these troops should have arrived so opportunely as to make -the capture of the place so profitable to us. With one blow we had -freed ourselves of a great part of our difficulties. - -But yet another serious difficulty arose, which drove us remorselessly -on. This was the necessity of procuring food for our large numbers of -natives. Accordingly we advanced up the Ludjenda river. Day after day -our patrols searched for native guides and supplies. During the next -few days, however, they had little success. The natives, never numerous -in this district, had fled before the advance of the Portuguese, -fearing their ruthlessness and cruelty, and had hidden what stores they -possessed. One after another, mules and horses found their way into our -stew-pots. Fortunately this district is very rich in game, and the -hunter can always shoot one of the numerous antelopes or guinea-fowl. - -Though at first our marching columns were too long and straggling, here -again practice made perfect. Bearers, boys, women and children, soon -learned to keep pace and distance as exactly as the Askari. Regularly -and in good order, the expedition wound along the narrow native paths, -and even through the thick bush, into the unknown land. Half an hour’s -halt was called after every two hours’ march; the rule was six hours’ -march a day, _i.e._, about fifteen to twenty miles, and this was often -exceeded. The force was for the most part divided into detachments of -three companies, each with one supply train and one field hospital. -The advance detachment was a day’s march ahead of the main body, the -last a day’s march behind. At the head of each detachment marched the -fighting companies with their machine guns; they had with them only the -necessary ammunition and medical stores, and each European was allowed -one load of necessities. The Askari marched gaily forward, straight -as lances, and with their guns reversed over their shoulders, as has -always been the custom in the rifle regiments. Lively conversation -was kept up, and after the plundering of an enemy camp, which often -yielded rich booty, cigarette smoke rose on all sides. The little -signal recruits strode bravely forward, half-grown youths in Askari -uniform for the most part, carrying all their worldly goods in a bundle -on their heads. The Askari would call out their friendly, “Jambo Bwana -Obao,” or “Jambo Bwana Generals” (“Good-day, Colonel”), or a little -signalman would express his hope of coming some day to Uleia (Europe) -and Berlin. “Then the Kaiser will say to me, ‘Good-day, my son,’ and I -shall give him an exhibition of signalling. Then he will give me roast -meat and present me to the Empress. The Empress will say, ‘Good-day, my -child,’ and will give me cakes and show me the shop-windows.” During -all their talk the Askari kept a sharp look-out, and no movement in the -thick bush escaped their lynx eyes. - -The head of the column investigated every trail, and from it gave the -number and the distance of the enemy. Equally soldierly were the -machine-gun bearers, mostly strapping Waniamwezi and Wazukuma. The -companies and detachments were followed by bearers with the loads of -supplies, baggage, camp-kit and stretcher cases. The loads, about 25 -kg., were carried alternately on the head and shoulders. The endurance -of these men is enormous. They became more and more attached to the -troops. If ever the supplies were short and the hunting parties -unsuccessful, they would say, “Haiswu’b (it doesn’t matter), we wait, -get some another time.” Many marched barefoot and often got thorns in -their feet. Often one would promptly take his knife and calmly cut out -a piece of flesh from the wounded foot. Then he would start off again. -The bearers were followed by the women and the Bibi. Many Askari had -their wives and children with them in the field, and many children were -born during the march. Each woman carried her own Mali (property), as -well as that of her lord, on her head. Often they carried on their -backs a small child, his woolly head peeping out of the cloth in which -he was wound. The women were kept in order and protected by a European -or a trustworthy old non-commissioned officer, assisted by a few -Askari. They all liked gay colours, and after an important capture, -the whole convoy stretching several miles would look like a carnival -procession. - -Even during the march the obtaining of supplies had to be attended to. -Hunting patrols marched ahead of the column or on the flanks in the -bush. Often they would remain behind near the old camping sites, where -game or traces of game had been observed. Other patrols followed human -tracks leading to settlements to requisition supplies. On arriving at -the camping-ground, four Askari and my boy Serubiti would cut down -branches and erect a frame for the tent sections or for a grass-hut. -Sometimes a raised bivouac of branches was arranged and covered with -grass. Soon afterwards the bearded Baba, my cook, would arrive and give -careful directions for the arrangement of the kitchen. The bearers -would come and fetch water, cut grass and firewood with their bush -knives. The hunting patrols brought in what they had shot, and soon the -smell of cooking rose from the camp-fires on all sides. Meanwhile, -parties of bearers had been threshing in the villages, and brought -back corn. In the Kinos (thick wooden vessels) the corn was crushed by -beating it with thick clubs, the dull thuds sounding far into the bush. -Messages, reconnaissance reports, and captured dispatches were brought -in; a box in a shady spot served as a desk. During the longer halts -a table was built of branches. The evening meal was eaten in company -with friends round the camp fire, the boys bringing cases to sit on. -The more lordly had deck-chairs. Then to bed under the mosquito-nets, -and in the early morning once more into the unknown. Should we find -supplies, and could we make what we had last out until we did? These -uncertainties cropped up every day afresh, and haunted us week after -week and month after month. The eternal marching was, as will be -understood, no mere pleasure. At—— I heard some remarks about myself, -such as: “Still further? The fellow must come from a family of country -postmen!” - -When we reached the confluence of the Chiulezi, difficulties of -supplies had become so serious, and the district hitherto regarded as -fertile had so greatly altered, that I dropped my original intention of -keeping the force together. For the moment it seemed impossible, from -the tactical point of view also. From the English, who were probably -following us, we need not expect any strong pressure, owing to the -daily lengthening of their line of communication and the consequent -difficulty of bringing up supplies. - -A written message from the British Commander-in-Chief, General van -Deventer, in which he summoned me to surrender, was brought under -protection of the white flag, and strengthened me in my belief that our -escape had taken him by surprise, and that our invasion of Portuguese -territory had put him at a loss. Neither he nor General Smuts had -ever thought of sending a summons to surrender when the situation -was favourable to the English. Why should they do so in a situation -like the present, or that of September, 1916, at Kissaki, which was -undoubtedly favourable to us? Only because they were at their wits’ -end. That was indeed not difficult to see through. The time before the -setting in of the rainy season, at the end of December, was too short -to prepare for a fresh operation, and after the rains had begun the -enemy transport of supplies, which depended largely on motors, would be -faced with new difficulties. - -We had, therefore, plenty of time, and could divide ourselves into -several columns without hesitation. We had nothing to fear from -temporary loss of touch one with the other. Accordingly General Wahle’s -detachment was separated from the rest, and marched through the Mkula -mountains, while I marched further up the Ludjenda. - -The surrender of Captain Tafel, which I learned from General van -Deventer’s message, came as a severe and unexpected blow. - -Captain Tafel had taken over the command at Mahenge from General Wahle, -when the latter left to take over the forces on the Lindi front. He -secured the fertile region of Mahenge to the north, with Commander -Schoenfeldt’s detachment of a few companies. The latter succeeded in -holding his ground with his weak force by skilful use of his 10·5 gun -from the _Königsberg_, and put his force in a very favourable position -materially by the cultivation of gardens and fields. - -On the middle Ruhudje was a weak detachment under Captain Aumann, -and north-east of Ssongea Captain Lincke’s detachment near Likuju. -The latter engaged the enemy repeatedly, and in the barren district -suffered from lack of supplies. They therefore gradually retired north -to Mponda. There they were reinforced by two companies and one gun -from the main force. Captain Otto took over the command. In August, -1917, strong English and Belgian forces converged on Mahenge; Captain -Tafel had foreseen this, and withdrawn his supplies out of the Mahenge -district to Mgangira. On September 11th, Mahenge was evacuated. -Even though the individual engagements were often successful, the -superiority of the enemy made itself seriously felt, and the shortage -of ammunition handicapped more and more the Askari companies, mostly -armed with the smoky ’71 rifle. - -I learned later through Captain Otto, who had fought his way through -to me with one of Captain Tafel’s patrols and joined me at——, that -Captain Tafel, from west of Livale, had marched south in three columns, -and on the upper Mbemkuru had fought several partially successful -actions, capturing large quantities of ammunition. He had then marched -further south to the Bangala river, and turned east when he thought he -was near Massassi. South of this place he heard from the natives that -the Germans had not been fighting north of Rovuma for several days. -Captain Tafel turned towards the Rovuma and crossed near the Nangala -confluence, hoping to find supplies on the south bank. His own were -literally exhausted. He found nothing and had no idea that about a -day’s march from him Goering’s detachment of my force had captured the -Portuguese camp and found enough food on the prosperous farms to enable -them to live well for fourteen days. Captain Tafel therefore returned -to the north bank of the Rovuma and surrendered to the enemy. - -The news of Captain Tafel’s surrender strengthened my reluctance to -detach another part of my force, though, in view of my proximity, the -junction at which we were both aiming had as nearly as possible been -effected. I was straightway put upon the rack by the cessation of news -from Goering’s detachment with which, while it was at Ngomano, we had -kept touch by means of patrols. During the march up the Ludjenda, when -we had to keep the different detachments and companies further apart, -in order to facilitate the search for food, it was necessary to impress -upon subordinate leaders the importance of keeping the whole force in -touch. It was, however, not to be expected that these officers, who -later performed such excellent work as leaders of detachments, and -worked so successfully in co-operation with the rest, should possess -the necessary training from the beginning. The Governor had remained -with the force even after leaving the Protectorate, in accordance -with the regulation (certainly not intended to provide for war with -a European power) that he was the military head of the Protectorate. -He had interpreted this authority in such a way as to interfere -most seriously with that of the Commander-in-Chief, and had often -encroached upon my sphere of activity. I had been powerless to prevent -this, and now that we were outside the Protectorate I attached the -greatest importance to the fact that now, at any rate, I had a free -hand. Even if I did not yield to the Governor’s claims, it must be -understood that in the unprecedented military situation there were -enough differences of opinion to overburden the Commander-in-Chief, -who, whatever happens, is held actually, if not morally, responsible. - -It was perhaps natural that at this time I was not always very gentle -and considerate to those around me. So it happened that those very -officers of my Staff who were working with the greatest devotion to -the cause and deserved the most recognition, were the objects of -much unjustified reproach. For not taking offence or allowing this -to prejudice the cheerful continuation of their work, they deserve -particular gratitude. It is largely to the work of these officers, -often carried out under adverse circumstances, that are due the -successes which the public is so generously inclined to place wholly to -my credit. For me, who have always delighted in the good comradeship -characteristic of our officer corps, this general atmosphere of -snarling and fault-finding was naturally not ideal. Fortunately, -however, it was only a passing phase. - -Our position was now such that in case of an encounter with the -enemy we could not investigate his strength. We had no time for -prolonged reconnaissance. Perhaps this conviction, together with the -determination with which we attacked the Portuguese forces whenever -we met them, accounts for the fact that, during December, three more -Portuguese fortified positions were taken in quick succession. Of -decisive importance in these enterprises was the personality of the -officer in command who first engaged the enemy. He must lose no time, -and so could not wait for orders. On the 2nd November, Lieutenant -Kempner, commanding the 11th Company, which was acting as advance-guard -in the march up the Ludjenda, came upon a fortified Portuguese camp -at Nangwale. Like most Portuguese camps, it lay on a bare hill, with -a wide range of fire. The brave 11th Company at once deployed along -the edge of the bush, and advanced to the attack across three hundred -metres of open ground exposed to the enemy’s fire. The Askari, who -were carrying full marching kit, could not keep up with the company -commander and his Effendi (black officer). Lieutenant Kempner and -the Effendi leapt upon the enemy’s breastwork, and from there into -the enemy’s entrenchments, and so for a time found themselves alone -among the enemy garrison, consisting of a platoon. The latter were -so dumbfounded that, hearing the cheers of the oncoming Askari, they -at once obeyed the order to lay down their arms. In addition, a -considerable ammunition dump fell into our hands, as well as enough -rations to feed our whole force for several days. When the Portuguese -officer invited Lieutenant Kempner to a glass of special brandy and -found the bottle empty, its owner had further reason for being taken -aback, but with the difference this time that his enemy was taken aback -equally. An Ombascha (black lance-corporal) had the best of the joke. - -I was filled with grave anxiety about the fate of Captain Goering, of -whom I had received no news. From General Wahle’s force, which had -marched up the Chiulezi river, we heard subsequently that they had -attacked and annihilated a force of several Portuguese companies in -a strongly entrenched position in the Mkula mountains. The repeated -attempts to establish communication with Wahle’s force by means -of the heliograph did not succeed, although the Portuguese in the -Mkula mountains had clearly observed our signals from Nangwale. The -Portuguese Europeans captured by our detachment had refused to give -their word not to fight against us again in this war. They had been -sent north to the Rovuma by General Wahle owing to the difficulty of -feeding them. - -Captain Stemmermann succeeded, after several days’ siege, in capturing -another very strongly held and vigorously defended fortified position. -As the storming of this offered no prospects of success, the enemy’s -water supply was cut off, which made his position in the trenches -untenable, and forced him to surrender. Among our casualties, -unfortunately, were a number of very good native non-commissioned -officers. I was not present at the fighting at Nangwale, as I was -occupied in dealing with delays in the rear companies and arranging -that the march should be kept up to the intended standard. By a double -day’s march I easily made up for the delay this had caused me, and -arrived in Nangwale in time to superintend the division of the captured -stores. In the most favourable circumstances we were only living from -hand to mouth. At Nangwale, where six months before our troops had -found such a rich neighbourhood, the position was now quite different. -Apart from the captured stores there was absolutely nothing; even the -game in a considerable area round Nangwale had been shot or frightened -away. This was a disappointment, for I had hoped at this place to be -freed from the more ordinary difficulties of supplies. The force had, -therefore, to be split up. From the information of the prisoners and -captured documents it appeared that the garrison in Nangwale had been -fed by columns of bearers from the distant neighbourhood of Mwalis. -There must, then, be something to be found there. - -On 5th December Captain Koehl, with five companies, a gun and an -ammunition column, left Nangwale to march to the Mwalia—Medo district. -I myself continued the march up the Ludjenda. Fortunately the assurance -of Lieutenant von Scherbening and other Europeans, who had already -patrolled this district, that we should soon come into a region rich in -supplies was confirmed. These supplies, however, were not excessive, -and we were very glad that they could be largely supplemented by -hunting. The enormous numbers of hippopotami which lived in the river -above Nangwale, often in large herds of from fifteen to twenty, had -become quite a staple dish. I myself could not resist having a shot at -a huge bull; the animal sank at once, the water above it swirling as -over a sinking ship. After a time it came to the surface again, feet -uppermost, and made little further movement. The animal was then drawn -to the bank with a rope. The numerous crocodiles made us cautious, -and many a good prize had to be left from fear of these. The flesh -of the hippopotamus tastes like coarse beef; the tongue, however, -is particularly delicate. The most valuable product, however, is -the excellent lard which the men had very quickly learnt to prepare. -Its snow-white, appetizing appearance now was quite different from -the dirty yellow of the first attempts on the Rufiji. On my many -reconnoitring and hunting expeditions into the bush the Askari, -who came with me and the bearers to carry the spoils of the chase, -gradually revealed some of the secrets of the bush. We had long ago -learned to make excellent spinach from different foliage plants (called -Mlenda); now they showed me many different kinds of excellent wild -fruit. We also learnt that the kernel of the Mbinji-fruit, the pulp of -which I already knew contains prussic acid, is quite free from acid, -and when roasted makes an exceptionally delicate dish, tasting like our -hazel-nut. - -On the 17th December, 1917, Headquarters arrived at Chirumba (Mtarika). -Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, with his company, had gone on ahead and -had soon driven off the weak Portuguese outposts. This was a station of -the Portuguese Nyassa company; this merchant company also administered -the northern part of the colony. Further south, too, the administration -is in the hands of other private companies. The Portuguese official -in Chirumba, called Fernandez, seems to have been very capable. The -massive buildings of his station, situated at the top of a bare -eminence, were spotlessly clean. A trench ensured it against surprise. -Beautiful gardens with fruit and vegetables stretched along the bank -of the adjacent Ludjenda river. Avenues of mulberry and mango trees -fringed the carefully laid-out roads. Many species of this mango fruit, -known to the natives as Emben, were to be found in the station and -the neighbouring native villages. It was already beginning to ripen -and was so plentiful that it was found worth while to have the fruit -systematically gathered. The waste to which the natives are generally -prone was prevented as far as possible. The beautiful, sweet fruit was -enjoyed by all the Europeans and a great part of the natives, and, in -view of the shortage of sugar, for weeks provided a really valuable -addition to the supplies. When, on my arrival at Chirumba, I stepped -on to the veranda of the European house, Lieutenant Ruckteschell set -before me some hog’s lard, which I had not seen for a long time. Here, -as at many other Portuguese stations, there had been European pigs. - -We remained here for several weeks. One detachment moved further -upstream and took possession of the small station of Luambala. -At the same time General Wahle marched to the prosperous station -of Mwemba, already known to us. The richly-cultivated triangle -Chirumba-Luambala-Mwemba and beyond the frontier was patrolled by our -requisitioning and reconnaissance patrols. The natives of this district -showed themselves for the most part intelligent and friendly; they -already knew that they had nothing to fear from the German troops. In -spite of that they had hidden their stores of food in the bush and -would let us have little or nothing. Our men had, however, long since -learned to examine closely, for example, a suspicious-looking tree -stump, and often found that it had been put together by hand and was -the hiding place for stocks of food. Others would drive their sticks -into the hollow ground of a freshly laid-out garden and found stores -of grain buried there. In short, many such hiding-places were found, -and when, at Christmas, we sat down to dinner in a large grass-hut, -we were relieved of the most pressing shortage of food. According to -the descriptions of our men the Ludjenda river was, during several -months of the year, so full of fish that they could be pulled out in -basketfuls. Oddly enough, on this occasion only very few were caught. -Most of them were sheat-fish, about eighteen inches long, and smaller -fish which were best fried crisp. These, too, contributed their modest -share towards the improvement of the rations. - -Touch was kept with Koehl’s detachment in the neighbourhood of Medo -by means of a system of relays. I thought it probable that the enemy, -following his usual tactics, was preparing a great concentric movement -against us which would not be ready for at least a month. We could -thus rely on there being no considerable enemy activity until after -the rains, which would end at the end of February. About this time I -intended to concentrate my forces in the neighbourhood of Nanungu. -Until then we must husband our supplies in this area and live as -far as possible on what could be obtained in the outer fringe of our -present locality. At first there was not much game shot at Chirumba, -but the bag increased when we found considerable herds of antelopes -on the east bank of the Ludjenda, and particularly further upstream. -During the remainder of the dry season, while the river was low, -caravans of bearers were continually crossing the river by several -fords, carrying their loads to the dumps on the east bank. As well -as the fords, canoes made from hollowed tree-trunks were used for -crossing. Patrols were sent out for weeks at a time to collect supplies -and reconnoitre. Lieutenant von Scherbening, with his patrol, made an -expedition lasting months, marching from Chirumba via Mtenda, Mahua -and finally south, via the Lurio river, then up the Malema, where -they surprised the Portuguese Boma Malema. An Italian, who had been -hunting elephants on the Ludjenda and had joined us in a ragged, -starving condition, accompanied Lieutenant von Scherbening’s patrol. -The man’s health was, however, so undermined by lingering malaria and -his spleen so terribly swollen that he had to be carried from Mahua to -a plantation near Malacotera. - -At the beginning of January, 1918, the English began to move. From the -south-east corner of Lake Nyassa two battalions—the 1st and 2nd King’s -African Rifles—began to advance towards Captain Goering’s detachment, -which had joined up with us and occupied the acute angle between the -Luhambala and Ludjenda rivers. He was covering the supply stores -further up the Ludjenda. On 9th January, in the forenoon, a detachment -of the enemy, attacking unsupported, was defeated. When, in the -afternoon, the enemy returned to the attack after the arrival of his -reinforcements, and at the same time an enemy force pressed forward in -a northerly direction toward the supply dumps on the east bank, Captain -Goering crossed to the east bank with the main part of his force. Only -a strong patrol was left in the old camp on the west bank, and they -held the enemy in check. At the same time an enemy force—the 2nd Cape -Corps of South African half-breeds was identified—was advancing on -Mwembe. - -Then began innumerable small skirmishes and patrol actions, which -often put us in an awkward position, owing to our inability to protect -the bearers bringing up supplies. The English cleverly took advantage -of these difficulties to try to undermine the loyalty of our Askari. -Many were very war-weary. Added to this, there was in many cases the -feeling of uncertainty as to where the campaign was going to lead -them. The great majority of black men cling to their homes and their -relations. They said to themselves: “If we go further we shall come -into country we don’t know. We can find our way back from where we are -now, but soon we shan’t be able to.” The English propaganda, by word -of mouth and pamphlets, fell in many cases on fruitful ground, and, -as a result, a number of good Askari and even older non-commissioned -officers deserted. Small annoyances, such as are bound to arise—the -persuasion of the women and so on—all contributed to their decision -to desert. One old _sol_ (native sergeant-major) suddenly disappeared, -who had led a brilliant independent patrol and had brought a strong -detachment of bearers with their loads right through the enemy lines, -and for his good service had been promoted to “Effendi.” He, too, had -deserted. The impulsiveness of the black makes him very sensitive -to insinuation. But even if the English Colonel can boast of having -lowered the _moral_ of certain elements, this was only a passing phase. -The old lust of battle and the old loyalty returned, even among those -who had begun to hang their heads. The example of the faithful Askari, -who simply laughed at the mountains of gold the English promised them -if they would desert, won the day. In so long and trying a campaign -the _moral_ was bound to be low from time to time. It was no use to be -astonished and discouraged, the important thing was to fight against it -firmly, and for this the loyal elements, of which there were many, both -among Europeans, Askari and bearers, had firmly made up their minds. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -EAST OF THE LUDJENDA - - -THE patrol of Captain Otto, who had been sent from Captain Tafel to -me after the latter’s surrender, and gave me details about the events -leading up to it, had arrived at Chirumba. Captain Otto, with two -additional companies, now marched to Luambala and took over the command -also of Goering’s detachment (three companies). As was expected, -the main pressure of the enemy was felt at Luambala, as also on the -east bank of the Ludjenda. It was clear that if the enemy advanced -downstream my position at Chirumba on the west bank of the river, in a -district where the supplies were being gradually exhausted, and with -the river swollen by the rains in my rear, was extremely unfavourable. - -It was necessary to evacuate this position and to move my force, -while there was time, to the east bank of the Ludjenda. Unfortunately -the fords were impassable, owing to the height of the river, so that -the whole crossing had to be effected by means of the three canoes -available. - -Gradually, and without interference, the companies were transferred -to the east bank. The supply question was beginning to become very -serious. Fortunately Captain Koehl, who, in the neighbourhood of Medo -and Namunu, had kept the very intelligent natives to the cultivation -of the quickly ripening grain, reported that a good harvest could be -relied on as early as the middle of February. But that was not for -another month, so we should have to try by every possible means to hold -out a bit longer at Chirumba. Welcome as the manna to the children of -Israel, the fungi which shoot up at this season helped to keep us from -starvation. I had already in Germany interested myself in mycology, -and soon found fungi closely related to our German species of mushrooms -and yellow boleta and others, in the African bush. I had often gathered -basketfuls in a very short time, and even though an excessive diet -of mushrooms is indigestible and not very sustaining, they were a -considerable help. - -In torrential rain we marched east. The usually dry ravines had become -raging torrents. Trees, felled in such a way as to fall over the -stream, formed bridges, a hand-rail being improvised from poles or -bark lashed together. The mule I was riding on account of fever—I am -apparently very sensitive to malaria, from which I suffered a great -deal—as well as the few other riding animals that had not found their -way into the cooking-pot swam across. When we arrived at the camping -ground my men soon built me, on account of the damp, a raised shelter -of branches over which both my tent-cloths were laid as a roof. -Veterinary Surgeon Huber, who was responsible for the material welfare -of the staff, and under him our capable black cook, old bearded Baba, -at once got to work and, no matter how wet the wood, we were always -able in a short time to sit down to our meal beside the camp-fire. -Dr. Huber often managed even to have a grass roof erected for our -protection. - -On sunny days tobacco was eagerly dried and cut. The efficient -Quartermaster-Lieutenant Besch, who was full of resource where the -comfort of the men was concerned, had thought of this and had collected -very good tobacco from the natives. But in spite of everything the -deprivations were very great and the insidious whisperings of the -enemy, that every native who deserted should be free to go home and -there live in comfort on his own land, did not always fall on deaf -ears. Even the faithful boy of one of our officers, whom he had served -for years, had one morning disappeared; probably his Bibi (wife) had -had enough of campaigning. - -Captain Otto’s detachment marched from Uambala due east to Mahua, and -there, on the Lurio river, found a district rich in supplies. Goering’s -detachment, marching from Luambala across country to Mtende, found -considerable supplies on the way. In this district the harvest was -very much earlier than in German East Africa; the maize was beginning -to ripen and could to a large extent already be eaten. Headquarters -next moved from Chirumba to Mtende and, some days later, on to Nanungu. -Wahle’s detachment, which had followed us from Chirumba to Mtende, was -here cut off by several enemy companies which appeared unexpectedly -on a height on their rear and interrupted the messenger service and -the transport. General Wahle extricated himself by a détour from this -uncomfortable position and advanced nearer to Headquarters at Nanungu. - -At Nanungu we found abundant supplies and we thought it expedient, as -before, to establish requisitioning stations and supply dumps in the -district between Nanungu and Namunu and further south. There was good -shooting, and the natives readily brought garden produce and honey -to exchange for meat or, preferably, clothing. Very welcome was a -delicate sweet, cherry-like Pori fruit, which ripened in millions in -the neighbourhood of Nanungu. I preferred to have it made into jam. We -also occasionally obtained other dainties, particularly pig-nuts, and -the crowing of cocks proclaimed far and wide that there were fowls and -eggs in the camps and among the natives. - -The setting in of the rainy season did not quite coincide with the -forecasts of the natives. There were some sharp downpours, but in the -undulating country the water quickly ran off and collected in the main -artery of that region, the Msalu river, which was soon swollen so -as to form a strong obstacle. Over the Msalu river the post-service -official, Hartmann, who had joined the force as a Sergeant-Major, had -built a pontoon bridge which connected us with General Wahle’s force, -which was still on the west bank. The floating supports of the bridge -were boats made from bark. The necessity in this well-watered country -of being able to cross the swollen rivers without difficulty had drawn -my attention to this question. Hitherto our sole provision for such -contingencies consisted of a few hollowed canoes. Their continued -transport, however, was too difficult and their capacity too limited. -A planter named Gerth, who had joined us as a volunteer, interested -himself particularly in this matter and had himself instructed by the -natives of the district in the building of boats from bark. The ensuing -experiments soon produced good results, after which the building of -these boats, which took barely two hours to put together, for crossing -rivers was enthusiastically taken up by every company. Most of these -boats were not used, but they gave us a feeling of security that, if -necessary, even a full stream would not be impassable for our unwieldy -caravans and baggage. - -When we became better acquainted with the neighbourhood, we found -fords over the Msalu which could be used even when the river was in -flood. Our patrols, in charge of Sergeant Valett and others, left our -fortified camp at Nanungu, crossed the river which formed the boundary -of our camp on the west, and went to look for the enemy in his camps at -Mtenda. One of these patrols, which was particularly strong and armed -with two machine guns, succeeded in surprising an enemy column west of -Mtenda. Our men, however, did not get away quickly enough to escape the -enemy’s covering force and, attacked from all sides, found themselves -in a difficult position. Both machine guns were lost and the Europeans -working them fell. Gradually the Askari all returned to Nanungu, but -the patrol leader, Sergeant-Major Musslin, who had got away from the -rest during the march, had fallen into the enemy’s hands. Another -patrol, with which Captain Müller crossed the Msalu to the north, -quickly drove off an English outpost at Lusinje. In the neighbourhood -of Lusinje, also the camp of the English, Lieutenant Wienholt, who, as -has already been mentioned, escaped from arrest and became one of the -best English patrol leaders, was captured. The natives were thoroughly -exploited by the English patrols and acted as spies for the enemy in -return for articles of clothing. The volunteer, Gerth, who has been -mentioned in connection with boat-building, was attacked and killed by -an English patrol while in the house of a native chief. - -In the second half of March, 1918, our spirits were greatly raised -by the news, received by our wireless, of the powerful German March -offensive on the Western front. I laid a wager with the Staff Medical -Officer, Staff-Surgeon Taute, that Amiens would soon fall. I used -the period of rest that now set in for several weeks during the lull -in our operations to have my foot attended to. It had been bitten by -a sand-fly, and for the last six months had caused me inconvenience. -These sand-flies, which infested many of the camps, bore their way -into the flesh, round the edge of the toe-nails, causing painful -inflammation. If care is not taken they attack the flesh round them -and, according to medical opinion, the maiming of the feet frequent -among the natives is very often to be traced to the sand-fly. I, -too, was suffering from this inconvenience, and on the march the -inflammation constantly recurred. Fortunately Staff-Surgeon Taute, -using a local anæsthetic, was able to extract the nail. - -I was also inconvenienced in another way. On a reconnoitring expedition -a blade of the tall grass, which grows above a man’s height, had -pierced my right eye. During the subsequent treatment it was feared -that the use of the lens might be affected by atropia; the result was -that I could not see properly with my right eye and was unable to -read hand-writing or sketch-maps. This was very awkward, as my left -eye had been so seriously injured by a shot wound received during the -Hottentot rebellion in South-West Africa, that I could only see through -it with the help of spectacles. Suitable spectacles could not, however, -be obtained, and so I was compelled to carry out various enterprises -without being able to see properly. - -The patrols of Koehl’s detachment in the Medo-Nanungu district had -meanwhile reached the coast, after taking Portuguese fortresses on, and -far south of, the lower Lurio river, and carrying off a few guns and, -what was more important, rifles, ammunition and considerable supplies. -The natives showed themselves very friendly towards our men, whom they -regarded as their deliverers from Portuguese oppression. Patrols from -Otto’s detachment from Mahua had also reconnoitred as far as the region -south of the Lurio. Lieutenant Methner, so experienced in the ways -of the natives, and first _referant_ of our government, praised the -capacity and cleverness of the Portuguese natives and the intelligence -and far-sightedness of their local chiefs. - -Lieutenant von Scherbening, who with his patrol had taken the Boma -Malema, reported that this neighbourhood was very productive. As a -specimen he sent us a captured pig to Nanungu. As it refused to walk it -was carried the 500 km. Unfortunately it turned out eventually not to -be a European pig at all, but a Pori pig, like those we frequently shot -in the bush. - -Once more a time had come when it was difficult to obtain news of the -enemy, but a good deal could be conjectured from the incomplete maps at -our disposal. I could have no doubt that the imminent enemy operations -would be launched from the neighbourhood of Port Amelia with their main -force from the coast. The appearance of strong enemy forces at Mtende, -as well as the report, unconfirmed it is true, that troops were on the -march from the south-west towards Mahua, showed me that other troops -from the west were going to co-operate with the approaching attack of -the enemy main force. A situation seemed to be developing in which -I could make use of my inner line to attack one part of the enemy -singly. The enemy’s position with regard to reserves and supplies made -it obvious that the columns marching from the west could not be over -strong. This seemed to be the chance I had so long been awaiting. I, -therefore, remained with my main force at Nanungu and also recalled -Captain Otto’s detachment from Lurio. With these forces I intended to -assume the offensive in a westerly direction. Captain Koehl, whose -detachment was assembled at Medo, was charged with the duty of holding -up the enemy’s main force advancing from Port Amelia and retiring -gradually on my force. - -Captain Müller, who, after years of work at Headquarters, had taken -over an independent detachment of two companies, was sent on from -the neighbourhood of Nanungu to Mahua to harass the enemy as far as -possible. He passed round Mahua and surprised, south-west of this -place, the fortified supply depot of Kanene. The defending English -European troops saw that all the stores were lost. To prevent this, at -least to some extent, they fell upon the stores of liquor in the camp -and were captured in a thoroughly intoxicated condition. - -For myself, I, likewise, advanced in the middle of April in the -direction of Mahua, and during the march could hear from afar heavy -sounds of firing. At Koriwa, north-east of Mahua, Captain Müller had -attacked an enemy battalion under Colonel Barton, which had been making -a reconnoitring expedition and was at once attacked by our troops on -the march. In spite of the fact that on our side scarcely 70 rifles -took part in the action, our troops succeeded in enveloping the enemy’s -right wing, and from a large ant-hill poured upon him such a vigorous -and effective machine-gun fire that he fled wildly. He lost over 40 -men in this action. Lieutenant-Commander Wunderlich, who had received -a severe wound through the abdomen, had to be taken to the hospital at -Nanungu, two days’ march distant, and died shortly afterwards. - -The blow which I had intended to strike with the main force had already -been successfully carried through by Müller’s weak detachment. I, -therefore, turned with my main force to the district west of Nanungu. A -large force of the enemy had arrived meanwhile on the Msalu river and -had crossed it with several patrols. My calculation that I should be -able to surprise a strong body of the enemy immediately after crossing -the river was not fulfilled: the reports received had been incorrect. -However, in a whole series of minor engagements on the Msalu river and -further west our fighting patrols inflicted, gradually, severe losses -on the enemy and his patrols soon evacuated the east bank of the Msalu. -On 3rd May our supply patrols, whose duty it was to obtain further -supplies from the direction of Mahua, surprised, in the neighbourhood -of Saidi, strong enemy detachments which were seriously threatening our -field hospital and supply depots at Makoti. - -Part of our stores had been brought to Makoti in readiness for the -operations planned to be carried out further west. Our fighting -patrols, which were sent out immediately, had several encounters with -the enemy near the Kireka mountain at Makoti. I thought at first that -these were only enemy patrols, so sent Captain Schulz there with a -strong patrol as a reinforcement, and myself marched on the 4th of May, -with the main body, to the Nanungu-Mahua road. From here I expected to -be able to carry out a swift attack on the enemy forces, which were -trying to surprise us somewhere in this neighbourhood. The general -situation was made clear when it was known that patrols had, in the -course of the day, encountered a new enemy near the Kireka mountain. An -enemy detachment had been thrown back and it was probable that strong -forces were in entrenched positions in the rear. In the morning of the -5th May I marched from my camp to Makoti. During the march I hoped -sincerely that the enemy would spare us the necessity of making the -attack on his fortified positions and that, as in view of the general -situation was not improbable, he would emerge from his entrenchments -and offer battle in the open. If this happened, and we succeeded -in attacking with our main force before the enemy was aware of our -arrival, a considerable success was probable. - -At eleven o’clock in the forenoon I arrived at the Kireka mountain -and went on ahead to see Captain Schulz who, with his patrol, had -occupied some rocky grottos in the copse. As soon as I had arrived a -_sol_ (native Sergeant-Major), who had just returned from a patrol -expedition, reported that the enemy was advancing in great force -and must soon appear at close quarters. I passed on this report to -Lieutenant Boell, who had just brought up his company in the rear -of Schulz’s detachment, and instructed him to go up at once in case -of an enemy attack. I then went back and ordered the advance of our -companies which were gradually arriving. Meanwhile the fighting in -front began. The enemy, advancing in close order, had quickly thrown -back our patrols out of the grottos, but had then been completely taken -by surprise by the effective machine-gun fire of Boell’s company and -partially driven back. Goering’s detachment, coming up at that moment, -began an enveloping movement on the right, completely surprising the -enemy, who was rapidly driven back with very heavy losses. - -After several miles of hot pursuit we reached the enemy’s -entrenchments. On our left wing, where two more companies had been sent -into action, the fight wavered, and it was difficult for me in the -thick bush to distinguish friend and foe. It was, therefore, some time -before I could get a clear idea of the situation on the left wing, and -it was not until I received a report from Major Kraut, whom I had sent -to investigate, that I realized that, in advancing, our left wing had -come under a withering enemy fire in a clearing which had brought it -to a standstill. A counter-attack by the enemy, which had brought him -very near to the position of our Headquarters, looked very dangerous. -Fortunately for us, however, just at this moment Lieutenant Buechsel, -whose company had been detached from the main force and so arrived -late, came upon the scene of action and was able to avert the danger. - -Meanwhile, on the right wing, Captain Goering had realized that a -frontal attack on the enemy entrenchment offered no prospect of -success. He had, therefore, sent Lieutenant Meier with a strong patrol -round the enemy’s position to fire on the enemy mine-thrower from the -rear and if possible to capture it. This capture was not brought off, -for the enemy had at his disposal unexpected reserves which were able -to keep Meier’s patrol at a distance. - -The action thus came to a standstill. When it had grown quite dark we -were close in front of the enemy. Shots were still being exchanged from -both sides, but only occasionally. The clerical work—even in Africa -there was writing to be done, though not as much as is usually the -case—was postponed during the fighting. A number of charges and other -tiresome details had to be written up. I was able from time to time -to talk personally with the company leaders, and called them together -for this purpose. I changed my own position as little as possible to -avoid difficulties and annoying delays in the dispatch and receipt of -messages. A meal was cooked further in the rear, where the dressing -station had also been established. We at Headquarters had our meal -prepared as usual by our black servants, who brought it up to the -firing-line. - -In order to get the force in hand ready for further action, some parts -of it were withdrawn from the front line and mustered. I came to the -conclusion that it would be expedient to remain where we were for the -night, to be in readiness to renew the action on the following day, and -especially to cut the enemy off from his water-supply, which must be -somewhere outside the camp. - -About midnight it was reported that one of our patrols had encountered -a strong enemy force on the Nanungu-Mahua road. I was afraid that this -force, which I took to be strong in view of its independent movement, -would advance further on Nanungu and capture our company’s stores -(ammunition, medical stores, supplies, etc.), which were on this road -as well as the depot at Nanungu. I therefore withdrew during the night -with the greater part of my force, via Makoti, to the Nanungu-Mahua -road. Only strong patrols remained in front of the enemy, but these -did not notice that the enemy, too, evacuated his position during the -night and withdrew towards Mahua. On 6th May it became apparent that -the report of strong enemy forces on the Nanungu-Mahua road, which had -caused my retirement, was incorrect. There was no enemy there. Captain -Müller, hearing the firing of the English trench-mortars, had, with -admirable initiative, immediately begun a forced march from his camp -north-east of Mahua, towards the sound and had apparently been taken -for the enemy. - -When he arrived on the battlefield he found that the enemy had retired. -The enemy, consisting of four companies and a machine-gun company, -and to judge from his fortifications a thousand strong, had been -completely defeated by our force of little more than 200 rifles—we -were 62 Europeans and 342 Askari. He had lost 14 Europeans and 91 -Askari killed, 3 Europeans and 3 Askari taken prisoner. In addition, -his hospital with about 100 wounded had fallen into our hands, and -according to the natives he had taken other wounded with him. Our -casualties were: 6 Europeans, 24 Askari, 5 other natives killed; 10 -Europeans, 67 Askari and 28 other natives wounded. - -While this gratifying success against the enemy’s western columns was -being attained, Koehl’s detachment had been engaged in continuous -fighting, often on a considerable scale, against the enemy divisions -which were advancing on Nanungu from Port Amelia. At Medo the enemy, -according to his own statement, suffered heavy losses in one -engagement west of Medo. Captain Spangenberg, with his two companies, -had succeeded in getting round the enemy, falling on and capturing -from the rear his light field howitzer battery. Nearly all the men and -horses of this battery were killed. Unfortunately it was not possible -to remove the guns and ammunition. They were rendered useless. But in -spite of this individual success, Koehl’s detachment had to retire. -The moment was approaching when the timely intervention of my main -force with Koehl’s detachment might bring about a decisive success -against General Edwards. Once more, however, the question of supplies -dragged our movements. The crops of the district had all been consumed, -except the Mtama, which ripens much earlier in this country than -in German East Africa. But it was not yet ripe. In order to avoid -having to withdraw simply for reasons of supply, we ripened the Mtama -artificially by drying it. This made the grain quite edible, and as -there was plenty of it in the district everyone got as much as he -wanted, and there was no want. - -The condition of the crops prompted me to march with the main body of -the force further south-west, in the direction of Mahua, and pitch my -camp beside the Koroma mountain, not far from the Timbani mountain. -I intended, if necessary, to march further south, to avail myself of -the abundant crops in the fertile districts near the confluence of -the Malma and Lurio rivers. West of the Timbani mountain the country -was favourable for a decisive action against General Edwards, who was -following Captain Koehl’s detachment south-west from Nanungu. The -extraordinarily rocky and broken country near the mountain, and four -miles north-east of it, as far as the place to which Koehl’s detachment -had retired, was not favourable for the decisive attack I had in view. -On 21st May smoke indicated fresh enemy camps west of the positions of -Koehl’s detachment. I guessed that this new enemy would march on 22nd -May to take Koehl’s detachment in the rear from the west. Unfortunately -I omitted to give Koehl’s detachment definite orders to withdraw their -main force immediately from the unfavourable country to the south-west -of the Timbani mountain. Instead of a positive order I gave him -instructions which left him too much freedom of action. - -Thus it came about that Koehl’s detachment did not get their bearers -with the ammunition and baggage on the march until the forenoon of the -22nd of May. Even then all would have been well if the Governor, who -had attached himself to Koehl’s division, had not marched at their -head. Not understanding the seriousness of the situation, he made a -considerable halt in the middle of this unfavourable country, where he -was exposed to a surprise attack from the enemy at any moment, without -being able to put up an effective defence. The bearers of Koehl’s -detachment, in spite of Captain Koehl’s orders, allowed themselves to -halt likewise. During the morning of this day, I once more personally -reconnoitred the very favourable country south-west of the Timbani -mountain, and met, among others, Lieutenant Kempner, who had been -wounded the day before with Koehl’s detachment and carried to the rear. -From Koehl’s detachment itself, where, since the morning, several -enemy attacks had been beaten off, sounds of distant fighting were -to be heard. There was telephonic communication with Captain Koehl, -and I returned about 11 a.m. to the Koroma camp without having any -idea of the situation of his transport. At noon I had just entered -the camp when suddenly there was a loud sound of firing, from a very -short distance, of trench-mortars, beyond doubt between us and Koehl’s -detachment. Immediately afterwards telephonic communication in that -direction was broken off. There was no alternative but to march my -whole force immediately from the Koroma camp against this new enemy. -I secretly hoped that, in spite of the unfavourable country, we -might perhaps succeed in taking him by surprise, and in inflicting a -decisive defeat. Barely an hour later we reached the Timbani mountain -and quickly threw back the advanced detachment of the enemy. A few -scattered men reported that the Governor and Captain Koehl’s transport -had been surprised by the enemy and all the baggage lost. The Governor -himself had only just managed to get away; others said he had been -taken prisoner. The enemy had opened a fairly lively fire with several -mine-throwers, and was attacked by our companies from several sides. He -had, however, taken up a good position, in which he entrenched himself -and had hidden part of the captured baggage. Unfortunately we only -recaptured a small quantity. But the enemy position was surrounded and -subjected to a concentrated and gruelling fire. According to a dispatch -captured later, the 1st King’s African Rifles alone lost about two -hundred men. - -[Illustration: Native Types (5). - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: Native Types (6). - -(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)] - -[Illustration: Fig. xviii. The Action at the Kireka Mts.] - -Several companies and patrols of Captain Koehl’s detachment took part -in this envelopment of the enemy. Captain Koehl himself had turned his -main force against the new enemy, attacking his rear, and hoped to be -able to defeat him while a strong patrol facing north-east held his -former enemy in check. This patrol, however, was much too weak. It was -pressed back, and had again to be reinforced with troops from Captain -Koehl’s detachment. Even though the enemy had without doubt suffered -on the whole considerable losses, a decisive success was unattainable. -The fighting was broken off at dark, and we withdrew to the favourable -country I had reconnoitred between the Timbani and Koroma mountains. - -Meanwhile the Governor had found his way to the camp by the Koroma -mountain. He had lost all his belongings in the adventure, and was -looked after by Heder, a non-commissioned officer, and the trustworthy -and cautious leader of the supply column. I, too, came up to help the -Governor in his adversity, and honoured him with a pair of blue socks, -which his wife had made me at the beginning of the war, but which -unfortunately had faded. - -Apart from the serious loss of about 70,000 rounds of ammunition, -we had also lost a considerable amount of notes—I believe it was -30,000 rupees. My desire to give requisition notes in preference to -bank notes, and so save a lot of transport of securities and avoid -unnecessary losses, had not been acceded. Millions of rupee notes -had been printed, the dragging about of which, in the present war -situation, was particularly burdensome. In order, at least, to avoid -similar losses in the future, the Quartermaster, on my instructions, -destroyed a great part of the notes which had been obtained with so -much trouble. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -IN THE REGION OF THE LURIO AND LIKUNGO RIVERS - - -ON May 23rd the rest of our transport and the main body of the troops -were started off from Coroma camp on a track right through the bush -to Koriwa. The bulk of our carrier columns and the sick had gone on -ahead. The rearguard under Captain Otto remained a few days longer on -the Koroma Mountain and there successfully repulsed several hostile -attacks. It looked as if our enemy had once again collected the bulk of -his troops at Timbani, after the conclusion of a concentric operation, -and needed some time to reorganize his supply before resuming -his march. Returning patrols reported heavy motor traffic on the -Nanungu-Timbani Mountain road. Other patrols informed us that hostile -forces from the east were approaching the northern bank of the Lurio -river. - -Unmolested by the enemy, I now made for the fertile district of -Kwiri, south of Mahua, and from thence on to the Lurio. It turned -out, however, that some of our seriously wounded and sick would not -be able to endure several days of such marches in their “Maschille” -(litters). Nor was it easy to ensure medical attention. We had too few -attendants to be able to leave the sick behind individually. So there -was nothing for it but to collect our invalids from time to time, turn -them into a complete Field Hospital, under a single medical officer, -and take our leave of them finally. Even the senior medical officer of -the Protective Force, Dr. Meixner, was left behind at Kwiri with one -such hospital. On that occasion I said farewell to Lieutenant Schaefer -who had rendered us such exemplary service in the preparations for the -action at Jassini, and was now stricken with black-water fever. This -experienced “African” was fully aware of his situation, but was as -cheerful as ever and faced his inevitable end, which was approaching -fast, with composure. - -I did not wish to linger long north of the Lurio, for I thought that -this river, which had been very high only a short time before, would -be a serious obstacle. For that reason I proposed to cross it with our -large quantity of transport quickly and without let or hindrance. When -we actually reached the Lurio it appeared that at this time of the year -there were plenty of fords which offered a comfortable crossing. We -left some of our troops on the northern bank without anxiety as to the -drawbacks involved, and established a camp for the main body on the -southern bank. The country was very fertile and the inhabitants trusted -in us; good relations had been established by the earlier visits of the -patrols and raiding parties. One of my orderlies had a hearty reception -from some old acquaintances. - -I was pretty sure that the English would attack us here and be -compelled to bring up ever more troops. If I only withdrew slowly -enough, the strong enemy forces would, I believed, probably follow, -but in view of their immense supply difficulties, it would be in vain. -In this way I might achieve my main purpose of gaining enough time to -raid the weaker hostile camps and posts further south. Captain Müller’s -detachment, which had been sent south, discovered one such camp at -Malema, the same place where our troops had won heartening successes -before. - -After fighting for several days Captain Müller captured the Boma -Malema. It had been occupied by an English half-battalion which retired -south at night. Simultaneously a Portuguese patrol had gone north from -the Boma Malema and returned. Captain Müller took the latter for the -retreating English, attacked them on the march and was very astonished -to find that the killed were Portuguese. - -After the action Captain Müller shifted his camp. In the move, -Lieutenant von Schroetter, who was ill with malaria, was left behind -for a short time and taken prisoner by an English patrol which suddenly -appeared upon the scene. When this patrol marched off to the Boma -Inagu he managed to escape, and rejoined us at length, quite exhausted. -But he lost all his belongings, and had nothing on his head—a very -serious matter under a tropical sun. - -From the reports of the natives and our own patrols there was no longer -room for doubt that strong enemy forces, which had disembarked at -Mozambique, were marching west on the Boma Malema, and were already -only a few days’ march from that place. Simultaneous reports were -received that troops were also marching towards the Boma Malema from -the west, the direction of Malacotera. A few days later the enemy -following us from the north reached the Lurio, so we evacuated its -northern bank. From captured documents and the fighting that took place -on the northern bank, we judged that this hostile force was stronger -than I had suspected. Thanks to its light motor transport columns it -had been able to follow us up quickly with all its supply as well as a -body which I estimated at about three or four battalions with auxiliary -arms. - -The country along the river Malema in which we had our camp was quite -extraordinarily fertile. The _mtama_ was perfectly ripe, and there was -an abundance of tomatoes, bananas, sweet potatoes (_batatas_) and other -fruits. The food was also very varied. Game and fish were plentiful. -The natives knew the German troops from previous acquaintance, and -were very friendly. When I rode from one detachment to another the -women came running out of their houses to see the “Njama” (animal, -game, flesh), a creature quite unknown to them. I was riding a horse, -of course! The fertile country was so extensive that we could not -even approximately exploit or protect it. We could not prevent it -supplying the necessities of life to the large number of Askari and -non-combatants with our enemies, as well as ourselves. We could not -deprive the enemy of the possibility of also making this prolific -region in a large measure into a new base and shortening his line -of supply. From our point of view the country was, if anything, too -fertile and we were not in a position, as on earlier occasions, to -exploit it to such an extent before we left that it was insufficient -to support the enemy masses. But at any rate it had the result that -for the moment we were very mobile as, thanks to our sojourn of several -weeks, our wounded and sick were so far recovered that all, even the -inmates of the field hospitals, were quite fit for marching. - -This advantage would have been lost once more by any considerable -actions. I decided gradually to evacuate the region, in spite of its -extraordinary fertility, and slip through the ring in which the enemy -columns were enclosing me in the fertile district of the Malema river. -My idea was that a small part of my troops should hold off these enemy -columns and keep them so busy that they would think they were involved -in a serious affair, and attack my rearguard properly. In coming to -this decision, good service was done me by the orders of the English -commander which had fallen into our hands. He had no intention of -being “foxed” by us a second time, as he had been at Koriwa, and had -therefore arranged that whenever contact was established with us at any -point, several detachments should immediately execute a flank march -round us at a distance of five or six English miles. I told General -Edwards about this later on, and he was extraordinarily amused that -this had given me an intimation of his intentions, and enabled me to -take my counter-measures against them. It was obvious that if I only -echeloned my troops deeply enough the enemy’s enveloping detachments -would be placed in the greatest peril. They would find themselves -sandwiched between my detachments and in this way could be taken by -surprise in the flank or rear by my troops echeloned further back. -Unfortunately the execution of this plan was only imperfect. In the -very thick bush, however carefully one watched camp fires and the -dust, there were too few indications to follow a column properly and -it was very difficult for a column to keep its direction. In addition -there were a number of factors that threw out one’s calculations, -factors such as dense bush, marshes and water-courses. In spite of all -these obstacles, we succeeded every now and then in taking one of the -hostile enveloping columns by surprise and bringing it under fire. -The inevitable difficulties of moving separate columns in the thick -bush were even greater on the English side than on the German. When a -collision occurred there was often a complete mix-up in which neither -friend nor foe knew whom he had before him. On one occasion Lieutenant -von Ruckteschell’s detachment, which had been nearest to the enemy, -fell back on some of our troops which had been echeloned further back. -In so doing it came across a reconnoitring party in the bush, at a -distance of about thirty paces. This patrol was recognized as an enemy. -The machine guns were brought into position under the nose of the enemy -and without any interference on his part, and the patrol, which had -taken our men for English, was fired on lustily at point-blank range -and put to flight in a second. - -In the same way our own patrols continually found themselves in the -middle of enemy troops. On one such occasion _Vizefeldwebel_ Schaffrath -made his patrol lie down in the high grass and then opened an effective -fire on the head of approaching enemy columns. Then he took cover -again. In this way he succeeded in the course of a few hours in -inflicting sensible losses on the enemy several times and capturing -some material. - -I wanted to gain time by these holding actions, so that I could get -my main body into the country further south, which was supposed to be -fertile, according to report, and fall upon and drive away the smallish -hostile garrisons we expected to find there. The first objective -of this nature was the Portuguese _Boma_ Alto-Moloque. A captured -map showed that this had been the seat of a higher administrative -authority in peace time and the military station of a force exceeding -a company. Both natives and food must certainly be there. Between us -and Alto-Moloque lay the high range of Inagu. An English battalion in -its entrenched camp at Inagu barred the road which led from the Boma -Malema round the west side of the Inagu Mountains to Alto-Moloque. -It was therefore probable that our advance by that road would be -contested, and that would have been unpleasant in view of the length -of our carrier columns. In any case we should have been delayed and -our intended surprise attack on Alto-Moloque would have been spoilt. -But surprise I regarded as absolutely essential, as we suspected the -presence of ammunition and arms at Alto-Moloque. - -Accordingly we left the enemy in peace in his entrenchments at Inagu -and marched round the east side of the Inagu Mountains on Alto-Moloque. -The strategic situation was somewhat remarkable, and well described in -the words of an old Boer, words that were not quite pure High German: -“Is das eine Komische Orlog; ons lopt achter de Portugies an, und de -Englanders lopt achter ons an” (_This is a funny war. We chase the -Portuguese, and the English chase us_). - -We marched by native tracks or straight through the bush. Several -considerable streams had to be negotiated on the way. This district, -too, was fertile, and we soon came across unmistakable human tracks -leading towards Alto-Moloque, not to mention kraals, the first I had -ever seen. They were grass huts, very thick and carefully built. Ashes -were smouldering in places and the heads of hens which were lying about -were still fresh. We exchanged shots with some Portuguese patrols and a -few rifles with ammunition were captured. - -No time must be lost, so Müller’s detachment, made specially mobile -by being relieved of all its transport, went on ahead and found in -Alto-Moloque only a few Portuguese officers and non-commissioned -officers who were just drinking coffee on the verandah of the very fine -European house. These were taken prisoner. - -I now followed slowly with the main body. Our rearguard, under -Captain Koehl, had quite a series of little collisions, which in -bulk caused the enemy not inconsiderable losses. One of our Askari -patrols had been surprised and captured by a stronger enemy patrol -when engaged in foraging for food. These Askari subsequently looked on -while this English patrol fought quite a bloody action with another -English detachment in the thick bush and the occurrence gave them -their opportunity of escaping. The lack of caution which many of our -Europeans continually showed, in spite of all warnings, caused us many -unnecessary losses. There was one Askari, a particularly reliable and -intelligent man, whose father, the old Effendi Plantan, had already -been with Von Wissmann’s Zulu Askari, whom I had been only too glad to -take with me on patrol. He never came back from some quite unnecessary -mission on which he was sent, and was probably taken prisoner. It was a -phenomenon common to both sides that a large part of the losses in the -war in East Africa were unnecessary and due solely to thoughtlessness. - -Koehl’s detachment gradually came up with the main body, which had -reached the Alto-Moloque-Inagu road at a European plantation which -was well stocked with provisions. From this place it had rung up -Alto-Moloque on the enemy’s telephone and received a reply, first from -a Portuguese, then from Captain Müller. Müller reported that only a -small amount of ammunition had been captured, and that the bulk must -have been got away to the south-east just in time by several carrier -parties. Strong patrols were immediately sent out after them. - -When the main body entered Alto-Moloque on June 16th we found some very -fine and massive European houses. They were charmingly situated on a -little hill, and had a view for miles over the neighbouring forests to -the mighty rugged mountains in the distance. There were thousands of -orange trees in full bloom and our coloured men immediately christened -it the “Boma ja machungwa” (Orange _boma_). - -The numerous maps and documents of all kinds which were found at -the station gave us a tolerably clear idea of the country towards -Quelimane. We could see that there was a telegraph wire from -Alto-Moloque to Quelimane via Ili. A large company, the Lugella -Company, had its headquarters at the confluence of the Lugella with the -Likungo. There were great plantations and factories and large supplies -of food. Above all, it looked as if preparations were in progress to -make this station a main supply depot for food and ammunition for -considerable bodies of troops. - -If we wished to exploit the opportunity that this situation presented, -our subordinate commanders would have to act very promptly and must not -be hampered by too rigid instructions. The impression that I formed in -my mind rested in many respects on unproved assumptions. Our pursuing -patrols must be able to act according to circumstances independently -and rapidly if that original impression was not confirmed subsequently. -Time must not be lost, or the enemy would be able to get his supplies -away in time. He would have the advantage of a railway which began not -far south of the Lugella Company’s station and led south to the river -Namacurra, as well as the steamer which plied on that stream. - -As so often happens, our pursuing patrols and companies were -occasionally found wanting in some respects. Yet it must not be -forgotten that besides many other qualities a very mature tactical -judgment is required to give an independent decision on the question -when the very exhausting pursuit of a fleeing foe is to be continued -at top pressure or should be broken off. To exploit the promising -situation to the greatest possible extent, on the very day of my -arrival at Alto-Moloque I had sent in pursuit the whole of Müller’s -detachment, which I had hitherto kept by me. In the course of various -patrols and raids in the neighbourhood we caught individual Portuguese -Askari who in many cases had set up off their own bats as little -tyrants in the villages of the district. The natives reported their -presence to us. - -The region of Alto-Moloque turned out to be very fertile, as we -anticipated. We were therefore in a position to give Müller’s -detachment a greater start in following up the enemy. One of the -patrols of this detachment had captured a hostile supply depot near -Ili. An enemy carrier column, turned off by an Anglo-Portuguese -detachment which was now several days’ march east of Alto-Moloque, and -trying to pass through Alto-Moloque in ignorance of our presence, was -a welcome acquisition to our Intendant, who needed it to carry the -supplies captured at Ili. Unfortunately this intended removal succeeded -only partially, for a fresh English detachment appeared at Ili, -apparently from the direction of Inagu, and drove off our patrols. - -The advance of our main body on Ili was contested by considerable -hostile patrols which were approaching the Alto-Moloque-Ili road from -the north. One of these patrols was immediately pursued energetically -and attacked in its camp, but I gained the impression that larger enemy -forces were advancing on us from the north of Ili and Alto-Moloque. -I had no intention of delaying, but wished rather to join up as -soon as possible with Müller’s detachment, which was on its way to -Lugella. Accordingly I marched south, skirting Ili and occupied the -Portuguese post of Nampepo. In this district, at about a day’s march -from each other, the Portuguese companies had established a number of -clean, well-arranged stations around which lay the fields, which they -cultivated. A whole series of these posts and their field-depots fell -into our hands during the march. Nampepo was one of them, only larger -than usual, and the centre of an extraordinarily fertile district. A -special feature of the Nampepo camp was our chase after domestic pigs. -Large numbers of these were running loose in the bush, so that we had -excellent sausages to eat, as well as roast pork and brawn. A German -planter named Hauter, from the district of Morogoro, who had delivered -large supplies of sausages to Morogoro during the war, had acquired -expert skill in preparing them, and this now came in very useful. He -now had the insides of pigs to practise on instead of the insides of -cows, and our enjoyment of this unwonted luxury was so great that we -did not allow ourselves to be disturbed even by the shots that fell -into our camp. - -For as a matter of fact a considerable enemy column from the north -was approaching the station of Nampepo, which was held by Captain -Spangenberg with our outposts. From the commanding ground the approach -of a large enemy column could be noted quite easily. As a particularly -favourable opportunity for attacking it presented itself we did not -disturb the enemy in his approach. However, contrary to expectation, he -did not attack us. Pillars of smoke arising from the bush about 1,500 -yards away showed us that he had encamped there. Our patrols which went -round the enemy crawled up to his camp at night and fired into it. -Koehl’s detachment had come up meanwhile and I marched off with the -main body to follow Müller’s detachment in the direction of Lugella. -Captain Spangenberg remained with our rearguard in touch with the -enemy, and then followed us at a distance of a day’s march. - -Meanwhile Captain Müller’s detachment had succeeded in crossing the -Likungo river, near the confluence of the Lugella, at a ford. It -had been able to give an apparently severe drubbing to a Portuguese -battalion which had rushed up from the south to protect it. Several -machine guns were captured. The great depot of the Lugella Company fell -into our hands. It was possible to distribute a large amount of food -and clothing. The buildings themselves, which had been adapted for -defence, and about 300,000 kilograms of food were burnt. - -As no other remunerative objective presented itself Captain Müller -considered he had fulfilled his mission for the time being, retired to -the southern bank of the Likungo and there awaited my arrival. - -I was afraid that our wonderful captures of the last few weeks would -tempt some of our Europeans to help themselves to things improperly, -and I took advantage of the occasion to point out the evils of such -behaviour. It must not be forgotten that war booty belongs to the -State, and that the individual soldier has to notify to his superiors -if he happens to want any particular object he has captured. An -estimate is then made of the value of the object and he has to pay the -amount. It was important for me to maintain the _moral_ of our troops -unconditionally if I was to be able to appeal to their sense of honour -and make calls on their endurance. - -A certain amount of ammunition was captured here and there, and, -further, a small Portuguese gun had fallen into our hands, but the -great haul of cartridges for which we had hoped and striven had not -materialized. I thought it extremely doubtful whether there ever had -been such large stocks at Alto-Moloque and Ili, and suspected that the -whole thing was a case of exaggeration of the approved native type. -That did not imply evil intentions on the part of those concerned. On -the contrary, the natives were well-disposed towards us. For example, -they brought back of their own accord one of our captured Portuguese -officers who had escaped. They also brought us some German black boys -who had been enjoying themselves looting, and had been caught and well -beaten by the natives, excusing themselves on the ground that they had -taken them for Portuguese! - -It is an extremely difficult matter even for a European to estimate, -for example, the numerical strength of a detachment on the march. The -native finds it much more difficult, especially when it comes to larger -numbers. The words he so frequently uses, _mingi_ (much) or _kama -majani_ (as thick as grass) can mean 50 just as well as 5,000. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -ON TO THE SOUTH - - -HOWEVER, wherever these large ammunition depots might be, they had -certainly not fallen into our hands. We had to start out on the search -again. The whole strategic situation, as well as the documents we -captured, showed that they _must_ be somewhere in this region. There -was a high degree of probability that the more considerable stocks, -whose existence we suspected, were further south, either because they -had been there from the start or because they had been moved there as a -result of our approach. It seemed likely that before long they would be -transported to the coast and transferred to ships, in case of emergency. - -During our march considerable patrols had reconnoitred the region -within a radius of a day’s march, and captured a few small enemy food -depots, but no arms or ammunition. Müller’s detachment, with which -we had joined up at Mujeba on June 27th, marched further south again -the same day. The natives told us of a large _boma_ at Origa, which -was said to be somewhere further south, near the coast, and to have -large ammunition supplies. Müller’s party was to find this _boma_. Our -directions were thoroughly inaccurate, as usual. I was quite certain -that on the march other and conflicting reports would infallibly -arrive. Unfortunately we had not a long time in which to test the -intelligence that came in. All we could do was to trust that it -contained at least an element of truth. - -As the situation demanded, Captain Müller was given the greatest -freedom of action. If any promising objective presented itself during -his march, he was to decide without hesitation what his best course -was. I would bring up our main body and intervene unconditionally -in his support, and, in any case, I would accept the situation he -had created. The main thing was that he should not wait for special -orders and instructions. I realized that in acting thus I was in a -large measure placing the conduct of our operations in the hands of a -subordinate commander. It was only possible because that subordinate -commander possessed a very sound, tactical judgment and great -initiative. - -Our leading troops, with their three weak companies, had to perform the -double function of cavalry sent out far and wide to reconnoitre, and -that of an advance guard led with the greatest energy. In any other -circumstances I should have been with the advance guard myself, in -view of its important task, so that I could have a surer hold on the -course of operations. Experience had taught me, however, that in view -of the distance between our columns, my presence with the main body was -indispensable, both to overcome obstacles quickly and to be able to -act in face of some unforeseen change in the situation. It must not be -forgotten that our whole advance was based on combination, and that, as -actually happened often enough, the unsuspected appearance of hostile -detachments from some other direction transformed the situation at a -blow and made fresh dispositions necessary. - -Accordingly we marched by small native tracks or right through the -bush in single file. Owing to the great length of our columns, on a -day’s march of nineteen miles or so the head had to start off in the -dark—about 5 a.m.