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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7be5812 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51548 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51548) diff --git a/old/51548-0.txt b/old/51548-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index bb76606..0000000 --- a/old/51548-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4740 +0,0 @@ -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51548 *** - -EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY & OTHER ESSAYS - -By - -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE - -TRANSLATED BY - -MAXIMILIAN A. MÜGGE - -AUTHOR OF "FR. NIETZSCHE, HIS LIFE AND WORK," ETC. - - -The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche - -The First Complete and Authorised English Translation - -Edited by Dr Oscar Levy - -Volume Two - -T.N. FOULIS - -13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET - -EDINBURGH: AND LONDON - -1911 - - - - -CONTENTS - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - -1. THE GREEK STATE--Preface to an unwritten book (1871) - -2. THE GREEK WOMAN--Fragment (1871) - -3. ON MUSIC AND WORDS--Fragment (1871) - -4. HOMER'S CONTEST--Preface to an unwritten book (1872) - -5. THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE ---Preface to an unwritten book (1872) - -6. PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS (1873) - -7. ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE (1873) - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - - -The essays contained in this volume treat of various subjects. With -the exception of perhaps one we must consider all these papers as -fragments. Written during the early Seventies, and intended mostly as -prefaces, they are extremely interesting, since traces of Nietzsche's -later tenets--like Slave and Master morality, the Superman--can be -found everywhere. But they are also very valuable on account of the -young philosopher's daring and able handling of difficult and abstruse -subjects. "Truth and Falsity," and "The Greek Woman" are probably the -two essays which will prove most attractive to the average reader. - -In the essay on THE GREEK STATE the two tenets mentioned above -are clearly discernible, though the Superman still goes by the -Schopenhauerian label "genius." Our philosopher attacks the modern -ideas of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of labour," because -Existence seems to be without worth and dignity. The preponderance -of such illusory ideas is due to the political power nowadays vested -in the "slaves." The Greeks saw no dignity in labour. They saw the -necessity of it, and the necessity of slavery, but felt ashamed of -both. Not even the labour of the artist did they admire, although they -praised his completed work. - -If the Greeks perished through their slavery, one thing is still more -certain: we shall perish through the lack of slavery. To the essence -of Culture slavery is innate. It is part of it. A vast multitude must -labour and "slave" in order that a few may lead an existence devoted to -beauty and art. - -Strife and war are necessary for the welfare of the State. War -consecrates and purines the State. The purpose of the military State -is the creating of the military genius, the ruthless conqueror, the -War-lord. There also exists a mysterious connection between the State -in general and the creating of the genius. - -In THE GREEK WOMAN, Nietzsche, the man who said, "One cannot think -highly enough of women," delineates his ideal of woman. Penelope, -Antigone, Electra are his ideal types. - -Plato's dictum that in the perfect State the family would cease to -exist, belongs to the most intimate things uttered about the relation -between women and the State. The Greek woman as mother had to vegetate -in obscurity, to lead a kind of Cranfordian existence for the greater -welfare of the body politic. Only in Greek antiquity did woman occupy -her proper position, and for this reason she was more honoured than she -has ever been since. Pythia was the mouthpiece, the symbol of Greek -unity. - -ON MUSIC AND WORDS. Music is older, more fundamental than language. -Music is an expression of cosmic consciousness. Language is only a -gesture-symbolism. - -It is true the music of every people was at first allied to lyric -poetry; "absolute music" always appeared much later. But that is due -to the double nature in the essence of language. The _tone_ of the -speaker expresses the basic pleasure- and displeasure-sensations of the -individual. These form the tonal subsoil common to all languages; they -are comprehensible everywhere. Language itself is a super-structure on -that subsoil; it is a gesture-symbolism for all the other conceptions -which man adds to that subsoil. - -The endeavour to illustrate a poem by music is futile. The text of -an opera is therefore quite negligible. Modern opera in its music is -therefore often only a stimulant or a remembrancer for set, stereotyped -feelings. Great music, _i.e.,_ Dionysean music, makes us forget to -listen to the words. - -HOMER'S CONTEST. The Greek genius acknowledged strife, struggle, -contest to be necessary in this life. Only through competition and -emulation will the Common-Wealth thrive. Yet there was no unbridled -ambition. Everyone's individual endeavours were subordinated to the -welfare of the community. The curse of present-day contest is that it -does not do the same. - -In THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE an -amusing and yet serious attack is made on the hollow would-be culture -of the German Philistines who after the Franco-Prussian war were -swollen with self-conceit, self-sufficiency, and were a great danger to -real Culture. Nietzsche points out Schopenhauer's great philosophy as -the only possible means of escaping the humdrum of Philistia with its -hypocrisy and intellectual ostrichisation. - -The essay on GREEK PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE is a performance -of great interest to the scholar. It brims with ideas. The Hegelian -School, especially Zeller, has shown what an important place is held by -the earlier thinkers in the history of Greek thought and how necessary -a knowledge of their work is for all who wish to understand Plato and -Aristotle. _Diels'_ great book: "Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker", -_Benn's, Burnet's_ and _Fairbanks'_ books we may regard as the -peristyle through which we enter the temple of Early Greek Philosophy. -Nietzsche's essay then is like a beautiful festoon swinging between the -columns erected by Diels and the others out of the marble of facts. - -Beauty and the personal equation are the two "leitmotive" of -Nietzsche's history of the pre-Socratian philosophers. Especially -does he lay stress upon the personal equation, since that is the -only permanent item of interest, considering that every "System" -crumbles into nothing with the appearance of a new thinker. In this -way Nietzsche treats of _Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, -Xenophanes, Anaxagoras._ There are also some sketches of a draft for -an intended but never accomplished continuation, in which Empedocles, -Democritus and Plato were to be dealt with. - -Probably the most popular of the Essays in this book will prove to be -the one on TRUTH AND FALSITY. It is an epistemological rhapsody on the -relativity of truth, on "Appearance and Reality," on "perceptual flux" -versus--"conceptual conceit." - -Man's intellect is only a means in the struggle for existence, a means -taking the place of the animal's horns and teeth. It adapts itself -especially to deception and dissimulation. - -There are no absolute truths. Truth is relative and always imperfect. -Yet fictitious values fixed by convention and utility are set down as -truth. The liar does not use these standard coins of the realm. He is -hated; not out of love for truth, no, but because he is dangerous. - -Our words never hit the essence, the "X" of a thing, but indicate only -external characteristics. Language is the columbarium of the ideas, the -cemetery of perceptions. - -Truths are metaphors, illusions, anthropomorph isms about which one has -forgotten that they are such. There are different truths to different -beings. Like a spider man sits in the web of his truths and ideas. He -wants to be deceived. By means of error he mostly lives; truth is often -fatal. When the liar, the story-teller, the poet, the rhapsodist lie to -him without hurting him he--loves them!-- - -The text underlying this translation is that of Vol. I. of the -"Taschenausgabe." One or two obscure passages I hope my conjectures may -have elucidated. The dates following the titles indicate the year when -these essays were written. - -In no other work have I felt so deeply the great need of the science of -Signifies with its ultimate international standardisation of terms, as -attempted by Eisler and Baldwin. I hope, however, I have succeeded in -conveying accurately the meaning of the author in spite of a certain -_looseness_ in his philosophical terminology. - -The English language is somewhat at a disadvantage through its lack -of a Noun-Infinitive. I can best illustrate this by a passage from -_Parmenides_: - -χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῑν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εῖναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ -ἔστιν· τά σ' ἐγὼ ψράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. - -In his usual masterly manner _Diels_ translates these lines with: "Das -Sagen und Denken musz ein Seiendes sein. Denn das Sein existiert, das -Nichts existiert nicht; das heisz ich dich wohl zu beherzigen." On -the other hand in _Fairbanks'_ "version" we read: "It is necessary -both to say and to think that being is; for it is possible that being -is, and it is impossible that not being is; this is what I bid thee -ponder." In order to avoid a similar obscurity, throughout the paper on -"EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY" I have rendered "das Seiende" (τὸ ἐὸν) with -"Existent", "das Nicht-Seiende" with "Non-Existent"; "das Sein" (εῖναι) -with "Being" and "das Nicht-Sein" with "Not-Being." - -I am directly or indirectly indebted for many suggestions to several -friends of mine, especially to two of my colleagues, J. Charlton -Hipkins, M.A., and R. Miller, B.A., for their patient revision of the -whole of the proofs. - -M. A. MÜGGE. - -LONDON, _July_ 1911. - - - - -THE GREEK STATE - - -Preface to an Unwritten Book (1871) - - -We moderns have an advantage over the Greeks in two ideas, which are -given as it were as a compensation to a world behaving thoroughly -slavishly and yet at the same time anxiously eschewing the word -"slave": we talk of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of -labour." Everybody worries in order miserably to perpetuate a miserable -existence; this awful need compels him to consuming labour; man -(or, more exactly, the human intellect) seduced by the "Will" now -occasionally marvels at labour as something dignified. However in -order that labour might have a claim on titles of honour, it would be -necessary above all, that Existence itself, to which labour after all -is only a painful means, should have more dignity and value than it -appears to have had, up to the present, to serious philosophies and -religions. What else may we find in the labour-need of all the millions -but the impulse to exist at any price, the same all-powerful impulse by -which stunted plants stretch their roots through earthless rocks! - -Out of this awful struggle for existence only individuals can emerge, -and they are at once occupied with the noble phantoms of artistic -culture, lest they should arrive at practical pessimism, which Nature -abhors as her exact opposite. In the modern world, which, compared -with the Greek, usually produces only abnormalities and centaurs, in -which the individual, like that fabulous creature in the beginning of -the Horatian Art of Poetry, is jumbled together out of pieces, here in -the modern world in one and the same man the greed of the struggle for -existence and the need for art show themselves at the same time: out of -this unnatural amalgamation has originated the dilemma, to excuse and -to consecrate that first greed before this need for art. Therefore; we -believe in the "Dignity of man" and the "Dignity of labour." - -The Greeks did not require such conceptual hallucinations, for among -them the idea that labour is a disgrace is expressed with startling -frankness; and another piece of wisdom, more hidden and less -articulate, but everywhere alive, added that the human thing also was -an ignominious and piteous nothing and the "dream of a shadow." Labour -is a disgrace, because existence has no value in itself; but even -though this very existence in the alluring embellishment of artistic -illusions shines forth and really seems to have a value in itself, then -that proposition is still valid that labour is a disgrace--a disgrace -indeed by the fact that it is impossible for man, fighting for the -continuance of bare existence, to become an _artist._ In modern times -it is not the art-needing man but the slave who determines the general -conceptions, the slave who according to his nature must give deceptive -names to all conditions in order to be able to live. Such phantoms as -the dignity of man, the dignity of labour, are the needy products of -slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woful time, in which the slave -requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and -beyond himself! Cursed seducers, who have destroyed the slave's state -of innocence by the fruit of the tree of knowledge! Now the slave must -vainly scrape through from one day to another with transparent lies -recognisable to every one of deeper insight, such as the alleged "equal -rights of all" or the so-called "fundamental rights of man," of man as -such, or the "dignity of labour." Indeed he is not to understand at -what stage and at what height dignity can first be mentioned--namely, -at the point, where the individual goes wholly beyond himself and no -longer has to work and to produce in order to preserve his individual -existence. - -And even on this height of "labour" the Greek at times is overcome by -a feeling, that looks like shame. In one place Plutarch with earlier -Greek instinct says that no nobly born youth on beholding the Zeus in -Pisa would have the desire to become himself a Phidias, or on seeing -the Hera in Argos, to become himself a Polyklet; and just as little -would he wish to be Anacreon, Philetas or Archilochus, however much he -might revel in their poetry. To the Greek the work of the artist falls -just as much under the undignified conception of labour as any ignoble -craft. But if the compelling force of the artistic impulse operates in -him, then he _must_ produce and submit himself to that need of labour. -And as a father admires the beauty and the gift of his child but thinks -of the act of procreation with shamefaced dislike, so it was with the -Greek. The joyful astonishment at the beautiful has not blinded him -as to its origin which appeared to him, like all "Becoming" in nature, -to be a powerful necessity, a forcing of itself into existence. That -feeling by which the process of procreation is considered as something -shamefacedly to be hidden, although by it man serves a higher purpose -than his individual preservation, the same feeling veiled also the -origin of the great works of art, in spite of the fact that through -them a higher form of existence is inaugurated, just as through -that other act comes a new generation. The feeling of _shame_ seems -therefore to occur where man is merely a tool of manifestations of will -infinitely greater than he is permitted to consider himself in the -isolated shape of the individual. - -Now we have the general idea to which are to be subordinated the -feelings which the Greek had with regard to labour and slavery. Both -were considered by them as a necessary disgrace, of which one feels -_ashamed,_ as a disgrace and as a necessity at the same time. In this -feeling of shame is hidden the unconscious discernment that the real -aim _needs_ those conditional factors, but that in that _need_ lies the -fearful and beast-of-prey-like quality of the Sphinx Nature, who in -the glorification of the artistically free culture-life so beautifully -stretches forth her virgin-body. Culture, which is chiefly a real need -for art, rests upon a terrible basis: the latter however makes itself -known in the twilight sensation of shame. In order that there may be a -broad, deep, and fruitful soil for the development of art, the enormous -majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly subjected -to life's struggle, to a _greater_ degree than their own wants -necessitate. At their cost, through the surplus of their labour, that -privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in -order to create and to satisfy a new world of want. - -Accordingly we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that _slavery -is of the essence of Culture;_ a truth of course, which leaves no -doubt as to the absolute value of Existence. _This truth_ is the -vulture, that gnaws at the liver of the Promethean promoter of Culture. -The misery of toiling men must still increase in order to make the -production of the world of art possible to a small number of Olympian -men. Here is to be found the source of that secret wrath nourished -by Communists and Socialists of all times, and also by their feebler -descendants, the white race of the "Liberals," not only against -the arts, but also against classical antiquity. If Culture really -rested upon the will of a people, if here inexorable powers did not -rule, powers which are law and barrier to the individual, then the -contempt for Culture, the glorification of a "poorness in spirit," the -iconoclastic annihilation of artistic claims would be _more than_ an -insurrection of the suppressed masses against drone-like individuals; -it would be the cry of compassion tearing down the walls of Culture; -the desire for justice, for the equalization of suffering, would -swamp all other ideas. In fact here and there sometimes an exuberant -degree of compassion has for a short time opened all the flood gates -of Culture-life; a rainbow of compassionate love and of peace appeared -with the first radiant rise of Christianity and under it was born -Christianity's most beautiful fruit, the gospel according to St John. -But there are also instances to show that powerful religions for long -periods petrify a given degree of Culture, and cut off with inexorable -sickle everything that still grows on strongly and luxuriantly. For it -is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we found in the -essence of every Culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful -religion and in general in the essence of _power,_ which is always -evil; so that we shall understand it just as well, when a Culture is -shattering, with a cry for liberty or at least justice, a too highly -piled bulwark of religious claims. That which in this "sorry scheme" of -things will live (_i.e.,_ must live), is at the bottom of its nature a -reflex of the primal-pain and primal-contradiction, and must therefore -strike our eyes--"an organ fashioned for this world and earth"--as -an insatiable greed for existence and an eternal self-contradiction, -within the form of time, therefore as Becoming. Every moment devours -the preceding one, every birth is the death of innumerable beings; -begetting, living, murdering, all is one. Therefore we may compare -this grand Culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his triumphal -procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot, -slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by -the wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless still exclaim: "Dignity of -labour!" "Dignity of Man!" The voluptuous Cleopatra-Culture throws ever -again the most priceless pearls, the tears of compassion for the misery -of slaves, into her golden goblet. Out of the emasculation of modern -man has been born the enormous social distress of the present time, -not out of the true and deep commiseration for that misery; and if it -should be true that the Greeks perished through their slavedom then -another fact is much more certain, that we shall perish through the -_lack_ of slavery. Slavedom did not appear in any way objectionable, -much less abominable, either to early Christianity or to the Germanic -race. What an uplifting effect on us has the contemplation of the -mediæval bondman, with his legal and moral relations,--relations that -were inwardly strong and tender,--towards the man of higher rank, with -the profound fencing-in of his narrow existence--how uplifting!--and -how reproachful! - -He who cannot reflect upon the position of affairs in Society without -melancholy, who has learnt to conceive of it as the continual painful -birth of those privileged Culture-men, in whose service everything -else must be devoured--he will no longer be deceived by that false -glamour, which the moderns have spread over the origin and meaning -of the State. For what can the State mean to us, if not the means by -which that social-process described just now is to be fused and to -be guaranteed in its unimpeded continuance? Be the sociable instinct -in individual man as strong as it may, it is only the iron clamp of -the State that constrains the large masses upon one another in such a -fashion that a chemical decomposition of Society, with its pyramid-like -super-structure, is _bound_ to take place. Whence however originates -this sudden power of the State, whose aim lies much beyond the insight -and beyond the egoism of the individual? How did the slave, the blind -mole of Culture, _originate_? The Greeks in their instinct relating -to the law of nations have betrayed it to us, in an instinct, which -even in the ripest fulness of their civilisation and humanity never -ceased to utter as out of a brazen mouth such words as: "to the victor -belongs the vanquished, with wife and child, life and property. Power -gives the first _right_ and there is no right, which at bottom is not -presumption, usurpation, violence." - -Here again we see with what pitiless inflexibility Nature, in order -to arrive at Society, forges for herself the cruel tool of the -State--namely, that _conqueror_ with the iron hand, who is nothing else -than the objectivation of the instinct indicated. By the indefinable -greatness and power of such conquerors the spectator feels, that they -are only the means of an intention manifesting itself through them -and yet hiding itself from them. The weaker forces attach themselves -to them with such mysterious speed, and transform themselves so -wonderfully, in the sudden swelling of that violent avalanche, under -the charm of that creative kernel, into an affinity hitherto not -existing, that it seems as if a magic will were emanating from them. - -Now when we see how little the vanquished trouble themselves after a -short time about the horrible origin of the State, so that history -informs us of no class of events worse than the origins of those -sudden, violent, bloody and, at least in _one_ point, inexplicable -usurpations: when hearts involuntarily go out towards the magic of -the growing State with the presentiment of an invisible deep purpose, -where the calculating intellect is enabled to see an addition of forces -only; when now the State is even contemplated with fervour as the -goal and ultimate aim of the sacrifices and duties of the individual: -then out of all that speaks the enormous necessity of the State, -without which Nature might not succeed in coming, through Society, -to her deliverance in semblance, in the mirror of the genius. What -discernments does the instinctive pleasure in the State not overcome! -One would indeed feel inclined to think that a man who looks into the -origin of the State will henceforth seek his salvation at an awful -distance from it; and where can one not see the monuments of its -origin--devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalised men, devouring -hatred of nations! The State, of ignominiously low birth, for the -majority of men a continually flowing source of hardship, at frequently -recurring periods the consuming torch of mankind--and yet a word, at -which we forget ourselves, a battle cry, which has filled men with -enthusiasm for innumerable really heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and -most venerable object for the blind and egoistic multitude which only -in the tremendous moments of State-life has the strange expression of -greatness on its face! - -We have, however, to consider the Greeks, with regard to the unique -sun-height of their art, as the "political men in themselves," and -certainly history knows of no second instance of such an awful -unchaining of the political passion, such an unconditional immolation -of all other interests in the service of this State-instinct; at the -best one might distinguish the men of the Renascence in Italy with a -similar title for like reasons and by way of comparison. So overloaded -is that passion among the Greeks that it begins ever anew to rage -against itself and to strike its teeth into its own flesh. This bloody -jealousy of city against city, of party against party, this murderous -greed of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse -of the slain enemy, in short, the incessant renewal of those Trojan -scenes of struggle and horror, in the spectacle of which, as a genuine -Hellene, Homer stands before us absorbed with _delight_--whither does -this naïve barbarism of the Greek State point? What is its excuse -before the tribunal of eternal justice? Proud and calm, the State steps -before this tribunal and by the hand it leads the flower of blossoming -womanhood: Greek society. For this Helena the State waged those -wars--and what grey-bearded judge could here condemn?-- - -Under this mysterious connection, which we here divine between State -and art, political greed and artistic creation, battlefield and work -of art, we understand by the State, as already remarked, only the -cramp-iron, which compels the Social process; whereas without the -State, in the natural _bellum omnium contra omnes_ Society cannot -strike root at all on a larger scale and beyond the reach of the -family. Now, after States have been established almost everywhere, that -bent of the _bellum omnium contra omnes_ concentrates itself from time -to time into a terrible gathering of war-clouds and discharges itself -as it were in rare but so much the more violent shocks and lightning -flashes. But in consequence of the effect of that _bellum,_--an effect -which is turned inwards and compressed,--Society is given time during -the intervals to germinate and burst into leaf, in order, as soon as -warmer days come, to let the shining blossoms of genius sprout forth. - -In face of the political world of the Hellenes, I will not hide those -phenomena of the present in which I believe I discern dangerous -atrophies of the political sphere equally critical for art and society. -If there should exist men, who as it were through birth are placed -outside the national-and State-instincts, who consequently have to -esteem the State only in so far as they conceive that it coincides -with their own interest, then such men will necessarily imagine as the -ultimate political aim the most undisturbed collateral existence of -great political communities possible, which _they_ might be permitted -to pursue their own purposes without restriction. With this idea in -their heads they will promote _that_ policy which will offer the -greatest security to these purposes; whereas it is unthinkable, that -they, against their intentions, guided perhaps by an unconscious -instinct, should sacrifice themselves for the State-tendency, -unthinkable because they lack that very instinct. All other citizens -of the State are in the dark about what Nature intends with her -State-instinct within them, and they follow blindly; only those who -stand outside this instinct know what _they_ want from the State and -what the State is to grant them. Therefore it is almost unavoidable -that such men should gain great influence in the State because they -are allowed to consider it as a _means,_ whereas all the others under -the sway of those unconscious purposes of the State are themselves -only means for the fulfilment of the State-purpose. In order now to -attain, through the medium of the State, the highest furtherance -of their selfish aims, it is above all necessary, that the State be -wholly freed from those awfully incalculable war-convulsions so that -it may be used rationally; and thereby they strive with all their -might for a condition of things in which war is an impossibility. For -that purpose the thing to do is first to curtail and to enfeeble the -political separatisms and factions and through the establishment of -large _equipoised_ State-bodies and the mutual safeguarding of them -to make the successful result of an aggressive war and consequently -war itself the greatest improbability; as on the other hand they will -endeavour to wrest the question of war and peace from the decision of -individual lords, in order to be able rather to appeal to the egoism -of the masses or their representatives; for which purpose they again -need slowly to dissolve the monarchic instincts of the nations. This -purpose they attain best through the most general promulgation of -the liberal optimistic view of the world, which has its roots in the -doctrines of French Rationalism and the French Revolution, _i.e.,_ in -a wholly un-Germanic, genuinely neo-Latin shallow and unmetaphysical -philosophy. I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international -movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of -universal suffrage, the effects of the _fear of war_ above everything -else, yea I behold behind these movements, those truly international -homeless money-hermits, as the really alarmed, who, with their -natural lack of the State-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as -a means of the Exchange, and State and Society as an apparatus for -their own enrichment. Against the deviation of the State-tendency -into a money-tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy -is war and once again war, in the emotions of which this at least -becomes obvious, that the State is not founded upon the fear of the -war-demon, as a protective institution for egoistic individuals, but -in love to fatherland and prince, it produces an ethical impulse, -indicative of a much higher destiny. If I therefore designate as a -dangerous and characteristic sign of the present political situation -the application of revolutionary thought in the service of a selfish -State-less money-aristocracy, if at the same time I conceive of the -enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern -financial affairs fallen into strange hands, and if I imagine all evils -of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to -have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one -will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a Pæan on war. Horribly -clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes along like the night, -war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and -purifying the State. First of all, however, as is said in the beginning -of the "Iliad," he lets fly his arrow on the mules and dogs. Then he -strikes the men themselves, and everywhere pyres break into flames. -Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the -State as the slave is for society, and who can avoid this verdict if -he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equalled Greek -art-perfection? - -He who contemplates war and its uniformed possibility, the _soldier's -profession,_ with respect to the hitherto described nature of the -State, must arrive at the conviction, that through war and in the -profession of arms is placed before our eyes an image, or even perhaps -the _prototype of the State._ Here we see as the most general effect of -the war-tendency an immediate decomposition and division of the chaotic -mass into _military castes,_ out of which rises, pyramid-shaped, -on an exceedingly broad base of slaves the edifice of the "martial -society." The unconscious purpose of the whole movement constrains -every individual under its yoke, and produces also in heterogeneous -natures as it were a chemical transformation of their qualities until -they are brought into affinity with that purpose. In the highest -castes one perceives already a little more of what in this internal -process is involved at the bottom, namely the creation of the _military -genius_--with whom we have become acquainted as the original founder of -states. In the case of many States, as, for example, in the Lycurgian -constitution of Sparta, one can distinctly perceive the impress of that -fundamental idea of the State, that of the creation of the military -genius. If we now imagine the military primal State in its greatest -activity, at its proper "labour," and if we fix our glance upon the -whole technique of war, we cannot avoid correcting our notions picked -up from everywhere, as to the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of -labour" by the question, whether the idea of dignity is applicable -also to that labour, which has as its purpose the destruction of the -"dignified" man, as well as to the man who is entrusted with that -"dignified labour," or whether in this warlike task of the State those -mutually contradictory ideas do not neutralise one another. I should -like to think the warlike man to be a _means_ of the military genius -and his labour again only a tool in the hands of that same genius; and -not to him, as absolute man and non-genius, but to him as a means of -the genius--whose pleasure also can be to choose his tool's destruction -as a mere pawn sacrificed on the strategist's chessboard--is due a -degree of dignity, of that dignity namely, _to have been deemed worthy -of being a means of the genius._ But what is shown here in a single -instance is valid in the most general sense; every human being, with -his total activity, only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of _the_ -genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately -deduce the ethical conclusion, that "man in himself," the absolute man -possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties; only as a wholly -determined being serving unconscious purposes can man excuse his -existence. - -_Plato's perfect State_ is according to these considerations certainly -something still greater than even the warm-blooded among his admirers -believe, not to mention the smiling mien of superiority with which -our "historically" educated refuse such a fruit of antiquity. The -proper aim of the State, the Olympian existence and ever-renewed -procreation and preparation of the genius,--compared with which -all other things are only tools, expedients and factors towards -realisation--is here discovered with a poetic intuition and painted -with firmness. Plato saw through the awfully devastated Herma of the -then-existing State-life and perceived even then something divine in -its interior. He _believed_ that one might be able to take out this -divine image and that the grim and barbarically distorted outside and -shell did not belong to the essence of the State: the whole fervour -and sublimity of his political passion threw itself upon this belief, -upon that desire--and in the flames of this fire he perished. That in -his perfect State he did not place at the head _the_ genius in its -general meaning, but only the genius of wisdom and of knowledge, that -he altogether excluded the inspired artist from his State, that was -a rigid consequence of the Socratian judgment on art, which Plato, -struggling against himself, had made his own. This more external, -almost incidental gap must not prevent our recognising in the total -conception of the Platonic State the wonderfully great hieroglyph of -a profound and eternally to be interpreted _esoteric doctrine of the -connection between State and Genius._ What we believed we could divine -of this cryptograph we have said in this preface. - - - - -THE GREEK WOMAN - - -(Fragment, 1871) - - -Just as Plato from disguises and obscurities brought to light the -innermost purpose of the State, so also he conceived the chief cause -of the position of the _Hellenic Woman_ with regard to the State; in -both cases he saw in what existed around him the image of the ideas -manifested to him, and of these ideas of course the actual was only a -hazy picture and phantasmagoria. He who according to the usual custom -considers the position of the Hellenic Woman to be altogether unworthy -and repugnant to humanity, must also turn with this reproach against -the Platonic conception of this position; for, as it were, the existing -forms were only precisely set forth in this latter conception. Here -therefore our question repeats itself: should not the nature and the -position of the Hellenic Woman have a _necessary_ relation to the goals -of the Hellenic Will? - -Of course there is one side of the Platonic conception of woman, which -stands in abrupt contrast with Hellenic custom: Plato gives to woman a -full share in the rights, knowledge and duties of man, and considers -woman only as the weaker sex, in that she will not achieve remarkable -success in all things, without however disputing this sex's title to -all those things. We must not attach more value to; this strange notion -than to the expulsion of the artist out of the ideal State; these are -side-lines daringly mis-drawn, aberrations as it were of the hand -otherwise so sure and of the so calmly contemplating eye which at times -under the influence of the deceased master becomes dim and dejected; in -this mood he exaggerates the master's paradoxes and in the abundance of -his love gives himself satisfaction by very eccentrically intensifying -the latter's doctrines even to foolhardiness. - -The most significant word however that Plato as a Greek could say on -the relation of woman to the State, was that so objectionable demand, -that in the perfect State, the _Family was to cease._ At present let us -take no account of his abolishing even marriage, in order to carry out -this demand fully, and of his substituting solemn nuptials arranged by -order of the State, between the bravest men and the noblest women, for -the attainment of beautiful offspring. In that principal proposition -however he has indicated most distinctly--indeed too distinctly, -offensively distinctly--an important preparatory step of the Hellenic -Will towards the procreation of the genius. But in the customs of the -Hellenic people the claim of the family on man and child was extremely -limited: the man lived in the State, the child grew up for the State -and was guided by the hand of the State. The Greek Will took care that -the need of culture could not be satisfied in the seclusion of a small -circle. From the State the individual has to receive everything in -order to return everything to the State. Woman accordingly means to the -State, what _sleep_ does to man. In her nature lies the healing power, -which replaces that which has been used up, the beneficial rest in -which everything immoderate confines itself, the eternal Same, by which -the excessive and the surplus regulate themselves. In her the future -generation dreams. Woman is more closely related to Nature than man and -in all her essentials she remains ever herself. Culture is with her -always something external, a something which does not touch the kernel -that is eternally faithful to Nature, therefore the culture of woman -might well appear to the Athenian as something indifferent, yea--if one -only wanted to conjure it up in one's mind, as something ridiculous. -He who at once feels himself compelled from that to infer the position -of women among the Greeks as unworthy and all too cruel, should not -indeed take as his criterion the "culture" of modern woman and her -claims, against which it is sufficient just to point out the Olympian -women together with Penelope, Antigone, Elektra. Of course it is true -that these are ideal figures, but who would be able to create such -ideals out of the present world?--Further indeed is to be considered -_what sons_ these women have borne, and what women they must have been -to have given birth to such sons! The Hellenic woman as _mother_ had -to live in obscurity, because the political instinct together with -its highest aim demanded it. She had to vegetate like a plant, in -the narrow circle, as a symbol of the Epicurean wisdom λάθε βυώσας. -Again, in more recent times, with the complete disintegration of the -principle of the State, she had to step in as helper; the family as a -makeshift for the State is her work; and in this sense the _artistic -aim_ of the State had to abase itself to the level of a _domestic_ art. -Thereby it has been brought about, that the passion of love, as the -one realm wholly accessible to women, regulates our art to the very -core. Similarly, home-education considers itself so to speak as the -only natural one and suffers State-education only as a questionable -infringement upon the right of home-education: all this is right as -far as the modern State only is concerned.--With that the nature of -woman withal remains unaltered, but her _power_ is, according to the -position which the State takes up with regard to women, a different -one. Women have indeed really the power to make good to a certain -extent the deficiencies of the State--ever faithful to their nature, -which I have compared to sleep. In Greek antiquity they held that -position, which the most supreme will of the State assigned to them: -for that reason they have been glorified as never since. The goddesses -of Greek mythology are their images: the Pythia and the Sibyl, as well -as the Socratic Diotima are the priestesses out of whom divine wisdom -speaks. Now one understands why the proud resignation of the Spartan -woman at the news of her son's death in battle can be no fable. Woman -in relation to the State felt herself in her proper position, therefore -she had more _dignity_ than woman has ever had since. Plato who through -abolishing family and marriage still intensifies the position of woman, -feels now so much _reverence_ towards them, that oddly enough he is -misled by a subsequent statement of their equality with man, to abolish -again the order of rank which is their due: the highest triumph of the -woman of antiquity, to have seduced even the wisest! - -As long as the State is still in an embryonic condition woman as -_mother_ preponderates and determines the grade and the manifestations -of Culture: in the same way as woman is destined to complement the -disorganised State. What Tacitus says of German women: _inesse -quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut consilia -earum aspernantur aut responsa neglegunt,_ applies on the whole to -all nations not yet arrived at the real State. In such stages one -feels only the more strongly that which at all times becomes again -manifest, that the instincts of woman as the bulwark of the future -generation are invincible and that in her care for the preservation -of the species Nature speaks out of these instincts very distinctly. -How far this divining power reaches is determined, it seems, by the -greater or lesser consolidation of the State: in disorderly and more -arbitrary conditions, where the whim or the passion of the individual -man carries along with itself whole tribes, then woman suddenly comes -forward as the warning prophetess. But in Greece too there was a never -slumbering care that the terribly overcharged political instinct might -splinter into dust and atoms the little political organisms before -they attained their goals in any way. Here the Hellenic Will created -for itself ever new implements by means of which it spoke, adjusting, -moderating, warning: above all it is in the _Pythia,_ that the power -of woman to compensate the State manifested itself so clearly, as it -has never done since. That a people split up thus into small tribes -and municipalities, was yet at bottom _whole_ and was performing the -task of its nature within its faction, was assured by that wonderful -phenomenon the Pythia and the Delphian oracle: for always, as long as -Hellenism created its great works of art, it spoke out of _one_ mouth -and as _one_ Pythia. We cannot hold back the portentous discernment -that to the Will individuation means much suffering, and that in order -to reach those _individuals_ It _needs_ an enormous step-ladder of -individuals. It is true our brains reel with the consideration whether -the Will in order to arrive at _Art,_ has perhaps effused Itself out -into these worlds, stars, bodies, and atoms: at least it ought to -become clear to us then, that Art is not necessary for the individuals, -but for the Will itself: a sublime outlook at which we shall be -permitted to glance once more from another position. - - - - -ON MUSIC AND WORDS - - -(Fragment, 1871) - - -What we here have asserted of the relationship between language and -music must be valid too, for equal reasons concerning the relationship -of _Mime_ to _Music._ The Mime too, as the intensified symbolism of -man's gestures, is, measured by the eternal significance of music, -only a simile, which brings into expression the innermost secret -of music but very superficially, namely on the substratum of the -passionately moved human body. But if we include language also in the -category of bodily symbolism, and compare the _drama,_ according to -the canon advanced, with music, then I venture to think, a proposition -of Schopenhauer will come into the clearest light, to which reference -must be made again later on. "It might be admissible, although a purely -musical mind does not demand it, to join and adapt words or even a -clearly represented action to the pure language of tones, although the -latter, being self-sufficient, needs no help; so that our perceiving -and reflecting intellect, which does not like to be quite idle, may -meanwhile have light and analogous occupation also. By this concession -to the intellect man's attention adheres even more closely to music, -by this at the same time, too, is placed underneath that which the -tones indicate in their general metaphorless language of the heart, -a visible picture, as it were a schema, as an example illustrating a -general idea ... indeed such things will even heighten the effect -of music." (Schopenhauer, Parerga, II., "On the Metaphysics of the -Beautiful and Æsthetics," § 224.) If we disregard the naturalistic -external motivation according to which our perceiving and reflecting -intellect does not like to be quite idle when listening to music, and -attention led by the hand of an obvious action follows better--then -the drama in relation to music has been characterised by Schopenhauer -for the best reasons as a schema, as an example illustrating a general -idea: and when he adds "indeed such things will even heighten the -effect of music" then the enormous universality and originality of -vocal music, of the connection of tone with metaphor and idea guarantee -the correctness of this utterance. The music of every people begins in -closest connection with lyricism and long before absolute music can be -thought of, the music of a people in that connection passes through -the most important stages of development. If we understand this primal -lyricism of a people, as indeed we must, to be an imitation of the -artistic typifying Nature, then as the original prototype of that union -of music and lyricism must be regarded: _the duality in the essence -of language,_ already typified by Nature. Now, after discussing the -relation of music to metaphor we will fathom deeper this essence of -language. - -In the multiplicity of languages the fact at once manifests itself, -that word and thing do not necessarily coincide with one another -completely, but that the word is a symbol. But what does the word -symbolise? Most certainly only conceptions, be these now conscious -ones or as in the greater number of cases, unconscious; for how -should a word-symbol correspond to that innermost nature of which we -and the world are images? Only as conceptions we know that kernel, -only in its metaphorical expressions are we familiar with it; beyond -that point there is nowhere a direct bridge which could lead us to it. -The whole life of impulses, too, the play of feelings, sensations, -emotions, volitions, is known to us--as I am forced to insert here in -opposition to Schopenhauer--after a most rigid self-examination, not -according to its essence but merely as conception; and we may well be -permitted to say, that even Schopenhauer's "Will" is nothing else but -the most general phenomenal form of a Something otherwise absolutely -indecipherable. If therefore we must acquiesce in the rigid necessity -of getting nowhere beyond the conceptions we can nevertheless again -distinguish two main species within their realm. The one species -manifest themselves to us as pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations and -accompany all other conceptions as a never-lacking fundamental basis. -This most general manifestation, out of which and by which alone we -understand all Becoming and all Willing and for which we will retain -the name "Will" has now too in language its own symbolic sphere: -and in truth this sphere is equally fundamental to the language, -as that manifestation is fundamental to all other conceptions. All -degrees of pleasure and displeasure--expressions of _one_ primal -cause unfathomable to us--symbolise themselves in _the tone of the -speaker:_ whereas all the other conceptions are indicated by the -_gesture-symbolism_ of the speaker. In so far as that primal cause -is the same in all men, the _tonal subsoil_ is also the common -one, comprehensible beyond the difference of language. Out of it -now develops the more arbitrary gesture-symbolism which is not -wholly adequate for its basis: and with which begins the diversity -of languages, whose multiplicity we are permitted to consider--to -use a simile--as a strophic text to that primal melody of the -pleasure-and-displeasure-language. The whole realm of the consonantal -and vocal we believe we may reckon only under gesture-symbolism: -consonants _and_ vowels without that fundamental tone which is -necessary above all else, are nothing but _positions_ of the organs -of speech, in short, gestures--; as soon as we imagine the _word_ -proceeding out of the mouth of man, then first of all the root of the -word, and the basis of that gesture-symbolism, the _tonal subsoil,_ -the echo of the pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations originate. As our -whole corporeality stands in relation to that original phenomenon, the -"Will," so the word built out of its consonants and vowels stands in -relation to its tonal basis. - -This original phenomenon, the "Will," with its scale of -pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations attains in the development of music -an ever more adequate symbolic expression: and to this historical -process the continuous effort of lyric poetry runs parallel, the effort -to transcribe music into metaphors: exactly as this double-phenomenon, -according to the just completed disquisition, lies typified in language. - -He who has followed us into these difficult contemplations readily, -attentively, and with some imagination--and with kind indulgence where -the expression has been too scanty or too unconditional--will now -have the advantage with us, of laying before himself more seriously and -answering more deeply than is usually the case some stirring points of -controversy of present-day æsthetics and still more of contemporary -artists. Let us think now, after all our assumptions, what an -undertaking it must be, to set music to a poem; _i.e.,_ to illustrate -a poem by music, in order to help music thereby to obtain a language -of ideas. What a perverted world! A task that appears to my mind like -that of a son wanting to create his father! Music can create metaphors -out of itself, which will always however be but schemata, instances as -it were of her intrinsic general contents. But how should the metaphor, -the conception, create music out of itself! Much less could the idea, -or, as one has said, the "poetical idea" do this. As certainly as a -bridge leads out of the mysterious castle of the musician into the free -land of the metaphors--and the lyric poet steps across it--as certainly -is it impossible to go the contrary way, although some are said to -exist who fancy they have done so. One might people the air with the -phantasy of a Raphael, one might see St. Cecilia, as he does, listening -enraptured to the harmonies of the choirs of angels--no tone issues -from this world apparently lost in music: even if we imagined that that -harmony in reality, as by a miracle, began to sound for us, whither -would Cecilia, Paul and Magdalena disappear from us, whither even -the singing choir of angels! We should at once cease to be Raphael: -and as in that picture the earthly instruments lie shattered on the -ground, so our painter's vision, defeated by the higher, would fade -and die away.--How nevertheless could the miracle happen? How should -the Apollonian world of the eye quite engrossed in contemplation be -able to create out of itself the tone, which on the contrary symbolises -a sphere which is excluded and conquered just by that very Apollonian -absorption in Appearance? The delight at Appearance cannot raise out -of itself the pleasure at Non-appearance; the delight of perceiving is -delight only by the fact that nothing reminds us of a sphere in which -individuation is broken and abolished. If we have characterised at -all correctly the Apollonian in opposition to the Dionysean, then the -thought which attributes to the metaphor, the idea, the appearance, -in some way the power of producing out of itself the tone, must -appear to us strangely wrong. We will not be referred, in order to be -refuted, to the musician who writes music to existing lyric poems; for -after all that has been said we shall be compelled to assert that the -relationship between the lyric poem and its setting must in any case -be a different one from that between a father and his child. Then what -exactly? - -Here now we may be met on the ground of a favourite æsthetic notion -with the proposition, "It is not the poem which gives birth to -the setting but the _sentiment_ created by the poem." I do not -agree with that; the more subtle or powerful stirring-up of that -pleasure-and-displeasure-subsoil is in the realm of productive art -_the_ element which is inartistic in itself; indeed only its total -exclusion makes the complete self-absorption and disinterested -perception of the artist possible. Here perhaps one might retaliate -that I myself just now predicated about the "Will," that in music -"Will" came to an ever more adequate symbolic expression. My answer, -condensed into an æsthetic axiom, is this: _the Will is the object of -music but not the origin of it,_ that is the Will in its very greatest -universality, as the most original manifestation, under which is to -be understood all Becoming. That, which we call _feeling,_ is with -regard to this Will already permeated and saturated with conscious and -unconscious conceptions and is therefore no longer directly the object -of music; it is unthinkable then that these feelings should be able -to create music out of themselves. Take for instance the feelings of -love, fear and hope: music can no longer do anything with them in a -direct way, every one of them is already so filled with conceptions. -On the contrary these feelings can serve to symbolise music, as the -lyric poet does who translates for himself into the simile-world of -feelings that conceptually and metaphorically unapproachable realm -of the Will, the proper content and object of music. The lyric poet -resembles all those hearers of music who are conscious of an _effect -of music on their emotions;_ the distant and removed power of music -appeals, with them, to an _intermediate realm_ which gives to them -as it were a foretaste, a symbolic preliminary conception of music -proper, it appeals to the intermediate realm of the emotions. One might -be permitted to say about them, with respect to the Will, the only -object of music, that they bear the same relation to this Will, as the -analogous morning-dream, according to Schopenhauer's theory, bears to -the dream proper. To all those, however, who are unable to get at music -except with their emotions, is to be said, that they will ever remain -in the entrance-hall, and will never have access to the sanctuary of -music: which, as I said, emotion cannot show but only symbolise. - -With regard however to the origin of music, I have already explained -that that can never lie in the Will, but must rather rest in the lap of -that force, which under the form of the "Will" creates out of itself a -visionary world: _the origin of music lies beyond all individuation,_ a -proposition, which after our discussion on the Dionysean self-evident. -At this point I take the liberty of setting forth again comprehensively -side by side those decisive propositions which the antithesis of the -Dionysean and Apollonian dealt with has compelled us to enunciate: - -The "Will," as the most original manifestation, is the object of music: -in this sense music can be called imitation of Nature, but of Nature in -its most general form.-- - -The "Will" itself and the feelings--manifestations of the Will already -permeated with conceptions--are wholly incapable of creating music out -of themselves, just as on the other hand it is utterly denied to music -to represent feelings, or to have feelings as its object, while Will is -its only object.-- - -He who carries away feelings as effects of music has within them as -it were a symbolic intermediate realm, which can give him a foretaste -of music, but excludes him at the same time from her innermost -sanctuaries.-- - -The lyric poet interprets music to himself through the symbolic -world of emotions, whereas he himself, in the calm of the Apollonian -contemplation, is exempted from those emotions.-- - -When, therefore, the musician writes a setting to a lyric poem he is -moved as musician neither through the images nor through the emotional -language in the text; but a musical inspiration coming from quite a -different sphere _chooses_ for itself that song-text as allegorical -expression. There cannot therefore be any question as to a necessary -relation between poem and music; for the two worlds brought here into -connection are too strange to one another to enter into more than a -superficial alliance; the song-text is just a symbol and stands to -music in the same relation as the Egyptian hieroglyph of bravery did to -the brave warrior himself. During the highest revelations of music we -even feel involuntarily the _crudeness_ of every figurative effort and -of every emotion dragged in for purposes of analogy; for example, the -last quartets of Beethoven quite put to shame all illustration and the -entire realm of empiric reality. The symbol, in face of the god really -revealing himself, has no longer any meaning; moreover it appears as an -offensive superficiality. - -One must not think any the worse of us for considering from this point -of view one item so that we may speak about it without reserve, namely -the _last movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony,_ a movement which -is unprecedented and unanalysable in its charms. To the dithyrambic -world-redeeming exultation of this music Schiller's poem "To Joy," -is wholly incongruous, yea, like cold moon-light, pales beside that -sea of flame. Who would rob me of this sure feeling? Yea, who would -be able to dispute that that feeling during the hearing of this music -does not find expression in a scream only because we, wholly impotent -through music for metaphor and word, already _hear nothing at all -from Schiller's poem._ All that noble sublimity, yea the grandeur of -Schiller's verses has, beside the truly naïve-innocent folk-melody of -joy, a disturbing, troubling, even crude and offensive effect; only -the ever fuller development of the choir's song and the masses of the -orchestra preventing us from hearing them, keep from us that sensation -of incongruity. What therefore shall we think of that awful æsthetic -superstition that Beethoven himself made a solemn statement as to his -belief in the limits of absolute music, in that fourth movement of the -Ninth Symphony, yea that he as it were with it unlocked the portals -of a new art, within which music had been enabled to represent even -metaphor and idea and whereby music had been opened to the "conscious -mind." And what does Beethoven himself tell us when he has choir-song -introduced by a recitative? "Alas friends, let us intonate not these -tones but more pleasing and joyous ones!" More pleasing and joyous -ones! For that he needed the convincing tone of the human voice, for -that he needed the music of innocence in the folk-song. Not the word, -but the "more pleasing" sound, not the idea but the most heartfelt -joyful tone was chosen by the sublime master in his longing for the -most soul-thrilling ensemble of his orchestra. And how could one -misunderstand him! Rather may the same be said of this movement as -_Richard Wagner_ says of the great "_Missa Solemnis_" which he calls "a -pure symphonic work of the most genuine Beethoven-spirit" (Beethoven, -p. 42). "The voices are treated here quite in the sense of human -instruments, in which sense Schopenhauer quite rightly wanted these -human voices to be considered; the text underlying them is understood -by us in these great Church compositions, not in its conceptual -meaning, but it serves in the sense of the musical work of art, merely -as material for vocal music and does not stand to our musically -determined sensation in a disturbing position simply because it does -not incite in us any rational conceptions but, as its ecclesiastical -character conditions too, only touches us with the impression of -well-known symbolic creeds." Besides I do not doubt that Beethoven, had -he written the Tenth Symphony--of which drafts are still extant--would -have composed just the _Tenth_ Symphony. - -Let us now approach, after these preparations, the discussion of the -_opera,_ so as to be able to proceed afterwards from the opera to -its counterpart in the Greek tragedy. What we had to observe in the -last movement of the Ninth, _i.e.,_ on the highest level of modern -music-development, viz., that the word-content goes down unheard in -the general sea of sound, is nothing isolated and peculiar, but the -general and eternally valid norm in the vocal music of all times, the -norm which alone is adequate to the origin of lyric song. The man in -a state of Dionysean excitement has a _listener_ just as little as -the orgiastic crowd, a listener to whom he might have something to -communicate, a listener as the epic narrator and generally speaking the -Apollonian artist, to be sure, presupposes. It is rather in the nature -of the Dionysean art, that it has no consideration for the listener: -the inspired servant of Dionysos is, as I said in a former place, -understood only by his compeers. But if we now imagine a listener at -those endemic outbursts of Dionysean excitement then we shall have to -prophesy for him a fate similar to that which Pentheus the discovered -eavesdropper suffered, namely, to be torn to pieces by the Mænads. The -lyric musician sings "as the bird sings,"[1] alone, out of innermost -compulsion; when the listener comes to him with a demand he must -become dumb. Therefore it would be altogether unnatural to ask from -the lyric musician that one should also understand the text-words of -his song, unnatural because here a demand is made by the listener, who -has no right at all during the lyric outburst to claim anything. Now -with the poetry of the great ancient lyric poets in your hand, put -the question honestly to yourself whether they can have even thought -of making themselves clear to the mass of the people standing around -and listening, clear with their world of metaphors and thoughts; -answer this serious question with a look at Pindar and the Æschylian -choir songs. These most daring and obscure intricacies of thought, -this whirl of metaphors, ever impetuously reproducing itself, this -oracular tone of the whole, which we, _without_ the diversion of music -and orchestration, so often cannot penetrate even with the closest -attention--was this whole world of miracles transparent as glass to -the Greek crowd, yea, a metaphorical-conceptual interpretation of -music? And with such mysteries of thought as are to be found in Pindar -do you think the wonderful poet could have wished to elucidate the -music already strikingly distinct? Should we here not be forced to an -insight into the very nature of the lyricist--the artistic man, who -to _himself_ must interpret music through the symbolism of metaphors -and emotions, but who has nothing to communicate to the listener; an -artist who, in complete aloofness, even forgets those who stand eagerly -listening near him. And as the lyricist his hymns, so the people sing -the folk-song, for themselves, out of in-most impulse, unconcerned -whether the word is comprehensible to him who does not join in the -song. Let us think of our own experiences in the realm of higher -art-music: what did we understand of the text of a Mass of Palestrina, -of a Cantata of Bach, of an Oratorio of Händel, if we ourselves perhaps -did not join in singing? Only for _him who joins_ in singing do lyric -poetry and vocal music exist; the listener stands before it as before -absolute music. - -But now the _opera_ begins, according to the clearest testimonies, with -the _demand of the listener to understand the word._ - -What? The listener _demands?_ The word is to be understood? - -But to bring music into the service of a series of metaphors and -conceptions, to use it as a means to an end, to the strengthening -and elucidation of such conceptions and metaphors--such a peculiar -presumption as is found in the concept of an "opera," reminds me of -that ridiculous person who endeavours to lift himself up into the air -with his own arms; that which this fool and which the opera according -to that idea attempt are absolute impossibilities. That idea of the -opera does not demand perhaps an abuse from music but--as I said--an -impossibility. Music never _can_ become a means; one may push, -screw, torture it; as tone, as roll of the drum, in its crudest and -simplest stages, it still defeats poetry and abases the latter to its -reflection. The opera as a species of art according to that concept is -therefore not only an aberration of music, but an erroneous conception -of æsthetics. If I herewith, after all, justify the nature of the opera -for æsthetics, I am of course far from justifying at the same time bad -opera music or bad opera-verses. The worst music can still mean, as -compared with the best poetry, the Dionysean world-subsoil, and the -worst poetry can be mirror, image and reflection of this subsoil, if -together with the best music: as certainly, namely, as the single tone -against the metaphor is already Dionysean, and the single metaphor -together with idea and word against music is already Apollonian. Yea, -even bad music together with bad poetry can still inform as to the -nature of music and poesy. - -When therefore Schopenhauer felt Bellini's "Norma," for example, as the -fulfilment of tragedy, with regard to that opera's music and poetry, -then he, in Dionysean-Apollonian emotion and self-forgetfulness, was -quite entitled to do so, because he perceived music and poetry in -their most general, as it were, philosophical value, _as_ music and -poetry: but with that judgment he showed a poorly educated taste,--for -good taste always has historical perspective. To us, who intentionally -in this investigation avoid any question of the historic value of an -art-phenomenon and endeavour to focus only the phenomenon itself, -in its unaltered eternal meaning, and consequently in its _highest_ -type, too,--to us the art-species of the "opera" seems to be justified -as much as the folk-song, in so far as we find in both that union -of the Dionysean and Apollonian and are permitted to assume for the -opera--namely for the highest type of the opera--an origin analogous to -that of the folk-song. Only in so far as the opera historically known -to us has a completely different origin from that of the folk-song -do we reject this "opera," which stands in the same relation to that -generic notion just defended by us, as the marionette does to a living -human being. It is certain, music never can become a means in the -service of the text, but must always defeat the text, yet music must -become bad when the composer interrupts every Dionysean force rising -within himself by an anxious regard for the words and gestures of his -marionettes. If the poet of the opera-text has offered him nothing more -than the usual schematised figures with their Egyptian regularity, then -the freer, more unconditional, more Dionysean is the development of the -music; and the more she despises all dramatic requirements, so much -the higher will be the value of the opera. In this sense it is true the -opera is, at its best, good music, and nothing but music: whereas the -jugglery performed at the same time is, as it were, only a fantastic -disguise of the orchestra, above all, of the most important instruments -the orchestra has: the singers; and from this jugglery the judicious -listener turns away laughing. If the mass is diverted by _this very -jugglery_ and only _permits_ the music with it, then the mob fares as -all those do who value the frame of a good picture higher than the -picture itself. Who treats such naïve aberrations with a serious or -even pathetic reproach? - -But what will the opera mean as "dramatic" music, in its possibly -farthest distance from pure music, efficient in itself, and purely -Dionysean? Let us imagine a passionate drama full of incidents which -carries away the spectator, and which is already sure of success -by its plot: what will "dramatic" music be able to add, if it does -not take away something? Firstly, it _will_ take away much: for in -every moment where for once the Dionysean power of music strikes -the listener, the eye is dimmed that sees the action, the eye that -became absorbed in the individuals appearing before it: the listener -now _forgets_ the drama and becomes alive again to it only when the -Dionysean spell over him has been broken. In so far, however, as music -makes the listener forget the drama, it is not yet "dramatic" music: -but what kind of music is that which is not _allowed_ to exercise -any Dionysean power over the listener? And how is it possible? It is -possible as _purely conventional symbolism,_ out of which convention -has sucked all natural strength: as music which has diminished to -symbols of remembrance: and its effect aims at reminding the spectator -of something, which at the sight of the drama must not escape him lest -he should misunderstand it: as a trumpet signal is an invitation for -the horse to trot. Lastly, before the drama commenced and in interludes -or during tedious passages, doubtful as to dramatic effect, yea, -even in its highest moments, there would still be permitted another -species of remembrance-music, no longer purely conventional, namely -_emotional-music,_ music, as a stimulant to dull or wearied nerves. -I am able to distinguish in the so-called dramatic music these two -elements only: a conventional rhetoric and remembrance-music, and a -sensational music with an effect essentially physical: and thus it -vacillates between the noise of the drum and the signal-horn, like -the mood of the warrior who goes into the battle. But now the mind, -regaling itself on pure music and educated through comparison, demands -a _masquerade_ for those two wrong tendencies of music; "Remembrance" -and "Emotion" are to be played, but in good music, which must be -in itself enjoyable, yea, valuable; what despair for the dramatic -musician, who must mask the big drum by good music, which, however, -must nevertheless have no purely musical, but only a stimulating -effect! And now comes the great Philistine public nodding its thousand -heads and enjoys this "dramatic music" which is ever ashamed of itself, -enjoys it to the very last morsel, without perceiving anything of its -shame and embarrassment. Rather the public feels its skin agreeably -tickled, for indeed homage is being rendered in all forms and ways to -the public! To the pleasure-hunting, dull-eyed sensualist, who needs -excitement, to the conceited "educated person" who has accustomed -himself to good drama and good music as to good food, without after all -making much out of it, to the forgetful and absent-minded egoist, who -must be led back to the work of art with force and with signal-horns -because selfish plans continually pass through his mind aiming at -gain or pleasure. Woe-begone dramatic musicians! "Draw near and view -your Patrons' faces! The half are coarse, the half are cold." "Why -should you rack, poor foolish Bards, for ends like these the gracious -Muses?"[2] And that the muses are tormented, even tortured and flayed, -these veracious miserable ones do not themselves deny! - -We had assumed a passionate drama, carrying away the spectator, which -even without music would be sure of its effect. I fear that that in -it which is "poetry" and _not_ action proper will stand in relation -to true poetry as dramatic music to music in general: it will be -remembrance-and emotional-poetry. Poetry will serve as a means, in -order to recall in a conventional fashion feelings and passions, -the expression of which has been found by real poets and has become -celebrated, yea, normal with them. Further, this poetry will be -expected in dangerous moments to assist the proper "action,"--whether -a criminalistic horror-story or an exhibition of witchery mad with -shifting the scenes,--and to spread a covering veil over the crudeness -of the action itself. Shamefully conscious, that the poetry is only -masquerade which cannot bear the light of day, such a "dramatic" -rime-jingle clamours now for "dramatic" music, as on the other hand -again the poetaster of such dramas is met after one-fourth of the -way by the dramatic musician with his talent for the drum and the -signal-horn and his shyness of genuine music, trusting in itself and -self-sufficient. And now they see one another; and these Apollonian and -Dionysean caricatures, this _par nobile fratrum,_ embrace one another! - - -[1] A reference to Goethe's ballad, The Minstrel, st. 5: - -"I sing as sings the bird, whose note The leafy bough is heard on. The -song that falters from my throat For me is ample guerdon." TR. - - -[2] A quotation from Goethe's "Faust": Part I., lines 91, 92, and 95, -96.--TR. - - - - -HOMER'S CONTEST - - -Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872) - - -When one speaks of "_humanity_" the notion lies at the bottom, -that humanity is that which _separates_ and distinguishes man from -Nature. But such a distinction does not in reality exist: the -"natural" qualities and the properly called "human" ones have grown -up inseparably together. Man in his highest and noblest capacities -_is_ Nature and bears in himself her awful twofold character. His -abilities generally considered dreadful and inhuman are perhaps indeed -the fertile soil, out of which alone can grow forth all humanity in -emotions, actions and works. - -Thus the Greeks, the most humane men of ancient times, have in -themselves a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction: -a trait, which in the grotesquely magnified image of the Hellene, in -Alexander the Great, is very plainly visible, which, however, in their -whole history, as well as in their mythology, must terrify us who -meet them with the emasculate idea of modern humanity. When Alexander -has the feet of Batis, the brave defender of Gaza, bored through, -and binds the living body to his chariot in order to drag him about -exposed to the scorn of his soldiers, that is a sickening caricature of -Achilles, who at night ill-uses Hector's corpse by a similar trailing; -but even this trait has for us something offensive, something which -inspires horror. It gives us a peep into the abysses of hatred. With -the same sensation perhaps we stand before the bloody and insatiable -self-laceration of two Greek parties, as for example in the Corcyrean -revolution. When the victor, in a fight of the cities, according to -the _law_ of warfare, executes the whole male population and sells all -the women and children into slavery, we see, in the sanction of such a -law, that the Greek deemed it a positive necessity to allow his hatred -to break forth unimpeded; in such moments the compressed and swollen -feeling relieved itself; the tiger bounded forth, a voluptuous cruelty -shone out of his fearful eye. Why had the Greek sculptor to represent -again and again war and fights in innumerable repetitions, extended -human bodies whose sinews are tightened through hatred or through the -recklessness of triumph, fighters wounded and writhing with pain, or -the dying with the last rattle in their throat? Why did the whole Greek -world exult in the fighting scenes of the "Iliad"? I am afraid, we do -not understand them enough in "Greek fashion," and that we should even -shudder, if for once we _did_ understand them thus. - -But what lies, as the mother-womb of the Hellenic, _behind_ the Homeric -world? In the _latter,_ by the extremely artistic definiteness, and the -calm and purity of the lines we are already lifted far above the purely -material amalgamation: its colours, by an artistic deception, appear -lighter, milder, warmer; its men, in this coloured, warm illumination, -appear better and more sympathetic--but where do we look, if, no -longer guided and protected by Homer's hand, we step backwards into -the pre-Homeric world? Only into night and horror, into the products -of a fancy accustomed to the horrible. What earthly existence is -reflected in the loathsome-awful theogonian lore: a life swayed only -by the _children of the night,_ strife, amorous desires, deception, -age and death. Let us imagine the suffocating atmosphere of Hesiod's -poem, still thickened and darkened and without all the mitigations and -purifications, which poured over Hellas from Delphi and the numerous -seats of the gods! If we mix this thickened Boeotian air with the grim -voluptuousness of the Etruscans, then such a reality would _extort_ -from us a world of myths within which Uranos, Kronos and Zeus and -the struggles of the Titans would appear as a relief. Combat in this -brooding atmosphere is salvation and safety; the cruelty of victory is -the summit of life's glories. And just as in truth the idea of Greek -law has developed from _murder_ and expiation of murder, so also nobler -Civilisation takes her first wreath of victory from the altar of the -expiation of murder. Behind that bloody age stretches a wave-furrow -deep into Hellenic history. The names of Orpheus, of Musæus, and -their cults indicate to what consequences the uninterrupted sight of -a world of warfare and cruelty led--to the loathing of existence, to -the conception of this existence as a punishment to be borne to the -end, to the belief in the identity of existence and indebtedness. But -these particular conclusions are not specifically Hellenic; through -them Greece comes into contact with India and the Orient generally. The -Hellenic genius had ready yet another answer to the question: what does -a life of fighting and of victory mean? and gives this answer in the -whole breadth of Greek history. - -In order to understand the latter we must start from the fact that -the Greek genius admitted the existing fearful impulse, and deemed it -_justified;_ whereas in the Orphic phase of thought was contained the -belief that life with such an impulse as its root would not be worth -living. Strife and the pleasure of victory were acknowledged; and -nothing separates the Greek world more from ours than the _colouring,_ -derived hence, of some ethical ideas, _e.g.,_ of _Eris_ and of _Envy_. - -When the traveller Pausanius during his wanderings through Greece -visited the Helicon, a very old copy of the first didactic poem of the -Greeks, "The Works and Days" of Hesiod, was shown to him, inscribed -upon plates of lead and severely damaged by time and weather. However -he recognised this much, that, unlike the usual copies, it had _not_ -at its head that little hymnus on Zeus, but began at once with the -declaration: "_Two_ Eris-goddesses are on earth." This is one of the -most noteworthy Hellenic thoughts and worthy to be impressed on the -new-comer immediately at the entrance-gate of Greek ethics. "One would -like to praise the one Eris, just as much as to blame the other, if -one uses one's reason. For these two goddesses have quite different -dispositions. For the one, the cruel one, furthers the evil war and -feud! No mortal likes her, but under the yoke of need one pays honour -to the burdensome Eris, according to the decree of the immortals. She, -as the elder, gave birth to black night. Zeus the high-ruling one, -however, placed the other Eris upon the roots of the earth and among -men as a much better one. She urges even the unskilled man to work, and -if one who lacks property beholds another who is rich, then he hastens -to sow in similar fashion and to plant and to put his house in order; -the neighbour vies with the neighbour who strives after fortune. Good -is this Eris to men. The potter also has a grudge against the potter, -and the carpenter against the carpenter; the beggar envies the beggar, -and the singer the singer." - -The two last verses which treat of the _odium figulinum_ appear to -our scholars to be incomprehensible in this place. According to their -judgment the predicates: "grudge" and "envy" fit only the nature of -the evil Eris, and for this reason they do not hesitate to designate -these verses as spurious or thrown by chance into this place. For -that judgment however a system of Ethics other than the Hellenic must -have inspired these scholars unawares; for in these verses to the -good Eris Aristotle finds no offence. And not only Aristotle but the -whole Greek antiquity thinks of spite and envy otherwise than we do -and agrees with Hesiod, who first designates as an evil one that Eris -who leads men against one another to a hostile war of extermination, -and secondly praises another Eris as the good one, who as jealousy, -spite, envy, incites men to activity but not to the action of war to -the knife but to the action of _contest._ The Greek is _envious_ and -conceives of this quality not as a blemish, but as the effect of a -_beneficent_ deity. What a gulf of ethical judgment between us and him? -Because he is envious he also feels, with every superfluity of honour, -riches, splendour and fortune, the envious eye of a god resting on -himself, and he fears this envy; in this case the latter reminds him -of the transitoriness of every human lot; he dreads his very happiness -and, sacrificing the best of it, he bows before the divine envy. -This conception does not perhaps estrange him from his gods; their -significance on the contrary is expressed by the thought that with them -man in whose soul jealousy is enkindled against every other living -being, is _never_ allowed to venture into contest. In the fight of -Thamyris with the Muses, of Marsyas with Apollo, in the heart-moving -fate of Niobe appears the horrible opposition of the two powers, who -must never fight with one another, man and god. - -The greater and more sublime however a Greek is, the brighter in him -appears the ambitious flame, devouring everybody who runs with him on -the same track. Aristotle once made a list of such contests on a large -scale; among them is the most striking instance how even a dead person -can still incite a living one to consuming jealousy; thus for example -Aristotle designates the relation between the Kolophonian Xenophanes -and Homer. We do not understand this attack on the national hero of -poetry in all its strength, if we do not imagine, as later on also with -Plato, the root of this attack to be the ardent desire to step into -the place of the overthrown poet and to inherit his fame. Every great -Hellene hands on the torch of the contest; at every great virtue a new -light is kindled. If the young Themistocles could not sleep at the -thought of the laurels of Miltiades so his early awakened bent released -itself only in the long emulation with Aristides in that uniquely -noteworthy, purely instinctive genius of his political activity, which -Thucydides describes. How characteristic are both question and answer, -when a notable opponent of Pericles is asked, whether he or Pericles -was the better wrestler in the city, and he gives the answer: "Even if -I throw him down he denies that he has fallen, attains his purpose and -convinces those who saw him fall." - -If one wants to see that sentiment unashamed in its naïve expressions, -the sentiment as to the necessity of contest lest the State's welfare -be threatened, one should think of the original meaning of _Ostracism,_ -as for example the Ephesians pronounced it at the banishment of -Hermodor. "Among us nobody shall be the best; if however someone is the -best, then let him be so elsewhere and among others." Why should not -someone be the best? Because with that the contest would fail, and the -eternal life-basis of the Hellenic State would be endangered. Later on -Ostracism receives quite another position with regard to the contest; -it is applied, when the danger becomes obvious that one of the great -contesting politicians and party-leaders feels himself urged on in -the heat of the conflict towards harmful and destructive measures and -dubious _coups d'état._ The original sense of this peculiar institution -however is not that of a safety-valve but that of a stimulant. -The all-excelling individual was to be removed in order that the -contest of forces might re-awaken, a thought which is hostile to the -"exclusiveness" of genius in the modern sense but which assumes that in -the natural order of things there are always _several_ geniuses which -incite one another to action, as much also as they hold one another -within the bounds of moderation. That is the kernel of the Hellenic -contest-conception: it abominates autocracy, and fears its dangers; it -desires as a _preventive_ against the genius--a second genius. - -Every natural gift must develop itself by contest. Thus the Hellenic -national pedagogy demands, whereas modern educators fear nothing as -much as, the unchaining of the so-called ambition. Here one fears -selfishness as the "evil in itself"--with the exception of the -Jesuits, who agree with the Ancients and who, possibly, for that -reason, are the most efficient educators of our time. They seem to -believe that Selfishness, _i.e.,_ the individual element is only the -most powerful _agens_ but that it obtains its character as "good" and -"evil" essentially from the aims towards which it strives. To the -Ancients however the aim of the agonistic education was the welfare of -the whole, of the civic society. Every Athenian for instance was to -cultivate his Ego in contest, so far that it should be of the highest -service to Athens and should do the least harm. It was not unmeasured -and immeasurable as modern ambition generally is; the youth thought of -the welfare of his native town when he vied with others in running, -throwing or singing; it was her glory that he wanted to increase with -his own; it was to his town's gods that he dedicated the wreaths which -the umpires as a mark of honour set upon his head. Every Greek from -childhood felt within himself the burning wish to be in the contest -of the towns an instrument for the welfare of his own town; in this -his selfishness was kindled into flame, by this his selfishness was -bridled and restricted. Therefore the individuals in antiquity were -freer, because their aims were nearer and more tangible. Modern man, on -the contrary, is everywhere hampered by infinity, like the fleet-footed -Achilles in the allegory of the Eleate Zeno: infinity impedes him, he -does not even overtake the tortoise. - -But as the youths to be educated were brought up struggling against -one another, so their educators were in turn in emulation amongst -themselves. Distrustfully jealous, the great musical masters, Pindar -and Simonides, stepped side by side; in rivalry the sophist, the higher -teacher of antiquity meets his fellow-sophist; even the most universal -kind of instruction, through the drama, was imparted to the people -only under the form of an enormous wrestling of the great musical and -dramatic artists. How wonderful! "And even the artist has a grudge -against the artist!" And the modern man dislikes in an artist nothing -so much as the personal battle-feeling, whereas the Greek recognises -the artist _only in such a personal struggle._ There where the modern -suspects weakness of the work of art, the Hellene seeks the source of -his highest strength! That, which by way of example in Plato is of -special artistic importance in his dialogues, is usually the result -of an emulation with the art of the orators, of the sophists, of the -dramatists of his time, invented deliberately in order that at the end -he could say: "Behold, I can also do what my great rivals can; yea -I can do it even better than they. No Protagoras has composed such -beautiful myths as I, no dramatist such a spirited and fascinating -whole as the Symposion, no orator penned such an oration as I put -up in the Georgias--and now I reject all that together and condemn -all imitative art! Only the contest made me a poet, a sophist, an -orator!" What a problem unfolds itself there before us, if we ask -about the relationship between the contest and the conception of the -work of art!--If on the other hand we remove the contest from Greek -life, then we look at once into the pre-Homeric abyss of horrible -savagery, hatred, and pleasure in destruction. This phenomenon alas! -shows itself frequently when a great personality was, owing to an -enormously brilliant deed, suddenly withdrawn from the contest and -became _hors de concours_ according to his, and his fellow-citizens' -judgment. Almost without exception the effect is awful; and if one -usually draws from these consequences the conclusion that the Greek was -unable to bear glory and fortune, one should say more exactly that he -was unable to bear fame without further struggle, and fortune at the -end of the contest. There is no more distinct instance than the fate -of Miltiades. Placed upon a solitary height and lifted far above every -fellow-combatant through his incomparable success at Marathon, he feels -a low thirsting for revenge awakened within himself against a citizen -of Para, with whom he had been at enmity long ago. To satisfy his -desire he misuses reputation, the public exchequer and civic honour and -disgraces himself. Conscious of his ill-success he falls into unworthy -machinations. He forms a clandestine and godless connection with Timo -a priestess of Demeter, and enters at night the sacred temple, from -which every man was excluded. After he has leapt over the wall and -comes ever nearer the shrine of the goddess, the dreadful horror of a -panic-like terror suddenly seizes him; almost prostrate and unconscious -he feels himself driven back and leaping the wall once more, he falls -down paralysed and severely injured. The siege must be raised and a -disgraceful death impresses its seal upon a brilliant heroic career, -in order to darken it for all posterity. After the battle at Marathon -the envy of the celestials has caught him. And this divine envy breaks -into flames when it beholds man without rival, without opponent, on -the solitary height of glory. He now has beside him only the gods--and -therefore he has them against him. These however betray him into a deed -of the Hybris, and under it he collapses. - -Let us well observe that just as Miltiades perishes so the noblest -Greek States perish when they, by merit and fortune, have arrived from -the racecourse at the temple of Nike. Athens, which had destroyed the -independence of her allies and avenged with severity the rebellions -of her subjected foes, Sparta, which after the battle of Ægospotamoi -used her preponderance over Hellas in a still harsher and more cruel -fashion, both these, as in the case of Miltiades, brought about their -ruin through deeds of the Hybris, as a proof that without envy, -jealousy, and contesting ambition the Hellenic State like the Hellenic -man degenerates. He becomes bad and cruel, thirsting for revenge, and -godless; in short, he becomes "pre-Homeric"--and then it needs only a -panic in order to bring about his fall and to crush him. Sparta and -Athens surrender to Persia, as Themistocles and Alcibiades have done; -they betray Hellenism after they have given up the noblest Hellenic -fundamental thought, the contest, and Alexander, the coarsened copy and -abbreviation of Greek history, now invents the cosmopolitan Hellene, -and the so-called "Hellenism." - - - - -THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE - - -Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872) - - -In dear vile Germany culture now lies so decayed in the streets, -jealousy of all that is great rules so shamelessly, and the general -tumult of those who race for "Fortune" resounds so deafeningly, that -one must have a strong faith, almost in the sense of _credo quia -absurdum est,_ in order to hope still for a growing Culture, and above -all--in opposition to the press with her "public opinion"--to be able -to work by public teaching. With violence must those, in whose hearts -lies the immortal care for the people, free themselves from all the -inrushing impressions of that which is just now actual and valid, and -evoke the appearance of reckoning them indifferent things. They must -appear so, because they want to think, and because a loathsome sight -and a confused noise, perhaps even mixed with the trumpet-flourishes -of war-glory, disturb their thinking, and above all, because they want -to _believe_ in the German character and because with this faith they -would lose their strength. Do not find fault with these believers if -they look from their distant aloofness and from the heights towards -their Promised Land! They fear those experiences, to which the kindly -disposed foreigner surrenders himself, when he lives among the Germans, -and must be surprised how little German life corresponds to those great -individuals, works and actions, which, in his kind disposition he -has learned to revere as the true German character. Where the German -cannot lift himself into the sublime he makes an impression less than -the mediocre. Even the celebrated German scholarship, in which a number -of the most useful domestic and homely virtues such as faithfulness, -self-restriction, industry, moderation, cleanliness appear transposed -into a purer atmosphere and, as it were, transfigured, is by no means -the result of these virtues; looked at closely, the motive urging to -unlimited knowledge appears in Germany much more like a defect, a gap, -than an abundance of forces, it looks almost like the consequence -of a needy formless atrophied life and even like a flight from the -moral narrow-mindedness and malice to which the German without such -diversions is subjected, and which also in spite of that scholarship, -yea still within scholarship itself, often break forth. As the true -virtuosi of philistinism the Germans are at home in narrowness of life, -discerning and judging; if any one will carry them above themselves -into the sublime, then they make themselves heavy as lead, and as such -lead-weights they hang to their truly great men, in order to pull them -down out of the ether to the level of their own necessitous indigence. -Perhaps this Philistine homeliness may be only the degeneration of -a genuine German virtue--a profound submersion into the detail, the -minute, the nearest and into the mysteries of the individual--but this -virtue grown mouldy is now worse than the most open vice, especially -since one has now become conscious, with gladness of the heart, of this -quality, even to literary self-glorification. Now the _"Educated"_ -among the proverbially so cultured Germans and the _"Philistines"_ -among the, as everybody knows, so uncultured Germans shake hands -in public and agree with one another concerning the way in which -henceforth one will have to write, compose poetry, paint, make music -and even philosophise, yea--rule, so as neither to stand too much aloof -from the culture of the one, nor to give offence to the "homeliness" -of the other. This they call now "The German Culture of our times." -Well, it is only necessary to inquire after the characteristic by which -that "educated" person is to be recognised; now that we know that his -foster-brother, the German Philistine, makes himself known as such to -all the world, without bashfulness, as it were, after innocence is lost. - -The educated person nowadays is educated above all _"historically,"_ by -his historic consciousness he saves himself from the sublime in which -the Philistine succeeds by his "homeliness." No longer that enthusiasm -which history inspires--as Goethe was allowed to suppose--but just the -blunting of all enthusiasm is now the goal of these admirers of the -_nil admirari,_ when they try to conceive everything historically; to -them however we should exclaim: Ye are the fools of all centuries! -History will make to you only those confessions, which you are worthy -to receive. The world has been at all times full of trivialities and -nonentities; to your historic hankering just these and only these -unveil themselves. By your thousands you may pounce upon an epoch--you -will afterwards hunger as before and be allowed to boast of your sort -of starved soundness. _Illam ipsam quam iactant sanitatem non firmitate -sed iciunio consequuntur. (Dialogus de oratoribus, cap._ 25.) History -has not thought fit to tell you anything that is essential, but -scorning and invisible she stood by your side, slipping into this one's -hand some state proceedings, into that one's an ambassadorial report, -into another's a date or an etymology or a pragmatic cobweb. Do you -really believe yourself able to reckon up history like an addition -sum, and do you consider your common intellect and your mathematical -education good enough for that? How it must vex you to hear, that -others narrate things, out of the best known periods, which you will -never conceive, never! - -If now to this "education," calling itself historic but destitute of -enthusiasm, and to the hostile Philistine activity, foaming with rage -against all that is great, is added that third brutal and excited -company of those who race after "Fortune"--then that in _summa_ results -in such a confused shrieking and such a limb-dislocating turmoil that -the thinker with stopped-up ears and blindfolded eyes flees into the -most solitary wilderness,--where he may see, what those never will -see, where he must hear sounds which rise to him out of all the depths -of nature and come down to him from the stars. Here he confers with -the great problems floating towards him, whose voices of course sound -just as comfortless-awful, as unhistoric-eternal. The feeble person -flees back from their cold breath, and the calculating one runs right -through them without perceiving them. They deal worst, however, with -the "educated man" who at times bestows great pains upon them. To him -these phantoms transform themselves into conceptual cobwebs and hollow -sound-figures. Grasping after them he imagines he has philosophy; in -order to search for them he climbs about in the so-called history -of philosophy--and when at last he has collected and piled up quite -a cloud of such abstractions and stereotyped patterns, then it may -happen to him that a real thinker crosses his path and--puffs them -away. What a desperate annoyance indeed to meddle with philosophy as -an "educated person"! From time to time it is true it appears to him -as if the impossible connection of philosophy with that which nowadays -gives itself airs as "German Culture" has become possible; some mongrel -dallies and ogles between the two spheres and confuses fantasy on -this side and on the other. Meanwhile however _one_ piece of advice -is to be given to the Germans, if they do not wish to let themselves -be confused. They may put to themselves the question about everything -that they now call Culture: is _this_ the hoped-for German Culture, so -serious and creative, so redeeming for the German mind, so purifying -for the German virtues that their only philosopher in this century, -Arthur _Schopenhauer,_ should have to espouse its cause? - -Here you have the philosopher--now search for the Culture proper to -him! And if you are able to divine what kind of culture that would have -to be, which would correspond to such a philosopher, then you have, in -this divination, already _passed sentence_ on all your culture and on -yourselves! - - - - -PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS - - -(1873) - - - -PREFACE - - -(_Probably_ 1874) - - -If we know the aims of men who are strangers to us, it is sufficient -for us to approve of or condemn them as wholes. Those who stand nearer -to us we judge according to the means by which they further their -aims; we often disapprove of their aims, but love them for the sake of -their means and the style of their volition. Now philosophical systems -are absolutely true only to their founders, to all later philosophers -they are usually _one_ big mistake, and to feebler minds a sum of -mistakes and truths; at any rate if regarded as highest aim they are -an error, and in so far reprehensible. Therefore many disapprove of -every philosopher, because his aim is not theirs; they are those whom I -called "strangers to us." Whoever on the contrary finds any pleasure at -all in great men finds pleasure also in such systems, be they ever so -erroneous, for they all have in them one point which is irrefutable, a -personal touch, and colour; one can use them in order to form a picture -of the philosopher, just as from a plant growing in a certain place one -can form conclusions as to the soil. _That_ mode of life, of viewing -human affairs at any rate, has existed once and is therefore possible; -the "system" is the growth in this soil or at least a part of this -system.... - -I narrate the history of those philosophers simplified: I shall bring -into relief only _that_ point in every system which is a little bit -of _personality,_ and belongs to that which is irrefutable, and -indiscussable, which history has to preserve: it is a first attempt -to regain and recreate those natures by comparison, and to let the -polyphony of Greek nature at least resound once again: the task is, to -bring to light that which we must _always love and revere_ and of which -no later knowledge can rob us: the great man. - - - -LATER PREFACE - - -(_Towards the end of_ 1879) - - -This attempt to relate the history of the earlier Greek philosophers -distinguishes itself from similar attempts by its brevity. This has -been accomplished by mentioning but a small number of the doctrines of -every philosopher, _i.e.,_ by incompleteness. Those doctrines, however, -have been selected in which the personal element of the philosopher -re-echoes most strongly; whereas a complete enumeration of all possible -propositions handed down to us--as is the custom in text-books--merely -brings about one thing, the absolute silencing of the personal element. -It is through this that those records become so tedious; for in systems -which have been refuted it is only this personal element that can still -interest us, for this alone is eternally irrefutable. It is possible -to shape the picture of a man out of three anecdotes. I endeavour to -bring into relief three anecdotes out of every system and abandon the -remainder. - - - -1. - - -There are opponents of philosophy, and one does well to listen to them; -especially if they dissuade the distempered heads of Germans from -metaphysics and on the other hand preach to them purification through -the Physis, as Goethe did, or healing through Music, as Wagner. The -physicians of the people condemn philosophy; he, therefore, who wants -to justify it, must show to what purpose healthy nations use and have -used philosophy. If he can show that, perhaps even the sick people -will benefit by learning why philosophy is harmful just to them. There -are indeed good instances of a health which can exist without any -philosophy or with quite a moderate, almost a toying use of it; thus -the Romans at their best period lived without philosophy. But where is -to be found the instance of a nation becoming diseased whom philosophy -had restored to health? Whenever philosophy showed itself helping, -saving, prophylactic, it was with healthy people; it made sick people -still more ill. If ever a nation was disintegrated and but loosely -connected with the individuals, never has philosophy bound these -individuals closer to the whole. If ever an individual was willing to -stand aside and plant around himself the hedge of self-sufficiency, -philosophy was always ready to isolate him still more and to destroy -him through isolation. She is dangerous where she is not in her full -right, and it is only the health of a nation but not that of every -nation which gives her this right. - -Let us now look around for the highest authority as to what -constitutes the health of a nation. I he Greeks, as _the_ truly -healthy nation, have _justified_ philosophy once for all by having -philosophised; and that indeed more than all other nations. They could -not even stop at the right time, for still in their withered age -they comported themselves as heated notaries of philosophy, although -they understood by it only the pious sophistries and the sacrosanct -hair-splittings of Christian dogmatics. They themselves have much -lessened their merit for barbarian posterity by not being able to stop -at the right time, because that posterity in its uninstructed and -impetuous youth necessarily became entangled in those artfully woven -nets and ropes. - -On the contrary, the Greek knew how to begin at the right time, and -this lesson, when one ought to begin philosophising, they teach more -distinctly than any other nation. For it should not be begun when -trouble comes as perhaps some presume who derive philosophy from -moroseness; no, but in good fortune, in mature manhood, out of the -midst of the fervent serenity of a brave and victorious man's estate. -The fact that the Greeks philosophised at that time throws light on -the nature of philosophy and her task as well as on the nature of the -Greeks themselves. Had they at that time been such commonsense and -precocious experts and gayards as the learned Philistine of our days -perhaps imagines, or had their life been only a state of voluptuous -soaring, chiming, breathing and feeling, as the unlearned visionary is -pleased to assume, then the spring of philosophy would not have come to -light among them. At the best there would have come forth a brook soon -trickling away in the sand or evaporating into fogs, but never that -broad river flowing forth with the proud beat of its waves, the river -which we know as Greek Philosophy. - -True, it has been eagerly pointed out how much the Greeks could -find and learn abroad, in the Orient, and how many different things -they may easily have brought from there. Of course an odd spectacle -resulted, when certain scholars brought together the alleged masters -from the Orient and the possible disciples from Greece, and exhibited -Zarathustra near Heraclitus, the Hindoos near the Eleates, the -Egyptians near Empedocles, or even Anaxagoras among the Jews and -Pythagoras among the Chinese. In detail little has been determined; -but we should in no way object to the general idea, if people did not -burden us with the conclusion that therefore Philosophy had only been -imported into Greece and was not indigenous to the soil, yea, that -she, as something foreign, had possibly ruined rather than improved -the Greek. Nothing is more foolish than to swear by the fact that the -Greeks had an aboriginal culture; no, they rather absorbed all the -culture flourishing among other nations, and they advanced so far, -just because they understood how to hurl the spear further from the -very spot where another nation had let it rest. They were admirable -in the art of learning productively, and so, like them, we _ought_ -to learn from our neighbours, with a view to Life not to pedantic -knowledge, using everything learnt as a foothold whence to leap -high and still higher than our neighbour. The questions as to the -beginning of philosophy are quite negligible, for everywhere in the -beginning there is the crude, the unformed, the empty and the ugly; -and in all things only the higher stages come into consideration. -He who in the place of Greek philosophy prefers to concern himself -with that of Egypt and Persia, because the latter are perhaps more -"original" and certainly older, proceeds just as ill-advisedly as -those who cannot be at ease before they have traced back the Greek -mythology, so grand and profound, to such physical trivialities as -sun, lightning, weather and fog, as its prime origins, and who fondly -imagine they have rediscovered for instance in the restricted worship -of the one celestial vault among the other Indo-Germans a purer form -of religion than the poly-theistic worship of the Greek had been. The -road towards the beginning always leads into barbarism, and he who is -concerned with the Greeks ought always to keep in mind the fact that -the unsubdued thirst for knowledge in itself always barbarises just as -much as the hatred of knowledge, and that the Greeks have subdued their -inherently insatiable thirst for knowledge by their regard for Life, -by an ideal need of Life,--since they wished to live immediately that -which they learnt. The Greeks also philosophised as men of culture and -with the aims of culture, and therefore saved themselves the trouble -of inventing once again the elements of philosophy and knowledge -out of some autochthonous conceit, and with a will they at once set -themselves to fill out, enhance, raise and purify these elements they -had taken over in such a way, that only now in a higher sense and in a -purer sphere they became inventors. For they discovered the _typical -philosopher's genius,_ and the inventions of all posterity have added -nothing essential. - -Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully -idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters, -Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, -Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and -self-contained,[1] and hewn out of one stone. Severe necessity exists -between their thinking and their character. They are not bound by any -convention, because at that time no professional class of philosophers -and scholars existed. They all stand before us in magnificent solitude -as the only ones who then devoted their life exclusively to knowledge. -They all possess the virtuous energy of the Ancients, whereby they -excel all the later philosophers in finding their own form and in -perfecting it by metamorphosis in its most minute details and general -aspect. For they were met by no helpful and facilitating fashion. Thus -together they form what Schopenhauer, in opposition to the Republic of -Scholars, has called a Republic of Geniuses; one giant calls to another -across the arid intervals of ages, and, undisturbed by a wanton, noisy -race of dwarfs, creeping about beneath them, the sublime intercourse of -spirits continues. - -Of this sublime intercourse of spirits I have resolved to relate those -items which our modern hardness of hearing might perhaps hear and -understand; that means certainly the least of all. It seems to me -that those old sages from Thales to Socrates have discussed in that -intercourse, although in its most general aspect, everything that -constitutes for our contemplation the peculiarly Hellenic. In their -intercourse, as already in their personalities, they express distinctly -the great features of Greek genius of which the whole of Greek history -is a shadowy impression, a hazy copy, which consequently speaks less -clearly. If we could rightly interpret the total life of the Greek -nation, we should ever find reflected only that picture which in her -highest geniuses shines with more resplendent colours. Even the first -experience of philosophy on Greek soil, the sanction of the Seven Sages -is a distinct and unforgettable line in the picture of the Hellenic. -Other nations have their Saints, the Greeks have Sages. Rightly it has -been said that a nation is characterised not only by her great men -but rather by the manner in which she recognises and honours them. In -other ages the philosopher is an accidental solitary wanderer in the -most hostile environment, either slinking through or pushing himself -through with clenched fists. With the Greek however the philosopher is -not accidental; when in the Sixth and Fifth centuries amidst the most -frightful dangers and seductions of secularisation he appears and as -it were steps forth from the cave of Trophonios into the very midst of -luxuriance, the discoverers' happiness, the wealth and the sensuousness -of the Greek colonies, then we divine that he comes as a noble warner -for the same purpose for which in those centuries Tragedy was born -and which the Orphic mysteries in their grotesque hieroglyphics give -us to understand. The opinion of those philosophers on Life and -Existence altogether means so much more than a modern opinion because -they had before themselves Life in a luxuriant perfection, and because -with them, unlike us, the sense of the thinker was not muddled by -the disunion engendered by the wish for freedom, beauty, fulness of -life and the love for truth that only asks: What is the good of Life -at all? The mission which the philosopher has to discharge within a -real Culture, fashioned in a homogeneous style, cannot be clearly -conjectured out of our circumstances and experiences for the simple -reason that we have no such culture. No, it is only a Culture like the -Greek which can answer the question as to that task of the philosopher, -only such a Culture can, as I said before, justify philosophy at all; -because such a Culture alone knows and can demonstrate why and how the -philosopher is _not_ an accidental, chance wanderer driven now hither, -now thither. There is a steely necessity which fetters the philosopher -to a true Culture: but what if this Culture does not exist? Then the -philosopher is an incalculable and therefore terror-inspiring comet, -whereas in the favourable case, he shines as the central star in the -solar-system of culture. It is for this reason that the Greeks justify -the philosopher, because with them he is no comet. - - -[1] _Cf._ Napoleon's word about Goethe: "Voilà un homme!"