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diff --git a/old/51594-0.txt b/old/51594-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 36e6908..0000000 --- a/old/51594-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15920 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The Greatest Failure in All History, by John Spargo - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Greatest Failure in All History - A Critical Examination of the Actual Workings of Bolshevism in Russia - -Author: John Spargo - -Release Date: March 28, 2016 [EBook #51594] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Hulse, Wayne Hammond and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - “THE GREATEST FAILURE - IN ALL HISTORY” - -[Illustration] - - - - -BOOKS BY - -JOHN SPARGO - - “THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY” - RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM - THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM - BOLSHEVISM - AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY - SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED - - - HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK - ESTABLISHED 1817 - - - - - “THE GREATEST FAILURE - IN ALL HISTORY” - - _A Critical Examination of - The Actual Workings of - Bolshevism In Russia_ - - BY - - JOHN SPARGO - - AUTHOR OF - “BOLSHEVISM” “THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM” - “RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM” - “SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED” - - [Illustration] - - HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS - NEW YORK AND LONDON - - - - - THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY - - - Copyright, 1920, by Harper & Brothers - Printed in the United States of America - Published August, 1920 - - G-U - - - _To The - MISGUIDED, THE MISTAKEN, - AND THE MISINFORMED - Who Have Hailed Bolshevism in Russia as the Advent of - A NEW FREEDOM_ - -_I Submit a Part of the Indisputable Evidence Upon Which, as a -Socialist, Who Believes in Democracy in Government and Industry--and -in the Generous Individualism Which Communism of Opportunity Alone -Can Give--I Base My Condemnation of Bolshevism as a Mad Attempt, by a -Brutal and Degrading Tyranny, to Carry Out an Impossible Program_ - - - - -NOTE - - -My thanks are due to many friends, in this country and in Europe, for -their kindly co-operation, assistance, and advice. I do not name them -all--partly because many of them have requested me not to do so. I -must, however, express my thanks to Mr. Henry L. Slobodin of New York, -for kindly placing his materials at my disposal; Dr. S. Ingerman of -New York, for his valuable assistance; Mr. Jerome Landfield of New -York, for most valuable suggestions; Prof. V. I. Issaiev of London, for -personal courtesies and for the assistance derived from his valuable -collection of data; Dr. Joseph M. Goldstein, author of _Russia, -Her Economic Past and Future_; Mr. Gregor Alexinsky; Mr. Alexander -Kerensky, former Premier of Russia; Madame Catherine Breshkovsky; Dr. -J. O. Gavronsky of London; the editors of _Pour la Russie_, Paris; -Gen. C. M. Oberoucheff, military commander of the Kiev District under -the Provisional Government; Mr. J. Strumillo, of the Russian Social -Democratic Party; Mr. G. Soloveytchik of Queen’s College, Oxford; to -the Institute for Public Service for the diagram used on page 65; -and, finally, my old friend and colleague of twenty-five years ago, -Col. John Ward, C.B., C.M.G., member of the British House of Commons, -founder of the Navvies’ Union, whose courageous struggle against -Bolshevism has won for him the respect and gratitude of all friends of -Russian freedom. - - J. S. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - NOTE vii - - PREFACE xi - - I. WHY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI RETAINED POWER? 1 - - II. THE SOVIETS 8 - - III. THE SOVIETS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKI 20 - - IV. THE UNDEMOCRATIC SOVIET STATE 38 - - V. THE PEASANTS AND THE LAND 67 - - VI. THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE PEASANTS 90 - - VII. THE RED TERROR 140 - - VIII. INDUSTRY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL 192 - - IX. THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY--I 240 - - X. THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY--II 280 - - XI. FREEDOM OF PRESS AND ASSEMBLY 309 - - XII. “THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT” 352 - - XIII. STATE COMMUNISM AND LABOR CONSCRIPTION 369 - - XIV. LET THE VERDICT BE RENDERED 410 - - DOCUMENTS 453 - - INDEX 473 - - - - -PREFACE - - -Like the immortal Topsy, this book may be said to have “just growed.” -In it I have simply assembled in something like an orderly arrangement -a vast amount of carefully investigated evidence concerning the -Bolshevist system and its workings--evidence which, in my judgment, -must compel every honest believer in freedom and democracy to condemn -Bolshevism as a vicious and dangerous form of reaction, subversive -of every form of progress and every agency of civilization and -enlightenment. - -I do not discuss theories in this book, except in a very incidental -way. In two earlier volumes my views upon the theories of Bolshevism -have been set forth, clearly and with emphasis. On its theoretical -side, despite the labored pretentiousness of Lenin and his interminable -“Theses,” so suggestive of medieval theology, Bolshevism is the -sorriest medley of antiquated philosophical rubbish and fantastic -speculation to command attention among civilized peoples since -Millerism stirred so many of the American people to a mental process -they mistook for and miscalled thinking. - -No one who is capable of honest and straight-forward thinking -upon political and economic questions can read the books of such -Bolshevist writers as Lenin, Trotsky, and Bucharin, and the numerous -proclamations, manifestoes, and decrees issued by the Soviet Government -and the Communist Party, and retain any respect for the Bolsheviki -as thinkers. Neither can any one who is capable of understanding the -essential difference between freedom and despotism read even those -official decrees, programs, and legal codes which they themselves have -caused to be published and doubt that the régime of the Bolsheviki -in Russia is despotic in the extreme. The cretinous-minded admirers -and defenders of Bolshevism, whether they call themselves Liberals, -Radicals, or Socialists--dishonoring thereby words of great and -honorable antecedents--“bawl for freedom in their senseless mood” and, -at the same time, give their hearts’ homage to a monstrous and arrogant -tyranny. - -In these pages will be found, I venture to assert, ample and conclusive -evidence to justify to any healthy and rational mind the description of -Bolshevism as “a monstrous and arrogant tyranny.” That is the purpose -of the volume. It is an indictment and arraignment of Bolshevism and -the Bolsheviki at the bar of enlightened public opinion. The evidence -upon which the indictment rests is so largely drawn from official -publications of the Soviet Government and of the Communist Party, and -from the authorized writings of the foremost spokesmen of Russian -Bolshevism, that the book might almost be termed a self-revelation -of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki. Such evidence as I have cited from -non-Bolshevist sources is of minor importance, slight in quantity and -merely corroborative of, or supplementary to, the evidence drawn from -the Bolshevist sources already indicated. Much of the evidence has been -published from time to time in numerous articles, state reports, and -pamphlets, both here and in England, but this is the first volume, I -believe, to bring the material together in a systematic arrangement. - -Following the publication of my _Bolshevism_ I found myself called -upon to deliver many addresses upon the subject. Some of these were -given before college and university audiences--at Dartmouth, Princeton, -Columbia, Barnard, and elsewhere--while others were given before a -wide variety of public audiences. The circulation of my book and many -magazine and newspaper articles on the subject, together with the -lectures and addresses, had the result of bringing me a veritable -multitude of questions from all parts of the country. The questions -came from men and women of high estate and of low, ranging from -United States Senators to a group of imprisoned Communists awaiting -deportation. Some of the questions were asked in good faith, to elicit -information; others were obviously asked for quite another purpose. -For a long time it seemed that every statement made in the press about -Bolshevism or the Bolsheviki reached me with questions or challenges -concerning it. - -To every question which was asked in apparent good faith I did my -best to reply. When--as often happened--the information was not in my -possession, I invoked the assistance of those of my Russian friends -in Europe and this country who have made it their special task to -keep well informed concerning developments in Russia. These friends -not only replied to my specific questions, but sent me from time to -time practically every item of interest concerning developments in -Russia. As a result, I found myself in the possession of an immense -mass of testimony and evidence of varying value. Fully aware of the -unreliability of much of the material thus placed in my hands, for -my own satisfaction I weeded out all stories based upon hearsay, all -stories told by unknown persons, all rumors and indefinite statements, -and, finally, all stories, no matter by whom told, which were not -confirmed by dependable witnesses. This winnowing process left the -following classes of evidence and testimony: (1) Statements by leading -Bolsheviki, contained in their official press or in publications -authorized by them; (2) reports of activities by the Soviet Government -or its officials, published in the official organs of the government; -(3) formal documents--decrees, proclamations, and the like--issued by -the Soviet Government and its responsible officials; (4) statements -made by well-known Russian Socialists and trades-unionists of high -standing upon facts within their own knowledge, where there was -confirmatory evidence; (5) the testimony of well-known Socialists from -other countries, upon matters of which they had personal knowledge and -concerning which there was confirmatory evidence. - -Every scrap of evidence adduced in the following pages belongs to one -or other of the five classes above described. Moreover, the reader can -rest assured that every possible care has been taken to guard against -misquotation and against quotation which, while literally accurate, -nevertheless misrepresents the truth. This is often done by unfairly -separating text from context, for example, and in other ways. I believe -that I can assure the reader of the freedom of this book from that -evil; certainly nothing of the sort has been intentionally included. -While I have accepted as correct and authentic certain translations, -such as the translations of Lenin’s _Soviets at Work_ and his _State -and Revolution_, both of which are largely circulated by pro-Bolshevist -propagandists, and such collections of documents as have been published -in this country by the _Nation_--the Soviet Constitution and certain -Decrees--and by _Soviet Russia_, the official organ of the Soviet -Government in this country, I have had almost every other line of -translated quotation examined and verified by some competent and -trustworthy Russian scholar. - -The book does not contain all or nearly all the evidence which has come -into my possession in the manner described. I have purposely omitted -much that was merely harrowing and brutal, as well as sensational -incidents which have no direct bearing upon the struggle in Russia, but -properly belong to the category of crimes arising out of the elemental -passions, which are to be found in every country. Crimes and atrocities -by irresponsible individuals I have passed over in silence, confining -myself to those things which reflect the actual purposes, methods, and -results of the régime itself. - -I have not tried to make a sensational book, yet now that it is -finished I feel that it is even worse than that. It seems to me to -be a terrible book. The cumulative effect of the evidence of brutal -oppression and savagery, of political trickery and chicane, of -reckless experimentation, of administrative inefficiency, of corrupt -bureaucratism, of outraged idealism and ambitious despotism, seems to -me as terrible as anything I know--more terrible than the descriptions -of czarism which formerly harrowed our feelings. When I remember the -monstrous evils that have been wrought in the name of Socialism, my -soul is torn by an indescribable agony. - -Yet more agonizing still is the consciousness that here in the United -States there are men and women of splendid character and apparent -intelligence whose vision has been so warped by hatred of the evils -of the present system, and by a cunning propaganda, that they are -ready to hail this loathsome thing of hatred, this monstrous tyranny, -as an evangel of fraternalism and freedom; ready to bring upon this -nation--where, despite every shortcoming, we are at least two centuries -ahead of Bolshevized Russia, politically, economically, morally--the -curse which during less than thirty months has afflicted unhappy Russia -with greater ills than fifty years of czarism. - -They will not succeed. They shall strive in vain to replace the -generous spirit of Lincoln with the brutal spirit of Lenin. For us -there shall be no dictatorship other than that of our own ever-growing -conscience as a nation, seeking freedom and righteousness in our own -way. - -We shall defeat and destroy Bolshevism by keeping the light shining -upon it, revealing its ugliness, its brutality, its despotism. We do -not need to adopt the measures which czarism found so unavailing. -Oppression cannot help us in this fight, or offer us any protection -whatsoever. If we would destroy Bolshevism we must destroy the -illusions which surround it. Once its real character is made known, -once men can see it as it is, we shall not need to fear its spread -among our fellow-citizens. Light, abundant light, is the best agent to -fight Bolshevism. - - JOHN SPARGO. - - “NESTLEDOWN,” - OLD BENNINGTON, VERMONT, - _May, 1920_. - - - - - “THE GREATEST FAILURE - IN ALL HISTORY” - - - - -“THE GREATEST FAILURE IN ALL HISTORY” - - - - -I - -WHY HAVE THE BOLSHEVIKI RETAINED POWER? - - -The Bolsheviki are in control of Russia. Never, at any time since -their usurpation of power in November, 1917, have Lenin and Trotsky -and their associates been so free from organized internal opposition -as they are now, after a lapse of more than two and a quarter years. -This is the central fact in the Russian problem. While it is true that -Bolshevist rule is obviously tottering toward its fall, it is equally -true that the anti-Bolshevist forces of Russia have been scattered -like chaff before the wind. While there is plenty of evidence that -the overwhelming mass of the Russian people have been and are opposed -to them, the Bolsheviki rule, nevertheless. This is what many very -thoughtful people who are earnestly seeking to arrive at just and -helpful conclusions concerning Russia find it hard and well-nigh -impossible to understand. Upon every hand one hears the question, “How -is it possible to believe that the Bolsheviki have been able for so -long to maintain and even increase their power against the opposition -of the great mass of the Russian people?” - -The complete answer to this question will be developed later, but a -partial and provisional answer may, perhaps, do much to clear the way -for an intelligent and dispassionate study of the manner in which -Bolshevism in Russia has been affected by the acid test of practice. -In the first place, it would be interesting to discuss the naïveté of -the question. Is it a new and unheard-of phenomenon that a despotic -and tyrannical government should increase its strength in spite of -the resentment of the masses? Czarism maintained itself in power for -centuries against the will of the people. If it be objected that only -a minority of the people of Russia actively opposed czarism, and that -the masses as a whole were passive for centuries, no such contention -can be made concerning the period from 1901 to 1906. At that time the -country was aflame with passionate discontent; the people as a whole -were opposed to czarism, yet they lacked the organized physical power -to overthrow it. Czarism ruled by brute force, and the methods which it -developed and used with success have been adopted by the Bolsheviki and -perfected by them. - -However, let a veteran Russian revolutionist answer the question: -Gen. C. M. Oberoucheff is an old and honored member of the Party -of Socialists-Revolutionists of Russia and under the old régime -suffered imprisonment and exile on account of his activities in the -revolutionary movement. Under the Provisional Government, while -Kerensky was Premier, he was made Military Commissary of Kiev, at the -request of the local Soviet. General Oberoucheff says: - -“Americans often ask the question: ‘How can it be explained that the -Bolsheviki hold power?... Does this not prove that they are supported -by the majority of the people?’ For us Russians the reply to this -question is very simple. The Czars held power for centuries. Is that -proof that their rule was supported by the will of the people? Of -course not. They held power by the rule of blood and iron and did not -rest at all upon the sympathies of the great masses of the people. -The Bolsheviki are retaining their power to-day by the same identical -means.... Russia of the Czars’ time was governed by Blue gendarmes. -Great Russia of to-day is ruled by Red gendarmes. The distinction is -only in color and perhaps somewhat in methods. The methods of the -Red gendarmes are more ruthless and cruel than those of the old Blue -gendarmes.” - -The greater part of a year has elapsed since these words were -written by General Oberoucheff. Since that time there have been many -significant changes in Russia, including recently some relaxation of -the brutal oppression. Czarism likewise had its periods of comparative -decency. It still remains true, however, that the rule of the -Bolsheviki rests upon the same basis as that of the old régime. It is, -in fact, only an inverted form of czarism. - -As we shall presently see, the precise methods by which monarchism -was so long maintained have been used by the Bolsheviki. The main -support of the old régime was an armed force, consisting of the corps -of gendarmes and special regiments of guards. Under Bolshevism, -corresponding to these, we have the famous Red Guards, certain -divisions of which have been maintained for the express purpose of -dealing with internal disorder and suppressing uprisings. Just as, -under czarism, the guard regiments were specially well paid and -accorded privileges which made them a class apart, so have these Red -Guards of the Bolsheviki enjoyed special privileges, including superior -pay and rations. - -Under czarism the _Okhrana_ and the Black Hundreds, together with the -Blue gendarmes, imposed a reign of terror upon the nation. They were -as corrupt as they were cruel. Under the Bolsheviki the Extraordinary -Committees and Revolutionary Tribunals have been just as brutal and -as corrupt as their czaristic predecessors. Under the Bolsheviki the -system of espionage and the use of provocative agents can be fairly -described as a continuance of the methods of the old régime. - -Czarism developed an immense bureaucracy; a vast army of petty -officials and functionaries was thus attached to the government. This -bureaucracy was characterized by the graft and corruption indulged in -by its members. They stole from the government and they used their -positions to extort blackmail and graft from the helpless and unhappy -people. In the same manner Bolshevism has developed a new bureaucracy -in Russia, larger than the old, and no less corrupt. As we shall see -later on, the sincere and honest idealists among the Bolsheviki have -loudly protested against this evil. Moreover, the system has become -so burdensome economically that the government itself has become -alarmed. By filling the land with spies and making it almost impossible -for any man to trust his neighbor, by suppressing practically all -non-Bolshevist journals, and by terrorism such as was unknown under the -old régime, the Bolsheviki have maintained themselves in power. - -There is a still more important reason why the Bolshevist régime -continues, namely, its own adaptability. Far from being the unbending -and uncompromising devotees of principle they are very generally -regarded as being, the Bolshevist leaders are, above all else, -opportunists. Notwithstanding their adoption of the repressive and -oppressive methods of the old régime, the Bolsheviki could not have -continued in power had they remained steadfast to the economic -theories and principles with which they began. No amount of force -could have continued for so long a system of government based on -economic principles so ruinous. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki -have continued to rule Russia because, without any change of mind or -heart, but under pressure of relentless economic necessity, they have -abandoned their theories. The crude communism which Lenin and his -accomplices set out to impose upon Russia by force has been discarded -and flung upon the scrap-pile of politics. That this is true will be -abundantly demonstrated by the testimony of the Bolsheviki themselves. - -No study of the reasons for the success of the Bolsheviki can be -regarded as complete which does not take into account the fact that -Russia has been living upon the stored-up resources of the old order. -When the Bolsheviki seized the reins of government there were in -the country large stores of food, of raw materials, of manufactured -and partially manufactured goods. There were also large numbers of -industrial establishments in working order. With these things alone, -even without any augmentation by new production--except, of course, -agricultural production--the nation could for a considerable time -escape utter destruction. With these resources completely in the hands -of the government, any opposition was necessarily placed at a very -great disadvantage. The principal spokesmen of the Bolsheviki have -themselves recognized this from time to time. On January 3, 1920, -_Pravda_, the official organ of the Communist Party--that is, of the -Bolsheviki--said: - - We must not forget that hitherto we have been living on the - stores and machinery, the means of production, which we - inherited from the bourgeoisie. We have been using the old - stores of raw material, half-manufactured and manufactured - goods. But these stores are getting exhausted and the machinery - is wearing out more and more. All our victories in the field - will lead to nothing if we do not add to them victories gained - by the hammer, pick, and lathe. - -It must be confessed that the continued rule of the Bolsheviki has, -to a very considerable extent, been due to the political ineptitude -and lack of coherence on the part of their opponents. The truth is -that on more than one occasion the overthrow of the Bolsheviki might -easily have been brought about by the Allies if they had dared do it. -The chancelleries of Europe were, at times, positively afraid that -the Bolshevist Government would be overthrown and that there would be -no sort of government to take its place. In the archives of all the -Allied governments there are filed away confidential reports warning -the governments that if the Bolsheviki should be overthrown Russia -would immediately become a vast welter of anarchy. Many European -diplomats and statesmen, upon the strength of such reports, shrugged -their shoulders and consoled themselves with the thought that, however -bad Bolshevist government might be, it was at least better than no -government at all. - -Finally, we must not overlook the fact that the mere existence of -millions of people who, finding it impossible to overthrow the -Bolshevist régime, devote their energies to the task of making it -endurable by bribing officials, conspiring to evade oppressive -regulations, and by outward conformity, tends to keep the national life -going, no matter how bad the government. - - - - -II - -THE SOVIETS - - -The first articulate cry of Bolshevism in Russia after the overthrow -of the monarchy was the demand “All power to the Soviets!” which the -Bolshevist leaders raised in the summer of 1917 when the Provisional -Government was bravely struggling to consolidate the democratic -gains of the March Revolution. The Bolsheviki were inspired by that -anti-statism which one finds in the literature of early Marxian -Socialism. It was not the individualistic antagonism to the state of -the anarchist, though easily confounded with and mistaken for it. It -was not motivated by an exaltation of the individual, but that of a -class. The early Marxian Socialists looked upon the modern state, with -its highly centralized authority, as a mere instrument of class rule, -by means of which the capitalist class maintained itself in power and -intensified its exploitation of the wage-earning class. Frederick -Engels, Marx’s great collaborator, described the modern state as being -the managing committee for the capitalist class as a whole. - -Naturally, the state being thus identified with capitalist -exploitation, the determination to overthrow the capitalist system -carried with it a like determination to destroy the political state. -Given a victory by the working-class sufficiently comprehensive to -enable it to take possession of the ruling power, the state would -either become obsolete, and die of its own accord, or be forcibly -abolished. This attitude is well and forcibly expressed by Engels in -some well-known passages. - -Thus, in his _Socialism, Utopian and Scientific_, Engels says: - - The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a - capitalistic machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal - personification of the total national capital. The more it - proceeds to the taking over of productive forces the more does - it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens - does it exploit.... Whilst the capitalist mode of production - ... forces on more and more the transformation of the vast - means of production, already socialized, into state property, - it shows itself the way to accomplish this revolution. The - proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of - production into state property. - -What Engels meant is made clear in a subsequent paragraph in the same -work. He argues that as long as society was divided into antagonistic -classes the state was a necessity. The ruling class for the time -being required an organized force for the purpose of protecting its -interest and particularly of forcibly keeping the subject class in -order. Under such conditions, the state could only be properly regarded -as the representative of society as a whole in the narrow sense that -the ruling class itself represented society as a whole. Assuming -the extinction of class divisions and antagonisms, the state would -immediately become unnecessary: - - The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes - itself the representative of the whole of society--the - taking possession of the means of production in the name of - society--this is, at the same time, its last independent act as - a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one - domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; - the government of persons is replaced by the administration of - things and by the conduct of processes of production. The state - is not “abolished.” _It dies out._ - -In another work, _The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the -State_, Engels says: - - We are now rapidly approaching a stage of evolution in - production in which the existence of classes has not only - ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive fetter on - production. Hence these classes must fall as inevitably they - once rose. The state must irrevocably fall with them. The - society that is to reorganize production on the basis of a - free and equal association of the producers will transfer the - machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum - of antiquities, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the - bronze ax. - -These passages from the classic literature of Marxian Socialism fairly -and clearly express the character of the anti-statism which inspired -the Bolsheviki at the outset. They wanted to develop a type of social -organization in which there would be practically no “government of -persons,” but only the “administration of things” and the “conduct of -the processes of production.” Modern Socialist thinkers have fairly -generally recognized the muddled character of the thinking upon which -this anti-statism rests. How can there be “administration of things” -without “government of persons”? The only meaning that can possibly -be attached to the “administration of things” by the government is -that human relations established through the medium of things are to -be administered or governed. Certainly the “conduct of the processes -of production” without some regulation of the conduct of the persons -engaged in those processes is unthinkable. - -We do not need to discuss the theory farther at this time. It is -enough to recognize that the primitive Marxian doctrine which we have -outlined required that state interference with the individual and with -social relations be reduced to a minimum, if not wholly abolished. It -is a far cry from that conception to the system of conscript labor -recently introduced, and the Code of Labor Laws of Soviet Russia, -which legalizes industrial serfdom and adscription and makes even -the proletarian subject to a more rigid and despotic “government of -persons” than has existed anywhere since the time when feudalism -flourished. - -The Bolsheviki believed that they saw in the Soviets of -factory-workers, peasants, and Socialists the beginnings of a form -of social organization which would supplant the state, lacking its -coercive features and better fitted for the administration of the -economic life of the nation. The first Soviet of Workmen’s Deputies -appeared in October, 1905, in Petrograd, at the time of the abortive -revolution. The idea of organizing such a council of workmen’s -representatives originated with the Mensheviki, the faction of the -Social Democratic Party opposed to the Bolsheviki. The sole aim of the -Soviet was to organize the revolutionary forces and sentiment. But, -during the course of its brief existence, it did much in the way of -relieving the distress. The Socialists-Revolutionists joined with the -Mensheviki in the creation of this first Soviet, but the Bolsheviki -were bitterly opposed to it, denouncing it as “the invention of -semi-bourgeois parties to enthrall the proletariat in a non-partizan -swamp.” When the Soviet was well under way, however, and its success -was manifest, the Bolsheviki entered it and became active participants -in its work. With the triumph of czarism, this first Soviet was -crushed, most of its leaders being banished to Siberia. - -Even before the formation of the Provisional Government was completed, -in March, 1917, the revolutionary working-class leaders of Petrograd -had organized a Soviet, or council, which they called the Council -of Workmen’s Deputies of Petrograd. Like all the similar Soviets -which sprang up in various parts of the country, this was a very -loose organization and very far from being a democratic body of -representatives. Its members were chosen at casual meetings held in the -factories and workshops and sometimes on the streets. No responsible -organizations arranged or governed the elections. Anybody could -call a mass-meeting, in any manner he pleased, and those who came -selected--usually by show of hands--such “deputies” as they pleased. -If only a score attended and voted in a factory employing hundreds, -the deputies so elected represented that factory in the Soviet. This -description equally applies to practically all the other Soviets which -sprang up in the industrial centers, the rural villages, and in the -army itself. Among the soldiers at the front company Soviets, and even -trench Soviets, were formed. In the cities it was common for groups -of soldiers belonging to the same company, meeting on the streets by -accident, to hold impromptu street meetings and form Soviets. There -was, of course, more order and a better chance to get representative -delegates when the meetings were held in barracks. - -Not only were the Soviets far from being responsible democratically -organized representative bodies; quite as significant is the fact that -the deputies selected by the factory-workers were, in many instances, -not workmen at all, but lawyers, university professors, lecturers, -authors and journalists, professional politicians, and so on. Many -of the men who played prominent rôles in the Petrograd Soviet, for -example, as delegates of the factory-workers, were Intellectuals of -the type described. Any well-known revolutionary leader who happened -to be in the public eye at the moment might be selected by a group of -admirers in a factory as their delegate. It was thus that Kerensky, the -brilliant lawyer, found himself a prominent member of the Petrograd -Soviet of Workmen’s Deputies, and that, later on, Trotsky, the -journalist, and Lenin, the scholar, became equally prominent. - -It was to such bodies as these that the Bolsheviki wanted to transfer -all the power of the government--political, military, and economic. -The leaders of the Provisional Government, when they found their -task too heavy, urged the Petrograd Soviet to take up the burden, -which it declined to do. That the Soviets were needed in the existing -circumstances, and that, as auxiliaries to the Provisional Government -and the Municipal Council, they were capable of rendering great service -to the democratic cause, can hardly be questioned by any one familiar -with the conditions that prevailed. The Provisional Government, chosen -from the Duma, was not, at first, a democratic body in the full -sense of that word. It did not represent the working-people. It was -essentially representative of the bourgeoisie and it was quite natural, -therefore, that in the Soviets there was developed a very critical -attitude toward the Provisional Government. - -Before very long, however, the Provisional Government became more -democratic through the inclusion of a large representation of the -working-class parties, men who were chosen by and directly responsible -to the Petrograd Soviet. This arrangement meant that the Soviet had -definitely entered into co-operation with the Provisional Government; -that in the interest of the success of the Revolution the working-class -joined hands with the bourgeoisie. This was the condition when, in -the summer of 1917, the Bolsheviki raised the cry “All power to the -Soviets!” There was not even the shadow of a pretense that the -Provisional Government was either undemocratic or unrepresentative. -At the same time the new municipal councils were functioning. These -admirable bodies had been elected upon the basis of universal, -equal, direct, and secret suffrage. Arrangements were far advanced -for holding--under the authority of the democratically constituted -municipal councils and Zemstvos--elections for a Constituent Assembly, -upon the same basis of generous democracy: universal, equal, direct, -and secret suffrage, with proportional representation. It will be seen, -therefore, that the work of creating a thoroughly democratic government -for Russia was far advanced and proceeding with great rapidity. Instead -of the power of government being placed in the hands of thoroughly -democratic representative bodies, the Bolsheviki wanted it placed in -the hands of the hastily improvised and loosely organized Soviets. - -At first the Bolsheviki had professed great faith in, and solicitude -for, the Constituent Assembly, urging its immediate convocation. In -view of their subsequent conduct, this has been regarded as evidence -of their hypocrisy and dishonesty. It has been assumed that they never -really wanted a Constituent Assembly at all. Of some of the leaders -this is certainly true; of others it is only partially true. Trotsky, -Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others, during the months of June and -July, 1917, opposed the policy of the Provisional Government in making -elaborate preparations for holding the elections to the Constituent -Assembly. They demanded immediate convocation of the Constituent -Assembly, upon the basis of “elections” similar to those of the -Soviets, knowing well that this would give them an irresponsible -mass-meeting, easily swayed and controlled by the demagoguery and -political craft of which they were such perfect masters. Had they -succeeded in their efforts at that time, the Constituent Assembly -would not have been dispersed, in all probability. It would have -been as useful an instrument for their purpose as the Soviets. When -they realized that the Constituent Assembly was to be a responsible -representative body, a deliberative assembly, they began their -agitation to have its place taken by the Soviets. They were perfectly -well aware that these could be much more easily manipulated and -controlled by an aggressive minority than a well-planned, thoroughly -representative assembly could be. - -The Bolsheviki wanted to use the Soviets as instruments. In this -simple statement of fact there is implicit a distinction between -Soviet government and Bolshevism, a distinction that is too often -lost sight of. Bolshevism may be defined either as an end to be -attained--communism--or as a policy, a method of attaining the desired -end. Neither the Soviet as an institution nor Soviet government, as -such, had any necessary connection with the particular goal of the -Bolsheviki or their methods. That the Bolsheviki in Russia and in -Hungary have approved Soviet government as the form of government best -adapted to the realization of their program, and found the Soviet a -desirable instrument, must not be regarded as establishing either -the identity of Bolshevism and Soviet government or a necessary -relation between the Soviet and the methods of the Bolsheviki. The same -instrument is capable of being used by the conservative as well as by -the radical. - -In this respect the Soviet system of government is like ordinary -parliamentary government. This, also, is an instrument which may be -used by either the reactionary or the revolutionist. The defender of -land monopoly and the Single-taxer can both use it. To reject the -Soviet system simply because it is capable of being used to attain the -ends of Bolshevism, or even because the advocates of Bolshevism find -it better adapted to their purpose than the political systems with -which we are familiar, is extremely foolish. Such a conclusion is as -irrational as that of the superficial idealists who renounce all faith -in organized government and its agencies because they can be used -oppressively, and are in fact sometimes so used. - -It is at least possible, and, in the judgment of the present writer, -not at all improbable, that the Soviet system will prove, in Russia -and elsewhere, inclined to conservatism in normal circumstances. -Trades-unions are capable of revolutionary action, but under normal -conditions they incline to a cautious conservatism. The difference -between a trades-union and a factory Soviet is, primarily, that the -former groups the workers of a trade and disregards the fact that they -work in different places, while the latter groups the workers in a -particular factory and disregards the fact that they pursue different -trades or grades of labor. What is there in this difference to warrant -the conclusion that the factory-unit form of organization is more -likely to adopt communist ideals or violent methods than the other form -of organization? Surely the fact that the Bolsheviki have found it -necessary to restrict and modify the Soviet system, even to the extent -of abolishing some of its most important features, disposes of the -mistaken notion that Bolshevism and the Soviet system are inseparable. - -It is not without significance that the leading theoretician of -Bolshevism, Lenin, on the basis of pure theory, opposed the Soviets -at first. Nor is the fact that many of the bitterest opponents of -Bolshevism in Russia, among the Socialists-Revolutionists, the -Mensheviki, the Populists, the leaders of the co-operatives and the -trades-unions, are stanch believers in and defenders of the Soviet -system of government, and confidently believe that it will be the -permanent form of Russian government. - -For reasons which will be developed in subsequent chapters, the present -writer does not accept this view. The principal objection to the Soviet -system, as such, is not that it is inseparable from Bolshevism, that -it must of necessity be associated with the aims and methods of the -latter, but that--unless greatly modified and limited--it must prove -inefficient to the point of vital danger to society. This does not -mean that organizations similar in structure to the Soviets can have -no place in the government or in industrial management. In some manner -the democratization of industry is to be attained in a not far distant -future. When that time comes it will be found that the ideas which gave -impulse to syndicalism and to Soviet government have found concrete -expression in a form wholly beneficent. - - - - -III - -THE SOVIETS UNDER THE BOLSHEVIKI - - -After the _coup d’état_, the Soviets continued to be elected in the -same haphazard manner as before. Even after the adoption, in July, -1918, of the Constitution, which made the Soviets the basis of -the superstructure of governmental power, there was no noticeable -improvement in this respect. Never, at any time, since the Bolsheviki -came into power, have the Soviets attained anything like a truly -representative character. The Constitution of the Russian Socialist -Federal Soviet Republic stamps it as the most undemocratic and -oligarchic of the great modern nations. The city Soviets are composed -of delegates elected by the employees of factories and workshops and -by trades and professional unions, including associations of mothers -and housewives. The Constitution does not prescribe the methods of -election, these being determined by the local Soviets themselves. -In the industrial centers most of the elections take place at open -meetings in the factories, the voting being done by show of hands. In -view of the elaborate system of espionage and the brutal repression -of all hostile criticism, it is easy to understand that such a -system of voting makes possible and easy every form of corruption and -intimidation. - -The whole system of government resulting from these methods proved -unrepresentative. A single illustration will make this quite plain: - -Within four days of the Czar’s abdication, the workers of Perm, in -the Government of the Urals, organized a Soviet--the Urals Workers’ -and Soldiers’ Soviet. At the head of it, as president, was Jandarmov, -a machinist, who had been active in the Revolution of 1905, a Soviet -worker and trades-unionist, many times imprisoned under the old -régime. This Soviet supplemented and co-operated with the Provisional -Government, worked for a democratic Constituent Assembly, and, after -the first few days of excitement had passed, greatly increased -production in the factories. But when the Bolshevist régime was -established, after the adoption of the Constitution, the Government of -the Urals, with its four million inhabitants, did not represent, even -on the basis of the Soviet figures, more than 72,000 workers. That was -the number of workers supposedly represented by the delegates of the -Soviet Government. As a matter of fact, in that number was included -the anti-Bolshevist strength, the workers who had been outvoted or -intimidated, as the case might be. When the peasants elected delegates -they were refused seats, because they were known to be, or believed -to be, anti-Bolshevists. This is the much-vaunted system of Soviet -“elections” concerning which so many of our self-styled Liberals have -been lyrically eloquent. - -Of course, even under the conditions described, anti-Bolshevists were -frequently elected to the Soviets. It was a very general practice, in -the early days of the Bolshevist régime, to quite arbitrarily “cleanse” -the Soviets of these “undesirable counter-revolutionaries,” most of -whom were Socialists. In December, 1917, the Soviets in Ufa, Saratov, -Samara, Kazan, and Jaroslav were compelled, under severe penalties, _to -dismiss their non-Bolshevist members_; in January, 1918, the same thing -took place at Perm and at Ekaterinburg; and in February, 1918, the -Soviets of Moscow and Petrograd were similarly “cleansed.” - -It was a very ordinary occurrence for Soviets to be suppressed because -their “state of mind” was not pleasing to the Bolsheviki in control of -the central authority. In a word, when a local Soviet election resulted -in a majority of Socialists-Revolutionists or other non-Bolshevist -representatives being chosen, the Council of the People’s Commissaries -dissolved the Soviet and ordered the election of a new one. Frequently -they used troops--generally Lettish or Chinese--to enforce their -orders. Numerous examples of this form of despotism might be cited -from the Bolshevist official press. For example, in April, 1918, the -elections to the Soviet of Jaroslav, a large industrial city north of -Moscow, resulted in a large majority of anti-Bolshevist representatives -being elected. The Council of the People’s Commissaries sent Lettish -troops to dissolve the Soviet and hold a new “election.” This so -enraged the people that they gave a still larger majority for the -anti-Bolshevist parties. Then the Council of the People’s Commissaries -issued a decree stating that as the working-class of Jaroslav had twice -proved their unfitness for self-government they would not be permitted -to have a Soviet at all! The town was proclaimed to be “a nest of -counter-revolutionaries.” Again and again the workers of Jaroslav tried -to set up local self-government, and each time they were crushed by -brutal and bloody violence.[1] - -[1] The salient facts in this paragraph are condensed from _L’Ouvrier -Russe_, May, 1918. See also Bullard, _The Russian Pendulum--Autocracy, -Democracy, Bolshevism_, p. 92, for an account of the same events. - -L. I. Goldman, member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social -Democratic Labor Party, made a report to that body concerning one of -these Jaroslav uprisings in which he wrote: - - The population of that city consists mainly of workmen. Having - the assistance of a military organization under the leadership - of General Alexiev and General Savinkov, the laborers of all - the plants and factories took part in the uprising. Before the - uprising began the leaders declared that they would not allow - it unless they had the sympathy of the laborers and other - classes. Trotsky sent a message stating that if the revolt - could not be quelled he would go as far as having the city of - Jaroslav with its 40,000 inhabitants completely destroyed.... - Though surrounded by 17,000 Red Guards, Jaroslav resisted, but - was finally captured by the Bolsheviki, due to the superiority - of their artillery. The uprising was suppressed by bloody and - terrible means. The spirit of destruction swayed over Jaroslav, - which is one of the oldest Russian cities. - -Bearing in mind that the sole aim of the people of Jaroslav--led by -Socialist workmen--was to establish their own local self-government, -the inviolability of the Soviet elections, let us examine a few of -the many reports concerning the struggle published in the official -Bolshevist organs. Under the caption “Official Bulletin,” _Izvestia_ -published, on July 21, 1918, this item: - - At Jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our - troops, has tried to enter into negotiations. _The reply has - been given under the form of redoubled artillery fire._ - -Four days later, on July 25th, _Izvestia_ published a military -proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Jaroslav, from which the -following passage is taken: - - The General Staff notifies to the population of Jaroslav that - all those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in - the course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the America - Bridge. Those who remain will be treated as insurgents, _and - no quarter will be given to any one_. Heavy artillery fire and - gas-bombs will be used against them. _All those who remain will - perish in the ruins of the town with the insurrectionists, - the traitors, and the enemies of the Workers’ and Peasants’ - Revolution._ - -On the day following, July 26th, _Izvestia_ published an article -to the effect that “after minute questionings and full inquiry” a -special commission of inquiry appointed to investigate the Jaroslav -insurrection had listed three hundred and fifty persons as having -“taken an active part in the insurrection and had relations with the -Czechoslovaks,” and that the commissioners had ordered the whole three -hundred and fifty to be shot. - -Throughout the summer the struggle went on, and in the _Severnaya -Communa_, September 10, 1918, the following despatch from Jaroslav was -published: - - JAROSLAV, _9th September_.--In the whole of the Jaroslav - government a strict registration of the bourgeoisie and its - partizans has been organized. Manifestly anti-Soviet elements - are being shot; suspected persons are interned in concentration - camps; non-working sections of the population are subjected to - forced labor. - -Here is further evidence, from official Bolshevist sources, that when -the Soviet elections went against them the Bolshevist Government -simply dissolved the offending Soviets. Here are two despatches from -_Izvestia_, from the issues of July 28 and August 3, 1918, respectively: - - KAZAN, _July 26th_.--_As the important offices in the Soviet - were occupied by Socialists-Revolutionists of the Left, the - Extraordinary Commission has dissolved the Provisional Soviet. - The governmental power is now represented by a Revolutionary - Committee._ - - KAZAN, _August 1st_.--The state of mind of the workmen is - revolutionary. _If the Mensheviki dare to carry on their - propaganda death menaces them._ - -By way of confirmation we have the following, from _Pravda_, August 6, -1918: - - KAZAN, _August 4th_.--The Provisional Congress of the Soviets - of the Peasants has been dissolved because of the absence from - it of poor peasants and _because its state of mind is obviously - counter-revolutionary_. - -Whenever a city Soviet was thus suppressed a military revolutionary -committee, designated by the Bolsheviki, was set up in its place. -To these committees the most arbitrary powers were given. Generally -composed of young soldiers from distant parts, over whom there was -practically no restraint, these committees frequently indulged in -frightful acts of violence and spoliation. Not infrequently the -Central Government, after disbanding a local Soviet, would send from -places hundreds of miles away, under military protection, members of -the Communist Party, who were designated as the executive committee -of the Soviet for that locality. There was not even a pretense that -they had been elected by anybody. Thus it was in Tumen: Protected by -a convoy of eight hundred Red Guards, who remained there to enforce -their authority, a group of members of the Communist Party arrived from -Ekaterinburg and announced that they were the executive committee of -the Soviet of Tumen where, in fact, no Soviet existed. This was not at -all an unusual occurrence. - -The suppression by force of those Soviets which were not absolutely -subservient to the Central Bolshevik Government went on as long as -there were any such Soviets. This was especially true in the rural -villages among the peasantry. The following statement is by an English -trades-unionist, H. V. Keeling, a member of the Lithographic Artists’ -and Engravers’ Society (an English trades-union), who worked in Russia -for five years--1914-19: - - In the villages conditions were often quite good, due to the - forming of a local Soviet by the inhabitants who were not - Bolshevik. The villagers elected the men whom they knew, and as - long as they were left alone things proceeded much as usual. - - Soon, however, a whisper would reach the district Commissar - that the Soviet was not politically straight; he would then - come with some Red soldiers and dissolve the committee and - order another election, often importing Bolshevik supporters - from the towns, and these men the villagers were instructed - to elect as their committee. Resistance was often made and an - army of Red Guards sent to break it down. Pitched battles often - took place, and _in one case of which I can speak from personal - knowledge twenty-one of the inhabitants were shot, including - the local telegraph-girl operator who had refused to telegraph - for reinforcements_. - - The practice of sending young soldiers into the villages which - were not Bolshevik was very general; care was taken to send men - who did not come from the district, so that any scruples might - be overcome. Even then it would happen that after the soldiers - had got food they would make friends with the people, and so - compel the Commissar to send for another set of Red Guards.[2] - -[2] _Bolshevism_, by H. V. Keeling, pp. 185-186. - -In the chapter dealing with the relation of the Bolsheviki to the -peasants and the land question abundant corroboration of Mr. Keeling’s -testimony is given. The Bolsheviki have, however, found an easier way -to insure absolute control of the Soviets: as a general rule they do -not depend upon these crude methods of violence. Instead, they have -adopted the delightfully simple method of permitting no persons to -be placed in nomination whose names are not approved by them. As a -first step the anti-Bolshevist parties, such as the Menshevist Social -Democrats, Socialists-Revolutionists of the Right and Center, and the -Constitutional Democrats, were excluded by the issuance of a decree -that “the right to nominate candidates belongs exclusively to the -parties of electors which file the declaration that they acknowledge -the Soviet authorities.” - -The following resolution was adopted by the All-Russian Central -Executive Committee on June 14, 1918: - - The representatives of the Social Revolutionary Party (the - Right wing and the Center) _are excluded_, and at the same time - all Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, Peasants’, and Cossacks’ - Deputies are recommended to expel from their midst all - representatives of this faction. - -This resolution, which was duly carried into effect, was strictly in -accordance with the clause in the Constitution of the Soviet Republic -which provides that “guided by the interests of the working-class as -a whole, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic deprives all -individuals and groups of rights which could be utilized by them to the -detriment of the Socialist Revolution.” Thus entire political parties -have been excluded from the Soviets by the party in power. It is a -noteworthy fact that many of those persons in this country, Socialists -and others, who have been most vigorous in denouncing the expulsion -from the New York Legislature of the elected representatives of the -Socialist Party are, at the same time, vigorous supporters of the -Bolsheviki. Comment upon the lack of moral and intellectual integrity -thus manifested is unnecessary. - -Let us consider the testimony of three other witnesses of -unquestionable competence: J. E. Oupovalov, chairman of the Votkinsk -Metal Workers’ Union, is a Social Democrat, a working-man. He was a -member of the local Soviet of Nizhni-Novgorod. Three times under Czar -Nicholas II this militant Socialist and trades-unionist was imprisoned -for his activities on behalf of his class. Here, then, is a witness -who is at once a Russian, a Socialist, a trades-unionist, and a -wage-worker, and he writes of matters of which he has intimate personal -knowledge. He does not indulge in generalities, but is precise and -specific in his references to events, places, and dates: - - In February, 1919, after the conclusion of the shameful - Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Soviet of Workmen’s Delegates met - in Nizhni-Novgorod for the purpose of electing delegates - to the All-Russian Congress, which would be called upon to - decide the question of peace. The Bolsheviks and the Left - Social-Revolutionaries obtained a chance majority of two - votes in the Soviet. _Taking advantage of this, they deprived - the Social Democrats and Right Social-Revolutionaries of the - right to take part in the election of delegates._ The expelled - members of the Soviet assembled at a separate meeting and - decided to elect independently a proportionate number of - delegates. _But the Bolsheviks immediately sent a band of armed - Letts and we were dispersed._ - - In March, 1918, the Sormovo workmen demanded the re-election - of the Soviet. After a severe struggle the re-elections took - place, the Mensheviks and the Social-Revolutionaries obtaining - a majority. But the former Bolshevist Soviet _refused to hand - over the management to the newly elected body, and the latter - was dispersed by armed Red Guards on April 8th_. Similar events - took place in Nizhni-Novgorod, Kovrov, Izhevsk, Koloma, and - other places. Who, therefore, would venture to assert that - power in Russia belongs to the Soviets? - -Equally pertinent and impressive is the testimony of J. Strumillo, also -a Social Democrat and trades-unionist. This militant working-man is a -member of the Social Democratic Party, to which both Lenin and Trotsky -formerly belonged. He is also a wage-worker, an electric fitter. He is -an official of the Metal Workers’ Union and a member of the Hospital -Funds Board for the town of Perm. He says: - - ... the Labor masses began to draw away from Bolshevism. This - became particularly evident after the Brest-Litovsk Peace, - which exposed the treacherous way in which the Bolsheviks - had handed over the Russian people to the German Junkers. - Everywhere re-elections began to take place for the Soviets - of Workmen’s Delegates and for the trades-unions. On seeing - that the workmen were withdrawing from them, the Bolsheviks - started by forbidding the re-elections to be held, and finally - _declared that the Bolsheviks alone had the right to elect - and be elected. Thus an enormous number of workmen were - disfranchised...._ The year 1918 saw the complete suppression - of the Labor movement and of the Social Democratic Party. - _All over Russia an order was issued from Moscow to exclude - representatives of the Social Democratic Party from the - Soviets, and the party itself was declared illegal._ - -V. M. Zenzinov, a member of the Central Committee of the Party of -Socialists-Revolutionists, came to this country in February, 1919, and -spent several weeks, during which time the present writer made his -acquaintance. Zenzinov was many times arrested under czarism for his -revolutionary activities, and more than once sent into Siberian exile. -He was a member of the Constituent Assembly, and later, in September, -1918, at the Ufa Conference, was elected member of the Directory. It -will be remembered that the Directory was forcibly overthrown and the -Kolchak Government set up in its place. Zenzinov is an anti-Bolshevik, -but his testimony is not to be set aside on that account. He says: “The -Soviet Government is not even a true Soviet régime, for the Bolsheviki -have expelled the representatives of all the other political parties -from the Soviets, either by force or by other similar means. The Soviet -Government is a government of the Bolshevist Party, pure and simple; it -is a party dictatorship--not even a dictatorship of the proletariat.” - -The apologists for the Bolsheviki in this country have frequently -denied the charge that the Soviets were thus packed and that -anti-Bolshevist parties were not given equal rights to secure -representation in them. Of the facts there can be no question, but -it is interesting to find such a well-known pro-Bolshevist writer -as Mr. Arthur Ransome stating, in the London _Daily News_, January -11, 1919, that “the Mensheviki now stand definitely on the Soviet -platform” and that “a decree has accordingly been passed _readmitting_ -them to the Soviets.” Does not the statement that a decree had been -passed “readmitting” this Socialist faction to the Soviets constitute -an admission that until the passing of the decree mentioned that -faction, at least, had been denied representation in the Soviets? Yet -this same Mr. Ransome, in view of this fact, which was well known to -most students of Russian conditions, and of which he can hardly have -been ignorant, addressed his eloquent plea to the people of America -on behalf of the Soviet Government as the true representative of the -Russian people! - -Even the trades-unions are not wholly assured of the right of -representation in the Soviets. Only “if their declared relations to the -Soviet Government are approved by the Soviet authorities” can they vote -or nominate candidates. Trades-unions may solemnly declare that they -“acknowledge the Soviet authorities,” but if their immediate relations -with the People’s Commissaries are not good--if they are engaged in -strikes, for example--there is little chance of their getting the -approval of the Soviet authorities, without which they cannot vote. -Finally, no union, party, faction, or group can nominate whomever it -pleases; all candidates must be acceptable to, and approved by, the -central authority! - -Numerous witnesses have testified that the Soviets under Bolshevism are -“packed”; that they are not freely elected bodies, in many cases. Thus -H. V. Keeling writes: - - The elections for the various posts in our union and local - Soviet were an absolute farce. I had a vote and naturally - consulted with friends whom to vote for. They laughed at me and - said it was all arranged, “we have been told who to vote for.” - I knew some of these “nominated” men quite well, and will go no - farther than saying that they were not the best workmen. It is - a simple truth that no one except he be a Bolshevik was allowed - to be elected for any post.[3] - -[3] Keeling, _op. cit._, p. 159. - -In _A Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in -Russia_, published by the State Department of the United States, -January, 1920, the following statement by an unnamed Russian appears in -a report dated July 2, 1919: - - Discontent and hatred against the Bolsheviks are now so strong - that a shock or the knowledge of approaching help would - suffice to make the people rise and annihilate the Communists. - Considering this discontent and hatred, it would seem that - elections to different councils should produce candidates of - other parties. Nevertheless all councils consist of Communists. - The explanation is very plain. That freedom of election of - which the Bolsheviks write and talk so much consists in the - free election of certain persons, a list of which had already - been prepared. For instance, if in one district six delegates - have to be elected, seven to eight names are mentioned, of - which six can be chosen. Very characteristic in this respect - were the elections February last in the district of ----, - Moscow Province, where I have one of my estates. Nearly all - voters, about 200, of which twelve Communists, came to the - district town. Seven delegates had to be elected and only seven - names were on the prepared list, naturally all Communists. - The local Soviet invited the twelve communistic voters to a - house, treated them with food, tea, and sugar, and gave each - ten rubles per day; the others received nothing, not even - housing. But they, knowing what they had to expect from former - experiences, had provided for such an emergency and decided - to remain to the end. The day of election was fixed and put - off from day to day. After four postponements the Soviet saw - no way out. The result was that the seven delegates elected - by all against twelve votes belonged to the Octobrists and - Constitutional-Democrats. But these seven and a number of the - wealthier voters were immediately arrested as agitators against - the Soviet Republic. New elections were announced three days - later, but this time the place was surrounded by machine-guns. - The next day official papers announced the unanimous election - of Communists in the district of Verea. After a short time - peasant revolts started. To put down these, Chinese and Letts - were sent and about 300 peasants were killed. Then began - arrests, but it is not known how many were executed. - -Finally, there is the testimony of the workman, Menshekov, member -of the Social Democratic Party, who was himself given an important -position in one of the largest factories of Russia, the Ijevsky -factory, in the Urals, when the Bolsheviki assumed control. This simple -workman was not, and is not, a “reactionary monarchist,” but a Social -Democrat. He belonged to the same party as Lenin and Trotsky until the -withdrawal of these men and their followers and the creation of the -Communist Party. Menshekov says: - - One of the principles which the Bolsheviki proposed is rule by - the Workers’ Councils. In June, 1918, we were told to elect - one of 135 delegates. We did, and only fifty pro-Bolsheviki - got in. _The Bolshevist Government was dissatisfied with - this result and ordered a second election._ This time only - twenty pro-Bolsheviki were elected. Now, I happen to have been - elected a member of this Workers’ Council, from which I was - further elected to sit on the Executive Council. According - to the Bolsheviki’s own principle, the Executive Council has - to do the whole administration. Everything is under it. But - the Bolshevist Government withheld this right from us. For - two weeks we sat and did nothing; then the Bolsheviki solved - the problem for themselves. They arrested some of us--I was - arrested myself--and, instead of an elected Council, _the Red - Government appointed a Council of selected Communists_, and - formed there, as everywhere, a special privileged class.[4] - -[4] Menshekov’s account is from a personal communication to the present -writer, who has carefully verified the statements made in it. - -All such charges have been scouted by the defenders of the Bolsheviki -in this country and in England. On March 22, 1919, the _Dyelo Naroda_, -organ of the Socialists-Revolutionists, reproduced the following -official document, which fully sustains the accusation that the -ordering of the “election” of certain persons to important offices is -not “an invention of the capitalist press”: - - Order of the Department of Information and Instruction of the - Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Peasants’ - Delegates of the Melenkovski District: - - No. 994. Town of Melenki (Prov. of Vladimir) - - Feb. 25, 1919 - - To the Voinovo Agricultural Council: - - The Provincial Department instructs you, on the basis of the - Constitution of the Soviet (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet - Republic). Section 43, Sub-section 6, letter _a_, to proceed - without fail with elections for an Agricultural Executive - Committee. - - The following _must be elected_ to the committee: As president, - Nikita Riabov; as member, Ivan Soloviev; and as secretary, - Alexander Krainov. These people, as may be gathered from - the posts to which they are named, _must be elected without - fail_. The non-fulfilment of this Order will result in those - responsible being severely punished. Acknowledge the carrying - out of these instructions to Provincial Headquarters by express. - - _Head of Provincial Section._ - - [Signed] J. NAZAROV. - -Surely there never was a greater travesty of representative government -than this--not even under czarism! This is worse than anything that -obtained in the old “rotten boroughs” of England before the great -Reform Act. Yet our “Liberals” and “Radicals” hail this vicious -reactionary despotism with gladness. - -If it be thought that the judgment of the present writer is too -harsh, he is quite content to rest upon the judgment pronounced by -such a sympathizer as Mr. Isaac Don Levine has shown himself to be. -In the New York _Globe_, January 5, 1920, Mr. Levine said: “To-day -Soviet Russia is a dictatorship, not of the proletariat, but for -the proletariat. It certainly is not democracy.” And again: “_The -dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia is really a dictatorship of -the Bolshevist or Communist Party._ This is the great change wrought -in Soviet Russia since 1918. _The Soviets ceased functioning as -parliamentary bodies._ Soviet elections, which were frequent in 1918, -are very rare now. In Russia, where things are moving so fast and -opinions are changing so rapidly, the majority of the present Soviets -are obsolete and do not represent the present view of the masses.” - -If the government is really a dictatorship of the Communist -Party--which does not include in its membership 1 per cent. of -the people of Russia--if the Soviets have ceased functioning as -parliamentary bodies, if the majority of the Soviets are obsolete and -do not represent the present view of the masses, the condemnation -expressed in this chapter is completely justified. - - - - -IV - -THE UNDEMOCRATIC SOVIET STATE - - -Mr. Lincoln Steffens is a most amiable idealist who possesses an -extraordinary genius for idealizing commonplace and even sordid -realities. He can always readily idealize a perfectly rotten egg into a -perfectly good omelet. It is surely significant that, in spite of his -very apparent efforts to justify and even glorify the Soviet Government -and the men who have imposed it upon Russia, even Mr. Steffens has to -admit its autocratic character. He says: - - The soviet form of government, which sprang up so spontaneously - all over Russia, is established. - - This is not a paper thing; not an invention. Never planned, it - has not yet been written into the forms of law. It is not even - uniform. It is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, and in - its final development it is not democratic. The present Russian - Government is the most autocratic government I have ever seen. - _Lenin, head of the Soviet Government, is farther removed from - the people than the Czar was, or than any actual ruler in - Europe is._ - - The people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. These little - informal soviets elect a local soviet; which elects delegates - to the city or country (community) soviet; which elects - delegates to the government (State) soviet. The government - soviets together elect delegates to the All-Russian Soviet, - which elects commissionnaires (who correspond to our Cabinet, - or to a European minority). And these commissionnaires finally - elect Lenin. He is thus five or six removes from the people. To - form an idea of his stability, independence, and power, think - of the process that would have to be gone through with by the - people to remove him and elect a successor. A majority of all - the soviets in all Russia would have to be changed in personnel - or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and - represent the altered will of the people.[5] - -[5] Report of Lincoln Steffens, laid before the Committee on Foreign -Relations of the United States Senate, September, 1919. Published in -_The Bullitt Mission to Russia_, pp. 111-112. Italics mine. - -This is a very moderate estimate of the government which Lenin and -Trotsky and their associates have imposed upon Russia by the old -agencies--blood and iron. Mr. Steffens is not quite accurate in his -statement that the Soviet form of government “has not yet been written -into the forms of law.” The report from which the above passage is -quoted bears the date of April 2, 1919; at that time there was in -existence, and widely known even outside of Russia, the Constitution -of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, which purports to -be “the Soviet form of government ... written into the forms of law.” -Either it is that or it is a mass of meaningless verbiage. There -existed, too, at that time, a very plethora of laws which purported to -be the written forms of Soviet government, and as such were published -by the Bolshevist Government of Russia. The Fundamental Law of -Socialization of the Land, which went into effect in September, 1918; -the law decreeing the Abolition of Classes and Ranks, dated November -10, 1917; the law creating Regional and Local Boards of National -Economy, dated December 23, 1917; the law creating The People’s Court, -November 24, 1917; the Marriage and Divorce Laws, December 18, 1917; -the Eight Hour Law, October 29, 1917, and the Insurance Law, November -29, 1917, are a few of the bewildering array of laws and decrees which -seem to indicate that the Soviet form of government has “been written -into the forms of law.” - -It is in no hypercritical spirit that attention is called to this -rather remarkable error in the report of Mr. Steffens. It is because -the Soviet form of government has “been written into the forms of law” -with so much thoroughness and detail that we are enabled to examine -Bolshevism at its best, as its protagonists have conceived it, and -not merely as it appears in practice, in its experimental stage, -with all its mistakes, abuses, and failures. After all, a written -constitution is a formulation of certain ideals to be attained and -certain principles to be applied as well as very imperfect human beings -can do it. Given a worthy ideal, it would be possible to make generous -allowance for the deficiencies of practice; to believe that these would -be progressively overcome and more or less constant and steady progress -made in the direction of the ideal. On the other hand, when the ideal -itself is inferior to the practice, when by reason of the good sense -and sound morality of the people the actual political life proves -superior to the written constitution and laws, it is not difficult to -appreciate the fact. In such circumstances we are not compelled to -discredit the right practice in order to condemn the wrong theory. -It is true that as a general rule mankind sets its ideals beyond its -immediate reach; but it is also true that men sometimes surpass their -ideals. Most men’s creeds are superior to their deeds, but there are -many men whose deeds are vastly better than their creeds. - -Similarly, while the political life of nations generally falls below -the standards set in their formal constitutions and laws, exceptions -to this rule are by no means rare. Constitutions are generally framed -by political theorists and idealists whose inveterate habit it is to -overrate the mental and moral capacity of the great majority of human -beings and to underrate the force of selfishness, ignorance, and other -defects of imperfect humanity. On the other hand, constitutions have -sometimes been framed by selfish and ignorant despots, inferior in -character and intelligence to the majority of the human beings to be -governed by the constitutions so devised. Under the former conditions -political realities fail to attain the high levels of the ideals; under -the latter conditions they rise above them. Finally, people outgrow -constitutions as they outgrow most other political devices and social -arrangements. In old civilizations it is common to find political life -upon a higher level than the formal constitutions, which, unrepealed -and unamended, have in fact become obsolete, ignored by the people of a -wiser and more generous age. - -The writer of these pages fully believes that the political reality -in Russia is already better than the ignoble ideal set by the -Bolshevist constitution. The fundamental virtues of the Russian -people, their innate tolerance, their democracy, and their shrewd -sense have mitigated, and tend to increasingly mitigate, the rigors -of the new autocracy. Once more it is demonstrated that “man is more -than constitutions”; that adequate resources of human character -can make a tolerable degree of comfort possible under any sort of -constitution, just as lack of those resources can make life intolerable -under the best constitution ever devised. Men have attained a high -degree of civilization and comfort in spite of despotically conceived -constitutions, and, on the other hand, the evils of Tammany Hall under -a Tweed developed in spite of a constitution conceived in a spirit more -generous than any modern nation had hitherto known. Great spiritual and -moral forces, whose roots are deeply embedded in the soil of historical -development, are shaping Russia’s life. Already there is discernible -much that is better than anything in the constitution imposed upon her. - -A more or less vague perception of this fact has led to much muddled -thinking; because the character of the Russian people and the political -and economic conditions prevailing have led to a general disregard of -much of Bolshevist theory, because men and women in Russia are finding -it possible to set aside certain elements of Bolshevism, and thereby -attain increasingly tolerable conditions of life, we are asked to -believe that Bolshevism is less evil than we feared it to be. To call -this “muddled thinking” is to put a strain upon charity of judgment. -The facts are not capable of such interpretation by minds disciplined -by the processes of straight and clear thinking. What they prove is -that, fortunately for mankind, the wholesomeness of the thought and -character of the average Russian has proved too strong to be overcome -by the false ideas and ideals of the Bolsheviki and their contrivances. -The Russian people live, not because they have found good in -Bolshevism, but because they have found means to circumvent Bolshevism -and set it aside. What progress is being made in Russia to-day is -not the result of Bolshevism, but of the growing power of those very -qualities of mind and heart which Bolshevism sought to destroy. - -Bolshevism is autocratic and despotic in its essence. Whoever -believes--as the present writer does--that the only rational and -coherent hope for the progress of civilization lies in the growth of -democracy must reject Bolshevism and all its works and ways. It is well -to remember that whatever there is of freedom and good will in Russia, -of democratic growth, exists in fundamental defiance and antagonism to -Bolshevism and would be crushed if the triumph of the latter became -complete. It is still necessary, therefore, to judge Bolshevism by its -ideal and the logical implications of its ideal; not by what results -where it is made powerless by moral or economic forces which it cannot -overcome, but by what it aims at doing and will do if possible. It is -for this reason that we must subject the constitution of Bolshevist -Russia to careful analysis and scrutiny. In this document the -intellectual leaders of Bolshevism have set forth in the precise terms -of organic law the manner in which they would reconstruct the state. - -In considering the political constitution of any nation the believer in -democratic government seeks first of all to know the extent and nature -of the franchise of its citizens, how it is obtained, what power it -has, and how it is exercised. The almost uniform experience of those -nations which have developed free and responsible self-government has -led to the conclusion that the ultimate sovereignty of the citizens -must be absolute; that suffrage must be equal, universal, direct, and -free; that it must be exercised under conditions which do not permit -intimidation, coercion, or fraud, and that, finally, the mandate of -the citizens so expressed must be imperative. The validity of these -conclusions may not be absolute; it is at least conceivable that -they may be revised. For that matter, a reversion to aristocracy is -conceivable, highly improbable though it may be. With these uniform -results of the experience of many nations as our criteria, let us -examine the fundamental suffrage provisions of the Constitution of the -Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the provisions relating -to elections. These are all set forth in Article IV, Chapters XIII to -XV, inclusive: - - -ARTICLE IV - - -Chapter XIII - -THE RIGHT TO VOTE - - 64. The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviets is - enjoyed by the following citizens of both sexes, irrespective - of religion, nationality, domicile, etc., of the Russian - Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, who shall have completed - their eighteenth year by the day of election: - - (_a_) All who have acquired the means of livelihood through - labor that is productive and useful to society, and also - persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the former to do - productive work, _i.e._, laborers and employees of all classes - who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc., and - peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers who employ no help - for the purpose of making profits. - - (_b_) Soldiers of the army and navy of the Soviets. - - (_c_) Citizens of the two preceding categories who have in any - degree lost their capacity to work. - - _Note 1_: Local Soviets may, upon approval of the central - power, lower the age standard mentioned herein. - - _Note 2_: Non-citizens mentioned in Section 20 (Article II. - Chapter V) have the right to vote. - - 65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor - the right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of - the categories enumerated above, namely: - - (_a_) Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it - an increase in profits. - - (_b_) Persons who have an income without doing any work, such - as interest from capital, receipts from property, etc. - - (_c_) Private merchants, trade and commercial brokers. - - (_d_) Monks and clergy of all denominations. - - (_e_) Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme - corps, and the _Okhrana_ (Czar’s secret service), also members - of the former reigning dynasty. - - (_f_) Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or - mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship. - - (_g_) Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their - rights of citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable - offenses, for the period fixed by the sentence. - - -Chapter XIV - -ELECTIONS - - 66. Elections are conducted according to custom on days fixed - by the local Soviets. - - 67. Election takes place in the presence of an election - committee and the representative of the local Soviet. - - 68. In case the representative of the Soviet cannot for valid - causes be present, the chairman of the election meeting - replaces him. - - 69. Minutes of the proceedings and results of elections are to - be compiled and signed by the members of the election committee - and the representative of the Soviet. - - 70. Detailed instructions regarding the election proceedings - and the participation in them of professional and other - workers’ organizations are to be issued by the local Soviets, - according to the instructions of the All-Russian Central - Executive Committee. - - -Chapter XV - -THE CHECKING AND CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS AND RECALL OF THE DEPUTIES - - 71. The respective Soviets receive all the records of the - proceedings of the election. - - 72. The Soviet appoints a commission to verify the election. - - 73. This commission reports the results to the Soviet. - - 74. The Soviet decides the question when there is doubt as to - which candidate is elected. - - 75. The Soviet announces a new election if the election of one - candidate or another cannot be determined. - - 76. If an election was irregularly carried on in its entirety, - it may be declared void by a higher Soviet authority. - - 77. The highest authority in relation to questions of elections - is the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. - - 78. Voters who have sent a deputy to the Soviet have the right - to recall him, and to have a new election, according to general - provisions. - -It is quite clear that the suffrage here provided for is not universal; -that certain classes of people commonly found in modern civilized -nations in considerable numbers are not entitled to vote. There may -be some doubt as to the precise meaning of some of the paragraphs in -Chapter XIII, but it is certain that, if the language used is to be -subject to no esoteric interpretation, the following social groups -are excluded from the right to vote: (_a_) all persons who employ -hired labor for profit, including farmers with a single hired helper; -(_b_) all persons who draw incomes from interest, rent, or profit; -(_c_) all persons engaged in private trade, even to the smallest -shopkeeper; (_d_) all ministers of religion of every kind; (_e_) all -persons engaged in work which is not defined by the proper authorities -as “productive and useful to society”; (_f_) members of the old royal -family and those formerly employed in the old police service. - -It is obvious that a very large part of the present voting population -of this country would be disfranchised if we should adopt these -restrictions or anything like them. It may be fairly argued in reply, -however, that the disfranchisement would be--and now is, in Russia--a -temporary condition only; that the object of the discriminations, and -of other political and economic arrangements complementary to them, -is to force people out of such categories as are banned and penalized -with disfranchisement--and that this is being done in Russia. In other -words, people are to be forced to cease hiring labor for profit, -engaging in private trade, being ministers of religion, living on -incomes derived from interest, rent, or profits. They are to be forced -into service that is “productive and useful to society,” and when that -is accomplished they will become qualified to vote. Thus practically -universal suffrage is possible, in theory at any rate. - -So much may be argued with fair show of reason. We may dispute the -assumption that there is anything to be gained by disfranchising -a man because he engages in trade, and thereby possibly confers a -benefit upon those whom he serves. We may doubt or deny that there is -likely to accrue any advantage to society from the disfranchisement -of all ministers of religion. We may believe that to suppress some of -the categories which are discriminated against would be a disaster, -subversive of the life of society even. When all this has been admitted -it remains the fact that it is possible to conceive of a society -in which there are no employers, traders, recipients of capitalist -incomes, or ministers of religion; it is possible to conceive of such -a society in which, even under this constitution, only a very small -fraction of the adult population would be disfranchised. Of course, -it is so highly improbable that it borders on the fantastic; but it -is, nevertheless, within the bounds of conceivability that practically -universal suffrage might be realized within the limits of this -instrument. - -Let us examine, briefly, the conditions under which the franchise is -to be exercised: we do not find any provision for that secrecy of -the ballot which experience and ordinary good sense indicate as the -only practicable method of eliminating coercion, intimidation, and -vote-trafficking. Nor do we find anything like a uniform method of -voting. The holding of elections “conducted according to custom on -days fixed by the local Soviets”--themselves elective bodies--makes -possible an amount of political manipulation and intrigue which almost -staggers the imagination. Not until human beings attain a far greater -degree of perfection than has ever yet been attained, so far as there -is any record, will it be safe or prudent to endow any set of men with -so much arbitrary power over the manner in which their fellows may -exercise the electoral franchise. - -There is one paragraph in the above-quoted portions of the Constitution -of Soviet Russia which alone opens the way to a despotism which is -practically unlimited. Paragraph 70 of Chapter XIV provides that: -“Detailed instructions regarding the election proceedings _and the -participation in them of professional and other workers’ organizations_ -are to be issued by the local Soviets, _according to the instructions -of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee_.” Within the scope of -this general statement every essential principle of representative -government can be lawfully abrogated. Elsewhere it has been shown -that trades-unions have been denied the right to nominate or vote for -candidates unless “their declared relations to the Soviet Government -are approved by the Soviet authorities”; that parties are permitted to -nominate only such candidates as are acceptable to, and approved by, -the central authority; that specific orders to elect certain favored -candidates have actually been issued by responsible officials. Within -the scope of Paragraph 70 of Chapter XIV, all these things are clearly -permissible. No limit to the “instructions” which may be given by the -All-Russian Central Executive Committee is provided by the Constitution -itself. It cannot be argued that the danger of evil practices occurring -is an imaginary one merely; the concrete examples cited in the previous -chapter show that the danger is a very real one. - -In this connection it is important to note Paragraph 23 of Chapter V, -Article VI, which reads as follows: - - Being guided by the interests of the working-class as a whole, - the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic deprives all - individuals and groups of rights which could be utilized by - them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolution. - -This means, apparently, that the Council of People’s Commissars can at -any time disfranchise any individual or group or party which aims to -overthrow their rule. This power has been used with tremendous effect -on many occasions. - -Was it this power which caused the Bolsheviki to withhold the -electoral franchise from all members of the teaching profession in -Petrograd, we wonder? According to Section 64 of Chapter XIII of -the Soviet Constitution, the “right to vote and to be elected to -the Soviets” belongs, first, to “all who have acquired the means of -livelihood through labor that is productive and useful to society.” -Teachers employed in the public schools and other educational -institutions--especially those controlled by the state--would naturally -be included in this category, without any question, one would suppose, -especially in view of the manner in which the Bolsheviki have paraded -their great passion for education and culture. Nevertheless, it seems -to be a fact that, up to July, 1919, the teaching profession of -Petrograd was excluded from representation in the Soviet. The following -paragraph from the _Izvestia_ of the Petrograd Soviet, dated July 3, -1919, can hardly be otherwise interpreted: - - Teachers and other cultural-educational workers this year - _for the first time_ will be able, in an organized manner - through their union, to take an active part in the work of - the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies. _This is the first and most - difficult examination for the working intelligentsia of the - above-named categories._ Comrades and citizens, scholars, - teachers, and other cultural workers, stand this test in a - worthy manner! - -Let us now turn our attention to those provisions of the Constitution -of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic which concern the -general political organization of the Soviet state. These are contained -in Article III, Chapters VI to XII, inclusive, and are as follows: - - -ARTICLE III - -CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET POWER - -A. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL POWER - - -Chapter VI - -THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS’, PEASANTS’, COSSACKS’, -AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES - - 24. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is the supreme power of - the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. - - 25. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of - representatives of urban Soviets (one delegate for 25,000 - voters), and of representatives of the provincial (_Gubernia_) - congresses of Soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabitants). - - _Note 1_: In case the Provincial Congress is not called before - the All-Russian Congress is convoked, delegates for the latter - are sent directly from the County (_Oyezd_) Congress. - - _Note 2_: In case the Regional (_Oblast_) Congress is convoked - indirectly, previous to the convocation of the All-Russian - Congress, delegates for the latter may be sent by the Regional - Congress. - - 26. The All-Russian Congress is convoked by the All-Russian - Central Executive Committee at least twice a year. - - 27. A special All-Russian Congress is convoked by the - All-Russian Central Executive Committee upon its own - initiative, or upon the request of local Soviets having not - less than one-third of the entire population of the Republic. - - 28. The All-Russian Congress elects an All-Russian Central - Executive Committee of not more than 200 members. - - 29. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee is entirely - responsible to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. - - 30. In the periods between the convocation of the Congresses, - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the supreme - power of the Republic. - - -Chapter VII - -THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE - - 31. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the supreme - legislative, executive, and controlling organ of the Russian - Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. - - 32. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee directs in - a general way the activity of the Workers’ and Peasants’ - Government and of all organs of the Soviet authority in the - country, and it co-ordinates and regulates the operation of the - Soviet Constitution and of the resolutions of the All-Russian - Congresses and of the central organs of the Soviet power. - - 33. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee considers and - enacts all measures and proposals introduced by the Soviet of - People’s Commissars or by the various departments, and it also - issues its own decrees and regulations. - - 34. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee convokes the - All-Russian Congress of Soviets, at which time the Executive - Committee reports on its activity and on general questions. - - 35. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee forms a Council - of People’s Commissars for the purpose of general management of - the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, - and it also forms departments (People’s Commissariats) for the - purpose of conducting the various branches. - - 36. The members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - work in the various departments (People’s Commissariats) or - execute special orders of the All-Russian Central Executive - Committee. - - -Chapter VIII - -THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE’S COMMISSARS - - 37. The Council of People’s Commissars is intrusted with the - general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist - Federal Soviet Republic. - - 38. For the accomplishment of this task the Council of People’s - Commissars issues decrees, resolutions, orders, and, in - general, takes all steps necessary for the proper and rapid - conduct of government affairs. - - 39. The Council of People’s Commissars notifies immediately the - All-Russian Central Executive Committee of all its orders and - resolutions. - - 40. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee has the right - to revoke or suspend all orders and resolutions of the Council - of People’s Commissars. - - 41. All orders and resolutions of the Council of People’s - Commissars of great political significance are referred for - consideration and final approval to the All-Russian Central - Executive Committee. - - _Note_: Measures requiring immediate execution may be enacted - directly by the Council of People’s Commissars. - - 42. The members of the Council of People’s Commissars stand at - the head of the various People’s Commissariats. - - 43. There are seventeen People’s Commissars: (_a_) Foreign - Affairs, (_b_) Army, (_c_) Navy, (_d_) Interior, (_e_) Justice, - (_f_) Labor, (_g_) Social Welfare, (_h_) Education, (_i_) Post - and Telegraph, (_j_) National Affairs, (_k_) Finances, (_l_) - Ways of Communication, (_m_) Agriculture, (_n_) Commerce and - Industry, (_o_) National Supplies, (_p_) State Control, (_q_) - Supreme Soviet of National Economy, (_r_) Public Health. - - 44. Every Commissar has a Collegium (Committee) of which he is - the President, and the members of which are appointed by the - Council of People’s Commissars. - - 45. A People’s Commissar has the individual right to decide - on all questions under the jurisdiction of his Commissariat, - and he is to report on his decision to the Collegium. If - the Collegium does not agree with the Commissar on some - decisions, the former may, without stopping the execution of - the decision, complain of it to the executive members of the - Council of People’s Commissars or to the All-Russian Central - Executive Committee. - - Individual members of the Collegium have this right also. - - 46. The Council of People’s Commissars is entirely responsible - to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the All-Russian - Central Executive Committee. - - 47. The People’s Commissars and the Collegia of the People’s - Commissariats are entirely responsible to the Council of - People’s Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive - Committee. - - 48. The title of People’s Commissar belongs only to the members - of the Council of People’s Commissars, which is in charge - of general affairs of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet - Republic, and it cannot be used by any other representative of - the Soviet power, either central or local. - - -Chapter IX - -AFFAIRS IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS AND THE -ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE - - 49. The All-Russian Congress and the All-Russian Central - Executive Committee deal with questions of state, such as: - - (_a_) Ratification and amendment of the Constitution of the - Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. - - (_b_) General direction of the entire interior and foreign - policy of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. - - (_c_) Establishing and changing boundaries, also ceding - territory belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet - Republic. - - (_d_) Establishing boundaries for regional Soviet unions - belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, - also settling disputes among them. - - (_e_) Admission of new members to the Russian Socialist Federal - Soviet Republic, and recognition of the secession of any parts - of it. - - (_f_) The general administrative division of the territory of - the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the approval - of regional unions. - - (_g_) Establishing and changing weights, measures, and money - denominations in the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. - - (_h_) Foreign relations, declaration of war, and ratification - of peace treaties. - - (_i_) Making loans, signing commercial treaties and financial - agreements. - - (_j_) Working out a basis and a general plan for the national - economy and for its various branches in the Russian Socialist - Federal Soviet Republic. - - (_k_) Approval of the budget of the Russian Socialist Federal - Soviet Republic. - - (_l_) Levying taxes and establishing the duties of citizens to - the state. - - (_m_) Establishing the bases for the organization of armed - forces. - - (_n_) State legislation, judicial organization and procedure, - civil and criminal legislation, etc. - - (_o_) Appointment and dismissal of the individual People’s - Commissars or the entire Council, also approval of the - President of the Council of People’s Commissars. - - (_p_) Granting and canceling Russian citizenship and fixing - rights of foreigners. - - (_q_) The right to declare individual and general amnesty. - - 50. Besides the above-mentioned questions, the All-Russian - Congress and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee have - charge of all other affairs which, according to their decision, - require their attention. - - 51. The following questions are solely under the jurisdiction - of the All-Russian Congress: - - (_a_) Ratification and amendment of the fundamental principles - of the Soviet Constitution. - - (_b_) Ratification of peace treaties. - - 52. The decision of questions indicated in Paragraphs (_c_) - and (_h_) of Section 49 may be made by the All-Russian Central - Executive Committee only in case it is impossible to convoke - the Congress. - - -B. ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL SOVIETS - - -Chapter X - -THE CONGRESSES OF THE SOVIETS - - 53. Congresses of Soviets are composed as follows: - - (_a_) Regional: of representatives of the urban and county - Soviets, one representative for 25,000 inhabitants of the - county, and one representative for 5,000 voters of the - cities--but not more than 500 representatives for the entire - region--or of representatives of the provincial Congresses, - chosen on the same basis, if such a Congress meets before the - regional Congress. - - (_b_) Provincial (_Gubernia_): of representatives of urban - and rural (_Volost_) Soviets, one representative for 10,000 - inhabitants from the rural districts, and one representative - for 2,000 voters in the city; altogether not more than 300 - representatives for the entire province. In case the county - Congress meets before the provincial, election takes place on - the same basis, but by the county Congress instead of the rural. - - (_c_) County: of representatives of rural Soviets, one - delegate for each 1,000 inhabitants, but not more than 300 - delegates for the entire county. - - (_d_) Rural (_Volost_): of representatives of all village - Soviets in the _Volost_, one delegate for ten members of the - Soviet. - - _Note 1_: Representatives of urban Soviets which have a - population of not more than 10,000 persons participate in the - county Congress; village Soviets of districts less than 1,000 - inhabitants unite for the purpose of electing delegates to the - county Congress. - - _Note 2_: Rural Soviets of less than ten members send one - delegate to the rural (_Volost_) Congress. - - 54. Congresses of the Soviets are convoked by the respective - Executive Committees upon their own initiative, or upon request - of local Soviets comprising not less than one-third of the - entire population of the given district. In any case they - are convoked at least twice a year for regions, every three - months for provinces and counties, and once a month for rural - districts. - - 55. Every Congress of Soviets (regional, provincial, county, - or rural) elects its Executive organ--an Executive Committee - the membership of which shall not exceed: (_a_) for regions and - provinces, twenty-five; (_b_) for a county, twenty; (_c_) for a - rural district, ten. The Executive Committee is responsible to - the Congress which elected it. - - 56. In the boundaries of the respective territories the - Congress is the supreme power; during intervals between the - convocations of the Congress, the Executive Committee is the - supreme power. - - -Chapter XI - -THE SOVIET OF DEPUTIES - - 57. Soviets of Deputies are formed: - - (_a_) In cities, one deputy for each 1,000 inhabitants; the - total to be not less than fifty and not more than 1,000 members. - - (_b_) All other settlements (towns, villages, hamlets, etc.) - of less than 10,000 inhabitants, one deputy for each 100 - inhabitants; the total to be not less than three and not more - than fifty deputies for each settlement. - - Term of the deputy, three months. - - _Note_: In small rural sections, whenever possible, all - questions shall be decided at general meetings of voters. - - 58. The Soviet of Deputies elects an Executive Committee to - deal with current affairs; not more than five members for - rural districts, one for every fifty members of the Soviets of - cities, but not more than fifteen and not less than three in - the aggregate (Petrograd and Moscow not more than forty). The - Executive Committee is entirely responsible to the Soviet which - elected it. - - 59. The Soviet of Deputies is convoked by the Executive - Committee upon its own initiative, or upon the request of not - less than one-half of the membership of the Soviet; in any - case at least once a week in cities, and twice a week in rural - sections. - - 60. Within its jurisdiction the Soviet, and in cases mentioned - in Section 57, Note, the meeting of the voters is the supreme - power in the given district. - - -Chapter XII - -JURISDICTION OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE SOVIETS - - 61. Regional, provincial, county, and rural organs of the - Soviet power and also the Soviets of Deputies have to perform - the following duties: - - (_a_) Carry out all orders of the respective higher organs of - the Soviet power. - - (_b_) Take all steps for raising the cultural and economic - standard of the given territory. - - (_c_) Decide all questions of local importance within their - respective territories. - - (_d_) Co-ordinate all Soviet activity in their respective - territories. - - 62. The Congresses of Soviets and their Executive Committees - have the right to control the activity of the local Soviets - (_i.e._, the regional Congress controls all Soviets of - the respective region; the provincial, of the respective - province, with the exception of the urban Soviets, etc.); and - the regional and provincial Congresses and their Executive - Committees have in addition the right to overrule the decisions - of the Soviets of their districts, giving notice in important - cases to the central Soviet authority. - - 63. For the purpose of performing their duties, the local - Soviets, rural and urban, and the Executive Committees form - sections respectively. - -_It is a significant and notable fact that nowhere in the whole of -this remarkable document is there any provision which assures to the -individual voter, or to any group, party, or other organization of -voters, assurance of the right to make nominations for any office -in the whole system of government._ Incredible as it may seem, this -is literally and exactly true. The urban Soviet consists of “one -deputy for each 1,000 inhabitants,” but there is nowhere a sentence -prescribing how these deputies are to be nominated or by whom. The -village Soviet consists of “one deputy for each 100 inhabitants,” -but there is nowhere a sentence to show how these deputies are to -be nominated, or wherein the right to make nominations is vested. -The _Volost_ Congress is composed of “representatives of all village -Soviets” and the County Congress (_Oyezd_) of “representatives of -rural Soviets.” In both these cases the representatives are termed -“delegates,” but there is no intimation of how they are nominated, or -what their qualifications are. The Provincial Congress (_Gubernia_) is -composed of “representatives of urban and rural (_Volost_) Soviets.” In -this case the word “representatives” is maintained throughout; the word -“delegates” does not appear. In this provision, as in the others, there -is no intimation of how they are nominated, or whether they are elected -or designated. - -It can hardly be gainsaid that the Constitution of the Russian -Socialist Federal Soviet Republic is characterized by loose -construction, vagueness where definiteness is essential, and a -marked deficiency of those safeguards and guaranties which ought to -be incorporated into a written constitution. There is, for example, -no provision for that immunity of parliamentary representatives -from arrest for libel, sedition, and the like, which is enjoyed in -practically all other countries. Even under Czar Nicholas II this -principle of parliamentary immunity was always observed until November, -1916, when the ferment of revolution was already manifesting itself. -It requires no expert legal knowledge or training to perceive that -the fundamental instrument of the political and legal system of -Soviet Russia fails to provide adequate protection for the rights and -liberties of its citizens. - -Let us consider now another matter of cardinal importance, the complex -and tedious processes which intervene between the citizen-voter and the -“Council of People’s Commissars.” - -(1) The electorate is divided into two groups or divisions, the -urban and the rural. Those entitled to vote in the city form, in the -first instance, the Soviet of the shop, factory, trades-union, or -professional association, as the case may be. Those entitled to vote in -the rural village form, in the first instance, the village Soviet. - -(2) The Soviets of the shops, factories, trades-unions, and -professional associations choose, in such manner as they will, -representatives to the urban Soviet. The urban Soviets are not all -based on equal representation, however. According to announcements -in the official Bolshevist press, factory workers in Petrograd are -entitled to one representative in the Petrograd Soviet for every -500 electors, while the soldiers and sailors are entitled to one -representative for every 200 members. Thus two soldiers’ votes -count for exactly as much as five workmen’s votes. Those entitled -to vote in the village Soviets choose representatives to a rural -Soviet (_Volost_), and this body, in turn, chooses representatives -to the county Soviet (_Oyezd_). This latter body is equal in power -to the urban Soviet; both are represented in the Provincial Soviet -(_Gubernia_). The village peasant is one step farther removed from the -Provincial Soviet than is the city worker. - -(3) Both the urban Soviets of the city workers’ representatives and the -county Soviets of the peasants’ representatives are represented in the -Provincial Soviet. There appears at this point another great inequality -in voting power. The basis of representation is one member for 2,000 -city _voters_ and one for 10,000 _inhabitants_ of rural villages. -At first this seems to mean--and has been generally understood to -mean--that each city worker’s vote is equal to the votes of _five_ -peasants. Apparently this is an error. The difference is more nearly -three to one than five to one. Representation is based on the number of -_city voters_ and the number of _village inhabitants_. - -(4) The Provincial Congress (_Gubernia_) sends representatives to the -Regional Congress. Here again the voting power is unequal: the basis -of representation is one representative for 5,000 _city voters_ and -one for “25,000 inhabitants of the county.” The discrimination here is -markedly greater than in the case of the Provincial Congresses for the -following reason: The members of these Regional Congresses are chosen -by the _Gubernias_, which include representatives of city workers as -well as representatives of peasants, the former being given three times -proportionate representation of the latter. Obviously, to again apply -the same principle and choose representatives of the _Gubernias_ to the -Regional Congresses on the same basis of three to one has a cumulative -disadvantage to the peasant. - -(5) The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of delegates -chosen by the Provincial Congresses, which represent city workers and -peasants, as already shown, _and of representatives sent direct from -the urban Soviets_. - -[Illustration: From Voter to National Government--Russia and U. S. -A.[6]] - -[6] In all the Soviets, from County Soviets onward, city voters have a -larger vote in proportion to numbers than rural voters. (See text.) - -It will be seen that at every step, from the county Soviet to the -All-Russian Congress of Soviets, elaborate care has been taken to -make certain that the representatives of the city workers are not -outnumbered by peasants’ representatives. The peasants, who make up 85 -per cent. of the population, are systematically discriminated against. - -(6) We are not yet at the end of the intricate Soviet system of -government. While the All-Russian Congress of Soviets is nominally the -supreme power in the state, it is too unwieldy a body to do more than -discuss general policies. It meets twice a year for this purpose. From -its membership of 1,500 is chosen the All-Russian Central Executive -Committee of “not more than 200 members.” This likewise is too unwieldy -a body to function either quickly or well. - -(7) The All-Russian Central Executive Committee selects the Council of -People’s Commissars of seventeen members, each Commissar being at the -head of a department of the government. - -A brief study of the diagram on the preceding page will show how much -less directly responsive to the electorate than our own United States -Government is this complicated, bureaucratic government of Soviet -Russia. - - - - -V - -THE PEASANTS AND THE LAND - - -At the time of the Revolution the peasantry comprised 85 per -cent. of the population. The industrial wage-earning class--the -proletariat--comprised, according to the most generous estimate, not -more than 3 to 4 per cent. That part of the proletariat which was -actively interested in the revolutionary social change was represented -by the Social Democratic Party, which was split into factions as -follows: on the right the moderate “defensist” Mensheviki; on the left -the radical “defeatist” Bolsheviki; with a large center faction which -held a middle course, sometimes giving its support to the right wing -and sometimes to the left. Each of these factions contained in it men -and women of varying shades of opinion and diverse temperaments. Thus -among the Mensheviki were some who were so radical that they were very -close to the Bolsheviki, while among the latter were some individuals -who were so moderate that they were very close to the Mensheviki. - -That part of the peasantry which was actively interested in -revolutionary social change was represented by the peasant Socialist -parties, the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists, and the Populists, -or People’s Socialists. The former alone possessed any great numerical -strength or political significance. In this party, as in the Social -Democratic Party, there was a moderate right wing and a radical -left wing with a strong centrist element. In this party also were -found in each of the wings men and women whose views seemed barely -distinguishable from those generally characteristic of the other. In -a general way, the relations of the Socialists-Revolutionists and the -Social Democrats were characterized by a tendency on the part of the -Socialists-Revolutionists of the Right to make common cause with the -Menshevist Social Democrats and a like tendency on the part of the -Socialists-Revolutionists of the Left to make common cause with the -Bolshevist Social Democrats. - -This merging of the two parties applied only to the general program -of revolutionary action; in particular to the struggle to overthrow -czarism. Upon the supreme basic economic issue confronting Russia they -were separated by a deep and wide gulf. The psychology of the peasants -was utterly unlike that of the urban proletariat. The latter were -concerned with the organization of the state, with factory legislation, -with those issues which are universally raised in the conflict -of capitalists and wage-earners. The consciousness of the Social -Democratic Party was proletarian. On the other hand, the peasants cared -very little about the organization of the state or any of the matters -which the city workers regarded as being of cardinal importance. They -were “land hungry”; they wanted a distribution of the land which would -increase their individual holdings. The passion for private possession -of land is strong in the peasant of every land, the Russian peasant -being no exception to the rule. Yet there is perhaps one respect in -which the psychology of the Russian peasant differs from that of the -French peasant, for example. The Russian peasant is quite as deeply -interested in becoming an individual landholder; he is much less -interested in the idea of absolute ownership. Undisturbed possession of -an adequate acreage, even though unaccompanied by the title of absolute -ownership, satisfies the Russian. - -The moderate Social Democrats, the Mensheviki, and the -Socialists-Revolutionists stood for substantially the same solution of -the land problem prior to the Revolution. They wanted to confiscate the -lands of great estates, the Church and the Crown, and to turn them over -to democratically elected and governed local bodies. The Bolsheviki, -on the other hand, wanted all land to be nationalized and in place of -millions of small owners they wanted state ownership and control. Large -scale agriculture on government-owned lands by government employees -and more or less rapid extinction of private ownership and operation -was their ideal. The Socialists-Revolutionists denounced this program -of nationalization, saying that it would make the peasants “mere -wage-slaves of the state.” They wanted “socialization” of all land, -including that of the small peasant owners. By socialization they meant -taking all lands “out of private ownership of persons into the public -ownership, _and their management by democratically organized leagues of -communities with the purpose of an equitable utilization_.” - -The Russian peasant looked upon the Revolution as, above everything -else, the certain fulfilment of his desire for redistribution of -the land. There were, in fact, two issues which far outweighed all -others--the land problem and peace. All classes in Russia, even -a majority of the great landowners themselves, realized that the -distribution of land among the peasants was now inevitable. Thus, -interrogated by peasants, Rodzianko, President of the Fourth Duma, a -large landowner, said: - -“Yes, we admit that the fundamental problem of the Constituent Assembly -is not merely to construct a political system for Russia, but likewise -_to give back to the peasantry the land which is at present in our -hands_.” - -The Provisional Government, under Lvov, dominated as it then was -by landowners and bourgeoisie, never for a moment sought to evade -this question. On March 15, 1917, the very day of its formation, -the Provisional Government by a decree transferred all the Crown -lands--approximately 12,000,000 acres--to the Ministry of Agriculture -as state property. Two weeks later the Provisional Government conferred -upon the newly created Food Commissions the right to take possession -of all vacant and uncultivated land, to cultivate it or to rent it -to peasants who were ready to undertake the cultivation. This order -compelled many landowners to turn their idle lands over to peasants -who were willing and ready to proceed with cultivation. On April 21, -1917, the Provisional Government by a decree created Land Commissions -throughout the whole of Russia. These Land Commissions were created in -every township (_Volost_), county (_Oyezd_), and province (_Gubernia_). -They were to collect all information concerning landownership and local -administrative agencies and make their reports to a superior national -body, the All-Russian Land Commission, which, in turn, would prepare -a comprehensive scheme for submission to the Constituent Assembly. On -May 18, 1917, the Provisional Government announced that the question of -the transfer of the land to the peasants was to be left wholly to the -Constituent Assembly. - -These local Land Commissions, as well as the superior national -commission, were democratically chosen bodies, thoroughly -representative of the peasantry. As might be expected, they were to -a very large extent guided by the representatives of the Party of -Socialists-Revolutionists. There was never any doubt concerning their -attitude toward the peasants’ demand for distribution of the land. On -the All-Russian Land Commission were the best-known Russian authorities -on the land question and the agrarian problem. Professor Posnikov, the -chairman; Victor Chernov, leader of the Socialists-Revolutionists; -Pieshekhonov; Rakitnikov; the two Moslovs; Oganovsky; Vikhliaev; -Cherenekov; Veselovsky, and many other eminent authorities were on -this important body. To the ordinary non-Russian these names will -mean little, perhaps, but to all who are familiar with modern Russia -this brief list will be a sufficient assurance that the commission -was governed by liberal idealism united to scientific knowledge and -practical experience. - -The Land Commissions were not created merely for the purpose of -collating data upon the subject of landownership and cultivation. That -was, indeed, their avowed and ostensible object; but behind that there -was another and much more urgent purpose. In the first place, as soon -as the revolutionary disturbances began, peasants in many villages -took matters into their own hands and appropriated whatever lands they -could seize. Agitators had gone among the peasantry--agitators of the -Party of Socialists-Revolutionists not less than of the Bolsheviki--and -preached the doctrine of “the expropriation of the expropriators.” They -told the peasants to seize the land and so execute the will of the -people. So long as czarism remained the peasants held back; once it was -destroyed, they threw off their restraint and began to seize the land -for themselves. The Revolution was here. Was it not always understood -that when the Revolution came they were to take the land? - -Numerous estates were seized and in some cases the landowners were -brutally murdered by the frenzied peasants. On some of the large -estates the mansions of the owners, the laborers’ cottages, stables, -cattle-sheds, and corn-stacks were burned and the valuable agricultural -machinery destroyed. Whenever this happened it was a great calamity, -for on the large estates were the model farms, the agricultural -experiment stations of Russia. And while this wanton and foolish -destruction was going on there was a great dearth of food for the -army at the front. Millions of men had to be fed and it was necessary -to make proper provision for the conservation of existing food crops -and for increased production. Nor was it only the big estates which -were thus attacked and despoiled; in numerous instances the farms of -the “middle peasants”--corresponding to our moderately well-to-do -farmers--were seized and their rightful owners driven away. In some -cases very small farms were likewise seized. Something had to be done -to save Russia from this anarchy, which threatened the very life of the -nation. The Land Commissions were made administrative organs to deal -with the land problems as they arose, to act until the new Zemstvos -could be elected and begin to function, when the administrative work of -the commissions would be assumed by the Land Offices of the Zemstvos. - -There was another very serious matter which made it important to have -the Land Commissions function as administrative bodies. Numerous -landowners had begun to divide their estates, selling the land off in -parcels, thus introducing greater complexity into the problem, a more -numerous class of owners to be dealt with. In many cases, moreover, the -“sales” and “transfers” were fictitious and deceptive, the new “owners” -being mere dummies. In this manner the landowners sought to trick and -cheat the peasants. It was to meet this menace that the Provisional -Government, on July 12, 1917, by special decree put a stop to all land -speculation and forbade the transfer of title to any land, outside of -the cities, except by consent of the local Land Commission approved by -the Ministry of Agriculture. - -Chernov, who under Kerensky became Minister of Agriculture, was the -creator of the Land Commissions and the principal author of the -agrarian program of the Provisional Government as this was developed -from March to October. How completely his policy was justified may -be judged from the fact that while most of the landlords fled to the -cities at the outbreak of the Revolution in March, fearing murderous -riotings such as took place in 1906, in June they had nearly all -returned to their estates. The Land Commissions had checked the -peasant uprisings; they had given the peasants something to do toward -a constructive solution, and had created in their minds confidence -that they were going to be honestly dealt with; that the land would -be distributed among them before long. In other words, the peasants -were patiently waiting for freedom and land to be assured by legal and -peaceful means. - -Then the Bolsheviki began to rouse the peasants once more and to play -upon their suspicions and fears. Simultaneously their propagandists in -the cities and in the villages began their attacks upon the Provisional -Government. To the peasants they gave the same old advice: “Seize the -land for yourselves! Expropriate the landlords!” Once more the peasants -began to seize estates, to sack and burn manor houses, and even to -kill landowners. The middle of July saw the beginning of a revival -of the “Jacqueries,” and in a few weeks they had become alarmingly -common. The propagandists of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists -did their best to put an end to the outrages, but the peasants were -not so easily placated as they had been in March and April. Hope long -deferred had brought about a state of despair and desperation. The -poor, bewildered peasants could not understand why such a simple matter -as the distribution of the land--for so it seemed to them--should -require months of preparation. They were ready to believe the -Bolshevist propagandists who told them that the delay was intended -to enable the bourgeoisie to betray the toilers, and that if they -wanted the land they must take it for themselves. “You know how the -Socialists-Revolutionists always talked to you aforetime,” said these -skilful demagogues; “they told you then to seize the land, but now they -only tell you to wait, just as the landlords tell you. They have been -corrupted; they are no longer true representatives of your interest. We -tell you, what you have long known, that if you want the land you must -seize it for yourselves!” - -Anarchy among the peasants grew apace. Some of the wisest of the -leaders of the Russian revolutionary movement urged the Provisional -Government to hurry, to revise its plan, and, instead of waiting for -the Constituent Assembly to act upon the land program, to put it into -effect at once. The All-Russian Land Commission hastened its work and -completed the formulation of a land program. The Provisional Government -stuck to its original declaration that the program must be considered -and approved or rejected by the Constituent Assembly. In October, at -the Democratic Conference in Petrograd, the so-called Pre-Parliament, -Prokopovich, the well-known Marxian economist, who had become Minister -of Commerce and Labor, uttered a solemn warning that “the disorderly -seizing of land was ruining agriculture and threatening the towns and -the northern provinces with famine.” - -It is one of the numerous tragedies of the Russian Revolution that at -the very time this warning was issued Kerensky had in his possession -two plans, either of which might have averted the catastrophe that -followed. One of them was the completed program of the All-Russian Land -Commission, largely Chernov’s work. It had already been approved by -the Provisional Government. It was proposed that Kerensky should make -a fight to have the Cabinet proclaim this program to be law, without -waiting for the Constituent Assembly. The other plan was very simple -and crude. It was that all the large estates be seized at once, as a -measure of military necessity, and that in the distribution of the -land thus taken peasant soldiers with honorable discharges be given -preference. In either case, Kerensky would have split his Cabinet. - -When we consider the conditions which prevailed at that time, the -extreme military and political weakness, and the vast stakes at -issue, it is easy to understand why Kerensky decided to wait for the -Constituent Assembly. It is easy enough to say now, after the event, -that Kerensky’s decision was wrong; that his only chance to hold the -confidence of the peasants was to do one of two things, declare -immediate peace or introduce sweeping land reforms. Certainly, that -seems fairly plain now. At that time, however, Kerensky faced the hard -fact that to do either of these things meant a serious break in the -Cabinet, another crisis, the outcome of which none could foretell. - -Moreover, we must bear in mind that Kerensky himself and those with -whom he was working were inspired by a very genuine and sincere -passion for democracy. They believed in the Constituent Assembly. -They had idealized it. To them it was in the nature of a betrayal -of the Revolution that a matter of such fundamental importance -should be disposed of by a small handful of men, rather than by the -representatives of the people duly elected, upon a democratic basis, -for that purpose. The Provisional Government was pledged to leave -the Constituent Assembly free and untrammeled to deal with the land -problem: how could it violate its pledge and usurp the functions of -the Assembly? If Kerensky’s course was a mistaken one, it was so only -because conscientious loyalty to principle is not invariably expedient -in politics; because the guile and dishonesty of his opponents -triumphed over his simple honesty and truthfulness. - -On October 20, 1917, the Provisional Government enacted a law which -marked a further step in the preparation of the way for the new system -of land tenure. The new law extended the control of the Land Offices -of the Zemstvos--where these existed, and of the Land Commissions, -where the Zemstvos with their Land Offices did not yet exist--over all -cultivated land. It was thus made possible for the provisions of a -comprehensive land law to be applied quickly, with a minimum amount of -either disturbance or delay. - -From the foregoing it will be readily seen that the Bolshevist _coup -d’état_ interfered with the consummation of a most painstaking, -scientific effort to solve the greatest of all Russian problems. Their -apologists are fond of claiming that the Bolsheviki can at least be -credited with having solved the land problem by giving the land to -the peasants. The answer to that preposterous claim is contained in -the foregoing plain and unadorned chronological record, the accuracy -of which can easily be attested by any person having access to a -reasonably good library. In so far as the Bolsheviki put forward any -land program at all, they adopted, for reasons of political expediency, -the program which had been worked out by the Land Commissions under -the Provisional Government--the so-called Chernov program. With that -program they did nothing of any practical value, however. Where the -land was distributed under their régime it was done by the peasants -themselves. In many cases it was done in the primitive, violent, -destructive, and anarchical ways of the “Jacqueries” already described, -adding enormously to Russia’s suffering and well-nigh encompassing her -destruction. By nothing else is the malefic character and influence -of Bolshevism more clearly shown than by the state in which it placed -the land problem, just when it was about to be scientifically and -democratically solved. - -When the Constituent Assembly met on January 5, 1918, the proposed land -law was at once taken up. The first ten paragraphs had been adopted -when the Assembly was dispersed by Trotsky’s Red Guards. The entire -bill was thus not acted upon. The ten paragraphs which were passed give -a very good idea of the general character and scope of the measure: - - In the name of the peoples of the Russian State, composing the - All-Russian Constituent Assembly, be it ordained that: - - 1. Right of ownership to land within the limits of the Russian - Republic is henceforth and forever abolished. - - 2. All lands contained within the boundaries of the Russian - Republic with all their underground wealth, forests, and waters - become the property of the people. - - 3. The control of all lands, the surface and under the surface, - and all forests and waters belongs to the Republic, as - expressed in the forms of its central administrative organs and - organs of local self-government on the principles enacted by - this law. - - 4. Those territories of the Russian Republic which are - autonomous in a juridico-governmental conception, are to - realize their agrarian plans on the basis of this law and in - accord with the Federal Constitution. - - 5. The aims of the government forces and the organs of local - self-government in the sphere of the control of lands, - underground riches, forests, and waters constitute: (_a_) - The creation of conditions most favorable to the greater - exploitation of the natural wealth of the land and the - highest development of productive forces; (_b_) The equitable - distribution of all natural wealth among the population. - - 6. The right of any person or institution to land, underground - resources, forests, and waters is limited only to the - utilization thereof. - - 7. All citizens of the Russian Republic, and also unions of - such citizens and states and social institutions, may become - users of land, underground resources, forests, and waters, - without regard to nationality or religion. - - 8. The land rights of such users are to be obtained, become - effective, and cease under the terms laid down by this law. - - 9. Land rights belonging at present to private persons, groups, - and institutions, in so far as they conflict with this law, are - herewith abrogated. - - 10. The transformation of all lands, underground strata, - forests, and waters, belonging at present to private persons, - groups, or institutions, into popular property is to be made - without recompense to such owners. - -After they had dispersed the Constituent Assembly the Bolsheviki -published their famous “Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring -and Exploited People,” containing their program for “socialization -of the land,” taken bodily from the Socialists-Revolutionists. This -declaration had been first presented to the Constituent Assembly when -the Bolsheviki demanded its adoption by that body. The paragraphs -relating to the socialization of the land read: - - 1. To effect the socialization of the land, private ownership - of land is abolished, and the whole land fund is declared - common national property and transferred to the laborers - without compensation, on the basis of equalized use of the soil. - - All forests, minerals, and waters of state-wide importance, as - well as the whole inventory of animate and inanimate objects, - all estates and agricultural enterprises, are declared national - property. - -This meant literally nothing from the standpoint of practical -politics. Its principal interest lies in the fact that it shows that -the Bolsheviki accepted in theory the essence of the land program -of the elements comprised in the Provisional Government and in the -Constituent Assembly, both of which they had overthrown. Practically -the declaration could have no effect upon the peasants. Millions of -them had been goaded by the Bolsheviki into resorting to anarchistic, -violent seizing of lands on the principle of “each for himself and -the devil take the hindmost.” These would now be ready to fight any -attempt made by the Soviet authorities to “socialize” the land they -held. Millions of other peasants were still under the direction of the -local Land Commissions, most of which continued to function, more or -less _sub rosa_, for some time. And even when and where the local Land -Commissions themselves did not exist, the plans they had prepared were, -in quite a large measure, put into practice when local land divisions -took place. - -The Bolsheviki were powerless to make a single constructive -contribution to the solution of the basic economic problem of Russia. -Their “socialization decree” was a poor substitute for the program -whence it had been derived; they possessed no machinery and no moral -agencies to give it reality. It remained a pious wish, at best; perhaps -a far harsher description would be that much more nearly true. Later -on, when they went into the villages and sought to “socialize” them, -the Bolsheviki found that they had not solved the land problem, but -had made it worse than it had been before. - -We have heard much concerning the nationalization of agriculture in -Soviet Russia, and of the marvelous success attending it. The facts, -as they are to be found in the official publications of the Soviet -Government and the Communist Party, do not sustain the roseate accounts -which have been published by our pro-Bolshevist friends. By July, 1918, -the month in which the previously decreed nationalization of industry -was enforced, some tentative steps toward the nationalization of -agriculture had already been taken. Maria Spiridonova, a leader of the -extreme left wing of the Socialists-Revolutionists, who had co-operated -with the Bolsheviki, bitterly assailed the Council of the People’s -Commissaries for having resorted to nationalization of the great -estates, especially in the western government. In a speech delivered in -Petrograd, on July 16th, Spiridonova charged that “the great estates -were being taken over by government departments and were being managed -by officials, on the ground that state control would yield better -results than communal ownership. Under this system the peasants were -being reduced to the state of slaves paid wages by the state. Yet the -law provided that these estates should be divided among the peasant -communes to be tilled by the peasants on a co-operative basis.” It -appears that this policy was adopted in a number of instances where -the hostility to the Bolsheviki manifested by the peasants made the -division of the land among them “undesirable.” Nationalization -upon any large scale was not resorted to until some months later. -Nationalization of the agriculture of the country as a whole has never -been attempted, of course. There could not be such a nationalization -of agriculture without first nationalizing the land, and that, popular -opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, has never been done in Russia -as yet. The _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. 229) declared, in November, -1919, that “in spite of the fact that the decree announcing the -nationalization of the land is now two years old, _this nationalization -has not yet been carried out_.” - -It was not until March, 1919, according to a report by N. Bogdanov -in _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, November 7, 1919, that nationalized -agriculture really began on a large scale. From this report we learn -something of the havoc which had been wrought upon the agricultural -industry of Russia from March, 1917 to 1919: - - A considerable portion of the estates taken over by the - People’s Commissariat of Agriculture could not be utilized, - due to the lack of various accessories, such as harness, - horseshoes, rope, small instruments, etc. - - The workers were very fluctuating, entirely unorganized, - politically inert--all this due to the shortage of provisions - and organization. The technical forces could not get used to - the village; besides, we did not have sufficient numbers of - agronomists (agricultural experts) familiar with the practical - organization of large estates. The regulations governing the - social management of land charged the representatives of the - industrial proletariat with a leading part in the work of - the Soviet estates. But, torn between meeting the various - requirements of the Republic, of prime importance, the - proletariat could not with sufficient speed furnish the number - of organizers necessary for agricultural management. - - The idea of centralized management on the Soviet estates has - not been properly understood by the local authorities, and the - work of organization from the very beginning had to progress - amid bitter fighting between the provincial Soviet estates and - the provincial offices of the Department of Agriculture. This - struggle has not as yet ceased. - - Thus, the work of nationalizing the country’s agriculture began - in the spring--_i.e._, a half-year later than it should have, - and without any definite territory (every inch of it had to - be taken after a long and strenuous siege on the part of the - surrounding population); with insufficient and semi-ruined - equipment; without provisions; without an apparatus for - organization and without the necessary experience for such - work; with the agricultural workers engaged in the Soviet - estates lacking any organization whatever. - - Naturally, the results of this work are not impressive. - - * * * * * - - Within the limits of the Soviet estates the labor-union - of agricultural proletariat has developed into a large - organization. - - In a number of provinces the leading part in the work of the - Soviet estates has been practically assumed by the industrial - proletariat, which has furnished a number of organizers, whose - reputation has been sufficiently established. - - Estimating the results of the work accomplished, we must admit - that we have not yet any fully nationalized rural economy. - But during the eight months of work in this direction all the - elements for its organization have been accumulated. - - * * * * * - - A preliminary familiarity with individual estates and with - agricultural regions makes it possible to begin the preparation - of a national plan for production on the Soviet estates and for - a systematic attempt to meet the manifold demands made on the - nationalized estates by the agricultural industries: sugar, - distilling, chemical, etc., as well as by the country’s need - for stock-breeding, seeds, planting, and other raw materials. - - The greatest difficulties arise in the creation of the - machinery of organization. The shortage of agricultural experts - is being replenished with great difficulty, for the position - of the technical personnel of the Soviet estates, due to - their weak political organization, is extremely unstable. The - mobilization of the proletarian forces for the work in the - Soviet estates gives us ground to believe that in this respect - the spring of 1920 will find us sufficiently prepared. - - The ranks of proletarian workers in the Soviet estates are - drawing together. True, the level of their enlightenment is by - no means high, but “in union there is strength,” and this force - if properly utilized will rapidly yield positive results. - -The sole purpose of these quotations is to show that at best the -“nationalization of agriculture” in Russia, concerning which we have -heard so much, is only an experiment that has just been begun; that -it bears no very important relation to the industry as a whole. -It would be just as true to say, on the basis of the agricultural -experiment stations of our national and state governments, that we -have “nationalized agriculture” as to make that claim for Russia. _The -records show that the “nationalized” farms did not produce enough food -to maintain the workers employed on them._ - -Apart from the nationalization of a number of large estates upon the -basis of wage labor under a centralized authority, the Committee for -the Communization of Agricultural Economy was formed for the purpose -of establishing agricultural communes. At the same time--February, -1919--the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets called on the -Provincial Soviets to take up this work of creating agricultural -communes. Millions of rubles were spent for this purpose, but the -results were very small. In March, 1919, _Pravda_ declared that “15,000 -communes were registered, but we have no proofs as to their existence -anywhere except on paper.” The _Izvestia_ of the Central Executive -Committee, May, 1919, complained that “the number of newly organized -communes is growing smaller from month to month; the existing communes -are becoming disintegrated, twenty of them having been disbanded during -March.” City-bred workers found themselves helpless on the land and in -conflict with the peasants. On the other hand, the peasants would not -accept the communes, accompanied as these were with Soviet control. In -the same number of the _Izvestia_ of the Central Executive Committee, -Nikolaiev, a well-known Bolshevik, declared: - - The communes are absolutely contradictory to the mode of - living of our toiling peasant masses, as these communes demand - not only the abolition of property rights, to implements and - means of production, but the division of products according to - program. - -At the Congress of Trades-unions, which met in Moscow in May, 1919, -the possibility of using the communes as means of relieving the -wide-spread unemployment and distress among the city workers was -discussed by Platonov, Rozanov, and other noted Bolsheviki. The -closing down of numerous factories and the resulting unemployment -of large masses of workmen had brought about an appalling amount of -hunger. It was proposed, therefore, that communes be formed in the -villages under the auspices of the trades-unions, and as branches of -the unions, parcels of land being given to the unions. In this way, it -was argued, employment would be found for the members of the unions -and the food-supply of the cities would be materially increased. While -approving the formation of communes, the Congress voted down the -proposal. - -On June 8, 1919, there was established the Administration of Industrial -Allotments. The object of this new piece of bureaucratic machinery -was the increase of agricultural production through land allotments -attached to, or assigned to, industrial establishments, and their -cultivation by the workers. This scheme, which had been promulgated as -early as February, 1919, was a pathetic anticlimax to the ambitious -program with which the Bolshevist Utopia-builders set out. It was -neither more nor less than the “allotment gardens” scheme so long -familiar in British cities. Such allotment gardens were common enough -in the industrial centers of the United States during the war. As -an emergency measure for providing vegetables they were useful and -even admirable; as a contribution to the solution of the agricultural -problem in its largest sense their value was insignificant. Yet we -find the _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, in November, 1919, indulging in the -old intoxicating visions of Utopia, and seeing in these allotments the -means whereby the cities could be relieved of their dependence upon the -rural villages for food: - - Out of the hitherto frenzied rush of workmen into villages, - brought about by hunger, a healthy proletariat movement was - born, aiming at the creation of their own agriculture by - means of allotments attached to the works. This movement - resulted, on February 15, 1919, in a decree which granted to - factory and other proletariat groups the right to organize - their own rural economy.... The enthusiasm of the workmen - is impressive.... _The complete emancipation of the towns - from the villages in the matter of food-supply appears to be - quite within the realms of possibility in the near future, - without the unwieldy, expensive, and inefficient machinery of - the People’s Commissariat of Food Supply, and without undue - irritation of the villages._ This will, besides, relieve - enormously the strain on the crippled railways. And, what is - even more important, it points out a new and the only right way - to the nationalization of the land and to the socialization - of agriculture. And, indeed, in spite of the fact that the - decree announcing the nationalization of the land is now two - years old, _this nationalization has not yet been carried out_. - The attitude of the peasant to the land, psychologically as - well as economically, is still that of the small landowner. - He still considers the land his property, for, as before, - it is he, and not the state, that draws both the absolute - and the differential rent, and he is fighting for it, with - the food detachments, with all his power. If there is any - difference at all it is that the rent which formerly used to - find its way into the wide pockets of the landowners now - goes into the slender purse of the peasant. The difference, - however, in the size of the respective pockets is becoming - more and more insignificant.... In order to make the approach - to socialization of the land possible, it is necessary that - the Soviet authorities should, besides promulgating decrees, - actually take possession of the land, and the authorities can - only do this with the help of the industrial proletariat, whose - dictatorship it represents. - -How extremely childish all this is! How little the knowledge of -the real problem it displays! If the official organ of the Supreme -Economic Council and the People’s Commissaries of Finance, Commerce -and Trade and Food knew no better than this after two such years as -Russia had passed through, how can there be any hope for Russia until -the reckless, ignorant, bungling experimenters are overthrown? Pills -of Podophyllum for earthquakes would be less grotesque than their -prescription for Russia’s ailment. - - - - -VI - -THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE PEASANTS - - -In the fierce fratricidal conflict between the Bolsheviki and the -democratic anti-Bolshevist elements so much bitterness has been -engendered that anything approaching calm, dispassionate discussion -and judgment has been impossible for Russians, whether as residents -in Russia, engaged in the struggle, or as _émigrés_, impotent to do -more than indulge in the expression of their emotions, practically all -Russians everywhere have been--and still are--too intensely partizan to -be just or fair-minded. And non-Russians have been subject to the same -distorting passions, only to a lesser degree. Even here in the United -States, while an incredibly large part of the population has remained -utterly indifferent, wholly uninterested in the struggle or the -issues at stake, it has been practically impossible to find anywhere -intelligent interest dissociated from fierce partizanship. - -The detachment and impartiality essential to the formation of sound and -unbiased judgment have been almost non-existent. The issues at stake -have been too vast and too fundamental, too vitally concerned with the -primal things of civilization, the sources of some of our profoundest -emotions, to permit cool deliberation. Moreover, little groups of men -and women with strident cries have hurled the challenge of Bolshevism -into the arena of our national life, and that at a time of abnormal -excitation, at the very moment when our lives were pulsing with a -fiercely emotional patriotism. As a result of these conditions there -has been little discriminating discernment in the tremendous riot of -discussion of Russian Bolshevism which has raged in all parts of the -land. It has been a frenzied battle of epithet and insult, calumny and -accusation. - -It is not at all strange or remarkable that their opponents, in Russia -and outside of it, have been ready to charge against the Bolsheviki -every evil condition in Russia, including those which have long -existed under czarism and those which developed during and as a result -of the war. The transportation system had been reduced to something -nearly approaching chaos before the Revolution of March, 1917, as -all reasonably well-informed people know. Yet, notwithstanding these -things, it is a common practice to charge the Bolsheviki with the -destruction of the transportation system and all the evil results -following from it. Industrial production declined greatly in the latter -part of 1916 and the early weeks of 1917. The March Revolution, by -lessening discipline in the factories, had the effect of lessening -production still further. The demoralization of industry was one of the -gravest problems with which Kerensky had to deal. Yet it is rare to -find any allowance made for these important facts in anti-Bolshevist -polemics. The Bolsheviki are charged with having wrought all the havoc -and harm; there is no discrimination, no intellectual balance. - -Similarly, many of their opponents have charged against the Russian -Bolsheviki much brutality and crime which in fairness should be -attributed rather to inherent defects of the peasant character, -themselves the product of centuries of oppression and misrule. There -is much that is admirable in the character of the Russian peasant, -and many western writers have found the temptation to idealize it -irresistible. Yet it is well to remember that it is not yet sixty -years since serfdom was abolished; that under a very thin veneer -there remain ignorant selfishness, superstition, and the capacity -for savage brutality which all primitive peoples have. Nothing is -gained, nobody is helped to an understanding of the Russian problem, -if emphasis is laid upon the riotous seizures of land by the peasants -in the early stages of the Bolshevist régime and no attention paid to -the fact that similar riotings and land seizures were numerous and -common in 1906, and that as soon as the Revolution broke out in March, -1917, the peasant uprisings began. Undoubtedly the Bolsheviki must be -held responsible for the fact that they deliberately destroyed the -discipline and restraint which the Land Commissions exercised over the -peasants; that they instigated them to riot and anarchy at the very -time when a peaceful and orderly solution of the land problem was made -certain. It is not necessary to minimize their crime against Russian -civilization: only it is neither true nor wise to attribute the brutal -character of the peasant to Bolshevism. - -The abolition of the courts of justice and the forms of judicial -procedure threw upon the so-called “People’s Tribunals” the task of -administering justice--a task which the peasants of whom the village -tribunals were composed, many of them wholly illiterate and wholly -unfit to exercise authority, could not be expected to discharge other -than as they did, with savage brutality. Here is a list of cases taken -from a single issue (April 26, 1918) of the _Dyelo Naroda_ (_People’s -Affair_), organ of the Socialists-Revolutionists: - -In Kirensk County the People’s Tribunal ordered a woman, found guilty -of extracting brandy, to be inclosed in a bag and repeatedly knocked -against the ground until dead. - -In the Province of Tver the People’s Tribunal has sentenced a young -fellow “to freeze to death” for theft. In a rigid frost he was led out, -clad only in a shirt, and water was poured on him until he turned into -a piece of ice. Out of pity somebody cut his tortures short by shooting -him. - -In Sarapulsk County a peasant woman, helped by her lover, killed her -husband. For this crime the People’s Tribunal sentenced the woman to be -buried alive and her lover to die. A grave was dug, into which first -the body of the killed lover was lowered, and then the woman, hands and -feet bound, put on top. She had been covered by almost fifteen feet -of earth when she still kept on yelling “Help!” and “Have pity, dear -people!” The peasants, who witnessed the scene, later said, “But the -life of a woman is as lasting as that of a cat.” - -In the village of Bolshaya Sosnovka a shoemaker killed a soldier -who tried to break in during the night. The victim’s comrades, also -soldiers, created a “Revolutionary Tribunal,” which convicted the -shoemaker to “be beheaded at the hands of one of his comrades to whose -lot it should fall to perform the task.” The shoemaker was put to death -in the presence of a crowd of thousands of people. - -In the village of Bootsenki five men and three women were accused -of misconduct. The local peasant committee undertook to try them. -After a long trial the committee reached the verdict to punish them -by flogging, giving each one publicly thirty-five strokes with the -rod. One of the women was pregnant and it was decided to postpone the -execution in her case until she had been delivered. The rest were -severely flogged. In connection with this affair an interesting episode -occurred. One of the convicted received only sixteen strokes instead -of thirty-five. At first no attention was paid to it. The next day, -however, rumors spread that the president of the committee had been -bribed, and had thus mitigated the punishment. - -Then the committee decreed to flog the president himself, administering -to him fifty strokes with the rod. - -In the village of Riepyrky, in Korotoyansk County, the peasants caught -a soldier robbing and decided to drown him. The verdict was carried out -by the members of the Revolutionary Tribunal in the presence of all the -people of the village. - -In the village of Vradievka, in Ananyensky County, eleven thieves, -sentenced by the people, were shot. - -In the district of Kubanetz, in the Province of Petrograd, carrying out -the verdict of the people, peasants shot twelve men of the fighting -militia who had been caught accepting bribes. - -These sentences speak for themselves. They were not expressions of -Bolshevist savagery, for in the village tribunals there were very few -Bolsheviki. As a matter of fact, the same people who meted out these -barbarous sentences treated the agents of the Soviet Government with -equally savage brutality. The Bolsheviki had unleashed the furious -passion of these primitive folk, destroyed their faith in liberty -within the law, and replaced it by license and tyranny. Thus had they -recklessly sown dragons’ teeth. - -As early as December, 1917, the Bolshevist press was discussing the -serious conditions which obtained among the peasants in the villages. -It was recognized that no good had resulted from the distribution of -the land by the anarchical methods which had been adopted. The evils -which the leaders of the Mensheviki and the Socialists-Revolutionists -had warned against were seen to be very stern realities. As was -inevitable, the land went, in many cases, not to the most needy, but -to the most powerful and least scrupulous. In these cases there was no -order, no wisdom, no justice, no law save might. It was the old, old -story of - - Let him take who has the power; - And let him keep who can. - -All that there was of justice and order came from the organizations -set up by the Provisional Government, the organizations the Bolsheviki -sought to destroy. Before they had been in power very long the new -rulers were compelled to recognize the seriousness of the situation. -On December 26, 1917, _Pravda_ said: - - Thus far not everybody realizes to what an extent the war - has affected the economic condition of the villages. The - increase in the cost of bread has been a gain only for those - selling it. The demolition of the estates of the landowners - has enriched only those who arrived at the place of plunder - in carriages driven by five horses. By the distribution of - the landowners’ cattle and the rest of their property, those - gained most who were in charge of the distribution. In charge - of the distribution were committees, which, as everybody was - complaining, consisted mainly of wealthy peasants. - -One of the most terrible consequences of the lawless anarchy that had -been induced by the Bolsheviki was the internecine strife between -villages, which speedily assumed the dimensions of civil war. It was -common for the peasants in one village to arm themselves and fight -the armed peasants of a neighboring village for the possession of -the lands of an estate. At the instigation of the Bolsheviki and of -German agents, many thousands of peasants had deserted from the army, -taking with them their weapons and as much ammunition as they could. -“Go back to your homes and take your guns with you. Seize the land for -yourselves and defend it!” was the substance of this propaganda. The -peasant soldiers deserted in masses, frequently terrorizing the people -of the villages and towns through which they passed. Several times the -Kerensky Government attempted to disarm these masses of deserters, but -their number was so great that this was not possible, every attempt -to disarm a body of them resolving itself into a pitched battle. In -this way the villages became filled with armed men who were ready to -use their weapons in the war for booty, a sort of savage tribal war, -the village populations being the tribes. In his paper, _Novaya Zhizn_, -Gorky wrote, in June, 1918: - - All those who have studied the Russian villages of our day - clearly perceive that _the process of demoralization and - decay is going on there with remarkable speed_. The peasants - have taken the land away from its owners, divided it among - themselves, and destroyed the agricultural implements. _And - they are getting ready to engage in a bloody internecine - struggle for the division of the booty._ In certain districts - the population has consumed the entire grain-supply, including - the seed. In other districts the peasants are hiding their - grain underground, for fear of being forced to share it with - starving neighbors. This situation cannot fail to lead to - chaos, destruction, and murder.[7] - -[7] Italics mine.--J. S. - -As a matter of fact the “bloody internecine struggle” had been going -on for some time. Even before the overthrow of Kerensky there had been -many of these village wars. The Bolshevist Government did not make any -very serious attempt to interfere with the peasant movements for the -distribution of land for some time after the _coup d’état_. It was too -busy trying to consolidate its position in the cities, and especially -to organize production in the factories. There was not much to be done -with the farms at that season of the year. Early in the spring of 1918 -agents of the Soviet Government began to appear in the villages. Their -purpose was to supervise and regulate the distribution of the land. -Since a great deal of the land had already been seized and distributed -by the peasants, this involved some interference on the part of the -central Soviet power in matters which the peasants regarded themselves -as rightfully entitled to settle in their own way. - -This gave rise to a bitter conflict between the peasants and the -central Soviet authorities. If the peasants had confiscated and -partitioned the land, however inequitably, they regarded their deed -as conclusive and final. The attempt of the Soviet agents to “revise” -their actions they regarded as robbery. The central Soviet authorities -had against them all the village population with the exception of the -disgruntled few. If the peasants had not yet partitioned the land they -were suspicious of outsiders coming to do it. The land was their own; -the city men had nothing to do with it. In hundreds of villages the -commissions sent by the Bolsheviki to carry out the provisions of the -land program were mobbed and brutally beaten, and in many cases were -murdered. The issue of _Vlast Naroda_ (_Power of the People_) for May, -1918, contained the following: - - In Bielo all members of the Soviets have been murdered. - - In Soligalich two of the most prominent members of the Soviets - have literally been torn to pieces. Two others have been beaten - half dead. - - In Atkarsk several members of the Soviets have been killed. In - an encounter between the Red Guards and the masses, many were - killed and wounded. The Red Guards fled. - - In Kleen a crowd entered by force the building occupied by the - Soviets, with the intention of bringing the deputies before - their own court of justice. The latter fled. The Financial - Commissary committed suicide by shooting himself, in order to - escape the infuriated crowd. - - In Oriekhovo-Zooyevo the deputies work in their offices guarded - by a most vigilant military force. Even on the streets they are - accompanied by guards armed with rifles and bayonets. - - In Penza an attempt has been made on the lives of the Soviet - members. One of the presiding officers has been wounded. The - Soviet building is now surrounded with cannon and machine-guns. - - In Svicherka, where the Bolsheviki had ordered a St. - Bartholomew night, the deputies are hunted like wild animals. - - In the district of Kaliasinsk the peasantry has decidedly - refused to obey orders of the Soviets to organize an army by - compulsion. Some of the recruiting officers and agitators have - been killed. - - Similar acts become more numerous as time goes on. The movement - against the Soviets spreads far and wide, affecting wider and - wider circles of the people. - -The warfare between villages over confiscated land was a very serious -matter. Not only did the peasants confiscate and divide among -themselves the great estates, but they took the “excess” lands of -the moderately well-to-do peasants in many instances--that is, all -over and above the average allotment for the village. Those residing -in a village immediately adjoining an estate thus confiscated had, -all other things being equal, a better chance to get the lands than -villagers a little farther distant, though the latter might be in -greater need of the land, owing to the fact that their holdings were -smaller. Again, the village containing many armed men stood a better -chance than the village containing few. Village made war against -village, raising armed forces for the purpose. We get a vivid picture -of this terrible anarchy from the following account in the _Vlast -Naroda_: - - The village has taken away the land from the landlords, - farmers, wealthy peasants, and monasteries. It cannot, however, - divide it peacefully, as was to be expected. - - The more land there is the greater the appetite for it; hence - more quarrels, misunderstandings, and fights. - - In Oboyansk County many villages refused to supply soldiers - when the Soviet authorities were mobilizing an army. In their - refusal they stated that “in the spring soldiers will be needed - at home in the villages,” not to cultivate the land, but to - protect it with arms against neighboring peasants. - - In the Provinces of Kaluga, Kursk, and Voronezh peasant - meetings adopted the following resolutions: - - “All grown members of the peasant community have to be home - in the spring. Whoever will then not return to the village - or voluntarily stay away will be forever expelled from the - community. - - “These provisions are made for the purpose of having as great a - force as possible in the spring when it comes to dividing the - land.” - - The peasantry is rapidly preparing to arm and is partly armed - already. The villages have a number of rifles, cartridges, - hand-grenades, and bombs. - - Some villages in the Nieshnov district in the Province of - Mohilev have supplied themselves with machine-guns. The village - of Little Nieshnov, for instance, has decided to order fifteen - machine-guns and has organized a Red Army in order to be able - better to defend a piece of land taken away from the landlords, - and, as they say, that “the neighboring peasants should not - come to cut our hay right in front of our windows, like last - year.” When the neighboring peasants “heard of the decision” - they also procured machine-guns. They have formed an army and - intend to go to Little Nieshnov to cut the hay on the meadows - “under the windows” of the disputed owners. - - In the Counties of Schigrovsk, Oboyansk, and Ruilsk, in the - Province of Kursk, almost every small and large village has - organized a Red Guard and is making preparations for the coming - spring war. In these places the peasants have taken rich booty. - They took and devastated 160 estates, 14 breweries, and 26 - sugar refineries. Some villages have even marked the spot where - the machine-guns will have to be placed in the spring. In Volsk - County in the Province of Saratov five large villages--Kluchi, - Pletnevka, Ruibni, Shakhan, and Chernavka--expect to have - war when the time comes to divide the 148,500 acres of Count - Orlov-Denisov’s estate. Stubborn fights for meadows and forests - are already going on. They often result in skirmishes and - murder. There are similar happenings in other counties of the - province; for instance, in Petrov, Balashov, and Arkhar. - - In the Province of Simbirsk there is war between the community - peasants and shopkeepers. The former have decided to do away - with “Stolypin heirs,” as they call the shopkeepers. The - latter, however, have organized and are ready for a stubborn - resistance. Combats have already taken place. The peasants - demolish farms, and the farmers set fire to towns, villages, - threshing-floors, etc. - - We have received from the village of Khanino, in the Province - of Kaluga, the following letter: - - “The division of the land leads to war. One village fights - against the other. The wealthy and strong peasants have - decided not to let the poor share the land taken away from - the landlords. In their turn, the poor peasants say, ‘We will - take away from you bourgeois peasants not only the lands of - the landlords, but also your own. We, the toilers, are now the - government.’ This leads to constant quarrels and fights. The - population of the neighboring village consists of so-called - natives and of peasants brought by landlords from the Province - of Orlov. The natives now say to those from Orlov: ‘Get away - from our land and return to your Province of Orlov. Anyhow, - we shall drive you away from here.’ The peasants from Orlov, - however, threaten ‘to kill all the natives.’ Thus there are - daily encounters.” - - In another village the peasants have about 5,400 acres of land, - which they bought. For some reason or other they failed to - cultivate it last year. Therefore the peasants of a neighboring - village decided to take it away from them as “superfluous - property which is against the labor status.” The owners, - however, declared: - - “First kill us and then you will be able to take away our land.” - - In some places the first battles for land have already taken - place. - - In the Province of Tambov, near the village of Ischeina, a - serious encounter has taken place between the peasants of the - village of Shleyevka and Brianchevka. Fortunately, among the - peasants of Brianchevka was a wise man, “the village Solomon,” - who first persuaded his neighbors to put out for the peasants - of Shleyevka five buckets of brandy. The latter actually took - the ransom and went away, thus leaving the land to the owners. - -In some instances the Bolsheviki instigated the peasants to massacre -hundreds of innocent people in adjacent villages and towns. They did -not stop, or even protest against, the most savage anti-Jewish pogroms. -Charles Dumas, the well-known French Socialist, a Deputy in Parliament, -after spending fifteen months in Russia, published his experiences -and solemnly warned the Socialists of France against Bolshevism. -His book[8] is a terrible chronicle of terrorism, oppression, and -anarchy, all the more impressive because of its restraint and careful -documentation. He cites the following cases: - -[8] _La Vérité sur les Bolsheviki_, par Charles Dumas. - - On March 18, 1918, the peasants of an adjoining village - organized, in collusion with the Bolsheviki, a veritable St. - Bartholomew night in the city of Kuklovo. About five hundred - bodies of the victims were found afterward, most of them - “Intellectuals.” All residences and stores were plundered and - destroyed, the Jews being among the worst sufferers. Entire - families were wiped out, and for three days the Bolsheviki - would not permit the burial of the dead. - - In May, 1918, the city of Korocha was the scene of a horrible - massacre. Thirty officers, four priests, and three hundred - citizens were killed. - -In May, 1918, the relations of the Soviet Government to the peasantry -were described by Gorky as the war of the city against the country. -They were, in fact, very similar to the relations of conquering -armies to the subjugated but rebellious and resentful populations of -conquered territories. On May 14th a decree was issued regarding the -control of grain, the famous compulsory grain registration order. This -decree occupies so important a place in the history of the struggle, -and contains so many striking features, that a fairly full summary is -necessary:[9] - -[9] The entire text is given as an appendix at the end of the volume. - - While the people in the consuming districts are starving, - there are large reserves of unthreshed grain in the producing - districts. This grain is in the hands of the village - bourgeoisie--“tight-fisted village dealers and profiteers”--who - remain “deaf and indifferent to the wailings of starving - workmen and peasant poverty” and hold their grain in the hope - of forcing the government to raise the price of grain, selling - only to the speculators at fabulous prices. “An end must be - put to this obstinacy of the greedy village grain-profiteers.” - To abolish the grain monopoly and the system of fixed prices, - while it would lessen the profits of one group of capitalists, - would also “make bread completely inaccessible to our many - millions of workmen and would subject them to inevitable death - from starvation.” Only food grains absolutely necessary for - feeding their families, on a rationed basis, and for seed - purposes should be permitted to be held by the peasants. “_The - answer to the violence of grain-growers toward the starving - poor must be violence toward the bourgeoisie._” - -Continuing its policy of price-fixing and monopolization of the -grain-supply, the government decreed “a merciless struggle with -grain speculators,” compulsion of “each grain-owner to declare the -surplus above what is needed to sow the fields and for personal use, -according to established normal quantities, until the new harvest, -and to surrender the same within a week after the publication of this -decision in each village.” The workmen and poor peasants were called -upon “to unite at once for a merciless struggle with grain-hoarders.” -All persons having a surplus of grain and failing to bring it to the -collecting-points, and those wasting grain on illicit distillation of -alcohol, were to be regarded as “enemies of the people.” They were to -be turned over to the Revolutionary Tribunal, which would “imprison -them for ten years, confiscate their entire property, and drive them -out forever from the communes”; while the distillers must, in addition, -“be condemned to compulsory communal work.” - -To carry out this rigorous policy it was provided that any person who -revealed an undeclared surplus of grains should receive one-half the -value of the surplus when it was seized and confiscated, the other half -going to the village commune. “For the more successful struggle with -the food crisis” extraordinary powers were conferred upon the People’s -Food Commissioner, appointed by the Soviet Government. This official -was empowered to (1) publish at his discretion obligatory regulations -regarding the food situation, “exceeding the usual limits of the -People’s Food Commissioner’s competence”; (2) to abrogate the orders of -local food bodies and other organizations contravening his own plans -and orders; (3) to demand from all institutions and organizations the -immediate carrying out of his regulations; (4) “_to use armed forces -in case resistance is shown to the removal of grains or other food -products_; (5) to dissolve or reorganize the food agencies where they -might resist his orders; (6) to discharge, transfer, commit to the -Revolutionary Tribunal, or subject to arrest officers and employees of -all departments and public organizations in case of interference with -his orders; (7) to transfer the powers of such officials, departments, -and institutions,” with the approval of the Council of People’s -Commissaries. - -It is not necessary here to discuss the merits of these regulations, -even if we possessed the complete data without which the merit of -the regulations cannot be determined. For our present purpose it -is sufficient to recognize the fact that the peasants regarded the -regulations as oppressive and vigorously resisted their enforcement. -They claimed that the amount of grain--and also of potatoes--they were -permitted to keep was insufficient; that it meant semi-starvation -to them. The peasant Soviets, where such still existed, jealous of -their rights, refused to recognize the authority of the People’s Food -Commissaries. No material increase in the supply of “surplus grain” -was observed. The receiving-stations were as neglected as before. The -poor wretches who, inspired by the rich reward of half the value of the -illegal reserves reported, acted as informers were beaten and tortured, -and the Food Commissaries, who were frequently arrogant and brutal in -their ways, were attacked and in some cases killed. - -The Soviet Government had resort to armed force against the peasants. -On May 30, 1918, the Council of People’s Commissaries met and decided -that the workmen of Petrograd and Moscow must form “food-requisitioning -detachments” and “advance in a crusade against the village bourgeoisie, -calling to their assistance the village poor.” From a manifesto issued -by the Council of People’s Commissaries this passage is quoted: - - The Central Executive Committee has ordered the Soviets of - Moscow and Petrograd to mobilize 10,000 workers, to arm them - and to equip them for a campaign for the conquest of wheat from - the rapacious and the monopolists. This order must be put into - operation within a week. Every worker called upon to take up - arms must perform his duty without a murmur. - -This was, of course, a mobilization for war of the city proletariat -against the peasantry. In an article entitled, “The Policy of Despair,” -published in his paper, the _Novaya Zhizn_, Gorky vigorously denounced -this policy: - - The war is declared, the city against the country, a war that - allows an infamous propaganda to say that the worker is to - snatch his last morsel of bread from the half-starved peasant - and to give him in return nothing but Communist bullets and - monetary emblems without value. Cruel war is declared, and - what is the more terrible, a war without an aim. The granaries - of Russia are outside of the Communistic Paradise, but rural - Russia suffers as much from famine as urban Russia. - - We are profoundly persuaded--and Lenin and many of the - intelligent Bolsheviks know this very well--that to collect - wheat through these methods that recall in a manner so striking - those employed by General Eichhorn (a Prussian general of - enduring memory for cruelty) in Ukrainia, will never solve the - food crisis. They know that the return to democracy and the - work of the local autonomies will give the best results, and - meantime they have taken this decisive step on the road to - folly. - -How completely the Bolshevist methods failed is shown by the official -Soviet journal, _Finances and National Economy_ (No. 38), November, -1918. The following figures refer to a period of three months in the -first half of 1918, and show the number of wagon-loads demanded and the -number actually secured: - - _1918_ _Wagon-loads _Wagon-loads _Percentage - Demanded_ Secured_ of Demand - Realized_ - - April 20,967 1,462 6.97 - May 19,780 1,684 7.02 - June 17,370 786 4.52 - -In explanation of these figures the apologists of Bolshevist rule have -said that the failure was due in large part to the control of important -grain-growing provinces by anti-Bolshevist forces. This is typical of -the half-truths which make up so much of the Bolshevist propaganda. -Of course, important grain districts _were_ in the control of the -anti-Bolshevist forces, _but the fact was known to the Bolsheviki and -was taken into account in making their demands_. Otherwise, their -demands would certainly have been much greater. Let us, however, -look at the matter from a slightly different angle and consider how -the scheme worked in those provinces which were wholly controlled by -the Bolsheviki, and where there were no “enemy forces.” The following -figures, taken from the same Soviet journal, refer to the month of -June, 1918: - - _Province_ _Wagon-loads _Wagon-loads _Percentage - Demanded_ Secured_ of Demand - Realized_ - - Voronezh 1,000 2 0.20 - Viatka 1,300 14 1.07 - Kazan 400 2 0.50 - Kursk 500 7 1.40 - Orel 300 8 2.67 - Tambo 675 98 14.51 - -On June 11, 1918, a decree was issued establishing the so-called Pauper -Committees, or Committees of the Poor. The decree makes it quite clear -that the object was to replace the village Soviets by these committees, -which were composed in part of militant Bolsheviki from the cities -and in part of the poorest peasants in the villages, including among -these the most thriftless, idle, and dissolute. Clause 2 of the decree -of June 11th provided that “both local residents and chance visitors” -might be elected. Those not admitted were those known to be exploiters -and “tight-fists,” those owning commercial or industrial concerns, and -those hiring labor. An explanatory note was added which stated that -those using hired labor for cultivating land up to a certain area might -be considered eligible. An official description of these Committees -of the Poor was published in _Pravda_, in February, 1919. Of course, -the committees had been established and working for something over six -months when _Pravda_ published this account: - - A Committee of the Poor is a close organization formed in all - villages of the very poorest peasants to fight against the - usurers, rich peasants, and clergy, who have been exploiting - the poorest peasants and squeezing out their life-blood for - centuries under the protection of emperors. _Only such of the - very poorest peasants as support the Soviet authority are - elected members of these committees._ These latter register - all grain and available foodstuffs in their villages, as well - as all cattle, agricultural implements, carts, etc. It is - likewise their duty to introduce the new land laws issued by - order of the Soviets of the Workers’, Soldiers’, Peasants’, and - Cossacks’ Deputies. - - The fields are cultivated with the implements thus registered, - and the harvest is divided among those who have worked in - accordance with the law. The surplus is supplied to the - starving cities in return for goods of all kinds that the - villagers need. _The motto of the Communist-Bolshevist Party is - impressed upon all members of these committees_--namely, “Help - the poor; do not injure the peasant of average means, but treat - usurers, clergy, and all members of the White Army without - mercy.” - -Even this account of these committees of the poor indicates a terrible -condition of strife in the villages. These committees were formed to -take the place of the Soviets, which the Food Commissars, in accordance -with the wide powers conferred upon them, could order suppressed -whenever they chose. Where the solidarity of the local peasantry -could not be broken up “chance visitors,” poor wretches imported for -the purpose, constituted the entire membership of such committees. In -other cases, a majority of the members of the committees were chosen -from among the local residents. There was no appeal from the decision -of these committees. Any member of such a committee having a grudge -against a neighbor could satisfy it by declaring him to be a hoarder, -could arrest him, seize his property and have him flogged or, as -sometimes happened, shot. The military detachments formed to secure -grain and other foodstuffs had to work with these committees where they -already existed, and to form them where none yet existed. - -The _Severnaya Oblast_, July 4, 1918, published detailed instructions -of how the food-requisitioning detachments were to proceed in villages -where committees of the poor had not yet been formed. They were to -first call a meeting, not of all the peasants in a village, but only -of the very poorest peasants and such other residents as were well -known to be loyal supporters of the Soviet Government. From the number -thus assembled five or seven must be selected as a committee. When -formed this committee must demand, as a first step, the surrendering -of all arms by the rest of the population. This disarming of the -people must be very vigorously and thoroughly carried out; refusal to -surrender arms to the committee, or concealing arms from the committee, -involved severe punishment. Persons guilty of either offense might be -ordered shot by the Committee of the Poor, the Food Commissar or the -Revolutionary Tribunal. After the disarmament had been proclaimed, -three days’ notice was to be served upon the peasants to deliver their -“surplus” grain--that is, all over and above the amount designated by -the committee--at the receiving station. Failure to do this entailed -severe penalties; destroying or concealing grain was treason and -punishable by death at the hands of a firing-squad. - -The war between the peasantry, on the one hand, and the Bolshevist -officials, the food-requisitioning detachments and the pauper -committees, on the other, went on throughout the summer of 1918. -The first armed detachments reached the villages toward the end of -June. From that time to the end of December the sanguinary struggle -was maintained. According to _Izvestia_ of the Food Commissariat, -December, 1918, the Food Army consisted of 3,000 men in June and -36,500 in December. In the course of the struggle this force had lost -7,309 men, killed, wounded, and sick. In other words, the casualties -amounted to 30 per cent. of the highest number ever engaged. These -figures of themselves bear eloquent witness to the fierce resistance -of the peasantry. It was a common occurrence for a food-requisitioning -detachment to enter a village and begin to search for concealed weapons -and grain and to be at once met with machine-gun and rifle-fire, -the peasants treating them as robbers and enemies. Sometimes the -villagers were victorious and the Bolshevist forces were driven away. -In almost every such case strong reinforcements were sent, principally -Lettish or Chinese troops, to subdue the rebel village and wipe out -the “counter-revolutionaries” and “bourgeoisie”--that is to say, -nine-tenths of the peasants in the village. - -Under these conditions things went from bad to worse. Naturally, there -was some increase in the amount of grain turned in at the receiving -stations, but the increase was not commensurate with the effort and -cost of obtaining it. In particular, it did not sustain the host -of officials, committees, inspectors, and armed forces employed in -intimidating the peasants. One of the most serious results was the -alarming decline of cultivation. The incentive to labor had been taken -away from the hard-working, thrifty peasants. Their toil was penalized, -in fact. A large part of the land ordinarily tilled was not planted -that autumn and for spring sowing there was even less cultivation. The -peasants saw that the industrious and careful producers had most of -the fruits of their labors taken from them and were left with meager -rations, which meant semi-starvation, while the idle, thriftless, -and shiftless “poorest peasants” fared much better, taking from the -industrious and competent. Through the peasantry ran the fatal cry: -“Why should we toil and starve? Let us all be idle and live well as -‘poor peasants’!” - -Thus far, we have followed the development of the agrarian policy -of the Bolsheviki through two stages: First of all, peasant Soviets -were recognized and regarded as the basis of the whole system of -agricultural production. It was found that these did not give -satisfactory results; that each Soviet cared only for its own village -prosperity; that the peasants held their grain for high prices while -famine raged in the cities. Then, secondly, all the village Soviets -were shorn of their power and all those which were intractable--a -majority of them--suppressed, their functions being taken over by -state-appointed officials, the Food Commissars and the Committees -of the Poor acting under the direction of these. As we shall see in -subsequent chapters, these stages corresponded in a very striking way -to the first two stages of industrial organization under Bolshevist -rule. - -The chairman of the Perm Committee of the Party of -Socialists-Revolutionists, M. C. Eroshkin, visited the United States in -the winter of 1918-19. It was the good fortune of the present writer -to become acquainted with this brilliant Russian Socialist leader and -to obtain much information from him. Few men possess a more thorough -understanding of the Russian agrarian problem than Mr. Eroshkin, who -during the régime of the Provisional Government was the representative -for the Perm District of the Ministry of Agriculture and later became a -member of the Provisional Government of Ural. In March, 1919, he said: - - The Russian peasant could, in all fairness, scarcely be - suspected of being a capitalist, and even according to the - Soviet constitution, no matter how twisted, he could not be - denied a vote. But fully aware that the peasants constitute - a majority and are, as a whole, opposed to the Bolsheviki, - the latter have destroyed the Soviets in the villages and - instead of these they have created so-called “Committees of - the Poor”--_i.e._, aggregations of inebriates, propertyless, - worthless, and work-hating peasants. For, whoever wishes to - work can find work in the Russian village which is always short - of agricultural help. These “Committees of the Poor” have been - delegated to represent the peasantry of Russia. - - Small wonder that the peasants are opposed to this scheme which - has robbed them of self-government. Small wonder that their - hatred for these “organizations” reaches such a stage that - entire settlements are rising against these Soviets and their - pretorians, the Red Guardsmen, and in their fury are not only - murdering these Soviet officials, but are practising fearful - cruelties upon them, as happened in December, 1918, in the - Governments of Pskov, Kaluga, and Tver. - - By removing and arresting all those delegates who are - undesirable to them, the Bolsheviki have converted these - Soviets into organizations loyal to themselves, and, of course, - fear to think of a true general election, for that will seal - their doom at once. - -Mr. Eroshkin, like practically every other leader of the Russian -peasants’ movement, is an anti-Bolshevik and his testimony may be -regarded as biased. Let us, therefore, consider what Bolshevist writers -have said in their own press. - -_Izvestia_ of the Provincial Soviets, January 18, 1919, published the -following: - - The Commissaries were going through the Tzaritzin County in - sumptuous carriages, driven by three, and often by six, horses. - A great array of adjutants and a large suite accompanied these - Commissaries and an imposing number of trunks followed along. - They made exorbitant demands upon the toiling population, - coupled with assaults and brutality. Their way of squandering - money right and left is particularly characteristic. In some - houses the Commissaries gambled away and spent on intoxicants - large sums. The hard-working population looked upon these - orgies as upon complete demoralization and failure of duty to - the world revolution. - -In the same official journal, four days later, January 22, 1919, -Kerzhentzev, the well-known Bolshevik, wrote: - - The facts describing the village Soviet of the Uren borough - present a shocking picture which is no doubt typical of all - other corners of our provincial Soviet life. The chairman of - this village Soviet, Rekhalev, and his nearest co-workers have - done all in their power to antagonize the population against - the Soviet rule. Rekhalev himself has often been found in an - intoxicated condition and he has frequently assaulted the local - inhabitants. _The beating-up of visitors to the Soviet office - was an ordinary occurrence._ In the village of Bierezovka _the - peasants have been thrashed not only with fists, but have often - been assaulted with sticks, robbed of their footwear, and cast - into damp cellars on bare earthen floors_. The members of the - Varnavinsk _Ispolkom_ (Executive Committee), Glakhov, Morev, - Makhov, and others, have gone even farther. They have organized - “requisition parties” which were nothing else but organized - pillagings, in the course of which _they have used wire-wrapped - sticks on the recalcitrants_. The abundant testimony, verified - by the Soviet Commission, portrays a very striking picture - of violence. When these members of the Executive Committee - arrived at the township of Sadomovo they commenced to assault - the population and to rob them of their household belongings, - such as quilts, clothing, harness, etc. No receipts for the - requisitioned goods were given and no money paid. _They even - resold to others on the spot some of the breadstuffs which they - had requisitioned._ - -In the same paper (No. 98), March 9, 1919, another Bolshevist writer, -Sosnovsky, reported on conditions in the villages of Tver Province as -follows: - - The local Communist Soviet workers behave themselves, with rare - exception, in a disgusting manner. Misuse of power is going on - constantly. - -_Izvestia_ published, January 5, 1919, the signed report of a -Bolshevist official, Latzis, complaining that “in the Velizsh county -of the Province of Vitebsk _they are flogging the peasants by the -authority of the local Soviet Committee_.” On May 14, 1919, the same -journal published the following article concerning conditions in this -province: - - Of late there has been going on in the village a really - scandalous orgy. It is necessary to call attention to the - destructive work of the scoundrels who worked themselves into - responsible positions. Evidently all the good and unselfish - beginnings of the workmen’s and peasants’ authority were either - purposely or unintentionally perverted by these adventurers - in order to undermine the confidence of the peasants in the - existing government in order to provoke dissatisfaction - and rebellion. It is no exaggeration to say that no open - counter-revolutionary or enemy of the proletariat has done - as much harm to the Socialist republic as the charlatans of - this sort. Take, as an instance, the third district of the - government of Vitebsk, the county of Veliashkov. Here the - taxes imposed upon the peasants were as follows: “P. Stoukov, - owning 17 dessiatines, was compelled to pay a tax of 5,000 - rubles, while U. Voprit, owning 24 dessiatines, paid only - 500 rubles. S. Grigoriev paid 2,000 on 29 dessiatines, while - Ivan Tselov paid 8,000 on 23 dessiatines.” (Quoting some more - instances, the writer adds that the soil was alike in all - cases. He then brings some examples of the wrongs committed by - the requisitioning squads.) - -The same issue of this Soviet organ contained the report of an official -Bolshevist investigation of the numerous peasant uprisings. This -report stated that “The local communists behave, with rare exceptions, -abominably, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that we were -able to explain to the peasants that we were also communists.” - -_Izvestia_ also published an appeal from one Vopatin against the -intolerable conditions prevailing in his village in the Province of -Tambov: - - Help! we are perishing! At the time when we are starving do - you know what is going on in the villages? Take, for instance, - our village, Olkhi. Speculation is rife there, especially with - salt, which sells at 40 rubles a pound. What does the militia - do? What do the Soviets do? When it is reported to them they - wave their hands and say, “This is a normal phenomenon.” Not - only this, but the militiamen, beginning with the chief and - including some communists, are all engaged in brewing their - own alcohol, which sells for 70 rubles a bottle. Nobody who is - in close touch with the militia is afraid to engage in this - work. Hunger is ahead of us, but neither the citizens nor the - “authorities” recognize it. The people’s judge also drinks, - and if one wishes to win a case one only needs to treat him - to a drink. We live in a terrible filth. There is no soap. - People and horses all suffer from skin diseases. Epidemics are - inevitable in the summer. If Moscow will pay no attention to - us, then we shall perish. _We had elections for the village and - county Soviets, but the voting occurred in violation of the - Constitution of the Soviet Government._ - - _As a result of this a number of village capitalists, who, - under the guise of communists, entered the party in order to - avoid the requisitions and contributions, were elected._ The - laboring peasantry is thus being turned against the government, - and this at a time when the hosts of Kolchak are advancing from - the east. - -Lenin, in his report to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party last -April, published in _Pravda_, April 9, 1919, faced the seriousness of -the situation indicated by these reports. He said: - - All class-conscious workmen, of Petrograd, Ivano-Voznesensk, - and Moscow, who have been in the villages, tell us of instances - of many misunderstandings, of misunderstandings that could not - be solved, it seemed, _and of conflicts of the most serious - nature_, all of which were, however, solved by sensible workmen - who did not speak according to the book, but in language which - the people could understand, and not like an officer allowing - himself to issue orders, though unacquainted with village life, - but like a comrade explaining the situation and appealing - to their feelings as toilers. And by such explanation one - attained what could not be attained by thousands who conducted - themselves like commanders or superiors. - -In the _Severnaya Communa_, May 10, 1919, another Bolshevist official, -Krivoshayev, reported: - - The Soviet workers are taking from the peasants chicken, geese, - bread, and butter without paying for it. In some households - of these poverty-stricken folk they are confiscating even the - pillows and the samovars and everything they can lay their - hands on. The peasants naturally feel very bitterly toward the - Soviet rule. - -Here, then, is a mass of Bolshevist testimony, published in the -official press of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. -It cannot be set aside as “capitalist misrepresentation,” or as -“lying propaganda of the Socialists-Revolutionists.” These and -other like phrases which have been so much on the lips of our -pro-Bolshevist Liberals and Socialists are outworn; they cannot avail -against the evidence supplied by the Bolsheviki themselves. If we -wanted to draw upon the mass of similar evidence published by the -Socialists-Revolutionists and other Socialist groups opposed to the -Bolsheviki, it would be easy to fill hundreds of pages. The apologists -of Bolshevism have repeatedly assured us that the one great achievement -of the Bolsheviki, concerning which there can be no dispute, is the -permanent solution of the land problem, and that as a result the -Bolsheviki are supported by the great mass of the peasantry. Against -that silly fable let one single fact stand as a sufficient refutation: -According to the _Severnaya Communa_, September 4, 1919, the Military -Supply Bureau of Petrograd alone had sent, up to April 1, 1919, 225 -armed military requisitioning detachments to various villages. Does not -that fact alone indicate the true attitude of the peasants? - -Armed force did not bring much food, however. The peasants concealed -and hoarded their supplies. They resisted the soldiers, in many -instances. When they were overcome they became sullen and refused to -plant more than they needed for their own use. Extensive curtailment -of production was their principal means of self-defense against what -they felt to be a great injustice. According to _Economicheskaya -Zhizn_ (No. 54), 1919, this was the principal reason for the enormous -decline of acreage under cultivation--a decline of 13,500,000 acres -in twenty-eight provinces--and the main cause of the serious shortage -of food grains. Instead of exporting a large surplus of grain, Tambov -Province was stricken with famine, and the plight of other provinces -was almost as bad. - -In the Province of Tambov the peasants rose and drove away the Red -Guards. In the Bejetsh district, Tver Province, 17,000 peasants rose in -revolt against the Soviet authorities, according to Gregor Alexinsky. -A punitive detachment sent there by Trotsky suppressed this rising -with great brutality, robbing the peasants, flogging many of them, and -killing many others. In Briansk, Province of Orel, the peasants and -workmen rose against the Soviet authorities in November, 1919, being -led by a former officer of the Fourth Soviet Army named Sapozhnikov. -Lettish troops suppressed this uprising in a sanguinary manner. In the -villages of Kharkov Province no less than forty-nine armed detachments -appeared, seeking to wrest grain from the peasants, who met the -soldiers with rifles and machine-guns. This caused Trotsky to send -large punitive expeditions, consisting principally of Lettish troops, -and many lives were sacrificed. Yet, despite the bloodshed, only a -small percentage of the grain expected was ever obtained. There were -serious peasant revolts against Soviet rule in many other places. - -The District Extraordinary Commissions and the revolutionary tribunals -were kept busy dealing with cases of food-hoarding and speculation. A -typical report is the following taken from the Bolshevist _Derevenskaia -Communa_ (No. 222), October 2, 1919. This paper complained that the -peasants were concealing and hoarding grain for the purpose of selling -it to speculators at fabulous prices: - - Every day the post brings information concerning concealment of - grain and other foodstuffs, and the difficulties encountered by - the registration commissions in their work in the villages. All - this shows the want of consciousness among the masses, who do - not realize what chaos such tactics introduce into the general - life of the country. - - No one can eat more than the human organism can absorb; the - ration--and that not at all a “famine” one--is fixed. Every one - is provided for, and yet--concealment, concealment everywhere, - in the hope of selling grain to town speculators at fabulous - prices. - - How much is being concealed, and what fortunes are made by - profiteering, may be seen from the following example: The - Goretsky Extraordinary Commission has fined Irina Ivashkevich, - a citizeness of Lapinsky village, for burying 25,000 rubles’ - worth of grain in a hole in her back yard. - - Citizeness Irina Ivashkevich has much money, but little - understanding of what she is doing. - -Neither force nor threats could overcome the resistance of -the peasants. In the latter part of November, 1919, sixteen -food-requisitioning detachments of twenty-five men each were sent from -Petrograd to the Simbirsk Province, according to the _Izvestia_ of -Petrograd. They were able to secure only 215 tons of grain at a very -extraordinary price. Speculation had raised the price of grain to 600 -rubles per pood of 36 pounds. The paper _Trud_ reported at the same -time that the delegates of forty-five labor organizations in Petrograd -and Moscow, who left for the food-producing provinces to seek for -non-rationed products, returned after two months wholly unsuccessful, -having spent an enormous amount of money in their search. Their failure -was due in part to a genuine shortage, but it was due in part also -to systematic concealment and hoarding for speculation on the part -of the peasants. Much of this illicit speculation and trading was -carried on with the very Soviet officials who were charged with its -suppression![10] - -[10] The _Bulletin_ of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets -(No. 25), February 24, 1919, reports such a case. Many other similar -references might be quoted. _Pravda_, July 4, 1919, said that many -of those sent to requisition grain from the peasants were themselves -“gross speculators.” - -How utterly the attempt to wrest the food from the peasants by armed -force failed is evidenced by figures published in the Soviet journal, -_Finances and National Economy_ (No. 310). The figures show the amounts -of food-supplies received in Petrograd in the first nine months of 1918 -as compared with the corresponding period of the previous year. The -totals include flour, rye, wheat, barley, oats, and peas: - - _Jan.