—if the tail was to reach the camp appointed the -same day, that is, late in the evening and just before darkness fell. -It was inevitable, because camping material had to be procured, wood -to be chopped, grass to be cut and shelters to be built, in case of -need, for the sick. For that reason our whole force could not march -concentrated. It was much too extended. Müller’s detachment, forming -the advance guard, marched one or two days’ march ahead. The rearguard, -Spangenberg’s detachment, followed the main body at a distance of about -a day’s march. Communication was maintained by means of runners. - -In the reports which reached us by the runners of Müller’s detachment, -the name “Kokosani” was now perpetually recurring. Considerable enemy -depots, strongly protected by hostile troops, were to be found there, -so it was said. But where was this Kokosani? The word could not be -found on our maps. It gradually came to light that Kokosani was the -same place that figured on Portuguese maps as Namacurra. In any case, -all our previous intelligence, as well as a glance at the situation on -the map, showed that Kokosani must be our most promising objective. We -had no means of knowing whether it would be possible to capture this -place, probably very strongly fortified, with our relatively limited -resources. Only the attempt itself could enlighten us on that point. -Captain Müller had turned west towards the place independently. On the -way it became clear that, as the natives had told us, there actually -was a ford over the river Likungo. - -I now marched on quickly with our main body, in order to join up, -and gave orders to the same effect to our rearguard under Captain -Spangenberg. In the afternoon of July 1st, the main force reached the -Likungo and immediately crossed it. The water of this great river, more -than four hundred yards wide, came up to our necks at the deepest parts -of the ford. It took each man about an hour to cross. When the troops -had successfully reached the western bank, we bivouacked, and next -morning continued our march in the tracks of Müller’s detachment ahead. - -On the way some thirty natives met us. They had worked in Kokosani, -and told us that a large number of Portuguese and Askari were -encamped there, and that a number of chests had arrived. We had to -employ interpreters in our talk with these men, as they did not know -Kisuaheli. Several of our Askari were masters of the local tongue or -related dialects. - -Before long we received an important report from the advance guard. On -the previous day Captain Müller had completely surprised the enemy at -Kokosani by an encircling move. Marching on the factory buildings from -the north in broad daylight, through a field of knee-high agaves and -without any cover, he had succeeded in getting into the Portuguese -entrenchments and, in several hours of very severe hand-to-hand -fighting, defeating the three Portuguese companies holding them, with -very heavy losses to the enemy. In the course of the action a number of -rifles, as well as two field guns with their ammunition, were captured. - -I myself went on a little ahead of our main body, and in the morning -came across several extensive and well-arranged plantations. Next -I followed the track of a field railway, which ran along the main -road right through the fields, and after a short time joined up with -a standard-gauge line. As was to appear later, the latter led from -the river Namacurra northwards to the neighbourhood of Lugella. When -Captain Müller struck this standard-gauge line the day before, he held -up a train which had just come from Lugella. It is easy to realize the -mutual amazement when there descended from the train several Portuguese -non-commissioned officers whom Müller had captured at Lugella and -released again. - -When I reached the factory buildings, Captain Müller came limping up to -me, pretty lame. He expressed his astonishment that I had brought my -detachment direct to Kokosani by the main road and without opposition, -for he thought that there must be quite two English companies somewhere -in the neighbourhood. He had not yet been able to ascertain their -whereabouts, but documents which Captain Müller had captured pointed -conclusively to their presence in the district. Müller also told -me that he had not yet found the considerable quantity of infantry -cartridges. All his people were still busy trying to find them and -anything similar. - -When I considered the matter more closely, it seemed to me more -probable that the ammunition stores we were hunting for would not -be near the factory, but must be somewhere directly on the railway, -and, indeed, at its southern terminus. That was the place for a large -ammunition depot, for it must be the unloading point where the stuff -was transferred to rail from ships on the Namacurra. We had to find out -whether these deductions were sound. I went back immediately and met -the leading files of our main body among the plantations. The leading -companies were anything but pleased to have to retrace their steps in -order to follow the standard-gauge railway southwards. After the long, -tiring march a few complimentary remarks about my arrangements were -comprehensible enough. Fortunately for me, I did not hear them. - -It was in a rather bad humour that the men at the head of the column -arrived in the neighbourhood of the railway-station. They did not -seriously believe in the possibility of a fight. It was upon them -suddenly, however, and several Askari were struck by hostile bullets -at quite short range and fell. The rest of our main force, which was -near at hand and ready for action, was brought up. When I arrived, the -situation was not at all clear; the enemy was obviously entrenched and -closer reconnaissance was in progress. An indecisive exchange of shots -now developed. It began to rain and was unpleasantly cold, so that -everyone felt thoroughly uncomfortable. I myself went to Lieutenant von -Ruckteschell’s company, which was lying opposite to and about ninety -yards from the corrugated-iron buildings of the station and directing -a well-aimed rifle and machine-gun fire from some high ant-hills every -time anything showed. - -I considered that the situation at the moment was unfavourable to -storming the station. We would have been compelled to rush at the -enemy’s position through the thick bush, which was commanded by a most -effective hostile fire. That offered but little prospect of success. A -number of our men would probably not have joined in the rush at all, -and those who did and got close to the enemy’s fortress would probably -have been held up and found themselves unable to get on. We should, -therefore, achieve nothing. - -On the other hand, my reconnaissance had brought the idea to my mind -that on targets, some of which were very visible, artillery fire would -be effective, especially from two sides. It would frighten the enemy’s -Askari and make them run away. That would be a favourable moment for -good machine-gun fire. But the day was already too far advanced, and -our gun was smashed, so that nothing definite could be ventured on for -that day. The larger portion of the troops retired to our camp, and -only three companies of Captain Poppe’s detachment remained in close -contact with the enemy. - -The next day, July 3rd, we got our gun into working order again, after -strenuous efforts. As luck would have it, it was of the same model -as the guns Captain Müller had captured, and so, by interchanging -the individual serviceable parts of these three guns, we produced a -field-piece fit for use. There was thus a prospect of putting to good -use the two hundred rounds we had captured two days before. In the -afternoon the gun was to be brought up to within a few hundred yards -of the station, and open fire upon it. Another smaller, 4-cm., gun was -ready in the foremost infantry line—and therefore about a hundred and -twenty-five yards off—to start a cross fire. All our machine guns were -held ready. In the morning I had been to the factory buildings again -for a conference, and had told the civilian personnel there they need -not get frightened if they heard the sound of firing in the afternoon. -The white women and children had been very frightened by the fighting, -and some of them had fled into the bush. - -I had gone back to our camp, extremely tired, when the sound of -fighting at the station suddenly made itself heard. We received a -telephone report that loud yells and cries of “hurrah” could be -heard coming from the station. By degrees the following facts were -established: the enemy was apparently tired of the well-aimed, -concentric fire which had been directed at them since the afternoon. -They were now being subjected to artillery fire from two sides at once, -and the moment there was the slightest movement machine guns opened on -them. Their young troops could not stand it, and were very restless. -Our companies recognized that this was their weak moment and used it -immediately, showing splendid initiative. They leaped up with loud -hurrahs, and the next minute were in the enemy’s position. The enemy -began to run away. The English maintained that they had been infected -by the example of the Portuguese. However that may be, they ran away -and our companies immediately went after them as hard as they could. -Our flying foes reached the river Namacurra, which ran immediately -behind their position, quickly pulled off their boots and dashed into -the water. Here most of the hostile troops were drowned, including -their commander, Major Gore-Brown. - -Between July 1st and 3rd the enemy had 5 Europeans and 100 Askari -killed, 4 Europeans and about 100 Askari drowned, while 421 Askari -were taken prisoner. Of the Europeans (5 English and 117 Portuguese) -who also fell into our hands, 55 Portuguese escaped and 46 sick and -wounded Portuguese were left behind in the hospital at Kokosani. We had -8 Askari and 1 machine-gun carrier killed, 3 Europeans, 11 Askari and -2 machine-gun carriers wounded. At first it was quite impossible to -estimate, even approximately, what amount of ammunition and food we had -captured at the station. Seven heavy, 3 light machine guns and 2 guns -had fallen into our hands, but these 2 guns had been rendered useless. - -More and more cases of captured ammunition were brought into our camp. -The Intendant, Lieutenant Besch (retired naval officer), was in despair -because he did not know where he was going to get enough carriers to -remove such vast stores. They included more than 300,000 kilograms of -food and the stocks from the Kokosani sugar factory. The amount of -booty enabled all our coloured men to receive as much clothing material -as they wanted, and my boy, Serubili, said to me: “This is a very -different matter to Tanga; we’re all getting as much sugar as we want -now.” - -It is a fact that the whole camp was littered with sugar. Each of the -blacks was so well-off for food and clothing of all kinds that they -stopped stealing, as if by word of command. Everyone knows what that -means where blacks are concerned. - -The booty included large quantities of European food and preserves. -Every European found himself well provided for for months ahead. -Unfortunately it was not possible for us to get away the whole stock -of excellent wine we had captured. After a sufficient quantity had -been set aside as a restorative for the sick, the rest had mainly to -be drunk on the spot. The risk of a wholesale “jollification” _that_ -involved was gladly taken, and everyone was allowed to let himself go -for once, after his long abstinence. - -In addition there was some fine schnapps in a large number of casks in -the Kokosani factory. These were being stored ready for the English -troops. With the best will in the world it was impossible to drink it -all, so we had to empty a large number of the casks into the Namacurra. - -Column after column of carriers arrived in the camp with booty, and -the Intendant became more and more desperate. Affairs reached a climax -when a telephone message came from the station that a river-steamer -had arrived. An English medical officer, all unsuspecting of what had -happened at Namacurra, disembarked from it and closer examination -of the boat revealed the presence of a considerable consignment of -cartridges, exceeding three hundred cases. - -In all we had captured about three hundred and fifty modern English and -Portuguese rifles, a welcome addition to our resources, which brought -our armament once more up to requirements. We were able to discard our -’71 pattern rifle almost entirely. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -BACK NORTH TO THE NAMACURRA RIVER - - -IN face of the enemy’s orders we had captured I had to anticipate -that within a short time comparatively strong hostile forces would be -coming from Quelimane to attack us. The country between the Namacurra -and the Zambesi, however, offered a large number of river barriers, -so that a march to the Zambesi would be full of difficulties for us -and hinder our freedom of movement to an extraordinary degree. Equally -unfavourable for campaigning, from our point of view, was the country -south and south-west of our present halting-place. In the last resort -we should find ourselves cooped up on the Zambesi without being in a -position to effect a crossing of that mighty river which was commanded -by the enemy’s gun-boats. - -I thought it better to abandon our previous march direction. Yet in -view of the total absence of news it was very difficult to say where -I ought to make for. Only one thing appeared to be clear—that the -enemy was not directly on our heels. At any rate our rearguard and the -patrols they had sent out behind them were not being pressed at all by -the enemy. It seemed probable that if hostile bodies were following -us at all they were engaged in trying to overhaul us on some route -parallel to that we had taken. If I were right in that view—and it -seemed to be confirmed by such reports as the natives brought in—we -could assume that the enemy was insufficiently informed of our presence -at Namacurra and further that the Portuguese soldiers among our -prisoners whom we had turned off could give him no clear or trustworthy -information. - -We had, therefore, to devote all our efforts to making those fellows -believe we intended to fortify and put up a stiff defence of Namacurra -and, further, that we had our eye on Quelimane. - -The unexpected disaster at Namacurra was bound to speed the steps of -the pursuing enemy. It was probable that his columns, advancing on a -parallel line to us, would overshoot the mark, especially as they must -be anxious about the important port of Quelimane. I therefore decided -to wait at Namacurra until the pursuing enemy columns had actually -shot ahead of me and then turn about to the north-east. What chiefly -influenced me in this decision was that a march in this direction, -leading towards Mozambique, on the main line of communication, would -cause the enemy anxiety, and as soon as he became aware of it he would -at once turn about to protect the neighbourhood of Mozambique with -its wealth of stores. If he did not do so we should have a free hand -at Mozambique. As the position would then develop the enemy would be -forced to undertake marches that would exhaust his troops, while we -gained time to recuperate our strength and allow our sick and wounded -to recover. - -It was difficult to decide on the most favourable moment for our change -of direction north-east; we should have to rely to some extent on the -fortune of war. Even if I made the movement too soon and encountered -one of the enemy columns there was always a chance of defeating it when -cut off from the rest. The first thing, however, was to get safely -across the Likungo river again. The available information as to the -fords was very unreliable. In order not to use the same fords as before -I marched with my main body on the evening of 4th July to a crossing -further to the south. Lieutenant Ott, however, ascertained by personal -reconnaissance that no ford existed at the place of which we had been -informed. On the other hand, it was apparent from native information as -well as from tracks discovered that on the same day an English patrol -had halted in this neighbourhood. The position might become awkward. In -order to lose no time in investigation I marched along the west bank -of the Likungo to our previous ford. Unfortunately I had withdrawn the -covering force that had hitherto been left there and I did not know -whether it was free. I was therefore very relieved when on 5th July the -crossing was effected without further interference. Koehl’s detachment -was still at Namacurra and followed as rearguard. - -When we were again marching as a single column through the bush, -the great length of the column was unwieldy and, in the event of an -encounter with the enemy, would be a source of danger. We therefore -tried to shorten the column and to march in two, and later in several -parallel columns through the bush. The disadvantage of this arrangement -was that instead of one head of a column having to cut a way through -the bush this had now to be done by several. But the advantages of the -shorter length outweighed this disadvantage. - -Information from our patrols and from the natives indicated that the -march of the enemy columns to the south-west had not been pressed so -far as I had anticipated. Enemy troops were reported both between -the Moniga and the lower Likungo and also at Mujebain; in some cases -they were ascertained to be marching south-west. This brought about -the extraordinary situation that the enemy troops were marching in -several columns south-west while we were passing between these columns -in the contrary direction, north-east. This fact could not long -remain hidden from the enemy, especially as the patrols soon began -to come in contact, and the enemy troops, marching along the line -of telephone communication from Mulevalla to Murubella, crossed our -track. We continued our march to Oriva, threw back a weak Portuguese -detachment west of this place, and occupied Oriva itself on 14th -July. Unfortunately the abundant stores of supplies and ammunition -that we had expected to find at this station were not forthcoming; -apparently either the numerous enemy troops had drawn heavily on the -resources of the neighbourhood or the stores that had been originally -left here had already been removed. A small patrol, sent out to -Muatama under Sergeant-Major Hüttich, succeeded in surprising a small -mixed detachment of English and Portuguese; as it was unfortunately -impossible to get away the supplies found in this station the stores -had to be burned. - -Meanwhile our attempts to get information from the natives as to the -whereabouts of supplies met with no success; it was impossible to wait -for the reports of other patrols dispatched to Murua in search of -supplies. Various patrol actions showed us that the enemy had meanwhile -become aware of the change in the situation and had accordingly turned -his columns about. Want of supplies forced us to continue our march, -and the attack of a mixed Portuguese-English column on our rearguard -under Captain Koehl could not be developed into a complete success -as our main force was already on the march. We halted for a few days -in the tolerably fertile territory between Oriva and Murua. Captured -papers showed us that an English patrol had closely observed our -movements. - -It was interesting to notice that the English prisoners whom we -took with us, for the most part, accepted as a matter of course the -hardships of the long marches, the constant crossing of rivers and the -countless difficulties connected with supplies and transport; they -realized that we Germans had exactly the same hardships to endure as -themselves and were in addition burdened with a number of further -duties such as patrol expeditions, fighting, carrying of supplies -and watch-keeping. They bore everything with a certain humour and -it was obviously interesting to them to see the war from the German -point of view. It was quite otherwise with the Portuguese officers. -It is true they were in an unenviable position: for the most part -they were infected with syphilis and were carefully avoided by the -English prisoners. In addition they were not real campaigners. They -had received a generous share of the booty captured at Namacurra, but -had not learned how to make the best of it. They had at once consumed -the precious oil with rice and it was too much to expect that the -Germans should now share with them their own meagre ration. Marching -was a burden to them, their boots were torn to pieces—in short, -their spokesman, the general staff officer captured at Namacurra, was -continually complaining to me of the inconveniences which with the best -will in the world I could not help. He was continually asking to be -released. I should have been only too glad to consent if he would have -given his parole not to fight against us, but this he would not do. I -could not be expected to release people without any obligation and so -put them in a position to attack us again immediately. - -Considerations of supply drove us on. After the failure of the Oriva -neighbourhood to come up to our expectations in this respect, I planned -to reach the territory east of the Ligonja, which was marked on the -map as thickly populated and well cultivated. On the way the advance -guard, under Captain Müller, quickly took Boma Tipa, where several -days’ supplies, particularly pig-nuts, fell into our hands. The weak -Portuguese garrison offered only slight resistance and then fled at -once; the leader, a Portuguese sergeant, was the only prisoner captured. - -We had reached a high degree of efficiency in the rapid and systematic -distribution of booty; the main force hardly lost a day’s march and I -can still see the approving smile of one of the English prisoners who -seemed to have entirely forgotten that the Portuguese were his allies. -Apparently it amused them to see with what little ceremony we took from -them their depots one after the other, together with their supplies. -The captured enemy papers repeatedly gave us valuable information. -Two days’ march from Tipa lay another _boma_ called Namirrue, where -the Portuguese garrison had been strengthened by an English company. -Apparently considerable stores lay here. At any rate, according to -information, supply columns had been sent to replenish at Namirrue. -The English troops there probably belonged to an enemy force newly -appeared from the direction of Mozambique. It was impossible for the -enemy force to which we had hitherto been opposed, and which had taken -part in the general march south-west north-east, to have established -such a lead on us. Accordingly the advance guard with our gun at once -marched on Namirrue (the smaller gun had been put out of action at -Namacurra and left behind after firing its few cartridges). Captain -Müller was instructed to reconnoitre the position at Namirrue and act -independently as might be required. For the time being the main force -remained at Tipa, on the east bank of the Moloque. It was to obtain -supplies and hold up the enemy advancing from the south-west long -enough to allow Captain Müller the necessary time at Namirrue. It was -not long before small enemy reconnoitring forces appeared at Tipa, or -the west bank of the Ligonja, which at this point offers no obstacle -worth mentioning. There was a series of unimportant patrol engagements -on the east bank also. The rearguard, under Captain Koehl, carried out -a number of delaying actions at places along the Tipa-Namirrue road -which for the most part have already been mentioned. As I was not clear -whether the main force would find the best opportunity to attack in -Koehl’s position or at Namirrue I began by following cautiously with -him Müller’s detachment. The report then came in from Captain Müller -that an enemy force of some two companies was entrenched on the heights -at Namirrue and that he could not get at them even with his gun. On -the other hand, he reported that in all probability English troops -would come to the support of the enemy from the north or north-west. -There was a favourable opportunity for us to defeat these troops in -the open. I therefore marched the main force to Namirrue and on the -22nd July crossed the Namirrue river, about three miles above the rocky -hill occupied by the enemy. Camp was pitched on the east bank and -immediately there were patrol engagements. I myself, with Lieutenant -Besch, made a detour of the hill to join Captain Müller, who was -encamped immediately south-east of it. The enemy position had been -encircled with patrols and machine guns. On the heights above several -horses could be seen and, here and there, men too. Wherever a target -offered the enemy was fired on to prevent him from sending down men to -fetch water. It appeared, however, that the enemy must have been able -to keep himself supplied with water from a source unknown to us. - -After drinking a cup of coffee with Captain Müller we went further -round the hill and came upon Lieutenant Kempner and other patrols, -keenly engaged on reconnoitring work. In order to keep under cover we -had to work our way partly through the thick bush and came on large -quantities of cow-itch: contact with this plant produces an intolerable -irritation of the skin. We were just in the middle of a thicket of -this plant when we heard lively firing from the camp of our main -force. At the same time the enemy in the hill fired several salvoes, -apparently as a signal to their friends. I was immediately convinced -that a not very strong enemy detachment was approaching which was -unaware of the arrival of our main