--TR. - - - -2 - - -After such contemplations it will be accepted without offence if I -speak of the pre-Platonic philosophers as of a homogeneous company, and -devote this paper to them exclusively. Something quite new begins with -Plato; or it might be said with equal justice that in comparison with -that Republic of Geniuses from Thales to Socrates, the philosophers -since Plato lack something essential. - -Whoever wants to express himself unfavourably about those older masters -may call them one-sided, and their _Epigones,_ with Plato as head, -many-sided. Yet it would be more just and unbiassed to conceive of -the latter as philosophic hybrid-characters, of the former as the -pure types. Plato himself is the first magnificent hybrid-character, -and as such finds expression as well in his philosophy as in his -personality. In his ideology are united Socratian, Pythagorean, and -Heraclitean elements, and for this reason it is no typically pure -phenomenon. As man, too, Plato mingles the features of the royally -secluded, all-sufficing Heraclitus, of the melancholy-compassionate and -legislatory Pythagoras and of the psycho-expert dialectician Socrates. -All later philosophers are such hybrid-characters; wherever something -one-sided does come into prominence with them as in the case of the -Cynics, it is not type but caricature. Much more important however is -the fact that they are founders of sects and that the sects founded -by them are all institutions in direct opposition to the Hellenic -culture and the unity of its style prevailing up to that time. In -their way they seek a redemption, but only for the individuals or at -the best for groups of friends and disciples closely connected with -them. The activity of the older philosophers tends, although they were -unconscious of it, towards a cure and purification on a large scale; -the mighty course of Greek culture is not to be stopped; awful dangers -are to be removed out of the way of its current; the philosopher -protects and defends his native country. Now, since Plato, he is in -exile and conspires against his fatherland. - -It is a real misfortune that so very little of those older philosophic -masters has come down to us and that all complete works of theirs are -withheld from us. Involuntarily, on account of that loss, we measure -them according to wrong standards and allow ourselves to be influenced -unfavourably towards them by the mere accidental fact that Plato -and Aristotle never lacked appreciators and copyists. Some people -presuppose a special providence for books, a _fatum libellorum;_ such -a providence however would at any rate be a very malicious one if it -deemed it wise to withhold from us the works of Heraclitus, Empedocles' -wonderful poem, and the writings of Democritus, whom the ancients put -on a par with Plato, whom he even excels as far as ingenuity goes, -and as a substitute put into our hand Stoics, Epicureans and Cicero. -Probably the most sublime part of Greek thought and its expression -in words is lost to us; a fate which will not surprise the man who -remembers the misfortunes of Scotus Erigena or of Pascal, and who -considers that even in this enlightened century the first edition of -Schopenhauer's "_The World As Will And Idea_" became waste-paper. If -somebody will presuppose a special fatalistic power with respect to -such things he may do so and say with Goethe: "Let no one complain -about and grumble at things vile and mean, they _are_ the real -rulers,--however much this be gainsaid!" In particular they are more -powerful than the power of truth. Mankind very rarely produces a good -book in which with daring freedom is intonated the battle-song of -truth, the song of philosophic heroism; and yet whether it is to live a -century longer or to crumble and moulder into dust and ashes, depends -on the most miserable accidents, on the sudden mental eclipse of men's -heads, on superstitious convulsions and antipathies, finally on fingers -not too fond of writing or even on eroding bookworms and rainy weather. -But we will not lament but rather take the advice of the reproving and -consolatory words which Hamann addresses to scholars who lament over -lost works. "Would not the artist who succeeded in throwing a lentil -through the eye of a needle have sufficient, with a bushel of lentils, -to practise his acquired skill? One would like to put this question to -all scholars who do not know how to use the works of the Ancients any -better than that man used his lentils." It might be added in our case -that not one more word, anecdote, or date needed to be transmitted to -us than has been transmitted, indeed that even much less might have -been preserved for us and yet we should have been able to establish the -general doctrine that the Greeks justify philosophy. - -A time which suffers from the so-called "general education" but has -no culture and no unity of style in her life hardly knows what to -do with philosophy, even if the latter were proclaimed by the very -Genius of Truth in the streets and market-places. She rather remains -at such a time the learned monologue of the solitary rambler, the -accidental booty of the individual, the hidden closet-secret or the -innocuous chatter between academic senility and childhood. Nobody -dare venture to fulfil in himself the law of philosophy, nobody -lives philosophically, with that simple manly faith which compelled -an Ancient, wherever he was, whatever he did, to deport himself as -a Stoic, when he had once pledged his faith to the Stoa. All modern -philosophising is limited politically and regulated by the police to -learned semblance. Thanks to governments, churches, academies, customs, -fashions, and the cowardice of man, it never gets beyond the sigh: "If -only!..." or beyond the knowledge: "Once upon a time there was..." -Philosophy is without rights; therefore modern man, if he were at all -courageous and conscientious, ought to condemn her and perhaps banish -her with words similar to those by which Plato banished the tragic -poets from his State. Of course there would be left a reply for her, as -there remained to those poets against Plato. If one once compelled her -to speak out she might say perhaps: "Miserable Nation! Is it my fault -if among you I am on the tramp, like a fortune teller through the land, -and must hide and disguise myself, as if I were a great sinner and ye -my judges? Just look at my sister, Art! It is with her as with me; we -have been cast adrift among the Barbarians and no longer know how to -save ourselves. Here we are lacking, it is true, every good right; but -the judges before whom we find justice judge you also and will tell -you: First acquire a culture; then you shall experience what Philosophy -can and will do."-- - - - -3. - - -Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous fancy, with the -proposition that _water_ is the origin and mother-womb of all things. -Is it really necessary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and -for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunciate -something about the origin of things; secondly, because it does -so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because in it is -contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea: Everything -is one. The first mentioned reason leaves Thales still in the company -of religious and superstitious people, the second however takes him -out of this company and shows him to us as a natural philosopher, but -by virtue of the third, Thales becomes the first Greek philosopher. -If he had said: "Out of water earth is evolved," we should only have -a scientific hypothesis; a false one, though nevertheless difficult -to refute. But he went beyond the scientific. In his presentation of -this concept of unity through the hypothesis of water, Thales has not -surmounted the low level of the physical discernments of his time, but -at the best overleapt them. The deficient and unorganised observations -of an empiric nature which Thales had made as to the occurrence and -transformations of water, or to be more exact, of the Moist, would -not in the least have made possible or even suggested such an immense -generalisation. That which drove him to this generalisation was a -metaphysical dogma, which had its origin in a mystic intuition and -which together with the ever renewed endeavours to express it better, -we find in all philosophies,--the proposition: _Everything is one!_ - -How despotically such a faith deals with all empiricism is worthy of -note; with Thales especially one can learn how Philosophy has behaved -at all times, when she wanted to get beyond the hedges of experience -to her magically attracting goal. On light supports she leaps in -advance; hope and divination wing her feet. Calculating reason too, -clumsily pants after her and seeks better supports in its attempt to -reach that alluring goal, at which its divine companion has already -arrived. One sees in imagination two wanderers by a wild forest-stream -which carries with it rolling stones; the one, light-footed, leaps -over it using the stones and swinging himself upon them ever further -and further, though they precipitously sink into the depths behind -him. The other stands helpless there most of the time; he has first -to build a pathway which will bear his heavy, weary step; sometimes -that cannot be done and then no god will help him across the stream. -What therefore carries philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? -Does it distinguish itself from calculating and measuring thought -only by its more rapid flight through large spaces? No, for a strange -illogical power wings the foot of philosophical thinking; and this -power is Fancy. Lifted by the latter, philosophical thinking leaps -from possibility to possibility, and these for the time being are -taken as certainties; and now and then even whilst on the wing it -gets hold of certainties. An ingenious presentiment shows them to -the flier; demonstrable certainties are divined at a distance to be -at this point. Especially powerful is the strength of Fancy in the -lightning-like seizing and illuminating of similarities; afterwards -reflection applies its standards and models and seeks to substitute -the similarities by equalities, that which was seen side by side by -causalities. But though this should never be possible, even in the case -of Thales the indemonstrable philosophising has yet its value; although -all supports are broken when Logic and the rigidity of Empiricism want -to get across to the proposition: Everything is water; yet still there -is always, after the demolition of the scientific edifice, a remainder, -and in this very remainder lies a moving force and as it were the hope -of future fertility. - -Of course I do not mean that the thought in any restriction or -attenuation, or as allegory, still retains some kind of "truth"; as -if, for instance, one might imagine the creating artist standing -near a waterfall, and seeing in the forms which leap towards him, -an artistically prefiguring game of the water with human and animal -bodies, masks, plants, rocks, nymphs, griffins, and with all existing -types in general, so that to him the proposition: Everything is water, -is confirmed. The thought of Thales has rather its value--even after -the perception of its indemonstrableness--in the very fact, that it was -meant unmythically and unallegorically. The Greeks among whom Thales -became so suddenly conspicuous were the anti-type of all realists -by only believing essentially in the reality of men and gods, and -by contemplating the whole of nature as if it were only a disguise, -masquerade and metamorphosis of these god-men. Man was to them the -truth, and essence of things; everything else mere phenomenon and -deceiving play. For that very reason they experienced incredible -difficulty in conceiving of ideas as ideas. Whilst with the moderns -the most personal item sublimates itself into abstractions, with -them the most abstract notions became personified. Thales, however, -said, "Not man but water is the reality of things "; he began to -believe in nature, in so far that he at least believed in water. As -a mathematician and astronomer he had grown cold towards everything -mythical and allegorical, and even if he did not succeed in becoming -disillusioned as to the pure abstraction, Everything is one, and -although he left off at a physical expression he was nevertheless among -the Greeks of his time a surprising rarity. Perhaps the exceedingly -conspicuous _Orpheans_ possessed in a still higher degree than he the -faculty of conceiving abstractions and of thinking unplastically; only -they did not succeed in expressing these abstractions except in the -form of the allegory. Also Pherecydes of Syrus who is a contemporary -of Thales and akin to him in many physical conceptions hovers with -the expression of the latter in that middle region where Allegory is -wedded to Mythos, so that he dares, for example, to compare the earth -with a winged oak, which hangs in the air with spread pinions and which -Zeus bedecks, after the defeat of Kronos, with a magnificent robe of -honour, into which with his own hands Zeus embroiders lands, water -and rivers. In contrast with such gloomy allegorical philosophising -scarcely to be translated into the realm of the comprehensible, Thales' -are the works of a creative master who began to look into Nature's -depths without fantastic fabling. If as it is true he used Science -and the demonstrable but soon out-leapt them, then this likewise -is a typical characteristic of the philosophical genius. The Greek -word which designates the Sage belongs etymologically to _sapio,_ I -taste, _sapiens,_ the tasting one, _sisyphos,_ the man of the most -delicate taste; the peculiar art of the philosopher therefore consists, -according to the opinion of the people, in a delicate selective -judgment by taste, by discernment, by significant differentiation. He -is not prudent, if one calls _him_ prudent, who in his own affairs -finds out the good; Aristotle rightly says: "That which Thales and -Anaxagoras know, people will call unusual, astounding, difficult, -divine but--useless, since human possessions were of no concern to -those two." Through thus selecting and precipitating the unusual, -astounding, difficult, and divine, Philosophy marks the boundary-lines -dividing her from Science in the same way as she does it from Prudence -by the emphasising of the useless. Science without thus selecting, -without such delicate taste, pounces upon everything knowable, in the -blind covetousness to know all at any price; philosophical thinking -however is always on the track of the things worth knowing, on the -track of the great and most important discernments. Now the idea of -greatness is changeable, as well in the moral as in the æsthetic -realm, thus Philosophy begins with a legislation with respect to -greatness, she becomes a Nomenclator. "That is great," she says, -and therewith she raises man above the blind, untamed covetousness -of his thirst for knowledge. By the idea of greatness she assuages -this thirst: and it is chiefly by this, that she contemplates the -greatest discernment, that of the essence and kernel of things, as -attainable and attained. When Thales says, "Everything is water," man -is startled up out of his worm-like mauling of and crawling about among -the individual sciences; he divines the last solution of things and -masters through this divination the common perplexity of the lower -grades of knowledge. The philosopher tries to make the total-chord of -the universe re-echo within himself and then to project it into ideas -outside himself: whilst he is contemplative like the creating artist, -sympathetic like the religionist, looking out for ends and causalities -like the scientific man, whilst he feels himself swell up to the -macrocosm, he still retains the circumspection to contemplate himself -coldly as the reflex of the world; he retains that cool-headedness, -which the dramatic artist possesses, when he transforms himself into -other bodies, speaks out of them, and yet knows how to project this -transformation outside himself into written verses. What the verse is -to the poet, dialectic thinking is to the philosopher; he snatches -at it in order to hold fast his enchantment, in order to petrify it. -And just as words and verse to the dramatist are only stammerings in -a foreign language, to tell in it what he lived, what he saw, and -what he can directly promulgate by gesture and music only, thus the -expression of every deep philosophical intuition by means of dialectics -and scientific reflection is, it is true, on the one hand the only -means to communicate what has been seen, but on the other hand it is -a paltry means, and at the bottom a metaphorical, absolutely inexact -translation into a different sphere and language. Thus Thales saw the -Unity of the "Existent," and when he wanted to communicate this idea he -talked of water. - - - -4 - - -Whilst the general type of the philosopher in the picture of Thales -is set off rather hazily, the picture of his great successor already -speaks much more distinctly to us. _Anaximander_ of Milet, the -first philosophical author of the Ancients, writes in the very way -that the typical philosopher will always write as long as he is -not alienated from ingenuousness and _naïveté_ by odd claims: in -a grand lapidarian style of writing, sentence for sentence ... a -witness of a new inspiration, and an expression of the sojourning in -sublime contemplations. The thought and its form are milestones on -the path towards the highest wisdom. With such a lapidarian emphasis -Anaximander once said: "Whence things originated, thither, according -to necessity, they must return and perish; for they must pay penalty -and be judged for their injustices according to the order of time." -Enigmatical utterance of a true pessimist, oracular inscription on the -boundary-stone of Greek philosophy, how shall we explain thee? - -The only serious moralist of our century in the Parergis (Vol. ii., -chap. 12, "Additional Remarks on The Doctrine about the Suffering in -the World, Appendix of Corresponding Passages") urges on us a similar -contemplation: "The right standard by which to judge every human -being is that he really is a being who ought not to exist at all, -but who is expiating his existence by manifold forms of suffering -and death:--What can one expect from such a being? Are we not all -sinners condemned to death? We expiate our birth firstly by our -life and secondly by our death." He who in the physiognomy of our -universal human lot reads this doctrine and already recognises the -fundamental bad quality of every human life, in the fact that none -can stand a very close and careful contemplation--although our time, -accustomed to the biographical epidemic, seems to think otherwise and -more loftily about the dignity of man; he who, like Schopenhauer, on -"the heights of the Indian breezes" has heard the sacred word about -the moral value of existence, will be kept with difficulty from -making an extremely anthropomorphic metaphor and from generalizing -that melancholy doctrine--at first only limited to human life--and -applying it by transmission to the general character of all existence. -It may not be very logical, it is however at any rate very human and -moreover quite in harmony with the philosophical leaping described -above, now with Anaximander to consider all Becoming as a punishable -emancipation from eternal "Being," as a wrong that is to be atoned -for by destruction. Everything that has once come into existence also -perishes, whether we think of human life or of water or of heat and -cold; everywhere where definite qualities are to be noticed, we are -allowed to prophesy the extinction of these qualities--according to -the all-embracing proof of experience. Thus a being that possesses -definite qualities and consists of them, can never be the origin and -principle of things; the veritable _ens,_ the "Existent," Anaximander -concluded, cannot possess any definite qualities, otherwise, like -all other things, it would necessarily have originated and perished. -In order that Becoming may not cease, the Primordial-being must be -indefinite. The immortality and eternity of the Primordial-being lies -not in an infiniteness and inexhaustibility--as usually the expounders -of Anaximander presuppose--but in this, that it lacks the definite -qualities which lead to destruction, for which reason it bears also its -name: The Indefinite. The thus labelled Primordial-being is superior -to all Becoming and for this very reason it guarantees the eternity -and unimpeded course of Becoming. This last unity in that Indefinite, -the mother-womb of all things, can, it is true, be designated only -negatively by man, as something to which no predicate out of the -existing world of Becoming can be allotted, and might be considered a -peer to the Kantian "Thing-in-itself." - -Of course he who is able to wrangle persistently with others as to what -kind of thing that primordial substance really was, whether perhaps an -intermediate thing between air and water, or perhaps between air and -fire, has not understood our philosopher at all; this is likewise to -be said about those, who seriously ask themselves, whether Anaximander -had thought of his primordial substance as a mixture of all existing -substances. Rather we must direct our gaze to the place where we can -learn that Anaximander no longer treated the question of the origin -of the world as purely physical; we must direct our gaze towards that -first stated lapidarian proposition. When on the contrary he saw a sum -of wrongs to be expiated in the plurality of things that have become, -then he, as the first Greek, with daring grasp caught up the tangle of -the most profound ethical problem. How can anything perish that has a -right to exist? Whence that restless Becoming and giving-birth, whence -that expression of painful distortion on the face of Nature, whence the -never-ending dirge in all realms of existence? Out of this world of -injustice, of audacious apostasy from the primordial-unity of things -Anaximander flees into a metaphysical castle, leaning out of which he -turns his gaze far and wide in order at last, after a pensive silence, -to address to all beings this question: "What is your existence worth? -And if it is worth nothing why are you there? By your guilt, I observe, -you sojourn in this world. You will have to expiate it by death. Look -how your earth fades; the seas decrease and dry up, the marine-shell -on the mountain shows you how much already they have dried up; fire -destroys your world even now, finally it will end in smoke and ashes. -But again and again such a world of transitoriness will ever build -itself up; who shall redeem you from the curse of Becoming?" - -Not every kind of life may have been welcome to a man who put such -questions, whose upward-soaring thinking continually broke the empiric -ropes, in order to take at once to the highest, superlunary flight. -Willingly we believe tradition, that he walked along in especially -dignified attire and showed a truly tragic hauteur in his gestures -and habits of life. He lived as he wrote; he spoke as solemnly as he -dressed himself, he raised his hand and placed his foot as if this -existence was a tragedy, and he had been born in order to co-operate -in that tragedy by playing the _rôle_ of hero. In all that he was the -great model of Empedocles. His fellow-citizens elected him the leader -of an emigrating colony--perhaps they were pleased at being able to -honour him and at the same time to get rid of him. His thought also -emigrated and founded colonies; in Ephesus and in Elea they could not -get rid of him; and if they could not resolve upon staying at the spot -where he stood, they nevertheless knew that they had been led there by -him, whence they now prepared to proceed without him. - -Thales shows the need of simplifying the empire of plurality, and -of reducing it to a mere expansion or disguise of the _one single_ -existing quality, water. Anaximander goes beyond him with two steps. -Firstly he puts the question to himself: How, if there exists an -eternal Unity at all, is that Plurality possible? and he takes the -answer out of the contradictory, self-devouring and denying character -of this Plurality. The existence of this Plurality becomes a moral -phenomenon to him; it is not justified, it expiates itself continually -through destruction. But then the questions occur to him: Yet why has -not everything that has become perished long ago, since, indeed, quite -an eternity of time has already gone by? Whence the ceaseless current -of the River of Becoming? He can save himself from these questions -only by mystic possibilities: the eternal Becoming can have its origin -only in the eternal "Being," the conditions for that apostasy from -that eternal "Being" to a Becoming in injustice are ever the same, the -constellation of things cannot help itself being thus fashioned, that -no end is to be seen of that stepping forth of the individual being out -of the lap of the "Indefinite." At this Anaximander stayed; that is, -he remained within the deep shadows which like gigantic spectres were -lying on the mountain range of such a world-perception. The more one -wanted to approach the problem of solving how out of the Indefinite the -Definite, out of the Eternal the Temporal, out of the Just the Unjust -could by secession ever originate, the darker the night became.---- - - - -5 - - -Towards the midst of this mystic night, in which Anaximander's problem -of the Becoming was wrapped up, Heraclitus of Ephesus approached and -illuminated it by a divine flash of lightning. "I contemplate the -Becoming," he exclaimed,--"and nobody has so attentively watched this -eternal wave-surging and rhythm of things. And what do I behold? -Lawfulness, infallible certainty, ever equal paths of Justice, -condemning Erinyes behind all transgressions of the laws, the whole -world the spectacle of a governing justice and of demoniacally -omnipresent natural forces subject to justice's sway. I do not behold -the punishment of that which has become, but the justification of -Becoming. When has sacrilege, when has apostasy manifested itself in -inviolable forms, in laws esteemed sacred? Where injustice sways, there -is caprice, disorder, irregularity, contradiction; where however Law -and Zeus' daughter, Dike, rule alone, as in this world, how could the -sphere of guilt, of expiation, of judgment, and as it were the place of -execution of all condemned ones be there?" - -From this intuition Heraclitus took two coherent negations, which are -put into the right light only by a comparison with the propositions of -his predecessor. Firstly, he denied the duality of two quite diverse -worlds, into the assumption of which Anaximander had been pushed; he -no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical, a realm -of definite qualities from a realm of indefinable indefiniteness. Now -after this first step he could neither be kept back any longer from -a still greater audacity of denying: he denied "Being" altogether. -For this one world which was left to him,--shielded all round by -eternal, unwritten laws, flowing up and down in the brazen beat of -rhythm,--shows nowhere persistence, indestructibility, a bulwark in the -stream. Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus exclaimed: "I see nothing -but Becoming. Be not deceived! It is the fault of your limited outlook -and not the fault of the essence of things if you believe that you see -firm land anywhere in the ocean of Becoming and Passing. You need names -for things, just as if they had a rigid permanence, but the very river -in which you bathe a second time is no longer the same one which you -entered before." - -Heraclitus has as his royal property the highest power of intuitive -conception, whereas towards the other mode of conception which is -consummated by ideas and logical combinations, that is towards reason, -he shows himself cool, apathetic, even hostile, and he seems to -derive a pleasure when he is able to contradict reason by means of a -truth gained intuitively, and this he does in such propositions as: -"Everything has always its opposite within itself," so fearlessly -that Aristotle before the tribunal of Reason accuses him of the -highest crime, of having sinned against the law of opposition. -Intuitive representation however embraces two things: firstly, the -present, motley, changing world, pressing on us in all experiences, -secondly, the conditions by means of which alone any experience of -this world becomes possible: time and space. For these are able to be -intuitively apprehended, purely in themselves and independent of any -experience; _i.e.,_ they can be perceived, although they are without -definite contents. If now Heraclitus considered time in this fashion, -dissociated from all experiences, he had in it the most instructive -monogram of all that which falls within the realm of intuitive -conception. Just as he conceived of time, so also for instance did -Schopenhauer, who repeatedly says of it: that in it every instant -exists only in so far as it has annihilated the preceding one, its -father, in order to be itself effaced equally quickly; that past -and future are as unreal as any dream; that the present is only the -dimensionless and unstable boundary between the two; that however, like -time, so space, and again like the latter, so also everything that -is simultaneously in space and time, has only a relative existence, -only through and for the sake of a something else, of the same kind -as itself, _i.e.,_ existing only under the same limitations. This -truth is in the highest degree self-evident, accessible to everyone, -and just for that very reason, abstractly and rationally, it is only -attained with great difficulty. Whoever has this truth before his eyes -must however also proceed at once to the next Heraclitean consequence -and say that the whole essence of actuality is in fact activity, and -that for actuality there is no other kind of existence and reality, -as Schopenhauer has likewise expounded ("The World As Will And Idea," -Vol. I., Bk. I, sec. 4): "Only as active does it fill space and time: -its action upon the immediate object determines the perception in -which alone it exists: the effect of the action of any material object -upon any other, is known only in so far as the latter acts upon the -immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted before; -it consists in this alone. Cause and effect thus constitute the whole -nature of matter; its true being _is_ its action. The totality of -everything material is therefore very appropriately called in German -_Wirklichkeit_ (actuality)--a word which is far more expressive than -_Realität_ (reality).[2] That upon which actuality acts is always -matter; actuality's whole 'Being' and essence therefore consist only in -the orderly change, which _one_ part of it causes in another, and is -therefore wholly relative, according to a relation which is valid only -within the boundary of actuality, as in the case of time and space." - -The eternal and exclusive Becoming, the total instability of all -reality and actuality, which continually works and becomes and never -_is,_ as Heraclitus teaches--is an awful and appalling conception, -and in its effects most nearly related to that sensation, by which -during an earthquake one loses confidence in the firmly-grounded earth. -It required an astonishing strength to translate this effect into -its opposite, into the sublime, into happy astonishment. Heraclitus -accomplished this through an observation of the proper course of all -Becoming and Passing, which he conceived of under the form of polarity, -as the divergence of a force into two qualitatively different, opposite -actions, striving after reunion. A quality is set continually at -variance with itself and separates itself into its opposites: these -opposites continually strive again one towards another. The common -people of course think to recognise something rigid, completed, -consistent; but the fact of the matter is that at any instant, bright -and dark, sour and sweet are side by side and attached to one another -like two wrestlers of whom sometimes the one succeeds, sometimes the -other. According to Heraclitus honey is at the same time sweet and -bitter, and the world itself an amphora whose contents constantly need -stirring up. Out of the war of the opposites all Becoming originates; -the definite and to us seemingly persistent qualities express only the -momentary predominance of the one fighter, but with that the war is not -at an end; the wrestling continues to all eternity. Everything happens -according to this struggle, and this very struggle manifests eternal -justice. It is a wonderful conception, drawn from the purest source -of Hellenism, which considers the struggle as the continual sway of a -homogeneous, severe justice bound by eternal laws. Only a Greek was -able to consider this conception as the fundament of a _Cosmodicy;_ it -is Hesiod's good Eris transfigured into the cosmic principle, it is -the idea of a contest, an idea held by individual Greeks and by their -State, and translated out of the gymnasia and palæstra, out of the -artistic agonistics, out of the struggle of the political parties and -of the towns into the most general principle, so that the machinery of -the universe is regulated by it. Just as every Greek fought as though -he alone were in the right, and as though an absolutely sure standard -of judicial opinion could at any instant decide whither victory is -inclining, thus the qualities wrestle one with another, according to -inviolable laws and standards which are inherent in the struggle. The -Things themselves in the permanency of which the limited intellect of -man and animal believes, do not "exist" at all; they are as the fierce -flashing and fiery sparkling of drawn swords, as the stars of Victory -rising with a radiant resplendence in the battle of the opposite -qualities. - -That struggle which is peculiar to all Becoming, that eternal -interchange of victory is again described by Schopenhauer: ("The World -As Will And Idea," Vol. I., Bk. 2, sec. 27) "The permanent matter -must constantly change its form; for under the guidance of causality, -mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving -to appear, wrest the matter from each other, for each desires to -reveal its own Idea. This strife may be followed up through the whole -of nature; indeed nature exists only through it." The following pages -give the most noteworthy illustrations of this struggle, only that -the prevailing tone of this description ever remains other than that -of Heraclitus in so far as to Schopenhauer the struggle is a proof of -the Will to Life falling out with itself; it is to him a feasting -on itself on the part of this dismal, dull impulse, as a phenomenon -on the whole horrible and not at all making for happiness. The arena -and the object of this struggle is Matter,--which some natural forces -alternately endeavour to disintegrate and build up again at the expense -of other natural forces,--as also Space and Time, the union of which -through causality _is_ this very matter. - - -[2] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo -sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat (Seneca, Epist. -81).--TR. - - - -6 - - -Whilst the imagination of Heraclitus measured the restlessly moving -universe, the "actuality" (_Wirklichkeit_), with the eye of the happy -spectator, who sees innumerable pairs wrestling in joyous combat -entrusted to the superintendence of severe umpires, a still higher -presentiment seized him, he no longer could contemplate the wrestling -pairs and the umpires, separated one from another; the very umpires -seemed to fight, and the fighters seemed to be their own judges--yea, -since at the bottom he conceived only of the one Justice eternally -swaying, he dared to exclaim: "The contest of The Many is itself pure -justice. And after all: The One is The Many. For what are all those -qualities according to their nature? Are they immortal gods? Are they -separate beings working for themselves from the beginning and without -end? And if the world which we see knows only Becoming and Passing but -no Permanence, should perhaps those qualities constitute a differently -fashioned metaphysical world, true, not a world of unity as Anaximander -sought behind the fluttering veil of plurality, but a world of eternal -and essential pluralities?" Is it possible that however violently he -had denied such duality, Heraclitus has after all by a round-about way -accidentally got into the dual cosmic order, an order with an Olympus -of numerous immortal gods and demons,--viz., _many_ realities,--and -with a human world, which sees only the dust-cloud of the Olympic -struggle and the flashing of divine spears,--_i.e.,_ only a Becoming? -Anaximander had fled just from these definite qualities into the lap of -the metaphysical "Indefinite"; because the former _became_ and passed, -he had denied them a true and essential existence; however should it -not seem now as if the Becoming is only the looming-into-view of a -struggle of eternal qualities? When we speak of the Becoming, should -not the original cause of this be sought in the peculiar feebleness of -human cognition--whereas in the nature of things there is perhaps no -Becoming, but only a co-existing of many true increate indestructible -realities? - -These are Heraclitean loop-holes and labyrinths; he exclaims once -again: "The 'One' is the 'Many'." The many perceptible qualities are -neither eternal entities, nor phantasmata of our senses (Anaxagoras -conceives them later on as the former, Parmenides as the latter), -they are neither rigid, sovereign "Being" nor fleeting Appearance -hovering in human minds. The third possibility which alone was left -to Heraclitus nobody will be able to divine with dialectic sagacity -and as it were by calculation, for what he invented here is a rarity -even in the realm of mystic incredibilities and unexpected cosmic -metaphors.--The world is the _Game_ of Zeus, or expressed more -physically, the game of fire with itself, the "One" is only in this -sense at the same time the "Many."-- - -In order to elucidate in the first place the introduction of fire as -a world-shaping force, I recall how Anaximander had further developed -the theory of water as the origin of things. Placing confidence in the -essential part of Thales' theory, and strengthening and adding to the -latter's observations, Anaximander however was not to be convinced -that before the water and, as it were, after the water there was no -further stage of quality: no, to him out of the Warm and the Cold -the Moist seemed to form itself, and the Warm and the Cold therefore -were supposed to be the preliminary stages, the still more original -qualities. With their issuing forth from the primordial existence -of the "Indefinite," Becoming begins. Heraclitus who as physicist -subordinated himself to the importance of Anaximander, explains to -himself this Anaximandrian "Warm" as the respiration, the warm breath, -the dry vapours, in short as the fiery element: about this fire he now -enunciates the same as Thales and Anaximander had enunciated about -the water: that in innumerable metamorphoses it was passing along the -path of Becoming, especially in the three chief aggregate stages as -something Warm, Moist, and Firm. For water in descending is transformed -into earth, in ascending into fire: or as Heraclitus appears to have -expressed himself more exactly: from the sea ascend only the pure -vapours which serve as food to the divine fire of the stars, from the -earth only the dark, foggy ones, from which the Moist derives its -nourishment. The pure vapours are the transitional stage in the passing -of sea into fire, the impure the transitional stage in the passing -of earth into water. Thus the two paths of metamorphosis of the fire -run continuously side by side, upwards and downwards, to and fro, from -fire to water, from water to earth, from earth back again to water, -from water to fire. Whereas Heraclitus is a follower of Anaximander in -the most important of these conceptions, _e.g.,_ that the fire is kept -up by the evaporations, or herein, that out of the water is dissolved -partly earth, partly fire; he is on the other hand quite independent -and in opposition to Anaximander in excluding the "Cold" from the -physical process, whilst Anaximander had put it side by side with the -"Warm" as having the same rights, so as to let the "Moist" originate -out of both. To do so, was of course a necessity to Heraclitus, for -if everything is to be fire, then, however many possibilities of its -transformation might be assumed, nothing can exist that would be the -absolute antithesis to fire; he has, therefore, probably interpreted -only as a degree of the "Warm" that which is called the "Cold," and -he could justify this interpretation without difficulty. Much more -important than this deviation from the doctrine of Anaximander is a -further agreement; he, like the latter, believes in an end of the -world periodically repeating itself and in an ever-renewed emerging of -another world out of the all-destroying world-fire. The period during -which the world hastens towards that world-fire and the dissolution -into pure fire is characterised by him most strikingly as a demand -and a need; the state of being completely swallowed up by the fire as -satiety; and now to us remains the question as to how he understood -and named the newly awakening impulse for world-creation, the -pouring-out-of-itself into the forms of plurality. The Greek proverb -seems to come to our assistance with the thought that "satiety gives -birth to crime" (the Hybris) and one may indeed ask oneself for a -minute whether perhaps Heraclitus has derived that return to plurality -out of the Hybris. Let us just take this thought seriously: in its -light the face of Heraclitus changes before our eyes, the proud gleam -of his eyes dies out, a wrinkled expression of painful resignation, of -impotence becomes distinct, it seems that we know why later antiquity -called him the "weeping philosopher." Is not the whole world-process -now an act of punishment of the Hybris? The plurality the result of a -crime? The transformation of the pure into the impure, the consequence -of injustice? Is not the guilt now shifted into the essence of the -things and indeed, the world of Becoming and of individuals accordingly -exonerated from guilt; yet at the same time are they not condemned for -ever and ever to bear the consequences of guilt? - - - -7 - - -That dangerous word, Hybris, is indeed the touchstone for every -Heraclitean; here he may show whether he has understood or mistaken -his master. Is there in this world: Guilt, injustice, contradiction, -suffering? - -Yes, exclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human being, who -sees divergently and not convergently, not for the contuitive god; -to him everything opposing converges into one harmony, invisible it -is true to the common human eye, yet comprehensible to him who like -Heraclitus resembles the contemplative god. Before his fiery eye no -drop of injustice is left in the world poured out around him, and even -that cardinal obstacle--how pure fire can take up its quarters in -forms so impure--he masters by means of a sublime simile. A Becoming -and Passing, a building and destroying, without any moral bias, in -perpetual innocence is in this world only the play of the artist and of -the child. And similarly, just as the child and the artist play, the -eternally living fire plays, builds up and destroys, in innocence--and -this game the _Æon_ plays with himself. Transforming himself into water -and earth, like a child he piles heaps of sand by the sea, piles up -and demolishes; from time to time he recommences the game. A moment of -satiety, then again desire seizes him, as desire compels the artist to -create. Not wantonness, but the ever newly awakening impulse to play, -calls into life other worlds. The child throws away his toys; but soon -he starts again in an innocent frame of mind. As soon however as the -child builds he connects, joins and forms lawfully and according to an -innate sense of order. - -Thus only is the world contemplated by the æsthetic man, who has -learned from the artist and the genesis of the latter's work, how the -struggle of plurality can yet bear within itself law and justice, -how the artist stands contemplative above, and working within the -work of art, how necessity and play, antagonism and harmony must pair -themselves for the procreation of the work of art. - -Who now will still demand from such a philosophy a system of Ethics -with the necessary imperatives--Thou Shalt,--or even reproach -Heraclitus with such a deficiency. Man down to his last fibre is -Necessity and absolutely "unfree "--if by freedom one understands the -foolish claim to be able to change at will one's _essentia_ like a -garment, a claim, which up to the present every serious philosophy -has rejected with due scorn. That so few human beings live with -consciousness in the _Logos_ and in accordance with the all-overlooking -artist's eye originates from their souls being wet and from the fact -that men's eyes and ears, their intellect in general is a bad witness -when "moist ooze fills their souls." Why that is so, is not questioned -any more than why fire becomes water and earth. Heraclitus is not -_compelled_ to prove (as Leibnitz was) that this world was even the -best of all; it was sufficient for him that the world is the beautiful, -innocent play of the _Æon._ Man on the whole is to him even an -irrational being, with which the fact that in all his essence the law -of all-ruling reason is fulfilled does lot clash. He does not occupy -a specially favoured position in nature, whose highest phenomenon is -not simple-minded man, but fire, for instance, as stars. In so far as -man has through necessity received a share of fire, he is a little -more rational; as far as he consists of earth and water it stands -badly with his reason. He is not compelled to take cognisance of the -_Logos_ simply because he is a human being. Why is there water, why -earth? This to Heraclitus is a much more serious problem than to ask, -why men are so stupid and bad. In the highest and the most perverted -men the same inherent lawfulness and justice manifest themselves. -If however one would ask Heraclitus the question "Why is fire not -always fire, why is it now water, now earth?" then he would only just -answer: "It is a game, don't take it too pathetically and still less, -morally." Heraclitus describes only the existing world and has the same -contemplative pleasure in it which the artist experiences when looking -at his growing work. Only those who have cause to be discontented -with his natural history of man find him gloomy, melancholy, tearful, -sombre, atrabilarious, pessimistic and altogether hateful. He however -would take these discontented people, together with their antipathies -and sympathies, their hatred und their love, as negligible and perhaps -answer them with some such comment as: "Dogs bark at anything they do -not know," or, "To the ass chaff is preferable to gold." - -With such discontented persons also originate the numerous complaints -as to the obscurity of the Heraclitean style; probably no man has ever -written clearer and more illuminatingly; of course, very abruptly, -and therefore naturally obscure to the racing readers. But why a -philosopher should intentionally write obscurely--a thing habitually -said about Heraclitus--is absolutely inexplicable; unless he has some -cause to hide his thoughts or is sufficiently a rogue to conceal his -thoughtlessness underneath words. One is, as Schopenhauer says, indeed -compelled by lucid expression to prevent misunderstandings even in -affairs of practical every-day life, how then should one be allowed to -express oneself indistinctly, indeed puzzlingly in the most difficult, -most abstruse, scarcely attainable object of thinking, the tasks of -philosophy? With respect to brevity however Jean Paul gives a good -precept: "On the whole it is right that everything great--of deep -meaning to a rare mind--should be uttered with brevity and (therefore) -obscurely so that the paltry mind would rather proclaim it to be -nonsense than translate it into the realm of his empty-headedness. -For common minds have an ugly ability to perceive in the deepest and -richest saying nothing but their own every-day opinion." Moreover and -in spite of it Heraclitus has not escaped the "paltry minds"; already -the Stoics have "re-expounded" him into the shallow and dragged down -his æsthetic fundamental-perception as to the play of the world to the -miserable level of the common regard for the practical ends of the -world and more explicitly for the advantages of man, so that out of his -Physics has arisen in those heads a crude optimism, with the continual -invitation to Dick, Tom, and Harry, "_Plaudite amici!_" - - - -8 - - -Heraclitus was proud; and if it comes to pride with a philosopher then -it is a great pride. His work never refers him to a "public," the -applause of the masses and the hailing chorus of contemporaries. To -wander lonely along his path belongs to the nature of the philosopher. -His talents are the most rare, in a certain sense the most unnatural -and at the same time exclusive and hostile even toward kindred talents. -The wall of his self-sufficiency must be of diamond, if it is not to -be demolished and broken, for everything is in motion against him. His -journey to immortality is more cumbersome and impeded than any other -and yet nobody can believe more firmly than the philosopher that he -will attain the goal by that journey--because he does not know where -he is to stand if not on the widely spread wings of all time; for the -disregard of everything present and momentary lies in the essence of -the great philosophic nature. He has truth; the wheel of time may roll -whither it pleases, never can it escape from truth. It is important -to hear that such men have lived. Never for example would one be able -to imagine the pride of Heraclitus as an idle possibility. In itself -every endeavour after knowledge seems by its nature to be eternally -unsatisfied and unsatisfactory. Therefore nobody unless instructed -by history will like to believe in such a royal self-esteem and -conviction of being the only wooer of truth. Such men live in their -own solar-system--one has to look for them there. A Pythagoras, an -Empedocles treated themselves too with a super-human esteem, yea, with -almost religious awe; but the tie of sympathy united with the great -conviction of the metempsychosis and the unity of everything living, -led them back to other men, for their welfare and salvation. Of that -feeling of solitude, however, which permeated the Ephesian recluse -of the Artemis Temple, one can only divine something, when growing -benumbed in the wildest mountain desert. No paramount feeling of -compassionate agitation, no desire to help, heal and save emanates from -him. He is a star without an atmosphere. His eye, directed blazingly -inwards, looks outward, for appearance's sake only, extinct and icy. -All around him, immediately upon the citadel of his pride beat the -waves of folly and perversity: with loathing he turns away from them. -But men with a feeling heart would also shun such a Gorgon monster -as cast out of brass; within an out-of-the-way sanctuary, among the -statues of gods, by the side of cold composedly-sublime architecture -such a being may appear more comprehensible. As man among men -Heraclitus was incredible; and though he was seen paying attention to -the play of noisy children, even then he was reflecting upon what never -man thought of on such an occasion: the play of the great world-child, -Zeus. He had no need of men, not even for his discernments. He was -not interested in all that which one might perhaps ascertain from -them, and in what the other sages before him had been endeavouring to -ascertain. He spoke with disdain of such questioning, collecting, in -short "historic" men. "I sought and investigated myself," he said, with -a word by which one designates the investigation of an oracle; as if -he and no one else were the true fulfiller and achiever of the Delphic -precept: "Know thyself." - -What he learned from this oracle, he deemed immortal wisdom, and -eternally worthy of explanation, of unlimited effect even in the -distance, after the model of the prophetic speeches of the Sibyl. -It is sufficient for the latest mankind: let the latter have that -expounded to her, as oracular sayings, which he like the Delphic god -"neither enunciates nor conceals." Although it is proclaimed by him, -"without smiles, finery and the scent of ointments," but rather as with -"foaming mouth," it _must_ force its way through the millenniums of -the future. For the world needs truth eternally, therefore she needs -also Heraclitus eternally; although he has no need of her. What does -his fame matter to _him?_--fame with "mortals ever flowing on!" as he -exclaims scornfully. His fame is of concern to man, not to himself; -the immortality of mankind needs him, not he the immortality of the -man Heraclitus. That which he beheld, _the doctrine of the Law in the -Becoming, and of the Play in the Necessity,_ must henceforth be beheld -eternally; he has raised the curtain of this greatest stage-play. - - - -9 - - -Whereas in every word of Heraclitus are expressed the pride and the -majesty of truth, but of truth caught by intuitions, not scaled by -the rope-ladder of Logic, whereas in sublime ecstasy he beholds but -does not espy, discerns but does not reckon, he is contrasted with his -contemporary _Parmenides,_ a man likewise with the type of a prophet -of truth, but formed as it were out of ice and not out of fire, and -shedding around himself cold, piercing light. - -Parmenides once had, probably in his later years, a moment of the -very purest abstraction, undimmed by any reality, perfectly lifeless; -this moment--un-Greek, like no other in the two centuries of the -Tragic Age--the product of which is the doctrine of "Being," became a -boundary-stone for his own life, which divided it into two periods; at -the same time however the same moment divides the pre-Socratic thinking -into two halves, of which the first might be called the Anaximandrian, -the second the Parmenidean. The first period in Parmenides' own -philosophising bears still the signature of Anaximander; this -period produced a detailed philosophic-physical system as answer to -Anaximander's questions. When later that icy abstraction-horror caught -him, and the simplest proposition treating of "Being" and "Not-Being" -was advanced by him, then among the many older doctrines thrown by him -upon the scrap heap was also his own system. However he does not appear -to have lost all paternal piety towards the strong and well-shapen -child of his youth, and he saved himself therefore by saying: "It is -true there is only one right way; if one however wants at any time to -betake oneself to another, then my earlier opinion according to its -purity and consequence alone is right." Sheltering himself with this -phrase he has allowed his former physical system a worthy and extensive -space in his great poem on Nature, which really was to proclaim the -new discernment as the only signpost to truth. This fatherly regard, -even though an error should have crept in through it, is a remainder -of human feeling, in a nature quite petrified by logical rigidity and -almost changed into a thinking-machine. - -Parmenides, whose personal intercourse with Anaximander does not seem -incredible to me, and whose starting from Anaximander's doctrine is -not only credible but evident, had the same distrust for the complete -separation of a world which only is, and a world which only becomes, as -had also caught Heraclitus and led to a denying of "Being" altogether. -Both sought a way out from that contrast and divergence of a dual order -of the world. That leap into the Indefinite, Indefinable, by which -once for all Anaximander had escaped from the realm of Becoming and -from the empirically given qualities of such realm, that leap did not -become an easy matter to minds so independently fashioned as those of -Heraclitus and Parmenides; first they endeavoured to walk as far as -they could and reserved to themselves the leap for that place, where -the foot finds no more hold and one has to leap, in order not to fall. -Both looked repeatedly at that very world, which Anaximander had -condemned in so melancholy a way and declared to be the place of wanton -crime and at the same time the penitentiary cell for the injustice of -Becoming. Contemplating this world Heraclitus, as we know already, had -discovered what a wonderful order, regularity and security manifest -themselves in every Becoming; from that he concluded that the Becoming -could not be anything evil and unjust. Quite a different outlook had -Parmenides; he compared the qualities one with another, and believed -that they were not all of the same kind, but ought to be classified -under two headings. If for example he compared bright and dark, then -the second quality was obviously only the _negation_ of the first; -and thus he distinguished positive and negative qualities, seriously -endeavouring to rediscover and register that fundamental antithesis -in the whole realm of Nature. His method was the following: He took a -few antitheses, _e.g.,_ light and heavy, rare and dense, active and -passive, and compared them with that typical antithesis of bright and -dark: that which corresponded with the bright was the positive, that -which corresponded with the dark the negative quality. If he took -perhaps the heavy and light, the light fell to the side of the bright, -the heavy to the side of the dark; and thus "heavy" was to him only -the negation of "light," but the "light" a positive quality. This -method alone shows that he had a defiant aptitude for abstract logical -procedure, closed against the suggestions of the senses. The "heavy" -seems indeed to offer itself very forcibly to the senses as a positive -quality; that did not keep Parmenides from stamping it as a negation. -Similarly he placed the earth in opposition to the fire, the "cold" -in opposition to the "warm," the "dense" in opposition to the "rare," -the "female" in opposition to the "male," the "passive" in opposition -to the "active," merely as negations: so that before his gaze our -empiric world divided itself into two separate spheres, into that -of the positive qualities--with a bright, fiery, warm, light, rare, -active-masculine character--and into that of the negative qualities. -The latter express really only the lack, the absence of the others, the -positive ones. He therefore described the sphere in which the positive -qualities are absent as dark, earthy, cold, heavy, dense and altogether -as of feminine-passive character. Instead of the expressions "positive" -and "negative" he used the standing term "existent" and "non-existent" -and had arrived with this at the proposition, that, in contradiction to -Anaximander, this our world itself contains something "existent," and -of course something "non-existent." One is not to seek that "existent" -outside the world and as it were above our horizon; but before us, -and everywhere in every Becoming, something "existent" and active is -contained. - -With that however still remained to him the task of giving the more -exact answer to the question: What is the Becoming? and here was the -moment where he had to leap, in order not to fall, although perhaps to -such natures as that of Parmenides, even any leaping means a falling. -Enough! we get into fog, into the mysticism of _qualitates occultæ,_ -and even a little into mythology. Parmenides, like Heraclitus, looks -at the general Becoming and Not-remaining and explains to himself a -Passing only thus, that the "Non-Existent" bore the guilt. For how -should the "Existent" bear the guilt of Passing? Likewise, however, -the Originating, i.e., the Becoming, must come about through the -assistance of the "Non-Existent"; for the "Existent" is always there -and could not of itself first originate and it could not explain any -Originating, any Becoming. Therefore the Originating, the Becoming -as well as the Passing and Perishing have been brought about by the -negative qualities. But that the originating "thing" has a content, -and the passing "thing" loses a content, presupposes that the positive -qualities--and that just means that very content--participate -likewise in both processes. In short the proposition results: "For the -Becoming the 'Existent' as well as the 'Non-Existent' is necessary; -when they co-operate then a Becoming results." But how come the -"positive" and the "negative" to one another? Should they not on the -contrary eternally flee one another as antitheses and thereby make -every Becoming impossible? Here Parmenides appeals to a _qualitas -occulta,_ to a mystic tendency of the antithetical pairs to approach -and attract one another, and he allegorises that peculiar contrariety -by the name of Aphrodite, and by the empirically known relation of -the male and female principle. It is the power of Aphrodite which -plays the matchmaker between the antithetical pair, the "Existent" -and the "Non-Existent." Passion brings together the antagonistic and -antipathetic elements: the result is a Becoming. When Desire has become -satiated, Hatred and the innate antagonism again drive asunder the -"Existent" and the "Non-Existent"--then man says: the thing perishes, -passes. - - - -10 - - -But no one with impunity lays his profane hands on such awful -abstractions as the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent"; the blood -freezes slowly as one touches them. There was a day upon which an odd -idea suddenly occurred to Parmenides, an idea which seemed to take -all value away from his former combinations, so that he felt inclined -to throw them aside, like a money bag with old worn-out coins. It is -commonly believed that an external impression, in addition to the -centrifugal consequence of such ideas as "existent" and "non-existent," -has also been co-active in the invention of that day; this impression -was an acquaintance with the theology of the old roamer and rhapsodist, -the singer of a mystic deification of Nature, the Kolophonian -_Xenophanes._ Throughout an extraordinary life Xenophanes lived as -a wandering poet and became through his travels a well-informed and -most instructive man who knew how to question and how to narrate, for -which reason Heraclitus reckoned him amongst the polyhistorians and -above all amongst the "historic" natures, in the sense mentioned. -Whence and when came to him the mystic bent into the One and the -eternally Resting, nobody will be able to compute; perhaps it is only -the conception of the finally settled old man, to whom, after the -agitation of his erratic wanderings, and after the restless learning -and searching for truth, the vision of a divine rest, the permanence of -all things within a pantheistic primal peace appears as _the_ highest -and greatest ideal. After all it seems to me quite accidental that in -the same place in Elea two men lived together for a time, each of whom -carried in his head a conception of unity; they formed no school and -had nothing in common which perhaps the one might have learned from -the other and then might have handed on. For, in the case of these two -men, the origin of that conception of unity is quite different, yea -opposite; and if either of them has become at all acquainted with the -doctrine of the other then, in order to understand it at all, he had to -translate it first into his own language. With this translation however -the very specific element of the other doctrine was lost. Whereas -Parmenides arrived at the unity of the "Existent" purely through an -alleged logical consequence and whereas he span that unity out of the -ideas "Being" and "Not-Being," Xenophanes was a religious mystic and -belonged, with that mystic unity, very properly to the Sixth Century. -Although he was no such revolutionising personality as Pythagoras -he had nevertheless in his wanderings the same bent and impulse to -improve, purify, and cure men. He was the ethical teacher, but still -in the stage of the rhapsodist; in a later time he would have been -a sophist. In the daring disapproval of the existing customs and -valuations he had not his equal in Greece; moreover he did not, like -Heraclitus and Plato, retire into solitude but placed himself before -the very public, whose exulting admiration of Homer, whose passionate -propensity for the honours of the gymnastic festivals, whose adoration -of stones in human shape, he criticised severely with wrath and scorn, -yet not as a brawling Thersites. The freedom of the individual was with -him on its zenith; and by this almost limitless stepping free from all -conventions he was more closely related to Parmenides than by that last -divine unity, which once he had beheld, in a visionary state worthy of -that century. His unity scarcely had expression and word in common with -the one "Being" of Parmenides, and certainly had not the same origin. - -It was rather an opposite state of mind in which Parmenides found his -doctrine of "Being," On that day and in that state he examined his -two co-operating antitheses, the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent," -the positive and the negative qualities, of which Desire and Hatred -constitute the world and the Becoming. He was suddenly caught up, -mistrusting, by the idea of negative quality, of the "Non-Existent." -For can something which does not exist be a quality? or to put the -question in a broader sense: can anything indeed which does not exist, -exist? The only form of knowledge in which we at once put unconditional -trust and the disapproval of which amounts to madness, is the tautology -A = A. But this very tautological knowledge called inexorably to him: -what does not exist, exists not! What is, is! Suddenly he feels -upon his life the load of an enormous logical sin; for had he not -always without hesitation assumed that _there were existing_ negative -qualities, in short a "Non-Existent," that therefore, to express it by -a formula, A = Not-A, which indeed could only be advanced by the most -out and out perversity of thinking. It is true, as he recollected, the -whole great mass of men judge with the same perversity; he himself -has only participated in the general crime against logic. But the -same moment which charges him with this crime surrounds him with the -light of the glory of an invention, he has found, apart from all human -illusion, a principle, the key to the world-secret, he now descends -into the abyss of things, guided by the firm and fearful hand of the -tautological truth as to "Being." - -On the way thither he meets Heraclitus--an unfortunate encounter! Just -now Heraclitus' play with antinomies was bound to be very hateful to -him, who placed the utmost importance upon the severest separation of -"Being" and "Not-Being"; propositions like this: "We are and at the -same time we are not" --"'Being' and 'Not-Being' is at the same time -the same thing and again not the same thing," propositions through -which all that he had just elucidated and disentangled became again -dim and inextricable, incited him to wrath. "Away with the men," he -exclaimed, "who seem to have two heads and yet know nothing! With them -truly everything is in flux, even their thinking! They stare at things -stupidly, but they must be deaf as well as blind so to mix up the -opposites"! The want of judgment on the part of the masses, glorified -by playful antinomies and praised as the acme of all knowledge was to -him a painful and incomprehensible experience. - -Now he dived into the cold bath of his awful abstractions. That which -is true must exist in eternal presence, about it cannot be said "it -was," "it will be." The "Existent" cannot have become; for out of what -should it have become? Out of the "Non-Existent"? But that does not -exist and can produce nothing. Out of the "Existent"? This would not -produce anything but itself. The same applies to the Passing, it is -just as impossible as the Becoming, as any change, any increase, any -decrease. On the whole the proposition is valid: Everything about which -it can be said: "it has been" or "it will be" does not exist; about -the "Existent" however it can never be said "it does not exist." The -"Existent" is indivisible, for where is the second power, which should -divide it? It is immovable, for whither should it move itself? It -cannot be infinitely great nor infinitely small, for it is perfect and -a perfectly given infinitude is a contradiction. Thus the "Existent" -is suspended, delimited, perfect, immovable, everywhere equally -balanced and such equilibrium equally perfect at any point, like a -globe, but not in a space, for otherwise this space would be a second -"Existent." But there cannot exist several "Existents," for in order to -separate them, something would have to exist which was not existing, an -assumption which neutralises itself. Thus there exists only the eternal -Unity. - -If now, however, Parmenides turned back his gaze to the world of -Becoming, the existence of which he had formerly tried to understand -by such ingenious conjectures, he was wroth at his eye seeing the -Becoming at all, his ear hearing it. "Do not follow the dim-sighted -eyes," now his command runs, "not the resounding ear nor the -tongue, but examine only by the power of the thought." Therewith he -accomplished the extremely important first critique of the apparatus -of knowledge, although this critique was still inadequate and proved -disastrous in its consequences. By tearing entirely asunder the -senses and the ability to think in abstractions, _i.e._ reason, just -as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he demolished -the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous -separation of "mind" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies -like a curse on philosophy. All sense perceptions, Parmenides judges, -cause only illusions and their chief illusion is their deluding us to -believe that even the "Non-Existent" exists, that even the Becoming has -a "Being." All that plurality, diversity and variety of the empirically -known world, the change of its qualities, the order in its ups and -downs, is thrown aside mercilessly as mere appearance and delusion; -from there nothing is to be learnt, therefore all labour is wasted -which one bestows upon this false, through-and-through futile world, -the conception of which has been obtained by being hum-bugged by the -senses. He who judges in such generalisations as Parmenides did, ceases -therewith to be an investigator of natural philosophy in detail; his -interest in phenomena withers away; there develops even a hatred of -being unable to get rid of this eternal fraud of the senses. Truth is -now to dwell only in the most faded, most abstract generalities, in the -empty husks of the most indefinite words, as in a maze of cobwebs; and -by such a "truth" now the philosopher sits, bloodless as an abstraction -and surrounded by a web of formulæ. The spider undoubtedly wants the -blood of its victims; but the Parmenidean philosopher hates the very -blood of his victims, the blood of Empiricism sacrificed by him. - - - -11 - - -And that was a Greek who "flourished" about the time of the outbreak -of the Ionic Revolution. At that time it was possible for a Greek -to flee out of the superabundant reality, as out of a mere delusive -schematism of the imaginative faculties--not perhaps like Plato into -the land of the eternal ideas, into the workshop of the world-creator, -in order to feast the eyes on unblemished, unbreakable primal-forms of -things--but into the rigid death-like rest of the coldest and emptiest -conception, that of the "Being." We will indeed beware of interpreting -such a remarkable fact by false analogies. That flight was not a -world-flight in the sense of Indian philosophers; no deep religious -conviction as to the depravity, transitoriness and accursedness of -Existence demanded that flight--that ultimate goal, the rest in the -"Being," was not striven after as the mystic absorption in _one_ -all-sufficing enrapturing conception which is a puzzle and a scandal -to common men. The thought of Parmenides bears in itself not the -slightest trace of the intoxicating mystical Indian fragrance, which -is perhaps not wholly imperceptible in Pythagoras and Empedocles; the -strange thing in that fact, at this period, is rather the very absence -of fragrance, colour, soul, form, the total lack of blood, religiosity -and ethical warmth, the abstract-schematic--in a Greek!--above all -however our philosopher's awful energy of striving after _Certainty,_ -in a mythically thinking and highly emotional--fantastic age is quite -remarkable. "Grant me but a certainty, ye gods!"is the prayer of -Parmenides, "and be it, in the ocean of Uncertainty, only a board, -broad enough to lie on! Everything becoming, everything luxuriant, -varied, blossoming, deceiving, stimulating, living, take all that for -yourselves, and give to me but the single poor empty Certainty!" - -In the philosophy of Parmenides the theme of ontology forms the -prelude. Experience offered him nowhere a "Being" as he imagined it to -himself, but from the fact that he could conceive of it he concluded -that it must exist; a conclusion which rests upon the supposition -that we have an organ of knowledge which reaches into the nature of -things and is independent of experience. The material of our thinking -according to Parmenides does not exist in perception at all but is -brought in from somewhere else, from an extra-material world to which -by thinking we have a direct access. Against all similar chains of -reasoning Aristotle has already asserted that existence never belongs -to the essence, never belongs to the nature of a thing. For that very -reason from the idea of "Being"--of which the _essentia_ precisely is -only the "Being"--cannot be inferred an _existentia_ of the "Being" at -all. The logical content of that antithesis "Being" and "Not-Being" -is perfectly nil, if the object lying at the bottom of it, if the -precept cannot be given from which this antithesis has been deduced -by abstraction; without this going back to the precept the antithesis -is only a play with conceptions, through which indeed nothing is -discerned. For the merely logical criterion of truth, as Kant teaches, -namely the agreement of a discernment with the general and the formal -laws of intellect and reason is, it is true, the _conditio sine qua -non,_ consequently the negative condition of all truth; further however -logic cannot go, and logic cannot discover by any touchstone the error -which pertains not to the form but to the contents. As soon, however, -as one seeks the content for the logical truth of the antithesis: -"That which is, is; that which is not, is not," one will find indeed -not a simple reality, which is fashioned rigidly according to that -antithesis: about a tree I can say as well "it is" in comparison with -all the other things, as well "it becomes" in comparison with itself -at another moment of time as finally also "it is not," _e.g._," it is -not yet tree," as long as I perhaps look at the shrub. Words are only -symbols for the relations of things among themselves and to us, and -nowhere touch absolute truth; and now to crown all, the word "Being" -designates only the most general relation, which connects all things, -and so does the word "Not-Being." If however the Existence of the -things themselves be unprovable, then the relation of the things among -themselves, the so-called "Being" and "Not-Being," will not bring us -any nearer to the land of truth. By means of words and ideas we shall -never get behind the wall of the relations, let us say into some -fabulous primal cause of things, and even in the pure forms of the -sensitive faculty and of the intellect, in space, time and causality -we gain nothing, which might resemble a "_Veritas æterna?_" It is -absolutely impossible for the subject to see and discern something -beyond himself, so impossible that Cognition and "Being" are the most -contradictory of all spheres. And if in the uninstructed _naïveté_ -of the then critique of the intellect Parmenides was permitted to -fancy that out of the eternally subjective idea he had come to a -"Being-In-itself," then it is to-day, after Kant, a daring ignorance, -if here and there, especially among badly informed theologians who -want to play the philosopher, is proposed as the task of philosophy: -"to conceive the Absolute by means of consciousness," perhaps even -in the form: "the Absolute is already extant, else how could it be -sought?" as Hegel has expressed himself, or with the saying of Beneke: -"that the 'Being' must be given somehow, must be attainable for us -somehow, since otherwise we could not even have the idea of 'Being.'" -The idea of "Being"! As though that idea did not indicate the most -miserable empiric origin already in the etymology of the word. For -_esse_ means at the bottom: "to breathe," if man uses it of all other -things, then he transmits the conviction that he himself breathes and -lives by means of a metaphor, _i.e.,_ by means of something illogical -to the other things and conceives of their Existence as a Breathing -according to human analogy. Now the original meaning of the word soon -becomes effaced; so much however still remains that man conceives of -the existence of other things according to the analogy of his own -existence, therefore anthropomorphically, and at any rate by means -of an illogical transmission. Even to man, therefore apart from that -transmission, the proposition: "I breathe, therefore a 'Being' exists" -is quite insufficient since against it the same objection must be made, -as against the _ambulo, ergo sum,_ or _ergo est_. - - - -12 - - -The other idea, of greater import than that of the "Existent," and -likewise invented already by Parmenides, although not yet so clearly -applied as by his disciple Zeno is the idea of the Infinite. Nothing -Infinite can exist; for from such an assumption the contradictory -idea of a perfect Infinitude would result. Since now our actuality, -our existing world everywhere shows the character of that perfect -Infinitude, our world signifies in its nature a contradiction against -logic and therewith also against reality and is deception, lie, -fantasma. Zeno especially applied the method of indirect proof; he -said for example, "There can be no motion from one place to another; -for if there were such a motion, then an Infinitude would be given as -perfect, this however is an impossibility." Achilles cannot catch up -the tortoise which has a small start in a race, for in order to reach -only the point from which the tortoise began, he would have had to run -through innumerable, infinitely many spaces, viz., first half of that -space, then the fourth, then the sixteenth, and so on _ad infinitum._ -If he does in fact overtake the tortoise then this is an illogical -phenomenon, and therefore at any rate not a truth, not a reality, not -real "Being," but only a delusion. For it is never possible to finish -the infinite. Another popular expression of this doctrine is the -flying and yet resting arrow. At any instant of its flight it has a -position; in this position it rests. Now would the sum of the infinite -positions of rest be identical with motion? Would now the Resting, -infinitely often repeated, be Motion, therefore its own opposite? -The Infinite is here used as the _aqua fortis_ of reality, through -it the latter is dissolved. If however the Ideas are fixed, eternal -and entitative--and for Parmenides "Being" and Thinking coincide--if -therefore the Infinite can never be perfect, if Rest can never become -Motion, then in fact the arrow has not flown at all; it never left its -place and resting position; no moment of time has passed. Or expressed -in another way: in this so-called yet only alleged Actuality there -exists neither time, nor space, nor motion. Finally the arrow itself is -only an illusion; for it originates out of the Plurality, out of the -phantasmagoria of the "Non-One" produced by the senses. Suppose the -arrow had a "Being," then it would be immovable, timeless, increate, -rigid and eternal--an impossible conception! Supposing that Motion was -truly real, then there would be no rest, therefore no position for the -arrow, therefore no space--an impossible conception! Supposing that -time were real, then it could not be of an infinite divisibility; the -time which the arrow needed, would have to consist of a limited number -of time-moments, each of these moments would have to be an _Atomon_--an -impossible conception! All our conceptions, as soon as their -empirically-given content, drawn out of this concrete world, is taken -as a _Veritas æterna,_ lead to contradictions. If there is absolute -motion, then there is no space; if there is absolute space then there -is no motion; if there is absolute "Being," then there is no Plurality; -if there is an absolute Plurality, then there is no Unity. It should -at least become clear to _us_ how little we touch the heart of things -or untie the knot of reality with such ideas, whereas Parmenides and -Zeno inversely hold fast to the truth and omnivalidity of ideas and -condemn the perceptible world as the opposite of the true and omnivalid -ideas, as an objectivation of the illogical and contradictory. With all -their proofs they start from the wholly undemonstrable, yea improbable -assumption that in that apprehensive faculty we possess the decisive, -highest criterion of "Being" and "Not-Being," _i.e.,_ of objective -reality and its opposite; those ideas are not to prove themselves -true, to correct themselves by Actuality, as they are after all really -derived from it, but on the contrary they are to measure and to judge -Actuality, and in case of a contradiction with logic, even to condemn. -In order to concede to them this judicial competence Parmenides had to -ascribe to them the same "Being," which alone he allowed in general -as _the_ "Being"; Thinking and that one increate perfect ball of the -"Existent" were now no longer to be conceived as two different kinds -of "Being," since there was not permitted a duality of "Being." Thus -the over-risky flash of fancy had become necessary to declare Thinking -and "Being" identical. No form of perceptibility, no symbol, no simile -could possibly be of any help here; the fancy was wholly inconceivable, -but it was necessary, yea in the lack of every possibility of -illustration it celebrated the highest triumph over the world and -the claims of the senses. Thinking and that clod-like, ball-shaped, -through-and-through dead-massive, and rigid-immovable "Being," must, -according to the Parmenidean imperative, dissolve into one another and -be the same in every respect, to the horror of fantasy. What does it -matter that this identity contradicts the senses! This contradiction -is just the guarantee that such an identity is not borrowed from the -senses. - - - -13 - - -Moreover against Parmenides could be produced a strong couple of -_argumenta ad hominem_ or _ex concessis,_ by which, it is true, truth -itself could not be brought to light, but at any rate the untruth of -that absolute separation of the world of the senses and the world of -the ideas, and the untruth of the identity of "Being" and Thinking -could be demonstrated. Firstly, if the Thinking of Reason in ideas is -real, then also Plurality and Motion must have reality, for rational -Thinking is mobile; and more precisely, it is a motion from idea to -idea, therefore within a plurality of realities. There is no subterfuge -against that; it is quite impossible to designate Thinking as a rigid -Permanence, as an eternally immobile, intellectual Introspection of -Unity. Secondly, if only fraud and illusion come from the senses, -and if in reality there exists only the real identity of "Being" and -Thinking, what then are the senses themselves? They too are certainly -Appearance only since they do not coincide with the Thinking, and -their product, the world of senses, does not coincide with "Being." -If however the senses themselves are Appearance to whom then are -they Appearance? How can they, being unreal, still deceive? The -"Non-Existent" cannot even deceive. Therefore the Whence? of deception -and Appearance remains an enigma, yea, a contradiction. We call these -_argumenta ad hominem:_ The Objection Of The Mobile Reason and that -of The Origin Of Appearance. From the first would result the reality -of Motion and of Plurality, from the second the impossibility of the -Parmenidean Appearance, assuming that the chief-doctrine of Parmenides -on the "Being" were accepted as true. This chief-doctrine however only -says: The "Existent" only has a "Being," the "Non-Existent" does not -exist. If Motion however has such a "Being," then to Motion applies -what applies to the "Existent" in general: it is increate, eternal, -indestructible, without increase or decrease. But if the "Appearance" -is denied and a belief in it made untenable, by means of that question -as to the Whence? of the "Appearance," if the stage of the so-called -Becoming, of change, our many-shaped, restless, coloured and rich -Existence is protected from the Parmenidean rejection, then it is -necessary to characterise this world of change and alteration as a -_sum_ of such really existing Essentials, existing simultaneously -into all eternity. Of a change in the strict sense, of a Becoming -there cannot naturally be any question even with this assumption. But -now Plurality has a real "Being," all qualities have a real "Being" -and motion not less; and of any moment of this world--although these -moments chosen at random lie at a distance of millenniums from one -another--it would have to be possible to say: all real Essentials -extant in this world are without exception co-existent, unaltered, -undiminished, without increase, without decrease. A millennium later -the world is exactly the same. Nothing has altered. If in spite of -that the appearance of the world at the one time is quite different -from that at the other time, then that is no deception, nothing merely -apparent, but the effect of eternal motion. The real "Existent" is -moved sometimes thus, sometimes thus: together, asunder, upwards, -downwards, into one another, pell-mell. - - - -14 - - -With this conception we have already taken a step into the realm -of the doctrine of _Anaxagoras._ By him both objections against -Parmenides are raised in full strength; that of the mobile Thinking -and that of the Whence? of "Appearance"; but in the chief proposition -Parmenides has subjugated him as well as all the younger philosophers -and nature-explorers. They all deny the possibility of Becoming and -Passing, as the mind of the people conceives them and as Anaximander -and Heraclitus had assumed with greater circumspection and yet still -heedlessly. Such a mythological Originating out of the Nothing, such -a Disappearing into the Nothing, such an arbitrary Changing of the -Nothing into the Something, such a random exchanging, putting on and -putting off of the qualities was henceforth considered senseless; but -so was, and for the same reasons, an originating of the Many out of the -One, of the manifold qualities out of the one primal-quality, in short -the derivation of the world out of a primary substance, as argued by -Thales and Heraclitus. Rather was now the real problem advanced of -applying the doctrine of increate imperishable "Being" to this existing -world, without taking one's refuge in the theory of appearance and -deception. But if the empiric world is not to be Appearance, if the -things are not to be derived out of Nothing and just as little out of -the one Something, then these things must contain in themselves a real -"Being," their matter and content must be unconditionally real, and -all change can refer only to the form, _i.e.,_ to the position, order, -grouping, mixing, separation of these eternally co-existing Essentials. -It is just as in a game of dice; they are ever the same dice; but -falling sometimes thus, sometimes thus, they mean to us something -different. All older theories had gone back to a primal element, as -womb and cause of Becoming, be this water, air, fire or the Indefinite -of Anaximander. Against that Anaxagoras now asserts that out of the -Equal the Unequal could never come forth, and that out of the one -"Existent" the change could never be explained. Whether now one were -to imagine that assumed matter to be rarefied or condensed, one would -never succeed by such a condensation or rarefaction in explaining the -problem one would like to explain: the plurality of qualities. But if -the world in fact is full of the most different qualities then these -must, in case they are not appearance, have a "Being," _i.e.,_ must -be eternal, increate, imperishable and ever co-existing. Appearance, -however, they cannot be, since the question as to the Whence? of -Appearance remains unanswered, yea answers itself in the negative! The -earlier seekers after Truth had intended to simplify the problem of -Becoming by advancing only one substance, which bore in its bosom the -possibilities of all Becoming; now on the contrary it is asserted: -there are innumerable substances, but never more, never less, and never -new ones. Only Motion, playing dice with them throws them into ever -new combinations. That Motion however is a truth and not Appearance, -Anaxagoras proved in opposition to Parmenides by the indisputable -succession of our conceptions in thinking. We have therefore in the -most direct fashion the insight into the truth of motion and succession -in the fact that we think and have conceptions. Therefore at any rate -the _one_ rigid, resting, dead "Being" of Parmenides has been removed -out of the way, there are many "Existents" just as surely as all -these many "Existents" (existing things, substances) are in motion. -Change is motion--but whence originates motion? Does this motion leave -perhaps wholly untouched the proper essence of those many independent, -isolated substances, and, according to the most severe idea of the -"Existent," _must_ not motion in itself be foreign to them? Or does -it after all belong to the things themselves? We stand here at an -important decision; according to which way we turn, we shall step into -the realm either of Anaxagoras or of Empedocles or of Democritus. The -delicate question must be raised: if there are many substances, and if -these many move, what moves them? Do they move one another? Or is it -perhaps only gravitation? Or are there magic forces of attraction and -repulsion within the things themselves? Or does the cause of motion -lie outside these many real substances? Or putting the question -more pointedly: if two things show a succession, a mutual change of -position, does that originate from themselves? And is this to be -explained mechanically or magically? Or if this should not be the case -is it a third something which moves them? It is a sorry problem, for -Parmenides would still have been able to prove against Anaxagoras the -impossibility of motion, even granted that there are many substances. -For he could say: Take two Substances existing of themselves, each with -quite differently fashioned, autonomous, unconditioned "Being"--and -of such kind are the Anaxagorean substances--they can never clash -together, never move, never attract one another, there exists between -them no causality, no bridge, they do not come into contact with one -another, do not disturb one another, they do not interest one another, -they are utterly indifferent. The impact then is just as inexplicable -as the magic attraction: that which is utterly foreign cannot exercise -any effect upon another, therefore cannot move itself nor allow -itself to be moved. Parmenides would even have added: the only way of -escape which is left to you is this, to ascribe motion to the things -themselves; then however all that you know and see as motion is indeed -only a deception and not true motion, for the only kind of motion which -could belong to those absolutely original substances, would be merely -an autogenous motion limited to themselves without any effect. But -you _assume_ motion in order to explain those effects of change, of -the disarrangement in space, of alteration, in short the causalities -and relations of the things among themselves. But these very effects -would not be explained and would remain as problematic as ever; for -this reason one cannot conceive why it should be necessary to assume a -motion since it does not perform that which you demand from it. Motion -does not belong to the nature of things and is eternally foreign to -them. - -Those opponents of the Eleatean unmoved Unity were induced to make -light of such an argument by prejudices of a perceptual character. It -seems so irrefutable that each veritable "Existent" is a space-filling -body, a lump of matter, large or small but in any case spacially -dimensioned; so that two or more such lumps cannot be in one space. -Under this hypothesis Anaxagoras, as later on Democritus, assumed that -they must knock against each other; if in their motions they came by -chance upon one another, that they would dispute the same space with -each other, and that this struggle was the very cause of all Change. -In other words: those wholly isolated, thoroughly heterogeneous and -eternally unalterable substances were after all not conceived as -being absolutely heterogeneous but all had in addition to a specific, -wholly peculiar quality, also one absolutely homogeneous substratum: a -piece of space-filling matter. In their participation in matter they -all stood equal and therefore could act upon one another, _i.e.,_ -knock one another. Moreover all Change did not in the least depend on -the heterogeneity of those substances but on their homogeneity, as -matter. At the bottom of the assumption of Anaxagoras is a logical -oversight; for that which is _the_ "Existent-In-Itself" must be wholly -unconditional and coherent, is therefore not allowed to assume as its -cause anything,--whereas all those Anaxagorean substances have still -a conditioning Something: matter, and already assume its existence; -the substance "Red" for example was to Anaxagoras not just merely red -in itself but also in a reserved or suppressed way a piece of matter -without any qualities. Only with this matter the "Red-In-Itself" acted -upon other substances, not with the "Red," but with that which is -not red, not coloured, nor in any way qualitatively definite. If the -"Red" had been taken strictly as "Red," as the real substance itself, -therefore without that substratum, then Anaxagoras would certainly not -have dared to speak of an effect of the "Red" upon other substances, -perhaps even with the phrase that the "Red-In-Itself" was transmitting -the impact received from the "Fleshy-In-Itself." Then it would be clear -that such an "Existent" _par excellence_ could never be moved. - - - -15 - - -One has to glance at the opponents of the Eleates, in order to -appreciate the extraordinary advantages in the assumption of -Parmenides. What embarrassments,--from which Parmenides had -escaped,--awaited Anaxagoras and all who believed in a plurality of -substances, with the question, How many substances? Anaxagoras made the -leap, closed his eyes and said, "Infinitely many"; thus he had flown -at least beyond the incredibly laborious proof of a definite number -of elementary substances. Since these "Infinitely Many" had to exist -without increase and unaltered for eternities, in that assumption was -given the contradiction of an infinity to be conceived as completed -and perfect. In short, Plurality, Motion, Infinity driven into flight -by Parmenides with the amazing proposition of the one "Being," returned -from their exile and hurled their projectiles at the opponents of -Parmenides, causing them wounds for which there is no cure. Obviously -those opponents have no real consciousness and knowledge as to the -awful force of those Eleatean thoughts, "There can be no time, no -motion, no space; for all these we can only think of as infinite, -and to be more explicit, firstly infinitely large, then infinitely -divisible; but everything infinite has no 'Being,' does not exist," and -this nobody doubts, who takes the meaning of the word "Being" severely -and considers the existence of something contradictory impossible, -_e.g.,_ the existence of a completed infinity. If however the very -Actuality shows us everything under the form of the completed infinity -then it becomes evident that it contradicts itself and therefore has no -true reality. If those opponents however should object: "but in your -thinking itself there does exist succession, therefore neither could -your thinking be real and consequently could not prove anything," then -Parmenides perhaps like Kant in a similar case of an equal objection -would have answered: "I can, it is true, say my conceptions follow upon -one another, but that means only that we are not conscious of them -unless within a chronological order, _i.e.,_ according to the form of -the inner sense. For that reason time is not a something in itself -nor any order or quality objectively adherent to things." We should -therefore have to distinguish between the Pure Thinking, that would -be timeless like the one Parmenidean "Being," and the consciousness -of this thinking, and the latter would already translate the thinking -into the form of appearance, _i.e.,_ of succession, plurality and -motion. It is probable that Parmenides would have availed himself -of this loophole; however, the same objection would then have to be -raised against him which is raised against Kant by A. Spir ("Thinking -And Reality," 2nd ed., vol. i., pp. 209, &c). "Now, in the first place -however it is clear, that I cannot know anything of a succession as -such, unless I have the successive members of the same simultaneously -in my consciousness. Thus the conception of a succession itself is -not at all successive, hence also quite different from the succession -of our conceptions. Secondly Kant's assumption implies such obvious -absurdities that one is surprised that he could leave them unnoticed. -Cæsar and Socrates according to this assumption are not really dead, -they still live exactly as they did two thousand years ago and only -seem to be dead, as a consequence of an organisation of my inner -sense." Future men already live and if they do not now step forward as -living that organisation of the "inner sense" is likewise the cause -of it. Here above all other things the question is to be put: How can -the beginning and the end of conscious life itself, together with -all its internal and external senses, exist merely in the conception -of the inner sense? _The_ fact is indeed this, that one certainly -cannot deny the reality of Change. If it is thrown out through the -window it slips in again through the keyhole. If one says: "It merely -seems to me, that conditions and conceptions change,"--then this very -semblance and appearance itself is something objectively existing and -within it without doubt the succession has objective reality, some -things in it really do succeed one another.