-Mar._ _Apr.-June_ _July-Sept._ _Total for - Nine Mos._ - _Tons_ _Tons_ _Tons_ _Tons_ - - In 1913 24,626 24,165 20,438 69,229 - In 1918 12,001 5,388 2,241 19,639 - -If we take barley and oats, which were drawn mainly from the northern -and central provinces and from the middle Volga--territories occupied -by the Bolsheviki and free from “enemy forces”--we find that the same -story is told: in the three months July-September, 1918, 105 tons of -barley were received, as against 1,245 tons in the corresponding period -of the previous year. Of oats the amount received in the three months -of July-September, 1918, was 175 tons as against 3,105 tons in the -corresponding period of 1917. - -Armed force failed as completely as Gorky had predicted it would. -References to the French Revolution are often upon the lips of the -leaders of Bolshevism, and they have slavishly copied its form and even -its terminology. It might have been expected, therefore, that they -would have remembered the French experience with the Law of Maximum -and its utter and tragic failure, and that they would have learned -something therefrom, at least enough to avoid a repetition of the same -mistakes as were made in 1793. There is no evidence of such learning, -however. For that matter, is there any evidence that they have learned -anything from history? - -Not only was armed force used in a vain attempt to wrest the grain -from the peasants, but similar methods were relied upon to force the -peasants into the Red Army. On May 1, 1919, _Pravda_, official organ of -the Communist Party, published the following announcement: - - From the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. - - The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party announces - the following-- - - _To all provincial committees of the Communist Party, to - Provincial Military Commissaries._ - - The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, at the - session of April 23d, unanimously adopted the decree to bring - the middle and poor peasants into the struggle against the - counter-revolution. According to this decree, every canton must - send 10 to 20 strong, capable soldiers, who can act as nuclei - for Red Army units in those places to which they will be sent. - -Just as they had resisted all efforts to wrest away their grain and -other foodstuffs by force, so the peasants resisted the attempts at -forcible mobilization. Conscripted peasants who had been mobilized -refused to go to the front and attempted mass desertions in many -places, notably, however, in Astrakhan. These struggles went on -throughout the early summer of 1919, but in the end force triumphed. On -August 12, 1919, Trotsky wrote in _Pravda_: - - The mobilization of the 19-year-old and part of the 18-year-old - men, the inrush of the peasants who before refused to appear - in answer to the mobilization decree, all of this is creating a - powerful, almost inexhaustible, source from which to build up - our army.... From now on any resistance to local authorities, - any attempt to retain and protect any valuable and experienced - military worker is deliberate sabotage.... No one should dare - to forget that all Soviet Russia is an armed camp.... All - Soviet institutions are obliged, immediately, within the next - months, not only to furnish officers’ schools with the best - quarters, but, in general, they must furnish these schools with - such material and special aids as will make it possible for the - students to work in the most intensive manner.... - -Bitter as the conflict was during this period and throughout 1919, it -was, nevertheless, considerably less violent than during the previous -year. This was due to the fact that the Bolsheviki had modified their -policy in dealing with the peasants in some very important respects. -Precisely as they had manifested particular hatred toward the -bourgeoisie in the cities, and made their appeal to the proletariat, -so they had, from the very first, manifested a special hatred toward -the great body of peasants of the “middle class”--that is to say, the -fairly well-to-do and successful peasant--and made their appeal to the -very poorest and least successful. The peasants who owned their own -farms, possessed decent stock, and perhaps employed some assistance, -were regarded as the “rural bourgeoisie” whom it was necessary to -expropriate. The whole appeal of the Bolsheviki, so far as the peasant -was concerned, was to the element corresponding to the proletariat, -owning nothing. The leaders of the Bolsheviki believed that only the -poorest section of the peasantry could make common cause with the -proletariat; that the greater part of the peasantry belonged with -the bourgeoisie. They relied upon the union of the urban proletariat -and the poorest part of the peasantry, led by the former, to furnish -the sinews of the Revolution. Over and over again Lenin’s speeches -and writings prior to April, 1919, refer to “the proletariat and the -poorest peasants”; over and over again he emphasizes this union, always -with the more or less definite statement that “the proletariat” must -lead and “the poorest peasants” follow. - -In April, 1919, at the Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Lenin -read a report on the attitude of the proletariat and the Soviet power -to the peasantry which marked a complete change of attitude, despite -the fact that Lenin intimated that neither he nor the party had ever -believed anything else. “No sensible Socialist ever thought that -we might apply violence to the middle peasantry,” he said. He even -disclaimed any intention to expropriate the rich peasants, if they -would refrain from counter-revolutionary tendencies! Of course, in thus -affirming his orthodoxy while throwing over an important article of his -creed, Lenin was simply conforming to an old and familiar practice. -When we remember how he berated the Menshevist Social Democrats and -declared them not to be Socialists because their party represented -“fairly prosperous peasants,”[11] and the fact that the Soviet -Constitution itself sets forth that the dictatorship to be set up is -“of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry,[12]” -Lenin’s attempt to make it appear that he had always regarded the -middle and rich peasantry with such benign toleration can only move us -to laughter. - -[11] _The New International_, April, 1918. - -[12] Article II, chap. v, paragraph 9. - -To present Lenin’s change of front fairly it is necessary to quote at -considerable length from his two speeches at the Congress as reported -in _Pravda_, April 5 and 9, 1919: - - During the long period of the bourgeois rule the peasant - has always supported the bourgeois authority and was on - the side of the bourgeoisie. This is understandable if one - takes into account the economic strength of the bourgeoisie - and the political methods of its rule. We cannot expect the - middle peasant to come over to our side immediately. But - if we direct our policy correctly, then after a certain - period hesitation will cease and the peasant may come over - to our side. Engels, who, together with Marx, laid the - foundations of scientific Marxism--that is, of the doctrine - which our party follows constantly and particularly in time - of revolution--Engels already established the fact that the - peasantry is differentiated with respect to their land holdings - into small, middle, and large; and this differentiation for the - overwhelming majority of the European countries exists to-day. - Engels said, “Perhaps it will not be necessary to suppress by - force even the large peasantry in all places.” And no sensible - Socialist ever thought that we might ever apply violence to - the middle peasantry (the smaller peasantry is our friend). - This is what Engels said in 1894, a year before his death, - when the agrarian question was the burning question of the - day. This point of view shows us that truth which is sometimes - forgotten, though with which we have always theoretically been - in accord. With respect to landlords and capitalists our task - is complete expropriation. But we do not permit any violence - with respect to the middle peasant. Even with respect to the - rich peasant, we do not speak with the same determination as - with regard to the bourgeoisie, “Absolute expropriation of the - rich peasantry.” In our program this difference is emphasized. - We say, “The suppression of the resistance of the peasantry, - the suppression of its counter-revolutionary tendencies.” This - is not complete expropriation. - - The fundamental difference in our attitude toward the - bourgeoisie and toward the middle peasantry is complete - expropriation of the bourgeoisie, but union with the middle - peasantry that does not exploit others. This fundamental line - _in theory_ is recognized by all. _In practice_ this line is - not always observed strictly, and _local workers have not - learned to observe it at all_. When the proletariat overthrew - the bourgeois authority and established its own and set about - to create a new society, the question of the middle peasantry - came into the foreground. Not a single Socialist in the world - has denied the fact that the establishment of communism - will proceed differently in those countries where there is - large land tenure. This is the most elementary of truths and - from this truth it follows that as we approach the tasks of - construction our main attention should be concentrated to a - certain extent precisely on the middle peasantry. Much will - depend on how we have defined our attitude toward the middle - peasantry. Theoretically, this question has been decided, but - we know from our own experience the difference between the - theoretical decision of a question and the practical carrying - out of the decision. - - * * * * * - - ... All remember with what difficulty, and after how many - months, we passed from workmen’s control to workmen’s - administration of industry, and that was development within our - class, within the proletarian class, with which we had always - had relations. But now we must define our attitude toward a new - class, toward a class which the city workmen do not know. We - must define our attitude toward a class which does not have a - definite steadfast position. The proletariat as a mass is for - Socialism; the bourgeoisie is against Socialism; it is easy - to define the relations between two such classes. But when we - come to such a group as the middle peasantry, then it appears - that this is such a kind of class that it hesitates. The middle - peasant is part property-owner and part toiler. He does not - exploit other representatives of the toilers. For decades he - has had to struggle hard to maintain his position and he has - felt the exploitation of the landlord-capitalists. But at the - same time he is a property-owner. - - Therefore our attitude toward this class presents enormous - difficulties. On the basis of our experience of more than a - year, and of proletariat work in the village for more than a - year, and in view of the fact that there has already taken - place a class differentiation in the village, we must be most - careful not to be hasty, not to theorize without understanding, - not to consider ready what has not been worked out. In the - resolution which the committee proposes to you, prepared by - the agrarian section, which one of the next speakers will - read to you, you will find many warnings on this point. From - the economic point of view it is clear that we must go to the - assistance of the middle peasant. On this point theoretically - there is no doubt. But with our level of culture, with our - lack of cultural and technical forces which we could offer - to the village, and with that helplessness with which we - often go to the villages, comrades often apply compulsion, - which spoils the whole cause. Only yesterday one comrade - gave me a small pamphlet entitled, _Instructions for Party - Activity in the Province of Nizhninovgorod_, a publication of - the Nizhninovgorod Committee of the Russian Communist Party - (Bolsheviki), and in this pamphlet I read, for example, on page - 41, “The decree on the extraordinary revolutionary tax should - fall with its whole weight on the shoulders of the village rich - peasant speculators, and in general on the middle elements of - the peasantry.” Now here one may see that people have indeed - “understood,” or is this a misprint? But it is not admissible - for such misprints to appear. Or is this the result of hurried, - hasty work, which shows how dangerous haste is in a matter like - this? Or have we here simply a failure to understand, though - this is the very worst supposition which I really do not wish - to make with reference to our comrades at Nizhninovgorod? It is - quite possible that this is simply an oversight. Such instances - occur in practice, as one of the comrades in the commission has - related. The peasants surrounded him and each peasant asked: - “Please define, am I a middle peasant or not? I have two horses - and one cow. I have two cows and one horse,” etc. And so this - agitator who was traveling over entire districts had to use a - kind of thermometer in order to take each peasant and tell him - whether he was a middle peasant or not. But to do this he had - to know the whole history and economic life of this particular - peasant and his relations to lower and higher groups, and of - course we cannot know this with exactness. - - Here one must have practical experience and knowledge of - local conditions, and we have not these things as yet. We are - not at all ashamed to admit this; we must admit this openly. - We have never been Utopists and have never imagined that we - could build up the communistic society with the pure hands - of pure communists who would be born and educated in a pure - communistic society. Such would be children’s fables. We must - build communism on the ruins of capitalism, and only that class - which has been tempered in the struggle against capitalism - can do this. You know very well that the proletariat is not - without the faults and weaknesses of the capitalistic society. - It struggles for Socialism, and at the same time against its - own defects. The best and most progressive portion of the - proletariat which has been carrying on a desperate struggle in - the cities for decades was able to imitate in the course of - this struggle all the culture of city life, and to a certain - extent did acquire it. You know that the village even in the - most progressive countries was condemned to ignorance. Of - course, the cultural level of the village will be raised by - us, but that is a matter of years and years. This is what - our comrades everywhere forget, and this is what every word - that comes to us from the village portrays with particular - clearness, when the word comes not from local intellectuals and - local officials, but from people who are watching the work in - the village from a practical point of view. - - * * * * * - - When we speak of the tasks in connection with work in the - villages, in spite of all difficulties, in spite of the - fact that our knowledge has been directed to the immediate - suppression of exploiters, we must nevertheless remember and - not forget that in the villages with relation to the middle - peasantry the task is of a different nature. All conscious - workmen, of Petrograd, Ivanovo-Vosnesensk, and Moscow, who - have been in the villages, tell us of instances of many - misunderstandings, of misunderstandings that could not be - solved, it seemed, and of conflicts of the most serious nature, - all of which were, however, solved by sensible workmen who did - not speak according to the book, but in language which the - people could understand, and not like an officer allowing - himself to issue orders though unacquainted with village life, - but like a comrade explaining the situation and appealing - to their feelings as toilers. And by such explanation one - attained what could not be attained by thousands who conducted - themselves like commanders or superiors. - - The resolution which we now present for your attention is drawn - up in this spirit. I have tried in this report to emphasize - the main principles behind this resolution, and its general - political significance. I have tried to show, and I trust I - have succeeded, that from the point of view of the interests - of the revolution as a whole we have not made any changes. - We have not altered our line of action. The White-Guardists - and their assistants shout and will continue to shout that we - have changed. Let them shout. That does not disturb us. We are - developing our aims in an absolutely logical manner. From the - task of suppressing the bourgeoisie we must now transfer our - attention to the task of building up the life of the middle - peasantry. We must live with the middle peasantry in peace. The - middle peasantry in a communistic society will be on our side - only if we lighten and improve its economic conditions. If we - to-morrow could furnish a hundred thousand first-class tractors - supplied with gasolene and machinists (you know, of course, - that for the moment this is dreaming), then the middle peasant - would say, “I am for the Commune.” But in order to do this we - must first defeat the international bourgeoisie; we must force - them to give us these tractors, or we must increase our own - production so that we can ourselves produce them. Only thus is - the question stated correctly. - - The peasant needs the industries of the cities and cannot - live without them and the industries are in our hands. If - we approach the situation correctly, then the peasant will - thank us because we will bring him the products from the - cities--implements and culture. It will not be exploiters - who will bring him these things, not landlords, but his own - comrades, workers whom he values very deeply. The middle - peasant is very practical and values only actual assistance, - quite carelessly thrusting aside all commands and instructions - from above. - - First help him and then you will secure his confidence. If this - matter is handled correctly, if each step taken by our group in - the village, in the canton, in the food-supply detachment, or - in any organization, is carefully made, is carefully verified - from this point of view, then we shall win the confidence of - the peasant, and only then shall we be able to move forward. - Now we must give him assistance. We must give him advice, and - this must not be the order of a commanding officer, but the - advice of a comrade. The peasant then will be absolutely for us. - - * * * * * - - ... We learned how to overthrow the bourgeoisie and suppress - it and we are very proud of what we have done. We have not - yet learned how to regulate our relations with the millions - of middle peasants and how to win their confidence. We must - say this frankly; but we have understood the task and we have - undertaken it and we say to ourselves with full hope, complete - knowledge, and entire decision: We shall solve this task, and - then Socialism will be absolute, invincible. - -At the same time, at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet, Kalinin, a peasant -and a Bolshevik, was elected president of the Central Executive -Committee. His speech, reported in _Severnaya Communa_, April 10, 1919, -sounded the same note as the speeches of Lenin--conciliation of the -middle peasantry: - - My election is the symbol of the union of the proletariat - and the peasantry. At the present moment when all - counter-revolutionary forces are pressing in on us, such a - union is particularly valuable. The peasantry was always our - natural ally, but in recent times one has heard notes of doubt - among the peasants; parties hostile to us are trying to drive - a wedge between us and the peasantry. _We must convince the - middle peasants that the working-class, having in its hands - the factories, has not attacked, and will not attack, the - small, individual farms of the peasant._ This can be done all - the more easily because neither the old nor the new program of - communists says that we will forcibly centralize the peasant - lands and drive them into communes, etc. Quite to the contrary, - we say definitely that we will make every effort to readjust - and raise the level of the peasant economic enterprises, - helping both technically and in other ways, and I shall adhere - to this policy in my new post. Here is the policy we shall - follow: - - We shall point out to province, district, and other executive - committees that they should make every effort in the course - of the collecting of the revolutionary tax, _to the end that - it should not be a heavy burden on the middle peasant_; that - they should make self-administration less costly and reduce - bureaucratic routine. We shall make every effort so that the - local executive committees shall not put obstacles in the way - of exchange of articles of agriculture and of home consumption - between cantons and peasants--that is, the purchase of farm - and household utensils that are sold at fairs. We shall try to - eliminate all friction and misunderstandings between provinces - and cantons. We shall appeal to the local executive committees - not only not to interfere with, but, on the contrary, to - support, separate peasant economic enterprises which, because - of their special character, have a special value. The mole of - history is working well for us; the hour of world revolution - is near, though we must not close our eyes to the fact that - at the present moment it is all the more difficult for us to - struggle with counter-revolution because of the disorganization - of our economic life. Frequently they prophesied our failure, - but we still hold on and we shall find new sources of strength - and support. Further, each of us must answer the question as - to how to adjust production, carry out our enormous tasks, - and use our great natural resources. In this field the unions - of Petersburg and Moscow are doing very much, because they - are the organizing centers from whose examples the provinces - will learn. Much has been done in preparing products, but much - still has to be done. We in Petersburg fed ourselves for three - months, from the end of June to the beginning of September, on - products from our Petersburg gardens. - -The new attitude toward the peasantry revealed in the speeches of -Lenin and Kalinin was already manifesting itself in the practical -policy of the Soviet power. Greatly alarmed by the spread of famine in -the cities, and by the stout resistance of the peasants to the armed -requisitioning detachments, which amounted to civil war upon a large -scale, they had established in many county towns in the grain-producing -provinces central exchanges to which the peasants were urged to bring -their grain to be exchanged for the manufactured goods so sorely -needed by them. The attitude toward the peasants was more tolerant -and friendly; the brutal strife practically disappeared. This did not -bring grain to the cities, however, in any considerable quantity. The -peasants found that the price offered for their grain was too low, -and the prices demanded for the manufactured goods too high. According -to _Izvestia_ of the Central Executive Committee, No. 443, the fixed -price of grain was only 70 per cent. higher than in the month preceding -the Bolshevist _coup d’état_, whereas the prices on manufactured goods -needed by the peasants, including shoes, clothing, household utensils, -and small tools, average more than 2,800 per cent. higher. The peasant -saw himself once more as a victim of the frightful parasitism of the -cities and refused to part with his grain. The same issue of _Izvestia_ -explained that the exchange stations “have functioned but feebly and -have brought very little relief to the villages”; that the stations -soon became storehouses for “bread taken away from the peasants by -force at the fixed prices.” When cajoling failed to move the peasants -the old agencies of force were resorted to. The grain was forcibly -taken and the peasants were paid in paper currency so depreciated as to -be almost worthless. Thus the villages were robbed of grain and, at the -same time, left destitute of manufactured goods. - -At the Congress of the Communist Party, following the speeches of -Lenin, from which we have quoted, it was decided that the work of -securing grain and other foodstuffs should be turned over to the -co-operatives. A few days earlier, according to _Pravda_, March 15, -1919, a decree was issued permitting, in a number of provinces, “free -sales of products, including foodstuffs.” This meant that the peasants -were free to bring their supplies of grain out in the open and to -sell them at the best prices they could get. The situation was thus -somewhat improved, but not everywhere nor for long. Many of the local -Soviets refused to adopt the new policy and, as pointed out by the -_Izvestia_ of the Petrograd Soviet, March 24, 1919, continued to make -forced requisitions. There was, however, some limitation upon the -arrogant and brutal rule of the local Soviets; some restrictions were -imposed upon the dictatorship of the Committees of the Poor. - -From an article in _Izvestia_, November 3, 1919, we get some further -information concerning the attitude of the peasants toward the Soviet -power, and its bearing upon the food question. Only a summary of the -article is possible here: “The food conditions are hard, not because -Russia, by being cut off from the principal bread-producing districts, -does not have sufficient quantities of grain, but principally owing -to the class war, _which has become permanent and continuous_. This -class war hinders the work of factories and shops” and, by lessening -the production of manufactured goods, “naturally renders the exchange -of goods between towns and country difficult, _because the peasants -consider money of no value, not being able to buy anything with -it_.” The peasants are not yet “sufficiently far-sighted to be quite -convinced of the stability of the Soviet power and the inevitability -of Socialism.” The peasants of the producing provinces “do not -willingly enough give the grain to the towns, and this greatly drags -on the class war, _which of course ruins them_.” The food conditions -in the towns promote “counter-revolution,” creating the hope that -the famine-stricken people in the towns will cease to support the -Soviet power. “Thus the peasants by concealing their bread ... render -conditions harder, not only for the workmen, but also for themselves.” -A statistical table shows that from August, 1918, to September, 1919, -in the twelve principal provinces, “99,980,000 poods of bread and -fodder grains were delivered to the state, which constitutes 38.1 per -cent. of the quantity which was to be received according to the state -allocation by provinces. The delivery of bread grain equaled 42.5 per -cent. Thus these provinces gave less than one-half of what they could -and should have given to the state.” - -Such is the self-confessed record of Bolshevism in rural Russia. It is -a record of stupid, blundering, oppressive bureaucracy at its best, and -at its worst of unspeakable brutality. In dealing with the peasantry, -who make up more than 85 per cent. of the population of Russia, -Lenin and Trotsky and their followers have shown no greater wisdom -of statesmanship, no stronger love of justice, no greater humanity, -than the old bureaucracy of czarism. They have not elevated the life -of the peasants, but, on the contrary, have checked the healthy -development that was already in progress and that promised so well. -They have further brutalized the life of the peasants, deepened their -old distrust of government, fostered anarchy, and restored the most -primitive methods of living and working. All this they have done in the -name of Socialism and Progress! - - - - -VII - -THE RED TERROR - - -It is frequently asserted in defense of the Bolsheviki that they -resorted to the methods of terrorism only after the bourgeoisie had -done so; that, in particular, the attempts to assassinate Lenin and -other prominent Bolshevist leaders induced terroristic reprisals. Thus -the Red Terror is made to appear as the response of the proletariat to -the White Terror of the bourgeoisie. This is not true, unless, indeed, -we are to take seriously the alleged “attack” on Lenin on January 16, -1918. A shot was fired, it was said, at Lenin while he was riding in -his motor-car. No one was arrested and no attempt was made to discover -the person who fired the shot. The general impression in Petrograd was -that it was a trick, designed to afford an excuse for the introduction -of the Terror. The assassination of Uritzky and the attempted -assassination of Lenin, in the summer of 1918, were undoubtedly -followed by an increase in the extent and savagery of the Red Terror, -but it is equally true that long before that time men and women who had -given their lives to the revolutionary struggle against czarism, and -who had approved of the terroristic acts against individual officials, -were staggered by the new mass terrorism which began soon after the -Bolsheviki seized the reins of power. - -On January 16th, following the alleged “attack” upon Lenin above -referred to, Zinoviev, Bouch-Bruyevich, and other leaders of the -Bolsheviki raised a loud demand for the Terror. On the 18th, the -date set for the opening of the Constituent Assembly, the brutal -suppression of the demonstration was to be held, but on the 16th the -self-constituted Commissaries of the People adopted a resolution -to the effect that any attempt “to hold a demonstration in honor -of the Constituent Assembly” would be “put down most ruthlessly.” -This resolution was adopted, it is said, at the instigation of -Bouch-Bruyevich, who under czarism had been a noted defender of -religious liberty. - -The upholders of the Constituent Assembly proceeded to hold their -demonstration. What happened is best told in the report of the event -made to the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau -by Inna Rakitnikov: - - From eleven o’clock in the morning cortèges, composed - principally of working-men bearing red flags and placards with - inscriptions such as “Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!” - “Land and Liberty!” “Long Live the Constituent Assembly!” etc., - set out from different parts of the city. The members of the - Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants’ Delegates had - agreed to meet at the Field of Mars, where a procession coming - from the Petrogradsky quarter was due to arrive. It was soon - learned that a part of the participants, coming from the Viborg - quarter, had been assailed at the Liteiny bridge by gun-fire - from the Red Guards and were obliged to turn back. But that - did not check the other parades. The peasant participants, - united with the workers from Petrogradsky quarter, came to the - Field of Mars; after having lowered their flags before the - tombs of the Revolution of February and sung a funeral hymn to - their memory, they installed themselves on Liteinaia Street. - New manifestants came to join them and the street was crowded - with people. At the corner of Fourstatskaia Street (one of the - streets leading to the Taurida Palace) they found themselves - all at once assailed by shots from the Red Guards. - - The Red Guard fired _without warning_, something that never - before happened, even in the time of czarism. The police always - began by inviting the participators to disperse. Among the - first victims was a member of the Executive Committee of the - Soviet of Peasants’ Delegates, the Siberian peasant, Logvinov. - An explosive bullet shot away half of his head (a photograph of - his body was taken; it was added to the documents which were - transferred to the Commission of Inquiry). Several workmen - and students and one militant of the Revolutionary Socialist - Party, Gorbatchevskaia, were killed at the same time. Other - processions of participants on their way to the Taurida Palace - were fired into at the same time. On all the streets leading - to the palace, groups of Red Guards had been established; they - received the order, “Not to spare the cartridges.” On that day - at Petrograd there were one hundred killed and wounded.[13] - -[13] _How the Russian Peasants Fought for a Constituent Assembly._ -A report to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov, -vice-president of the executive committee of the Soviet of Delegates, -placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the Constituent -Assembly. With a letter-preface by the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, member -of the International Socialist Bureau. May 30, 1918. Note: This report -is printed in full as Appendix II to _Bolshevism_, by John Spargo, pp. -331-384. - -What of the brutal murder of the two members of the Provisional -Government, F. F. Kokoshkin and A. I. Shingarev? Seized in the middle -of December, they were cast into dark, damp, and cold cells in the -Peter and Paul Fortress, in the notorious “Trubetskoy Bastion.” On the -evening of January 18th they were taken to the Marie Hospital. That -night Red Guards and sailors forced their way into the hospital and -brutally murdered them both. It is true that _Izvestia_ condemned the -crime, saying: “Apart from everything else it is bad from a political -point of view. This is a fearful blow aimed at the Revolution, at the -Soviet authorities.” It is true, also, that Dybenko, Naval Commissary, -published a remarkable order, saying: “The honor of the Revolutionary -Fleet must not bear the stain of an accusation of revolutionary -sailors having murdered their helpless enemies, rendered harmless by -imprisonment. _I call upon all who took part in the murder ... to -appear of their own accord before the Revolutionary Tribunal._” - -In the absence of definite proof to the contrary it is perhaps best -to regard this outrage as due to the brutal savagery of individuals, -rather than as part of a deliberate officially sanctioned policy of -terrorism. Yet there is the fact that the sailors and Red Guards, -who were armed, had gone straight to the hospital from the office -of the Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and -Profiteering. That this body, which from the first enlisted the -services of many of the spies and secret agents of the old régime, had -some connection with the murders was generally believed. - -At the end of December, 1917, and in January, 1918, there were -wholesale massacres in Sebastopol, Simferopol, Eupatoria, and other -places. The well-known radical Russian journalist, Dioneo-Shklovsky, -quotes Gorky’s paper, the _Novaya Zhizn_ (_New Life_), as follows: - - The garrison of the Revolutionary Army at Sebastopol has - already begun its final struggle against the bourgeoisie. - Without much ado they decided simply to massacre all the - bourgeoisie. At first they massacred the inhabitants of the two - most bourgeois streets in Sebastopol, then the same operation - was extended to Simferopol, and then it was the turn of - Eupatoria. - -In Sebastopol not less than five hundred citizens disappeared during -this St. Bartholomew massacre, according to this report, while at -Simferopol between two and three hundred officers were shot in the -prisons and in the streets. At Yalta many persons--between eighty and -one hundred--were thrown into the bay. At Eupatoria the sailors placed -the local “bourgeoisie in a barge and sank it.” - -Of course Gorky’s paper was at that time very bitter in its criticisms -of the brutal methods of the Bolsheviki, and that fact must be taken -into account in considering its testimony. Gorky had been very friendly -to the Bolsheviki up to the _coup d’état_, but revolted against their -brutality in the early part of their régime. Subsequently, as is well -known, he became reconciled to the régime sufficiently to take office -under it. The foregoing accounts, as well as those in the following -paragraph, agree in all essential particulars with reports published -in the Constitutional-Democratic paper, _Nast Viek_. This paper, for -some inexplicable reason, notwithstanding its vigorous opposition -to the Bolsheviki, was permitted to appear, even when all other -non-Bolshevist papers were suppressed. - -According to the _Novaya Zhizn_, No. 5, the Soviets in many Russian -towns made haste to follow the example of the revolutionary forces -at Sebastopol and Simferopol. In the town of Etaritsa the local Red -Guard wired to the authorities at the Smolny Institute, Petrograd, -for permission to have “a St. Bartholomew’s night” (_Yeremeievskaia -Notch_). In Tropetz, according to the same issue of Gorky’s paper, the -commandant presented this report to the Executive Committee of the -local Soviet: “The Red Army is quite ready for action. Am waiting for -orders to begin a St. Bartholomew’s massacre.” During the latter part -of February and the first week of March, 1918, there were wholesale -massacres of officers and other bourgeoisie in Kiev, Rostov-on-Don and -Novotcherkassk, among other places. The local Socialists-Revolutionists -paper, _Izvestia_, of Novotcherkassk, in its issue of March 6, 1918, -gave an account of the killing of a number of officers. - -In the beginning of March, 1918, mass executions were held in -Rostov-on-Don. Many children were executed by way of reprisal. The -_Russkiya Viedomosti_ (_Russian News_), in its issue of March 23, 1918, -reported that the president of the Municipal Council of Rostov, B. C. -Vasiliev, a prominent member of the Social Democratic Party; the mayor -of the city; the former chairman of the Rostov-Nakhichevan Council of -Working-men’s and Soldiers’ Delegates, P. Melnikov; and M. Smirnov, who -was chairman of this Soviet at the time--had handed in a petition to -the Bolshevist War-Revolutionary Council, asking that they themselves -be shot “instead of the innocent children who are executed without law -and justice.” - -A group of mothers submitted to the same Bolshevist tribunal the -following heartrending petition: - - If, according to you, there is need of sacrifices in blood and - life in order to establish a socialistic state and to create - new ways of life, take our lives, kill us, grown mothers and - fathers, but let our children live. They have not yet had a - chance to live; they are only growing and developing. Do not - destroy young lives. Take our lives and our blood as ransom. - - Our voices are calling to you, laborers. You have not stained - the banner of the Revolution even with the blood of traitors, - such as Shceglovitov and Protopopov. Why do you now witness - indifferently the bloodshed of our children? Raise your voices - in protest. Children do not understand about party strife. - Their adherence to one or another party is directed by their - eagerness for new impressions, novelty, and the suggestions of - elders. - - We, mothers, have served the country by giving our sons, - husbands, and brothers. Pray, take our last possessions, our - lives, but spare our children. Call us one after the other for - execution, when our children are to be shot! Every one of us - would gladly die in order to save the life of her children or - that of other children. - - Citizens, members of the War-Revolutionary Council, listen to - the cries of the mothers. We cannot keep silent! - -A. Lockerman is a Socialist whose work against czarism brought prison -and exile. He was engaged in Socialist work in Rostov-on-Don when the -Bolsheviki seized the city in 1918, and during the seventy days they -remained its masters. He says: - - The callousness with which the Red soldiers carried out - executions was amazing. Without wasting words, without - questions, even without any irritation, the Red Army men took - those who were brought to them from the street, stripped them - naked, put them to the wall and shot them. Then the bodies were - thrown out on the embankment and stable manure thrown over the - pools of blood.[14] - -[14] A. Lockerman; _Les Bolsheviks à l’œuvre_, preface par V. Zenzinov, -Paris, 1920. - -Such barbarity and terrorism went on wherever the Bolsheviki held -control, long before the introduction of a system of organized -terror directed by the central Soviet Government. Not only did the -Bolshevist leaders make no attempt to check the brutal savagery, the -murders, lynchings, floggings, and other outrages, but they loudly -complained that the local revolutionary authorities were not severe -enough. Zinoviev bewailed the too great leniency displayed toward -the “counter-revolutionaries and bourgeoisie.” Even Lenin, popularly -believed to be less inclined to severity than any of his colleagues, -complained, in April, 1918, that “our rule is too mild, quite -frequently resembling jam rather than iron.” Trotsky with greater -savagery said: - - You are perturbed by the mild terror we are applying against - our class enemies, but know that a month hence this terror - will take a more terrible form on the model of the terror of - the great revolutionaries of France. Not a fortress, but the - guillotine, will be for our enemies! - -Numerous reports similar to the foregoing could be cited to disprove -the claim of the apologists of the Bolsheviki that the Red Terror was -introduced in consequence of the assassination of Uritzky and the -attempt to assassinate Lenin. The truth is that the tyrannicide, the -so-called White Terror, was the result of the Red Terror, not its -cause. It is true, of course, that the terrorism was not all on the one -side. There were many uprisings of the people, both city workers and -peasants, against the Bolshevist usurpers. Defenders of the Bolsheviki -cite these uprisings and the brutal savagery with which the Soviet -officials were attacked to justify the terroristic policy of the -Bolsheviki. The introduction of such a defense surely knocks the bottom -out of the claim that the Bolsheviki really represented the great mass -of the working-people, and that only the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, -and the rich peasants were opposed to them. The uprisings were too -numerous, too wide-spread, and too formidable to admit of such an -interpretation. - -M. C. Eroshkin, who was chairman of the Perm Committee of the Party of -Socialists-Revolutionists, and represented the Minister of Agriculture -in the Perm district under the Provisional Government, during his visit -to the United States in 1919 told the present writer some harrowing -stories of uprisings against the Soviets which took on a character -of bestial brutality. One of these stories was of an uprising in the -Polevsky Works, in Ekaterinburg County, where a mob of peasants, armed -with axes, scythes, and sticks, fell upon the members of the Soviet -like so many wild animals, tearing fifty of them literally into pieces! - -That the government of Russia under the Bolsheviki was to be -tyrannical and despotic in the extreme was made evident from the very -beginning. By the decree of November 24, 1917, all existing courts of -justice were abolished and in their places set up a system of local -courts based upon the elective principle. The first judges were to -be elected by the Soviets, but henceforth “on the basis of direct -democratic vote.” It was provided that the judges were to be “guided -in their rulings and verdicts by the laws of the governments which -had been overthrown only in so far as those laws are not annulled by -the Revolution, and do not contradict the revolutionary conscience -and the revolutionary conception of right.” An interpretative note -was appended to this clause explaining that all laws which were in -contradiction to the decrees of the Central Executive Committee of the -Soviet Government, or the minimum programs of the Social Democratic or -Socialists-Revolutionists parties, must be regarded as canceled. - -This new “democratic judicial system” was widely hailed as an earnest -of the democracy of the new régime and as a constructive experiment of -the highest importance. That the decree seemed to manifest a democratic -intention is not to be gainsaid: the question of its sincerity cannot -be so easily determined. Of course, there is much in the decree and -in the scheme outlined that is extremely crude, while the explanatory -note referred to practically had the effect of enacting the platforms -of political parties, which had never been formulated in the precise -terms of laws, being rather general propositions concerning the exact -meaning, of which there was much uncertainty. Crude and clumsy though -the scheme might be, however, it had the merit of appearing to be -democratic. A careful reading of the decree reveals the fact that -several most important classes of offenses were exempted from the -jurisdiction of these courts, among them all “political offenses.” -Special revolutionary tribunals were to be charged with “the defense of -the Revolution”: - - For the struggle against the counter-revolutionary forces - by means of measures for the defense of the Revolution and - its accomplishments, and also for the trial of proceedings - against profiteering, speculation, sabotage, and other - misdeeds of merchants, manufacturers, officials, and other - persons, Workmen’s and Peasants’ Revolutionary Tribunals - are established, consisting of a chairman and six members, - serving in turn, elected by the provincial or city Soviets of - Workmen’s, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies. - -Perhaps only those who are familiar with the methods of czarism can -appreciate fully the significance of thus associating political -offenses, such as counter-revolutionary agitation, with such offenses -as illegal speculation and profiteering. Proceedings against profiteers -and speculators could be relied upon to bring sufficient popularity to -these tribunals to enable them to punish political offenders severely, -and with a greater degree of impunity than would otherwise be possible. -On December 19, 1917, I. Z. Steinberg, People’s Commissar of Justice, -issued a decree called “Instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal,” -which caused Shcheglovitov, the most reactionary Minister of Justice -the Czar ever had, to cry out: “The Cadets repeatedly charged me in the -Duma with turning the tribunal into a weapon of political struggle. -How far the Bolsheviki have left me behind!” The following paragraphs -from this remarkable document show how admirably the institution of the -Revolutionary Tribunal was designed for political oppression: - - 1. The Revolutionary Tribunal has jurisdiction in cases of - persons (_a_) who organize uprisings against the authority of - the Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government, actively oppose the - latter or do not obey it, or call upon other persons to oppose - or disobey it; (_b_) who utilize their positions in the state - or public service to disturb or hamper the regular progress - of work in the institution or enterprise in which they are or - have been serving (sabotage, concealing or destroying documents - or property, etc.); (_c_) who stop or reduce production of - articles of general use without actual necessity for so doing; - (_d_) who violate the decrees, orders, binding ordinances, - and other published acts of the organs of the Workmen’s and - Peasants’ Government, if such acts stipulate a trial by the - Revolutionary Tribunal for their violation; (_e_) who, taking - advantage of their social or administrative position, misuse - the authority given them by the revolutionary people. Crimes - against the people committed by means of the press are under - the jurisdiction of a specially instituted Revolutionary - Tribunal. - - 2. The Revolutionary Tribunal for offenses indicated in Article - I imposes upon the guilty the following penalties: (1) fine; - (2) deprivation of freedom; (3) exile from the capitals, from - particular localities, or from the territory of the Russian - Republic; (4) public censure; (5) declaring the offender a - public enemy; (6) deprivation of all or some political rights; - (7) sequestration or confiscation, partial or general, of - property; (8) sentence to compulsory public work. - - The Revolutionary Tribunal fixes the penalty, being guided - by the circumstances of the case and the dictates of the - revolutionary conscience. - - * * * * * - - II. The verdicts of the Revolutionary Tribunal are final. In - case of violation of the form of procedure established by - these instructions, or the discovery of indications of obvious - injustice in the verdict, the People’s Commissar of Justice - has the right to address to the Central Executive Committee of - the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies a - request to order a second and last trial of the case. - -Refusal to obey the Soviet Government, active opposition to it, and -calling upon other persons “to oppose or disobey it” are thus made -punishable offenses. In view of the uproar of protest raised in this -country against the deportation of alien agitators and conspirators, -especially by the defenders and upholders of the Bolsheviki who have -assured us of the beneficent liberality of the Soviet Utopia, it -may be well to direct particular attention to the fact that these -“instructions” make special and precise provisions for the deportation -of political undesirables. It is set forth that the Revolutionary -Tribunal may inflict, among other penalties, “exile from the capitals, -from particular localities, _or from the territory of the Russian -Republic_,” that is, deportation. These penalties, moreover, apply to -Russian citizens, not, as in the case of our deportations, to aliens. -The various forms of exile thus provided for were common penalties -under the old régime.[15] - -[15] To avoid misunderstanding (though I cannot hope to avert -misrepresentation) let me say that this paragraph is not intended -to be a defense or a justification of the policy of deporting alien -agitators. While admitting the right of our government to deport -undesirable aliens, as a corollary to the undoubted right to deny -their admission in the first place, I do not believe in deportation -as a method of dealing with revolutionary propaganda. On the other -hand, I deny the right of the Bolsheviki or their supporters to oppose -as reactionary and illiberal a method of dealing with political -undesirables which is in full force in Bolshevist Russia, which they -acclaim so loudly. - -It is interesting to observe, further, that there is no right of -appeal from the verdicts of the Revolutionary Tribunal, except that -“the People’s Commissar of Justice has the right to address to the -Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and -Peasants’ Deputies a _request_ to order a second and last trial” of -any case in which he is sufficiently interested to do so. Unless this -official can be convinced that there has been some “violation of the -form of procedure” or that there is “obvious injustice in the verdict,” -and unless he can be induced to make such a “request” to the central -Soviet authority, the verdict of the Revolutionary Tribunal is final -and absolute. What a travesty upon justice and upon democracy! What an -admirable instrument for tyrants to rely upon! - -Even this terrible weapon of despotism and oppression did not satisfy -the Bolsheviki, however. For one thing, the decree constituting the -Revolutionary Tribunal provided that its session must be held in the -open; for another, its members must be elected. Consequently, a new -type of tribunal was added to the system, the Extraordinary Commission -for Combating Counter-Revolution--the infamous _Chresvychaika_. Not -since the Inquisitions of the Middle Ages has any civilized nation -maintained tribunals clothed with anything like the arbitrary and -unlimited authority possessed by the central and local Extraordinary -Commissions for Combating Counter-Revolution. They have written upon -the pages of Russia’s history a record of tyranny and oppression which -makes the worst record of czarism seem gentle and beneficent. - -It is not without sinister significance that in all the collections of -documents which the Bolsheviki and their sympathizers have published -to illustrate the workings of the Soviet system, in this country and -in Europe, there is not one explaining the organization, functions, -methods, and personnel of it’s most characteristic institution--more -characteristic even than the Soviet. Neither in the several collections -published by _The Nation_, the American Association for International -Conciliation, the Russian Soviet Government Bureau, nor in the books -of writers like John Reed, Louise Bryant, William C. Bullitt, Raymond -Robins, William T. Goode, Arthur Ransome, Isaac Don Levine, Colonel -Malone, M.P., Lincoln Eyre, Etienne Antonelli, nor any other volume -of the kind, can such information be found. This silence is profoundly -eloquent. - -This much we know about the _Chresvychaikas_: The Soviet Government -created the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating -Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Profiteering, and established -it at the headquarters of the former Prefecture of Petrograd, 2, -Gorokhovaia Street. Its full personnel has never been made known, but -it is well known that many of the spies and confidential agents of -the former secret police service entered its employ. _Until February, -1919, it possessed absolutely unlimited powers of arrest, except -for the immunity enjoyed by members of the government; its hearings -were held in secret; it was not obliged to report even the names of -persons sentenced by it; mass arrests and mass sentences were common -under its direction; it was not confined to dealing with definite -crimes, violations of definite laws, but could punish at will, in any -manner it deemed fit, any conduct which it pleased to declare to be -“counter-revolutionary.”_ - -Those apologists who say that the Bolsheviki resorted to terrorism -only after the assassination of Uritzky, and those others who say -that terrorism was the answer to the intervention of the Allies, -are best answered by the citation of official documentary evidence -furnished by the Bolsheviki themselves. In the face of such evidence -argument is puerile and vain. In February, 1918, months before either -the assassination of Uritzky or the intervention of the Allies took -place, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission issued the following -proclamation, which was published in the _Krasnaya Gazeta_, official -organ of the Petrograd Soviet, on February 23, 1918: - - The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat - Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation, of the Council - of People’s Commissaries, brings to the notice of all citizens - that up to the present time it has been lenient in the struggle - against the enemies of the people. - - But at the present moment, when the counter-revolution is - becoming more impudent every day, inspired by the treacherous - attacks of German counter-revolutionists; when the bourgeoisie - of the whole world is trying to suppress the advance-guard of - the revolutionary International, the Russian proletariat, the - All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, acting in conformity with - the ordinances of the Council of People’s Commissaries, sees - _no other way to combat counter-revolutionists_, speculators, - marauders, hooligans, obstructionists, and other parasites, - _except by pitiless destruction at the place of crime_. - - Therefore the Commission announces that all enemy agents, _and - counter-revolutionary agitators, speculators, organizers of - uprisings or participants in preparations for uprisings to - overthrow the Soviet authority, all fugitives to the Don to - join the counter-revolutionary armies of Kaledin and Kornilov - and the Polish counter-revolutionary Legions_, sellers or - purchasers of arms to be sent to the Finnish White Guard, the - troops of Kaledin, Kornilov, and Dovbor Musnitsky, or to arm - the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie of Petrograd, _will be - mercilessly shot by detachments of the Commission at the place - of the crime_. - - PETROGRAD, _February 22, 1918_. - - ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION. - -In connection with this ferocious document and its announcement that -“counter-revolutionists” would be subject to “pitiless destruction,” -that “counter-revolutionary agitators” would be “mercilessly shot,” it -is important to remember that during the summer of 1917, when Kerensky -was struggling against “German counter-revolutionists” and plots to -overthrow the Revolution, the Bolsheviki had demanded the abolition -of the death penalty. Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others -denounced Kerensky as a “hangman” and “murderer.” Where is the moral -integrity of these men? Like scorpion stings are the bitter words -of the protest of L. Martov, leader of the radical left wing of the -Menshevist Social Democrats: - - In 1910 the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen - passed a resolution in favor of starting a campaign in all - countries for the abolition of the death penalty. - - All the present leaders of the Bolshevist Party--Lenin, - Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev, Radek, Rakovsky, - Lunarcharsky--voted for this resolution. I saw them all there - raising their hands in favor of the resolution declaring war on - capital punishment. - - Then I saw them in Petrograd in July, 1917, protesting against - punishing by death even those who had turned traitors to their - country during the war. - - I see them now condemning to death and executing people, - bourgeoisie and workmen, peasants and officers alike. I see - them now demanding from their subordinates that they should - not count the victims, that they should put to death as many - opponents of the Bolshevist régime as possible. - - And I say to these Bolshevist “judges”: You are malignant - liars and perjurers! You have deceived the workmen’s - International by signing its demand for the universal abolition - of the death penalty and by its restoration when you came to - power. - -No idle threat was the proclamation of February: the performance -was fully as brutal as the text. Hundreds of people were shot. The -death penalty had been “abolished,” and on the strength of that fact -the Bolsheviki had been lauded to the skies for their humanity by -myopic and perverse admirers in this country and elsewhere outside of -Russia. But the shooting of people by the armed detachments of the -Extraordinary Commission went on. No court ever examined the cases; no -competent jurists heard or reviewed the evidence, or even examined the -charges. A simple entry, such as “Ivan Kouzmitch--Robbery--Shot,” might -cover the murder of a devoted Socialist whose only crime was a simple -speech to his fellow-workmen in favor of the immediate convocation of -the Constituent Assembly, or calling upon them to unite against the -Bolsheviki. And where counter-revolutionary agitation was given as the -crime for which men were shot there was nothing to show, in many cases, -whether the victim had taken up arms against the Soviet power or merely -expressed opinions unfavorable to the régime. - -Originally under the direction of Uritzky, who met a well-deserved -fate at the hands of an assassin[16] in July, 1918, the All-Russian -Extraordinary Commission in turn set up Provincial and District -Extraordinary Commissions, all of which enjoyed the same practically -unlimited powers. Before February, 1919, these bodies were not even -limited in the exercise of the right to inflict the death penalty, -except for the immunity enjoyed by members of the government. Any -Extraordinary Commission could arrest, arraign, condemn, and execute -any person in secret, the only requirement being that _afterward_, if -called upon to do so, it must report the case to the local Soviet! A -well-known Bolshevist writer, Alminsky, wrote in _Pravda_, October 8, -1918: - -[16] Uritzky is thus described by Maurice Verstraete: - -“He is a refined sadist, who does his grim work for the love of it.... -Uritzky is a hunchback and seems to be revenging himself on all -mankind for his deformity. His heart is full of hatred, his nerves -are shattered, and his mind depraved. He is the personification of a -civilized brute--that is to say, the most cruel of all. Yesterday he -was laughing at his own joke. He had ordered twenty men to be executed. -Among the condemned was a lover of the girl who was waiting to be -examined. Uritzky himself told her of the death of her lover.... The -only emotion of which Uritzky is capable is fear. The only person -Uritzky obeys is the Swiss ambassador, as he hopes, in return, that the -latter will enable him to procure a passport to Switzerland, in case -he is forced to escape when the Bolsheviks are overthrown.... Trotsky -and Zinoviev are in many ways like Uritzky. They are also cruel, -hysterical, and ready to overwhelm the world with blood.”--VERSTRAETE, -_Mes Cahiers Russes_, p. 350. - - The absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled - at the “instruction” issued by the All-Russian Extraordinary - Commission to “All Provincial Extraordinary Commissions,” which - says: “The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission is perfectly - independent in its work, carrying out house-searches, arrests, - executions, of which it _afterward_ reports to the Council - of the People’s Commissaries and to the Central Executive - Council.” Further, the Provincial and District Extraordinary - Commissions “are independent in their activities, and when - called upon by the local Executive Council present a report - of their work.” In so far as house-searches and arrests are - concerned, a report made _afterward_ may result in putting - right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. - The same cannot be said of executions.... It can also be seen - from the “instruction” that personal safety is to a certain - extent guaranteed only to members of the government, of the - Central Council, and of the local Executive Committees. With - the exception of these few persons all members of the local - committees of the (Bolshevik) Party, of the Control Committees, - and of the Executive Committee of the party may be shot at any - time by the decision of any Extraordinary Commission of a small - district town if they happen to be on its territory, and a - report of that made _afterward_. - -After the assassination of Uritzky, and the attempted assassination -of Lenin, there was instituted a mad orgy of murderous terror without -parallel. It was a veritable saturnalia of brutal repression. Against -the vain protestation of the defenders of the Bolsheviki that the Red -Terror has been grossly exaggerated, it is quite sufficient to set -down the exultations and admissions of the Bolsheviki themselves, -the records made and published in their own official reports and -newspapers. The evidence which is given in the next few pages is only -a small part of the immense volume of such evidence that is available, -every word of it taken from Bolshevist sources. - -Under czarism revolutionary terrorism directed against government -officials was almost invariably followed by increased repression; -terror made answer to terror. We shall search the records of czarism -in vain, however, for evidence of such brutal and blood-lusting rage -as the Bolsheviki manifested when their terror was answered by terror. -When a young Jew named Kannegiesser assassinated Uritzky the _Krasnaya -Gazeta_ declared: - - The whole bourgeoisie must answer for this act of terror.... - Thousands of our enemies must pay for Uritzky’s death.... We - must teach the bourgeoisie a bloody lesson.... Death to the - bourgeoisie! - -This same Bolshevist organ, after the attempt to assassinate Lenin, -said: - - We will turn our hearts into steel, which we will temper in - the fire of suffering and the blood of fighters for freedom. - We will make our hearts cruel, hard, and immovable, so that - no mercy will enter them, and so that they will not quiver - at the sight of a sea of enemy blood. We will let loose the - flood-gates of that sea. Without mercy, without sparing, we - will kill our enemies in scores of hundreds. Let them be - thousands; let them drown themselves in their own blood. For - the blood of Lenin and Uritzky, Zinoviev, and Volodarsky, let - there be floods of the blood of the bourgeoisie--more blood, as - much as possible. - -In the same spirit the _Izvestia_ declared, “The proletariat will -reply to the attempt on Lenin in a manner that will make the whole -bourgeoisie shudder with horror.” Peters, successor to Uritzky as head -of the Extraordinary Commission, said, in an official proclamation, -“This crime will be answered by a mass terror.” On September 2d, -Petrovsky, Commissar for the Interior, issued this call to mass terror: - - Murder of Volodarsky and Uritzky, attempt on Lenin, and - shooting of masses of our comrades in Finland, Ukrainia, the - Don and Czechoslovakia, continual discovery of conspiracies in - our rear, open acknowledgment of Right Social Revolutionary - Party and other counter-revolutionary rascals of their part - in these conspiracies, together with the insignificant extent - of serious repressions and mass shooting of White Guards and - bourgeoisie on the part of the Soviets, all these things show - that notwithstanding frequent pronouncements urging mass terror - against the Socialists-Revolutionaries, White Guards, and - bourgeoisie no real terror exists. - - Such a situation should decidedly be stopped. End should be put - to weakness and softness. All Right Socialists-Revolutionaries - known to local Soviets should be arrested immediately. Numerous - hostages should be taken from the bourgeoisie and officer - classes. At the slightest attempt to resist or the slightest - movement among the White Guards, mass shooting should be - applied at once. Initiative in this matter rests especially - with the local executive committees. - - Through the militia and extraordinary commissions, all branches - of government must take measures to seek out and arrest persons - hiding under false names and shoot without fail anybody - connected with the work of the White Guards. - - All above measures should be put immediately into execution. - - Indecisive action on the part of local Soviets must be - immediately reported to People’s Commissary for Home Affairs. - - The rear of our armies must be finally guaranteed and - completely cleared of all kinds of White-Guardists, and - all despicable conspirators against the authority of the - working-class and of the poorest peasantry. Not the slightest - hesitation or the slightest indecisiveness in applying mass - terror. - - Acknowledge the receipt of this telegram. - - Transmit to district Soviets. - - [Signed] PETROVSKY.[17] - -[17] The text is taken from the _Weekly of the All-Russian -Extraordinary Commission_ (No. 1), Moscow, September 21, 1918. The -translation used is that published by the U. S. Department of State. It -has been verified. - -On September 3, 1918, the _Izvestia_ published this news item: - - In connection with the murder of Uritzky five hundred persons - have been shot by order of the Petrograd Extraordinary - Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution. The names of the - persons shot, and those of candidates for future shooting, in - case of a new attempt on the lives of the Soviet leaders, will - be published later.[18] - -[18] Desiring to confine the evidence here strictly to Bolshevist -sources, I have passed over much testimony by well-known -Socialists-Revolutionists, Social Democrats, and others. Because it -has not been possible to have the item referring to the retaliatory -massacre in Petrograd satisfactorily verified, I introduce here, by way -of corroboration, a statement by the Socialists-Revolutionists leader, -Eugene Trupp, published in the organ of the Socialists-Revolutionists, -_Zemlia i Volia_, October 3, 1918: - -“After the murder of Uritzky in Petrograd 1,500 people were -arrested; 512, including 10 Socialists-Revolutionists, were shot. -At the same time 800 people were arrested in Moscow. It is unknown, -however, how many of these were shot. In Nizhni-Novgorod, 41 were -shot; in Jaroslavl, 13; in Astrakhan, 12 Socialists-Revolutionists; -in Sarapool, a member of the Central Committee of the party of -Socialists-Revolutionists, I. I. Teterin; in Penza, about 40 officers.” - -See also the corroboration of this incident quoted from the _Weekly -Journal of the Extraordinary Commission_, on p. 171. - -Two days later, September 5, 1918, a single column of _Izvestia_ -contained the following paragraphs, headed “Latest News”: - - -_Arrest of Right Socialists-Revolutionaries_ - - At the present moment the ward extraordinary commissioners are - making mass arrests of Right Socialists-Revolutionaries, since - it has become clear that this party is responsible for the - recent acts of terrorism (attempt on life of Comrade Lenin and - the murder of Uritzky), which were carried out according to a - definitely elaborated program. - - -_Arrest of a Priest_ - - For an anti-Soviet sermon preached from the church pulpit, - the Priest Molot has been arrested and turned over to the - counter-revolutionary section of the All-Russian Extraordinary - Commission. - - -_Struggle Against Counter-Revolutionaries_ - - We have received the following telegram from the president - of the Front Extraordinary Commission, Comrade Latsis: “The - Extraordinary Commission of the Front had shot in the district - of Ardatov, for anti-Soviet agitation, 4 peasants, and sent to - a concentration camp 32 officers. - - “At Arzamas were shot three champions of the Tsarist régime, - and one peasant-exploiter, and 14 officers were sent to the - concentration camp for anti-Soviet agitation.” - - -_House Committee Fined_ - - For failure to execute the orders of the dwelling section of - the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the house committee - at 42, Pokrovka, has been fined 20,000 rubles. - - This fine is a punishment for failure to remove from the - house register the name of the well-known Cadet Astrov, who - disappeared three months ago. - - All the movable property of Astrov has been confiscated. - - -_The Arrest of Speculators_ - - On September 3d members of the Section to Combat Speculation - of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission arrested Citizen - Pitkevich, who was trying to buy 125 food-cards at 20 rubles - each. A search was made in the apartment of Pitkevich, which - revealed a store of such cards bearing official stamps. - - This section also arrested a certain Bosh, who was speculating - in cocaine brought from Pskov. - -On September 5, 1918, the Council of the People’s Commissaries ordered -that the names of persons shot by order of the Extraordinary Commission -should be published, with full particulars of their cases, a decision -which was flouted by the Extraordinary Commission, as we shall see. The -resolution of the Council of People’s Commissaries was published in the -_Severnaya Communa_, evening edition, November 9, 1918, and reads as -follows: - - The Council of the People’s Commissaries, having considered the - report of the chairman of the Extraordinary Commission, finds - that under the existing conditions it is most necessary to - secure the safety of the rear by means of terror. All persons - belonging to the White Guard organizations or involved in - conspiracies and rebellion are to be shot. Their names and the - particulars of their cases are to be published. - -On September 10, 1918, the _Severnaya Communa_ published in its news -columns the two following despatches: - - JAROSLAVL, _September 9th_.--In the whole of the Jaroslavl - Government a strict registration of the bourgeoisie and its - partizans has been organized. Manifestly anti-Soviet elements - are being shot; suspected persons are being interned in - concentration camps; non-working sections of the population are - being subjected to compulsory labor. - - TYER, _September 9th_.--The Extraordinary Commission has - arrested and sent to concentration camps over 130 hostages from - among the bourgeoisie. The prisoners include members of the - Cadet Party, Socialists-Revolutionists of the Right, former - officers, well-known members of the propertied class, and - policemen. - -Two days later, September 12th, the same journal contained the -following: - - ATKARSK, _September, 11th_.--Yesterday martial law was - proclaimed in the town. Eight counter-revolutionaries were shot. - -On September 18, 1918, the _Severnaya Communa_ published the following -evidences of the wide-spread character of the terrorism which the -Bolsheviki were practising: - - In Sebesh a priest named Kikevitch was shot for - counter-revolutionary propaganda and for _saying masses for the - late Nicholas Romanov_. - - In Astrakhan the Extraordinary Commission has shot _ten - Socialists-Revolutionists of the Right involved in a plot - against the Soviet power_. In Karamyshev a priest named - Lubinoff and a deacon named Kvintil have been shot for - _revolutionary agitation against the decree separating - the Church from the State_ and for an appeal to overthrow - the Soviet Government. In Perm, _in retaliation for the - assassination of Uritzky and for the attempt on Lenin, fifty - hostages from among the bourgeois classes and the White Guards - were shot_. - -The shooting of innocent hostages is a peculiarly brutal form of -terrorism. When it was practised by the Germans during the war the -world reverberated with denunciation. That the Bolsheviki ever were -guilty of this crime, so much more odious than anything which can be -charged against czarism, has been many times denied, but the foregoing -statement from one of their most influential official journals is a -complete refutation of all such denials. Perm is more than a thousand -miles from Petrograd, where the assassination of Uritzky occurred, and -no attempt was ever made to show that the fifty hostages who were shot, -or any of them, were guilty of any complicity in the assassination. It -was a brutal, malignant retaliation upon innocent people for a crime -of which they knew nothing. The famous “Decree No. 903,” signed by -Trotsky, which called for the taking of hostages as a means of checking -desertions from the Red Army, was published in _Izvestia_, September -18, 1918: - - Decree No. 903: Seeing the increasing number of deserters, - especially among the commanders, orders are issued to arrest as - hostages all the members of the family one can lay hands on: - father, mother, brother, sister, wife, and children. - -The evening edition of _Severnaya Communa_, September 18, 1918, -reported a meeting of the Soviet of the first district of Petrograd, -stating that the following resolution had been passed: - - The meeting welcomes the fact that mass terror is being used - against the White Guards and higher bourgeois classes, and - declares that every attempt on the life of any of our leaders - will be answered by the proletariat by the shooting down - not only of hundreds, as the case is now, but of thousands - of White Guards, bankers, manufacturers, Cadets, and - Socialists-Revolutionists of the Right. - -On the following day, September 19th, the same journal quoted Zinoviev -as saying: - - To overcome our enemies we must have our own Socialist - Militarism. We must win over to our side 90 millions out of - the 100 millions of population of Russia under the Soviets. - _As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them; they must be - annihilated._ - -Reference has already been made to the fact that the Council of the -People’s Commissaries ordered that the Extraordinary Commission publish -the names of all persons sentenced to be shot, with particulars of -their cases, and the further fact that the instruction was ignored. It -is well known that great friction developed between the Extraordinary -Commissions and the Soviet power. In many places the Extraordinary -Commissions not only defied the local Soviets, _but actually suppressed -them_. Naturally, there was friction between the Soviet power and -its creature. There were loud protests on the part of influential -Bolsheviki, who demanded that the _Chresvychaikas_ be curbed and -restrained and that the power to inflict the death penalty be taken -from them. That is why the resolution of September 5th, already quoted, -was passed. Nevertheless, in practice secrecy was very generally -observed. Trials took place in secret and there was no publication, -in many instances, of results. Reporting a meeting of the Executive -Committee of the Moscow Soviet, which took place on October 16, 1918, -_Izvestia_, the official Bolshevist organ, contained the following in -its issue of the next day: - - The report of the work of the All-Russian Extraordinary - Commission was read at a secret session of the Executive - Committee. _But the report and the discussion of it were held - behind closed doors and will not be published._ After a debate - the doors of the Session Hall were thrown open. - -From an article in the _Severnaya Communa_, October 17, 1918, we -learn that the Extraordinary Commission “has registered 2,559 -counter-revolutionary affairs and 5,000 arrests have been made”; that -“at Kronstadt there have been 1,130 hostages. Only 183 people are left; -500 have been shot.” - -Under the heading, “The Conference of the Extraordinary Commission,” -_Izvestia_ of October 19, 1918, printed the following paragraph: - - PETROGRAD, _October 17th_.--At to-day’s meeting of the - Conference of the Extraordinary Investigating Commission, - Comrades Moros and Baky read reports giving an account of the - activities of the Extraordinary Commission in Petrograd and - Moscow. Comrade Baky threw light on the work of the district - commission of Petrograd after the departure of the All-Russian - Extraordinary Commission for Moscow. The total number of people - arrested by the Extraordinary Commission amounted to 6,220. - _Eight hundred people were shot._ - -On November 5, 1918, _Izvestia_ said: - - A riot occurred in the Kirsanoff district. The rioters - shouted, “Down with the Soviets.” They dissolved the Soviet - and Committee of the Village Poor. The riot was suppressed by - a detachment of Soviet troops. Six ringleaders were shot. The - case is under examination. - -The _Weekly Journal of the Extraordinary Commissions to Combat -Counter-Revolution_ is, as the name implies, the official organ in -which the proclamations and reports of these Extraordinary Commissions -are published. It is popularly nicknamed “The Hangmen’s Journal.” The -issue of October 6, 1918 (No. 3), contains the following: - - We decided to make it a real, not a paper terror. In many - cities there took place, accordingly, _mass shootings of - hostages_, and it is well that they did. In such business - half-measures are worse than none. - -Another issue (No. 5), dated October 20, 1918, says: - - Upon the decision of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission, - 500 hostages were shot. - -These are typical extracts: it would be possible to quote from this -journal whole pages quite similar to them. - -How closely the Extraordinary Commissions copied the methods of the -Czar’s secret police system can be judged from a paragraph that -appeared in the _Severnaya Communa_, October 17, 1918: - - The Extraordinary Commission has organized the placing of - police agents in every part of Petrograd. The Commission has - issued a proclamation to the workmen exhorting them to inform - the police of all they know. The bandits, both in word and - action, must be forced to recognize that the revolutionary - proletariat is watching them strictly. - -Here, then, is a formidable array of evidence from Bolshevist sources -of the very highest authority. It is only a part of the whole volume -of such evidence that is available; nevertheless, it is sufficient, -overwhelming, and conclusive. If we were to draw upon the official -documentary testimony of the Socialist parties and groups opposed to -the Bolsheviki, hundreds of pages of records of _Schrecklichkeit_, -even more brutal than anything here quoted, could be easily compiled. -Much of this testimony is as reliable and entitled to as much weight -as any of the foregoing. Take, for example, the statement of the -Foreign Representatives of the Russian Social Democratic Party upon -the shooting of six young students arrested in Petrograd: In the New -York _World_, March 22, 1920, Mr. Lincoln Eyre quotes “Red Executioner -Peters” as saying: “We have never yet passed the sentence of death -on a foreigner, although some of them richly deserved it. The few -foreigners who have lost their lives in the Revolution have been killed -in the course of a fight or in some such manner.” Shall we not set -against that statement the signed testimony of responsible and honored -spokesmen of the Russian Social Democratic Party? - -Three brothers, named Genzelli, French citizens, were arrested and shot -without the formality of a trial. They had been officers in the Czar’s -army, and, with three young fellow-officers, Russians, were discovered -at a private gathering, wearing the shoulder-straps indicative of -their former military rank. This was their offense. According to a -statement issued by the Foreign Representatives of the Russian Social -Democratic Party, Lenin was asked at Smolny, “What is to be done with -the students?” and replied, “Do with them what you like.” The whole six -were shot, but it has never been possible to ascertain who issued the -order for the execution. - -Another example: The famous Schastny case throws a strong light upon -one very important phase of the Bolshevist terror. Shall we decline to -give credence to Socialists of honorable distinction, simply because -they are opposed to Bolshevism? Here are two well-known Socialist -writers, one French and the other Russian, long and honorably -identified with the international Socialist movement. Charles Dumas, -the French Socialist, from whose book[19] quotation has already been -made, gives an account of the Schastny case which vividly illustrates -the brutality of the Bolsheviki: - -[19] _La Vérité sur les Bolsheviki_, par Charles Dumas, Paris, 1919. - - The Schastny case is the most detestable episode in Bolshevist - history. Its most repulsive feature is the parody of legality - which the Bolsheviki attempt to attach to a case of wanton - murder. Admiral Schastny was the commander of the Baltic - Fleet and was put in command by the Bolsheviki themselves. - Thanks to his efforts, the Russian war-ships were brought - out of Helsingfors harbor in time to escape capture by the - Germans on the eve of their invasion of Finland. In general, - it was he who contributed largely to the saving of whatever - there was left of the Russian fleet. His political views were - so radical that even the Bolsheviki tolerated him in their - service. Notwithstanding all this, he was accused of complicity - in a counter-revolutionary plot and haled before a tribunal. - In vain did the judge search for a shred of proof of his - guilt. Only one witness appeared against him--Trotsky--who - delivered an impassioned harangue full of venom and malice. - Admiral Schastny implored the court to allow witnesses for the - defense to testify, but the judges decreed that his request - was sheer treason. Thereupon the witnesses who were prevented - from appearing in court forwarded their testimony in writing, - but the court decided not to read their communication. After - a simulated consultation, Schastny was condemned to die--a - verdict which later stirred even Krylenko, one of his - accusers, to say: “That was not a death sentence--that was a - summary shooting!” - - The verdict was to be carried out in twenty-four hours. This - aroused the ire of the Socialists-Revolutionists of the Left, - who at that time were represented in the People’s Commissariat, - and they immediately forwarded, in the name of their party, a - sharp protest against the official confirmation of the death - sentence. The Commissaries, in reply, ordered the immediate - shooting of Schastny. - - Apparently Schastny was subjected to torture before his death. - He was killed without witnesses, without a priest, and even - his lawyer was not notified of the hour of his execution. - When his family demanded the surrender of his body to them, - it was denied. What, if otherwise, did the Bolsheviki fear, - and why did they so assiduously conceal the body of the dead - admiral? The same occurred after the execution of Fanny Royd, - who shot at Lenin. There is also indisputable evidence that the - Bolsheviki are resorting to torture at inquests. The assassin - of Commissary Uritzky (whose family, by the way, was entirely - wiped out by the Bolsheviki as a matter of principle, without - even the claim that they knew anything about the planned - attempt) was tortured by his executioners in the Fortress of - St. Peter and Paul. - -In the modern revolutionary movement of Russia few men have served -with greater distinction than L. Martov, and none with greater -disinterestedness. His account of the Schastny trial is vibrant with -the passionate hatred of tyranny and oppression characteristic of his -whole career: - - He was accused of conspiring against the Soviet power. Captain - Schastny denied it. He asked the tribunal to hear witnesses, - including Bolshevist commissaries, who had been appointed to - watch him. Who was better qualified to state whether he had - really conspired against the Soviet power? - - The tribunal refused to hear witnesses. Refused what every - court in the world, except Stolypin’s field court martials, - recognized the worst criminal entitled to. - - A man’s life was at stake, the life of a man who had won the - love and confidence of his subordinates, the sailors of the - Baltic Fleet, who protested against the captain’s arrest. - The life of a man who had performed a marvelous feat! He had - somehow managed to take out of Helsingfors harbor all the ships - of the Baltic Fleet, and had thus saved them from capture by - the Finnish Whites. - - It was not the enraged Finnish Whites, nor the German - Imperialists, who shot this man. He was put to death by men - who call themselves Russian Communists--by Messrs. Medvedeff, - Bruno, Karelin, Veselovski, Peterson, members of the Supreme - Revolutionary Tribunal. - - Captain Schastny was refused the exercise of the right - to which every thief or murderer is entitled--_i.e._, to - call in witnesses for the defense. But the witness for the - prosecution was heard. This witness was Trotsky, Trotsky, who, - as Commissary for War and Naval Affairs, had arrested Captain - Schastny. - - At the hearing of the case by the tribunal, Trotsky acted, not - as a witness, but as a prosecutor. As a prosecutor he declared, - “This man is guilty; you must condemn him!” And Trotsky did - it after having gagged the prisoner by refusing to call in - witnesses who might refute the accusations brought against him. - - Not much valor is required to fight a man who has been gagged - and whose hands are tied, nor much honesty or loftiness of - character. - - It was not a trial; it was a farce. There was no jury. The - judges were officials dependent upon the authorities, receiving - their salaries from the hands of Trotsky and other People’s - Commissaries. And this mockery of a court passed the death - sentence, which was hurriedly carried out before the people, - who were profoundly shaken by this order to kill an innocent - man, could do anything to save him. - - Under Nicholas Romanov one could sometimes stop the carrying - out of a monstrously cruel sentence and thus pull the victim - out of the executioner’s hands. - - Under Vladimir Ulianov this is impossible. The Bolshevist - leaders slept peacefully when, under the cover of night, the - first victim of their tribunal was stealthily being killed. - - No one knew who murdered Schastny or how he was murdered. As - under the Czars, the executioners’ names are concealed from the - people. No one knows whether Trotsky himself came to the place - of the execution to watch and direct it. - - Perhaps he, too, slept peacefully and saw in his dreams the - proletariat of the whole world hailing him as the liberator of - mankind, as the leader of the universal revolution. - - In the name of Socialism, in thy name, O proletariat, blind - madmen and vainglorious fools staged this appalling farce of - cold-blooded murder. - -The evidence we have cited from Bolshevist sources proves conclusively -that the Red Terror was far from being the unimportant episode it -is frequently represented to have been by pro-Bolshevist writers. -It effectually disposes of the assiduously circulated myth that the -Extraordinary Commissions were for the most part concerned with the -suppression of robbery, crimes of violence, and illegal speculation, -and that only in a few exceptional instances did they use their powers -to suppress anti-Bolshevist propaganda. The evidence makes it quite -clear that from the early days of the Bolshevist régime until November, -1918, at least, an extraordinary degree of terrorism prevailed -throughout Soviet Russia. According to a report published by the -All-Russian Extraordinary Commission in February of the present year, -not less than 6,185 persons were executed in 1918 and 3,456 in 1919, -a total of 9,641 in Moscow and Petrograd alone. Of the total number -for the two years, _7,068 persons were shot for counter-revolutionary -activities_, 631 for crimes in office--embezzlement, corruption, and -so on--217 for speculation and profiteering, and 1,204 for all other -classes of crime. - -That these figures understate the extent of the Red Terror is -certain. In the first place, the report covers only the work of the -Extraordinary Commissions of Moscow and Petrograd. The numerous -District Extraordinary Commissions are not reported on. In the next -place, there is reason to believe that many of the reports of the -Extraordinary Commissions were falsified in order not to create too -bad an impression. Quite frequently, as a matter of fact, the number -of victims reported by the _Chresvychaikas_ was less than the number -actually known to have been killed. Moreover, the figures given refer -only to the victims of the Extraordinary Commissions, and do not -include those sentenced to death by the other revolutionary tribunals. -The 9,641 executions--even if we accept the figures as full and -complete--refer only to the victims of the Moscow and Petrograd -_Chresvychaikas_, men and women put to death without anything like -a trial.[20] When to these figures there shall be added the victims -of all the District Extraordinary Commissions and of all the other -revolutionary tribunals, the real meaning of the Red Terror will begin -to appear. But even that will not give us the real measure of the Red -Terror, for the simple reason that the many thousands of peasants and -workmen who have been slain in the numerous uprisings, frequently -taking on the character of pitched battles between armed masses and -detachments of Soviet troops, are not included. - -[20] The figures are taken from _Russkoe Delo_ (Prague), March 4, 1920. - -The naïve and impressionable Mr. Goode says of the judicial system -of Soviet Russia: “Its chief quality would seem to be a certain -simplicity. By a stroke of irony the people’s courts aim not only at -punishment of evil, but also at reformation of the wrongdoer! A first -offender is set free on condition that he must not fall again. Should -he do so, he pays the penalty of his second offense together with that -to which his first crime rendered him liable.”[21] That Mr. Goode -should be ignorant of the fact that such humane measures were not -unknown or uncommon in the administration of justice by the ordinary -criminal courts under czarism is perhaps not surprising. It is somewhat -surprising, however, that he should write as though the Soviet courts -have made a distinct advance in penology. Has he never heard of the -First Offenders Act in his own country, or of our extensive system of -suspended sentences, parole, probation, and so on? It is not necessary -to deny Mr. Goode’s statement, or even to question it. As a commentary -upon it, the following article from _Severnaya Communa_, December 4, -1918, is sufficient: - -[21] _Bolshevism at Work_, by William T. Goode, pp. 96-97. - - It is impossible to continue silent. It has constantly been - brought to the knowledge of the Viborg Soviet (Petrograd) of - the terrible state of affairs existing in the city prisons. - That people all the time are dying there of hunger; _that - people are detained six and eight months without examination, - and that in many cases it is impossible to learn why they have - been arrested, owing to officials being changed, departments - closed, and documents lost_. In order to confirm, or otherwise, - these rumors, the Soviet decided to send on the 3d November - a commission consisting of the president of the Soviet, the - district medical officer, and district military commissar, to - visit and report on the “Kresti” prison. Comrades! What they - saw and what they heard from the imprisoned is impossible to - describe. Not only were all rumors confirmed, but conditions - were actually found much worse than had been stated. I was - pained and ashamed. I myself was imprisoned under czardom in - that same prison. Then all was clean, and prisoners had clean - linen twice a month. Now, not only are prisoners left without - clean linen, but many are even without blankets, and, as in - the past, for a trifling offense they are placed in solitary - confinement in cold, dark cells. But the most terrible sights - we saw were in the sick-bays. Comrades, there we saw living - dead who hardly had strength enough to whisper their complaints - that they were dying of hunger. In one ward, among the sick - a corpse had lain for several hours, whose neighbors managed - to murmur, “Of hunger he died, and soon of hunger we shall - all die.” Comrades, among them are many who are quite young, - who wish to live and see the sunshine. If we really possess a - workmen’s government such things should not be. - -Following the example of Mr. Arthur Ransome, many pro-Bolshevist -writers have assured us that after 1918 the Red Terror practically -ceased to exist. Mr. Ransome makes a great deal of the fact that -in February, 1919, the Central Executive Committee of the People’s -Commissaries “definitely limited the powers of the Extraordinary -Commission.”[22] Although he seems to have attended the meeting at -which this was done, and talks of “the bitter struggle within the party -for and against the almost dictatorial powers of the Extraordinary -Committee,” he appears not to have understood what was done. Perhaps -it ought not to be expected that this writer of fairy-stories who -so naïvely confesses his ignorance of “economics” should comprehend -the revolutionary struggle in Russia. Be that how it may, he does -not state accurately what happened. He says: “Therefore the right of -sentencing was removed from the Extraordinary Commission; but if, -through unforeseen circumstances, the old conditions should return, -they intended that the dictatorial powers of the Commission should -be returned to it until those conditions had ceased.” Actually the -decision was that the power to inflict the death penalty should be -taken from the Extraordinary Commissions, _except where and when -martial law existed_. When Krylenko, Diakonov, and others protested -against the outrage of permitting the Extraordinary Commissions to -execute people without proof of their guilt, _Izvestia_ answered -in words which clearly reveal the desperate and brutal spirit of -Bolshevism: “_If among one hundred executed one was guilty, this would -be satisfactory and would sanction the action of the Commission._” - -[22] _Russia in 1919_, by Arthur Ransome, pp. 108-114. - -As a matter of fact, the resolution which, according to Mr. Ransome, -“definitely limited the powers of the Extraordinary Commission,” was -an evasion of the issue. Not only was martial law in existence in the -principal cities, and not only was it easy to declare martial law -anywhere in Soviet Russia, but it was a very easy matter for accused -persons to be brought to Moscow or Petrograd and there sentenced -by the Extraordinary Commission. _This was actually done in many -cases after the February decision._ Mr. Ransome quotes Dzerzhinsky -to the effect that criminality had been greatly decreased by the -Extraordinary Commissions--in Moscow by 80 per cent.!