force. I was seized with the desire -to use this rare opportunity at once with my full strength. I tried -with all haste to get to the main force, but the cow-itch hampered my -progress and the irritation was maddening. Eventually we reached the -camp before dark. My second in command, Major Kraut, had begun the -attack with small forces. In the bright moonlight I could still hope -to use the approaching night for a successful battle. All available -forces, with the exception of a company left to protect the camp, were -at once prepared for action. On the left wing, Captain Goering, who -was to undertake an enveloping movement, took his force round to a -position in the rear of the enemy. There he heard the barking of a dog, -ran forward at once and found the English commanding officer, Colonel -Dickinson, with his adjutant and a medical officer, telephoning in a -ravine and took them prisoner. Captain Goering at once attacked and the -detachments of Captains Spangenberg and Poppe, in front and on the left -wing, did the same. In a very short time the enemy, consisting of one -battalion, was completely overwhelmed and routed. All the detachments -engaged in a hot pursuit, but in the darkness and the thick bush touch -was lost with the enemy. - -It turned out later that the enemy’s troops marching parallel with us -had crossed the Namirrue at the same time a little further upstream. -In view of the constantly changing situation, due to the continuous -movement of the forces and the impenetrable screen of the bush which -made it impossible to see far in any direction, and also owing to the -large number of his marching columns, it was quite impossible for the -enemy, in spite of the unremitting labours of his wireless service, -to obtain a clear picture of the situation as a whole and to keep -his subordinate leaders informed in time of all the changes of the -situation. In this case a column had become detached and had run upon -us with only a part of its strength: only one battalion had crossed the -river. In an exposed and very dangerous position this battalion had -been badly handled by our main force. - -A company detailed for the further pursuit of the retreating enemy -returned the following day without having achieved anything more; here, -again, after such a favourable action the subordinate leaders and the -troops themselves could only with difficulty be persuaded to throw -themselves in to the last ounce to wring every possible advantage from -their success. Lieutenant Schroetter, who then for several days carried -on the pursuit in a manner in keeping with the situation, was unable -to effect more than a few patrol skirmishes. The enemy had, in the -meantime, gained too great a start. No information was obtained except -as to the very hurried flight of the enemy. - -[Illustration: Fig. xix. The Action at Namirruë, July 23, 1918.] - -I, with the main part of my forces, stood my ground. The full -exploitation of the success lay less in the pursuit of the beaten enemy -than in the chances offered by the situation of the enemy we were -surrounding on the hill, now that the help intended was for the moment -unavailable. - -For the first time in this campaign we had captured a trench-mortar -with ammunition. The various parts were collected on the field of -action and the seventeen rounds of ammunition made ready for firing. -Experiments made with practice ammunition gave satisfactory results, -and we were able to arrange for the bombardment of the enemy among the -rocks at four o’clock in the afternoon. The command of this attack -was entrusted to Captain Müller, whose detachment had not taken part -in the fighting on the previous day and had known nothing about it. -To this detachment was added Lieutenant von Ruckteschell’s, which had -remained in the camp. The trench-mortar was placed in position on one -side of the hill, the gun on the other; our machine-guns were disposed -round the hill in readiness for the attack. At 3.45 Lieutenant von -Ruckteschell took leave of the English Colonel Dickinson, who had been -placed in his charge, saying that he expected to be back in an hour. At -4 o’clock the first round from our trench-mortar burst in the centre of -the enemy’s position. The enemy commander was just considering whether -he should make a sortie during the night. In a moment the hill burst -into life: everywhere men could be seen running up and down the rocks. -They were brought under the fire of our gun and machine guns. Very soon -the enemy showed the white flag, but continued to fire. - -Lieutenant von Ruckteschell returned to his guest as he had promised, -an hour later, but unfortunately with a shattered leg. His orderly who, -when he was wounded, had tried to carry him out of the fight, was shot -down under him. Meanwhile Captain Müller had climbed the hill from -the other side and stormed the camp. It was occupied by a squadron of -mounted infantry of the Gold Coast Regiment of whom hardly one came -out alive. Even the horses were killed almost without exception. On -our side brave Lieutenant Selke was killed by an enemy bullet shortly -before the storming of the camp. He was buried on the battlefield. The -_matériel_ captured was small, but the two days of fighting had cost -the enemy heavy losses in men. His detachments, which were numerically -hardly less strong than our own, were literally annihilated. Here, as -at Namacurra, it turned out that the English had conscripted black -troops from German East Africa into their fighting force, including a -considerable number of old German Askari. - -Our thorough work at Namirrue had been made possible by Koehl’s -detachment, consisting only of three companies, which had kept us free -from interference. This detachment had fallen back gradually from -Tipa on Namirrue, daily fighting rearguard actions with the enemy who -was pressing on with all his strength. They were now within half a -day’s march of Namirrue and I ordered them across to the east bank -of the Namirrue river. Patrols sent out to reconnoitre had meanwhile -learned from the natives that there was an enemy depot with a garrison -at Pekera. This seemed to me very probable, as Pekera lies in the -thickly populated area east of the Ligonja river, said to be a fertile -district. Our expectations were realized when after two days’ march -we arrived at Pekera. The mounted squadron of the Gold Coast Regiment -stationed there was at once destroyed and several motors were captured. -In the same way we quickly took possession of the Boma of Chalau and -a number of other stations where the Portuguese had stored large -quantities of supplies, particularly pig-nuts. Our patrols advanced as -far as Angoche and in a very short time we were masters of the wide -and exceptionally fertile district. One night some of the Portuguese -officer prisoners escaped and succeeded in joining the enemy troops at -Angoche. Apparently there were among these gentlemen some who knew the -country well by reason of their occupations in peace. - -The period of rest during our stay in the Chalau district made it -possible for our sick and wounded, who had been brought with us on the -long marches, to recover; the fit, too, benefited by the respite. All -had suffered more or less from the uninterrupted marching and exertions -they had just gone through. It was noteworthy how the recent successes -brought out the warlike spirit of the bearers, who were for the most -part a very sound and reliable lot of men. A large number offered their -services as Askari. Even my old cook was not disinclined to take up -arms. - -On 5th of August supplies began to run short and there remained as -our chief article of diet only the still bitter _muhogo_. Several -enemy patrols approaching us from the north-east showed me that the -enemy columns following us from the south-west had actually overtaken -us during our halt and were concentrating for an attack at Wamaka, -north-east of our camp. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -BACK TO THE LURIO RIVER - - -IN order to confirm the enemy in his mistake as to our objective I -marched on 7th August along the road to Wamaka and pitched my camp -three hours’ march north-east of Chalau, in a good supply area. Several -enemy patrols were driven off. From Wamaka an enemy officer appeared -with a flag of truce to announce that the English Commander-in-Chief -would like to arrange for an exchange of medical prisoners. He was also -instructed to inform me as to when and where equipment for the English -prisoners could be handed over to us. These very transparent proposals -showed me that the enemy had something serious in hand from the north -and was trying to make his task easier by enticing me into a trap. -Various enemy spies were captured and confirmed my belief. Their report -that the enemy intended to attack in three columns was in accordance -with the usual plan of such undertakings. - -When several patrol and outpost actions on 10th and 11th August -indicated that a strong enemy column was advancing along the -Wamaka-Chalau road, I assumed that at least one other column would -be marching parallel with this further south; their objective was -obviously Chalau. I decided to engage this southern enemy column by -itself. The prospect of the success of my plan was certainly not great, -as the enemy was marching for the most part through the bush, avoiding -the paths. To meet such a development of the situation I had had a -path reconnoitred and marked. In spite of this our march, begun in -the evening of 11th August, lasted through the whole night. Not until -daybreak did we arrive east of Chalau at the place I had selected. -Strong patrols, among them a whole company under Captain Koehl, were -still on the march. - -My general idea was a march west to enable me to turn either to the -Blantyre district or east of Lake Nyassa. Without any hindrance from -the enemy we crossed the Ligonja at Metil and the Tipa-Namirrue road. -There the grave of an officer of the 1st battalion 2nd King’s African -Rifles proved that the enemy column, which had first followed us -from Tipa to Namirrue, had gone round us to the north to Wamaka: for -this 1st battalion 2nd King’s African Rifles belonged to the force -which was now approaching from Wamaka. On the further march to Ili -we passed through the camps of the enemy forces which had come from -the south-west and had continued their march in the direction of -Alto-Moloque. They too had made a wide détour and had accomplished -correspondingly long marches. It was strange that all these enemy -columns should suddenly display such a high degree of mobility; they -had changed their supply system and, partially at any rate, left -their lines of communication. According to the reports of prisoners -they sent requisitioning parties on ahead to commandeer supplies -from the natives, which were then distributed among the troops. This -requisitioning of supplies seems to have been carried out with great -ruthlessness. The confidence which the natives had shown during our -recent stay in the Ili district had vanished. They now saw an enemy in -every Askari and individual men who were left behind were on several -occasions attacked by the natives. - -When we came to Ili, the English telegraphic station situated there -was quickly captured. The papers found there gave useful information -as to the movements of the enemy troops. According to this there were -considerable stores at Numarroe and Regone; strong forces were to try -to overtake us from Alto-Moloque and Mukubi, while one column followed -immediately on our track. The enemy, who up to a short time back had -been groping in the dark, had apparently received, a few days before, -reliable information as to our movements. It was very difficult to find -the road to Regone, as no guides could be raised. From Ili, however, -a newly erected telephone line of copper wire led to Numarroe. If we -followed this line we were sure to come upon something useful. As a -matter of fact parts of the enemy columns were near us when we left -Ili. The patrols we had left behind even met some Askari whom they took -to be friends: they exchanged cigarettes and lights with these and did -not realize until afterwards that they were enemies. - -During these days I was much occupied with a domestic question. The -supply of bread for the European prisoners became difficult in view of -the prolonged marches. The men were unskilled and not in a position to -help themselves. At last I succeeded in getting over the difficulty, -and had considerable quantities of flour prepared by other methods. -Captain Krüger, who had charge of the prisoners of war and died soon -afterwards, was already very ill and exhausted by hardships; with the -best intentions he had not always managed to find the ways and means of -meeting the wishes of the prisoners, which were often very exacting. - -In the morning of 24th August we crossed the Likungo river, and -continued our march towards Numarroe. We could already see, several -miles in breadth, the hill and the buildings of Boma Numarroe. -During a halt we lunched in the congenial company of Lieutenant Ott, -Sergeant-Major Nordenholz and the other officers of the advance guard. -We had long grown accustomed during the halts to bring out, without -ceremony, a piece of bread and a box of lard or hippopotamus fat. Naval -Lieutenant Freund even still possessed some butter from Namacurra. -Even the Askari and bearers, who formerly used to wait for their meal -until camp was pitched, adopted more and more the “desturi” (manners, -customs) of the Europeans. As soon as a halt was called every black -would bring out his lunch. It was very jolly when the whole force -bivouacked in this way in the forest, in the best of spirits, and -refreshed themselves for fresh exertions, fresh marches and fresh -fighting. - -We were still two hours east of Numarroe when the advance guard was -fired on. An enemy company had camped on our line of march and was -slowly and cleverly retreating before us from kopje to kopje in the -direction of Numarroe. Lieutenant Ott, who was shot through the chest, -was in a very serious condition. With the main body led by Goering’s -detachment, I made a detour, and, passing the enemy to the south, made -straight for the Boma of Numarroe. Before dark our gun was brought into -position and fire opened on the Boma and its entrenchments. Goering’s -detachment, without loss of time, made a still wider detour to the -south in order, by using a ravine, to come close up to the Boma in the -rear. The advance guard (Müller’s detachment), which was out of sound -of the fighting, was also quickly brought up. The enemy shooting was -not bad, and in spite of the distance the rifle bullets of the infantry -came very close whenever one of us exposed himself. - -It soon grew dark; the firing increased and died down again, until -suddenly heavy firing was heard from the direction of Goering’s -detachment. Then there was silence. Goering’s detachment had surprised -the enemy in the rear and stormed some stubbornly defended trenches. -The retreating enemy was, however, not recognized as the enemy by -another German detachment and got away. The night was unpleasantly -cold; it was pouring with rain and our baggage had not yet come up. -On the following day 3 enemy Europeans and 41 Askari were buried by -us; 1 European and 6 Askari wounded, 1 European, 7 Askari and 28 other -blacks unwounded were taken prisoner. Among the prisoners was the enemy -Commander, Major Garrod, who commanded the half of the 2nd battalion -4th King’s African Rifles here. On our side, Sergeant-Major Nordenholz -was shot through the head; 6 Askari and 1 machine-gun bearer were -killed; 3 Europeans, 18 Askari and 4 machine-gun bearers were wounded; -40,000 rounds of ammunition and two light machine guns, in addition to -hand-grenades, medical stores and large quantities of supplies, were -captured. Among our wounded left behind in the clean, massively built -houses was Lieutenant Ott, cheerful as ever. Fortunately, his wound was -not so serious as was feared at first, but it was not possible to take -him with us. - -On August 25th I wanted at all costs to reach the camp of Regone. -From captured papers I knew that valuable stores had been taken to -Regone to be safe from us, including trench-mortar ammunition. Regone -was probably, for the moment, still weakly garrisoned. In view of the -proximity of the enemy columns it might, however, be assumed that -August 26th would already be too late for a _coup de main_. The path -led through a pass in the steep rocky hills. During the march our -advance guard soon came upon the enemy and engaged him, while I, with -the main force, passed round this enemy and marched direct on Regone. -During the climb over the hilly country, where it was only possible -to see a short distance ahead, two German detachments, mistaking each -other for the enemy, nearly became engaged. The machine guns were -already in position when the mistake was fortunately discovered. - -We then advanced further over the hills, while below us, already -considerably in the rear, could be heard the machine-gun fire of our -advance guard. The march was so difficult, and as we could only cross -the hills in single file, our column was so long that Regone, my -objective for that day, was not nearly reached. As a matter of fact we -had no exact idea where Regone was. Only the fact that we could see in -the distance the converging of several paths led us to conclude that -Regone must lie there. Half way to Regone we saw a large encampment -of tents which I took to be the other half of the battalion which had -marched from Regone to the support of Numarroe. - -In pouring rain we had to pitch our camp in the bush. On the next day -the camp we had observed had been struck. The Boma of Regone was held -in considerable strength. An attack on this place over the bare hills -offered no prospect of success, and we confined ourselves to skirmishes -with patrols and single detachments. As I had seen from his papers, -the enemy had given orders that we should be allowed to strike at -Regone unhindered and then attacked in the flank or rear by the strong -reserves which lay outside. It was therefore necessary to exercise -particular caution, and the impetuosity with which Lieutenant Boell’s -company, in spite of all these considerations, advanced on the Boma -might have had serious consequences. Several enemy camps and columns -outside the entrenchments were surprised by our fire and some supplies -captured. The captured papers informed us of the approach of strong -enemy columns from the south and south-east towards Regone. But there -were also troops to the north; whether these were in the neighbourhood -of Lioma-Malacotera or at Malema could not be ascertained. It was, -however, certain that they were at hand and it was probable that they -were approaching Regone, and that from the north. - -As a _coup de main_ against Regone offered no prospect of success, and -a prolonged enterprise, in view of the intervention to be expected from -outside, could not be relied on, I determined to resume the march. -On account of the obstacles formed by the rivers and swamps south of -Lake Nyassa, the line of march I had formerly decided on to the west -appeared ill-advised, especially as the enemy could, with the help of -steamers and railways, easily concentrate and maintain a force there. -A further march north seemed to me more practicable, passing the -lake on the east; it seemed probable that our return to German East -Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who would take our -objective to be the natural capital of this district, Tabora. Under -this impression he might be expected, in order to save his main force -the difficult overland march to Tabora, to withdraw to the Portuguese -coast, take ship from there to Dar-es-Salaam, and proceed by rail to -Tabora. These calculations were to a large extent realized. It was -natural that, having reached the north end of Lake Nyassa, I should -continue my march, not to Tabora but in another direction, probably -west. In any case, the first thing was to reach the north end of the -lake. This could not be done in less than a month and meanwhile the -situation might alter considerably. - -At Regone we observed the concentration of strong enemy forces, who -examined our camps immediately after our departure but followed us -only slowly. The country, with its numerous ravines and water-courses, -was particularly favourable to us. On the way to Lioma a considerable -enemy supply dump was captured, including a large quantity of -tobacco. Müller’s detachment, which had gone on ahead to Lioma, soon -reported the enemy occupation of this place, but could not obtain -any exact information as to his strength. I reached this advance -detachment on 30th August with the main force. The position of the -enemy entrenchments in the thick bush had not yet been located with -any exactness. Apparently he had only just arrived and had not yet -completed his works. I therefore attacked immediately. The detachments -of Müller and Goering marched round the enemy to take him from the -north. Meanwhile the main force gradually closed in along several -ravines in the forest. - -In view of the lack of information I could get no clear picture of the -situation. Suddenly lively firing was heard from the rear, where our -carrier columns were still on the march. A strong enemy patrol had -unexpectedly opened fire on our bearers. A great part of our baggage -was lost. Captain Poppe, who with two companies was standing by in case -I required him, was sent to attack. He could no longer find the patrol, -but followed their line of retreat and came upon an entrenched camp -which he immediately stormed. Sergeant-Major Schaffrath was severely -wounded. These events were personally reported to me by Captain Poppe, -who was brought back severely wounded in the chest. He reported that -the enemy had been completely defeated, and that large captures of arms -and ammunition had been made. The companies of Poppe’s detachment had -pursued the fleeing enemy and come upon a fresh and larger camp. This -same camp was also attacked from the north by Goering’s detachment, -so that the enemy was taken under an effective cross fire. Meanwhile, -a new enemy, advancing from the north-east, was held up by Müller’s -detachment. - -I did not get anything like a clear view of these different events -until I personally reconnoitred the position long after dark. On one of -these reconnaissances an enemy rifle-bullet, of which many were being -fired, passed through the trousers of one of my companions (Hauter, of -the Landsturm), struck my other companion, Lieutenant Besch, in the -thigh and severed the artery. Fortunately we were near the dressing -station. I was thus able to take leave of this officer, who had -hitherto acted as Quartermaster and at the same time had undertaken the -duties of orderly officer, with the knowledge that he would recover. -His few possessions he gave to his companions together with his wishes -for good luck for the future. I, too, was honoured with a handful -of cigarettes. It was my habit to smoke continuously during serious -fighting. - -In the middle of the bush I met Lieutenant Von Ruckteschell with some -bearers, on his stretcher which he was forced to use temporarily -because of his wounded leg, which had not yet healed; he had kept the -column together as far as possible during the long march and now, rifle -in hand, was beaming with joy at the possibility of taking part in the -engagement with the enemy patrol which appeared on the flank and in our -rear. Part of our columns had lost their way in the thick bush and only -found us some hours later. After nightfall the dressing station in a -ravine had been filled with wounded. It was reported that Lieutenant -Schroetter and Naval Lieutenant Freund had fallen. In a further -patrol-attack, Sergeant-Majors Bolles and Hüttig accidentally came -close to the enemy positions and were fired on suddenly; Bolles fell, -Hüttig was captured, severely wounded. Sergeant-Major Thurmann had come -within five yards of the enemy trenches, and being an excellent shot he -repeatedly picked off from an ant-hill any of the enemy inside the camp -who exposed himself, until he, too, received a mortal wound. - -Captain Goering, regarding it as hopeless to storm the camp, did not -attempt this and, after dark, withdrew the force, leaving only patrols -in front of the enemy. The main force was thus collected in several -groups north of the enemy camp, and I decided to evacuate the scene of -action on the following day and march on. - -[Illustration: Fig. xx. Through Portuguese East Africa.] - -By force of necessity we had to leave behind part of our sick and -wounded, as well as the sick prisoners, in charge of an English medical -officer, and at nine o’clock in the morning we began our march north -in several columns. We had no guides; the country was quite unknown to -us and I could only give the Commander of the advance guard general -instructions that I intended to pass round one of the hills that lay -before us to the north. Soon firing could be heard from the advance -guard. It gradually became clear in the bush that our advance guard had -turned against an enemy who had attacked in the rear from the left. -The shooting was at close range, and from Headquarters, which was with -the main body, seemed to come from a considerable force. - -I sent back an Askari to lead the head of the main force to the place -where I was. The position certainly invited us to catch the enemy -between our advance guard and our main force, and overwhelm him. I -waited, but our main force did not arrive. At last I ran back and saw -from the tracks that the main force had been wrongly guided and had -marched past us a long way to the side. On the other hand, I saw the -head of Stemmermann’s detachment, to which the greater part of our -columns and our sick belonged, in the very act of marching unwittingly -straight into the enemy. There was just time to head off this -detachment. I myself now joined the advance detachments of Müller and -Goering, who had meanwhile continued their march further north. They -were following a road which led up the hill and was then completely -lost. I paid no further attention to the firing which I heard from time -to time further to the rear. In the late afternoon I was astonished to -notice that the rest of the troops had not followed the detachments of -Müller and Goering, but were marching along the valley to our right. -I had no idea that our column had meanwhile been fired on again by a -new enemy from the east and that a great part of a field hospital had -fallen into the enemy’s hands. - -In order to bring the force together, I tried to descend from my -hill. The descent, however, proved impossible; the rocks were steep, -almost perpendicular. We continued along a native path, and evening -was falling when Captain Müller reported that this path, too, ended -abruptly in a precipice. Fortunately there was another small bypath. -This we followed and succeeded in climbing down. Even here it was very -steep in places, but the bare feet of the carriers gave them a good -foothold and I, too, after taking off my boots, managed the descent. -It was pitch dark and we had no water. At last, however, we found -some, and a load fell from my heart when we came upon the rest of the -force which, under General Wahle, had, on their side, been trying to -join us. On the 30th and 31st of August, we had lost 6 Europeans, -23 Askari killed; 11 Europeans, 16 Askari wounded; 5 Europeans, 29 -Askari missing; 5 Askari taken prisoner; 48,000 rounds of ammunition, -important medical and surgical stores, a considerable number of rifle -parts and the whole transport of Müller’s detachment had been lost. The -enemy losses were also severe, as appeared from a casualty list of the -1st battalion 1st King’s African Rifles which was captured later. In -addition to this battalion part of the 3rd battalion of this regiment -and the 2nd King’s African Rifles had taken part in the fighting -against us. - -Our men fought brilliantly; some of the carriers, it is true, had -been somewhat unnerved by the unexpected fire and more than 200 were -missing. There was no news of Koehl’s detachment, but our leaders had -become so experienced and skilled in bush warfare that there was no -need for me to be anxious. On the next day, on arrival at our camp, we -surprised an English supply column. - -We then crossed the Cutea-Malema road on which enemy troops also -appeared, and then crossed the Lurio river at Mtetere. An English -requisitioning force fled and some supplies were captured. Here Koehl’s -detachment rejoined the main force. They had followed the enemy who -was following us and had ascertained that he was several battalions -strong. We then marched down the Lurio to the fertile district of -Mpuera. Here Sol (Sergeant-Major) Salim, who, during an earlier patrol -expedition, had married a wife who had followed him faithfully, left -her behind with her father, the local Jumbo, in view of her approaching -confinement. - -As there was plenty of food in this district, I gave our troops, -who had been very exhausted by recent events, a day’s rest. It was -necessary, anyhow, in the interests of our numerous invalids. Captain -Koehl had been left behind with his company without transport so that -he could do the enemy as much damage as possible. He reported that -strong bodies of enemy troops had arrived in the neighbourhood and -east of Mtetere. It was clear that for the time being the enemy was -devoting his whole energies to pursuing us, and for that purpose had -concentrated all his forces. On that account I did not think the -moment favourable for some partial success, because it could not be -exploited, and an action would have cost us wounded whom we could not -take away with us. As my idea was to forage the district north of -Luambala for food, I was unwilling to postpone the march thither any -longer. - -The day of rest, September 5th, was employed in completing our food -supplies from the fertile region of Mpuera, and early on the 6th we -continued our march in a northerly direction. It was to be assumed that -the enemy would march downstream, and therefore in a north-easterly -direction, in several columns. Our troops advanced in order of echelon -through the bush, and I expected any moment to come across the most -northerly of the enemy columns, but we crossed its probable course -without discovering its tracks. About midday we were approaching our -objective, a water-hole on Mount Hulua. Here our advance guard was shot -at and before long a lively action was in progress. Captain Müller, in -command of the advance guard, had stumbled on the rear of a hostile -column which was marching north-east on a course making an acute angle -with ours. He had immediately attacked the 2nd battalion 2nd King’s -African Rifles, which was at the end of the column, and put it to -flight, capturing the enemy’s field-hospital and his mule train. - -I deployed Goering’s detachment on the right of Müller’s detachment, -and it quickly threw back part of the opposing forces, but did not -press on as the enemy deployed larger bodies—the 1st battalion of the -2nd King’s African Rifles and apparently parts of the 3rd battalion as -well. - -Our left wing, which had arrived in rolling, open country in its -advance, and also collided with fresh hostile troops, had retired a -few hundred yards and occupied a slight eminence, giving a field of -fire of several hundred yards. I was not able to get a clear picture -of the situation until I went from the right wing, where I had joined -Goering’s detachment, back to the left. - -The action was pretty violent and at length came to a standstill. We -now heard the sound of trench-mortar fire coming from the rearguard, -under Captain Spangenberg, whose arrival I was awaiting. The rearguard -had beaten off the attack of another enemy column at Mpuera and -driven part of it away in disorderly flight. In accordance with its -instructions it had followed the main body at seven o’clock in the -morning. It arrived on the battlefield about five in the afternoon, and -I considered whether I ought not to throw in all my reserves to inflict -a decisive defeat on the 2nd King’s African Rifles there and then on -Mount Hulua. I gave up the idea, however. Time was very short, for -there was only an hour to darkness, and I felt perfectly certain that -very early next morning fresh hostile forces would appear on the scene. -If we were to achieve a decisive victory it would certainly cost us -appreciable losses, and I was anxious to avoid such losses in view of -the small numbers—176 Europeans and 1,487 Askari—which our strength -return of September 1, 1918, revealed. Lieutenant Wenig (Navy), who had -been employed with his gun in Goering’s detachment, told me that he -had taken over the command of that detachment, because all the other -officers were incapacitated. Before long, Captain Goering, with a -severe wound in the breast, and Lieutenant Boell, with one in the head, -were brought to the dressing station. - -Accordingly I would not commit our reserves to the confusion and -uncertainty of a night battle in the bush, and determined to slip away -from the battlefield in a north-westerly direction. It was soon quite -dark and our progress was very slow in the thick, high grass. After -going three miles we bivouacked. Our losses in the action of September -6th had been 5 Askari, 4 machine-gunners killed; 13 Europeans, 49 -Askari, and 15 other natives wounded; 3 Europeans, 13 Askari, and 12 -carriers missing; 3 Askari and 3 bearers captured. The enemy were seen -to have some 10 Europeans and 30 Askari hit, while 8 Europeans and 45 -Askari were captured; those of the prisoners who were sick or wounded, -and our own more severely wounded, were left on the battlefield under -the charge of English R.A.M.C. Documents captured later on at Mwembe -showed that “Karturol” (abbreviation for “Column of the 2nd King’s -African Rifles”) had heavy losses on the 6th September and was put out -of action for a time. - -The enemy did not molest our further progress. Captain Koehl had -remained behind with his company to the west of Mpuera, in order to -operate from the rear against the enemy and his communications. He -followed our trail, having slight encounters at Milweberg with the -1st battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles, which arrived at that -point from the south on the 8th September. We moved in several columns -right through the bush, a region rich in game. We even killed several -buffaloes on the march. At Kanene we crossed the road that ran from -Lake Amaramba to Mahua. The enemy had burnt down the store at Kanene, -but we found ample supplies in the country itself, and the material -condition of the troops would have been good, if only the influenza -epidemic had not made such strides. About half had bronchial catarrh, -and from three to six men in each company had inflammation of the -lungs; as it was only possible for some eighty sick to be carried in -the whole force, about twenty men suffering with slight inflammation -of the lungs had to march at times. No satisfactory solution of the -problem of transport of sick was to be found, short of abandoning the -campaign; we could not simply leave the sick to die in the bush. This -difficult position inevitably placed the greatest possible strain -on the nerves of Surgeon-Major Taute, our splendid senior medical -officer. It was the greatest good fortune that this officer, singularly -gifted both in medicine and in organization, proved equal to his grave -responsibility. We owe it to the measures adopted by him, as well as -to the change of district and climate forced upon us by circumstances, -that the epidemic soon abated. A number of Askari and other natives not -in a fit state for heavy work followed the force slowly; many of them -lost courage when they continually found our camping-places empty. A -large number, however, caught up with us, especially when the force did -one of its short marches, or was able (a rare occurrence enough) to -take a day’s rest. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -ON GERMAN SOIL ONCE MORE - - -BUT we could not afford many halts. The military position imperatively -demanded that we should pass quickly through the districts to the east -of the centre of Lake Nyassa, which were not fertile and had been -largely stripped in the latest period of the war. Rapidity was all -the more essential as it was possible for the enemy to move troops by -sea to the north end of the lake and thus anticipate us by strongly -occupying the district there. As we approached the river Lujenda, the -ground became more mountainous and was scored with many water-courses -and ravines. We could not simply march by the compass, but had to have -regard to the watershed and keep along the mountain ridge. Fortunately, -the leader of the advance guard, Captain Spangenberg, found some -natives who acted as pathfinders and made it much easier to discover -a good route. But a certain amount of doubling was unavoidable, and -that retarded our progress, while the enemy were in a position to -move troops and supplies swiftly from Malacotera along a good road to -Luambala. - -I was somewhat anxious to know whether the water of the river Ludjenda -would have fallen sufficiently to enable us to use the fords. It would -no doubt have been easy to construct bark boats, but the transport -of the whole force could hardly have gone smoothly forward, having -regard to the violence of the current. In any case, I thought it most -important that there should be no enemy opposition, and that again -made haste essential. Fortunately patrols which we sent ahead found -a ford below Luambala, where the wading of the river presented no -difficulty. Several slaughtered hippopotami enabled us to prepare -some fat again, and in the neighbourhood of Mwembe, which we reached -on the 17th September, we were able to replenish our supplies once -more. At this point we took our first day’s rest for a long time. It -was here at Mwembe that the lung epidemic reached its crisis. Since -the middle of August, 7 Europeans and about 200 natives had been -attacked, of whom 2 Europeans and 17 natives had died. The stores at -Mwembe had been destroyed by the weak enemy posts, but there were still -ample supplies to be had in the district. The question of carriers -began to cause anxieties. The men had been severely tested by the -continual marching, by the epidemic, and by the carriage of the sick; -and we were approaching their home districts. It was probable that -the Wangoni carriers would desert the moment they reached their home, -which lay to the north of the Rovuma. In the district of Mwembe and the -well-cultivated valleys of the river Luscheringo, several patrols of -the enemy “Intelligence Department” were encountered; true, they were -easily driven off, but their presence showed that the enemy was in the -main aware of our movements. - -We sent long-distance patrols towards Mitomoni and Makalogi. To the -south of the Rovuma, after leaving the Luscheringo valley, the steppe -through which our march led us was amazingly rich in game, as was the -Rovuma itself, which we reached on the 28th September. But the big -game had its drawbacks, for once again a sentry was killed by lions. -We came on to German soil again, and stayed two days at Nagwamira; -we surprised several enemy depots and columns, which had had no news -of our appearance. The country was amazingly fertile, and the troops -were able to get thoroughly fit again. Our patrols sent out towards -Mitomoni reported a camp somewhat strongly held and the arrival of -reinforcements coming from the west. Ssongea, too, was occupied by -the enemy, but in what strength could not be ascertained. Various -reports, as well as the geographical position, made it likely that -reinforcements were also on their way to Ssongea from Lake Nyassa. - -We continued our march, moving in the direction of Ssongea, and -southwards of this place came into thickly settled country. The -enemy wireless disclosed that enemy troops were present in Ssongea, -and that another column had arrived in the neighbourhood, in all -probability from Mitomoni. On the 4th October I passed Ssongea on the -west and continued to the north. When the advance guard under Captain -Spangenberg reached the high road from Ssongea to Wiedhafen, it was -attacked with trench-mortars by three enemy companies, which had come -from the west. The enemy was forced back a little. On account of the -hilly and ravine-scored nature of the ground and the advanced hour, it -was improbable that we could achieve a really effective success on this -day. By the morrow, however, there would be further enemy troops on the -spot. I accordingly carried the attack no further, and marched by to -the west of the enemy into a camp at the Peramiho mission station. - -As we passed through the Wangoni territory, a large number of our -carriers deserted, as we had feared would happen. It would after all -have been asking too much of human nature, to expect that these men, -who had not seen their people for years, should now march straight -through their native district. The nigger’s love of home is too -strong. Even Samarunga, one of my own carriers and a very devoted and -trustworthy fellow, asked for leave to visit his village, which lay -near by. He came back faithfully enough and brought his brother with -him. The two then marched on with us, and Samarunga stayed on even when -his brother left. To revive his depression, I gave him some of my meat -ration, but on the next morning he proved to have disappeared after -all, having first put all my things in order. - -To the north of Ssongea a few enemy reconnoitring patrols were again -met with. Day after day we moved through territory formerly fertile -and well settled. Thousands of farmers could settle there in a healthy -and beautiful climate. On the 14th October, we reached Pangire -(Jacobi), a pleasantly situated mission station, in which, before the -war, the missionary Gröschel had entertained me on my last tour. The -missionary’s family had been removed, but the natives, who were of -the Wabena tribe, had remained, and received us as in peace time, in -a most friendly manner. Several old Askari, also, who had left the -force for one reason or another, now reported again. Here, too, some -patrols were met with and driven off. In the Wabena country, which is -well stocked with cattle, our very scanty stocks were replenished, and -a mobile food-reserve thus constituted, which helped greatly to lighten -our transport. After we had quitted Pangire, a patrol that we had left -there was fired on by an enemy detachment. Near Ubena our rearguard, -under Captain Müller, was attacked by several enemy companies arriving -from the south. A fairly strong enemy column was thus following our -track. The free open steppes of Ubena were not favourable ground for us -to fight on, as they were commanded from long range by rifle and gun -fire. Several reports were also received of the advance on Ubena of -strong enemy forces from Mwakete; these reports proved to be in part -incorrect, and led to a short fight between two German patrols. - -It was highly probable, and later it proved to be the case, that enemy -troops would be moved by water to the northern end of Lake Nyassa and -march from there on Ubena or further to the north. If I desired to give -up the march towards Tabora, and to move instead between Lakes Nyassa -and Rukwa, and later between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, to Rhodesia, -the time for the change of direction was now approaching and there was -not a day to lose; this was all the more so as our freedom of movement -was severely restricted by the steep slopes of Mount Livingstone -and the hills round Mbeja. In settling our line of march we had to -bear in mind that our stocks of provisions had dwindled considerably -and required replenishing. Native information pointed to this being -possible in the region of Kidugala and Sombowano, while famine was said -to be raging in Ussangu, and especially round New Utengule. - -On the 17th October, I quitted Ubena with the main body, leaving behind -there, sick or wounded, General Wahle, two other Europeans, and some -Askari. I reached Kidugala on this day. Koehl’s detachment followed on -the 18th October. On the same day, the Boma Ubena was occupied by some -100 enemy Askari, while 200 to 300 advanced northwards to the Iringa -road. We learnt from captured newspapers that Cambrai had fallen on -the 29th September and that the Belgians had advanced 3 kilometres west -of Roubaix. We read, too, of the cessation of hostilities in Bulgaria, -of the retirement of Count Hertling, and of the capture of St. Quentin -and Armentières. But positions could be given up for so many different -reasons that I did not attribute any decisive importance to this news. - -Our further march past Ngombowano and Brandt led us through a district -well stocked with cattle. Missions and schools had been deserted, -but we were very glad to find garden fruits, especially mulberries -and peaches. In the bush we also found great quantities of wild figs -and other sweet and tasty fruits. Small patrol encounters indicated -that enemy troops were moving direct from Lake Nyassa northwards into -the Brandt district. In Ruiwa we found large English depots, and we -had to destroy a whole warehouse full of leather. We went on to the -mission of Old Utengule, also well known to me from peace time, and now -lying deserted. We then reached Mbozi mission, where the English had -assembled the men from the district, examined them, and sent them to -New Langenburg, probably in order to turn them into Askari there. At -Mbozi there was a large English depot, containing, among other things, -75 loads of salt and 47 loads of coffee. - -It was difficult to feel our way through the district. In the main it -was but little known to us, and for years the enemy had been altering -it by building storehouses and transport roads. To have reconnoitred in -advance would have made too great a demand on our time and strength, -besides depriving us of the advantage of surprise. The inhabitants -were very hostile to the English and rendered us valuable service, -but their information was too often very vague. While we rested a day -in Mbozi and replenished our stores, our patrols were far afield, one -towards Galula (St. Moritz’ mission), another towards Itaka, one in -the direction of New Langenburg, and one in that of Fife. Some of them -would be away for weeks, and we could not wait for their reports. - -This much, however, became clear, that a main communication road of -the enemy ran past Mbozi from Fife via Rwiba to New Langenburg. On -this road we captured a lot of stores and several supply columns on the -march. The existence of this road showed that a large English depot -must lie in the neighbourhood of Fife. It would probably be possible -to capture this by swift action, before stronger enemy forces arrived -there. On the morning of 31st October a fighting patrol was dispatched -against Fife. On the evening of the same day natives and patrols -reported the advance of strong enemy forces on the New Langenburg-Rwiba -road. In the early morning of the 1st November I moved off with the -whole force, advancing in the first instance towards Mount Rwiba. There -the track showed that a strong enemy column had passed the Rwiba hill -shortly before us, in the direction of Fife. This enemy force had not -been observed by a German fighting patrol that had been sent out to -Mount Rwiba. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA - - -THE second patrol dispatched by us on the 31st October towards Fife -had halted at Mount Rwiba. I had now to advance with the whole force -towards Fife, in order to reach it before the enemy, or to attack if -our first patrol should prove to be engaged there. The ten-hour march -(actual marching time) from Mbozi to Fife was a tremendous strain on -the force, but the reports of our patrols, the track of the enemy, and -his notes found on the trees, proved beyond a doubt that the enemy -was doing everything possible to reach Fife on the same day, the 1st -November. The great distance which they, too, had to march justified -us in assuming that our patrol, which I expected would reach Fife on -the 31st October, or at the latest on the 1st November, would be equal -to preventing the enemy occupying the depot at Fife on the 1st. In the -course of the afternoon we fired on several patrols, without halting -in our advance. Late in the afternoon weak enemy detachments in the -hills near Fife were quickly thrown back. I myself, with Spangenberg’s -detachment, which had moved off the road to the right, advanced along a -mountain ridge on to a point where we judged that Fife would lie. - -The ground was becoming more open, being mainly covered with knee-high -bush and grass, when a few hundred yards before us we observed men -moving about and tents pitched close together. The men were moving -about in such unconcerned fashion that I almost took them for our own -patrol, but at 200 yards we were received with violent and at first -very well directed rifle and machine-gun fire. It was fortunate that -our men did not answer it, for I had happened to get in advance and -was between the two parties. After a time the enemy, who had apparently -become very excited, began to fire high. It started to grow darker, so -that my patrol was able to get back to our line. We had, at any rate, -reached certainty. We knew that the enemy with a strength of several -companies was lying before us in an entrenched position with a good -field of fire. His advanced detachments had been thrown back. His -depots lay in part outside the trenches, and later fell into our hands. -I did not want to undertake the storming of the position, which would -have been costly, but the opportunity seemed favourable to bombard the -enemy, massed as he was in the position, with our trench-mortar, and -also from a height with our gun, as well as with rifle and machine-gun -fire if he should show himself. Our machine guns were accordingly -moved forward in the night close to his position and entrenched. -Reconnaissance for a good gun position was postponed to the next day. - -It was probable that the opening of our trench-mortar and gun-fire -would lead the enemy advancing from New Langenburg to attack us. Such -an attack against our heights would have been very difficult. But -in spite of the bombardment on the 2nd November, which was observed -to cause some losses, no new enemy appeared. The definite success -for which we hoped against the camp was not achieved, since our -trench-mortar was destroyed at one of the first shots by a prematurely -bursting shell. Flat trajectory fire alone could do nothing against -the well-protected enemy. In the afternoon, therefore, our main body, -with its herds of cattle more than 400 strong, marched off, between -Fife and the Mwenzo mission towards Rhodesia. When we had reached -camp, we saw heavy columns of smoke rising from the depots at Fife, -to which Müller’s detachment had set fire after our departure. From -the direction of the Mwenzo mission we heard short bursts of fire on -several occasions. - -Reports came in gradually from that direction. In addition to our -fighting patrols dispatched from Mbozi, other patrols of ours had -arrived, and had fought with English patrols, and also with each other. -One report stated that one enemy patrol had been observed with quite -dark uniforms, hitherto unknown, and that it must be some recently -arrived body. After many inquiries I finally ascertained that one of -our own patrols, whose equipment was certainly no longer quite in -accord with regulations, had been continually mistaken for the enemy. -In the Mwenzo mission itself there was a stationary enemy hospital, -from which we were able to replenish our medical stores. Our quinine -stocks were brought up to over fourteen kilos, supplies thus being -insured until June, 1919. - -[Illustration: Fig. xxi. The March into Rhodesia.] - -Various reports and statements of prisoners showed that enemy transport -was moving from the Broken Hill district to Kasama, and from there -onwards to Fife, with motor-cars and ox-wagons. Kasama itself seemed to -be a large place and an important road centre. In any case, we could -expect enemy depots on the way from Fife to Kasama, and Kasama itself -would be a valuable objective. So far as one could tell from the map, -the position also seemed to be such that we should be able there to -decide to go further southwards round Lake Bangweolo and reach the -Zambesi-Congo watershed, or to march further westwards between Lakes -Bangweolo and Moero. The information was certainly very uncertain, -resting almost exclusively on several Askari, who as children had been -employed in trade caravans in the neighbourhood of Lake Moero. - -The important question of the nature of the rivers, and in particular -of the Luapala, which flowed from Lake Bangweolo into Lake Moero, was -for the time quite unsolved. We did not clear up these points until -we captured some maps and notes. About this time, according to these, -the Luapala was a mighty barrier; deep