--Besides one must observe -that indeed the whole critique of reason only has cause and right of -existence under the assumption that to us our _conceptions_ themselves -appear exactly as they are. For if the conceptions also appeared to us -otherwise than they really are, then one would not be able to advance -any solid proposition about them, and therefore would not be able to -accomplish any gnosiology or any "transcendental" investigation of -objective validity. Now it remains however beyond all doubt that our -conceptions themselves appear to us as successive." - -The contemplation of this undoubted succession and agitation has now -urged Anaxagoras to a memorable hypothesis. Obviously the conceptions -themselves moved themselves, were not pushed and had no cause of -motion outside themselves. Therefore he said to himself, there exists -a something which bears in itself the origin and the commencement -of motion; secondly, however, he notices that this conception was -moving not only itself but also something quite different, the body. -He discovers therefore, in the most immediate experience an effect -of conceptions upon expansive matter, which makes itself known as -motion in the latter. That was to him a fact; and only incidentally -it stimulated him to explain this fact. Let it suffice that he had a -regulative schema for the motion in the world,--this motion he now -understood either as a motion of the true isolated essences through -the Conceptual Principle, the Nous, or as a motion through a something -already moved. That with his fundamental assumption the latter kind, -the mechanical transmission of motions and impacts likewise contained -in itself a problem, probably escaped him; the commonness and every-day -occurrence of the effect through impact most probably dulled his eye to -the mysteriousness of impact. On the other hand he certainly felt the -problematic, even contradictory nature of an effect of conceptions upon -substances existing in themselves and he also tried therefore to trace -this effect back to a mechanical push and impact which were considered -by him as quite comprehensible. For the Nous too was without doubt such -a substance existing in itself and was characterised by him as a very -delicate and subtle matter, with the specific quality of thinking. -With a character assumed in this way, the effect of this matter upon -other matter had of course to be of exactly the same kind as that -which another substance exercises upon a third, _i.e.,_ a mechanical -effect, moving by pressure and impact. Still the philosopher had now a -substance which moves itself and other things, a substance of which the -motion did not come from outside and depended on no one else: whereas -it seemed almost a matter of indifference how this automobilism was -to be conceived of, perhaps similar to that pushing themselves hither -and thither of very fragile and small globules of quicksilver. Among -all questions which concern motion there is none more troublesome than -the question as to the beginning of motion. For if one may be allowed -to conceive of all remaining motions as effect and consequences, then -nevertheless the first primal motion is still to be explained; for the -mechanical motions, the first link of the chain certainly cannot lie in -a mechanical motion, since that would be as good as recurring to the -nonsensical idea of the _causa sui._ But likewise it is not feasible -to attribute to the eternal, unconditional things a motion of their -own, as it were from the beginning, as dowry of their existence. For -motion cannot be conceived without a direction whither and whereupon, -therefore only as relation and condition; but a thing is no longer -"entitative-in-itself" and "unconditional," if according to its nature -it refers necessarily to something existing outside of it. In this -embarrassment Anaxagoras thought he had found an extraordinary help -and salvation in that Nous, automobile and otherwise independent; the -nature of that Nous being just obscure and veiled enough to produce the -deception about it, that its assumption also involves that forbidden -_causa sui._ To empiric observation it is even an established fact that -Conception is not a _causa sui_ but the effect of the brain, yea, it -must appear to that observation as an odd eccentricity to separate the -"mind," the product of the brain, from its _causa_ and still to deem it -existing after this severing. This Anaxagoras did; he forgot the brain, -its marvellous design, the delicacy and intricacy of its convolutions -and passages and he decreed the "Mind-In-Itself." This "Mind-In-Itself" -alone among all substances had Free-will,--a grand discernment! This -Mind was able at any odd time to begin with the motion of the things -outside it; on the other hand for ages and ages it could occupy itself -with itself--in short Anaxagoras was allowed to assume a _first_ moment -of motion in some primeval age, as the _Chalaza_ of all so-called -Becoming; _i.e.,_ of all Change, namely of all shifting and rearranging -of the eternal substances and their particles, Although the Mind itself -is eternal, it is in no way compelled to torment itself for eternities -with the shifting about of grains of matter; and certainly there was a -time and a state of those matters--it is quite indifferent whether that -time was of long or short duration--during which the Nous had not acted -upon them, during which they were still unmoved. That is the period of -the Anaxagorean chaos. - - - -16 - - -The Anaxagorean chaos is not an immediately evident conception; in -order to grasp it one must have understood the conception which our -philosopher had with respect to the so-called "Becoming." For in -itself the state of all heterogeneous "Elementary-existences" before -all motion would by no means necessarily result in an absolute mixture -of all "seeds of things," as the expression of Anaxagoras runs, an -intermixture, which he imagined as a complete pell-mell, disordered -in its smallest parts, after all these "Elementary-existences" had -been, as in a mortar, pounded and resolved into atoms of dust, so that -now in that chaos, as in an amphora, they could be whirled into a -medley. One might say that this conception of the chaos did not contain -anything inevitable, that one merely needed rather to assume any chance -position of all those "existences," but not an infinite decomposition -of them; an irregular side-by-side arrangement was already sufficient; -there was no need of a pell-mell, let alone such a total pell-mell. -What therefore put into Anaxagoras' head that difficult and complex -conception? As already said: his conception of the empirically given -Becoming. From his experience he drew first a most extraordinary -proposition on the Becoming, and this proposition necessarily resulted -in that doctrine of the chaos, as its consequence. - -The observation of the processes of evolution in nature, not a -consideration of an earlier philosophical system, suggested to -Anaxagoras the doctrine, that _All originated from All;_ this was the -conviction of the natural philosopher based upon a manifold, and at the -bottom, of course, excessively inadequate induction. He proved it thus: -if even the contrary could originate out of the contrary, _e.g.,_ the -Black out of the White, everything is possible; that however did happen -with the dissolution of white snow into black water. The nourishment of -the body he explained to himself in this way: that in the articles of -food there must be invisibly small constituents of flesh or blood or -bone which during alimentation became disengaged and united with the -homogeneous in the body. But if All can become out of All, the Firm out -of the Liquid, the Hard out of the Soft, the Black out of the White, -the Fleshy out of Bread, then also All must be contained in All. The -names of things in that case express only the preponderance of the one -substance over the other substances to be met with in smaller, often -imperceptible quantities. In gold, that is to say, in that which one -designates _a potiore_ by the name "gold," there must be also contained -silver, snow, bread, and flesh, but in very small quantities; the -whole is called after the preponderating item, the gold-substance. - -But how is it possible, that one substance preponderates and fills a -thing in greater mass than the others present? Experience shows, that -this preponderance is gradually produced only through Motion, that -the preponderance is the result of a process, which we commonly call -Becoming. On the other hand, that "All is in All" is not the result -of a process, but, on the contrary, the preliminary condition of all -Becoming and all Motion, and is consequently previous to all Becoming. -In other words: experience teaches, that continually the like is -added to the like, _e.g.,_ through nourishment, therefore originally -those homogeneous substances were not together and agglomerated, but -they were separate. Rather, in all empiric processes coming before -our eyes, the homogeneous is always segregated from the heterogeneous -and transmitted (_e.g.,_ during nourishment, the particles of flesh -out of the bread, &c), consequently the pell-mell of the different -substances is the older form of the constitution of things and in point -of time previous to all Becoming and Moving. If all so-called Becoming -is a segregating and presupposes a mixture, the question arises, -what degree of intermixture this pell-mell must have had originally. -Although the process of a moving on the part of the homogeneous to -the homogeneous--_i.e.,_ Becoming--has already lasted an immense -time, one recognises in spite of that, that even yet in all things -remainders and seed-grains of all other things are enclosed, waiting -for their segregation, and one recognises further that only here and -there a preponderance has been brought about; the primal mixture -must have been a complete one, _i.e.,_ going down to the infinitely -small, since the separation and unmixing takes up an infinite length of -time. Thereby strict adherence is paid to the thought: that everything -which possesses an essential "Being" is infinitely divisible, without -forfeiting its specificum. - -According to these hypotheses Anaxagoras conceives of the world's -primal existence: perhaps as similar to a dust-like mass of infinitely -small, concrete particles of which every one is specifically simple -and possesses one quality only, yet so arranged that every specific -quality is represented in an infinite number of individual particles. -Such particles Aristotle has called _Homoiomere_ in consideration of -the fact that they are the Parts, all equal one to another, of a Whole -which is homogeneous with its Parts. One would however commit a serious -mistake to equate this primal pell-mell of all such particles, such -"seed-grains of things" to the one primal matter of Anaximander; for -the latter's primal matter called the "Indefinite" is a thoroughly -coherent and peculiar mass, the former's primal pell-mell is an -aggregate of substances. It is true one can assert about this Aggregate -of Substances exactly the same as about the Indefinite of Anaximander, -as Aristotle does: it could be neither white nor grey, nor black, nor -of any other colour; it was tasteless, scentless, and altogether as a -Whole defined neither quantitatively nor qualitatively: so far goes the -similarity of the Anaximandrian Indefinite and the Anaxagorean Primal -Mixture. But disregarding this negative equality they distinguish -themselves one from another positively by the latter being a compound, -the former a unity. Anaxagoras had by the assumption of his Chaos at -least so much to his advantage, that he was not compelled to deduce the -Many from the One, the Becoming out of the "Existent." - -Of course with his complete intermixture of the "seeds" he had to -admit one exception: the Nous was not then, nor is It now admixed with -any thing. For if It were admixed with only one "Existent," It would -have, in infinite divisions, to dwell in all things. This exception -is logically very dubious, especially considering the previously -described material nature of the Nous, it has something mythological in -itself and seems arbitrary, but was however, according to Anaxagorean -_prœmissa,_ a strict necessity. The Mind, which is moreover infinitely -divisible like any other matter, only not through other matters but -through Itself, has, if It divides Itself, in dividing and conglobating -sometimes in large, sometimes in small masses, Its equal mass and -quality from all eternity; and that which at this minute exists as Mind -in animals, plants, men, was also Mind without a more or less, although -distributed in another way a thousand years ago. But wherever It had a -relation to another substance, there It never was admixed with it, but -voluntarily seized it, moved and pushed it arbitrarily--in short, ruled -it. Mind, which alone has motion in Itself, alone possesses ruling -power in this world and shows it through moving the grains of matter. -But whither does It move them? Or is a motion conceivable, without -direction, without path? Is Mind in Its impacts just as arbitrary -as it is, with regard to the time when It pushes, and when It does -not push? In short, does Chance, _i.e.,_ the blindest option, rule -within Motion? At this boundary we step into the Most Holy within the -conceptual realm of Anaxagoras. - - - -17 - - -What had to be done with that chaotic pell-mell of the primal state -previous to all motion, so that out of it, without any increase of -new substances and forces, the existing world might originate, with -its regular stellar orbits, with its regulated forms of seasons and -days, with its manifold beauty and order,--in short, so that out of -the Chaos might come a Cosmos? This can be only the effect of Motion, -and of a definite and well-organised motion. This Motion itself is -the means of the Nous, Its goal would be the perfect segregation of -the homogeneous, a goal up to the present not yet attained, because -the disorder and the mixture in the beginning was infinite. This -goal is to be striven after only by an enormous process, not to be -realized suddenly by a mythological stroke of the wand. If ever, at -an infinitely distant point of time, it is achieved that everything -homogeneous is brought together and the "primal-existences" undivided -are encamped side by side in beautiful order, and every particle has -found its comrades and its home, and the great peace comes about after -the great division and splitting up of the substances, and there will -be no longer anything that is divided ind split up, then the Nous will -again return into Its automobilism and, no longer Itself divided, -roam through the world, sometimes in larger, sometimes in smaller -masses, as plant-mind or animal-mind, and no longer will It take up Its -new dwelling-place in other matter. Meanwhile the task has not been -completed; but the kind of motion which the Nous has thought out, in -order to solve the task, shows a marvellous suitableness, for by this -motion the task is further solved in each new moment. For this motion -has the character of concentrically progressive circular motion; it -began at some one point of the chaotic mixture, in the form of a little -gyration, and in ever larger paths this circular movement traverses -all existing "Being," jerking forth everywhere the homogeneous to -the homogeneous. At first this revolution brings everything Dense -to the Dense, everything Rare to the Rare, and likewise all that is -Dark, Bright, Moist, Dry to their kind; above these general groups or -classifications there are again two still more comprehensive, namely -_Ether,_ that is to say everything that is Warm, Bright, Rare, and -_Aër,_ that is to say everything that is Dark, Cold, Heavy, Firm. -Through the segregation of the ethereal masses from the aërial, -there is formed, as the most immediate effect of that epicycle whose -centre moves along in the circumference of ever greater circles, a -something as in an eddy made in standing water; heavy compounds are -led towards the middle and compressed. Just in the same way that -travelling waterspout in chaos forms itself on the outer side out of -the Ethereal, Rare, Bright Constituents, on the inner side out of the -Cloudy, Heavy, Moist Constituents. Then in the course of this process -out of that Aërial mass, conglomerating in its interior, water is -separated, and again out of the water the earthy element, and then -out of the earthy element, under the effect of the awful cold are -separated the stones. Again at some juncture masses of stone, through -the momentum of the rotation, are torn away sideways from the earth and -thrown into the realm of the hot light Ether; there in the latter's -fiery element they are made to glow and, carried along in the ethereal -rotation, they irradiate light, and as sun and stars illuminate and -warm the earth, in herself dark and cold. The whole conception is of -a wonderful daring and simplicity and has nothing of that clumsy and -anthropomorphical teleology, which has been frequently connected with -the name of Anaxagoras. That conception has its greatness just in this, -that it derives the whole Cosmos of Becoming out of the moved circle, -whereas Parmenides contemplated the true "Existent" as a resting, dead -ball. Once that circle is put into motion and caused to roll by the -Nous, then all the order, law and beauty of the world is the natural -consequence of that first impetus. How very much one wrongs Anaxagoras -if one reproaches him for the wise abstention from teleology which -shows itself in this conception and talks scornfully of his Nous as -of a _deus ex machina._ Rather, on account of the elimination of -mythological and theistic miracle-working and anthropomorphic ends and -utilities, Anaxagoras might have made use of proud words similar to -those which Kant used in his Natural History of the Heavens. For it is -indeed a sublime thought, to retrace that grandeur of the cosmos and -the marvellous arrangement of the orbits of the stars, to retrace all -that, in all forms to a simple, purely mechanical motion and, as it -were, to a moved mathematical figure, and therefore not to reduce all -that to purposes and intervening hands of a machine-god, but only to -a kind of oscillation, which, having once begun, is in its progress -necessary and definite, and effects result which resemble the wisest -computation of sagacity and extremely well thought-out fitness without -being anything of the sort. "I enjoy the pleasure," says Kant, of -seeing how a well-ordered whole produces itself without the assistance -of arbitrary fabrications, under the impulse of fixed laws of motion--a -well-ordered whole which looks so similar to that world-system which -is ours, that I cannot abstain from considering it to be the same. -It seems to me that one might say here, in a certain sense without -presumption: 'Give me matter and I will build a world out of it.'" - - - -18 - - -Suppose now, that for once we allow that primal mixture as rightly -concluded, some considerations especially from Mechanics seem to oppose -the grand plan of the world edifice. For even though the Mind at a -point causes a circular movement its continuation is only conceivable -with great difficulty, especially since it is to be infinite and -gradually to make all existing masses rotate. As a matter of course one -would assume that the pressure of all the remaining matter would have -crushed out this small circular movement when it had scarcely begun; -that this does not happen presupposes on the part of the stimulating -Nous, that the latter began to work suddenly with awful force, or at -any rate so quickly, that we must call the motion a whirl: such a -whirl as Democritus himself imagined. And since this whirl must be -infinitely strong in order not to be checked through the whole world of -the Infinite weighing heavily upon it, it will be infinitely quick, for -strength can manifest itself originally only in speed. On the contrary -the broader the concentric rings are, the slower will be this motion; -if once the motion could reach the end of the infinitely extended -world, then this motion would have already infinitely little speed of -rotation. _Vice versa,_ if we conceive of the motion as infinitely -great, _i.e.,_ infinitely quick, at the moment of the very first -beginning of motion, then the original circle must have been infinitely -small; we get therefore as the beginning a particle rotated round -itself, a particle with an infinitely small material content. This -however would not at all explain the further motion; one might imagine -even all particles of the primal mass to rotate round themselves and -yet the whole mass would remain unmoved and unseparated. If, however, -that material particle of infinite smallness, caught and swung by the -Nous, was not turned round itself but described a circle somewhat -larger than a point, this would cause it to knock against other -material particles, to move them on, to hurl them, to make them rebound -and thus gradually to stir up a great and spreading tumult within -which, as the next result, that separation of the aërial masses from -the ethereal had to take place. Just as the commencement of the motion -itself is an arbitrary act of the Nous, arbitrary also is the manner of -this commencement in so far as the first motion circumscribes a circle -of which the radius is chosen somewhat larger than a point. - - - -19 - - -Here of course one might ask, what fancy had at that time so suddenly -occurred to the Nous, to knock against some chance material particle -out of that number of particles and to turn it around in whirling dance -and why that did not occur to It earlier. Whereupon Anaxagoras would -answer: "The Nous has the privilege of arbitrary action; It may begin -at any chance time, It depends on Itself, whereas everything else is -determined from outside. It has no duty, and no end which It might -be compelled to pursue; if It did once begin with that motion and -set Itself an end, this after all was only--the answer is difficult, -Heraclitus would say--_play!_" - -That seems always to have been the last solution or answer hovering on -the lips of the Greek. The Anaxagorean Mind is an artist and in truth -the most powerful genius of mechanics and architecture, creating with -the simplest means the most magnificent forms and tracks and as it were -a mobile architecture, but always out of that irrational arbitrariness -which lies in the soul of the artist. It is as though Anaxagoras was -pointing at Phidias and in face of the immense work of art, the Cosmos, -was calling out to us as he would do in front of the Parthenon: "The -Becoming is no moral, but only an artistic phenomenon." Aristotle -relates that, to the question what made life worth living, Anaxagoras -had answered: "Contemplating the heavens and the total order of the -Cosmos." He treated physical things so devotionally, and with that -same mysterious awe, which we feel when standing in front of an antique -temple; his doctrine became a species of free-thinking religious -exercise, protecting itself through the _odi profanum vulgus et arceo_ -and choosing its adherents with precaution out of the highest and -noblest society of Athens. In the exclusive community of the Athenian -Anaxagoreans the mythology of the people was allowed only as a symbolic -language; all myths, all gods, all heroes were considered here only as -hieroglyphics of the interpretation of nature, and even the Homeric -epic was said to be the canonic song of the sway of the Nous and the -struggles and laws of Nature. Here and there a note from this society -of sublime free-thinkers penetrated to the people; and especially -Euripides, the great and at all times daring Euripides, ever thinking -of something new, dared to let many things become known by means of the -tragic mask, many things which pierced like an arrow through the senses -of the masses and from which the latter freed themselves only by means -of ludicrous caricatures and ridiculous re-interpretations. - -The greatest of all Anaxagoreans however is Pericles, the mightiest and -worthiest man of the world; and Plato bears witness that the philosophy -of Anaxagoras alone had given that sublime flight to the genius of -Pericles. When as a public orator he stood before his people, in the -beautiful rigidity and immobility of a marble Olympian and now, calm, -wrapped in his mantle, with unruffled drapery, without any change of -facial expression, without smile, with a voice the strong tone of -which remained ever the same, and when he now spoke in an absolutely -un-Demosthenic but merely Periclean fashion, when he thundered, struck -with lightnings, annihilated and redeemed--then he was the epitome -of the Anaxagorean Cosmos, the image of the Nous, who has built for -Itself the most beautiful and dignified receptacle, then Pericles was -as it were the visible human incarnation of the building, moving, -eliminating, ordering, reviewing, artistically-undetermined force of -the Mind. Anaxagoras himself said man was the most rational being or -he must necessarily shelter the Nous within himself in greater fulness -than all other beings, because he had such admirable organs as his -hands; Anaxagoras concluded therefore, that that Nous, according to -the extent to which It made Itself master of a material body, was -always forming for Itself out of this material the tools corresponding -to Its degree of power, consequently the Nous made the most beautiful -and appropriate tools, when It was appearing in his greatest fulness. -And as the most wondrous and appropriate action of the Nous was that -circular primal-motion, since at that time the Mind was still together, -undivided, in Itself, thus to the listening Anaxagoras the effect -of the Periclean speech often appeared perhaps as a simile of that -circular primal-motion; for here too he perceived a whirl of thoughts -moving itself at first with awful force but in an orderly manner, which -in concentric circles gradually caught and carried away the nearest and -farthest and which, when it reached its end, had reshaped--organising -and segregating--the whole nation. - -To the later philosophers of antiquity the way in which Anaxagoras -made use of his Nous for the interpretation of the world was strange, -indeed scarcely pardonable; to them it seemed as though he had found a -grand tool but had not well understood it and they tried to retrieve -what the finder had neglected. They therefore did not recognise what -meaning the abstention of Anaxagoras, inspired by the purest spirit -of the method of natural science, had, and that this abstention first -of all in every case puts to itself the question: "What is the cause -of Something"? (_causa efficiens_)--and not "What is the purpose of -Something"? (_causa finalis_). The Nous has not been dragged in by -Anaxagoras for the purpose of answering the special question: "What -is the cause of motion and what causes regular motions?"; Plato -however reproaches him, that he ought to have, but had not shown that -everything was in its own fashion and its own place the most beautiful, -the best and the most appropriate. But this Anaxagoras would not have -dared to assert in any individual case, to him the existing world was -not even the most conceivably perfect world, for he saw everything -originate out of everything, and he found the segregation of the -substances through the Nous complete and done with, neither at the -end of the filled space of the world nor in the individual beings. -For his understanding it was sufficient that he had found a motion, -which, by simple continued action could create the visible order out -of a chaos mixed through and through; and he took good care not to put -the question as to the Why? of the motion, as to the rational purpose -of motion. For if the Nous had to fulfil by means of motion a purpose -innate in the noumenal essence, then it was no longer in Its free will -to commence the motion at any chance time; in so far as the Nous is -eternal, It had also to be determined eternally by this purpose, and -then no point of time could have been allowed to exist in which motion -was still lacking, indeed it would have been logically forbidden to -assume a starting point for motion: whereby again the conception of -original chaos, the basis of the whole Anaxagorean interpretation of -the world would likewise have become logically impossible. In order -to escape such difficulties, which teleology creates, Anaxagoras had -always to emphasise and asseverate that the Mind has free will; all -Its actions, including that of the primal motion, were actions of the -"free will," whereas on the contrary after that primeval moment the -whole remaining world was shaping itself in a strictly determined, and -more precisely, mechanically determined form. That absolutely free -will however can be conceived only as purposeless, somewhat after the -fashion of children's play or the artist's bent for play. It is an -error to ascribe to Anaxagoras the common confusion of the teleologist, -who, marvelling at the extraordinary appropriateness, at the agreement -of the parts with the whole, especially in the realm of the organic, -assumes that that which exists for the intellect had also come into -existence through intellect, and that that which man brings about only -under the guidance of the idea of purpose, must have been brought about -by Nature through reflection and ideas of purpose. (Schopenhauer, "The -World As Will And Idea," vol. ii., Second Book, chap. 26: On Teleology). -Conceived in the manner of Anaxagoras, however, the order and -appropriateness of things on the contrary is nothing but the immediate -result of a blind mechanical motion; and only in order to cause this -motion, in order to get for once out of the dead-rest of the Chaos, -Anaxagoras assumed the free-willed Nous who depends only on Itself. -He appreciated in the Nous just the very quality of being a thing of -chance, a chance agent, therefore of being able to act unconditioned, -undetermined, guided neither by causes nor by purposes. - - - - -Notes for a Continuation - - -(Early Part of 1873) - - -1 - - -That this total conception of the Anaxagorean doctrine must be -right, is proved most clearly by the way in which the successors -of Anaxagoras, the Agrigentine Empedocles and the atomic teacher -Democritus in their counter-systems actually criticised and improved -that doctrine. The method of this critique is more than anything a -continued renunciation in that spirit of natural science mentioned -above, the law of economy applied to the interpretation of nature. -That hypothesis, which explains the existing world with the smallest -expenditure of assumptions and means is to have preference: for in such -a hypothesis is to be found the least amount of arbitrariness, and in -it free play with possibilities is prohibited. Should there be two -hypotheses which both explain the world, then a strict test must be -applied as to which of the two better satisfies that demand of economy. -He who can manage this explanation with the simpler and more known -forces, especially the mechanical ones, he who deduces the existing -edifice of the world out of the smallest possible number of forces, -will always be preferred to him who allows the more complicated and -less-known forces, and these moreover in greater number, to carry on a -world-creating play. So then we see Empedocles endeavouring to remove -the _superfluity_ of hypotheses from the doctrine of Anaxagoras. - -The first hypothesis which falls as unnecessary is that of the -Anaxagorean Nous, for its assumption is much too complex to explain -anything so simple as motion. After all it is only necessary to explain -the two kinds of motion: the motion of a body towards another, and the -motion away from another. - - - -2 - - -If our present Becoming is a segregating, although not a complete one, -then Empedocles asks: what prevents complete segregation? Evidently a -force works against it, _i.e.,_ a latent motion of attraction. - -Further: in order to explain that Chaos, a force must already have -been at work; a movement is necessary to bring about this complicated -entanglement. - -Therefore periodical preponderance of the one and the other force is -certain. They are opposites. - -The force of attraction is still at work; for otherwise there would be -no Things at all, everything would be segregated. - -This is the actual fact: two kinds of motion. The Nous does not explain -them. On the contrary, Love and Hatred; indeed we certainly see that -these move as well as that the Nous moves. - -Now the conception of the primal state undergoes a change: it is -the most _blessed._ With Anaxagoras it was the chaos before the -architectural work, the heap of stones as it were upon the building -site. - - - -3 - - -Empedocles had conceived the thought of a tangential force originated -by revolution and working against gravity ("de coelo," i., p. 284), -Schopenhauer, "W. A. W.," ii. 390. - -He considered the continuation of the circular movement according -to Anaxagoras _impossible._ It would result in a _whirl, i.e.,_ the -contrary of ordered motion. - -If the particles were infinitely mixed, pell-mell, then one would be -able to break asunder the bodies without any exertion of power, they -would not cohere or hold together, they would be as dust. - -The forces, which press the atoms against one another, and which give -stability to the mass, Empedocles calls "Love." It is a molecular -force, a constitutive force of the bodies. - - - -4 - - -Against Anaxagoras. - -1. The Chaos already presupposes motion. - -2. Nothing prevented the complete segregation. - -3. Our bodies would be dust-forms. How can motion exist, if there are -not counter-motions in all bodies? - -4. An ordered permanent circular motion impossible; only a whirl. He -assumes the whirl itself to be an effect of the νεῑκος.--ἀπορροιαί. How -do distant things operate on one another, sun upon earth? If everything -were still in a whirl, that would be impossible. Therefore at least two -moving powers: which must be inherent in Things. - -5. Why infinite ὄντα? Transgression of experience. Anaxagoras meant -the chemical atoms. Empedocles tried the assumption of four kinds of -chemical atoms. He took the aggregate states to be essential, and heat -to be co-ordinated. Therefore the aggregate states through repulsion -and attraction; matter in four forms. - -6. The periodical principle is necessary. - -7. With the living beings Empedocles will also deal still on the same -principle. Here also he denies purposiveness. His greatest deed. With -Anaxagoras a dualism. - - - -5 - - -The symbolism of _sexual love._ Here as in the Platonic fable the -longing after Oneness shows itself, and here, likewise, is shown -that once a greater unity already existed; were this greater unity -established, then this would again strive after a still greater one. -The conviction of the unity of everything living guarantees that once -there was an _immense Living Something,_ of which we are pieces; -that is probably the Sphairos itself. He is the most blessed deity. -Everything was connected only through love, therefore in the highest -degree appropriate. Love has been torn to pieces and splintered by -hatred, love has been divided into her elements and killed--bereft -of life. In the whirl no living individuals originate. Eventually -everything is segregated and now our period begins. (He opposes the -Anaxagorean Primal Mixture by a Primal Discord.) Love, blind as she -is, with furious haste again throws the elements one against another -endeavouring to see whether she can bring them back to life again or -not. Here and there she is successful. It continues. A presentiment -originates in the living beings, that they are to strive after still -higher unions than home and the primal state. Eros. It is a terrible -crime to kill life, for thereby one works back to the Primal Discord. -Some day everything will be again one _single life,_ the most blissful -state. - -The Pythagorean-orphean doctrine re-interpreted in the manner of -natural science. Empedocles consciously masters both means of -expression, therefore he is the first rhetor. Political aims. - -The double-nature--the agonal and the loving, the compassionate. - -Attempt of the _Hellenic total reform_. - -All inorganic matter has originated out of organic, it is dead organic -matter. Corpse and man. - - - -6 - - -DEMOCRITUS - -The greatest possible simplification of the hypotheses. - -1. There is motion, therefore vacuum, therefore a "Non-Existent." -Thinking is motion. - -2. If there is a "Non-Existent" it must be indivisible, _i.e.,_ -absolutely filled. Division is only explicable in case of empty spaces -and pores. The "Non-Existent" alone is an absolutely porous thing. - -3. The secondary qualities of matter, νόμῳ, not of Matter-In-Itself. - -4. Establishment of the primary qualities of the ἄτομα. Wherein -homogeneous, wherein heterogeneous? - -5. The aggregate-states of Empedocles (four elements) presuppose only -the homogeneous atoms, they themselves cannot therefore be ὄντα. - -6. Motion is connected indissolubly with the atoms, effect of gravity. -Epicur. Critique: what does gravity signify in an infinite vacuum? - -7. Thinking is the motion of the fire-atoms. Soul, life, perceptions of -the senses. - . . . . . . . . -Value of materialism and its embarrassment. - -Plato and Democritus. - -The hermit-like homeless noble searcher for truth. Democritus and the -Pythagoreans together find the basis of natural sciences. - . . . . . . . . -What are the causes which have interrupted a flourishing science of -experimental physics in antiquity after Democritus? - - - -7 - - -Anaxagoras has taken from Heraclitus the idea that in every Becoming -and in every Being the opposites are together. - -He felt strongly the contradiction that a body has many qualities and -he _pulverised_ it in the belief that he had now dissolved it into -its true qualities. - . . . . . . . -_Plato:_ first Heraclitean, later Sceptic: Everything, even Thinking, -is in a state of flux. - -Brought through Socrates to the permanence of the good, the beautiful. - -These assumed as entitative. - -All generic ideals partake of the idea of the good, the beautiful, and -they too are therefore _entitative_, _being_ (as the soul partakes of -the idea of Life). The idea is _formless_. - -Through Pythagoras' metempsychosis has been answered the question: how -we can know anything about the ideas. - -Plato's end: scepticism in Parmenides. Refutation of ideology. - - - -8 - -CONCLUSION - - -Greek thought during the _tragic age is pessimistic_ or _artistically -optimistic_. - -Their judgment about _life_ implies more. - -The One, flight from the Becoming. _Aut_ unity, _aut_ artistic play. - -Deep distrust of reality: nobody assumes a good god, who has made -everything _optime_. - - {Pythagoreans, religious sect. - {Anaximander. - {Empedocles. - Eleates. - {Anaxagoras. - {Heraclitus. - Democritus: the world without moral - and æsthetic meaning, pessimism of - chance. - -If one placed a tragedy before all these, the three former would see -in it the mirror of the fatality of existence, Parmenides a transitory -appearance, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras an artistic edifice and image of -the world-laws, Democritus the result of machines. - . . . . . . . - -With Socrates _Optimism_ begins, an optimism no longer artistic, with -teleology and faith in the good god; faith in the enlightened good -man. Dissolution of the instincts, Socrates breaks with the hitherto -prevailing _knowledge_ and _culture;_ he intends returning to the old -citizen-virtue and to the State. - -Plato dissociates himself from the State, when he observes that the -State has become identical with the new Culture. - -The Socratic scepticism is a weapon against the hitherto prevailing -culture and knowledge. - - - - -ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE - - -(1873) - - -In some remote corner of the universe, effused into innumerable -solar-systems, there was once a star upon which clever animals invented -cognition. It was the haughtiest, most mendacious moment in the history -of this world, but yet only a moment. After Nature had taken breath -awhile the star congealed and the clever animals had to die.--Someone -might write a fable after this style, and yet he would not have -illustrated sufficiently, how wretched,; shadow-like, transitory, -purposeless and fanciful the human intellect appears in Nature. There -were eternities during which this intellect did not exist, and when it -has once more passed away there will be nothing to show that it has -existed. For this intellect is not concerned with any further mission -transcending the sphere of human life. No, it is purely human and none -but its owner and procreator regards it so pathetically as to suppose -that the world revolves around it. If, however, we and the gnat could -understand each other we should learn that even the gnat swims through -the air with the same pathos, and feels within itself the flying centre -of the world. Nothing in Nature is so bad or so insignificant that it -will not, at the smallest puff of that force cognition, immediately -swell up like a balloon, and just as a mere porter wants to have his -admirer, so the very proudest man, the philosopher, imagines he sees -from all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically directed upon -his actions and thoughts. - -It is remarkable that this is accomplished by the intellect, which -after all has been given to the most unfortunate, the most delicate, -the most transient beings only as an expedient, in order to detain them -for a moment in existence, from which without that extra-gift they -would have every cause to flee as swiftly as Lessing's son.[1] That -haughtiness connected with cognition and sensation, spreading blinding -fogs before the eyes and over the senses of men, deceives itself -therefore as to the value of existence owing to the fact that it bears -within itself the most flattering evaluation of cognition. Its most -general effect is deception; but even its most particular effects have -something of deception in their nature. - -The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, -develops its chief power in dissimulation; for it is by dissimulation -that the feebler, and less robust individuals preserve themselves, -since it has been denied them to fight the battle of existence -with horns or the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. In man this art -of dissimulation reaches its acme of perfection: in him deception, -flattery, falsehood and fraud, slander, display, pretentiousness, -disguise, cloaking convention, and acting to others and to himself -in short, the continual fluttering to and fro around the _one_ -flame--Vanity: all these things are so much the rule, and the law, -that few things are more incomprehensible than the way in which an -honest and pure impulse to truth could have arisen among men. They -are deeply immersed in illusions and dream-fancies; their eyes glance -only over the surface of things and see "forms"; their sensation -nowhere leads to truth, but contents itself with receiving stimuli -and, so to say, with playing hide-and-seek on the back of things. -In addition to that, at night man allows his dreams to lie to him a -whole life-time long, without his moral sense ever trying to prevent -them; whereas men are said to exist who by the exercise of a strong -will have overcome the habit of snoring. What indeed _does_ man know -about himself? Oh! that he could but once see himself complete, placed -as it were in an illuminated glass-case! Does not nature keep secret -from him most things, even about his body, _e.g.,_ the convolutions of -the intestines, the quick flow of the blood-currents, the intricate -vibrations of the fibres, so as to banish and lock him up in proud, -delusive knowledge? Nature threw away the key; and woe co the fateful -curiosity which might be able for a moment to look out and down through -a crevice in the chamber of consciousness, and discover that man, -indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the pitiless, the -greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging in -dreams on the back of a tiger. Whence, in the wide world, with this -state of affairs, arises the impulse to truth? - -As far as the individual tries to preserve himself against other -individuals, in the natural state of things he uses the intellect -in most cases only for dissimulation; since, however, man both from -necessity and boredom wants to exist socially and gregariously, he -must needs make peace and at least endeavour to cause the greatest -_bellum omnium contra omnes_ to disappear from his world. This first -conclusion of peace brings with it a something which looks like the -first step towards the attainment of that enigmatical bent for truth. -For that which henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to -say, a uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented -and the legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth: -since here, for the first time, originates the contrast between truth -and falsity. The liar uses the valid designations, the words, in order -to make the unreal appear as real; _e.g.,_ he says, "I am rich," -whereas the right designation for his state would be "poor." He abuses -the fixed conventions by convenient substitution or even inversion -of terms. If he does this in a selfish and moreover harmful fashion, -society will no longer trust him but will even exclude him. In this way -men avoid not so much being defrauded, but being injured by fraud. At -bottom, at this juncture too, they hate not deception, but the evil, -hostile consequences of certain species of deception. And it is in -a similarly limited sense only that man desires truth: he covets the -agreeable, life-preserving consequences of truth; he is indifferent -towards pure, ineffective knowledge; he is even inimical towards truths -which possibly might prove harmful or destroying. And, moreover, what -after all are those conventions op language? Are they possibly products -of knowledge, of the love of truth; do the designations and the things -coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities? - -Only by means of forgetfulness can man ever arrive at imagining that he -possesses "truth" in that degree just indicated. If he does not mean -to content himself with truth in the shape of tautology, that is, with -empty husks, he will always obtain illusions instead of truth. What -is a word? The expression of a nerve-stimulus in sounds. But to infer -a cause outside us from the nerve-stimulus is already the result of a -wrong and unjustifiable application of the proposition of causality. -How should we dare, if truth with the genesis of language, if the point -of view of certainty with the designations had alone been decisive; how -indeed should we dare to say: the stone is hard; as if "hard" was known -to us otherwise; and not merely as an entirely subjective stimulus! -We divide things according to genders; we designate the tree as -masculine,[2] the plant as feminine:[3] what arbitrary metaphors! How -far flown beyond the canon of certainty! We speak of a "serpent";[4] -the designation fits nothing but the sinuosity, and could therefore -also appertain to the worm. What arbitrary demarcations! what one-sided -preferences given sometimes to this, sometimes to that quality of a -thing! The different languages placed side by side show that with words -truth or adequate expression matters little: for otherwise there would -not be so many languages. The "Thing-in-itself" (it is just this which -would be the pure ineffective truth) is also quite incomprehensible -to the creator of language and not worth making any great endeavour -to obtain. He designates only the relations of things to men and for -their expression he calls to his help the most daring metaphors. A -nerve-stimulus, first transformed into a percept! First metaphor! The -percept again copied into a sound! Second metaphor! And each time he -leaps completely out of one sphere right into the midst of an entirely -different one. One can imagine a man who is quite deaf and has never -had a sensation of tone and of music; just as this man will possibly -marvel at Chladni's sound figures in the sand, will discover their -cause in the vibrations of the string, and will then proclaim that -now he knows what man calls "tone"; even so does it happen to us all -with language. When we talk about trees, colours, snow and flowers, -we believe we know something about the things themselves, and yet we -only possess metaphors of the things, and these metaphors do not in the -least correspond to the original essentials. Just as the sound shows -itself as a sand-figure, in the same way the enigmatical _x_ of the -Thing-in-itself is seen first as nerve-stimulus, then as percept, and -finally as sound. At any rate the genesis of language did not therefore -proceed on logical lines, and the whole material in which and with -which the man of truth, the investigator, the philosopher works and -builds, originates, if not from Nephelococcygia, cloud-land, at any -rate not from the essence of things. - -Let us especially think about the formation of ideas. Every word -becomes at once an idea not by having, as one might presume, to serve -as a reminder for the original experience happening but once and -absolutely individualised, to which experience such word owes its -origin, no, but by having simultaneously to fit innumerable, more or -less similar (which really means never equal, therefore altogether -unequal) cases. Every idea originates through equating the unequal. As -certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar to any other, so certain -is it that the idea "leaf" has been formed through an arbitrary -omission of these individual differences, through a forgetting of the -differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in -nature there is, besides the leaves, a something called _the_ "leaf," -perhaps a primal form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, -accurately measured, coloured, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled -hands, so that no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a -true copy of the primal form. We call a man "honest"; we ask, why has -he acted so honestly to-day? Our customary answer runs, "On account of -his honesty." _The_ Honesty! That means again: the "leaf" is the -cause of the leaves. We really and truly do not know anything at all -about an essential quality which might be called _the_ honesty, but we -do know about numerous individualised, and therefore unequal actions, -which we equate by omission of the unequal, and now designate as honest -actions; finally out of them we formulate a _qualitas occulta_ with the -name "Honesty." The disregarding of the individual and real furnishes -us with the idea, as it likewise also gives us the form; whereas nature -knows of no forms and ideas, and therefore knows no species but only -an _x,_ to us inaccessible and indefinable. For our antithesis of -individual and species is anthropomorphic too and does not come from -the essence of things, although on the other hand we do not dare to -say that it does not correspond to it; for that would be a dogmatic -assertion and as such just as undemonstrable as its contrary. - -What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, -anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became -poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and -after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths -are illusions of which one has forgotten that they _are_ illusions; -worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; -coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account -as coins but merely as metal. - -Still we do not yet know whence the impulse to truth comes, for up to -now we have heard only about the obligation which society imposes in -order to exist: to be truthful, that is, to use the usual metaphors, -therefore expressed morally: we have heard only about the obligation -to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie gregariously in a style -binding for all. Now man of course forgets that matters are going thus -with him; he therefore lies in that fashion pointed out unconsciously -and according to habits of centuries' standing--and by _this very -unconsciousness,_ by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for -truth. Through this feeling of being obliged to designate one thing as -"red," another as "cold," a third one as "dumb," awakes a moral emotion -relating to truth. Out of the antithesis "liar" whom nobody trusts, -whom all exclude, man demonstrates to himself the venerableness, -reliability, usefulness of truth. Now as a "_rational_" being he -submits his actions to the sway of abstractions; he no longer suffers -himself to be carried away by sudden impressions, by sensations, he -first generalises all these impressions into paler, cooler ideas, in -order to attach to them the ship of his life and actions. Everything -which makes man stand out in bold relief against the animal depends on -this faculty of volatilising the concrete metaphors into a schema, and -therefore resolving a perception into an idea. For within the range of -those schemata a something becomes possible that never could succeed -under the first perceptual impressions: to build up a pyramidal order -with castes and grades, to create a new world of laws, privileges, -sub-orders, delimitations, which now stands opposite the other -perceptual world of first impressions and assumes the appearance of -being the more fixed, general, known, human of the two and therefore -the regulating and imperative one. Whereas every metaphor of perception -is individual and without its equal and therefore knows how to escape -all attempts to classify it, the great "edifice of ideas shows the -rigid regularity of a Roman Columbarium and in logic breathes forth the -sternness and coolness which we find in mathematics. He who has been -breathed upon by this coolness will scarcely believe, that the idea -too, bony and hexa-hedral, and permutable as a die, remains however -only as the _residuum of a metaphor,_ and that the illusion of the -artistic metamorphosis of a nerve-stimulus into percepts is, if not -the mother, then the grand-mother of every idea. Now in this game of -dice, "Truth" means to use every die as it is designated, to count its -points carefully, to form exact classifications, and never lo violate -the order of castes and the sequences of rank. Just as the Romans -and Etruscans for their benefit cut up the sky by means of strong -mathematical lines and banned a god as it were into a _templum,_ into a -space limited in this fashion, so every nation has above its head such -a sky of ideas divided up mathematically, and it understands the demand -for truth to mean that every conceptual god is to be looked for only -in _his_ own sphere. One may here well admire man, who succeeded in -piling up an infinitely complex dome of ideas on a movable foundation -and as it were on running water, as a powerful genius of architecture. -Of course in order to obtain hold on such a foundation it must be as -an edifice piled up out of cobwebs, so fragile, as to be carried away -by the waves: so firm, as not to be blown asunder by every wind. In -this way man as an architectural genius rises high above the bee; -she builds with wax, which she brings together out of nature; he -with the much more delicate material of ideas, which he must first -manufacture within himself. He is very much to be admired here--but -not on account of his impulse for truth, his bent for pure cognition -of things. If somebody hides a thing behind a bush, seeks it again and -finds it in the self-same place, then there is not much to boast of, -respecting this seeking and finding; thus, however, matters stand with -the seeking and finding of "truth" within the realm of reason. If I -make the definition of the mammal and then declare after inspecting a -camel, "Behold a mammal," then no doubt a truth is brought to light -thereby, but it is of very limited value, I mean it is anthropomorphic -through and through, and does not contain one single point which is -"true-in-itself," real and universally valid, apart from man. The -seeker after such truths seeks at the bottom only the metamorphosis -of the world in man, he strives for an understanding of the world as -a human-like thing and by his battling gains at best the feeling of -an assimilation. Similarly, as the astrologer contemplated the stars -in the service of man and in connection with their happiness and -unhappiness, such a seeker contemplates the whole world as related to -man, as the infinitely protracted echo of an original sound: man; as -the multiplied copy of the one arch-type: man. His procedure is to -apply man as the measure of all things, whereby he starts from the -error of believing that he has these things immediately before him -as pure objects. He therefore forgets that the original metaphors of -perception _are_ metaphors, and takes them for the things themselves. - -Only by forgetting that primitive world of metaphors, only by the -congelation and coagulation of an original mass of similes and percepts -pouring forth as a fiery liquid out of the primal faculty of human -fancy, only by the invincible faith, that _this_ sun, _this_ window, -_this_ table is a truth in itself: in short only by the fact that -man forgets himself as subject, and what is more as an _artistically -creating_ subject: only by all this does he live with some repose, -safety and consequence. If he were able to get out of the prison walls -of this faith, even for an instant only, his "self-consciousness would -be destroyed at once. Already it costs him some trouble to admit to -himself that the insect and the bird perceive a world different from -his own, and that the question, which of the two world-perceptions is -more accurate, is quite a senseless one, since to decide this question -it would be necessary to apply the standard of _right perception,_ -i.e., to apply a standard which _does not exist._ On the whole it -seems to me that the "right perception"--which would mean the adequate -expression of an object in the subject--is a nonentity full of -contradictions: for between two utterly different spheres, as between -subject and object, there is no causality, no accuracy, no expression, -but at the utmost an _æsthetical_ relation, I mean a suggestive -metamorphosis, a stammering translation into quite a distinct foreign -language, for which purpose however there is needed at any rate an -intermediate sphere, an intermediate force, freely composing and -freely inventing. The word "phenomenon" contains many seductions, and -on that account I avoid it as much as possible, for it is not true -that the essence of things appears in the empiric world. A painter -who had no hands and wanted to express the picture distinctly present -to his mind by the agency of song, would still reveal much more with -this permutation of spheres, than the empiric world reveals about -the essence of things. The very relation of a nerve-stimulus to the -produced percept is in itself no necessary one; but if the same percept -has been reproduced millions of times and has been the inheritance of -many successive generations of man, and in the end appears each time to -all mankind as the result of the same cause, then it attains finally -for man the same importance as if it were _the_ unique, necessary -percept and as if that relation between the original nerve-stimulus -and the percept produced were a close relation of causality: just as -a dream eternally repeated, would be perceived and judged as though -real. But the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor does not at all -guarantee the necessity and exclusive justification of that metaphor. - -Surely every human being who is at home with such contemplations has -felt a deep distrust against any idealism of that kind, as often -as he has distinctly convinced himself of the eternal rigidity, -omni-presence, and infallibility of nature's laws: he has arrived at -the conclusion that as far as we can penetrate the heights of the -telescopic and the depths of the microscopic world, everything is quite -secure, complete, infinite, determined, and continuous. Science will -have to dig in these shafts eternally and successfully and all things -found are sure to have to harmonise and not to contradict one another. -How little does this resemble a product of fancy, for if it were one -it would necessarily betray somewhere its nature of appearance and -unreality. Against this it may be objected in the first place that if -each of us had for himself a different sensibility, if we ourselves -were only able to perceive sometimes as a bird, sometimes as a worm, -sometimes as a plant, or if one of us saw the same stimulus as red, -another as blue, if a third person even perceived it as a tone, then -nobody would talk of such an orderliness of nature, but would conceive -of her only as an extremely subjective structure. Secondly, what is, -for us in general, a law of nature? It is not known in itself but -only in its effects, that is to say in its relations to other laws -of nature, which again are known to us only as sums of relations. -Therefore all these relations refer only one to another and are -absolutely incomprehensible to us in their essence; only that which we -add: time, space, _i.e.,_ relations of sequence and numbers, are really -known to us in them. Everything wonderful, however, that we marvel -at in the laws of nature, everything that demands an explanation and -might seduce us into distrusting idealism, lies really and solely in -the mathematical rigour and inviolability of the conceptions of time -and space. These however we produce within ourselves and throw them -forth with that necessity with which the spider spins; since we are -compelled to conceive all things under these forms only, then it is no -longer wonderful that in all things we actually conceive none but these -forms: for they all must bear within themselves the laws of number, -and this very idea of number is the most marvellous in all things. All -obedience to law which impresses us so forcibly in the orbits of stars -and in chemical processes coincides at the bottom with those qualities -which we ourselves attach to those things, so that it is we who -thereby make the impression upon ourselves. Whence it clearly follows -that that artistic formation of metaphors, with which every sensation -in us begins, already presupposes those forms, and is therefore only -consummated within them; only out of the persistency of these primal -forms the possibility explains itself, how afterwards--out of the -metaphors themselves a structure of ideas, could again be compiled. For -the latter is an imitation of the relations of time, space and number -in the realm of metaphors. - - -[1] The German poet, Lessing, had been married for just a little over -one year to Eva König. A son was born and died the same day, and the -mother's life was despaired of. In a letter to his friend Eschenburg -the poet wrote: "... and I lost him so unwillingly, this son! For he -had so much understanding! so much understanding! Do not suppose that -the few hours of fatherhood have made me an ape of a father! I know -what I say. Was it not understanding, that they had to drag him into -the world with a pair of forceps? that he so soon suspected the evil -of this world? Was it not understanding, that he seized the first -opportunity to get away from it?..." - -Eva König died a week later.--TR. - -[2] In German _the tree--der Baum_--is masculine.--TR. - -[3] In German _the plant--die Pflanze--_-is feminine--TR. - -[4] _Cf._ the German _die Schlange_ and _schlingen,_ the English -_serpent_ from the Latin _serpere._--TR. - - - -2 - - -As we saw, it is _language_ which has worked originally at the -construction of ideas; in later times it is _science._ Just as the -bee works at the same time at the cells and fills them with honey, -thus science works irresistibly at that great columbarium of ideas, -the cemetery of perceptions, builds ever newer and higher storeys; -supports, purifies, renews the old cells, and endeavours above all to -fill that gigantic framework and to arrange within it the whole of the -empiric world, _i.e.,_ the anthropomorphic world. And as the man of -action binds his life to reason and its ideas, in order to avoid being -swept away and losing himself, so the seeker after truth builds his hut -close to the towering edifice of science in order to collaborate with -it and to find protection. And he needs protection. For there are awful -powers which continually press upon him, and which hold out against the -"truth" of science "truths" fashioned in quite another way, bearing -devices of the most heterogeneous character. - -That impulse towards the formation of metaphors, mat fundamental -impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one moment--for thereby -we should reason away man himself--is in truth not defeated nor even -subdued by the fact that out of its evaporated products, the ideas, a -regular and rigid new world has been built as a stronghold for it. This -impulse seeks for itself a new realm of action and another river-bed, -and finds it in _Mythos_ and more generally in _Art._ This impulse -constantly confuses the rubrics and cells of the ideas, by putting -up new figures of speech, metaphors, metonymies; it constantly shows -its passionate longing for shaping the existing world of waking man -as motley, irregular, inconsequentially incoherent, attractive, and -eternally new as the world of dreams is. For indeed, waking man _per -se_ is only clear about his being awake through the rigid and orderly -woof of ideas, and it is for this very reason that he sometimes comes -to believe that he was dreaming when that woof of ideas has for a -moment been torn by Art. Pascal is quite right, when he asserts, that -if the same dream came to us every night we should be just as much -occupied by it as by the things which we see every day; to quote his -words, "If an artisan were certain that he would dream every night -for fully twelve hours that he was a king, I believe that he would -be just as happy as a king who dreams every night for twelve hours -that he is an artisan." The wide-awake day of a people mystically -excitable, let us say of the earlier Greeks, is in fact through the -continually-working wonder, which the mythos presupposes, more akin to -the dream than to the day of the thinker sobered by science. If every -tree may at some time talk as a nymph, or a god under the disguise of -a bull, carry away virgins, if the goddess Athene herself be suddenly -seen as, with a beautiful team, she drives, accompanied by Pisistratus, -through the markets of Athens--and every honest Athenian did believe -this--at any moment, as in a dream, everything is possible; and all -nature swarms around man as if she were nothing but the masquerade -of the gods, who found it a huge joke to deceive man by assuming all -possible forms. - -Man himself, however, has an invincible tendency to let himself -be deceived, and he is like one enchanted with happiness when the -rhapsodist narrates to him epic romances in such a way that they appear -real or when the actor on the stage makes the king appear more kingly -than reality shows him. Intellect, that master of dissimulation, is -free and dismissed from his service as slave, so long as It is able -to deceive without _injuring,_ and then It celebrates Its Saturnalia. -Never is It richer, prouder, more luxuriant, more skilful and daring; -with a creator's delight It throws metaphors into confusion, shifts the -boundary-stones of the abstractions, so that for instance It designates -the stream as the mobile way which carries man to that place whither -he would otherwise go. Now It has thrown off Its shoulders the emblem -of servitude. Usually with gloomy officiousness It endeavours to point -out the way to a poor individual coveting existence, and It fares forth -for plunder and booty like a servant for his master, but now It Itself -has become a master and may wipe from Its countenance the expression -of indigence. Whatever It now does, compared with Its former doings, -bears within itself dissimulation, just as Its former doings bore the -character of distortion. It copies human life, but takes it for a -good thing and seems to rest quite satisfied with it. That enormous -framework and hoarding of ideas, by clinging to which needy man saves -himself through life, is to the freed intellect only a scaffolding and -a toy for Its most daring feats, and when It smashes it to pieces, -throws it into confusion, and then puts it together ironically, pairing -the strangest, separating the nearest items, then It manifests that It -has no use for those makeshifts of misery, and that It is now no longer -led by ideas but by intuitions. From these intuitions no regular road -leads into the land of the spectral schemata, the abstractions; for -them the word is not made, when man sees them he is dumb, or speaks in -forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of ideas, in order -to correspond creatively with the impression of the powerful present -intuition at least by destroying and jeering at the old barriers of -ideas. - -There are ages, when the rational and the intuitive man stand side by -side, the one full of fear of the intuition, the other full of scorn -for the abstraction; the latter just as irrational as the former is -inartistic. Both desire to rule over life; the one by knowing how to -meet the most important needs with foresight, prudence, regularity; -the other as an "over-joyous" hero by ignoring those needs and taking -that life only as real which simulates appearance and beauty. Wherever -intuitive man, as for instance in the earlier history of Greece, -brandishes his weapons more powerfully and victoriously than his -opponent, there under favourable conditions, a culture can develop and -art can establish her rule over life. That dissembling, that denying of -neediness, that splendour of metaphorical notions and especially that -directness of dissimulation accompany all utterances of such a life. -Neither the house of man, nor his way of walking, nor his clothing, nor -his earthen jug suggest that necessity invented them; it seems as if -they all were intended as the expressions of a sublime happiness, an -Olympic cloudlessness, and as it were a playing at seriousness. Whereas -the man guided by ideas and abstractions only wards off misfortune by -means of them, without even enforcing for himself happiness out of the -abstractions; whereas he strives after the greatest possible freedom -from pains, the intuitive man dwelling in the midst of culture has from -his intuitions a harvest: besides the warding off of evil, he attains a -continuous in-pouring of enlightenment, enlivenment and redemption. Of -course when he _does_ suffer, he suffers more: and he even suffers more -frequently since he cannot learn from experience, but again and again -falls into the same ditch into which he has fallen before. In suffering -he is just as irrational as in happiness; he cries aloud and finds no -consolation. How different matters are in the same misfortune with -the Stoic, taught by experience and ruling himself by ideas! He who -otherwise only looks for uprightness, truth, freedom from deceptions -and shelter from ensnaring and sudden attack, in his misfortune -performs the masterpiece of dissimulation, just as the other did in -his happiness; he shows no twitching mobile human face but as it were a -mask with dignified, harmonious features; he does not cry out and does -not even alter his voice; when a heavy thundercloud bursts upon him, -he wraps himself up in his cloak and with slow and measured step walks -away from beneath it. - - -THE END. - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51548 *** diff --git a/old/51548-h/51548-h.htm b/old/51548-h/51548-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index c7ed1ce..0000000 --- a/old/51548-h/51548-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4952 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> - <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - The Project Gutenberg eBook of Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays, by Friedrich Nietzsche. - </title> - <style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; -} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; -} - -.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - clear: both; -} - -hr.tb {width: 45%;} -hr.chap {width: 65%} -hr.full {width: 95%;} - -hr.r5 {width: 5%; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em;} -hr.r65 {width: 65%; margin-top: 3em; margin-bottom: 3em;} - - -.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - left: 92%; - font-size: smaller; - text-align: right; - color: #CCCCCC; -} /* page numbers */ - - -.blockquot { - margin-left: 5%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - -a:link {color: #800000; text-decoration: none; } - -v:link {color: #800000; text-decoration: none; } - -.center {text-align: center;} - -.right {text-align: right;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - -.caption {font-weight: bold;} - -/* Images */ -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; -} - -.figleft { - float: left; - clear: left; - margin-left: 0; - margin-bottom: 1em; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-right: 1em; - padding: 0; - text-align: center; -} - -.figright { - float: right; - clear: right; - margin-left: 1em; - margin-bottom: - 1em; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-right: 0; - padding: 0; - text-align: center; -} - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} - -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: - none; -} - - </style> - </head> -<body> - - -<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51548 ***</div> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h1>EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY & OTHER ESSAYS</h1> - -<h3>By</h3> - -<h2>FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE</h2> - -<h3>TRANSLATED BY</h3> - -<h4>MAXIMILIAN A. MÜGGE</h4> - -<h4>AUTHOR OF "FR. NIETZSCHE, HIS LIFE AND WORK," ETC.</h4> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 150px;"> -<img src="images/ill_niet.jpg" width="150" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h4>The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche</h4> - -<h5>The First Complete and Authorised English Translation</h5> - -<h4>Edited by Dr Oscar Levy</h4> - -<h4>Volume Two</h4> - -<h5>T.N. FOULIS</h5> - -<h5>13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET</h5> - -<h5>EDINBURGH: AND LONDON</h5> - -<h5>1911</h5> -<hr class="full" /> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;"> -<span class="caption">CONTENTS</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.25em;"><a href="#TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE</a></span><br /> -1. <a href="#THE_GREEK_STATE">THE GREEK STATE</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Preface to an unwritten book(1871)</span><br /> -2. <a href="#THE_GREEK_WOMAN">THE GREEK WOMAN</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Fragment (1871)</span><br /> -3. <a href="#ON_MUSIC_AND_WORDS">ON MUSIC AND WORDS</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Fragment (1871)</span><br /> -4. <a href="#HOMERS_CONTEST">HOMER'S CONTEST</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Preface to an unwritten book (1872)</span><br /> -5. <a href="#THE_RELATION_OF_SCHOPENHAUERS_PHILOSOPHY_TO_A_GERMAN_CULTURE">THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Preface to an unwritten book (1872)</span><br /> -6. <a href="#PHILOSOPHY_DURING_THE_TRAGIC_AGE_OF_THE_GREEKS">PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS</a> (1873)<br /> -7. <a href="#ON_TRUTH_AND_FALSITY_IN_THEIR_ULTRAMORAL_SENSE">ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE</a> (1873)<br /> -</p> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE" id="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE</a></h4> - - -<p>The essays contained in this volume treat of various subjects. With -the exception of perhaps one we must consider all these papers as -fragments. Written during the early Seventies, and intended mostly as -prefaces, they are extremely interesting, since traces of Nietzsche's -later tenets—like Slave and Master morality, the Superman—can be -found everywhere. But they are also very valuable on account of the -young philosopher's daring and able handling of difficult and abstruse -subjects. "Truth and Falsity," and "The Greek Woman" are probably the -two essays which will prove most attractive to the average reader.</p> - -<p>In the essay on <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE GREEK STATE</span> the two tenets mentioned above -are clearly discernible, though the Superman still goes by the -Schopenhauerian label "genius." Our philosopher attacks the modern -ideas of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of labour," because -Existence seems to be without worth and dignity. The preponderance -of such illusory ideas is due to the political power nowadays vested -in the "slaves." The Greeks saw no dignity in labour. They saw the -necessity of it, and the necessity of slavery, but felt ashamed of -both. Not even the labour of the artist did they admire, although they -praised his completed work.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span></p> - -<p>If the Greeks perished through their slavery, one thing is still more -certain: we shall perish through the lack of slavery. To the essence -of Culture slavery is innate. It is part of it. A vast multitude must -labour and "slave" in order that a few may lead an existence devoted to -beauty and art.</p> - -<p>Strife and war are necessary for the welfare of the State. War -consecrates and purines the State. The purpose of the military State -is the creating of the military genius, the ruthless conqueror, the -War-lord. There also exists a mysterious connection between the State -in general and the creating of the genius.</p> - -<p>In <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE GREEK WOMAN</span>, Nietzsche, the man who said, "One cannot think -highly enough of women," delineates his ideal of woman. Penelope, -Antigone, Electra are his ideal types.</p> - -<p>Plato's dictum that in the perfect State the family would cease to -exist, belongs to the most intimate things uttered about the relation -between women and the State. The Greek woman as mother had to vegetate -in obscurity, to lead a kind of Cranfordian existence for the greater -welfare of the body politic. Only in Greek antiquity did woman occupy -her proper position, and for this reason she was more honoured than she -has ever been since. Pythia was the mouthpiece, the symbol of Greek -unity.</p> - -<p><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">ON MUSIC AND WORDS</span>. Music is older, more fundamental than language. -Music is an expression of cosmic consciousness. Language is only a -gesture-symbolism.</p> - -<p>It is true the music of every people was at first allied to lyric -poetry; "absolute music" always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> appeared much later. But that is due -to the double nature in the essence of language. The <i>tone</i> of the -speaker expresses the basic pleasure- and displeasure-sensations of the -individual. These form the tonal subsoil common to all languages; they -are comprehensible everywhere. Language itself is a super-structure on -that subsoil; it is a gesture-symbolism for all the other conceptions -which man adds to that subsoil.</p> - -<p>The endeavour to illustrate a poem by music is futile. The text of -an opera is therefore quite negligible. Modern opera in its music is -therefore often only a stimulant or a remembrancer for set, stereotyped -feelings. Great music, <i>i.e.,</i> Dionysean music, makes us forget to -listen to the words.</p> - -<p><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">HOMER'S CONTEST</span>. The Greek genius acknowledged strife, struggle, -contest to be necessary in this life. Only through competition and -emulation will the Common-Wealth thrive. Yet there was no unbridled -ambition. Everyone's individual endeavours were subordinated to the -welfare of the community. The curse of present-day contest is that it -does not do the same.</p> - -<p>In <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE</span> an -amusing and yet serious attack is made on the hollow would-be culture -of the German Philistines who after the Franco-Prussian war were -swollen with self-conceit, self-sufficiency, and were a great danger to -real Culture. Nietzsche points out Schopenhauer's great philosophy as -the only possible means of escaping the humdrum of Philistia with its -hypocrisy and intellectual ostrichisation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> - -<p>The essay on <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">GREEK PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE</span> is a performance -of great interest to the scholar. It brims with ideas. The Hegelian -School, especially Zeller, has shown what an important place is held by -the earlier thinkers in the history of Greek thought and how necessary -a knowledge of their work is for all who wish to understand Plato and -Aristotle. <i>Diels'</i> great book: "Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker", -<i>Benn's, Burnet's</i> and <i>Fairbanks'</i> books we may regard as the -peristyle through which we enter the temple of Early Greek Philosophy. -Nietzsche's essay then is like a beautiful festoon swinging between the -columns erected by Diels and the others out of the marble of facts.</p> - -<p>Beauty and the personal equation are the two "leitmotive" of -Nietzsche's history of the pre-Socratian philosophers. Especially -does he lay stress upon the personal equation, since that is the -only permanent item of interest, considering that every "System" -crumbles into nothing with the appearance of a new thinker. In this -way Nietzsche treats of <i>Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, -Xenophanes, Anaxagoras.</i> There are also some sketches of a draft for -an intended but never accomplished continuation, in which Empedocles, -Democritus and Plato were to be dealt with.</p> - -<p>Probably the most popular of the Essays in this book will prove to be -the one on <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">TRUTH AND FALSITY</span>. It is an epistemological rhapsody on the -relativity of truth, on "Appearance and Reality," on "perceptual flux" -versus—"conceptual conceit."</p> - -<p>Man's intellect is only a means in the struggle for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> existence, a means -taking the place of the animal's horns and teeth. It adapts itself -especially to deception and dissimulation.</p> - -<p>There are no absolute truths. Truth is relative and always imperfect. -Yet fictitious values fixed by convention and utility are set down as -truth. The liar does not use these standard coins of the realm. He is -hated; not out of love for truth, no, but because he is dangerous.</p> - -<p>Our words never hit the essence, the "X" of a thing, but indicate only -external characteristics. Language is the columbarium of the ideas, the -cemetery of perceptions.</p> - -<p>Truths are metaphors, illusions, anthropomorphisms about which one has -forgotten that they are such. There are different truths to different -beings. Like a spider man sits in the web of his truths and ideas. He -wants to be deceived. By means of error he mostly lives; truth is often -fatal. When the liar, the story-teller, the poet, the rhapsodist lie to -him without hurting him he—loves them!—</p> - -<p>The text underlying this translation is that of Vol. I. of the -"Taschenausgabe." One or two obscure passages I hope my conjectures may -have elucidated. The dates following the titles indicate the year when -these essays were written.</p> - -<p>In no other work have I felt so deeply the great need of the science of -Signifies with its ultimate international standardisation of terms, as -attempted by Eisler and Baldwin. I hope, however, I have succeeded in -conveying accurately the meaning of the author in spite of a certain -<i>looseness</i> in his philosophical terminology.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></p> - -<p>The English language is somewhat at a disadvantage through its lack -of a Noun-Infinitive. I can best illustrate this by a passage from -<i>Parmenides</i>:</p> - -<p>χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῑν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εῖναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ -ἔστιν· τά σ' ἐγὼ ψράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.</p> - -<p>In his usual masterly manner <i>Diels</i> translates these lines with: "Das -Sagen und Denken musz ein Seiendes sein. Denn das Sein existiert, das -Nichts existiert nicht; das heisz ich dich wohl zu beherzigen." On -the other hand in <i>Fairbanks'</i> "version" we read: "It is necessary -both to say and to think that being is; for it is possible that being -is, and it is impossible that not being is; this is what I bid thee -ponder." In order to avoid a similar obscurity, throughout the paper on -"<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY</span>" I have rendered "das Seiende" (τὸ ἐὸν) with -"Existent", "das Nicht-Seiende" with "Non-Existent"; "das Sein" (εῖναι) -with "Being" and "das Nicht-Sein" with "Not-Being."</p> - -<p>I am directly or indirectly indebted for many suggestions to several -friends of mine, especially to two of my colleagues, J. Charlton -Hipkins, M.A., and R. Miller, B.A., for their patient revision of the -whole of the proofs.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 70%; font-size: 0.8em;">M. A. MÜGGE.</p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">LONDON, <i>July</i> 1911.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a><br /><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a><br /><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_GREEK_STATE" id="THE_GREEK_STATE">THE GREEK STATE</a></h4> - - -<h5>Preface to an Unwritten Book (1871)</h5> - - -<p>We moderns have an advantage over the Greeks in two ideas, which are -given as it were as a compensation to a world behaving thoroughly -slavishly and yet at the same time anxiously eschewing the word -"slave": we talk of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of -labour." Everybody worries in order miserably to perpetuate a miserable -existence; this awful need compels him to consuming labour; man -(or, more exactly, the human intellect) seduced by the "Will" now -occasionally marvels at labour as something dignified. However in -order that labour might have a claim on titles of honour, it would be -necessary above all, that Existence itself, to which labour after all -is only a painful means, should have more dignity and value than it -appears to have had, up to the present, to serious philosophies and -religions. What else may we find in the labour-need of all the millions -but the impulse to exist at any price, the same all-powerful impulse by -which stunted plants stretch their roots through earthless rocks!</p> - -<p>Out of this awful struggle for existence only individuals can emerge, -and they are at once occupied with the noble phantoms of artistic -culture, lest they should arrive at practical pessimism, which Nature -abhors as her exact opposite. In the modern world, which, compared -with the Greek, usually produces<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> only abnormalities and centaurs, in -which the individual, like that fabulous creature in the beginning of -the Horatian Art of Poetry, is jumbled together out of pieces, here in -the modern world in one and the same man the greed of the struggle for -existence and the need for art show themselves at the same time: out of -this unnatural amalgamation has originated the dilemma, to excuse and -to consecrate that first greed before this need for art. Therefore; we -believe in the "Dignity of man" and the "Dignity of labour."</p> - -<p>The Greeks did not require such conceptual hallucinations, for among -them the idea that labour is a disgrace is expressed with startling -frankness; and another piece of wisdom, more hidden and less -articulate, but everywhere alive, added that the human thing also was -an ignominious and piteous nothing and the "dream of a shadow." Labour -is a disgrace, because existence has no value in itself; but even -though this very existence in the alluring embellishment of artistic -illusions shines forth and really seems to have a value in itself, then -that proposition is still valid that labour is a disgrace—a disgrace -indeed by the fact that it is impossible for man, fighting for the -continuance of bare existence, to become an <i>artist.</i> In modern times -it is not the art-needing man but the slave who determines the general -conceptions, the slave who according to his nature must give deceptive -names to all conditions in order to be able to live. Such phantoms as -the dignity of man, the dignity of labour, are the needy products of -slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woful time, in which the slave<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> -requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and -beyond himself! Cursed seducers, who have destroyed the slave's state -of innocence by the fruit of the tree of knowledge! Now the slave must -vainly scrape through from one day to another with transparent lies -recognisable to every one of deeper insight, such as the alleged "equal -rights of all" or the so-called "fundamental rights of man," of man as -such, or the "dignity of labour." Indeed he is not to understand at -what stage and at what height dignity can first be mentioned—namely, -at the point, where the individual goes wholly beyond himself and no -longer has to work and to produce in order to preserve his individual -existence.</p> - -<p>And even on this height of "labour" the Greek at times is overcome by -a feeling, that looks like shame. In one place Plutarch with earlier -Greek instinct says that no nobly born youth on beholding the Zeus in -Pisa would have the desire to become himself a Phidias, or on seeing -the Hera in Argos, to become himself a Polyklet; and just as little -would he wish to be Anacreon, Philetas or Archilochus, however much he -might revel in their poetry. To the Greek the work of the artist falls -just as much under the undignified conception of labour as any ignoble -craft. But if the compelling force of the artistic impulse operates in -him, then he <i>must</i> produce and submit himself to that need of labour. -And as a father admires the beauty and the gift of his child but thinks -of the act of procreation with shamefaced dislike, so it was with the -Greek. The joyful astonishment at the beautiful has not blinded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> him -as to its origin which appeared to him, like all "Becoming" in nature, -to be a powerful necessity, a forcing of itself into existence. That -feeling by which the process of procreation is considered as something -shamefacedly to be hidden, although by it man serves a higher purpose -than his individual preservation, the same feeling veiled also the -origin of the great works of art, in spite of the fact that through -them a higher form of existence is inaugurated, just as through -that other act comes a new generation. The feeling of <i>shame</i> seems -therefore to occur where man is merely a tool of manifestations of will -infinitely greater than he is permitted to consider himself in the -isolated shape of the individual.</p> - -<p>Now we have the general idea to which are to be subordinated the -feelings which the Greek had with regard to labour and slavery. Both -were considered by them as a necessary disgrace, of which one feels -<i>ashamed,</i> as a disgrace and as a necessity at the same time. In this -feeling of shame is hidden the unconscious discernment that the real -aim <i>needs</i> those conditional factors, but that in that <i>need</i> lies the -fearful and beast-of-prey-like quality of the Sphinx Nature, who in -the glorification of the artistically free culture-life so beautifully -stretches forth her virgin-body. Culture, which is chiefly a real need -for art, rests upon a terrible basis: the latter however makes itself -known in the twilight sensation of shame. In order that there may be a -broad, deep, and fruitful soil for the development of art, the enormous -majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly subjected -to life's struggle, to a <i>greater</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> degree than their own wants -necessitate. At their cost, through the surplus of their labour, that -privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in -order to create and to satisfy a new world of want.</p> - -<p>Accordingly we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that <i>slavery -is of the essence of Culture;</i> a truth of course, which leaves no -doubt as to the absolute value of Existence. <i>This truth</i> is the -vulture, that gnaws at the liver of the Promethean promoter of Culture. -The misery of toiling men must still increase in order to make the -production of the world of art possible to a small number of Olympian -men. Here is to be found the source of that secret wrath nourished -by Communists and Socialists of all times, and also by their feebler -descendants, the white race of the "Liberals," not only against -the arts, but also against classical antiquity. If Culture really -rested upon the will of a people, if here inexorable powers did not -rule, powers which are law and barrier to the individual, then the -contempt for Culture, the glorification of a "poorness in spirit," the -iconoclastic annihilation of artistic claims would be <i>more than</i> an -insurrection of the suppressed masses against drone-like individuals; -it would be the cry of compassion tearing down the walls of Culture; -the desire for justice, for the equalization of suffering, would -swamp all other ideas. In fact here and there sometimes an exuberant -degree of compassion has for a short time opened all the flood gates -of Culture-life; a rainbow of compassionate love and of peace appeared -with the first radiant rise of Christianity and under it was born -Christianity's most beautiful fruit, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> gospel according to St John. -But there are also instances to show that powerful religions for long -periods petrify a given degree of Culture, and cut off with inexorable -sickle everything that still grows on strongly and luxuriantly. For it -is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we found in the -essence of every Culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful -religion and in general in the essence of <i>power,</i> which is always -evil; so that we shall understand it just as well, when a Culture is -shattering, with a cry for liberty or at least justice, a too highly -piled bulwark of religious claims. That which in this "sorry scheme" of -things will live (<i>i.e.,</i> must live), is at the bottom of its nature a -reflex of the primal-pain and primal-contradiction, and must therefore -strike our eyes—"an organ fashioned for this world and earth"—as -an insatiable greed for existence and an eternal self-contradiction, -within the form of time, therefore as Becoming. Every moment devours -the preceding one, every birth is the death of innumerable beings; -begetting, living, murdering, all is one. Therefore we may compare -this grand Culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his triumphal -procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot, -slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by -the wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless still exclaim: "Dignity of -labour!" "Dignity of Man!" The voluptuous Cleopatra-Culture throws ever -again the most priceless pearls, the tears of compassion for the misery -of slaves, into her golden goblet. Out of the emasculation of modern -man has been born the enormous social distress of the present time, -not out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> of the true and deep commiseration for that misery; and if it -should be true that the Greeks perished through their slavedom then -another fact is much more certain, that we shall perish through the -<i>lack</i> of slavery. Slavedom did not appear in any way objectionable, -much less abominable, either to early Christianity or to the Germanic -race. What an uplifting effect on us has the contemplation of the -mediæval bondman, with his legal and moral relations,—relations that -were inwardly strong and tender,—towards the man of higher rank, with -the profound fencing-in of his narrow existence—how uplifting!—and -how reproachful!</p> - -<p>He who cannot reflect upon the position of affairs in Society without -melancholy, who has learnt to conceive of it as the continual painful -birth of those privileged Culture-men, in whose service everything -else must be devoured—he will no longer be deceived by that false -glamour, which the moderns have spread over the origin and meaning -of the State. For what can the State mean to us, if not the means by -which that social-process described just now is to be fused and to -be guaranteed in its unimpeded continuance? Be the sociable instinct -in individual man as strong as it may, it is only the iron clamp of -the State that constrains the large masses upon one another in such a -fashion that a chemical decomposition of Society, with its pyramid-like -super-structure, is <i>bound</i> to take place. Whence however originates -this sudden power of the State, whose aim lies much beyond the insight -and beyond the egoism of the individual? How did the slave, the blind -mole of Culture, <i>originate</i>?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> The Greeks in their instinct relating -to the law of nations have betrayed it to us, in an instinct, which -even in the ripest fulness of their civilisation and humanity never -ceased to utter as out of a brazen mouth such words as: "to the victor -belongs the vanquished, with wife and child, life and property. Power -gives the first <i>right</i> and there is no right, which at bottom is not -presumption, usurpation, violence."</p> - -<p>Here again we see with what pitiless inflexibility Nature, in order -to arrive at Society, forges for herself the cruel tool of the -State—namely, that <i>conqueror</i> with the iron hand, who is nothing else -than the objectivation of the instinct indicated. By the indefinable -greatness and power of such conquerors the spectator feels, that they -are only the means of an intention manifesting itself through them -and yet hiding itself from them. The weaker forces attach themselves -to them with such mysterious speed, and transform themselves so -wonderfully, in the sudden swelling of that violent avalanche, under -the charm of that creative kernel, into an affinity hitherto not -existing, that it seems as if a magic will were emanating from them.</p> - -<p>Now when we see how little the vanquished trouble themselves after a -short time about the horrible origin of the State, so that history -informs us of no class of events worse than the origins of those -sudden, violent, bloody and, at least in <i>one</i> point, inexplicable -usurpations: when hearts involuntarily go out towards the magic of -the growing State with the presentiment of an invisible deep purpose, -where the calculating intellect is enabled to see an addition of forces -only; when now the State<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> is even contemplated with fervour as the -goal and ultimate aim of the sacrifices and duties of the individual: -then out of all that speaks the enormous necessity of the State, -without which Nature might not succeed in coming, through Society, -to her deliverance in semblance, in the mirror of the genius. What -discernments does the instinctive pleasure in the State not overcome! -One would indeed feel inclined to think that a man who looks into the -origin of the State will henceforth seek his salvation at an awful -distance from it; and where can one not see the monuments of its -origin—devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalised men, devouring -hatred of nations! The State, of ignominiously low birth, for the -majority of men a continually flowing source of hardship, at frequently -recurring periods the consuming torch of mankind—and yet a word, at -which we forget ourselves, a battle cry, which has filled men with -enthusiasm for innumerable really heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and -most venerable object for the blind and egoistic multitude which only -in the tremendous moments of State-life has the strange expression of -greatness on its face!</p> - -<p>We have, however, to consider the Greeks, with regard to the unique -sun-height of their art, as the "political men in themselves," and -certainly history knows of no second instance of such an awful -unchaining of the political passion, such an unconditional immolation -of all other interests in the service of this State-instinct; at the -best one might distinguish the men of the Renascence in Italy with a -similar title for like reasons and by way of comparison. So overloaded -is that passion among the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> Greeks that it begins ever anew to rage -against itself and to strike its teeth into its own flesh. This bloody -jealousy of city against city, of party against party, this murderous -greed of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse -of the slain enemy, in short, the incessant renewal of those Trojan -scenes of struggle and horror, in the spectacle of which, as a genuine -Hellene, Homer stands before us absorbed with <i>delight</i>—whither does -this naïve barbarism of the Greek State point? What is its excuse -before the tribunal of eternal justice? Proud and calm, the State steps -before this tribunal and by the hand it leads the flower of blossoming -womanhood: Greek society. For this Helena the State waged those -wars—and what grey-bearded judge could here condemn?—</p> - -<p>Under this mysterious connection, which we here divine between State -and art, political greed and artistic creation, battlefield and work -of art, we understand by the State, as already remarked, only the -cramp-iron, which compels the Social process; whereas without the -State, in the natural <i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i> Society cannot -strike root at all on a larger scale and beyond the reach of the -family. Now, after States have been established almost everywhere, that -bent of the <i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i> concentrates itself from time -to time into a terrible gathering of war-clouds and discharges itself -as it were in rare but so much the more violent shocks and lightning -flashes. But in consequence of the effect of that <i>bellum,</i>—an effect -which is turned inwards and compressed,—Society is given time during -the intervals to germinate and burst into leaf,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> in order, as soon as -warmer days come, to let the shining blossoms of genius sprout forth.</p> - -<p>In face of the political world of the Hellenes, I will not hide those -phenomena of the present in which I believe I discern dangerous -atrophies of the political sphere equally critical for art and society. -If there should exist men, who as it were through birth are placed -outside the national-and State-instincts, who consequently have to -esteem the State only in so far as they conceive that it coincides -with their own interest, then such men will necessarily imagine as the -ultimate political aim the most undisturbed collateral existence of -great political communities possible, which <i>they</i> might be permitted -to pursue their own purposes without restriction. With this idea in -their heads they will promote <i>that</i> policy which will offer the -greatest security to these purposes; whereas it is unthinkable, that -they, against their intentions, guided perhaps by an unconscious -instinct, should sacrifice themselves for the State-tendency, -unthinkable because they lack that very instinct. All other citizens -of the State are in the dark about what Nature intends with her -State-instinct within them, and they follow blindly; only those who -stand outside this instinct know what <i>they</i> want from the State and -what the State is to grant them. Therefore it is almost unavoidable -that such men should gain great influence in the State because they -are allowed to consider it as a <i>means,</i> whereas all the others under -the sway of those unconscious purposes of the State are themselves -only means for the fulfilment of the State-purpose. In order now to -attain, through the medium of the State,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> the highest furtherance -of their selfish aims, it is above all necessary, that the State be -wholly freed from those awfully incalculable war-convulsions so that -it may be used rationally; and thereby they strive with all their -might for a condition of things in which war is an impossibility. For -that purpose the thing to do is first to curtail and to enfeeble the -political separatisms and factions and through the establishment of -large <i>equipoised</i> State-bodies and the mutual safeguarding of them -to make the successful result of an aggressive war and consequently -war itself the greatest improbability; as on the other hand they will -endeavour to wrest the question of war and peace from the decision of -individual lords, in order to be able rather to appeal to the egoism -of the masses or their representatives; for which purpose they again -need slowly to dissolve the monarchic instincts of the nations. This -purpose they attain best through the most general promulgation of -the liberal optimistic view of the world, which has its roots in the -doctrines of French Rationalism and the French Revolution, <i>i.e.,</i> in -a wholly un-Germanic, genuinely neo-Latin shallow and unmetaphysical -philosophy. I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international -movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of -universal suffrage, the effects of the <i>fear of war</i> above everything -else, yea I behold behind these movements, those truly international -homeless money-hermits, as the really alarmed, who, with their -natural lack of the State-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as -a means of the Exchange, and State and Society as an apparatus for -their own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> enrichment. Against the deviation of the State-tendency -into a money-tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy -is war and once again war, in the emotions of which this at least -becomes obvious, that the State is not founded upon the fear of the -war-demon, as a protective institution for egoistic individuals, but -in love to fatherland and prince, it produces an ethical impulse, -indicative of a much higher destiny. If I therefore designate as a -dangerous and characteristic sign of the present political situation -the application of revolutionary thought in the service of a selfish -State-less money-aristocracy, if at the same time I conceive of the -enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern -financial affairs fallen into strange hands, and if I imagine all evils -of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to -have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one -will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a Pæan on war. Horribly -clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes along like the night, -war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and -purifying the State. First of all, however, as is said in the beginning -of the "Iliad," he lets fly his arrow on the mules and dogs. Then he -strikes the men themselves, and everywhere pyres break into flames. -Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the -State as the slave is for society, and who can avoid this verdict if -he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equalled Greek -art-perfection?</p> - -<p>He who contemplates war and its uniformed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> possibility, the <i>soldier's -profession,</i> with respect to the hitherto described nature of the -State, must arrive at the conviction, that through war and in the -profession of arms is placed before our eyes an image, or even perhaps -the <i>prototype of the State.</i> Here we see as the most general effect of -the war-tendency an immediate decomposition and division of the chaotic -mass into <i>military castes,</i> out of which rises, pyramid-shaped, -on an exceedingly broad base of slaves the edifice of the "martial -society." The unconscious purpose of the whole movement constrains -every individual under its yoke, and produces also in heterogeneous -natures as it were a chemical transformation of their qualities until -they are brought into affinity with that purpose. In the highest -castes one perceives already a little more of what in this internal -process is involved at the bottom, namely the creation of the <i>military -genius</i>—with whom we have become acquainted as the original founder of -states. In the case of many States, as, for example, in the Lycurgian -constitution of Sparta, one can distinctly perceive the impress of that -fundamental idea of the State, that of the creation of the military -genius. If we now imagine the military primal State in its greatest -activity, at its proper "labour," and if we fix our glance upon the -whole technique of war, we cannot avoid correcting our notions picked -up from everywhere, as to the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of -labour" by the question, whether the idea of dignity is applicable -also to that labour, which has as its purpose the destruction of the -"dignified" man, as well as to the man who is entrusted with that -"dignified labour," or whether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> in this warlike task of the State those -mutually contradictory ideas do not neutralise one another. I should -like to think the warlike man to be a <i>means</i> of the military genius -and his labour again only a tool in the hands of that same genius; and -not to him, as absolute man and non-genius, but to him as a means of -the genius—whose pleasure also can be to choose his tool's destruction -as a mere pawn sacrificed on the strategist's chessboard—is due a -degree of dignity, of that dignity namely, <i>to have been deemed worthy -of being a means of the genius.