--and that there -was now, February, 1919, no longer danger of “large scale revolts.” -What a pity that the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission did not -consult Mr. Ransome before publishing its report in February of this -year! That report shows, first, that in 1919 the activities of the -Extraordinary Commission were much greater than in 1918; second, that -the number of arrests made in 1919 was 80,662 as against 46,348 in -1918; third, that in 1919 the arrests of “ordinary criminals” nearly -equaled the total number of arrests made in 1918 for _all causes_, -including counter-revolutionary activity, speculation, crimes in -office, and general crime. The figures given in the report are: arrests -for ordinary crimes only in 1919, 39,957; arrests for all causes in -1918, 47,348. When it is remembered that all the other revolutionary -tribunals were active throughout this period, how shall we reconcile -this record of the Extraordinary Commission with Mr. Ransome’s account? -The fact is that crime steadily increased throughout 1919, _and that -at the very time Mr. Ransome was in Moscow conditions there were -exceedingly bad, as the report of arrests and convictions shows_. - -Terrorism continued in Russia throughout 1919, the rose-colored reports -of specially coached correspondents to the contrary notwithstanding. -There was, indeed, a period in the early summer when the rigors of the -Red Terror were somewhat relaxed. This seems to have been connected -with the return of the bourgeois specialists to the factories and the -officers of the Czar’s army to positions of importance in the Red Army. -This could not fail to lessen the persecution of the bourgeoisie, -at least for a time. In July the number of arrests made by the -Extraordinary Commission was small, only 4,301; in November it reached -the high level of 14,673. To those who claim that terrorism did not -exist in Russia during 1919, the best answer is--this very illuminating -official Bolshevist report. - -On January 10, 1919, _Izvestia_ published an article by Trotsky in -which the leader of the military forces of the Soviet Republic dealt -with the subject of terrorism. This was, of course, in advance of the -meeting which Mr. Ransome so completely misunderstood. Trotsky said: - - By its terror against saboteurs the proletariat does not at - all say, “I shall wipe out all of you and get along without - specialists.” Such a program would be a program of hopelessness - and ruin. _While dispersing, arresting, and shooting saboteurs - and conspirators_, the proletariat says, “_I shall break your - will, because my will is stronger than yours, and I shall force - you to serve me_.” Terror as the demonstration of the will - and strength of the working-class is historically justified, - precisely because the proletariat was able thereby to break - the will of the Intelligentsia, pacify the professional men of - various categories and work, and gradually subordinate them to - its own aims within the fields of their specialties. - -On April 2, 1919, _Izvestia_ published a proclamation by Dzerzhinsky, -president of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, warning that -“demonstrations and appeals of any kind will be suppressed without -pity”: - - In view of the discovery of a conspiracy which aimed to - organize an armed demonstration against the Soviet authority by - means of explosions, destruction of railways, and fires, the - All-Russian Extraordinary Commission warns that demonstrations - and appeals of any kind will be suppressed without pity. In - order to save Petrograd and Moscow from famine, in order - to save hundreds and thousands of innocent victims, the - All-Russian Extraordinary Commission will be obliged to take - the most severe measures of punishment against all who will - appeal for White Guard demonstration or for attempts at armed - uprising. - - [Signed] F. DZERZHINSKY, - _President of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission_. - -The _Severnaya Communa_ of April 2, 1919, contains an official report -of the shooting by the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission of a -printer named Michael Ivanovsky “_for the printing of proclamations -issued by the Socialists-Revolutionists of the Left_.” Later several -Socialists-Revolutionists, among them Soronov, were shot “for having -proclamations and appeals in their possession.” - -On May 1, 1919, the _Izvestia_ of Odessa, official organ of the Soviet -in that city, published the following account of the infliction of the -death penalty for belonging to an organization. It said: - - The Special Branch of the Staff of the Third Army has uncovered - the existence of an organization, the Union of the Russian - People, now calling itself “the Russian Union for the People - and the State.” The entire committee was arrested. - -After giving the names of those arrested the account continued: - - The case of those arrested was transferred to the Military - Tribunal of the Soviet of the Third Army. Owing to the obvious - activity of the members of the Union directed against the - peaceful population and the conquests of the Revolution, the - Revolutionary Tribunal decided to sentence the above-mentioned - persons to death. The verdict was carried out on the same night. - -On May 6, 1919, _Severnaya Communa_ published the following order from -the Defense Committee: - - Order No. 8 of the Defense Committee. The Extraordinary - Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution is to take measures - to suppress all forms of official crime, and not to hesitate at - shooting the guilty. The Extraordinary Committee is bound to - indict not only those who are guilty of active crime, but also - those who are guilty of inaction of authority or condonement of - crime, bearing in mind that the punishment must be increased in - proportion to the responsibility attached to the post filled by - the guilty official. - -On May 14, 1919, _Izvestia_ published an article by a Bolshevist -official describing what happened in the Volga district as the -Bolsheviki advanced. This article is important because it calls -attention to a form of terrorism not heretofore mentioned: it will be -remembered that in the latter part of 1918 the Bolsheviki introduced -the system of rationing out food upon class lines, giving to the Red -Army three times as much food per capita as to the average of the civil -population, and dividing the latter into categories. The article under -consideration shows very clearly how this system was made an instrument -of terrorism: - - Instructions were received from Moscow to forbid free trade, - and to introduce the class system of feeding. After much - confusion, _this made the population starve in a short time_, - and rebel against the food dictatorship.... “Was it necessary - to introduce the class system of feeding into the Volga - district so haphazardly?” asks the writer. “Oh no. _There - was enough bread ready for shipment in that region, and in - many places it was rotting, because of the lack of railroad - facilities._ The class-feeding system did not increase - the amount of bread.... It did create, together with the - inefficient policy, and the lack of a distribution system, a - state of starvation, which provoked dissatisfaction.” - -Throughout 1919 the official Bolshevist press continued to publish -accounts of the arrest of hostages. Thus _Izvestia_ of the Petrograd -Soviet of Workmen’s and Red Army Deputies (No. 185), August 16, 1919, -published an official order by the acting Commandant of the fortified -district of Petrograd, a Bolshevist official named Kozlovsky. The two -closing paragraphs of this order follow: - - I declare that all guilty of arson, also all those who have - knowledge of the same and fail to report the culprits to the - authorities, _will be shot forthwith_. - - I warn all that in the event of repeated cases of arson I will - not hesitate to adopt extreme measures, _including the shooting - of the bourgeoisie’s hostages_, in view of the fact that all - the White Guards’ plots directed against the proletarian state - _must be regarded not as the crime of individuals, but as the - offense of the entire enemy class_. - -That hostages were actually shot, and not merely held under arrest, is -clearly stated in the _Severnaya Communa_, March 11, 1919: - - By order of the Military Revolutionary Committee of Petrograd - several officers were shot for _spreading untrue rumors that - the Soviet authority had lost the confidence of the people_. - - _All relatives of the officers of the 86th Infantry Regiment - (which deserted to the Whites) were shot._ - -The same journal published, September 2, 1919, the following decree of -the War Council of the Petrograd Fortified District: - - It has been ascertained that on the 17th of August there was - maliciously cut down in the territory of the Ovtzenskaya - Colony about 200 sazhensks of telegraph and telephone wire. In - consequence of the above-mentioned criminal offense, the War - Council of the Petrograd Fortified District has ordered-- - - (1) To impose on the Ovtzenskaya Colony a fine of 500,000 - rubles; (2) the guarding of the intactness of the lines - to be made incumbent upon the population under reciprocal - responsibility; and (3) _hostages to be taken_. - - Note: The decree of the War Council was carried out on the 30th - of August. The following hostages have been taken: Languinen, - P. M.; Languinen, Ya. P.; Finck, F. Kh.; Ikert, E. S.; Luneff, - F. L.; Dalinguer, P. M.; Dalinguer, P. Ya.; Raw, Ya. I.; - Shtraw, V. M.; Afanassieff, L. K. - -This drastic order was issued and carried out nearly a month before the -district was declared to be in a state of siege. - - * * * * * - -The _Krasnaya Gazeta_, November 4, 1919, published a significant -list of Red Army officers who had deserted to the Whites and of the -retaliatory arrests of innocent members of their families. Mothers, -brothers, sisters, and wives were arrested and punished for the acts of -their relatives in deserting the Red Army. The list follows: - -1. Khomutov, D. C.--brother and mother arrested. - -2. Piatnitzky, D. A.--mother, sister, and brother arrested. - -3. Postnov--mother and sister arrested. - -4. Agalakov, A. M.--wife, father, and mother arrested. - -5. Haratkviech, B.--wife and sister arrested. - -6. Kostylev, V. I.--wife and brother arrested. - -7. Smyrnov, A. A.--mother, sister, and father arrested. - -8. Chebykin--wife arrested. - -In September, 1919, practically all the Bolshevist papers published the -following order, signed by Trotsky: - - I have ordered several times that officers with indefinite - political convictions should not be appointed to military - posts, especially when the families of such officers live - on the territory controlled by enemies of the Soviet Power. - My orders are not being carried out. In one of our armies - an officer whose family lives on the territory controlled - by Kolchak was appointed as a commander of a division. - Consequently, this commander betrayed his division and went - over, together with his staff, to the enemy. Once more I order - the Military Commissaries to make a thorough cleansing of all - Commanding Staffs. In case an officer goes over to the enemy, - _his family should be made to feel the consequences of his - betrayal_. - -Early in November, 1919, the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission -announced that by its orders forty-two persons had been shot. A number -of these were ordinary criminals; several others had been guilty -of selling cocaine. Among the other victims we find one Maximovich, -“for organizing a mass desertion of Red Army soldiers to the Whites”; -one Shramchenko, “_for participating in a counter-revolutionary -conspiracy_”; E. K. Kaulbars, “for spying”; Ploozhnikoff and -Demeshchenke, “_for exciting the politically unconscious masses and -hounding them on against the Soviet Power_.” - -In considering this terribly impressive accumulation of evidence from -the Bolshevist press we must bear in mind that it represents not the -criticism of a free press, but only that measure of truth which managed -to find its way through the most drastic censorship ever known in any -country at any time. Not only were the organs of the anti-Bolshevist -Socialists suppressed, but even the Soviet press was not free to -publish the truth. Trotsky himself made vigorous protest in the -_Izvestia_ of the Central Executive Committee (No. 13) against the -censorship which “prevented the publication of the news that Perm was -taken by the White Guards.” A congress of Soviet journalists was held -at Moscow, in May, 1919, and made protest against the manner in which -they were restrained from criticizing Soviet misrule. The _Izvestia_ -of the Provincial Executive Committee, May 8, 1919, quotes from this -protest as follows: - - The picture of the provincial Soviet press is melancholy - enough. We journalists are particularly “up against it” when we - endeavor to expose the shortcomings of the local Soviet rule - and the local Soviet officials. Immediately we are met with - threats of arrest and banishment, _threats which are often - carried out_. In Kaluga a Soviet editor was nearly shot for a - remark about a drunken communist. - -Under such conditions as are indicated in this protest the evidence we -have cited was published. What the record would have been if only there -was freedom for the opposition press can only be imagined. In the light -of such a mass of authoritative evidence furnished by the Bolsheviki -themselves, of what use is it for casual visitors to Russia, like Mr. -Goode and Mr. Lansbury, for example, to attempt to throw dust into our -eyes and make it appear that acts of terrorism and tyranny are no more -common in Russia than in countries like England, France, and America? -And how, in the light of such testimony, shall we explain the ecstatic -praise of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki by men and women who call -themselves Socialists and Liberals, and who profess to love freedom? It -is true that the abolition of the death penalty has now been decreed, -the decree going into effect on January 22, 1920. Lenin has declared -that this date marks the passing of the policy of blood, and that only -a renewal of armed intervention by the Allies can force a return to it. -We shall see. This is not the first time the death penalty has been -“abolished” by decree during the Bolshevist régime. Some of us remember -that on November 7, 1918, the Central Executive Committee in Moscow -decreed the abolition of the death penalty and a general amnesty. After -that murder, by order of the Extraordinary Commissions, went on worse -than before.[23] - -[23] As proofs of these pages are being revised, word comes that the -death penalty has been revived--_Vide_ London _Times_, May 26, 1920. - -In Odessa an investigation was made into the workings of the -_Chresvychaika_ and a list of fifteen classes of crimes for which -the death penalty had been imposed and carried out was published. -The list enumerated various offenses, ranging from espionage and -counter-revolutionary agitation to “dissoluteness.” The fifteenth and -last class on the list read, “Reasons unknown.” Perhaps these words sum -up the only answer to our last question. - - - - -VIII - -INDUSTRY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL - - -For the student of the evolution of Bolshevism in Russia there is, -perhaps, no task more difficult than to unravel the tangled skein of -the history of the first few weeks after the _coup d’état_. Whoever -attempts to set forth the development of events during those weeks -in an ordered and consecutive narrative, and to present an accurate, -yet intelligible, account of the conditions that prevailed, must toil -patiently through a bewildering snarled mass of conflicting testimony, -charges and counter-charges, claims and counter-claims. Statements -concerning apparently simple matters of fact, made by witnesses whose -competence and probity are not to be lightly questioned, upon events of -which they were witnesses, are simply irreconcilable. Moreover, there -is a perfect welter of sweeping generalizations and an almost complete -lack of such direct and definite information, statistical and other, as -can readily be found relating to both the earlier and the later stages -of the Revolution. - -Let us first set down the facts concerning which there is -substantial agreement on the part of the partizans of the -Bolsheviki and the various factions opposed to them, ranging -from the Constitutional-Democrats to such factions as the -Socialists-Revolutionists of the Left and the “Internationalist” -section of the Menshevist Social Democrats, both of which were quite -closely allied to the Bolsheviki in sympathy and in theory. At the -time when the Bolsheviki raised the cry, “All power to the Soviets!” -in October, 1917, arrangements were well under way for the election, -upon the most democratic basis imaginable, of a great representative -constitutional convention, the Constituent Assembly. Not only had the -Bolsheviki nominated their candidates and entered upon an electoral -campaign in advocacy of their program; not only were they, in common -with all other parties, pledged to the holding of the Constituent -Assembly; much more important is the fact that they professed to be, -and were by many regarded as, the special champions and defenders of -the Constituent Assembly, solicitous above all else for its convocation -and its integrity. From June onward Trotsky, Kamenev, and other -Bolshevist leaders had professed to fear only that the Provisional -Government would either refuse to convoke the Constituent Assembly or -in some manner prevent its free action. No small part of the influence -possessed by the Bolsheviki immediately prior to the overthrow of -Kerensky was due to the fact that, far from being suspected of -hostility to the Constituent Assembly, they were widely regarded as -its most vigorous and determined upholders. To confirm that belief the -Council of the People’s Commissaries issued this, its first decree: - - In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic, chosen - by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and - Soldiers’ Deputies with participation of peasant deputies, the - Council of People’s Commissars decrees: - - 1. The elections for the Constituent Assembly shall take place - at the date determined upon--November 12th. - - 2. All electoral commissions, organs of local self-government, - Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies, and - soldiers’ organizations on the front should make every effort - to assure free and regular elections at the date determined - upon. - - In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic, - - _The President of the Council of People’s Commissars_, - VLADIMIR ULIANOV--LENIN. - -That was in November, 1917--and the Constituent Assembly has not yet -been convoked. In _Pravda_, December 26, 1917, Lenin published a series -of propositions to show that the elections, which had taken place -since the Bolsheviki assumed power, did not give a clear indication of -the real voice of the masses! The elections had gone heavily against -the Bolsheviki, and that fact doubtless explains Lenin’s disingenuous -argument. Later on Lenin was able to announce that no assembly elected -by the masses by universal suffrage could be accepted! “The Soviet -Republic repudiates the hypocrisy of formal equality of all human -beings,” he wrote in his _Letter to American Workmen_. - -It is quite certain that the political power and influence of the -Soviets was never so small at any time since the birth of the -Revolution in March as it was when the Bolsheviki raised the cry, -“All power to the Soviets!” The reasons for this, if not obvious, are -easily intelligible: the mere facts that the election of a thoroughly -democratic constitutional convention at an early date was assured, -and that the electoral campaign had already begun, were by themselves -sufficient to cause many of those actively engaged in the revolutionary -struggle to turn their interest from the politics of the Soviets to -the greater political issues connected with the campaign for the -Constituent Assembly elections. There were other factors at work -lessening the popular interest in and, consequently, the political -influence of, the Soviets. In the first place, the hectic excitement of -the early stages of the Revolution had passed off, together with its -novelty, and life had assumed a _tempo_ nearer normal; in the second -place, city Dumas and the local Zemstvos, which had been elected during -the summer, upon a thoroughly democratic basis, were functioning, and, -naturally, absorbing much energy which had hitherto been devoted to the -Soviets. - -Concerning these things there is little room for dispute. The -_Izvestia_ of the Soviets again and again called attention to the -waning power and influence of the Soviets, always cheerfully and with -wise appreciation. On September 28, 1917, it said: - - At last a truly democratic government, born of the will of - all classes of the Russian people, the first rough form of - the future liberal parliamentary régime, has been formed. - Ahead of us is the Constituent Assembly, which will solve all - questions of fundamental law, and whose composition will be - essentially democratic. The function of the Soviets is at an - end, and the time is approaching when they must retire, with - the rest of the revolutionary machinery, from the stage of a - free and victorious people, whose weapons shall hereafter be - the peaceful ones of political action. - -On October 23, 1917, _Izvestia_ published an important article dealing -with this subject, saying: - - We ourselves are being called the “undertakers” of our own - organization. In reality, we are the hardest workers in - constructing the new Russia.... When autocracy and the entire - bureaucratic régime fell, we set up the Soviets as barracks in - which all the democracy could find temporary shelter. Now, in - place of barracks we are building the permanent edifice of a - new system, and naturally the people will gradually leave the - barracks for the more comfortable quarters. - -Dealing with the lessening activity of the local Soviets, scores of -which had ceased to exist, the Soviet organ said: - - This is natural, for the people are coming to be interested in - the more permanent organs of legislation--the municipal Dumas - and the Zemstvos. - -Continuing, the article said: - - In the important centers of Petrograd and Moscow, where the - Soviets were best organized, they did not take in all the - democratic elements.... The majority of the intellectuals did - not participate, and many workers also; some of the workers - because they were politically backward, others because the - center of gravity for them was in their unions.... We cannot - deny that these organizations are firmly united with the - masses, whose every-day needs are better served by them.... - - That the local democratic administrations are being - energetically organized is highly important. The city Dumas are - elected by universal suffrage, and in purely local matters have - more authority than the Soviets. Not a single democrat will see - anything wrong in this.... - - ... Elections to the municipalities are being conducted - in a better and more democratic way than the elections - to the Soviets.... All classes are represented in the - municipalities.... And as soon as the local self-governments - begin to organize life in the municipalities, the rôle of the - local Soviets naturally ends.... - - ... There are two factors in the falling off of interest in - the Soviets. The first we may attribute to the lowering of - political interest in the masses; the second to the growing - effort of provincial and local governing bodies to organize the - building of new Russia.... The more the tendency lies in this - latter direction the sooner disappears the significance of the - Soviets.... - -It seems to be hardly less certain, though less capable of complete -demonstration, perhaps, that the influence of the Soviets in the -factories was also on the wane. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that -there was an increasing sense of responsibility and a lessening of the -dangerous recklessness of the earlier stages of the Revolution. The -factory Soviets in the time of the Provisional Government varied so -greatly in their character and methods that it is rather difficult to -accurately represent them in a brief description. Many of them were -similar, in practice, to the shop meetings of the trades-unions; -others more nearly resembled the Whitley Councils of England. There -were still others, however, which asserted practically complete -ownership of the factories and forced the real owners out. - -On March 20, 1917, _Izvestia_ said: - - If any owner of an undertaking who is dissatisfied with the - demands made by the workmen refuses to carry on the business, - then the workmen must resolutely insist on the management - of the work being given over into their hands, under the - supervision of the Commissary of the Soviets. - -That is precisely what happened in many cases. We must not forget that -the Bolsheviki did not introduce Soviet control of industry. That -they did so is a very general belief, but, like so many other beliefs -concerning Russia, it is erroneous. The longest trial of the Soviet -control of industry took place under the régime of the Provisional -Government, in the pre-Bolshevist period. Many of the worst evils of -the system were developed during that period, though as a result of -Bolshevist propaganda and intrigue to a large degree. - -Industrial control by the workers, during the pre-Bolshevist period of -the Revolution, and especially during the spring and early summer, was -principally carried on by means of four distinct types of organization, -to all of which the general term “Soviet” was commonly applied. Perhaps -a brief description of each of these types will help to interpret the -history of this period: - -(1) Factory Councils. These may be called the true factory Soviets. -They existed in most factories, large and small alike, their size -varying in proportion to the number of workers employed. In a small -factory the Council might consist of seven or nine members; in a -large factory the number might be sixty. The latter figure seems -rarely to have been exceeded. Most of the Councils were elected by the -workers directly, upon a basis of equal suffrage, every wage-worker, -whether skilled or unskilled, male or female, being entitled to vote. -Boys and girls were on the same footing as their elders in this -respect. Generally the voting was done at mass-meetings, held during -working-hours, the ordinary method being a show of hands. While there -were exceptions to this rule, it was rare that foremen, technical -supervisors, or other persons connected with the management were -permitted to vote. In some cases the Council was elected indirectly, -that is to say, it was selected by a committee, called the Workshop -Committee. The Factory Council was not elected for any specified -period of time, as a rule, and where a definite period for holding -office was fixed, the right of recall was so easily invoked, and was -so freely exercised, that the result was the same as if there had been -no such provision. As a result of the nervous tension of the time, the -inevitable reaction against long-continued repression, there was much -friction at first and recalls and re-elections were common. The present -writer has received several reports, from sources of indubitable -authority, of factories in which two, and even three, Council elections -were held in less than one month! Of course, this is an incidental -fact, ascribable to the environment rather than to the institution. -The Councils held their meetings during working-hours, the members -receiving full pay for the time thus spent. Usually the Council would -hold a daily meeting, and it was not uncommon for the meetings to last -all day, and even into the evening--overtime being paid for the extra -hours. Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian Socialist Minister of State--a -most sympathetic observer--is authority for the statement that in -one establishment in Petrograd, employing 8,000 skilled workers, the -Factory Council, composed of forty-three men who each earned sixteen -rubles per day of eight hours, sat regularly eight hours per day.[24] - -[24] _Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution_, by Emile Vandervelde, -p. 71. - -To describe fully the functions of the Factory Councils would require -many pages, so complex were they. Only a brief synopsis of their most -important rights and duties is possible here. Broadly speaking, they -possessed the right of control over everything, but no responsibility -for successful management and administration. In their original form, -and where the owners still remained at the head, the Councils did -not interfere in such matters as the securing of raw materials, for -example. They did not interest themselves in the financial side of the -undertaking, at least not to see that its operations were profitable. -Their concern was to control the working conditions and to “guard the -interests of the workers.” They sometimes assumed the right to refuse -to do work upon contracts of which they disapproved. Jealous in their -exercise of the right to _control_, they would assume no responsibility -for _direction_. At the same time, however, they asserted--and -generally enforced--their right to determine everything relating to the -engaging or dismissal of workers, the fixing of wages, hours of labor, -rules of employment, and so on, as well as _the selection of foremen, -superintendents, technical experts, and even the principal managers of -the establishments_. Professor Ross quotes the statement made by the -spokesman of the employers at Baku, adding that the men did strike and -win: - - They ask that we grant leave on pay for a certain period to - a sick employee. Most of us are doing that already. They - stipulate that on dismissal an employee shall receive a month’s - pay for every year he has been in our service. Agreed. They - demand that no workman be dismissed without the consent of - a committee representing the men. That’s all right. They - require that we take on new men from a list submitted by - them. That’s reasonable enough. They know far better than we - can whether or not a fellow is safe to work alongside of in - a dangerous business like ours. But when they demand control - over the hiring and firing of _all_ our employees--foremen, - superintendents, and managers as well as workmen--we balk. - We don’t see how we can yield that point without losing the - control essential to discipline and efficiency. Yet if we don’t - sign to-night, they threaten to strike.[25] - -[25] _Russia in Upheaval_, by E. A. Ross, p. 277. - -(2) Workshop Committees. This term was sometimes used instead of -“Factory Councils,” particularly in the case of smaller factories, and -much confusion in the published reports of the time may be attributed -to this fact. Nothing is gained by an arbitrary division of Factory -Councils on the basis of size, since there was no material difference -in functions or methods. The term “Workshop Committee” was, however, -applied to a different organization entirely, which was to be found -in practically every large industrial establishment, along with, and -generally subordinated to, the Factory Council. These committees -usually carried out the policies formulated by the superior Factory -Councils. They did the greater part of the work usually performed by -a foreman, and their functions were sometimes summed up in the term -“collective foremanship.” They decided who should be taken on and who -employed; they decided when fines or other forms of punishment should -be imposed for poor work, sabotage, and other offenses. The foreman was -immediately responsible to them. Appeals from the decisions of these -committees might be made to the Councils, either by the owners or the -workers. Like the Councils, the committees were elected by universal, -equal voting at open meetings; indeed, in some cases, only the Workshop -Committee was so elected, being charged with the task of selecting the -Factory Council. - -(3) Wages Committees. These committees existed in the large -establishments, as a rule, especially those in which the labor employed -was of many kinds and varying degrees of skill. Like all other factory -organizations, they were elected by vote of the employees. Responsible -to the Factory Councils, though independently elected, the Wages -Committees classified all workers into their respective wage-groups, -fixed prices for piece-work, and so on. They could, and frequently did, -decide these matters independently, without consulting the management -at all. - -(4) Committees of Arbitration and Adjustment. These seem to have been -less common than the other committees already described. Elected solely -by the workers, in the same manner as the other bodies described, they -were charged with hearing and settling disputes arising, no matter -from what cause. They dealt with the charges brought by individual -employees, whether against the employers or against fellow-employees; -they dealt, also, with complaints by the workers as a whole against -conditions, with disputes over wages, and so on. _In all cases of -disputes between workers and employers the decision was left entirely -to the elected representatives of the workers._ - -The foregoing gives a very fair idea of the proletarian machinery set -up in the factories under the Provisional Government. In one factory -might be found operating these four popularly elected representative -bodies, all of them holding meetings in working-hours and being paid -for the time consumed; all of them involving more or less frequent -elections. No matter how moderate and restrained the description may -be, the impression can hardly fail to be one of appalling wastefulness -and confusion. As a matter of fact, there is very general agreement -that in practice, after the first few weeks, what seems a grotesque -system worked reasonably well, or, at least, far better than its -critics had believed possible. Of course, there _was_ much overlapping -of functions; there _was_ much waste. On the other hand, wasteful -strikes were avoided and the productive processes were maintained. Of -course, the experiment was made under abnormal conditions. Not very -much in the way of certain conclusion can be adduced from it. Opponents -of the Soviet theory and system will always point to the striking -decline of productive efficiency and say that it was the inevitable -result of the Soviet control; believers in the theory and the system -will say that the inefficiency would have been greater but for the -Soviets. - -That there was an enormous decline in productive efficiency during -the early part of the period of Soviet control cannot be disputed. -The evidence of this is too overwhelmingly conclusive. As early as -April, 1917, serious reports of this decline began to be made. It was -said that in some factories the per capita daily production was less -than a third of what it was a few weeks before. The air was filled -with charges that the workers were loafing and malingering. On April -11th Tseretelli denounced these “foul slanders” at a meeting of the -Petrograd Soviet and was wildly cheered. Nevertheless, one fact stood -out--namely, the sharp decline in productivity in almost every line. -There were not a few cases in which the owners and highly trained -managers were forced out entirely and their places filled by wholly -incompetent men possessing no technical training at all. An extreme -illustration is quoted by Ross:[26] In a factory in southern Russia -the workers forced the owner out and then undertook to run the plant -themselves. When they had used up the small supply of raw material -they had they began to sell the machines out of the works in order to -get money to buy more raw material; then, when they obtained the raw -material, they lacked the machinery for working it up. Of course, the -incident is simply an illustration of extreme folly, merely. Men misuse -safety razors to commit suicide with in extreme cases, and the misuse -of Soviet power in isolated cases proves little of value. On the other -hand, the case cited by Ross is only an extreme instance of a very -general practice. Many factories were taken over in the same way, after -the competent directors had been driven out, and were brought to ruin -by the Soviets. It was a general practice or, at any rate, a common -one, which drew from Skobelev, Minister of Labor, this protest, which -_Izvestia_ published at the beginning of May: - -[26] Ross, _op. cit._, p. 283. - - The seizure of factories makes workmen without any experience - in management, and without working capital, temporarily masters - of such undertakings, but soon leads to their being closed - down, or to the subjugation of the workmen to a still harder - taskmaster. - -On July 10th Skobelev issued another stirring appeal to the workers, -pointing out that “the success of the struggle against economic -devastation depends upon the productivity of labor, and pointing out -the danger of the growing anarchy. The appeal is too long to quote in -its entirety, but the following paragraphs give a good idea of it, -and, at the same time, indicate how serious the demoralization of the -workers had become: - - Workmen, comrades, I appeal to you at a critical period of - the Revolution. Industrial output is rapidly declining, the - quantity of necessary manufactured articles is diminishing, the - peasants are deprived of industrial supplies, we are threatened - with fresh food complications and increasing national - destitution. - - * * * * * - - The Revolution has swept away the oppression of the police - régime, which stifled the labor movement, and the liberated - working-class is enabled to defend its economic interests by - the mere force of its class solidarity and unity. They possess - the freedom of strikes, they have professional unions, which - can adapt the tactics of a mass economic movement, according to - the conditions of the present economic crisis. - - However, at present purely elemental tendencies are gaining the - upper hand over organized movement, and without regard to the - limited resources of the state, and without any reckoning as - to the state of the industry in which you are employed, and to - the detriment of the proletarian class movement, you sometimes - obtain an increase of wages which disorganizes the enterprise - and drains the exchequer. - - Frequently the workmen refuse all negotiations and by menace - of violence force the gratification of their demands. They - use violence against officials and managers, dismiss them of - their own accord, interfere arbitrarily with the technical - management, and even attempt to take the whole enterprise into - their own hands. - - * * * * * - - _Workmen, comrades, our socialistic ideals shall be attained - not by the seizure of separate factories, but by a high - standard of economic organization, by the intelligence of the - masses, and the wide development of the country’s productive - forces...._ Workmen, comrades, remember not only your rights, - but also your duties; think not only of your wishes, but of - the possibilities of granting them, not only of your own good, - but of the sacrifices necessary for the consolidation of the - Revolution and the triumph of our ideals. - -In July the per capita output in the munition-works of Petrograd was -reported as being only 25 per cent. of what it was at the beginning of -the year. In August Kornilov told the Moscow Democratic Conference that -the productivity of the workers in the great gun and shell plants had -declined 60 per cent., as compared with the three months immediately -prior to the Revolution; that the decline at the aeroplane-factories -was still greater, not less than 70 per cent. No denial of this came -from the representatives of the Soviets. In Petrograd, Nijni-Novgorod, -Saratov, and other large centers there was an estimated general decline -of production of between 60 and 70 per cent. - -The representatives of the workers, the Soviet leaders, said that -the decline, which they admitted, was due to causes over which the -Soviets had no control to a far greater degree than to any conscious -or unconscious sabotage by the workers. They admitted that many of -the workers had not yet got used to freedom; that they interpreted it -as meaning freedom from work. There was a very natural reaction, they -said, against the tremendous pace which had been maintained under the -old régime. They insisted, however, that this temporary failing of -the workers was a minor cause only, and that far greater causes were -(1) deterioration of machinery; (2) withdrawal for military reasons -and purposes of many of the most capable and efficient workers; (3) -shortage and poor quality of materials. - -There is room here for an endless controversy, and the present writer -does not intend to enter into it. He is convinced that the three causes -named by the Soviet defenders were responsible for a not inconsiderable -proportion of the decline in productivity, but that the Soviets and -the impaired morale of the workers were the main causes. In the mining -of coal and iron, the manufacture of munitions, locomotives, textiles, -metal goods, paper, and practically everything else, the available -reports show an enormous increase in production cost per unit, -accompanied by a very great decline in average per capita production. -It is true that there were exceptions to this rule, that there were -factories in which, after the first few days of the revolutionary -excitation in March, production per capita rose and was maintained at -a high level for a long time--until the Bolsheviki secured ascendancy -in those factories, in fact. The writer has seen and examined numerous -reports indicating this, but prefers to confine himself to the citation -of such reports as come with the authority of responsible and trusted -witnesses. - -Such a report is that of the Social Democrat, the workman Menshekov, -concerning the Ijevski factory with its 40,000 workmen, and of the -sales department of which he was made manager when full Soviet -control was established. In that position he had access to the -books showing production for the years 1916, 1917, and 1918, and the -figures show that under the Provisional Government production rose, -but that it declined with the rise of Bolshevism among the workers -and declined more rapidly when the Bolsheviki gained control. Such -another witness is the trades-unionist and Social Democrat, Oupovalov, -concerning production in the great Sormovo Works, in the Province of -Nijni-Novgorod, which during the war employed 20,000 persons. Not only -was production maintained, but there was even a marked improvement. -The writer has been permitted to examine the documentary evidence in -the possession of these men and believes that it fully confirms and -justifies the claim that, where there was an earnest desire on the part -of the workers to maintain and even to improve production, this proved -possible under Soviet control. - -The fact seems quite clear to the writer (though perhaps impossible to -prove by an adequate volume of concrete evidence) that the impaired -morale of the workers which resulted in lessened production was due -to two principal causes, namely, Bolshevist propaganda and the lack -of an intelligent understanding on the part of masses of workers who -were not mentally or morally ready for the freedom which was suddenly -thrust upon them. The condition of these latter is readily understood -and appreciated. The disciplines and self-compulsions of freedom are -not learned in a day. When we reflect upon the conditions that obtained -under czarism, we can hardly wonder that so many of the victims of -those conditions should have mistaken license for liberty, or that -they should have failed to see the vital connection between their own -honest effort in the shop and the success of the Revolution they were -celebrating. - -All through the summer the Bolsheviki were carrying on their propaganda -among the workers in the shops as well as among the troops at the -front. Just as they preached desertion to the soldiers, so they -preached sabotage and advocated obstructive strikes among the workers -in the factories. This was a logical thing for them to do; they wanted -to break up the military machine in order to compel peace, and a -blow at that machine was as effective when struck in the factory as -anywhere else. For men who were preaching mass desertion and mutiny -at the front, sabotage in the munition-works at the rear, or in the -transportation service on which the army depended, was a logical -policy. It is as certain as anything can be that the Bolshevist -agitation was one of the primary causes of the alarming decrease in -the production during the régime of the Provisional Government. On -the other hand, the Socialist leaders who supported the Provisional -Government waged a vigorous propaganda among the workers, urging them -to increase production. Where they made headway, in general there -production was maintained, or the decline was relatively small. The -counterpart of that patriotism which Kerensky preached among the troops -at the front with such magnificent energy was preached among the -factory-workers. Here is what Jandarmov says: - - It is a mistake to suppose that output was interfered with, - for, to do our working-class justice, nowhere was work delayed - for more than two days, and in many factories this epoch-making - development was taken without a pause in the ordinary routine. - - I cannot too strongly insist upon the altogether unanimous - idealism of those early days. There was not an ugly streak - in that beautiful dawn where now the skies are glowering and - red and frightful. I say that output was speeded up. I, as - chairman of the first Soviet,[27] assure you that we received - fifty-seven papers from workmen containing proposals for - increasing the efficiency of the factory; and that spirit - lasted three months, figures of output went well up and old - closed-down factories were reopened. _New Russia was bursting - with energy--the sluice-gates of our character were unlocked._ - -[27] That is, “first Soviet” at the Lisvinsk factory, about seventy -miles from Perm. - -There must have been a great deal of that exalted feeling among the -intelligent working-men of Russia in those stirring times. No one who -has known anything of the spiritual passion, of sacrificial quality, -which has characterized the Russian revolutionary movement can doubt -this. Of course, Jandarmov is referring to the early months before -Bolshevism began to spread in that district. Then there was a change. -It was the old, old story of rapidly declining production: - - But after the first few months the workers as a whole began to - fall under the spell of catchwords and stock phrases. Agitation - began among the lower workers. Bolshevism started in the ranks - of unskilled labor. They clamored for the reduction of hours - and down went the output. The defenders of the idea of the - shortest possible working-day were the same men who afterward - turned out very fiends of Bolshevism and every disorder. I - watched the growing of their madness and the development of - their claims, each more impossible than the last. - - In the Kiselovski mines the output of 2,000,000 poods monthly - dropped to 300,000, and the foundries of Upper Serginski - produced 1,200 poods of iron instead of 2,000. Why such a fall? - The engineers wondered how workers could reduce output to such - an extent if they tried, but one soon ceased to wonder at the - disasters that followed in quick succession. - - There was anarchy in the factories and a premium on idleness - became the order of the day. It was a positive danger to work - more than the laziest unskilled laborer, because this was the - type of man who always seemed to get to the top of the Soviet. - “Traitor to the interests of Labor” you were called if you - exceeded the time limit, which soon became two hours a day.[28] - -[28] These extracts are from a personal report by Jandarmov, sent to -the present writer. - -By September, 1917, a healthy reaction against the abuses of Soviet -industrial control was making itself felt in the factories. The workers -were making less extravagant demands and accepting the fact that -they could gain nothing by paralyzing production; that reducing the -quantity and the quality of production can only result in disaster -to the nation, and, most of all, to the workers themselves. In -numerous instances the factory Soviets had called back the owners they -had forced out, and the managers and technical directors they had -dismissed, and restored the authority of foremen. In other words, they -ceased to be controlling authorities and became simply consultative -bodies. While, therefore, they were becoming valuable democratic -agencies, the economic power and influence of the Soviets was waning. - -On the day of the _coup d’état_, November 7, 1917, the Bolshevist -Military Revolutionary Committee issued a special proclamation which -said, “The goal for which the people fought, the immediate proposal of -a democratic peace, the abolition of private landed property, _labor -control of industry_, the establishment of a Soviet Government--all -this is guaranteed.” Seven days later, November 14th, a decree was -issued, giving an outline of the manner in which the control of -industry by the Soviets was to be organized and carried out. The -principal features of this outline plan are set forth in the following -paragraphs: - - (1) In order to put the economic life of the country on an - orderly basis, control by the workers is instituted over all - industrial, commercial, and agricultural undertakings and - societies; and those connected with banking and transport, as - well as over productive co-operative societies which employ - labor or put out work to be done at home or in connection with - the production, purchase, and sale of commodities and of raw - materials, and with conservation of such commodities as well as - regards the financial aspect of such undertakings. - - (2) Control is exercised by all the workers of a given - enterprise through the medium of their elected organs, such - as factories and works committees, councils of workmen’s - delegates, etc., such organs equally comprising representatives - of the employees and of the technical staff. - - (3) In each important industrial town, province, or district - is set up a local workmen’s organ of control, which, being the - organ of the soldiers’, workmen’s, and peasants’ council, will - comprise the representatives of the labor unions, workmen’s - committees, and of any other factories, as well as of workmen’s - co-operative societies. - - * * * * * - - (5) Side by side with the Workmen’s Supreme Council of the - Labor Unions, committees of inspection comprising technical - specialists, accountants, etc. These committees, both on their - own initiative or at the request of local workmen’s organs of - control, proceed to a given locality to study the financial and - technical side of any enterprise. - - (6) The Workmen’s Organs of Control have the right to supervise - production, to fix a minimum wage in any undertaking, and to - take steps to fix the prices at which manufactured articles are - to be sold. - - (7) The Workmen’s Organs of Control have the right to control - all correspondence passing in connection with the business - of an undertaking, being held responsible before a court of - justice for diverting their correspondence. Commercial secrets - are abolished. The owners are called upon to produce to the - Workmen’s Organs of Control all books and moneys in hand, both - relating to the current year and to any previous transactions. - - (8) The decisions of the Workmen’s Organs of Control are - binding upon the owners of undertakings, and cannot be - nullified save by the decision of a Workmen’s Superior Organ of - Control. - - (9) Three days are given to the owners, or the administrators - of a business, to appeal to a Workmen’s Superior Court of - Control against the decisions filed by any of the lower organs - of Workmen’s Control. - - (10) In all undertakings, the owners and the representatives - of workmen and of employees delegated to exercise control - on behalf of the workmen, are responsible to the government - for the maintenance of strict order and discipline, and - for the conservation of property (goods). Those guilty of - misappropriating materials and products, of not keeping books - properly, and of similar offenses, are liable to prosecution. - - * * * * * - -It was not until December 27, 1917--seven weeks after their arbitrary -seizure of the reins of government--that the Bolsheviki published the -details of their scheme. Both the original preliminary outline and the -later carefully elaborated scheme made it quite evident that, no matter -how loudly and grandiloquently Lenin, Trotsky, Miliutin, Smedevich, -and others might talk about the “introduction” of workers’ control, in -point of fact they were only thinking of giving a certain legal status -to the Soviet system of control already in operation. That system, as -we have already seen, had been in their hands for some time. They had -used it to destroy efficiency, to cripple the factories and assist -in paralyzing the government and the military forces of the nation. -Now that they were no longer an opposition party trying to upset -the government, but were themselves the _de facto_ government, the -Bolsheviki could no longer afford to pursue the policy of encouraging -the factory Soviets to sabotage. Maximum production was the first -necessity of the Bolshevist Government, quite as truly as it had been -for the Provisional Government, and as it must have been for any other -government. Sabotage in the factories had been an important means of -combating the Provisional Government, but now it must be quickly -eliminated. So long as they were in the position of being a party of -revolt the Bolshevist leaders were ready to approve the seizure of -factories by the workers, regardless of the consequences to industrial -production or to the military enterprises dependent upon that -production. As the governing power of the nation, in full possession of -the machinery of government, such ruinous action by the workers could -not be tolerated. For the same reasons, the demoralization of the army, -which they had laboriously fostered, must now be arrested. - -In the instructions to the All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control, -published December 27, 1917, we find no important _extension_ of -the existing Soviet control; we do, however, find its _legalization -with important limitations_. These limitations, moreover, are merely -legalistic formulations of the modifications already developed in -practice and obtaining in many factories. A comparison of the full -text of the instructions with the account of the system of factory -control under the Provisional Government will demonstrate this beyond -doubt.[29] The control in each enterprise is to be organized “either -by the Shop or Factory Committee or by the General Assembly of workers -and employees of the enterprise, who elect a Special Commission of -Control” (Article I). In “large-scale enterprises” the election of -such a Control Commission is compulsory. To the Commission of Control -is given sole authority to “enter into relations with the management -upon the subject of control,” though it may give authorization to other -workers to enter into such relations if it sees fit (Article III). The -Control Commission must make report to the general body of workers and -employees in the enterprise “at least twice a month” (Article IV). The -article (No. 5) which deals with and defines the “Duties and Privileges -of the Control Commission” is so elaborate that it is almost impossible -to summarize it without injustice. It is, therefore, well to quote it -in full. - -[29] This important document is printed in full at the end of the book -as an Appendix. - - V. The Control Commission of each enterprise is required: - - 1. To determine the stock of goods and fuel possessed by the - plant, and the amount of these needed respectively for the - machinery of production, the technical personnel, and the - laborers by specialties. - - 2. To determine to what extent the plant is provided with - everything that is necessary to insure its normal operation. - - 3. To forecast whether there is danger of the plant closing - down or lowering production, and what the causes are. - - 4. To determine the number of workers by specialties likely to - be unemployed, basing the estimate upon the reserve supply and - the expected receipts of fuel and materials. - - 5. _To determine the measures to be taken to maintain - discipline in work among the workers and employees._ - - 6. To superintend the execution of the decisions of - governmental agencies regulating the buying and selling of - goods. - - 7. (_a_) _To prevent the arbitrary removal of machines, - materials, fuel, etc., from the plant without authorization - from the agencies which regulate economic affairs, and to see - that inventories are not tampered with._ - - (_b_) To assist in explaining the causes of the lowering of - production and to take measures for raising it. - - 8. To assist in elucidating the possibility of a complete or - partial utilization of the plant for some kind of production - (especially how to pass from a war to a peace footing, and - what kind of production should be undertaken), to determine - what changes should be made in the equipment of the plant and - in the number of its personnel, to accomplish this purpose; to - determine in what period of time these changes can be effected; - to determine what is necessary in order to make them, and the - probable amount of production after the change is made to - another kind of manufacture. - - 9. To aid in the study of the possibility of developing the - kinds of labor required by the necessities of peace-times, - such as the methods of using three shifts of workmen, or any - other method, by furnishing information on the possibilities of - housing the additional number of laborers and their families. - - 10. _To see that the production of the plant is maintained - at the figures to be fixed by the governmental regulating - agencies, and until such time as these figures shall have been - fixed to see that the production reaches the normal average for - the plant, judged by a standard of conscientious labor._ - - 11. To co-operate in estimating costs of production of the - plant upon the demand of the higher agency of workers’ control - or upon the demand of the governmental regulating institutions. - -It is expressly stipulated that only the owner has “the right to give -orders to the directors of the plant”; that the Control Commission -“does not participate in the management of the plant and has no -responsibility for its development and operation” (Article VII). It is -also definitely stated that the Control Commission has no concern with -financial management of the plant (Article VIII). Finally, while it -has the right to “recommend for the consideration of the governmental -regulating institutions the question of the sequestration of the plant -or other measures of constraint upon the plant,” the Control Commission -“has not the right to seize and direct the enterprise” (Article IX). -These are the principal clauses of this remarkable document relating -to the functions and methods of the Soviet system of control in the -factory itself; other clauses deal with the relations of the factory -organizations to the central governmental authority and to the -trades-unions. They prescribe and define a most elaborate system of -bureaucracy. - -So much for the _imperium in imperio_ of the Soviet system of -industrial control conceived by the Bolsheviki. In many important -respects it is much more conservative than the system itself had -been under Kerensky. It gives legal form and force to those very -modifications which had been brought about, and it specifically -prohibits the very abuses the Bolshevist agitators had fostered and -the elimination of which they had everywhere bitterly resisted. -Practically every provision in the elaborate decree of instructions -limiting the authority of the workers, defining the rights of the -managers, insisting upon the maintenance of production, and the like, -the Kerensky government had endeavored to introduce, being opposed -and denounced therefor by the Bolsheviki. It is easy to imagine how -bitterly that decree of instructions on Workers’ Control would have -been denounced by Lenin and Trotsky had it been issued by Kerensky’s -Cabinet in July or August. - -Let us not make the mistake, however, of assuming that because the -Bolsheviki in power thus sought to improve the system of industrial -control, to purge it of its weaknesses--its reckless lawlessness, -sabotage, tyranny, dishonesty, and incompetence--that there was -actually a corresponding improvement in the system itself. The -pro-Bolshevist writers in this country and in western Europe have -pointed to these instructions, and to many other decrees conceived in -a similar spirit and couched in a similar tone, as conclusive evidence -of moderation, constructive statesmanship, and wise intention. Alas! -in statesmanship good intention is of little value. In politics and -social polity, as in life generally, the road to destruction is paved -with “good intentions.” The Lenins and Trotskys, who in opposition and -revolt were filled with the fury of destruction, might be capable of -becoming builders under the influence of a solemn recognition of the -obligations of authority and power. But for the masses of the people -no such change was possible. Such miracles do not happen, except in -the disordered imaginations of those whose minds are afflicted with -moral Daltonism and that incapacity for sequential thinking which -characterizes such a wide variety of subnormal mentalities. - -By their propaganda the Bolsheviki had fostered an extremely -anti-social consciousness, embracing sabotage, lawlessness, and narrow -selfishness; the manner in which they had seized the governmental -power, and brutally frustrated the achievement of that great democratic -purpose which had behind it the greatest collective spiritual impulse -in the history of the nation, greatly intensified that anti-social -consciousness. Now that they were in power these madmen hoped that -in the twinkling of an eye, by the mere issuance of decrees and -manifestoes, they could eradicate the evil thing. Canute’s command to -the tide was not one whit more vain than their verbose decrees hurled -against the relentless and irresistible sequence of cause and effect. -Loafing, waste, disorder, and sabotage continued in the factories, -as great a burden to the Bolshevist oligarchs as they had been to -the democrats. Workers continued to “seize” factories as before, and -production steadily declined to the music of an insatiable demand -on the part of the workers for more pay. There was no change in the -situation, except in so far as it grew worse. The governmental machine -grew until it became like an immense swarm of devastating locusts, -devouring everything and producing nothing. History does not furnish -another such record of industrial chaos and ruinous inefficiency. - -Five days after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviki, the Commissar -of Labor, Shliapnikov, issued a protest against sabotage and violence. -Naturally, he ascribed the excesses of the workers to provocation by -the propertied classes. That “proletarian consciousness” upon which -the Bolsheviki based their faith must have been sadly lacking in the -workers if, at such a time, they were susceptible to the influence of -the “propertied classes.” The fact is that the destructive anarchical -spirit they had fostered was now a deadly menace to the Bolsheviki -themselves. Shliapnikov wrote: - - The propertied classes are endeavoring to create anarchy and - the ruin of industry by provoking the workmen to excesses - and violence over the question of foremen, technicians, and - engineers. They hope thereby to achieve the complete and - final ruin of all the mills and factories. The revolutionary - Commission of Labor asks you, our worker-comrades, to abstain - from all acts of violence and excess. By a joint and creative - work of the laboring masses and proletarian organizations, the - Commission of Labor will know how to surmount all obstacles - in its way. The new revolutionary government will apply the - most drastic measures against all industrials and those who - continue to sabotage industry, and thereby prevent the carrying - out of the tasks and aims of the great proletarian and peasant - Revolution. Executions without trial and other arbitrary acts - will only damage the cause of the Revolution. The Commission - of Labor calls on you for self-control and revolutionary - discipline. - -In January, 1918, Lenin read to a gathering of party workers a -characteristic series of numbered “theses,” which _Izvestia_ published -on March 8th of that year. In that document he said: - - 1. The situation of the Russian Revolution at the present - moment is such that almost all workmen and the overwhelming - majority of the peasants undoubtedly are on the side of the - Soviet authority, and of the social revolution started by it. - To that extent the success of the socialistic revolution in - Russia is guaranteed. - - 2. At the same time the civil war, caused by the frantic - resistance of the propertied classes which understand very well - that they are facing the last and decisive struggle to preserve - private property in land, and in the means of production, has - not as yet reached its highest point. The victory of the Soviet - authority in this war is guaranteed, but inevitably some time - yet must pass, inevitably a considerable exertion of strength - will be required, a certain period of acute disorganization and - chaos, which always attend any war and in particular a civil - war, is inevitable, before the resistance of the bourgeoisie - will be crushed. - - 3. Further, this resistance takes less and less active and - non-military forms: sabotage, bribing beggars, bribing agents - of the bourgeoisie who have pushed themselves into the ranks - of the Socialists in order to ruin the latter’s cause, etc. - This resistance has proved stubborn, and capable of assuming - so many different forms, that the struggle against it will - inevitably drag along for a certain period, and will probably - not be finished in its main aspects before several months. And - without a decisive victory over this passive and concealed - resistance of the bourgeoisie and its champions, the success of - the socialistic revolution is impossible. - - 4. Finally, the organizing tasks of the socialistic - reorganization of Russia are so enormous and difficult that a - rather prolonged period of time is also required to solve them, - in view of the large number of petty bourgeois fellow-travelers - of the socialistic proletariat, and of the latter’s low - cultural level. - - 5. All these circumstances taken together are such that from - them result _the necessity, for the success of Socialism in - Russia, of a certain interval of time, not less than a few - months_, in the course of which the socialistic government must - have its hands absolutely free, in order to triumph over the - bourgeoisie, first of all in its own country, and in order to - adopt broad and deep organizing activity. - -The greatest significance of Lenin’s words lies in their recognition -of the seriousness of the non-military forms of resistance, sabotage, -and the like, and of the “low cultural level” of the “socialistic -proletariat.” Reading the foregoing statements carefully and -remembering Lenin’s other utterances, both before and after, we -are compelled to wonder whether he is intellectually dishonest, an -unscrupulous trickster playing upon the credulity of his followers, -or merely a loose thinker adrift and helpless on the swift tides of -events. “For the success of Socialism ... not less than _a few months_” -we read from the pen of the man who, in June of the previous year, -while on his way from Switzerland, had written “Socialism cannot now -prevail in Russia”; the same man who in May, 1918, was to tell his -comrades “it is hardly to be expected that the even more developed -coming generation will accomplish a complete transition to Socialism”; -who later told Raymond Robins: “The Russian Revolution will probably -fail. We have not developed far enough in the capitalist stage, we are -too primitive to realize the Socialist state.”[30] - -[30] _Vide_ testimony of Robins before U. S. Senate Committee. - -And yet--“the success of Socialism ... not less than a few months!” - -By the latter part of February, 1918, it was quite clear that the -Soviet control of industry was “killing the goose that laid the golden -eggs”; that it was ruining the industrial life of the nation. The -official press began to discuss in the most serious manner the alarming -decline in production and the staggering financial losses incurred in -the operation of what formerly had been profitable enterprises. At the -Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, in March, 1918, the seriousness of -the situation caused great alarm and a desperate appeal was made to the -workers to increase production, refrain from sabotage, and practise -self-discipline. The congress urged “a merciless struggle against chaos -and disorganization.” Lenin himself pointed out that confiscation of -factories by the workers was ruining Russia. The very policy they had -urged upon the workers, the seizure of the factories, was now seen as a -menace. - -On April 28, 1918, Lenin said: “If we are to expropriate at this -pace, we shall be certain to suffer a defeat. The organization of -production under proletarian control is notoriously very much behind -the expropriation of big masses of capital.”[31] He had already come to -realize that the task of transforming capitalist society to a Socialist -society was not the easy matter he had believed shortly before. In -September he had looked upon the task of realizing Socialism as a child -might have done. It would require a Freudian expert to explain the -silly childishness of this paragraph from _The State and Revolution_, -published in September, 1917: - -[31] _Soviets at Work._ I have quoted the passage as it appears in the -English edition of Kautsky’s _Dictatorship of the Proletariat_, p. -125. This rendering, which conforms to the French translations of the -authorized text, is clearer and stronger than the version given in the -confessedly “improved” version of Lenin’s speech by Doctor Dubrovsky, -published by the Rand School of Social Science. - - Capitalist culture has created industry on a large scale in - the shape of factories, railways, posts, telephones, and so - forth; and on this basis the great majority of the functions - of the old state have become enormously simplified and reduced - in practice to very simple operations, such as registration, - filing, and checking. Hence they will be quite within the reach - of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform - them for the usual “working-man’s wages.”[32] - -[32] _The State and Revolution_, by N. Lenin, p. 12. - -Thus it was in September, before the overthrow of the Provisional -Government. Then Lenin was at the head of a revolting faction and -presented the task of reorganizing the state as very simple indeed. -In April he was at the head of a government, confronted by realities, -and emphasizing the enormous difficulty and complexity of the task of -reorganization. _The Soviets at Work_ and the later booklet, _The Chief -Tasks of Our Times_, lay great emphasis upon the great difficulties to -be overcome, the need of experienced and trained men, and the folly -of expecting anything like immediate success. “We know all about -Socialism,” he said, “but we do not know how to organize on a large -scale, how to manage distribution, and so on. The old Bolshevist -leaders have not taught us these things, and this is not to the credit -of our party.”[33] - -[33] _The Chief Tasks of Our Times_, p. 12. - -The same man who had urged the workers to “take possession of -the factories” now realized how utterly unfitted the mass of the -workers must be for undertaking the management of modern industrial -establishments: - - To every deputation of workers which has come to me complaining - that a factory was stopping work, I have said, “If you desire - the confiscation of your factory the decree forms are ready, - and I can sign a decree at once. But tell me: Can you take - over the management of the concern? Have you reckoned what - you can produce? Do you know the relations of your work with - Russian and foreign markets?” Then it has appeared that they - are inexperienced in these matters; that there is nothing - about them in the Bolshevist literature, in the Menshevist, - either.[34] - -[34] _Idem_, p. 12. - -Lenin and his associates had been brought face to face with a condition -which many Marxian Socialist writers had foreseen was likely to exist, -not only in Russia, but in far more highly developed industrial -nations, namely, a dangerous decline of production and of the average -productivity of the workers, instead of the enormous increase which -must be attained before any of the promises of Socialism could be -redeemed. A few figures from official Bolshevist sources will serve -to illustrate the seriousness of the decline in production. The great -Soromovo Works had produced fifteen locomotives monthly, even during -the last months of the Kerensky régime. By the end of April, 1918, it -was pointed out, the output was barely two per month. At the Mytishchy -Works in Moscow, the production, as compared with 1916, was only 40 per -cent. At this time the Donetz Basin was held by the Bolsheviki. The -average monthly output in the coal-fields of this important territory -prior to the arrival of the Bolsheviki was 125,000,000 poods. The -rule of the Bolsheviki was marked by a serious and continuous decline -in production, dropping almost at once to 80,000,000 poods and then -steadily declining, month by month, until in April-May, 1918, it -reached the low level of 26,000,000 poods.[35] When the Bolsheviki were -driven away, the production rose month by month, until, in December, -1918, it had reached 40,000,000 poods. Then the Bolsheviki won control -once more and came back, and at once production declined with great -swiftness, soon getting down to 24,000,000 poods.[36] These figures, be -it remembered, are official Bolshevist figures. - -[35] _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, May 6, 1919. - -[36] _Idem._ - -So serious was the decline of production in every department that a -commission was appointed to investigate the matter. The commission -reported in January, 1919, and from its report the following facts -are quoted: in the Moscow railway workshops the number of workmen in -1916 was 1,192; in 1917 the number was 1,179; in 1918 it was 1,772--an -increase of 50 per cent. The number of holidays and “off days” rose -from 6 per cent. in 1916 to 12 per cent. in 1917 and 39.5 per cent. in -1918. At the same time, each car turned out per month represented the -labor of 3.35 men in 1918 as against 1 in 1917 and .44 in 1916. In the -Mytishchy Works, Moscow, the loss of production was enormous. Taking -the eight-hour day as a basis, and counting as 100 the production of -1916, the production in 1917 amounted to 75, and only 40 in 1918. In -the coal-mines of the Moscow region the fall of labor productivity was -equally marked. The normal production per man is given as 750 poods -per month. In 1916 the production was 614 poods; in 1917 it was 448 -poods, and in 1918 it was only 242 poods. In the textile industries the -decline in productivity was 35 per cent., including the flax industry, -which does not depend upon the importation of raw materials.[37] In the -Scherbatchev factory the per-capita production of calico was 68 per -cent, lower than in 1917, according to the _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. -50). - -[37] For most of the statistical data in this chapter I am indebted to -Prof. V. I. Issaiev, whose careful analyses of the statistical reports -of the Soviet Government are of very great value to all students of the -subject.--AUTHOR. - -It is not necessary to quote additional statistics from the report of -the investigating commission. The figures cited are entirely typical. -The report as a whole reveals that there not only had been no arrest -of the serious decline of the year 1917, but _an additional decline at -an accelerated rate_, and that the condition was general throughout -all branches of industry. The report attributes this serious condition -partly to loss of efficiency in the workers due to under-nutrition, but -more particularly to the mistaken conception of freedom held by the -workers, their irresponsibility and indifference; to administrative -chaos arising from inefficiency; and, finally, the enormous amount of -time lost in holding meetings and elections and in endless committees. -In general this report confirms the accounts furnished by the agent of -the governments of Great Britain and the United States of America and -published by them,[38] as well as reports made by well-known European -Socialists. - -[38] See the British _White Book_ and the _Memorandum on Certain -Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia_, presented to the Foreign -Relations Committee of the U. S. Senate by Secretary of State Lansing, -January 5, 1920. - -As early as April, 1918, Lenin and other Bolshevist leaders had taken -cognizance of the enormous loss of time consumed by the innumerable -meetings which Soviet control of industry involved. Lenin claimed, with -much good reason, that much of this wasteful talking was the natural -reaction of men who had been repressed too long, though his argument is -somewhat weakened by the fact that there had been eight months of such -talk before the Bolshevist régime began: - - The habit of holding meetings is ridiculed, and more often - wrathfully hissed at by the bourgeoisie, Mensheviks, etc., - who see only chaos, senseless bustle, and outbursts of petty - bourgeoisie egoism. But without the “holding of meetings” the - oppressed masses could never pass from the discipline forced - by the exploiters to conscious and voluntary discipline. - “Meeting-holding” is the real democracy of the toilers, their - straightening out, their awakening to a new life, their - first steps on the field which they themselves have cleared - of reptiles (exploiters, imperialists, landed proprietors, - capitalists), and which they want to learn to put in order - themselves in their own way; for themselves, in accord with - the principles of their, “Soviet,” rule, and not the rule of - the foreigners, of the nobility and bourgeoisie. The November - victory of the toilers against the exploiters was necessary; it - was necessary to have a whole period of elementary discussion - by the toilers themselves of the new conditions of life and - of the new problems to make possible _a secure transition to - higher forms of labor discipline, to a conscious assimilation - of the idea of the necessity of the dictatorship of the - proletariat, to absolute submission to the personal orders of - the representatives of the Soviet rule during work_.[39] - -[39] _The Soviets at Work_, p. 37. - -There is a very characteristic touch of Machiavellian artistry in this -reference to “a secure transition to higher forms of labor discipline,” -in which there is to be “absolute submission to the personal orders -of the representatives of the Soviet rule during work.” The eloquent -apologia for the Soviet system of industrial control by the workers -carries the announcement of the liquidation of that system. It is to -be replaced by some “higher forms of labor discipline,” forms which -will not attempt the impossible task of conducting factories on -“debating-society lines.” The “petty bourgeois tendency to turn the -members of the Soviets into ‘parliamentarians,’ or, on the other hand, -into bureaucrats,” is to be combated. In many places the departments -of the Soviets are turning “into organs which gradually merge with the -commissariats”--in other words, are ceasing to function as governing -bodies in the factories. There is a difficult transition to be made -which alone will make possible “the definite realization of Socialism,” -and that is to put an end to the wastefulness arising from the attempt -to combine the discussion and solution of political problems with work -in the factories. There must be a return to the system of uninterrupted -work for so many hours, with politics after working-hours. That is -what is meant by the statement: “It is our object to obtain _the free -performance of state obligations by every toiler after he is through -with his eight-hour session of productive work_.” - -Admirable wisdom! Saul among the prophets at last! The romancer turns -realist! But this program cannot be carried out without making of -the elaborate system of workers’ control a wreck, a thing of shreds -and patches. Away goes the Utopian combination of factory and forum, -in which the dynamos are stilled when there are speeches to be -made--pathetic travesty of industry and government both. The toiler -must learn that his “state obligations” are to be performed after the -day’s work is done, and not in working-time at the expense of the -pay-roll. More than this, it is necessary to place every factory under -the absolute dictatorship of one person: - - Every large machine industry requires an absolute and strict - unity of the will which directs the joint work of hundreds, - thousands, and tens of thousands of people.... But how can - we secure a strict unity of will? By subjecting the will of - thousands to the will of one.[40] - -[40] _The Soviets at Work._ - -If the workers are properly submissive, if they are “ideally conscious -and disciplined,” this dictatorship may be a very mild affair; -otherwise it will be stern and harsh: - - There is a lack of appreciation of the simple and obvious - fact that, if the chief misfortunes of Russia are famine and - unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be overcome by any - outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and universal - organization of discipline, in order to increase the production - of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it in - time, and to distribute it in the right way. That, therefore, - responsibility for the pangs of famine and unemployment - falls on _every one who violates the labor discipline in any - enterprise and in any business_. That those who are responsible - should be discovered, tried, and _punished without mercy_.[41] - -[41] _Idem._ - -Not only must the workers abandon their crude conception of industrial -democracy as requiring the abolition of individual authority, but -they must also abandon the notion that in the management of industry -one man is as good as another. They must learn that experts are -necessary:[42] “Without the direction of specialists of different -branches of knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation -toward Socialism is impossible.” Although it is a defection from -proletarian principles, a compromise, “a step backward by our Socialist -Soviet state,” it is necessary to “make use of the old bourgeois -method and agree to a very high remuneration for the biggest of the -bourgeois specialists.” The proletarian principles must still further -be compromised and the payment of time wages on the basis of equal -remuneration for all workers must give place to payment according to -performance; piece-work must be adopted. Finally, the Taylor system of -scientific management must be introduced: “The possibility of Socialism -will be determined by our success in combining the Soviet rule and -Soviet organization of management with the latest progressive measures -of capitalism. _We must introduce in Russia the study and the teaching -of the Taylor system, and its systematic trial and adaptation._”[43] - -[42] A much later statement of Lenin’s view is contained in this -paragraph from a speech by him on March 17, 1920. The quotation is from -_Soviet Russia_, official organ of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau -in the United States: - - “Every form of administrative work requires specific - qualifications. One may be the best revolutionist and agitator - and yet useless as an administrator. It is important that - those who manage industries be completely competent, and be - acquainted with all technical conditions within the industry. - We are not opposed to the management of industries by the - workers. _But we point out that the solution of the question - must be subordinate to the interests of the industry._ - Therefore the question of the management of industry must - be regarded from a business standpoint. The industry must - be managed with the least possible waste of energy, and the - managers of the industry must be efficient men, whether they be - specialists or workers.” - -[43] _The Soviets at Work._ - -In all this there is much that is fine and admirable, but it is in -direct and fundamental opposition to the whole conception of industrial -control by factory Soviets. No thoughtful person can read and compare -the elaborate provisions of the Instructions on Workers’ Control, -already summarized, and Lenin’s _Soviets at Work_ without reaching the -conclusion that the adoption of the proposals contained in the latter -absolutely destroys the former. The end of the Soviet as a proletarian -industry-directing instrument was already in sight. - -Bolshevism was about to enter upon a new phase. What the general -character of that phase would be was quite clear. It had already -been determined and Lenin’s task was to justify what was in reality -a reversal of policy. The essential characteristics of the Soviet -system in industry, having proved to be useless impedimenta, were to be -discarded, and, in like manner, anti-Statism was to be exchanged for an -exaggerated Statism. In February, 1918, the Bolshevist rulers of Russia -were confronted by a grave menace, an evil inherent in Syndicalism in -all its variant forms, including Bolshevism--namely, the assertion -of exorbitant demands by workers employed in performing services of -immediate and vital importance in the so-called “key industries.” -Although the railway workers were only carrying the Bolshevist theories -into practice, acquiescence in their demands would have placed the -whole industrial life of Russia under their domination. Instead of a -dictatorship of the proletariat, there would have been dictatorship -by a single occupational group. Faced by this danger, the Bolshevist -Government did not hesitate to nationalize the railways and place them -under an absolute dictator, responsible, not to the railway workers, -but to the central Soviet authority, the government. Wages, hours of -labor, and working conditions were no longer subject to the decision of -the railway workers’ councils, but were determined by the dictators -appointed by the state. The railway workers’ unions were no longer -recognized, and the right to strike was denied and strikes declared -to be treason against the state. The railway workers’ councils were -not abolished at first, but were reduced to a nominal existence as -“consultative bodies,” which in practice were not consulted. Here was -the apotheosis of the state: the new policy could not be restricted -to railways; nationalization of industry, under state direction, was -to take the place of the direction of industry by autonomous workers’ -councils. - -In May, 1918, Commissar of Finances Gukovsky, staggered by the enormous -loss incurred upon every hand, in his report to the Congress of -Soviets called attention to the situation. He said that the railway -system, the arterial system of the industrial life of the nation, was -completely disorganized and demoralized. Freight-tonnage capacity had -decreased by 70 per cent., while operating expenses had increased 150 -per cent. Whereas before the war operating expenses were 11,579 rubles -per verst, in May, 1918, _wages alone_ amounted to 80,000 rubles per -verst, the total working expenses being not less than 120,000 rubles -per verst. A similar state of demoralization obtained, said Gukovsky, -in the nationalized marine transportation service. In every department -of industry, according to this highly competent authority, waste, -inefficiency, idleness, and extravagance prevailed. He called attention -to the swollen salary-list; the army of paid officials. Already the -menace of what soon developed into a formidable bureaucracy was seen: -“The machinery of the old régime has been preserved, the ministries -remain, and parallel with them Soviets have arisen--provincial, -district, volost, and so forth.” - -In June, 1918, after the railways had been nationalized for some time, -Kobozev, Bolshevist Commissar of Communications, said: “The eight-hour -workday and the payment per hour have definitely disorganized the whole -politically ignorant masses, who understand these slogans, not as an -appeal to the most productive efficiency of a free citizen, but as a -right to idleness unjustified by any technical means. _Whole powerful -railway workshops give a daily disgraceful exhibition of inactivity_ on -the principle of ‘Why should I work when my neighbor is paid by time -for doing no work at all?’” - -Although nationalization of industry had been decided upon in February, -and a comprehensive plan for the administration and regulation of -nationalized enterprises had been published in March, promulgated as a -decree, with instructions that it must be enforced by the end of May, -it was not until July that the Soviet Government really decided upon -its enforcement. It should be said, however, that a good many factories -were nationalized between April and July. Many factories were actually -abandoned by their owners and directors, and had to be taken over. Many -others were just taken in an “irregular manner” by the workers, who -continued their independent confiscations. For this there was indeed -some sort of authority in the decree of March, 1918.