and in many places very broad; -it is enclosed by extended marshes. In the rainy season that was just -approaching, any attempt to cross the river in canoes would meet with -difficulties, since on our approach the canoes would certainly be -removed to the opposite bank or concealed. I devoted every minute to -the study of maps and travel-descriptions, burying myself in them at -every halt in the march. There was great danger that in ignorance of -our position we might run into an _impasse_ in this region of great -rivers and lakes. - -The first thing was to sweep rapidly along the communication road -Fife-Kajambi mission-Kasama. Mobile detachments were sent on by forced -marches, capturing several small depots, taking their guards prisoner, -and also securing a few ox-wagon teams. Captain Spangenberg followed -immediately with three companies, and then the main body, at a distance -of about one day’s march. - -The heavy marches and the deviation to the south-west, into quite new -and unknown territory, was too much for a number of carriers. On one -single day there deserted from the staff 20 Wafiri, who had their homes -in the region of Bismarckburg, and 13 carriers from other districts. - -The main body arrived at Kajambi on the 6th November. The Catholic -mission station there consists of wonderful, spacious and massive -buildings. The missionaries had fled, quite unnecessarily. In the nuns’ -house there was a letter for me from a Catholic nun. She was a native -of Westphalia, and as a fellow-countrywoman appealed to my humanity. -She would certainly have spared herself many discomforts if both she -herself and the other people attached to the mission had remained -quietly at their posts. We should have done as little to them as we had -done earlier to the old English missionary at Peramiho, near Ssongea. -The soil was extraordinarily fertile; in the mission garden magnificent -strawberries were growing. At midday we heard rifle fire from the -rearguard, which was encamped two hours’ march north-east of Kajambi; -Captain Koehl had remained there to gather supplies, and his Europeans -and Askari had largely been distributed into separate supply patrols. -In this situation he was attacked by an enemy patrol. Captain Koehl -extricated himself from this unpleasant position and on the next day -established his front by Kajambi mission, and we had the opportunity, -which we used with great success, to take the enemy under our fire -by surprise. On the 7th November our main body resumed its march on -Kasama. The enemy were not observed to be following up. If, however, -they were to press on behind us, it was to be assumed that questions of -supply would prevent their doing so in really great strength. We had -the prospect of swiftly seizing Kasama, and then of making this place -our base and giving battle under favourable conditions. - -But these were hopes of the future; the first thing was to take Kasama -itself quickly; according to our information it was not strongly held, -but was well fortified. Captain Spangenberg with the advance guard -kept increasing his distance from the main body by longer and longer -marches. I followed with the main body; ample supplies were found, and -we also met with confirmation of the descriptions given in various -books to the effect that the forest is well stocked with tasty bush -fruits. - -On the 8th November Spangenberg’s detachment had several patrol fights -to the north of Kasama, and on the 9th it took Kasama, whose garrison, -in the strength of half a company, retired to the southward. Only a -little ammunition was captured and there was little else of value -in the armoury. There was a large repair shop for motor and other -vehicles, and more than a score of Boer wagons were taken. There was -considerable booty in food supplies for Europeans. It was noteworthy -that an English company in Kasama—I think it was the African Lakes -Corporation—had given written instructions for the destruction of -its depots by the natives. These came in large numbers to loot, and -Spangenberg’s detachment found buildings and their contents largely -destroyed by looting natives. It is due to his action that among other -things the house of the British Commissioner, which was built and -furnished with great taste, was preserved. - -During our advance from Fife it had appeared that the further we went -the fuller were the enemy depots. We gained the impression that we were -working up a line of communications which started around Broken Hill -or somewhat to the north of it, and was only just being established. -We had grounds for hoping that if we moved rapidly forward, we should -find depots even more plentifully stocked; and the documents taken, -besides information from natives, seemed to confirm this. Three days’ -march further along the telephone line, large stores were said to be -lying at the Chambezi ferry, which had in part been brought thither by -boat. I myself on the 11th November cycled to Kasama and met Captain -Spangenberg there, and he immediately resumed his march, with two -companies, southwards, in the direction of the Chambezi ferry. - -On the 12th November the main body reached Kasama. Towards evening -rifle and machine-gun fire was heard from the direction of our march. -Our rearguard had been attacked in its camp, two hours to the north -of Kasama. The enemy who had fought at Kajambi had not followed us -directly, but had taken a parallel course. In the evening Koehl’s -detachment arrived in Kasama. I had now formed the opinion that the -attempt on the Chambezi depot was the more promising and important -undertaking, especially as the whole position made it probable that the -pursuing enemy would continue to follow and thus again afford us an -opportunity to give battle. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE ARMISTICE AND OUR RETURN HOME - - -ACCORDINGLY only Koehl’s detachment remained at Kasama, with -instructions to follow us a day’s march behind. Early on November 13th -I followed Spangenberg’s detachment with our main body. I had gone on -ahead on a bicycle, selected the site for our camp and was waiting for -the troops to come up when Captain Müller appeared before me, also on -his bicycle, and reported that an armistice had been concluded. An -English motor-cyclist who was to have brought the news to the British -troops had apparently passed through Kasama and been captured there by -Koehl’s detachment. Thanks to the English telephone line, along which -we were marching, we were soon able to understand each other, and thus -did we get the news of the armistice. - -The telegram of the motor-cyclist ran as follows: - - * * * * * - -“12. 11. 18. To be fwded via M.B. cable and despatch rider. - -“Send following to Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck under white flag. The -Prime Minister of England has announced that an armistice was signed -at 5 hours on Nov. 11th, and that hostilities on all fronts cease at -11 hours on Nov. 11th. I am ordering my troops to cease hostilities -forthwith unless attacked, and of course I conclude that you will do -the same. Conditions of armistice will be forwarded you immediately -I receive them. Meanwhile I suggest that you should remain in your -present vicinity in order to facilitate communication.—General van -Deventer. As message is also being sent to Livingstone, it is important -Karwunfor receives this same time as enemy; every effort must be made -to get message to him to-day.” - -Our feelings were very mixed. Personally, as I had no knowledge of the -real state of affairs in Germany, I felt convinced that the conclusion -of hostilities must have been favourable, or at least not unfavourable -to Germany. - -Spangenberg’s detachment, which was on ahead, had to be told as soon as -possible, and I immediately set out on my bicycle after it, taking with -me Haouter, a Landsturm soldier, as my sole companion. About half-way, -Reissmann’s cyclist patrol of Spangenberg’s detachment met me and -reported that Captain Spangenberg had arrived at the Chambezi. Although -I had no doubts about the correctness of the English news, our position -was very uncomfortable. We were in a district where there was little -food, and were therefore compelled to move on from place to place. This -circumstance had already compelled us to reconnoitre and secure for -ourselves the crossings of the Chambezi. If hostilities were resumed we -must be certain of a safe crossing. This was a burning question, as the -rainy season, meaning a great rise of this river, was near at hand. We -had already encountered heavy storms. I had, therefore, much to discuss -with Captain Spangenberg and the English officer who would presumably -be on the far bank of the river. In any case we must continue to -devote our energies to buying or getting food. Full of that idea, I -sent my companion back and cycled myself with Reissmann’s patrol to -Spangenberg’s detachment. - -We arrived about eight o’clock, when it was quite dark. Captain -Spangenberg was away on a reconnaissance, but Assistant-Paymaster -Dohmen and other Europeans looked after me well as soon as they learnt -of my arrival. I was able to convince myself that the supply depot of -Kasama really existed. I tasted jam and other good things which had -been unknown to me hitherto. - -When Captain Spangenberg came back he told me that he had already heard -of the armistice through the English. After I had gone to bed in his -tent, he brought me about midnight a telegram from General Deventer -which had been brought in by the English. It had come from Salisbury. -It stated that Germany had accepted the unconditional handing-over of -all troops operating in East Africa. Deventer added that he demanded -the immediate surrender of all our English prisoners of war, and that -we should march to Abercorn. All our arms and ammunition were to be -given up at Abercorn, but our Europeans were to be allowed to keep -their weapons. - -The full text of the telegram ran as follows: - - * * * * * - -“13. 11. 18. To Norforce. Karwunfor via Fife. - -“Send following to Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck under white flag: War -Office London telegraphs that clause seventeen of the armistice signed -by the German Govt. provides for unconditional surrender of all German -forces operating in East Africa within one month from Nov. 11th. - -“My conditions are. First: hand over all allied prisoners in your -hands, Europeans and natives to the nearest body of British troops -forthwith. Second: that you bring your forces to Abercorn without -delay, as Abercorn is the nearest place at which I can supply you -with food. Third: that you hand over all arms and ammunition to my -representative at Abercorn. I will, however, allow you and your -officers and European ranks to retain their personal weapons for the -present in consideration of the gallant fight you have made, provided -that you bring your force to Abercorn without delay. Arrangements will -be made at Abercorn to send all Germans to Morogoro and to repatriate -German Askari. Kindly send an early answer, giving probable date of -arrival at Abercorn and numbers of German officers and men, Askari and -followers.” - - * * * * * - -This was news enough if it were confirmed, and showed the desperate -situation of the Fatherland. Nothing else could account for the -surrender of a force still maintaining itself proudly and victoriously -in the field. - -Without being in a position to examine the ground in detail, I had to -tell myself that the conditions imposed upon us were inevitable, and -must be loyally carried out. I met the British Commissioner, who had -come from Kasama to the Chambezi rubber factory, at the river at eight -o’clock on the morning of the 14th. There I handed to him a telegram -to His Majesty, in which I reported what had happened and added that I -would act accordingly. The Commissioner told me that the German fleet -had revolted, and that a revolution had also broken out in Germany; -further, if he was to accept a report which was official but had not -yet been confirmed, the Kaiser had abdicated on November 10th. All this -news seemed to me very improbable, and I did not believe it until it -was confirmed on my way home months later. - -All our troops, native as well as Europeans, had always held the -conviction that Germany could not be beaten in this war, and were -resolved to fight on to the last. Of course it was doubtful whether -our resources would last out if the war lasted several years more, but -we faced all possibilities tranquilly for at least another year. The -men were well armed, equipped and fed, and the strategic situation at -the moment was more favourable than it had been for a long time. The -Askari, it is true, saw that our numbers were dwindling—we were still -155 Europeans, comprising 30 officers, medical officers and higher -officials, 1,168 Askari, and about 3,000 other natives—but whenever I -discussed this topic with one of my orderlies he always assured me: “I -will always stick by you and fight on till I fall.” Many others spoke -to the same effect, and I am convinced that it was not merely a case of -empty words. - -In the afternoon of the 14th November, I cycled back to our main body -and told the Europeans what I had learned at the Chambezi, and that it -was my intention to carry out the conditions which had been officially -communicated to me, conditions the accuracy of which I did not doubt. - -Before the prisoners were released Colonel Dickinson, the most senior -of them, came to look for me to say good-bye. He said that his period -of captivity (it had been more than three months) had given him an -interesting insight into our camp life, our marching methods, and -the way in which we conducted our actions. He was full of praise for -the simplicity of our arrangements and the absence of friction which -distinguished our operations. There is no doubt he had been using his -eyes. - -Our Askari were now informed of the turn of affairs. It was to be -anticipated that there would be difficulties when it came to settling -up with them for their pay, which was years overdue, and the same -applied to the carriers. Yet it was a matter of honour for us to see -that these people, who had fought and worked for us with such devotion, -should receive their rights. The sum involved—about one and a half -million rupees—was relatively small, and so Lieutenant Kempner was -sent out on a bicycle to get this sum from the English, or induce them -to procure it as quickly as possible. Our repeated efforts were without -result. We were told at different times and places that the matter -was “under consideration” by the War Office, and there it remained. I -never even received a reply to my telegram to the German Government -in Berlin. There was nothing for it but to draw up lists of all the -back pay that was due, and give the individual carriers and Askari -certificates against it. - -We then marched by short stages through Kasama to Abercorn. The British -gave us further details about the armistice conditions. It appeared -that not “unconditional surrender” (as General van Deventer had said -originally) but “unconditional evacuation” was what was required. -I made several protests against the interpretation of the British -War Office, which made the word “evacuation” include surrender and -disarming, but I received no answer either from the Governments of the -allied countries and the United States, or from the German Government. -In view of the doubtful interpretation of the word “evacuation,” I -considered whether I should not cut short negotiations and march to -join the Belgians or somewhere else. But in comparison to the whole -series of peace conditions which affected the Protective Force, this -seemed a small point, and in the end I decided to go to Dar-es-Salaam, -as General van Deventer required, though certainly in the expectation -that in accordance with the terms the English would immediately send us -back from there to Germany. As will appear later that expectation was -not fulfilled. - -Not far north of Kasama we came up with the enemy with whom we had -fought our last engagement. They were the 1st battalion of the 4th -King’s African Rifles. I had to refuse the invitation of Colonel -Hawkins (their estimable commander, who was barely thirty years old), -communicated to me on the march by Colonel Dickinson, to bring all the -German officers to lunch, much though I appreciated such an expression -of chivalry. Yet Colonel Dickinson did not neglect to pay me his -promised visit on one of the following days, and we had a very pleasant -hour over a cup of coffee. I must record that the officers of this -battalion, even in the somewhat difficult circumstances in which they -were placed, behaved with great tact and with that regard which is due -to an honourable foe. Hawkins told me that for reasons of supply he -would not have been able to follow us any further, and in fact we had -to help him out with cattle, of which we had an ample stock. - -Lieutenant Kempner had gone on to Abercorn on his bicycle. When he came -back I went there myself in a car which General Edwards had sent for -me. My reception by General Edwards, as well as his Staff, was very -kind. I put forward my point of view to General Edwards that I did not -recognize any duty to surrender of our arms, but was ready to do so if -I was thereby conferring some advantage, not on ourselves individually, -but on the German Government. I was then informed that the arms we -surrendered would form part of the quantity which Germany had to hand -over to the Allied Governments in accordance with the terms of the -armistice. Further, the surrender of our arms should not have the -character of a laying-down of arms. - -As regards the Askari and carriers, I was informed that the English -would take them to an internment camp at Tabora, until the question -of their pay had been settled and their repatriation arranged. The -Europeans were to be interned at Dar-es-Salaam until their ship left, -presumably, therefore, for a few days. Not only the Askari but the -Europeans at Dar-es-Salaam were kept behind barbed wire for a month and -a half and more. - -The troops arrived at Abercorn on the 25th November. The English flag -was waving on the parade-ground where the handing-over of arms took -place, and this shows that the character of a surrender of our arms was -not altogether avoided. What we handed over was as follows: - -1 Portuguese gun, 37 machine guns (7 German, 16 heavy and 14 light -English), 1,071 English and Portuguese rifles, 208,000 rounds, -40 rounds of artillery ammunition. The English were mighty quick -at getting away the surrendered material. There was not a single -modern German rifle among it! The strength of our troops was: the -Governor, 20 officers, 5 medical officers, a doctor of the Voluntary -Medical Detachment, a senior veterinary officer, a senior chemist, a -field-telegraph officer, 125 European other ranks, 1,156 Askari and -1,598 carriers. The arrival of individual detachments was delayed for -hours by heavy rain. - -The camp for the Askari was surrounded by a thick thorn hedge, and -was much too small. This led to a good deal of bad feeling among our -Askari, which vented itself in frequent demonstrations against the -English Askari. But at length our people resigned themselves to the -uncomfortable conditions, and even General Edwards realized that the -treatment provided an opportunity for unnecessary friction. We were -not ordinary prisoners of war, whose escape he had to fear, but had -given ourselves into his hands voluntarily in the performance of an -unpleasant duty. He took precautions against similar occurrences during -our march to Bismarckburg, and we went there with Hawkins’ battalion -and without the slightest friction. On November 28th we bivouacked by -the mighty waterfall of the river Kalambo, three hours’ march from -Bismarckburg. Here we remained several days, as the departure of the -steamer from that place was being continually delayed. Many of my -officers continually badgered me to know whether we could not fight -on. These suggestions were far from comfortable, as I had already -quite enough to do to consider how we should get out of so unpleasant -a situation. But putting aside the difficulties involved, I could only -feel glad and proud of such a revelation of true soldierly spirit, a -spirit which did not shrink, even after we had handed over all our -arms, from storming an enemy camp and once more procuring for ourselves -the means to continue the war. - -On December 3rd I received a telegram, dated the 2nd December, from -General van Deventer. It ran as follows: - - * * * * * - -“I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram setting forth your -formal protest against your troops being treated as prisoners of war. -This will duly be forwarded to the War Office. Meanwhile I am sure you -will recognise that pending the receipt through the War Office of a -communication on the subject of the German Govt. I have had no choice -but to act in accordance with the orders of the War Office, and treat -your force as prisoners of war.” - - * * * * * - -The same day the first lot of troops for transport went on board four -ships. One of them, the _St. George_, had, in addition to its crew of -English bluejackets and an escort officer, only the Governor and the -officers of our force with their black servants. For food the English -gave us corned beef, dates and biscuits, and Dr. Huber, the veterinary -officer, looked after our bodily welfare here on board as carefully as -he had done for so many years in the bush. The British commander, the -escort officer and the whole crew were extraordinarily kind. After a -short stop on the evening of the 3rd, at the Belgian station of Vua, a -violent storm arose in the night. It tore away the awning and, among -other things, carried off Dr. Huber’s coat. The English sailors did all -they possibly could for the Germans, who were quite wet through. - -On December 5th we arrived at Kigoma. The place was under Belgian -control, and the Belgians received us with a hospitality which could -not have been anticipated. They displayed a tactful reserve to us which -had never been shown before. Tables covered with cloths had been set -out for all the Europeans, a sight we had not seen for years. Some red -wine was produced. The Belgian Governor had sent his orderly officer, -who spoke German fluently, to receive us officially, and I was glad -to take the opportunity, before we started on our railway journey, -to thank the Belgian commandant for the _camaraderie_ shown us, -_camaraderie_ which always exists among soldiers, even between enemies, -when they have a mutual regard for each other. - -Among the English, too, examples of discourtesy on the part of -individual officers, who apparently had not been brought up in the -South, were absolutely exceptional. The senior men immediately adopted -a tactful attitude, whereas one or two juniors did otherwise—for -example, they were inconsiderate enough to want to keep a German -invalid out of the compartment. We Europeans were very well looked -after on the train, and it was like peace time to get a good night’s -rest by letting down the bunks and using a leather pillow. - -There was quite a crowd of Germans on the station at Tabora. They -complained of many cases of theft on the part of the Belgians and -English. It is undoubtedly true that such outrages had taken place. We -stopped for the night at Dodoma and next morning had an opportunity of -fetching water and having a bath. - -The news of the approach of our train had reached Morogoro, and when -we arrived there in the afternoon we once more found the German women -whom we had left behind us in and about Morogoro two years before. They -had tea and coffee waiting for us. They had arranged tables and baked -plenty of rolls and cakes. In addition they had got the finest fruit -for us. The English were almost as much interested as the Germans. -Besides a very amiable elderly medical officer I have a particularly -lively recollection of a tall, lanky corporal who had apparently drunk -a whole series of glasses to our health before our train arrived. I -managed to slip away from him at last. - -We reached Dar-es-Salaam at seven o’clock on the morning of December -8th. The Europeans were well housed in tents in a camp within a -barbed-wire fence. Food was good and plentiful, and we were able -to buy necessaries of all kinds cheaply from the English canteen. -Governor Schnee and I were received by the Chief of Staff of the -British commander, General Sheppard, and conducted to our very pretty -house outside the camp. General van Deventer had very kindly sent a -luncheon there as a welcome to us. Major Kraut, Captain Spangenberg, -and Dr. Huber were all quartered here. We found General Wahle, who had -been left behind sick at Ubene and fallen into the enemy’s hands a -few months back. He had quite recovered. We had a common mess and our -freedom of movement out of the house was only limited to the extent -that we had always to be accompanied by a British officer as escort. -At the start these gentlemen were very unpunctual, but gradually -quite tolerable relations were established between us, and I had an -opportunity of visiting acquaintances in Dar-es-Salaam and arranging my -personal affairs. A car was also usually placed at my disposal. Major -Hosken, the Commandant of the prison camp, who had previously shown -himself extremely considerate to the captured German women and children -in Tanga, now again devoted himself to preserve us from unnecessary -annoyance. - -On our railway journey we had already been surprised to find almost -more English Europeans at every station than we had in the whole of the -Protective Force. Dar-es-Salaam itself literally swarmed with white -troops. I estimated their number at not less than five thousand, and -hundreds and hundreds of motor lorries and cars were awaiting repairs -in the motor transport park. - -This close concentration of human beings revealed its dangers when -Spanish influenza made its appearance. Escort officers told me that -frequently five or seven English officers had died of this disease -at Dar-es-Salaam. We soon came across its traces among ourselves. -Infection had probably taken place while we were on the ship on Lake -Tanganyika, and subsequently on the train. It spread from man to man in -the concentration camps in Dar-es-Salaam. Captain Spangenberg was going -about with me in the town shortly after his arrival at Dar-es-Salaam. -Then he felt ill, and though his iron constitution had successfully -overcome all the hardships of the campaign, he died in hospital on -December 18th