</i> But what is shown here in a single -instance is valid in the most general sense; every human being, with -his total activity, only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of <i>the</i> -genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately -deduce the ethical conclusion, that "man in himself," the absolute man -possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties; only as a wholly -determined being serving unconscious purposes can man excuse his -existence.</p> - -<p><i>Plato's perfect State</i> is according to these considerations certainly -something still greater than even the warm-blooded among his admirers -believe, not to mention the smiling mien of superiority with which -our "historically" educated refuse such a fruit of antiquity. The -proper aim of the State, the Olympian existence and ever-renewed -procreation and preparation of the genius,—compared with which -all other things are only tools, expedients and factors towards -realisation—is here discovered with a poetic intuition and painted -with firmness. Plato saw through the awfully devastated Herma of the -then-existing State-life and perceived even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> then something divine in -its interior. He <i>believed</i> that one might be able to take out this -divine image and that the grim and barbarically distorted outside and -shell did not belong to the essence of the State: the whole fervour -and sublimity of his political passion threw itself upon this belief, -upon that desire—and in the flames of this fire he perished. That in -his perfect State he did not place at the head <i>the</i> genius in its -general meaning, but only the genius of wisdom and of knowledge, that -he altogether excluded the inspired artist from his State, that was -a rigid consequence of the Socratian judgment on art, which Plato, -struggling against himself, had made his own. This more external, -almost incidental gap must not prevent our recognising in the total -conception of the Platonic State the wonderfully great hieroglyph of -a profound and eternally to be interpreted <i>esoteric doctrine of the -connection between State and Genius.</i> What we believed we could divine -of this cryptograph we have said in this preface.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></p> -<h4><a name="THE_GREEK_WOMAN" id="THE_GREEK_WOMAN">THE GREEK WOMAN</a></h4> - - -<h5>(Fragment, 1871)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>Just as Plato from disguises and obscurities brought to light the -innermost purpose of the State, so also he conceived the chief cause -of the position of the <i>Hellenic Woman</i> with regard to the State; in -both cases he saw in what existed around him the image of the ideas -manifested to him, and of these ideas of course the actual was only a -hazy picture and phantasmagoria. He who according to the usual custom -considers the position of the Hellenic Woman to be altogether unworthy -and repugnant to humanity, must also turn with this reproach against -the Platonic conception of this position; for, as it were, the existing -forms were only precisely set forth in this latter conception. Here -therefore our question repeats itself: should not the nature and the -position of the Hellenic Woman have a <i>necessary</i> relation to the goals -of the Hellenic Will?</p> - -<p>Of course there is one side of the Platonic conception of woman, which -stands in abrupt contrast with Hellenic custom: Plato gives to woman a -full share in the rights, knowledge and duties of man, and considers -woman only as the weaker sex, in that she will not achieve remarkable -success in all things, without however disputing this sex's title to -all those things. We must not attach more value to; this strange notion -than to the expulsion of the artist out of the ideal State; these are -side-lines daringly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> mis-drawn, aberrations as it were of the hand -otherwise so sure and of the so calmly contemplating eye which at times -under the influence of the deceased master becomes dim and dejected; in -this mood he exaggerates the master's paradoxes and in the abundance of -his love gives himself satisfaction by very eccentrically intensifying -the latter's doctrines even to foolhardiness.</p> - -<p>The most significant word however that Plato as a Greek could say on -the relation of woman to the State, was that so objectionable demand, -that in the perfect State, the <i>Family was to cease.</i> At present let us -take no account of his abolishing even marriage, in order to carry out -this demand fully, and of his substituting solemn nuptials arranged by -order of the State, between the bravest men and the noblest women, for -the attainment of beautiful offspring. In that principal proposition -however he has indicated most distinctly—indeed too distinctly, -offensively distinctly—an important preparatory step of the Hellenic -Will towards the procreation of the genius. But in the customs of the -Hellenic people the claim of the family on man and child was extremely -limited: the man lived in the State, the child grew up for the State -and was guided by the hand of the State. The Greek Will took care that -the need of culture could not be satisfied in the seclusion of a small -circle. From the State the individual has to receive everything in -order to return everything to the State. Woman accordingly means to the -State, what <i>sleep</i> does to man. In her nature lies the healing power, -which replaces that which has been used up, the beneficial rest in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> -which everything immoderate confines itself, the eternal Same, by which -the excessive and the surplus regulate themselves. In her the future -generation dreams. Woman is more closely related to Nature than man and -in all her essentials she remains ever herself. Culture is with her -always something external, a something which does not touch the kernel -that is eternally faithful to Nature, therefore the culture of woman -might well appear to the Athenian as something indifferent, yea—if one -only wanted to conjure it up in one's mind, as something ridiculous. -He who at once feels himself compelled from that to infer the position -of women among the Greeks as unworthy and all too cruel, should not -indeed take as his criterion the "culture" of modern woman and her -claims, against which it is sufficient just to point out the Olympian -women together with Penelope, Antigone, Elektra. Of course it is true -that these are ideal figures, but who would be able to create such -ideals out of the present world?—Further indeed is to be considered -<i>what sons</i> these women have borne, and what women they must have been -to have given birth to such sons! The Hellenic woman as <i>mother</i> had -to live in obscurity, because the political instinct together with -its highest aim demanded it. She had to vegetate like a plant, in -the narrow circle, as a symbol of the Epicurean wisdom λάθε βυώσας. -Again, in more recent times, with the complete disintegration of the -principle of the State, she had to step in as helper; the family as a -makeshift for the State is her work; and in this sense the <i>artistic -aim</i> of the State had to abase itself to the level of a <i>domestic</i> art. -Thereby it has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> been brought about, that the passion of love, as the -one realm wholly accessible to women, regulates our art to the very -core. Similarly, home-education considers itself so to speak as the -only natural one and suffers State-education only as a questionable -infringement upon the right of home-education: all this is right as -far as the modern State only is concerned.—With that the nature of -woman withal remains unaltered, but her <i>power</i> is, according to the -position which the State takes up with regard to women, a different -one. Women have indeed really the power to make good to a certain -extent the deficiencies of the State—ever faithful to their nature, -which I have compared to sleep. In Greek antiquity they held that -position, which the most supreme will of the State assigned to them: -for that reason they have been glorified as never since. The goddesses -of Greek mythology are their images: the Pythia and the Sibyl, as well -as the Socratic Diotima are the priestesses out of whom divine wisdom -speaks. Now one understands why the proud resignation of the Spartan -woman at the news of her son's death in battle can be no fable. Woman -in relation to the State felt herself in her proper position, therefore -she had more <i>dignity</i> than woman has ever had since. Plato who through -abolishing family and marriage still intensifies the position of woman, -feels now so much <i>reverence</i> towards them, that oddly enough he is -misled by a subsequent statement of their equality with man, to abolish -again the order of rank which is their due: the highest triumph of the -woman of antiquity, to have seduced even the wisest!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> - -<p>As long as the State is still in an embryonic condition woman as -<i>mother</i> preponderates and determines the grade and the manifestations -of Culture: in the same way as woman is destined to complement the -disorganised State. What Tacitus says of German women: <i>inesse -quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut consilia -earum aspernantur aut responsa neglegunt,</i> applies on the whole to -all nations not yet arrived at the real State. In such stages one -feels only the more strongly that which at all times becomes again -manifest, that the instincts of woman as the bulwark of the future -generation are invincible and that in her care for the preservation -of the species Nature speaks out of these instincts very distinctly. -How far this divining power reaches is determined, it seems, by the -greater or lesser consolidation of the State: in disorderly and more -arbitrary conditions, where the whim or the passion of the individual -man carries along with itself whole tribes, then woman suddenly comes -forward as the warning prophetess. But in Greece too there was a never -slumbering care that the terribly overcharged political instinct might -splinter into dust and atoms the little political organisms before -they attained their goals in any way. Here the Hellenic Will created -for itself ever new implements by means of which it spoke, adjusting, -moderating, warning: above all it is in the <i>Pythia,</i> that the power -of woman to compensate the State manifested itself so clearly, as it -has never done since. That a people split up thus into small tribes -and municipalities, was yet at bottom <i>whole</i> and was performing the -task of its nature within its faction,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> was assured by that wonderful -phenomenon the Pythia and the Delphian oracle: for always, as long as -Hellenism created its great works of art, it spoke out of <i>one</i> mouth -and as <i>one</i> Pythia. We cannot hold back the portentous discernment -that to the Will individuation means much suffering, and that in order -to reach those <i>individuals</i> It <i>needs</i> an enormous step-ladder of -individuals. It is true our brains reel with the consideration whether -the Will in order to arrive at <i>Art,</i> has perhaps effused Itself out -into these worlds, stars, bodies, and atoms: at least it ought to -become clear to us then, that Art is not necessary for the individuals, -but for the Will itself: a sublime outlook at which we shall be -permitted to glance once more from another position.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></p> -<h4><a name="ON_MUSIC_AND_WORDS" id="ON_MUSIC_AND_WORDS">ON MUSIC AND WORDS</a></h4> - - -<h5>(Fragment, 1871)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>What we here have asserted of the relationship between language and -music must be valid too, for equal reasons concerning the relationship -of <i>Mime</i> to <i>Music.</i> The Mime too, as the intensified symbolism of -man's gestures, is, measured by the eternal significance of music, -only a simile, which brings into expression the innermost secret -of music but very superficially, namely on the substratum of the -passionately moved human body. But if we include language also in the -category of bodily symbolism, and compare the <i>drama,</i> according to -the canon advanced, with music, then I venture to think, a proposition -of Schopenhauer will come into the clearest light, to which reference -must be made again later on. "It might be admissible, although a purely -musical mind does not demand it, to join and adapt words or even a -clearly represented action to the pure language of tones, although the -latter, being self-sufficient, needs no help; so that our perceiving -and reflecting intellect, which does not like to be quite idle, may -meanwhile have light and analogous occupation also. By this concession -to the intellect man's attention adheres even more closely to music, -by this at the same time, too, is placed underneath that which the -tones indicate in their general metaphorless language of the heart, -a visible picture, as it were a schema, as an example illustrating a -general idea ... indeed such things will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> even heighten the effect -of music." (Schopenhauer, Parerga, II., "On the Metaphysics of the -Beautiful and Æsthetics," § 224.) If we disregard the naturalistic -external motivation according to which our perceiving and reflecting -intellect does not like to be quite idle when listening to music, and -attention led by the hand of an obvious action follows better—then -the drama in relation to music has been characterised by Schopenhauer -for the best reasons as a schema, as an example illustrating a general -idea: and when he adds "indeed such things will even heighten the -effect of music" then the enormous universality and originality of -vocal music, of the connection of tone with metaphor and idea guarantee -the correctness of this utterance. The music of every people begins in -closest connection with lyricism and long before absolute music can be -thought of, the music of a people in that connection passes through -the most important stages of development. If we understand this primal -lyricism of a people, as indeed we must, to be an imitation of the -artistic typifying Nature, then as the original prototype of that union -of music and lyricism must be regarded: <i>the duality in the essence -of language,</i> already typified by Nature. Now, after discussing the -relation of music to metaphor we will fathom deeper this essence of -language.</p> - -<p>In the multiplicity of languages the fact at once manifests itself, -that word and thing do not necessarily coincide with one another -completely, but that the word is a symbol. But what does the word -symbolise? Most certainly only conceptions, be these now conscious -ones or as in the greater number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> cases, unconscious; for how -should a word-symbol correspond to that innermost nature of which we -and the world are images? Only as conceptions we know that kernel, -only in its metaphorical expressions are we familiar with it; beyond -that point there is nowhere a direct bridge which could lead us to it. -The whole life of impulses, too, the play of feelings, sensations, -emotions, volitions, is known to us—as I am forced to insert here in -opposition to Schopenhauer—after a most rigid self-examination, not -according to its essence but merely as conception; and we may well be -permitted to say, that even Schopenhauer's "Will" is nothing else but -the most general phenomenal form of a Something otherwise absolutely -indecipherable. If therefore we must acquiesce in the rigid necessity -of getting nowhere beyond the conceptions we can nevertheless again -distinguish two main species within their realm. The one species -manifest themselves to us as pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations and -accompany all other conceptions as a never-lacking fundamental basis. -This most general manifestation, out of which and by which alone we -understand all Becoming and all Willing and for which we will retain -the name "Will" has now too in language its own symbolic sphere: -and in truth this sphere is equally fundamental to the language, -as that manifestation is fundamental to all other conceptions. All -degrees of pleasure and displeasure—expressions of <i>one</i> primal -cause unfathomable to us—symbolise themselves in <i>the tone of the -speaker:</i> whereas all the other conceptions are indicated by the -<i>gesture-symbolism</i> of the speaker. In so far as that primal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> cause -is the same in all men, the <i>tonal subsoil</i> is also the common -one, comprehensible beyond the difference of language. Out of it -now develops the more arbitrary gesture-symbolism which is not -wholly adequate for its basis: and with which begins the diversity -of languages, whose multiplicity we are permitted to consider—to -use a simile—as a strophic text to that primal melody of the -pleasure-and-displeasure-language. The whole realm of the consonantal -and vocal we believe we may reckon only under gesture-symbolism: -consonants <i>and</i> vowels without that fundamental tone which is -necessary above all else, are nothing but <i>positions</i> of the organs -of speech, in short, gestures—; as soon as we imagine the <i>word</i> -proceeding out of the mouth of man, then first of all the root of the -word, and the basis of that gesture-symbolism, the <i>tonal subsoil,</i> -the echo of the pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations originate. As our -whole corporeality stands in relation to that original phenomenon, the -"Will," so the word built out of its consonants and vowels stands in -relation to its tonal basis.</p> - -<p>This original phenomenon, the "Will," with its scale of -pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations attains in the development of music -an ever more adequate symbolic expression: and to this historical -process the continuous effort of lyric poetry runs parallel, the effort -to transcribe music into metaphors: exactly as this double-phenomenon, -according to the just completed disquisition, lies typified in language.</p> - -<p>He who has followed us into these difficult contemplations readily, -attentively, and with some imagination—and with kind indulgence where -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> expression has been too scanty or too unconditional—will now -have the advantage with us, of laying before himself more seriously and -answering more deeply than is usually the case some stirring points of -controversy of present-day æsthetics and still more of contemporary -artists. Let us think now, after all our assumptions, what an -undertaking it must be, to set music to a poem; <i>i.e.,</i> to illustrate -a poem by music, in order to help music thereby to obtain a language -of ideas. What a perverted world! A task that appears to my mind like -that of a son wanting to create his father! Music can create metaphors -out of itself, which will always however be but schemata, instances as -it were of her intrinsic general contents. But how should the metaphor, -the conception, create music out of itself! Much less could the idea, -or, as one has said, the "poetical idea" do this. As certainly as a -bridge leads out of the mysterious castle of the musician into the free -land of the metaphors—and the lyric poet steps across it—as certainly -is it impossible to go the contrary way, although some are said to -exist who fancy they have done so. One might people the air with the -phantasy of a Raphael, one might see St. Cecilia, as he does, listening -enraptured to the harmonies of the choirs of angels—no tone issues -from this world apparently lost in music: even if we imagined that that -harmony in reality, as by a miracle, began to sound for us, whither -would Cecilia, Paul and Magdalena disappear from us, whither even -the singing choir of angels! We should at once cease to be Raphael: -and as in that picture the earthly instruments lie shattered on the -ground,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> so our painter's vision, defeated by the higher, would fade -and die away.—How nevertheless could the miracle happen? How should -the Apollonian world of the eye quite engrossed in contemplation be -able to create out of itself the tone, which on the contrary symbolises -a sphere which is excluded and conquered just by that very Apollonian -absorption in Appearance? The delight at Appearance cannot raise out -of itself the pleasure at Non-appearance; the delight of perceiving is -delight only by the fact that nothing reminds us of a sphere in which -individuation is broken and abolished. If we have characterised at -all correctly the Apollonian in opposition to the Dionysean, then the -thought which attributes to the metaphor, the idea, the appearance, -in some way the power of producing out of itself the tone, must -appear to us strangely wrong. We will not be referred, in order to be -refuted, to the musician who writes music to existing lyric poems; for -after all that has been said we shall be compelled to assert that the -relationship between the lyric poem and its setting must in any case -be a different one from that between a father and his child. Then what -exactly?</p> - -<p>Here now we may be met on the ground of a favourite æsthetic notion -with the proposition, "It is not the poem which gives birth to -the setting but the <i>sentiment</i> created by the poem." I do not -agree with that; the more subtle or powerful stirring-up of that -pleasure-and-displeasure-subsoil is in the realm of productive art -<i>the</i> element which is inartistic in itself; indeed only its total -exclusion makes the complete self-absorption and disinterested<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -perception of the artist possible. Here perhaps one might retaliate -that I myself just now predicated about the "Will," that in music -"Will" came to an ever more adequate symbolic expression. My answer, -condensed into an æsthetic axiom, is this: <i>the Will is the object of -music but not the origin of it,</i> that is the Will in its very greatest -universality, as the most original manifestation, under which is to -be understood all Becoming. That, which we call <i>feeling,</i> is with -regard to this Will already permeated and saturated with conscious and -unconscious conceptions and is therefore no longer directly the object -of music; it is unthinkable then that these feelings should be able -to create music out of themselves. Take for instance the feelings of -love, fear and hope: music can no longer do anything with them in a -direct way, every one of them is already so filled with conceptions. -On the contrary these feelings can serve to symbolise music, as the -lyric poet does who translates for himself into the simile-world of -feelings that conceptually and metaphorically unapproachable realm -of the Will, the proper content and object of music. The lyric poet -resembles all those hearers of music who are conscious of an <i>effect -of music on their emotions;</i> the distant and removed power of music -appeals, with them, to an <i>intermediate realm</i> which gives to them -as it were a foretaste, a symbolic preliminary conception of music -proper, it appeals to the intermediate realm of the emotions. One might -be permitted to say about them, with respect to the Will, the only -object of music, that they bear the same relation to this Will, as the -analogous morning-dream,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> according to Schopenhauer's theory, bears to -the dream proper. To all those, however, who are unable to get at music -except with their emotions, is to be said, that they will ever remain -in the entrance-hall, and will never have access to the sanctuary of -music: which, as I said, emotion cannot show but only symbolise.</p> - -<p>With regard however to the origin of music, I have already explained -that that can never lie in the Will, but must rather rest in the lap of -that force, which under the form of the "Will" creates out of itself a -visionary world: <i>the origin of music lies beyond all individuation,</i> a -proposition, which after our discussion on the Dionysean self-evident. -At this point I take the liberty of setting forth again comprehensively -side by side those decisive propositions which the antithesis of the -Dionysean and Apollonian dealt with has compelled us to enunciate:</p> - -<p>The "Will," as the most original manifestation, is the object of music: -in this sense music can be called imitation of Nature, but of Nature in -its most general form.—</p> - -<p>The "Will" itself and the feelings—manifestations of the Will already -permeated with conceptions—are wholly incapable of creating music out -of themselves, just as on the other hand it is utterly denied to music -to represent feelings, or to have feelings as its object, while Will is -its only object.—</p> - -<p>He who carries away feelings as effects of music has within them as -it were a symbolic intermediate realm, which can give him a foretaste -of music, but excludes him at the same time from her innermost -sanctuaries.—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> - -<p>The lyric poet interprets music to himself through the symbolic -world of emotions, whereas he himself, in the calm of the Apollonian -contemplation, is exempted from those emotions.—</p> - -<p>When, therefore, the musician writes a setting to a lyric poem he is -moved as musician neither through the images nor through the emotional -language in the text; but a musical inspiration coming from quite a -different sphere <i>chooses</i> for itself that song-text as allegorical -expression. There cannot therefore be any question as to a necessary -relation between poem and music; for the two worlds brought here into -connection are too strange to one another to enter into more than a -superficial alliance; the song-text is just a symbol and stands to -music in the same relation as the Egyptian hieroglyph of bravery did to -the brave warrior himself. During the highest revelations of music we -even feel involuntarily the <i>crudeness</i> of every figurative effort and -of every emotion dragged in for purposes of analogy; for example, the -last quartets of Beethoven quite put to shame all illustration and the -entire realm of empiric reality. The symbol, in face of the god really -revealing himself, has no longer any meaning; moreover it appears as an -offensive superficiality.</p> - -<p>One must not think any the worse of us for considering from this point -of view one item so that we may speak about it without reserve, namely -the <i>last movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony,</i> a movement which -is unprecedented and unanalysable in its charms. To the dithyrambic -world-redeeming exultation of this music Schiller's poem<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> "To Joy," -is wholly incongruous, yea, like cold moon-light, pales beside that -sea of flame. Who would rob me of this sure feeling? Yea, who would -be able to dispute that that feeling during the hearing of this music -does not find expression in a scream only because we, wholly impotent -through music for metaphor and word, already <i>hear nothing at all -from Schiller's poem.</i> All that noble sublimity, yea the grandeur of -Schiller's verses has, beside the truly naïve-innocent folk-melody of -joy, a disturbing, troubling, even crude and offensive effect; only -the ever fuller development of the choir's song and the masses of the -orchestra preventing us from hearing them, keep from us that sensation -of incongruity. What therefore shall we think of that awful æsthetic -superstition that Beethoven himself made a solemn statement as to his -belief in the limits of absolute music, in that fourth movement of the -Ninth Symphony, yea that he as it were with it unlocked the portals -of a new art, within which music had been enabled to represent even -metaphor and idea and whereby music had been opened to the "conscious -mind." And what does Beethoven himself tell us when he has choir-song -introduced by a recitative? "Alas friends, let us intonate not these -tones but more pleasing and joyous ones!" More pleasing and joyous -ones! For that he needed the convincing tone of the human voice, for -that he needed the music of innocence in the folk-song. Not the word, -but the "more pleasing" sound, not the idea but the most heartfelt -joyful tone was chosen by the sublime master in his longing for the -most soul-thrilling ensemble of his orchestra. And how could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> one -misunderstand him! Rather may the same be said of this movement as -<i>Richard Wagner</i> says of the great "<i>Missa Solemnis</i>" which he calls "a -pure symphonic work of the most genuine Beethoven-spirit" (Beethoven, -p. 42). "The voices are treated here quite in the sense of human -instruments, in which sense Schopenhauer quite rightly wanted these -human voices to be considered; the text underlying them is understood -by us in these great Church compositions, not in its conceptual -meaning, but it serves in the sense of the musical work of art, merely -as material for vocal music and does not stand to our musically -determined sensation in a disturbing position simply because it does -not incite in us any rational conceptions but, as its ecclesiastical -character conditions too, only touches us with the impression of -well-known symbolic creeds." Besides I do not doubt that Beethoven, had -he written the Tenth Symphony—of which drafts are still extant—would -have composed just the <i>Tenth</i> Symphony.</p> - -<p>Let us now approach, after these preparations, the discussion of the -<i>opera,</i> so as to be able to proceed afterwards from the opera to -its counterpart in the Greek tragedy. What we had to observe in the -last movement of the Ninth, <i>i.e.,</i> on the highest level of modern -music-development, viz., that the word-content goes down unheard in -the general sea of sound, is nothing isolated and peculiar, but the -general and eternally valid norm in the vocal music of all times, the -norm which alone is adequate to the origin of lyric song. The man in -a state of Dionysean excitement has a <i>listener</i> just as little as -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> orgiastic crowd, a listener to whom he might have something to -communicate, a listener as the epic narrator and generally speaking the -Apollonian artist, to be sure, presupposes. It is rather in the nature -of the Dionysean art, that it has no consideration for the listener: -the inspired servant of Dionysos is, as I said in a former place, -understood only by his compeers. But if we now imagine a listener at -those endemic outbursts of Dionysean excitement then we shall have to -prophesy for him a fate similar to that which Pentheus the discovered -eavesdropper suffered, namely, to be torn to pieces by the Mænads. The -lyric musician sings "as the bird sings,"<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> alone, out of innermost -compulsion; when the listener comes to him with a demand he must -become dumb. Therefore it would be altogether unnatural to ask from -the lyric musician that one should also understand the text-words of -his song, unnatural because here a demand is made by the listener, who -has no right at all during the lyric outburst to claim anything. Now -with the poetry of the great ancient lyric poets in your hand, put -the question honestly to yourself whether they can have even thought -of making themselves clear to the mass of the people standing around -and listening, clear with their world of metaphors and thoughts; -answer this serious question with a look at Pindar and the Æschylian -choir songs. These most daring and obscure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> intricacies of thought, -this whirl of metaphors, ever impetuously reproducing itself, this -oracular tone of the whole, which we, <i>without</i> the diversion of music -and orchestration, so often cannot penetrate even with the closest -attention—was this whole world of miracles transparent as glass to -the Greek crowd, yea, a metaphorical-conceptual interpretation of -music? And with such mysteries of thought as are to be found in Pindar -do you think the wonderful poet could have wished to elucidate the -music already strikingly distinct? Should we here not be forced to an -insight into the very nature of the lyricist—the artistic man, who -to <i>himself</i> must interpret music through the symbolism of metaphors -and emotions, but who has nothing to communicate to the listener; an -artist who, in complete aloofness, even forgets those who stand eagerly -listening near him. And as the lyricist his hymns, so the people sing -the folk-song, for themselves, out of in-most impulse, unconcerned -whether the word is comprehensible to him who does not join in the -song. Let us think of our own experiences in the realm of higher -art-music: what did we understand of the text of a Mass of Palestrina, -of a Cantata of Bach, of an Oratorio of Händel, if we ourselves perhaps -did not join in singing? Only for <i>him who joins</i> in singing do lyric -poetry and vocal music exist; the listener stands before it as before -absolute music.</p> - -<p>But now the <i>opera</i> begins, according to the clearest testimonies, with -the <i>demand of the listener to understand the word.</i></p> - -<p>What? The listener <i>demands?</i> The word is to be understood?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> - -<p>But to bring music into the service of a series of metaphors and -conceptions, to use it as a means to an end, to the strengthening -and elucidation of such conceptions and metaphors—such a peculiar -presumption as is found in the concept of an "opera," reminds me of -that ridiculous person who endeavours to lift himself up into the air -with his own arms; that which this fool and which the opera according -to that idea attempt are absolute impossibilities. That idea of the -opera does not demand perhaps an abuse from music but—as I said—an -impossibility. Music never <i>can</i> become a means; one may push, -screw, torture it; as tone, as roll of the drum, in its crudest and -simplest stages, it still defeats poetry and abases the latter to its -reflection. The opera as a species of art according to that concept is -therefore not only an aberration of music, but an erroneous conception -of æsthetics. If I herewith, after all, justify the nature of the opera -for æsthetics, I am of course far from justifying at the same time bad -opera music or bad opera-verses. The worst music can still mean, as -compared with the best poetry, the Dionysean world-subsoil, and the -worst poetry can be mirror, image and reflection of this subsoil, if -together with the best music: as certainly, namely, as the single tone -against the metaphor is already Dionysean, and the single metaphor -together with idea and word against music is already Apollonian. Yea, -even bad music together with bad poetry can still inform as to the -nature of music and poesy.</p> - -<p>When therefore Schopenhauer felt Bellini's "Norma," for example, as the -fulfilment of tragedy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> with regard to that opera's music and poetry, -then he, in Dionysean-Apollonian emotion and self-forgetfulness, was -quite entitled to do so, because he perceived music and poetry in -their most general, as it were, philosophical value, <i>as</i> music and -poetry: but with that judgment he showed a poorly educated taste,—for -good taste always has historical perspective. To us, who intentionally -in this investigation avoid any question of the historic value of an -art-phenomenon and endeavour to focus only the phenomenon itself, -in its unaltered eternal meaning, and consequently in its <i>highest</i> -type, too,—to us the art-species of the "opera" seems to be justified -as much as the folk-song, in so far as we find in both that union -of the Dionysean and Apollonian and are permitted to assume for the -opera—namely for the highest type of the opera—an origin analogous to -that of the folk-song. Only in so far as the opera historically known -to us has a completely different origin from that of the folk-song -do we reject this "opera," which stands in the same relation to that -generic notion just defended by us, as the marionette does to a living -human being. It is certain, music never can become a means in the -service of the text, but must always defeat the text, yet music must -become bad when the composer interrupts every Dionysean force rising -within himself by an anxious regard for the words and gestures of his -marionettes. If the poet of the opera-text has offered him nothing more -than the usual schematised figures with their Egyptian regularity, then -the freer, more unconditional, more Dionysean is the development of the -music; and the more she despises all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> dramatic requirements, so much -the higher will be the value of the opera. In this sense it is true the -opera is, at its best, good music, and nothing but music: whereas the -jugglery performed at the same time is, as it were, only a fantastic -disguise of the orchestra, above all, of the most important instruments -the orchestra has: the singers; and from this jugglery the judicious -listener turns away laughing. If the mass is diverted by <i>this very -jugglery</i> and only <i>permits</i> the music with it, then the mob fares as -all those do who value the frame of a good picture higher than the -picture itself. Who treats such naïve aberrations with a serious or -even pathetic reproach?</p> - -<p>But what will the opera mean as "dramatic" music, in its possibly -farthest distance from pure music, efficient in itself, and purely -Dionysean? Let us imagine a passionate drama full of incidents which -carries away the spectator, and which is already sure of success -by its plot: what will "dramatic" music be able to add, if it does -not take away something? Firstly, it <i>will</i> take away much: for in -every moment where for once the Dionysean power of music strikes -the listener, the eye is dimmed that sees the action, the eye that -became absorbed in the individuals appearing before it: the listener -now <i>forgets</i> the drama and becomes alive again to it only when the -Dionysean spell over him has been broken. In so far, however, as music -makes the listener forget the drama, it is not yet "dramatic" music: -but what kind of music is that which is not <i>allowed</i> to exercise -any Dionysean power over the listener? And how is it possible? It is -possible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> as <i>purely conventional symbolism,</i> out of which convention -has sucked all natural strength: as music which has diminished to -symbols of remembrance: and its effect aims at reminding the spectator -of something, which at the sight of the drama must not escape him lest -he should misunderstand it: as a trumpet signal is an invitation for -the horse to trot. Lastly, before the drama commenced and in interludes -or during tedious passages, doubtful as to dramatic effect, yea, -even in its highest moments, there would still be permitted another -species of remembrance-music, no longer purely conventional, namely -<i>emotional-music,</i> music, as a stimulant to dull or wearied nerves. -I am able to distinguish in the so-called dramatic music these two -elements only: a conventional rhetoric and remembrance-music, and a -sensational music with an effect essentially physical: and thus it -vacillates between the noise of the drum and the signal-horn, like -the mood of the warrior who goes into the battle. But now the mind, -regaling itself on pure music and educated through comparison, demands -a <i>masquerade</i> for those two wrong tendencies of music; "Remembrance" -and "Emotion" are to be played, but in good music, which must be -in itself enjoyable, yea, valuable; what despair for the dramatic -musician, who must mask the big drum by good music, which, however, -must nevertheless have no purely musical, but only a stimulating -effect! And now comes the great Philistine public nodding its thousand -heads and enjoys this "dramatic music" which is ever ashamed of itself, -enjoys it to the very last morsel, without perceiving anything of its -shame and embarrassment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> Rather the public feels its skin agreeably -tickled, for indeed homage is being rendered in all forms and ways to -the public! To the pleasure-hunting, dull-eyed sensualist, who needs -excitement, to the conceited "educated person" who has accustomed -himself to good drama and good music as to good food, without after all -making much out of it, to the forgetful and absent-minded egoist, who -must be led back to the work of art with force and with signal-horns -because selfish plans continually pass through his mind aiming at -gain or pleasure. Woe-begone dramatic musicians! "Draw near and view -your Patrons' faces! The half are coarse, the half are cold." "Why -should you rack, poor foolish Bards, for ends like these the gracious -Muses?"<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And that the muses are tormented, even tortured and flayed, -these veracious miserable ones do not themselves deny!</p> - -<p>We had assumed a passionate drama, carrying away the spectator, which -even without music would be sure of its effect. I fear that that in -it which is "poetry" and <i>not</i> action proper will stand in relation -to true poetry as dramatic music to music in general: it will be -remembrance-and emotional-poetry. Poetry will serve as a means, in -order to recall in a conventional fashion feelings and passions, -the expression of which has been found by real poets and has become -celebrated, yea, normal with them. Further, this poetry will be -expected in dangerous moments to assist the proper "action,"—whether -a criminalistic horror-story or an exhibition of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> witchery mad with -shifting the scenes,—and to spread a covering veil over the crudeness -of the action itself. Shamefully conscious, that the poetry is only -masquerade which cannot bear the light of day, such a "dramatic" -rime-jingle clamours now for "dramatic" music, as on the other hand -again the poetaster of such dramas is met after one-fourth of the -way by the dramatic musician with his talent for the drum and the -signal-horn and his shyness of genuine music, trusting in itself and -self-sufficient. And now they see one another; and these Apollonian and -Dionysean caricatures, this <i>par nobile fratrum,</i> embrace one another!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A reference to Goethe's ballad, The Minstrel, st. 5: -</p> -<p> -"I sing as sings the bird, whose note<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">The leafy bough is heard on.</span><br /> -The song that falters from my throat<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">For me is ample guerdon." TR.</span><br /> -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A quotation from Goethe's "Faust": Part I., lines 91, 92, -and 95, 96.—TR.</p> -</div> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></p> -<h4><a name="HOMERS_CONTEST" id="HOMERS_CONTEST">HOMER'S CONTEST</a></h4> - - -<h5>Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>When one speaks of "<i>humanity</i>" the notion lies at the bottom, -that humanity is that which <i>separates</i> and distinguishes man from -Nature. But such a distinction does not in reality exist: the -"natural" qualities and the properly called "human" ones have grown -up inseparably together. Man in his highest and noblest capacities -<i>is</i> Nature and bears in himself her awful twofold character. His -abilities generally considered dreadful and inhuman are perhaps indeed -the fertile soil, out of which alone can grow forth all humanity in -emotions, actions and works.</p> - -<p>Thus the Greeks, the most humane men of ancient times, have in -themselves a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction: -a trait, which in the grotesquely magnified image of the Hellene, in -Alexander the Great, is very plainly visible, which, however, in their -whole history, as well as in their mythology, must terrify us who -meet them with the emasculate idea of modern humanity. When Alexander -has the feet of Batis, the brave defender of Gaza, bored through, -and binds the living body to his chariot in order to drag him about -exposed to the scorn of his soldiers, that is a sickening caricature of -Achilles, who at night ill-uses Hector's corpse by a similar trailing; -but even this trait has for us something offensive, something which -inspires<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> horror. It gives us a peep into the abysses of hatred. With -the same sensation perhaps we stand before the bloody and insatiable -self-laceration of two Greek parties, as for example in the Corcyrean -revolution. When the victor, in a fight of the cities, according to -the <i>law</i> of warfare, executes the whole male population and sells all -the women and children into slavery, we see, in the sanction of such a -law, that the Greek deemed it a positive necessity to allow his hatred -to break forth unimpeded; in such moments the compressed and swollen -feeling relieved itself; the tiger bounded forth, a voluptuous cruelty -shone out of his fearful eye. Why had the Greek sculptor to represent -again and again war and fights in innumerable repetitions, extended -human bodies whose sinews are tightened through hatred or through the -recklessness of triumph, fighters wounded and writhing with pain, or -the dying with the last rattle in their throat? Why did the whole Greek -world exult in the fighting scenes of the "Iliad"? I am afraid, we do -not understand them enough in "Greek fashion," and that we should even -shudder, if for once we <i>did</i> understand them thus.</p> - -<p>But what lies, as the mother-womb of the Hellenic, <i>behind</i> the Homeric -world? In the <i>latter,</i> by the extremely artistic definiteness, and the -calm and purity of the lines we are already lifted far above the purely -material amalgamation: its colours, by an artistic deception, appear -lighter, milder, warmer; its men, in this coloured, warm illumination, -appear better and more sympathetic—but where do we look, if, no -longer guided and protected by Homer's hand,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> we step backwards into -the pre-Homeric world? Only into night and horror, into the products -of a fancy accustomed to the horrible. What earthly existence is -reflected in the loathsome-awful theogonian lore: a life swayed only -by the <i>children of the night,</i> strife, amorous desires, deception, -age and death. Let us imagine the suffocating atmosphere of Hesiod's -poem, still thickened and darkened and without all the mitigations and -purifications, which poured over Hellas from Delphi and the numerous -seats of the gods! If we mix this thickened Boeotian air with the grim -voluptuousness of the Etruscans, then such a reality would <i>extort</i> -from us a world of myths within which Uranos, Kronos and Zeus and -the struggles of the Titans would appear as a relief. Combat in this -brooding atmosphere is salvation and safety; the cruelty of victory is -the summit of life's glories. And just as in truth the idea of Greek -law has developed from <i>murder</i> and expiation of murder, so also nobler -Civilisation takes her first wreath of victory from the altar of the -expiation of murder. Behind that bloody age stretches a wave-furrow -deep into Hellenic history. The names of Orpheus, of Musæus, and -their cults indicate to what consequences the uninterrupted sight of -a world of warfare and cruelty led—to the loathing of existence, to -the conception of this existence as a punishment to be borne to the -end, to the belief in the identity of existence and indebtedness. But -these particular conclusions are not specifically Hellenic; through -them Greece comes into contact with India and the Orient generally. The -Hellenic genius had ready yet another answer to the question: what does -a life of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> fighting and of victory mean? and gives this answer in the -whole breadth of Greek history.</p> - -<p>In order to understand the latter we must start from the fact that -the Greek genius admitted the existing fearful impulse, and deemed it -<i>justified;</i> whereas in the Orphic phase of thought was contained the -belief that life with such an impulse as its root would not be worth -living. Strife and the pleasure of victory were acknowledged; and -nothing separates the Greek world more from ours than the <i>colouring,</i> -derived hence, of some ethical ideas, <i>e.g.,</i> of <i>Eris</i> and of <i>Envy</i>.</p> - -<p>When the traveller Pausanius during his wanderings through Greece -visited the Helicon, a very old copy of the first didactic poem of the -Greeks, "The Works and Days" of Hesiod, was shown to him, inscribed -upon plates of lead and severely damaged by time and weather. However -he recognised this much, that, unlike the usual copies, it had <i>not</i> -at its head that little hymnus on Zeus, but began at once with the -declaration: "<i>Two</i> Eris-goddesses are on earth." This is one of the -most noteworthy Hellenic thoughts and worthy to be impressed on the -new-comer immediately at the entrance-gate of Greek ethics. "One would -like to praise the one Eris, just as much as to blame the other, if -one uses one's reason. For these two goddesses have quite different -dispositions. For the one, the cruel one, furthers the evil war and -feud! No mortal likes her, but under the yoke of need one pays honour -to the burdensome Eris, according to the decree of the immortals. She, -as the elder, gave birth to black night. Zeus the high-ruling one, -however, placed the other Eris upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> roots of the earth and among -men as a much better one. She urges even the unskilled man to work, and -if one who lacks property beholds another who is rich, then he hastens -to sow in similar fashion and to plant and to put his house in order; -the neighbour vies with the neighbour who strives after fortune. Good -is this Eris to men. The potter also has a grudge against the potter, -and the carpenter against the carpenter; the beggar envies the beggar, -and the singer the singer."</p> - -<p>The two last verses which treat of the <i>odium figulinum</i> appear to -our scholars to be incomprehensible in this place. According to their -judgment the predicates: "grudge" and "envy" fit only the nature of -the evil Eris, and for this reason they do not hesitate to designate -these verses as spurious or thrown by chance into this place. For -that judgment however a system of Ethics other than the Hellenic must -have inspired these scholars unawares; for in these verses to the -good Eris Aristotle finds no offence. And not only Aristotle but the -whole Greek antiquity thinks of spite and envy otherwise than we do -and agrees with Hesiod, who first designates as an evil one that Eris -who leads men against one another to a hostile war of extermination, -and secondly praises another Eris as the good one, who as jealousy, -spite, envy, incites men to activity but not to the action of war to -the knife but to the action of <i>contest.</i> The Greek is <i>envious</i> and -conceives of this quality not as a blemish, but as the effect of a -<i>beneficent</i> deity. What a gulf of ethical judgment between us and him? -Because he is envious he also feels, with every superfluity of honour, -riches, splendour and fortune, the envious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> eye of a god resting on -himself, and he fears this envy; in this case the latter reminds him -of the transitoriness of every human lot; he dreads his very happiness -and, sacrificing the best of it, he bows before the divine envy. -This conception does not perhaps estrange him from his gods; their -significance on the contrary is expressed by the thought that with them -man in whose soul jealousy is enkindled against every other living -being, is <i>never</i> allowed to venture into contest. In the fight of -Thamyris with the Muses, of Marsyas with Apollo, in the heart-moving -fate of Niobe appears the horrible opposition of the two powers, who -must never fight with one another, man and god.</p> - -<p>The greater and more sublime however a Greek is, the brighter in him -appears the ambitious flame, devouring everybody who runs with him on -the same track. Aristotle once made a list of such contests on a large -scale; among them is the most striking instance how even a dead person -can still incite a living one to consuming jealousy; thus for example -Aristotle designates the relation between the Kolophonian Xenophanes -and Homer. We do not understand this attack on the national hero of -poetry in all its strength, if we do not imagine, as later on also with -Plato, the root of this attack to be the ardent desire to step into -the place of the overthrown poet and to inherit his fame. Every great -Hellene hands on the torch of the contest; at every great virtue a new -light is kindled. If the young Themistocles could not sleep at the -thought of the laurels of Miltiades so his early awakened bent released -itself only in the long emulation with Aristides in that uniquely -noteworthy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> purely instinctive genius of his political activity, which -Thucydides describes. How characteristic are both question and answer, -when a notable opponent of Pericles is asked, whether he or Pericles -was the better wrestler in the city, and he gives the answer: "Even if -I throw him down he denies that he has fallen, attains his purpose and -convinces those who saw him fall."</p> - -<p>If one wants to see that sentiment unashamed in its naïve expressions, -the sentiment as to the necessity of contest lest the State's welfare -be threatened, one should think of the original meaning of <i>Ostracism,</i> -as for example the Ephesians pronounced it at the banishment of -Hermodor. "Among us nobody shall be the best; if however someone is the -best, then let him be so elsewhere and among others." Why should not -someone be the best? Because with that the contest would fail, and the -eternal life-basis of the Hellenic State would be endangered. Later on -Ostracism receives quite another position with regard to the contest; -it is applied, when the danger becomes obvious that one of the great -contesting politicians and party-leaders feels himself urged on in -the heat of the conflict towards harmful and destructive measures and -dubious <i>coups d'état.</i> The original sense of this peculiar institution -however is not that of a safety-valve but that of a stimulant. -The all-excelling individual was to be removed in order that the -contest of forces might re-awaken, a thought which is hostile to the -"exclusiveness" of genius in the modern sense but which assumes that in -the natural order of things there are always <i>several</i> geniuses which -incite one another to action, as much<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> also as they hold one another -within the bounds of moderation. That is the kernel of the Hellenic -contest-conception: it abominates autocracy, and fears its dangers; it -desires as a <i>preventive</i> against the genius—a second genius.</p> - -<p>Every natural gift must develop itself by contest. Thus the Hellenic -national pedagogy demands, whereas modern educators fear nothing as -much as, the unchaining of the so-called ambition. Here one fears -selfishness as the "evil in itself"—with the exception of the -Jesuits, who agree with the Ancients and who, possibly, for that -reason, are the most efficient educators of our time. They seem to -believe that Selfishness, <i>i.e.,</i> the individual element is only the -most powerful <i>agens</i> but that it obtains its character as "good" and -"evil" essentially from the aims towards which it strives. To the -Ancients however the aim of the agonistic education was the welfare of -the whole, of the civic society. Every Athenian for instance was to -cultivate his Ego in contest, so far that it should be of the highest -service to Athens and should do the least harm. It was not unmeasured -and immeasurable as modern ambition generally is; the youth thought of -the welfare of his native town when he vied with others in running, -throwing or singing; it was her glory that he wanted to increase with -his own; it was to his town's gods that he dedicated the wreaths which -the umpires as a mark of honour set upon his head. Every Greek from -childhood felt within himself the burning wish to be in the contest -of the towns an instrument for the welfare of his own town; in this -his selfishness was kindled into flame, by this his selfishness was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> -bridled and restricted. Therefore the individuals in antiquity were -freer, because their aims were nearer and more tangible. Modern man, on -the contrary, is everywhere hampered by infinity, like the fleet-footed -Achilles in the allegory of the Eleate Zeno: infinity impedes him, he -does not even overtake the tortoise.</p> - -<p>But as the youths to be educated were brought up struggling against -one another, so their educators were in turn in emulation amongst -themselves. Distrustfully jealous, the great musical masters, Pindar -and Simonides, stepped side by side; in rivalry the sophist, the higher -teacher of antiquity meets his fellow-sophist; even the most universal -kind of instruction, through the drama, was imparted to the people -only under the form of an enormous wrestling of the great musical and -dramatic artists. How wonderful! "And even the artist has a grudge -against the artist!" And the modern man dislikes in an artist nothing -so much as the personal battle-feeling, whereas the Greek recognises -the artist <i>only in such a personal struggle.</i> There where the modern -suspects weakness of the work of art, the Hellene seeks the source of -his highest strength! That, which by way of example in Plato is of -special artistic importance in his dialogues, is usually the result -of an emulation with the art of the orators, of the sophists, of the -dramatists of his time, invented deliberately in order that at the end -he could say: "Behold, I can also do what my great rivals can; yea -I can do it even better than they. No Protagoras has composed such -beautiful myths as I, no dramatist such a spirited and fascinating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -whole as the Symposion, no orator penned such an oration as I put -up in the Georgias—and now I reject all that together and condemn -all imitative art! Only the contest made me a poet, a sophist, an -orator!" What a problem unfolds itself there before us, if we ask -about the relationship between the contest and the conception of the -work of art!—If on the other hand we remove the contest from Greek -life, then we look at once into the pre-Homeric abyss of horrible -savagery, hatred, and pleasure in destruction. This phenomenon alas! -shows itself frequently when a great personality was, owing to an -enormously brilliant deed, suddenly withdrawn from the contest and -became <i>hors de concours</i> according to his, and his fellow-citizens' -judgment. Almost without exception the effect is awful; and if one -usually draws from these consequences the conclusion that the Greek was -unable to bear glory and fortune, one should say more exactly that he -was unable to bear fame without further struggle, and fortune at the -end of the contest. There is no more distinct instance than the fate -of Miltiades. Placed upon a solitary height and lifted far above every -fellow-combatant through his incomparable success at Marathon, he feels -a low thirsting for revenge awakened within himself against a citizen -of Para, with whom he had been at enmity long ago. To satisfy his -desire he misuses reputation, the public exchequer and civic honour and -disgraces himself. Conscious of his ill-success he falls into unworthy -machinations. He forms a clandestine and godless connection with Timo -a priestess of Demeter, and enters at night the sacred temple, from -which every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> man was excluded. After he has leapt over the wall and -comes ever nearer the shrine of the goddess, the dreadful horror of a -panic-like terror suddenly seizes him; almost prostrate and unconscious -he feels himself driven back and leaping the wall once more, he falls -down paralysed and severely injured. The siege must be raised and a -disgraceful death impresses its seal upon a brilliant heroic career, -in order to darken it for all posterity. After the battle at Marathon -the envy of the celestials has caught him. And this divine envy breaks -into flames when it beholds man without rival, without opponent, on -the solitary height of glory. He now has beside him only the gods—and -therefore he has them against him. These however betray him into a deed -of the Hybris, and under it he collapses.</p> - -<p>Let us well observe that just as Miltiades perishes so the noblest -Greek States perish when they, by merit and fortune, have arrived from -the racecourse at the temple of Nike. Athens, which had destroyed the -independence of her allies and avenged with severity the rebellions -of her subjected foes, Sparta, which after the battle of Ægospotamoi -used her preponderance over Hellas in a still harsher and more cruel -fashion, both these, as in the case of Miltiades, brought about their -ruin through deeds of the Hybris, as a proof that without envy, -jealousy, and contesting ambition the Hellenic State like the Hellenic -man degenerates. He becomes bad and cruel, thirsting for revenge, and -godless; in short, he becomes "pre-Homeric"—and then it needs only a -panic in order to bring about his fall and to crush him. Sparta and -Athens surrender to Persia, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> Themistocles and Alcibiades have done; -they betray Hellenism after they have given up the noblest Hellenic -fundamental thought, the contest, and Alexander, the coarsened copy and -abbreviation of Greek history, now invents the cosmopolitan Hellene, -and the so-called "Hellenism."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></p> -<h4><a name="THE_RELATION_OF_SCHOPENHAUERS_PHILOSOPHY_TO_A_GERMAN_CULTURE" id="THE_RELATION_OF_SCHOPENHAUERS_PHILOSOPHY_TO_A_GERMAN_CULTURE">THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE</a></h4> - - -<h5>Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>In dear vile Germany culture now lies so decayed in the streets, -jealousy of all that is great rules so shamelessly, and the general -tumult of those who race for "Fortune" resounds so deafeningly, that -one must have a strong faith, almost in the sense of <i>credo quia -absurdum est,</i> in order to hope still for a growing Culture, and above -all—in opposition to the press with her "public opinion"—to be able -to work by public teaching. With violence must those, in whose hearts -lies the immortal care for the people, free themselves from all the -inrushing impressions of that which is just now actual and valid, and -evoke the appearance of reckoning them indifferent things. They must -appear so, because they want to think, and because a loathsome sight -and a confused noise, perhaps even mixed with the trumpet-flourishes -of war-glory, disturb their thinking, and above all, because they want -to <i>believe</i> in the German character and because with this faith they -would lose their strength. Do not find fault with these believers if -they look from their distant aloofness and from the heights towards -their Promised Land! They fear those experiences, to which the kindly -disposed foreigner surrenders himself, when he lives among the Germans, -and must be surprised how little German life corresponds to those great -individuals, works and actions, which, in his kind disposition he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> -has learned to revere as the true German character. Where the German -cannot lift himself into the sublime he makes an impression less than -the mediocre. Even the celebrated German scholarship, in which a number -of the most useful domestic and homely virtues such as faithfulness, -self-restriction, industry, moderation, cleanliness appear transposed -into a purer atmosphere and, as it were, transfigured, is by no means -the result of these virtues; looked at closely, the motive urging to -unlimited knowledge appears in Germany much more like a defect, a gap, -than an abundance of forces, it looks almost like the consequence -of a needy formless atrophied life and even like a flight from the -moral narrow-mindedness and malice to which the German without such -diversions is subjected, and which also in spite of that scholarship, -yea still within scholarship itself, often break forth. As the true -virtuosi of philistinism the Germans are at home in narrowness of life, -discerning and judging; if any one will carry them above themselves -into the sublime, then they make themselves heavy as lead, and as such -lead-weights they hang to their truly great men, in order to pull them -down out of the ether to the level of their own necessitous indigence. -Perhaps this Philistine homeliness may be only the degeneration of -a genuine German virtue—a profound submersion into the detail, the -minute, the nearest and into the mysteries of the individual—but this -virtue grown mouldy is now worse than the most open vice, especially -since one has now become conscious, with gladness of the heart, of this -quality, even to literary self-glorification. Now the <i>"Educated"</i> -among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> the proverbially so cultured Germans and the <i>"Philistines"</i> -among the, as everybody knows, so uncultured Germans shake hands -in public and agree with one another concerning the way in which -henceforth one will have to write, compose poetry, paint, make music -and even philosophise, yea—rule, so as neither to stand too much aloof -from the culture of the one, nor to give offence to the "homeliness" -of the other. This they call now "The German Culture of our times." -Well, it is only necessary to inquire after the characteristic by which -that "educated" person is to be recognised; now that we know that his -foster-brother, the German Philistine, makes himself known as such to -all the world, without bashfulness, as it were, after innocence is lost.</p> - -<p>The educated person nowadays is educated above all <i>"historically,"</i> by -his historic consciousness he saves himself from the sublime in which -the Philistine succeeds by his "homeliness." No longer that enthusiasm -which history inspires—as Goethe was allowed to suppose—but just the -blunting of all enthusiasm is now the goal of these admirers of the -<i>nil admirari,</i> when they try to conceive everything historically; to -them however we should exclaim: Ye are the fools of all centuries! -History will make to you only those confessions, which you are worthy -to receive. The world has been at all times full of trivialities and -nonentities; to your historic hankering just these and only these -unveil themselves. By your thousands you may pounce upon an epoch—you -will afterwards hunger as before and be allowed to boast of your sort -of starved soundness. <i>Illam ipsam quam iactant sanitatem non firmitate -sed iciunio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> consequuntur. (Dialogus de oratoribus, cap.</i> 25.) History -has not thought fit to tell you anything that is essential, but -scorning and invisible she stood by your side, slipping into this one's -hand some state proceedings, into that one's an ambassadorial report, -into another's a date or an etymology or a pragmatic cobweb. Do you -really believe yourself able to reckon up history like an addition -sum, and do you consider your common intellect and your mathematical -education good enough for that? How it must vex you to hear, that -others narrate things, out of the best known periods, which you will -never conceive, never!</p> - -<p>If now to this "education," calling itself historic but destitute of -enthusiasm, and to the hostile Philistine activity, foaming with rage -against all that is great, is added that third brutal and excited -company of those who race after "Fortune"—then that in <i>summa</i> results -in such a confused shrieking and such a limb-dislocating turmoil that -the thinker with stopped-up ears and blindfolded eyes flees into the -most solitary wilderness,—where he may see, what those never will -see, where he must hear sounds which rise to him out of all the depths -of nature and come down to him from the stars. Here he confers with -the great problems floating towards him, whose voices of course sound -just as comfortless-awful, as unhistoric-eternal. The feeble person -flees back from their cold breath, and the calculating one runs right -through them without perceiving them. They deal worst, however, with -the "educated man" who at times bestows great pains upon them. To him -these phantoms transform themselves into conceptual cobwebs and hollow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -sound-figures. Grasping after them he imagines he has philosophy; in -order to search for them he climbs about in the so-called history -of philosophy—and when at last he has collected and piled up quite -a cloud of such abstractions and stereotyped patterns, then it may -happen to him that a real thinker crosses his path and—puffs them -away. What a desperate annoyance indeed to meddle with philosophy as -an "educated person"! From time to time it is true it appears to him -as if the impossible connection of philosophy with that which nowadays -gives itself airs as "German Culture" has become possible; some mongrel -dallies and ogles between the two spheres and confuses fantasy on -this side and on the other. Meanwhile however <i>one</i> piece of advice -is to be given to the Germans, if they do not wish to let themselves -be confused. They may put to themselves the question about everything -that they now call Culture: is <i>this</i> the hoped-for German Culture, so -serious and creative, so redeeming for the German mind, so purifying -for the German virtues that their only philosopher in this century, -Arthur <i>Schopenhauer,</i> should have to espouse its cause?</p> - -<p>Here you have the philosopher—now search for the Culture proper to -him! And if you are able to divine what kind of culture that would have -to be, which would correspond to such a philosopher, then you have, in -this divination, already <i>passed sentence</i> on all your culture and on -yourselves!</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></p> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></p> -<h4><a name="PHILOSOPHY_DURING_THE_TRAGIC_AGE_OF_THE_GREEKS" id="PHILOSOPHY_DURING_THE_TRAGIC_AGE_OF_THE_GREEKS">PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS</a></h4> - - -<h5>(1873)</h5> - - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></p> -<h4>PREFACE</h4> - - -<h5>(<i>Probably</i> 1874)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -If we know the aims of men who are strangers to us, it is sufficient -for us to approve of or condemn them as wholes. Those who stand nearer -to us we judge according to the means by which they further their -aims; we often disapprove of their aims, but love them for the sake of -their means and the style of their volition. Now philosophical systems -are absolutely true only to their founders, to all later philosophers -they are usually <i>one</i> big mistake, and to feebler minds a sum of -mistakes and truths; at any rate if regarded as highest aim they are -an error, and in so far reprehensible. Therefore many disapprove of -every philosopher, because his aim is not theirs; they are those whom I -called "strangers to us." Whoever on the contrary finds any pleasure at -all in great men finds pleasure also in such systems, be they ever so -erroneous, for they all have in them one point which is irrefutable, a -personal touch, and colour; one can use them in order to form a picture -of the philosopher, just as from a plant growing in a certain place one -can form conclusions as to the soil. <i>That</i> mode of life, of viewing -human affairs at any rate, has existed once and is therefore possible; -the "system" is the growth in this soil or at least a part of this -system....</p> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></p> - -<p>I narrate the history of those philosophers simplified: I shall bring -into relief only <i>that</i> point in every system which is a little bit -of <i>personality,</i> and belongs to that which is irrefutable, and -indiscussable, which history has to preserve: it is a first attempt -to regain and recreate those natures by comparison, and to let the -polyphony of Greek nature at least resound once again: the task is, to -bring to light that which we must <i>always love and revere</i> and of which -no later knowledge can rob us: the great man.</p> - - - -<h4>LATER PREFACE</h4> - - -<h5>(<i>Towards the end of</i> 1879)</h5> - - -<p>This attempt to relate the history of the earlier Greek philosophers -distinguishes itself from similar attempts by its brevity. This has -been accomplished by mentioning but a small number of the doctrines of -every philosopher, <i>i.e.,</i> by incompleteness. Those doctrines, however, -have been selected in which the personal element of the philosopher -re-echoes most strongly; whereas a complete enumeration of all possible -propositions handed down to us—as is the custom in text-books—merely -brings about one thing, the absolute silencing of the personal element. -It is through this that those records become so tedious; for in systems -which have been refuted it is only this personal element that can still -interest us, for this alone is eternally irrefutable. It is possible -to shape the picture of a man out of three anecdotes. I endeavour to -bring into relief three anecdotes out of every system and abandon the -remainder.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span></p> - - - -<h4>1.</h4> - - -<p>There are opponents of philosophy, and one does well to listen to them; -especially if they dissuade the distempered heads of Germans from -metaphysics and on the other hand preach to them purification through -the Physis, as Goethe did, or healing through Music, as Wagner. The -physicians of the people condemn philosophy; he, therefore, who wants -to justify it, must show to what purpose healthy nations use and have -used philosophy. If he can show that, perhaps even the sick people -will benefit by learning why philosophy is harmful just to them. There -are indeed good instances of a health which can exist without any -philosophy or with quite a moderate, almost a toying use of it; thus -the Romans at their best period lived without philosophy. But where is -to be found the instance of a nation becoming diseased whom philosophy -had restored to health? Whenever philosophy showed itself helping, -saving, prophylactic, it was with healthy people; it made sick people -still more ill. If ever a nation was disintegrated and but loosely -connected with the individuals, never has philosophy bound these -individuals closer to the whole. If ever an individual was willing to -stand aside and plant around himself the hedge of self-sufficiency, -philosophy was always ready to isolate him still more and to destroy -him through isolation. She is dangerous where she is not in her full -right, and it is only the health of a nation but not that of every -nation which gives her this right.</p> - -<p>Let us now look around for the highest authority<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> as to what -constitutes the health of a nation. I he Greeks, as <i>the</i> truly -healthy nation, have <i>justified</i> philosophy once for all by having -philosophised; and that indeed more than all other nations. They could -not even stop at the right time, for still in their withered age -they comported themselves as heated notaries of philosophy, although -they understood by it only the pious sophistries and the sacrosanct -hair-splittings of Christian dogmatics. They themselves have much -lessened their merit for barbarian posterity by not being able to stop -at the right time, because that posterity in its uninstructed and -impetuous youth necessarily became entangled in those artfully woven -nets and ropes.</p> - -<p>On the contrary, the Greek knew how to begin at the right time, and -this lesson, when one ought to begin philosophising, they teach more -distinctly than any other nation. For it should not be begun when -trouble comes as perhaps some presume who derive philosophy from -moroseness; no, but in good fortune, in mature manhood, out of the -midst of the fervent serenity of a brave and victorious man's estate. -The fact that the Greeks philosophised at that time throws light on -the nature of philosophy and her task as well as on the nature of the -Greeks themselves. Had they at that time been such commonsense and -precocious experts and gayards as the learned Philistine of our days -perhaps imagines, or had their life been only a state of voluptuous -soaring, chiming, breathing and feeling, as the unlearned visionary is -pleased to assume, then the spring of philosophy would not have come to -light among them. At the best there would have come forth a brook soon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> -trickling away in the sand or evaporating into fogs, but never that -broad river flowing forth with the proud beat of its waves, the river -which we know as Greek Philosophy.</p> - -<p>True, it has been eagerly pointed out how much the Greeks could -find and learn abroad, in the Orient, and how many different things -they may easily have brought from there. Of course an odd spectacle -resulted, when certain scholars brought together the alleged masters -from the Orient and the possible disciples from Greece, and exhibited -Zarathustra near Heraclitus, the Hindoos near the Eleates, the -Egyptians near Empedocles, or even Anaxagoras among the Jews and -Pythagoras among the Chinese. In detail little has been determined; -but we should in no way object to the general idea, if people did not -burden us with the conclusion that therefore Philosophy had only been -imported into Greece and was not indigenous to the soil, yea, that -she, as something foreign, had possibly ruined rather than improved -the Greek. Nothing is more foolish than to swear by the fact that the -Greeks had an aboriginal culture; no, they rather absorbed all the -culture flourishing among other nations, and they advanced so far, -just because they understood how to hurl the spear further from the -very spot where another nation had let it rest. They were admirable -in the art of learning productively, and so, like them, we <i>ought</i> -to learn from our neighbours, with a view to Life not to pedantic -knowledge, using everything learnt as a foothold whence to leap -high and still higher than our neighbour. The questions as to the -beginning of philosophy are quite negligible, for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> everywhere in the -beginning there is the crude, the unformed, the empty and the ugly; -and in all things only the higher stages come into consideration. -He who in the place of Greek philosophy prefers to concern himself -with that of Egypt and Persia, because the latter are perhaps more -"original" and certainly older, proceeds just as ill-advisedly as -those who cannot be at ease before they have traced back the Greek -mythology, so grand and profound, to such physical trivialities as -sun, lightning, weather and fog, as its prime origins, and who fondly -imagine they have rediscovered for instance in the restricted worship -of the one celestial vault among the other Indo-Germans a purer form -of religion than the poly-theistic worship of the Greek had been. The -road towards the beginning always leads into barbarism, and he who is -concerned with the Greeks ought always to keep in mind the fact that -the unsubdued thirst for knowledge in itself always barbarises just as -much as the hatred of knowledge, and that the Greeks have subdued their -inherently insatiable thirst for knowledge by their regard for Life, -by an ideal need of Life,—since they wished to live immediately that -which they learnt. The Greeks also philosophised as men of culture and -with the aims of culture, and therefore saved themselves the trouble -of inventing once again the elements of philosophy and knowledge -out of some autochthonous conceit, and with a will they at once set -themselves to fill out, enhance, raise and purify these elements they -had taken over in such a way, that only now in a higher sense and in a -purer sphere they became inventors. For they discovered the <i>typical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -philosopher's genius,</i> and the inventions of all posterity have added -nothing essential.</p> - -<p>Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully -idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters, -Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, -Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and -self-contained,<a name="FNanchor_1_3" id="FNanchor_1_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_3" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and hewn out of one stone. Severe necessity exists -between their thinking and their character. They are not bound by any -convention, because at that time no professional class of philosophers -and scholars existed. They all stand before us in magnificent solitude -as the only ones who then devoted their life exclusively to knowledge. -They all possess the virtuous energy of the Ancients, whereby they -excel all the later philosophers in finding their own form and in -perfecting it by metamorphosis in its most minute details and general -aspect. For they were met by no helpful and facilitating fashion. Thus -together they form what Schopenhauer, in opposition to the Republic of -Scholars, has called a Republic of Geniuses; one giant calls to another -across the arid intervals of ages, and, undisturbed by a wanton, noisy -race of dwarfs, creeping about beneath them, the sublime intercourse of -spirits continues.</p> - -<p>Of this sublime intercourse of spirits I have resolved to relate those -items which our modern hardness of hearing might perhaps hear and -understand; that means certainly the least of all. It seems to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> me -that those old sages from Thales to Socrates have discussed in that -intercourse, although in its most general aspect, everything that -constitutes for our contemplation the peculiarly Hellenic. In their -intercourse, as already in their personalities, they express distinctly -the great features of Greek genius of which the whole of Greek history -is a shadowy impression, a hazy copy, which consequently speaks less -clearly. If we could rightly interpret the total life of the Greek -nation, we should ever find reflected only that picture which in her -highest geniuses shines with more resplendent colours. Even the first -experience of philosophy on Greek soil, the sanction of the Seven Sages -is a distinct and unforgettable line in the picture of the Hellenic. -Other nations have their Saints, the Greeks have Sages. Rightly it has -been said that a nation is characterised not only by her great men -but rather by the manner in which she recognises and honours them. In -other ages the philosopher is an accidental solitary wanderer in the -most hostile environment, either slinking through or pushing himself -through with clenched fists. With the Greek however the philosopher is -not accidental; when in the Sixth and Fifth centuries amidst the most -frightful dangers and seductions of secularisation he appears and as -it were steps forth from the cave of Trophonios into the very midst of -luxuriance, the discoverers' happiness, the wealth and the sensuousness -of the Greek colonies, then we divine that he comes as a noble warner -for the same purpose for which in those centuries Tragedy was born -and which the Orphic mysteries in their grotesque hieroglyphics give -us to understand. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> opinion of those philosophers on Life and -Existence altogether means so much more than a modern opinion because -they had before themselves Life in a luxuriant perfection, and because -with them, unlike us, the sense of the thinker was not muddled by -the disunion engendered by the wish for freedom, beauty, fulness of -life and the love for truth that only asks: What is the good of Life -at all? The mission which the philosopher has to discharge within a -real Culture, fashioned in a homogeneous style, cannot be clearly -conjectured out of our circumstances and experiences for the simple -reason that we have no such culture. No, it is only a Culture like the -Greek which can answer the question as to that task of the philosopher, -only such a Culture can, as I said before, justify philosophy at all; -because such a Culture alone knows and can demonstrate why and how the -philosopher is <i>not</i> an accidental, chance wanderer driven now hither, -now thither. There is a steely necessity which fetters the philosopher -to a true Culture: but what if this Culture does not exist? Then the -philosopher is an incalculable and therefore terror-inspiring comet, -whereas in the favourable case, he shines as the central star in the -solar-system of culture. It is for this reason that the Greeks justify -the philosopher, because with them he is no comet.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_3" id="Footnote_1_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_3"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Napoleon's word about Goethe: "Voilà un homme!"—TR.</p></div> - - - -<h4>2</h4> - - -<p>After such contemplations it will be accepted without offence if I -speak of the pre-Platonic philosophers as of a homogeneous company, and -devote this paper to them exclusively. Something quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> new begins with -Plato; or it might be said with equal justice that in comparison with -that Republic of Geniuses from Thales to Socrates, the philosophers -since Plato lack something essential.</p> - -<p>Whoever wants to express himself unfavourably about those older masters -may call them one-sided, and their <i>Epigones,</i> with Plato as head, -many-sided. Yet it would be more just and unbiassed to conceive of -the latter as philosophic hybrid-characters, of the former as the -pure types. Plato himself is the first magnificent hybrid-character, -and as such finds expression as well in his philosophy as in his -personality. In his ideology are united Socratian, Pythagorean, and -Heraclitean elements, and for this reason it is no typically pure -phenomenon. As man, too, Plato mingles the features of the royally -secluded, all-sufficing Heraclitus, of the melancholy-compassionate and -legislatory Pythagoras and of the psycho-expert dialectician Socrates. -All later philosophers are such hybrid-characters; wherever something -one-sided does come into prominence with them as in the case of the -Cynics, it is not type but caricature. Much more important however is -the fact that they are founders of sects and that the sects founded -by them are all institutions in direct opposition to the Hellenic -culture and the unity of its style prevailing up to that time. In -their way they seek a redemption, but only for the individuals or at -the best for groups of friends and disciples closely connected with -them. The activity of the older philosophers tends, although they were -unconscious of it, towards a cure and purification on a large scale; -the mighty course of Greek culture is not to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> be stopped; awful dangers -are to be removed out of the way of its current; the philosopher -protects and defends his native country. Now, since Plato, he is in -exile and conspires against his fatherland.</p> - -<p>It is a real misfortune that so very little of those older philosophic -masters has come down to us and that all complete works of theirs are -withheld from us. Involuntarily, on account of that loss, we measure -them according to wrong standards and allow ourselves to be influenced -unfavourably towards them by the mere accidental fact that Plato -and Aristotle never lacked appreciators and copyists. Some people -presuppose a special providence for books, a <i>fatum libellorum;</i> such -a providence however would at any rate be a very malicious one if it -deemed it wise to withhold from us the works of Heraclitus, Empedocles' -wonderful poem, and the writings of Democritus, whom the ancients put -on a par with Plato, whom he even excels as far as ingenuity goes, -and as a substitute put into our hand Stoics, Epicureans and Cicero. -Probably the most sublime part of Greek thought and its expression -in words is lost to us; a fate which will not surprise the man who -remembers the misfortunes of Scotus Erigena or of Pascal, and who -considers that even in this enlightened century the first edition of -Schopenhauer's "<i>The World As Will And Idea</i>" became waste-paper. If -somebody will presuppose a special fatalistic power with respect to -such things he may do so and say with Goethe: "Let no one complain -about and grumble at things vile and mean, they <i>are</i> the real -rulers,—however much this be gainsaid!" In particular they are more -powerful than the power of truth. Mankind very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> rarely produces a good -book in which with daring freedom is intonated the battle-song of -truth, the song of philosophic heroism; and yet whether it is to live a -century longer or to crumble and moulder into dust and ashes, depends -on the most miserable accidents, on the sudden mental eclipse of men's -heads, on superstitious convulsions and antipathies, finally on fingers -not too fond of writing or even on eroding bookworms and rainy weather. -But we will not lament but rather take the advice of the reproving and -consolatory words which Hamann addresses to scholars who lament over -lost works. "Would not the artist who succeeded in throwing a lentil -through the eye of a needle have sufficient, with a bushel of lentils, -to practise his acquired skill? One would like to put this question to -all scholars who do not know how to use the works of the Ancients any -better than that man used his lentils." It might be added in our case -that not one more word, anecdote, or date needed to be transmitted to -us than has been transmitted, indeed that even much less might have -been preserved for us and yet we should have been able to establish the -general doctrine that the Greeks justify philosophy.</p> - -<p>A time which suffers from the so-called "general education" but has -no culture and no unity of style in her life hardly knows what to -do with philosophy, even if the latter were proclaimed by the very -Genius of Truth in the streets and market-places. She rather remains -at such a time the learned monologue of the solitary rambler, the -accidental booty of the individual, the hidden closet-secret or the -innocuous chatter between academic senility and childhood.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> Nobody -dare venture to fulfil in himself the law of philosophy, nobody -lives philosophically, with that simple manly faith which compelled -an Ancient, wherever he was, whatever he did, to deport himself as -a Stoic, when he had once pledged his faith to the Stoa. All modern -philosophising is limited politically and regulated by the police to -learned semblance. Thanks to governments, churches, academies, customs, -fashions, and the cowardice of man, it never gets beyond the sigh: "If -only!..." or beyond the knowledge: "Once upon a time there was..." -Philosophy is without rights; therefore modern man, if he were at all -courageous and conscientious, ought to condemn her and perhaps banish -her with words similar to those by which Plato banished the tragic -poets from his State. Of course there would be left a reply for her, as -there remained to those poets against Plato. If one once compelled her -to speak out she might say perhaps: "Miserable Nation! Is it my fault -if among you I am on the tramp, like a fortune teller through the land, -and must hide and disguise myself, as if I were a great sinner and ye -my judges? Just look at my sister, Art! It is with her as with me; we -have been cast adrift among the Barbarians and no longer know how to -save ourselves. Here we are lacking, it is true, every good right; but -the judges before whom we find justice judge you also and will tell -you: First acquire a culture; then you shall experience what Philosophy -can and will do."—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> - - - -<h4>3.</h4> - - -<p>Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous fancy, with the -proposition that <i>water</i> is the origin and mother-womb of all things. -Is it really necessary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and -for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunciate -something about the origin of things; secondly, because it does -so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because in it is -contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea: Everything -is one. The first mentioned reason leaves Thales still in the company -of religious and superstitious people, the second however takes him -out of this company and shows him to us as a natural philosopher, but -by virtue of the third, Thales becomes the first Greek philosopher. -If he had said: "Out of water earth is evolved," we should only have -a scientific hypothesis; a false one, though nevertheless difficult -to refute. But he went beyond the scientific. In his presentation of -this concept of unity through the hypothesis of water, Thales has not -surmounted the low level of the physical discernments of his time, but -at the best overleapt them. The deficient and unorganised observations -of an empiric nature which Thales had made as to the occurrence and -transformations of water, or to be more exact, of the Moist, would -not in the least have made possible or even suggested such an immense -generalisation. That which drove him to this generalisation was a -metaphysical dogma, which had its origin in a mystic intuition and -which together with the ever renewed endeavours to express it better,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> -we find in all philosophies,—the proposition: <i>Everything is one!</i></p> - -<p>How despotically such a faith deals with all empiricism is worthy of -note; with Thales especially one can learn how Philosophy has behaved -at all times, when she wanted to get beyond the hedges of experience -to her magically attracting goal. On light supports she leaps in -advance; hope and divination wing her feet. Calculating reason too, -clumsily pants after her and seeks better supports in its attempt to -reach that alluring goal, at which its divine companion has already -arrived. One sees in imagination two wanderers by a wild forest-stream -which carries with it rolling stones; the one, light-footed, leaps -over it using the stones and swinging himself upon them ever further -and further, though they precipitously sink into the depths behind -him. The other stands helpless there most of the time; he has first -to build a pathway which will bear his heavy, weary step; sometimes -that cannot be done and then no god will help him across the stream. -What therefore carries philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? -Does it distinguish itself from calculating and measuring thought -only by its more rapid flight through large spaces? No, for a strange -illogical power wings the foot of philosophical thinking; and this -power is Fancy. Lifted by the latter, philosophical thinking leaps -from possibility to possibility, and these for the time being are -taken as certainties; and now and then even whilst on the wing it -gets hold of certainties. An ingenious presentiment shows them to -the flier; demonstrable certainties are divined at a distance to be -at this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> point. Especially powerful is the strength of Fancy in the -lightning-like seizing and illuminating of similarities; afterwards -reflection applies its standards and models and seeks to substitute -the similarities by equalities, that which was seen side by side by -causalities. But though this should never be possible, even in the case -of Thales the indemonstrable philosophising has yet its value; although -all supports are broken when Logic and the rigidity of Empiricism want -to get across to the proposition: Everything is water; yet still there -is always, after the demolition of the scientific edifice, a remainder, -and in this very remainder lies a moving force and as it were the hope -of future fertility.</p> - -<p>Of course I do not mean that the thought in any restriction or -attenuation, or as allegory, still retains some kind of "truth"; as -if, for instance, one might imagine the creating artist standing -near a waterfall, and seeing in the forms which leap towards him, -an artistically prefiguring game of the water with human and animal -bodies, masks, plants, rocks, nymphs, griffins, and with all existing -types in general, so that to him the proposition: Everything is water, -is confirmed. The thought of Thales has rather its value—even after -the perception of its indemonstrableness—in the very fact, that it was -meant unmythically and unallegorically. The Greeks among whom Thales -became so suddenly conspicuous were the anti-type of all realists -by only believing essentially in the reality of men and gods, and -by contemplating the whole of nature as if it were only a disguise, -masquerade and metamorphosis of these god-men. Man was to them the -truth, and essence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> of things; everything else mere phenomenon and -deceiving play. For that very reason they experienced incredible -difficulty in conceiving of ideas as ideas. Whilst with the moderns -the most personal item sublimates itself into abstractions, with -them the most abstract notions became personified. Thales, however, -said, "Not man but water is the reality of things "; he began to -believe in nature, in so far that he at least believed in water. As -a mathematician and astronomer he had grown cold towards everything -mythical and allegorical, and even if he did not succeed in becoming -disillusioned as to the pure abstraction, Everything is one, and -although he left off at a physical expression he was nevertheless among -the Greeks of his time a surprising rarity. Perhaps the exceedingly -conspicuous <i>Orpheans</i> possessed in a still higher degree than he the -faculty of conceiving abstractions and of thinking unplastically; only -they did not succeed in expressing these abstractions except in the -form of the allegory. Also Pherecydes of Syrus who is a contemporary -of Thales and akin to him in many physical conceptions hovers with -the expression of the latter in that middle region where Allegory is -wedded to Mythos, so that he dares, for example, to compare the earth -with a winged oak, which hangs in the air with spread pinions and which -Zeus bedecks, after the defeat of Kronos, with a magnificent robe of -honour, into which with his own hands Zeus embroiders lands, water -and rivers. In contrast with such gloomy allegorical philosophising -scarcely to be translated into the realm of the comprehensible, Thales' -are the works of a creative master who began to look into Nature's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> -depths without fantastic fabling. If as it is true he used Science -and the demonstrable but soon out-leapt them, then this likewise -is a typical characteristic of the philosophical genius. The Greek -word which designates the Sage belongs etymologically to <i>sapio,</i> I -taste, <i>sapiens,</i> the tasting one, <i>sisyphos,</i> the man of the most -delicate taste; the peculiar art of the philosopher therefore consists, -according to the opinion of the people, in a delicate selective -judgment by taste, by discernment, by significant differentiation. He -is not prudent, if one calls <i>him</i> prudent, who in his own affairs -finds out the good; Aristotle rightly says: "That which Thales and -Anaxagoras know, people will call unusual, astounding, difficult, -divine but—useless, since human possessions were of no concern to -those two." Through thus selecting and precipitating the unusual, -astounding, difficult, and divine, Philosophy marks the boundary-lines -dividing her from Science in the same way as she does it from Prudence -by the emphasising of the useless. Science without thus selecting, -without such delicate taste, pounces upon everything knowable, in the -blind covetousness to know all at any price; philosophical thinking -however is always on the track of the things worth knowing, on the -track of the great and most important discernments. Now the idea of -greatness is changeable, as well in the moral as in the æsthetic -realm, thus Philosophy begins with a legislation with respect to -greatness, she becomes a Nomenclator. "That is great," she says, -and therewith she raises man above the blind, untamed covetousness -of his thirst for knowledge. By the idea of greatness she assuages<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -this thirst: and it is chiefly by this, that she contemplates the -greatest discernment, that of the essence and kernel of things, as -attainable and attained. When Thales says, "Everything is water," man -is startled up out of his worm-like mauling of and crawling about among -the individual sciences; he divines the last solution of things and -masters through this divination the common perplexity of the lower -grades of knowledge. The philosopher tries to make the total-chord of -the universe re-echo within himself and then to project it into ideas -outside himself: whilst he is contemplative like the creating artist, -sympathetic like the religionist, looking out for ends and causalities -like the scientific man, whilst he feels himself swell up to the -macrocosm, he still retains the circumspection to contemplate himself -coldly as the reflex of the world; he retains that cool-headedness, -which the dramatic artist possesses, when he transforms himself into -other bodies, speaks out of them, and yet knows how to project this -transformation outside himself into written verses. What the verse is -to the poet, dialectic thinking is to the philosopher; he snatches -at it in order to hold fast his enchantment, in order to petrify it. -And just as words and verse to the dramatist are only stammerings in -a foreign language, to tell in it what he lived, what he saw, and -what he can directly promulgate by gesture and music only, thus the -expression of every deep philosophical intuition by means of dialectics -and scientific reflection is, it is true, on the one hand the only -means to communicate what has been seen, but on the other hand it is -a paltry means, and at the bottom a metaphorical,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> absolutely inexact -translation into a different sphere and language. Thus Thales saw the -Unity of the "Existent," and when he wanted to communicate this idea he -talked of water.</p> - - - -<h4>4</h4> - - -<p>Whilst the general type of the philosopher in the picture of Thales -is set off rather hazily, the picture of his great successor already -speaks much more distinctly to us. <i>Anaximander</i> of Milet, the -first philosophical author of the Ancients, writes in the very way -that the typical philosopher will always write as long as he is -not alienated from ingenuousness and <i>naïveté</i> by odd claims: in -a grand lapidarian style of writing, sentence for sentence ... a -witness of a new inspiration, and an expression of the sojourning in -sublime contemplations. The thought and its form are milestones on -the path towards the highest wisdom. With such a lapidarian emphasis -Anaximander once said: "Whence things originated, thither, according -to necessity, they must return and perish; for they must pay penalty -and be judged for their injustices according to the order of time." -Enigmatical utterance of a true pessimist, oracular inscription on the -boundary-stone of Greek philosophy, how shall we explain thee?</p> - -<p>The only serious moralist of our century in the Parergis (Vol. ii., -chap. 12, "Additional Remarks on The Doctrine about the Suffering in -the World, Appendix of Corresponding Passages") urges on us a similar -contemplation: "The right standard by which to judge every human -being is that he really is a being who ought not to exist at all, -but who is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> expiating his existence by manifold forms of suffering -and death:—What can one expect from such a being? Are we not all -sinners condemned to death? We expiate our birth firstly by our -life and secondly by our death." He who in the physiognomy of our -universal human lot reads this doctrine and already recognises the -fundamental bad quality of every human life, in the fact that none -can stand a very close and careful contemplation—although our time, -accustomed to the biographical epidemic, seems to think otherwise and -more loftily about the dignity of man; he who, like Schopenhauer, on -"the heights of the Indian breezes" has heard the sacred word about -the moral value of existence, will be kept with difficulty from -making an extremely anthropomorphic metaphor and from generalizing -that melancholy doctrine—at first only limited to human life—and -applying it by transmission to the general character of all existence. -It may not be very logical, it is however at any rate very human and -moreover quite in harmony with the philosophical leaping described -above, now with Anaximander to consider all Becoming as a punishable -emancipation from eternal "Being," as a wrong that is to be atoned -for by destruction. Everything that has once come into existence also -perishes, whether we think of human life or of water or of heat and -cold; everywhere where definite qualities are to be noticed, we are -allowed to prophesy the extinction of these qualities—according to -the all-embracing proof of experience. Thus a being that possesses -definite qualities and consists of them, can never be the origin and -principle of things; the veritable <i>ens,</i> the "Existent,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> Anaximander -concluded, cannot possess any definite qualities, otherwise, like -all other things, it would necessarily have originated and perished. -In order that Becoming may not cease, the Primordial-being must be -indefinite. The immortality and eternity of the Primordial-being lies -not in an infiniteness and inexhaustibility—as usually the expounders -of Anaximander presuppose—but in this, that it lacks the definite -qualities which lead to destruction, for which reason it bears also its -name: The Indefinite. The thus labelled Primordial-being is superior -to all Becoming and for this very reason it guarantees the eternity -and unimpeded course of Becoming. This last unity in that Indefinite, -the mother-womb of all things, can, it is true, be designated only -negatively by man, as something to which no predicate out of the -existing world of Becoming can be allotted, and might be considered a -peer to the Kantian "Thing-in-itself."