[44] Transportation -had broken down, and there was a lack of raw materials. It was -officially reported that in May there were more than 250,000 unemployed -workmen in Moscow alone. No less than 224 machine-shops, which had -employed an aggregate of 120,000 men, were closed. Thirty-six textile -factories, employing a total of 136,000 operatives, were likewise idle. -To avert revolt, it was necessary to keep these unemployed workers -upon the pay-roll. Under czarism the policy of subsidizing industrial -establishments out of the government revenues had been very extensively -developed. This policy was continued by the Provisional Government -under Kerensky and by the Bolsheviki in their turn. Naturally, with -industry so completely disorganized, this led toward bankruptcy at a -rapid rate. The following extract from Gukovsky’s report to the Central -Executive Committee in May requires no elucidation: - -[44] See text of the decree--Appendix. - - Our Budget has reached the astronomical figures of from 80 to - 100 billions of rubles. No revenue can cover such expenditure. - Our revenue for the half-year reaches approximately - 3,294,000,000 rubles. It is exceedingly difficult to find a - way of escape out of this situation. The repudiation of state - loans played a very unfavorable part in this respect, as now - it is impossible to borrow money--no one will lend. Formerly - railways used to yield a revenue, and agriculture likewise. Now - agriculturists refuse to export their produce, they are feeding - better and hoarding money. The former apparatus--in the shape - of a Government Spirit Monopoly and rural police officers--no - longer exists. Only one thing remains to be done--to issue - paper money _ad infinitum_. But soon we shall not be able to do - even this. - -At the Congress of the Soviets of People’s Economy in May, Rykov, the -president of the Superior Council of the National Board of Economy, -reported, concerning the nationalization of industries, that so far -it had been carried out without regard to industrial economy or -efficiency, but exclusively from the point of view of successfully -struggling against the bourgeoisie. It was, therefore, a war measure, -and must not be judged by ordinary economic standards. Miliutin, -another Bolshevist Commissar, declared that “nationalization bore a -punitive character.” It was pointed out by Gostev, another Bolshevist -official, that it had been carried out against the wishes of many of -the workers themselves quite as much as against the wishes of the -bourgeoisie. “I must laugh when they speak of bourgeois sabotage,” -he said. “_We have a national people’s and proletarian sabotage. We -are met with enormous opposition from the labor masses when we start -standardizing._” For good or ill, however, and despite all opposition, -Bolshevism had turned to nationalization and to the erection of a -powerful and highly centralized state. What the results of that policy -were we shall see. - - - - -IX - -THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY--I - - -To judge fairly and wisely the success or failure of an economic and -political policy so fundamental and far-reaching as the nationalization -of industry we must discard theories altogether and rely wholly upon -facts. Nothing could be easier than to formulate theoretical arguments -of great plausibility and force, either in support of the state -ownership of industries and their direction by state agencies or in -opposition to such a policy. Interesting such theorizing may be, but -nothing can be conclusively determined by it. When we come to deal with -the case of a country where, as in Russia, nationalization of industry -has been tried upon quite a large scale, there is only one criterion to -apply, namely, its relative success as compared with other methods of -industrial organization and management in the same or like conditions. -If nationalization and state direction can be shown to have brought -about greater advantage than other forms of industrial ownership and -control, then nationalization is justified by that result; if, on the -other hand, its advantages are demonstrably less, it must be judged a -failure. - -Whether the nationalization of industry by the Bolshevist Government -of Russia was a sound policy, wisely conceived and carried out with a -reasonable degree of efficiency, can be determined with a fair approach -to certainty and finality. Our opinions concerning Karl Marx’s theory -of the economic motivation of social evolution, or Lenin’s ability -and character, or the methods by which the Bolsheviki obtained power, -are absolutely irrelevant and inconsequential. History will base its -estimate of Bolshevism, not upon the evidence of the terrorism which -attended it, ample and incontestable as that evidence may be, but upon -its success or failure in solving the great economic problems which -it set out to solve. Our judgment of the nationalization of industry -must not be warped by our resentment of those features of Bolshevist -rule which established its tyrannical character. The ample testimony -furnished by the official journals published by the Bolshevist -Government and the Communist Party enables us to visualize with great -clearness the conditions prevailing in Russia before nationalization -of industry was resorted to. We have seen that there was an alarming -shortage of production, a ruinous excess of cost per unit of -production, a great deal of inefficiency and waste, together with a -marked increase in the number of salaried administrative officials. -We have seen that during the period of industrial organization and -direction by the autonomous organizations of the workers in the -factories these evils grew to menacing proportions. It was to remedy -these evils that nationalization was resorted to. If, therefore, we -can obtain definite and authoritative answers to certain questions -which inevitably suggest themselves, we shall be in a position to -judge the merits of nationalization, not as a general policy, for all -times and places, but as a policy for Russia in the circumstances -and conditions prevailing when it was undertaken. The questions -suggest themselves: Was there any increase in the total volume of -production? Was the average per-capita production raised or lowered? -Did the new methods result in lessening the excessive average cost -per unit of production? Was there any perceptible marked increase in -efficiency? Finally, did nationalization lessen the number of salaried -administrative officials or did it have a contrary effect? - -We are not concerned with opinions here, but only with such definite -facts as are to be had. The replies to our questions are to be found -in the mass of statistical data which the Bolsheviki have published. -We are not compelled to rely upon anybody’s opinions or observations; -the numerous reports published by the responsible officials of the -Bolshevist Government, and by their official press, contain an -abundance of statistical evidence affording adequate and reliable -answer to each of the questions we have asked. - -Because the railways were nationalized first, and because of their -vital importance to the general economic life of the nation, let us -consider how the nationalization of railroad transportation worked out. -The following table is taken from the report of the Commissar of Ways -and Communications: - - Working - Gross Working Expenses Wages and Profit and - Year Receipts Expenses per Verst Salaries Loss - (rubles) (rubles) (rubles) (rubles) (rubles) - - 1916 1,350,000,000 1,210,000,000 1,700 650,000,000 +140,000,000 - 1917 1,400,000,000 3,300,000,000 46,000 2,300,000,000 -1,900,000,000 - 1918 1,500,000,000 9,500,000,000 44,000 8,000,000,000 -8,000,000,000 - -These figures indicate that the nationalization of railways during -the nine months of 1918 was characterized by a condition which no -country in the world could stand for a very long time. This official -table affords no scintilla of a suggestion that nationalization was -succeeding any better than the anarcho-Syndicalist management which -preceded it. The enormous increase in operating cost, the almost -stationary receipts, and the resulting colossal deficit require no -comment. At least on the financial side the nationalization policy -cannot be said to have been a success, a fact which was frankly -admitted by the _Severnaya Communa_, March 26, 1919. To see a profit -of 140 million rubles transformed into a loss of 8 billion rubles is -surely a serious matter. - -Let us, however, adopt another test than that of finance, namely, the -service test, and see whether that presents us with a more favorable -result: According to the official report of the Commissar of Ways and -Communications, there were in operation on October 1, 1917--that is, -shortly before the Bolshevist _coup d’état_--52,597 versts[45] of -railroad line in operation; on October 1, 1918, there were in operation -21,800 versts, a decrease of 30,797. On October 1, 1917, there were in -working order 15,732 locomotives; on October 1, 1918, the number had -dwindled to 5,037, a decrease of 10,695. On October 1, 1917, the number -of freight cars in working condition was 521,591; on October 1, 1918, -the number was 227,274, a decrease of 294,317. - -[45] One verst equals .663 mile, roughly, about two-thirds of a mile. - -The picture presented by these figures is, for one who knows the -economic conditions in Russia, simply appalling. At its best the -Russian railway system was wholly inadequate to serve the economic -life of the nation. The foregoing official figures indicate an utter -collapse of the railways at a time when the nation needed an efficient -railroad transportation system more than at any time in its history. -One of the reasons for the collapse of the railway system was the -failure of the fuel supply. In northern and central Russia wood is -generally used for fuel in the factories and on the railways. Difficult -as it might be for them to maintain the supply of coal under the -extraordinary conditions prevailing, it would seem that with enormous -forests at their disposal, so near at hand, they would have found it -relatively easy to supply the railways with wood for fuel purposes. Yet -nowhere in the whole range of the industrial system of Russia was the -failure more disastrous or more complete than here. According to an -official estimate, the amount of wood fuel required for the railways -from May 1, 1918, to May 1, 1919, estimated upon the basis of “famine -rations,” was 4,954,000 cubic sazhens,[46] of which 858,000 cubic -sazhens was on hand, leaving 4,096,000 cubic sazhens as the amount to -be provided. A report published in the _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. -41) stated that not more than 18 per cent. of the total amount of wood -required was felled, and that not more than one-third of that amount -was actually delivered to the railways. In other words, 82 per cent. -of the wood fuel was not cut at all, at least so far as the particular -economic body whose business it was to provide the wood was concerned. -Extraordinary measures had to be taken to secure the fuel. From -_Economicheskaya Zhizn_, February 22, 1919, we learn that the railway -administration managed to secure fuel wood amounting to 70 per cent. of -its requirements, and the People’s Superior Economic Council another -2 per cent., a very large part of which had been secured by private -enterprise. If this last statement seems astonishing and anomalous, -it must be understood that as early as January 17, 1919, Lenin, as -President of the Central Soviet Government, promulgated a decree which -in a very large measure restored the right to private enterprise. -Already nationalization was being pronounced a failure by Lenin. In an -address announcing this remarkable modification of policy he said: - -[46] One sazhen equals seven feet. - - If each peasant would consent to reduce his consumption of - products to a point a little less than his needs and turn over - the remainder to the state, and if we were able to distribute - that remainder regularly, we could go on, assuring the - population a food-supply, insufficient, it is true, but enough - to avoid famine. - - This last is, however, beyond our strength, due to our - disorganization. The people, exhausted by famine, show the most - extreme impatience. Assuredly, we have our food policy, but - the essential of it is that the decrees should be executed. - _Although they were promulgated long ago, the decrees relative - to the distribution of food products by the state never have - been executed because the peasants will sell nothing for paper - money._ - - It is better to tell the truth. _The conditions require that we - should pitilessly, relentlessly force our local organizations - to obey the central power._ This, again, is difficult because - millions of our inhabitants are accustomed to regard any - central power as an organization of exploiters and brigands. - They have no confidence in us and without confidence it is - impossible to institute an economic régime. - - The crisis in food-supplies, aggravated by the breakdown of - transportation, explains the terrible situation that confronts - us. At Petrograd the condition of the transportation service is - desperate. The rolling-stock is unusable. - -Another reason for the failure of the railways under nationalization -during the first year’s experimentation with that policy was the -demoralization of the labor force. The low standard of efficiency, -constant loafing, and idleness were factors in the problem. The -interference by the workers’ councils was even more serious. When -the railways were nationalized the elected committees of workers, -while shorn of much of their power, were retained as consultative -bodies, as we have already seen. Toward the end of 1918 the officials -responsible for the direction of the railroads found even that measure -of authority which remained to these councils incompatible with -efficient organization. Consequently, at the end of 1918 the abolition -of the workers’ committees of control was decreed and the dictatorial -powers of the railroad directors made absolute. The system of paying -wages by the day was replaced by a piece-work system, supplemented by -cash bonuses for special efficiency. Later on, as we shall see, these -changes were made applicable to all the nationalized industries. Thus, -the principal features of the capitalist wage system were brought back -to replace the communistic principles which had failed. When Lomov, -president of the Chief Forest Committee, declared, as reported in -_Izvestia_, June 4, 1919, that “proletarian principles must be set -aside and the services of private capitalistic apparatus made use of,” -he simply gave expression to what was already a very generally accepted -view. - -The “return to capitalism,” as it was commonly and justly described, -had begun in earnest some months before Lomov made the declaration -just quoted. The movement was attended by a great deal of internal -conflict and dissension. In particular the trades-unions were incensed -because they were practically suppressed as autonomous organs of the -working-class. The dictatorship of the proletariat was already assuming -the character of a dictatorship over the proletariat by a strongly -centralized state. The rulers of this state, setting aside the written -Constitution, were in fact not responsible to any electorate. They -ruled by fiat and proclamation and ruthlessly suppressed all who sought -to oppose them. They held that, industry having become nationalized, -trades-unions were superfluous, and that strikes could not be tolerated -because they became, _ipso facto_, acts of treason against the state. -Such was the evolution of this anti-Statist movement. - -The unions resisted the attempts to deprive them of their character -as fighting organizations. They protested against the denial of the -right to strike, the suppression of their meetings and their press. -They resented the arbitrary fixing of their wages by officials -of the central government. As a result, there was an epidemic of -strikes, most of which were suppressed with great promptitude and -brutality. At the Alexander Works, Moscow, eighty workers were killed -by machine-gun fire. From March 6 to 26, 1919, the _Krasnaya Gazeta_ -published accounts of fifteen strikes in Petrograd, involving more -than half the wage-workers of the city, some of the strikes being -attended with violence which was suppressed by armed troops. At the -beginning of March there was such a strike at the Tula Works, reported -in _Izvestia_, March 2, 1919. On March 16, 1919, the _Severnaya -Communa_ gave an account of the strike at the famous Putilov Works, -and of the means taken to “clear out the Social Revolutionary -blackguards”--meaning thereby the striking workmen. _Pravda_ published -on March 23, 1919, accounts of serious strikes at the Putilov Works, -the Arthur Koppel Works, the government car-building shops, and -elsewhere. Despite a clearly defined policy on the part of the press -to ignore labor struggles as far as possible, sufficient was published -to show that there was an intense struggle by the Russian proletariat -against its self-constituted masters. “The workers of Petrograd are in -the throes of agitation, and strikes are occurring in some shops. The -Bolsheviki have been making arrests,” said _Izvestia_ on March 2, 1919. - -Of course it may be fairly said that the strikes did not of themselves -indicate a condition of unrest and dissatisfaction peculiar to Russia. -That is quite true. There were strikes in many countries in the early -months of 1919. This fact does not, however, add anything to the -strength of the defense of the Bolshevist régime. In the capitalist -countries, where the struggle between the wage-earning and the -employing classes is a normal condition, strikes are very ordinary -phenomena. The Bolsheviki, in common with all other Socialists, -pointed to these conflicts as evidence of the unfitness of capitalism -to continue; and of the need for Socialism. It was the very essence -of their faith that in the Socialist state strikes would be unknown, -because no conflict of class interests would be possible. Yet here -in the Utopia of the Bolsheviki the proletarian dictatorship was -accompanied by strikes and lock-outs precisely like those common to -the capitalist system in all lands. _Moreover, while the nations which -still retained the capitalist system had their strikes, there was not -one of them in which such brutal methods of repression were resorted -to._ Russia was at war, we are told, and strikes were a deadly menace -to her very existence. But this argument, like the other, is of no -avail. England, France, Italy, and America on the one side, and Germany -and Austria upon the other side, all had strikes during the war, but in -no one of them were strikers shot down with such savage recklessness as -in Russia under the Bolsheviki. - -Where and when in any of the great capitalist nations during the war -was there such a butchery of striking workmen as that at the Alexander -Works, already referred to? Where and when during the whole course of -the war did any capitalist government suppress a strike of workmen with -anything like the brutality with which the Bolshevist masters of Russia -suppressed the strike at the Putilov Works in March, 1919? At first the -marines in Petrograd were ordered to disperse the strikers and break -the strike, but they refused to obey the order. At a meeting these -marines decided that, rather than shoot down the striking workmen, they -would join forces with them. Then the Bolsheviki called out detachments -of coast guards, armed sailors from Kronstadt and Petrograd formerly -belonging to the “disciplinary battalions,” chiefly Letts. The strikers -put up an armed resistance, being supported in this by a small body of -soldiers. They were soon overcome, however, and the armed sailors took -possession of the works and summarily executed many of the strikers, -shooting them on the spot without even a drum-head court martial. The -authorities issued a proclamation--published in _Severnaya Communa_, -March 16, 1919--forbidding the holding of meetings and “inviting” the -strikers back to work: - - All honest workmen desirous of carrying out the decision of - the Petrograd Soviet and ready to start work will be allowed - to go into the factory on condition that they forthwith go to - their places and take up their work. All those who begin work - will receive an additional ration of one-half pound of bread. - They who do not want to resume work will be at once discharged, - without receiving any concessions. A special commission will - be formed for the reorganization of the works. _No meetings - will be allowed to be held...._ For the last time the Petrograd - Soviet invites the Putilov workmen to expiate their crime - committed against the working-class and the peasantry of - Russia, and to cease at once their foolish strike. - -On the following day this “invitation” was followed up by a typical -display of Bolshevist force. A detachment of armed sailors went to the -homes of the striking workmen and at the point of the bayonet drove the -men back into the works, about which a strong guard was placed. The -men were kept at work by armed guards placed at strategic positions in -the shops. All communication with the outside was strictly prohibited. -Numerous arrests were made. With grim irony the Bolshevist officials -posted in and around the shops placards explaining that, unlike -imperialistic and capitalistic governments, the Soviet authority had -no intention of suppressing strikes or insurrections by armed force. -For the good of the Revolution, however, and to meet the war needs, the -government would use every means at its command to force the workmen to -remain at their tasks and to prevent all demonstrations. - -A bitter struggle took place between the trades-unions and the Soviet -Government. It was due, not to strikes merely, or even mainly, though -these naturally brought out its bitterest manifestations. The real -cause of the conflict was the fact that the government had thrown -communism to the winds and adopted a policy of state capitalism. All -the evils of capitalism in its relation to the workers reappeared, -intensified and exaggerated as an inevitable result of being -fundamental elements of the polity of an all-powerful state wholly -free from democratic control. The abolition of the right to strike; -the introduction of piece-work, augmented by a bonus system in place -of day wages; the arbitrary fixing of wages and working conditions; -the withdrawal of the powers which the workers’ councils, led by the -unions, had possessed since the beginning of the Revolution, and the -substitution for the crude spirit of democracy which inspired the -Soviet control of industry of the despotic principle of autocracy, -“absolute submission to the will of a single individual”--these things -inevitably evoked the active hostility of the organized workers. It was -from the proletariat, and from its most “class-conscious” elements, -that the Bolshevist régime received this determined resistance. - -Many unions were suppressed altogether. This happened to the Teachers’ -Union, which was declared to be “counter-revolutionary.”[47] It -happened also to the Printers’ Union. In this case the authorities -simply declared that all membership cards were invalid and that -the old officers were displaced. In order to work as a printer it -was necessary to get a new card of membership, and such cards were -only issued to those who signed declarations of loyalty to the -Bolshevist authority.[48] The trades-unions were made to conform to -the decisions of the Communist Party and subordinated to the rule of -the Commissaries. Upon this point there is a good deal of evidence -available, though most of it comes from non-Bolshevist sources. The -references to this important matter in the official Bolshevist press -are very meager and vague, and the Ransomes, Goodes, Malones, Coppings, -and other apologists are practically silent upon the subject. - -[47] See Keeling, _op. cit._ - -[48] _Idem._ - -The Socialist and trades-union leader, Oupovalov, from whom we have -previously quoted, testifies that “Trades-unions, as working-class -organizations independent of any political party, were transformed -by the Bolsheviki into party organizations and subordinated to the -Commissaries.” Strumillo, equally competent as a witness, says: -“Another claim of the Social Democrats--that trades-unions should be -independent of political parties--likewise came to nothing. They were -all to be under the control of the Bolsheviki. Alone the All-Russian -Union of Printers succeeded in keeping its independence, _but -eventually for that it was dispersed by the order of Lenin, and the -members of its Executive Committee arrested_.” These statements are -borne out by the testimony of the English trades-unionist, Keeling, who -says: - - If a trades-union did not please the higher Soviet it was fined - and suppressed and a new union was formed in its place by the - Bolsheviks themselves. Entry to this new union was only open to - members of the old union who signed a form declaring themselves - entirely in agreement with, and prepared completely to support - in every detail, the policy of the Soviet Government. - - Refusal to join on these terms meant the loss of the work - and the salary, together with exclusion from both the first - and second categories.[49] It will readily be understood how - serious a matter it was to oppose any coercive measure. - -[49] _I.e._, the food categories entitling one to the highest and next -highest food rations. - - Every incentive was held out to the poorer people to spy and - report on the others. A workman or a girl who gave information - that any member of the trades-union was opposed in any way to - the Soviet system was specially rewarded. He or she would be - given extra food and promoted as soon as possible to a seat - upon the executive of the union or a place on the factory - committee. - -Soon after the first Congress of the Railroad Workers’ Unions, in -February, 1918, the unions of railway workers were “merged with the -state”--that is, they were forbidden to strike or to function as -defensive or offensive organizations of the workers, and were compelled -to accept the direction of the officials appointed by the central -government and to carry out their orders. At the second Congress of the -Railroad Workers’ Unions, February, 1919, according to _Economicheskaya -Zhizn_ (No. 42), this policy was “sharply and categorically opposed” by -Platonov, himself a Bolshevik and one of the most influential of the -leaders of the railway men’s unions. At the Moscow Conference of Shop -Committees and Trades-Unions, March, 1919, it was reported, according -to _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. 51), the unions “having given up their -neutrality and independence, completely merged their lot with that of -the Soviet Government.... Their work came to be closely interwoven -with the state activities of the Soviet Government.... Only practical -utilitarian considerations prevent us from completely merging the -trades-unions with the administrative apparatus of the state.” - -At the ninth Congress of the Communist Party, held in Moscow, Bucharin -proposed the adoption of certain “basic principles” governing the -status of trades-unions and these were accepted by the Congress: -“In the Soviet state economic and political issues are indivisible, -therefore the economic organs of the Labor movement--the unions--have -to be completely merged with the political--the Soviets--and not to -continue as independent organizations as is the case in a capitalistic -state. Being more limited in their scope, they have to be subordinate -to the Soviets, which are more universal institutions. But merging -with the Soviet apparatus the unions by no means become organs of the -state power; they only take upon themselves the economic functions of -this power.” In his speech Bucharin contended that “such an intimate -connection of the trades-unions with the Soviet power will present an -ideal network of economic administrative organization covering the -whole of Russia.” It is quite clear that the unions must cease to exist -as fighting organizations in the Bolshevist state, and become merely -subordinate agencies carrying out the will of the central power. - -Even if this testimony, official and otherwise, were lacking, it -would be evident from the numerous strikes of a serious character -among the best organized workers, and from their violence, that -Bolshevism at this stage of its development found itself in opposition -to the trades-unions. And if the evidence upon that point were not -overwhelming and conclusive, it would only be necessary to read -carefully the numerous laws and decrees of the Bolshevist Government, -and to observe the development of its industrial policy, in order -to understand that trades-unions, as independent and militant -working-class organizations, fighting always to advance the interests -of their class, could not exist under such a system. - -The direct and immediate reason for the policy that was adopted toward -the unions was, of course, the state of the industries, which made it -impossible to meet the ever-growing demands made by the unions. There -was, however, a far deeper and profounder reason, namely, the character -of the unions themselves. The Bolsheviki had been forced to recognize -the fundamental weakness of every form of Syndicalism, including -Sovietism. They had found that the Soviets were not qualified to carry -on industry efficiently; that narrow group interests were permitted -to dominate, instead of the larger interests of society as a whole. -The same thing was true of the trades-unions. By its very nature the -trades-union movement is limited to a critical purpose and attitude; it -makes demands and evades responsibilities. The trades-union does not -and cannot, as a trades-union, possess the capacity for constructive -functioning that a co-operative society possesses, for instance. - -This fact was very clearly and frankly stated in March, 1919, by L. B. -Krassin, in a criticism which was published in the _Economicheskaya -Zhizn_ (No. 52). He pointed out that, apart from the struggle for -higher wages, “the labor control on the part of the trades-unions -confined itself the whole time to perfunctory supervision of the -activities of the plants, and completely ignored the general work -of production. A scientific technical control, the only kind that -is indispensable, is altogether beyond the capacities of the -trades-unions.” The same issue of this authoritative Bolshevist organ -stated that at the Conference of Electrical Workers it was reported -that “In the course of last year everybody admitted the failure of -workers’ control,” and that the conference had adopted a resolution “to -replace the working-men’s control by one of inspection--_i.e._, by the -engineers of the Council of National Economy.” - -Instead of the expected idyllic peace and satisfaction, there was -profound unrest in the Utopia of the Bolsheviki. There was not even -the inspiration of enthusiastic struggle and sacrifice to attain the -goal. The organized workers were disillusioned. They found that the -Bolshevist state, in its relations to them as employer, differed from -the capitalist employers they had known mainly in the fact that it had -all the coercive forces of the state at its command, and a will to use -them without any hesitation or any mercy. One view of the social and -industrial unrest of the period is set forth in the following extract -from the _Severnaya Communa_, March 30, 1919: - - At the present moment a tremendous struggle is going on within - the ranks of the proletariat between two diametrically opposed - currents. Part of the proletariat, numerically in the great - majority, still tied to the village, both in a material as well - as an ideological respect, is in an economic sense inclined to - anarchism. It is not connected in production and in interest - in its development. The other part is the industrial, highly - skilled mechanics, who fight for new methods of production. - - _By the equalization of pay, and by the introduction of - majority rule in the management of the factories, supposed - to be a policy of democracy, we are only sawing off the limb - on which we are sitting_, for the flower of our proletariat, - the most efficient workers, prefer to go to the villages, - or to engage in home trades, or to do anything else but to - remain within those demolished and dusty fortresses we call - factories. Why, this means in its truest sense _a dictatorship - of unskilled laborers_! - -This outcry from one of the principal official organs of the Bolsheviki -is interesting from several points of view. The struggle within the -proletariat itself is recognized. This alone could only mean the -complete abandonment of faith in the original Bolshevist ideal, which -was based upon the solidarity of interest of the working-class as a -whole. The denunciation of the equalitarian principle of uniform wages -for all workers, and of majority rule in the factories, could only come -from a conviction that Bolshevism and Sovietism were alike unsuited to -Russia and undesirable. The scornful reference to a “dictatorship of -unskilled laborers” might have come from any bourgeois employer. - -From the official Bolshevist press of this period pages of quotations -might easily be given to show that the transformation to familiar -capitalist conditions was proceeding at a rapid rate. Thus, the -Bolshevist official, Glebov, reported at the Conference of Factory -Committees, in March, 1919: “The fight against economic disintegration -demanded the reintroduction of the premium system. This system has -produced splendid results in many instances, having increased the -productivity of labor 100 to 200 per cent.” The Bolshevist journal, -_Novy Put_, declared, “The most effective means for raising the -efficiency of labor is the introduction of the premium and piece-work -system as against daily wages.” The _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. 46) -declared, “An investigation undertaken last month by the trades-unions -has shown that in 75 per cent. of the plants the old system of wages -has been reintroduced and that nearly everywhere this has been followed -by satisfactory and even splendid results.” The same issue of this -important official organ showed that there had been large increases -in production wherever the old system of wages and premiums had been -restored. At the Marx Printing Works the increase was 20 per cent.; at -the Nobel Factory 35 per cent.; at the Aviation Plant 150 per cent.; -and at Seminov’s Lumber Mill 243 per cent. - -The _Severnaya Communa_ reported that “In the Nevski Works the -substitution of the premium system for the monthly wage system -increased the productivity of the working-men three and one-half -times, and the cost of labor for one locomotive dropped from 1,400,000 -rubles to 807,000 rubles--_i.e._, to almost one-half.” Rykov, president -of the Superior Council of National Economy, one of the ablest of the -Bolshevist officials, reported, according to _Izvestia_, that “in the -Tula Munition Works, after the old ‘premium’ system of wages had been -restored, the productivity of the works and of labor rose to 70 per -cent. of what it was in 1916.” - -These are only a few of the many similar statements appearing in the -official Bolshevist press pointing to a reversal of policy and a return -to capitalist methods. On March 1, 1919, a decree of the People’s -Commissaries was promulgated which introduced a new wage scale, based -upon the principle of extra pay for skill. The greater the skill the -higher the rate of wages was the new rule. As published in _Severnaya -Communa_, the scale provided for twenty-seven classes of workers. The -lowest, unskilled class of laborers, domestics, and so forth, receive -600 rubles per month (1st class), 660 rubles (2d class), and so on. -Higher employees, specialists, are put in classes 20 to 27, and receive -from 1,370 to 2,200 rubles a month. Skilled mechanics in chemical -plants, for example, receive 1,051-1,160 rubles. Unskilled laborers, -600 rubles, and chemical engineers more than 2,000 rubles a month. - -Nationalization of industry meant, and could only mean, state -capitalism. Communism was as far away as it was under czarism. And many -of the old complaints so familiar in capitalist countries were heard. -The workers were discontented and restless; production, while it was -better than under Soviet control, was still far below the normal level; -there was an enormous growth of bureaucracy and an appalling amount of -corruption. Profiteering and speculation were rampant and inefficiency -was the order of the day. The following extract from an article in -_Pravda_, March 15, 1919, is a confession of failure most abject: - - Last year the people of Russia were suffering from lack of - bread. To-day they are in distress because there is plenty of - foodstuffs which cannot be brought out from the country and - which will, no doubt, decay to a great extent when hot weather - arrives. - - The misery of bread scarcity is replaced by another - calamity--the plentifulness of breadstuffs. That the situation - is really such is attested by these figures: - - The Food Commission and its subsidiary organs have stored up - from August, 1918, to February 20, 1919, grain and forage - products amounting to 82,633,582 poods. There remained on the - last-mentioned date in railroad stations and other collection - centers not less than 22,245,072 poods of grain and fodder. - Of these stocks, according to the incomplete information by - the Transport Branch of the Food Commission, there are stalled - on the Moscow-Kazan and Syzran-Viazma Railroads alone not - less than 2,000,000 poods of grain in 2,382 cars. There are, - moreover, according to the same source, on the Kazanburgsk and - Samara-Zlatoostovsk Line, at least 1,300 more car-loads of - breadstuffs that cannot be moved. - - All this grain is stalled because there are no locomotives to - haul the rolling-stock. Thus the starving population does not - receive the bread which is provided for it and which is, in - part, even loaded up in cars. - - * * * * * - - In a hungry land there must be no misery while there is a - surplus of bread. Such a misfortune would be truly unbearable! - -On April 15, 1919, _Izvestia_ published an article by Zinoviev, in -which the famous Bolshevist leader confessed that the Soviet Government -had not materially benefited the average working-man: - - Has the Soviet Government, has our party done everything that - can be done for the direct improvement of the daily life of the - average working-man and his family? Alas! we hesitate to answer - this question in the affirmative. - - Let us look the truth in the face. We have committed quite a - number of blunders in this realm. _We have to confess that - we are unable to improve the nutrition of the average worker - to any serious extent._ But do the wages correspond with the - actually stupendous rise of prices for unrationed foodstuffs? - Nobody will undertake to answer this question entirely in the - affirmative, while the figures given by Comrade Strumilin - show that in spite of a threefold raise of the wage scale, - the real purchasing power of these wages had shrunk, on the - average, more than 30 per cent. by March of the current year, - as compared with May of last year. - -The _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, May 6, 1919, gave a despondent account of -the coal industry and the low production, accompanied by this alarming -picture: “The starving, ill-clad miners are running away from the pits -in a panic, and it is to be feared that in two or three weeks not only -the whole production of coal will be stopped, but most of the mines -will be flooded.” - -Nationalization of industry was not a new thing in Russia. It was, -indeed, quite common under czarism. The railways were largely state -owned and operated by the government. Most of the factories engaged -in the manufacture of guns and munitions were also nationalized under -czarism. It is interesting, therefore, to compare the old régime with -the new in this connection. Under czarism nationalization had always -led to the creation of an immense bureaucracy, politically powerful -by reason of its numbers, extravagant, inefficient, and corrupt. That -nationalization under the new régime was attended by the same evils, in -an exaggerated form, the only difference being that the new bureaucracy -was drawn from a different class, is written so plainly in the records -that he who runs may read. No country in the world, it is safe to say, -has ever known such a bureaucracy as the Bolshevist régime produced. - -At the eighth All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party, held in -March, 1919, Lenin said: “You imagine that you have abolished private -property, but instead of the old bourgeoisie that has been crushed -you are faced by a new one. The places of the former bourgeoisie have -already been filled up by the newly born bourgeoisie.” The backbone -of this new bourgeoisie was the vast army of government officials -and employees. These and the food speculators and profiteers, many -of whom have amassed great wealth--real wealth, not worthless paper -rubles--make up a formidable bourgeoisie. Professor Miliukov tells of -a statistical department in Moscow with twenty-one thousand employees; -and of eighteen offices having to be visited to get permission to -buy a pair of shoes from the government store. Alexander Berkenheim, -vice-chairman of the Moscow Central Union of Russian Consumers’ -Co-operative Societies, said: “The experiment in socialization has -resulted in the building up of an enormous bureaucratic machine. To buy -a pencil one has to call at eighteen official places.” These men are -competent witnesses, notwithstanding their opposition to Bolshevism. -Let us put it aside, however, and consider only a small part of the -immense mass of official Bolshevist testimony to the same general -effect. - -On February 21, 1919, the Bolshevist official, Nemensky, presented -to the Supreme Council of National Economy the report of the -official inspection and audit of the Centro-Textile, the central -state organization having charge of the production and distribution -of textiles. There are some sixty of these organizations, such as -Centro-Sugar, Centro-Tea, Centro-Coal, and so on, the entire number -being federated into the Supreme Council of National Economy. From the -report referred to, as published in _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, February -25, 1919, the following paragraphs are quoted: - - An enormous staff of employees (about 6,000), for the most - part loafing about, doing nothing; it was discovered that 125 - employees were actually not serving at all, but receiving a - salary the same as the others. There have been cases where - some have been paid twice for the same period of time. _The - efficiency of the officials is negligible to a striking - degree...._ - - The following figures may partially serve as an illustration of - what was the work of the collaborators: For four months--from - August 25 to November 21, 1918--the number of letters received - amounted to 59,959 (making an average of 500 a day), and the - number of letters sent was 25,781 (an average of 207 per day). - Each secretary had to deal with 10 letters received and 4 sent, - each typist with 2 letters sent, and each clerk with 1 letter - received and 0.5 sent. Together with chairs, tables, etc., the - inventory-book contained entries of dinners, rent, etc. When - checking the inventory of the department it was established - that the following were missing--142 tables, 500 chairs, 39 - cupboards, 14 typewriters, etc. On the whole, the entries in - the book exceeded by 50 per cent, the number of articles found - on the spot. - -Commenting upon this report the _Izvestia_[50] said: “An enormous staff -of employees in most cases lounge about in idleness. An inquiry showed -that _the staff of the Centro-Textile included 125 employees who were -practically not in its service, though drawing their pay. There were -cases where one and the same person drew his pay twice over for one -and the same period of time._ The working capacity of the employees is -ridiculously low; the average correspondence per typist was one letter -outward and one inward per day; the average per male clerk was a half -a letter outward and one inward.” We do not wonder, at Nemensky’s -own comment, “Such Soviet institutions are a beautiful example of -deadening bureaucracy and must be liquidated.” - -[50] No. 63, 1919. - -The disclosures made in the Centro-Textile were repeated in other -state economic institutions. Thus the _Izvestia_ of the State Control, -commenting upon the Budget for 1919, said: - - The Audit Department sees in the increase of expenditure for - the payment of work a series of negative causes. Among these is - that it leads to a double working on parallel lines--_viz._, - the same work is done by two and even more sections, resulting - in mutual friction and disorder and bringing the number of - employees beyond all necessary requirements. We noticed on - more than one occasion that an institution with many auxiliary - branches had been opened before any operations to be carried on - by them were even started. - - Furthermore, the work is mostly very slovenly and inefficiently - conducted. It leads to an increase of the number of employees - and workmen without benefit to the work. - -In the _Bulletin of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets_ -(No. 15) we find this confession: “We have created extraordinary -commissaries and Extraordinary Commissions without number. All of -these are, to a lesser or greater degree, only mischief-makers.” -Lunacharsky, the Bolshevist Commissary of Education, is reported by the -_Severnaya Communa_ of May 23, 1919, as saying: “The upper stratum of -the Soviet rule is becoming detached from the masses and the blunders -of the communist workers are becoming more and more frequent. These -latter, according to statements made by workmen, treat the masses in a -high-handed manner and are very generous with threats and repressions.” -In _Pravda_, May 14, 1919, the Bolshevik, Monastyrev, wrote: “Such a -wholesale loafing as is taking place in our Soviet institutions and -such a tremendous number of officials the history of the world has -never known and does not know. All the Soviet papers have written -about it, and we have felt it on our backs, too.” _Izvestia_ of the -Central Executive Committee (No. 15), 1919, said: “Besides Soviets -and committees, many commissaries and committees have been instituted -here. Almost every commissariat has an extraordinary organ peculiar to -its own department. As a result we have numberless commissaries of all -kinds. All of them are more or less highly arbitrary in their behavior -and by their actions undermine Soviet authority.” - -These are only a few of the many statements of a like character -published in the official Bolshevist press. In a country which had long -been accustomed to an immense bureaucracy, the horde of officials was -regarded with astonishment and alarm. Like the old bureaucracy, the -new bureaucracy was at once brutal and corrupt. No one can read the -reports published by the Bolsheviki themselves and fail to be impressed -by the entire absence of idealism so far as the great majority of the -officials are concerned, a fact which Lenin himself has commented -upon more than once. That there were and are exceptions to the rule -we may well believe, just as there were such exceptions under the old -régime of Nicholas II. Upon the whole, however, it is difficult to see -wherein the bureaucracy of the Bolsheviki was less brutal, less coarse, -or less corrupt than that of czarism. But again let the Bolsheviki -speak through their own recognized spokesmen: - -According to _Izvestia_ of the Central Executive Committee, November -1, 1918, a commission of five which had been appointed to discover and -distribute metal among the factories in proportion to their needs was -found to have been bribed to distribute the metal, not in proportion to -the needs of the industries, but according to the value of the bribe. - -From the _Weekly Report of the Extraordinary Commission_, No. 1, -page 28, we learn that the administration of the combined Moscow -nationalized factories was convicted of a whole series of abuses and -speculations, resulting in the embezzlement of many millions of rubles. -It was said that members of the administrative board and practically -all the employees took part in this graft. - -From _Izvestia_ of the Central Executive Committee, November 3, 1918, -we learn that the Soviet of National Economy of Kursk, connected -with the Supreme Council of National Economy, was found guilty of -speculative dealings in sugar and hemp. - -In the same important official journal, January 22, 1919, the -well-known Bolshevik, Kerzhentzev, in a terrible exposure from which -we have already quoted in an earlier chapter, says: “The abundant -testimony, verified by the Soviet Commission, portrays a very striking -picture of violence. When these members of the Executive Committee [he -names Glakhov, Morev, and Makhov] arrived at the township of Sadomovo -they commenced to assault the population and to rob them of foodstuffs -and of their household belongings, such as quilts, clothing, harness, -etc. No receipts for the requisitioned goods were given and no money -paid. “_They even resold to others on the spot some of the breadstuffs -which they had requisitioned._” Again, the same journal published, -on March 9, 1919, a report by a prominent Bolshevik, Sosnovsky, on -conditions in the Tver Province, saying: “The local Communist Soviet -workers behave themselves, with rare exceptions, in a disgusting -manner. _Misuse of power is going on constantly._” - -A cursory examination of the files of the _Bulletin of the Central -Executive Committee of the Soviets_, for the first few months of -1919, reveals a great deal of such evidence as the foregoing. In No. -12 we read: “The toiling population see in the squandering of money -right and left by the commissaries and in their indecent loudness and -profanity during their trips through the district, the complete absence -of party discipline.” In No. 13 of the same organ there is an account -of the case of Commissary Odintzov, a member of the peace delegation -to the Ukraine, who was “found speculating in breadstuffs.” In No. -20 we read that “members of the Extraordinary Commission, Unger and -Lebedev, were found guilty of embezzlement.” No. 25 says that “a case -has been started against the commissaries, O. K. Bogdanov and Zaitzev, -accused of misappropriating part of the requisitioned gold and silver -articles.” - -Let us hear from some of the leading Bolsheviki who participated in the -debate on the subject of the relation of the central Soviet authority -to local self-government at the eighth Congress of the Communist Party, -March, 1919. Nogin, former president of the Moscow Soviet, said: “The -time has come to state openly before this meeting how low our party has -fallen. We have to confess that the representatives both of the central -and the local authorities disgrace the name of the party by their -conduct. _Their drunkenness and immorality, the robberies and other -crimes committed by them, are so terrible as scarcely to be believed._” -Commissar Volin said: “Some of the local authorities give themselves -over to outrageous abominations. How can they be put a stop to? The -word ‘communist’ rouses deep hatred, not only among the bourgeoisie, -but even among the poorer and the middle classes which we are ruining. -What can we do for our own salvation?” Pakhomoff said: “I sent several -comrades to the villages. _They had barely reached their destination -when they turned bandits._” Ossinsky said, “The revolts now taking -place are not White Guard risings, as formerly, but rebellions caused -by famine _and the outrageous behavior of our own commissaries_.” - -Zinoviev was equally emphatic in his declaration: “It cannot be -concealed from this meeting that in certain localities the word -‘communist’ has become a term of abuse. The people are beginning to -hate the ‘men in leather jackets,’ as the commissaries were nicknamed -in Perm. The fact cannot be denied, and we must look the truth in the -face. Every one knows that both in the provinces and in the large -towns the housing reform has been carried out imperfectly. True, -the bourgeoisie has been driven out of its houses, _but the workmen -have gained nothing thereby. The houses are taken possession of by -Bolshevist state employees_, and sometimes they have been occupied, -not even by the ‘Soviet bureaucrat,’ but by his mother-in-law or -grandmother.” - -Not only has the bribery of officials grown, as revealed by the reports -of the Extraordinary Commissions, but many of the Bolshevist officials -have engaged in food speculation. That the greatest buyers of the food -illegally sold at the Sukharevka market are the highly paid Soviet -officials is a charge frequently made in the Bolshevist press. In -November, 1919, Tsurupa, People’s Commissary for Supplies, published an -article in _Izvestia_ (No. 207), exposing the speculation in foodstuffs -at the Sukharevka market, formerly the largest market for second-hand -goods in Moscow, now the center of illicit speculation. Tsurupa said: - - At the present moment a number of measures are being drawn up - to begin war on “Sukharevka.” The struggle must be carried - on in two directions: first, the strengthening of the organs - of supply and the control over the work of Soviet machinery; - secondly, the destruction of speculators. The measures of - the second kind are, of course, merely palliative, and it - is impossible to overcome “Sukharevka” without insuring the - population a certain supply of the rationed foodstuffs. - - Even among our respected comrades there are some who consider - “Sukharevaka” as an almost normal thing, or, at any rate, as - supplementing the gaps in food-supply. - - * * * * * - - Many defects in our organization are directly conducive to - speculation. Thus many head commissariats, centers, factories, - and works pay their workmen and employees in foodstuffs - exceeding their personal requirements, and, as a rule, these - articles find their way to “Sukharevka” for purposes of - speculation. - - The foodstuffs which find their way to “Sukharevka” are sold - at such high prices that _only the upper circles of Soviet - employees can afford to buy them, the masses of consumers being - totally unable to do so_. These foodstuffs are at the disposal - of the--so to speak--_Soviet bourgeoisie_, who can afford to - squander thousands of rubles. “Sukharevka” gives nothing to the - masses. - - The Moscow Extraordinary Commission is carrying on an active - campaign against “Sukharevka” speculation. As a result of a - fortnight’s work, 437 persons have been arrested, and a series - of transactions have been discovered. The most important cases - were as follows: - - (1) Sale of 19 million rubles’ worth of textiles. - - (2) Sale of three wagon-loads of sugar. (At the price of even - 200 rubles, and not 400 rubles, a wagon of 36,000 pounds of - sugar works out at 8,000,000 rubles, and the whole deal amounts - to 24,000,000 rubles.) - - (3) Seventeen wagon-loads of herrings. - - (4) 15,000,000 rubles’ worth of rubber goods, etc. - -In the course of the campaign of the Moscow Extraordinary Commission -above referred to it was discovered that the state textile stores -in Moscow had been looted by the “Communists” in charge of them. -Millions of yards of textiles, instead of being placed on sale in -the nationalized stores, had been sold to speculators and found their -way into the Sukharevka. During the summer of 1919 the Bolshevist -official press literally teemed with revelations of graft, spoliation, -and robbery by officials. The report of the Smolensk Extraordinary -Commission showed that hundreds of complaints had been made and -investigated. In general the financial accounts were kept with almost -unbelievable carelessness and laxity. Large sums of money were paid out -on the order of single individuals without the knowledge of any other -officials, and without check of any sort. Out of a total expenditure of -three and a half million rubles for food rations to soldiers’ families -there were no vouchers or receipts for 1,161,670 rubles, according to -the report. Commenting upon the reign of corruption in all parts of -Soviet Russia, the _Krasnaya Gazeta_, in an article entitled, “When Is -This to End?” said: - - In the Commissariat of the Boards for the various - municipalities thefts of goods and money are almost of daily - occurrence. Quite recently representatives of the State Control - found that silk and other goods for over a million rubles - had been stolen within a short space of time from the goods - listed as nationalized. Furthermore, it has come out during - the inspection of the nationalized houses that thefts and - embezzlements of the people’s money have become an ordinary - occurrence. It is remarkable how light-fingered gentry who are - put to manage the confiscated houses succeed in getting away - after pocketing the money belonging to the Soviet, and all that - with impunity, _and yet the money stolen by them is estimated - not at hundreds of rubles, but at tens of thousands of rubles_. - Will there ever be an end to these proceedings? Or is complete - liberty to be given to the thieves in Soviet Russia to do as - they like? - - Why does the Extraordinary Commission not see to the affairs of - the Commissariat of the Municipality? It is high time all these - Augean stables were cleaned up. This must stop at last. The - Soviet authorities are sufficiently strong to have some scores - of these thieves of the people’s property hanged. To close - one’s eyes to all this is the same as encouraging the thieves. - -Here, then, is a part of the evidence of the brutality and corruption -of the vast bureaucracy which Bolshevism has developed to replace the -old bureaucracy of the Czars. It is only a small part of the total mass -of such evidence.[51] Every word of it comes from Bolshevist officials -and journals of standing and authority. It will not do to seek to evade -the issue by setting up the plea that corruption and brutality are -found in other lands. That plea not only “begs the question,” but it -destroys the only foundation upon which an honest attempt to justify -Bolshevism can be made, namely, the claim that it represents a higher -stage of civilization, of culture, and morality than the old. Only a -profound belief in the righteousness of that claim could justify the -recourse to such a terrible method of bringing about a change in the -social organization of a great nation. There is not the faintest shadow -of a reason for believing that Bolshevism has been one whit less -corrupt than the czarist bureaucracy. - -[51] In _Les Bolsheviks à l’œuvre_, Paris, 1920, A. Lockerman gives a -list of many similar cases of looting and graft by commissars. - -What of efficiency? Does the available evidence tend to show that -this bureaucratic system managed to secure a degree of efficiency in -production and distribution commensurate, in part, at least, with its -enormous cost? On the contrary, while there was a marked increase in -output after nationalization was introduced, due to the restoration -of capitalist methods of management, the enormous cost at which the -improvement was effected, for which the bureaucracy was responsible, -left matters in a deplorable condition. This can be well understood -in view of the fact, cited by Professor Issaiev, that in one of -the largest metal works in Moscow the overhead charges, cost of -administration, accounting, and so on, which in 1916, the last year of -the old régime, amounted to 15 per cent. of the total cost, rose to -over 65 per cent. in 1918-19. This was not an unusual case, but fairly -typical. Once again, however, let us resist the temptation to quote -such figures, based upon the calculations and researches of hostile -critics, and confine ourselves strictly to Bolshevist testimony. - -At the end of December, 1918, Rykov, president of the Supreme Council -of National Economy, reported to the Central Executive Committee, -according to _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, “Now almost all the large and -medium-sized establishments are nationalized.” A few days later an -article by Miliutin, published in the same paper, said: “A year ago -there were about 36 per cent. of nationalized establishments throughout -Soviet Russia. At the present time 90 per cent. of industrial -establishments are nationalized.” On January 12, 1919, the same -journal reported that nationalization had become general throughout -Russian industry, embracing the textile and metallurgical industries, -glass-making, printing, publishing, practically all commerce, and -even barber shops. We are, therefore, in a fair position to judge the -effects of nationalization upon the basis of subsequent reports. - -It is not as well known as it ought to be that the Bolsheviki, even -under nationalization, continued the practice, established under -czarism and maintained by the Provisional Government under Kerensky, of -subsidizing factories from the central treasury of the government. Bad -as this practice was under capitalism, it was immeasurably worse when -applied to industry under Soviet control and to nationalized industry. -It was not only conducive to laxity and bad management, but it invited -these as well as being destructive of enterprise and energy. The sums -spent for this purpose were enormous, staggering in their total. A few -illustrations must suffice to show this. According to _Economicheskaya -Zhizn_ (No. 50), in the month of January, 1919, the Metal Department -of the Supreme Council of National Economy distributed among the -various nationalized metallurgical works 1,167,295,000 rubles, and the -central organization of the copper industry received 1,193,990,000 -rubles. According to a report of the Section of Polygraphic -Trades, published in _Pravda_, May 17, 1919, nineteen nationalized -printing-establishments lost 13,500,000 rubles during 1918, the deficit -having to be made up by subsidies from the central treasury. At the -Conference of Tobacco Workers, held on April 25, 1919, it was reported, -according to _Severnaya Communa_, that the Petrograd factories alone -were being operated at a loss approaching two million rubles a month. -It was further stated that “the condition of the tobacco industry is -bad. The number of plants has been decreased by more than half, and the -output is only one-third.” In the report of Nemensky on the audit of -the Centro-Textile, from which we have already quoted, we read: - - The Finance Credit Division of the Centrotekstil received up to - February 1, 1919, 3,400,000,000 rubles. There was no control - of the expenditure of moneys. _Money was advanced to factories - immediately upon demand, and there were cases when money was - forwarded to factories which did not exist._ From July 1 to - December 31, 1918, the Centrotekstil advanced on account of - products to be received 1,348,619,000 rubles. The value of the - goods securing these advances received up to January 1, 1919, - was only 143,716,000 rubles. The Centrotekstil’s negligent - way of doing business may be particularly observed from the - way it purchased supplies of raw wool. Up to January 1, 1919, - only 129,803 poods of wool was acquired, whereas the annual - requirement is figured at 3,500,000 poods. - -The value of the goods actually received was, according to this -authority, only 10 per cent. of the money advanced. We are told that -“money was forwarded to factories which did not exist.” That this -practice was not confined to the Centro-Textile we infer from the -account given in the _Izvestia_ of State Control (No. 2) of a firm -which obtained a large sum of money in advance for Westinghouse brakes -to be manufactured and supplied by it, though investigation proved -that the firm did not even own a foundry and was unable to furnish -any brakes at all. How much of this represents inefficiency, and how -much of it graft, the reader must judge for himself. The Bolshevist -newspaper, _Trud_, organ of the trades-unions, in an article dealing -with the closing down of nineteen textile factories, said, April 28, -1919: - - In our textile crisis a prominent part is played also by the - bad utilization of that which we do have. Thus the efficiency - of labor has dropped to almost nothing, of labor discipline - there is not even a trace left, the machinery, on account of - careless handling, has deteriorated and its productive capacity - has been lowered. - -In _Izvestia_ of the Central Executive Committee, March 21, 1919, -Bucharin said: “Our position is such that, together with the -deterioration of the material production--machinery, railways, and -other things--_there is a destruction of the fundamental productive -force, the labor class, as such_. Here in Russia, as in western -Europe,[52] the working-class is dissolving, factories are closing, and -the working-class is reabsorbed into the villages.” - -[52] _Sic!_ - -From the report of the Supreme Council of National Economy, March, -1919, we learn that in the vast majority of the branches of Russia’s -industry the labor required for production had increased from 400 to -500 per cent. The Congress of Salesmen’s Unions, held at the end of -April, 1919, adopted a resolution, published in _Izvestia_ (No. 97), -which said, “The nationalization of commerce, owing to the pell-mell -speed of the methods employed in carrying it out, has assumed with us -extremely ugly forms, and has only aggravated the bad state of affairs -in the circulation of goods in the country, which was poor enough as it -was.” - -These statements show that in the early part of last year the -Bolshevist régime was in a very critical condition. Demands for the -“liquidation” of the system were heard on every hand. Instead of this, -the resourceful rulers of Soviet Russia once more revolutionized their -methods. The period of nationalization we have been considering may be -described as the first phase, the period of the rule of industry by the -professional politicians of the Communist Party. When, in March, 1919, -Leonid B. Krassin[53] undertook the reorganization of the industrial -life of the nation, Bolshevism entered upon a new phase. - -[53] Krassin’s first name is usually given as “Gregory,” but this is an -error. His full name is Leonid Borisovitch Krassin. He is a Siberian of -bourgeois extraction. - - - - -X - -THE NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY--II - - -The second phase of nationalization may be characterized as the -adoption by a political state of the purest capitalist methods. Krassin -was not a Bolshevik or a Socialist of any kind, so far as can be -learned. He severed his rather nominal connection with the Socialist -movement in 1906, it is said, and, thoroughly disillusioned, devoted -himself to his profession and to the management of the Petrograd -establishment of the great German firm of Siemens-Schuckart. He is said -to have maintained very cordial relations with Lenin and was asked by -the latter to accept three portfolios, namely, Commerce and Industry, -Transports, and War and Munitions. He agreed to take the appointment, -provided the Soviet Government would accept his conditions. He demanded -(1) the right to appoint specialists of his own choosing to manage all -the departments under his control, regardless of their political or -social views; (2) that all remaining workers’ committees of control be -abolished and that he be given the power to replace them by responsible -directors, with full powers; (3) that piece-work payments and premiums -take the place of day-work payment, with the right to insist upon -overtime regardless of any existing rules or laws. - -Of course, acceptance of these conditions was virtually an abandonment -of every distinctive principle and ideal the Bolsheviki had ever -advanced. Krassin immediately set to work to bring some semblance of -order out of the chaos. The “iron discipline” that was introduced -and the brutal suppression of strikes already described were due to -his powerful energy. A martinet, with no sort of use for the Utopian -visions of his associates, Krassin is a typical industrial despot. -The attitude of the workers toward him was tersely stated by the -_Proletarskoe Echo_ in these words: “How Comrade Krassin has organized -the traffic we have all seen and now know. We do not know whether -Comrade Krassin has improved the traffic, but one thing is certain, -that his autocratic ways as a Commissary greatly remind us of the -autocratic policy of a Czar.”[54] - -[54] Quoted by H. W. Lee, _The Dictatorship of the Proletariat_, p. 7. - -Yet Krassin failed to do more or better than prolong the hopeless -struggle against utter ruin and disastrous failure. He was, after all, -an engineer, not a miracle-worker. Trades-unions were deprived of power -and made mere agencies for transmitting autocratic orders; tens of -thousands of useless politicians were ousted from the factories and -the railways; the workers’ control was so thoroughly broken that there -were not left in Soviet Russia a dozen workers’ committees possessing -the power of the printers’ “chapel” in the average large American -newspaper plant, or anything like the power possessed by hundreds, and -perhaps thousands, of shop committees in our industrial centers.[55] -But Krassin and his stern capitalist methods had come too late. The -demoralization had gone too far. - -[55] In view of the denials of the dissolution of workers’ control, -circulated by _Soviet Russia_ and the whole body of pro-Bolshevist -propagandists, it may be well to clinch the statements made on this -point by quoting from an indisputable authority. In the issue of -_Economicheskaya Zhizn_, November 13, 1919, appears the following -paragraph: - -“Schliapnikoff, Commissar of Labor in the Soviet Republic, writes: ‘The -principal cause of the deplorable situation of the Russian industry is -a total absence of order and discipline in the factories. The Working -Men’s Councils and the Shop Committees, created with the purpose of -establishing order in the factories, exercised an injurious influence -on the general course of affairs by destroying the last traces of -discipline and by squandering away the property of the factories. _All -those circumstances put together have compelled us to abolish the -Working Men’s Councils and to place at the head of the most important -concerns special “dictators,” with unlimited powers and entitled to -dispose of the life and death of the workmen._’” - -Only a brief summary of the most important statistical data -illustrating the results attained during the remainder of the year -1919, that is to say, the second phase of nationalization, can be given -here. To attempt anything like a detailed presentation of the immense -mass of available official statistical data covering this period would -of itself require a large volume. If we take the _Economicheskaya -Zhizn_ for the months of October and November, 1919, we shall be -able to get a fairly good measure of the results attained during the -half-year following the reorganization of the system by Krassin. It -must always be borne in mind that the _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ is the -official organ of the Supreme Economic Council and of the Ministries -of Finance, Commerce and Trade, and Food. To avoid having to use the -name of the journal in almost every other line, the statements of fact -made upon its authority are followed by numbers inclosed in brackets; -these numbers indicate the issues from which the statements are -taken.[56] - -[56] For the mass of translations covering this period the author is -indebted to Mr. Alexander Kerensky. - -Turning our attention first to the important subject of transportation, -to which Krassin naturally devoted special attention, we find that on -the entire railway system of Soviet Russia the number of freight-cars -and trucks in daily service during August and September averaged -between 7,000 and 7,500. Of this number from 45 to 50 per cent.--that -is, from 3,500 to 3,750 cars--were used for carrying fuel for the -railway service itself; transportation of military supplies took 25 per -cent., from 1,750 to 1,850 cars; 10 per cent., from 700 to 750 cars, -were used for “evacuation purposes,” and only 15 to 20 per cent., 1,050 -to 1,150 cars, for general transportation (_215_). It is worthy of -note that of this absurdly inadequate service for the transportation -of general supplies for the civilian population, 95 per cent. was used -for the transportation of wood fuel for the cities and towns (_229_). -Not less than 50 per cent. of all the locomotives in the country were -out of order at the beginning of November, 1919, and it was stated that -to increase the percentage of usable engines to the normal level would -require, under the most favorable circumstances, a period of at least -five years (_228_). Despite this deplorable condition there was still -a great deal of bureaucratic red tape and waste. At the meeting of the -directors of the Supreme Council of National Economy, in September, -Markov, a member, argued in favor of eliminating the red tape and -waste. He pointed out that wood was being transported to Moscow _from_ -the West and at the same time _to_ the West from the North. The Main -Fuel Committee had rejected a proposal to exchange the supplies of wood -and thus save transportation (_214_). River transportation was in just -as bad a condition, to judge from the fact that the freight tonnage on -the river Volga was only 11 per cent. of the pre-war volume (_228_). - -To prove the humanitarian character of the Bolshevist régime its -apologists in this country and in England have cited the fact that the -Soviet authorities offered a prize for the invention of a hand-cart -which would permit a maximum load to be pushed or drawn with a -minimum expenditure of human strength. Quite another light is thrown -upon this action by the data concerning the breakdown of mechanical -transportation and the rapid disappearance of horses from Moscow and -Petrograd. The number of horses in September, 1919, was only 8 per -cent. of the number in November, 1917--that is to say, under Bolshevism -the number of horses had declined 92 per cent. (_207_). Of course the -decline was not so enormous throughout the whole of Soviet Russia, but -it was, nevertheless, so serious as to prohibit any hope of making up -the loss of mechanical power by the use of horses. Accordingly, we find -arrangements for the organization of a rope haulage system for the -transportation of coal and food. In the Bazulk and Aktiubin districts -provision was made for the use of 6,000 carts to transport wood fuel, -and 10,000 carts for corn (_228_). Similar arrangements were under way -in other districts. From locomotives and steamers to transport food -and fuel there was a return to the most primitive of methods, such as -were used to transport the Great Pyramid in Egypt, as shown by the -hieroglyphs. For this purpose the peasants were mobilized (_228_). The -bodies of masses of men were substituted for horses and mechanical -traction. _Thus was reintroduced into Russian life in the twentieth -century the form of labor most hated in the old days of serfdom._ - -The fuel situation was exceedingly bad. Not more than 55 per cent. -of the fuel oil required could be obtained, the deficiency amounting -to over four million poods of oil (_221_). Only 33 per cent. of the -fuel wood required was obtained (_221_). The production of coal in the -Moscow region was 45 per cent. lower than in 1917 (_224_). To overcome -the shortage of fuel in Petrograd a large number of houses and boats -were ordered to be wrecked for the sake of the wood (_227_). To save -the country from perishing for lack of fuel, it was proposed that the -modest fir cones which dropped from the trees be collected and saved. -It was proposed to mobilize school-children, disabled soldiers, and old -and sick persons to collect these fir cones (_202_). - -In the nationalized cotton-factories there were 6,900,962 spindles -and 169,226 looms, but only 300,000 spindles and 18,182 looms were -actually working on September 1st (_207_). On January 1, 1919, there -were 48,490 textile-workers in the Moscow District; six months later -there were 33,200, a reduction of 15,290--that is, 35 per cent. -(_220_). In the same period the number of workers engaged in preparing -raw cotton was reduced by 47.2 per cent. (_220_). In the metal works -of Petrograd there were nominally employed a total of 12,141 workers, -of which number only 7,585--that is, 62.4 per cent.--were actually -working. Of 7,500 workmen registered at the Putilov Works only 2,800, -or 37.3 per cent., were actually working on August 15th. At the Nevsky -Shipbuilding and Engineering Works not less than 56 per cent. of -the employees were classed as absentees for the first half of July, -70 per cent. for the second half, and 84 per cent. for the first -half of August. That is to say, of those nominally employed at this -important works the actual daily attendance was 44 per cent. during -the first half of July, 30 per cent. for the second half, and only 16 -per cent. for the first half of August (_209_). Since then the Nevsky -Shipbuilding and Engineering Works have been entirely closed. It must -be remembered that even during the Kerensky régime the metallurgical -establishments in Petrograd District, which included some of the finest -plants in the world, gave employment to more than 100,000 workmen as -against 12,141 registered employees in September, 1919. - -In the nationalized leather-factories of the Moscow District the -output of large hides was 43 per cent. less than the output of -1918, which was itself far below the normal average (_227_). In the -factories which were not nationalized the output of large hides -was 60 per cent. less than in 1918. The apparent superiority of the -nationalized factories indicated by these figures is explained by the -fact that the Centrokaja, the central administration of the leather -industry, gave preference to the nationalized factories in the supply -of tanning acids, fuel, and other necessities of production (_227_). -Just as in the metallurgical industry smaller undertakings had a -better chance of surviving than larger ones (_211_), so in the leather -industry[57] (_227_). In both cases the establishments not nationalized -are far more successful than the nationalized. The output of small -hides in nationalized undertakings fell by 60 per cent., and in the -establishments not nationalized by 18 per cent. (_227_). - -[57] Yet we find the Bolshevik, Bazhenov, writing in the -_Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. 50), in March, 1919, the following -nonsense: “The only salvation for Russia’s industry lies in the -nationalization of large enterprises and the closing of small and -medium-sized ones.” Bazhenov is evidently a doctrinaire Marxist of the -school to whom one ounce of theory is of more worth than a ton of facts. - -The four nationalized match-factories in the northern region employed -2,000 persons. The output in October, 1919, was 50 per cent. of the -normal output, the explanation being given that the falling off was due -to the fact that large numbers of workmen had to be sent off into the -villages to search for bread, while others had to be assigned to work -in the fields and to loading wood for fuel (_225_). The manufacture of -electric lamps was practically at a standstill. The Petrograd factories -were closed down because of a shortage of skilled workmen and technical -directors; the Moscow factories, because of the complete absence -of gas (_210_). The sugar industry was almost completely liquidated -(_207_). - -In the report of the People’s Commissariat for Finance we get a -graphic and impressive picture of the manner in which this ill-working -nationalization was, and is, bolstered up. For financing the -nationalized industries appropriations were made as follows: - - First six months of 1918 762,895,100 rubles - Second six months of 1918 5,141,073,179 “ - First six months of 1919 15,439,115,828 “ - -The report calls attention to the fact that whereas it had been -estimated that there would be paid into the treasury during the first -six months of 1919 for goods issued for consumption 1,503,516,945 -rubles, the sum actually received was 54,564,677 rubles--that is, only -3.5 per cent. - -Some idea of the conditions prevailing can be gathered from the -desperate attempts to produce substitutes for much-needed articles. The -_ersatz_ experiments and achievements of the Germans during the war may -have had something to do with this. At all events, we find attempts -made in the cotton-factories to use “cottonized” flax as a substitute -for cotton (_207_). These attempts did not afford any satisfactory or -encouraging results. In consequence of the almost complete stoppage -of the sugar industry we find the Soviet authorities resorting to -attempts to produce sugar from sawdust (_207_). Even more pathetic is -the manner in which attempts were made to supply salt. This necessary -commodity had, for all practical purposes, completely disappeared from -the market, though on October 3d, in Petrograd, it was quoted at 140 -to 150 rubles per pound (_221_). As a result of this condition, in -several districts old herring-barrels, saturated with salt, were cut -up into small pieces and used in cooking instead of salt (_205_). A -considerable market for these pieces of salted wood was found. - -We may profitably close this summary of the economic situation in -Soviet Russia in October and November, 1919, by quoting from the report -of the Chief Administration of Engineering Works: - - If we had reason to fear last year for the working of our - transport, the complaints of its inefficiency being well - grounded, matters have become considerably worse during the - period under report. Water transport is by no means in a better - position, whilst of haulage transport there is no need to - speak.... The consuming needs of the workmen have not been even - remotely satisfied, either in the last year or in the current - year, by the Commissariat of Food Supply, _the main source of - food-supply of the workmen being speculation and free market_. - But even the latter source of food-supply of the workmen in - manufacturing districts is becoming more and more inaccessible. - Besides the fact that prices have soared up to a much greater - extent than the controlled rates of wages, we see the almost - complete disappearance of food articles from working-center - markets. _Of recent times, even pilgrimage to villages is of - no avail. The villages will not part with food for money even - at high prices._ What they demand is articles of which the - workers are no less in need. Hence the workers’ escape from the - factories (_220_). - - Unfortunately, a good many of the concerns enumerated [in the - Tula District] do not work or work only with half the output, - in spite of the fact that 20 of the shafts working yield - considerable quantities of coal, 10 mines supply much raw - material (15 milliard poods of minerals are estimated to be - lying in this district), whilst there is also a large number of - broken lathes and machinery which can, however, be repaired. - Bread for the workers could also be found, if all efforts were - strained (the district used to export corn in peace-time). All - these possibilities are not carried into life, as there are - no people who could by their intense will and sincere desire - restore the iron discipline of labor. Our institutions are - filled with “Sovburs” and “Speks,” who only think of their own - welfare and not of the welfare of the state and of making use - of the revolutionary possibilities of the “toilers in revolt.” - -In the light of this terrible evidence we can readily believe what -Zinoviev wrote in an article contributed to the _Severnaya Communa_ in -January of this year. In that article he said: “King Famine seems to -be putting out his tongue at the proletariat of Petrograd and their -families.... Of late I have been receiving, one after another, starving -delegations from working men and women. They do not protest, nor do -they make any demands; they merely point out, with silent reproach, the -present intolerable state of affairs.” - -We are not dependent upon general statements such as Zinoviev’s for -our information concerning the state of affairs in Soviet Russia in -January, 1920. We have an abundance of precise and authoritative data. -In the first place, Gregor Alexinsky has published, in admirable -translation, the text of the most important parts of the reports -made to the Joint Congress of the Councils of National Economy, -Trades-Unions and the Central Soviet Power. This congress opened in -Moscow on January 25, 1920, and lasted for several days. Important -reports were made to it by A. Rykov, president of the Supreme Council -of National Economy; M. Tomsky, chairman of the Central Council of -Trades-Unions; Kamenev, president of the Moscow Soviet; Lenin, Trotsky, -and others. Alexinsky was fortunate enough to secure copies of the -stenographic reports of the speeches made at this joint congress. In -addition to this material the present writer has had placed at his -disposal several issues of _Izvestia_ containing elaborate reports of -the congress. At the outset Rykov dealt with the effects of the World -War and the Civil War upon the economic situation: - - During the past few years of Imperialistic (World) and Civil - Wars the exhaustion of the countries of Europe, and in - particular of Russia, has reached unheard-of proportions. - This exhaustion has affected the whole territory of the - Imperialistic war, but _the Civil war has been, as regards - dissipation of the national wealth and waste of material and - human resources, much more detrimental than the Imperialistic - war_, for it spread across the greater part of the territory of - Soviet Russia, involving not only the clashing of armies, but - also devastation, fires, and destruction of objects of greatest - value and of structures. - - * * * * * - - The Civil War, having caused an unparalleled waste of the - human and material resources of the Republic, has engendered - an economic and productive crisis. In its main features this - crisis is one of transportation, fuel, and human labor power. - -Truly these are interesting admissions--here is “a very Daniel come to -judgment.” The civil war, we are told, has been “much more detrimental -than the Imperialistic war,” it has “caused an unparalleled waste of -the human and material resources of the republic.” Is it not pertinent -to remind ourselves that for bringing on the civil war the Bolsheviki -were solely responsible? There was no civil war in Russia until they -began it. The whole of the democratic forces of Russia were unitedly -working for the reconstruction of the nation upon a sound basis of -free democracy. They began the civil war in the face of the most -solemn warnings and despite the fact that every thoughtful person -could foresee its inevitable disastrous results. By Rykov’s confession -the Bolsheviki are condemned for having brought upon Russia evils -greater than those which the World War brought in its train. Of the -transportation problem Rykov has this to say: - - Before the war, the percentage of disabled locomotives, even - in the worst of times, never rose above 15 per cent. At the - present time, however, we have 59.5 per cent. of disabled - locomotives--_i.e._, out of every 100 locomotives in Soviet - Russia 60 are disabled, and only 40 capable of working. The - repair of disabled locomotives also keeps on declining with - extraordinary rapidity; before the war we used to repair up to - 8 per cent.; this percentage, after the October revolution, - sometimes dropped to 1 per cent.; now we have gone up, but - only 1 per cent., and we are now repairing 2 per cent. of our - locomotives. Under present conditions of railway transportation - the repairs do not keep abreast of the deterioration of our - locomotives, and _every month we have, in absolute figures, 200 - locomotives less than the preceding month_. It is indispensable - that we raise the repair of locomotives from 2 per cent. up - to 10 per cent., in order to stop the decline and further - disintegration of railway transportation, in order to maintain - it at least on the level on which it stands at the present - time. As for the broad masses of the population, the workers - and peasants of Soviet Russia, _these figures simply mean - that there is no possibility of utilizing any one of those - grain-producing regions, nor those which have raw material and - fuel, that have been added to Soviet Russia as a result of the - victory of the Red Army_. - -According to Trotsky, Rykov’s figures, depressing enough in all -conscience, did not disclose the full gravity of the situation. The -real number of disabled locomotives was greater than the figures -given, he said, for the reason that “we frequently call ‘sound’ -half-disabled locomotives which threaten to drop out completely on -the morrow.” Rykov’s statements do more than merely confirm those -previously quoted from the _Economicheskaya Zhizn_: they show that from -October to January there had been a steady increase of deterioration; -that conditions had gone from bad to worse. The report proceeds to -illustrate the seriousness of the situation by concrete examples of the -actual conditions confronting the government: - - We have a metallurgical region in the Ural mountains; but we - have had at our disposal until now but _one single special - train a month to carry metals from the Urals to central - Russia_. In order to transport 10 million poods[58] of metal by - one single train per month several decades would be required, - should we be able to utilize those scanty supplies of metal - which are ready in the Urals. - -[58] One pood equals thirty-six pounds. - - In order to deliver cotton from Turkestan to the textile - factories in Moscow, we have to carry more than one-half - million poods per month--up to 600,000 poods. But at this time - we have only about two trains a month; that is, scores of years - will be required for transporting under present conditions - from Turkestan those 8 million poods of cotton which we could - convert, but are unable to deliver to the factories. - -The disorganized and demoralized state of the transportation system was -only partly responsible for the shortage of raw materials, however. -It was only one of several causes: “On account of the disorganized -state of transportation we are unable to obtain cotton now, as the -railroads are unable to carry it here. But even as regards those raw -materials which are produced in the central parts of Soviet Russia, -such as flax, wool, hemp, hides, even in these raw stuffs Soviet Russia -is experiencing a severe crisis.” Attention is called to the enormous -decline in the production of flax, the acreage devoted to this crop -being only 30 per cent. of that formerly devoted to it and the yield -very much poorer. Rykov offers as an explanation of this condition the -fact that, as the Soviet Government had not been able to deliver to the -peasants in the flax-producing districts “any considerable quantity of -foodstuffs,” the peasants grew foodstuffs instead of flax. He adds, -“Another reason why the peasants began to cultivate grains instead -of flax was that the speculative prices of bread are higher than the -fixed prices of flax at which the state is purchasing it.” He pours the -cold water of realism upon the silly talk of huge exports of flax from -Russia as soon as trade with foreign nations is opened up, and says, -“_But we shall not be able to export large quantities of flax abroad, -and the catastrophic decline in flax production as compared with 1919 -raises the question whether the flax industry shall not experience in -1920 a flax shortage similar to the one experienced by the textile -industry in cotton._” - -Rykov calls attention to the decline in the production of hides for -leather and of wool. During the first six months of 1919 the hides -collected amounted to about one million pieces, but the total for the -whole of 1920 was not expected to exceed 650,000 pieces. “The number -of hides delivered to the government decreases with every succeeding -month.” There was also to be observed “a decline in the quantity of -live stock, especially those kinds which furnish wool for our woolen -mills.” But perhaps the most impressive part of his report is that -dealing with the fuel shortage. Though adjacent to large coal-fields, -as well as to vast forests, Moscow in the winter of 1919-20 lacked fuel -“even for heating the infirmaries and hospitals.” For the winter of -1919-20 the Council of People’s Commissaries had fixed the necessary -quantity of wood for fuel to be produced at 12,000,000 to 14,000,000 -cubic sagenes (one cubic sagene being equal to two cubic meters). But -the Administrations which were charged with the work forwarded to the -railroads and to the rivers less than 2,500,000 sagenes. It must be -added that of these same 2,500,000 sagenes the Soviet Administrations -were not able to transport to the cities and industrial centers more -than a very small quantity, and “even the minimum program of supply of -fuel for the factories of Moscow could not be carried out because of -the lack of means of transport.” - -Bad as this is, the coal-supply is in a worse condition yet. “Things -are going badly for the production of coal and petroleum” we are told. -Upon their reoccupation of the Donetz Basin the Bolsheviki found coal -on the surface, ready to be shipped, which was estimated at 100,000,000 -poods. “But until the reconstruction of bridges and re-establishment -of railroad communications in the Donetz territory these coal-supplies -cannot be utilized.” Of course the havoc wrought by war in the Donetz -Basin must be taken into account and full allowance made for it. But -what is the explanation of conditions in the coal-fields of the Moscow -region, which from the very first has been under Bolshevist rule, and -never included in the territory of war, civil or otherwise? Says Rykov: - - The fields of Moscow not only have not given what they ought - to have given for the fuel-supply of Soviet Russia, but the - production of coal remained in 1919 at the same level as in - 1918 and it did not reach the figure of 30,000,000 poods; - whereas, under the Czar at the time of the Imperialist War, the - Czar’s officials, with the aid of prisoners of war, knew how to - increase the production of coal in the Moscow fields to the - extent of 40,000,000 poods and even more. - -This brings us face to face with the most vitally important fact -of all, namely, the relatively low productivity of labor under -nationalization of industry as practised in the sorry Utopia of the -Bolsheviki. This is evident in every branch of industry. “When we -speak, in the factories and mills, of the increase of the productivity -of labor, the workmen always answer us,” says Rykov, “with the same -demand and always present us with the same complaint, _Give us bread -and then we will work_.” But the demand for bread could not be met, -despite the fact that there was a considerable store of wheat and -other flour grains. Whereas at the beginning of 1919 there was a wheat -reserve of 60,000,000 poods, on January 1, 1920, the reserve was -90,000,000 poods. Rykov admits that this is really not a great deal, -and explains that in 1919 the government had only been able to collect -about half the wheat demanded from the peasants, despite the vigorous -policy pursued. He says that “in the grain elevators there are reserves -which assure the supply for workmen and peasants for three months.” -This calculation is based upon the near-famine rationing, for Rykov is -careful to add the words, “according to the official food rations.” - - * * * * * - -So, the whole reserve, if fairly distributed, would last until April. -But again the problem of transportation comes in: “If the workers and -peasants have until now received no bread, and if up to this time a -food shortage exists in the greater part of the starving consuming -localities, the cause does not lie in inadequate preparations, but in -the fact that we are unable to ship and distribute the grain already -carted and stored in the granaries.” As a result of these conditions -the workers in the factories at mass-meetings “demand the breach of the -economic front of Bolshevism,” that is to say, the re-establishment of -free and unrestricted commerce. In other words, their demand is for the -abolition of the nationalization policy. It is from the _proletariat_ -that this cry comes, be it observed; and it is addressed to rulers -who claim to represent the “dictatorship of the proletariat”! Could -there be more conclusive evidence that Bolshevism in practice is the -dictatorship of a few men _over_ the proletariat? - -What remedial measures does this important official, upon whom the -organization of the work of economic reconstruction chiefly depends, -propose to his colleagues? All that we get by way of specific and -definite plans is summed up in the following paragraph: - - The Council of People’s Commissaries has already decided to - call upon individual workmen as well as groups of them to - repair the rolling-stock, granting them the right to use the - equipment which they shall have repaired with their own forces - for the transportation of food to those factories and mills - which repair the locomotives and cars. Recently this decision - has been also extended to the fuel-supply. Each factory and - each mill now has the opportunity to carry its own fuel, - provided they repair with their own forces the disabled - locomotives and cars they obtain from the commissariat of ways - and communications. - -Was ever such madness as this let loose upon a suffering people? Let -those who have dilated upon the “statesmanship” and the “organizing -genius” of these men contemplate the picture presented by the decision -of the Council of People’s Commissaries. Each factory to repair with -its own forces the disabled locomotives and cars it needs to transport -fuel and raw materials. Textile-workers, for instance, must repair -locomotives and freight-cars or go without bread. Individual workmen -and groups of workmen and individual factories are thus to be turned -loose upon what remains of an organized transportation system. Not -only must this result in the completion of the destruction of railway -transportation, but it must inevitably cripple the factories. Take -workers from unrelated industries, unused to the job, and set them to -repairing locomotives and freight-cars; every man who has ever had -anything to do with the actual organization and direction of working -forces knows that such men, especially when the special equipment -and tools are lacking, cannot perform, man for man, one-tenth as -much as men used to the work and equipped with the proper tools and -equipment. And then to tell these factory workers that they have “the -right to use the equipment which they shall have repaired” means, if -it means anything at all, that from the factories are to be diverted -further forces to operate railway trains and collect food, fuel, -and raw materials. What that means we have already noted in the case -of the decline of production in the match-factories, “owing to the -wholesale dispersing of workmen in the search for bread, to field work -and unloading of wood.”