of influenza and inflammation of the lungs. - -Almost all the Europeans in our camp were attacked by it, and it was -very sad that in addition to Captain Spangenberg, nine other Europeans, -in all, therefore, ten per cent. of our strength, succumbed. Numbers of -our Askari interned at Tabora also died. - -My comings and goings often took me to the Administration Staff -(corresponding more or less to our Commandant on the Lines of -Communication). After much questioning I had found it in my old house -which I had occupied before the war. Among intelligent Englishmen I -found the view prevailing that Germany must have colonies on economic -grounds, as well as on account of her over-populousness. England was -considered to have too many colonies. For the time being, at any rate, -she had not sufficient suitable personnel to manage them. - -If the English, when telling us of the armistice, insisted on our -coming to Dar-es-Salaam at once, in order that we should be transported -punctually—that is, by the 12th December—they showed no haste -on their own part to carry out the terms of that armistice. Our -embarkation was continually postponed, and, finally, it did not take -place until the 17th January, 1919, five years to the day after I had -landed at Dar-es-Salaam. - - * * * * * - -To describe my return home in detail would furnish material for a whole -book and could hardly be excelled for tragi-comic events. In addition -to 114 German soldiers, we had 107 women and 87 children on board, and -an escort of 200 British soldiers. - -Voyaging by Cape Town, we reached Rotterdam at the end of February. The -large crowd of Germans who turned up to meet us at the quay showed me, -to my surprise, that our East African war had been watched very closely -in the homeland. Many Dutch also gave us proofs of goodwill. - -In cold truth our small band, which at the most comprised some 300 -Europeans and about 11,000 Askari, had occupied a very superior enemy -force for the whole war. According to what English officers told me, -137 Generals had been in the field, and in all about 300,000 men had -been employed against us. The enemy’s losses in dead would not be put -too high at 60,000, for an English Press notice stated that about -20,000 Europeans and Indians alone had died or been killed, and to that -must be added the large number of black soldiers who fell. The enemy -had left 140,000 horses and mules behind in the battle area. Yet in -spite of the enormously superior numbers at the disposal of the enemy, -our small force, the rifle strength of which was only about 1,400 at -the time of the armistice, had remained in the field always ready for -action and possessed of the highest determination. - -I believe it was the transparency of our aims, the love of our -Fatherland, the strong sense of duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice -which animated each of our few Europeans and communicated themselves, -consciously or unconsciously, to our brave black soldiers that gave our -operations that impetus which they possessed to the end. In addition -there was a soldierly pride, a feeling of firm mutual co-operation and -a spirit of enterprise without which military success is impossible in -the long run. We East Africans know only too well that our achievements -cannot be compared with the military deeds and devotion of those in the -homeland. No people in history has ever done more. - -If we East Africans received so kindly a reception in the homeland it -was because everyone seemed to think that we had preserved some part of -Germany’s soldierly traditions, had come back home unsullied, and that -the Teutonic sense of loyalty peculiar to us Germans had kept its head -high even under the conditions of war in the tropics. - -It is true that that feeling has suffered eclipse in many of our people -under the impression of the present tribulations of our Fatherland. -But it is part of the flesh and blood of us all, and it is just that -enthusiastic welcome which hundreds of thousands of our countrymen gave -us that strengthens our conviction that, in spite of the momentary -distractions and perplexities, the healthy spirit of our German people -will prevail again and once more tread the upward path. - - - - - INDEX - - - A - - _Adjutant_ (steamer), 85. - - Adler, Captain, 35, 56. - - Aeroplanes: - first appearance, 80; - brought down, 86. - - Alto Moloque: - surprise, 263; - Portuguese officers taken prisoner, 263; - large supplies of food, 265. - - Amaramba, Lake, 302. - - Amboni plantation, 62. - - Armistice, first news of, 13 Nov., 315. - - Arrival of first store-ship, 67; - second ditto, 117. - - Artillery, 38, 46. - - Arusha: - cattle extensive, 11; - potentiality of the district, 11, 29. - - Askari: - native soldiers, 27; - training, 8; - old, well-to-do, 10; - back pay, 319; - women follow our force, 177. - - _Astræa_, English cruiser, 27. - - Attendants reduced, 176. - - Augar, Captain, 35. - - Aumann, Captain, 84, 96, 100. - - Auracher, District Commissioner, 35, 38. - - - B - - Bagamoyo: - bombarded, 31; - reconnoitre, 146; - falls into enemy hands, 148. - - Bangweolo, Lake, 311. - - _Baron Dhanis_, steamer (Belgian), 95. - - Barrett, Lieutenant (English), 107. - - Barton, Colonel (English), 251. - - Bast, Sergt.-Major, killed, 87. - - Batzner, Lieutenant, 214. - - Baudouinville (Congo): - White Fathers, 14; - French missionaries, 14; - native industry, 14. - - Baumstark, Captain, 33, 36, 38. - - Baziots, The, Administrator, 96. - - Becker’s post, 90. - - Before the war, re-arming companies, 13. - - Behobeho: - field howitzer lost, 171; - heavy fighting and Selous killed, 171. - - Belgian steamer _Delcommune_ shot to pieces, 29. - - Belgian Commander-in-Chief at Lake Kivu, 92. - - Bergmann, Lieutenant, 39. - - Besch, Lieutenant, 224, 246. - - Beves, General (English), 212. - - Bismarckburg-Langenburg operations, 96. - - Bleeck, Lieutenant, 56, 162, 200. - - Bock, Lieut.-Colonel von, 8. - - Bock, Captain von, 89, 136. - - Boell, Lieutenant, 138; - wounded, 301. - - Boemken, Major von, 159. - - Bolles, Sergt.-Major, killed, 296. - - Boot-making experiments, 194. - - Botha, General, reported coming, 72. - - Braunschweig, Captain, 82, 149, 182. - - Bread without wheat flour, 193. - - Bridge building, 71. - - British North Lancashire Regiment, 42. - - British Regular officers chivalrous, 107. - - British treatment of German prisoners, 221. - - Brits, General, 147, 149. - - Brucher, Lieutenant, 192. - - Bueschel, Lieutenant, 87. - - Buffaloes, best in East Africa, 12. - - Buiko, 141. - - Bukoba, 88, 91. - - Buller, Major (English), wounded, 147. - - Burungi Mountains, 134; - supplies plentiful, 134. - - - C - - _Camaraderie_ of escort, 322. - - Carriers, numbers of, 22, 24. - - _Cecil Rhodes_, steamer, sunk, 97. - - Chalau taken, 287. - - Chambesi depot, 314. - - Chappuis, Lieutenant von, 31, 185. - - Chirumba station, 241. - - Chiulezi, 235. - - Chiwata, position, 217; - ammunition shortage, 218. - - Christiansen, Lieutenant, 68. - - Cloth-making at Kilima Njaro, 70. - - Coast towns defence, 63. - - Command of Lake Tanganyika, 29. - - Communications cut off, 34. - - Concentration at Pugu, 21. - - Congo Act, against England, 19. - - Containing the enemy on Uganda, 77. - - Cook, Lieutenant, 101st Grenadier Guards, 45. - - Cotton spinning, 69. - - Cutsch, Lieutenant, 221. - - Cutting down rations, 176. - - - D - - Dar-es-Salaam: - first action, artillery fire, 27; - negotiations for surrender, 28; - English ships appear, 52; - English Consul King, 20; - internment at, 323; - embarkation, 325. - - _Delcommune_, Belgian steamer, destroyed, 29. - - Delschitz, Lieutenant von, 97. - - Dessel, Dr., 38. - - Destructiveness of termites, 30. - - Deventer, General van: - arrives, 138; - at Kondoa, 144; - at Kilossa, 146; - at Kilwa, 200; - calls for surrender, 235; - telegram of Armistice, 315; - conditions of Armistice, 317. - - Dickinson, Colonel (English), 284, 318. - - Discontent at Logeloge, 163. - - District Commissioner, 6. - - Dodoma, enemy reach, 145. - - Dsalla, Lake, 110. - - Dürr, Father, 10. - - Dutumi action, 156; - abandoned, 157. - - - E - - Edwards, General (English), 255, 262, 320. - - Embarkation, January 17th, 1919, 325. - - Enemy, The: - vital point, 4; - - Enemy, The: - propaganda captured, 86; - scouts use poisoned arrows, 90; - advances north-west and south-west, 140; - take a rest, 158. - - Engare Len, 78. - - England among our enemies, 18. - - English Consul King, 20; - naval expedition, 97; - plans discovered, 290; - recruits make good, 104; - spies active, 99. - - Enslin, General, 154. - - Erdmann, Second Lieutenant, killed, 63. - - Erok Mountain ambush, 64. - - Europeans and natives interned, 320. - - - F - - Falkenstein, Captain, 84. - - Fate of German possessions, 3. - - Feilke, Captain, 31, 51, 134, 174. - - Field companies increased, 71. - - Fife, enemy depots captured, 310. - - First action, Dar-es-Salaam, 27. - - First journey of inspection, 4. - - First Masai: - pure Hamites, 10; - original Jews, 10; - characteristics, 10. - - Fischer, Major, 119. - - Franken, Lieutenant, 97, 186. - - French missionary propaganda, 14. - - Freund, Lieutenant, 291, 296. - - - G - - Galula, 307. - - Gararagua encounters, 110. - - Garrod, Major (English), captured, 292. - - Gerlich, Lieutenant, killed, 63. - - German Fleet revolt, 318; - patrol rides into enemy camp, 144; - possessions, fate of, 3. - - German prisoners, British treatment of, 221; - Reservists mobilized, 22; - Revolution, 318; - settlers source of military power, 7. - - Goering, Captain, 210; - wounded, 301. - - _Goetzen_, steamer: - building, 84; - completed, 96; - sunk, 186. - - Gold Coast Hill, enemy grenade attack, 169. - - Gore-Brown, Major (English), drowned, 276. - - Gothein, Lieutenant Dr., 99. - - Grabow, Master Butcher, 40. - - Grawert, Major von, surrenders, 188. - - Grote, Lieutenant, 75; - died, 121. - - Gudovius, wounded and prisoner, 185. - - Guerilla warfare imperative, 63; - commenced, 64. - - _Gwendoline_, steamer, 99. - - - H - - Hammerstein, Captain von, 18 31, 38, 42, 44, 56, 58; - died of wounds, 63. - - Handeni, collecting station, 130. - - Hasslacher, Lieutenant, killed, 186. - - Haun, Lieutenant, 96. - - Haxthausen, Lieutenant von, 89. - - _Hedwig von Wissmann_, steamer, 14; - captured, 28, 100. - - Henneberger, Lieutenant, 86. - - Hering’s battery, 43. - - Hiffmeister, Veterinary Officer, 12. - - Himo, 32. - - Hindenburg’s name not heard of, 48. - - Horn, Lieutenant, 28, 94; - builds cottages, 130. - - Hoskins, Major (English), 200. - - Huber, Dr., 323. - - Huebner, Lieutenant, surrenders, 186. - - Hulua Mountain, 300. - - Hüttich, Sergt.-Major, 280. - - _Hyacinth_, The, off Tanga, 86. - - - I - - Ili, 266; - return to, 290; - English plans discovered, 290. - - Imminence of universal war, 3. - - Inagu, von Schroetter’s escape, 261. - - Indian Brigade, 42; - Expeditionary Force, 25, 44. - - Influenza epidemic, 302, 324. - - Insufficient interest of authorities, 10. - - Internment of Europeans and natives, 320. - - Iringa, 15. - - Irangi: - enemy shell headquarters, 138; - food in abundance, 139; - series of actions, 139; - enemy casualties heavy, 139; - general view of position, 140. - - - J - - Jantzen, Lieutenant, 207. - - Jassini. _See_ YASIN. - - Jericho, 97. - - Jews, first Masai the original, 10. - - Jipe, Lake, 108, 125. - - Johannes, Lieut.-Colonel, 10. - - - K - - Kaempfe, Lieutenant, 87. - - Kahe, 121; - our retreat, 123. - - Kaiser’s, The, abdication, 318. - - Kajambi Catholic Mission, 312. - - Kaltenborn, Captain von, 130. - - Kanene, 250, 302. - - Kanga Mountain encounters, 142. - - Karongo, 98. - - Kasama captured, 313. - - Kasigao Mountain action, 75. - - Kauffman, Second Lieutenant, killed, 63. - - Kayense, 47. - - Kempner, Lieutenant, 319. - - Kepler, Major, 57; - killed, 63. - - Kibata: - occupied, 167; - guns brought up, 167; - congratulations of General Smuts, 170. - - Kidodi heliograph station, 18. - - Kifumbiro, 89. - - Kigoma (Tanganyika), 13; - as naval base, 95. - - Kilima Njaro: - supply depot, 32; - activities at, 68; - cotton shortage, 69; - making cloth, tyres, motor fuel and boots, 70; - bridge building, 70. - - Kilimatinde, best buffaloes in East Africa, 12. - - Kilossa, 145. - - Kilwa: - demands attention, 159; - Commissioner taken prisoner, 159; - enemy dumps surprised, 192; - bombarding enemy transports, 193; - enemy’s strong forces, 200. - - Kimamba depot, 133. - - King, English Consul, 7, 20. - - _Kingani_, steamer, 95; - lost, 98. - - Kirnamba, 31. - - Kissaki: - stores destroyed, 152; - enemy defeated, 153, 155; - prisoners taken, 155. - - Kissangire Station, 123; - minor engagements, 164. - - Kissenyi fighting, 92. - - Kissi Mountains, 173. - - Kissija: - capture of enemy propaganda, 86; - enemy driven out, 164. - - Kitangari, 223. - - Kitendu, enemy division surrounded, 188. - - Kituta, 96. - - Kivu, Lake, 91, 98, 126, 140, 185. - - Klein, Sergt.-Major, killed, 214. - - Klinghardt, Captain, 93, 126, 134, 142, 144, 145. - - Koehl, Captain, 68, 112, 179, 204; - transport surprised, 256. - - Kokosani (Namacurra), 272; - Portuguese heavy losses, 273; - search for ammunition, 273; - large supplies captured, 276. - - Kondoa: - occupied, 135; - fight in the dark, 137; - English civil administration, 137. - - Kondoa-Irangi: - enemy shell Headquarters, 138; - food in abundance, 139; - series of actions, 139; - enemy heavy losses, 139; - general view of position, 140. - - Konduchi, 27. - - _Königsberg_, The, 19; - puts to sea, 28; - destroys English cruiser _Pegasus_, 84; - concealed in Rufiji delta, 84; - blown up, 85; - ten guns salved, 85; - Adjutant recaptured, 85. - - Koriwa, Wunderlich wounded, 251. - - Kornatzki, Captain von, 33, 52. - - Korogwe, 31, 33, 36. - - Kraut, Major, 29, 182, 184, 323. - - Kraut, Captain, 32, 47. - - Kröber, Railway Commissary, 36, 57, 79. - - Kroeger, Lieutenant, killed, 214. - - Krüger, Secretary, 30. - - Kühlwein, Herr, 162. - - Kungulio: - Enemy defeat, 172; - hippo shooting, 160. - - Kurungu, our envelopment fails, 205. - - Kwiri, field hospital left behind, 259. - - - L - - Lake Amaramba, 302. - - ” Bangweolo, 311. - - ” Dsalla, 110. - - ” Jipe, 108, 125. - - ” Kivu, 91, 98, 126, 140, 185. - - ” Moero, 322. - - ” Nyassa, 98, 306. - - ” Rukwa, 189, 306. - - ” Tanganyika, 29, 52. - - ” Tshahafi, 92. - - ” Utungi, 174, 177, 179, 188. - - ” Victoria, 47, 88. - - Lang, Lieutenant, 92. - - Langenburg: - fertility and native industries, 15; - ours for eighteen months, 99. - - Langenn, Major von, 96, 98, 185, 186; - division loses heavily, 187. - - Ledebur, Freiherr von, 8. - - Lembeni country, 124; - aeroplanes brought down, 140. - - “Lettow Schnapps,” 195. - - Liebermann, Captain von, 164, 200, 202. - - Ligonja, 282. - - Lincke, Captain, 136. - - Lindi, 196. - - Lioma: - retirement after heavy fighting, 296; - transport detachment lost, 299; - severe enemy losses, 299. - - Logeloge discontent, 163. - - Lolkisale Mountain: - 28th Company surrender, 126; - Captain Rothert wounded, 126. - - Longido Mountain: - English attack, 67; - enemy reinforced, 106. - - Low level of musketry training, 9. - - Luambala, 242, 303. - - Lugella: - depot captured, 268; - no ammunition found, 270. - - Lukuledi, 213; - conference on aspects, 216. - - Lupembe, enemy retire, 187. - - Luscheringe River, 304. - - Lusinje, Captain Wienholt captured, 248. - - Lutende: - enemy surprised and routed, 199; - English commanding officer wounded, 199. - - Luwungi, 92, 98. - - Lyncker, Lieutenant von, 106. - - - M - - Mafia Island, English take, 86. - - Magad Railway, 65. - - Mahenge country, 141. - - Mahiwa: - flank surprise, 211; - severe fighting, 211; - enemy defeat absolute, 211; - guns and ammunition captured, 213. - - Mahua, 246, 250. - - Makatan, English defeat, 74. - - Makima headquarters, 165. - - Makoti, enemy retire with heavy losses, 254. - - Malangali action, 149, 182; - Wahehe chief rebels, 182. - - Malaria, native immunity against, 24. - - Malema: - fertility of, 261; - enemy advance, 262; - difficulties of bush tactics, 262; - Boma captured, 260. - - Malleson, General (English), 74, 106. - - Mara Bay, 90. - - Marangu, 105. - - Masai, first, 10. - - Massako, 98. - - Matendu floods, 197. - - Matuschka, Lieutenant, 80. - - Mawa action, 179. - - Maximum strength, 72. - - Mayita, 90. - - Mbinji fruit, 241. - - Mbizi depot, 307. - - Mbosi Mission, 15; - reports of English intentions, June, 1914, 15; - country, 96. - - Mbuyuni, 73, 79. - - Mechanical transport, 50. - - Meda, 245. - - Medical supplies, 195. - - Meinhertshagen, Captain (English), 44. - - Meixner, Dr., 259. - - Merensky, Lieutenant, 36, 38. - - Merker, M., and the Masai, 10. - - Michels, District Commissioner, 146. - - Mihambia, bombs dropped, 203. - - Mirow, Sergt.-Major, killed, 168. - - Mkulu Mountain, 239. - - Mlali, enemy advance, 150. - - Mletere, 299. - - Mobilization, August, 1914-18, not extended to overseas, 18; - Reservists, 22. - - Moero, Lake, 312. - - _Moewe_, steamer, 19, 28, 91, 94. - - Mori Bay, 89. - - Morogoro as base, 142; - headquarters, 146; - enemy converge on, 149. - - Moshi, 52. - - Mosquito, The, 25. - - Moving forces to Northern Railway, 29. - - Mpapua action, 145. - - Mpili, 224. - - Mpoororo, 91. - - Mpotora base, 181. - - Msalu river, 247. - - Mtende, 246, 248. - - _Muanza_, steamer, 47, 87, 88, 89. - - Mujeba, 270. - - Mujebain, 280. - - Müller, Staff Surgeon, 46, 196. - - Musketry training low level, 9. - - Musslin, Major-General, 248. - - Musoma, 89. - - Mwasge Mission, 96. - - Mwembe, 191, 242, 304. - - Mwenzo Mission, 311. - - Mwurnoni, 56. - - My early experiences, 16. - - Mzima Camp, 69. - - - N - - Nagawamira, 304. - - Namacurra. _See_ KOKOSANI. - - Nambindinga, 220; - reducing the strength, 220. - - Namirrue: - enemy routed, 283; - Colonel Dickinson captured, 284; - Lieut. Ruckteschell wounded, 286; - Lieutenant Silke killed, 286; - enemy annihilated, 286. - - Nampepo, roast pork and brawn, 267. - - Namunu, 245. - - Nangwale, 238. - - Nanungu concentration, 242. - - Narungombe: - enemy flee in disorder, 202; - Liebermann’s great success, 202. - - Narunyu, enemy attack, 205. - - Native carrier difficulty, 24; - interchange of communications, 13; - method of warfare, 9; - immunity against malaria, 24; - industries, 15. - - Naumann, Captain, 189, 221. - - Naval guns salved from the Königsberg, 85. - - Ndanda Catholic Mission, 206. - - Nevale, 224. - - New Moshi, 32, 33, 36; - headquarters, 49; - pleasant times at, 59; - aeroplane drops bombs, 113; - abandoned, 119. - - New Steglitz headquarters, 116. - - New supply detachment raised, 179. - - News: - from home, 67; - of German Fleet revolt, 318; - German Revolution, Kaiser’s abdication, 318. - - Ngaula, enemy routed, 193. - - Ngomano action, 230. - - Niemeyer, Commander, 7. - - Njango Camp, 204; - telegram from His Majesty, 204. - - Nordenholz, Sergt.-Major, 291. - - Northey, General, 140, 149. - - North Pare Mountains, 125. - - Numarroe, 291. - - Nyanza hostile enterprises, 47. - - Nyassa, Lake, 98. - - - O - - Old Askari, 10. - - Old 1871 rifle, 8. - - Oldorobo Mountain, 80; - enemy retreat in disorder, 104; - English recruiting bait, 104; - English orders, “Take no prisoners,” 104. - - Old Utengule Mission, 307. - - Oriva occupied, 280. - - Ott, Lieutenant, wounded, 292. - - Otto, Captain, 58, 145, 172, 179. - - Our movements from North-West to Central, 127. - - Our departure from North final, 129. - - - P - - Pangire Mission, 305. - - Pare Mountains, 125. - - _Pegasus_, English cruiser, 27, 84. - - Pekera captured, 287. - - Peramiho Mission, 305. - - Poisoned arrows used by enemy, 90. - - Police Askari, 6. - - Poppe, Captain, wounded, 295. - - Pori (bush) difficulties, 12; - not easy to disappear in, 13. - - Portuguese: - invade Makonde, 165; - driven into their territory, 166; - territory entered, 190. - - _President_, steamer, 84, 198. - - Prince, Captain von, 4, 32, 41, 45. - - Protective Force, 6; - strength of, 19. - - Pugu, concentration of troops, 21. - - - Q - - Quelimane, 265. - - Quinine production, 71. - - - R - - Ras-Kasone, 36, 39. - - Rations cut down, 176. - - Reata-Kahe: - our withdrawal by night, 114; - evacuated, 116; - enemy occupy, 116. - - Reata-Latima Mountain repulse, 114. - - Reata-North defences, 111. - - Recke, Lieutenant, killed, 89. - - Regone, 293. - - Rentell, Engineer, 71. - - Reservists mobilized, 22. - - Revolt of German Fleet, 318. - - Revolution in Germany, 318. - - Rifle, old 1871, 8. - - Rothe, Director of Postal Service, 30. - - Rothert, Captain, 119, 125. - - Rotterdam welcome, 325. - - Ruckteschell, Lieutenant von, 75, 147, 286. - - Rufiji, Delta, 84; - loss of the Königsberg, 85; - enemy advance on, 160; - evacuated at rainy season, 180. - - Rugesi Passage, 89. - - Ruhudje, fighting on the, 184. - - Rukwa, Lake, 306. - - Ruponda, we lose supplies, 208. - - Russissi minor actions, 93. - - Rwiba Mount, 308. - - - S - - Saidi, 251. - - Salt supplies, 194. - - Schaefer, Lieutenant, 57. - - Schaefner, Lieutenant, 259. - - Schimmer, Captain, 93. - - Schleuntz, Colonel von, 8. - - Schnee, Dr., 27. - - Schmid, Captain, 31. - - Schoenfeld, Lieut.-Commander, 7, 85, 144. - - Schottstaedt, Lieutenant, 45. - - Schroetter, Lieutenant von, 51, 260, 296. - - Schulz, Captain, 33, 94, 98, 130, 146, 163, 167. - - Second store-ship arrives, 117. - - Selke, Lieutenant, killed, 286. - - Selous killed, 171. - - “Shensi” spies, 108. - - Shirarti, 89. - - Singida stud farms, 11. - - Sisal plant, 56. - - Smith-Dorrien, General, 104. - - Smuts, General: - takes over command from Smith-Dorrien, 104; - at Kitovo, 110; - at Handeni, 142; - calls for surrender at Uluguru Mountains, 158; - congratulates Von Lettow on decoration, 170; - operations wrecked on Rufiji, 172; - relieved by General Hoskins, 200. - - South Pare Mountains, 76. - - Spalding, Lieutenant, killed, 63. - - Spangenberg, Captain, 323; - died, 324. - - Sphinx Harbour, 100. - - Ssongea, enemy at, 304. - - Ssonyo treachery, 87. - - Stemmermann, Captain, 113, 146, 153. - - Sternheim, Lieutenant, 114. - - Stewart, General (English), 110. - - Stolowsky, Staff Surgeon, 195. - - Store-ships arrive, 67, 117. - - Strength of Protective Force, 19. - - Struwe, Sergt.-Major, 192. - - Stud farms at Singida, 11. - - Stuemer, Major von, 87, 130, 134, 190, 207. - - Supplies devoured at depots, 174. - - Supply system, 23. - - Supreme military power, 21. - - Surgery under difficulties, 196. - - Surrender: - Smuts calls for, 158; - Deventer calls for, 235. - - Swahili, 15. - - _Sybil_, steamer (English), 88, 90. - - - T - - _Tabora_, hospital ship, 51. - - Tabora retirement, 186. - - Tafel, Captain, 22, 28, 33, 132, 178. - - Tafeli surrender, 236. - - “Take no prisoners,” English order, 104. - - Tanga: - hostile cruisers off, 35. - plans for defence, 36; - enemy attack, 41; - British North Lancashire Regiment defeat, 42; - enemy mowed down, 42; - transfer of wounded, 44. - - Tanganyika, Lake, command of, 29. - - ” Railway, 52. - - Taveta, 29, 33. - - Termites, 30. - - Thierfelder, Dr., 195. - - Thurmann, Sergt.-Major, killed, 296. - - Timbani Mountain, 256; - Koehl’s transport surprised, 256. - - Tipa, Boma, 282. - - Tombeur, Belgian commander at Kivu, 92. - - Tombwe post captured, 95. - - _Tomondo_, steamer, 159. - - Treachery of Ssonyo, 87. - - Trench mortar captured, 286. - - Tse-tse fly, 11; - plague, 26. - - Tshahafi, Lake, 92. - - Tuliani headquarters bombed, 143. - - Tunduru district, 192. - - Tunga: - enormous booty, 45; - our losses insignificant, 45. - - - U - - Ubena, 306. - - Uganda Railway, containing the enemy on, 4, 77. - - Ukerewe, 89. - - Unconditional “surrender” or “evacuation,” 319. - - Unindi, enemy repulsed, 200. - - Universal war imminent, 3. - - Unprepared for war, 10. - - Unterrichter, Lieutenant von, 68. - - Usambara country, 4; - volunteer rifle corps, 4. - - Utengule (Old) Mission, 307. - - Utungi, Lake, 172, 174, 177, 179, 188. - - - V - - Victoria, Lake, 47, 88; - in English hands, 87. - - Volunteer Rifle Corps at Usambara, 4. - - Vorbeck, General von Lettow-: - landing at Dar-es-Salaam, 3; - tour of inspection, 4; - buffalo hunting, 13; - water on the knee, 13; - a raw hand, 16; - early experiences, 16; - had malaria ten times, 25; - slightly wounded, 138; - congratulated by Smuts, 170; - experiments in bread-making, 193; - wireless from Kaiser, 204; - Deventer calls for surrender, 235; - hippo shooting, 240; - receives news of German offensive, Western Front, 248; - operation on toe, 249; - injury to eye, 249; - Deventer’s telegram of Armistice, 315; - and conditions of surrender, 317; - sends telegram to Kaiser, 317; - no reply from German Government, 319; - declines Colonel Hawkins’ invitation, 319; - Deventer’s reply to protest, 321; - at Kigoma, 322; - at Tabora and at Morogoro, 323; - at Dar-es-Salaam, December 8th, 1918. Embarked January 17th, 1919, - 325; - reached Rotterdam, 325. - - - W - - Waganda Warriors, 47. - - Wahehe tribe, 32. - - Wahle, Major-General, 23, 31, 51, 97, 140, 184 _et seq._, 323. - - _Waimi_, steamer, 86; - blown up, 186. - - Wajagga tribe, 24, 32. - - Wamaka, 288. - - Wangoni desertions, 305. - - Wassukuma people, 91. - - Water-finding, 80. - - Welcome at Rotterdam, 325. - - White Fathers, 14. - - Wienholt, Lieutenant, capture and escape, 143. - - Wienholt, Captain, captured, 248. - - Wilhelmstal native police, 6. - - Wintgens, Captain, 91, 185, 186; - division captures gun, 187; - taken prisoner, 189. - - Winzer, Sergt.-Major, gets through, 188. - - Wülfingen, Captain Bock von, 87. - - Wunderlich, Lieut.-Commander, wounded, 251. - - - Y - - Yasin. _See_ JASSINI: - enemy advance, 30; - country, 34; - English concentration, 56; - our attack, 58; - enemy surrender, 61. - - - Z - - Zambesi Ferry, 314. - - Zelewski’s expedition, 15. - - _Ziethen_, steamer, 86. - - Zimmer, Captain, 28, 82, 93, 94. - -_Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey._ - - - - - FOOTNOTES: - -[1] M. Merker, “Die Masai,” Berlin, 1904 (2nd Edition, 1910). - -[2] Askari are “soldiers,” not a distinct tribe. - -[3] Seitenschlag. - -[4] We have no corresponding rank. He is a reservist who has served as -a “One-year Volunteer,” but has not yet done enough reserve training to -qualify as an Officer in the Reserve. - -[5] The English Government issued to us articles of food for the -English prisoners which we could not get for ourselves. - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of My Reminiscences of East Africa, by -General von Lettow-Vorbeck - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY REMINISCENCES OF EAST AFRICA *** - -***** This file should be named 51746-0.txt or 51746-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/7/4/51746/ - -Produced by Giovanni Fini, Brian Coe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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