</p> - -<p>Of course he who is able to wrangle persistently with others as to what -kind of thing that primordial substance really was, whether perhaps an -intermediate thing between air and water, or perhaps between air and -fire, has not understood our philosopher at all; this is likewise to -be said about those, who seriously ask themselves, whether Anaximander -had thought of his primordial substance as a mixture of all existing -substances. Rather we must direct our gaze to the place where we can -learn that Anaximander no longer treated the question of the origin -of the world as purely physical; we must direct our gaze towards that -first stated lapidarian proposition. When on the contrary he saw a sum -of wrongs to be expiated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> in the plurality of things that have become, -then he, as the first Greek, with daring grasp caught up the tangle of -the most profound ethical problem. How can anything perish that has a -right to exist? Whence that restless Becoming and giving-birth, whence -that expression of painful distortion on the face of Nature, whence the -never-ending dirge in all realms of existence? Out of this world of -injustice, of audacious apostasy from the primordial-unity of things -Anaximander flees into a metaphysical castle, leaning out of which he -turns his gaze far and wide in order at last, after a pensive silence, -to address to all beings this question: "What is your existence worth? -And if it is worth nothing why are you there? By your guilt, I observe, -you sojourn in this world. You will have to expiate it by death. Look -how your earth fades; the seas decrease and dry up, the marine-shell -on the mountain shows you how much already they have dried up; fire -destroys your world even now, finally it will end in smoke and ashes. -But again and again such a world of transitoriness will ever build -itself up; who shall redeem you from the curse of Becoming?"</p> - -<p>Not every kind of life may have been welcome to a man who put such -questions, whose upward-soaring thinking continually broke the empiric -ropes, in order to take at once to the highest, superlunary flight. -Willingly we believe tradition, that he walked along in especially -dignified attire and showed a truly tragic hauteur in his gestures -and habits of life. He lived as he wrote; he spoke as solemnly as he -dressed himself, he raised his hand and placed his foot as if this -existence was a tragedy, and he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> had been born in order to co-operate -in that tragedy by playing the <i>rôle</i> of hero. In all that he was the -great model of Empedocles. His fellow-citizens elected him the leader -of an emigrating colony—perhaps they were pleased at being able to -honour him and at the same time to get rid of him. His thought also -emigrated and founded colonies; in Ephesus and in Elea they could not -get rid of him; and if they could not resolve upon staying at the spot -where he stood, they nevertheless knew that they had been led there by -him, whence they now prepared to proceed without him.</p> - -<p>Thales shows the need of simplifying the empire of plurality, and -of reducing it to a mere expansion or disguise of the <i>one single</i> -existing quality, water. Anaximander goes beyond him with two steps. -Firstly he puts the question to himself: How, if there exists an -eternal Unity at all, is that Plurality possible? and he takes the -answer out of the contradictory, self-devouring and denying character -of this Plurality. The existence of this Plurality becomes a moral -phenomenon to him; it is not justified, it expiates itself continually -through destruction. But then the questions occur to him: Yet why has -not everything that has become perished long ago, since, indeed, quite -an eternity of time has already gone by? Whence the ceaseless current -of the River of Becoming? He can save himself from these questions -only by mystic possibilities: the eternal Becoming can have its origin -only in the eternal "Being," the conditions for that apostasy from -that eternal "Being" to a Becoming in injustice are ever the same, the -constellation of things cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> help itself being thus fashioned, that -no end is to be seen of that stepping forth of the individual being out -of the lap of the "Indefinite." At this Anaximander stayed; that is, -he remained within the deep shadows which like gigantic spectres were -lying on the mountain range of such a world-perception. The more one -wanted to approach the problem of solving how out of the Indefinite the -Definite, out of the Eternal the Temporal, out of the Just the Unjust -could by secession ever originate, the darker the night became.——</p> - - - -<h4>5</h4> - - -<p>Towards the midst of this mystic night, in which Anaximander's problem -of the Becoming was wrapped up, Heraclitus of Ephesus approached and -illuminated it by a divine flash of lightning. "I contemplate the -Becoming," he exclaimed,—"and nobody has so attentively watched this -eternal wave-surging and rhythm of things. And what do I behold? -Lawfulness, infallible certainty, ever equal paths of Justice, -condemning Erinyes behind all transgressions of the laws, the whole -world the spectacle of a governing justice and of demoniacally -omnipresent natural forces subject to justice's sway. I do not behold -the punishment of that which has become, but the justification of -Becoming. When has sacrilege, when has apostasy manifested itself in -inviolable forms, in laws esteemed sacred? Where injustice sways, there -is caprice, disorder, irregularity, contradiction; where however Law -and Zeus' daughter, Dike, rule alone, as in this world, how could the -sphere of guilt, of expiation, of judgment, and as it were the place of -execution of all condemned ones be there?"</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> - -<p>From this intuition Heraclitus took two coherent negations, which are -put into the right light only by a comparison with the propositions of -his predecessor. Firstly, he denied the duality of two quite diverse -worlds, into the assumption of which Anaximander had been pushed; he -no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical, a realm -of definite qualities from a realm of indefinable indefiniteness. Now -after this first step he could neither be kept back any longer from -a still greater audacity of denying: he denied "Being" altogether. -For this one world which was left to him,—shielded all round by -eternal, unwritten laws, flowing up and down in the brazen beat of -rhythm,—shows nowhere persistence, indestructibility, a bulwark in the -stream. Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus exclaimed: "I see nothing -but Becoming. Be not deceived! It is the fault of your limited outlook -and not the fault of the essence of things if you believe that you see -firm land anywhere in the ocean of Becoming and Passing. You need names -for things, just as if they had a rigid permanence, but the very river -in which you bathe a second time is no longer the same one which you -entered before."</p> - -<p>Heraclitus has as his royal property the highest power of intuitive -conception, whereas towards the other mode of conception which is -consummated by ideas and logical combinations, that is towards reason, -he shows himself cool, apathetic, even hostile, and he seems to -derive a pleasure when he is able to contradict reason by means of a -truth gained intuitively, and this he does in such propositions as: -"Everything has always its opposite within itself,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> so fearlessly -that Aristotle before the tribunal of Reason accuses him of the -highest crime, of having sinned against the law of opposition. -Intuitive representation however embraces two things: firstly, the -present, motley, changing world, pressing on us in all experiences, -secondly, the conditions by means of which alone any experience of -this world becomes possible: time and space. For these are able to be -intuitively apprehended, purely in themselves and independent of any -experience; <i>i.e.,</i> they can be perceived, although they are without -definite contents. If now Heraclitus considered time in this fashion, -dissociated from all experiences, he had in it the most instructive -monogram of all that which falls within the realm of intuitive -conception. Just as he conceived of time, so also for instance did -Schopenhauer, who repeatedly says of it: that in it every instant -exists only in so far as it has annihilated the preceding one, its -father, in order to be itself effaced equally quickly; that past -and future are as unreal as any dream; that the present is only the -dimensionless and unstable boundary between the two; that however, like -time, so space, and again like the latter, so also everything that -is simultaneously in space and time, has only a relative existence, -only through and for the sake of a something else, of the same kind -as itself, <i>i.e.,</i> existing only under the same limitations. This -truth is in the highest degree self-evident, accessible to everyone, -and just for that very reason, abstractly and rationally, it is only -attained with great difficulty. Whoever has this truth before his eyes -must however also proceed at once to the next Heraclitean consequence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> -and say that the whole essence of actuality is in fact activity, and -that for actuality there is no other kind of existence and reality, -as Schopenhauer has likewise expounded ("The World As Will And Idea," -Vol. I., Bk. I, sec. 4): "Only as active does it fill space and time: -its action upon the immediate object determines the perception in -which alone it exists: the effect of the action of any material object -upon any other, is known only in so far as the latter acts upon the -immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted before; -it consists in this alone. Cause and effect thus constitute the whole -nature of matter; its true being <i>is</i> its action. The totality of -everything material is therefore very appropriately called in German -<i>Wirklichkeit</i> (actuality)—a word which is far more expressive than -<i>Realität</i> (reality).<a name="FNanchor_2_4" id="FNanchor_2_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_4" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> That upon which actuality acts is always -matter; actuality's whole 'Being' and essence therefore consist only in -the orderly change, which <i>one</i> part of it causes in another, and is -therefore wholly relative, according to a relation which is valid only -within the boundary of actuality, as in the case of time and space."</p> - -<p>The eternal and exclusive Becoming, the total instability of all -reality and actuality, which continually works and becomes and never -<i>is,</i> as Heraclitus teaches—is an awful and appalling conception, -and in its effects most nearly related to that sensation, by which -during an earthquake one loses confidence in the firmly-grounded earth. -It required an astonishing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> strength to translate this effect into -its opposite, into the sublime, into happy astonishment. Heraclitus -accomplished this through an observation of the proper course of all -Becoming and Passing, which he conceived of under the form of polarity, -as the divergence of a force into two qualitatively different, opposite -actions, striving after reunion. A quality is set continually at -variance with itself and separates itself into its opposites: these -opposites continually strive again one towards another. The common -people of course think to recognise something rigid, completed, -consistent; but the fact of the matter is that at any instant, bright -and dark, sour and sweet are side by side and attached to one another -like two wrestlers of whom sometimes the one succeeds, sometimes the -other. According to Heraclitus honey is at the same time sweet and -bitter, and the world itself an amphora whose contents constantly need -stirring up. Out of the war of the opposites all Becoming originates; -the definite and to us seemingly persistent qualities express only the -momentary predominance of the one fighter, but with that the war is not -at an end; the wrestling continues to all eternity. Everything happens -according to this struggle, and this very struggle manifests eternal -justice. It is a wonderful conception, drawn from the purest source -of Hellenism, which considers the struggle as the continual sway of a -homogeneous, severe justice bound by eternal laws. Only a Greek was -able to consider this conception as the fundament of a <i>Cosmodicy;</i> it -is Hesiod's good Eris transfigured into the cosmic principle, it is -the idea of a contest, an idea held by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> individual Greeks and by their -State, and translated out of the gymnasia and palæstra, out of the -artistic agonistics, out of the struggle of the political parties and -of the towns into the most general principle, so that the machinery of -the universe is regulated by it. Just as every Greek fought as though -he alone were in the right, and as though an absolutely sure standard -of judicial opinion could at any instant decide whither victory is -inclining, thus the qualities wrestle one with another, according to -inviolable laws and standards which are inherent in the struggle. The -Things themselves in the permanency of which the limited intellect of -man and animal believes, do not "exist" at all; they are as the fierce -flashing and fiery sparkling of drawn swords, as the stars of Victory -rising with a radiant resplendence in the battle of the opposite -qualities.</p> - -<p>That struggle which is peculiar to all Becoming, that eternal -interchange of victory is again described by Schopenhauer: ("The World -As Will And Idea," Vol. I., Bk. 2, sec. 27) "The permanent matter -must constantly change its form; for under the guidance of causality, -mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving -to appear, wrest the matter from each other, for each desires to -reveal its own Idea. This strife may be followed up through the whole -of nature; indeed nature exists only through it." The following pages -give the most noteworthy illustrations of this struggle, only that -the prevailing tone of this description ever remains other than that -of Heraclitus in so far as to Schopenhauer the struggle is a proof of -the Will to Life falling out with itself; it is to him a feasting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> -on itself on the part of this dismal, dull impulse, as a phenomenon -on the whole horrible and not at all making for happiness. The arena -and the object of this struggle is Matter,—which some natural forces -alternately endeavour to disintegrate and build up again at the expense -of other natural forces,—as also Space and Time, the union of which -through causality <i>is</i> this very matter.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_4" id="Footnote_2_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_4"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et -consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat (Seneca, -Epist. 81).—TR.</p></div> - - - -<h4>6</h4> - - -<p>Whilst the imagination of Heraclitus measured the restlessly moving -universe, the "actuality" (<i>Wirklichkeit</i>), with the eye of the happy -spectator, who sees innumerable pairs wrestling in joyous combat -entrusted to the superintendence of severe umpires, a still higher -presentiment seized him, he no longer could contemplate the wrestling -pairs and the umpires, separated one from another; the very umpires -seemed to fight, and the fighters seemed to be their own judges—yea, -since at the bottom he conceived only of the one Justice eternally -swaying, he dared to exclaim: "The contest of The Many is itself pure -justice. And after all: The One is The Many. For what are all those -qualities according to their nature? Are they immortal gods? Are they -separate beings working for themselves from the beginning and without -end? And if the world which we see knows only Becoming and Passing but -no Permanence, should perhaps those qualities constitute a differently -fashioned metaphysical world, true, not a world of unity as Anaximander -sought behind the fluttering veil of plurality, but a world of eternal -and essential pluralities?" Is it possible that however violently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> he -had denied such duality, Heraclitus has after all by a round-about way -accidentally got into the dual cosmic order, an order with an Olympus -of numerous immortal gods and demons,—viz., <i>many</i> realities,—and -with a human world, which sees only the dust-cloud of the Olympic -struggle and the flashing of divine spears,—<i>i.e.,</i> only a Becoming? -Anaximander had fled just from these definite qualities into the lap of -the metaphysical "Indefinite"; because the former <i>became</i> and passed, -he had denied them a true and essential existence; however should it -not seem now as if the Becoming is only the looming-into-view of a -struggle of eternal qualities? When we speak of the Becoming, should -not the original cause of this be sought in the peculiar feebleness of -human cognition—whereas in the nature of things there is perhaps no -Becoming, but only a co-existing of many true increate indestructible -realities?</p> - -<p>These are Heraclitean loop-holes and labyrinths; he exclaims once -again: "The 'One' is the 'Many'." The many perceptible qualities are -neither eternal entities, nor phantasmata of our senses (Anaxagoras -conceives them later on as the former, Parmenides as the latter), -they are neither rigid, sovereign "Being" nor fleeting Appearance -hovering in human minds. The third possibility which alone was left -to Heraclitus nobody will be able to divine with dialectic sagacity -and as it were by calculation, for what he invented here is a rarity -even in the realm of mystic incredibilities and unexpected cosmic -metaphors.—The world is the <i>Game</i> of Zeus, or expressed more -physically, the game of fire with itself, the "One" is only in this -sense at the same time the "Many."—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span></p> - -<p>In order to elucidate in the first place the introduction of fire as -a world-shaping force, I recall how Anaximander had further developed -the theory of water as the origin of things. Placing confidence in the -essential part of Thales' theory, and strengthening and adding to the -latter's observations, Anaximander however was not to be convinced -that before the water and, as it were, after the water there was no -further stage of quality: no, to him out of the Warm and the Cold -the Moist seemed to form itself, and the Warm and the Cold therefore -were supposed to be the preliminary stages, the still more original -qualities. With their issuing forth from the primordial existence -of the "Indefinite," Becoming begins. Heraclitus who as physicist -subordinated himself to the importance of Anaximander, explains to -himself this Anaximandrian "Warm" as the respiration, the warm breath, -the dry vapours, in short as the fiery element: about this fire he now -enunciates the same as Thales and Anaximander had enunciated about -the water: that in innumerable metamorphoses it was passing along the -path of Becoming, especially in the three chief aggregate stages as -something Warm, Moist, and Firm. For water in descending is transformed -into earth, in ascending into fire: or as Heraclitus appears to have -expressed himself more exactly: from the sea ascend only the pure -vapours which serve as food to the divine fire of the stars, from the -earth only the dark, foggy ones, from which the Moist derives its -nourishment. The pure vapours are the transitional stage in the passing -of sea into fire, the impure the transitional stage<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> in the passing -of earth into water. Thus the two paths of metamorphosis of the fire -run continuously side by side, upwards and downwards, to and fro, from -fire to water, from water to earth, from earth back again to water, -from water to fire. Whereas Heraclitus is a follower of Anaximander in -the most important of these conceptions, <i>e.g.,</i> that the fire is kept -up by the evaporations, or herein, that out of the water is dissolved -partly earth, partly fire; he is on the other hand quite independent -and in opposition to Anaximander in excluding the "Cold" from the -physical process, whilst Anaximander had put it side by side with the -"Warm" as having the same rights, so as to let the "Moist" originate -out of both. To do so, was of course a necessity to Heraclitus, for -if everything is to be fire, then, however many possibilities of its -transformation might be assumed, nothing can exist that would be the -absolute antithesis to fire; he has, therefore, probably interpreted -only as a degree of the "Warm" that which is called the "Cold," and -he could justify this interpretation without difficulty. Much more -important than this deviation from the doctrine of Anaximander is a -further agreement; he, like the latter, believes in an end of the -world periodically repeating itself and in an ever-renewed emerging of -another world out of the all-destroying world-fire. The period during -which the world hastens towards that world-fire and the dissolution -into pure fire is characterised by him most strikingly as a demand -and a need; the state of being completely swallowed up by the fire as -satiety; and now to us remains the question as to how he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> understood -and named the newly awakening impulse for world-creation, the -pouring-out-of-itself into the forms of plurality. The Greek proverb -seems to come to our assistance with the thought that "satiety gives -birth to crime" (the Hybris) and one may indeed ask oneself for a -minute whether perhaps Heraclitus has derived that return to plurality -out of the Hybris. Let us just take this thought seriously: in its -light the face of Heraclitus changes before our eyes, the proud gleam -of his eyes dies out, a wrinkled expression of painful resignation, of -impotence becomes distinct, it seems that we know why later antiquity -called him the "weeping philosopher." Is not the whole world-process -now an act of punishment of the Hybris? The plurality the result of a -crime? The transformation of the pure into the impure, the consequence -of injustice? Is not the guilt now shifted into the essence of the -things and indeed, the world of Becoming and of individuals accordingly -exonerated from guilt; yet at the same time are they not condemned for -ever and ever to bear the consequences of guilt?</p> - - - -<h4>7</h4> - - -<p>That dangerous word, Hybris, is indeed the touchstone for every -Heraclitean; here he may show whether he has understood or mistaken -his master. Is there in this world: Guilt, injustice, contradiction, -suffering?</p> - -<p>Yes, exclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human being, who -sees divergently and not convergently, not for the contuitive god; -to him everything opposing converges into one harmony, invisible it -is true to the common human eye, yet comprehensible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> to him who like -Heraclitus resembles the contemplative god. Before his fiery eye no -drop of injustice is left in the world poured out around him, and even -that cardinal obstacle—how pure fire can take up its quarters in -forms so impure—he masters by means of a sublime simile. A Becoming -and Passing, a building and destroying, without any moral bias, in -perpetual innocence is in this world only the play of the artist and of -the child. And similarly, just as the child and the artist play, the -eternally living fire plays, builds up and destroys, in innocence—and -this game the <i>Æon</i> plays with himself. Transforming himself into water -and earth, like a child he piles heaps of sand by the sea, piles up -and demolishes; from time to time he recommences the game. A moment of -satiety, then again desire seizes him, as desire compels the artist to -create. Not wantonness, but the ever newly awakening impulse to play, -calls into life other worlds. The child throws away his toys; but soon -he starts again in an innocent frame of mind. As soon however as the -child builds he connects, joins and forms lawfully and according to an -innate sense of order.</p> - -<p>Thus only is the world contemplated by the æsthetic man, who has -learned from the artist and the genesis of the latter's work, how the -struggle of plurality can yet bear within itself law and justice, -how the artist stands contemplative above, and working within the -work of art, how necessity and play, antagonism and harmony must pair -themselves for the procreation of the work of art.</p> - -<p>Who now will still demand from such a philosophy a system of Ethics -with the necessary imperative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span>s—Thou Shalt,—or even reproach -Heraclitus with such a deficiency. Man down to his last fibre is -Necessity and absolutely "unfree "—if by freedom one understands the -foolish claim to be able to change at will one's <i>essentia</i> like a -garment, a claim, which up to the present every serious philosophy -has rejected with due scorn. That so few human beings live with -consciousness in the <i>Logos</i> and in accordance with the all-overlooking -artist's eye originates from their souls being wet and from the fact -that men's eyes and ears, their intellect in general is a bad witness -when "moist ooze fills their souls." Why that is so, is not questioned -any more than why fire becomes water and earth. Heraclitus is not -<i>compelled</i> to prove (as Leibnitz was) that this world was even the -best of all; it was sufficient for him that the world is the beautiful, -innocent play of the <i>Æon.</i> Man on the whole is to him even an -irrational being, with which the fact that in all his essence the law -of all-ruling reason is fulfilled does lot clash. He does not occupy -a specially favoured position in nature, whose highest phenomenon is -not simple-minded man, but fire, for instance, as stars. In so far as -man has through necessity received a share of fire, he is a little -more rational; as far as he consists of earth and water it stands -badly with his reason. He is not compelled to take cognisance of the -<i>Logos</i> simply because he is a human being. Why is there water, why -earth? This to Heraclitus is a much more serious problem than to ask, -why men are so stupid and bad. In the highest and the most perverted -men the same inherent lawfulness and justice manifest themselves.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> -If however one would ask Heraclitus the question "Why is fire not -always fire, why is it now water, now earth?" then he would only just -answer: "It is a game, don't take it too pathetically and still less, -morally." Heraclitus describes only the existing world and has the same -contemplative pleasure in it which the artist experiences when looking -at his growing work. Only those who have cause to be discontented -with his natural history of man find him gloomy, melancholy, tearful, -sombre, atrabilarious, pessimistic and altogether hateful. He however -would take these discontented people, together with their antipathies -and sympathies, their hatred und their love, as negligible and perhaps -answer them with some such comment as: "Dogs bark at anything they do -not know," or, "To the ass chaff is preferable to gold."</p> - -<p>With such discontented persons also originate the numerous complaints -as to the obscurity of the Heraclitean style; probably no man has ever -written clearer and more illuminatingly; of course, very abruptly, -and therefore naturally obscure to the racing readers. But why a -philosopher should intentionally write obscurely—a thing habitually -said about Heraclitus—is absolutely inexplicable; unless he has some -cause to hide his thoughts or is sufficiently a rogue to conceal his -thoughtlessness underneath words. One is, as Schopenhauer says, indeed -compelled by lucid expression to prevent misunderstandings even in -affairs of practical every-day life, how then should one be allowed to -express oneself indistinctly, indeed puzzlingly in the most difficult, -most abstruse, scarcely attainable object of thinking,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> the tasks of -philosophy? With respect to brevity however Jean Paul gives a good -precept: "On the whole it is right that everything great—of deep -meaning to a rare mind—should be uttered with brevity and (therefore) -obscurely so that the paltry mind would rather proclaim it to be -nonsense than translate it into the realm of his empty-headedness. -For common minds have an ugly ability to perceive in the deepest and -richest saying nothing but their own every-day opinion." Moreover and -in spite of it Heraclitus has not escaped the "paltry minds"; already -the Stoics have "re-expounded" him into the shallow and dragged down -his æsthetic fundamental-perception as to the play of the world to the -miserable level of the common regard for the practical ends of the -world and more explicitly for the advantages of man, so that out of his -Physics has arisen in those heads a crude optimism, with the continual -invitation to Dick, Tom, and Harry, "<i>Plaudite amici!</i>"</p> - - - -<h4>8</h4> - - -<p>Heraclitus was proud; and if it comes to pride with a philosopher then -it is a great pride. His work never refers him to a "public," the -applause of the masses and the hailing chorus of contemporaries. To -wander lonely along his path belongs to the nature of the philosopher. -His talents are the most rare, in a certain sense the most unnatural -and at the same time exclusive and hostile even toward kindred talents. -The wall of his self-sufficiency must be of diamond, if it is not to -be demolished and broken, for everything is in motion against him. His -journey to immortality is more cumbersome and impeded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> than any other -and yet nobody can believe more firmly than the philosopher that he -will attain the goal by that journey—because he does not know where -he is to stand if not on the widely spread wings of all time; for the -disregard of everything present and momentary lies in the essence of -the great philosophic nature. He has truth; the wheel of time may roll -whither it pleases, never can it escape from truth. It is important -to hear that such men have lived. Never for example would one be able -to imagine the pride of Heraclitus as an idle possibility. In itself -every endeavour after knowledge seems by its nature to be eternally -unsatisfied and unsatisfactory. Therefore nobody unless instructed -by history will like to believe in such a royal self-esteem and -conviction of being the only wooer of truth. Such men live in their -own solar-system—one has to look for them there. A Pythagoras, an -Empedocles treated themselves too with a super-human esteem, yea, with -almost religious awe; but the tie of sympathy united with the great -conviction of the metempsychosis and the unity of everything living, -led them back to other men, for their welfare and salvation. Of that -feeling of solitude, however, which permeated the Ephesian recluse -of the Artemis Temple, one can only divine something, when growing -benumbed in the wildest mountain desert. No paramount feeling of -compassionate agitation, no desire to help, heal and save emanates from -him. He is a star without an atmosphere. His eye, directed blazingly -inwards, looks outward, for appearance's sake only, extinct and icy. -All around him, immediately upon the citadel of his pride beat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> the -waves of folly and perversity: with loathing he turns away from them. -But men with a feeling heart would also shun such a Gorgon monster -as cast out of brass; within an out-of-the-way sanctuary, among the -statues of gods, by the side of cold composedly-sublime architecture -such a being may appear more comprehensible. As man among men -Heraclitus was incredible; and though he was seen paying attention to -the play of noisy children, even then he was reflecting upon what never -man thought of on such an occasion: the play of the great world-child, -Zeus. He had no need of men, not even for his discernments. He was -not interested in all that which one might perhaps ascertain from -them, and in what the other sages before him had been endeavouring to -ascertain. He spoke with disdain of such questioning, collecting, in -short "historic" men. "I sought and investigated myself," he said, with -a word by which one designates the investigation of an oracle; as if -he and no one else were the true fulfiller and achiever of the Delphic -precept: "Know thyself."</p> - -<p>What he learned from this oracle, he deemed immortal wisdom, and -eternally worthy of explanation, of unlimited effect even in the -distance, after the model of the prophetic speeches of the Sibyl. -It is sufficient for the latest mankind: let the latter have that -expounded to her, as oracular sayings, which he like the Delphic god -"neither enunciates nor conceals." Although it is proclaimed by him, -"without smiles, finery and the scent of ointments," but rather as with -"foaming mouth," it <i>must</i> force its way through the millenniums of -the future. For<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> the world needs truth eternally, therefore she needs -also Heraclitus eternally; although he has no need of her. What does -his fame matter to <i>him?</i>—fame with "mortals ever flowing on!" as he -exclaims scornfully. His fame is of concern to man, not to himself; -the immortality of mankind needs him, not he the immortality of the -man Heraclitus. That which he beheld, <i>the doctrine of the Law in the -Becoming, and of the Play in the Necessity,</i> must henceforth be beheld -eternally; he has raised the curtain of this greatest stage-play.</p> - - - -<h4>9</h4> - - -<p>Whereas in every word of Heraclitus are expressed the pride and the -majesty of truth, but of truth caught by intuitions, not scaled by -the rope-ladder of Logic, whereas in sublime ecstasy he beholds but -does not espy, discerns but does not reckon, he is contrasted with his -contemporary <i>Parmenides,</i> a man likewise with the type of a prophet -of truth, but formed as it were out of ice and not out of fire, and -shedding around himself cold, piercing light.</p> - -<p>Parmenides once had, probably in his later years, a moment of the -very purest abstraction, undimmed by any reality, perfectly lifeless; -this moment—un-Greek, like no other in the two centuries of the -Tragic Age—the product of which is the doctrine of "Being," became a -boundary-stone for his own life, which divided it into two periods; at -the same time however the same moment divides the pre-Socratic thinking -into two halves, of which the first might be called the Anaximandrian, -the second the Parmenidean. The first period in Parmenides' own -philosophising<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> bears still the signature of Anaximander; this -period produced a detailed philosophic-physical system as answer to -Anaximander's questions. When later that icy abstraction-horror caught -him, and the simplest proposition treating of "Being" and "Not-Being" -was advanced by him, then among the many older doctrines thrown by him -upon the scrap heap was also his own system. However he does not appear -to have lost all paternal piety towards the strong and well-shapen -child of his youth, and he saved himself therefore by saying: "It is -true there is only one right way; if one however wants at any time to -betake oneself to another, then my earlier opinion according to its -purity and consequence alone is right." Sheltering himself with this -phrase he has allowed his former physical system a worthy and extensive -space in his great poem on Nature, which really was to proclaim the -new discernment as the only signpost to truth. This fatherly regard, -even though an error should have crept in through it, is a remainder -of human feeling, in a nature quite petrified by logical rigidity and -almost changed into a thinking-machine.</p> - -<p>Parmenides, whose personal intercourse with Anaximander does not seem -incredible to me, and whose starting from Anaximander's doctrine is -not only credible but evident, had the same distrust for the complete -separation of a world which only is, and a world which only becomes, as -had also caught Heraclitus and led to a denying of "Being" altogether. -Both sought a way out from that contrast and divergence of a dual order -of the world. That leap into the Indefinite, Indefinable, by which -once<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> for all Anaximander had escaped from the realm of Becoming and -from the empirically given qualities of such realm, that leap did not -become an easy matter to minds so independently fashioned as those of -Heraclitus and Parmenides; first they endeavoured to walk as far as -they could and reserved to themselves the leap for that place, where -the foot finds no more hold and one has to leap, in order not to fall. -Both looked repeatedly at that very world, which Anaximander had -condemned in so melancholy a way and declared to be the place of wanton -crime and at the same time the penitentiary cell for the injustice of -Becoming. Contemplating this world Heraclitus, as we know already, had -discovered what a wonderful order, regularity and security manifest -themselves in every Becoming; from that he concluded that the Becoming -could not be anything evil and unjust. Quite a different outlook had -Parmenides; he compared the qualities one with another, and believed -that they were not all of the same kind, but ought to be classified -under two headings. If for example he compared bright and dark, then -the second quality was obviously only the <i>negation</i> of the first; -and thus he distinguished positive and negative qualities, seriously -endeavouring to rediscover and register that fundamental antithesis -in the whole realm of Nature. His method was the following: He took a -few antitheses, <i>e.g.,</i> light and heavy, rare and dense, active and -passive, and compared them with that typical antithesis of bright and -dark: that which corresponded with the bright was the positive, that -which corresponded with the dark the negative quality. If<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> he took -perhaps the heavy and light, the light fell to the side of the bright, -the heavy to the side of the dark; and thus "heavy" was to him only -the negation of "light," but the "light" a positive quality. This -method alone shows that he had a defiant aptitude for abstract logical -procedure, closed against the suggestions of the senses. The "heavy" -seems indeed to offer itself very forcibly to the senses as a positive -quality; that did not keep Parmenides from stamping it as a negation. -Similarly he placed the earth in opposition to the fire, the "cold" -in opposition to the "warm," the "dense" in opposition to the "rare," -the "female" in opposition to the "male," the "passive" in opposition -to the "active," merely as negations: so that before his gaze our -empiric world divided itself into two separate spheres, into that -of the positive qualities—with a bright, fiery, warm, light, rare, -active-masculine character—and into that of the negative qualities. -The latter express really only the lack, the absence of the others, the -positive ones. He therefore described the sphere in which the positive -qualities are absent as dark, earthy, cold, heavy, dense and altogether -as of feminine-passive character. Instead of the expressions "positive" -and "negative" he used the standing term "existent" and "non-existent" -and had arrived with this at the proposition, that, in contradiction to -Anaximander, this our world itself contains something "existent," and -of course something "non-existent." One is not to seek that "existent" -outside the world and as it were above our horizon; but before us, -and everywhere in every Becoming, something "existent" and active is -contained.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span></p> - -<p>With that however still remained to him the task of giving the more -exact answer to the question: What is the Becoming? and here was the -moment where he had to leap, in order not to fall, although perhaps to -such natures as that of Parmenides, even any leaping means a falling. -Enough! we get into fog, into the mysticism of <i>qualitates occultæ,</i> -and even a little into mythology. Parmenides, like Heraclitus, looks -at the general Becoming and Not-remaining and explains to himself a -Passing only thus, that the "Non-Existent" bore the guilt. For how -should the "Existent" bear the guilt of Passing? Likewise, however, -the Originating, i.e., the Becoming, must come about through the -assistance of the "Non-Existent"; for the "Existent" is always there -and could not of itself first originate and it could not explain any -Originating, any Becoming. Therefore the Originating, the Becoming -as well as the Passing and Perishing have been brought about by the -negative qualities. But that the originating "thing" has a content, -and the passing "thing" loses a content, presupposes that the positive -qualities—and that just means that very content—participate -likewise in both processes. In short the proposition results: "For the -Becoming the 'Existent' as well as the 'Non-Existent' is necessary; -when they co-operate then a Becoming results." But how come the -"positive" and the "negative" to one another? Should they not on the -contrary eternally flee one another as antitheses and thereby make -every Becoming impossible? Here Parmenides appeals to a <i>qualitas -occulta,</i> to a mystic tendency of the antithetical pairs to approach -and attract one another, and he allegorises that peculiar contrariety -by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> name of Aphrodite, and by the empirically known relation of -the male and female principle. It is the power of Aphrodite which -plays the matchmaker between the antithetical pair, the "Existent" -and the "Non-Existent." Passion brings together the antagonistic and -antipathetic elements: the result is a Becoming. When Desire has become -satiated, Hatred and the innate antagonism again drive asunder the -"Existent" and the "Non-Existent"—then man says: the thing perishes, -passes.</p> - - - -<h4>10</h4> - - -<p>But no one with impunity lays his profane hands on such awful -abstractions as the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent"; the blood -freezes slowly as one touches them. There was a day upon which an odd -idea suddenly occurred to Parmenides, an idea which seemed to take -all value away from his former combinations, so that he felt inclined -to throw them aside, like a money bag with old worn-out coins. It is -commonly believed that an external impression, in addition to the -centrifugal consequence of such ideas as "existent" and "non-existent," -has also been co-active in the invention of that day; this impression -was an acquaintance with the theology of the old roamer and rhapsodist, -the singer of a mystic deification of Nature, the Kolophonian -<i>Xenophanes.</i> Throughout an extraordinary life Xenophanes lived as -a wandering poet and became through his travels a well-informed and -most instructive man who knew how to question and how to narrate, for -which reason Heraclitus reckoned him amongst the polyhistorians and -above<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> all amongst the "historic" natures, in the sense mentioned. -Whence and when came to him the mystic bent into the One and the -eternally Resting, nobody will be able to compute; perhaps it is only -the conception of the finally settled old man, to whom, after the -agitation of his erratic wanderings, and after the restless learning -and searching for truth, the vision of a divine rest, the permanence of -all things within a pantheistic primal peace appears as <i>the</i> highest -and greatest ideal. After all it seems to me quite accidental that in -the same place in Elea two men lived together for a time, each of whom -carried in his head a conception of unity; they formed no school and -had nothing in common which perhaps the one might have learned from -the other and then might have handed on. For, in the case of these two -men, the origin of that conception of unity is quite different, yea -opposite; and if either of them has become at all acquainted with the -doctrine of the other then, in order to understand it at all, he had to -translate it first into his own language. With this translation however -the very specific element of the other doctrine was lost. Whereas -Parmenides arrived at the unity of the "Existent" purely through an -alleged logical consequence and whereas he span that unity out of the -ideas "Being" and "Not-Being," Xenophanes was a religious mystic and -belonged, with that mystic unity, very properly to the Sixth Century. -Although he was no such revolutionising personality as Pythagoras -he had nevertheless in his wanderings the same bent and impulse to -improve, purify, and cure men. He was the ethical teacher, but still -in the stage of the rhapsodist; in a later time<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> he would have been -a sophist. In the daring disapproval of the existing customs and -valuations he had not his equal in Greece; moreover he did not, like -Heraclitus and Plato, retire into solitude but placed himself before -the very public, whose exulting admiration of Homer, whose passionate -propensity for the honours of the gymnastic festivals, whose adoration -of stones in human shape, he criticised severely with wrath and scorn, -yet not as a brawling Thersites. The freedom of the individual was with -him on its zenith; and by this almost limitless stepping free from all -conventions he was more closely related to Parmenides than by that last -divine unity, which once he had beheld, in a visionary state worthy of -that century. His unity scarcely had expression and word in common with -the one "Being" of Parmenides, and certainly had not the same origin.</p> - -<p>It was rather an opposite state of mind in which Parmenides found his -doctrine of "Being," On that day and in that state he examined his -two co-operating antitheses, the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent," -the positive and the negative qualities, of which Desire and Hatred -constitute the world and the Becoming. He was suddenly caught up, -mistrusting, by the idea of negative quality, of the "Non-Existent." -For can something which does not exist be a quality? or to put the -question in a broader sense: can anything indeed which does not exist, -exist? The only form of knowledge in which we at once put unconditional -trust and the disapproval of which amounts to madness, is the tautology -A = A. But this very tautological knowledge called inexorably to him: -what does not exist, exists not! What is, is!<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> Suddenly he feels -upon his life the load of an enormous logical sin; for had he not -always without hesitation assumed that <i>there were existing</i> negative -qualities, in short a "Non-Existent," that therefore, to express it by -a formula, A = Not-A, which indeed could only be advanced by the most -out and out perversity of thinking. It is true, as he recollected, the -whole great mass of men judge with the same perversity; he himself -has only participated in the general crime against logic. But the -same moment which charges him with this crime surrounds him with the -light of the glory of an invention, he has found, apart from all human -illusion, a principle, the key to the world-secret, he now descends -into the abyss of things, guided by the firm and fearful hand of the -tautological truth as to "Being."</p> - -<p>On the way thither he meets Heraclitus—an unfortunate encounter! Just -now Heraclitus' play with antinomies was bound to be very hateful to -him, who placed the utmost importance upon the severest separation of -"Being" and "Not-Being"; propositions like this: "We are and at the -same time we are not" —"'Being' and 'Not-Being' is at the same time -the same thing and again not the same thing," propositions through -which all that he had just elucidated and disentangled became again -dim and inextricable, incited him to wrath. "Away with the men," he -exclaimed, "who seem to have two heads and yet know nothing! With them -truly everything is in flux, even their thinking! They stare at things -stupidly, but they must be deaf as well as blind so to mix up the -opposites"! The want of judgment on the part of the masses, glorified -by playful<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> antinomies and praised as the acme of all knowledge was to -him a painful and incomprehensible experience.</p> - -<p>Now he dived into the cold bath of his awful abstractions. That which -is true must exist in eternal presence, about it cannot be said "it -was," "it will be." The "Existent" cannot have become; for out of what -should it have become? Out of the "Non-Existent"? But that does not -exist and can produce nothing. Out of the "Existent"? This would not -produce anything but itself. The same applies to the Passing, it is -just as impossible as the Becoming, as any change, any increase, any -decrease. On the whole the proposition is valid: Everything about which -it can be said: "it has been" or "it will be" does not exist; about -the "Existent" however it can never be said "it does not exist." The -"Existent" is indivisible, for where is the second power, which should -divide it? It is immovable, for whither should it move itself? It -cannot be infinitely great nor infinitely small, for it is perfect and -a perfectly given infinitude is a contradiction. Thus the "Existent" -is suspended, delimited, perfect, immovable, everywhere equally -balanced and such equilibrium equally perfect at any point, like a -globe, but not in a space, for otherwise this space would be a second -"Existent." But there cannot exist several "Existents," for in order to -separate them, something would have to exist which was not existing, an -assumption which neutralises itself. Thus there exists only the eternal -Unity.</p> - -<p>If now, however, Parmenides turned back his gaze to the world of -Becoming, the existence of which he had formerly tried to understand -by such ingenious conjectures, he was wroth at his eye seeing the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> -Becoming at all, his ear hearing it. "Do not follow the dim-sighted -eyes," now his command runs, "not the resounding ear nor the -tongue, but examine only by the power of the thought." Therewith he -accomplished the extremely important first critique of the apparatus -of knowledge, although this critique was still inadequate and proved -disastrous in its consequences. By tearing entirely asunder the -senses and the ability to think in abstractions, <i>i.e.</i> reason, just -as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he demolished -the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous -separation of "mind" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies -like a curse on philosophy. All sense perceptions, Parmenides judges, -cause only illusions and their chief illusion is their deluding us to -believe that even the "Non-Existent" exists, that even the Becoming has -a "Being." All that plurality, diversity and variety of the empirically -known world, the change of its qualities, the order in its ups and -downs, is thrown aside mercilessly as mere appearance and delusion; -from there nothing is to be learnt, therefore all labour is wasted -which one bestows upon this false, through-and-through futile world, -the conception of which has been obtained by being hum-bugged by the -senses. He who judges in such generalisations as Parmenides did, ceases -therewith to be an investigator of natural philosophy in detail; his -interest in phenomena withers away; there develops even a hatred of -being unable to get rid of this eternal fraud of the senses. Truth is -now to dwell only in the most faded, most abstract generalities, in the -empty husks of the most indefinite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> words, as in a maze of cobwebs; and -by such a "truth" now the philosopher sits, bloodless as an abstraction -and surrounded by a web of formulæ. The spider undoubtedly wants the -blood of its victims; but the Parmenidean philosopher hates the very -blood of his victims, the blood of Empiricism sacrificed by him.</p> - - - -<h4>11</h4> - - -<p>And that was a Greek who "flourished" about the time of the outbreak -of the Ionic Revolution. At that time it was possible for a Greek -to flee out of the superabundant reality, as out of a mere delusive -schematism of the imaginative faculties—not perhaps like Plato into -the land of the eternal ideas, into the workshop of the world-creator, -in order to feast the eyes on unblemished, unbreakable primal-forms of -things—but into the rigid death-like rest of the coldest and emptiest -conception, that of the "Being." We will indeed beware of interpreting -such a remarkable fact by false analogies. That flight was not a -world-flight in the sense of Indian philosophers; no deep religious -conviction as to the depravity, transitoriness and accursedness of -Existence demanded that flight—that ultimate goal, the rest in the -"Being," was not striven after as the mystic absorption in <i>one</i> -all-sufficing enrapturing conception which is a puzzle and a scandal -to common men. The thought of Parmenides bears in itself not the -slightest trace of the intoxicating mystical Indian fragrance, which -is perhaps not wholly imperceptible in Pythagoras and Empedocles; the -strange thing in that fact, at this period, is rather the very absence -of fragrance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> colour, soul, form, the total lack of blood, religiosity -and ethical warmth, the abstract-schematic—in a Greek!—above all -however our philosopher's awful energy of striving after <i>Certainty,</i> -in a mythically thinking and highly emotional—fantastic age is quite -remarkable. "Grant me but a certainty, ye gods!"is the prayer of -Parmenides, "and be it, in the ocean of Uncertainty, only a board, -broad enough to lie on! Everything becoming, everything luxuriant, -varied, blossoming, deceiving, stimulating, living, take all that for -yourselves, and give to me but the single poor empty Certainty!"</p> - -<p>In the philosophy of Parmenides the theme of ontology forms the -prelude. Experience offered him nowhere a "Being" as he imagined it to -himself, but from the fact that he could conceive of it he concluded -that it must exist; a conclusion which rests upon the supposition -that we have an organ of knowledge which reaches into the nature of -things and is independent of experience. The material of our thinking -according to Parmenides does not exist in perception at all but is -brought in from somewhere else, from an extra-material world to which -by thinking we have a direct access. Against all similar chains of -reasoning Aristotle has already asserted that existence never belongs -to the essence, never belongs to the nature of a thing. For that very -reason from the idea of "Being"—of which the <i>essentia</i> precisely is -only the "Being"—cannot be inferred an <i>existentia</i> of the "Being" at -all. The logical content of that antithesis "Being" and "Not-Being" -is perfectly nil, if the object lying at the bottom of it, if the -precept cannot be given from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> which this antithesis has been deduced -by abstraction; without this going back to the precept the antithesis -is only a play with conceptions, through which indeed nothing is -discerned. For the merely logical criterion of truth, as Kant teaches, -namely the agreement of a discernment with the general and the formal -laws of intellect and reason is, it is true, the <i>conditio sine qua -non,</i> consequently the negative condition of all truth; further however -logic cannot go, and logic cannot discover by any touchstone the error -which pertains not to the form but to the contents. As soon, however, -as one seeks the content for the logical truth of the antithesis: -"That which is, is; that which is not, is not," one will find indeed -not a simple reality, which is fashioned rigidly according to that -antithesis: about a tree I can say as well "it is" in comparison with -all the other things, as well "it becomes" in comparison with itself -at another moment of time as finally also "it is not," <i>e.g.</i>," it is -not yet tree," as long as I perhaps look at the shrub. Words are only -symbols for the relations of things among themselves and to us, and -nowhere touch absolute truth; and now to crown all, the word "Being" -designates only the most general relation, which connects all things, -and so does the word "Not-Being." If however the Existence of the -things themselves be unprovable, then the relation of the things among -themselves, the so-called "Being" and "Not-Being," will not bring us -any nearer to the land of truth. By means of words and ideas we shall -never get behind the wall of the relations, let us say into some -fabulous primal cause of things, and even in the pure forms of the -sensitive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> faculty and of the intellect, in space, time and causality -we gain nothing, which might resemble a "<i>Veritas æterna?</i>" It is -absolutely impossible for the subject to see and discern something -beyond himself, so impossible that Cognition and "Being" are the most -contradictory of all spheres. And if in the uninstructed <i>naïveté</i> -of the then critique of the intellect Parmenides was permitted to -fancy that out of the eternally subjective idea he had come to a -"Being-In-itself," then it is to-day, after Kant, a daring ignorance, -if here and there, especially among badly informed theologians who -want to play the philosopher, is proposed as the task of philosophy: -"to conceive the Absolute by means of consciousness," perhaps even -in the form: "the Absolute is already extant, else how could it be -sought?" as Hegel has expressed himself, or with the saying of Beneke: -"that the 'Being' must be given somehow, must be attainable for us -somehow, since otherwise we could not even have the idea of 'Being.'" -The idea of "Being"! As though that idea did not indicate the most -miserable empiric origin already in the etymology of the word. For -<i>esse</i> means at the bottom: "to breathe," if man uses it of all other -things, then he transmits the conviction that he himself breathes and -lives by means of a metaphor, <i>i.e.,</i> by means of something illogical -to the other things and conceives of their Existence as a Breathing -according to human analogy. Now the original meaning of the word soon -becomes effaced; so much however still remains that man conceives of -the existence of other things according to the analogy of his own -existence, therefore anthropomorphically, and at any rate by means<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -of an illogical transmission. Even to man, therefore apart from that -transmission, the proposition: "I breathe, therefore a 'Being' exists" -is quite insufficient since against it the same objection must be made, -as against the <i>ambulo, ergo sum,</i> or <i>ergo est</i>.</p> - - - -<h4>12</h4> - - -<p>The other idea, of greater import than that of the "Existent," and -likewise invented already by Parmenides, although not yet so clearly -applied as by his disciple Zeno is the idea of the Infinite. Nothing -Infinite can exist; for from such an assumption the contradictory -idea of a perfect Infinitude would result. Since now our actuality, -our existing world everywhere shows the character of that perfect -Infinitude, our world signifies in its nature a contradiction against -logic and therewith also against reality and is deception, lie, -fantasma. Zeno especially applied the method of indirect proof; he -said for example, "There can be no motion from one place to another; -for if there were such a motion, then an Infinitude would be given as -perfect, this however is an impossibility." Achilles cannot catch up -the tortoise which has a small start in a race, for in order to reach -only the point from which the tortoise began, he would have had to run -through innumerable, infinitely many spaces, viz., first half of that -space, then the fourth, then the sixteenth, and so on <i>ad infinitum.</i> -If he does in fact overtake the tortoise then this is an illogical -phenomenon, and therefore at any rate not a truth, not a reality, not -real "Being," but only a delusion. For it is never possible to finish -the infinite. Another popular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> expression of this doctrine is the -flying and yet resting arrow. At any instant of its flight it has a -position; in this position it rests. Now would the sum of the infinite -positions of rest be identical with motion? Would now the Resting, -infinitely often repeated, be Motion, therefore its own opposite? -The Infinite is here used as the <i>aqua fortis</i> of reality, through -it the latter is dissolved. If however the Ideas are fixed, eternal -and entitative—and for Parmenides "Being" and Thinking coincide—if -therefore the Infinite can never be perfect, if Rest can never become -Motion, then in fact the arrow has not flown at all; it never left its -place and resting position; no moment of time has passed. Or expressed -in another way: in this so-called yet only alleged Actuality there -exists neither time, nor space, nor motion. Finally the arrow itself is -only an illusion; for it originates out of the Plurality, out of the -phantasmagoria of the "Non-One" produced by the senses. Suppose the -arrow had a "Being," then it would be immovable, timeless, increate, -rigid and eternal—an impossible conception! Supposing that Motion was -truly real, then there would be no rest, therefore no position for the -arrow, therefore no space—an impossible conception! Supposing that -time were real, then it could not be of an infinite divisibility; the -time which the arrow needed, would have to consist of a limited number -of time-moments, each of these moments would have to be an <i>Atomon</i>—an -impossible conception! All our conceptions, as soon as their -empirically-given content, drawn out of this concrete world, is taken -as a <i>Veritas æterna,</i> lead to contradictions. If there is absolute -motion, then<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> there is no space; if there is absolute space then there -is no motion; if there is absolute "Being," then there is no Plurality; -if there is an absolute Plurality, then there is no Unity. It should -at least become clear to <i>us</i> how little we touch the heart of things -or untie the knot of reality with such ideas, whereas Parmenides and -Zeno inversely hold fast to the truth and omnivalidity of ideas and -condemn the perceptible world as the opposite of the true and omnivalid -ideas, as an objectivation of the illogical and contradictory. With all -their proofs they start from the wholly undemonstrable, yea improbable -assumption that in that apprehensive faculty we possess the decisive, -highest criterion of "Being" and "Not-Being," <i>i.e.,</i> of objective -reality and its opposite; those ideas are not to prove themselves -true, to correct themselves by Actuality, as they are after all really -derived from it, but on the contrary they are to measure and to judge -Actuality, and in case of a contradiction with logic, even to condemn. -In order to concede to them this judicial competence Parmenides had to -ascribe to them the same "Being," which alone he allowed in general -as <i>the</i> "Being"; Thinking and that one increate perfect ball of the -"Existent" were now no longer to be conceived as two different kinds -of "Being," since there was not permitted a duality of "Being." Thus -the over-risky flash of fancy had become necessary to declare Thinking -and "Being" identical. No form of perceptibility, no symbol, no simile -could possibly be of any help here; the fancy was wholly inconceivable, -but it was necessary, yea in the lack of every possibility of -illustration it celebrated the highest triumph over<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> the world and -the claims of the senses. Thinking and that clod-like, ball-shaped, -through-and-through dead-massive, and rigid-immovable "Being," must, -according to the Parmenidean imperative, dissolve into one another and -be the same in every respect, to the horror of fantasy. What does it -matter that this identity contradicts the senses! This contradiction -is just the guarantee that such an identity is not borrowed from the -senses.</p> - - - -<h4>13</h4> - - -<p>Moreover against Parmenides could be produced a strong couple of -<i>argumenta ad hominem</i> or <i>ex concessis,</i> by which, it is true, truth -itself could not be brought to light, but at any rate the untruth of -that absolute separation of the world of the senses and the world of -the ideas, and the untruth of the identity of "Being" and Thinking -could be demonstrated. Firstly, if the Thinking of Reason in ideas is -real, then also Plurality and Motion must have reality, for rational -Thinking is mobile; and more precisely, it is a motion from idea to -idea, therefore within a plurality of realities. There is no subterfuge -against that; it is quite impossible to designate Thinking as a rigid -Permanence, as an eternally immobile, intellectual Introspection of -Unity. Secondly, if only fraud and illusion come from the senses, -and if in reality there exists only the real identity of "Being" and -Thinking, what then are the senses themselves? They too are certainly -Appearance only since they do not coincide with the Thinking, and -their product, the world of senses, does not coincide with "Being." -If however the senses themselves are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> Appearance to whom then are -they Appearance? How can they, being unreal, still deceive? The -"Non-Existent" cannot even deceive. Therefore the Whence? of deception -and Appearance remains an enigma, yea, a contradiction. We call these -<i>argumenta ad hominem:</i> The Objection Of The Mobile Reason and that -of The Origin Of Appearance. From the first would result the reality -of Motion and of Plurality, from the second the impossibility of the -Parmenidean Appearance, assuming that the chief-doctrine of Parmenides -on the "Being" were accepted as true. This chief-doctrine however only -says: The "Existent" only has a "Being," the "Non-Existent" does not -exist. If Motion however has such a "Being," then to Motion applies -what applies to the "Existent" in general: it is increate, eternal, -indestructible, without increase or decrease. But if the "Appearance" -is denied and a belief in it made untenable, by means of that question -as to the Whence? of the "Appearance," if the stage of the so-called -Becoming, of change, our many-shaped, restless, coloured and rich -Existence is protected from the Parmenidean rejection, then it is -necessary to characterise this world of change and alteration as a -<i>sum</i> of such really existing Essentials, existing simultaneously -into all eternity. Of a change in the strict sense, of a Becoming -there cannot naturally be any question even with this assumption. But -now Plurality has a real "Being," all qualities have a real "Being" -and motion not less; and of any moment of this world—although these -moments chosen at random lie at a distance of millenniums from one -another—it would have to be possible to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> say: all real Essentials -extant in this world are without exception co-existent, unaltered, -undiminished, without increase, without decrease. A millennium later -the world is exactly the same. Nothing has altered. If in spite of -that the appearance of the world at the one time is quite different -from that at the other time, then that is no deception, nothing merely -apparent, but the effect of eternal motion. The real "Existent" is -moved sometimes thus, sometimes thus: together, asunder, upwards, -downwards, into one another, pell-mell.</p> - - - -<h4>14</h4> - - -<p>With this conception we have already taken a step into the realm -of the doctrine of <i>Anaxagoras.</i> By him both objections against -Parmenides are raised in full strength; that of the mobile Thinking -and that of the Whence? of "Appearance"; but in the chief proposition -Parmenides has subjugated him as well as all the younger philosophers -and nature-explorers. They all deny the possibility of Becoming and -Passing, as the mind of the people conceives them and as Anaximander -and Heraclitus had assumed with greater circumspection and yet still -heedlessly. Such a mythological Originating out of the Nothing, such -a Disappearing into the Nothing, such an arbitrary Changing of the -Nothing into the Something, such a random exchanging, putting on and -putting off of the qualities was henceforth considered senseless; but -so was, and for the same reasons, an originating of the Many out of the -One, of the manifold qualities out of the one primal-quality, in short -the derivation of the world out of a primary substance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> as argued by -Thales and Heraclitus. Rather was now the real problem advanced of -applying the doctrine of increate imperishable "Being" to this existing -world, without taking one's refuge in the theory of appearance and -deception. But if the empiric world is not to be Appearance, if the -things are not to be derived out of Nothing and just as little out of -the one Something, then these things must contain in themselves a real -"Being," their matter and content must be unconditionally real, and -all change can refer only to the form, <i>i.e.,</i> to the position, order, -grouping, mixing, separation of these eternally co-existing Essentials. -It is just as in a game of dice; they are ever the same dice; but -falling sometimes thus, sometimes thus, they mean to us something -different. All older theories had gone back to a primal element, as -womb and cause of Becoming, be this water, air, fire or the Indefinite -of Anaximander. Against that Anaxagoras now asserts that out of the -Equal the Unequal could never come forth, and that out of the one -"Existent" the change could never be explained. Whether now one were -to imagine that assumed matter to be rarefied or condensed, one would -never succeed by such a condensation or rarefaction in explaining the -problem one would like to explain: the plurality of qualities. But if -the world in fact is full of the most different qualities then these -must, in case they are not appearance, have a "Being," <i>i.e.,</i> must -be eternal, increate, imperishable and ever co-existing. Appearance, -however, they cannot be, since the question as to the Whence? of -Appearance remains unanswered, yea answers itself in the negative! The -earlier seekers after Truth had intended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> to simplify the problem of -Becoming by advancing only one substance, which bore in its bosom the -possibilities of all Becoming; now on the contrary it is asserted: -there are innumerable substances, but never more, never less, and never -new ones. Only Motion, playing dice with them throws them into ever -new combinations. That Motion however is a truth and not Appearance, -Anaxagoras proved in opposition to Parmenides by the indisputable -succession of our conceptions in thinking. We have therefore in the -most direct fashion the insight into the truth of motion and succession -in the fact that we think and have conceptions. Therefore at any rate -the <i>one</i> rigid, resting, dead "Being" of Parmenides has been removed -out of the way, there are many "Existents" just as surely as all -these many "Existents" (existing things, substances) are in motion. -Change is motion—but whence originates motion? Does this motion leave -perhaps wholly untouched the proper essence of those many independent, -isolated substances, and, according to the most severe idea of the -"Existent," <i>must</i> not motion in itself be foreign to them? Or does -it after all belong to the things themselves? We stand here at an -important decision; according to which way we turn, we shall step into -the realm either of Anaxagoras or of Empedocles or of Democritus. The -delicate question must be raised: if there are many substances, and if -these many move, what moves them? Do they move one another? Or is it -perhaps only gravitation? Or are there magic forces of attraction and -repulsion within the things themselves? Or does the cause of motion -lie outside<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> these many real substances? Or putting the question -more pointedly: if two things show a succession, a mutual change of -position, does that originate from themselves? And is this to be -explained mechanically or magically? Or if this should not be the case -is it a third something which moves them? It is a sorry problem, for -Parmenides would still have been able to prove against Anaxagoras the -impossibility of motion, even granted that there are many substances. -For he could say: Take two Substances existing of themselves, each with -quite differently fashioned, autonomous, unconditioned "Being"—and -of such kind are the Anaxagorean substances—they can never clash -together, never move, never attract one another, there exists between -them no causality, no bridge, they do not come into contact with one -another, do not disturb one another, they do not interest one another, -they are utterly indifferent. The impact then is just as inexplicable -as the magic attraction: that which is utterly foreign cannot exercise -any effect upon another, therefore cannot move itself nor allow -itself to be moved. Parmenides would even have added: the only way of -escape which is left to you is this, to ascribe motion to the things -themselves; then however all that you know and see as motion is indeed -only a deception and not true motion, for the only kind of motion which -could belong to those absolutely original substances, would be merely -an autogenous motion limited to themselves without any effect. But -you <i>assume</i> motion in order to explain those effects of change, of -the disarrangement in space, of alteration, in short the causalities -and relations of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> the things among themselves. But these very effects -would not be explained and would remain as problematic as ever; for -this reason one cannot conceive why it should be necessary to assume a -motion since it does not perform that which you demand from it. Motion -does not belong to the nature of things and is eternally foreign to -them.</p> - -<p>Those opponents of the Eleatean unmoved Unity were induced to make -light of such an argument by prejudices of a perceptual character. It -seems so irrefutable that each veritable "Existent" is a space-filling -body, a lump of matter, large or small but in any case spacially -dimensioned; so that two or more such lumps cannot be in one space. -Under this hypothesis Anaxagoras, as later on Democritus, assumed that -they must knock against each other; if in their motions they came by -chance upon one another, that they would dispute the same space with -each other, and that this struggle was the very cause of all Change. -In other words: those wholly isolated, thoroughly heterogeneous and -eternally unalterable substances were after all not conceived as -being absolutely heterogeneous but all had in addition to a specific, -wholly peculiar quality, also one absolutely homogeneous substratum: a -piece of space-filling matter. In their participation in matter they -all stood equal and therefore could act upon one another, <i>i.e.,</i> -knock one another. Moreover all Change did not in the least depend on -the heterogeneity of those substances but on their homogeneity, as -matter. At the bottom of the assumption of Anaxagoras is a logical -oversight; for that which is <i>the</i> "Existent-In-Itself" must be wholly -unconditional and coherent,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> is therefore not allowed to assume as its -cause anything,—whereas all those Anaxagorean substances have still -a conditioning Something: matter, and already assume its existence; -the substance "Red" for example was to Anaxagoras not just merely red -in itself but also in a reserved or suppressed way a piece of matter -without any qualities. Only with this matter the "Red-In-Itself" acted -upon other substances, not with the "Red," but with that which is -not red, not coloured, nor in any way qualitatively definite. If the -"Red" had been taken strictly as "Red," as the real substance itself, -therefore without that substratum, then Anaxagoras would certainly not -have dared to speak of an effect of the "Red" upon other substances, -perhaps even with the phrase that the "Red-In-Itself" was transmitting -the impact received from the "Fleshy-In-Itself." Then it would be clear -that such an "Existent" <i>par excellence</i> could never be moved.</p> - - - -<h4>15</h4> - - -<p>One has to glance at the opponents of the Eleates, in order to -appreciate the extraordinary advantages in the assumption of -Parmenides. What embarrassments,—from which Parmenides had -escaped,—awaited Anaxagoras and all who believed in a plurality of -substances, with the question, How many substances? Anaxagoras made the -leap, closed his eyes and said, "Infinitely many"; thus he had flown -at least beyond the incredibly laborious proof of a definite number -of elementary substances. Since these "Infinitely Many" had to exist -without increase and unaltered for eternities, in that assumption was -given the contradiction of an infinity to be conceived as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> completed -and perfect. In short, Plurality, Motion, Infinity driven into flight -by Parmenides with the amazing proposition of the one "Being," returned -from their exile and hurled their projectiles at the opponents of -Parmenides, causing them wounds for which there is no cure. Obviously -those opponents have no real consciousness and knowledge as to the -awful force of those Eleatean thoughts, "There can be no time, no -motion, no space; for all these we can only think of as infinite, -and to be more explicit, firstly infinitely large, then infinitely -divisible; but everything infinite has no 'Being,' does not exist," and -this nobody doubts, who takes the meaning of the word "Being" severely -and considers the existence of something contradictory impossible, -<i>e.g.,</i> the existence of a completed infinity. If however the very -Actuality shows us everything under the form of the completed infinity -then it becomes evident that it contradicts itself and therefore has no -true reality. If those opponents however should object: "but in your -thinking itself there does exist succession, therefore neither could -your thinking be real and consequently could not prove anything," then -Parmenides perhaps like Kant in a similar case of an equal objection -would have answered: "I can, it is true, say my conceptions follow upon -one another, but that means only that we are not conscious of them -unless within a chronological order, <i>i.e.,</i> according to the form of -the inner sense. For that reason time is not a something in itself -nor any order or quality objectively adherent to things." We should -therefore have to distinguish between the Pure Thinking, that would -be timeless like the one Parmenidean "Being," and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> the consciousness -of this thinking, and the latter would already translate the thinking -into the form of appearance, <i>i.e.,</i> of succession, plurality and -motion. It is probable that Parmenides would have availed himself -of this loophole; however, the same objection would then have to be -raised against him which is raised against Kant by A. Spir ("Thinking -And Reality," 2nd ed., vol. i., pp. 209, &c). "Now, in the first place -however it is clear, that I cannot know anything of a succession as -such, unless I have the successive members of the same simultaneously -in my consciousness. Thus the conception of a succession itself is -not at all successive, hence also quite different from the succession -of our conceptions. Secondly Kant's assumption implies such obvious -absurdities that one is surprised that he could leave them unnoticed. -Cæsar and Socrates according to this assumption are not really dead, -they still live exactly as they did two thousand years ago and only -seem to be dead, as a consequence of an organisation of my inner -sense." Future men already live and if they do not now step forward as -living that organisation of the "inner sense" is likewise the cause -of it. Here above all other things the question is to be put: How can -the beginning and the end of conscious life itself, together with -all its internal and external senses, exist merely in the conception -of the inner sense? <i>The</i> fact is indeed this, that one certainly -cannot deny the reality of Change. If it is thrown out through the -window it slips in again through the keyhole. If one says: "It merely -seems to me, that conditions and conceptions change,"—then this very -semblance and appearance itself is something objectively<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> existing and -within it without doubt the succession has objective reality, some -things in it really do succeed one another.—Besides one must observe -that indeed the whole critique of reason only has cause and right of -existence under the assumption that to us our <i>conceptions</i> themselves -appear exactly as they are. For if the conceptions also appeared to us -otherwise than they really are, then one would not be able to advance -any solid proposition about them, and therefore would not be able to -accomplish any gnosiology or any "transcendental" investigation of -objective validity. Now it remains however beyond all doubt that our -conceptions themselves appear to us as successive."</p> - -<p>The contemplation of this undoubted succession and agitation has now -urged Anaxagoras to a memorable hypothesis. Obviously the conceptions -themselves moved themselves, were not pushed and had no cause of -motion outside themselves. Therefore he said to himself, there exists -a something which bears in itself the origin and the commencement -of motion; secondly, however, he notices that this conception was -moving not only itself but also something quite different, the body. -He discovers therefore, in the most immediate experience an effect -of conceptions upon expansive matter, which makes itself known as -motion in the latter. That was to him a fact; and only incidentally -it stimulated him to explain this fact. Let it suffice that he had a -regulative schema for the motion in the world,—this motion he now -understood either as a motion of the true isolated essences through -the Conceptual Principle, the Nous, or as a motion through a something -already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> moved. That with his fundamental assumption the latter kind, -the mechanical transmission of motions and impacts likewise contained -in itself a problem, probably escaped him; the commonness and every-day -occurrence of the effect through impact most probably dulled his eye to -the mysteriousness of impact. On the other hand he certainly felt the -problematic, even contradictory nature of an effect of conceptions upon -substances existing in themselves and he also tried therefore to trace -this effect back to a mechanical push and impact which were considered -by him as quite comprehensible. For the Nous too was without doubt such -a substance existing in itself and was characterised by him as a very -delicate and subtle matter, with the specific quality of thinking. -With a character assumed in this way, the effect of this matter upon -other matter had of course to be of exactly the same kind as that -which another substance exercises upon a third, <i>i.e.,</i> a mechanical -effect, moving by pressure and impact. Still the philosopher had now a -substance which moves itself and other things, a substance of which the -motion did not come from outside and depended on no one else: whereas -it seemed almost a matter of indifference how this automobilism was -to be conceived of, perhaps similar to that pushing themselves hither -and thither of very fragile and small globules of quicksilver. Among -all questions which concern motion there is none more troublesome than -the question as to the beginning of motion. For if one may be allowed -to conceive of all remaining motions as effect and consequences, then -nevertheless the first primal motion is still to be explained;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> for the -mechanical motions, the first link of the chain certainly cannot lie in -a mechanical motion, since that would be as good as recurring to the -nonsensical idea of the <i>causa sui.</i> But likewise it is not feasible -to attribute to the eternal, unconditional things a motion of their -own, as it were from the beginning, as dowry of their existence. For -motion cannot be conceived without a direction whither and whereupon, -therefore only as relation and condition; but a thing is no longer -"entitative-in-itself" and "unconditional," if according to its nature -it refers necessarily to something existing outside of it. In this -embarrassment Anaxagoras thought he had found an extraordinary help -and salvation in that Nous, automobile and otherwise independent; the -nature of that Nous being just obscure and veiled enough to produce the -deception about it, that its assumption also involves that forbidden -<i>causa sui.</i> To empiric observation it is even an established fact that -Conception is not a <i>causa sui</i> but the effect of the brain, yea, it -must appear to that observation as an odd eccentricity to separate the -"mind," the product of the brain, from its <i>causa</i> and still to deem it -existing after this severing. This Anaxagoras did; he forgot the brain, -its marvellous design, the delicacy and intricacy of its convolutions -and passages and he decreed the "Mind-In-Itself." This "Mind-In-Itself" -alone among all substances had Free-will,—a grand discernment! This -Mind was able at any odd time to begin with the motion of the things -outside it; on the other hand for ages and ages it could occupy itself -with itself—in short Anaxagoras was allowed to assume a <i>first</i> moment -of motion in some primeval<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> age, as the <i>Chalaza</i> of all so-called -Becoming; <i>i.e.,</i> of all Change, namely of all shifting and rearranging -of the eternal substances and their particles, Although the Mind itself -is eternal, it is in no way compelled to torment itself for eternities -with the shifting about of grains of matter; and certainly there was a -time and a state of those matters—it is quite indifferent whether that -time was of long or short duration—during which the Nous had not acted -upon them, during which they were still unmoved. That is the period of -the Anaxagorean chaos.</p> - - - -<h4>16</h4> - - -<p>The Anaxagorean chaos is not an immediately evident conception; in -order to grasp it one must have understood the conception which our -philosopher had with respect to the so-called "Becoming." For in -itself the state of all heterogeneous "Elementary-existences" before -all motion would by no means necessarily result in an absolute mixture -of all "seeds of things," as the expression of Anaxagoras runs, an -intermixture, which he imagined as a complete pell-mell, disordered -in its smallest parts, after all these "Elementary-existences" had -been, as in a mortar, pounded and resolved into atoms of dust, so that -now in that chaos, as in an amphora, they could be whirled into a -medley. One might say that this conception of the chaos did not contain -anything inevitable, that one merely needed rather to assume any chance -position of all those "existences," but not an infinite decomposition -of them; an irregular side-by-side arrangement was already sufficient; -there was no need of a pell-mell, let alone<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> such a total pell-mell. -What therefore put into Anaxagoras' head that difficult and complex -conception? As already said: his conception of the empirically given -Becoming. From his experience he drew first a most extraordinary -proposition on the Becoming, and this proposition necessarily resulted -in that doctrine of the chaos, as its consequence.</p> - -<p>The observation of the processes of evolution in nature, not a -consideration of an earlier philosophical system, suggested to -Anaxagoras the doctrine, that <i>All originated from All;</i> this was the -conviction of the natural philosopher based upon a manifold, and at the -bottom, of course, excessively inadequate induction. He proved it thus: -if even the contrary could originate out of the contrary, <i>e.g.,</i> the -Black out of the White, everything is possible; that however did happen -with the dissolution of white snow into black water. The nourishment of -the body he explained to himself in this way: that in the articles of -food there must be invisibly small constituents of flesh or blood or -bone which during alimentation became disengaged and united with the -homogeneous in the body. But if All can become out of All, the Firm out -of the Liquid, the Hard out of the Soft, the Black out of the White, -the Fleshy out of Bread, then also All must be contained in All. The -names of things in that case express only the preponderance of the one -substance over the other substances to be met with in smaller, often -imperceptible quantities. In gold, that is to say, in that which one -designates <i>a potiore</i> by the name "gold," there must be also contained -silver, snow, bread, and flesh, but in very small quantities; the -whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> is called after the preponderating item, the gold-substance.</p> - -<p>But how is it possible, that one substance preponderates and fills a -thing in greater mass than the others present? Experience shows, that -this preponderance is gradually produced only through Motion, that -the preponderance is the result of a process, which we commonly call -Becoming. On the other hand, that "All is in All" is not the result -of a process, but, on the contrary, the preliminary condition of all -Becoming and all Motion, and is consequently previous to all Becoming. -In other words: experience teaches, that continually the like is -added to the like, <i>e.g.,</i> through nourishment, therefore originally -those homogeneous substances were not together and agglomerated, but -they were separate. Rather, in all empiric processes coming before -our eyes, the homogeneous is always segregated from the heterogeneous -and transmitted (<i>e.g.,</i> during nourishment, the particles of flesh -out of the bread, &c), consequently the pell-mell of the different -substances is the older form of the constitution of things and in point -of time previous to all Becoming and Moving. If all so-called Becoming -is a segregating and presupposes a mixture, the question arises, -what degree of intermixture this pell-mell must have had originally. -Although the process of a moving on the part of the homogeneous to -the homogeneous—<i>i.e.,</i> Becoming—has already lasted an immense -time, one recognises in spite of that, that even yet in all things -remainders and seed-grains of all other things are enclosed, waiting -for their segregation, and one recognises further that only here and -there a preponderance has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> brought about; the primal mixture -must have been a complete one, <i>i.e.,</i> going down to the infinitely -small, since the separation and unmixing takes up an infinite length of -time. Thereby strict adherence is paid to the thought: that everything -which possesses an essential "Being" is infinitely divisible, without -forfeiting its specificum.</p> - -<p>According to these hypotheses Anaxagoras conceives of the world's -primal existence: perhaps as similar to a dust-like mass of infinitely -small, concrete particles of which every one is specifically simple -and possesses one quality only, yet so arranged that every specific -quality is represented in an infinite number of individual particles. -Such particles Aristotle has called <i>Homoiomere</i> in consideration of -the fact that they are the Parts, all equal one to another, of a Whole -which is homogeneous with its Parts. One would however commit a serious -mistake to equate this primal pell-mell of all such particles, such -"seed-grains of things" to the one primal matter of Anaximander; for -the latter's primal matter called the "Indefinite" is a thoroughly -coherent and peculiar mass, the former's primal pell-mell is an -aggregate of substances. It is true one can assert about this Aggregate -of Substances exactly the same as about the Indefinite of Anaximander, -as Aristotle does: it could be neither white nor grey, nor black, nor -of any other colour; it was tasteless, scentless, and altogether as a -Whole defined neither quantitatively nor qualitatively: so far goes the -similarity of the Anaximandrian Indefinite and the Anaxagorean Primal -Mixture. But disregarding this negative equality they distinguish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> -themselves one from another positively by the latter being a compound, -the former a unity. Anaxagoras had by the assumption of his Chaos at -least so much to his advantage, that he was not compelled to deduce the -Many from the One, the Becoming out of the "Existent."</p> - -<p>Of course with his complete intermixture of the "seeds" he had to -admit one exception: the Nous was not then, nor is It now admixed with -any thing. For if It were admixed with only one "Existent," It would -have, in infinite divisions, to dwell in all things. This exception -is logically very dubious, especially considering the previously -described material nature of the Nous, it has something mythological in -itself and seems arbitrary, but was however, according to Anaxagorean -<i>prœmissa,</i> a strict necessity. The Mind, which is moreover infinitely -divisible like any other matter, only not through other matters but -through Itself, has, if It divides Itself, in dividing and conglobating -sometimes in large, sometimes in small masses, Its equal mass and -quality from all eternity; and that which at this minute exists as Mind -in animals, plants, men, was also Mind without a more or less, although -distributed in another way a thousand years ago. But wherever It had a -relation to another substance, there It never was admixed with it, but -voluntarily seized it, moved and pushed it arbitrarily—in short, ruled -it. Mind, which alone has motion in Itself, alone possesses ruling -power in this world and shows it through moving the grains of matter. -But whither does It move them? Or is a motion conceivable, without -direction, without path? Is Mind in Its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> impacts just as arbitrary -as it is, with regard to the time when It pushes, and when It does -not push? In short, does Chance, <i>i.e.,</i> the blindest option, rule -within Motion? At this boundary we step into the Most Holy within the -conceptual realm of Anaxagoras.</p> - - - -<h4>17</h4> - - -<p>What had to be done with that chaotic pell-mell of the primal state -previous to all motion, so that out of it, without any increase of -new substances and forces, the existing world might originate, with -its regular stellar orbits, with its regulated forms of seasons and -days, with its manifold beauty and order,—in short, so that out of -the Chaos might come a Cosmos? This can be only the effect of Motion, -and of a definite and well-organised motion. This Motion itself is -the means of the Nous, Its goal would be the perfect segregation of -the homogeneous, a goal up to the present not yet attained, because -the disorder and the mixture in the beginning was infinite. This -goal is to be striven after only by an enormous process, not to be -realized suddenly by a mythological stroke of the wand. If ever, at -an infinitely distant point of time, it is achieved that everything -homogeneous is brought together and the "primal-existences" undivided -are encamped side by side in beautiful order, and every particle has -found its comrades and its home, and the great peace comes about after -the great division and splitting up of the substances, and there will -be no longer anything that is divided ind split up, then the Nous will -again return into Its automobilism and, no longer Itself divided, -roam through the world, sometimes in larger, sometimes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> in smaller -masses, as plant-mind or animal-mind, and no longer will It take up Its -new dwelling-place in other matter. Meanwhile the task has not been -completed; but the kind of motion which the Nous has thought out, in -order to solve the task, shows a marvellous suitableness, for by this -motion the task is further solved in each new moment. For this motion -has the character of concentrically progressive circular motion; it -began at some one point of the chaotic mixture, in the form of a little -gyration, and in ever larger paths this circular movement traverses -all existing "Being," jerking forth everywhere the homogeneous to -the homogeneous. At first this revolution brings everything Dense -to the Dense, everything Rare to the Rare, and likewise all that is -Dark, Bright, Moist, Dry to their kind; above these general groups or -classifications there are again two still more comprehensive, namely -<i>Ether,</i> that is to say everything that is Warm, Bright, Rare, and -<i>Aër,</i> that is to say everything that is Dark, Cold, Heavy, Firm. -Through the segregation of the ethereal masses from the aërial, -there is formed, as the most immediate effect of that epicycle whose -centre moves along in the circumference of ever greater circles, a -something as in an eddy made in standing water; heavy compounds are -led towards the middle and compressed. Just in the same way that -travelling waterspout in chaos forms itself on the outer side out of -the Ethereal, Rare, Bright Constituents, on the inner side out of the -Cloudy, Heavy, Moist Constituents. Then in the course of this process -out of that Aërial mass, conglomerating in its interior, water is -separated, and again out of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> water the earthy element, and then -out of the earthy element, under the effect of the awful cold are -separated the stones. Again at some juncture masses of stone, through -the momentum of the rotation, are torn away sideways from the earth and -thrown into the realm of the hot light Ether; there in the latter's -fiery element they are made to glow and, carried along in the ethereal -rotation, they irradiate light, and as sun and stars illuminate and -warm the earth, in herself dark and cold. The whole conception is of -a wonderful daring and simplicity and has nothing of that clumsy and -anthropomorphical teleology, which has been frequently connected with -the name of Anaxagoras. That conception has its greatness just in this, -that it derives the whole Cosmos of Becoming out of the moved circle, -whereas Parmenides contemplated the true "Existent" as a resting, dead -ball. Once that circle is put into motion and caused to roll by the -Nous, then all the order, law and beauty of the world is the natural -consequence of that first impetus. How very much one wrongs Anaxagoras -if one reproaches him for the wise abstention from teleology which -shows itself in this conception and talks scornfully of his Nous as -of a <i>deus ex machina.</i> Rather, on account of the elimination of -mythological and theistic miracle-working and anthropomorphic ends and -utilities, Anaxagoras might have made use of proud words similar to -those which Kant used in his Natural History of the Heavens. For it is -indeed a sublime thought, to retrace that grandeur of the cosmos and -the marvellous arrangement of the orbits of the stars, to retrace all -that, in all forms to a simple, purely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> mechanical motion and, as it -were, to a moved mathematical figure, and therefore not to reduce all -that to purposes and intervening hands of a machine-god, but only to -a kind of oscillation, which, having once begun, is in its progress -necessary and definite, and effects result which resemble the wisest -computation of sagacity and extremely well thought-out fitness without -being anything of the sort. "I enjoy the pleasure," says Kant, of -seeing how a well-ordered whole produces itself without the assistance -of arbitrary fabrications, under the impulse of fixed laws of motion—a -well-ordered whole which looks so similar to that world-system which -is ours, that I cannot abstain from considering it to be the same. -It seems to me that one might say here, in a certain sense without -presumption: 'Give me matter and I will build a world out of it.'"</p> - - - -<h4>18</h4> - - -<p>Suppose now, that for once we allow that primal mixture as rightly -concluded, some considerations especially from Mechanics seem to oppose -the grand plan of the world edifice. For even though the Mind at a -point causes a circular movement its continuation is only conceivable -with great difficulty, especially since it is to be infinite and -gradually to make all existing masses rotate. As a matter of course one -would assume that the pressure of all the remaining matter would have -crushed out this small circular movement when it had scarcely begun; -that this does not happen presupposes on the part of the stimulating -Nous, that the latter began to work suddenly with awful force, or at -any rate so quickly, that we must call the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> motion a whirl: such a -whirl as Democritus himself imagined. And since this whirl must be -infinitely strong in order not to be checked through the whole world of -the Infinite weighing heavily upon it, it will be infinitely quick, for -strength can manifest itself originally only in speed. On the contrary -the broader the concentric rings are, the slower will be this motion; -if once the motion could reach the end of the infinitely extended -world, then this motion would have already infinitely little speed of -rotation. <i>Vice versa,</i> if we conceive of the motion as infinitely -great, <i>i.e.,</i> infinitely quick, at the moment of the very first -beginning of motion, then the original circle must have been infinitely -small; we get therefore as the beginning a particle rotated round -itself, a particle with an infinitely small material content. This -however would not at all explain the further motion; one might imagine -even all particles of the primal mass to rotate round themselves and -yet the whole mass would remain unmoved and unseparated. If, however, -that material particle of infinite smallness, caught and swung by the -Nous, was not turned round itself but described a circle somewhat -larger than a point, this would cause it to knock against other -material particles, to move them on, to hurl them, to make them rebound -and thus gradually to stir up a great and spreading tumult within -which, as the next result, that separation of the aërial masses from -the ethereal had to take place. Just as the commencement of the motion -itself is an arbitrary act of the Nous, arbitrary also is the manner of -this commencement in so far as the first motion circumscribes a circle -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> which the radius is chosen somewhat larger than a point.</p> - - - -<h4>19</h4> - - -<p>Here of course one might ask, what fancy had at that time so suddenly -occurred to the Nous, to knock against some chance material particle -out of that number of particles and to turn it around in whirling dance -and why that did not occur to It earlier. Whereupon Anaxagoras would -answer: "The Nous has the privilege of arbitrary action; It may begin -at any chance time, It depends on Itself, whereas everything else is -determined from outside. It has no duty, and no end which It might -be compelled to pursue; if It did once begin with that motion and -set Itself an end, this after all was only—the answer is difficult, -Heraclitus would say—<i>play!</i>"</p> - -<p>That seems always to have been the last solution or answer hovering on -the lips of the Greek. The Anaxagorean Mind is an artist and in truth -the most powerful genius of mechanics and architecture, creating with -the simplest means the most magnificent forms and tracks and as it were -a mobile architecture, but always out of that irrational arbitrariness -which lies in the soul of the artist. It is as though Anaxagoras was -pointing at Phidias and in face of the immense work of art, the Cosmos, -was calling out to us as he would do in front of the Parthenon: "The -Becoming is no moral, but only an artistic phenomenon." Aristotle -relates that, to the question what made life worth living, Anaxagoras -had answered: "Contemplating the heavens and the total order of the -Cosmos." He treated physical things so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> devotionally, and with that -same mysterious awe, which we feel when standing in front of an antique -temple; his doctrine became a species of free-thinking religious -exercise, protecting itself through the <i>odi profanum vulgus et arceo</i> -and choosing its adherents with precaution out of the highest and -noblest society of Athens. In the exclusive community of the Athenian -Anaxagoreans the mythology of the people was allowed only as a symbolic -language; all myths, all gods, all heroes were considered here only as -hieroglyphics of the interpretation of nature, and even the Homeric -epic was said to be the canonic song of the sway of the Nous and the -struggles and laws of Nature. Here and there a note from this society -of sublime free-thinkers penetrated to the people; and especially -Euripides, the great and at all times daring Euripides, ever thinking -of something new, dared to let many things become known by means of the -tragic mask, many things which pierced like an arrow through the senses -of the masses and from which the latter freed themselves only by means -of ludicrous caricatures and ridiculous re-interpretations.</p> - -<p>The greatest of all Anaxagoreans however is Pericles, the mightiest and -worthiest man of the world; and Plato bears witness that the philosophy -of Anaxagoras alone had given that sublime flight to the genius of -Pericles. When as a public orator he stood before his people, in the -beautiful rigidity and immobility of a marble Olympian and now, calm, -wrapped in his mantle, with unruffled drapery, without any change of -facial expression, without smile, with a voice the strong tone of -which remained ever the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> same, and when he now spoke in an absolutely -un-Demosthenic but merely Periclean fashion, when he thundered, struck -with lightnings, annihilated and redeemed—then he was the epitome -of the Anaxagorean Cosmos, the image of the Nous, who has built for -Itself the most beautiful and dignified receptacle, then Pericles was -as it were the visible human incarnation of the building, moving, -eliminating, ordering, reviewing, artistically-undetermined force of -the Mind. Anaxagoras himself said man was the most rational being or -he must necessarily shelter the Nous within himself in greater fulness -than all other beings, because he had such admirable organs as his -hands; Anaxagoras concluded therefore, that that Nous, according to -the extent to which It made Itself master of a material body, was -always forming for Itself out of this material the tools corresponding -to Its degree of power, consequently the Nous made the most beautiful -and appropriate tools, when It was appearing in his greatest fulness. -And as the most wondrous and appropriate action of the Nous was that -circular primal-motion, since at that time the Mind was still together, -undivided, in Itself, thus to the listening Anaxagoras the effect -of the Periclean speech often appeared perhaps as a simile of that -circular primal-motion; for here too he perceived a whirl of thoughts -moving itself at first with awful force but in an orderly manner, which -in concentric circles gradually caught and carried away the nearest and -farthest and which, when it reached its end, had reshaped—organising -and segregating—the whole nation.