[59] Of all the lunacy that has come out of -Bolshevist Russia, even, this is perhaps the worst. - -[59] _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, No. 225. - -Rykov tells us that at the end of 1919 4,000 industrial establishments -had been nationalized. “That means,” he says, “that nearly the -whole industry has been transferred to the state, to the Soviet -organizations, and that the industry of private owners, of -manufacturers, has been done away with, for the old statistics -estimated the total number of industrial establishments, including -peasants’ homework places, to be around 10,000. The peasants’ industry -is not subject to nationalization, and 4,000 nationalized industrial -establishments include not only the largest, but also the greater part -of the middle-sized, industrial enterprises of Soviet Russia.” - -What is the state of these nationalized factories, and are the results -obtained satisfactory? Again Rykov’s report gives the answer in very -clear terms: “Of these 4,000 establishments only 2,000 are working at -present. All the rest are closed and idle. The number of workers, by a -rough estimate, is about 1,000,000. Thus you can see that both in point -of number of the working-men employed as well as in point of numbers -of still working establishments, the manufacturing industry is also in -the throes of a crisis.” The explanation offered by Trotsky, that the -industrial failure was due to the destruction of technical equipment, -Rykov sweeps aside. “_The Soviet state, the Workers’ and Peasants’ -Power, could not utilize even those lathes, machines, and factory -equipment which were still at its disposal._ And a considerable part of -manufacturing enterprises was shut down, while part is still working -only in a few departments and workshops.” On every hand it is evident -that shortage of raw materials and of skilled labor are the really -important causes, not lack of machinery. Of 1,191 metallurgical plants -614 had been nationalized. The government had undertaken to provide -these with about 30 per cent. of the metals required, but had been able -to supply only 15 per cent., “less than one-quarter of the need that -must be satisfied in order to sustain a minimum of our industrial life.” - -Take the textile industry as another example: Russia was the third -country in Europe in textile manufacture, England and Germany alone -leading her, the latter by no large margin. No lack of machinery -accounts for the failure here, for of the available looms only 11 per -cent. were used in 1919, and of the spindles only 7 per cent. The -decline of production in 1919 was enormous, so that at the end of that -year it was only 10 per cent. of the normal production. We are told -that: “During the period of January-March, 1919, 100,000 to 200,000 -poods of textile fabrics were produced per month; during the period of -September-November only 25,000 to 68,000 poods were produced per month. -Therefore we have to face an almost complete stoppage of all textile -production in central Russia, which dominated all the other textile -regions in Russia.” - -Rykov seems to have no illusions left concerning the prospects for the -immediate future. He realizes that Bolshevism has nothing to offer -the working-people of Russia in the way of immediate improvement. He -confesses “that in regard to industry the supplying of the population -with footwear, clothing, metals, and so on, Soviet Russia is living -only one-third of the life which Russia lived in times of peace.” As to -the future he has only this to say: “Such a condition might last one -or two years, during which we might live on former reserves, thanks to -that which remained from the preceding period of Russian history. But -these reserves are being exhausted and from one day to another, from -one hour to another, we are approaching a complete crisis in these -branches of industry.” - -But what of the human element in industry, the workers themselves, -that class whose interests and aspirations Bolshevism is supposed to -represent? We have already noted Rykov’s admission that the workers and -peasants lack bread and his explanation. Upon this same matter, Tomsky, -president of the Central Council of the Trades-Unions, says: - - So far as food-supplies are concerned it is evident that under - the present condition of transport we will not be able to - accumulate reserves of provisions sufficiently great so that - each workman may have a sufficient ration. We must renounce the - principle of equality in rationing and reduce the latter to - two or three categories of workman’s ration. We must recognize - that making our first steps upon the road of ameliorating the - situation of industrial workers, we must introduce a system - of so-called “supply of essential occupation.” “Above all, we - will have to supply those groups of workmen who are especially - necessary to production.” - -Two and a quarter years after the forcible seizure of power by the -Bolsheviki one of their “statesmen” prates to his colleagues about -making the “first steps” toward “ameliorating the situation of -industrial workers.” The leading speakers who addressed the congress -discussed at length the bearing of these conditions upon what -Trotsky called “the dissipation of the working-class”--that is, the -disappearance of the proletariat from the industrial centers. Rykov -explained that: - - The crisis of skilled labor has a special importance for our - industry, because even in those industrial branches which - work for our army we make vain efforts because of the lack of - qualified workmen. Sometimes for weeks and even entire months - we could not find the necessary number of workmen skilled and - knowing the trade of which the factories and mills had such - need, in order to give to the Red Army rifles, machine-guns, - and cannon and thereby save Moscow. We experienced enormous - difficulties to find even as few as twenty or thirty workmen. - We hunted for them everywhere, at the employment bureaus, - among trades-unions, in the regiments, and in the villages. - The wastage of the most precious element which production - calls for--that is to say, skilled labor--is one of the most - dangerous phenomena of our present economic life. This wastage - has reached to-day colossal and unheard-of dimensions and - _there are industrial enterprises which we cannot operate even - if we had fuel and raw materials, because competent skilled - labor is lacking_. - -That Rykov is not an alarmist, that his statements are not exaggerated, -we may be quite assured. Even Trotsky protested that conditions were -worse than Rykov had described them, and not better. While Rykov -claimed that there were 1,000,000 workmen engaged in the nationalized -factories, Trotsky said that in reality there were not more than -850,000. But how is this serious decrease in the number of workmen to -be accounted for? An insatiable hunger, idle factories, unused raw -materials, a government eagerly seeking workmen, and yet the workmen -are not forthcoming. Trotsky offers this explanation: “Hunger, bad -living conditions, and cold drive the Russian workmen from industrial -centers to the rural districts, and not only to those districts, but -also _into the ranks of profiteers and parasites_.” Kamenev agrees -with Trotsky and says that “profiteering is the enemy whom the Moscow -proletariat has felt already for some time to be present, but who has -succeeded in growing up to full height and is now _eating up the entire -fabric of the new socialistic economic structure_.” Tomsky answers the -question in a very similar manner. He says: - - If in capitalistic society a shortage of labor power marks the - most intensive activity of industry, in our own case this has - been caused by conditions which are unique and unprecedented in - capitalist economic experience. Only part of our industry is at - work, and yet there is a shortage of labor power felt in the - cities and industrial centers. We observe an exodus of laborers - from industrial centers, caused by poor living conditions. - Those hundreds of skilled laborers whom we are at present - lacking for the most elementary and minimal requirements of - industry have gone partly to the country, to labor communes, - Soviet farms, producers’ associations, while another part, a - very considerable one, serves in the army. _But the proletariat - also leaks away to join the ranks of petty profiteers and - barter-traders, we are ashamed and sorry to confess._ This fact - is being observed and there is no use concealing or denying - it. There is also another cause which hurts the industrial - life and hinders a systematic organization of work. This is - the migration of the workers from place to place in search of - better living conditions. All of this, again, is the result of - the one fundamental cause--the very critical food situation in - the cities and, in general, the hard conditions of life for the - industrial proletariat. - -Finally, some attention must be given to the speech of Lenin, reported -in _Izvestia_, January 29, 1920. Discussing the question whether -industry should be administered by a “collegium” or by a single -individual clothed with absolute authority, Lenin defended the latter -as the only practical method, illustrating his case by reference to -the Red Army. The Soviet organization in the army was well enough at -first, as a start, but the system of administration has now become -“administration by a single individual as the only proper method of -work.” He explains this point in the following words: - - Administration by “colleges” as the basic type of the - organization of the Soviet administration presents in itself - something fundamental and necessary for the first stage when it - is necessary to build anew. But with the establishing of more - stable forms, a transition to practical work is bound up with - administration by a single individual, a system which, most of - all, assures the best use of human powers and a real and not - verbal control of work. - -Thus the master pronounces the doom of industrial Sovietism. No cry of, -“All power to the Soviets!” comes from his lips now, but only a demand -that the individual must be made all-powerful. Lenin the ruler pours -scorn upon the vision of Lenin the leader of revolt. His ideal now is -that of every industrial despot everywhere. He has no pity for the -toiler, but tells his followers that they must “replace the machines -which are lacking and those which are being destroyed by the strength -of the living laborer.” That means rope haulage instead of railway -transportation; it means that, instead of being masters of great -machines, the Russian toilers must replace the machines. - -What a picture of “the dictatorship of the proletariat” these -utterances of the leading exponents of Bolshevism make! Proletarians -starving in a land of infinite abundance; forced by hunger, cold, and -oppression to leave homes and jobs and go back to village life, or, -much worse, to become either vagabonds or petty profiteers trafficking -in the misery of their fellows. Their tragic condition, worse than -anything they had to endure under czarism, suggests the lines: - - The hungry sheep look up and are not fed, - But, swollen with wind and the rank mist they draw, - Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread. - -We do not wonder at Krassin’s confession, published early this year -in the _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, urging “a friendly liquidation of -Bolshevism in Russia” and declaring that: “The Communistic régime -cannot restore the life of the country, and the fall of Bolshevism is -inevitable. The people are beginning to recognize that the Bolshevist -experiment has plunged them into a sea of blood and torment and aroused -no more than a feeling of fatigue and disappointment.” - -Here, then, is a picture of nationalized industry under Bolshevism, -drawn by no unfriendly or malicious critic, but by its own stout -upholders, its ablest champions. It is a self-portrait, an -autobiographical sketch. In it we can see Bolshevism as it is, a -repellent and terrifying thing of malefic might and purpose. Possessed -of every vice and every weakness of capitalism, with none of its -virtues, Bolshevism is abhorrent to all who love liberty and hold faith -in mankind. Promising plenty, it gives only famine; promising freedom, -it gives only fetters; promising love, it gives only hate; promising -order, it gives only chaos; promising righteous and just government, -it gives only corrupt despotism; promising fraternity, it gives only -fratricide. - -Yet, despite the overwhelming mass of evidence, there will still be -defenders and apologists of this monstrous perversion of the democratic -Socialist ideal. We shall be told that the Bolsheviki have had to -contend against insurmountable obstacles; that when they entered into -power they found the industrial system already greatly demoralized; -that they have been compelled to devote themselves to war instead of -to reconstruction; that they have been isolated and deprived of those -things with which other nations hitherto supplied Russia. - -All these things are true, but in what way do they excuse or palliate -the crimes of the Bolsheviki? When they overthrew the Provisional -Government and by brute force usurped its place they knew that the -industrial life of the nation, including the transportation system, -had been gravely injured. They knew, moreover, that it was recovering -and that its complete restoration could only be brought about by the -united effort of all the freedom-loving elements in the land. They -knew, or ought to have known, just as every sane person in and out of -Russia knew, that if they deserted the Allies in the time of their -gravest peril, and, by making peace with Germany, aided her upon the -western front, the Allies would not--could not and dare not--continue -to maintain their friendly and co-operative relations with Russia. -They knew, or ought to have known, as every sane person in and out of -Russia did, that if they tried to impose their rule upon the nation by -force of arms, they would be resisted and there would be civil war. -All these things Lenin and his followers had pointed out to them by -clear-visioned Socialists. All of them are written large upon history’s -pages. - -No defense of Bolshevism has yet been made which is not itself an -accusation. - - - - -XI - -FREEDOM OF PRESS AND ASSEMBLY - - -In 1903, after the split of the Russian Social Democratic Party -into two factions--the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki--the late Rosa -Luxemburg, in an article which she contributed to _Iskra_ (_Spark_), -gave a keen analysis of Lenin. She charged that he was an autocrat at -heart, that he despised the workers and their rights. In burning words -she protested that Lenin wanted to rule Russia with an iron fist, -to replace one czarism by another. Now, Rosa Luxemburg was no “mere -bourgeois reformer,” no “sentimental opportunist”; even at that time -she was known in the international Socialist movement as “Red Rosa,” -a revolutionist among revolutionists, one of the reddest of them all. -Hating despotism and autocracy as such, and not merely the particular -manifestation of it in the Romanov régime, she saw quite clearly, -and protested against, the contempt for democracy and all its ways -which, even at that time, she recognized as underlying Lenin’s whole -conception of the revolutionary struggle. - -A very similar estimate of Lenin was made ten years later, in 1913, -by one of his associates, P. Rappaport. When we remember that it was -written a year before the World War began, and five years before the -outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March, 1917, this estimate of -Lenin, written by Rappaport in 1913, is remarkable: “No party in the -world could live under the régime of the Czar Social Democrat, who -calls himself a liberal Marxist, and who is only a political adventurer -on a grand scale.” - -These estimates of Lenin by fellow-Socialists who knew him well, and -who were thoroughly familiar with his thought, possess no small amount -of interest to-day. Of course, we are concerned with the individual -and with the motivation of his thought and actions only in so far as -the individual asserts an influence upon contemporary developments, -either directly, by deeds of his own, or indirectly through others. -There is much significance in the fact that “Bolshevism” and “Leninism” -are already in use as synonyms, indicating that a movement which has -spread with great rapidity over a large part of the world is currently -regarded as exemplifying the thought and the purpose of the man, -Ulianov, whom posterity, like his contemporaries, will know best by -his pseudonym. Nicolai Lenin’s contempt for democratic ways, and his -admiration for autocratic and despotic ways, are thus of historical -importance. - -There was much that was infamous in the régime of the last of the -Romanovs, Nicholas II, but by comparison with that of his successor, -“Nicholas III,” it was a régime of benignity, benevolence, and -freedom. No government that has been set up in modern times, among -civilized peoples, has been so thoroughly tyrannical, so intolerant and -hostile to essential freedom, as the government which the Bolsheviki -established in Russia by usurpation of power and have maintained thus -far by a relentless and conscienceless use of every instrumentality -of oppression and suppression known to the hated Romanovs. _Without -mandate of authority from the people, or even any considerable part of -the people, this brutal power dissolved the Constituent Assembly and -annulled all its acts; chose its own agents and conferred upon them the -title of representatives of the people; disbanded the courts of law and -substituted therefor arbitrary tribunals, clothed with unlimited power; -without semblance of lawful trial, sentenced men and women to death, -many of them not even accused of any crime whatsoever; seized innocent -men, women, and children as hostages for the conduct of others; -shot and otherwise executed innocent persons, including women and -children, for crimes and offenses of others, of which they admittedly -knew nothing; deprived citizens of freedom, and imprisoned them in -vile dungeons, for no crime save written or spoken appeal in defense -of lawful rights; arbitrarily suppressed the existing freedom of -assemblage and of publication; based civic rights upon the acceptance -of particular beliefs; by arbitrary decree levied unjust, unequal, and -discriminatory taxes; filled the land with hireling secret spies and -informers; imposed a constitution and laws upon the people without -their consent, binding upon the people, but not upon itself; placed the -public revenues at the disposal of a political faction representing -only a minority of the people; and, finally, by a decree restored -involuntary servitude._ - -This formidable indictment is no more than a mere outline sketch of -the despotism under which Russia has suffered since November, 1917. -There is not a clause in the indictment which is not fully sustained by -the evidence given in these pages. Lenin is fond of quoting a saying -of Marx that, “The domination of the proletariat can most easily be -accomplished in a war-weary country--_i.e._, in a worn-out, will-less, -and weakened land.” He and his associates found Russia war weary, worn -out, and weakened indeed, but not “will-less.” On the contrary, the -great giant, staggering from the weakness and weariness arising from -years of terrible struggle, urged by a mighty will to make secure the -newly conquered freedom, was already turning again to labor, to restore -industry and build a prosperous nation. By resorting to the methods -and instrumentalities which tyrants in all ages have used to crush the -peoples rightly struggling to be free, the Bolsheviki have imposed upon -Russia a tyranny greater than the old. That they have done this in the -name of liberty in no wise mitigates their crime, but, on the contrary, -adds to it. The classic words of the English seventeenth-century -pamphleteer come to mind: “Almost all tyrants have been first captains -and generals for the people, under pretense of vindicating or defending -their liberties.... Tyrants accomplish their ends much more by fraud -than force ... with cunning, plausible pretenses to impose upon men’s -understandings, and in the end they master those that had so little -wit as to rely upon their faith and integrity.” - -The greatest liberty of all, that liberty upon which all other -liberties must rest, and without which men are slaves, no matter by -what high-sounding names they may be designated, is the liberty of -discussion. Perhaps no people in the world have realized this to -the same extent as the great Anglo-Saxon peoples, or have been so -solicitous in maintaining it. Only the French have approached us in -this respect. The immortal words of a still greater seventeenth-century -pamphleteer constitute a part of the moral and political heritage of -our race. Who does not thrill at Milton’s words, “Give me the liberty -to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above -all liberties.” That fine declaration was the inspiration of Patrick -Henry’s sublime demand, “Give me liberty or give me death.” Upon that -rock, and that rock alone, was built “government of the people, by the -people, and for the people.” - -The manner in which the Bolsheviki have stifled protest, discussion, -and appeal through the suppression of the opposition newspapers -constitutes one of the worst chapters in their infamous history. Yet, -strangely enough, of such perversity is the human mind capable, they -have found their chief defenders, outside of Russia, among individuals -and groups devoted to the upholding of popular liberties. Let us -take, for example, the case of Mr. William Hard and his laborious and -ingenious--though disingenuous--articles in defense of the Bolsheviki, -published in the _New Republic_ and elsewhere: - -In an earlier volume,[60] written at the close of 1918, and published -in March, 1919, the present writer said of the Bolsheviki, “When they -came into power they suppressed all non-Bolshevist papers in a manner -differing not at all from that of the Czar’s régime, forcing the other -Socialist partizan groups to resort to pre-Revolution underground -methods.” The statement that the “other Socialist partizan groups” -were forced to “resort to pre-Revolution underground methods,” made in -the connection it was, conveyed to every person reading that paragraph -who knew anything at all of the history of the Russian revolutionary -struggle the information that the statement that the Bolsheviki -“suppressed all non-Bolshevist papers” was not to be interpreted -as meaning the suppression was absolute. Even if it had not been -pointed out elsewhere--as it was, upon the authority of a famous -Socialist-Revolutionist--that in some instances suppressed papers -managed to appear in spite of the authorities, simply changing their -names, _precisely as they had done under czarism_, the statement quoted -above would have been justified as a substantially correct statement of -the facts, particularly in view of the boast of responsible Bolsheviki -themselves that they had suppressed the entire opposition press and -that only the Bolshevist press remained. Certainly when one speaks or -writes of the suppression of newspapers under czarism one does not -deny that the revolutionists from time to time found ways and means -of circumventing the authorities, and that it was more or less common -for such suppressed newspapers to reappear under new names. The -whole point of the paragraph in question was that the characteristic -conditions of czarism had been restored. - -[60] _Bolshevism_, by John Spargo, New York, 1919. - -With a mental agility more admirable than either his controversial -manners or his political morals, by a distortion of facts worthy of his -mentors, but not of himself or of his reputation, Mr. Hard makes it -appear that the Bolsheviki only suppressed the opposition newspapers -after the middle of 1918, when, as he alleges, the opposition to the -Bolsheviki assumed the character of “open acute civil war.” Mr. Hard -admits that prior to this time there were suppressions and that “if any -paper tried not merely to criticize the Lenin administration, but to -utterly destroy the Bolshevik Soviet idea of the state, its editor was -likely to find his publishing life quite frequently interrupted.” - -Now the facts in the case are as different from Mr. Hard’s presentation -as a normal mind can well conceive. Mr. David N. Shub, a competent -authority, made an exhaustive reply to Mr. Hard’s article, a reply -that was an exposure, in the columns of _Struggling Russia_. Before -reproducing Mr. Shub’s reply it may be well to set forth a few facts -of record which are of fundamental importance: _On the very day on -which the Bolsheviki published the decree on the establishment of the -Soviet power, November 10, 1917, they published also a decree directed -against the freedom of the press._ The decree proper was accompanied -by a characteristic explanatory statement. This statement recited that -it had been necessary for the Temporary Revolutionary Committee to -“adopt a series of measures against the counter-revolutionary press -of various shades”; that protests had been made on all sides against -this as a violation of the program which provided for the freedom of -the press; repressive measures were temporary and precautionary, and -that they would cease and complete freedom be given to the press, in -accordance with the widest and most progressive law, “as soon as the -new régime takes firm root.” The decree proper read: - - I. Only those organs of the press will be suspended - - (_a_) Which appeal for open resistance to the government - of workmen and peasants. - - (_b_) Which foment disorders by slanderously falsifying - facts. - - (_c_) Which incite to criminal acts--_i.e._, acts within - the jurisdiction of the police courts. - - II. Provisional or definitive suspension can be executed - only by order of the Council of People’s Commissaries. - - III. These regulations are only of a provisional nature - and shall be abrogated by a special ukase when - life has returned to normal conditions. - - If Mr. Hard or any of the numerous journalistic apologists of - the Bolsheviki in this country will look the matter up he or - they will find that this decree copied the forms usually used - by the Czar’s government. It is noteworthy that the restoration - of freedom of the press was already made dependent upon that - czaristic instrument, the _ukase_. On the 16th of November the - Central Executive Committee of the Soviets adopted a resolution - which read: - - The closure of the bourgeois papers was caused not only by - the purely fighting requirements in the period of the rising - and the suppression of counter-revolutionary attempts, but - likewise as a necessary temporary measure for the establishment - of a new régime in the sphere of the press, under which the - capital proprietors of printing-works and paper would not be - able to become autocratic beguilers of public opinion.... - The re-establishment of the so-called freedom of the press, - _viz._, the simple return of printing-offices and paper to - capitalists, poisoners of the people’s conscience, would be - an unpermissible surrender to the will of capital--_i.e._, a - counter-revolutionary measure. - -At the meeting when this resolution was adopted, and speaking in its -support, Trotsky made a speech remarkable for its cynical dishonesty -and its sinister menace. He said, according to the report in _Pravda_ -two days later: - - _Those measures which are employed to frighten individuals must - be applied to the press also...._ All the resources of the - press must be handed over to the Soviet Power. You say that - formerly we demanded freedom of the press for the _Pravda_? But - then we were in a position to demand a minimum program; now we - insist on the maximum program. _When the power was in the hands - of the bourgeoisie we demanded juridical freedom of the press._ - When the power is held by the workmen and peasants--we must - create conditions for the freedom of the press. - -Quite obviously, as shown by their own official reports, Mr. Hard and -gentlemen of the _New Republic_, Mr. Oswald Villard and gentlemen -of _The Nation_, and you, too, Mr. Norman Thomas, who find Mr. -Hard’s disingenuous pleading so convincing,[61] the hostility of -the Bolsheviki to freedom of the press was manifest from the very -beginning of their rule. On the night of November 30th ten important -newspapers were suppressed and their offices closed, among them being -six Socialist newspapers. Their offense lay in the fact that they urged -their readers to stand by the Constituent Assembly. Not only were the -papers suppressed and their offices closed, but the best equipped of -them all was “requisitioned” for the use of a Bolshevist paper, the -_Soldatskaia Pravda_. The names of the newspapers were: _Nasha Rech_, -_Sovremennoie Delo_, _Utro_, _Rabochaia Gazeta_, _Volia Naroda_, -_Trudovoe Slovo_, _Edinstvo_, and _Rabotcheie Delo_. The suppression -of the _Rabochaia Gazeta_, official organ of the Central Committee -of the Social Democratic Party, caused a vigorous protest and the -Central Committee of the party decided “to bring to the knowledge of -all the members of the party that the central organ of the party, the -_Rabochaia Gazeta_, is closed by the Military Revolutionary Committee. -While branding this as an arbitrary act in defiance of the Russian -and international proletariat, committed by so-called Socialists on -a Social-Democrat paper and the Labor Party, whose organ it is, the -Central Committee has decided to call upon the party to organize a -movement of protest against this act in order to open the eyes of the -labor masses to the character of the régime which governs the country.” - -[61] See _The World Tomorrow_, February, 1920, p. 61. - -In consequence of the tremendous volume of protest and through the -general adoption of the devices familiar to the revolutionaries under -czarism--using new names, changing printing-offices, and the like--most -of the papers reappeared for a brief while in one form or another. -But in February, 1918, all the anti-Bolshevist papers were again -suppressed, save one, the principal organ of the Cadets, formerly the -_Rech_, but later appearing as the _Nash Viek_. This paper was suffered -to appear for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. -Mr. Shub’s article contains a detailed, though by no means full, -account of the further suppressions: - - A few days after the Bolshevist coup, in November, 1917, - the Bolsheviki closed down, among others, the organ of - the Mensheviki-Internationalists, _Rabochaya Gazeta_; the - central organ of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists, - _Dyelo Naroda_; the _Volia Naroda_, published by Catherine - Breshkovsky; the _Yedinstvo_, published by George Plechanov; - the _Russkaya Volia_, published by Leonid Andreiev; the - _Narodnoye Slovo_, the organ of the People’s Socialists, and - the _Dien_, published by the well-known Social-Democrat, - Alexander Potresov. - - The printing-presses which belonged to Andreiev were - confiscated and his paper, _Russkaya Volia, never again - appeared under any other name_. The editor-in-chief of - the _Volia Naroda_--the newspaper published by Catherine - Breshkovsky--A. Agunov, was incarcerated by the Bolsheviki - in the Fortress of Saints Peter and Paul and this paper was - _never able to appear again, even under a changed name_. - The offices of the _Dyelo Naroda_ were for a time guarded - by groups of armed soldiers in sympathy with the Party of - Socialists-Revolutionists, and notwithstanding all orders - by the Commissary of the Press to cease publication, the - Socialists-Revolutionists managed from time to time to issue - their newspapers, in irregular form, under one name or another. - But the copies of the paper would be confiscated from the - newsdealers immediately upon their appearance, and the newsboys - who risked the selling of it were subjected to unbelievable - persecutions. There were even cases when the sellers of these - “seditious” Socialist papers were shot by the Bolsheviki. These - facts were recorded by every newspaper which appeared from time - to time in those days in Petrograd and Moscow. - - The _Dien_ (_Day_) did not appear at all for some time after - its suppression. Later there appeared in its place the - _Polnotch_ (_Midnight_), which was immediately suppressed for - publishing an exposé of the Bolshevist Commissary, Lieutenant - Schneuer, an ex-provocateur of the Tzar’s government and a - German spy, the same Schneuer who conducted negotiations with - the German command for an armistice, and who later, together - with Krylenko, led the orgy called “the capture of the General - Headquarters,” in the course of which General Dukhonine, the - Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, was brutally murdered - and mutilated for his refusal to conclude an armistice with the - Germans. - - A few days after the _Polnotch_ was closed another paper - appeared in its place, called _Notch_ (_Night_), but this one - was just as rapidly suppressed. Again _V Glookhooyou Notch_ - (_In the Thick of Night_) appeared for a brief period, and - still later _V Temnooyou Notch_ (_In the Dark of Night_). The - paper was thus appearing once a week, and sometimes once every - other week, under different names. I have all these papers - in my possession, and their contents and fate would readily - convince the reader how “tolerantly” the Bolsheviki, in the - early days of their “rule,” treated the adverse opinions of - even such leading Socialists as Alexander Potresov, one of the - founders of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, who, for - decades, was one of the editors of the central organs of the - party. - - The publication of G. V. Plechanov’s--Russia’s greatest - Socialist writer and leader--the _Yedinstvo_, after it was - suppressed, appeared in the end of December, 1917, under the - name _Nashe Yedinstvo_, but was closed down in January, 1918, - and the Bolsheviki _confiscated its funds kept in a bank and - ordered the confiscation of all moneys coming in by mail to its - office_. This information was even cabled to New York by the - Petrograd correspondent of the New York Jewish pro-Bolshevist - newspaper, the _Daily Forward_. The _Nashe Yedinstvo_, at - the head of which, besides George Plechanov, there were such - widely known Russian revolutionists and Socialists as Leo - Deutsch, Vera Zasulitch, Dr. N. Vassilyev, L. Axelrod-Orthodox, - and Gregory Alexinsky, was thus permanently destroyed by the - Bolsheviki in January, or early in February, 1918, and never - appeared again under any other name. - - The newspapers _Dien_, _Dyelo Naroda_, the Menshevist _Novy - Looch_, and a few others did make an attempt to appear later, - but on the eve of the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty - _all_ oppositional Socialist newspapers were again suppressed - wholesale. In the underground Socialist bulletins, which were - at that time being published by the Socialists-Revolutionists - and Social Democrats, it was stated that this move was carried - out by order of the German General Staff. The prominent Social - Democrat and Internationalist, L. Martov, later, at an open - meeting of the Soviet, flung this accusation in the face of - Lenin, _who never replied to it by either word or pen_. - - When the Germans, after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, still - continued their offensive movement, occupying one Russian city - after another, and the Bolsheviki had reasons to believe that - they were nearing their end, they somewhat relaxed their régime - and some newspapers obtained the possibility of appearing - again, _on condition that all such newspapers, under threat - of fine and confiscation, were to print on their first pages - all the Bolshevist decrees and all distorted information and - explanations by the Bolshevist commissaries_. Aside from that, - the press was subject to huge fines for every bit of news - that did not please the eye of the Bolshevist censor. Thus, - for instance, _Novaya Zhizn_, Gorky’s organ, was fined 35,000 - rubles for a certain piece of “unfavorable” news which it - printed. - - However, early in May, 1918--_i.e._, _before the beginning - of the so-called “intervention” by the Allies_--even this - measure of “freedom” of the press appeared too frivolous for - the Bolshevist commissaries, and they permanently closed down - _Dyelo Naroda_, _Dien_, and _Novy Looch_, and, somewhat later, - all the remaining opposition papers, including Gorky’s _Novaya - Zhizn_, and since that time none of them have reappeared. In - spite of endless attempts, Maxim Gorky did not succeed in - obtaining permission to establish his paper even six months - afterward, when he had officially made peace with the Soviet - régime. The Bolsheviki are afraid of the free speech of even - their official “friends,” and that is the true reason why there - is not in Soviet Russia to-day a single independent organ of - the press.[62] - -[62] April, 1919. - - With one kick of the Red Army boot was thus destroyed Russia’s - greatest treasure, her independent press. The oldest and - greatest founts of Russian culture and social justice, such - as the monthly magazine, _Russkoye Bogatstvo_, and the daily - _Russkya Viedomosti_, which even the Czar’s government never - dared to suppress permanently, were brutally strangled. These - organs have raised entire generations of Russian radicals - and Socialists and had among their contributors and editors - the greatest savants, publicists, and journalists of Russia, - such as Nicholas Chernishevsky, Glieb Uspensky, Nicholas - Mikhailovsky, N. Zlatovratsky, Ilya Metchnikov, Professor N. - Kareiev, Vladimir Korolenko, Peter Kropotkin, and numerous - others. - -Let us look at the subject from a slightly different angle: one -of the first things they did was to declare the “nationalization” -of the printing-establishments of certain newspapers, which they -immediately turned over to their own press. In this manner the -printing-establishment of the _Novoye Vremia_ was seized and used -for the publication of _Izvestia_ and _Pravda_, the latter being an -organ of the party and not of the government. Here was a new form of -political nepotism which a Tweed might well envy and only a Nash could -portray. We are at the beginning of the nepotism, however. On November -20, 1917, the advertising monopoly was decreed, and on December 10th -following it went into effect. This measure forbade the printing of -advertisements in any except the official journals, thereby cutting off -the revenue from advertising, upon which newspapers depend, from all -except official journals. This measure alone had the effect of limiting -the possibility of publication practically to the official papers and -those which were heavily subsidized. Moreover, the Bolsheviki used the -public revenues to subsidize their own newspapers. They raised the -postal rates for sending newspapers by mail to a prohibitive height, -and then carried the newspapers of their own partizans free of charge -at the public expense. They “nationalized” the sale of newspapers, -which made it unlawful for unauthorized persons to obtain and offer for -sale any save the official Bolshevist newspapers and those newspapers -published by its partizans which supported the government. The decree -forbade taking subscriptions for the “unauthorized” papers at the -post-offices, in accordance with custom, forbade their circulation -through the mails, and imposed a special tax upon such as were -permitted to appear. Article III of this wonderful decree reads: - - Subscriptions to the bourgeois and pseudo-Socialist newspapers - are suppressed and will not hereafter be accepted at the - post-office. Issues of these journals that may be mailed will - not be delivered at their destination. - - Newspapers of the bourgeoisie will be subject to a tax - which may be as great as three rubles for each number. - Pseudo-Socialist journals such as the _V period_ and the _Troud - Vlast Naroda_[63] will be subject to the same tax. - -[63] These were organs of the Mensheviki and the Social Revolutionists. - -Is it any wonder that by the latter part of May, 1918, the -anti-Bolshevist press had been almost entirely exterminated except -for the fitful and irregular appearance of papers published -surreptitiously, and the few others whose appearance was due to the -venality of some Bolshevist officials? Was there ever, in the history -of any nation, since Gutenberg’s invention of movable type made -newspapers possible, such organized political nepotism? Was there ever, -since men organized governments, anything more subversive of freedom -and political morality? Yet there is worse to come; as time went on, -new devices suggested themselves to these perverters of democracy -and corrupters of government. On July 27, 1918, _Izvestia_ published -the information that the press department would grant permits for -periodical publications, _provided they accepted the Soviet platform_. -In carrying out this arrangement, so essentially despotic, the press -department reserved to itself the right to determine _whether or not -the population was in need of the proposed publication_, whether it was -advisable to permit the use of any of the available paper-supply for -the purpose, and so forth and so on. Under this arrangement permission -was given to publish a paper called the _Mir_. Ostensibly a pacifist -paper, the _Mir_ was very cordially welcomed by the Bolshevist papers -to the confraternity of privileged journals. That the _Mir_ was -subsidized by the German Government for the propaganda of international -pacificism (this was in the summer of 1918) seems to have been -established.[64] The closing chapter of the history of this paper is -told in the following extract from _Izvestia_, October 17, 1918, which -is more interesting for its disclosures of Bolshevist mentality than -anything else: - -[64] See Dumas, _op. cit._, p. 80. - - The suppression of the paper _Mir_ (_Peace_).--In accordance - with the decision published in the _Izvestia_ on the 27th - July, No. 159, the Press Department granted permits to - issue _to periodical publications which accepted the Soviet - platform_. When granting permission the Press Department took - into consideration the available supplies of paper, _whether - the population was in need of the proposed periodical - publication_, and also the necessity of providing employment - for printers and pressmen. Thus permission was granted to - issue the paper _Mir_, especially in view of the publisher’s - declaration that the paper was intended to propagate pacifist - ideas. At the present moment _the requirements of the - population of the Federal Socialist Republic for means of daily - information are adequately met by the Soviet publications_; - employment for those engaged in journalistic work is secured - in the Soviet papers; a paper crisis is approaching. The Press - Department, therefore, considers it impossible to permit the - further publication of the _Mir_ and has decided to _suppress - this paper forever_. - -Another device which the Bolsheviki resorted to was the compulsion of -people to purchase the official newspapers, whether they wanted them or -not. On July 20, 1918, there was published “Obligatory Regulation No. -27,” which provided for the compulsory purchase by all householders of -the _Severnaya Communa_. This unique regulation read as follows: - - -OBLIGATORY REGULATION NO. 27 - - Every house committee in the city of Petrograd and other towns - included in the Union of Communes of the Northern Region is - under obligation to subscribe to, paying for same, one copy of - the newspaper, the _Severnaya Communa_, the official organ of - the Soviets of the Northern Region. - - The newspaper should be given to every resident in the house on - the first demand. - - Chairman of the Union of the Communes of the Northern region, - Gr. Zinoviev. - - Commissary of printing, N. Kuzmin. - -The _Severnaya Communa_, on November 10, 1918, published the following -with reference to this beautiful scheme: - - To the Notice of the House Committees of the Poor: - - On 20th July of the present year there was published obligatory - regulation No. 27, to the following effect: - - “Every house committee in the city of Petrograd and other towns - included in the Union of Communes of the Northern Region is - under obligation to subscribe to, paying for same, one copy of - the newspaper, the _Severnaya Communa_, the official organ of - the Soviets of the Northern Region. - - “The newspaper should be given to every resident in the house - on the first demand. - - “Chairman of the Union of the Communes of the Northern region, - Gr. Zinoviev. - - “Commissary of printing, N. Kuzmin.” - -However, until now the majority of houses inhabited mainly by the -bourgeoisie do not fulfil the above-expressed obligatory regulation, -and the working population of such houses is deprived of the -possibility of receiving the _Severnaya Communa_ in its house -committees. - -Therefore, the publishing office of the _Severnaya Communa_ brings to -the notice of all house committees that it has undertaken, through -the medium of especial emissaries, the control of the fulfilment by -house committees of the obligatory regulation No. 27, and all house -committees which cannot show a receipt for a subscription to the -newspaper, the _Severnaya Communa_, will be immediately called to the -most severe account for the breaking of the obligatory regulation. - -Subscriptions will be received in the main office and branches of the -_Severnaya Communa_ daily, except Sundays and holidays, from 10 to 4. - -After this it is something of an anticlimax to even take note of -the tremendous power wielded by the Revolutionary Tribunal of the -Press, Section of Political Crimes, which was created in March, 1918. -The decree relating to this body and outlining its functions, dated -December 18, 1917, read as follows: - - -THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL OF THE PRESS - - 1. Under the Revolutionary Tribunal is created a Revolutionary - Tribunal of the Press. This Tribunal will have jurisdiction of - crimes and offenses against the people committed by means of - the press. - - 2. Crimes and offenses by means of the press are the - publication and circulation of any false or perverted reports - and information about events of public life, in so far as they - constitute an attempt upon the rights and interests of the - revolutionary people. - - 3. The Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press consists of three - members, elected for a period not longer than three months by - the Soviet of Workmen’s, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies. - These members are charged with the conduct of the preliminary - investigation as well as the trial of the case. - - 4. The following serve as grounds for instituting proceedings: - reports of legal or administrative institutions, public - organizations, or private persons. - - 5. The prosecution and defense are conducted on the principles - laid down in the instructions to the general Revolutionary - Tribunal. - - 6. The sessions of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press are - public. - - 7. The decisions of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press are - final and are not subject to appeal. - - 8. The Revolutionary Tribunal imposes the following penalties: - (1) fine; (2) expression of public censure, which the convicted - organ of the Press brings to the general knowledge in a way - indicated by the Tribunal; (3) the publication in a prominent - place or in a special edition of a denial of the false report; - (4) temporary or permanent suppression of the publication or - its exclusion from circulation; (5) confiscation to national - ownership of the printing-shop or property of the organ of the - Press if it belongs to the convicted parties. - - 9. The trial of an organ of the Press by the Revolutionary - Tribunal of the Press does not absolve the guilty persons from - general criminal responsibility. - -Under the provisions of this body the newspapers which were appearing -found themselves subject to a new terror. An offensive reference to -Trotsky caused the _Outre Rossii_ to be mulcted to the extent of 10,000 -rubles. Even the redoubtable Martov was punished and the _Vperiod_, -organ of the Social Democratic Party, suppressed. The _Nache Slovo_ -was fined 25,000 rubles and the _Ranee Outre_ was mulcted in a like -amount for printing a news article concerning some use of the Lettish -sharp-shooters by the Bolsheviki, though there was no denial that the -facts were as stated. It was a common practice to impose fines of -anywhere from 10,000 to 50,000 rubles upon papers which had indulged -in criticism of the government or anything that could be construed as -“an offense against the people” or “an attempt upon the rights and -interests of the revolutionary people.” - -Here, then, is a summary of the manner in which the Bolsheviki have -suppressed the freedom of the press. It is a record which cannot be -equaled, nor approached, in all the history of Russia during the reign -of Nicholas Romanov II. Mr. Hard attempts to cover the issue with -confusion by asking, “Is there any government in the world that permits -pro-enemy papers to be printed within its territory during a civil -war?” and he is applauded by the entire claque of so-called “Liberal” -and “Radical” pro-Bolshevist journals. It was done in this country -during the War of the Rebellion, Mr. Hard; it has been done in Ireland -under “British tyranny.” The Bolshevist records show, first, that the -suppression of non-Bolshevist journals was carried out upon a wholesale -scale when there was no state of civil war, no armed resistance to -the Bolsheviki; that it was, in fact, carried out upon a large scale -during the period when preparations were being made for holding the -Constituent Assembly which the Bolsheviki themselves, in repeated -official declarations, had sworn to uphold and defend. The records -show, furthermore, that the Bolsheviki sought not merely to suppress -those journals which were urging civil war, but that, as a matter of -fact, they suppressed the papers which urged the contrary--that is, -that the civil war be brought to an end. The _Vsiegda Vperiod_ is a -case in point. In February, 1919, the Central Executive Committee of -the Soviets announced that it had confirmed the decision to close this -newspaper, “_as its appeals for the cessation of civil war appear to be -a betrayal of the working-class_.” - -No, Mr. Hard. No, Mr. Oswald Villard. No, Mr. Norman Thomas. No, -gentlemen of the _New Republic_. No, gentlemen of _The Nation_. -There can be no escape through the channels of such juggling with -facts. When you defend the Bolshevist régime you defend a monstrous -organized oppression, and you thereby disqualify yourselves to set -up as champions and defenders of Freedom. When you protest against -restrictions of popular liberties here the red ironic laughter of the -tyrants you have defended drowns the sound of your voices. When you -speak fair words for Freedom in America your fellow-men hear only -the echoes of your louder words spoken for tyranny in Russia. You -do not approach the bar with clean hands and clean consciences. You -are forsworn. By what right shall you who have defended Bolshevism -in Russia, with all its brutal tyranny, its loathsome corruption, -its unrestrained reign of hatred, presume to protest when Liberty is -assailed in America? Those among us who have protested against every -invasion of popular liberties at home, and have at the same time been -loyal to our comrades in Russia who have so bravely resisted tyranny, -have the right to enter the lists in defense of Freedom in America, and -to raise our voices when that Freedom is assailed. You have not that -right, gentlemen; you cannot speak for Freedom, in America or anywhere -else, without bringing shame upon her. - -In all the platforms and programs of the Socialist parties of the -world, without a single exception, the demand for freedom of the press -has held a prominent place. No accredited spokesmen of the Socialist -movement, anywhere, at any time, has suggested that this demand was -made with mental reservations of any kind, or that when Socialists -came into power they would suppress the publication of views hostile -to their own, or the views of parties struggling to introduce other -changes. Yet we find Lenin at the meeting of the Central Executive -Committee of the Soviets held on November 18, 1917, saying: “We, the -Bolsheviki, have always said that when we came into power we would -shut down the bourgeois newspapers. To tolerate bourgeois newspapers -is to quit being Socialists.” And Trotsky supported this position and -affirmed it as his own. - -We have here only the beginnings of a confession of moral bankruptcy, -of long-continued, systematic, studied misrepresentation of their -purpose and deception of their comrades and of all who believed the -words they said, unsuspecting the serious reservations back of the -words. _Theses Respecting the Social Revolution and the Tasks of -the Proletariat During Its Dictatorship in Russia_ is, as might be -inferred from its title, a characteristic piece of Lenin’s medieval -scholasticism, in which, with ponderous verbosity, he explains and -interprets Bolshevism. Let us consider _Theses_ Nos. 17, 18, 19, and 20: - - (17) The former demands for a democratic republic, and general - freedom (that is freedom for the middle classes as well), - were quite correct in the epoch that is now past, the epoch - of preparation and gathering of strength. _The worker needed - freedom for his press, while the middle-class press was noxious - to him, but he could not at this time put forward a demand - for the suppression of the middle-class press._ Consequently, - the proletariat demanded general freedom, even freedom for - reactionary assemblies, for black labor organizations. - - (18) Now we are in the period of the direct attack on capital, - the direct overthrow and destruction of the imperialist robber - state, and the direct suppression of the middle class. It is, - therefore, absolutely clear that in the present epoch the - principle of defending general freedom (that is also for the - counter-revolutionary middle class) is not only superfluous, - but directly dangerous. - - (19) This also holds good for the press, and the leading - organizations of the social traitors. The latter have been - unmasked as the active elements of the counter-revolution. - They even attack with weapons the proletarian government. - Supported by former officers and the money-bags of the defeated - finance capital, they appear on the scene as the most energetic - organizations for various conspiracies. The proletariat - dictatorship is their deadly enemy. Therefore, they must be - dealt with in a corresponding manner. - - (20) As regards the working-class and the poor peasants, these - possess the fullest freedom. - -What have we here? One reads these paragraphs and is stunned by them; -repeated readings are necessary. We are told, in fact, that all the -demands for freedom of the press, including the bourgeois press, made -by Socialists out of office, during the period of their struggle, were -hypocritical; that the demand for freedom for all was made for no other -reason than the inability of those making it to secure their freedom by -themselves and apart from the general freedom; that there was always -an unconfessed desire and intention to use the power gained through -the freedom thus acquired to suppress the freedom already possessed -by others. What a monstrous confession of duplicity and deceit long -practised, and what a burden of suspicion and doubt it imposes upon -all who hereafter in the name of Socialism urge the freedom of the -press.[65] - -[65] See Kautsky, _The Dictatorship of the Proletariat_. - -Let us hear from another leading Bolshevist luminary, Bucharin, who -shares with Lenin the heaviest tasks of expounding Bolshevist theories -and who is in some respects a rival theologian. In July, 1918, Bucharin -published his pamphlet, _The Program of the Communists_, authorized -by the Communist Party, of whose organ, _Pravda_, he is the editor. A -revolutionary organization in this country published the greater part -of this pamphlet, and it is significant that it omitted Chapter VII, -in which Bucharin reveals precisely the same attitude as Lenin. He -goes farther in that he admits the same insincerity of attitude toward -equal suffrage and the Constituent Assembly based on the will of the -majority. He says: - - If we have a dictatorship of the proletariat, the object of - which is to stifle the bourgeoisie, to compel it to give up - its attempts for the restoration of the bourgeois authority, - then it is obvious that there can be no talk of allowing - the bourgeoisie electoral rights or of a change from soviet - authority to a bourgeois-republican parliament. - - The Communist (Bolshevik) party receives from all sides - accusations and even threats like the following: “You close - newspapers, you arrest people, you forbid meetings, you trample - underfoot freedom of speech and of the press, you reconstruct - autocracy, you are oppressors and murderers.” - - It is necessary to discuss in detail this question of - “liberties” in a Soviet republic. - - At present the following is clear for the working-men and the - peasants. The Communist party not only does not demand any - liberty of the press, speech, meetings, unions, etc., for the - bourgeois enemies of the people, but, on the contrary, it - demands that the government should be always in readiness to - close the bourgeois press; to disperse the meetings of the - enemies of the people; to forbid them to lie, slander, and - spread panic; to crush ruthlessly all attempts at a restoration - of the bourgeois régime. This is precisely the meaning of the - dictatorship of the proletariat. - - Another question may be put to us: “Why did the Bolsheviki - not speak formerly of the abrogation of full liberty for the - bourgeoisie? Why did they formerly support the idea of a - _bourgeois-democratic republic? Why did they support the idea - of the Constituent Assembly and did not speak of depriving the - bourgeoisie of the right of suffrage?_ Why have they changed - their program so far as these questions are concerned?” - - _The answer to this question is very simple. The working-class - formerly did not have strength enough to storm the bulwarks - of the bourgeoisie. It needed preparation, accumulation of - strength, enlightenment of the masses, organization. It needed, - for example, the freedom of its own labor press. But it could - not come to the capitalists and to their governments and - demand that they shut down their own newspapers and give full - freedom to the labor papers. Everybody would merely laugh at - the working-men. Such demands can be made only at the time - of a storming attack. And there had never been such a time - before. This is why the working-men demanded (and our party, - too) “Freedom of the press.” (Of the whole press, including the - bourgeois press.)_ - -A more immoral doctrine than that contained in these utterances by -the foremost intellectual leaders of Russian Bolshevism can hardly be -conceived of. How admirably their attitude and their method is summed -up in the well-known words of Frederick II of Prussia: “I understand by -the word ‘policy’ that one must make it his study to deceive others; -that is the way to get the better of them.” And these are the men and -this the policy which have found so many champions among us! When or -where in all the history of a hundred years was such a weapon as this -placed in the hands of the reactionists? Here are the spokesmen of what -purports to be a Socialist republic, and of the political party which -claims to present Socialism in its purest and undiluted form, saying -to the world, “Socialists do not believe in freedom of the press; they -find it convenient to say they do while they are weak, in order to -gain protection and aid for their own press, but whenever and wherever -they obtain the power to do so they will suppress the press of all who -disagree with them or in any way oppose them.” That, and not less than -that, is the meaning of these declarations. - -The Socialist Party of America has always declared for the fullest -freedom of the press, without any expressed qualifications or -reservations. Tens of thousands of honest men and women have accepted -the party’s declarations upon this subject in good faith, and found -satisfaction and joy in upholding them. No doubt of the sincerity of -the professions of loyalty to the principle of freedom and equality -for all ever entered their minds; no thought or suspicion of sinister -secret reservations or understandings ever disturbed their faith. Not -once, but hundreds of times, when unjust discrimination by government -officials and others seemed to imperil the safety of some Socialist -paper, men and women who were not Socialists at all, but who were -believers in freedom of the press, rushed to their aid. This hundreds -of thousands of Americans have done, because they believed the -Socialists were sincere in their professions that they wanted only -justice, not domination; that they sought only that measure of freedom -they themselves would aid others in securing and maintaining. - -If at any time some one had challenged the good faith of the -Socialists, and charged that in the event of their obtaining control of -the government they would use its powers to cripple and suppress the -opposition press, he would have been denounced as a malignant libeler -of honest men and women. Yet here come Lenin and Bucharin, and others -of the same school, affirming that this has always been a Socialist -principle; that the Bolsheviki at least have always said they would act -in precisely that manner. What say American Socialists? The Socialist -Party has declared its support of the party of Lenin and Trotsky and -Bucharin; its national standard-bearer has declared himself to be a -Bolshevik; the party has joined the party of the Russian Bolsheviki in -the Third International, forsaking for that purpose association with -the non-Bolshevist Socialist parties and the Second International. - -_Unless and until they unequivocally and unreservedly repudiate the -vicious doctrine set forth by the leading theorists of Bolshevism, the -spokesmen of American Socialism will be properly and justly open to the -suspicion that they cherish in their hearts the intention to use the -powers of government whensoever, and in whatsoever manner, these shall -fall under their control, to abolish the principle of equal freedom for -all, and to suppress by force the organs of publicity of all who do not -agree with them._ - -If they are not willing to repudiate this doctrine, and to deny the -purpose imputed to them, let them be honest and admit the belief -and the purpose. Silence cannot save them in the face of the words -of Lenin and Bucharin. Silence is eloquent confession henceforth. -Behind every Socialist speaker who seeks to obscure this issue with -rhetoric, or to remain silent upon it, every American who believes in -and loves Freedom--thousands of Socialists among the number--will see -the menacing specter of Bolshevism, nursling of intriguing hate and -lying treason. America will laugh such men to scorn when they invoke -Freedom’s name. Against the masked spirit of despotism which resides in -the Bolshevist propaganda America will set her own traditional ideal, -so well expressed in Lincoln’s fine saying, “As I would not be a slave, -so I would not be a master,” and Whitman’s line, so worthy to accompany -it--“By God! I want nothing for myself that all others may not have -upon equal terms.” - -That is the essence of democracy and of liberty; that is the sense in -which these great words live in the heart of America. And that, too, be -it said, is the sense in which they live in the Socialism of Marx--of -which Bolshevism is a grotesque and indecent caricature. That is the -central idea of Marx’s vision of a world free from class divisions and -class strife--a world where none is master and none is slave; where all -good things are accessible to all upon equal terms, and where burdens -are shared with the equality that is fraternal. - -With the freedom of the press freedom of assemblage and of speech is -closely interwoven. The foes of the freedom of the press are always and -everywhere equally the foes of the right to assemble for discussion and -argument. And the Bolsheviki are no exception to the rule. From the -beginning, as soon as they had consolidated their power sufficiently -to do so, they have repressed by all the force at their command the -meetings, both public and private, of all who were opposed to them, -even meetings of Socialists called for no purpose other than to -demand government by equal suffrage and meetings of workmen’s unions -called for the purpose of explaining their grievances in such matters -as wages, hours of labor, and shop management. Hundreds of pages of -evidence in support of this statement could be given if that were -necessary. Here, for example, is the testimony of V. M. Zenzinov, -member of the Central Committee of the Socialists-Revolutionists Party: - - The Bolsheviki are the only ones who are able to hold political - meetings in present-day Russia; everybody else is deprived of - the right to voice his political opinions, for “undesirable” - speakers are promptly arrested on the spot by the Bolshevist - police. All the Socialist, non-Bolshevist members of the - Soviets were ejected by force of arms; many leaders of - Socialist parties have been arrested. The delegates to the - Moscow Congress of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists - scheduled for May, 1918, were arrested by the Bolsheviki, - yet nobody will attempt to claim that this party, which has - participated in every International Socialist Congress, is not - a Socialist Party. - - It was during my stay in Petrograd in April, 1918, that a - conference of factory and industrial plants employees of - Petrograd and vicinity was held, to which 100,000 Petrograd - working-men (out of a total of 132,000) sent delegates. - The conference adopted a resolution sharply denouncing the - Bolshevist régime. Following this conference an attempt was - made in May to call together an All-Russian Congress of - workmen’s deputies in Moscow, but all the delegates were - arrested by the Bolsheviki, and to this day I am ignorant of - the fate that befell my comrades. For all I know they may have - been put to death, as a number of other Socialists have been. - -Here is the testimony of Oupovalov, Social Democrat and -trades-unionist, who once more speaks only of matters of which he has -personal knowledge: - - On June 22, 1918, the Social Democratic Committee at Sormovo - called a Provincial Non-Party Labor Conference for the purpose - of discussing current events; 350 delegates were present, - representing 350,000 workmen. The afternoon meeting passed - off safely, but before the opening of the evening meeting a - large crowd of local workmen who had gathered in front of the - conference premises were fired upon by a Lettish detachment by - order of the commissaries. The result was that several peaceful - workmen were killed and wounded. The conference was dispersed, - and I, being one of the speakers, was arrested. After a - fortnight’s confinement in a damp cellar, with daily threats of - execution, I was released, owing to energetic protests on the - part of my fellow-workmen, but not for long. - - A Labor meeting was convoked at Sormovo by a commissar of - the People’s Economic Soviet from Moscow for the purpose of - discussing the question of food-supply. I was delegated by the - Social Democratic Party to speak at this meeting and criticize - the Bolsheviks’ food policy. _The resolution proposed by me - demanded the cessation of civil war, the summoning of the - Constituent Assembly, the right for co-operatives to purchase - foodstuffs freely._ Out of the 18,000 persons present only 350 - voted against the resolution. - - That same night I was arrested and sentenced to be shot. The - workmen declared a strike, demanding my release. The Bolsheviks - sent a detachment of Letts, who fired on the unarmed workmen - and many were killed. Nevertheless, the workmen would not give - in, and the Bolsheviki mitigated their sentence and deported me - to the Perm Province. - -But what is the use of citing any number of such instances? When a -score, a hundred, or a thousand have been cited we shall hear from the -truculent defenders of Bolshevism that no testimony offered by Russian -revolutionists of the highest standing is worth anything as compared to -the testimony of the Ransomes, Goodes, Coppings, Lansburys, _et al._, -the human phonograph records who repeat with such mechanical precision -the words which the Bolsheviki desire the world outside of Russia -to hear. Against this logic of unreason no amount of testimony can -prevail. It is not so easy, however, to dispose of a “decree” of the -Soviet Government--for is not a “decree” a thing to be regarded as the -Mohammedan regards the Koran? Here, then, is a Bolshevist decree--not, -it need hardly be said, to be found included in any of the collections -of Bolshevist laws and decrees issued to impress the public of America -in favor of the Bolsheviki. Read, mark, and learn, and inwardly digest -it, Mr. Oswald Villard, Mr. Norman Thomas, Mr. William Hard, gentlemen -of the Civil Liberties Bureau, and you others who find America so -reactionary and tyrannical. It is taken from the _Severnaya Communa_, -September 13, 1919, and is signed by Zinoviev: - - -DECREE REGULATING RIGHT OF PUBLIC ASSOCIATIONS AND MEETINGS - - (1) All societies, unions, and associations--political, - economic, artistic, religious, etc.--formed on the territory - of the Union of the Commune of the Northern Region must be - registered at the corresponding Soviets or Committees of the - Village Poor. - - (2) The constitution of the union or society, a list of - founders and members of the committee, with names and - addresses, and a list of all members, with their names and - addresses, must be submitted at registration. - - (3) All books, minutes, etc., must always be kept at the - disposal of representatives of the Soviet Power for purposes of - revision. - - (4) Three days’ notice must be given to the Soviet or to the - Committee of the Village Poor, of all public and private - meetings. - - (5) All meetings must be open to the representatives of the - Soviet Power, _viz._, the representatives of the Central - and District Soviet, the Committee of the Poor, and the - Kommandantur of the Revolutionary Secret Police Force. - - (6) Unions and societies which do not comply with those - regulations will be regarded as counter-revolutionary - organizations and prosecuted. - -This document, like so many others issued by the Bolsheviki, bears a -striking resemblance to the regulations which were issued under Czar -Nicholas II. There is not the slightest suggestion of a spirit and -purpose more generous in its regard for freedom. Nowhere is there -any evidence of a different psychology. Of course, it may be said -in defense, or extenuation if not defense, of the remarkable decree -just quoted that it was a military measure; that it was due to the -conditions of civil warfare prevailing. That defense might be seriously -considered but for the fact that similar regulations have been imposed -in places far removed from any military activity, where there was -no civil warfare, where the Bolsheviki ruled a passive people. More -important than this fact, however, is the evidence of the attitude of -the Bolsheviki, as revealed by their accredited spokesmen. From this it -is quite clear that, regardless of this or that particular decree or -proclamation, _the Bolsheviki look upon the continuous and permanent -suppression of their opponents’ right to hold meetings as a fundamental -policy_. The decree under consideration, with its stringent provisions -requiring registration of all societies and associations of every -kind, the list and addresses of all members, and of all who attend the -meetings, and the arrangement for the attendance of the “Kommandantur -of the Revolutionary Secret-Police Force” at meetings of every kind, -trades-union meetings and religious gatherings no less than political -meetings, is fully in harmony with the declaration of fundamental -policy made by the intellectual leaders of Bolshevism. _Pravda_, -December 7, 1919, quotes Baranov as saying at the seventh All-Russian -Congress: “We do not allow meetings of Mensheviki and Cadets, who in -these meetings would speak of counter-revolution within the country. -The Soviet Power will not allow such meetings, of course, just as it -will not allow freedom of the press, as there are appearing sufficient -White Guardists’ leaflets.” But let us listen once more to the chief -sophist: - - 7. “Freedom of meeting” may be taken as an example of the - demands for “pure democracy.” Any conscious workman who has - not broken with his own class will understand immediately that - it would be stupid to permit freedom of meetings to exploiters - at this period, and under the present circumstances, when the - exploiters are resisting their overthrow, and are fighting - for their privileges. When the bourgeoisie was revolutionary, - in England in 1649, and in France in 1793, it did not give - “freedom of meetings” to monarchists and nobles who were - calling in foreign troops and who were “meeting” to organize - attempts at restoration. _If the present bourgeoisie, which - has been reactionary for a long time now, demands of the - proletariat that the latter guarantee in advance freedom - of meetings for exploiters no matter what resistance the - capitalists may show to the measures of expropriation directed - against them, the workmen will only laugh at the hypocrisy of - the bourgeoisie._ - - On the other hand, the workmen know very well that “freedom - of meetings,” even in the most democratic bourgeois republic, - is an empty phrase, for the rich have all the best public - and private buildings at their disposal, and also sufficient - leisure time for meetings and for the protection of these - meetings by the bourgeois apparatus of authority. The - proletarians of the city and of the village and the poor - peasants--that is, the overwhelming majority of the population, - have none of these three things. So long as the situation is - such, “equality”--that is, “pure democracy”--is sheer fraud. - In order to secure genuine equality, in order to realize in - fact democracy for the toilers, one must first take away from - the exploiters all public and luxurious private dwellings, one - must give leisure time to the toilers, _one must protect the - freedom of their meetings by armed workmen, and not by noble or - capitalist officers with browbeaten soldiers_. - - Only after such a change can one speak of freedom of meetings - and of equality, without scoffing at workmen, toilers, and - the poor. And no one can bring about this change except the - advance-guard of the toilers--that is, the proletariat--by - overthrowing the exploiters, the bourgeoisie. - - 8. “Freedom of press” is also one of the main arguments - of “pure democracy,” but again the workmen know that the - Socialists of all countries have asserted millions of times - that _this freedom is a fraud so long as the best printing - machinery and the largest supplies of paper have been seized - by the capitalists, and so long as the power of capital over - the press continues, which power in the whole world is clearly - more harsh and more cynical in proportion to the development - of democratism and the republican principle, as, for example, - in America_. In order to secure actual equality and actual - democracy for the toilers, for workmen and peasants, _one must - first take from capitalists the possibility of hiring writers, - of buying up publishing houses, of buying up newspapers, and - to this end one must overthrow the yoke of capital, overthrow - the exploiters, and put down all resistance on their part_. - The capitalists have always called “freedom” the freedom to - make money for the rich and the freedom to die of hunger for - workmen. The capitalists call “freedom” the freedom of the - rich, freedom to buy up the press, freedom to use wealth, to - manufacture and support so-called public opinion. The defenders - of “pure democracy” again in actual fact turn out to be the - defenders of the most dirty and corrupt system of the rule - of the rich over the means of education of the masses. They - deceive the people by attractive, fine-sounding, beautiful, - but absolutely false phrases, trying to dissuade the masses - from the concrete historic task of freeing the press from the - capitalists who have gotten control of it. Actual freedom - and equality will exist only in the order established by the - Communists, in which it will be impossible to become rich at - the expense of another, where it will be impossible, either - directly or indirectly, to subject the press to the power of - money, where there will be no obstacle to prevent any toiler - (or any large group of such) from enjoying and actually - realizing the equal right to the use of public printing-presses - and of the public fund of paper. - -These are “theses” from the report of Lenin on “Bourgeois and -Proletarian Democracies,” published in _Pravda_, March 8, 1919. That -the very term “proletarian democracy” is an absurd self-contradiction, -just as “capitalist democracy” would be, since democracy is inherently -incompatible with class domination of any kind, is worthy of remark -only in so far as the use of the phrase shows the mentality of the man. -Was ever such a farrago of nonsense put forward with such solemnly -pretentious pedantry? The unreasoning hatred and shallow ignorance -of the most demagogic soap-box Socialist propaganda are covered with -the verbiage of scholasticism, and the result is given to the world -as profound philosophy. If there is any disposition to question the -justice of this summary judgment a candid consideration of the two -“theses” just quoted should suffice to settle all doubts. - -In the first place, the dominant note is hatred and retaliation: In -1649 the bourgeoisie of England suppressed the right of assemblage, -and in 1793 the bourgeoisie of France did likewise. Therefore, if the -present bourgeoisie, “which has been reactionary for a long time,” now -demands that the workers guarantee freedom of meetings, the workers -will only laugh at their hypocrisy. One is reminded of the ignorant -pogrom-makers who gave the crucifixion of Jesus as their reason for -persecuting Jews in the twentieth century. Upon what higher level is -Lenin’s justification than the ignorant feeling of hostility toward -England, still found in some dark corners of American life, because -of the misgovernment of the Colonies by the England of George the -Third? Is there to be no allowance for the advance made, even by the -bourgeoisie, since the struggles of 1649 and 1793; no consideration of -the fact that the bourgeoisie of England and France in later years -have gone far beyond the standards set by their forerunners in 1649 -and 1793; _that they have granted freedom of assemblage, even to those -struggling to overthrow them_? Is twentieth-century Socialism to have -no higher ideal than capitalism already had in the seventeenth and -eighteenth centuries? Waiving the greater question of whether or not -the claim of any class to succeed to power is worthy of attention -unless its ideals are measurably higher than those of the class it -would displace, is it not quite clear that Lenin’s appeal to “history” -is arrant demagoguery? - -Consider the argument further: There is no freedom of meetings, “even -in the most democratic bourgeois republic,” we are told, because “the -rich” have the halls in which to meet, the leisure for meeting and -the “bourgeois apparatus of authority” for the protection of their -meetings. This absurd travesty of facts which are well known to all who -know life in democratic nations is put forward by a man who is hailed -as a philosopher-statesman, though his ponderous “theses” show him to -be among the most blatant demagogues of modern history, his greatest -mental gift being unscrupulous cunning. The workers lack leisure for -meetings, we are told, therefore no freedom of meeting exists--in the -bourgeois democracies. Well, what of the Utopia of the Bolsheviki, the -Utopia of Lenin’s own fashioning? Is there greater leisure for the -worker there? By its own journals we are informed that the Russian -worker now works _twelve hours a day_, but let us not take advantage -of that fact, which is admittedly due to a desperate economic -condition--for which, however, the Bolsheviki are mainly responsible. -But in the very much praised labor laws of the Russian Socialist -Federal Soviet Republic an eight-hour workday is provided for. Are -we to assume that this leaves sufficient leisure to the workers to -make freedom of meeting possible for them? Very well. To a very large -extent the eight-hour day prevails in this poor despised “bourgeois -democracy,” either as a result of legislation or of trades-union -organization. Nay, more, the forty-four-hour week is with us, and even -the _six-hour day_, in some trades. The unattained ideal of Sovdepia’s -labor legislation is thus actually below what is rapidly coming to be -our common practice. Anybody who knows anything at all of the facts -knows that the conditions here set forth are true of this country and, -to a very large degree, of England. - -Is it true that freedom of assemblage is impossible in this poor old -“bourgeois democracy,” because, forsooth, the workers lack the halls -in which to meet? Is that the condition in England, or in any of the -western nations in which the much-despised “bourgeois democracy” -prevails? How many communities are there in America where meeting-halls -are accessible only to “the rich,” where they cannot be had by the -workers upon equal terms with all other people? Over the greater part -of America--wherever “bourgeois democracy” exists--our publicly owned -auditoriums, the city halls, and school halls, are open to all citizens -upon equal terms. Even where private halls have to be hired, and -stiff rents paid, it is common for the collections to cover expenses -and even leave a profit. In many of the cities the organized workers -own their own auditoriums. In England, Belgium, Denmark, and other -European countries--“bourgeois democracies” all--a great many of the -finest auditoriums are those owned and controlled by the workmen’s -organizations, and they are frequently hired by “the rich.” Finally, -wherever the government of any city has come under the control of -Socialist or Labor movements, auditoriums freely accessible to the -workers have been provided, and this obstacle to freedom of assemblage -which gives Lenin such concern has been removed. This has been done, -moreover, without descending to the level of old oppressors, and it -has not been necessary to resort to “armed workmen,” any more than to -“browbeaten soldiers” with capitalist officers to protect the freedom -of assemblage. - -So, too, with the freedom of the press. In the nations where democratic -laws prevail _the workers’ press is just as strong and powerful as the -interest and will of the workers themselves decree_. If the Socialist -press in our cities is weak and uninfluential, that fact is the natural -and inevitable corollary of the weakness of the Socialist movement -itself. Was _L’Humanité_, when it was still a great and powerful -newspaper, or were the Berlin _Vorwärts_, _Le Peuple_ of Brussels, -and _L’Avanti_ of Rome, less “free” than other newspapers? Were they -less “free” than _Pravda_, even, to say nothing of the anti-Bolshevist -papers opposed to Bolshevism? True, they had not the privilege of -looting the public treasuries; they could not force an oppressive, -discriminatory, and confiscatory tax upon the other newspapers; they -could not utilize the forces of the state to seize and use the plants -belonging to their rivals; they could not rely upon the power of the -state to compel people against their will to “subscribe” to them. In -other words, the freedom they possessed was the freedom to publish -their views and to gain as many readers as possible by lawful methods; -the only “freedom” they lacked was the freedom of brigandage, the right -to despoil and oppress others. - -So much, then, for the labored sophistry of the chief Talmudist of -Bolshevism and his tiresome “theses” with their demagogic cant and -their appeals to the lowest instincts and passions of his followers. -The record herein set forth proves beyond shadow of a doubt that -neither in the régime Lenin and his co-conspirators have thus far -maintained nor in the ideal they set for themselves is there any place -for that freedom of speech and thought and conscience without which all -other liberties are unavailing. These men prate of freedom, but they -are tyrants. If they be not tyrants, “we then extremely wrong Caligula -and Nero in calling them tyrants, and they were rebels that conspired -against them.” If Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bucharin are not -tyrants, but liberators, so were the Grand Inquisitors of Spain. - - - - -XII - -“THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT” - - -In a pamphlet entitled _Two Tactics_, published in Geneva, in 1905, at -the time of the first Russian Revolution, Lenin wrote: - - Whoever wants to try any path to Socialism other than political - democracy _will inevitably come to absurd and reactionary - conclusions, both in an economic and a political sense_. If - some workmen ask us, “Why not achieve the maximum program?” - we shall answer them by pointing out how alien to Socialism - the democratic masses are, how undeveloped are the class - contradictions, how unorganized are the proletarians.... The - largest possible realization of democratic reform is necessary - and requisite for the spreading of socialistic enlightenment - and for introducing appropriate organization. - -These words are worth remembering. In the light of the tragic -results of Bolshevism they seem singularly prophetic, for certainly -by attempting to achieve Socialism through other methods than those -of political democracy Lenin and his followers have “come to absurd -and reactionary conclusions, both in an economic and a political -sense.” They profess, for example, to have established in Russia a -“dictatorship of the proletariat.” In reality they have set up a -tyrannical rule over the proletariat, together with the rest of the -population, by an almost infinitesimal part of the population of -Russia. Lenin and his followers claim to be the logical exemplars of -the teachings of Karl Marx, whereas their whole theory is no more than -a grotesque travesty of Marx’s teachings. - -More than seventy years have elapsed since the publication of Marx’s -_Communist Manifesto_, in which he set forth his theory of the -historic rôle of the proletariat. Thirty-seven years--more than a full -generation--have elapsed since his death in 1883. Even if it were true -that during the period spanned by these two dates Karl Marx believed -in and advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat in the sense in -which that term is used by the Bolsheviki, that fact would possess -little more than historical interest. Much has happened since the -death of Marx, and still more since the early ’seventies, when his -life-work virtually ended, which the political realist needs must take -into account. Marx did not utter the last word of human wisdom upon -the laws and methods of social progress and so render new and fresh -judgments unnecessary and wrong. No one can study the evolution of -Marx himself and doubt that if he were alive to-day he would hold very -different views from those which he held in 1847 and subsequently. Our -only justification for considering the relation of Leninism to Marxism -lies in the fact that in this and other countries outside of Russia a -considerable element in the Socialist movement, deceived by Lenin’s -use of certain Marxian phrases, gives its support to Leninism in the -belief that it is identical with Marxism. Nothing could be farther from -the teachings of Marx than the oppressive bureaucratic dictatorship by -an infinitesimal minority set up by Lenin and his disciples. - -In the _Communist Manifesto_ Marx used the term “proletariat” in the -sense in which it was used by Barnave and other Intellectuals of the -French Revolution, not as it is commonly used to-day, as a synonym for -the wage-earning class. The term as used by Marx connoted not merely -an absence of property, not merely poverty, but a peculiar state of -degradation. Just as in Roman society the term was applied to a large -class, including peasants, wage laborers, and others without capital, -property, or assured means of support, unfit and unworthy to exercise -political rights, so the term was used by Marx, as it had been by -his predecessors, to designate a class in modern society similarly -denied the rights of citizenship. When Marx wrote in 1847 this was -the condition of the wage-earning class in every European country. -In no one of these countries did the working-class enjoy the right -of suffrage. Marx saw no hope of any amelioration of the lot of this -class. On the contrary, he believed that the evolution of society -would take the form of a relentless, brutal process, unrestrained by -any humane consciousness or legislation, which would culminate in a -division of society into two classes, on the one hand a very small -ruling and owning class, on the other hand the overwhelming majority -of the population. He specifically rejected the idea of minority -rule: “All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, -or in the interest of minorities. _The proletarian movement is the -self-conscious independent movement of the immense majority, in the -interest of the immense majority._ The proletariat, the lowest stratum -of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without -the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into -the air.” - -Not only does Marx here present the proletarian uprising as the -culmination of a historical process which has made proletarians of -“the immense majority,” but, what is more significant, perhaps, -he presents this movement, not as a conscious _ideal_, but as an -inevitable and inescapable _condition_. In 1875, in a famous letter -criticizing the Gotha program of the German Social Democrats, he -wrote: “Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of -the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. This -requires a political transition stage, which can be nothing less than -the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.” It is mainly upon -this single quotation that Lenin and his followers rely in claiming -Marxian authority for the régime set up in Russia under the title the -Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The passage cited cannot honestly and -fairly be so interpreted. We are bound to bear in mind that Marx still -held to the belief that the revolution from capitalist to communist -society could only take place when the proletariat had become “the -immense majority.” - -Moreover, it is quite clear that he was still thinking, in 1875, of -dictatorship by this _immense majority_ as a temporary measure. Of -course, the word “dictatorship” is a misnomer when it is so used, but -not more so than when used to describe rule by any class. Strictly -speaking, dictatorship refers to a rule by a single individual who is -bound by no laws, the absolute supremacy of an individual dictator. -Friedrich Engels, who collaborated with Marx in writing the _Communist -Manifesto_ and in much of his subsequent work, and who became his -literary executor and finished _Das Kapital_, certainly knew the mind -of Marx as no other human being did or could. Engels has, fortunately, -made quite clear the sense in which Marx used the term “dictatorship -of the proletariat.” In his _Civil War in France_, Marx described the -Paris Commune as “essentially a government of the working-class, the -result of the struggle of the producing class against the appropriating -class, the political form under which the freedom of labor could -be attained being at length revealed.” He described with glowing -enthusiasm the Commune with its town councilors chosen by universal -suffrage, and not by the votes of a single class. As Kautsky remarks, -“the dictatorship of the proletariat was for him a condition which -necessarily arose in a real democracy, because of the overwhelming -numbers of the proletariat.”[66] That this is a correct interpretation -of Marx’s thought is attested by the fact that in his introduction -to the _Civil War in France_ Engels describes the Commune, based on -the general suffrage of the whole people, as “the Dictatorship of the -Proletariat.” - -[66] Kautsky, _The Dictatorship of the Proletariat_, p. 45. - -Of course, the evolution of modern industrial nations has proceeded -upon very different lines from those forecasted by Marx. The middle -class has not been exterminated and shows no signs of being submerged -in the wage-earning class; the workers are no longer disfranchised and -outside the pale of citizenship; on the contrary, they have acquired -full political rights and are becoming increasingly powerful in the -parliaments. In other words, the wage-earning class is, for the most -part, no longer “proletarian” in the narrow sense in which Marx -used the term. Quite apart from these considerations, however, it -is very obvious that the theory of Lenin and his followers that the -whole political power of Russia should be centered in the so-called -industrial proletariat, which even the Bolsheviki themselves have not -estimated at more than 3 per cent. of the entire population, bears -no sort of relation to the process Marx always had in mind when he -referred to “proletarian dictatorship.” Not only is there no sanction -for the Leninist view in Marxian theory, but the two are irreconcilably -opposed. - -The Bolshevist régime does not even represent the proletariat, -however. The fact is thoroughly well established that the political -power rests in the Communist Party, which represents only a minority -of the proletariat. What we have before us in Russia is not even a -dictatorship of the proletariat, but a dictatorship over an entire -people, including the proletariat, by the Communist Party. The -testimony of the Bolsheviki themselves upon this point is abundant -and conclusive. If any good purpose were served thereby, pages of -statements to this effect by responsible Bolshevist leaders could be -cited; for our present purpose, however, the following quotations will -suffice: - -In a letter to workmen and peasants issued in July, 1918, Lenin said, -“The dictatorship of the proletariat _is carried out by the party of -the Bolsheviki_, which, as early as 1905, and earlier, became one with -the entire revolutionary proletariat.” In an article entitled, “The -Party and the Soviets,” published in _Pravda_, February 13, 1919, -Bucharin, editor-in-chief of that important official organ of the -Communist Party, said: “It is no secret for any one that in a country -where the working-class and the poorest peasantry are in power, that -party is the directing party which expresses the interests of these -groups of the population--the Communist Party. All the work in the -Soviet goes on under the influence and the political leadership of -our party. It is the forms which this leadership should assume that -are the subject of disagreement.” In _Pravda_, November 5, 1919, the -leading editorial says of the “adventure of Yudenich” that in the last -analysis “this ordeal has strengthened the cause of revolution and has -_strengthened the hegemony of the Communist Party_.” In the _Samara -Kommuna_, April 11, 1919, we read that “The Communist Party as a whole -is responsible for the future of the young Soviet Socialist Republic, -for the whole course of the world Communist revolution. In the country -_the highest organ of authority, to which all Soviet institutions and -officials are subordinate, is again the Communist Party_.” - -Not only do we find that the Bolshevist régime rests upon the theory -of the hegemony of the Communist Party, but in practice the party -functions as a part of the state machinery, as the directing machinery, -in point of fact, placing the Soviets in a subordinate position. At -times the Communist Party has exercised the entire power of government, -as, for example, from July, 1918, to January, 1919. Thus we read in -_Izvestia_, November 6, 1919, “From October, 1917, up to July, 1918, -is the first period of Soviet construction; from July, 1918, up to -January, 1919, the second period, _when the Soviet work was conducted -exclusively by the power of the Russian Communist Party_; and the third -period from January this year, when in the work of Soviet construction -broad non-partizan masses participated.” - -This condition was, of course, made possible by the predominance of -Communist Party members in the Soviet Government, a predominance due -to the measures taken to exclude the anti-Bolshevist parties. Thus 88 -per cent. of the members of the Executive Committees of the Provincial -Soviets were members of the Communist Party, according to _Izvestia_, -November 6, 1919. In the army, while their number was relatively small, -not more than 10,000 in the entire army, members of the Communist Party -held almost all the responsible posts. Trotsky, as Commander-in-Chief, -reported to the seventh Congress, according to the _Red Baltic Fleet_, -December 11, 1919, “our Army consists of peasants and workmen. _Workmen -represent scarcely more than 15 to 18 per cent., but they maintain -the same directing position as throughout Soviet Russia._ This is -a privilege secured to them because of their greater consciousness, -compactness, and revolutionary zeal. The army is the reflection of our -whole social order. It is based on the rule of the working-class, in -which latter the party of Communists plays the leading rôle.” Trotsky -further said: “The number of members of this party in the army is about -ten thousand. The responsible posts of commissaries are occupied by -them in the overwhelming majority of instances. In each regiment there -is a Communist group. The significance of the Communists in the army is -shown by the fact that when conditions become unfavorable in a given -division the commanding staff appeals to the Revolutionary Military -Soviet with a request that a group of Communists be sent down.” -Accordingly, it is not surprising to find the party itself exercising -the functions of government and issuing orders. In _Izvestia_ and -_Pravda_, during April, 1919, numerous paragraphs were published -relating to the mobilization of regiments by the Communist Party. - -From figures published by the Bolsheviki themselves it is possible to -obtain a tolerably accurate idea of the actual numerical strength of -the Communist Party. During the second half of 1918, when, as stated -in the paragraph already quoted from _Izvestia_, “the Soviet work was -conducted exclusively by the power of the Russian Communist Party,” -there was naturally a considerable increase in the party membership, -for very obvious reasons. In _Severnaya Communa_, February 22, 1919, -appeared the following: - - At the session of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist - Party, on February 15, 1919, the following resolutions were - carried: Taking into account--(1) That the uninterrupted - growth of our party during the year of dictatorship has - inevitably meant _that there have entered its ranks elements - having absolutely nothing in common with Communism_, joining - in order to use the authority of the Russian Communist - Party for their own personal, selfish aims; (2) That these - elements, taking cover under the flag of Communism, are by - their acts discrediting in the eyes of the people the prestige - and glorious name of our Proletarian Party; (3) That _the - so-called “Communists of our days” by their outrageous behavior - are arousing discontent and bitter feeling in the people_, - thus creating a favorable soil for counter-revolutionary - agitation--taking all this into account, the Moscow Committee - of the Russian Communist Party declares: - - (_a_) That the party congress about to be held should call - on all party organizations to check up in the strictest - manner all members of the party and cleanse its ranks of - elements foreign to the party; (_b_) that one must carry on - a decisive struggle against those elements whose acts create - a counter-revolutionary state of mind; (_c_) that one must - make every effort to raise the moral level of members of the - Russian Communist Party and educate them in the spirit of true - Proletarian Communism; (_d_) that one must direct all efforts - toward strengthening party discipline and establishing strict - control by the party over all its members in all fields of - Party-Soviet activity. - -Yet, notwithstanding the inflation of party membership here referred -to, we find _Izvestia_ reporting in that same month, February, 1919, -as follows: “The secretary of the Communist Party of the Moscow -Province states that the total number of party members throughout the -whole province is 2,881.” At the eighth Congress of the Communist -Party, March, 1919, serious attention was given to the inflation of -the party membership by the admission of Soviet employees and others -who were not Communists at heart, and it was decided to cleanse the -party of such elements and, after that was done, to undertake a -recruiting campaign for new members. Yet, according to the official -minutes of this Congress, “_the sum total of the Communist Party -throughout Soviet Russia represents about one-half of one per cent. -of the entire population_.” We find in _Izvestia_, May 8, 1919, that -out of a total of more than two million inhabitants in the Province -of Kaluga the membership of the Communist Party amounted to less than -one-fifth of one per cent. of the population: “According to the data -of the Communist Congress of the Province of Kaluga there are 3,861 -registered members of the party throughout the whole province.” On the -following day, May 9, 1919, _Izvestia_ reported: “At the Communist -Congress of the Riazan Province 181 organizations were represented, -numbering 5,994 members.” As the population of the Riazan Province was -well over 3,000,000 it will be seen that here again the Communist Party -membership was less than one-fifth of one per cent. of the population. - -At this time various Bolshevist journals gave the Communist Party -membership at 20,000 for the city of Moscow and 12,000 for Petrograd. -Then took place the so-called “re-registration,” to “relieve the -party of this ballast,” as _Pravda_ said later on, “those careerists -of the petty bourgeois groups of the population.” In Petrograd the -membership was reduced by nearly one-third and in some provincial towns -by from 50 to 75 per cent. The result was that in September, 1919, -_Pravda_ reported the number of Communist Party members in Petrograd as -9,000, “with at least 50,000 ardent supporters of the anti-Bolshevist -movement.” This official journal did not regard the 9,000 as a united -body of genuine and sincere Communists: “Are the 9,000 upholding the -cause of Bolshevism acting according to their convictions? No. Most of -them are in ignorance of the principles of the Communists, _which at -heart they do not believe in_, but all the employees of the Soviets -study these principles much the same as under the rule of the Czar they -turned their attention to police rules _in order to get ahead_.” - -On October 1, 1919, _Pravda_ published two significant circular letters -from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the district -and local organizations of the party. The first of these called for -“a campaign to recruit new members into the party” and to induce old -members to rejoin. To make joining the party easier “entry into the -party is not to be conditioned by the presentation of two written -recommendations as before.” The appeal to the party workers says, -“During ‘party-week’ _we ought to increase the membership of our party -to half a million_.” The second circular is of interest because of the -following sentences: “The principle of administration by ‘colleges’ -must be reduced to a minimum. Discussions and considerations must be -given up. _The party must be as soon as possible rebuilt on military -lines_, and there must be created a military revolutionary apparatus -which would work solidly and accurately. In this apparatus there must -be clearly distributed privileges and duties.” - -The frenzied efforts to increase the party membership by “drives” in -which every device and every method of persuasion and pressure was used -brought into the party many who were not Communists at all. Thus we -find _Pravda_ saying, December 12, 1919: “The influx of many members -to the collectives (Soviet Management groups) comes not only from the -working-class, _but also from the middle bourgeoisie_ which formerly -considered Communists as its enemies. One of the new collectives is a -collective at the estate of Kurakin (a children’s colony). Here entered -the collective not only loyal employees, _but also representatives -of the teaching staff_.” _Pravda_ adds that “this inrush of the -bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie that formerly considered the Communists -as its enemies, is not at all to our interest. Of course, there may be -honest Soviet officials who have in fact shown their loyalty to the -great ideas of Communism, and such can find their place in our ranks.” -Other Bolshevist journals wrote in the same spirit deploring the -admission of so many “bourgeois” Soviet officials into the party. - -In spite of this abnormal and much-feared inflation of the party -membership, _Pravda_ reported on March 18, 1920, that with more than -300,000 workmen in Petrograd the total membership of the Communist -Party in that city was only 30,000. That is to say, including all -the Soviet officials and “bourgeois elements,” the party membership -amounted to rather less than 10 per cent. of the industrial -proletariat, and that in the principal center of the party, the first -of the two great cities. Surely this is proof that the Communist Party -really represents only a minority of the industrial proletariat. If -even with all its bourgeois elements it amounts in the principal -industrial city, its stronghold, to less than 10 per cent. of the -number of working-men, we may be quite certain that in the country as a -whole the percentage is very much smaller. - -Even if we take into account only the militant portion of the organized -proletariat, the Communist Party is shown to represent only a minority -of it. _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, October 15, 1919, published an -elaborate statistical analysis of the First Trades-Union Conference of -the Moscow Government. We learn that in the Union of Textile Workers, -the largest union represented, of 131 delegates present only 27, or -20.6 per cent., declared themselves to be Communists; while 94, or 71.7 -per cent., declared themselves to be non-party, and 3 declared that -they were Mensheviki. Of the 21 delegates of the Union of Compositors -13, or 62.3 per cent., declared themselves to be Mensheviki; 7, or 33 -per cent., to be non-party, and only 1 registered as a Communist. The -Union of Soviet employees naturally sent a majority of delegates who -registered as Communists, 45 out of 67 delegates, or 67 per cent., so -registering themselves. The unions were divided into four classes or -categories, as follows: - - _Category_ _No. of _No. of Members - Delegates_ Represented_ - - _First_: Workers employed in - large industries 287 266,660 - - _Second_: Workers employed in - small industries 113 806,200 - - _Third_: “Mixed unions” of - Soviet employees, etc 197 204,100 - - _Fourth_: Intellectual workers’ - unions 183 132,800 - -If we take the first two categories as representing the industrial -proletariat as a whole we get 1,072,860 proletarians represented by -400 delegates; in the third and fourth categories, representing Soviet -officials, Intellectuals, and “petty bourgeois elements,” we get 380 -delegates representing 336,900 members. Thus the industrial proletariat -secured only about one-third of the representation in proportion to -membership secured by the other elements. Representation was upon this -basis: - - _Category_ _One Delegate for - Every_ - - _First_: Workers in large industries 610 workers - - _Second_: Workers in small industries 1,427 “ - - _Third_: “Mixed unions”--Soviet employees, - city employees, etc 247 “ - - _Fourth_: Intellectuals 237 “ - -With all this juggling and gerrymandering the Bolsheviki did not manage -to get a majority of out-and-out Communists, and only by having a -separate classification for “sympathizers” did they manage to attain -such a majority, namely, 52 per cent. of all delegates. If we take the -delegates of workers engaged in the large industries, the element which -Lenin has so often called “the kernel of the proletariat,” we find that -only 28 per cent. declared themselves as belonging to the Communist -Party. At the All-Russian Conference of Engineering Workers, reported -in _Economicheskaya Zhizn_ (No. 219), we find that of the delegates -present those declaring themselves to be Communists were 40 per cent., -those belonging to no party 46 per cent., and Mensheviki 8 per cent. - -In considering these figures we must bear in mind these facts: First, -delegates to such bodies are drawn from the most active men in the -organizations; second, persecution of all active in opposition to the -Bolsheviki inevitably lessened the number of active opponents among the -delegates; third, for two years there had been no freedom of press, -speech, or assemblage for any but the Communists; fourth, by enrolling -as a Communist, or even by declaring himself to be a “sympathizer,” -a man could obtain a certain amount of protection and a privileged -position in the matter of food distribution. When all these things are -duly taken into account the weakness of the hold of the Bolsheviki upon -the minds of even the militant part of the proletariat is evident. - -What an absurdity it is to call the Bolshevist régime a dictatorship -of the proletariat, even if we accept the narrow use of this term upon -which the Bolsheviki insist and omit all except about 5 per cent. -of the peasantry, a class which comprises 85 per cent. of the entire -population. It is a dictatorship by the Communist Party, a political -faction which, according to its own figures, had in its membership in -March, 1919, about one-half of one per cent. of the population--or, -roughly, one and a half per cent. of the adult population entitled -to vote under the universal franchise introduced by the Provisional -Government; a party which, after a period of confessedly dangerous -inflation by the inclusion of non-proletarian elements in exceedingly -large numbers, had in March of this year, in the greatest industrial -center, a membership amounting to less than 10 per cent. of the -number of working-men. To say that Soviet Russia is governed by the -proletariat is, in the face of these figures, a grotesque and stupid -misstatement. - - - - -XIII - -STATE COMMUNISM AND LABOR CONSCRIPTION - - -Many of the most influential critics of modern Socialism have argued -that the realization of its program must inevitably require a complete -and intolerable subjection of the individual to an all-powerful, -bureaucratic state. They have contended that Socialism in practice -would require the organization of the labor forces of the nation upon -military lines; that the right of the citizen to select his or her own -occupation subject only to economic laws, and to leave one job for -another at will, would have to be denied and the sole authority of -the state established in such matters as the assignment of tasks, the -organization and direction of industry. - -Writers like Yves Guyot, Eugene Richter, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, -Goldwin Smith, and many others, have emphasized this criticism and -assailed Socialism as the foe of individual freedom. Terrifying -pictures have been drawn of the lot of the workers in such a society; -their tasks assigned to them by some state authority, their hours of -labor, and their remuneration similarly controlled, with no freedom of -choice or right of change of occupation. Just as under the _adscriptio -glebæ_ of feudalism the worker was bound to the soil, so, these -hostile critics of Socialism have argued, must the workers be bound -to bureaucratically set tasks under Socialism. Just as, immediately -prior to the breaking up of the Roman Empire, workers were thus bound -to certain kinds of work and, moreover, to train their children to the -same work, so, we have been told a thousand times, it must necessarily -be in a Socialist state. - -Of course all responsible Socialists have repudiated these fantastic -caricatures of Socialism. They have uniformly insisted that Socialism -is compatible with the highest individualism; that it affords the -basis for a degree of personal freedom not otherwise obtainable. -They have laughed to scorn the idea of a system which gave to the -state the power to assign each man or woman his or her task. Every -Socialist writer has insisted that the selection of occupation, for -example, must be personal and free, and has assailed the idea of a -regimentation or militarization of labor, pointing out that this would -never be tolerated by a free democracy; that it was only possible in a -despotic state, undemocratic, and not subject to the will and interest -of the people. Many of the most brilliant and convincing pages of the -great literature of modern international Socialism are devoted to its -exoneration from this charge, particular attention being given to the -anti-statist character of the Socialist movement and to the natural -antagonism of democracy to centralization and bureaucracy. - -It is a significant fact that from the middle of the nineteenth -century right down to the present day the extreme radical left wing -of the Socialist movement in every country has been bitter in its -denunciation of those Socialists who assumed the continued existence -of the state, rivaling the most extreme individualists in abuse of -“the tyranny of the state.” Without a single noteworthy exception -the leaders of the radical left wing of the movement have been -identified with those revolts against “statism” which have manifested -themselves in the agitations for decentralized autonomy. They have been -anti-parliamentarians and direct-actionists almost to a man. - -By a strange irony of history it has remained for the self-styled -Marxian Socialists of Russia, the Bolsheviki, who are so much more -Marxist than Marx himself, to give to the criticism we are discussing -the authority of history. They have lifted it from the shadowy regions -of fantastic speculation to the almost impregnable and unassailable -ground of established law and practice. The Code of Labor Laws of -Soviet Russia, recently published in this country by the official -bureau of the Russian Soviet Government, can henceforth be pointed -to by the enemies of social democracy as evidence of the truth of -the charge that Socialism aims to reduce mankind to a position of -hopeless servitude. Certainly no freedom-loving man or woman would -want to exchange life under capitalism, with all its drawbacks and -disadvantages, for the despotic, bureaucratic régime clearly indicated -in this most remarkable collection of laws. - -As we have seen, Lenin and his followers were anti-statists. Once -in the saddle they set up a powerful state machine and began to -apotheosize the state. Not only did the term “Soviet State” come into -quite general use in place of “Soviet Power”; what is still more -significant is the special sanctity with which they endowed the state. -In this they go as far as Hegel, though they do not use his spiritual -terminology. The German philosopher saw the state as “the Divine Will -embodied in the human will,” as “Reason manifested,” and as “the -Eternal personified.” Upon that conception the Prussian-German ideal -of the state was based. That the state must be absolute, its authority -unquestioned, is equally the basic conception upon which the Bolshevist -régime rests. In no modern nation, not even the Germany of Bismarck -and Wilhelm II, has the authority of the state been so comprehensive, -so wholly dependent upon force or more completely independent of the -popular will. Notwithstanding the revolutionary ferment of the time, -so arrogantly confident have the self-constituted rulers become that -we find Zinoviev boasting, “Were we to publish a decree ordering the -entire population of Petrograd, under fifty years of age, to present -themselves on the field of Mars to receive twenty-five birch rods, we -are certain that 75 per cent. would obediently form a queue, and the -remaining 25 per cent. would bring medical certificates exempting them -from the flogging.” - -It is interesting to note in the writings of Lenin the Machiavellian -manner in which, even before the _coup d’état_ of November, 1917, -he began to prepare the minds of his followers for the abandonment -of anti-statism. Shortly before that event he published a leaflet -entitled, “Shall the Bolsheviki Remain in Power?” In this leaflet he -pointed out that the Bolsheviki had preached the destruction of the -state _only because, and so long as, the state was in the possession -of the master class_. He asked why they should continue to do this -after they themselves had taken the helm. The state, he argued, is -the organized rule of a privileged minority class, and the Bolsheviki -must use the enemy’s machinery and substitute their minority. Here we -have revealed the same vicious and unscrupulous duplicity, the same -systematic, studied deception, as in such matters as freedom of speech -and press, equal suffrage, and the convocation of the Constituent -Assembly--a fundamental principle so long as the party was in revolt, -anti-statism was to be abandoned the moment the power to give it -effect was secured. Other Socialists had been derided and bitterly -denounced by the Bolsheviki for preaching the “bourgeois doctrine” -of controlling and using the machinery of the state; nothing but the -complete destruction of the state and its machinery would satisfy their -revolutionary minds. But with their first approach to power the tune is -changed and possession and use of the machinery of the state are held -to be desirable and even essential. - -For what is this possession of the power and machinery of the state -desired? For no constructive purpose of any sort or kind whatever, if -we may believe Lenin, but only for destruction and oppression. In his -little book, _The State and the Revolution_, written in September, -1917, he says: “As the state is only a transitional institution -which we must use in the revolutionary struggle _in order forcibly -to crush our opponents_, it is a pure absurdity to speak of a Free -People’s State. While the proletariat still needs the state, _it does -not require it in the interests of freedom, but in the interests of -crushing its antagonists_.” Here, then, is the brutal doctrine of -the state as an instrument of coercion and repression which the arch -Bolshevist acknowledges; a doctrine differing from that of Treitschke -and other Prussians only in its greater brutality. The much-discussed -Code of Labor Laws of the Soviet Government, with its elaborate -provisions for a permanent conscription of labor upon an essentially -military basis, is the logical outcome of the Bolshevist conception of -the state. - -The statement has been made by many of the apologists of the Bolsheviki -that the conscription of labor, which has been so unfavorably commented -upon in the western nations, is a temporary measure only, introduced -because of the extraordinary conditions prevailing. It has been stated, -by Mr. Lincoln Eyre among others, that it was adopted on the suggestion -of Mr. Royal C. Keely, an American engineer who was employed by Lenin -to make an expert report upon Russia’s economic position and outlook, -and whose report, made in January of this year, is known to have been -very unfavorable. A brief summary of the essential facts will show (1) -that the Bolsheviki had this system in mind from the very first, and -(2) that quite early they began to make tentative efforts to introduce -it. - -When the Bolsheviki appeared at the convocation of the Constituent -Assembly and demanded that that body adopt a document which would -virtually amount to a complete abdication of its functions, that -document contained a clause--Article II, Paragraph 4--which read as -follows: “To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the -class of parasites, and to reorganize the economic life.” In April, -1918, Lenin wrote: - - The delay in introducing obligatory labor service is another - proof that the most urgent problem is precisely the preparatory - organization work which, on one hand, should definitely - secure our gains, and which, on the other hand, is necessary - to prepare the campaign to “surround capital” and to “compel - its surrender.” _The introduction of obligatory labor service - should be started immediately, but it should be introduced - gradually and with great caution, testing every step by - practical experience, and, of course, introducing first of all - obligatory labor service for the rich._ The introduction of - a labor record-book and a consumption-budget record-book for - every bourgeois, including the village bourgeois, would be a - long step forward toward a complete “siege” of the enemy and - toward the creation of a really _universal_ accounting and - control over production and distribution.