</p> - -<p>To the later philosophers of antiquity the way in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> which Anaxagoras -made use of his Nous for the interpretation of the world was strange, -indeed scarcely pardonable; to them it seemed as though he had found a -grand tool but had not well understood it and they tried to retrieve -what the finder had neglected. They therefore did not recognise what -meaning the abstention of Anaxagoras, inspired by the purest spirit -of the method of natural science, had, and that this abstention first -of all in every case puts to itself the question: "What is the cause -of Something"? (<i>causa efficiens</i>)—and not "What is the purpose of -Something"? (<i>causa finalis</i>). The Nous has not been dragged in by -Anaxagoras for the purpose of answering the special question: "What -is the cause of motion and what causes regular motions?"; Plato -however reproaches him, that he ought to have, but had not shown that -everything was in its own fashion and its own place the most beautiful, -the best and the most appropriate. But this Anaxagoras would not have -dared to assert in any individual case, to him the existing world was -not even the most conceivably perfect world, for he saw everything -originate out of everything, and he found the segregation of the -substances through the Nous complete and done with, neither at the -end of the filled space of the world nor in the individual beings. -For his understanding it was sufficient that he had found a motion, -which, by simple continued action could create the visible order out -of a chaos mixed through and through; and he took good care not to put -the question as to the Why? of the motion, as to the rational purpose -of motion. For if the Nous had to fulfil by means of motion a purpose -innate in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> noumenal essence, then it was no longer in Its free will -to commence the motion at any chance time; in so far as the Nous is -eternal, It had also to be determined eternally by this purpose, and -then no point of time could have been allowed to exist in which motion -was still lacking, indeed it would have been logically forbidden to -assume a starting point for motion: whereby again the conception of -original chaos, the basis of the whole Anaxagorean interpretation of -the world would likewise have become logically impossible. In order -to escape such difficulties, which teleology creates, Anaxagoras had -always to emphasise and asseverate that the Mind has free will; all -Its actions, including that of the primal motion, were actions of the -"free will," whereas on the contrary after that primeval moment the -whole remaining world was shaping itself in a strictly determined, and -more precisely, mechanically determined form. That absolutely free -will however can be conceived only as purposeless, somewhat after the -fashion of children's play or the artist's bent for play. It is an -error to ascribe to Anaxagoras the common confusion of the teleologist, -who, marvelling at the extraordinary appropriateness, at the agreement -of the parts with the whole, especially in the realm of the organic, -assumes that that which exists for the intellect had also come into -existence through intellect, and that that which man brings about only -under the guidance of the idea of purpose, must have been brought about -by Nature through reflection and ideas of purpose. (Schopenhauer, "The -World As Will And Idea," vol. ii., Second Book, chap. 26: On Teleology). -Conceived in the manner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> of Anaxagoras, however, the order and -appropriateness of things on the contrary is nothing but the immediate -result of a blind mechanical motion; and only in order to cause this -motion, in order to get for once out of the dead-rest of the Chaos, -Anaxagoras assumed the free-willed Nous who depends only on Itself. -He appreciated in the Nous just the very quality of being a thing of -chance, a chance agent, therefore of being able to act unconditioned, -undetermined, guided neither by causes nor by purposes.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></p> -<h4><a name="Notes_for_a_Continuation" id="Notes_for_a_Continuation">Notes for a Continuation</a></h4> - - -<h5>(Early Part of 1873)</h5> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></p> -<h5>1</h5> - - -<p>That this total conception of the Anaxagorean doctrine must be -right, is proved most clearly by the way in which the successors -of Anaxagoras, the Agrigentine Empedocles and the atomic teacher -Democritus in their counter-systems actually criticised and improved -that doctrine. The method of this critique is more than anything a -continued renunciation in that spirit of natural science mentioned -above, the law of economy applied to the interpretation of nature. -That hypothesis, which explains the existing world with the smallest -expenditure of assumptions and means is to have preference: for in such -a hypothesis is to be found the least amount of arbitrariness, and in -it free play with possibilities is prohibited. Should there be two -hypotheses which both explain the world, then a strict test must be -applied as to which of the two better satisfies that demand of economy. -He who can manage this explanation with the simpler and more known -forces, especially the mechanical ones, he who deduces the existing -edifice of the world out of the smallest possible number of forces, -will always be preferred to him who allows the more complicated and -less-known forces, and these moreover in greater number, to carry on a -world-creating play. So then we see Empedocles endeavouring to remove -the <i>superfluity</i> of hypotheses from the doctrine of Anaxagoras.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span></p> - -<p>The first hypothesis which falls as unnecessary is that of the -Anaxagorean Nous, for its assumption is much too complex to explain -anything so simple as motion. After all it is only necessary to explain -the two kinds of motion: the motion of a body towards another, and the -motion away from another.</p> - - - -<h5>2</h5> - - -<p>If our present Becoming is a segregating, although not a complete one, -then Empedocles asks: what prevents complete segregation? Evidently a -force works against it, <i>i.e.,</i> a latent motion of attraction.</p> - -<p>Further: in order to explain that Chaos, a force must already have -been at work; a movement is necessary to bring about this complicated -entanglement.</p> - -<p>Therefore periodical preponderance of the one and the other force is -certain. They are opposites.</p> - -<p>The force of attraction is still at work; for otherwise there would be -no Things at all, everything would be segregated.</p> - -<p>This is the actual fact: two kinds of motion. The Nous does not explain -them. On the contrary, Love and Hatred; indeed we certainly see that -these move as well as that the Nous moves.</p> - -<p>Now the conception of the primal state undergoes a change: it is -the most <i>blessed.</i> With Anaxagoras it was the chaos before the -architectural work, the heap of stones as it were upon the building -site.</p> - - - -<h5>3</h5> - - -<p>Empedocles had conceived the thought of a tangential force originated -by revolution and working<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> against gravity ("de coelo," i., p. 284), -Schopenhauer, "W. A. W.," ii. 390.</p> - -<p>He considered the continuation of the circular movement according -to Anaxagoras <i>impossible.</i> It would result in a <i>whirl, i.e.,</i> the -contrary of ordered motion.</p> - -<p>If the particles were infinitely mixed, pell-mell, then one would be -able to break asunder the bodies without any exertion of power, they -would not cohere or hold together, they would be as dust.</p> - -<p>The forces, which press the atoms against one another, and which give -stability to the mass, Empedocles calls "Love." It is a molecular -force, a constitutive force of the bodies.</p> - - - -<h5>4</h5> - - -<p>Against Anaxagoras.</p> - -<p>1. The Chaos already presupposes motion.</p> - -<p>2. Nothing prevented the complete segregation.</p> - -<p>3. Our bodies would be dust-forms. How can motion exist, if there are -not counter-motions in all bodies?</p> - -<p>4. An ordered permanent circular motion impossible; only a whirl. He -assumes the whirl itself to be an effect of the νεῑκος.—ἀπορροιαί. How -do distant things operate on one another, sun upon earth? If everything -were still in a whirl, that would be impossible. Therefore at least two -moving powers: which must be inherent in Things.</p> - -<p>5. Why infinite ὄντα? Transgression of experience. Anaxagoras meant -the chemical atoms. Empedocles tried the assumption of four kinds of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> -chemical atoms. He took the aggregate states to be essential, and heat -to be co-ordinated. Therefore the aggregate states through repulsion -and attraction; matter in four forms.</p> - -<p>6. The periodical principle is necessary.</p> - -<p>7. With the living beings Empedocles will also deal still on the same -principle. Here also he denies purposiveness. His greatest deed. With -Anaxagoras a dualism.</p> - - - -<h5>5</h5> - - -<p>The symbolism of <i>sexual love.</i> Here as in the Platonic fable the -longing after Oneness shows itself, and here, likewise, is shown -that once a greater unity already existed; were this greater unity -established, then this would again strive after a still greater one. -The conviction of the unity of everything living guarantees that once -there was an <i>immense Living Something,</i> of which we are pieces; -that is probably the Sphairos itself. He is the most blessed deity. -Everything was connected only through love, therefore in the highest -degree appropriate. Love has been torn to pieces and splintered by -hatred, love has been divided into her elements and killed—bereft -of life. In the whirl no living individuals originate. Eventually -everything is segregated and now our period begins. (He opposes the -Anaxagorean Primal Mixture by a Primal Discord.) Love, blind as she -is, with furious haste again throws the elements one against another -endeavouring to see whether she can bring them back to life again or -not. Here and there she is successful. It continues. A presentiment -originates in the living beings, that they are to strive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> after still -higher unions than home and the primal state. Eros. It is a terrible -crime to kill life, for thereby one works back to the Primal Discord. -Some day everything will be again one <i>single life,</i> the most blissful -state.</p> - -<p>The Pythagorean-orphean doctrine re-interpreted in the manner of -natural science. Empedocles consciously masters both means of -expression, therefore he is the first rhetor. Political aims.</p> - -<p>The double-nature—the agonal and the loving, the compassionate.</p> - -<p>Attempt of the <i>Hellenic total reform</i>.</p> - -<p>All inorganic matter has originated out of organic, it is dead organic -matter. Corpse and man.</p> - - - -<h5>6</h5> - - -<p>DEMOCRITUS</p> - -<p>The greatest possible simplification of the hypotheses.</p> - -<p>1. There is motion, therefore vacuum, therefore a "Non-Existent." -Thinking is motion.</p> - -<p>2. If there is a "Non-Existent" it must be indivisible, <i>i.e.,</i> -absolutely filled. Division is only explicable in case of empty spaces -and pores. The "Non-Existent" alone is an absolutely porous thing.</p> - -<p>3. The secondary qualities of matter, νόμῳ, not of Matter-In-Itself.</p> - -<p>4. Establishment of the primary qualities of the ἄτομα. Wherein -homogeneous, wherein heterogeneous?</p> - -<p>5. The aggregate-states of Empedocles (four elements)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> presuppose only -the homogeneous atoms, they themselves cannot therefore be ὄντα.</p> - -<p>6. Motion is connected indissolubly with the atoms, effect of gravity. -Epicur. Critique: what does gravity signify in an infinite vacuum?</p> - -<p>7. Thinking is the motion of the fire-atoms. Soul, life, perceptions of -the senses.</p> - -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>Value of materialism and its embarrassment.</p> - -<p>Plato and Democritus.</p> - -<p>The hermit-like homeless noble searcher for truth. Democritus and the -Pythagoreans together find the basis of natural sciences.</p> -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>What are the causes which have interrupted a flourishing science of -experimental physics in antiquity after Democritus?</p> - - - -<h5>7</h5> - - -<p>Anaxagoras has taken from Heraclitus the idea that in every Becoming -and in every Being the opposites are together.</p> - -<p>He felt strongly the contradiction that a body has many qualities and -he <i>pulverised</i> it in the belief that he had now dissolved it into -its true qualities.</p> - -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p><i>Plato:</i> first Heraclitean, later Sceptic: Everything, even -Thinking, is in a state of flux.</p> - -<p>Brought through Socrates to the permanence of the good, the beautiful.</p> - -<p>These assumed as entitative.</p> - -<p>All generic ideals partake of the idea of the good, the beautiful, and -they too are therefore <i>entitative</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> <i>being</i> (as the soul partakes of -the idea of Life). The idea is <i>formless</i>.</p> - -<p>Through Pythagoras' metempsychosis has been answered the question: how -we can know anything about the ideas.</p> - -<p>Plato's end: scepticism in Parmenides. Refutation of ideology.</p> - - - -<h5>8</h5> - -<p>CONCLUSION</p> - - -<p>Greek thought during the <i>tragic age is pessimistic</i> or <i>artistically -optimistic</i>.</p> - -<p>Their judgment about <i>life</i> implies more.</p> - -<p>The One, flight from the Becoming. <i>Aut</i> unity, <i>aut</i> artistic play.</p> - -<p>Deep distrust of reality: nobody assumes a good god, who has made -everything <i>optime</i>.</p> - -<p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Pythagoreans, religious sect.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Anaximander.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Empedocles.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">Eleates.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Anaxagoras.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Heraclitus.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">Democritus: the world without moral</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">and æsthetic meaning, pessimism of</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">chance.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>If one placed a tragedy before all these, the three former would see -in it the mirror of the fatality of existence, Parmenides a transitory -appearance, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras an artistic edifice and image of -the world-laws, Democritus the result of machines.</p> -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span></p> - -<p>With Socrates <i>Optimism</i> begins, an optimism no longer artistic, with -teleology and faith in the good god; faith in the enlightened good -man. Dissolution of the instincts, Socrates breaks with the hitherto -prevailing <i>knowledge</i> and <i>culture;</i> he intends returning to the old -citizen-virtue and to the State.</p> - -<p>Plato dissociates himself from the State, when he observes that the -State has become identical with the new Culture.</p> - -<p>The Socratic scepticism is a weapon against the hitherto prevailing -culture and knowledge.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></p> -<h4><a name="ON_TRUTH_AND_FALSITY_IN_THEIR_ULTRAMORAL_SENSE" id="ON_TRUTH_AND_FALSITY_IN_THEIR_ULTRAMORAL_SENSE">ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE</a></h4> - - -<h5>(1873)</h5> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></p> -<h5>1.</h5> - - -<p>In some remote corner of the universe, effused into innumerable -solar-systems, there was once a star upon which clever animals invented -cognition. It was the haughtiest, most mendacious moment in the history -of this world, but yet only a moment. After Nature had taken breath -awhile the star congealed and the clever animals had to die.—Someone -might write a fable after this style, and yet he would not have -illustrated sufficiently, how wretched,; shadow-like, transitory, -purposeless and fanciful the human intellect appears in Nature. There -were eternities during which this intellect did not exist, and when it -has once more passed away there will be nothing to show that it has -existed. For this intellect is not concerned with any further mission -transcending the sphere of human life. No, it is purely human and none -but its owner and procreator regards it so pathetically as to suppose -that the world revolves around it. If, however, we and the gnat could -understand each other we should learn that even the gnat swims through -the air with the same pathos, and feels within itself the flying centre -of the world. Nothing in Nature is so bad or so insignificant that it -will not, at the smallest puff of that force cognition, immediately -swell up like a balloon, and just as a mere porter wants to have his -admirer, so the very proudest man, the philosopher,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> imagines he sees -from all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically directed upon -his actions and thoughts.</p> - -<p>It is remarkable that this is accomplished by the intellect, which -after all has been given to the most unfortunate, the most delicate, -the most transient beings only as an expedient, in order to detain them -for a moment in existence, from which without that extra-gift they -would have every cause to flee as swiftly as Lessing's son.<a name="FNanchor_1_5" id="FNanchor_1_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_5" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> That -haughtiness connected with cognition and sensation, spreading blinding -fogs before the eyes and over the senses of men, deceives itself -therefore as to the value of existence owing to the fact that it bears -within itself the most flattering evaluation of cognition. Its most -general effect is deception; but even its most particular effects have -something of deception in their nature.</p> - -<p>The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, -develops its chief power in dissimulation; for it is by dissimulation -that the feebler, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> less robust individuals preserve themselves, -since it has been denied them to fight the battle of existence -with horns or the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. In man this art -of dissimulation reaches its acme of perfection: in him deception, -flattery, falsehood and fraud, slander, display, pretentiousness, -disguise, cloaking convention, and acting to others and to himself -in short, the continual fluttering to and fro around the <i>one</i> -flame—Vanity: all these things are so much the rule, and the law, -that few things are more incomprehensible than the way in which an -honest and pure impulse to truth could have arisen among men. They -are deeply immersed in illusions and dream-fancies; their eyes glance -only over the surface of things and see "forms"; their sensation -nowhere leads to truth, but contents itself with receiving stimuli -and, so to say, with playing hide-and-seek on the back of things. -In addition to that, at night man allows his dreams to lie to him a -whole life-time long, without his moral sense ever trying to prevent -them; whereas men are said to exist who by the exercise of a strong -will have overcome the habit of snoring. What indeed <i>does</i> man know -about himself? Oh! that he could but once see himself complete, placed -as it were in an illuminated glass-case! Does not nature keep secret -from him most things, even about his body, <i>e.g.,</i> the convolutions of -the intestines, the quick flow of the blood-currents, the intricate -vibrations of the fibres, so as to banish and lock him up in proud, -delusive knowledge? Nature threw away the key; and woe co the fateful -curiosity which might be able for a moment to look out and down through -a crevice in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> the chamber of consciousness, and discover that man, -indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the pitiless, the -greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging in -dreams on the back of a tiger. Whence, in the wide world, with this -state of affairs, arises the impulse to truth?</p> - -<p>As far as the individual tries to preserve himself against other -individuals, in the natural state of things he uses the intellect -in most cases only for dissimulation; since, however, man both from -necessity and boredom wants to exist socially and gregariously, he -must needs make peace and at least endeavour to cause the greatest -<i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i> to disappear from his world. This first -conclusion of peace brings with it a something which looks like the -first step towards the attainment of that enigmatical bent for truth. -For that which henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to -say, a uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented -and the legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth: -since here, for the first time, originates the contrast between truth -and falsity. The liar uses the valid designations, the words, in order -to make the unreal appear as real; <i>e.g.,</i> he says, "I am rich," -whereas the right designation for his state would be "poor." He abuses -the fixed conventions by convenient substitution or even inversion -of terms. If he does this in a selfish and moreover harmful fashion, -society will no longer trust him but will even exclude him. In this way -men avoid not so much being defrauded, but being injured by fraud. At -bottom, at this juncture too, they hate not deception, but the evil, -hostile consequences of certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> species of deception. And it is in -a similarly limited sense only that man desires truth: he covets the -agreeable, life-preserving consequences of truth; he is indifferent -towards pure, ineffective knowledge; he is even inimical towards truths -which possibly might prove harmful or destroying. And, moreover, what -after all are those conventions op language? Are they possibly products -of knowledge, of the love of truth; do the designations and the things -coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?</p> - -<p>Only by means of forgetfulness can man ever arrive at imagining that he -possesses "truth" in that degree just indicated. If he does not mean -to content himself with truth in the shape of tautology, that is, with -empty husks, he will always obtain illusions instead of truth. What -is a word? The expression of a nerve-stimulus in sounds. But to infer -a cause outside us from the nerve-stimulus is already the result of a -wrong and unjustifiable application of the proposition of causality. -How should we dare, if truth with the genesis of language, if the point -of view of certainty with the designations had alone been decisive; how -indeed should we dare to say: the stone is hard; as if "hard" was known -to us otherwise; and not merely as an entirely subjective stimulus! -We divide things according to genders; we designate the tree as -masculine,<a name="FNanchor_2_6" id="FNanchor_2_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_6" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> the plant as feminine:<a name="FNanchor_3_7" id="FNanchor_3_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_7" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> what arbitrary metaphors! How -far flown beyond the canon of certainty! We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> speak of a "serpent";<a name="FNanchor_4_8" id="FNanchor_4_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_8" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -the designation fits nothing but the sinuosity, and could therefore -also appertain to the worm. What arbitrary demarcations! what one-sided -preferences given sometimes to this, sometimes to that quality of a -thing! The different languages placed side by side show that with words -truth or adequate expression matters little: for otherwise there would -not be so many languages. The "Thing-in-itself" (it is just this which -would be the pure ineffective truth) is also quite incomprehensible -to the creator of language and not worth making any great endeavour -to obtain. He designates only the relations of things to men and for -their expression he calls to his help the most daring metaphors. A -nerve-stimulus, first transformed into a percept! First metaphor! The -percept again copied into a sound! Second metaphor! And each time he -leaps completely out of one sphere right into the midst of an entirely -different one. One can imagine a man who is quite deaf and has never -had a sensation of tone and of music; just as this man will possibly -marvel at Chladni's sound figures in the sand, will discover their -cause in the vibrations of the string, and will then proclaim that -now he knows what man calls "tone"; even so does it happen to us all -with language. When we talk about trees, colours, snow and flowers, -we believe we know something about the things themselves, and yet we -only possess metaphors of the things, and these metaphors do not in the -least correspond to the original essentials. Just as the sound shows -itself as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> sand-figure, in the same way the enigmatical <i>x</i> of the -Thing-in-itself is seen first as nerve-stimulus, then as percept, and -finally as sound. At any rate the genesis of language did not therefore -proceed on logical lines, and the whole material in which and with -which the man of truth, the investigator, the philosopher works and -builds, originates, if not from Nephelococcygia, cloud-land, at any -rate not from the essence of things.</p> - -<p>Let us especially think about the formation of ideas. Every word -becomes at once an idea not by having, as one might presume, to serve -as a reminder for the original experience happening but once and -absolutely individualised, to which experience such word owes its -origin, no, but by having simultaneously to fit innumerable, more or -less similar (which really means never equal, therefore altogether -unequal) cases. Every idea originates through equating the unequal. As -certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar to any other, so certain -is it that the idea "leaf" has been formed through an arbitrary -omission of these individual differences, through a forgetting of the -differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in -nature there is, besides the leaves, a something called <i>the</i> "leaf," -perhaps a primal form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, -accurately measured, coloured, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled -hands, so that no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a -true copy of the primal form. We call a man "honest"; we ask, why has -he acted so honestly to-day? Our customary answer runs, "On account of -his honesty." <i>The</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> Honesty! That means again: the "leaf" is the -cause of the leaves. We really and truly do not know anything at all -about an essential quality which might be called <i>the</i> honesty, but we -do know about numerous individualised, and therefore unequal actions, -which we equate by omission of the unequal, and now designate as honest -actions; finally out of them we formulate a <i>qualitas occulta</i> with the -name "Honesty." The disregarding of the individual and real furnishes -us with the idea, as it likewise also gives us the form; whereas nature -knows of no forms and ideas, and therefore knows no species but only -an <i>x,</i> to us inaccessible and indefinable. For our antithesis of -individual and species is anthropomorphic too and does not come from -the essence of things, although on the other hand we do not dare to -say that it does not correspond to it; for that would be a dogmatic -assertion and as such just as undemonstrable as its contrary.</p> - -<p>What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, -anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became -poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and -after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths -are illusions of which one has forgotten that they <i>are</i> illusions; -worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; -coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account -as coins but merely as metal.</p> - -<p>Still we do not yet know whence the impulse to truth comes, for up to -now we have heard only about the obligation which society imposes in -order to exist: to be truthful, that is, to use the usual metaphors,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> -therefore expressed morally: we have heard only about the obligation -to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie gregariously in a style -binding for all. Now man of course forgets that matters are going thus -with him; he therefore lies in that fashion pointed out unconsciously -and according to habits of centuries' standing—and by <i>this very -unconsciousness,</i> by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for -truth. Through this feeling of being obliged to designate one thing as -"red," another as "cold," a third one as "dumb," awakes a moral emotion -relating to truth. Out of the antithesis "liar" whom nobody trusts, -whom all exclude, man demonstrates to himself the venerableness, -reliability, usefulness of truth. Now as a "<i>rational</i>" being he -submits his actions to the sway of abstractions; he no longer suffers -himself to be carried away by sudden impressions, by sensations, he -first generalises all these impressions into paler, cooler ideas, in -order to attach to them the ship of his life and actions. Everything -which makes man stand out in bold relief against the animal depends on -this faculty of volatilising the concrete metaphors into a schema, and -therefore resolving a perception into an idea. For within the range of -those schemata a something becomes possible that never could succeed -under the first perceptual impressions: to build up a pyramidal order -with castes and grades, to create a new world of laws, privileges, -sub-orders, delimitations, which now stands opposite the other -perceptual world of first impressions and assumes the appearance of -being the more fixed, general, known, human of the two and therefore -the regulating and imperative one. Whereas every metaphor of perception -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> individual and without its equal and therefore knows how to escape -all attempts to classify it, the great "edifice of ideas shows the -rigid regularity of a Roman Columbarium and in logic breathes forth the -sternness and coolness which we find in mathematics. He who has been -breathed upon by this coolness will scarcely believe, that the idea -too, bony and hexa-hedral, and permutable as a die, remains however -only as the <i>residuum of a metaphor,</i> and that the illusion of the -artistic metamorphosis of a nerve-stimulus into percepts is, if not -the mother, then the grand-mother of every idea. Now in this game of -dice, "Truth" means to use every die as it is designated, to count its -points carefully, to form exact classifications, and never lo violate -the order of castes and the sequences of rank. Just as the Romans -and Etruscans for their benefit cut up the sky by means of strong -mathematical lines and banned a god as it were into a <i>templum,</i> into a -space limited in this fashion, so every nation has above its head such -a sky of ideas divided up mathematically, and it understands the demand -for truth to mean that every conceptual god is to be looked for only -in <i>his</i> own sphere. One may here well admire man, who succeeded in -piling up an infinitely complex dome of ideas on a movable foundation -and as it were on running water, as a powerful genius of architecture. -Of course in order to obtain hold on such a foundation it must be as -an edifice piled up out of cobwebs, so fragile, as to be carried away -by the waves: so firm, as not to be blown asunder by every wind. In -this way man as an architectural genius rises high above the bee; -she builds with wax, which she brings together out of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> nature; he -with the much more delicate material of ideas, which he must first -manufacture within himself. He is very much to be admired here—but -not on account of his impulse for truth, his bent for pure cognition -of things. If somebody hides a thing behind a bush, seeks it again and -finds it in the self-same place, then there is not much to boast of, -respecting this seeking and finding; thus, however, matters stand with -the seeking and finding of "truth" within the realm of reason. If I -make the definition of the mammal and then declare after inspecting a -camel, "Behold a mammal," then no doubt a truth is brought to light -thereby, but it is of very limited value, I mean it is anthropomorphic -through and through, and does not contain one single point which is -"true-in-itself," real and universally valid, apart from man. The -seeker after such truths seeks at the bottom only the metamorphosis -of the world in man, he strives for an understanding of the world as -a human-like thing and by his battling gains at best the feeling of -an assimilation. Similarly, as the astrologer contemplated the stars -in the service of man and in connection with their happiness and -unhappiness, such a seeker contemplates the whole world as related to -man, as the infinitely protracted echo of an original sound: man; as -the multiplied copy of the one arch-type: man. His procedure is to -apply man as the measure of all things, whereby he starts from the -error of believing that he has these things immediately before him -as pure objects. He therefore forgets that the original metaphors of -perception <i>are</i> metaphors, and takes them for the things themselves.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span></p> - -<p>Only by forgetting that primitive world of metaphors, only by the -congelation and coagulation of an original mass of similes and percepts -pouring forth as a fiery liquid out of the primal faculty of human -fancy, only by the invincible faith, that <i>this</i> sun, <i>this</i> window, -<i>this</i> table is a truth in itself: in short only by the fact that -man forgets himself as subject, and what is more as an <i>artistically -creating</i> subject: only by all this does he live with some repose, -safety and consequence. If he were able to get out of the prison walls -of this faith, even for an instant only, his "self-consciousness would -be destroyed at once. Already it costs him some trouble to admit to -himself that the insect and the bird perceive a world different from -his own, and that the question, which of the two world-perceptions is -more accurate, is quite a senseless one, since to decide this question -it would be necessary to apply the standard of <i>right perception,</i> -i.e., to apply a standard which <i>does not exist.</i> On the whole it -seems to me that the "right perception"—which would mean the adequate -expression of an object in the subject—is a nonentity full of -contradictions: for between two utterly different spheres, as between -subject and object, there is no causality, no accuracy, no expression, -but at the utmost an <i>æsthetical</i> relation, I mean a suggestive -metamorphosis, a stammering translation into quite a distinct foreign -language, for which purpose however there is needed at any rate an -intermediate sphere, an intermediate force, freely composing and -freely inventing. The word "phenomenon" contains many seductions, and -on that account I avoid it as much as possible, for it is not true -that the essence of things appears in the empiric<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> world. A painter -who had no hands and wanted to express the picture distinctly present -to his mind by the agency of song, would still reveal much more with -this permutation of spheres, than the empiric world reveals about -the essence of things. The very relation of a nerve-stimulus to the -produced percept is in itself no necessary one; but if the same percept -has been reproduced millions of times and has been the inheritance of -many successive generations of man, and in the end appears each time to -all mankind as the result of the same cause, then it attains finally -for man the same importance as if it were <i>the</i> unique, necessary -percept and as if that relation between the original nerve-stimulus -and the percept produced were a close relation of causality: just as -a dream eternally repeated, would be perceived and judged as though -real. But the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor does not at all -guarantee the necessity and exclusive justification of that metaphor.</p> - -<p>Surely every human being who is at home with such contemplations has -felt a deep distrust against any idealism of that kind, as often -as he has distinctly convinced himself of the eternal rigidity, -omni-presence, and infallibility of nature's laws: he has arrived at -the conclusion that as far as we can penetrate the heights of the -telescopic and the depths of the microscopic world, everything is quite -secure, complete, infinite, determined, and continuous. Science will -have to dig in these shafts eternally and successfully and all things -found are sure to have to harmonise and not to contradict one another. -How little does this resemble a product of fancy, for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> if it were one -it would necessarily betray somewhere its nature of appearance and -unreality. Against this it may be objected in the first place that if -each of us had for himself a different sensibility, if we ourselves -were only able to perceive sometimes as a bird, sometimes as a worm, -sometimes as a plant, or if one of us saw the same stimulus as red, -another as blue, if a third person even perceived it as a tone, then -nobody would talk of such an orderliness of nature, but would conceive -of her only as an extremely subjective structure. Secondly, what is, -for us in general, a law of nature? It is not known in itself but -only in its effects, that is to say in its relations to other laws -of nature, which again are known to us only as sums of relations. -Therefore all these relations refer only one to another and are -absolutely incomprehensible to us in their essence; only that which we -add: time, space, <i>i.e.,</i> relations of sequence and numbers, are really -known to us in them. Everything wonderful, however, that we marvel -at in the laws of nature, everything that demands an explanation and -might seduce us into distrusting idealism, lies really and solely in -the mathematical rigour and inviolability of the conceptions of time -and space. These however we produce within ourselves and throw them -forth with that necessity with which the spider spins; since we are -compelled to conceive all things under these forms only, then it is no -longer wonderful that in all things we actually conceive none but these -forms: for they all must bear within themselves the laws of number, -and this very idea of number is the most marvellous in all things. All -obedience to law which impresses us so forcibly in the orbits of stars<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> -and in chemical processes coincides at the bottom with those qualities -which we ourselves attach to those things, so that it is we who -thereby make the impression upon ourselves. Whence it clearly follows -that that artistic formation of metaphors, with which every sensation -in us begins, already presupposes those forms, and is therefore only -consummated within them; only out of the persistency of these primal -forms the possibility explains itself, how afterwards—out of the -metaphors themselves a structure of ideas, could again be compiled. For -the latter is an imitation of the relations of time, space and number -in the realm of metaphors.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_5" id="Footnote_1_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_5"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The German poet, Lessing, had been married for just a -little over one year to Eva König. A son was born and died the same -day, and the mother's life was despaired of. In a letter to his friend -Eschenburg the poet wrote: "... and I lost him so unwillingly, this -son! For he had so much understanding! so much understanding! Do not -suppose that the few hours of fatherhood have made me an ape of a -father! I know what I say. Was it not understanding, that they had -to drag him into the world with a pair of forceps? that he so soon -suspected the evil of this world? Was it not understanding, that he -seized the first opportunity to get away from it?..." -</p> -<p> -Eva König died a week later.—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_6" id="Footnote_2_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_6"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> In German <i>the tree—der Baum—is</i> masculine.—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_7" id="Footnote_3_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_7"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In German <i>the plant—die Pflanze—</i>-is feminine—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_8" id="Footnote_4_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_8"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> the German <i>die Schlange</i> and <i>schlingen,</i> the -English <i>serpent</i> from the Latin <i>serpere.</i>—TR.</p></div> - - - -<h5>2</h5> - - -<p>As we saw, it is <i>language</i> which has worked originally at the -construction of ideas; in later times it is <i>science.</i> Just as the -bee works at the same time at the cells and fills them with honey, -thus science works irresistibly at that great columbarium of ideas, -the cemetery of perceptions, builds ever newer and higher storeys; -supports, purifies, renews the old cells, and endeavours above all to -fill that gigantic framework and to arrange within it the whole of the -empiric world, <i>i.e.,</i> the anthropomorphic world. And as the man of -action binds his life to reason and its ideas, in order to avoid being -swept away and losing himself, so the seeker after truth builds his hut -close to the towering edifice of science in order to collaborate with -it and to find protection. And he needs protection. For there are awful -powers which continually press upon him, and which hold out against the -"truth" of science "truths" fashioned in quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> another way, bearing -devices of the most heterogeneous character.</p> - -<p>That impulse towards the formation of metaphors, mat fundamental -impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one moment—for thereby -we should reason away man himself—is in truth not defeated nor even -subdued by the fact that out of its evaporated products, the ideas, a -regular and rigid new world has been built as a stronghold for it. This -impulse seeks for itself a new realm of action and another river-bed, -and finds it in <i>Mythos</i> and more generally in <i>Art.</i> This impulse -constantly confuses the rubrics and cells of the ideas, by putting -up new figures of speech, metaphors, metonymies; it constantly shows -its passionate longing for shaping the existing world of waking man -as motley, irregular, inconsequentially incoherent, attractive, and -eternally new as the world of dreams is. For indeed, waking man <i>per -se</i> is only clear about his being awake through the rigid and orderly -woof of ideas, and it is for this very reason that he sometimes comes -to believe that he was dreaming when that woof of ideas has for a -moment been torn by Art. Pascal is quite right, when he asserts, that -if the same dream came to us every night we should be just as much -occupied by it as by the things which we see every day; to quote his -words, "If an artisan were certain that he would dream every night -for fully twelve hours that he was a king, I believe that he would -be just as happy as a king who dreams every night for twelve hours -that he is an artisan." The wide-awake day of a people mystically -excitable, let us say of the earlier Greeks, is in fact through the -continually-working<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> wonder, which the mythos presupposes, more akin to -the dream than to the day of the thinker sobered by science. If every -tree may at some time talk as a nymph, or a god under the disguise of -a bull, carry away virgins, if the goddess Athene herself be suddenly -seen as, with a beautiful team, she drives, accompanied by Pisistratus, -through the markets of Athens—and every honest Athenian did believe -this—at any moment, as in a dream, everything is possible; and all -nature swarms around man as if she were nothing but the masquerade -of the gods, who found it a huge joke to deceive man by assuming all -possible forms.</p> - -<p>Man himself, however, has an invincible tendency to let himself -be deceived, and he is like one enchanted with happiness when the -rhapsodist narrates to him epic romances in such a way that they appear -real or when the actor on the stage makes the king appear more kingly -than reality shows him. Intellect, that master of dissimulation, is -free and dismissed from his service as slave, so long as It is able -to deceive without <i>injuring,</i> and then It celebrates Its Saturnalia. -Never is It richer, prouder, more luxuriant, more skilful and daring; -with a creator's delight It throws metaphors into confusion, shifts the -boundary-stones of the abstractions, so that for instance It designates -the stream as the mobile way which carries man to that place whither -he would otherwise go. Now It has thrown off Its shoulders the emblem -of servitude. Usually with gloomy officiousness It endeavours to point -out the way to a poor individual coveting existence, and It fares forth -for plunder and booty like a servant for his master, but now It Itself -has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> become a master and may wipe from Its countenance the expression -of indigence. Whatever It now does, compared with Its former doings, -bears within itself dissimulation, just as Its former doings bore the -character of distortion. It copies human life, but takes it for a -good thing and seems to rest quite satisfied with it. That enormous -framework and hoarding of ideas, by clinging to which needy man saves -himself through life, is to the freed intellect only a scaffolding and -a toy for Its most daring feats, and when It smashes it to pieces, -throws it into confusion, and then puts it together ironically, pairing -the strangest, separating the nearest items, then It manifests that It -has no use for those makeshifts of misery, and that It is now no longer -led by ideas but by intuitions. From these intuitions no regular road -leads into the land of the spectral schemata, the abstractions; for -them the word is not made, when man sees them he is dumb, or speaks in -forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of ideas, in order -to correspond creatively with the impression of the powerful present -intuition at least by destroying and jeering at the old barriers of -ideas.</p> - -<p>There are ages, when the rational and the intuitive man stand side by -side, the one full of fear of the intuition, the other full of scorn -for the abstraction; the latter just as irrational as the former is -inartistic. Both desire to rule over life; the one by knowing how to -meet the most important needs with foresight, prudence, regularity; -the other as an "over-joyous" hero by ignoring those needs and taking -that life only as real which simulates appearance and beauty. Wherever -intuitive man, as for instance in the earlier<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> history of Greece, -brandishes his weapons more powerfully and victoriously than his -opponent, there under favourable conditions, a culture can develop and -art can establish her rule over life. That dissembling, that denying of -neediness, that splendour of metaphorical notions and especially that -directness of dissimulation accompany all utterances of such a life. -Neither the house of man, nor his way of walking, nor his clothing, nor -his earthen jug suggest that necessity invented them; it seems as if -they all were intended as the expressions of a sublime happiness, an -Olympic cloudlessness, and as it were a playing at seriousness. Whereas -the man guided by ideas and abstractions only wards off misfortune by -means of them, without even enforcing for himself happiness out of the -abstractions; whereas he strives after the greatest possible freedom -from pains, the intuitive man dwelling in the midst of culture has from -his intuitions a harvest: besides the warding off of evil, he attains a -continuous in-pouring of enlightenment, enlivenment and redemption. Of -course when he <i>does</i> suffer, he suffers more: and he even suffers more -frequently since he cannot learn from experience, but again and again -falls into the same ditch into which he has fallen before. In suffering -he is just as irrational as in happiness; he cries aloud and finds no -consolation. How different matters are in the same misfortune with -the Stoic, taught by experience and ruling himself by ideas! He who -otherwise only looks for uprightness, truth, freedom from deceptions -and shelter from ensnaring and sudden attack, in his misfortune -performs the masterpiece of dissimulation, just as the other did<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> in -his happiness; he shows no twitching mobile human face but as it were a -mask with dignified, harmonious features; he does not cry out and does -not even alter his voice; when a heavy thundercloud bursts upon him, -he wraps himself up in his cloak and with slow and measured step walks -away from beneath it.</p> - - -<h4>THE END.</h4> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> - - - - - - - - - -<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51548 ***</div> - -</body> -</html> diff --git a/old/51548-h/images/cover.jpg b/old/51548-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 2ef3f76..0000000 --- a/old/51548-h/images/cover.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/51548-h/images/ill_niet.jpg b/old/51548-h/images/ill_niet.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index d035085..0000000 --- a/old/51548-h/images/ill_niet.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/old/51548-0.txt b/old/old/51548-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index cecc5c5..0000000 --- a/old/old/51548-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5135 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays - Collected Works, Volume Two - -Author: Friedrich Nietzsche - -Editor: Oscar Levy - -Translator: Maximilian A. Mügge - -Release Date: March 25, 2016 [EBook #51548] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY, OTHER ESSAYS *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - - - - - -EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY & OTHER ESSAYS - -By - -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE - -TRANSLATED BY - -MAXIMILIAN A. MÜGGE - -AUTHOR OF "FR. NIETZSCHE, HIS LIFE AND WORK," ETC. - - -The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche - -The First Complete and Authorised English Translation - -Edited by Dr Oscar Levy - -Volume Two - -T.N. FOULIS - -13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET - -EDINBURGH: AND LONDON - -1911 - - - - -CONTENTS - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - -1. THE GREEK STATE--Preface to an unwritten book (1871) - -2. THE GREEK WOMAN--Fragment (1871) - -3. ON MUSIC AND WORDS--Fragment (1871) - -4. HOMER'S CONTEST--Preface to an unwritten book (1872) - -5. THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE ---Preface to an unwritten book (1872) - -6. PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS (1873) - -7. ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE (1873) - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - - -The essays contained in this volume treat of various subjects. With -the exception of perhaps one we must consider all these papers as -fragments. Written during the early Seventies, and intended mostly as -prefaces, they are extremely interesting, since traces of Nietzsche's -later tenets--like Slave and Master morality, the Superman--can be -found everywhere. But they are also very valuable on account of the -young philosopher's daring and able handling of difficult and abstruse -subjects. "Truth and Falsity," and "The Greek Woman" are probably the -two essays which will prove most attractive to the average reader. - -In the essay on THE GREEK STATE the two tenets mentioned above -are clearly discernible, though the Superman still goes by the -Schopenhauerian label "genius." Our philosopher attacks the modern -ideas of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of labour," because -Existence seems to be without worth and dignity. The preponderance -of such illusory ideas is due to the political power nowadays vested -in the "slaves." The Greeks saw no dignity in labour. They saw the -necessity of it, and the necessity of slavery, but felt ashamed of -both. Not even the labour of the artist did they admire, although they -praised his completed work. - -If the Greeks perished through their slavery, one thing is still more -certain: we shall perish through the lack of slavery. To the essence -of Culture slavery is innate. It is part of it. A vast multitude must -labour and "slave" in order that a few may lead an existence devoted to -beauty and art. - -Strife and war are necessary for the welfare of the State. War -consecrates and purines the State. The purpose of the military State -is the creating of the military genius, the ruthless conqueror, the -War-lord. There also exists a mysterious connection between the State -in general and the creating of the genius. - -In THE GREEK WOMAN, Nietzsche, the man who said, "One cannot think -highly enough of women," delineates his ideal of woman. Penelope, -Antigone, Electra are his ideal types. - -Plato's dictum that in the perfect State the family would cease to -exist, belongs to the most intimate things uttered about the relation -between women and the State. The Greek woman as mother had to vegetate -in obscurity, to lead a kind of Cranfordian existence for the greater -welfare of the body politic. Only in Greek antiquity did woman occupy -her proper position, and for this reason she was more honoured than she -has ever been since. Pythia was the mouthpiece, the symbol of Greek -unity. - -ON MUSIC AND WORDS. Music is older, more fundamental than language. -Music is an expression of cosmic consciousness. Language is only a -gesture-symbolism. - -It is true the music of every people was at first allied to lyric -poetry; "absolute music" always appeared much later. But that is due -to the double nature in the essence of language. The _tone_ of the -speaker expresses the basic pleasure- and displeasure-sensations of the -individual. These form the tonal subsoil common to all languages; they -are comprehensible everywhere. Language itself is a super-structure on -that subsoil; it is a gesture-symbolism for all the other conceptions -which man adds to that subsoil. - -The endeavour to illustrate a poem by music is futile. The text of -an opera is therefore quite negligible. Modern opera in its music is -therefore often only a stimulant or a remembrancer for set, stereotyped -feelings. Great music, _i.e.,_ Dionysean music, makes us forget to -listen to the words. - -HOMER'S CONTEST. The Greek genius acknowledged strife, struggle, -contest to be necessary in this life. Only through competition and -emulation will the Common-Wealth thrive. Yet there was no unbridled -ambition. Everyone's individual endeavours were subordinated to the -welfare of the community. The curse of present-day contest is that it -does not do the same. - -In THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE an -amusing and yet serious attack is made on the hollow would-be culture -of the German Philistines who after the Franco-Prussian war were -swollen with self-conceit, self-sufficiency, and were a great danger to -real Culture. Nietzsche points out Schopenhauer's great philosophy as -the only possible means of escaping the humdrum of Philistia with its -hypocrisy and intellectual ostrichisation. - -The essay on GREEK PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE is a performance -of great interest to the scholar. It brims with ideas. The Hegelian -School, especially Zeller, has shown what an important place is held by -the earlier thinkers in the history of Greek thought and how necessary -a knowledge of their work is for all who wish to understand Plato and -Aristotle. _Diels'_ great book: "Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker", -_Benn's, Burnet's_ and _Fairbanks'_ books we may regard as the -peristyle through which we enter the temple of Early Greek Philosophy. -Nietzsche's essay then is like a beautiful festoon swinging between the -columns erected by Diels and the others out of the marble of facts. - -Beauty and the personal equation are the two "leitmotive" of -Nietzsche's history of the pre-Socratian philosophers. Especially -does he lay stress upon the personal equation, since that is the -only permanent item of interest, considering that every "System" -crumbles into nothing with the appearance of a new thinker. In this -way Nietzsche treats of _Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, -Xenophanes, Anaxagoras._ There are also some sketches of a draft for -an intended but never accomplished continuation, in which Empedocles, -Democritus and Plato were to be dealt with. - -Probably the most popular of the Essays in this book will prove to be -the one on TRUTH AND FALSITY. It is an epistemological rhapsody on the -relativity of truth, on "Appearance and Reality," on "perceptual flux" -versus--"conceptual conceit." - -Man's intellect is only a means in the struggle for existence, a means -taking the place of the animal's horns and teeth. It adapts itself -especially to deception and dissimulation. - -There are no absolute truths. Truth is relative and always imperfect. -Yet fictitious values fixed by convention and utility are set down as -truth. The liar does not use these standard coins of the realm. He is -hated; not out of love for truth, no, but because he is dangerous. - -Our words never hit the essence, the "X" of a thing, but indicate only -external characteristics. Language is the columbarium of the ideas, the -cemetery of perceptions. - -Truths are metaphors, illusions, anthropomorph isms about which one has -forgotten that they are such. There are different truths to different -beings. Like a spider man sits in the web of his truths and ideas. He -wants to be deceived. By means of error he mostly lives; truth is often -fatal. When the liar, the story-teller, the poet, the rhapsodist lie to -him without hurting him he--loves them!-- - -The text underlying this translation is that of Vol. I. of the -"Taschenausgabe." One or two obscure passages I hope my conjectures may -have elucidated. The dates following the titles indicate the year when -these essays were written. - -In no other work have I felt so deeply the great need of the science of -Signifies with its ultimate international standardisation of terms, as -attempted by Eisler and Baldwin. I hope, however, I have succeeded in -conveying accurately the meaning of the author in spite of a certain -_looseness_ in his philosophical terminology. - -The English language is somewhat at a disadvantage through its lack -of a Noun-Infinitive. I can best illustrate this by a passage from -_Parmenides_: - -χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῑν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εῖναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ -ἔστιν· τά σ' ἐγὼ ψράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. - -In his usual masterly manner _Diels_ translates these lines with: "Das -Sagen und Denken musz ein Seiendes sein. Denn das Sein existiert, das -Nichts existiert nicht; das heisz ich dich wohl zu beherzigen." On -the other hand in _Fairbanks'_ "version" we read: "It is necessary -both to say and to think that being is; for it is possible that being -is, and it is impossible that not being is; this is what I bid thee -ponder." In order to avoid a similar obscurity, throughout the paper on -"EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY" I have rendered "das Seiende" (τὸ ἐὸν) with -"Existent", "das Nicht-Seiende" with "Non-Existent"; "das Sein" (εῖναι) -with "Being" and "das Nicht-Sein" with "Not-Being." - -I am directly or indirectly indebted for many suggestions to several -friends of mine, especially to two of my colleagues, J. Charlton -Hipkins, M.A., and R. Miller, B.A., for their patient revision of the -whole of the proofs. - -M. A. MÜGGE. - -LONDON, _July_ 1911. - - - - -THE GREEK STATE - - -Preface to an Unwritten Book (1871) - - -We moderns have an advantage over the Greeks in two ideas, which are -given as it were as a compensation to a world behaving thoroughly -slavishly and yet at the same time anxiously eschewing the word -"slave": we talk of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of -labour." Everybody worries in order miserably to perpetuate a miserable -existence; this awful need compels him to consuming labour; man -(or, more exactly, the human intellect) seduced by the "Will" now -occasionally marvels at labour as something dignified. However in -order that labour might have a claim on titles of honour, it would be -necessary above all, that Existence itself, to which labour after all -is only a painful means, should have more dignity and value than it -appears to have had, up to the present, to serious philosophies and -religions. What else may we find in the labour-need of all the millions -but the impulse to exist at any price, the same all-powerful impulse by -which stunted plants stretch their roots through earthless rocks! - -Out of this awful struggle for existence only individuals can emerge, -and they are at once occupied with the noble phantoms of artistic -culture, lest they should arrive at practical pessimism, which Nature -abhors as her exact opposite. In the modern world, which, compared -with the Greek, usually produces only abnormalities and centaurs, in -which the individual, like that fabulous creature in the beginning of -the Horatian Art of Poetry, is jumbled together out of pieces, here in -the modern world in one and the same man the greed of the struggle for -existence and the need for art show themselves at the same time: out of -this unnatural amalgamation has originated the dilemma, to excuse and -to consecrate that first greed before this need for art. Therefore; we -believe in the "Dignity of man" and the "Dignity of labour." - -The Greeks did not require such conceptual hallucinations, for among -them the idea that labour is a disgrace is expressed with startling -frankness; and another piece of wisdom, more hidden and less -articulate, but everywhere alive, added that the human thing also was -an ignominious and piteous nothing and the "dream of a shadow." Labour -is a disgrace, because existence has no value in itself; but even -though this very existence in the alluring embellishment of artistic -illusions shines forth and really seems to have a value in itself, then -that proposition is still valid that labour is a disgrace--a disgrace -indeed by the fact that it is impossible for man, fighting for the -continuance of bare existence, to become an _artist._ In modern times -it is not the art-needing man but the slave who determines the general -conceptions, the slave who according to his nature must give deceptive -names to all conditions in order to be able to live. Such phantoms as -the dignity of man, the dignity of labour, are the needy products of -slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woful time, in which the slave -requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and -beyond himself! Cursed seducers, who have destroyed the slave's state -of innocence by the fruit of the tree of knowledge! Now the slave must -vainly scrape through from one day to another with transparent lies -recognisable to every one of deeper insight, such as the alleged "equal -rights of all" or the so-called "fundamental rights of man," of man as -such, or the "dignity of labour." Indeed he is not to understand at -what stage and at what height dignity can first be mentioned--namely, -at the point, where the individual goes wholly beyond himself and no -longer has to work and to produce in order to preserve his individual -existence. - -And even on this height of "labour" the Greek at times is overcome by -a feeling, that looks like shame. In one place Plutarch with earlier -Greek instinct says that no nobly born youth on beholding the Zeus in -Pisa would have the desire to become himself a Phidias, or on seeing -the Hera in Argos, to become himself a Polyklet; and just as little -would he wish to be Anacreon, Philetas or Archilochus, however much he -might revel in their poetry. To the Greek the work of the artist falls -just as much under the undignified conception of labour as any ignoble -craft. But if the compelling force of the artistic impulse operates in -him, then he _must_ produce and submit himself to that need of labour. -And as a father admires the beauty and the gift of his child but thinks -of the act of procreation with shamefaced dislike, so it was with the -Greek. The joyful astonishment at the beautiful has not blinded him -as to its origin which appeared to him, like all "Becoming" in nature, -to be a powerful necessity, a forcing of itself into existence. That -feeling by which the process of procreation is considered as something -shamefacedly to be hidden, although by it man serves a higher purpose -than his individual preservation, the same feeling veiled also the -origin of the great works of art, in spite of the fact that through -them a higher form of existence is inaugurated, just as through -that other act comes a new generation. The feeling of _shame_ seems -therefore to occur where man is merely a tool of manifestations of will -infinitely greater than he is permitted to consider himself in the -isolated shape of the individual. - -Now we have the general idea to which are to be subordinated the -feelings which the Greek had with regard to labour and slavery. Both -were considered by them as a necessary disgrace, of which one feels -_ashamed,_ as a disgrace and as a necessity at the same time. In this -feeling of shame is hidden the unconscious discernment that the real -aim _needs_ those conditional factors, but that in that _need_ lies the -fearful and beast-of-prey-like quality of the Sphinx Nature, who in -the glorification of the artistically free culture-life so beautifully -stretches forth her virgin-body. Culture, which is chiefly a real need -for art, rests upon a terrible basis: the latter however makes itself -known in the twilight sensation of shame. In order that there may be a -broad, deep, and fruitful soil for the development of art, the enormous -majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly subjected -to life's struggle, to a _greater_ degree than their own wants -necessitate. At their cost, through the surplus of their labour, that -privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in -order to create and to satisfy a new world of want. - -Accordingly we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that _slavery -is of the essence of Culture;_ a truth of course, which leaves no -doubt as to the absolute value of Existence. _This truth_ is the -vulture, that gnaws at the liver of the Promethean promoter of Culture. -The misery of toiling men must still increase in order to make the -production of the world of art possible to a small number of Olympian -men. Here is to be found the source of that secret wrath nourished -by Communists and Socialists of all times, and also by their feebler -descendants, the white race of the "Liberals," not only against -the arts, but also against classical antiquity. If Culture really -rested upon the will of a people, if here inexorable powers did not -rule, powers which are law and barrier to the individual, then the -contempt for Culture, the glorification of a "poorness in spirit," the -iconoclastic annihilation of artistic claims would be _more than_ an -insurrection of the suppressed masses against drone-like individuals; -it would be the cry of compassion tearing down the walls of Culture; -the desire for justice, for the equalization of suffering, would -swamp all other ideas. In fact here and there sometimes an exuberant -degree of compassion has for a short time opened all the flood gates -of Culture-life; a rainbow of compassionate love and of peace appeared -with the first radiant rise of Christianity and under it was born -Christianity's most beautiful fruit, the gospel according to St John. -But there are also instances to show that powerful religions for long -periods petrify a given degree of Culture, and cut off with inexorable -sickle everything that still grows on strongly and luxuriantly. For it -is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we found in the -essence of every Culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful -religion and in general in the essence of _power,_ which is always -evil; so that we shall understand it just as well, when a Culture is -shattering, with a cry for liberty or at least justice, a too highly -piled bulwark of religious claims. That which in this "sorry scheme" of -things will live (_i.e.,_ must live), is at the bottom of its nature a -reflex of the primal-pain and primal-contradiction, and must therefore -strike our eyes--"an organ fashioned for this world and earth"--as -an insatiable greed for existence and an eternal self-contradiction, -within the form of time, therefore as Becoming. Every moment devours -the preceding one, every birth is the death of innumerable beings; -begetting, living, murdering, all is one. Therefore we may compare -this grand Culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his triumphal -procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot, -slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by -the wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless still exclaim: "Dignity of -labour!" "Dignity of Man!" The voluptuous Cleopatra-Culture throws ever -again the most priceless pearls, the tears of compassion for the misery -of slaves, into her golden goblet. Out of the emasculation of modern -man has been born the enormous social distress of the present time, -not out of the true and deep commiseration for that misery; and if it -should be true that the Greeks perished through their slavedom then -another fact is much more certain, that we shall perish through the -_lack_ of slavery. Slavedom did not appear in any way objectionable, -much less abominable, either to early Christianity or to the Germanic -race. What an uplifting effect on us has the contemplation of the -mediæval bondman, with his legal and moral relations,--relations that -were inwardly strong and tender,--towards the man of higher rank, with -the profound fencing-in of his narrow existence--how uplifting!--and -how reproachful! - -He who cannot reflect upon the position of affairs in Society without -melancholy, who has learnt to conceive of it as the continual painful -birth of those privileged Culture-men, in whose service everything -else must be devoured--he will no longer be deceived by that false -glamour, which the moderns have spread over the origin and meaning -of the State. For what can the State mean to us, if not the means by -which that social-process described just now is to be fused and to -be guaranteed in its unimpeded continuance? Be the sociable instinct -in individual man as strong as it may, it is only the iron clamp of -the State that constrains the large masses upon one another in such a -fashion that a chemical decomposition of Society, with its pyramid-like -super-structure, is _bound_ to take place. Whence however originates -this sudden power of the State, whose aim lies much beyond the insight -and beyond the egoism of the individual? How did the slave, the blind -mole of Culture, _originate_? The Greeks in their instinct relating -to the law of nations have betrayed it to us, in an instinct, which -even in the ripest fulness of their civilisation and humanity never -ceased to utter as out of a brazen mouth such words as: "to the victor -belongs the vanquished, with wife and child, life and property. Power -gives the first _right_ and there is no right, which at bottom is not -presumption, usurpation, violence." - -Here again we see with what pitiless inflexibility Nature, in order -to arrive at Society, forges for herself the cruel tool of the -State--namely, that _conqueror_ with the iron hand, who is nothing else -than the objectivation of the instinct indicated. By the indefinable -greatness and power of such conquerors the spectator feels, that they -are only the means of an intention manifesting itself through them -and yet hiding itself from them. The weaker forces attach themselves -to them with such mysterious speed, and transform themselves so -wonderfully, in the sudden swelling of that violent avalanche, under -the charm of that creative kernel, into an affinity hitherto not -existing, that it seems as if a magic will were emanating from them. - -Now when we see how little the vanquished trouble themselves after a -short time about the horrible origin of the State, so that history -informs us of no class of events worse than the origins of those -sudden, violent, bloody and, at least in _one_ point, inexplicable -usurpations: when hearts involuntarily go out towards the magic of -the growing State with the presentiment of an invisible deep purpose, -where the calculating intellect is enabled to see an addition of forces -only; when now the State is even contemplated with fervour as the -goal and ultimate aim of the sacrifices and duties of the individual: -then out of all that speaks the enormous necessity of the State, -without which Nature might not succeed in coming, through Society, -to her deliverance in semblance, in the mirror of the genius. What -discernments does the instinctive pleasure in the State not overcome! -One would indeed feel inclined to think that a man who looks into the -origin of the State will henceforth seek his salvation at an awful -distance from it; and where can one not see the monuments of its -origin--devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalised men, devouring -hatred of nations! The State, of ignominiously low birth, for the -majority of men a continually flowing source of hardship, at frequently -recurring periods the consuming torch of mankind--and yet a word, at -which we forget ourselves, a battle cry, which has filled men with -enthusiasm for innumerable really heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and -most venerable object for the blind and egoistic multitude which only -in the tremendous moments of State-life has the strange expression of -greatness on its face! - -We have, however, to consider the Greeks, with regard to the unique -sun-height of their art, as the "political men in themselves," and -certainly history knows of no second instance of such an awful -unchaining of the political passion, such an unconditional immolation -of all other interests in the service of this State-instinct; at the -best one might distinguish the men of the Renascence in Italy with a -similar title for like reasons and by way of comparison. So overloaded -is that passion among the Greeks that it begins ever anew to rage -against itself and to strike its teeth into its own flesh. This bloody -jealousy of city against city, of party against party, this murderous -greed of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse -of the slain enemy, in short, the incessant renewal of those Trojan -scenes of struggle and horror, in the spectacle of which, as a genuine -Hellene, Homer stands before us absorbed with _delight_--whither does -this naïve barbarism of the Greek State point? What is its excuse -before the tribunal of eternal justice? Proud and calm, the State steps -before this tribunal and by the hand it leads the flower of blossoming -womanhood: Greek society. For this Helena the State waged those -wars--and what grey-bearded judge could here condemn?-- - -Under this mysterious connection, which we here divine between State -and art, political greed and artistic creation, battlefield and work -of art, we understand by the State, as already remarked, only the -cramp-iron, which compels the Social process; whereas without the -State, in the natural _bellum omnium contra omnes_ Society cannot -strike root at all on a larger scale and beyond the reach of the -family. Now, after States have been established almost everywhere, that -bent of the _bellum omnium contra omnes_ concentrates itself from time -to time into a terrible gathering of war-clouds and discharges itself -as it were in rare but so much the more violent shocks and lightning -flashes. But in consequence of the effect of that _bellum,_--an effect -which is turned inwards and compressed,--Society is given time during -the intervals to germinate and burst into leaf, in order, as soon as -warmer days come, to let the shining blossoms of genius sprout forth. - -In face of the political world of the Hellenes, I will not hide those -phenomena of the present in which I believe I discern dangerous -atrophies of the political sphere equally critical for art and society. -If there should exist men, who as it were through birth are placed -outside the national-and State-instincts, who consequently have to -esteem the State only in so far as they conceive that it coincides -with their own interest, then such men will necessarily imagine as the -ultimate political aim the most undisturbed collateral existence of -great political communities possible, which _they_ might be permitted -to pursue their own purposes without restriction. With this idea in -their heads they will promote _that_ policy which will offer the -greatest security to these purposes; whereas it is unthinkable, that -they, against their intentions, guided perhaps by an unconscious -instinct, should sacrifice themselves for the State-tendency, -unthinkable because they lack that very instinct. All other citizens -of the State are in the dark about what Nature intends with her -State-instinct within them, and they follow blindly; only those who -stand outside this instinct know what _they_ want from the State and -what the State is to grant them. Therefore it is almost unavoidable -that such men should gain great influence in the State because they -are allowed to consider it as a _means,_ whereas all the others under -the sway of those unconscious purposes of the State are themselves -only means for the fulfilment of the State-purpose. In order now to -attain, through the medium of the State, the highest furtherance -of their selfish aims, it is above all necessary, that the State be -wholly freed from those awfully incalculable war-convulsions so that -it may be used rationally; and thereby they strive with all their -might for a condition of things in which war is an impossibility. For -that purpose the thing to do is first to curtail and to enfeeble the -political separatisms and factions and through the establishment of -large _equipoised_ State-bodies and the mutual safeguarding of them -to make the successful result of an aggressive war and consequently -war itself the greatest improbability; as on the other hand they will -endeavour to wrest the question of war and peace from the decision of -individual lords, in order to be able rather to appeal to the egoism -of the masses or their representatives; for which purpose they again -need slowly to dissolve the monarchic instincts of the nations. This -purpose they attain best through the most general promulgation of -the liberal optimistic view of the world, which has its roots in the -doctrines of French Rationalism and the French Revolution, _i.e.,_ in -a wholly un-Germanic, genuinely neo-Latin shallow and unmetaphysical -philosophy. I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international -movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of -universal suffrage, the effects of the _fear of war_ above everything -else, yea I behold behind these movements, those truly international -homeless money-hermits, as the really alarmed, who, with their -natural lack of the State-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as -a means of the Exchange, and State and Society as an apparatus for -their own enrichment. Against the deviation of the State-tendency -into a money-tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy -is war and once again war, in the emotions of which this at least -becomes obvious, that the State is not founded upon the fear of the -war-demon, as a protective institution for egoistic individuals, but -in love to fatherland and prince, it produces an ethical impulse, -indicative of a much higher destiny. If I therefore designate as a -dangerous and characteristic sign of the present political situation -the application of revolutionary thought in the service of a selfish -State-less money-aristocracy, if at the same time I conceive of the -enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern -financial affairs fallen into strange hands, and if I imagine all evils -of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to -have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one -will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a Pæan on war. Horribly -clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes along like the night, -war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and -purifying the State. First of all, however, as is said in the beginning -of the "Iliad," he lets fly his arrow on the mules and dogs. Then he -strikes the men themselves, and everywhere pyres break into flames. -Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the -State as the slave is for society, and who can avoid this verdict if -he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equalled Greek -art-perfection? - -He who contemplates war and its uniformed possibility, the _soldier's -profession,_ with respect to the hitherto described nature of the -State, must arrive at the conviction, that through war and in the -profession of arms is placed before our eyes an image, or even perhaps -the _prototype of the State._ Here we see as the most general effect of -the war-tendency an immediate decomposition and division of the chaotic -mass into _military castes,_ out of which rises, pyramid-shaped, -on an exceedingly broad base of slaves the edifice of the "martial -society." The unconscious purpose of the whole movement constrains -every individual under its yoke, and produces also in heterogeneous -natures as it were a chemical transformation of their qualities until -they are brought into affinity with that purpose. In the highest -castes one perceives already a little more of what in this internal -process is involved at the bottom, namely the creation of the _military -genius_--with whom we have become acquainted as the original founder of -states. In the case of many States, as, for example, in the Lycurgian -constitution of Sparta, one can distinctly perceive the impress of that -fundamental idea of the State, that of the creation of the military -genius. If we now imagine the military primal State in its greatest -activity, at its proper "labour," and if we fix our glance upon the -whole technique of war, we cannot avoid correcting our notions picked -up from everywhere, as to the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of -labour" by the question, whether the idea of dignity is applicable -also to that labour, which has as its purpose the destruction of the -"dignified" man, as well as to the man who is entrusted with that -"dignified labour," or whether in this warlike task of the State those -mutually contradictory ideas do not neutralise one another. I should -like to think the warlike man to be a _means_ of the military genius -and his labour again only a tool in the hands of that same genius; and -not to him, as absolute man and non-genius, but to him as a means of -the genius--whose pleasure also can be to choose his tool's destruction -as a mere pawn sacrificed on the strategist's chessboard--is due a -degree of dignity, of that dignity namely, _to have been deemed worthy -of being a means of the genius._ But what is shown here in a single -instance is valid in the most general sense; every human being, with -his total activity, only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of _the_ -genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately -deduce the ethical conclusion, that "man in himself," the absolute man -possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties; only as a wholly -determined being serving unconscious purposes can man excuse his -existence. - -_Plato's perfect State_ is according to these considerations certainly -something still greater than even the warm-blooded among his admirers -believe, not to mention the smiling mien of superiority with which -our "historically" educated refuse such a fruit of antiquity. The -proper aim of the State, the Olympian existence and ever-renewed -procreation and preparation of the genius,--compared with which -all other things are only tools, expedients and factors towards -realisation--is here discovered with a poetic intuition and painted -with firmness. Plato saw through the awfully devastated Herma of the -then-existing State-life and perceived even then something divine in -its interior. He _believed_ that one might be able to take out this -divine image and that the grim and barbarically distorted outside and -shell did not belong to the essence of the State: the whole fervour -and sublimity of his political passion threw itself upon this belief, -upon that desire--and in the flames of this fire he perished. That in -his perfect State he did not place at the head _the_ genius in its -general meaning, but only the genius of wisdom and of knowledge, that -he altogether excluded the inspired artist from his State, that was -a rigid consequence of the Socratian judgment on art, which Plato, -struggling against himself, had made his own. This more external, -almost incidental gap must not prevent our recognising in the total -conception of the Platonic State the wonderfully great hieroglyph of -a profound and eternally to be interpreted _esoteric doctrine of the -connection between State and Genius._ What we believed we could divine -of this cryptograph we have said in this preface. - - - - -THE GREEK WOMAN - - -(Fragment, 1871) - - -Just as Plato from disguises and obscurities brought to light the -innermost purpose of the State, so also he conceived the chief cause -of the position of the _Hellenic Woman_ with regard to the State; in -both cases he saw in what existed around him the image of the ideas -manifested to him, and of these ideas of course the actual was only a -hazy picture and phantasmagoria. He who according to the usual custom -considers the position of the Hellenic Woman to be altogether unworthy -and repugnant to humanity, must also turn with this reproach against -the Platonic conception of this position; for, as it were, the existing -forms were only precisely set forth in this latter conception. Here -therefore our question repeats itself: should not the nature and the -position of the Hellenic Woman have a _necessary_ relation to the goals -of the Hellenic Will? - -Of course there is one side of the Platonic conception of woman, which -stands in abrupt contrast with Hellenic custom: Plato gives to woman a -full share in the rights, knowledge and duties of man, and considers -woman only as the weaker sex, in that she will not achieve remarkable -success in all things, without however disputing this sex's title to -all those things. We must not attach more value to; this strange notion -than to the expulsion of the artist out of the ideal State; these are -side-lines daringly mis-drawn, aberrations as it were of the hand -otherwise so sure and of the so calmly contemplating eye which at times -under the influence of the deceased master becomes dim and dejected; in -this mood he exaggerates the master's paradoxes and in the abundance of -his love gives himself satisfaction by very eccentrically intensifying -the latter's doctrines even to foolhardiness. - -The most significant word however that Plato as a Greek could say on -the relation of woman to the State, was that so objectionable demand, -that in the perfect State, the _Family was to cease._ At present let us -take no account of his abolishing even marriage, in order to carry out -this demand fully, and of his substituting solemn nuptials arranged by -order of the State, between the bravest men and the noblest women, for -the attainment of beautiful offspring. In that principal proposition -however he has indicated most distinctly--indeed too distinctly, -offensively distinctly--an important preparatory step of the Hellenic -Will towards the procreation of the genius. But in the customs of the -Hellenic people the claim of the family on man and child was extremely -limited: the man lived in the State, the child grew up for the State -and was guided by the hand of the State. The Greek Will took care that -the need of culture could not be satisfied in the seclusion of a small -circle. From the State the individual has to receive everything in -order to return everything to the State. Woman accordingly means to the -State, what _sleep_ does to man. In her nature lies the healing power, -which replaces that which has been used up, the beneficial rest in -which everything immoderate confines itself, the eternal Same, by which -the excessive and the surplus regulate themselves. In her the future -generation dreams. Woman is more closely related to Nature than man and -in all her essentials she remains ever herself. Culture is with her -always something external, a something which does not touch the kernel -that is eternally faithful to Nature, therefore the culture of woman -might well appear to the Athenian as something indifferent, yea--if one -only wanted to conjure it up in one's mind, as something ridiculous. -He who at once feels himself compelled from that to infer the position -of women among the Greeks as unworthy and all too cruel, should not -indeed take as his criterion the "culture" of modern woman and her -claims, against which it is sufficient just to point out the Olympian -women together with Penelope, Antigone, Elektra. Of course it is true -that these are ideal figures, but who would be able to create such -ideals out of the present world?--Further indeed is to be considered -_what sons_ these women have borne, and what women they must have been -to have given birth to such sons! The Hellenic woman as _mother_ had -to live in obscurity, because the political instinct together with -its highest aim demanded it. She had to vegetate like a plant, in -the narrow circle, as a symbol of the Epicurean wisdom λάθε βυώσας. -Again, in more recent times, with the complete disintegration of the -principle of the State, she had to step in as helper; the family as a -makeshift for the State is her work; and in this sense the _artistic -aim_ of the State had to abase itself to the level of a _domestic_ art. -Thereby it has been brought about, that the passion of love, as the -one realm wholly accessible to women, regulates our art to the very -core. Similarly, home-education considers itself so to speak as the -only natural one and suffers State-education only as a questionable -infringement upon the right of home-education: all this is right as -far as the modern State only is concerned.--With that the nature of -woman withal remains unaltered, but her _power_ is, according to the -position which the State takes up with regard to women, a different -one. Women have indeed really the power to make good to a certain -extent the deficiencies of the State--ever faithful to their nature, -which I have compared to sleep. In Greek antiquity they held that -position, which the most supreme will of the State assigned to them: -for that reason they have been glorified as never since. The goddesses -of Greek mythology are their images: the Pythia and the Sibyl, as well -as the Socratic Diotima are the priestesses out of whom divine wisdom -speaks. Now one understands why the proud resignation of the Spartan -woman at the news of her son's death in battle can be no fable. Woman -in relation to the State felt herself in her proper position, therefore -she had more _dignity_ than woman has ever had since. Plato who through -abolishing family and marriage still intensifies the position of woman, -feels now so much _reverence_ towards them, that oddly enough he is -misled by a subsequent statement of their equality with man, to abolish -again the order of rank which is their due: the highest triumph of the -woman of antiquity, to have seduced even the wisest! - -As long as the State is still in an embryonic condition woman as -_mother_ preponderates and determines the grade and the manifestations -of Culture: in the same way as woman is destined to complement the -disorganised State. What Tacitus says of German women: _inesse -quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut consilia -earum aspernantur aut responsa neglegunt,_ applies on the whole to -all nations not yet arrived at the real State. In such stages one -feels only the more strongly that which at all times becomes again -manifest, that the instincts of woman as the bulwark of the future -generation are invincible and that in her care for the preservation -of the species Nature speaks out of these instincts very distinctly. -How far this divining power reaches is determined, it seems, by the -greater or lesser consolidation of the State: in disorderly and more -arbitrary conditions, where the whim or the passion of the individual -man carries along with itself whole tribes, then woman suddenly comes -forward as the warning prophetess. But in Greece too there was a never -slumbering care that the terribly overcharged political instinct might -splinter into dust and atoms the little political organisms before -they attained their goals in any way. Here the Hellenic Will created -for itself ever new implements by means of which it spoke, adjusting, -moderating, warning: above all it is in the _Pythia,_ that the power -of woman to compensate the State manifested itself so clearly, as it -has never done since. That a people split up thus into small tribes -and municipalities, was yet at bottom _whole_ and was performing the -task of its nature within its faction, was assured by that wonderful -phenomenon the Pythia and the Delphian oracle: for always, as long as -Hellenism created its great works of art, it spoke out of _one_ mouth -and as _one_ Pythia. We cannot hold back the portentous discernment -that to the Will individuation means much suffering, and that in order -to reach those _individuals_ It _needs_ an enormous step-ladder of -individuals. It is true our brains reel with the consideration whether -the Will in order to arrive at _Art,_ has perhaps effused Itself out -into these worlds, stars, bodies, and atoms: at least it ought to -become clear to us then, that Art is not necessary for the individuals, -but for the Will itself: a sublime outlook at which we shall be -permitted to glance once more from another position. - - - - -ON MUSIC AND WORDS - - -(Fragment, 1871) - - -What we here have asserted of the relationship between language and -music must be valid too, for equal reasons concerning the relationship -of _Mime_ to _Music._ The Mime too, as the intensified symbolism of -man's gestures, is, measured by the eternal significance of music, -only a simile, which brings into expression the innermost secret -of music but very superficially, namely on the substratum of the -passionately moved human body. But if we include language also in the -category of bodily symbolism, and compare the _drama,_ according to -the canon advanced, with music, then I venture to think, a proposition -of Schopenhauer will come into the clearest light, to which reference -must be made again later on. "It might be admissible, although a purely -musical mind does not demand it, to join and adapt words or even a -clearly represented action to the pure language of tones, although the -latter, being self-sufficient, needs no help; so that our perceiving -and reflecting intellect, which does not like to be quite idle, may -meanwhile have light and analogous occupation also. By this concession -to the intellect man's attention adheres even more closely to music, -by this at the same time, too, is placed underneath that which the -tones indicate in their general metaphorless language of the heart, -a visible picture, as it were a schema, as an example illustrating a -general idea ... indeed such things will even heighten the effect -of music." (Schopenhauer, Parerga, II., "On the Metaphysics of the -Beautiful and Æsthetics," § 224.) If we disregard the naturalistic -external motivation according to which our perceiving and reflecting -intellect does not like to be quite idle when listening to music, and -attention led by the hand of an obvious action follows better--then -the drama in relation to music has been characterised by Schopenhauer -for the best reasons as a schema, as an example illustrating a general -idea: and when he adds "indeed such things will even heighten the -effect of music" then the enormous universality and originality of -vocal music, of the connection of tone with metaphor and idea guarantee -the correctness of this utterance. The music of every people begins in -closest connection with lyricism and long before absolute music can be -thought of, the music of a people in that connection passes through -the most important stages of development. If we understand this primal -lyricism of a people, as indeed we must, to be an imitation of the -artistic typifying Nature, then as the original prototype of that union -of music and lyricism must be regarded: _the duality in the essence -of language,_ already typified by Nature. Now, after discussing the -relation of music to metaphor we will fathom deeper this essence of -language. - -In the multiplicity of languages the fact at once manifests itself, -that word and thing do not necessarily coincide with one another -completely, but that the word is a symbol. But what does the word -symbolise? Most certainly only conceptions, be these now conscious -ones or as in the greater number of cases, unconscious; for how -should a word-symbol correspond to that innermost nature of which we -and the world are images? Only as conceptions we know that kernel, -only in its metaphorical expressions are we familiar with it; beyond -that point there is nowhere a direct bridge which could lead us to it. -The whole life of impulses, too, the play of feelings, sensations, -emotions, volitions, is known to us--as I am forced to insert here in -opposition to Schopenhauer--after a most rigid self-examination, not -according to its essence but merely as conception; and we may well be -permitted to say, that even Schopenhauer's "Will" is nothing else but -the most general phenomenal form of a Something otherwise absolutely -indecipherable. If therefore we must acquiesce in the rigid necessity -of getting nowhere beyond the conceptions we can nevertheless again -distinguish two main species within their realm. The one species -manifest themselves to us as pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations and -accompany all other conceptions as a never-lacking fundamental basis. -This most general manifestation, out of which and by which alone we -understand all Becoming and all Willing and for which we will retain -the name "Will" has now too in language its own symbolic sphere: -and in truth this sphere is equally fundamental to the language, -as that manifestation is fundamental to all other conceptions. All -degrees of pleasure and displeasure--expressions of _one_ primal -cause unfathomable to us--symbolise themselves in _the tone of the -speaker:_ whereas all the other conceptions are indicated by the -_gesture-symbolism_ of the speaker. In so far as that primal cause -is the same in all men, the _tonal subsoil_ is also the common -one, comprehensible beyond the difference of language. Out of it -now develops the more arbitrary gesture-symbolism which is not -wholly adequate for its basis: and with which begins the diversity -of languages, whose multiplicity we are permitted to consider--to -use a simile--as a strophic text to that primal melody of the -pleasure-and-displeasure-language. The whole realm of the consonantal -and vocal we believe we may reckon only under gesture-symbolism: -consonants _and_ vowels without that fundamental tone which is -necessary above all else, are nothing but _positions_ of the organs -of speech, in short, gestures--; as soon as we imagine the _word_ -proceeding out of the mouth of man, then first of all the root of the -word, and the basis of that gesture-symbolism, the _tonal subsoil,_ -the echo of the pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations originate. As our -whole corporeality stands in relation to that original phenomenon, the -"Will," so the word built out of its consonants and vowels stands in -relation to its tonal basis. - -This original phenomenon, the "Will," with its scale of -pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations attains in the development of music -an ever more adequate symbolic expression: and to this historical -process the continuous effort of lyric poetry runs parallel, the effort -to transcribe music into metaphors: exactly as this double-phenomenon, -according to the just completed disquisition, lies typified in language. - -He who has followed us into these difficult contemplations readily, -attentively, and with some imagination--and with kind indulgence where -the expression has been too scanty or too unconditional--will now -have the advantage with us, of laying before himself more seriously and -answering more deeply than is usually the case some stirring points of -controversy of present-day æsthetics and still more of contemporary -artists. Let us think now, after all our assumptions, what an -undertaking it must be, to set music to a poem; _i.e.,_ to illustrate -a poem by music, in order to help music thereby to obtain a language -of ideas. What a perverted world! A task that appears to my mind like -that of a son wanting to create his father! Music can create metaphors -out of itself, which will always however be but schemata, instances as -it were of her intrinsic general contents. But how should the metaphor, -the conception, create music out of itself! Much less could the idea, -or, as one has said, the "poetical idea" do this. As certainly as a -bridge leads out of the mysterious castle of the musician into the free -land of the metaphors--and the lyric poet steps across it--as certainly -is it impossible to go the contrary way, although some are said to -exist who fancy they have done so. One might people the air with the -phantasy of a Raphael, one might see St. Cecilia, as he does, listening -enraptured to the harmonies of the choirs of angels--no tone issues -from this world apparently lost in music: even if we imagined that that -harmony in reality, as by a miracle, began to sound for us, whither -would Cecilia, Paul and Magdalena disappear from us, whither even -the singing choir of angels! We should at once cease to be Raphael: -and as in that picture the earthly instruments lie shattered on the -ground, so our painter's vision, defeated by the higher, would fade -and die away.--How nevertheless could the miracle happen? How should -the Apollonian world of the eye quite engrossed in contemplation be -able to create out of itself the tone, which on the contrary symbolises -a sphere which is excluded and conquered just by that very Apollonian -absorption in Appearance? The delight at Appearance cannot raise out -of itself the pleasure at Non-appearance; the delight of perceiving is -delight only by the fact that nothing reminds us of a sphere in which -individuation is broken and abolished. If we have characterised at -all correctly the Apollonian in opposition to the Dionysean, then the -thought which attributes to the metaphor, the idea, the appearance, -in some way the power of producing out of itself the tone, must -appear to us strangely wrong. We will not be referred, in order to be -refuted, to the musician who writes music to existing lyric poems; for -after all that has been said we shall be compelled to assert that the -relationship between the lyric poem and its setting must in any case -be a different one from that between a father and his child. Then what -exactly? - -Here now we may be met on the ground of a favourite æsthetic notion -with the proposition, "It is not the poem which gives birth to -the setting but the _sentiment_ created by the poem." I do not -agree with that; the more subtle or powerful stirring-up of that -pleasure-and-displeasure-subsoil is in the realm of productive art -_the_ element which is inartistic in itself; indeed only its total -exclusion makes the complete self-absorption and disinterested -perception of the artist possible. Here perhaps one might retaliate -that I myself just now predicated about the "Will," that in music -"Will" came to an ever more adequate symbolic expression. My answer, -condensed into an æsthetic axiom, is this: _the Will is the object of -music but not the origin of it,_ that is the Will in its very greatest -universality, as the most original manifestation, under which is to -be understood all Becoming. That, which we call _feeling,_ is with -regard to this Will already permeated and saturated with conscious and -unconscious conceptions and is therefore no longer directly the object -of music; it is unthinkable then that these feelings should be able -to create music out of themselves. Take for instance the feelings of -love, fear and hope: music can no longer do anything with them in a -direct way, every one of them is already so filled with conceptions. -On the contrary these feelings can serve to symbolise music, as the -lyric poet does who translates for himself into the simile-world of -feelings that conceptually and metaphorically unapproachable realm -of the Will, the proper content and object of music. The lyric poet -resembles all those hearers of music who are conscious of an _effect -of music on their emotions;_ the distant and removed power of music -appeals, with them, to an _intermediate realm_ which gives to them -as it were a foretaste, a symbolic preliminary conception of music -proper, it appeals to the intermediate realm of the emotions. One might -be permitted to say about them, with respect to the Will, the only -object of music, that they bear the same relation to this Will, as the -analogous morning-dream, according to Schopenhauer's theory, bears to -the dream proper. To all those, however, who are unable to get at music -except with their emotions, is to be said, that they will ever remain -in the entrance-hall, and will never have access to the sanctuary of -music: which, as I said, emotion cannot show but only symbolise. - -With regard however to the origin of music, I have already explained -that that can never lie in the Will, but must rather rest in the lap of -that force, which under the form of the "Will" creates out of itself a -visionary world: _the origin of music lies beyond all individuation,_ a -proposition, which after our discussion on the Dionysean self-evident. -At this point I take the liberty of setting forth again comprehensively -side by side those decisive propositions which the antithesis of the -Dionysean and Apollonian dealt with has compelled us to enunciate: - -The "Will," as the most original manifestation, is the object of music: -in this sense music can be called imitation of Nature, but of Nature in -its most general form.-- - -The "Will" itself and the feelings--manifestations of the Will already -permeated with conceptions--are wholly incapable of creating music out -of themselves, just as on the other hand it is utterly denied to music -to represent feelings, or to have feelings as its object, while Will is -its only object.-- - -He who carries away feelings as effects of music has within them as -it were a symbolic intermediate realm, which can give him a foretaste -of music, but excludes him at the same time from her innermost -sanctuaries.-- - -The lyric poet interprets music to himself through the symbolic -world of emotions, whereas he himself, in the calm of the Apollonian -contemplation, is exempted from those emotions.-- - -When, therefore, the musician writes a setting to a lyric poem he is -moved as musician neither through the images nor through the emotional -language in the text; but a musical inspiration coming from quite a -different sphere _chooses_ for itself that song-text as allegorical -expression. There cannot therefore be any question as to a necessary -relation between poem and music; for the two worlds brought here into -connection are too strange to one another to enter into more than a -superficial alliance; the song-text is just a symbol and stands to -music in the same relation as the Egyptian hieroglyph of bravery did to -the brave warrior himself. During the highest revelations of music we -even feel involuntarily the _crudeness_ of every figurative effort and -of every emotion dragged in for purposes of analogy; for example, the -last quartets of Beethoven quite put to shame all illustration and the -entire realm of empiric reality. The symbol, in face of the god really -revealing himself, has no longer any meaning; moreover it appears as an -offensive superficiality. - -One must not think any the worse of us for considering from this point -of view one item so that we may speak about it without reserve, namely -the _last movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony,_ a movement which -is unprecedented and unanalysable in its charms. To the dithyrambic -world-redeeming exultation of this music Schiller's poem "To Joy," -is wholly incongruous, yea, like cold moon-light, pales beside that -sea of flame. Who would rob me of this sure feeling? Yea, who would -be able to dispute that that feeling during the hearing of this music -does not find expression in a scream only because we, wholly impotent -through music for metaphor and word, already _hear nothing at all -from Schiller's poem._ All that noble sublimity, yea the grandeur of -Schiller's verses has, beside the truly naïve-innocent folk-melody of -joy, a disturbing, troubling, even crude and offensive effect; only -the ever fuller development of the choir's song and the masses of the -orchestra preventing us from hearing them, keep from us that sensation -of incongruity. What therefore shall we think of that awful æsthetic -superstition that Beethoven himself made a solemn statement as to his -belief in the limits of absolute music, in that fourth movement of the -Ninth Symphony, yea that he as it were with it unlocked the portals -of a new art, within which music had been enabled to represent even -metaphor and idea and whereby music had been opened to the "conscious -mind." And what does Beethoven himself tell us when he has choir-song -introduced by a recitative? "Alas friends, let us intonate not these -tones but more pleasing and joyous ones!" More pleasing and joyous -ones! For that he needed the convincing tone of the human voice, for -that he needed the music of innocence in the folk-song. Not the word, -but the "more pleasing" sound, not the idea but the most heartfelt -joyful tone was chosen by the sublime master in his longing for the -most soul-thrilling ensemble of his orchestra. And how could one -misunderstand him! Rather may the same be said of this movement as -_Richard Wagner_ says of the great "_Missa Solemnis_" which he calls "a -pure symphonic work of the most genuine Beethoven-spirit" (Beethoven, -p. 42). "The voices are treated here quite in the sense of human -instruments, in which sense Schopenhauer quite rightly wanted these -human voices to be considered; the text underlying them is understood -by us in these great Church compositions, not in its conceptual -meaning, but it serves in the sense of the musical work of art, merely -as material for vocal music and does not stand to our musically -determined sensation in a disturbing position simply because it does -not incite in us any rational conceptions but, as its ecclesiastical -character conditions too, only touches us with the impression of -well-known symbolic creeds." Besides I do not doubt that Beethoven, had -he written the Tenth Symphony--of which drafts are still extant--would -have composed just the _Tenth_ Symphony. - -Let us now approach, after these preparations, the discussion of the -_opera,_ so as to be able to proceed afterwards from the opera to -its counterpart in the Greek tragedy. What we had to observe in the -last movement of the Ninth, _i.e.,_ on the highest level of modern -music-development, viz., that the word-content goes down unheard in -the general sea of sound, is nothing isolated and peculiar, but the -general and eternally valid norm in the vocal music of all times, the -norm which alone is adequate to the origin of lyric song. The man in -a state of Dionysean excitement has a _listener_ just as little as -the orgiastic crowd, a listener to whom he might have something to -communicate, a listener as the epic narrator and generally speaking the -Apollonian artist, to be sure, presupposes. It is rather in the nature -of the Dionysean art, that it has no consideration for the listener: -the inspired servant of Dionysos is, as I said in a former place, -understood only by his compeers. But if we now imagine a listener at -those endemic outbursts of Dionysean excitement then we shall have to -prophesy for him a fate similar to that which Pentheus the discovered -eavesdropper suffered, namely, to be torn to pieces by the Mænads. The -lyric musician sings "as the bird sings,"[1] alone, out of innermost -compulsion; when the listener comes to him with a demand he must -become dumb. Therefore it would be altogether unnatural to ask from -the lyric musician that one should also understand the text-words of -his song, unnatural because here a demand is made by the listener, who -has no right at all during the lyric outburst to claim anything. Now -with the poetry of the great ancient lyric poets in your hand, put -the question honestly to yourself whether they can have even thought -of making themselves clear to the mass of the people standing around -and listening, clear with their world of metaphors and thoughts; -answer this serious question with a look at Pindar and the Æschylian -choir songs. These most daring and obscure intricacies of thought, -this whirl of metaphors, ever impetuously reproducing itself, this -oracular tone of the whole, which we, _without_ the diversion of music -and orchestration, so often cannot penetrate even with the closest -attention--was this whole world of miracles transparent as glass to -the Greek crowd, yea, a metaphorical-conceptual interpretation of -music? And with such mysteries of thought as are to be found in Pindar -do you think the wonderful poet could have wished to elucidate the -music already strikingly distinct? Should we here not be forced to an -insight into the very nature of the lyricist--the artistic man, who -to _himself_ must interpret music through the symbolism of metaphors -and emotions, but who has nothing to communicate to the listener; an -artist who, in complete aloofness, even forgets those who stand eagerly -listening near him. And as the lyricist his hymns, so the people sing -the folk-song, for themselves, out of in-most impulse, unconcerned -whether the word is comprehensible to him who does not join in the -song. Let us think of our own experiences in the realm of higher -art-music: what did we understand of the text of a Mass of Palestrina, -of a Cantata of Bach, of an Oratorio of Händel, if we ourselves perhaps -did not join in singing? Only for _him who joins_ in singing do lyric -poetry and vocal music exist; the listener stands before it as before -absolute music. - -But now the _opera_ begins, according to the clearest testimonies, with -the _demand of the listener to understand the word._ - -What? The listener _demands?_ The word is to be understood? - -But to bring music into the service of a series of metaphors and -conceptions, to use it as a means to an end, to the strengthening -and elucidation of such conceptions and metaphors--such a peculiar -presumption as is found in the concept of an "opera," reminds me of -that ridiculous person who endeavours to lift himself up into the air -with his own arms; that which this fool and which the opera according -to that idea attempt are absolute impossibilities. That idea of the -opera does not demand perhaps an abuse from music but--as I said--an -impossibility. Music never _can_ become a means; one may push, -screw, torture it; as tone, as roll of the drum, in its crudest and -simplest stages, it still defeats poetry and abases the latter to its -reflection. The opera as a species of art according to that concept is -therefore not only an aberration of music, but an erroneous conception -of æsthetics. If I herewith, after all, justify the nature of the opera -for æsthetics, I am of course far from justifying at the same time bad -opera music or bad opera-verses. The worst music can still mean, as -compared with the best poetry, the Dionysean world-subsoil, and the -worst poetry can be mirror, image and reflection of this subsoil, if -together with the best music: as certainly, namely, as the single tone -against the metaphor is already Dionysean, and the single metaphor -together with idea and word against music is already Apollonian. Yea, -even bad music together with bad poetry can still inform as to the -nature of music and poesy. - -When therefore Schopenhauer felt Bellini's "Norma," for example, as the -fulfilment of tragedy, with regard to that opera's music and poetry, -then he, in Dionysean-Apollonian emotion and self-forgetfulness, was -quite entitled to do so, because he perceived music and poetry in -their most general, as it were, philosophical value, _as_ music and -poetry: but with that judgment he showed a poorly educated taste,--for -good taste always has historical perspective. To us, who intentionally -in this investigation avoid any question of the historic value of an -art-phenomenon and endeavour to focus only the phenomenon itself, -in its unaltered eternal meaning, and consequently in its _highest_ -type, too,--to us the art-species of the "opera" seems to be justified -as much as the folk-song, in so far as we find in both that union -of the Dionysean and Apollonian and are permitted to assume for the -opera--namely for the highest type of the opera--an origin analogous to -that of the folk-song. Only in so far as the opera historically known -to us has a completely different origin from that of the folk-song -do we reject this "opera," which stands in the same relation to that -generic notion just defended by us, as the marionette does to a living -human being. It is certain, music never can become a means in the -service of the text, but must always defeat the text, yet music must -become bad when the composer interrupts every Dionysean force rising -within himself by an anxious regard for the words and gestures of his -marionettes. If the poet of the opera-text has offered him nothing more -than the usual schematised figures with their Egyptian regularity, then -the freer, more unconditional, more Dionysean is the development of the -music; and the more she despises all dramatic requirements, so much -the higher will be the value of the opera. In this sense it is true the -opera is, at its best, good music, and nothing but music: whereas the -jugglery performed at the same time is, as it were, only a fantastic -disguise of the orchestra, above all, of the most important instruments -the orchestra has: the singers; and from this jugglery the judicious -listener turns away laughing. If the mass is diverted by _this very -jugglery_ and only _permits_ the music with it, then the mob fares as -all those do who value the frame of a good picture higher than the -picture itself. Who treats such naïve aberrations with a serious or -even pathetic reproach? - -But what will the opera mean as "dramatic" music, in its possibly -farthest distance from pure music, efficient in itself, and purely -Dionysean? Let us imagine a passionate drama full of incidents which -carries away the spectator, and which is already sure of success -by its plot: what will "dramatic" music be able to add, if it does -not take away something? Firstly, it _will_ take away much: for in -every moment where for once the Dionysean power of music strikes -the listener, the eye is dimmed that sees the action, the eye that -became absorbed in the individuals appearing before it: the listener -now _forgets_ the drama and becomes alive again to it only when the -Dionysean spell over him has been broken. In so far, however, as music -makes the listener forget the drama, it is not yet "dramatic" music: -but what kind of music is that which is not _allowed_ to exercise -any Dionysean power over the listener? And how is it possible? It is -possible as _purely conventional symbolism,_ out of which convention -has sucked all natural strength: as music which has diminished to -symbols of remembrance: and its effect aims at reminding the spectator -of something, which at the sight of the drama must not escape him lest -he should misunderstand it: as a trumpet signal is an invitation for -the horse to trot. Lastly, before the drama commenced and in interludes -or during tedious passages, doubtful as to dramatic effect, yea, -even in its highest moments, there would still be permitted another -species of remembrance-music, no longer purely conventional, namely -_emotional-music,_ music, as a stimulant to dull or wearied nerves. -I am able to distinguish in the so-called dramatic music these two -elements only: a conventional rhetoric and remembrance-music, and a -sensational music with an effect essentially physical: and thus it -vacillates between the noise of the drum and the signal-horn, like -the mood of the warrior who goes into the battle. But now the mind, -regaling itself on pure music and educated through comparison, demands -a _masquerade_ for those two wrong tendencies of music; "Remembrance" -and "Emotion" are to be played, but in good music, which must be -in itself enjoyable, yea, valuable; what despair for the dramatic -musician, who must mask the big drum by good music, which, however, -must nevertheless have no purely musical, but only a stimulating -effect! And now comes the great Philistine public nodding its thousand -heads and enjoys this "dramatic music" which is ever ashamed of itself, -enjoys it to the very last morsel, without perceiving anything of its -shame and embarrassment. Rather the public feels its skin agreeably -tickled, for indeed homage is being rendered in all forms and ways to -the public! To the pleasure-hunting, dull-eyed sensualist, who needs -excitement, to the conceited "educated person" who has accustomed -himself to good drama and good music as to good food, without after all -making much out of it, to the forgetful and absent-minded egoist, who -must be led back to the work of art with force and with signal-horns -because selfish plans continually pass through his mind aiming at -gain or pleasure. Woe-begone dramatic musicians! "Draw near and view -your Patrons' faces! The half are coarse, the half are cold." "Why -should you rack, poor foolish Bards, for ends like these the gracious -Muses?"[2] And that the muses are tormented, even tortured and flayed, -these veracious miserable ones do not themselves deny! - -We had assumed a passionate drama, carrying away the spectator, which -even without music would be sure of its effect. I fear that that in -it which is "poetry" and _not_ action proper will stand in relation -to true poetry as dramatic music to music in general: it will be -remembrance-and emotional-poetry. Poetry will serve as a means, in -order to recall in a conventional fashion feelings and passions, -the expression of which has been found by real poets and has become -celebrated, yea, normal with them. Further, this poetry will be -expected in dangerous moments to assist the proper "action,"--whether -a criminalistic horror-story or an exhibition of witchery mad with -shifting the scenes,--and to spread a covering veil over the crudeness -of the action itself. Shamefully conscious, that the poetry is only -masquerade which cannot bear the light of day, such a "dramatic" -rime-jingle clamours now for "dramatic" music, as on the other hand -again the poetaster of such dramas is met after one-fourth of the -way by the dramatic musician with his talent for the drum and the -signal-horn and his shyness of genuine music, trusting in itself and -self-sufficient. And now they see one another; and these Apollonian and -Dionysean caricatures, this _par nobile fratrum,_ embrace one another! - - -[1] A reference to Goethe's ballad, The Minstrel, st. 5: - -"I sing as sings the bird, whose note The leafy bough is heard on. The -song that falters from my throat For me is ample guerdon." TR. - - -[2] A quotation from Goethe's "Faust": Part I., lines 91, 92, and 95, -96.--TR. - - - - -HOMER'S CONTEST - - -Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872) - - -When one speaks of "_humanity_" the notion lies at the bottom, -that humanity is that which _separates_ and distinguishes man from -Nature. But such a distinction does not in reality exist: the -"natural" qualities and the properly called "human" ones have grown -up inseparably together. Man in his highest and noblest capacities -_is_ Nature and bears in himself her awful twofold character. His -abilities generally considered dreadful and inhuman are perhaps indeed -the fertile soil, out of which alone can grow forth all humanity in -emotions, actions and works. - -Thus the Greeks, the most humane men of ancient times, have in -themselves a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction: -a trait, which in the grotesquely magnified image of the Hellene, in -Alexander the Great, is very plainly visible, which, however, in their -whole history, as well as in their mythology, must terrify us who -meet them with the emasculate idea of modern humanity. When Alexander -has the feet of Batis, the brave defender of Gaza, bored through, -and binds the living body to his chariot in order to drag him about -exposed to the scorn of his soldiers, that is a sickening caricature of -Achilles, who at night ill-uses Hector's corpse by a similar trailing; -but even this trait has for us something offensive, something which -inspires horror. It gives us a peep into the abysses of hatred. With -the same sensation perhaps we stand before the bloody and insatiable -self-laceration of two Greek parties, as for example in the Corcyrean -revolution. When the victor, in a fight of the cities, according to -the _law_ of warfare, executes the whole male population and sells all -the women and children into slavery, we see, in the sanction of such a -law, that the Greek deemed it a positive necessity to allow his hatred -to break forth unimpeded; in such moments the compressed and swollen -feeling relieved itself; the tiger bounded forth, a voluptuous cruelty -shone out of his fearful eye. Why had the Greek sculptor to represent -again and again war and fights in innumerable repetitions, extended -human bodies whose sinews are tightened through hatred or through the -recklessness of triumph, fighters wounded and writhing with pain, or -the dying with the last rattle in their throat? Why did the whole Greek -world exult in the fighting scenes of the "Iliad"? I am afraid, we do -not understand them enough in "Greek fashion," and that we should even -shudder, if for once we _did_ understand them thus. - -But what lies, as the mother-womb of the Hellenic, _behind_ the Homeric -world? In the _latter,_ by the extremely artistic definiteness, and the -calm and purity of the lines we are already lifted far above the purely -material amalgamation: its colours, by an artistic deception, appear -lighter, milder, warmer; its men, in this coloured, warm illumination, -appear better and more sympathetic--but where do we look, if, no -longer guided and protected by Homer's hand, we step backwards into -the pre-Homeric world? Only into night and horror, into the products -of a fancy accustomed to the horrible. What earthly existence is -reflected in the loathsome-awful theogonian lore: a life swayed only -by the _children of the night,_ strife, amorous desires, deception, -age and death. Let us imagine the suffocating atmosphere of Hesiod's -poem, still thickened and darkened and without all the mitigations and -purifications, which poured over Hellas from Delphi and the numerous -seats of the gods! If we mix this thickened Boeotian air with the grim -voluptuousness of the Etruscans, then such a reality would _extort_ -from us a world of myths within which Uranos, Kronos and Zeus and -the struggles of the Titans would appear as a relief. Combat in this -brooding atmosphere is salvation and safety; the cruelty of victory is -the summit of life's glories. And just as in truth the idea of Greek -law has developed from _murder_ and expiation of murder, so also nobler -Civilisation takes her first wreath of victory from the altar of the -expiation of murder. Behind that bloody age stretches a wave-furrow -deep into Hellenic history. The names of Orpheus, of Musæus, and -their cults indicate to what consequences the uninterrupted sight of -a world of warfare and cruelty led--to the loathing of existence, to -the conception of this existence as a punishment to be borne to the -end, to the belief in the identity of existence and indebtedness. But -these particular conclusions are not specifically Hellenic; through -them Greece comes into contact with India and the Orient generally. The -Hellenic genius had ready yet another answer to the question: what does -a life of fighting and of victory mean? and gives this answer in the -whole breadth of Greek history. - -In order to understand the latter we must start from the fact that -the Greek genius admitted the existing fearful impulse, and deemed it -_justified;_ whereas in the Orphic phase of thought was contained the -belief that life with such an impulse as its root would not be worth -living. Strife and the pleasure of victory were acknowledged; and -nothing separates the Greek world more from ours than the _colouring,_ -derived hence, of some ethical ideas, _e.g.,_ of _Eris_ and of _Envy_. - -When the traveller Pausanius during his wanderings through Greece -visited the Helicon, a very old copy of the first didactic poem of the -Greeks, "The Works and Days" of Hesiod, was shown to him, inscribed -upon plates of lead and severely damaged by time and weather. However -he recognised this much, that, unlike the usual copies, it had _not_ -at its head that little hymnus on Zeus, but began at once with the -declaration: "_Two_ Eris-goddesses are on earth." This is one of the -most noteworthy Hellenic thoughts and worthy to be impressed on the -new-comer immediately at the entrance-gate of Greek ethics. "One would -like to praise the one Eris, just as much as to blame the other, if -one uses one's reason. For these two goddesses have quite different -dispositions. For the one, the cruel one, furthers the evil war and -feud! No mortal likes her, but under the yoke of need one pays honour -to the burdensome Eris, according to the decree of the immortals. She, -as the elder, gave birth to black night. Zeus the high-ruling one, -however, placed the other Eris upon the roots of the earth and among -men as a much better one. She urges even the unskilled man to work, and -if one who lacks property beholds another who is rich, then he hastens -to sow in similar fashion and to plant and to put his house in order; -the neighbour vies with the neighbour who strives after fortune. Good -is this Eris to men. The potter also has a grudge against the potter, -and the carpenter against the carpenter; the beggar envies the beggar, -and the singer the singer." - -The two last verses which treat of the _odium figulinum_ appear to -our scholars to be incomprehensible in this place. According to their -judgment the predicates: "grudge" and "envy" fit only the nature of -the evil Eris, and for this reason they do not hesitate to designate -these verses as spurious or thrown by chance into this place. For -that judgment however a system of Ethics other than the Hellenic must -have inspired these scholars unawares; for in these verses to the -good Eris Aristotle finds no offence. And not only Aristotle but the -whole Greek antiquity thinks of spite and envy otherwise than we do -and agrees with Hesiod, who first designates as an evil one that Eris -who leads men against one another to a hostile war of extermination, -and secondly praises another Eris as the good one, who as jealousy, -spite, envy, incites men to activity but not to the action of war to -the knife but to the action of _contest._ The Greek is _envious_ and -conceives of this quality not as a blemish, but as the effect of a -_beneficent_ deity. What a gulf of ethical judgment between us and him? -Because he is envious he also feels, with every superfluity of honour, -riches, splendour and fortune, the envious eye of a god resting on -himself, and he fears this envy; in this case the latter reminds him -of the transitoriness of every human lot; he dreads his very happiness -and, sacrificing the best of it, he bows before the divine envy. -This conception does not perhaps estrange him from his gods; their -significance on the contrary is expressed by the thought that with them -man in whose soul jealousy is enkindled against every other living -being, is _never_ allowed to venture into contest. In the fight of -Thamyris with the Muses, of Marsyas with Apollo, in the heart-moving -fate of Niobe appears the horrible opposition of the two powers, who -must never fight with one another, man and god. - -The greater and more sublime however a Greek is, the brighter in him -appears the ambitious flame, devouring everybody who runs with him on -the same track. Aristotle once made a list of such contests on a large -scale; among them is the most striking instance how even a dead person -can still incite a living one to consuming jealousy; thus for example -Aristotle designates the relation between the Kolophonian Xenophanes -and Homer. We do not understand this attack on the national hero of -poetry in all its strength, if we do not imagine, as later on also with -Plato, the root of this attack to be the ardent desire to step into -the place of the overthrown poet and to inherit his fame. Every great -Hellene hands on the torch of the contest; at every great virtue a new -light is kindled. If the young Themistocles could not sleep at the -thought of the laurels of Miltiades so his early awakened bent released -itself only in the long emulation with Aristides in that uniquely -noteworthy, purely instinctive genius of his political activity, which -Thucydides describes. How characteristic are both question and answer, -when a notable opponent of Pericles is asked, whether he or Pericles -was the better wrestler in the city, and he gives the answer: "Even if -I throw him down he denies that he has fallen, attains his purpose and -convinces those who saw him fall." - -If one wants to see that sentiment unashamed in its naïve expressions, -the sentiment as to the necessity of contest lest the State's welfare -be threatened, one should think of the original meaning of _Ostracism,_ -as for example the Ephesians pronounced it at the banishment of -Hermodor. "Among us nobody shall be the best; if however someone is the -best, then let him be so elsewhere and among others." Why should not -someone be the best? Because with that the contest would fail, and the -eternal life-basis of the Hellenic State would be endangered. Later on -Ostracism receives quite another position with regard to the contest; -it is applied, when the danger becomes obvious that one of the great -contesting politicians and party-leaders feels himself urged on in -the heat of the conflict towards harmful and destructive measures and -dubious _coups d'état._ The original sense of this peculiar institution -however is not that of a safety-valve but that of a stimulant. -The all-excelling individual was to be removed in order that the -contest of forces might re-awaken, a thought which is hostile to the -"exclusiveness" of genius in the modern sense but which assumes that in -the natural order of things there are always _several_ geniuses which -incite one another to action, as much also as they hold one another -within the bounds of moderation. That is the kernel of the Hellenic -contest-conception: it abominates autocracy, and fears its dangers; it -desires as a _preventive_ against the genius--a second genius. - -Every natural gift must develop itself by contest. Thus the Hellenic -national pedagogy demands, whereas modern educators fear nothing as -much as, the unchaining of the so-called ambition. Here one fears -selfishness as the "evil in itself"--with the exception of the -Jesuits, who agree with the Ancients and who, possibly, for that -reason, are the most efficient educators of our time. They seem to -believe that Selfishness, _i.e.,_ the individual element is only the -most powerful _agens_ but that it obtains its character as "good" and -"evil" essentially from the aims towards which it strives. To the -Ancients however the aim of the agonistic education was the welfare of -the whole, of the civic society. Every Athenian for instance was to -cultivate his Ego in contest, so far that it should be of the highest -service to Athens and should do the least harm. It was not unmeasured -and immeasurable as modern ambition generally is; the youth thought of -the welfare of his native town when he vied with others in running, -throwing or singing; it was her glory that he wanted to increase with -his own; it was to his town's gods that he dedicated the wreaths which -the umpires as a mark of honour set upon his head. Every Greek from -childhood felt within himself the burning wish to be in the contest -of the towns an instrument for the welfare of his own town; in this -his selfishness was kindled into flame, by this his selfishness was -bridled and restricted. Therefore the individuals in antiquity were -freer, because their aims were nearer and more tangible. Modern man, on -the contrary, is everywhere hampered by infinity, like the fleet-footed -Achilles in the allegory of the Eleate Zeno: infinity impedes him, he -does not even overtake the tortoise. - -But as the youths to be educated were brought up struggling against -one another, so their educators were in turn in emulation amongst -themselves. Distrustfully jealous, the great musical masters, Pindar -and Simonides, stepped side by side; in rivalry the sophist, the higher -teacher of antiquity meets his fellow-sophist; even the most universal -kind of instruction, through the drama, was imparted to the people -only under the form of an enormous wrestling of the great musical and -dramatic artists. How wonderful! "And even the artist has a grudge -against the artist!" And the modern man dislikes in an artist nothing -so much as the personal battle-feeling, whereas the Greek recognises -the artist _only in such a personal struggle._ There where the modern -suspects weakness of the work of art, the Hellene seeks the source of -his highest strength! That, which by way of example in Plato is of -special artistic importance in his dialogues, is usually the result -of an emulation with the art of the orators, of the sophists, of the -dramatists of his time, invented deliberately in order that at the end -he could say: "Behold, I can also do what my great rivals can; yea -I can do it even better than they. No Protagoras has composed such -beautiful myths as I, no dramatist such a spirited and fascinating -whole as the Symposion, no orator penned such an oration as I put -up in the Georgias--and now I reject all that together and condemn -all imitative art! Only the contest made me a poet, a sophist, an -orator!" What a problem unfolds itself there before us, if we ask -about the relationship between the contest and the conception of the -work of art!--If on the other hand we remove the contest from Greek -life, then we look at once into the pre-Homeric abyss of horrible -savagery, hatred, and pleasure in destruction. This phenomenon alas! -shows itself frequently when a great personality was, owing to an -enormously brilliant deed, suddenly withdrawn from the contest and -became _hors de concours_ according to his, and his fellow-citizens' -judgment. Almost without exception the effect is awful; and if one -usually draws from these consequences the conclusion that the Greek was -unable to bear glory and fortune, one should say more exactly that he -was unable to bear fame without further struggle, and fortune at the -end of the contest. There is no more distinct instance than the fate -of Miltiades. Placed upon a solitary height and lifted far above every -fellow-combatant through his incomparable success at Marathon, he feels -a low thirsting for revenge awakened within himself against a citizen -of Para, with whom he had been at enmity long ago. To satisfy his -desire he misuses reputation, the public exchequer and civic honour and -disgraces himself. Conscious of his ill-success he falls into unworthy -machinations. He forms a clandestine and godless connection with Timo -a priestess of Demeter, and enters at night the sacred temple, from -which every man was excluded. After he has leapt over the wall and -comes ever nearer the shrine of the goddess, the dreadful horror of a -panic-like terror suddenly seizes him; almost prostrate and unconscious -he feels himself driven back and leaping the wall once more, he falls -down paralysed and severely injured. The siege must be raised and a -disgraceful death impresses its seal upon a brilliant heroic career, -in order to darken it for all posterity. After the battle at Marathon -the envy of the celestials has caught him. And this divine envy breaks -into flames when it beholds man without rival, without opponent, on -the solitary height of glory. He now has beside him only the gods--and -therefore he has them against him. These however betray him into a deed -of the Hybris, and under it he collapses. - -Let us well observe that just as Miltiades perishes so the noblest -Greek States perish when they, by merit and fortune, have arrived from -the racecourse at the temple of Nike. Athens, which had destroyed the -independence of her allies and avenged with severity the rebellions -of her subjected foes, Sparta, which after the battle of Ægospotamoi -used her preponderance over Hellas in a still harsher and more cruel -fashion, both these, as in the case of Miltiades, brought about their -ruin through deeds of the Hybris, as a proof that without envy, -jealousy, and contesting ambition the Hellenic State like the Hellenic -man degenerates. He becomes bad and cruel, thirsting for revenge, and -godless; in short, he becomes "pre-Homeric"--and then it needs only a -panic in order to bring about his fall and to crush him. Sparta and -Athens surrender to Persia, as Themistocles and Alcibiades have done; -they betray Hellenism after they have given up the noblest Hellenic -fundamental thought, the contest, and Alexander, the coarsened copy and -abbreviation of Greek history, now invents the cosmopolitan Hellene, -and the so-called "Hellenism." - - - - -THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE - - -Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872) - - -In dear vile Germany culture now lies so decayed in the streets, -jealousy of all that is great rules so shamelessly, and the general -tumult of those who race for "Fortune" resounds so deafeningly, that -one must have a strong faith, almost in the sense of _credo quia -absurdum est,_ in order to hope still for a growing Culture, and above -all--in opposition to the press with her "public opinion"--to be able -to work by public teaching. With violence must those, in whose hearts -lies the immortal care for the people, free themselves from all the -inrushing impressions of that which is just now actual and valid, and -evoke the appearance of reckoning them indifferent things. They must -appear so, because they want to think, and because a loathsome sight -and a confused noise, perhaps even mixed with the trumpet-flourishes -of war-glory, disturb their thinking, and above all, because they want -to _believe_ in the German character and because with this faith they -would lose their strength. Do not find fault with these believers if -they look from their distant aloofness and from the heights towards -their Promised Land! They fear those experiences, to which the kindly -disposed foreigner surrenders himself, when he lives among the Germans, -and must be surprised how little German life corresponds to those great -individuals, works and actions, which, in his kind disposition he -has learned to revere as the true German character. Where the German -cannot lift himself into the sublime he makes an impression less than -the mediocre. Even the celebrated German scholarship, in which a number -of the most useful domestic and homely virtues such as faithfulness, -self-restriction, industry, moderation, cleanliness appear transposed -into a purer atmosphere and, as it were, transfigured, is by no means -the result of these virtues; looked at closely, the motive urging to -unlimited knowledge appears in Germany much more like a defect, a gap, -than an abundance of forces, it looks almost like the consequence -of a needy formless atrophied life and even like a flight from the -moral narrow-mindedness and malice to which the German without such -diversions is subjected, and which also in spite of that scholarship, -yea still within scholarship itself, often break forth. As the true -virtuosi of philistinism the Germans are at home in narrowness of life, -discerning and judging; if any one will carry them above themselves -into the sublime, then they make themselves heavy as lead, and as such -lead-weights they hang to their truly great men, in order to pull them -down out of the ether to the level of their own necessitous indigence. -Perhaps this Philistine homeliness may be only the degeneration of -a genuine German virtue--a profound submersion into the detail, the -minute, the nearest and into the mysteries of the individual--but this -virtue grown mouldy is now worse than the most open vice, especially -since one has now become conscious, with gladness of the heart, of this -quality, even to literary self-glorification. Now the _"Educated"_ -among the proverbially so cultured Germans and the _"Philistines"_ -among the, as everybody knows, so uncultured Germans shake hands -in public and agree with one another concerning the way in which -henceforth one will have to write, compose poetry, paint, make music -and even philosophise, yea--rule, so as neither to stand too much aloof -from the culture of the one, nor to give offence to the "homeliness" -of the other. This they call now "The German Culture of our times." -Well, it is only necessary to inquire after the characteristic by which -that "educated" person is to be recognised; now that we know that his -foster-brother, the German Philistine, makes himself known as such to -all the world, without bashfulness, as it were, after innocence is lost. - -The educated person nowadays is educated above all _"historically,"_ by -his historic consciousness he saves himself from the sublime in which -the Philistine succeeds by his "homeliness." No longer that enthusiasm -which history inspires--as Goethe was allowed to suppose--but just the -blunting of all enthusiasm is now the goal of these admirers of the -_nil admirari,_ when they try to conceive everything historically; to -them however we should exclaim: Ye are the fools of all centuries! -History will make to you only those confessions, which you are worthy -to receive. The world has been at all times full of trivialities and -nonentities; to your historic hankering just these and only these -unveil themselves. By your thousands you may pounce upon an epoch--you -will afterwards hunger as before and be allowed to boast of your sort -of starved soundness. _Illam ipsam quam iactant sanitatem non firmitate -sed iciunio consequuntur. (Dialogus de oratoribus, cap._ 25.) History -has not thought fit to tell you anything that is essential, but -scorning and invisible she stood by your side, slipping into this one's -hand some state proceedings, into that one's an ambassadorial report, -into another's a date or an etymology or a pragmatic cobweb. Do you -really believe yourself able to reckon up history like an addition -sum, and do you consider your common intellect and your mathematical -education good enough for that? How it must vex you to hear, that -others narrate things, out of the best known periods, which you will -never conceive, never! - -If now to this "education," calling itself historic but destitute of -enthusiasm, and to the hostile Philistine activity, foaming with rage -against all that is great, is added that third brutal and excited -company of those who race after "Fortune"--then that in _summa_ results -in such a confused shrieking and such a limb-dislocating turmoil that -the thinker with stopped-up ears and blindfolded eyes flees into the -most solitary wilderness,--where he may see, what those never will -see, where he must hear sounds which rise to him out of all the depths -of nature and come down to him from the stars. Here he confers with -the great problems floating towards him, whose voices of course sound -just as comfortless-awful, as unhistoric-eternal. The feeble person -flees back from their cold breath, and the calculating one runs right -through them without perceiving them. They deal worst, however, with -the "educated man" who at times bestows great pains upon them. To him -these phantoms transform themselves into conceptual cobwebs and hollow -sound-figures. Grasping after them he imagines he has philosophy; in -order to search for them he climbs about in the so-called history -of philosophy--and when at last he has collected and piled up quite -a cloud of such abstractions and stereotyped patterns, then it may -happen to him that a real thinker crosses his path and--puffs them -away. What a desperate annoyance indeed to meddle with philosophy as -an "educated person"! From time to time it is true it appears to him -as if the impossible connection of philosophy with that which nowadays -gives itself airs as "German Culture" has become possible; some mongrel -dallies and ogles between the two spheres and confuses fantasy on -this side and on the other. Meanwhile however _one_ piece of advice -is to be given to the Germans, if they do not wish to let themselves -be confused. They may put to themselves the question about everything -that they now call Culture: is _this_ the hoped-for German Culture, so -serious and creative, so redeeming for the German mind, so purifying -for the German virtues that their only philosopher in this century, -Arthur _Schopenhauer,_ should have to espouse its cause? - -Here you have the philosopher--now search for the Culture proper to -him! And if you are able to divine what kind of culture that would have -to be, which would correspond to such a philosopher, then you have, in -this divination, already _passed sentence_ on all your culture and on -yourselves! - - - - -PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS - - -(1873) - - - -PREFACE - - -(_Probably_ 1874) - - -If we know the aims of men who are strangers to us, it is sufficient -for us to approve of or condemn them as wholes. Those who stand nearer -to us we judge according to the means by which they further their -aims; we often disapprove of their aims, but love them for the sake of -their means and the style of their volition. Now philosophical systems -are absolutely true only to their founders, to all later philosophers -they are usually _one_ big mistake, and to feebler minds a sum of -mistakes and truths; at any rate if regarded as highest aim they are -an error, and in so far reprehensible. Therefore many disapprove of -every philosopher, because his aim is not theirs; they are those whom I -called "strangers to us." Whoever on the contrary finds any pleasure at -all in great men finds pleasure also in such systems, be they ever so -erroneous, for they all have in them one point which is irrefutable, a -personal touch, and colour; one can use them in order to form a picture -of the philosopher, just as from a plant growing in a certain place one -can form conclusions as to the soil. _That_ mode of life, of viewing -human affairs at any rate, has existed once and is therefore possible; -the "system" is the growth in this soil or at least a part of this -system.... - -I narrate the history of those philosophers simplified: I shall bring -into relief only _that_ point in every system which is a little bit -of _personality,_ and belongs to that which is irrefutable, and -indiscussable, which history has to preserve: it is a first attempt -to regain and recreate those natures by comparison, and to let the -polyphony of Greek nature at least resound once again: the task is, to -bring to light that which we must _always love and revere_ and of which -no later knowledge can rob us: the great man. - - - -LATER PREFACE - - -(_Towards the end of_ 1879) - - -This attempt to relate the history of the earlier Greek philosophers -distinguishes itself from similar attempts by its brevity. This has -been accomplished by mentioning but a small number of the doctrines of -every philosopher, _i.e.,_ by incompleteness. Those doctrines, however, -have been selected in which the personal element of the philosopher -re-echoes most strongly; whereas a complete enumeration of all possible -propositions handed down to us--as is the custom in text-books--merely -brings about one thing, the absolute silencing of the personal element. -It is through this that those records become so tedious; for in systems -which have been refuted it is only this personal element that can still -interest us, for this alone is eternally irrefutable. It is possible -to shape the picture of a man out of three anecdotes. I endeavour to -bring into relief three anecdotes out of every system and abandon the -remainder. - - - -1. - - -There are opponents of philosophy, and one does well to listen to them; -especially if they dissuade the distempered heads of Germans from -metaphysics and on the other hand preach to them purification through -the Physis, as Goethe did, or healing through Music, as Wagner. The -physicians of the people condemn philosophy; he, therefore, who wants -to justify it, must show to what purpose healthy nations use and have -used philosophy. If he can show that, perhaps even the sick people -will benefit by learning why philosophy is harmful just to them. There -are indeed good instances of a health which can exist without any -philosophy or with quite a moderate, almost a toying use of it; thus -the Romans at their best period lived without philosophy. But where is -to be found the instance of a nation becoming diseased whom philosophy -had restored to health? Whenever philosophy showed itself helping, -saving, prophylactic, it was with healthy people; it made sick people -still more ill. If ever a nation was disintegrated and but loosely -connected with the individuals, never has philosophy bound these -individuals closer to the whole. If ever an individual was willing to -stand aside and plant around himself the hedge of self-sufficiency, -philosophy was always ready to isolate him still more and to destroy -him through isolation. She is dangerous where she is not in her full -right, and it is only the health of a nation but not that of every -nation which gives her this right. - -Let us now look around for the highest authority as to what -constitutes the health of a nation. I he Greeks, as _the_ truly -healthy nation, have _justified_ philosophy once for all by having -philosophised; and that indeed more than all other nations. They could -not even stop at the right time, for still in their withered age -they comported themselves as heated notaries of philosophy, although -they understood by it only the pious sophistries and the sacrosanct -hair-splittings of Christian dogmatics. They themselves have much -lessened their merit for barbarian posterity by not being able to stop -at the right time, because that posterity in its uninstructed and -impetuous youth necessarily became entangled in those artfully woven -nets and ropes. - -On the contrary, the Greek knew how to begin at the right time, and -this lesson, when one ought to begin philosophising, they teach more -distinctly than any other nation. For it should not be begun when -trouble comes as perhaps some presume who derive philosophy from -moroseness; no, but in good fortune, in mature manhood, out of the -midst of the fervent serenity of a brave and victorious man's estate. -The fact that the Greeks philosophised at that time throws light on -the nature of philosophy and her task as well as on the nature of the -Greeks themselves. Had they at that time been such commonsense and -precocious experts and gayards as the learned Philistine of our days -perhaps imagines, or had their life been only a state of voluptuous -soaring, chiming, breathing and feeling, as the unlearned visionary is -pleased to assume, then the spring of philosophy would not have come to -light among them. At the best there would have come forth a brook soon -trickling away in the sand or evaporating into fogs, but never that -broad river flowing forth with the proud beat of its waves, the river -which we know as Greek Philosophy. - -True, it has been eagerly pointed out how much the Greeks could -find and learn abroad, in the Orient, and how many different things -they may easily have brought from there. Of course an odd spectacle -resulted, when certain scholars brought together the alleged masters -from the Orient and the possible disciples from Greece, and exhibited -Zarathustra near Heraclitus, the Hindoos near the Eleates, the -Egyptians near Empedocles, or even Anaxagoras among the Jews and -Pythagoras among the Chinese. In detail little has been determined; -but we should in no way object to the general idea, if people did not -burden us with the conclusion that therefore Philosophy had only been -imported into Greece and was not indigenous to the soil, yea, that -she, as something foreign, had possibly ruined rather than improved -the Greek. Nothing is more foolish than to swear by the fact that the -Greeks had an aboriginal culture; no, they rather absorbed all the -culture flourishing among other nations, and they advanced so far, -just because they understood how to hurl the spear further from the -very spot where another nation had let it rest. They were admirable -in the art of learning productively, and so, like them, we _ought_ -to learn from our neighbours, with a view to Life not to pedantic -knowledge, using everything learnt as a foothold whence to leap -high and still higher than our neighbour. The questions as to the -beginning of philosophy are quite negligible, for everywhere in the -beginning there is the crude, the unformed, the empty and the ugly; -and in all things only the higher stages come into consideration. -He who in the place of Greek philosophy prefers to concern himself -with that of Egypt and Persia, because the latter are perhaps more -"original" and certainly older, proceeds just as ill-advisedly as -those who cannot be at ease before they have traced back the Greek -mythology, so grand and profound, to such physical trivialities as -sun, lightning, weather and fog, as its prime origins, and who fondly -imagine they have rediscovered for instance in the restricted worship -of the one celestial vault among the other Indo-Germans a purer form -of religion than the poly-theistic worship of the Greek had been. The -road towards the beginning always leads into barbarism, and he who is -concerned with the Greeks ought always to keep in mind the fact that -the unsubdued thirst for knowledge in itself always barbarises just as -much as the hatred of knowledge, and that the Greeks have subdued their -inherently insatiable thirst for knowledge by their regard for Life, -by an ideal need of Life,--since they wished to live immediately that -which they learnt. The Greeks also philosophised as men of culture and -with the aims of culture, and therefore saved themselves the trouble -of inventing once again the elements of philosophy and knowledge -out of some autochthonous conceit, and with a will they at once set -themselves to fill out, enhance, raise and purify these elements they -had taken over in such a way, that only now in a higher sense and in a -purer sphere they became inventors. For they discovered the _typical -philosopher's genius,_ and the inventions of all posterity have added -nothing essential. - -Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully -idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters, -Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, -Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and -self-contained,[1] and hewn out of one stone. Severe necessity exists -between their thinking and their character. They are not bound by any -convention, because at that time no professional class of philosophers -and scholars existed. They all stand before us in magnificent solitude -as the only ones who then devoted their life exclusively to knowledge. -They all possess the virtuous energy of the Ancients, whereby they -excel all the later philosophers in finding their own form and in -perfecting it by metamorphosis in its most minute details and general -aspect. For they were met by no helpful and facilitating fashion. Thus -together they form what Schopenhauer, in opposition to the Republic of -Scholars, has called a Republic of Geniuses; one giant calls to another -across the arid intervals of ages, and, undisturbed by a wanton, noisy -race of dwarfs, creeping about beneath them, the sublime intercourse of -spirits continues. - -Of this sublime intercourse of spirits I have resolved to relate those -items which our modern hardness of hearing might perhaps hear and -understand; that means certainly the least of all. It seems to me -that those old sages from Thales to Socrates have discussed in that -intercourse, although in its most general aspect, everything that -constitutes for our contemplation the peculiarly Hellenic. In their -intercourse, as already in their personalities, they express distinctly -the great features of Greek genius of which the whole of Greek history -is a shadowy impression, a hazy copy, which consequently speaks less -clearly. If we could rightly interpret the total life of the Greek -nation, we should ever find reflected only that picture which in her -highest geniuses shines with more resplendent colours. Even the first -experience of philosophy on Greek soil, the sanction of the Seven Sages -is a distinct and unforgettable line in the picture of the Hellenic. -Other nations have their Saints, the Greeks have Sages. Rightly it has -been said that a nation is characterised not only by her great men -but rather by the manner in which she recognises and honours them. In -other ages the philosopher is an accidental solitary wanderer in the -most hostile environment, either slinking through or pushing himself -through with clenched fists. With the Greek however the philosopher is -not accidental; when in the Sixth and Fifth centuries amidst the most -frightful dangers and seductions of secularisation he appears and as -it were steps forth from the cave of Trophonios into the very midst of -luxuriance, the discoverers' happiness, the wealth and the sensuousness -of the Greek colonies, then we divine that he comes as a noble warner -for the same purpose for which in those centuries Tragedy was born -and which the Orphic mysteries in their grotesque hieroglyphics give -us to understand. The opinion of those philosophers on Life and -Existence altogether means so much more than a modern opinion because -they had before themselves Life in a luxuriant perfection, and because -with them, unlike us, the sense of the thinker was not muddled by -the disunion engendered by the wish for freedom, beauty, fulness of -life and the love for truth that only asks: What is the good of Life -at all? The mission which the philosopher has to discharge within a -real Culture, fashioned in a homogeneous style, cannot be clearly -conjectured out of our circumstances and experiences for the simple -reason that we have no such culture. No, it is only a Culture like the -Greek which can answer the question as to that task of the philosopher, -only such a Culture can, as I said before, justify philosophy at all; -because such a Culture alone knows and can demonstrate why and how the -philosopher is _not_ an accidental, chance wanderer driven now hither, -now thither. There is a steely necessity which fetters the philosopher -to a true Culture: but what if this Culture does not exist? Then the -philosopher is an incalculable and therefore terror-inspiring comet, -whereas in the favourable case, he shines as the central star in the -solar-system of culture. It is for this reason that the Greeks justify -the philosopher, because with them he is no comet. - - -[1] _Cf._ Napoleon's word about Goethe: "Voilà un homme!"--TR. - - - -2 - - -After such contemplations it will be accepted without offence if I -speak of the pre-Platonic philosophers as of a homogeneous company, and -devote this paper to them exclusively. Something quite new begins with -Plato; or it might be said with equal justice that in comparison with -that Republic of Geniuses from Thales to Socrates, the philosophers -since Plato lack something essential. - -Whoever wants to express himself unfavourably about those older masters -may call them one-sided, and their _Epigones,_ with Plato as head, -many-sided. Yet it would be more just and unbiassed to conceive of -the latter as philosophic hybrid-characters, of the former as the -pure types. Plato himself is the first magnificent hybrid-character, -and as such finds expression as well in his philosophy as in his -personality. In his ideology are united Socratian, Pythagorean, and -Heraclitean elements, and for this reason it is no typically pure -phenomenon. As man, too, Plato mingles the features of the royally -secluded, all-sufficing Heraclitus, of the melancholy-compassionate and -legislatory Pythagoras and of the psycho-expert dialectician Socrates. -All later philosophers are such hybrid-characters; wherever something -one-sided does come into prominence with them as in the case of the -Cynics, it is not type but caricature. Much more important however is -the fact that they are founders of sects and that the sects founded -by them are all institutions in direct opposition to the Hellenic -culture and the unity of its style prevailing up to that time. In -their way they seek a redemption, but only for the individuals or at -the best for groups of friends and disciples closely connected with -them. The activity of the older philosophers tends, although they were -unconscious of it, towards a cure and purification on a large scale; -the mighty course of Greek culture is not to be stopped; awful dangers -are to be removed out of the way of its current; the philosopher -protects and defends his native country. Now, since Plato, he is in -exile and conspires against his fatherland. - -It is a real misfortune that so very little of those older philosophic -masters has come down to us and that all complete works of theirs are -withheld from us. Involuntarily, on account of that loss, we measure -them according to wrong standards and allow ourselves to be influenced -unfavourably towards them by the mere accidental fact that Plato -and Aristotle never lacked appreciators and copyists. Some people -presuppose a special providence for books, a _fatum libellorum;_ such -a providence however would at any rate be a very malicious one if it -deemed it wise to withhold from us the works of Heraclitus, Empedocles' -wonderful poem, and the writings of Democritus, whom the ancients put -on a par with Plato, whom he even excels as far as ingenuity goes, -and as a substitute put into our hand Stoics, Epicureans and Cicero. -Probably the most sublime part of Greek thought and its expression -in words is lost to us; a fate which will not surprise the man who -remembers the misfortunes of Scotus Erigena or of Pascal, and who -considers that even in this enlightened century the first edition of -Schopenhauer's "_The World As Will And Idea_" became waste-paper. If -somebody will presuppose a special fatalistic power with respect to -such things he may do so and say with Goethe: "Let no one complain -about and grumble at things vile and mean, they _are_ the real -rulers,--however much this be gainsaid!" In particular they are more -powerful than the power of truth. Mankind very rarely produces a good -book in which with daring freedom is intonated the battle-song of -truth, the song of philosophic heroism; and yet whether it is to live a -century longer or to crumble and moulder into dust and ashes, depends -on the most miserable accidents, on the sudden mental eclipse of men's -heads, on superstitious convulsions and antipathies, finally on fingers -not too fond of writing or even on eroding bookworms and rainy weather. -But we will not lament but rather take the advice of the reproving and -consolatory words which Hamann addresses to scholars who lament over -lost works. "Would not the artist who succeeded in throwing a lentil -through the eye of a needle have sufficient, with a bushel of lentils, -to practise his acquired skill? One would like to put this question to -all scholars who do not know how to use the works of the Ancients any -better than that man used his lentils." It might be added in our case -that not one more word, anecdote, or date needed to be transmitted to -us than has been transmitted, indeed that even much less might have -been preserved for us and yet we should have been able to establish the -general doctrine that the Greeks justify philosophy. - -A time which suffers from the so-called "general education" but has -no culture and no unity of style in her life hardly knows what to -do with philosophy, even if the latter were proclaimed by the very -Genius of Truth in the streets and market-places. She rather remains -at such a time the learned monologue of the solitary rambler, the -accidental booty of the individual, the hidden closet-secret or the -innocuous chatter between academic senility and childhood. Nobody -dare venture to fulfil in himself the law of philosophy, nobody -lives philosophically, with that simple manly faith which compelled -an Ancient, wherever he was, whatever he did, to deport himself as -a Stoic, when he had once pledged his faith to the Stoa. All modern -philosophising is limited politically and regulated by the police to -learned semblance. Thanks to governments, churches, academies, customs, -fashions, and the cowardice of man, it never gets beyond the sigh: "If -only!..." or beyond the knowledge: "Once upon a time there was..." -Philosophy is without rights; therefore modern man, if he were at all -courageous and conscientious, ought to condemn her and perhaps banish -her with words similar to those by which Plato banished the tragic -poets from his State. Of course there would be left a reply for her, as -there remained to those poets against Plato. If one once compelled her -to speak out she might say perhaps: "Miserable Nation! Is it my fault -if among you I am on the tramp, like a fortune teller through the land, -and must hide and disguise myself, as if I were a great sinner and ye -my judges? Just look at my sister, Art! It is with her as with me; we -have been cast adrift among the Barbarians and no longer know how to -save ourselves. Here we are lacking, it is true, every good right; but -the judges before whom we find justice judge you also and will tell -you: First acquire a culture; then you shall experience what Philosophy -can and will do."-- - - - -3. - - -Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous fancy, with the -proposition that _water_ is the origin and mother-womb of all things. -Is it really necessary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and -for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunciate -something about the origin of things; secondly, because it does -so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because in it is -contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea: Everything -is one. The first mentioned reason leaves Thales still in the company -of religious and superstitious people, the second however takes him -out of this company and shows him to us as a natural philosopher, but -by virtue of the third, Thales becomes the first Greek philosopher. -If he had said: "Out of water earth is evolved," we should only have -a scientific hypothesis; a false one, though nevertheless difficult -to refute. But he went beyond the scientific. In his presentation of -this concept of unity through the hypothesis of water, Thales has not -surmounted the low level of the physical discernments of his time, but -at the best overleapt them. The deficient and unorganised observations -of an empiric nature which Thales had made as to the occurrence and -transformations of water, or to be more exact, of the Moist, would -not in the least have made possible or even suggested such an immense -generalisation. That which drove him to this generalisation was a -metaphysical dogma, which had its origin in a mystic intuition and -which together with the ever renewed endeavours to express it better, -we find in all philosophies,--the proposition: _Everything is one!_ - -How despotically such a faith deals with all empiricism is worthy of -note; with Thales especially one can learn how Philosophy has behaved -at all times, when she wanted to get beyond the hedges of experience -to her magically attracting goal. On light supports she leaps in -advance; hope and divination wing her feet. Calculating reason too, -clumsily pants after her and seeks better supports in its attempt to -reach that alluring goal, at which its divine companion has already -arrived. One sees in imagination two wanderers by a wild forest-stream -which carries with it rolling stones; the one, light-footed, leaps -over it using the stones and swinging himself upon them ever further -and further, though they precipitously sink into the depths behind -him. The other stands helpless there most of the time; he has first -to build a pathway which will bear his heavy, weary step; sometimes -that cannot be done and then no god will help him across the stream. -What therefore carries philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? -Does it distinguish itself from calculating and measuring thought -only by its more rapid flight through large spaces? No, for a strange -illogical power wings the foot of philosophical thinking; and this -power is Fancy. Lifted by the latter, philosophical thinking leaps -from possibility to possibility, and these for the time being are -taken as certainties; and now and then even whilst on the wing it -gets hold of certainties. An ingenious presentiment shows them to -the flier; demonstrable certainties are divined at a distance to be -at this point. Especially powerful is the strength of Fancy in the -lightning-like seizing and illuminating of similarities; afterwards -reflection applies its standards and models and seeks to substitute -the similarities by equalities, that which was seen side by side by -causalities. But though this should never be possible, even in the case -of Thales the indemonstrable philosophising has yet its value; although -all supports are broken when Logic and the rigidity of Empiricism want -to get across to the proposition: Everything is water; yet still there -is always, after the demolition of the scientific edifice, a remainder, -and in this very remainder lies a moving force and as it were the hope -of future fertility. - -Of course I do not mean that the thought in any restriction or -attenuation, or as allegory, still retains some kind of "truth"; as -if, for instance, one might imagine the creating artist standing -near a waterfall, and seeing in the forms which leap towards him, -an artistically prefiguring game of the water with human and animal -bodies, masks, plants, rocks, nymphs, griffins, and with all existing -types in general, so that to him the proposition: Everything is water, -is confirmed. The thought of Thales has rather its value--even after -the perception of its indemonstrableness--in the very fact, that it was -meant unmythically and unallegorically. The Greeks among whom Thales -became so suddenly conspicuous were the anti-type of all realists -by only believing essentially in the reality of men and gods, and -by contemplating the whole of nature as if it were only a disguise, -masquerade and metamorphosis of these god-men. Man was to them the -truth, and essence of things; everything else mere phenomenon and -deceiving play. For that very reason they experienced incredible -difficulty in conceiving of ideas as ideas. Whilst with the moderns -the most personal item sublimates itself into abstractions, with -them the most abstract notions became personified. Thales, however, -said, "Not man but water is the reality of things "; he began to -believe in nature, in so far that he at least believed in water. As -a mathematician and astronomer he had grown cold towards everything -mythical and allegorical, and even if he did not succeed in becoming -disillusioned as to the pure abstraction, Everything is one, and -although he left off at a physical expression he was nevertheless among -the Greeks of his time a surprising rarity. Perhaps the exceedingly -conspicuous _Orpheans_ possessed in a still higher degree than he the -faculty of conceiving abstractions and of thinking unplastically; only -they did not succeed in expressing these abstractions except in the -form of the allegory. Also Pherecydes of Syrus who is a contemporary -of Thales and akin to him in many physical conceptions hovers with -the expression of the latter in that middle region where Allegory is -wedded to Mythos, so that he dares, for example, to compare the earth -with a winged oak, which hangs in the air with spread pinions and which -Zeus bedecks, after the defeat of Kronos, with a magnificent robe of -honour, into which with his own hands Zeus embroiders lands, water -and rivers. In contrast with such gloomy allegorical philosophising -scarcely to be translated into the realm of the comprehensible, Thales' -are the works of a creative master who began to look into Nature's -depths without fantastic fabling. If as it is true he used Science -and the demonstrable but soon out-leapt them, then this likewise -is a typical characteristic of the philosophical genius. The Greek -word which designates the Sage belongs etymologically to _sapio,_ I -taste, _sapiens,_ the tasting one, _sisyphos,_ the man of the most -delicate taste; the peculiar art of the philosopher therefore consists, -according to the opinion of the people, in a delicate selective -judgment by taste, by discernment, by significant differentiation. He -is not prudent, if one calls _him_ prudent, who in his own affairs -finds out the good; Aristotle rightly says: "That which Thales and -Anaxagoras know, people will call unusual, astounding, difficult, -divine but--useless, since human possessions were of no concern to -those two." Through thus selecting and precipitating the unusual, -astounding, difficult, and divine, Philosophy marks the boundary-lines -dividing her from Science in the same way as she does it from Prudence -by the emphasising of the useless. Science without thus selecting, -without such delicate taste, pounces upon everything knowable, in the -blind covetousness to know all at any price; philosophical thinking -however is always on the track of the things worth knowing, on the -track of the great and most important discernments. Now the idea of -greatness is changeable, as well in the moral as in the æsthetic -realm, thus Philosophy begins with a legislation with respect to -greatness, she becomes a Nomenclator. "That is great," she says, -and therewith she raises man above the blind, untamed covetousness -of his thirst for knowledge. By the idea of greatness she assuages -this thirst: and it is chiefly by this, that she contemplates the -greatest discernment, that of the essence and kernel of things, as -attainable and attained. When Thales says, "Everything is water," man -is startled up out of his worm-like mauling of and crawling about among -the individual sciences; he divines the last solution of things and -masters through this divination the common perplexity of the lower -grades of knowledge. The philosopher tries to make the total-chord of -the universe re-echo within himself and then to project it into ideas -outside himself: whilst he is contemplative like the creating artist, -sympathetic like the religionist, looking out for ends and causalities -like the scientific man, whilst he feels himself swell up to the -macrocosm, he still retains the circumspection to contemplate himself -coldly as the reflex of the world; he retains that cool-headedness, -which the dramatic artist possesses, when he transforms himself into -other bodies, speaks out of them, and yet knows how to project this -transformation outside himself into written verses. What the verse is -to the poet, dialectic thinking is to the philosopher; he snatches -at it in order to hold fast his enchantment, in order to petrify it. -And just as words and verse to the dramatist are only stammerings in -a foreign language, to tell in it what he lived, what he saw, and -what he can directly promulgate by gesture and music only, thus the -expression of every deep philosophical intuition by means of dialectics -and scientific reflection is, it is true, on the one hand the only -means to communicate what has been seen, but on the other hand it is -a paltry means, and at the bottom a metaphorical, absolutely inexact -translation into a different sphere and language. Thus Thales saw the -Unity of the "Existent," and when he wanted to communicate this idea he -talked of water. - - - -4 - - -Whilst the general type of the philosopher in the picture of Thales -is set off rather hazily, the picture of his great successor already -speaks much more distinctly to us. _Anaximander_ of Milet, the -first philosophical author of the Ancients, writes in the very way -that the typical philosopher will always write as long as he is -not alienated from ingenuousness and _naïveté_ by odd claims: in -a grand lapidarian style of writing, sentence for sentence ... a -witness of a new inspiration, and an expression of the sojourning in -sublime contemplations. The thought and its form are milestones on -the path towards the highest wisdom. With such a lapidarian emphasis -Anaximander once said: "Whence things originated, thither, according -to necessity, they must return and perish; for they must pay penalty -and be judged for their injustices according to the order of time." -Enigmatical utterance of a true pessimist, oracular inscription on the -boundary-stone of Greek philosophy, how shall we explain thee? - -The only serious moralist of our century in the Parergis (Vol. ii., -chap. 12, "Additional Remarks on The Doctrine about the Suffering in -the World, Appendix of Corresponding Passages") urges on us a similar -contemplation: "The right standard by which to judge every human -being is that he really is a being who ought not to exist at all, -but who is expiating his existence by manifold forms of suffering -and death:--What can one expect from such a being? Are we not all -sinners condemned to death? We expiate our birth firstly by our -life and secondly by our death." He who in the physiognomy of our -universal human lot reads this doctrine and already recognises the -fundamental bad quality of every human life, in the fact that none -can stand a very close and careful contemplation--although our time, -accustomed to the biographical epidemic, seems to think otherwise and -more loftily about the dignity of man; he who, like Schopenhauer, on -"the heights of the Indian breezes" has heard the sacred word about -the moral value of existence, will be kept with difficulty from -making an extremely anthropomorphic metaphor and from generalizing -that melancholy doctrine--at first only limited to human life--and -applying it by transmission to the general character of all existence. -It may not be very logical, it is however at any rate very human and -moreover quite in harmony with the philosophical leaping described -above, now with Anaximander to consider all Becoming as a punishable -emancipation from eternal "Being," as a wrong that is to be atoned -for by destruction. Everything that has once come into existence also -perishes, whether we think of human life or of water or of heat and -cold; everywhere where definite qualities are to be noticed, we are -allowed to prophesy the extinction of these qualities--according to -the all-embracing proof of experience. Thus a being that possesses -definite qualities and consists of them, can never be the origin and -principle of things; the veritable _ens,_ the "Existent," Anaximander -concluded, cannot possess any definite qualities, otherwise, like -all other things, it would necessarily have originated and perished. -In order that Becoming may not cease, the Primordial-being must be -indefinite. The immortality and eternity of the Primordial-being lies -not in an infiniteness and inexhaustibility--as usually the expounders -of Anaximander presuppose--but in this, that it lacks the definite -qualities which lead to destruction, for which reason it bears also its -name: The Indefinite. The thus labelled Primordial-being is superior -to all Becoming and for this very reason it guarantees the eternity -and unimpeded course of Becoming. This last unity in that Indefinite, -the mother-womb of all things, can, it is true, be designated only -negatively by man, as something to which no predicate out of the -existing world of Becoming can be allotted, and might be considered a -peer to the Kantian "Thing-in-itself." - -Of course he who is able to wrangle persistently with others as to what -kind of thing that primordial substance really was, whether perhaps an -intermediate thing between air and water, or perhaps between air and -fire, has not understood our philosopher at all; this is likewise to -be said about those, who seriously ask themselves, whether Anaximander -had thought of his primordial substance as a mixture of all existing -substances. Rather we must direct our gaze to the place where we can -learn that Anaximander no longer treated the question of the origin -of the world as purely physical; we must direct our gaze towards that -first stated lapidarian proposition. When on the contrary he saw a sum -of wrongs to be expiated in the plurality of things that have become, -then he, as the first Greek, with daring grasp caught up the tangle of -the most profound ethical problem. How can anything perish that has a -right to exist? Whence that restless Becoming and giving-birth, whence -that expression of painful distortion on the face of Nature, whence the -never-ending dirge in all realms of existence? Out of this world of -injustice, of audacious apostasy from the primordial-unity of things -Anaximander flees into a metaphysical castle, leaning out of which he -turns his gaze far and wide in order at last, after a pensive silence, -to address to all beings this question: "What is your existence worth? -And if it is worth nothing why are you there? By your guilt, I observe, -you sojourn in this world. You will have to expiate it by death. Look -how your earth fades; the seas decrease and dry up, the marine-shell -on the mountain shows you how much already they have dried up; fire -destroys your world even now, finally it will end in smoke and ashes. -But again and again such a world of transitoriness will ever build -itself up; who shall redeem you from the curse of Becoming?" - -Not every kind of life may have been welcome to a man who put such -questions, whose upward-soaring thinking continually broke the empiric -ropes, in order to take at once to the highest, superlunary flight. -Willingly we believe tradition, that he walked along in especially -dignified attire and showed a truly tragic hauteur in his gestures -and habits of life. He lived as he wrote; he spoke as solemnly as he -dressed himself, he raised his hand and placed his foot as if this -existence was a tragedy, and he had been born in order to co-operate -in that tragedy by playing the _rôle_ of hero. In all that he was the -great model of Empedocles. His fellow-citizens elected him the leader -of an emigrating colony--perhaps they were pleased at being able to -honour him and at the same time to get rid of him. His thought also -emigrated and founded colonies; in Ephesus and in Elea they could not -get rid of him; and if they could not resolve upon staying at the spot -where he stood, they nevertheless knew that they had been led there by -him, whence they now prepared to proceed without him. - -Thales shows the need of simplifying the empire of plurality, and -of reducing it to a mere expansion or disguise of the _one single_ -existing quality, water. Anaximander goes beyond him with two steps. -Firstly he puts the question to himself: How, if there exists an -eternal Unity at all, is that Plurality possible? and he takes the -answer out of the contradictory, self-devouring and denying character -of this Plurality. The existence of this Plurality becomes a moral -phenomenon to him; it is not justified, it expiates itself continually -through destruction. But then the questions occur to him: Yet why has -not everything that has become perished long ago, since, indeed, quite -an eternity of time has already gone by? Whence the ceaseless current -of the River of Becoming? He can save himself from these questions -only by mystic possibilities: the eternal Becoming can have its origin -only in the eternal "Being," the conditions for that apostasy from -that eternal "Being" to a Becoming in injustice are ever the same, the -constellation of things cannot help itself being thus fashioned, that -no end is to be seen of that stepping forth of the individual being out -of the lap of the "Indefinite." At this Anaximander stayed; that is, -he remained within the deep shadows which like gigantic spectres were -lying on the mountain range of such a world-perception. The more one -wanted to approach the problem of solving how out of the Indefinite the -Definite, out of the Eternal the Temporal, out of the Just the Unjust -could by secession ever originate, the darker the night became.---- - - - -5 - - -Towards the midst of this mystic night, in which Anaximander's problem -of the Becoming was wrapped up, Heraclitus of Ephesus approached and -illuminated it by a divine flash of lightning. "I contemplate the -Becoming," he exclaimed,--"and nobody has so attentively watched this -eternal wave-surging and rhythm of things. And what do I behold? -Lawfulness, infallible certainty, ever equal paths of Justice, -condemning Erinyes behind all transgressions of the laws, the whole -world the spectacle of a governing justice and of demoniacally -omnipresent natural forces subject to justice's sway. I do not behold -the punishment of that which has become, but the justification of -Becoming. When has sacrilege, when has apostasy manifested itself in -inviolable forms, in laws esteemed sacred? Where injustice sways, there -is caprice, disorder, irregularity, contradiction; where however Law -and Zeus' daughter, Dike, rule alone, as in this world, how could the -sphere of guilt, of expiation, of judgment, and as it were the place of -execution of all condemned ones be there?" - -From this intuition Heraclitus took two coherent negations, which are -put into the right light only by a comparison with the propositions of -his predecessor. Firstly, he denied the duality of two quite diverse -worlds, into the assumption of which Anaximander had been pushed; he -no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical, a realm -of definite qualities from a realm of indefinable indefiniteness. Now -after this first step he could neither be kept back any longer from -a still greater audacity of denying: he denied "Being" altogether. -For this one world which was left to him,--shielded all round by -eternal, unwritten laws, flowing up and down in the brazen beat of -rhythm,--shows nowhere persistence, indestructibility, a bulwark in the -stream. Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus exclaimed: "I see nothing -but Becoming. Be not deceived! It is the fault of your limited outlook -and not the fault of the essence of things if you believe that you see -firm land anywhere in the ocean of Becoming and Passing. You need names -for things, just as if they had a rigid permanence, but the very river -in which you bathe a second time is no longer the same one which you -entered before." - -Heraclitus has as his royal property the highest power of intuitive -conception, whereas towards the other mode of conception which is -consummated by ideas and logical combinations, that is towards reason, -he shows himself cool, apathetic, even hostile, and he seems to -derive a pleasure when he is able to contradict reason by means of a -truth gained intuitively, and this he does in such propositions as: -"Everything has always its opposite within itself," so fearlessly -that Aristotle before the tribunal of Reason accuses him of the -highest crime, of having sinned against the law of opposition. -Intuitive representation however embraces two things: firstly, the -present, motley, changing world, pressing on us in all experiences, -secondly, the conditions by means of which alone any experience of -this world becomes possible: time and space. For these are able to be -intuitively apprehended, purely in themselves and independent of any -experience; _i.e.,_ they can be perceived, although they are without -definite contents. If now Heraclitus considered time in this fashion, -dissociated from all experiences, he had in it the most instructive -monogram of all that which falls within the realm of intuitive -conception. Just as he conceived of time, so also for instance did -Schopenhauer, who repeatedly says of it: that in it every instant -exists only in so far as it has annihilated the preceding one, its -father, in order to be itself effaced equally quickly; that past -and future are as unreal as any dream; that the present is only the -dimensionless and unstable boundary between the two; that however, like -time, so space, and again like the latter, so also everything that -is simultaneously in space and time, has only a relative existence, -only through and for the sake of a something else, of the same kind -as itself, _i.e.,_ existing only under the same limitations. This -truth is in the highest degree self-evident, accessible to everyone, -and just for that very reason, abstractly and rationally, it is only -attained with great difficulty. Whoever has this truth before his eyes -must however also proceed at once to the next Heraclitean consequence -and say that the whole essence of actuality is in fact activity, and -that for actuality there is no other kind of existence and reality, -as Schopenhauer has likewise expounded ("The World As Will And Idea," -Vol. I., Bk. I, sec. 4): "Only as active does it fill space and time: -its action upon the immediate object determines the perception in -which alone it exists: the effect of the action of any material object -upon any other, is known only in so far as the latter acts upon the -immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted before; -it consists in this alone. Cause and effect thus constitute the whole -nature of matter; its true being _is_ its action. The totality of -everything material is therefore very appropriately called in German -_Wirklichkeit_ (actuality)--a word which is far more expressive than -_Realität_ (reality).[2] That upon which actuality acts is always -matter; actuality's whole 'Being' and essence therefore consist only in -the orderly change, which _one_ part of it causes in another, and is -therefore wholly relative, according to a relation which is valid only -within the boundary of actuality, as in the case of time and space." - -The eternal and exclusive Becoming, the total instability of all -reality and actuality, which continually works and becomes and never -_is,_ as Heraclitus teaches--is an awful and appalling conception, -and in its effects most nearly related to that sensation, by which -during an earthquake one loses confidence in the firmly-grounded earth. -It required an astonishing strength to translate this effect into -its opposite, into the sublime, into happy astonishment. Heraclitus -accomplished this through an observation of the proper course of all -Becoming and Passing, which he conceived of under the form of polarity, -as the divergence of a force into two qualitatively different, opposite -actions, striving after reunion. A quality is set continually at -variance with itself and separates itself into its opposites: these -opposites continually strive again one towards another. The common -people of course think to recognise something rigid, completed, -consistent; but the fact of the matter is that at any instant, bright -and dark, sour and sweet are side by side and attached to one another -like two wrestlers of whom sometimes the one succeeds, sometimes the -other. According to Heraclitus honey is at the same time sweet and -bitter, and the world itself an amphora whose contents constantly need -stirring up. Out of the war of the opposites all Becoming originates; -the definite and to us seemingly persistent qualities express only the -momentary predominance of the one fighter, but with that the war is not -at an end; the wrestling continues to all eternity. Everything happens -according to this struggle, and this very struggle manifests eternal -justice. It is a wonderful conception, drawn from the purest source -of Hellenism, which considers the struggle as the continual sway of a -homogeneous, severe justice bound by eternal laws. Only a Greek was -able to consider this conception as the fundament of a _Cosmodicy;_ it -is Hesiod's good Eris transfigured into the cosmic principle, it is -the idea of a contest, an idea held by individual Greeks and by their -State, and translated out of the gymnasia and palæstra, out of the -artistic agonistics, out of the struggle of the political parties and -of the towns into the most general principle, so that the machinery of -the universe is regulated by it. Just as every Greek fought as though -he alone were in the right, and as though an absolutely sure standard -of judicial opinion could at any instant decide whither victory is -inclining, thus the qualities wrestle one with another, according to -inviolable laws and standards which are inherent in the struggle. The -Things themselves in the permanency of which the limited intellect of -man and animal believes, do not "exist" at all; they are as the fierce -flashing and fiery sparkling of drawn swords, as the stars of Victory -rising with a radiant resplendence in the battle of the opposite -qualities. - -That struggle which is peculiar to all Becoming, that eternal -interchange of victory is again described by Schopenhauer: ("The World -As Will And Idea," Vol. I., Bk. 2, sec. 27) "The permanent matter -must constantly change its form; for under the guidance of causality, -mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving -to appear, wrest the matter from each other, for each desires to -reveal its own Idea. This strife may be followed up through the whole -of nature; indeed nature exists only through it." The following pages -give the most noteworthy illustrations of this struggle, only that -the prevailing tone of this description ever remains other than that -of Heraclitus in so far as to Schopenhauer the struggle is a proof of -the Will to Life falling out with itself; it is to him a feasting -on itself on the part of this dismal, dull impulse, as a phenomenon -on the whole horrible and not at all making for happiness. The arena -and the object of this struggle is Matter,--which some natural forces -alternately endeavour to disintegrate and build up again at the expense -of other natural forces,--as also Space and Time, the union of which -through causality _is_ this very matter. - - -[2] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo -sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat (Seneca, Epist. -81).--TR. - - - -6 - - -Whilst the imagination of Heraclitus measured the restlessly moving -universe, the "actuality" (_Wirklichkeit_), with the eye of the happy -spectator, who sees innumerable pairs wrestling in joyous combat -entrusted to the superintendence of severe umpires, a still higher -presentiment seized him, he no longer could contemplate the wrestling -pairs and the umpires, separated one from another; the very umpires -seemed to fight, and the fighters seemed to be their own judges--yea, -since at the bottom he conceived only of the one Justice eternally -swaying, he dared to exclaim: "The contest of The Many is itself pure -justice. And after all: The One is The Many. For what are all those -qualities according to their nature? Are they immortal gods? Are they -separate beings working for themselves from the beginning and without -end? And if the world which we see knows only Becoming and Passing but -no Permanence, should perhaps those qualities constitute a differently -fashioned metaphysical world, true, not a world of unity as Anaximander -sought behind the fluttering veil of plurality, but a world of eternal -and essential pluralities?" Is it possible that however violently he -had denied such duality, Heraclitus has after all by a round-about way -accidentally got into the dual cosmic order, an order with an Olympus -of numerous immortal gods and demons,--viz., _many_ realities,--and -with a human world, which sees only the dust-cloud of the Olympic -struggle and the flashing of divine spears,--_i.e.,_ only a Becoming? -Anaximander had fled just from these definite qualities into the lap of -the metaphysical "Indefinite"; because the former _became_ and passed, -he had denied them a true and essential existence; however should it -not seem now as if the Becoming is only the looming-into-view of a -struggle of eternal qualities? When we speak of the Becoming, should -not the original cause of this be sought in the peculiar feebleness of -human cognition--whereas in the nature of things there is perhaps no -Becoming, but only a co-existing of many true increate indestructible -realities? - -These are Heraclitean loop-holes and labyrinths; he exclaims once -again: "The 'One' is the 'Many'." The many perceptible qualities are -neither eternal entities, nor phantasmata of our senses (Anaxagoras -conceives them later on as the former, Parmenides as the latter), -they are neither rigid, sovereign "Being" nor fleeting Appearance -hovering in human minds. The third possibility which alone was left -to Heraclitus nobody will be able to divine with dialectic sagacity -and as it were by calculation, for what he invented here is a rarity -even in the realm of mystic incredibilities and unexpected cosmic -metaphors.--The world is the _Game_ of Zeus, or expressed more -physically, the game of fire with itself, the "One" is only in this -sense at the same time the "Many."-- - -In order to elucidate in the first place the introduction of fire as -a world-shaping force, I recall how Anaximander had further developed -the theory of water as the origin of things. Placing confidence in the -essential part of Thales' theory, and strengthening and adding to the -latter's observations, Anaximander however was not to be convinced -that before the water and, as it were, after the water there was no -further stage of quality: no, to him out of the Warm and the Cold -the Moist seemed to form itself, and the Warm and the Cold therefore -were supposed to be the preliminary stages, the still more original -qualities. With their issuing forth from the primordial existence -of the "Indefinite," Becoming begins. Heraclitus who as physicist -subordinated himself to the importance of Anaximander, explains to -himself this Anaximandrian "Warm" as the respiration, the warm breath, -the dry vapours, in short as the fiery element: about this fire he now -enunciates the same as Thales and Anaximander had enunciated about -the water: that in innumerable metamorphoses it was passing along the -path of Becoming, especially in the three chief aggregate stages as -something Warm, Moist, and Firm. For water in descending is transformed -into earth, in ascending into fire: or as Heraclitus appears to have -expressed himself more exactly: from the sea ascend only the pure -vapours which serve as food to the divine fire of the stars, from the -earth only the dark, foggy ones, from which the Moist derives its -nourishment. The pure vapours are the transitional stage in the passing -of sea into fire, the impure the transitional stage in the passing -of earth into water. Thus the two paths of metamorphosis of the fire -run continuously side by side, upwards and downwards, to and fro, from -fire to water, from water to earth, from earth back again to water, -from water to fire. Whereas Heraclitus is a follower of Anaximander in -the most important of these conceptions, _e.g.,_ that the fire is kept -up by the evaporations, or herein, that out of the water is dissolved -partly earth, partly fire; he is on the other hand quite independent -and in opposition to Anaximander in excluding the "Cold" from the -physical process, whilst Anaximander had put it side by side with the -"Warm" as having the same rights, so as to let the "Moist" originate -out of both. To do so, was of course a necessity to Heraclitus, for -if everything is to be fire, then, however many possibilities of its -transformation might be assumed, nothing can exist that would be the -absolute antithesis to fire; he has, therefore, probably interpreted -only as a degree of the "Warm" that which is called the "Cold," and -he could justify this interpretation without difficulty. Much more -important than this deviation from the doctrine of Anaximander is a -further agreement; he, like the latter, believes in an end of the -world periodically repeating itself and in an ever-renewed emerging of -another world out of the all-destroying world-fire. The period during -which the world hastens towards that world-fire and the dissolution -into pure fire is characterised by him most strikingly as a demand -and a need; the state of being completely swallowed up by the fire as -satiety; and now to us remains the question as to how he understood -and named the newly awakening impulse for world-creation, the -pouring-out-of-itself into the forms of plurality. The Greek proverb -seems to come to our assistance with the thought that "satiety gives -birth to crime" (the Hybris) and one may indeed ask oneself for a -minute whether perhaps Heraclitus has derived that return to plurality -out of the Hybris. Let us just take this thought seriously: in its -light the face of Heraclitus changes before our eyes, the proud gleam -of his eyes dies out, a wrinkled expression of painful resignation, of -impotence becomes distinct, it seems that we know why later antiquity -called him the "weeping philosopher." Is not the whole world-process -now an act of punishment of the Hybris? The plurality the result of a -crime? The transformation of the pure into the impure, the consequence -of injustice? Is not the guilt now shifted into the essence of the -things and indeed, the world of Becoming and of individuals accordingly -exonerated from guilt; yet at the same time are they not condemned for -ever and ever to bear the consequences of guilt? - - - -7 - - -That dangerous word, Hybris, is indeed the touchstone for every -Heraclitean; here he may show whether he has understood or mistaken -his master. Is there in this world: Guilt, injustice, contradiction, -suffering? - -Yes, exclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human being, who -sees divergently and not convergently, not for the contuitive god; -to him everything opposing converges into one harmony, invisible it -is true to the common human eye, yet comprehensible to him who like -Heraclitus resembles the contemplative god. Before his fiery eye no -drop of injustice is left in the world poured out around him, and even -that cardinal obstacle--how pure fire can take up its quarters in -forms so impure--he masters by means of a sublime simile. A Becoming -and Passing, a building and destroying, without any moral bias, in -perpetual innocence is in this world only the play of the artist and of -the child. And similarly, just as the child and the artist play, the -eternally living fire plays, builds up and destroys, in innocence--and -this game the _Æon_ plays with himself. Transforming himself into water -and earth, like a child he piles heaps of sand by the sea, piles up -and demolishes; from time to time he recommences the game. A moment of -satiety, then again desire seizes him, as desire compels the artist to -create. Not wantonness, but the ever newly awakening impulse to play, -calls into life other worlds. The child throws away his toys; but soon -he starts again in an innocent frame of mind. As soon however as the -child builds he connects, joins and forms lawfully and according to an -innate sense of order. - -Thus only is the world contemplated by the æsthetic man, who has -learned from the artist and the genesis of the latter's work, how the -struggle of plurality can yet bear within itself law and justice, -how the artist stands contemplative above, and working within the -work of art, how necessity and play, antagonism and harmony must pair -themselves for the procreation of the work of art. - -Who now will still demand from such a philosophy a system of Ethics -with the necessary imperatives--Thou Shalt,--or even reproach -Heraclitus with such a deficiency. Man down to his last fibre is -Necessity and absolutely "unfree "--if by freedom one understands the -foolish claim to be able to change at will one's _essentia_ like a -garment, a claim, which up to the present every serious philosophy -has rejected with due scorn. That so few human beings live with -consciousness in the _Logos_ and in accordance with the all-overlooking -artist's eye originates from their souls being wet and from the fact -that men's eyes and ears, their intellect in general is a bad witness -when "moist ooze fills their souls." Why that is so, is not questioned -any more than why fire becomes water and earth. Heraclitus is not -_compelled_ to prove (as Leibnitz was) that this world was even the -best of all; it was sufficient for him that the world is the beautiful, -innocent play of the _Æon._ Man on the whole is to him even an -irrational being, with which the fact that in all his essence the law -of all-ruling reason is fulfilled does lot clash. He does not occupy -a specially favoured position in nature, whose highest phenomenon is -not simple-minded man, but fire, for instance, as stars. In so far as -man has through necessity received a share of fire, he is a little -more rational; as far as he consists of earth and water it stands -badly with his reason. He is not compelled to take cognisance of the -_Logos_ simply because he is a human being. Why is there water, why -earth? This to Heraclitus is a much more serious problem than to ask, -why men are so stupid and bad. In the highest and the most perverted -men the same inherent lawfulness and justice manifest themselves. -If however one would ask Heraclitus the question "Why is fire not -always fire, why is it now water, now earth?" then he would only just -answer: "It is a game, don't take it too pathetically and still less, -morally." Heraclitus describes only the existing world and has the same -contemplative pleasure in it which the artist experiences when looking -at his growing work. Only those who have cause to be discontented -with his natural history of man find him gloomy, melancholy, tearful, -sombre, atrabilarious, pessimistic and altogether hateful. He however -would take these discontented people, together with their antipathies -and sympathies, their hatred und their love, as negligible and perhaps -answer them with some such comment as: "Dogs bark at anything they do -not know," or, "To the ass chaff is preferable to gold." - -With such discontented persons also originate the numerous complaints -as to the obscurity of the Heraclitean style; probably no man has ever -written clearer and more illuminatingly; of course, very abruptly, -and therefore naturally obscure to the racing readers. But why a -philosopher should intentionally write obscurely--a thing habitually -said about Heraclitus--is absolutely inexplicable; unless he has some -cause to hide his thoughts or is sufficiently a rogue to conceal his -thoughtlessness underneath words. One is, as Schopenhauer says, indeed -compelled by lucid expression to prevent misunderstandings even in -affairs of practical every-day life, how then should one be allowed to -express oneself indistinctly, indeed puzzlingly in the most difficult, -most abstruse, scarcely attainable object of thinking, the tasks of -philosophy? With respect to brevity however Jean Paul gives a good -precept: "On the whole it is right that everything great--of deep -meaning to a rare mind--should be uttered with brevity and (therefore) -obscurely so that the paltry mind would rather proclaim it to be -nonsense than translate it into the realm of his empty-headedness. -For common minds have an ugly ability to perceive in the deepest and -richest saying nothing but their own every-day opinion." Moreover and -in spite of it Heraclitus has not escaped the "paltry minds"; already -the Stoics have "re-expounded" him into the shallow and dragged down -his æsthetic fundamental-perception as to the play of the world to the -miserable level of the common regard for the practical ends of the -world and more explicitly for the advantages of man, so that out of his -Physics has arisen in those heads a crude optimism, with the continual -invitation to Dick, Tom, and Harry, "_Plaudite amici!