[67] - -[67] _The Soviets at Work_, p. 19 - -Some idea of the extent to which the principle of compulsory labor was -applied to the bourgeoisie, as suggested by Lenin, can be gathered -from the numerous references to the subject in the official Bolshevist -press, especially in the late summer and early autumn of 1918. The -extracts here cited are entirely typical: as early as April 17, -1918, _Izvestia_ published a report by Larine, one of the People’s -Commissaries, on the government of Moscow, in which he said: “A -redistribution of manual labor must be made by an organized autonomous -government composed of workers; compulsory labor for workmen must -be prohibited; it would subject the proletariat to the peasants and -on the whole could be of no use, seeing the general stoppage of all -labor. Compulsion can be used only for those who have no need to work -for their living--members of heretofore ruling classes.” _Bednota_, an -official organ of the Communist Party, on September 20, 1918, published -an interesting item from the Government of Smolensk, saying: “We shall -soon have a very interesting community: we are bringing together -all the landed proprietors of the district, are assigning them one -property, supplying them with the necessary inventory, and making them -work. Come and see this miracle! It is evident that this community is -strictly guarded. The affair seems to promise well.” - -Here are seven typical news items from four issues of _Bednota_, the -date of the paper being given after each item: - - _The mobilization of the bourgeoisie._--In the Government of - Aaratov the bourgeoisie is mobilized. The women mend the sacks, - the men clear the ruins from a big fire. In the Government of - Samara the bourgeois from 18 to 50 years of age, not living - from the results of their labor, are also called up. (September - 19, 1918.) - - VIATKA, _24th September_.--The mobilization of the idlers - (bourgeois) has been decided. (September 26, 1918.) - - NEVEL, _26th September_.--The executive committee has decreed - the mobilization of the bourgeoisie in town and country. All - the bourgeois in fit state to work are obliged to do forced - labor without remuneration. (September 27, 1918.) - - KOSTROMA, _26th September_.--The mobilized bourgeoisie is - working at the paving of the streets. (September 27, 1918.) - - The executive committee of the Soviet of the Government of - Moscow has decided to introduce in all the districts the use - of forced labor for all persons from 18 to 50 years of age, - belonging to the non-working class. (September 27, 1918.) - - VORONEGE, _28th September_.--The poverty committee has - decided to call up all the wealthy class for communal work - (ditch-making, draining the marshes, etc.). (September 29, - 1918.) - - SVOTSCHEVKA, _28th September_.--The concentration of the - bourgeoisie is being proceeded with and the transfer of the - poor into commodious and healthy dwellings. The bourgeois is - cleaning the streets. (September 29, 1918.) - -From other Bolshevist journals a mass of similar information might -be cited. Thus _Goloss Krestianstva_, October 1, 1918, said: -“_Mobilization of the parasites._--Odoeff, 28th September.--The -Soviet of the district has mobilized the bourgeoisie, the priests, -and other parasites for public works: repairing the pavements, -cleaning the pools, and so on.” On October 6, 1918, _Pravda_ reported: -“Chembar.--The bourgeoisie put to compulsory work is repairing the -pavements and the roads.” On October 11th the same paper reported -Zinoviev as saying, in a speech: “If you come to Petrograd you will -see scores of bourgeoisie laying the pavement in the courtyard of the -Smolny.... I wish you could see how well they unload coal on the Neva -and clean the barracks.” _Izvestia_, October 19, 1918, published this: -“Orel.--To-day the Orel bourgeoisie commenced compulsory work to which -it was made liable. Parties of the bourgeoisie, thus made to work, are -cleaning the streets and squares from rubbish and dirt.” The _Krasnaya -Gazeta_, October 16, 1918, said, “Large forces of mobilized bourgeoisie -have been sent to the front to do trench work.” Finally, the last-named -journal on November 6, 1918, said: “The District Extraordinary -Commission (Saransk) has organized a camp of concentration for the -local bourgeoisie and _kulaki_.[68] The duties of the confined shall -consist in keeping clean the town of Saransk. The existence of the camp -will be maintained at the expense of the same bourgeoisie.” - -[68] _i.e._, “close-fists.” - -That a great and far-reaching social revolution should deny to the -class overthrown the right to live in idleness is neither surprising -nor wrong. A Socialist revolution could not do other than insist that -no person able to work be entitled to eat without rendering some useful -service to society. No Socialist will criticize the Bolsheviki for -requiring work from the bourgeoisie. What is open to criticism and -condemnation is the fact that compulsory labor for the bourgeoisie -was not a measure of socialization, but of stupid vengeance. The -bourgeois members of society were not placed upon an equality with -other citizens and told that they must share the common lot and give -service for bread. Instead of that, they were made a class apart and -set to the performance of tasks selected only to degrade and humiliate -them. In almost every reference to the subject appearing in the -official Bolshevist press we observe that the bourgeoisie--the class -comprising the organizers of industry and business and almost all the -technical experts in the country--was set to menial tasks which the -most illiterate and ignorant peasants could better do. Just as high -military officers were set to digging trenches and cleaning latrines, -so the civilian bourgeoisie were set to cleaning streets, removing -night soil, and draining ditches, and not even given a chance to render -the vastly greater services they were capable of, in many instances; -services, moreover, of which the country was in dire need. A notable -example of this stupidity was when the advocates of Saratov asked the -local Soviet authorities to permit them to open up an idle soap-factory -to make soap, of which there was a great scarcity. The reply given was -that “_the bourgeoisie could not be suffered to be in competition with -the working-class_.” Not only was this a brutal policy, in view of the -fact that the greater part of the bourgeoisie had been loyal to the -March Revolution; it was as stupid and short-sighted as it was brutal, -for it did not, and could not, secure the maximum services of which -these elements were capable. It is quite clear that, instead of being -dominated by the generous idealism of Socialism, they were mastered by -hatred and a passion for revenge. - -Of course the policy pursued toward the bourgeoisie paved the way, -as Lenin intended it to do, for the introduction of the principle of -compulsory labor in general. By pandering to the lowest instincts and -motives of the unenlightened masses, causing them to rejoice at the -enslavement of the formerly rich and powerful, as well as those only -moderately well-to-do, Lenin and his satellites knew well that they -were surely undermining the moral force of those who rejoiced, so -that later they would be incapable of strong resistance against the -application of the same tyranny to themselves. The publication of the -Code of Labor Laws, in 1919, was the next step. This code contains 193 -regulations with numerous explanatory notes, with all of which the -ordinary workman, who is a conscript in the fullest sense of the word, -is presumed to be familiar. Only a few of its outstanding features -can be noted here. The principle of compulsion and the extent of its -application are stated in the first article of the Code: - - -ARTICLE I - -_On Compulsory Labor_ - - 1. All citizens of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet - Republic, with the exceptions stated in Section 2 and 3, shall - be subject to compulsory labor. - - 2. The following persons shall be exempt from compulsory labor: - - (_a_) Persons under 16 years of age; - - (_b_) All persons over 50 years; - - (_c_) Persons who have become incapacitated by injury or - illness. - - 3. Temporarily exempt from compulsory labor are: - - (_a_) Persons who are temporarily incapacitated owing to - illness or injury, for a period necessary for their recovery. - - (_b_) Women, for a period of 8 weeks before and 8 weeks after - confinement. - - 4. All students shall be subject to compulsory labor at the - schools. - - 5. The fact of permanent or temporary disability shall be - certified after a medical examination by the Bureau of Medical - Survey in the city, district or province, by accident insurance - office or agencies representing the former, according to the - place of residence of the person whose disability is to be - certified. - - _Note I._ The rules on the method of examination of disabled - workmen are appended hereto. - - _Note II._ Persons who are subject to compulsory labor and - are not engaged in useful public work may be summoned by the - local Soviets for the execution of public work, on conditions - determined by the Department of Labor in agreement with the - local Soviets of trades-unions. - - 6. Labor may be performed in the form of: - - (_a_) Organized co-operation; - - (_b_) Individual personal service; - - (_c_) Individual special jobs. - - 7. Labor conditions in government (Soviet) establishments shall - be regulated by tariff rules approved by the Central Soviet - authorities through the People’s Commissariat of Labor. - - 8. Labor conditions in all establishments (Soviet, - nationalized, public, and private) shall be regulated by - tariff rules drafted by the trades-unions, in agreement with - the directors or owners of establishments and enterprises, and - approved by the People’s Commissariat of Labor. - - _Note._ In cases where it is impossible to arrive at an - understanding with the directors or owners of establishments - or enterprises, the tariff rules shall be drawn up by the - trades-unions and submitted for approval to the People’s - Commissariat of Labor. - - 9. Labor in the form of individual personal service or in the - form of individual special jobs shall be regulated by tariff - rules drafted by the respective trades-unions and approved by - the People’s Commissariat of Labor. - -It will be observed that this subjection to labor conscription -applies to “all citizens” except for certain exempted classes. Women, -therefore, are equally liable with men, except for a stated period -before and after childbirth. It will also be observed that apparently -a great deal of control is exercised by the trades-unions. We must -bear in mind, however, at every point, that the trades-unions in -Soviet Russia are not free and autonomous organs of the working-class. -A free trades-union--that is, a trades-union wholly autonomous and -independent of government control, _does not exist in Russia_. The -actual status of Russian trades-unions is set forth in the resolution -adopted at the ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in March, -1920, which provides, that “All decisions of the All-Russian Central -Soviet of Trades-Unions concerning the conditions and organization -of labor are obligatory for all trades-unions and the members of the -Communist Party who are employed in them, and _can be canceled only by -the Central Committee of the Party_.” The hierarchy of the Communist -Party is supreme, the trades-unions, the co-operatives, and the Soviet -Government itself being subordinate to it. - -Article II deals with the manner in which the compulsion to labor is to -be enforced. Paragraph 16 of this article provides that “the assignment -of wage-earners to work shall be carried out through the Departments -of Labor Distribution.” Paragraph 24 reads as follows: “_An unemployed -person has no right to refuse an offer of work at his vocation_, -provided the working conditions conform with the standards fixed by the -respective tariff regulations, or in the absence of the same by the -trades-unions.” Paragraphs 27 to 30, inclusive, show the extraordinary -power of the Departments of Labor Distribution over the workers: - - 27. Whenever workers are required for work outside of their - district, a roll-call of the unemployed registered in the - Department of Labor Distribution shall take place, to ascertain - who are willing to go; if a sufficient number of such should - not be found, _the Department of Labor Distribution shall - assign the lacking number from among the unemployed in the - order of their registration_, provided that those who have - dependents must not be given preference before single persons. - - 28. If in the Departments of Labor Distribution, within the - limits of the district, there be no workmen meeting the - requirements, the District Exchange Bureau has the right, upon - agreement with the respective trades-union, to send unemployed - of another class approaching as nearly as possible the trade - required. - - 29. An unemployed person who is offered work outside his - vocation shall be obliged to accept it, on the understanding, - if he so wishes, that this be only temporary, until he receives - work at his vocation. - - 30. A wage-earner who is working outside his specialty, and - who has stated his wish that this be only temporary, shall - retain his place on the register on the Department of Labor - Distribution until he gets work at his vocation. - -It is quite clear from the foregoing that the Department of Labor -Distribution can arbitrarily compel a worker to leave a job satisfying -to him or her and to accept another job and remain at it until given -permission to leave. The worker may be compelled by this power to -leave a desirable job and take up a different line of work, or even to -move to some other locality. It is hardly possible to imagine a device -more effective in liquidating personal grudges or effecting political -pressure. One has only to face the facts of life squarely in order -to recognize the potentiality for evil embodied in this system. What -is there to prevent the Soviet official removing the “agitator,” the -political opponent, for “the good of the party”? What man wants his -sister or daughter to be subject to the menace of such power in the -hands of unscrupulous officials? There is not the slightest evidence -in the record of Bolshevism so far as it has been tried in Russia to -warrant the assumption that only saints will ever hold office in the -Departments of Labor Distribution. - -Article V governs the withdrawal of wage-earners from jobs which -do not satisfy them. Paragraph 51 of this article clearly provides -that a worker can only be permitted to resign if his reasons are -approved by what is described as the “respective organ of workmen’s -self-government.” Paragraph 52 provides that if the resignation is -not approved by this authority “the wage-earner must remain at work, -but may appeal from the decision of the committee to the respective -professional unions.” Provision is made for fixing the remuneration of -labor by governmental authority. Article VI, Paragraph 55, provides -that “the remuneration of wage-earners for work in enterprises, -establishments, and institutions employing paid labor ... shall be -fixed by tariffs worked out for each kind of labor.” Paragraph 57 -provides that “in working out the tariff rates and determining the -standard remuneration rates, all the wage-earners of a trade shall -be divided into groups and categories and a definite standard of -remuneration shall be fixed for each of them.” Paragraph 58 provides -that “the standard of remuneration fixed by the tariff rates must be at -least sufficient to cover the minimum living expenses _as determined -by the People’s Commissariat of Labor_ for each district of the -Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.” Paragraph 60 provides -that “the remuneration of each wage-earner shall be determined by his -classification in a definite group and category.” Paragraph 61, with an -additional note, explains the method of thus classifying wage-earners. -“Valuation commissions” are established by the “professional -organizations” and their procedure is absolutely determined by the -local Soviet official called the Commissariat of Labor. If a worker -receives more than the standard remuneration fixed, “irrespective of -the pretext and form under which it might be offered and whether it -be paid in only one or in several places of employment”--Paragraph -65--the excess amount so received may be deducted from his next wages, -according to Paragraph 68. - -The amount of work to be performed each day is arbitrarily assigned. -Thus, Article VIII, Paragraph 114, provides that “every wage-earner -must during a normal working-day and under normal working conditions -perform the standard amount of work fixed for the category and group in -which he is enrolled.” According to Paragraph 118 of the same article, -“a wage-earner systematically producing less than the fixed standard -may be transferred by decision of the proper valuation commission to -other work in the same group and category, or to a lower group or -category, with a corresponding reduction of wages.” If it is judged -that his failure to maintain the normal output is due to lack of good -faith and to negligence, he may be discharged without notice. - -An appendix to Section 80 provides that every wage-earner must carry -a labor booklet. The following description of this booklet shows how -thoroughly registered and controlled labor is in Sovdepia: - - 1. Every citizen of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet - Republic, upon assignment to a definite group and category - (Section 62 of the present Code), shall receive, free of - charge, a labor booklet. - - _Note._ The form of the labor booklets shall be worked out by - the People’s Commissariat of Labor. - - 2. Each wage-earner, on entering the employment of an - enterprise, establishment, or institution employing paid labor, - shall present his labor booklet to the management thereof, and - on entering the employment of a private individual--to the - latter. - - _Note._ A copy of the labor booklet shall be kept by the - management of the enterprise, establishment, institution, or - private individual by whom the wage-earner is employed. - - 3. All work performed by a wage-earner during the normal - working-day as well as piece-work or overtime work, and all - payments received by him as a wage-earner (remuneration in - money or in kind, subsidies from the unemployment and hospital - funds), must be entered in his labor booklet. - - _Note._ In the labor booklet must also be entered the leaves of - absence and sick-leave of the wage-earner, as well as the fines - imposed on him during and on account of his work. - - 4. Each entry in the labor booklet must be dated and signed by - the person making the entry, and also by the wage-earner (if - the latter is literate), who thereby certifies the correctness - of the entry. - - 5. The labor booklet shall contain: - - (_a_) The name, surname, and date of birth of the wage-earner; - - (_b_) The name and address of the trades-union of which the - wage-earner is a member; - - (_c_) The group and category to which the wage-earner has been - assigned by the valuation commission. - - 6. Upon the discharge of a wage-earner, his labor booklet shall - under no circumstances be withheld from him. Whenever an old - booklet is replaced by a new one, the former shall be left in - possession of the wage-earner. - - 7. In case a wage-earner loses his labor booklet, he shall be - provided with a new one into which shall be copied all the - entries of the lost booklet; in such a case a fee determined - by the rules of internal management may be charged to the - wage-earner for the new booklet. - - 8. A wage-earner must present his labor booklet upon the - request: - - (_a_) Of the managers of the enterprise, establishment, or - institution where he is employed; - - (_b_) Of the Department of Labor Distribution; - - (_c_) Of the trades union; - - (_d_) Of the officials of workmen’s control and of labor - protection; - - (_e_) Of the insurance offices or institutions acting as such. - -A wireless message from Moscow, dated February 11, 1920, referring to -the actual introduction of these labor booklets, says: - - The decree on the establishment of work-books is in course of - realization at Moscow and Petrograd. The book has 32 pages in - it, containing, besides particulars as to the holder’s civil - status, information on the following points: - - Persons dependent on the holder, degree of capacity for work, - place where employed, pay allowanced or pension, food-cards - received, and so forth. One of these books should be handed - over to all citizens not less than 16 years old. It constitutes - the proof that the holder is doing his share of productive - work. The introduction of the work-book will make it possible - for us to ascertain whether the law as to work is being - observed by citizens. This being the object, it will only be - handed to workmen and employees in accordance with the lists of - the business concerns in which they are working, to artisans - who can produce a regular certificate of their registration as - being sick or a certificate from the branches of the Public - Welfare Administration, and to women who are engaged in keeping - house, and who produce a certificate by the House Committee. - When the distribution has been completed, all sick persons, not - possessed of work-books, will be sent to their work by the - branch of the Labor Distribution Administration. - -We have summarized, in the exact language of the official English -translation published by the Soviet Government Bureau in this country, -the characteristic and noteworthy features of this remarkable scheme. -Surely this is the ultimate madness of bureaucratism, the most complete -subjection of the individual citizen to an all-powerful state since -the days of Lycurgus. At the time of Edward III, by the Statute of -Laborers of 1349, not only was labor enforced on the lower classes, but -men were not free to work where they liked, nor were their employers -permitted to pay them more than certain fixed rates of wages. In -short, the laborer was a serf; and that is the condition to which this -Bolshevist scheme would reduce all the people of Russia except the -privileged bureaucracy. It is a rigid and ruthless rule that is here -set up, making no allowance for individual likes or dislikes, leaving -no opportunity for honest personal initiative. The only variations and -modifications possible are those resulting from favoritism, political -influence, and circumvention of the laws by corruption of official and -other illicit methods. - -We must bear in mind that what we are considering is not a body of -facts relating to practical work under pressure of circumstance, but -a carefully formulated plan giving concrete form to certain aims and -intentions. It is not a record of which the Bolsheviki can say, “This -we were compelled to do,” but a prospectus of what they propose to -do. As such the Bolsheviki have caused the wide-spread distribution -of this remarkable Code of Labor Laws in this country and in England, -believing, apparently, that the workers of the two countries must -be attracted by this Communist Utopia. They have relied upon the -potency of slogans and principles long held in honor by the militant -and progressive portion of the working-class in every modern nation, -such as the right to work and the right to assured living income and -leisure, to win approval and support. But they have linked these things -which enlightened workers believe in to a system of despotism abhorrent -to them. After two full years of terrible experience the Bolsheviki -propose, in the name of Socialism and freedom, a tyranny which goes far -beyond anything which any modern nation has known. - -It was obvious from the time when this scheme was first promulgated -that it could only be established by strong military measures. No one -who knew anything of Russia could believe that the great mass of the -peasantry would willingly acquiesce in a scheme of government so much -worse than the old serfdom. Nor was it possible to believe that the -organized and enlightened workers of the cities would, as a whole, -willingly and freely place themselves in such bondage. It was not -at all surprising, therefore, to learn that it had been decided to -take advantage of the military situation, and the existence of a vast -organization of armed forces, to introduce compulsory labor as part -of the military system. On December 11, 1919, _The Red Baltic Fleet_, -a Bolshevist paper published for the sailors of the Baltic fleet, -printed an abstract of Trotsky’s report to the Seventh Congress of -Soviets, from which the following significant paragraphs are quoted: - - If one speaks of the conclusion of peace within the next - months, such a peace cannot be called a permanent peace. So - long as class states remain, as powerful centers of Imperialism - in the Far East and in America, it is not impossible that the - peace which we shall perhaps conclude in the near future will - again be for us only a long and prolonged respite. So long as - this possibility is not excluded, it is possible that it will - be a matter _not of disarming, but of altering the form of the - armed forces of the state_. - - We must get the workmen back to the factories, and the - peasants to the villages, re-establish industries and develop - agriculture. Therefore, the troops must be brought nearer to - the workers, and the regiments to the factories, villages, and - cantons. We must pass to the introduction of the militia system - of armed forces. - -There is a scarcely veiled threat to the rest of the world in Trotsky’s -intimation that the peace they hope to conclude will perhaps be only -a prolonged respite. As an isolated utterance, it might perhaps -be disregarded, but it must be considered in the light of, and in -connection with, a number of other utterances upon the same subject. -In the instructions from the People’s Commissar for Labor to the -propagandists sent to create sympathy and support for the Labor Army -scheme among the soldiers we find this striking passage: “The country -must continue to remain armed for many years to come. _Until Socialist -revolution triumphs throughout the world we must continue to be armed -and prepared for eventualities._” A Bolshevist message, dated Moscow, -March 11, 1920, explains that: “The utilization of whole Labor Armies, -retaining the army system of organization, may only be justified from -the point of view of keeping the army intact for military purposes. -As soon as the necessity for this ceases to exist the need to retain -large staffs and administrations will also cease to exist.” There is -not the slightest doubt that the Bolsheviki contemplate the maintenance -of a great army to be used as a labor force until the time arrives when -it shall seem desirable to hurl it against the nations of central and -western Europe in the interests of “world revolution.” - -On January 15, 1920, Lenin and Brichkina, president and secretary, -respectively, of the Council of Defense, signed and issued the first -decree for the formation of a Labor Army. The text of the decree -follows: - - -DECREE OF THE WORKERS’ AND PEASANTS’ COUNCIL OF DEFENSE ON THE FIRST -REVOLUTIONARY LABOR ARMY - - 1. The Third Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army is to be utilized - for labor purposes. This army is to be considered as a complete - organization; its apparatus is neither to be disorganized nor - split up, and it is to be known under the name of the First - Revolutionary Labor Army. - - 2. The utilization of the Third Red Army for labor purposes - is a temporary measure. The period is to be determined by a - special regulation of the Council of Defense in accordance - with the military situation as well as with the character of - the work which the army will be able to carry out, and will - especially depend on the practical productivity of the labor - army. - - 3. The following are the principal tasks to which the forces - and means of the third army are to be applied: - - -_First_: - - (_a_) The preparation of food and forage in accordance with - the regulation of the People’s Commissariat for Food, and the - concentration of these in certain depots: - - (_b_) The preparation of wood and its delivery to factories and - railway stations; - - (_c_) The organization for this purpose of land transport as - well as water transport; - - (_d_) The mobilization of necessary labor power for work on a - national scale; - - (_e_) Constructive work within the above limits as well as on a - wider scale, for the purpose of introducing, gradually, further - works. - - -_Second_: - - (_f_) For repair of agricultural implements; - - (_g_) Agricultural work, etc. - -4. The first duty of the Labor Army is to secure provisions, not below -the Red Army ration, for the local workers in those regions where the -army is stationed; this is to be brought about by means of the army -organs of supply in all those cases where the President of the Food -Commissariat of the Labor Army Council (No. 7) will find that no other -means of securing the necessary provisions for the above-mentioned -workers are to be had. - -5. The utilization of the labor of the third army in a certain locality -must take place in the locality in which the principal part of the army -is stationed; this is to be determined exactly by the leading organs -of the army (No. 6) with a subsequent confirmation by the Council of -Defense. - -6. The Revolutionary Council of the Labor Army is the organ in charge -of work appointed, with the provision that the locality where the -services of the Labor Army are to be applied is to be the same locality -where the services of the Revolutionary Council of the Labor Army -enjoys economic authority. - -7. The Revolutionary Council of the Labor Army is to be composed -of members of the Revolutionary War Council and of authorized -representatives of the People’s Commissariat for Food, the Supreme -Council for Public Economy, the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture, -the People’s Commissariat for Communication, and the People’s -Commissariat for Labor. - -An especially authorized Council of Defense which is to enjoy the -rights of presidency of the Council of the Labor Army is to be put at -the head of the above Council. - -8. All the questions concerning internal military organizations and -defined by regulations of internal military service and other military -regulations are to be finally settled upon by the Revolutionary War -Council which introduces in the internal life of the army all the -necessary changes arising in consequence of the demands of the economic -application of the army. - -9. In every sphere of work (food, fuel, railway, etc.) the final -decision in the matter of organizing this work is to be left with the -representative of the corresponding sphere of the Labor Army Council. - -10. In the event of radical disagreement the case is to be transferred -to the Council of Defense. - -11. All the local institutions, Councils of Public Economy, Food -Committees, land departments, etc., are to carry out the special -orders and instructions of the Labor Army Council through the latter’s -corresponding members either in its entirety or in that sphere of the -work which is demanded by the application of the mass labor power. - -12. All local institutions (councils of public economy, food -committees, etc.) are to remain in their particular localities and -carry out, through their ordinary apparatus, the work which falls to -their share in the execution of the economic plans of the Labor Army -Council; local institutions can be changed, either in structure or in -their functions, on no other condition except with the consent of the -corresponding departmental representatives who are members of the Labor -Army Council, or, in the case of radical changes, with the consent of -the corresponding central department. - -13. In the case of work for which individual parts of the army can be -utilized in a casual manner, as well as in the case of those parts -of the army which are stationed outside the chief army, or which can -be transferred beyond the limits of this locality, the Army Council -must in each instance enter into an agreement with the permanent -local institutions carrying out the corresponding work, and as far as -that is practical and meets with no obstacles, the separate military -detachments are to be transferred to their temporary economic disposal. - -14. Skilled workers, in so far as they are not indispensable for the -support of the life of the army itself, must be transferred by the -army to the local factories and to the economic institutions generally -under direction of the corresponding representatives of the Labor Army -Council. - -_Note_: Skilled labor can be sent to factories under no other condition -except with the consent of those economic organs to which the factory -in question is subject. Members of trades-unions are liable to be -withdrawn from local enterprises for the economic needs in connection -with the problems of the army only with the consent of the local organs. - -15. The Labor Army Council must, through its corresponding members, -take all the necessary measures toward inducing the local -institutions of a given department to control, in the localities, the -army detachments and their institutions in the carrying out of the -latter’s share of work without infringing upon the respective by-laws, -regulations, and instructions of the Soviet Republic. - -_Note_: It is particularly necessary to take care that the general -state rate of pay is to be observed in the remuneration of peasants for -the delivery of food, for the preparation of wood or other fuel. - -16. The Central Statistical Department in agreement with the Supreme -Council for Public Economy and the War Department is instructed to draw -up an estimate defining the forms and period of registration. - -17. The present regulation comes into force with the moment of its -publication by telegraph. - - _President of the Council of Defense_, - - V. ULIANOV (LENIN). - S. BRICHKINA, _Secretary_. - - Moscow, _January 15, 1920_. - -On January 18, 1920, the _Krasnaya Gazeta_ published the following -order by Trotsky to the First Labor Army: - - -ORDER TO THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY LABOR ARMY - - 1. The First Army has finished its war task, but the enemy is - not completely dispersed. The rapacious imperialists are still - menacing Siberia in the extreme Orient. To the East the armies - paid by the Entente are still menacing Soviet Russia. The bands - of the White Guards are still at Archangel. The Caucasus is - not yet liberated. For this reason the First Russian Army has - not as yet been diverted, but retains its internal unity and - its warlike ardor, in order that it may be ready in case the - Socialist Fatherland should once more call it to new tasks. - - 2. The First Russian Army, which is, however, desirous of doing - its duty, does not wish to lose any time. During the coming - weeks and months of respite it will have to apply its strength - and all its means to ameliorate the agricultural situation in - this country. - - 3. The Revolutionary War Council of the First Army will come to - an agreement with the Labor Council. The representatives of the - agricultural institutions of the Red Republic of the Soviets - will work side by side with the members of the Revolutionary - Council. - - 4. Food-supplies are indispensable to the famished workmen of - the commercial centers. The First Labor Army should make it its - essential task to gather systematically in the region occupied - by it such food-supplies as are there, as well as also to make - an exact listing of what has been obtained, to rapidly and - energetically forward them to the various factories and railway - stations, and load them upon the freight-cars. - - 5. Wood is needed by commerce. It is the important task of - the Revolutionary Labor Army to cut and saw the wood, and to - transport it to the factories and to the railway stations. - - 6. Spring is coming; this is the season of agricultural work. - As the productive force of our factories has lessened, the - number of new farm implements which can be delivered has become - insufficient. The peasants have, however, a tolerably large - number of old implements which are in need of repair. The - Revolutionary Labor Army will employ its workshops as well as - its workmen in order to repair such tools and machinery as are - needed. When the season arrives for work in the fields, the Red - cavalry and infantry will prove that they know how to plow the - earth. - - 7. All members of the army should enter into fraternal - relations with the professional societies[69] of the local - Soviets, remembering that such organizations are those of the - laboring people. All work should be done after having come to - an understanding with them. - -[69] _i.e._, trades-unions. - - 8. Indefatigable energy should be shown during the work, as - much as if it were a combat or a fight. - - 9. The necessary efforts, as well as the results to be - obtained, should be carefully calculated. Every pound of Soviet - bread, and every log of national wood should be tabulated. - Everything should contribute to the foundation of the Socialist - activities. - - 10. The Commandants and Commissars should be responsible for - the work of their men while work is going on, as much as if it - were a combat. Discipline should not be relaxed. The Communist - Societies should during the work be models of perseverance and - patience. - - 11. The Revolutionary Tribunals should punish the lazy and - parasites and the thieves of national property. - - 12. Conscientious soldiers, workmen, and revolutionary peasants - should be in the first rank. Their bravery and devotion should - serve as an example to others and inspire them to act similarly. - - 13. The front should be contracted as much as possible. Those - who are useless should be sent to the first ranks of the - workers. - - 14. Start and finish your work, if the locality permits it, - to the sound of revolutionary hymns and songs. Your task is - not the work of a laborer, but a great service rendered the - Socialist Fatherland. - - 15. Soldiers of the Third Army, called the First Revolutionary - Army of Labor. Let your example prove a great one. All Russia - will rise to your call. The Radio has already spread throughout - the universe all that the Third Army intends in being - transposed into the First Army of Labor. Soldier Workmen! Do - not lower the red standard! - - _The President of the War Council of the - Revolutionary Republic_, - - [Signed] TROTSKY. - -There is not the slightest doubt where Lenin and Trotsky found the -model for the foregoing orders and the inspiration of the entire -scheme. Almost exactly a century earlier, that is to say in the first -quarter of the nineteenth century, Count Arakcheev, a favorite of -Alexander I, introduced into Russia the militarization of agricultural -labor. Peasant conscripts were sent to the “military settlements,” -formed into battalions under command of army officers, marched in -proper military formation to their tasks, which they performed to -martial music. The arable lands were divided among the owner-settlers -according to the size of their families. Tasks were arbitrarily set for -the workers by the officers; resignation or withdrawal was, of course, -impossible; desertion was punished with great severity. Elaborate -provisions were made by this monarchist autocrat for the housing of the -conscript-settlers, for medical supervision, and for the education of -the children. Everything seems to have been provided for the conscripts -in these settlements except freedom. - -Travelers gave most glowing accounts of Arakcheev’s Utopia, just as -later travelers did of the Russia of Nicholas II, and as the Ransomes, -Goodes, Lansburys, and other travelers of to-day are giving of -Bolshevist Russia. But the people themselves were discontented and -unhappy, a fact evidenced by the many serious uprisings. Robbed of -freedom, all initiative taken from them, so that they became abject and -cowed and almost devoid of will power, like dumb beasts yet under the -influence of desperate and daring leaders, they rose in revolt again -and again with brutal fury. Arakcheev’s Utopia was not intended to be -oppressive or unjust, we may well believe. There are evidences that it -was conceived in a noble and even generous spirit. It inevitably became -cruel and oppressive, however, as every such scheme that attempts to -disregard the variations in human beings, and to compel them to conform -to a single pattern or plan, must do. At a meeting of the Central -Committee of the Communist Party in Petrograd Trotsky protested that -only the “petty bourgeois intellectuals” could liken his system of -militarized labor to Arakcheev’s, but the facts speak for themselves. -And in all Russia’s tragic history there are no blacker pages than -those which record her great experiments with militarized labor. - -Addressing the joint meeting of the third Russian Congress of -Soviets of National Economy, the Moscow Soviet of Deputies and the -Administrative Boards of the Trades-Unions, on January 25, 1920, -Trotsky made a report which required more than two hours for its -delivery. Defining labor conscription, he said: - - We shall succeed if qualified and trained workers take part - in productive labor. They must all be registered and provided - with work registration books. Trades-unions must register - qualified workmen in the villages. Only in those localities - where trades-union methods are inadequate other methods must - be introduced, in particular that of compulsion, because labor - conscription gives the state the right to tell the qualified - workman who is employed on some unimportant work in his - villages, “You are obliged to leave your present employment and - go to Sormova or Kolomna, because there your work is required.” - - Labor conscription means that qualified workmen who leave - the army must take their work registration books and proceed - to places where they are required, where their presence - is necessary to the economic system of the country. Labor - conscription gives the Labor State the right to order a workman - to leave the village industry in which he is engaged and to - work in state enterprises which require his services. We - must feed these workmen and guarantee them the minimum food - ration. A short time ago we were confronted by the problem of - defending the frontiers of the Soviet Republic, now our aim is - to collect, load, and transport a sufficient quantity of bread, - meat, fats, and fish to feed the working-class. We are not only - confronted by the question of the industrial proletariat, but - also by the question of utilizing unskilled labor. - - * * * * * - - There is still one way to the reorganization of national - economy--the way of uniting the army and labor and changing the - military detachments of the army into labor detachments of a - labor army. Many in the army have already accomplished their - military task, but they cannot be demobilized as yet. Now that - they have been released from their military duties, they must - fight against economic ruin and against hunger; they must work - to obtain fuel, peat, and inflammable slate; they must take - part in building, in clearing the lines of snow, in repairing - roads, building sheds, grinding flour, and so on. We have - already got several of these armies. These armies have already - been allotted their tasks. One must obtain foodstuffs for the - workmen of the district in which it was formerly stationed, and - there also it will cut down wood, cart it to the railways, and - repair engines. Another will help in the laying down of railway - lines for the transport of crude oil. A third will be used for - repairing agricultural implements and machines, and in the - spring for taking part in working the land. At the present time - among the working masses there must be the greatest exactitude - and conscientiousness, together with responsibility to the end; - there must be utter strictness and severity, both in small - matters and in great. If the most advanced workmen in the - country will devote all their thoughts, all their will, and all - their revolutionary duty to the cause of regulating economic - affairs, then I have no doubt that we shall lead Russia on a - new free road, to the confounding of our enemies and the joy of - our friends. - -Going into further details concerning the scheme, Trotsky said, -according to _Izvestia_, January 29, 1920: - - Wherein lies the meaning of this transformation? We possess - armies which have accomplished their military tasks. _Can - we demobilize them? In no case whatever. If we have learned - anything in the civil war it is certainly circumspection._ - While keeping the army under arms, we may use it for economic - purposes, with the _possibility of sending it to the front in - case of need_. - - Such is the present condition of the Third Soviet Army at - Ekaterinburg, some units of which are quartered in the - direction of Omsk. It numbers no less than _150,000 men, of - whom 7,000 are Communists and 9,000 are sympathizers_. Such - an army is class-conscious to a high degree. No wonder it - has offered itself for employment for labor purposes. The - labor army must perform definite and simple tasks requiring - the application of mass force, such as lumbering operations, - peat-cutting, collecting grain, etc. Trades-unions, political - and Soviet organizations must, of course, establish the closest - contact with the Labor Army. An experienced and competent - workman is appointed as chief of staff of this army, and - a former chief of staff, an officer of the general staff, - is his assistant. The Operative Department is renamed the - Labor-Operative Department, and controls requisitions and the - execution of the labor-operative orders and the labor bulletins. - - A great number of labor artels, with a well-ordered telegraph - and telephone system, is thus at our disposal. They receive - orders and report on their execution the same day. This is - but the beginning of our work. There will be many drawbacks - at first, much will have to be altered, but the basis itself - cannot be unsound, as it is the same on which our entire Soviet - structure is founded. - - In this case we possess several thousand Ural workmen, who - are placed at the head of the army, and a mass of men under - the guidance of these advanced workmen. What is it? It is but - a reflection on a small scale of Soviet Russia, founded upon - millions upon millions of peasants, and the guiding apparatus - is formed of more conscious peasants and an overwhelming - majority of industrial workers. This first experiment is being - made by the other armies likewise. It is intended to utilize - the Seventh Army, quartered at the Esthonian frontier, for - peat-cutting and slate-quarrying. If these labor armies are - capable of extracting raw materials, of giving new life to our - transport, of providing corn, fuel, etc., to our main economic - centers, then our economic organism will revive. - - This experiment is of the most vital moral and material - importance. We cannot mobilize the peasants by means of - trades-unions, and the trades-unions themselves do not possess - any means of laying hold of millions of peasants. They can best - be mobilized on a military footing. Their labor formations will - have to be organized on a military model--labor platoons, labor - companies, labor battalions, disciplined as required, for we - shall have to deal with masses which have not passed through - trades-union trading. This is a matter of the near future. We - shall be compelled to create military organizations such as - exist already in the form of our armies. It is therefore urgent - to utilize them by adapting them to economic requirements. That - is exactly what we are doing now. - -At the ninth Congress of the Communist Party in March, according to -_Izvestia_ of March 21, 1920, Trotsky made another report on the -militarization of labor, in which he said: - - At the present time the militarization of labor is all the more - needed in that we have now come to the mobilization of peasants - as the means of solving the problems requiring mass action. - We are mobilizing the peasants and forming them into labor - detachments which very closely resemble military detachments. - Some of our comrades say, however, that even though in the case - of the working power of mobilized peasantry it is necessary to - apply militarization, a military apparatus need not be created - when the question involves skilled labor and industry because - there we have professional unions performing the function of - organizing labor. This opinion, however, is erroneous. - - At present it is true that professional unions distribute labor - power at the demand of social-economic organizations, but what - means and methods do they possess for insuring that the workman - who is sent to a given factory actually reports at that factory - for work? - - We have in the most important branches of our industry more - than a million workmen on the lists, but not more than eight - hundred thousand of them are actually working, and where are - the remainder? They have gone to the villages, or to other - divisions of industry, or into speculation. Among soldiers this - is called desertion, and in one form or another the measures - used to compel soldiers to do their duty should be applied in - the field of labor. - - _Under a unified system of economy the masses of workmen should - be moved about, ordered and sent from place to place in exactly - the same manner as soldiers. This is the foundation of the - militarization of labor, and without this we are unable to - speak seriously of any organization of industry on a new basis - in the conditions of starvation and disorganization existing - to-day...._ - - In the period of transition in the organization of labor, - compulsion plays a very important part. The statement that free - labor--namely, freely employed labor--produces more than labor - under compulsion is correct only when applied to feudalistic - and bourgeois orders of society. - -It is, of course, too soon to attempt anything in the nature of a final -judgment upon this new form of industrial serfdom. In his report to -the ninth Congress of the Communist Party, already quoted, Trotsky -declared that the belief that free labor is more productive than forced -labor is “correct only when applied to feudalistic and bourgeois -orders of society.” The implication is that it will be otherwise in -the Communistic society of the future, but of that Trotsky can have no -knowledge. His declaration springs from faith, not from knowledge. -All that he or anybody else can know is that the whole history of -mankind hitherto shows that free men work better than men who are not -free. Arakcheev’s militarized peasants were less productive than other -peasants not subject to military rule. So far as the present writer’s -information goes, no modern army when engaged in productive work has -equaled civilian labor in similar lines, judged on a per-capita basis. -Slaves, convicts, and conscripts have everywhere been notoriously poor -producers. - -Will it be better if the conscription is done by the Bolsheviki, and if -the workers sing revolutionary songs, instead of the hymns to the Czar -sung by Arakcheev’s conscript settlers, or the religious melodies sung -by the negro slaves in our Southern States? Those whose only guide to -the future is the history of the past will doubt it; those who, like -Trotsky, see in the past no lesson for the future confidently believe -that it will. The thoughtful and candid mind wonders whether the -following paragraph, published by the _Krasnaya Gazeta_ in March, may -not be regarded as a foreshadowing of Bolshevist disillusionment: - - The attempts of the Soviet power to utilize the Labor Army for - cleansing Petrograd from mud, excretions, and rubbish have not - met with success. In addition to the usual Labor Army rations, - the men were given an increased allowance of bread, tobacco, - etc. Nevertheless, it was found impossible to get not only any - intensive work, but even, generally speaking, any real work at - all out of the Labor Army men. Recourse, therefore, had to - be had to the usual means--the men had to be paid a premium - of 1,000 rubles for every tramway-truck of rubbish unloaded. - Moreover, the tramway brigade had to be paid 300 rubles for - every third trip. - -In hundreds of statements by responsible Bolshevist officials and -journals the wonderful morale of the Petrograd workers has been -extolled and held up to the rest of Russia for emulation. If these -things are possible in “Red Peter” at the beginning, what may we not -expect elsewhere--and later? The _Novaya Russkaya Zhizn_, published at -Helsingfors, is an anti-Bolshevist paper. The following quotation from -its issue of March 6, 1920, is of interest and value only in so far as -it directs attention to a Bolshevist official report: - - In the Soviet press we find a brilliant illustration (in - figures) of the latest “new” tactics proclaimed by the - Communists of the Third International on the subject of - soldiers “stacking their rifles and taking to axes, saws, and - spades.” - - “The 56th Division of the Petrograd Labor Army, during the - fortnight from 1st to 14th February, loaded 60 cars with - wood-fuel, transported 225 sagenes,[70] stacked 43 cubic - sagenes, and sawed up 39 cubic sagenes.” Besides this, the - division dug out “several locomotives” from under the snow. - -[70] One sagene equals seven feet. - - In Soviet Russia a regiment is about 1,000 strong, and a - division is about 4,000. In the course of a fortnight the - division worked twelve days. According to our calculation this - works out, on an average, at a fraction over one billet of wood - per diem per Red Army man handled by him in one way or another. - - Thus it took 4,000 men a fortnight to do what could, in former - days, be easily performed by ten workmen. - - Unfortunately, the Bolsheviks have not yet calculated the cost - to the Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government of the wood-fuel - which was loaded, transported, stacked, and sawn up by the 56th - Division of the Labor Army in the course of a fortnight. - -These quotations are not offered as proof of the uneconomical character -of compulsory labor. It is useless to argue that question further -than we have already done. But there is a question of vastly greater -importance than the volume of production--namely, the effect upon the -human elements involved, the producers themselves. It is quite clear -that this universal conscription of the laborers cannot be carried -out without a large measure of adscription to the jobs assigned them, -however modified in individual cases. It is equally certain that -under the conditions described by Lenin and Trotsky in the official -utterances we have quoted, nothing worthy the name of personal freedom -can by any possibility exist. The condition of the workers under such -a system cannot be fundamentally different from that of the natives of -Paraguay in the theocratic-communist régime established by the Jesuits -in the seventeenth century, or from that of Arakcheev’s militarized -serfs. External and superficial differences there may be, but none of -fundamental importance. The Bolshevist régime may be less brutal and -more humane than Arakcheev’s, but so was the Jesuit rule in Paraguay. -Yet in the latter, as in the former, the workers were reduced to the -condition of mere automatons until, led by daring spirits, they rose in -terrible revolt of unparalleled brutality. - -Such is the militarization of labor in the Bolshevist paradise, and -such is the light that history throws upon it. We do not wonder that -_Pravda_ had to admit, on March 28, 1920, that mass-meetings to protest -against the new system were being held in all parts of Soviet Russia. -That the Russian workers will submit for long to the new tyranny is, -happily, unthinkable. - - - - -XIV - -LET THE VERDICT BE RENDERED - - -The men and women of America are by the force of circumstance impaneled -as a jury to judge the Bolshevist régime. The evidence submitted in -these pages is before them. It is no mere chronicle of scandal; neither -is it a cunningly wrought mosaic of rumors, prejudiced inferences, -exaggerated statements by hostile witnesses, sensational incidents and -utterances, selected because they are calculated to provoke resentment. -On the contrary, the most scrupulous care has been taken to confine -the case to the well-established and acknowledged characteristic -features of the Bolshevist régime. The bulk of the evidence cited -comes from Bolshevist sources of the highest possible authority and -responsibility. The non-Bolshevist witnesses are, without exception, -men of high character, identified with the international Socialist -movement. There is not a reactionist or an apologist for the capitalist -order of society among them. In each case special attention has been -directed to their anti-Bolshevist views, so that the jury can make -full allowance therefor. Moreover, in no instance has the testimony -of witnesses of anti-Bolshevist views been cited without ample -corroborative evidence from responsible and authoritative Bolshevist -sources. The jury must now pass upon this evidence and render its -verdict. - -It is urged by the Bolsheviki and by their defenders that the time for -passing judgment has not yet arrived; that we are not yet in possession -of sufficient evidence to warrant a decision. Neither the Bolsheviki -nor their defenders have the right to make this plea, for the simple -reason that they themselves have long since demanded that, with -less than a thousandth part of the testimony now before us, we pass -judgment--and, of course, give our unqualified approval to Bolshevism -and its works. It is a matter of record and of common knowledge that -soon after the Bolshevist régime was instituted in Russia a vigorous, -systematic propaganda in its favor and support was begun in all the -western nations, including the United States. By voice and pen the -makers of this propaganda called upon the people of the western nations -to adopt Bolshevism. They presented glowing pictures of the Bolshevist -Utopia, depicting it, not as an experiment of uncertain outcome, to be -watched with sympathetic interest, but as an achievement so great, so -successful and beneficent, that to refrain from copying it was both -stupid and wrong. In this country, as in the other western nations, -pamphlets extolling the merits of the Soviet régime were extensively -circulated by well-organized groups, while certain “Liberal” weeklies -devoted themselves to the task of presenting Bolshevism as a great -advance in political and economic practice, a triumph of humanitarian -idealism. Organizations were formed for the purpose of molding our -public opinion in favor of Bolshevism. - -It was not until this pro-Bolshevist propaganda was well under way -that anything in the nature of a counter-propaganda was begun. For -a considerable period of time this counter-propaganda in defense of -existing democratic forms of government was relatively weak, and even -now it has to be admitted that the pro-Bolshevist books and pamphlets -in circulation in this country greatly outnumber those on the other -side. In view of these facts, the defenders of Bolshevism have no moral -right to demand suspension of judgment now. They themselves rushed to -the bar of public opinion with a flimsy case, composed in its entirety -of _ex parte_ and misleading statements by interested witnesses, many -of them perjured, and demanded an instant verdict of approval. Upon -what intellectual or moral grounds, then, shall others be denied the -right to appear before that same court of public opinion, with a much -more complete case, composed mainly of unchallenged admissions and -records of the Bolsheviki themselves, and to ask for a contrary verdict? - -There is not the slightest merit in the claim that we do not possess -sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusive verdict in the case. -Whether the Soviet form of government, basing suffrage upon occupation -and economic functioning, is better adapted for Russia than the types -of representative parliamentary government familiar to us in the -western nations, does not enter into the case at all. The issue is -not Sovietism, but Bolshevism. It is the tragic failure of Bolshevism -with which we are concerned. It has failed to give the people freedom -and failed to give them bread. We know that there is no freedom in -Russia, and, what is more, that freedom can never be had upon the basis -of the Bolshevist philosophy. Whether in Russia or in this country, -government must rest upon the consent of the governed in order to -merit the designation of free government; upon any other basis it must -be tyrannical. It is as certain now as it will be a generation or a -century hence, as certain as that yesterday belongs to the past and is -irrevocable, that Bolshevism is government by a minority imposed upon -the majority by force; that its sanctions are not the free choice and -consent of the governed. - -We know as much now as our descendants will know a couple of centuries -hence concerning the great fundamental issues involved in this -controversy. More than seven centuries have elapsed since the signing -of Magna Charta at Runnimede. Upon every page of the history of the -Anglo-Saxon people, from that day in June, 1215, to the present, it is -plainly written that government which does not rest upon the consent -of the governed cannot satisfy free men. Throughout that long period -the moral and intellectual energy of the race has been devoted to the -attainment of the ideal of universal and equal suffrage as the basis -of free government. There are many persons who do not believe in that -ideal, and it is possible to bring against it arguments which do not -lack plausibility or force. Czar Nicholas II did not believe in that -ideal; George III did not believe in it; Nicolai Lenin does not believe -in it. Lincoln did believe in it; Marx believed in it; the American -people believe in it. At this late day it is not necessary to argue -the merits of democratic government. The consensus of the opinion of -mankind, based upon long experience, favors government resting upon -the will of the majority, with proper safeguards for the rights of the -minority, as against government by minorities however constituted. -Bolshevism, admittedly based upon the theory of rule by a minority -of the people, thus runs counter to the experience and judgment of -civilized mankind in every nation. In Russia a democratic government -conforming to the experience and judgment of civilized and free peoples -was being set up when the Bolsheviki by violence destroyed the attempt. - -More conclusive, however, is the moral judgment of the conduct of the -Bolsheviki as exemplified by their attitude toward the Constituent -Assembly: During the summer of 1917, the period immediately preceding -the _coup d’état_ of November, while the Provisional Government under -Kerensky was engaged in making preparations for the holding of the -Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviki professed to believe that the -Provisional Government was not loyal to the Constituent Assembly, and -that there was danger that this instrument of popular sovereignty -would be crippled, if not wholly destroyed, unless Kerensky and his -associates were replaced by men and women more thoroughly devoted to -the Constituent Assembly than they. It was as champions and defenders -of the Constituent Assembly that the Bolsheviki obtained the power -which enabled them to overthrow the Provisional Government. As late as -October 25th Trotsky denounced Kerensky, charging him with conspiring -to prevent the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. He demanded -that the powers of government be taken over by the Soviets, which -would, he said, convoke the Assembly on December 12th, the date -assigned for it. Immediately after the _coup d’état_, the triumphant -Bolsheviki, at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, announced -that “pending the calling together of the Constituent Assembly, a -Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government is to be formed, which -is to be called the Council of People’s Commissaries.” On the day -following the _coup d’état_, November 8, 1917, Lenin made this very -positive and explicit statement at the Soviet Congress: - - As a democratic government, we cannot disregard the will of - the masses, even though we disagree with it. In the fires of - life, applying the decree in practice, carrying it out on - the spot, the peasants will themselves understand where the - truth is. _And even if the peasants will continue to follow - the Socialists-Revolutionists, and even if they will return a - majority for that Party in the elections to the Constituent - Assembly, we shall still say--let it be thus!_ Life is the best - teacher, and it will show who was right. And let the peasants - from their end, and us from ours, solve this problem. Life - will compel us to approach each other in the general current - of revolutionary activity, in the working out of new forms of - statehood. We should keep abreast of life; we must allow the - masses of the people full freedom of creativeness. - -On that same day the “land decree” was issued. It began with these -words: “The land problem in its entirety can be solved only by the -national Constituent Assembly.” Three days after the revolt Lenin, as -president of the People’s Commissaries, published a decree, stating: - - 1. That the elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held - on November 25th, the day we set aside for this purpose. - - 2. All electoral committees, all local organizations, the - Councils of Workmen’s, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Delegates and - the soldiers’ organizations at the front are to bend every - effort toward safeguarding the freedom of the voters and fair - play at the elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will - be held on the appointed date. - -If language has any meaning at all, by these declarations the -Bolsheviki were pledged to recognize and uphold the Constituent -Assembly. - -As the electoral campaign proceeded and it became evident that the -Bolsheviki would not receive the support of the great mass of the -voters, their organs began to adopt a very critical attitude toward the -Constituent Assembly. There was a thinly veiled menace in the following -passages from an article published in _Pravda_ on November 18, 1917, -while the electoral campaign was in full swing: - - _To expect from the Constituent Assembly a painless solution - of all our accursed problems not only savors of parliamentary - imbecility, but is also dangerous politically...._ The victory - of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison in the November - revolution furnishes the only possible guaranty of the - convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and, what is not less - important, assures success to such a solution of our political - and social problems which the War and the Revolution have - made the order of the day. The convocation of the Constituent - Assembly stands or falls with the Soviet power. - -The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in a large majority -of electoral districts on the 12th, 19th, and 26th of November, -1917--that is, after the _coup d’état_, in the full tide of Bolshevist -enthusiasm. The Bolsheviki were in power, and there is abundant -evidence that they resorted to almost every known method of coercion -and intimidation to secure a result favorable to themselves. Of 703 -deputies elected in 54 out of a total of 81 election districts, only -168 belonged to the Bolshevist Party. At the same time the Party of -Socialists-Revolutionists proper, not reckoning the organizations of -the same party among other nationalities of Russia, won twice that -number of seats--namely, 338. Out of a total of 36,257,960 votes -cast in 54 election districts the Bolshevist Party counted barely 25 -per cent. The votes cast for their candidates amounted to 9,023,963, -whereas the Socialists-Revolutionists polled 20,893,734--that is, 58 -per cent. of all the votes cast. - -When the election results were known _Pravda_ and _Izvestia_ both took -the position that the victorious people did not need a Constituent -Assembly; that a new instrument, greatly superior to the old and -“obsolete” democratic instrument, had been created. On December 1, -1917, _Pravda_ said: “If the lines of action of the Soviets and the -Constituent Assembly should diverge, if there should arise between them -any disagreements, the question will arise as to who expresses better -the will of the masses. _We think it is the Soviets who through their -peculiar organization express more clearly, more correctly, and more -definitely the will of the workers, soldiers, and peasants...._ This -is why the Soviets will have to propose to the Constituent Assembly to -adopt as the constitution of the Russian Republic, not that political -system which forms the basis of its convocation (_i.e._, Democracy), -but the Soviet system, the constitution of the Republic of Workers’, -soldiers’, and Peasants’ Soviets.” On December 7, 1917, the Executive -Committee of the Soviet power published a resolution which indicated -that this self-constituted authority, despite the most solemn pledges, -was already tampering with the newly elected Constituent Assembly. The -resolution asserted that the Soviet power had the right to issue writs -for new elections where a majority of the voters expressed themselves -as dissatisfied with the result of the elections already held. In other -words, notwithstanding the fact that the elections for the Constituent -Assembly had been held in November, while the Bolsheviki were in power, -and the first meeting of that body was scheduled for December 12th, new -elections might be ordered by the Soviet power in response to a request -from the majority of the electorate. That the elections had gone so -overwhelmingly against the Bolsheviki, most of their candidates being -badly defeated, throws a sinister light upon this decision. _Pravda_ -demanded that the leading members of the Constitutional-Democratic -Party be arrested, including those elected to the Constituent -Assembly, and on December 13, 1917, it published this decree of -the Council of People’s Commissaries: “The leading members of the -Constitutional-Democratic Party, as a party of enemies of the people, -are to be arrested and brought to trial before the Revolutionary -Tribunals.” - -On December 26, 1917, Lenin published in _Pravda_ a series of nineteen -“theses” concerning the Constituent Assembly. He therein set forth -the doctrine that although the elections had taken place after the -Bolshevist _coup d’état_, and under the authority and protection of -the temporary Soviet power, yet the elections gave no clear indication -of the real mind of the masses of the people, because, forsooth, the -Socialists-Revolutionists Party, whose candidates had been elected in -a majority of the constituencies, had divided into a Right Wing and a -Left Wing subsequent to the elections. That the differences between -these factions would be fully threshed out in the Constituent Assembly -was obvious. Nevertheless, Lenin announced that the Constituent -Assembly just elected was not suitable. Again we are compelled to -connect this announcement with the fact that the Bolsheviki had not -succeeded in winning the support of the electorate. In these tortuous -logomachies we encounter the same immoral doctrine that we have -noticed in Lenin’s discussion of the demand for freedom of speech, -publication, and assemblage. The demand for the convocation of the -Constituent Assembly had been “an entirely just one in the program -of revolutionary Social-Democracy” in the past, but now with the -Bolsheviki in power it was a different matter! Whereas the Soviets -had been declared to be the loyal protectors of the Constituent -Assembly, Lenin’s new declaration was, “The Soviet Republic represents -not only a higher form of democratic institutions (in comparison -with the middle-class republic and the Constituent Assembly as its -consummation), it is also the sole form which renders possible the -least painful transition to Socialism.” - -When the Constituent Assembly finally convened on January 18, 1918, -there were sailors and Lettish troops in the hall armed with rifles, -hand-grenades, and machine-guns, placed there to intimidate the elected -representatives of the people. The Bolshevist delegates demanded the -adoption of a declaration by the Assembly which was tantamount to a -formal abdication. One of the paragraphs in this declaration read: -“Supporting the Soviet rule and _accepting the orders of the Council -of People’s Commissaries_, the Constituent Assembly acknowledges its -duty to outline a form for the reorganization of society.” When the -Constituent Assembly, which represented more than thirty-six million -votes, declined to adopt this declaration, the Bolsheviki withdrew and -later, by force of arms, dispersed the Assembly. It was subsequently -promised that arrangements for the election of a new Constituent -Assembly would be made, but, as all the world knows, _no such elections -have been held to this time_. - -At the Congress of the Bolshevist Party--now Communist Party--held -in February, 1918, Lenin set forth a brand-new set of principles for -adoption as a program. He declared that the transition to Socialism -necessarily presupposes that there can be “no liberty and democracy -for all, but only for the exploited working-classes, for the sake of -their liberation from exploitation”; that it requires “the automatic -exclusion of the exploiting classes, and of the rich representatives of -the petty bourgeoisie” and “the abolition of parliamentary government.” -On the basis of these principles the Constitution of the Russian -Socialist Federated Soviet Republic was developed. - -To say that we are not yet in a position to judge such a record as -this is an insult to the intelligence. A century hence the record will -stand precisely as it is and the base treachery and duplicity of the -Bolsheviki will be neither more nor less obvious. The betrayal of the -Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviki constitutes one of the blackest -crimes in the history of politics and is incapable of defense by any -honest democrat. It is only necessary to imagine a constitutional -convention representing the free choice of the electorate in any state -of the Union thus dealt with by a political faction representing only -a small minority of the population to arrive at a just estimate of its -infamous character. As the evidence drawn from official Bolshevist -sources shows, the Bolsheviki have not respected the integrity of the -Soviet any more than they respected that of the Constituent Assembly. -When Soviet elections have gone against them they have not hesitated -to suppress the Soviets. Is there any room for rational doubt what the -verdict of decent liberty-loving and law-respecting men and women ought -to be? The Bolshevist régime was conceived in dishonor and born in -infamy. - -We are as fully competent to judge the Red Terror organized and -maintained by the Bolsheviki as our descendants will be. The civilized -world has long since made up its mind concerning the Reign of Terror in -the French Revolution. Contemporary foreign opinion became the judgment -of posterity. That it did not help the cause of freedom and democracy, -which the Revolution as a whole served, is so plainly apparent and so -universally admitted that it need not be argued. It rendered aid only -to the reaction. When the leaders of the Bolsheviki proclaimed their -intention of copying the methods of the Reign of Terror _it was already -possible to form a just judgment of the spirit of their undertaking_. -The civilized world had no difficulty in judging the conduct of the -Germans in shooting innocent hostages during the war. Neither has -it any difficulty in making up its mind concerning the wholesale -shooting of innocent hostages by the Bolsheviki. From their own records -we have read their admissions that hundreds and thousands of such -hostages--men, women, and children--who were not even accused of crime, -were shot down in cold blood. To say that we lack sufficient evidence -to pronounce judgment upon such crimes is tantamount to a confession of -lacking elemental moral sense. - -It is sometimes said that these things are but the violent birth pangs -which inevitably accompany the birth of a new social order. With such -flimsy evasions it is difficult to have patience. This specious defense -utterly lacks moral and intellectual sincerity. It is a craven coward’s -plea. If we are to use the facts and the language of obstetrics to -illustrate the great Russian tragedy, at least let us be honest and -use them with some regard to the essential realities. In terms of -obstetrics, Russia in 1917 was like unto a woman in the agony of her -travail. From March onward she labored to give birth to her child, the -long-desired democratic freedom. She was carefully watched and tenderly -cared for by the accoucheur, the Provisional Government. At the -critical moment of her delivery a ruthless brute drove the accoucheur -away from her side, brutally maltreated her, strangled her newly born -infant, and in its place substituted a hideous monstrosity. That is the -only true application of the obstetrical simile to the realities of the -Russian tragedy. The sufferings of Russia under the Bolsheviki have -nothing to do with the natural birth pains of the Russian Revolution. -Nobody ever expected the Russian Revolution to be accomplished without -suffering and hardship; revolutions do not come that way. For all the -natural and necessary pains of such a profound event as the birth of -a new social order every friend of Russian freedom was prepared. What -was not foreseen or anticipated by anybody was that when the agony of -parturition was practically at an end, and the birth of the new order -an accomplished fact, such a brutal assault would be made upon the -maternal body of Russia. It is upon this crime, infamous beyond infamy, -that the great jury of civilized public opinion is asked to pronounce -its condemnation. - -There is absolutely no justification for the view that the evils of the -Bolshevist régime, and especially its terroristic features, should be -regarded as the inevitable incidental evil accompaniments of a great -beneficent process. Neither is any useful purpose served by dragging -in the French Revolution. The champions of Bolshevism cite that great -event and assert that everybody now acknowledges that it was a great -liberating force, a notable advance in the evolution of freedom and -democracy, and that nobody now condemns it on account of the Reign of -Terror. - -This argument is the result of a lamentable misreading of history, -where it is not a deliberate and carefully studied deception. No -honest parallel can be drawn between the French Revolution and the -Bolshevist Counter-Revolution. That there are certain similarities -between the revolutionary movement of eighteenth-century France and -that of twentieth-century Russia is fairly obvious. In both cases the -revolutions were directed against corrupt, inefficient, and oppressive -monarchical absolutism. In France in 1789 the peasantry formed about -75 per cent. of the population, the bourgeoisie about 20 per cent., -the proletariat about 3 per cent., and the “privileged” class about -1 per cent. In Russia in 1917 the peasantry amounted to something -over 85 per cent. of the population, the bourgeoisie--the merchants, -manufacturers, tradesmen, and investors--to about 9 per cent., the -proletariat to about 3 per cent., and the nobility and clergy to 1 per -cent. Both in France and in Russia the peasantry was identified with -the struggle against monarchical absolutism, being motivated by great -agrarian demands. - -Moreover, the similarities extend to the moral and psychological -factors involved. In the French Revolution, precisely as in the -Russian, we see a great mass of illiterate peasants led by a few -intellectuals, abstract thinkers wholly without practical experience -in government or economic organization. In both cases we find a naïve -Utopianism, a conviction that a sudden transformation of the whole -social order could be easily effected. What the shibboleths of Karl -Marx are to the Bolsheviki the shibboleths of Rousseau were to many of -the leaders of the French Revolution. And just as in 1789 there was a -pathetic dependence upon _anarchie spontanée_, a conviction, wholly -non-rational and exclusively mystical, that in the chaos and disorder -creative powers latent in the masses would be discovered--itself an -evidence of the purely abstract character of their thinking--so it was -in Russia in 1917. The revolution which overthrew the absolutism of -Nicholas II of Russia repeated many of the characteristic features of -that which overthrew the absolutism of Louis XVI of France. - -Yet the true parallel to the French Revolution is not the Bolshevist -_coup d’état_, but the Revolution of March, 1917. It was not the -Bolshevist revolution that overturned the throne of the Romanovs and -destroyed czarism. That was done by the March Revolution. Whereas the -French Revolution was a revolution against a corrupt and oppressive -monarchy, the Bolshevist revolt was a counter-revolution against -democracy. The Bolsheviki had played only a very insignificant part -in the revolution against czarism. They rose against the Provisional -Government of the triumphant people. This Provisional Government -represented the forces that had overthrown czarism; it was not a -reactionary body of aristocrats and monarchists, but was mainly -composed of Socialists and radicals and was thoroughly devoted to -republicanism and democracy. It had immediately adopted as its -program all that the French Revolution attained, and more: it had -placed suffrage upon an even more generous basis, and dealt much more -thoroughly with the land problem. The Directory put Gracchus Babeuf to -death for advocating the redistribution of the land in 1795, but the -Provisional Government of Russia did not hesitate to declare for that -in 1917 and to create the machinery for carrying it into effect. At the -very moment when it was overthrown by the Bolsheviki it was engaged -in bringing about the election of the Constituent Assembly, the most -democratic body of its kind in history. - -Finally, just as the French Revolution was characterized by a -passionate national consciousness and pride, so that it is customary -to speak of it as the birth of French nationalism, so the Provisional -Government represented a newly awakened Russian nationalism. -Bolshevism, on the contrary, in its early stages, at any rate, -represented the opposite, a violent antagonism to the ideology and -institutions of nationalism. The French in 1793, and throughout -the long struggle, were zealous for France and in her defense; the -Bolsheviki cared nothing for Russia and would sacrifice her upon the -altar of world revolution. In view of all these facts, it is simply -absurd to liken the Bolshevist phase of the Russian Revolution, the -counter-revolutionary phase of it, to the French Revolution. - -There were phases of the French Revolution which can be fairly likened -to the Bolshevist phase of the Russian Revolution. There is a striking -analogy between the Reign of Terror instituted in 1793 and the Red -Terror which began in Russia early in 1918. The Montagnards and the -Bolsheviki are akin; the appeal of the former to the sansculottes -and of the latter to the proletariat are alike. In both cases we -see a brutal and desperate attempt to establish the dictatorial -rule of a class comprising only 3 per cent. of the population. -There is an equally striking analogy between the struggle of the -Girondins against the Jacobins in France and the struggle of the -Socialists-Revolutionists and Social Democrats against the Bolsheviki. -In Russia at the beginning of 1920 the significant term “Thermidorians” -began to be used. To compare Bolshevism to the Jacobin phase of the -French Revolution is quite a different matter from comparing it to the -Revolution as a whole. - -The permanent achievements of the French Revolution afford no -justification for the Reign of Terror. The Revolution succeeded in -spite of the Terror, not because of it, and the success was attended -by evils which might easily have been averted. To condemn the Terror -is not to decry the Revolution. Similarly, the Russian Revolution will -succeed, we may well believe, not because of the Red Terror or of -the Bolsheviki, but in spite of them. The bitterest opponents of the -Bolsheviki are the most stalwart defenders of the Revolution. No appeal -to the history of the French Revolution can extenuate or palliate the -crimes of the Bolsheviki. Perhaps their greatest crime, the one which -history will regard as most heinous, is their wanton disregard of all -the lessons of that great struggle. They could not have entertained -any rational hope of making their terrorism more complete or more -fearful than was the Reign of Terror, which utterly failed to maintain -the power of the proletariat. They could not have been unaware of the -fierce resistance the Terror provoked and evoked, the counter-terror -and the reaction--the Ninth Thermidor, the Directory, the _coup d’état_ -of the Eighteenth Brumaire, the Empire. They could not have been -ignorant of the fact that the Reign of Terror divided and weakened the -revolutionary forces. That they embarked upon their mad and brutal -adventure in the face of the plain lessons of the French Revolution is -the unpardonable crime of the Bolsheviki. - -Despite their copying of the vices of the worst elements in the French -Revolution, the Bolsheviki are most closely connected in their ideals -and their methods with those cruel and adventurous social rebels of -the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose exploits, familiar to -every Russian, are practically unknown to the rest of the world. Upon -every page of the record of the Bolshevist régime there are reminders -of the revolt of Bogdan Khnielnitski (1644-53) and that of Stenka Razin -(1669-71). These cruel and bloodthirsty men, and others of the same -kind who followed them, appealed only to the savage hatred and envy of -the serfs, encouraged them to wanton destruction and frightful terror. -Quite justly does the Zionist organ, _Dos Yiddishce Volk_,[71] say: - -[71] July 11, 1919. - - The slogans of Bolshevist practice are, in fact, the old - Russian slogans with which the Volga bands of Pubachev and - Razin ambushed the merchant wagon-trains and the Boyars. It is - very characteristic that the Central Committee of the Communist - Party has seen fit to unveil, on May 1st, at Moscow, a monument - to the Ataman Stenka Razin, the hero of the Volga robber raids - in the seventeenth century. Razin, indeed, is the legitimate - father of Bolshevist practice. - -Here we may as well give attention to another appeal which the -Bolsheviki and their champions make to French history. They are fond -of citing the Paris Commune of 1871, and claiming it as the model for -their tactics. This claim, which is thoroughly dishonest, has often -been made by Lenin himself. In the “Theses on Bourgeois and Proletarian -Democracies,” published in _Pravda_, March 8, 1919, Lenin says: -“Precisely at the present moment when the Soviet movement, covering -the whole world, continues the work of the Paris Commune before the -eyes of the whole world, the traitors to Socialism forget concrete -experiences and the concrete lessons of the Paris Commune, repeating -the old bourgeois rubbish about ‘democracy in general.’ The Commune -was not a parliamentary institution.” On many occasions Lenin has made -similar references to the Commune of 1871. The official Bolshevist -press constantly indulges in such statements. The _Krasnaya Gazeta_, -for example, published an article on the subject on December 17, 1919, -parrot-like repeating Lenin’s sophistries. - -The simple facts are that (1) the Paris Commune had nothing to do -with Communism or any other social theory. It was an intensely -nationalistic movement, inspired by resentment of a peace which it -regarded as dangerous and humiliating to France. It was a movement for -local independence; (2) it was not a class movement, but embraced the -bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat; (3) it _was_ a “parliamentary -institution,” based upon universal, equal suffrage; (4) the first act -of the revolutionists in 1871 was to appeal to the will of the people, -through popular elections, in which all parties were free and voting -was, as stated, based on equal and universal suffrage; (5) within -two weeks the elections were held, with the result that sixty-five -revolutionists were chosen as against twenty-one elected by the -opposition parties. The opposition included six radical Republicans of -the Gambetta school and fifteen reactionaries of various shades. In -the majority were representatives of every Socialist group and faction; -(6) the Communards never attempted to set up a minority dictatorship, -but remained true to the principles of democracy. This Karl Marx -himself emphasized in his _The Civil War in France_. Bolshevist -“history” is as grotesque as Bolshevist economics! No matter what we -may think of the Commune of 1871, it cannot justly be compared to the -cruel betrayal of Russian democracy by the Bolsheviki. The Communards -were democrats in the fullest sense of the term and their brief rule -had the sanction of a popular majority. - -The Bolsheviki and their defenders are never tired of contending that -most of the sufferings of the Russian people during the Bolshevist -régime have been due, not to those responsible for that régime, but to -the “blockade” imposed by the Allies upon Russian trade with foreign -nations. Perhaps no single argument has won so much sympathy from -sentimental and ill-informed people as this. Yet the falsity of the -contention has been demonstrated many times, even by those Russians -opposed to the blockade. A brief summary of the salient facts will show -that this claim has been used as a peg upon which to hang a propaganda -remarkable for its insincerity and its trickery. - -The blockade was declared in November, 1917, shortly after the -Bolsheviki seized the machinery of government. It was already quite -apparent that they would make a separate peace with Germany, and that -Germany would be the dictator of the peace. There was great danger -that supplies furnished to Russia under these conditions would be -used by the Germans. As a policy, therefore, the blockade was dictated -by military considerations of the highest importance and was directed -against the Central Empires, and not primarily against the Bolsheviki. -It was, of course, inevitable that it would inflict hardship upon -Russia, our former ally, and not merely upon the Bolsheviki. So long as -the Central Empires were in a position to carry on the fight, however, -and especially after the Brest-Litovsk Peace gave Germany such a -command over the life of Russia, the maintenance of the blockade seemed -to be of the highest importance from a military point of view. That -it entailed hardship and suffering upon people who were our friends -was one of the numerous tragedies of the war, not more terrible, -perhaps--except as regards the number of people affected--than many of -the measures taken in those parts of France occupied by the enemy or in -the fighting-zone. - -After the armistice and the cessation of actual fighting the question -at once took on a new aspect. Many persons--the present writer among -the number--believed and urged that the blockade should then be lifted -entirely. The issue was blurred, however, by the fact that while this -would certainly give aid to the Bolsheviki there was no assurance that -it would in any degree benefit the people in Russia who were opposed -to them. The discrimination in favor of the Bolsheviki practised in -the distribution of food and everything else was responsible for -this. It must be borne in mind that the blockade did not cut off -from Russia any important source of food-supply. Russia had never -depended upon other nations for staple foods. On the contrary, she -was a food-exporting country. She practically fed the greater part of -western Europe. Cutting off her _imports_ did not lessen the grain she -had; cutting off her _exports_ certainly had the effect of _increasing_ -the stores available for home consumption. All this is as plain as the -proverbial pikestaff. - -The starvation of the Russian people was not caused by the blockade, -which did not lessen the amount of staple foods available, but, on the -contrary, increased it. The real causes were these: the breakdown of -the transportation system, which made it impossible to transport the -grain to the great centers of population; the stupid policy of the -Bolsheviki toward the peasants and the warfare consequent thereon; -the demoralization of industry and the resulting inability to give -the peasants manufactured goods in exchange for their grain. It may -be objected, in reply to this statement, that but for the blockade -it would have been possible to import railway equipment, industrial -machinery, and so on, and that therefore the blockade was an indirect -cause of food shortage. The fallacy in this argument is transparent: as -to the industrial machinery, Soviet Russia had, and according to Rykov -still has, much more than could be used. As regards large importations -of manufactured goods and railway equipment, what would have been -exported in exchange for such imports? The available stocks of raw -materials, especially flax and hides, were exceedingly small and would -have exchanged for very little. We have the authority of Rykov for -this statement also. - -What, then, was there available for export? The answer is--_food -grains_! In almost every statement issued by the Bolsheviki in their -propaganda against the blockade wheat figured as the most important -available exportable commodity. The question arises, therefore, _how -could the export of wheat from Russia help to feed her starving -people_? If there was wheat for export, hunger was surely an absurdity! -Victor Kopp, representative of the Soviet Government in Berlin, in a -special interview published in the London _Daily Chronicle_, February -28, 1920, made this quite clear, pointing out that the hope that Russia -would be able to send food grains to central Europe in exchange for -manufactured goods was entirely unfounded, because Russia sorely needed -all her foodstuffs of every kind. Krassin, head of the department of -Trade and Commerce in the Soviet Government, told Mr. Copping--that -most useful of phonographs!--that the shattered condition of -transportation “leaves us temporarily unable to get adequate supplies -of food for our own cities, and puts entirely out of the question any -possibility, at present, of assembling goods at our ports for sending -abroad.”[72] As a matter of fact, the raising of the blockade, if, and -in so far as, it led to an export of wheat and other food grains in -return for manufactured goods, _would have increased the hunger and -underfeeding of the Russian people_. - -[72] _Daily Chronicle_, London, February 26, 1920. - -The Bolsheviki knew this quite well and did not want the blockade -raised. They realized that the propaganda in other countries against -the blockade was an enormous asset to them, whereas removal of the -blockade would reveal their weakness. Support is given to this -contention by the following passage from Rykov’s report in January of -this year: - - It is the greatest fallacy to imagine that the lifting of - the blockade or conclusion of peace is able in any degree to - solve our raw-material crisis. _On the contrary, the lifting - of the blockade and conclusion of peace, if such should take - place, will mean an increased demand for raw materials_, as - these are the only articles which Russia can furnish to Europe - and exchange for European commodities. The supplies of flax - on hand are sufficient for a period of from eight months to a - year. _But we shall not be able to export large quantities of - flax abroad_, and the catastrophic decline in flax production - as compared with 1919 raises the question whether the flax - industry shall not experience in 1920 a flax shortage similar - to the one experienced by the textile industry in cotton. - -In the spring of 1919 Mr. Alexander Berkenheim, one of the managers -of the “Centrosoyuz,” with other well-known Russian co-operators, -represented to the British Government that the blockade of Russia was -inflicting hardship and famine only, or at least mainly, upon the -innocent civil population. They argued that if the blockade were lifted -the Bolsheviki would see to the feeding of the general population. -Berkenheim and his friends applied for permission for their association -to send a steamer to Odessa laden with foodstuffs, medicines, and -other supplies, to be distributed exclusively among children and sick -and convalescing civilians. Backed by influential British supporters, -Berkenheim and his friends gave guaranties that not a single pound of -such supplies would reach the Red Army. All was to be distributed by -the co-operatives without any interference by the authorities. The -Bolshevist Government gave a similar guaranty, stated in very definite -and unequivocal terms. Accordingly, the British Government consented -to allow the steamer to sail, and in June, 1919, the steamer, with a -cargo of tea, coffee, cocoa, and rice, consigned to the “Centrosoyuz,” -arrived at Odessa. But no sooner had the steamer entered the port than -the whole cargo was requisitioned by the Soviet authorities and handed -over to the organization supplying the Red Army. - -This treachery was the principal cause of the continuance of the -blockade. That it was intended to have precisely that effect is not -improbable. On January 16, 1920, the Supreme Council of the League -of Nations, at its first meeting, upon the proposal of the British -Government, decided to so greatly modify the blockade as to amount -to its practical abandonment. Trade was to be opened up with Russia -through the co-operatives, it was announced. The co-operatives were to -act as importing and exporting agencies, receiving clothing, machinery, -medicines, railroad equipment, and so on, and exporting the “surplus” -grain, flax, hides, and so on, in return. - -Immediately after that arrangement was announced the Bolsheviki adopted -an entirely new attitude. They began to raise hitherto unheard-of -objections. They could not permit trade with the co-operatives on -the conditions laid down; the co-operatives were not independent -organizations, but a part of the Soviet state machinery; trade must -accompany recognition of the Soviet Government, and so on. Thus the -“diplomatic” arguments went. In Russia itself the leaders took the -position expressed by Rykov in the speech already quoted. - -To sum up: the blockade was a natural military measure of precaution, -rendered necessary by the actions of the Bolsheviki; it was directed -primarily against the Germans; it was not at any time a primary -cause of the food shortage in Russia. When efforts were made to -ameliorate the condition of the civil population by raising the -blockade the Bolsheviki treacherously defeated such efforts. The -prolonged continuation of the blockade was mainly due to the policy of -obstruction pursued by the Bolsheviki. No large volume of trade could -have been had with Russia at any time during the Bolshevist régime. -The Bolsheviki themselves did not want the blockade removed, and -finally confessed that such removal would not help them. Certainly, the -Allies and the United States made many mistakes in connection with the -blockade; but, when that has been fully admitted, and when all that can -fairly be said against that policy has been said, it remains the fact -that the Bolsheviki were responsible for creating the conditions which -made the blockade necessary and inevitable, and that their treachery -forced its continuation long after the Allies had shown themselves -ready and even anxious to abandon it. At every step of their fatal -progress in the devastation and spoliation of Russia the treachery of -the Bolsheviki, their entire lack of honor and good faith, appear. - -Herein lies the real reason why no civilized government can with safety -to its own institutions--to say nothing of regard for its own dignity -and honor--enter into any covenant with the Bolshevist Government of -Russia or hold official relations with it. At the root of Bolshevism -lies a negation of everything of fundamental importance to the friendly -and co-operative relations of governments and peoples. When the leaders -of a government that is set up and maintained by brute force, and -does not, therefore, have behind it the sanction of the will of its -citizens, being subject to no control other than its own ambitions, -declare that they will sign agreements with foreign nations without -feeling in the slightest degree obligated by such agreements, they -outlaw themselves and their government. - -Not only have the Bolsheviki boasted that this was their attitude, but -they have gone farther. Their responsible leaders and spokesmen--Lenin, -Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, and others--have openly declared -that they are determined to use any and all means to bring about -revolts in all other civilized countries, to upset their governments -and institute Bolshevist rule. They have declared that only by such a -universal spread of its rule can Bolshevism be maintained in Russia. -“Soviet Russia by its very existence is a ferment and a propagator of -the inevitable world revolution,” wrote Radek in Maximilian Harden’s -_Zukunft_, in February, 1920. Referring to the Spartacist uprisings in -Germany, he said: “You are afraid of Bolshevist propaganda penetrating -into Germany with other goods. You recall an experiment already -carried out by Germany. _Yes, I glory in the results of our work._” -“One does not demand a patent for immortality from the man to whom -one sells a suit of underclothing ... and our only concern is trade,” -said Radek in the same article. When Radek wrote that he knew that he -was lying. He knew that, far from being their “only concern,” trade -was the least of the concerns of the Bolsheviki. Upon this point the -evidence leaves no room for doubt. In _The Program of the Communist -Party_, Chapter XIX, Bucharin says, “The program of the Communist -Party is not alone a program of liberating the proletariat of one -country; it is the program of liberating the proletariat of the world.” -Lenin wrote in _The Chief Tasks of Our Times_: “Only a madman can -imagine that the task of overthrowing international imperialism can -be fulfilled by Russians alone. While in the west the revolution is -maturing and is making appreciable progress, the task before us is as -follows: We who in spite of our weakness are in the forefront must do -all in our power to retain the occupied positions.... We must strain -every nerve in order to remain in power as long as possible, _so as -to give time for a development of the western revolution_, which is -growing much more slowly than we expected and wished.” Zinoviev wrote -in _Pravda_, November 7, 1919, that “in a year, in two years, the -Communist International will rule the world.” Kalinin, president of -the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Power, in -his New-Year’s greeting for 1920, published in the _Krasnaya Gazeta_, -January 1, 1920, declared that, “Western European brothers in the -coming year should overthrow the rule of their capitalists and should -join with the Russian proletariat and establish the single authority of -the Soviets through the entire world under the protection of the Third -International.” Many other statements of a similar character could -be quoted to show that the Russian Bolsheviki’s chief concern is not -trade, but world-wide revolt on Bolshevist lines. - -That the Bolsheviki would use the privileges and immunities accorded -to diplomatic representatives to foster Bolshevist agitation and -revolt is made manifest by their utterances and their performances -alike. “We have no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of any -country,” said Kopp, in the interview already quoted, and the Soviet -Government has repeatedly stated its willingness to give assurances -of non-interference with the political or economic system of other -countries. But of what use are assurances from men who boast that they -are willing to sign agreements without the slightest intention of -being bound by them? Take, for example, Trotsky’s statement, published -at Petrograd, in February, 1918: “If, in awaiting the imminent -proletarian flood in Europe, Russia should be compelled to conclude -peace with the present-day governments of the Central Powers, it would -be a provisional, temporary, and transitory peace, with the revision -of which the European Revolution will have to concern itself in the -first instance. _Our whole policy is built upon the expectation of -this revolution._” Precisely the same attitude toward the Allies was -more bluntly expressed by Zinoviev on February 2, 1919, regarding the -proposed Prinkipo Conference: “We are willing to sign an unfavorable -peace with the Allies.... _It would only mean that we should put no -trust whatever in the bit of paper we should sign._ We should use the -breathing-space so obtained in order to gather our strength in order -that the mere continued existence of our government would keep up the -world-wide propaganda which Soviet Russia has been carrying on for more -than a year.” Of the Third International, so closely allied with the -Soviet Government, Zinoviev is reported by Mr. Lincoln Eyre as saying: -“Our propaganda system is as strong and as far-reaching as ever. The -Third International is primarily an instrument of revolution. This work -will be continued, no matter what happens, legally or illegally. The -Soviet Government may pledge itself to refrain from propaganda abroad, -but the Third International, never.”[73] - -[73] New York _World_, February 26, 1920. - -Finally, there is the speech of Lenin before the Council of the -People’s Commissaries during the negotiations upon the ill-starred -Prinkipo Conference proposal, in which he said: - - The successful development of the Bolshevist doctrine - throughout the world can only be effected by means of periods - of rest during which we may recuperate and gather new strength - for further exertions. I have never hesitated to come to - terms with bourgeois governments, when by so doing I thought I - could weaken the bourgeoisie. It is sound strategy in war to - postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy - renders the delivery of a mortal blow possible. This was the - policy we adopted toward the German Empire, and it has proved - successful. _The time has now come for us to conclude a second - Brest-Litovsk_, this time with the Entente. We must make peace - not only with the Entente, but also with Poland, Lithuania, and - the Ukraine, and all the other forces which are opposing us in - Russia. _We must be prepared to make every concession, promise, - and sacrifice in order to entice our foes into the conclusion - of this peace._ We shall know that we have but concluded a - truce permitting us to complete our preparations for a decisive - onslaught which will assure our triumph. - -In view of these utterances, and scores of others like them, of -what value are the “assurances of non-interference”--or any other -assurances--offered by Chicherine, Lenin, and the rest? But we are not -confined to mere utterances: there are deeds aplenty which fully bear -out the inferences we have from the words of the Bolshevist leaders. -In a London court, before Mr. Justice Neville, it was brought out -that the Bolshevist envoy, Litvinov, had been guilty of using his -position to promote revolutionary agitation. Not only had Litvinov -committed a breach of agreement, said Mr. Justice Neville, but he -had been guilty of a breach of public law. A circular letter to the -British trades-unions was read by the justice, containing these words: -“_Hence it is that the Russian revolutionaries are summoning the -proletarians of all countries to a revolutionary fight against their -government._” Even worse was the case of the Bolshevist ambassador, -Joffe, who was expelled from Berlin for using his diplomatic position -to wage a propaganda for the overthrow of the German Government, and -this notwithstanding the fact that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in its -second article specifically forbade “any agitation against the state -and military institutions of Germany.” - -In an official note to the German Foreign Office, published in -_Izvestia_, December 26, 1918, Chicherine boasted that millions of -rubles had been sent to Berlin for the purpose of revolutionary -propaganda. The duplicity revealed by this note was quite -characteristic of the Bolshevist régime and in keeping with the record -of Chicherine himself in his relations with the British Government -during his stay in London, where he acted as one of the representatives -of the Russians in London who were seeking repatriation. _Izvestia_, -on January 1, 1919, contained an article by Joffe on “Revolutionary -Methods,” in which he said: “Having accepted this forcibly imposed -treaty [Brest-Litovsk], revolutionary Russia of course had to accept -its second article, which forbade ‘any agitation against the state and -military institutions of Germany.’ But both the Russian Government as a -whole and its accredited representative in Berlin _never concealed the -fact that they were not observing this article and did not intend to do -so_.” As a matter of fact, the agitation against the German Government -by the Bolsheviki continued even after the so-called supplementary -treaties of Brest-Litovsk, dated August 27, 1918, which, as pointed out -by the United States Department of State, were not signed under duress, -as was the original treaty, but were actively sought for and gladly -signed by the Bolsheviki. - -In view of these indisputable facts, is there any honest and worthy -reason for suspending judgment upon the character of the Soviet -Government? Surely it must be plainly evident to every candid and -dispassionate mind that Bolshevism is practically a negation of -every principle of honor and good faith essential to friendly and -co-operative relations among governments in modern civilization. The -Bolsheviki have outlawed themselves and placed themselves outside the -pale of the community of nations. - -The merits of Sovietism as a method of government do not here and -now concern us. But we are entitled to demand that those who urge us -to adopt it furnish some evidence of its superiority in practice. Up -to the present time, no such evidence has been offered by those who -advocate the change; on the other hand, all the available evidence -tends to show that Soviet government, far from being superior to our -own, is markedly inferior to it. We are entitled, surely, to call -attention to the fact that, so far as it has been tried in Russia, -Sovietism has resulted in an enormous increase in bureaucracy; that it -has not done away with corruption and favoritism in government; that -it has shown itself to be capable of every abuse of which other forms -of government, whether despotic, oligarchic, or democratic, have been -capable. It has not given Russia a government one whit more humane or -just, one whit less oppressive or corrupt than czarism. It seems to be -inherently bureaucratic and therefore inefficient. Be that how it may, -it is impossible to deny that it has failed and failed utterly. Even -the Bolsheviki, whose sole excuse for their assault upon the rapidly -evolving democracy of Russia was their faith in the superiority of -Sovietism over parliamentary government, have found it necessary to -abandon it, not only in government, but in industry and in military -organization. - -In industry Sovietism, so far as it has been tried in Russia, has -shown itself to be markedly inferior to the methods of industrial -organization common to the great industrial nations, and the so-called -Soviet Government itself, which is in reality an oligarchy, has had -to abandon it and to revert to the essential principles and methods -of capitalist industry. This is not the charge of a hostile critic: -it is the confession of Lenin, of Trotsky, of Krassin, of Rykov, and -practically every acknowledged Bolshevist authority. We do not say that -the Soviet idea contains nothing of good; we do not deny that, under -a democratic government, Soviets might have aided, and may yet aid, -to democratize Russian industrial life. What we do say is that the -Bolsheviki have failed to make them of the slightest service to the -Russian people; that Bolshevism has completely failed to organize the -industrial life of Russia, either on Soviet lines or any other, and has -had to revert to capitalism and to call upon the capitalists of other -lands to come and rescue them from utter destruction. After ruthlessly -exterminating their own capitalists, they have been compelled to offer -to give foreign capitalists, in the shape of vast economic concessions, -a mortgage upon the great heritage of future generations of the Russian -people and the right to exploit their toil. - -So, too, with the military organization of the country: Starting out -with Soviet management in the army, the present rulers of Russia soon -discovered that the system would not work. As early as January, 1918, -Krylenko, Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the Bolsheviki, -reported to the Central Executive Committee that the soldiers’ -committees were “the only remnant of the army.” In May, 1919, Trotsky -was preaching the necessity of “respect for military science” and of “a -genuine army, properly organized and firmly ruled by a single hand.” -Conscription was introduced, not by law enacted by responsible elected -representatives of the people, but by decree. It was enforced with -a brutality and savagery unknown to this age in any other country. -Just as in industry the “bourgeois specialists” were brought back -and compelled to work under espionage and duress, so the officers of -the old imperial army were brought back and held to their tasks by -terror, their wives and children and other relatives being held as -hostages for their conduct. _Izvestia_ published, September 18, 1918, -Trotsky’s famous Order No. 903, which read: “Seeing the increasing -number of deserters, especially among the commanders, orders are -issued to _arrest as hostages_ all the members of the family one can -lay hands on: father, mother, brother, sister, wife, and children.” -Another order issued by Trotsky in the summer of 1919 said, “In case an -officer goes over to the enemy, _his family should be made to feel the -consequences of his betrayal_.” - -_Pravda_[74] published an article giving an account of the formation of -a Red cavalry regiment. From that article we learn that every officer -mobilized in the Red Army had to sign the following statement: - -[74] No. 11, 1919. - - I have received due notice that in the event of my being guilty - of treason or betrayal in regard to the Soviet Government, - my nearest relatives [names given] residing at [full address - given] will be responsible for me. - -What this meant is known from the many news items in the Bolshevist -press relating to the arrest, imprisonment, and even shooting of -the relatives of deserters. To cite only one example: the _Krasnaya -Gazeta_, November 4, 1919, published a “preliminary list” of nine -deserting Red Army officers whose relatives--including mothers, -fathers, sisters, brothers, and wives--had been arrested. _Izvestia_ -printed a list of deserters’ relatives condemned to be shot, _including -children fourteen and sixteen years old_. - -At the Joint Conference on National Economy in Moscow, January, -1920, Lenin summed up the experience of the Bolsheviki with Soviet -direction of the army, saying, “In the organization of the army we -have passed from the principle of commanding by committee to the -direct command of the chiefs. We must do the same in the organization -of government and industry.” And again, “The experience of our army -shows us that primitive organization based on the collectivist -principle becomes transformed into an administration based upon the -principle of individual power.” In the _Program of the Communists_ we -read that “The demand that the military command should be elective -... has no significance with reference to the Red Army, composed of -class-conscious workmen and peasants.” In a pamphlet issued by the -All-Russian Central Executive Committee in the latter part of 1918 we -read that “Regimental Committees, acting as administrative organs, -cannot exist in the Soviet Army.” These quotations amply prove that -Sovietism in the army was found undesirable and unworkable by the -Bolsheviki themselves and by them abandoned. - -We remember the glowing promises with which the first Red Army was -launched: volunteers considering it an honor to be permitted to fight -for the Communist Utopia; the “collective self-discipline”; the -direction of the whole military organization by soldiers’ committees, -and all the rest of the wild vision. We compare it with the brutal -reality, and the contrast between the hope and the reality is the -measure of the ghastly failure of Bolshevism. The military system of -the Bolsheviki is infinitely more brutal than the old Prussian system -was. The Red Army is an army of slaves driven by terrorized slaves. -Sovietism proved a fool’s fantasy. The old military discipline came -back harsher than ever; the death penalty was restored; conscription -and mobilization at the point of the bayonet were carried out with a -ferocity never equaled in any modern nation, not even in Russia under -Czar Nicholas II. Was there ever a more complete failure? - -The mass of evidence we have cited from Bolshevist authorities warrants -the judgment that Sovietism, as exemplified during the Bolshevist -régime, in every department of the national life, is at best an utterly -impracticable Utopian scheme. Certainly every fair-minded person of -normal intelligence must agree that there is nothing in the record of -the experiment--a record, be it remembered, made by the Bolsheviki -themselves--to rouse enthusiastic hopes or to justify any civilized -nation in throwing aside the existing machinery of government and -industrial organization and immediately substituting Sovietism therefor. - -As for Bolshevism, in contradistinction from Sovietism, there can be -no hesitation in reaching a verdict upon the evidence supplied by its -own accredited spokesmen and official records. We have not massed the -isolated crimes of individuals and mobs and presented the result as a -picture of Russian life. That would be as unjust as to list all the -accounts of race riots, lynchings, and murders in this country and -offering the list as a fair picture of American life. Ignoring these -things completely, we have taken the laws and decrees of Soviet Russia; -its characteristic institutions; the things done by its government; the -writings and speeches of its statesmen and recognized interpreters; -the cold figures of its own reports of industry and agriculture. The -result is a picture of Bolshevism, self-drawn, more ugly and repellent -than the most malicious imagination could have drawn. - -On the other side there is no single worthy creative achievement to -be recorded. There are almost innumerable “decrees,” some of them -attractive enough, but there are no actual achievements of merit to be -credited to the Bolsheviki. Even in the matter of education, concerning -which we have heard so much, there is not a scintilla of evidence that -will bear examination which tends to show that they have actually -accomplished anything which Russia will gratefully remember or cherish -in the days that are to come. The much-vaunted “Proletcult” of Soviet -Russia is in practice little more than a means of providing jobs for -Communists. The Bolshevist publicist, Mizkevich, made this charge in -_Izvestia_, March 22, 1919. “The Proletcult is using up our not very -numerous forces, and spending public money, which it gets from ... the -Commissariat for Public Instruction, on the same work that is done by -the Public Instruction departments ... opposes its own work for the -creation of proletarian culture to the same work of the agents of the -proletarian authority, and thus creates confusion in the minds of the -proletarian mass.” - -The Bolsheviki have published decrees and articles on education -with great freedom, but they have done little else except harm. -They have weakened the great universities and rudely interrupted -the development of the great movement to improve and extend popular -education initiated shortly before the Revolution by Count Ignatiev, -the best friend of popular education that ever held office in Russia, -compared to whom Lunacharsky is a cretin. They have imposed upon the -universities and schools the bureaucratic rule of men most of whom know -nothing of university requirements, are at best poorly educated and -sometimes even illiterate. - -Promising peace and freedom from militarism, they betrayed their -Allies and played the game of their foes; they brought new wars upon -the already war-weary nation and imposed upon it a militarism more -brutal than the old. Promising freedom, they have developed a tyranny -more brutal and oppressive than that of the Romanovs. Promising humane -and just government, they instituted the _Chresvychaikas_ and a vast, -corrupt bureaucracy. Promising to so organize production that there -should be plenty for all and poverty for none, they ruined industrial -production, decreased agricultural production to a perilously low level -and so that famine reigned in a land of plentiful resources, human -and material. Promising to make the workers masters of the machines, -free citizens in a great industrial democracy, they have destroyed the -machines, forced the workers to take the places of beasts of burden, -and made them bond-slaves. - -_The evidence is in: let the jury render its verdict._ - - -FINIS - - - - -DOCUMENTS - - - - -I - -DECREE REGARDING GRAIN CONTROL - - -The disastrous undermining of the country’s food-supply, the serious -heritage of the four years’ war, continues to extend more and more, and -to be more and more acute. While the consuming provincial governments -are starving, in the producing governments there are at the present -moment, as before, large reserves of grain of the harvests of 1916 and -1917 not yet even threshed. This grain is in the hands of tight-fisted -village dealers and profiteers, of the village bourgeoisie. Well fed -and well provided for, having accumulated enormous sums of money -obtained during the years of war, the village bourgeoisie remains -stubbornly deaf and indifferent to the wailings of starving workmen and -peasant poverty, and does not bring the grain to the collecting-points. -The grain is held with the hope of compelling the government to raise -repeatedly the prices of grain, at the same time that the holders sell -their grain at home at fabulous prices to grain speculators. - -An end must be put to this obstinacy of the greedy village -grain-profiteers. The food experience of former years showed that -the breaking of fixed prices and the denial of grain monopoly, while -lessening the possibility of feasting for our group of capitalists, -would make bread completely inaccessible to our many millions of -workmen and would subject them to inevitable death from starvation. - -The answer to the violence of grain-owners toward the starving poor -must be violence toward the bourgeoisie. - -Not a pood should remain in the hands of those holding the grain, -except the quantity needed for sowing the fields and provisioning their -families until the new harvest. - -This policy must be put into force at once, especially since the German -occupation of the Ukraine compels us to get along with grain resources -which will hardly suffice for sowing and curtailed use. - -Having considered the situation thus created, and taking into account -that only with the most rigid calculation and equal distribution of all -grain reserves can Russia pass through the food crisis, the Central -Executive Committee of All Russia has decreed: - -1. Confirming the fixity of the grain monopoly and fixed prices, and -also the necessity of a merciless struggle with grain speculators, to -compel each grain-owner to declare the surplus above what is needed to -sow the fields and for personal use, according to established normal -quantities, until the new harvest, and to surrender the same within -a week after the publication of this decision in each village. The -order of these declarations is to be determined by the People’s Food -Commissioner through the local food organizations. - -2. To call upon workmen and poor peasants to unite at once for a -merciless struggle with grain-hoarders. - -3. To declare all those who have a surplus of grain and who do not -bring it to the collecting-points, and likewise those who waste grain -reserves on illicit distillation of alcohol and do not bring them to -the collecting-point, enemies of the people; to turn them over to the -Revolutionary Tribunal, imprison them for not less than ten years, -confiscate their entire property, and drive them out forever from -the communes; while the distillers are, besides, to be condemned to -compulsory communal work. - -In case an excess of grain which was not declared for surrender, in -compliance with Article I, is found in the possession of any one -the grain is to be taken away from him without pay, while the sum, -according to fixed prices, due for the undeclared surpluses is to be -paid, one-half to the person who points out the concealed surpluses, -after they have been placed at the collecting-points, and the other -half to the village commune. Declarations concerning the concealed -surpluses are made by the local food organizations. - -Further, taking into consideration that the struggle with the food -crisis demands the application of quick and decisive measures, that -the more fruitful realization of these measures demands in its turn -the centralization of all orders dealing with the food question in one -organization, and that this organization appears to be the People’s -Food Commissioner, the Central Executive Committee of All Russia hereby -orders, for the more successful struggle with the food crisis, that the -People’s Food Commissioner be given the following powers: - -1. To publish obligatory regulations regarding the food situation, -exceeding the usual limits of the People’s Food Commissioner’s -competence. - -2. To abrogate the orders of local food bodies and other organizations -contravening the plans and actions of the People’s Commissioner. - -3. To demand from institutions and organizations of all departments the -carrying out of the regulations of the People’s Food Commissioner in -connection with the food situation without evasions and at once. - -4. To use the armed forces in case resistance is shown to the removal -of food grains or other food products. - -5. To dissolve or reorganize the food agencies in places where they -might resist the orders of the People’s Commissioner. - -6. To discharge, transfer, turn over to the Revolutionary Tribunal, or -subject to arrest officials and employees of all departments and public -organizations in case of interference with the orders of the People’s -Commissioner. - -7. To transfer the present powers, in addition to the right to subject -to arrest, above, to other persons and institutions in various places, -with the approval of the Council of the People’s Commissioners. - -8. All understandings of the People’s Commissioner, related in -character to the Department of Ways of Communication and the -Supreme Council of National Economy, are to be carried through upon -consultation with the corresponding departments. - -9. The regulations and orders of the People’s Commissioner, issued in -accordance with the present powers, are verified by his college, which -has the right, without suspending their operation, of referring them to -the Council of Public Commissioners. - -10. The present decree becomes effective from the date of its signature -and is to be put into operation by telegraph. - - _Published May 14, 1918._ - - - - -II - -REGULATION CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS - - -_Part I_ - -1. The Central Administration of Nationalized Undertakings, of whatever -branch of industry, assigns for each large nationalized undertaking -technical and administrative directors, in whose hands are placed the -actual administration and direction of the entire activity of the -undertaking. They are responsible to the Central Administration and the -Commissioner appointed by it. - -2. The technical director appoints technical employees and gives all -orders regarding the technical administration of the undertaking. The -factory committee may, however, complain regarding these appointments -and orders to the Commissioner of the Central Administration, and -then to the Central Administration itself; but only the Commissioner -and Central Administration may stop the appointments and order of the -technical director. - -3. In connection with the Administrative Director there is an Economic -Administrative Council, consisting of delegates from laborers, -employees, and engineers of the undertaking. The Council examines the -estimates of the undertaking, the plan of its works, the rules of -internal distribution, complaints, the material and moral conditions -of the work and life of the workmen and employees, and likewise all -questions regarding the progress of the undertaking. - -4. On questions of a technical character relating to the enterprise -the Council has only a consultative voice, but on other questions a -decisive voice, on condition, however, that the Administrative Director -appointed by the Central Administration has the right to appeal -from the orders of the Council to the Commissioner of the Central -Administration. - -5. The duty of acting upon decisions of the Economic Administrative -Council belongs to the Administrative Director. - -6. The Council of the enterprise has the right to make representation -to the Central Administration regarding a change of the directors of -the enterprise, and to present its own candidates. - -7. Depending on the size and importance of the enterprise, the Central -Administration may appoint several technical and administrative -directors. - -8. The composition of the Economic Administrative Council of the -enterprise consists of (_a_) a representative of the workmen of the -undertaking; (_b_) a representative of the other employees; (_c_) a -representative of the highest technical and commercial personnel; -(_d_) the directors of the undertaking, appointed by the Central -Administration; (_e_) representatives of the local or regional council -of professional unions, of the people’s economic council, of the -council of workmen’s deputies, and to the professional council of -that branch of industry to which the given enterprise belongs; (_f_) -a representative of the workmen’s co-operative council; and (_g_) a -representative of the Soviet of peasants’ deputies of the corresponding -region. - -9. In the composition of the Economic Administrative Council of -the enterprise, representatives of workmen and other employees, as -mentioned in points (_a_) and (_b_) of Article VIII, may furnish only -half of the number of members. - -10. The workmen’s control of nationalized undertakings is realized by -leaving all declarations and orders of the factory committee, or of the -controlling commission, to the judgment and decision of the Economic -Administrative Council of the enterprise. - -11. The workmen, employees, and highest technical and commercial -personnel of nationalized undertakings are in duty bound before the -Russian Soviet Republic to observe industrial discipline and to -carry out conscientiously and accurately the work assigned to them. -To the Economic Administrative Council are given judicial rights, -including that of dismissal without notice for longer or shorter -periods, together with the declaration of a boycott for non-proletariat -recognition of their rights and duties. - -12. In the case of those industrial branches for which Central -Administrations have not yet been formed, all their rights are vested -in provincial councils of the national economy, and in corresponding -industrial sections of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. - -13. The estimates and plan of work of a nationalized undertaking must -be presented by its Economic Administrative Council to the Central -Administration of a given industrial branch at least as often as once -in three months, through the provincial organizations, where such have -been established. - -14. The management of nationalized undertakings, where such management -has heretofore been organized on other principles because of the -absence of a general plan and general orders for the whole of Russia, -must now be reorganized, in accordance with the present regulation, -within the next three months (_i.e._, by the end of May, new style). - -15. For the consideration of the declarations of the Economic -Administrative Council concerning the activity of the directors of -the undertaking at the Central Administration of a given branch of -industry, a special section is established, composed one-third of -representatives of general governmental, political, and economic -institutions of the proletariat, one-third of representatives of -workmen and other employees of the given industrial branch, and -one-third of representatives of the directing, technical, and -commercial personnel and its professional organizations. - -16. The present order must be posted on the premises of each -nationalized undertaking. - - _Note._--Small nationalized enterprises are managed on similar - principles, with the proviso that the duties of technical and - administrative directors may be combined in one person, and - the numerical strength of the Economic Administrative Council - may be cut down by the omission of representatives of one or - another institution or organization. - - -_Part II_ - -17. A Central Administration [Principal Committee] for each -nationalized branch of industry is to be established in connection with -the Supreme Council of the National Economy, to be composed one-third -of representatives of workmen and employees of a given industrial -branch; one-third of representatives of the general proletariat, -general governmental, political, and economic organizations and -institutions (Supreme Council of National Economy, the People’s -Commissioners, All-Russian Council of Professional Unions, All-Russian -Council of Workmen’s Co-operative Unions, Central Executive -Committee of the Councils of Workmen’s Delegates) and one-third of -representatives of scientific bodies, of the supreme technical and -commercial personnel, and of democratic organizations of All Russia -(Council of the Congresses of All Russia, co-operative unions of -consumers, councils of peasants’ deputies). - -18. The Central Administration selects its bureau, for which all -orders of the Central Administration are obligatory, which conducts -the current work and carries into effect the general plans for the -undertaking. - -19. The Central Administration organizes provincial and local -administrations of a given industrial branch, on principles similar to -those on which its own organization is based. - -20. The rights and duties of each Central Administration are indicated -in the order concerning the establishment of each of them, but in -each case each Central Administration unites, in its own hands (_a_) -the management of the enterprises of a given industrial branch, (_b_) -their financing, (_c_) their technical unification or reconstruction, -(_d_) standardization of the working conditions of the given industrial -branch. - -21. All orders of the Supreme Council of National Economy are -obligatory for each Central Administration; the Central Administration -comes in contact with the Supreme Council in the person of the bureau -of productive organization of the Supreme Council of National Economy -through the corresponding productive sections. - -22. When the Central Administration for any industrial branch which -has not yet been nationalized is organized, it has the right to -sequestrate the enterprises of the given branch, and equally, without -sequestration, to prevent its managers completely or in part from -engaging in its administration, appoint commissioners, give orders, -which are obligatory, to the owners of non-nationalized enterprises, -and incur expenses on account of these enterprises for measures which -the Central Administration may consider necessary; and likewise to -combine into a technical whole separate enterprises or parts of the -same, to transfer from some enterprises to others fuel and customers’ -orders, and establish prices upon articles of production and commerce. - -23. The Central Administration controls imports and exports of -corresponding goods for a period which it determines, for which purpose -it forms a part of the general governmental organizations of external -commerce. - -24. The Central Administration has the right to concentrate, in -its hands and in institutions established by it, both the entire -preparation of articles necessary for a given branch of industry (raw -material, machinery, etc.) and the disposal to enterprises subject to -it of all products and acceptances of orders for them. - - -_Part III_ - -25. Upon the introduction of nationalization into any industrial -branch, or into any individual enterprise, the corresponding Central -Administration (or the temporary Central Administration appointed -with its rights) takes under its management the nationalized -enterprises, each separately, and preserves the large ones as separate -administrative units, annexing to them the smaller ones. - -26. Until the nationalized enterprises have been taken over by the -Central Administration (or principal commissioner) all former managers -or directorates must continue their work in its entirety in the usual -manner, and under the supervision of the corresponding commissioner -(if one has been appointed), taking all measures necessary for the -preservation of the national property and for the continuous course of -operations. - -27. The Central Administration and its organs establish new managements -and technical administrative directorates of enterprises. - -28. Technical administrative directorates of nationalized enterprises -are organized according to Part I of this Regulation. - -29. The management of a large undertaking, treated as a separate -administrative unit, is organized with a view to securing, in as -large a measure as possible, the utilization of the technical and -commercial experience accumulated by the undertaking; for which purpose -there are included in the composition of the new management not only -representatives of the laborers and employees of the enterprise (to -the number of one-third of the general numerical strength of the -management) and of the Central Administration itself (to the number -of one-third or less, as the Central Administration shall see fit), -but also, as far as possible, members of former managements, excepting -persons specially removed by the Central Administration and, upon their -refusal, representatives of any special competent organizations, even -if they are not proletariat (to a number not exceeding one-third of -the general membership of the management). - -30. When nationalization is introduced, whether of the entire branch of -the industry or of separate enterprises, the Central Administrations -are permitted, in order to facilitate the change, to pay to the highest -technical and commercial personnel their present salaries, and even, -in case of refusal on their part to work and the impossibility of -filling their places with other persons, to introduce for their benefit -obligatory work and to bring suit against them. - -31. The former management of each nationalized undertaking must -prepare a report for the last year of operation and an inventory -of the undertaking, in accordance with which inventory the new -management verifies the properties taken over. The actual taking over -of the enterprise is done by the new management immediately upon its -confirmation by the principal committee, without waiting for the -presentation of the inventory and report. - -32. Upon receipt in their locality of notice of the nationalization -of some enterprise, and until the organization of the management and -its administration by the Central Administration (or the principal -commissioner, or institution having the rights of the principal -commissioner) the workmen and employees of the given enterprise, and, -if possible, also the Council of Workmen’s Deputies, the Council of -National Economy, and Council of Professional Unions, select temporary -commissioners, under whose supervision and observation (and, if -necessary, under whose management) the activity of the undertaking -continues. The workmen and employees of the given enterprise, and -the regional councils of national economy, of professional unions, -and of workmen’s delegates have the right also to organize temporary -managements and directorates of nationalized enterprises until the -same are completely established by the Central Administration. - -33. If the initiative for the nationalization of a given enterprise -comes, not from the general governmental and proletariat organs -authorized for that purpose, but from the workmen of a given enterprise -or from some local or regional organization, then they propose to the -Supreme Council of National Economy, in the bureau of organization of -production, that the necessary steps be undertaken through the proper -production sections, according to the decree of 28th February regarding -the method of confiscating enterprises. - -34. In exceptional cases local labor organizations are given the right -to take temporarily under their management the given enterprise, if -circumstances do not permit of awaiting the decision of the question -in the regular order, but on condition that such action be immediately -brought to the notice of the nearest provincial council of national -economy, which then puts a temporary sequestration upon the enterprise -pending the complete solution of the question of nationalization by -the Supreme Council of National Economy; or, if it shall consider -the reasons insufficient, or nationalization clearly inexpedient, -or a prolonged sequestration unnecessary, it directs a temporary -sequestration or even directly re-establishes the former management -of the enterprise under its supervision, or introduces into the -composition of the management representatives of labor organizations. - -35. The present order must be furnished by the professional unions of -All Russia to all their local divisions, and by the councils of factory -committees to all factory committees, and must be published in full in -the _Izvestia_ of all provincial councils of workmen’s and peasants’ -deputies. - - _Published March 7, 1918._ - - - - -III - -INSTRUCTIONS ON WORKERS’ CONTROL - - -(_Official Text_) - - I. Agencies of Workers’ Control in Each Enterprise. - - I. Control in each enterprise is organized either by the Shop - or Factory Committee, or by the General Assembly of workers and - employees of the enterprise, who elect a Special Commission of - Control. - - II. The Shop or Factory Committee may be included in its - entirety in the Control Commission, to which may be elected - also technical experts and other employees of the enterprise. - In large-scale enterprises, participation of the employees - in the Control Commission is compulsory. In large-scale - enterprises a portion of the members of the Control Commission - is elected by trade sections and classes, at the rate of one to - each trade section or class. - - III. The workers and employees not members of the Control - Commission may not enter into relations with the management of - the enterprise on the subject of control except upon the direct - order and with the previous authorization of the Commission. - - IV. The Control Commission is responsible for its activity - to the General Assembly of employees and workers of the - enterprise, as well as to the agency of workers’ control upon - which it is dependent and under the direction of which it - functions. It makes a report of its activity at least twice a - month to these two bodies. - - -II. Duties and Privileges of the Control Commission. - - V. The Control Commission of each enterprise is required: - - 1. To determine the stock of goods and fuel possessed by the - plant, and the amount of these needed respectively for the - machinery of production, the technical personnel, and the - laborers by specialties. - - 2. To determine to what extent the plant is provided with - everything that is necessary to insure its normal operation. - - 3. To forecast whether there is danger of the plant closing - down or lowering production, and what the causes are. - - 4. To determine the number of workers by specialties likely to - be unemployed, basing the estimate upon the reserve supply and - the expected receipt of fuel and materials. - - 5. _To determine the measures to be taken to maintain - discipline in work among the workers and employees._ - - 6. To superintend the execution of the decisions of - governmental agencies regulating the buying and selling of - goods. - - 7. (_a_) _To prevent the arbitrary removal of machines, - materials, fuel, etc., from the plant without authorization - from the agencies which regulate economic affairs, and to see - that inventories are not tampered with._ - - (_b_) To assist in explaining the causes of the lowering of - production and to take measures for raising it. - - 8. To assist in elucidating the possibility of a complete or - partial utilization of the plant for some kind of production - (especially how to pass from a war to a peace footing, and - what kind of production should be undertaken), to determine - what changes should be made in the equipment of the plant and - in the number of its personnel to accomplish this purpose; to - determine in what period of time these changes can be effected; - to determine what is necessary in order to make them, and the - probable amount of production after the change is made to - another kind of manufacture. - - 9. To aid in the study of the possibility of developing the - kinds of labor required by the necessities of peace-times, - such as the method of using three shifts of workmen, or any - other method, by furnishing information on the possibilities of - housing the additional number of laborers and their families. - - 10. _To see that the production of the plant is maintained - at the figures to be fixed by the governmental regulating - agencies, and, until such time as these figures shall have been - fixed, to see that the production reaches the normal average - for the plant, judged by a standard of conscientious labor._ - - 11. To co-operate in estimating costs of production of the - plant upon the demand of the higher agency of workers’ control - or upon the demand of the governmental regulating institutions. - - VI. Upon the owner of the plant, the decisions of the Control - Commission, which are intended to assure him the possibility of - accomplishing the objects stated in the preceding articles, - are binding. In particular the Commission may, of itself or - through its delegates: - - 1. Inspect the business correspondence of the plant, all the - books and all the accounts pertaining to its past or present - operation. - - 2. Inspect all the divisions of the plant--shops, stores, - offices, etc. - - 3. Be present at meetings of the representatives of the - directing agencies; make statements and address interpellations - to them on all questions relating to control. - - VII. _The right to give orders to the directors of the plant, - and the management and operation of the plant are reserved - to the owner. The Control Commission does not participate in - the management of the plant and has no responsibility for its - development and operation. This responsibility rests upon the - owner._ - - VIII. The Control Commission is not concerned with financial - questions of the plant. If such questions arise they are - forwarded to the governmental regulating institutions. - - IX. _The Control Commission of each enterprise may, through - the higher organ of workers’ control, recommend for the - consideration of the governmental regulating institutions the - question of the sequestration of the plant or other measures of - constraint upon the plant, but it has not the right to seize - and direct the enterprise._ - - -III. Resources of the Control Commission of each Plant. - - X. To cover the expenses of the Control Commission, the owner - is bound to place at its disposal not more than two per cent. - of the amount paid out by the plant in wages. The wages lost - by the members of the Factory or Shop Committee and by the - members of the Control Commission as a result of performing - their duties during working hours when they cannot be performed - otherwise, are paid out of this two-per-cent. account. Control - over expenditures from the above-mentioned fund is exercised by - the Commission of Control and Distribution of the trades-unions - of the industrial branch concerned. - - -IV. Higher Agencies of Workers’ Control. - - XI. The organ immediately superior to the Control Commission - of each enterprise consists of the Commission of Control and - Distribution of the trades-union of the industrial branch to - which the plant in question belongs. - - All decisions of the Control Commissions of each enterprise may - be appealed to the Commission of Control and Distribution of - the trades-union exercising jurisdiction. - - XII. At least half of the members of the Commission of Control - and Distribution are elected by the Control Commissions (or - their delegates) of all plants belonging to the same branch - of industry. These are convened by the directors of the - trades-union. The other members are elected by the directors, - or by delegates, or else by the General Assembly of the - trades-union. Engineers, statisticians, and other persons who - may be of use, are eligible to election to membership in the - Commission of Control and Distribution. - - XIII. The executive directorate of the union is authorized to - direct and review the activity of the Commission of Control and - Distribution and of the Control Commission of each plant under - its jurisdiction. - - XIV. The Control Commission of each plant constitutes the - executive agency of the Commission of Control and Distribution - for its branch of industry, and is bound to make its activity - conform to the decisions of the latter. - - XV. The Commission of Control and Distribution of the - trades-union has the authority of its own accord to convene the - General Assembly of workers and employees of each enterprise, - to require new elections of Control Commissions of each plant, - and likewise to propose to the governmental regulating agencies - the temporary closing down of plants or the dismissal of all - the personnel or of a part of it, in case the workers employed - in the plant will not submit to its decisions. - - XVI. The Commission of Control and Distribution has entire - control over all branches of industry within its district, and - according to the needs of any one plant in fuel, materials, - equipment, etc., assists that plant in obtaining supplies from - the reserve of other plants of the same kind either in active - operation or idle. If other means cannot be found, it proposes - to the Governmental Regulating Commissions to close down - particular plants so that others may be sustained, or to place - the workmen and employees of plants which have been closed - down, either temporarily or definitively, in other plants - engaged in the same kind of manufacture, or to take any other - measures which are likely to prevent the closing down of plants - or an interruption in their operation, or which are thought - capable of insuring the regular operation of said plants in - conformity with the plans and decisions of the governmental - regulating agencies. - - _Remark._--The Commissions of Control and Distribution issue - technical instructions for the Control Commissions of each - plant of their branch of industry and according to their - technical specialties. These instructions must not in any - respect be inconsistent with these regulations. - - XVII. Appeal may be made against all decisions and all acts - of the Commission of Control and Distribution to the regional - Council of Workers’ Control. - - XVIII. The operating expenses of the Commission of Control - and Distribution for each branch of industry are covered by - the balances in the treasury of each plant (Art. 17) and by - equal assessments on the state and the trades-union exercising - jurisdiction. - - XIX. The Local Council of Workers’ Control considers and - decides all questions of a general nature for all or for any of - the Commissions of Control and Distribution of a given locality - and co-ordinates their activity to conform with advices - received from the All-Russian Council of Control by the Workers. - - XX. Each Council of Workers’ Control should enact compulsory - regulations to govern the working discipline of the workmen and - employees of the plants under its jurisdiction. - - XXI. The Local Council of Workers’ Control may establish within - it a council of experts, economists, statisticians, engineers, - or other persons who may be useful. - - XXII. The All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control may charge - the All-Russian Trades-Union or the regional trades-union - of any branch of industry with the duty of forming an - All-Russian Commission or a Regional Commission of Control and - Distribution, for the given branch of industry. The regulations - for such an All-Russian or Regional Commission of Control and - Distribution, drafted by the Union, must be approved by the - All-Russian Council of Workers’ Control. - - XXIII. All decisions of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers’ - Control and all decisions of other governmental regulating - agencies in the realm of economic regularization are binding - upon all the agencies of the institution of workers’ control. - - XXIV. These regulations are binding upon all institutions of - workers’ control, and apply _in toto_ to plants which employ - one hundred or more workmen and employees. Control over plants - employing a smaller personnel will be effected as far as - possible on the basis of these instructions as a model. - - - - -INDEX - - - A - - Adjustment committees, 203. - - Administrative officials, increase in, 236, 241, 242. - - Advertising monopoly, decreed, 323. - - Aeroplane-factories, decline of output in, 207. - - Agents, provocative, use of, 4. - - Agriculture, nationalization of, 82, 83, 84, 85. - - Agunov, A., incarcerated, 319. - - Alexander Works, strike at, 248, 250. - - Alexinsky, Gregory, reports of Joint Congress, 291, 321. - - Alien agitators, deportation of, 152, 153 _n_. - - Allies, intervention by, 155, 190; - deserted by Bolsheviki, 308; - and blockade of Russia, 431-438. - - “Allotment gardens” scheme, 87, 88. - - Alminsky, on Extraordinary Commission, 159, 160. - - Anarchy, among peasants, 7, 72, 74, 75, 96, 97, 99, 100, 212. - - Andreiv, Leonid, 319. - - Anti-Bolshevist press exterminated, 324. - - Anti-Jewish pogroms, 103. - - Antonelli, Etienne, 155. - - Arakcheev, Count, and militarization of agricultural labor, 399. - - Arbitration committees, 203. - - Armed force, failed, 124, 125, 136. - - Armistice, the, 432. - - Army: - demoralization of, 216; - labor, 391-409; - under Soviet direction, 446, 447. - - Arrests, mass, 155. - - Arthur Koppel Works, strike at, 248. - - Assemblage, freedom of, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 347, 348. - - Astrov, Cadet, property confiscated, 165. - - Auditoriums, publicly owned, 349; - controlled by workmen’s organizations, 350. - - Aviation plant, wage system, 259. - - Axelrod-Orthodox, 321. - - - B - - Babeuf, Gracchus, death, 426. - - Ballot, secrecy of, 49. - - Berkenheim, Alexander, and blockade, 435, 436. - - Bezhenov, quoted, 287 _n_. - - Black Hundreds, reign of terror, 4. - - Blockade, Russian, 431-438. - - Blue gendarmes, reign of terror, 4. - - Bogdanov, N., report on nationalization of agriculture, 83, 84, 85. - - Bolsheviki: - control in Russia, 1; - methods, 2; - rule of blood and iron, 3; - Red Guards, 4; - system of espionage, 4, 5; - abandoned theories, 5; - opposed to first Soviet, 12, 16, 22-28; - apologists, 31; - discontent and hatred against, 33; - peasants hostile to, 82; - and transportation system, 91; - charged with brutality and crime, 92; - and distribution of land, 97, 98, 99; - instigate peasants to murder, 103; - grain decree, 104, 453-464; - create committees of the poor, 109; - and terrorism, 140-191; - brutal methods, 144, 145, 146, 147; - despotic and tyrannical, 194; - demand abolition of death penalty, 157; - restore death penalty, 158; - torture at inquest, 174; - and Soviet control of industry, 198; - decline of productivity under, 209, 210, 211; - propaganda, 210, 220, 411, 412; - and demoralization of army, 210, 216; - and maximum production, 215; - and seizure of government, 215; - and factory control, 216, 217, 218, 219; - and trades-unions, 247-258; - bureaucracy of, 263-267; - and civil war, 292, 308; - party formed, 309; - brutal methods to maintain power, 311; - suppression of newspapers, 313-317; - hostility to freedom of press, 317-319, 329, 332-339; - and public assemblage, 342-346; - and conscription of labor, 374-383; - and labor army, 391, 392, 406; - attitude toward Constituent Assembly, 414, 415, 421; - election against, 417, 419; - wholesale shootings, 422; - sufferings of - Russia under, 423; - and czarism, 426; - unpardonable crime of, 428; - and blockade, 431-438; - treachery, 438; - agitation against German Government, 443, 444; - and Brest-Litovsk treaty, 444; - decree on education, 450; - and militarism, 451. - - Bolshevism: - developed new bureaucracy, 4; - defined, 16; - and nationalization of industry, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 307; - fall inevitable, 307; - abhorrent, 307; - perversion of Socialistic idea, 307; - tragic failure, 413; - a government by force, 413; - universal spread of, 438, 439, 440. - - Bolshevist: - régime tottering, 1; - adaptability, 5; - propaganda, 210, 220, 411, 412; - congress of, 421. - - Bonch-Bruyevich, and Red Terror, 141. - - Bourgeoisie, massacre of, 144; - mobilization of, 376, 377, 378, 379. - - Bread scarcity, 261, 262, 297. - - Breshkovsky, Catherine, 319. - - Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 29, 30, 321, 432, 442, 443, 444. - - Brichkina, S., and Labor Army, 392-396. - - Bryant, Louise, 154. - - Bucharin, and trades-unions, 255; - _The Program of the Communists_, 334, 439; - and freedom of the press, 335, 337; - a tyrant, 351; - editor of _Pravda_, 358. - - Bullitt, William C., 154. - - Bureaucracy: - developed, 4; - of the Bolsheviki, 263-267; - corruption of, 268-274; - efficiency of, 275-279; - increase, 444. - - Bureaucratic red tape, 284. - - - C - - Capitalism, return to, 247. - - Capital punishment, abolition of, 157; - restoration of, 158. - - “Centrosoyuz,” 435, 436. - - Chernov, 74, 76, 78. - - Chicherine, relations with British Government, 443. - - _Chief Tasks of Our Times, The_, 226, 439. - - Children executed, 145, 146. - - _Chresvychaika, The_, 154, 155, 169, 451. - - _Civil War in France_, Marx, 356. - - Civil War in Russia, 292. - - Clergy denied right to vote, 46. - - Coal-mines, low production, 228, 229, 262. - - Coal: - transportation, 283, 285; - supply, 296. - - Code of Labor Laws of Soviet Russia, 371, 374, 380, 381, 382, 390. - - Commissars, Council of People’s, 54, 55, 56, 57, 63, 66. - - Committee, All-Russian Central Executive, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, - 61, 66. - - Committee of the Poor established, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115. - - Committees, extraordinary, brutal and corrupt, 4. - - Commune of 1871, Paris, 356, 429, 430, 431. - - Communes, agricultural, 86, 87. - - _Communist Manifesto_, Marx, 353, 354, 356. - - Communist Party: - hatred of, 33; - creation of, 35; - dictatorship over Russian people, 357; - responsibility, 358; - predominance of, in Soviet Government, 359; - in the army, 359; - mobilization - of regiments by, 360; - membership, 360, 361, 362, 364; - campaign for new members, 363, 364; - represents minority of organized proletariat, 365. - - Congresses of the Soviets, The, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 66. - - Conscription by decree, 446. - - Conscription of labor, 369, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, - 382, 383, 400, 401, 406. - - Constituent Assembly: - elections, 15, 16, 193, 194, 195, 417, 418, 426; - and land problem, 76-81; - convocation of, 141, 142, 158, 414, 415, 416, 420; - dispersed, 311, 420; - betrayal of, 421. - - Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, 62, 421. - - Control Commission, the, instructions to, 216, 217, 218, 219. - - Corn, transport, 285. - - Corruption of the bureaucracy, 268-274. - - Cotton-factories, idle, 286. - - “Cottonized” flax, 288. - - Cotton substitute, 288. - - Council of the People’s Commissaries, 22, 23, 193, 194. - - Council of Workmen’s Deputies of Petrograd organized, 12. - - Counter-revolutionists, destruction of, 156, 157. - - Courts of justice abolished, 149. - - Cultivation, decline in, 113, 121. - - Czarism, opposition to, 2; - ruled by brute force, 3; - developed bureaucracy, 4, 139; - destroyed, 426. - - - D - - _Das Kapital_, 356. - - Day-work payments, 281. - - Death penalty, right to inflict, 156, 157, 158, 159; - abolished, 190. - - Decree No. 903, 167, 168. - - Deportation, provisions for, 152, 153. - - Deputies, Soviet of, 59, 60. - - Deserters, army, 446; - shooting of relatives, 447. - - Desertion, mass, 210. - - Deutsch, Leo, 321. - - _Dictatorship of the Proletariat_, 225 _n_. - - Dictatorship of the proletariat, 298, 306. - - _Dien, The_, suppressed, 319, 320, 321, 322. - - Dioneo-Shklovsky, on wholesale massacres, 144. - - Disfranchisement, right of, 48, 49, 51. - - Documents: - decree regarding grain control, 453-456; - regulation concerning the administration of national undertakings, - 456-464; - instructions on Workers’ Control, 465-472. - - Donetz Basin coal-fields, output, 228; - supply from, 296. - - Dukhonine, General, murdered, 320. - - Dumas, Charles, on village wars, 103; - on Schastny case, 173, 174. - - Dumas, city, 195, 197. - - _Dyelo Naroda_, quoted, 35; - suppressed, 319, 321, 322. - - Dzerzhinsky, proclamation by, 183, 184. - - - E - - _Economicheskaya Zhizn_, quoted, 88, 282, 282 _n_, 283, 284, 285, 286, - 287, 288, 289, 293, 307. - - _Edinstvo_, suppressed, 318. - - Education, decrees on, 450. - - Efficiency of the bureaucracy, 275-279. - - Eight-hour day, 229, 232, 237, 349. - - Elections, Soviet, 46, 47, 48. - - Electoral franchise withheld, 45, 46, 47, 51. - - Electorate, divided into two groups, 63. - - Electric-lamp factories closed, 287. - - Engels, Frederick, and the modern state, 8; - quoted, 9, 10, 128; - and Marx, 356. - - Eroshkin, M. C., on Committees of the Poor, 114, 115; - and uprisings against Soviets, 148, 149. - - Estates, nationalization of, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 95, 96; - confiscated, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101. - - Eupatoria, massacres in, 144. - - Exchange stations established, 136, 137. - - Executions: - mass, held at Rostov-on-Don, 145; - Mihont trial, 222. - - Exports, 433, 434. - - Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution, created, - 154, 155; - proclamation, 156; - shooting of people by, 158, 159, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, - 170, 171; - powers limited, 180. - - Eyre, Lincoln, and the _Chresvychaikas_, 155; - on compulsory labor, 374. - - - F - - Factories: - closing of, 87, 300; - confiscated, 205, 211, 216, 225, 227, 237; - abandoned by owners, 237; - nationalized, 300. - - Factory: - owners forced out, 198, 204, 205; - councils, 198, 199, 200, 201; - owners recalled, 212; - control - under Provisional Government, 216, 217, 218, 219. - - Famine, 121, 136, 138, 245, 246, 289, 290. - - Feeding, class system of, 185, 186. - - Fir cones, collected for fuel, 285. - - Flax, production, 294, 295; - export, 295, 435. - - Food: - army, 112; - hoarding, 122, 123; - transportation, 285; - supply, 433; - shortage, 435, 437. - - Food-requisitioning detachments: - formed, 107, 111, 112; - reports on, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120; - unsuccessful visits, 122, 123; - resistance to, 136. - - Freedom, promise of, 451. - - Free trade, forbidden, 185. - - Freight-tonnage, decrease in, 236. - - French Revolution, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428. - - Fuel, situation, 285; - shortage, 295, 296. - - Fuel supply, failure of, 244. - - - G - - Gas, absence of, 288. - - George III, and equal suffrage, 414. - - Gendarmes, Russia ruled by, 3, 4. - - Genzelli brothers, shot, 172. - - Germany, peace with Russia, 308, 431. - - Girondins, 427. - - Goldman, L. I., on Jaroslav uprisings, 23. - - Goode, William T., 154; - on judicial system of Soviet Russia, 178, 179. - - Gorky, Maxim, on village wars, 97, 103; - “The Policy of Despair,” 107; - and armed force, 124; - on brutal methods of the Bolsheviki, 144, 145; - paper suppressed, 322. - - Gostev, on nationalization of industry, 239. - - Grain control, decree regarding, 453-456. - - Grain: - shipments, 123, 124; - exchanged, 136; - control of, 104, 453-456; - profiteers, 105; - regulations, 105, 106; - requisitioned, 107, 108, 109, 112; - curtailment of production, 121; - hoarding, 122, 123; - speculation in, 122, 123. - - Guards, Red, special privileges, 4. - - Gukovsky, commissar of finances, on railway system, 236; - on marine transportation service, 236; - report on Budget, 238. - - Guyot, Yves, 369. - - - H - - Hand-cart, prize for invention of, 284. - - “Hangman’s Journal, The,” 170. - - Hard, William, and suppression of newspapers, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, - 318, 330, 342. - - Haulage system, rope, introduced, 285; - instead of railways, 306. - - Hides, production, 295. - - Holidays, increase of, 228. - - Horses, disappearance, 284. - - _How the Russian Peasants Fought for a Constituent Assembly_, 142 _n_. - - Hunger, unemployment cause of, 87, 88. - - Huxley, 369. - - - I - - Imports, 433. - - Industrial allotments, administration of, established, 87. - - Industrial establishments, policy of subsidizing, 238. - - Industry: - nationalization of, 82, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243; - Soviet control of, 198, 213, 214, 215; - disorganized, 238. - - International, Third, an instrument of revolution, 440, 441. - - Ivanovsky, Michael, shooting of, 184. - - _Izvestia_, on peasant uprisings, 117, 118, 119; - quoted, 24, 115, 118, 138, 143, 163, 170, 183-187, 195, 196, 197, - 198, 205, 222-224, 262, 266, 268, 271, 305, 328, 378, 402-405. - - - J - - Jacobins, 427. - - “Jacqueries,” revival of, 74. - - Jandarmov, on production, 210, 211, 212. - - Jaroslav insurrection, 22, 23, 24. - - Jews, persecuting of, 347. - - Joffe, on “Revolutionary Methods,” 443. - - Journals, suppressed, 5. - - Judicial system, democratic, 149; - of Soviet Russia, 178, 179. - - - K - - Kalinin, and conciliation of the middle peasantry, 134, 135, 136. - - Kamenev: - on Constituent Assembly, 15; - and death penalty, 157; - and constitutional assembly, 193; - on profiteering, 304; - and universal spread of Bolshevism, 438. - - Kautsky, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, 356. - - Keeling, H. V., on suppression of Soviets, 27; - on Soviet elections, 33. - - Keely, Royal C., and compulsory labor, 374. - - Kerensky, A. F., Premier of Provincial Government, 2, 3; - land - program, 74, 76, 77; - and demoralization of industry, 91; - and deserting soldiers, 96; - and German counter-revolutionists, 157; - overthrow, 193; - on increased production, 210; - and industrial control, 219; - and help for industrial establishments, 238. - - Kerensky, Alexander, translator, 283 _n_. - - Kerzheutzer, on “requisition parties,” 116, 117. - - Kiev, massacres in, 145. - - Knielnitski, Bogdan, revolt of, 429. - - Kobozev, Commissar of Communications, on inactivity of the workers, - 237. - - Kohoshkin, F. F., murder of, 143. - - Kopp, Victor, on grain exports, 434. - - Kornilov, on decline of productivity, 207. - - Krassin, Leonid B., and reorganization of industry, 279; - appointment as commissary, 280; - industrial despot, 281; - reorganized system, 282; - and transportation, 283, 284, 285; - on the fall of Bolshevism, 307; - on grain exports, 434. - - Krivoshayer, report on requisitioning detachments, 120. - - Krylenko, and capture of General Headquarters, 320; - report on military organization, 446. - - - L - - Labor booklet, 386, 387, 388, 389. - - Labor distribution, department of, 383, 384, 385, 386. - - Labor, time limit, 212; - low productivity, 297; - shortage, 304, 305; - conscription of, 369, 370, - 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 381, 382, 383, 391, 400, 401, 409. - - Land commissions created, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 81. - - Landowners murdered, 72, 74. - - Land: - seized, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76; - law, 78, 79; - socialization of, 80, 83, 87, 88, 89; - distribution of, 95-103, 426. - - Latzis, on conditions in Province of Vitebsk, 117. - - _L’Avanti_, of Rome, 350. - - _La Vérité sur les Bolsheviki_, Charles Dumas, 103 _n_. - - Laws, Russian, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56. - - League of Nations, Supreme Council of, 436. - - Leather-factories, output, 286, 287. - - Lenin, Nicolai, internal opposition, 1; - theories abandoned, 5; - and Constitutional Assembly, 15, 415, 416, 417, 419; - opposed Soviets, 18; - report on peasant uprisings, 119; - attitude toward peasantry, 127, 128-134; - and Menshevist Social Democrats, 127; - attempted assassination of, 140, 141, 148, 160, 161, 162, 164; - on terrorism, 147; - and death penalty, 157; - on elections, 194; - on success of Socialism in Russia, 222, 223, 224; - and Soviet meetings, 230; - and new-born bourgeoisie, 263; - on administration by single individual, 305, 306; - analysis of, by Rosa Luxemburg, 309; - estimate of, by P. Rappaport, 310; - contempt for democratic ways, 310; - brutal methods, 311, 312; - and freedom of the press, 332, 333, 337; - report on “Bourgeois and Proletarian Democracies,” 345, 346; - a tyrant, 351; - _Two Tactics_, 352; - and Marxism, 353, 354, 355; - on dictatorship of the proletariat, 358; - anti-statists, 371, 372, 373; - on compulsory labor, 375, 380; - and labor army, 392-396; - and equal suffrage, 414; - on freedom of speech, publication, and assemblage, 420; - new set of principles, 421; - and Paris Commune, 429, 430; - and universal spread of Bolshevism, 438, 439; - and Soviet direction of army, 447. - - _Le Peuple_, of Brussels, 350. - - _Les Bolsheviks à l’œuvre_, 147 _n_. - - Levine, Isaac Don, on Soviet Russia, 37, 154. - - _L’Humanité_, 350. - - Liberty, the right of discussion, 313. - - Lincoln, Abraham, quoted, 338; - and equal suffrage, 414. - - Litvinov, and revolutionary agitation, 442. - - Livestock, decline in quantity, 295. - - Lockerman, M., on terrorism, 147. - - Locomotives, lack of, 261, 262; - disabled, 292, 293, 299. - - Lock-outs, 249. - - Lomov, and return to capitalism, 247. - - Louis XVI, overthrow, 425. - - - M - - Machine-shops closed, 238. - - Magna Charta, signing of, 413. - - Malone, M. P., Colonel, 154, 155. - - Manufactured goods, lessening of production, 138. - - Marine transportation service, nationalized, 236; - demoralized, 236. - - Martov, L., protest against restoration - of death penalty, 157, 158; - account of Schastny trial, 174, 175; - on red tape and waste, 284; - accuses Lenin, 321. - - Marx, Karl, theory, 128, 425; - and social evolution, 241; - Socialism of, 339; - teachings, 353; - _Communist Manifesto_, 353, 354; - death, 353; - meaning of the term “proletariat,” 354, 355, 356; - and universal suffrage, 414; - _Civil War in France_, 431. - - Marxian Socialists of Russia, 227, 271. - - Marxism and Leninism, 353, 354. - - Marx Printing Works, wage-system, 259. - - Massacres, wholesale, 144, 145. - - Material, raw, lack of, 238; - transportation, 293, 294. - - Match-factories, output, 287. - - “Meeting-holding” and loss of time, 230, 231. - - Melnikov, P., and execution of children, 146. - - _Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia, - A_, quoted, 33. - - Menshekov, on Soviet elections, 35; - report on production, 208. - - Mensheviki: - opposed to Bolsheviki, 12; - stand on Soviet platform, 32; - faction of Social Democratic Party, 67; - party formed, 309. - - Metal, transportation, 294. - - Metal workers idle, 286. - - Militarism, freedom from, 451. - - Military Revolutionary committees, 26. - - Miliukov, and government employees, 264. - - Miliutin, on nationalization of industry, 239. - - _Mir_, privileged journal, 325. - - Mizkevich, publicist, 450. - - Mobilization, forcible, 125. - - Molot, priest, arrest, 164. - - Money, loan, 238; - paper issue, 238, 246. - - Monks, denied right to vote, 46. - - Montagnards, the, 427. - - Moscow railway workshops, decline in production, 228, 229. - - Mothers petition for lives of their children, 146. - - Munition-works, decline of output in, 207, 208. - - Mytishchy Works, Moscow, loss of production, 228, 229. - - - N - - _Nache Slovo_, fined, 329. - - _Narodnoye Slovo_, suppressed, 319. - - _Nasha Rech_, suppressed, 318. - - _Nashe Yedinstvo_, confiscated, 321. - - Nationalization: - of the land, 83, 85, 88; - of industry, 260, 280, 282; - policy, demand for abolition, 298. - - Nationalized industries, financing, 288; - picture of, 307. - - Nemensky, and government employees, 264. - - Nevsky Shipbuilding and Engineering Works, premium system restored, - 259; - closed, 286. - - Newspaper, compulsory purchase of, 326. - - Newspapers: suppressed, 313-319; - “nationalized,” 324; - fined, 329; - denied circulation through mails, 324. - - Nicholas II, Czar, 62; - regulations, 343; - and equal suffrage, 414; - overthrow, 425. - - Nikolaiev, on agricultural communes, 86. - - Noble Factory, wage-system, 259. - - _Notch_, suppressed, 320. - - _Novayia Zhizn_, suppressed, 322. - - Novotcherkassk, massacres in, 145. - - _Novoye Vremia_, establishment seized, 323. - - _Novy Looch_, suppressed, 321, 322. - - - O - - Oberoucheff, Gen. C. M., quoted, 3. - - Obligatory Regulation No. 27, 326, 327. - - “Off days,” increase of, 228. - - Oil, fuel, deficiency, 285. - - _Okhrana_ (Czar’s Secret Service), reign of terror, 4, 46. - - _Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State_, 10. - - Oupovalov, J. E., on suppression of Soviets, 29, 30; - on increased production, 209; - and trades-unions, 253; - on public assemblage, 340, 341. - - _Outre Rossii_, fined, 329. - - Overtime, 281. - - - P - - Paper currency, worthless, 137, 138. - - Pauper committees established, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115. - - Peasantry: - Lenin’s attitude toward, 127-134; - Kalinin on, 134-136. - - Peasants: - voters discriminated against, 66; - uprisings among, 72, 73, 74, 75, 92, 96, 100, 101, 102, 148, 149; - character, 92, 93; - savage brutality, 93, 94; - soldier deserters, 96, 97; - distribution of land among, 97, 98, 99; - conflict with Soviet authorities, 98, 99; - resist grain regulations, - 106, 107, 112; - city proletariat against, 107; - opposed to Committees of the Poor, 114, 115; - resist requisitioning detachments, 120, 121, 122; - curtail production, 121; - revolt against Soviet rule, 121, 122; - hoarding food, 122, 123; - resist forcible mobilization, 125; - and exchange stations, 136, 137; - robbed of grain, 137; - and Soviet power, 138. - - People’s commissaries, 32. - - People’s food commissioner, powers of, 105, 106. - - People’s tribunals, cases and sentences cited, 93, 94. - - Petrograd Soviet of Workmen’s Deputies organized, 12, 13. - - Petrovsky, call for mass terror, 162, 163. - - Piece-work system, 247, 252, 259, 280. - - Platonov, on agricultural communes, 87. - - Plechanov, George V., publication confiscated, 319, 321. - - “Policy of Despair, The,” Gorky, 107. - - Political offenses, special tribunals for, 150, 151, 152. - - Politicians, ousted, 281. - - _Polnotch_, suppressed, 320. - - Potresov, Alexander, opinions of, 319, 320. - - _Pravda_, quoted, 6, 26, 96, 110, 125, 128-134, 159, 194, 261, 317, - 344-346, 363, 364, 447. - - Premiums, 280. - - Press Department, 325. - - Press, Russian, freedom of, 315, 316, 317, 318, 322, 329, 332, 333, - 334, 335, 336, 337, 339, 350, 351. - - Prinkipo Conference, 441. - - Printing establishments “nationalized,” 323. - - Printers’ union, suppressed, 252. - - Prisons, city, conditions in, 179. - - Production, decrease under Soviet government, 208, 209, 212, 227, 228, - 229, 241, 242. - - Productivity, decline in, 204, 206, 207, 208. - - Profiteering, proceedings against, 150. - - _Program of the Communists, The_, 334, 439. - - Proletariat: - dictatorship of the, 352, 353, 355, 356; - meaning of, 354; - uprising of, 355. - - “Proletcult” of Soviet Russia, 450. - - Propaganda, 441. - - Provisional Government, the, 8, 12, 14, 15, 95, 197, 198, 203, 209, - 210, 211, 215, 216, 226, 308, 414, 415, 426. - - Putilov works, strike at, 248, 250. - - - R - - _Rabatcheie Delo_, suppressed, 318. - - _Rabochaia Gazeta_, suppressed, 318, 319. - - Radek, and death penalty, 157. - - Radek, and universal spread of Bolshevism, 438; - on Spartacist uprisings, 439. - - Rakovsky, and death penalty, 157. - - Railroad Workers’ Unions: - Congress of, 254; - merged with the state, 254, 255. - - Railway system: - demoralized, 236; - operating expenses increased, 236. - - Railways: - nationalized, 235, 237, 242, 243, 246; - deficits, 243; - service test, 243, 244; - collapse, 244, 246; - wood fuel for, 244, 245. - - Railway transportation, 283, 292, 293, 294, 296, 297, 299. - - Railway workers’ councils abolished, 236. - - Rakitnikov, Inna, report on opening of Constituent Assembly, 141, 142. - - _Ranee Outre_, fined, 329. - - Ransome, Arthur, on Soviet Government, 32; - Bolsheviki sympathizer, 154; - on Red Terror, 180; - on powers of Extraordinary Commission, 181, 182. - - Raw material, shortage, 301. - - Razin, Stenka, revolt of, 429. - - Red army: - deserters, 187; - whole families shot, 187, 188; - formation of, 447, 448. - - Red Terror: - a reprisal, 140; - introduction of, 148; - a mad orgy, 160; - extent of, 177, 178; - ceased to exist, 180; - beginning of, 427. - - Reed, John, 154. - - Revolutionary Tribunal, the, decree constituting, 151, 152, 153, 154. - - Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press, created, 328, 329. - - Richter, Eugene, 369. - - Reign of Terror in French Revolution, 422, 424, 427, 428. - - Robins, Raymond, 154. - - Romanov II, Nicholas, reign of, 330. - - Rope haulage, 285, 306. - - Ross, Professor, on strikes, 201; - on misuse of Soviet power, 204, 205; - on decline in productivity, 204, 205. - - Rostov-on-Don, massacres in, 145. - - Royd, Fanny, execution of, 174. - - Rozanov, on agricultural communes, 87. - - Russian: - Revolution, 195, 423, 425, 426, 427, 428; - Social Democratic Party, split of, 309; - blockade, 431-438; - peace with Germany, 431-433. - - _Russkaya Volia_, suppressed, 319. - - _Russkoye Bogatstvo_, suppressed, 322. - - _Russkya Viedomasti_, suppressed, 322. - - Rykov, A., and nationalization of industries, 239, 300; - on economic situation, 291, 292; - on transportation problem, 292, 293; - on production of flax, 294, 295; - and hides, 295; - and wool, 295; - on fuel situation, 295, 296, 297; - on grain, 297; - remedial measures proposed, 298, 299; - on textile industry, 301, 302; - as to the future, 302; - and skilled labor, 303, 304. - - - S - - Sabotage, 150, 207, 210, 215, 220, 221, 223, 224. - - Salt, disappeared from market, 288, 289; - substitute, 289. - - Sawdust, substitute for sugar, 288. - - Schastny, Admiral, trial and death, 172, 173, 174. - - Scherbatchev factory, fall in production, 229. - - Schliapnikoff, Commissar of Labor, quoted, 282 _n_. - - Schneuer, Lieutenant, German spy, 320. - - Sebastopol, massacres in, 144. - - Seminov’s lumber mill, wage-system, 259. - - Sentences, mass, 155. - - Serfdom abolished, 92. - - _Severnaya Communa_, subscription to, obligatory, 326, 327; - quoted, 25, 120, 166-169, 171, 179, 184, 185, 250-251, 258, 259-260, - 342, 361. - - Shingarev, A. I., murder of, 143. - - Shliapnikov, protest against sabotage, 221, 222. - - Shooting, mass, 170. - - Shub, David N., on suppression of newspapers, 315, 319, 320, 321, 322, - 323. - - Simferopol, massacres in, 144. - - Six-hour day, 349. - - Skobelev, on seizure of factories, 205; - on decline of industrial output, 206, 207. - - Smirnov, M., and execution of children, 146. - - Smith, Goldwin, 369. - - Socialism: - foe of individual freedom, 369; - critics of, 369, 370. - - _Socialism, Utopian and Scientific_, 9. - - Socialists, Marxian, 8, 10, 11; - join first Soviet, 12; - expelled from New York Legislature, 29; - and freedom of the press, 336; - press, 350. - - Socialists-Revolutionists, party of, election, 417; - factions in, 419. - - _Soldatskaia Pravda_, Bolshevist paper, 318. - - Soldiers, peasant, deserters, 96, 210. - - Soromovo Works, output, 227. - - Soronov, shot, 184. - - Sosnovsky, report on conditions in Tver Province, 117. - - Soviet: - government in Russia, 16, 17; - system, 17, 18; - elections, 21, 22, 33, 34, 35, 36; - form of government explained, 38, 39; - estates, 83, 84, 85; - power, misuse of, 205; - increased cost of production under, 208; - control - of industries, 213, 214, 215, 219, 230, 231, 234; - control of factories, 216; - decree of instructions, 217, 218, 220, 225; - economic situation in 1919, 289; - official organ, 326, 327. - - Sovietism: - merits of, 444; - increased bureaucracy, 444; - in industry, 445; - and direction of army, 446, 447; - impractical, 449. - - _Soviets at Work, The_, 225 _n_, 226, 234. - - Soviets: - formed, 12, 13; - irresponsible bodies, 13; - cleansed, 22; - dissolved, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27; - uprisings against, 148, 149; - waning power of, 195, 196, 197; - and decline in productivity, 208. - - _Sovremennoie Delo_, suppressed, 318. - - Spartacist uprisings, 439. - - Speech, freedom of, 339, 420. - - Spencer, Herbert, 369. - - Spiridonova, Maria, on nationalization of estates, 82. - - _State and Revolution, The_, 226 _n_, 373. - - State loans, repudiation of, 238. - - St. Bartholomew massacres, 144, 145. - - Steffens, Lincoln, on Soviet form of government, 38, 40. - - Steinberg, I. Z., “Instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal,” 151. - - Strikers, right to, 201, 248, 252; - wasteful, 204; - among factory workers, 210; - treason against state, 236; - epidemic of, 248; - suppressed with brutality, 248, 249, 250, 251, 281. - - Strumillo, J., on suppression of Soviets, 30, 31. - - Substitutes for needed articles, 288. - - Suffrage, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 334, 335, 339, 354, 413, 414, 426. - - Sugar industry, liquidated, 288; - sawdust substitute, 288. - - “Sukharevka,” campaign against, 271, 272. - - Syndicalism, 235. - - - T - - Taylor system of management, 234. - - Teachers union, suppressed, 252. - - Teaching profession denied right to vote, 51, 52. - - Terrorism and the Bolsheviki, 140-191. - - Terror, mass, 162, 163. - - Textile industries, decline in production, 229, 301, 302; - factories closed, 238; - idle workers, 286. - - “Thermidorians,” 427. - - Thomas, Norman, 330, 342. - - Tomsky, on food-supplies, 302, 303; - on shortage of labor, 304, 305. - - Trades-unions, Russian: - conservatism of, 17, 18; - and representation, 32; - right to nominate, 50; - Congress, 86, 87; - and agricultural communes, 87; - and strikes, 248, 252; - and wage-fixing, 248, 252; - and state capitalism, 252; - suppressed, 252, 253; - controlled by Bolsheviki, 252, 253; - deprived of power, 281; - status of, 382. - - Transportation system, 91, 238, 283, 284, 285, 289, 308, 433. - - Tribunals, revolutionary, critical and corrupt, 4. - - Trotsky: - and internal opposition, 1; - on constitutional assembly, 15, 193; - and Jaroslav insurrection, 23; - dispersed constitutional assembly, 79, 80, 81; - and peasant uprisings, 121, 122; - and forcible mobilization, 125, 126; - on terrorism, 147, 183; - and guillotine, 148; - and death penalty, 157; - famous decree No. 903, 167; - and Admiral Schastny, 173, 175, 176; - on railway transportation, 293, 294; - on industrial failure, 301; - on dissipation of working-class, 303, 304; - on freedom of the press, 317, 332; - a tyrant, 351; - and communists in army, 359, 360; - and labor army, 391, 396-406; - denounced Kerensky, 415; - and universal spread of Bolshevism, 438, 439; - and deserters, 446, 447. - - _Trudovoe Slovo_, suppressed, 318. - - Trupp, Eugene, statement by, 163 _n_, 164 _n_. - - Tseretelli, and decline of productivity, 204. - - Tula Munition Works, strike at, 248; - premium system restored, 260. - - Tyrants, defined, 312, 313. - - - U - - Uprisings, peasant, 72, 73, 74, 75, 92, 96, 100, 101, 102, 148, 149. - - Urals Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviet, 21. - - Uritzky, assassination of, 140, 148, 155, 158, 158 _n_, 159 _n_, 160, - 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 174. - - _Utro_, suppressed, 318. - - - V - - Vandervelde, Emile, on factory councils, 200. - - Vasiliev, B. C., and execution of children, 145, 146. - - Vassilyev, Dr. N., 321. - - Verstraete, Maurice, description of Uritzky, 158 _n_, 159 _n_. - - _V. Glookhooyou Notch_, suppressed, 320. - - Village wars, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103. - - Villard, Oswald, 330, 342. - - _Vlast Naroda_, on village wars, 100, 101, 102. - - _Volia Naroda_, suppressed, 318, 319. - - _Vorwärts_, Berlin, 350. - - _Vperiod_, suppressed, 329. - - _Vsiegda Vperiod_, suppressed, 330. - - _V. Temnooyou Notch_, suppressed, 320. - - - W - - Wages committees, 202, 203. - - Wage-system: - daily pay, 247, 252, 259; - piece-work, 247, 252, 259; - cash bonuses, 247, 252; - premiums, 259, 260. - - Wheat reserve, 297. - - White guards: - shooting of, 166, 186; - mass terror used against, 168. - - White terror of the bourgeoisie, 140, 148. - - Whitley Councils of England, 198. - - Whitman, Walt, quoted, 338. - - Women, liable to labor conscription, 382. - - Wood fuel, transportation of, 244, 245, 284, 285, 295, 296. - - Wool, production, 295. - - Work-books, 386, 387, 388, 389. - - Workers’ Control Commission, instructions on, 217, 218, 234. - - Workers’ control, abolished, 281, 282 _n_. - - Workmen’s and Peasants’ Revolutionary Tribunals established, 150. - - Workmen’s: - supreme council, 214; - organs of control, 214; - superior court of control, 214. - - Workmen, unemployed, 238. - - Workshop committees, 199, 201, 202. - - - Y - - _Yedinstvo_, suppressed, 319, 321. - - - Z - - Zasulitch, Vera, 321. - - Zemstvos, local, 195. - - Zenzinov, V. M., on the Soviet Government, 31; - on freedom of assemblage, 339, 340. - - Zinoviev: - on Constituent Assembly, 15; - and Red Terror, 141, 147; - and death penalty, 157; - on Soviet Russia, 290; - a tyrant, 351; - and universal spread of Bolshevism, 438, 439. - - -THE END - - - - -RECENT BIOGRAPHIES AND REMINISCENCES - - - * * * * * - - -_A DIPLOMAT’S WIFE IN MEXICO_ - -BY EDITH O’SHAUGHNESSY - -_Intimate personal experiences at Mexico City and Vera Cruz during -those dramatic months in 1913 and 1914, when Nelson O’Shaughnessy was -American Chargé d’Affaires._ - - Illustrated. Octavo - - -_THE SUNNY SIDE OF DIPLOMATIC LIFE_ - -BY MADAME DE HEGERMANN-LINDENCRONE - -_As the wife of a Danish diplomat she has many gossipy bits to relate -of life in Washington, Rome, Denmark, Paris and Berlin._ - - Illustrated. 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