_" - - - -8 - - -Heraclitus was proud; and if it comes to pride with a philosopher then -it is a great pride. His work never refers him to a "public," the -applause of the masses and the hailing chorus of contemporaries. To -wander lonely along his path belongs to the nature of the philosopher. -His talents are the most rare, in a certain sense the most unnatural -and at the same time exclusive and hostile even toward kindred talents. -The wall of his self-sufficiency must be of diamond, if it is not to -be demolished and broken, for everything is in motion against him. His -journey to immortality is more cumbersome and impeded than any other -and yet nobody can believe more firmly than the philosopher that he -will attain the goal by that journey--because he does not know where -he is to stand if not on the widely spread wings of all time; for the -disregard of everything present and momentary lies in the essence of -the great philosophic nature. He has truth; the wheel of time may roll -whither it pleases, never can it escape from truth. It is important -to hear that such men have lived. Never for example would one be able -to imagine the pride of Heraclitus as an idle possibility. In itself -every endeavour after knowledge seems by its nature to be eternally -unsatisfied and unsatisfactory. Therefore nobody unless instructed -by history will like to believe in such a royal self-esteem and -conviction of being the only wooer of truth. Such men live in their -own solar-system--one has to look for them there. A Pythagoras, an -Empedocles treated themselves too with a super-human esteem, yea, with -almost religious awe; but the tie of sympathy united with the great -conviction of the metempsychosis and the unity of everything living, -led them back to other men, for their welfare and salvation. Of that -feeling of solitude, however, which permeated the Ephesian recluse -of the Artemis Temple, one can only divine something, when growing -benumbed in the wildest mountain desert. No paramount feeling of -compassionate agitation, no desire to help, heal and save emanates from -him. He is a star without an atmosphere. His eye, directed blazingly -inwards, looks outward, for appearance's sake only, extinct and icy. -All around him, immediately upon the citadel of his pride beat the -waves of folly and perversity: with loathing he turns away from them. -But men with a feeling heart would also shun such a Gorgon monster -as cast out of brass; within an out-of-the-way sanctuary, among the -statues of gods, by the side of cold composedly-sublime architecture -such a being may appear more comprehensible. As man among men -Heraclitus was incredible; and though he was seen paying attention to -the play of noisy children, even then he was reflecting upon what never -man thought of on such an occasion: the play of the great world-child, -Zeus. He had no need of men, not even for his discernments. He was -not interested in all that which one might perhaps ascertain from -them, and in what the other sages before him had been endeavouring to -ascertain. He spoke with disdain of such questioning, collecting, in -short "historic" men. "I sought and investigated myself," he said, with -a word by which one designates the investigation of an oracle; as if -he and no one else were the true fulfiller and achiever of the Delphic -precept: "Know thyself." - -What he learned from this oracle, he deemed immortal wisdom, and -eternally worthy of explanation, of unlimited effect even in the -distance, after the model of the prophetic speeches of the Sibyl. -It is sufficient for the latest mankind: let the latter have that -expounded to her, as oracular sayings, which he like the Delphic god -"neither enunciates nor conceals." Although it is proclaimed by him, -"without smiles, finery and the scent of ointments," but rather as with -"foaming mouth," it _must_ force its way through the millenniums of -the future. For the world needs truth eternally, therefore she needs -also Heraclitus eternally; although he has no need of her. What does -his fame matter to _him?_--fame with "mortals ever flowing on!" as he -exclaims scornfully. His fame is of concern to man, not to himself; -the immortality of mankind needs him, not he the immortality of the -man Heraclitus. That which he beheld, _the doctrine of the Law in the -Becoming, and of the Play in the Necessity,_ must henceforth be beheld -eternally; he has raised the curtain of this greatest stage-play. - - - -9 - - -Whereas in every word of Heraclitus are expressed the pride and the -majesty of truth, but of truth caught by intuitions, not scaled by -the rope-ladder of Logic, whereas in sublime ecstasy he beholds but -does not espy, discerns but does not reckon, he is contrasted with his -contemporary _Parmenides,_ a man likewise with the type of a prophet -of truth, but formed as it were out of ice and not out of fire, and -shedding around himself cold, piercing light. - -Parmenides once had, probably in his later years, a moment of the -very purest abstraction, undimmed by any reality, perfectly lifeless; -this moment--un-Greek, like no other in the two centuries of the -Tragic Age--the product of which is the doctrine of "Being," became a -boundary-stone for his own life, which divided it into two periods; at -the same time however the same moment divides the pre-Socratic thinking -into two halves, of which the first might be called the Anaximandrian, -the second the Parmenidean. The first period in Parmenides' own -philosophising bears still the signature of Anaximander; this -period produced a detailed philosophic-physical system as answer to -Anaximander's questions. When later that icy abstraction-horror caught -him, and the simplest proposition treating of "Being" and "Not-Being" -was advanced by him, then among the many older doctrines thrown by him -upon the scrap heap was also his own system. However he does not appear -to have lost all paternal piety towards the strong and well-shapen -child of his youth, and he saved himself therefore by saying: "It is -true there is only one right way; if one however wants at any time to -betake oneself to another, then my earlier opinion according to its -purity and consequence alone is right." Sheltering himself with this -phrase he has allowed his former physical system a worthy and extensive -space in his great poem on Nature, which really was to proclaim the -new discernment as the only signpost to truth. This fatherly regard, -even though an error should have crept in through it, is a remainder -of human feeling, in a nature quite petrified by logical rigidity and -almost changed into a thinking-machine. - -Parmenides, whose personal intercourse with Anaximander does not seem -incredible to me, and whose starting from Anaximander's doctrine is -not only credible but evident, had the same distrust for the complete -separation of a world which only is, and a world which only becomes, as -had also caught Heraclitus and led to a denying of "Being" altogether. -Both sought a way out from that contrast and divergence of a dual order -of the world. That leap into the Indefinite, Indefinable, by which -once for all Anaximander had escaped from the realm of Becoming and -from the empirically given qualities of such realm, that leap did not -become an easy matter to minds so independently fashioned as those of -Heraclitus and Parmenides; first they endeavoured to walk as far as -they could and reserved to themselves the leap for that place, where -the foot finds no more hold and one has to leap, in order not to fall. -Both looked repeatedly at that very world, which Anaximander had -condemned in so melancholy a way and declared to be the place of wanton -crime and at the same time the penitentiary cell for the injustice of -Becoming. Contemplating this world Heraclitus, as we know already, had -discovered what a wonderful order, regularity and security manifest -themselves in every Becoming; from that he concluded that the Becoming -could not be anything evil and unjust. Quite a different outlook had -Parmenides; he compared the qualities one with another, and believed -that they were not all of the same kind, but ought to be classified -under two headings. If for example he compared bright and dark, then -the second quality was obviously only the _negation_ of the first; -and thus he distinguished positive and negative qualities, seriously -endeavouring to rediscover and register that fundamental antithesis -in the whole realm of Nature. His method was the following: He took a -few antitheses, _e.g.,_ light and heavy, rare and dense, active and -passive, and compared them with that typical antithesis of bright and -dark: that which corresponded with the bright was the positive, that -which corresponded with the dark the negative quality. If he took -perhaps the heavy and light, the light fell to the side of the bright, -the heavy to the side of the dark; and thus "heavy" was to him only -the negation of "light," but the "light" a positive quality. This -method alone shows that he had a defiant aptitude for abstract logical -procedure, closed against the suggestions of the senses. The "heavy" -seems indeed to offer itself very forcibly to the senses as a positive -quality; that did not keep Parmenides from stamping it as a negation. -Similarly he placed the earth in opposition to the fire, the "cold" -in opposition to the "warm," the "dense" in opposition to the "rare," -the "female" in opposition to the "male," the "passive" in opposition -to the "active," merely as negations: so that before his gaze our -empiric world divided itself into two separate spheres, into that -of the positive qualities--with a bright, fiery, warm, light, rare, -active-masculine character--and into that of the negative qualities. -The latter express really only the lack, the absence of the others, the -positive ones. He therefore described the sphere in which the positive -qualities are absent as dark, earthy, cold, heavy, dense and altogether -as of feminine-passive character. Instead of the expressions "positive" -and "negative" he used the standing term "existent" and "non-existent" -and had arrived with this at the proposition, that, in contradiction to -Anaximander, this our world itself contains something "existent," and -of course something "non-existent." One is not to seek that "existent" -outside the world and as it were above our horizon; but before us, -and everywhere in every Becoming, something "existent" and active is -contained. - -With that however still remained to him the task of giving the more -exact answer to the question: What is the Becoming? and here was the -moment where he had to leap, in order not to fall, although perhaps to -such natures as that of Parmenides, even any leaping means a falling. -Enough! we get into fog, into the mysticism of _qualitates occultæ,_ -and even a little into mythology. Parmenides, like Heraclitus, looks -at the general Becoming and Not-remaining and explains to himself a -Passing only thus, that the "Non-Existent" bore the guilt. For how -should the "Existent" bear the guilt of Passing? Likewise, however, -the Originating, i.e., the Becoming, must come about through the -assistance of the "Non-Existent"; for the "Existent" is always there -and could not of itself first originate and it could not explain any -Originating, any Becoming. Therefore the Originating, the Becoming -as well as the Passing and Perishing have been brought about by the -negative qualities. But that the originating "thing" has a content, -and the passing "thing" loses a content, presupposes that the positive -qualities--and that just means that very content--participate -likewise in both processes. In short the proposition results: "For the -Becoming the 'Existent' as well as the 'Non-Existent' is necessary; -when they co-operate then a Becoming results." But how come the -"positive" and the "negative" to one another? Should they not on the -contrary eternally flee one another as antitheses and thereby make -every Becoming impossible? Here Parmenides appeals to a _qualitas -occulta,_ to a mystic tendency of the antithetical pairs to approach -and attract one another, and he allegorises that peculiar contrariety -by the name of Aphrodite, and by the empirically known relation of -the male and female principle. It is the power of Aphrodite which -plays the matchmaker between the antithetical pair, the "Existent" -and the "Non-Existent." Passion brings together the antagonistic and -antipathetic elements: the result is a Becoming. When Desire has become -satiated, Hatred and the innate antagonism again drive asunder the -"Existent" and the "Non-Existent"--then man says: the thing perishes, -passes. - - - -10 - - -But no one with impunity lays his profane hands on such awful -abstractions as the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent"; the blood -freezes slowly as one touches them. There was a day upon which an odd -idea suddenly occurred to Parmenides, an idea which seemed to take -all value away from his former combinations, so that he felt inclined -to throw them aside, like a money bag with old worn-out coins. It is -commonly believed that an external impression, in addition to the -centrifugal consequence of such ideas as "existent" and "non-existent," -has also been co-active in the invention of that day; this impression -was an acquaintance with the theology of the old roamer and rhapsodist, -the singer of a mystic deification of Nature, the Kolophonian -_Xenophanes._ Throughout an extraordinary life Xenophanes lived as -a wandering poet and became through his travels a well-informed and -most instructive man who knew how to question and how to narrate, for -which reason Heraclitus reckoned him amongst the polyhistorians and -above all amongst the "historic" natures, in the sense mentioned. -Whence and when came to him the mystic bent into the One and the -eternally Resting, nobody will be able to compute; perhaps it is only -the conception of the finally settled old man, to whom, after the -agitation of his erratic wanderings, and after the restless learning -and searching for truth, the vision of a divine rest, the permanence of -all things within a pantheistic primal peace appears as _the_ highest -and greatest ideal. After all it seems to me quite accidental that in -the same place in Elea two men lived together for a time, each of whom -carried in his head a conception of unity; they formed no school and -had nothing in common which perhaps the one might have learned from -the other and then might have handed on. For, in the case of these two -men, the origin of that conception of unity is quite different, yea -opposite; and if either of them has become at all acquainted with the -doctrine of the other then, in order to understand it at all, he had to -translate it first into his own language. With this translation however -the very specific element of the other doctrine was lost. Whereas -Parmenides arrived at the unity of the "Existent" purely through an -alleged logical consequence and whereas he span that unity out of the -ideas "Being" and "Not-Being," Xenophanes was a religious mystic and -belonged, with that mystic unity, very properly to the Sixth Century. -Although he was no such revolutionising personality as Pythagoras -he had nevertheless in his wanderings the same bent and impulse to -improve, purify, and cure men. He was the ethical teacher, but still -in the stage of the rhapsodist; in a later time he would have been -a sophist. In the daring disapproval of the existing customs and -valuations he had not his equal in Greece; moreover he did not, like -Heraclitus and Plato, retire into solitude but placed himself before -the very public, whose exulting admiration of Homer, whose passionate -propensity for the honours of the gymnastic festivals, whose adoration -of stones in human shape, he criticised severely with wrath and scorn, -yet not as a brawling Thersites. The freedom of the individual was with -him on its zenith; and by this almost limitless stepping free from all -conventions he was more closely related to Parmenides than by that last -divine unity, which once he had beheld, in a visionary state worthy of -that century. His unity scarcely had expression and word in common with -the one "Being" of Parmenides, and certainly had not the same origin. - -It was rather an opposite state of mind in which Parmenides found his -doctrine of "Being," On that day and in that state he examined his -two co-operating antitheses, the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent," -the positive and the negative qualities, of which Desire and Hatred -constitute the world and the Becoming. He was suddenly caught up, -mistrusting, by the idea of negative quality, of the "Non-Existent." -For can something which does not exist be a quality? or to put the -question in a broader sense: can anything indeed which does not exist, -exist? The only form of knowledge in which we at once put unconditional -trust and the disapproval of which amounts to madness, is the tautology -A = A. But this very tautological knowledge called inexorably to him: -what does not exist, exists not! What is, is! Suddenly he feels -upon his life the load of an enormous logical sin; for had he not -always without hesitation assumed that _there were existing_ negative -qualities, in short a "Non-Existent," that therefore, to express it by -a formula, A = Not-A, which indeed could only be advanced by the most -out and out perversity of thinking. It is true, as he recollected, the -whole great mass of men judge with the same perversity; he himself -has only participated in the general crime against logic. But the -same moment which charges him with this crime surrounds him with the -light of the glory of an invention, he has found, apart from all human -illusion, a principle, the key to the world-secret, he now descends -into the abyss of things, guided by the firm and fearful hand of the -tautological truth as to "Being." - -On the way thither he meets Heraclitus--an unfortunate encounter! Just -now Heraclitus' play with antinomies was bound to be very hateful to -him, who placed the utmost importance upon the severest separation of -"Being" and "Not-Being"; propositions like this: "We are and at the -same time we are not" --"'Being' and 'Not-Being' is at the same time -the same thing and again not the same thing," propositions through -which all that he had just elucidated and disentangled became again -dim and inextricable, incited him to wrath. "Away with the men," he -exclaimed, "who seem to have two heads and yet know nothing! With them -truly everything is in flux, even their thinking! They stare at things -stupidly, but they must be deaf as well as blind so to mix up the -opposites"! The want of judgment on the part of the masses, glorified -by playful antinomies and praised as the acme of all knowledge was to -him a painful and incomprehensible experience. - -Now he dived into the cold bath of his awful abstractions. That which -is true must exist in eternal presence, about it cannot be said "it -was," "it will be." The "Existent" cannot have become; for out of what -should it have become? Out of the "Non-Existent"? But that does not -exist and can produce nothing. Out of the "Existent"? This would not -produce anything but itself. The same applies to the Passing, it is -just as impossible as the Becoming, as any change, any increase, any -decrease. On the whole the proposition is valid: Everything about which -it can be said: "it has been" or "it will be" does not exist; about -the "Existent" however it can never be said "it does not exist." The -"Existent" is indivisible, for where is the second power, which should -divide it? It is immovable, for whither should it move itself? It -cannot be infinitely great nor infinitely small, for it is perfect and -a perfectly given infinitude is a contradiction. Thus the "Existent" -is suspended, delimited, perfect, immovable, everywhere equally -balanced and such equilibrium equally perfect at any point, like a -globe, but not in a space, for otherwise this space would be a second -"Existent." But there cannot exist several "Existents," for in order to -separate them, something would have to exist which was not existing, an -assumption which neutralises itself. Thus there exists only the eternal -Unity. - -If now, however, Parmenides turned back his gaze to the world of -Becoming, the existence of which he had formerly tried to understand -by such ingenious conjectures, he was wroth at his eye seeing the -Becoming at all, his ear hearing it. "Do not follow the dim-sighted -eyes," now his command runs, "not the resounding ear nor the -tongue, but examine only by the power of the thought." Therewith he -accomplished the extremely important first critique of the apparatus -of knowledge, although this critique was still inadequate and proved -disastrous in its consequences. By tearing entirely asunder the -senses and the ability to think in abstractions, _i.e._ reason, just -as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he demolished -the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous -separation of "mind" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies -like a curse on philosophy. All sense perceptions, Parmenides judges, -cause only illusions and their chief illusion is their deluding us to -believe that even the "Non-Existent" exists, that even the Becoming has -a "Being." All that plurality, diversity and variety of the empirically -known world, the change of its qualities, the order in its ups and -downs, is thrown aside mercilessly as mere appearance and delusion; -from there nothing is to be learnt, therefore all labour is wasted -which one bestows upon this false, through-and-through futile world, -the conception of which has been obtained by being hum-bugged by the -senses. He who judges in such generalisations as Parmenides did, ceases -therewith to be an investigator of natural philosophy in detail; his -interest in phenomena withers away; there develops even a hatred of -being unable to get rid of this eternal fraud of the senses. Truth is -now to dwell only in the most faded, most abstract generalities, in the -empty husks of the most indefinite words, as in a maze of cobwebs; and -by such a "truth" now the philosopher sits, bloodless as an abstraction -and surrounded by a web of formulæ. The spider undoubtedly wants the -blood of its victims; but the Parmenidean philosopher hates the very -blood of his victims, the blood of Empiricism sacrificed by him. - - - -11 - - -And that was a Greek who "flourished" about the time of the outbreak -of the Ionic Revolution. At that time it was possible for a Greek -to flee out of the superabundant reality, as out of a mere delusive -schematism of the imaginative faculties--not perhaps like Plato into -the land of the eternal ideas, into the workshop of the world-creator, -in order to feast the eyes on unblemished, unbreakable primal-forms of -things--but into the rigid death-like rest of the coldest and emptiest -conception, that of the "Being." We will indeed beware of interpreting -such a remarkable fact by false analogies. That flight was not a -world-flight in the sense of Indian philosophers; no deep religious -conviction as to the depravity, transitoriness and accursedness of -Existence demanded that flight--that ultimate goal, the rest in the -"Being," was not striven after as the mystic absorption in _one_ -all-sufficing enrapturing conception which is a puzzle and a scandal -to common men. The thought of Parmenides bears in itself not the -slightest trace of the intoxicating mystical Indian fragrance, which -is perhaps not wholly imperceptible in Pythagoras and Empedocles; the -strange thing in that fact, at this period, is rather the very absence -of fragrance, colour, soul, form, the total lack of blood, religiosity -and ethical warmth, the abstract-schematic--in a Greek!--above all -however our philosopher's awful energy of striving after _Certainty,_ -in a mythically thinking and highly emotional--fantastic age is quite -remarkable. "Grant me but a certainty, ye gods!"is the prayer of -Parmenides, "and be it, in the ocean of Uncertainty, only a board, -broad enough to lie on! Everything becoming, everything luxuriant, -varied, blossoming, deceiving, stimulating, living, take all that for -yourselves, and give to me but the single poor empty Certainty!" - -In the philosophy of Parmenides the theme of ontology forms the -prelude. Experience offered him nowhere a "Being" as he imagined it to -himself, but from the fact that he could conceive of it he concluded -that it must exist; a conclusion which rests upon the supposition -that we have an organ of knowledge which reaches into the nature of -things and is independent of experience. The material of our thinking -according to Parmenides does not exist in perception at all but is -brought in from somewhere else, from an extra-material world to which -by thinking we have a direct access. Against all similar chains of -reasoning Aristotle has already asserted that existence never belongs -to the essence, never belongs to the nature of a thing. For that very -reason from the idea of "Being"--of which the _essentia_ precisely is -only the "Being"--cannot be inferred an _existentia_ of the "Being" at -all. The logical content of that antithesis "Being" and "Not-Being" -is perfectly nil, if the object lying at the bottom of it, if the -precept cannot be given from which this antithesis has been deduced -by abstraction; without this going back to the precept the antithesis -is only a play with conceptions, through which indeed nothing is -discerned. For the merely logical criterion of truth, as Kant teaches, -namely the agreement of a discernment with the general and the formal -laws of intellect and reason is, it is true, the _conditio sine qua -non,_ consequently the negative condition of all truth; further however -logic cannot go, and logic cannot discover by any touchstone the error -which pertains not to the form but to the contents. As soon, however, -as one seeks the content for the logical truth of the antithesis: -"That which is, is; that which is not, is not," one will find indeed -not a simple reality, which is fashioned rigidly according to that -antithesis: about a tree I can say as well "it is" in comparison with -all the other things, as well "it becomes" in comparison with itself -at another moment of time as finally also "it is not," _e.g._," it is -not yet tree," as long as I perhaps look at the shrub. Words are only -symbols for the relations of things among themselves and to us, and -nowhere touch absolute truth; and now to crown all, the word "Being" -designates only the most general relation, which connects all things, -and so does the word "Not-Being." If however the Existence of the -things themselves be unprovable, then the relation of the things among -themselves, the so-called "Being" and "Not-Being," will not bring us -any nearer to the land of truth. By means of words and ideas we shall -never get behind the wall of the relations, let us say into some -fabulous primal cause of things, and even in the pure forms of the -sensitive faculty and of the intellect, in space, time and causality -we gain nothing, which might resemble a "_Veritas æterna?_" It is -absolutely impossible for the subject to see and discern something -beyond himself, so impossible that Cognition and "Being" are the most -contradictory of all spheres. And if in the uninstructed _naïveté_ -of the then critique of the intellect Parmenides was permitted to -fancy that out of the eternally subjective idea he had come to a -"Being-In-itself," then it is to-day, after Kant, a daring ignorance, -if here and there, especially among badly informed theologians who -want to play the philosopher, is proposed as the task of philosophy: -"to conceive the Absolute by means of consciousness," perhaps even -in the form: "the Absolute is already extant, else how could it be -sought?" as Hegel has expressed himself, or with the saying of Beneke: -"that the 'Being' must be given somehow, must be attainable for us -somehow, since otherwise we could not even have the idea of 'Being.'" -The idea of "Being"! As though that idea did not indicate the most -miserable empiric origin already in the etymology of the word. For -_esse_ means at the bottom: "to breathe," if man uses it of all other -things, then he transmits the conviction that he himself breathes and -lives by means of a metaphor, _i.e.,_ by means of something illogical -to the other things and conceives of their Existence as a Breathing -according to human analogy. Now the original meaning of the word soon -becomes effaced; so much however still remains that man conceives of -the existence of other things according to the analogy of his own -existence, therefore anthropomorphically, and at any rate by means -of an illogical transmission. Even to man, therefore apart from that -transmission, the proposition: "I breathe, therefore a 'Being' exists" -is quite insufficient since against it the same objection must be made, -as against the _ambulo, ergo sum,_ or _ergo est_. - - - -12 - - -The other idea, of greater import than that of the "Existent," and -likewise invented already by Parmenides, although not yet so clearly -applied as by his disciple Zeno is the idea of the Infinite. Nothing -Infinite can exist; for from such an assumption the contradictory -idea of a perfect Infinitude would result. Since now our actuality, -our existing world everywhere shows the character of that perfect -Infinitude, our world signifies in its nature a contradiction against -logic and therewith also against reality and is deception, lie, -fantasma. Zeno especially applied the method of indirect proof; he -said for example, "There can be no motion from one place to another; -for if there were such a motion, then an Infinitude would be given as -perfect, this however is an impossibility." Achilles cannot catch up -the tortoise which has a small start in a race, for in order to reach -only the point from which the tortoise began, he would have had to run -through innumerable, infinitely many spaces, viz., first half of that -space, then the fourth, then the sixteenth, and so on _ad infinitum._ -If he does in fact overtake the tortoise then this is an illogical -phenomenon, and therefore at any rate not a truth, not a reality, not -real "Being," but only a delusion. For it is never possible to finish -the infinite. Another popular expression of this doctrine is the -flying and yet resting arrow. At any instant of its flight it has a -position; in this position it rests. Now would the sum of the infinite -positions of rest be identical with motion? Would now the Resting, -infinitely often repeated, be Motion, therefore its own opposite? -The Infinite is here used as the _aqua fortis_ of reality, through -it the latter is dissolved. If however the Ideas are fixed, eternal -and entitative--and for Parmenides "Being" and Thinking coincide--if -therefore the Infinite can never be perfect, if Rest can never become -Motion, then in fact the arrow has not flown at all; it never left its -place and resting position; no moment of time has passed. Or expressed -in another way: in this so-called yet only alleged Actuality there -exists neither time, nor space, nor motion. Finally the arrow itself is -only an illusion; for it originates out of the Plurality, out of the -phantasmagoria of the "Non-One" produced by the senses. Suppose the -arrow had a "Being," then it would be immovable, timeless, increate, -rigid and eternal--an impossible conception! Supposing that Motion was -truly real, then there would be no rest, therefore no position for the -arrow, therefore no space--an impossible conception! Supposing that -time were real, then it could not be of an infinite divisibility; the -time which the arrow needed, would have to consist of a limited number -of time-moments, each of these moments would have to be an _Atomon_--an -impossible conception! All our conceptions, as soon as their -empirically-given content, drawn out of this concrete world, is taken -as a _Veritas æterna,_ lead to contradictions. If there is absolute -motion, then there is no space; if there is absolute space then there -is no motion; if there is absolute "Being," then there is no Plurality; -if there is an absolute Plurality, then there is no Unity. It should -at least become clear to _us_ how little we touch the heart of things -or untie the knot of reality with such ideas, whereas Parmenides and -Zeno inversely hold fast to the truth and omnivalidity of ideas and -condemn the perceptible world as the opposite of the true and omnivalid -ideas, as an objectivation of the illogical and contradictory. With all -their proofs they start from the wholly undemonstrable, yea improbable -assumption that in that apprehensive faculty we possess the decisive, -highest criterion of "Being" and "Not-Being," _i.e.,_ of objective -reality and its opposite; those ideas are not to prove themselves -true, to correct themselves by Actuality, as they are after all really -derived from it, but on the contrary they are to measure and to judge -Actuality, and in case of a contradiction with logic, even to condemn. -In order to concede to them this judicial competence Parmenides had to -ascribe to them the same "Being," which alone he allowed in general -as _the_ "Being"; Thinking and that one increate perfect ball of the -"Existent" were now no longer to be conceived as two different kinds -of "Being," since there was not permitted a duality of "Being." Thus -the over-risky flash of fancy had become necessary to declare Thinking -and "Being" identical. No form of perceptibility, no symbol, no simile -could possibly be of any help here; the fancy was wholly inconceivable, -but it was necessary, yea in the lack of every possibility of -illustration it celebrated the highest triumph over the world and -the claims of the senses. Thinking and that clod-like, ball-shaped, -through-and-through dead-massive, and rigid-immovable "Being," must, -according to the Parmenidean imperative, dissolve into one another and -be the same in every respect, to the horror of fantasy. What does it -matter that this identity contradicts the senses! This contradiction -is just the guarantee that such an identity is not borrowed from the -senses. - - - -13 - - -Moreover against Parmenides could be produced a strong couple of -_argumenta ad hominem_ or _ex concessis,_ by which, it is true, truth -itself could not be brought to light, but at any rate the untruth of -that absolute separation of the world of the senses and the world of -the ideas, and the untruth of the identity of "Being" and Thinking -could be demonstrated. Firstly, if the Thinking of Reason in ideas is -real, then also Plurality and Motion must have reality, for rational -Thinking is mobile; and more precisely, it is a motion from idea to -idea, therefore within a plurality of realities. There is no subterfuge -against that; it is quite impossible to designate Thinking as a rigid -Permanence, as an eternally immobile, intellectual Introspection of -Unity. Secondly, if only fraud and illusion come from the senses, -and if in reality there exists only the real identity of "Being" and -Thinking, what then are the senses themselves? They too are certainly -Appearance only since they do not coincide with the Thinking, and -their product, the world of senses, does not coincide with "Being." -If however the senses themselves are Appearance to whom then are -they Appearance? How can they, being unreal, still deceive? The -"Non-Existent" cannot even deceive. Therefore the Whence? of deception -and Appearance remains an enigma, yea, a contradiction. We call these -_argumenta ad hominem:_ The Objection Of The Mobile Reason and that -of The Origin Of Appearance. From the first would result the reality -of Motion and of Plurality, from the second the impossibility of the -Parmenidean Appearance, assuming that the chief-doctrine of Parmenides -on the "Being" were accepted as true. This chief-doctrine however only -says: The "Existent" only has a "Being," the "Non-Existent" does not -exist. If Motion however has such a "Being," then to Motion applies -what applies to the "Existent" in general: it is increate, eternal, -indestructible, without increase or decrease. But if the "Appearance" -is denied and a belief in it made untenable, by means of that question -as to the Whence? of the "Appearance," if the stage of the so-called -Becoming, of change, our many-shaped, restless, coloured and rich -Existence is protected from the Parmenidean rejection, then it is -necessary to characterise this world of change and alteration as a -_sum_ of such really existing Essentials, existing simultaneously -into all eternity. Of a change in the strict sense, of a Becoming -there cannot naturally be any question even with this assumption. But -now Plurality has a real "Being," all qualities have a real "Being" -and motion not less; and of any moment of this world--although these -moments chosen at random lie at a distance of millenniums from one -another--it would have to be possible to say: all real Essentials -extant in this world are without exception co-existent, unaltered, -undiminished, without increase, without decrease. A millennium later -the world is exactly the same. Nothing has altered. If in spite of -that the appearance of the world at the one time is quite different -from that at the other time, then that is no deception, nothing merely -apparent, but the effect of eternal motion. The real "Existent" is -moved sometimes thus, sometimes thus: together, asunder, upwards, -downwards, into one another, pell-mell. - - - -14 - - -With this conception we have already taken a step into the realm -of the doctrine of _Anaxagoras._ By him both objections against -Parmenides are raised in full strength; that of the mobile Thinking -and that of the Whence? of "Appearance"; but in the chief proposition -Parmenides has subjugated him as well as all the younger philosophers -and nature-explorers. They all deny the possibility of Becoming and -Passing, as the mind of the people conceives them and as Anaximander -and Heraclitus had assumed with greater circumspection and yet still -heedlessly. Such a mythological Originating out of the Nothing, such -a Disappearing into the Nothing, such an arbitrary Changing of the -Nothing into the Something, such a random exchanging, putting on and -putting off of the qualities was henceforth considered senseless; but -so was, and for the same reasons, an originating of the Many out of the -One, of the manifold qualities out of the one primal-quality, in short -the derivation of the world out of a primary substance, as argued by -Thales and Heraclitus. Rather was now the real problem advanced of -applying the doctrine of increate imperishable "Being" to this existing -world, without taking one's refuge in the theory of appearance and -deception. But if the empiric world is not to be Appearance, if the -things are not to be derived out of Nothing and just as little out of -the one Something, then these things must contain in themselves a real -"Being," their matter and content must be unconditionally real, and -all change can refer only to the form, _i.e.,_ to the position, order, -grouping, mixing, separation of these eternally co-existing Essentials. -It is just as in a game of dice; they are ever the same dice; but -falling sometimes thus, sometimes thus, they mean to us something -different. All older theories had gone back to a primal element, as -womb and cause of Becoming, be this water, air, fire or the Indefinite -of Anaximander. Against that Anaxagoras now asserts that out of the -Equal the Unequal could never come forth, and that out of the one -"Existent" the change could never be explained. Whether now one were -to imagine that assumed matter to be rarefied or condensed, one would -never succeed by such a condensation or rarefaction in explaining the -problem one would like to explain: the plurality of qualities. But if -the world in fact is full of the most different qualities then these -must, in case they are not appearance, have a "Being," _i.e.,_ must -be eternal, increate, imperishable and ever co-existing. Appearance, -however, they cannot be, since the question as to the Whence? of -Appearance remains unanswered, yea answers itself in the negative! The -earlier seekers after Truth had intended to simplify the problem of -Becoming by advancing only one substance, which bore in its bosom the -possibilities of all Becoming; now on the contrary it is asserted: -there are innumerable substances, but never more, never less, and never -new ones. Only Motion, playing dice with them throws them into ever -new combinations. That Motion however is a truth and not Appearance, -Anaxagoras proved in opposition to Parmenides by the indisputable -succession of our conceptions in thinking. We have therefore in the -most direct fashion the insight into the truth of motion and succession -in the fact that we think and have conceptions. Therefore at any rate -the _one_ rigid, resting, dead "Being" of Parmenides has been removed -out of the way, there are many "Existents" just as surely as all -these many "Existents" (existing things, substances) are in motion. -Change is motion--but whence originates motion? Does this motion leave -perhaps wholly untouched the proper essence of those many independent, -isolated substances, and, according to the most severe idea of the -"Existent," _must_ not motion in itself be foreign to them? Or does -it after all belong to the things themselves? We stand here at an -important decision; according to which way we turn, we shall step into -the realm either of Anaxagoras or of Empedocles or of Democritus. The -delicate question must be raised: if there are many substances, and if -these many move, what moves them? Do they move one another? Or is it -perhaps only gravitation? Or are there magic forces of attraction and -repulsion within the things themselves? Or does the cause of motion -lie outside these many real substances? Or putting the question -more pointedly: if two things show a succession, a mutual change of -position, does that originate from themselves? And is this to be -explained mechanically or magically? Or if this should not be the case -is it a third something which moves them? It is a sorry problem, for -Parmenides would still have been able to prove against Anaxagoras the -impossibility of motion, even granted that there are many substances. -For he could say: Take two Substances existing of themselves, each with -quite differently fashioned, autonomous, unconditioned "Being"--and -of such kind are the Anaxagorean substances--they can never clash -together, never move, never attract one another, there exists between -them no causality, no bridge, they do not come into contact with one -another, do not disturb one another, they do not interest one another, -they are utterly indifferent. The impact then is just as inexplicable -as the magic attraction: that which is utterly foreign cannot exercise -any effect upon another, therefore cannot move itself nor allow -itself to be moved. Parmenides would even have added: the only way of -escape which is left to you is this, to ascribe motion to the things -themselves; then however all that you know and see as motion is indeed -only a deception and not true motion, for the only kind of motion which -could belong to those absolutely original substances, would be merely -an autogenous motion limited to themselves without any effect. But -you _assume_ motion in order to explain those effects of change, of -the disarrangement in space, of alteration, in short the causalities -and relations of the things among themselves. But these very effects -would not be explained and would remain as problematic as ever; for -this reason one cannot conceive why it should be necessary to assume a -motion since it does not perform that which you demand from it. Motion -does not belong to the nature of things and is eternally foreign to -them. - -Those opponents of the Eleatean unmoved Unity were induced to make -light of such an argument by prejudices of a perceptual character. It -seems so irrefutable that each veritable "Existent" is a space-filling -body, a lump of matter, large or small but in any case spacially -dimensioned; so that two or more such lumps cannot be in one space. -Under this hypothesis Anaxagoras, as later on Democritus, assumed that -they must knock against each other; if in their motions they came by -chance upon one another, that they would dispute the same space with -each other, and that this struggle was the very cause of all Change. -In other words: those wholly isolated, thoroughly heterogeneous and -eternally unalterable substances were after all not conceived as -being absolutely heterogeneous but all had in addition to a specific, -wholly peculiar quality, also one absolutely homogeneous substratum: a -piece of space-filling matter. In their participation in matter they -all stood equal and therefore could act upon one another, _i.e.,_ -knock one another. Moreover all Change did not in the least depend on -the heterogeneity of those substances but on their homogeneity, as -matter. At the bottom of the assumption of Anaxagoras is a logical -oversight; for that which is _the_ "Existent-In-Itself" must be wholly -unconditional and coherent, is therefore not allowed to assume as its -cause anything,--whereas all those Anaxagorean substances have still -a conditioning Something: matter, and already assume its existence; -the substance "Red" for example was to Anaxagoras not just merely red -in itself but also in a reserved or suppressed way a piece of matter -without any qualities. Only with this matter the "Red-In-Itself" acted -upon other substances, not with the "Red," but with that which is -not red, not coloured, nor in any way qualitatively definite. If the -"Red" had been taken strictly as "Red," as the real substance itself, -therefore without that substratum, then Anaxagoras would certainly not -have dared to speak of an effect of the "Red" upon other substances, -perhaps even with the phrase that the "Red-In-Itself" was transmitting -the impact received from the "Fleshy-In-Itself." Then it would be clear -that such an "Existent" _par excellence_ could never be moved. - - - -15 - - -One has to glance at the opponents of the Eleates, in order to -appreciate the extraordinary advantages in the assumption of -Parmenides. What embarrassments,--from which Parmenides had -escaped,--awaited Anaxagoras and all who believed in a plurality of -substances, with the question, How many substances? Anaxagoras made the -leap, closed his eyes and said, "Infinitely many"; thus he had flown -at least beyond the incredibly laborious proof of a definite number -of elementary substances. Since these "Infinitely Many" had to exist -without increase and unaltered for eternities, in that assumption was -given the contradiction of an infinity to be conceived as completed -and perfect. In short, Plurality, Motion, Infinity driven into flight -by Parmenides with the amazing proposition of the one "Being," returned -from their exile and hurled their projectiles at the opponents of -Parmenides, causing them wounds for which there is no cure. Obviously -those opponents have no real consciousness and knowledge as to the -awful force of those Eleatean thoughts, "There can be no time, no -motion, no space; for all these we can only think of as infinite, -and to be more explicit, firstly infinitely large, then infinitely -divisible; but everything infinite has no 'Being,' does not exist," and -this nobody doubts, who takes the meaning of the word "Being" severely -and considers the existence of something contradictory impossible, -_e.g.,_ the existence of a completed infinity. If however the very -Actuality shows us everything under the form of the completed infinity -then it becomes evident that it contradicts itself and therefore has no -true reality. If those opponents however should object: "but in your -thinking itself there does exist succession, therefore neither could -your thinking be real and consequently could not prove anything," then -Parmenides perhaps like Kant in a similar case of an equal objection -would have answered: "I can, it is true, say my conceptions follow upon -one another, but that means only that we are not conscious of them -unless within a chronological order, _i.e.,_ according to the form of -the inner sense. For that reason time is not a something in itself -nor any order or quality objectively adherent to things." We should -therefore have to distinguish between the Pure Thinking, that would -be timeless like the one Parmenidean "Being," and the consciousness -of this thinking, and the latter would already translate the thinking -into the form of appearance, _i.e.,_ of succession, plurality and -motion. It is probable that Parmenides would have availed himself -of this loophole; however, the same objection would then have to be -raised against him which is raised against Kant by A. Spir ("Thinking -And Reality," 2nd ed., vol. i., pp. 209, &c). "Now, in the first place -however it is clear, that I cannot know anything of a succession as -such, unless I have the successive members of the same simultaneously -in my consciousness. Thus the conception of a succession itself is -not at all successive, hence also quite different from the succession -of our conceptions. Secondly Kant's assumption implies such obvious -absurdities that one is surprised that he could leave them unnoticed. -Cæsar and Socrates according to this assumption are not really dead, -they still live exactly as they did two thousand years ago and only -seem to be dead, as a consequence of an organisation of my inner -sense." Future men already live and if they do not now step forward as -living that organisation of the "inner sense" is likewise the cause -of it. Here above all other things the question is to be put: How can -the beginning and the end of conscious life itself, together with -all its internal and external senses, exist merely in the conception -of the inner sense? _The_ fact is indeed this, that one certainly -cannot deny the reality of Change. If it is thrown out through the -window it slips in again through the keyhole. If one says: "It merely -seems to me, that conditions and conceptions change,"--then this very -semblance and appearance itself is something objectively existing and -within it without doubt the succession has objective reality, some -things in it really do succeed one another.--Besides one must observe -that indeed the whole critique of reason only has cause and right of -existence under the assumption that to us our _conceptions_ themselves -appear exactly as they are. For if the conceptions also appeared to us -otherwise than they really are, then one would not be able to advance -any solid proposition about them, and therefore would not be able to -accomplish any gnosiology or any "transcendental" investigation of -objective validity. Now it remains however beyond all doubt that our -conceptions themselves appear to us as successive." - -The contemplation of this undoubted succession and agitation has now -urged Anaxagoras to a memorable hypothesis. Obviously the conceptions -themselves moved themselves, were not pushed and had no cause of -motion outside themselves. Therefore he said to himself, there exists -a something which bears in itself the origin and the commencement -of motion; secondly, however, he notices that this conception was -moving not only itself but also something quite different, the body. -He discovers therefore, in the most immediate experience an effect -of conceptions upon expansive matter, which makes itself known as -motion in the latter. That was to him a fact; and only incidentally -it stimulated him to explain this fact. Let it suffice that he had a -regulative schema for the motion in the world,--this motion he now -understood either as a motion of the true isolated essences through -the Conceptual Principle, the Nous, or as a motion through a something -already moved. That with his fundamental assumption the latter kind, -the mechanical transmission of motions and impacts likewise contained -in itself a problem, probably escaped him; the commonness and every-day -occurrence of the effect through impact most probably dulled his eye to -the mysteriousness of impact. On the other hand he certainly felt the -problematic, even contradictory nature of an effect of conceptions upon -substances existing in themselves and he also tried therefore to trace -this effect back to a mechanical push and impact which were considered -by him as quite comprehensible. For the Nous too was without doubt such -a substance existing in itself and was characterised by him as a very -delicate and subtle matter, with the specific quality of thinking. -With a character assumed in this way, the effect of this matter upon -other matter had of course to be of exactly the same kind as that -which another substance exercises upon a third, _i.e.,_ a mechanical -effect, moving by pressure and impact. Still the philosopher had now a -substance which moves itself and other things, a substance of which the -motion did not come from outside and depended on no one else: whereas -it seemed almost a matter of indifference how this automobilism was -to be conceived of, perhaps similar to that pushing themselves hither -and thither of very fragile and small globules of quicksilver. Among -all questions which concern motion there is none more troublesome than -the question as to the beginning of motion. For if one may be allowed -to conceive of all remaining motions as effect and consequences, then -nevertheless the first primal motion is still to be explained; for the -mechanical motions, the first link of the chain certainly cannot lie in -a mechanical motion, since that would be as good as recurring to the -nonsensical idea of the _causa sui._ But likewise it is not feasible -to attribute to the eternal, unconditional things a motion of their -own, as it were from the beginning, as dowry of their existence. For -motion cannot be conceived without a direction whither and whereupon, -therefore only as relation and condition; but a thing is no longer -"entitative-in-itself" and "unconditional," if according to its nature -it refers necessarily to something existing outside of it. In this -embarrassment Anaxagoras thought he had found an extraordinary help -and salvation in that Nous, automobile and otherwise independent; the -nature of that Nous being just obscure and veiled enough to produce the -deception about it, that its assumption also involves that forbidden -_causa sui._ To empiric observation it is even an established fact that -Conception is not a _causa sui_ but the effect of the brain, yea, it -must appear to that observation as an odd eccentricity to separate the -"mind," the product of the brain, from its _causa_ and still to deem it -existing after this severing. This Anaxagoras did; he forgot the brain, -its marvellous design, the delicacy and intricacy of its convolutions -and passages and he decreed the "Mind-In-Itself." This "Mind-In-Itself" -alone among all substances had Free-will,--a grand discernment! This -Mind was able at any odd time to begin with the motion of the things -outside it; on the other hand for ages and ages it could occupy itself -with itself--in short Anaxagoras was allowed to assume a _first_ moment -of motion in some primeval age, as the _Chalaza_ of all so-called -Becoming; _i.e.,_ of all Change, namely of all shifting and rearranging -of the eternal substances and their particles, Although the Mind itself -is eternal, it is in no way compelled to torment itself for eternities -with the shifting about of grains of matter; and certainly there was a -time and a state of those matters--it is quite indifferent whether that -time was of long or short duration--during which the Nous had not acted -upon them, during which they were still unmoved. That is the period of -the Anaxagorean chaos. - - - -16 - - -The Anaxagorean chaos is not an immediately evident conception; in -order to grasp it one must have understood the conception which our -philosopher had with respect to the so-called "Becoming." For in -itself the state of all heterogeneous "Elementary-existences" before -all motion would by no means necessarily result in an absolute mixture -of all "seeds of things," as the expression of Anaxagoras runs, an -intermixture, which he imagined as a complete pell-mell, disordered -in its smallest parts, after all these "Elementary-existences" had -been, as in a mortar, pounded and resolved into atoms of dust, so that -now in that chaos, as in an amphora, they could be whirled into a -medley. One might say that this conception of the chaos did not contain -anything inevitable, that one merely needed rather to assume any chance -position of all those "existences," but not an infinite decomposition -of them; an irregular side-by-side arrangement was already sufficient; -there was no need of a pell-mell, let alone such a total pell-mell. -What therefore put into Anaxagoras' head that difficult and complex -conception? As already said: his conception of the empirically given -Becoming. From his experience he drew first a most extraordinary -proposition on the Becoming, and this proposition necessarily resulted -in that doctrine of the chaos, as its consequence. - -The observation of the processes of evolution in nature, not a -consideration of an earlier philosophical system, suggested to -Anaxagoras the doctrine, that _All originated from All;_ this was the -conviction of the natural philosopher based upon a manifold, and at the -bottom, of course, excessively inadequate induction. He proved it thus: -if even the contrary could originate out of the contrary, _e.g.,_ the -Black out of the White, everything is possible; that however did happen -with the dissolution of white snow into black water. The nourishment of -the body he explained to himself in this way: that in the articles of -food there must be invisibly small constituents of flesh or blood or -bone which during alimentation became disengaged and united with the -homogeneous in the body. But if All can become out of All, the Firm out -of the Liquid, the Hard out of the Soft, the Black out of the White, -the Fleshy out of Bread, then also All must be contained in All. The -names of things in that case express only the preponderance of the one -substance over the other substances to be met with in smaller, often -imperceptible quantities. In gold, that is to say, in that which one -designates _a potiore_ by the name "gold," there must be also contained -silver, snow, bread, and flesh, but in very small quantities; the -whole is called after the preponderating item, the gold-substance. - -But how is it possible, that one substance preponderates and fills a -thing in greater mass than the others present? Experience shows, that -this preponderance is gradually produced only through Motion, that -the preponderance is the result of a process, which we commonly call -Becoming. On the other hand, that "All is in All" is not the result -of a process, but, on the contrary, the preliminary condition of all -Becoming and all Motion, and is consequently previous to all Becoming. -In other words: experience teaches, that continually the like is -added to the like, _e.g.,_ through nourishment, therefore originally -those homogeneous substances were not together and agglomerated, but -they were separate. Rather, in all empiric processes coming before -our eyes, the homogeneous is always segregated from the heterogeneous -and transmitted (_e.g.,_ during nourishment, the particles of flesh -out of the bread, &c), consequently the pell-mell of the different -substances is the older form of the constitution of things and in point -of time previous to all Becoming and Moving. If all so-called Becoming -is a segregating and presupposes a mixture, the question arises, -what degree of intermixture this pell-mell must have had originally. -Although the process of a moving on the part of the homogeneous to -the homogeneous--_i.e.,_ Becoming--has already lasted an immense -time, one recognises in spite of that, that even yet in all things -remainders and seed-grains of all other things are enclosed, waiting -for their segregation, and one recognises further that only here and -there a preponderance has been brought about; the primal mixture -must have been a complete one, _i.e.,_ going down to the infinitely -small, since the separation and unmixing takes up an infinite length of -time. Thereby strict adherence is paid to the thought: that everything -which possesses an essential "Being" is infinitely divisible, without -forfeiting its specificum. - -According to these hypotheses Anaxagoras conceives of the world's -primal existence: perhaps as similar to a dust-like mass of infinitely -small, concrete particles of which every one is specifically simple -and possesses one quality only, yet so arranged that every specific -quality is represented in an infinite number of individual particles. -Such particles Aristotle has called _Homoiomere_ in consideration of -the fact that they are the Parts, all equal one to another, of a Whole -which is homogeneous with its Parts. One would however commit a serious -mistake to equate this primal pell-mell of all such particles, such -"seed-grains of things" to the one primal matter of Anaximander; for -the latter's primal matter called the "Indefinite" is a thoroughly -coherent and peculiar mass, the former's primal pell-mell is an -aggregate of substances. It is true one can assert about this Aggregate -of Substances exactly the same as about the Indefinite of Anaximander, -as Aristotle does: it could be neither white nor grey, nor black, nor -of any other colour; it was tasteless, scentless, and altogether as a -Whole defined neither quantitatively nor qualitatively: so far goes the -similarity of the Anaximandrian Indefinite and the Anaxagorean Primal -Mixture. But disregarding this negative equality they distinguish -themselves one from another positively by the latter being a compound, -the former a unity. Anaxagoras had by the assumption of his Chaos at -least so much to his advantage, that he was not compelled to deduce the -Many from the One, the Becoming out of the "Existent." - -Of course with his complete intermixture of the "seeds" he had to -admit one exception: the Nous was not then, nor is It now admixed with -any thing. For if It were admixed with only one "Existent," It would -have, in infinite divisions, to dwell in all things. This exception -is logically very dubious, especially considering the previously -described material nature of the Nous, it has something mythological in -itself and seems arbitrary, but was however, according to Anaxagorean -_prœmissa,_ a strict necessity. The Mind, which is moreover infinitely -divisible like any other matter, only not through other matters but -through Itself, has, if It divides Itself, in dividing and conglobating -sometimes in large, sometimes in small masses, Its equal mass and -quality from all eternity; and that which at this minute exists as Mind -in animals, plants, men, was also Mind without a more or less, although -distributed in another way a thousand years ago. But wherever It had a -relation to another substance, there It never was admixed with it, but -voluntarily seized it, moved and pushed it arbitrarily--in short, ruled -it. Mind, which alone has motion in Itself, alone possesses ruling -power in this world and shows it through moving the grains of matter. -But whither does It move them? Or is a motion conceivable, without -direction, without path? Is Mind in Its impacts just as arbitrary -as it is, with regard to the time when It pushes, and when It does -not push? In short, does Chance, _i.e.,_ the blindest option, rule -within Motion? At this boundary we step into the Most Holy within the -conceptual realm of Anaxagoras. - - - -17 - - -What had to be done with that chaotic pell-mell of the primal state -previous to all motion, so that out of it, without any increase of -new substances and forces, the existing world might originate, with -its regular stellar orbits, with its regulated forms of seasons and -days, with its manifold beauty and order,--in short, so that out of -the Chaos might come a Cosmos? This can be only the effect of Motion, -and of a definite and well-organised motion. This Motion itself is -the means of the Nous, Its goal would be the perfect segregation of -the homogeneous, a goal up to the present not yet attained, because -the disorder and the mixture in the beginning was infinite. This -goal is to be striven after only by an enormous process, not to be -realized suddenly by a mythological stroke of the wand. If ever, at -an infinitely distant point of time, it is achieved that everything -homogeneous is brought together and the "primal-existences" undivided -are encamped side by side in beautiful order, and every particle has -found its comrades and its home, and the great peace comes about after -the great division and splitting up of the substances, and there will -be no longer anything that is divided ind split up, then the Nous will -again return into Its automobilism and, no longer Itself divided, -roam through the world, sometimes in larger, sometimes in smaller -masses, as plant-mind or animal-mind, and no longer will It take up Its -new dwelling-place in other matter. Meanwhile the task has not been -completed; but the kind of motion which the Nous has thought out, in -order to solve the task, shows a marvellous suitableness, for by this -motion the task is further solved in each new moment. For this motion -has the character of concentrically progressive circular motion; it -began at some one point of the chaotic mixture, in the form of a little -gyration, and in ever larger paths this circular movement traverses -all existing "Being," jerking forth everywhere the homogeneous to -the homogeneous. At first this revolution brings everything Dense -to the Dense, everything Rare to the Rare, and likewise all that is -Dark, Bright, Moist, Dry to their kind; above these general groups or -classifications there are again two still more comprehensive, namely -_Ether,_ that is to say everything that is Warm, Bright, Rare, and -_Aër,_ that is to say everything that is Dark, Cold, Heavy, Firm. -Through the segregation of the ethereal masses from the aërial, -there is formed, as the most immediate effect of that epicycle whose -centre moves along in the circumference of ever greater circles, a -something as in an eddy made in standing water; heavy compounds are -led towards the middle and compressed. Just in the same way that -travelling waterspout in chaos forms itself on the outer side out of -the Ethereal, Rare, Bright Constituents, on the inner side out of the -Cloudy, Heavy, Moist Constituents. Then in the course of this process -out of that Aërial mass, conglomerating in its interior, water is -separated, and again out of the water the earthy element, and then -out of the earthy element, under the effect of the awful cold are -separated the stones. Again at some juncture masses of stone, through -the momentum of the rotation, are torn away sideways from the earth and -thrown into the realm of the hot light Ether; there in the latter's -fiery element they are made to glow and, carried along in the ethereal -rotation, they irradiate light, and as sun and stars illuminate and -warm the earth, in herself dark and cold. The whole conception is of -a wonderful daring and simplicity and has nothing of that clumsy and -anthropomorphical teleology, which has been frequently connected with -the name of Anaxagoras. That conception has its greatness just in this, -that it derives the whole Cosmos of Becoming out of the moved circle, -whereas Parmenides contemplated the true "Existent" as a resting, dead -ball. Once that circle is put into motion and caused to roll by the -Nous, then all the order, law and beauty of the world is the natural -consequence of that first impetus. How very much one wrongs Anaxagoras -if one reproaches him for the wise abstention from teleology which -shows itself in this conception and talks scornfully of his Nous as -of a _deus ex machina._ Rather, on account of the elimination of -mythological and theistic miracle-working and anthropomorphic ends and -utilities, Anaxagoras might have made use of proud words similar to -those which Kant used in his Natural History of the Heavens. For it is -indeed a sublime thought, to retrace that grandeur of the cosmos and -the marvellous arrangement of the orbits of the stars, to retrace all -that, in all forms to a simple, purely mechanical motion and, as it -were, to a moved mathematical figure, and therefore not to reduce all -that to purposes and intervening hands of a machine-god, but only to -a kind of oscillation, which, having once begun, is in its progress -necessary and definite, and effects result which resemble the wisest -computation of sagacity and extremely well thought-out fitness without -being anything of the sort. "I enjoy the pleasure," says Kant, of -seeing how a well-ordered whole produces itself without the assistance -of arbitrary fabrications, under the impulse of fixed laws of motion--a -well-ordered whole which looks so similar to that world-system which -is ours, that I cannot abstain from considering it to be the same. -It seems to me that one might say here, in a certain sense without -presumption: 'Give me matter and I will build a world out of it.'" - - - -18 - - -Suppose now, that for once we allow that primal mixture as rightly -concluded, some considerations especially from Mechanics seem to oppose -the grand plan of the world edifice. For even though the Mind at a -point causes a circular movement its continuation is only conceivable -with great difficulty, especially since it is to be infinite and -gradually to make all existing masses rotate. As a matter of course one -would assume that the pressure of all the remaining matter would have -crushed out this small circular movement when it had scarcely begun; -that this does not happen presupposes on the part of the stimulating -Nous, that the latter began to work suddenly with awful force, or at -any rate so quickly, that we must call the motion a whirl: such a -whirl as Democritus himself imagined. And since this whirl must be -infinitely strong in order not to be checked through the whole world of -the Infinite weighing heavily upon it, it will be infinitely quick, for -strength can manifest itself originally only in speed. On the contrary -the broader the concentric rings are, the slower will be this motion; -if once the motion could reach the end of the infinitely extended -world, then this motion would have already infinitely little speed of -rotation. _Vice versa,_ if we conceive of the motion as infinitely -great, _i.e.,_ infinitely quick, at the moment of the very first -beginning of motion, then the original circle must have been infinitely -small; we get therefore as the beginning a particle rotated round -itself, a particle with an infinitely small material content. This -however would not at all explain the further motion; one might imagine -even all particles of the primal mass to rotate round themselves and -yet the whole mass would remain unmoved and unseparated. If, however, -that material particle of infinite smallness, caught and swung by the -Nous, was not turned round itself but described a circle somewhat -larger than a point, this would cause it to knock against other -material particles, to move them on, to hurl them, to make them rebound -and thus gradually to stir up a great and spreading tumult within -which, as the next result, that separation of the aërial masses from -the ethereal had to take place. Just as the commencement of the motion -itself is an arbitrary act of the Nous, arbitrary also is the manner of -this commencement in so far as the first motion circumscribes a circle -of which the radius is chosen somewhat larger than a point. - - - -19 - - -Here of course one might ask, what fancy had at that time so suddenly -occurred to the Nous, to knock against some chance material particle -out of that number of particles and to turn it around in whirling dance -and why that did not occur to It earlier. Whereupon Anaxagoras would -answer: "The Nous has the privilege of arbitrary action; It may begin -at any chance time, It depends on Itself, whereas everything else is -determined from outside. It has no duty, and no end which It might -be compelled to pursue; if It did once begin with that motion and -set Itself an end, this after all was only--the answer is difficult, -Heraclitus would say--_play!_" - -That seems always to have been the last solution or answer hovering on -the lips of the Greek. The Anaxagorean Mind is an artist and in truth -the most powerful genius of mechanics and architecture, creating with -the simplest means the most magnificent forms and tracks and as it were -a mobile architecture, but always out of that irrational arbitrariness -which lies in the soul of the artist. It is as though Anaxagoras was -pointing at Phidias and in face of the immense work of art, the Cosmos, -was calling out to us as he would do in front of the Parthenon: "The -Becoming is no moral, but only an artistic phenomenon." Aristotle -relates that, to the question what made life worth living, Anaxagoras -had answered: "Contemplating the heavens and the total order of the -Cosmos." He treated physical things so devotionally, and with that -same mysterious awe, which we feel when standing in front of an antique -temple; his doctrine became a species of free-thinking religious -exercise, protecting itself through the _odi profanum vulgus et arceo_ -and choosing its adherents with precaution out of the highest and -noblest society of Athens. In the exclusive community of the Athenian -Anaxagoreans the mythology of the people was allowed only as a symbolic -language; all myths, all gods, all heroes were considered here only as -hieroglyphics of the interpretation of nature, and even the Homeric -epic was said to be the canonic song of the sway of the Nous and the -struggles and laws of Nature. Here and there a note from this society -of sublime free-thinkers penetrated to the people; and especially -Euripides, the great and at all times daring Euripides, ever thinking -of something new, dared to let many things become known by means of the -tragic mask, many things which pierced like an arrow through the senses -of the masses and from which the latter freed themselves only by means -of ludicrous caricatures and ridiculous re-interpretations. - -The greatest of all Anaxagoreans however is Pericles, the mightiest and -worthiest man of the world; and Plato bears witness that the philosophy -of Anaxagoras alone had given that sublime flight to the genius of -Pericles. When as a public orator he stood before his people, in the -beautiful rigidity and immobility of a marble Olympian and now, calm, -wrapped in his mantle, with unruffled drapery, without any change of -facial expression, without smile, with a voice the strong tone of -which remained ever the same, and when he now spoke in an absolutely -un-Demosthenic but merely Periclean fashion, when he thundered, struck -with lightnings, annihilated and redeemed--then he was the epitome -of the Anaxagorean Cosmos, the image of the Nous, who has built for -Itself the most beautiful and dignified receptacle, then Pericles was -as it were the visible human incarnation of the building, moving, -eliminating, ordering, reviewing, artistically-undetermined force of -the Mind. Anaxagoras himself said man was the most rational being or -he must necessarily shelter the Nous within himself in greater fulness -than all other beings, because he had such admirable organs as his -hands; Anaxagoras concluded therefore, that that Nous, according to -the extent to which It made Itself master of a material body, was -always forming for Itself out of this material the tools corresponding -to Its degree of power, consequently the Nous made the most beautiful -and appropriate tools, when It was appearing in his greatest fulness. -And as the most wondrous and appropriate action of the Nous was that -circular primal-motion, since at that time the Mind was still together, -undivided, in Itself, thus to the listening Anaxagoras the effect -of the Periclean speech often appeared perhaps as a simile of that -circular primal-motion; for here too he perceived a whirl of thoughts -moving itself at first with awful force but in an orderly manner, which -in concentric circles gradually caught and carried away the nearest and -farthest and which, when it reached its end, had reshaped--organising -and segregating--the whole nation. - -To the later philosophers of antiquity the way in which Anaxagoras -made use of his Nous for the interpretation of the world was strange, -indeed scarcely pardonable; to them it seemed as though he had found a -grand tool but had not well understood it and they tried to retrieve -what the finder had neglected. They therefore did not recognise what -meaning the abstention of Anaxagoras, inspired by the purest spirit -of the method of natural science, had, and that this abstention first -of all in every case puts to itself the question: "What is the cause -of Something"? (_causa efficiens_)--and not "What is the purpose of -Something"? (_causa finalis_). The Nous has not been dragged in by -Anaxagoras for the purpose of answering the special question: "What -is the cause of motion and what causes regular motions?"; Plato -however reproaches him, that he ought to have, but had not shown that -everything was in its own fashion and its own place the most beautiful, -the best and the most appropriate. But this Anaxagoras would not have -dared to assert in any individual case, to him the existing world was -not even the most conceivably perfect world, for he saw everything -originate out of everything, and he found the segregation of the -substances through the Nous complete and done with, neither at the -end of the filled space of the world nor in the individual beings. -For his understanding it was sufficient that he had found a motion, -which, by simple continued action could create the visible order out -of a chaos mixed through and through; and he took good care not to put -the question as to the Why? of the motion, as to the rational purpose -of motion. For if the Nous had to fulfil by means of motion a purpose -innate in the noumenal essence, then it was no longer in Its free will -to commence the motion at any chance time; in so far as the Nous is -eternal, It had also to be determined eternally by this purpose, and -then no point of time could have been allowed to exist in which motion -was still lacking, indeed it would have been logically forbidden to -assume a starting point for motion: whereby again the conception of -original chaos, the basis of the whole Anaxagorean interpretation of -the world would likewise have become logically impossible. In order -to escape such difficulties, which teleology creates, Anaxagoras had -always to emphasise and asseverate that the Mind has free will; all -Its actions, including that of the primal motion, were actions of the -"free will," whereas on the contrary after that primeval moment the -whole remaining world was shaping itself in a strictly determined, and -more precisely, mechanically determined form. That absolutely free -will however can be conceived only as purposeless, somewhat after the -fashion of children's play or the artist's bent for play. It is an -error to ascribe to Anaxagoras the common confusion of the teleologist, -who, marvelling at the extraordinary appropriateness, at the agreement -of the parts with the whole, especially in the realm of the organic, -assumes that that which exists for the intellect had also come into -existence through intellect, and that that which man brings about only -under the guidance of the idea of purpose, must have been brought about -by Nature through reflection and ideas of purpose. (Schopenhauer, "The -World As Will And Idea," vol. ii., Second Book, chap. 26: On Teleology). -Conceived in the manner of Anaxagoras, however, the order and -appropriateness of things on the contrary is nothing but the immediate -result of a blind mechanical motion; and only in order to cause this -motion, in order to get for once out of the dead-rest of the Chaos, -Anaxagoras assumed the free-willed Nous who depends only on Itself. -He appreciated in the Nous just the very quality of being a thing of -chance, a chance agent, therefore of being able to act unconditioned, -undetermined, guided neither by causes nor by purposes. - - - - -Notes for a Continuation - - -(Early Part of 1873) - - -1 - - -That this total conception of the Anaxagorean doctrine must be -right, is proved most clearly by the way in which the successors -of Anaxagoras, the Agrigentine Empedocles and the atomic teacher -Democritus in their counter-systems actually criticised and improved -that doctrine. The method of this critique is more than anything a -continued renunciation in that spirit of natural science mentioned -above, the law of economy applied to the interpretation of nature. -That hypothesis, which explains the existing world with the smallest -expenditure of assumptions and means is to have preference: for in such -a hypothesis is to be found the least amount of arbitrariness, and in -it free play with possibilities is prohibited. Should there be two -hypotheses which both explain the world, then a strict test must be -applied as to which of the two better satisfies that demand of economy. -He who can manage this explanation with the simpler and more known -forces, especially the mechanical ones, he who deduces the existing -edifice of the world out of the smallest possible number of forces, -will always be preferred to him who allows the more complicated and -less-known forces, and these moreover in greater number, to carry on a -world-creating play. So then we see Empedocles endeavouring to remove -the _superfluity_ of hypotheses from the doctrine of Anaxagoras. - -The first hypothesis which falls as unnecessary is that of the -Anaxagorean Nous, for its assumption is much too complex to explain -anything so simple as motion. After all it is only necessary to explain -the two kinds of motion: the motion of a body towards another, and the -motion away from another. - - - -2 - - -If our present Becoming is a segregating, although not a complete one, -then Empedocles asks: what prevents complete segregation? Evidently a -force works against it, _i.e.,_ a latent motion of attraction. - -Further: in order to explain that Chaos, a force must already have -been at work; a movement is necessary to bring about this complicated -entanglement. - -Therefore periodical preponderance of the one and the other force is -certain. They are opposites. - -The force of attraction is still at work; for otherwise there would be -no Things at all, everything would be segregated. - -This is the actual fact: two kinds of motion. The Nous does not explain -them. On the contrary, Love and Hatred; indeed we certainly see that -these move as well as that the Nous moves. - -Now the conception of the primal state undergoes a change: it is -the most _blessed._ With Anaxagoras it was the chaos before the -architectural work, the heap of stones as it were upon the building -site. - - - -3 - - -Empedocles had conceived the thought of a tangential force originated -by revolution and working against gravity ("de coelo," i., p. 284), -Schopenhauer, "W. A. W.," ii. 390. - -He considered the continuation of the circular movement according -to Anaxagoras _impossible._ It would result in a _whirl, i.e.,_ the -contrary of ordered motion. - -If the particles were infinitely mixed, pell-mell, then one would be -able to break asunder the bodies without any exertion of power, they -would not cohere or hold together, they would be as dust. - -The forces, which press the atoms against one another, and which give -stability to the mass, Empedocles calls "Love." It is a molecular -force, a constitutive force of the bodies. - - - -4 - - -Against Anaxagoras. - -1. The Chaos already presupposes motion. - -2. Nothing prevented the complete segregation. - -3. Our bodies would be dust-forms. How can motion exist, if there are -not counter-motions in all bodies? - -4. An ordered permanent circular motion impossible; only a whirl. He -assumes the whirl itself to be an effect of the νεῑκος.--ἀπορροιαί. How -do distant things operate on one another, sun upon earth? If everything -were still in a whirl, that would be impossible. Therefore at least two -moving powers: which must be inherent in Things. - -5. Why infinite ὄντα? Transgression of experience. Anaxagoras meant -the chemical atoms. Empedocles tried the assumption of four kinds of -chemical atoms. He took the aggregate states to be essential, and heat -to be co-ordinated. Therefore the aggregate states through repulsion -and attraction; matter in four forms. - -6. The periodical principle is necessary. - -7. With the living beings Empedocles will also deal still on the same -principle. Here also he denies purposiveness. His greatest deed. With -Anaxagoras a dualism. - - - -5 - - -The symbolism of _sexual love._ Here as in the Platonic fable the -longing after Oneness shows itself, and here, likewise, is shown -that once a greater unity already existed; were this greater unity -established, then this would again strive after a still greater one. -The conviction of the unity of everything living guarantees that once -there was an _immense Living Something,_ of which we are pieces; -that is probably the Sphairos itself. He is the most blessed deity. -Everything was connected only through love, therefore in the highest -degree appropriate. Love has been torn to pieces and splintered by -hatred, love has been divided into her elements and killed--bereft -of life. In the whirl no living individuals originate. Eventually -everything is segregated and now our period begins. (He opposes the -Anaxagorean Primal Mixture by a Primal Discord.) Love, blind as she -is, with furious haste again throws the elements one against another -endeavouring to see whether she can bring them back to life again or -not. Here and there she is successful. It continues. A presentiment -originates in the living beings, that they are to strive after still -higher unions than home and the primal state. Eros. It is a terrible -crime to kill life, for thereby one works back to the Primal Discord. -Some day everything will be again one _single life,_ the most blissful -state. - -The Pythagorean-orphean doctrine re-interpreted in the manner of -natural science. Empedocles consciously masters both means of -expression, therefore he is the first rhetor. Political aims. - -The double-nature--the agonal and the loving, the compassionate. - -Attempt of the _Hellenic total reform_. - -All inorganic matter has originated out of organic, it is dead organic -matter. Corpse and man. - - - -6 - - -DEMOCRITUS - -The greatest possible simplification of the hypotheses. - -1. There is motion, therefore vacuum, therefore a "Non-Existent." -Thinking is motion. - -2. If there is a "Non-Existent" it must be indivisible, _i.e.,_ -absolutely filled. Division is only explicable in case of empty spaces -and pores. The "Non-Existent" alone is an absolutely porous thing. - -3. The secondary qualities of matter, νόμῳ, not of Matter-In-Itself. - -4. Establishment of the primary qualities of the ἄτομα. Wherein -homogeneous, wherein heterogeneous? - -5. The aggregate-states of Empedocles (four elements) presuppose only -the homogeneous atoms, they themselves cannot therefore be ὄντα. - -6. Motion is connected indissolubly with the atoms, effect of gravity. -Epicur. Critique: what does gravity signify in an infinite vacuum? - -7. Thinking is the motion of the fire-atoms. Soul, life, perceptions of -the senses. - . . . . . . . . -Value of materialism and its embarrassment. - -Plato and Democritus. - -The hermit-like homeless noble searcher for truth. Democritus and the -Pythagoreans together find the basis of natural sciences. - . . . . . . . . -What are the causes which have interrupted a flourishing science of -experimental physics in antiquity after Democritus? - - - -7 - - -Anaxagoras has taken from Heraclitus the idea that in every Becoming -and in every Being the opposites are together. - -He felt strongly the contradiction that a body has many qualities and -he _pulverised_ it in the belief that he had now dissolved it into -its true qualities. - . . . . . . . -_Plato:_ first Heraclitean, later Sceptic: Everything, even Thinking, -is in a state of flux. - -Brought through Socrates to the permanence of the good, the beautiful. - -These assumed as entitative. - -All generic ideals partake of the idea of the good, the beautiful, and -they too are therefore _entitative_, _being_ (as the soul partakes of -the idea of Life). The idea is _formless_. - -Through Pythagoras' metempsychosis has been answered the question: how -we can know anything about the ideas. - -Plato's end: scepticism in Parmenides. Refutation of ideology. - - - -8 - -CONCLUSION - - -Greek thought during the _tragic age is pessimistic_ or _artistically -optimistic_. - -Their judgment about _life_ implies more. - -The One, flight from the Becoming. _Aut_ unity, _aut_ artistic play. - -Deep distrust of reality: nobody assumes a good god, who has made -everything _optime_. - - {Pythagoreans, religious sect. - {Anaximander. - {Empedocles. - Eleates. - {Anaxagoras. - {Heraclitus. - Democritus: the world without moral - and æsthetic meaning, pessimism of - chance. - -If one placed a tragedy before all these, the three former would see -in it the mirror of the fatality of existence, Parmenides a transitory -appearance, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras an artistic edifice and image of -the world-laws, Democritus the result of machines. - . . . . . . . - -With Socrates _Optimism_ begins, an optimism no longer artistic, with -teleology and faith in the good god; faith in the enlightened good -man. Dissolution of the instincts, Socrates breaks with the hitherto -prevailing _knowledge_ and _culture;_ he intends returning to the old -citizen-virtue and to the State. - -Plato dissociates himself from the State, when he observes that the -State has become identical with the new Culture. - -The Socratic scepticism is a weapon against the hitherto prevailing -culture and knowledge. - - - - -ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE - - -(1873) - - -In some remote corner of the universe, effused into innumerable -solar-systems, there was once a star upon which clever animals invented -cognition. It was the haughtiest, most mendacious moment in the history -of this world, but yet only a moment. After Nature had taken breath -awhile the star congealed and the clever animals had to die.--Someone -might write a fable after this style, and yet he would not have -illustrated sufficiently, how wretched,; shadow-like, transitory, -purposeless and fanciful the human intellect appears in Nature. There -were eternities during which this intellect did not exist, and when it -has once more passed away there will be nothing to show that it has -existed. For this intellect is not concerned with any further mission -transcending the sphere of human life. No, it is purely human and none -but its owner and procreator regards it so pathetically as to suppose -that the world revolves around it. If, however, we and the gnat could -understand each other we should learn that even the gnat swims through -the air with the same pathos, and feels within itself the flying centre -of the world. Nothing in Nature is so bad or so insignificant that it -will not, at the smallest puff of that force cognition, immediately -swell up like a balloon, and just as a mere porter wants to have his -admirer, so the very proudest man, the philosopher, imagines he sees -from all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically directed upon -his actions and thoughts. - -It is remarkable that this is accomplished by the intellect, which -after all has been given to the most unfortunate, the most delicate, -the most transient beings only as an expedient, in order to detain them -for a moment in existence, from which without that extra-gift they -would have every cause to flee as swiftly as Lessing's son.[1] That -haughtiness connected with cognition and sensation, spreading blinding -fogs before the eyes and over the senses of men, deceives itself -therefore as to the value of existence owing to the fact that it bears -within itself the most flattering evaluation of cognition. Its most -general effect is deception; but even its most particular effects have -something of deception in their nature. - -The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, -develops its chief power in dissimulation; for it is by dissimulation -that the feebler, and less robust individuals preserve themselves, -since it has been denied them to fight the battle of existence -with horns or the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. In man this art -of dissimulation reaches its acme of perfection: in him deception, -flattery, falsehood and fraud, slander, display, pretentiousness, -disguise, cloaking convention, and acting to others and to himself -in short, the continual fluttering to and fro around the _one_ -flame--Vanity: all these things are so much the rule, and the law, -that few things are more incomprehensible than the way in which an -honest and pure impulse to truth could have arisen among men. They -are deeply immersed in illusions and dream-fancies; their eyes glance -only over the surface of things and see "forms"; their sensation -nowhere leads to truth, but contents itself with receiving stimuli -and, so to say, with playing hide-and-seek on the back of things. -In addition to that, at night man allows his dreams to lie to him a -whole life-time long, without his moral sense ever trying to prevent -them; whereas men are said to exist who by the exercise of a strong -will have overcome the habit of snoring. What indeed _does_ man know -about himself? Oh! that he could but once see himself complete, placed -as it were in an illuminated glass-case! Does not nature keep secret -from him most things, even about his body, _e.g.,_ the convolutions of -the intestines, the quick flow of the blood-currents, the intricate -vibrations of the fibres, so as to banish and lock him up in proud, -delusive knowledge? Nature threw away the key; and woe co the fateful -curiosity which might be able for a moment to look out and down through -a crevice in the chamber of consciousness, and discover that man, -indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the pitiless, the -greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging in -dreams on the back of a tiger. Whence, in the wide world, with this -state of affairs, arises the impulse to truth? - -As far as the individual tries to preserve himself against other -individuals, in the natural state of things he uses the intellect -in most cases only for dissimulation; since, however, man both from -necessity and boredom wants to exist socially and gregariously, he -must needs make peace and at least endeavour to cause the greatest -_bellum omnium contra omnes_ to disappear from his world. This first -conclusion of peace brings with it a something which looks like the -first step towards the attainment of that enigmatical bent for truth. -For that which henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to -say, a uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented -and the legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth: -since here, for the first time, originates the contrast between truth -and falsity. The liar uses the valid designations, the words, in order -to make the unreal appear as real; _e.g.,_ he says, "I am rich," -whereas the right designation for his state would be "poor." He abuses -the fixed conventions by convenient substitution or even inversion -of terms. If he does this in a selfish and moreover harmful fashion, -society will no longer trust him but will even exclude him. In this way -men avoid not so much being defrauded, but being injured by fraud. At -bottom, at this juncture too, they hate not deception, but the evil, -hostile consequences of certain species of deception. And it is in -a similarly limited sense only that man desires truth: he covets the -agreeable, life-preserving consequences of truth; he is indifferent -towards pure, ineffective knowledge; he is even inimical towards truths -which possibly might prove harmful or destroying. And, moreover, what -after all are those conventions op language? Are they possibly products -of knowledge, of the love of truth; do the designations and the things -coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities? - -Only by means of forgetfulness can man ever arrive at imagining that he -possesses "truth" in that degree just indicated. If he does not mean -to content himself with truth in the shape of tautology, that is, with -empty husks, he will always obtain illusions instead of truth. What -is a word? The expression of a nerve-stimulus in sounds. But to infer -a cause outside us from the nerve-stimulus is already the result of a -wrong and unjustifiable application of the proposition of causality. -How should we dare, if truth with the genesis of language, if the point -of view of certainty with the designations had alone been decisive; how -indeed should we dare to say: the stone is hard; as if "hard" was known -to us otherwise; and not merely as an entirely subjective stimulus! -We divide things according to genders; we designate the tree as -masculine,[2] the plant as feminine:[3] what arbitrary metaphors! How -far flown beyond the canon of certainty! We speak of a "serpent";[4] -the designation fits nothing but the sinuosity, and could therefore -also appertain to the worm. What arbitrary demarcations! what one-sided -preferences given sometimes to this, sometimes to that quality of a -thing! The different languages placed side by side show that with words -truth or adequate expression matters little: for otherwise there would -not be so many languages. The "Thing-in-itself" (it is just this which -would be the pure ineffective truth) is also quite incomprehensible -to the creator of language and not worth making any great endeavour -to obtain. He designates only the relations of things to men and for -their expression he calls to his help the most daring metaphors. A -nerve-stimulus, first transformed into a percept! First metaphor! The -percept again copied into a sound! Second metaphor! And each time he -leaps completely out of one sphere right into the midst of an entirely -different one. One can imagine a man who is quite deaf and has never -had a sensation of tone and of music; just as this man will possibly -marvel at Chladni's sound figures in the sand, will discover their -cause in the vibrations of the string, and will then proclaim that -now he knows what man calls "tone"; even so does it happen to us all -with language. When we talk about trees, colours, snow and flowers, -we believe we know something about the things themselves, and yet we -only possess metaphors of the things, and these metaphors do not in the -least correspond to the original essentials. Just as the sound shows -itself as a sand-figure, in the same way the enigmatical _x_ of the -Thing-in-itself is seen first as nerve-stimulus, then as percept, and -finally as sound. At any rate the genesis of language did not therefore -proceed on logical lines, and the whole material in which and with -which the man of truth, the investigator, the philosopher works and -builds, originates, if not from Nephelococcygia, cloud-land, at any -rate not from the essence of things. - -Let us especially think about the formation of ideas. Every word -becomes at once an idea not by having, as one might presume, to serve -as a reminder for the original experience happening but once and -absolutely individualised, to which experience such word owes its -origin, no, but by having simultaneously to fit innumerable, more or -less similar (which really means never equal, therefore altogether -unequal) cases. Every idea originates through equating the unequal. As -certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar to any other, so certain -is it that the idea "leaf" has been formed through an arbitrary -omission of these individual differences, through a forgetting of the -differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in -nature there is, besides the leaves, a something called _the_ "leaf," -perhaps a primal form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, -accurately measured, coloured, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled -hands, so that no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a -true copy of the primal form. We call a man "honest"; we ask, why has -he acted so honestly to-day? Our customary answer runs, "On account of -his honesty." _The_ Honesty! That means again: the "leaf" is the -cause of the leaves. We really and truly do not know anything at all -about an essential quality which might be called _the_ honesty, but we -do know about numerous individualised, and therefore unequal actions, -which we equate by omission of the unequal, and now designate as honest -actions; finally out of them we formulate a _qualitas occulta_ with the -name "Honesty." The disregarding of the individual and real furnishes -us with the idea, as it likewise also gives us the form; whereas nature -knows of no forms and ideas, and therefore knows no species but only -an _x,_ to us inaccessible and indefinable. For our antithesis of -individual and species is anthropomorphic too and does not come from -the essence of things, although on the other hand we do not dare to -say that it does not correspond to it; for that would be a dogmatic -assertion and as such just as undemonstrable as its contrary. - -What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, -anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became -poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and -after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths -are illusions of which one has forgotten that they _are_ illusions; -worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; -coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account -as coins but merely as metal. - -Still we do not yet know whence the impulse to truth comes, for up to -now we have heard only about the obligation which society imposes in -order to exist: to be truthful, that is, to use the usual metaphors, -therefore expressed morally: we have heard only about the obligation -to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie gregariously in a style -binding for all. Now man of course forgets that matters are going thus -with him; he therefore lies in that fashion pointed out unconsciously -and according to habits of centuries' standing--and by _this very -unconsciousness,_ by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for -truth. Through this feeling of being obliged to designate one thing as -"red," another as "cold," a third one as "dumb," awakes a moral emotion -relating to truth. Out of the antithesis "liar" whom nobody trusts, -whom all exclude, man demonstrates to himself the venerableness, -reliability, usefulness of truth. Now as a "_rational_" being he -submits his actions to the sway of abstractions; he no longer suffers -himself to be carried away by sudden impressions, by sensations, he -first generalises all these impressions into paler, cooler ideas, in -order to attach to them the ship of his life and actions. Everything -which makes man stand out in bold relief against the animal depends on -this faculty of volatilising the concrete metaphors into a schema, and -therefore resolving a perception into an idea. For within the range of -those schemata a something becomes possible that never could succeed -under the first perceptual impressions: to build up a pyramidal order -with castes and grades, to create a new world of laws, privileges, -sub-orders, delimitations, which now stands opposite the other -perceptual world of first impressions and assumes the appearance of -being the more fixed, general, known, human of the two and therefore -the regulating and imperative one. Whereas every metaphor of perception -is individual and without its equal and therefore knows how to escape -all attempts to classify it, the great "edifice of ideas shows the -rigid regularity of a Roman Columbarium and in logic breathes forth the -sternness and coolness which we find in mathematics. He who has been -breathed upon by this coolness will scarcely believe, that the idea -too, bony and hexa-hedral, and permutable as a die, remains however -only as the _residuum of a metaphor,_ and that the illusion of the -artistic metamorphosis of a nerve-stimulus into percepts is, if not -the mother, then the grand-mother of every idea. Now in this game of -dice, "Truth" means to use every die as it is designated, to count its -points carefully, to form exact classifications, and never lo violate -the order of castes and the sequences of rank. Just as the Romans -and Etruscans for their benefit cut up the sky by means of strong -mathematical lines and banned a god as it were into a _templum,_ into a -space limited in this fashion, so every nation has above its head such -a sky of ideas divided up mathematically, and it understands the demand -for truth to mean that every conceptual god is to be looked for only -in _his_ own sphere. One may here well admire man, who succeeded in -piling up an infinitely complex dome of ideas on a movable foundation -and as it were on running water, as a powerful genius of architecture. -Of course in order to obtain hold on such a foundation it must be as -an edifice piled up out of cobwebs, so fragile, as to be carried away -by the waves: so firm, as not to be blown asunder by every wind. In -this way man as an architectural genius rises high above the bee; -she builds with wax, which she brings together out of nature; he -with the much more delicate material of ideas, which he must first -manufacture within himself. He is very much to be admired here--but -not on account of his impulse for truth, his bent for pure cognition -of things. If somebody hides a thing behind a bush, seeks it again and -finds it in the self-same place, then there is not much to boast of, -respecting this seeking and finding; thus, however, matters stand with -the seeking and finding of "truth" within the realm of reason. If I -make the definition of the mammal and then declare after inspecting a -camel, "Behold a mammal," then no doubt a truth is brought to light -thereby, but it is of very limited value, I mean it is anthropomorphic -through and through, and does not contain one single point which is -"true-in-itself," real and universally valid, apart from man. The -seeker after such truths seeks at the bottom only the metamorphosis -of the world in man, he strives for an understanding of the world as -a human-like thing and by his battling gains at best the feeling of -an assimilation. Similarly, as the astrologer contemplated the stars -in the service of man and in connection with their happiness and -unhappiness, such a seeker contemplates the whole world as related to -man, as the infinitely protracted echo of an original sound: man; as -the multiplied copy of the one arch-type: man. His procedure is to -apply man as the measure of all things, whereby he starts from the -error of believing that he has these things immediately before him -as pure objects. He therefore forgets that the original metaphors of -perception _are_ metaphors, and takes them for the things themselves. - -Only by forgetting that primitive world of metaphors, only by the -congelation and coagulation of an original mass of similes and percepts -pouring forth as a fiery liquid out of the primal faculty of human -fancy, only by the invincible faith, that _this_ sun, _this_ window, -_this_ table is a truth in itself: in short only by the fact that -man forgets himself as subject, and what is more as an _artistically -creating_ subject: only by all this does he live with some repose, -safety and consequence. If he were able to get out of the prison walls -of this faith, even for an instant only, his "self-consciousness would -be destroyed at once. Already it costs him some trouble to admit to -himself that the insect and the bird perceive a world different from -his own, and that the question, which of the two world-perceptions is -more accurate, is quite a senseless one, since to decide this question -it would be necessary to apply the standard of _right perception,_ -i.e., to apply a standard which _does not exist._ On the whole it -seems to me that the "right perception"--which would mean the adequate -expression of an object in the subject--is a nonentity full of -contradictions: for between two utterly different spheres, as between -subject and object, there is no causality, no accuracy, no expression, -but at the utmost an _æsthetical_ relation, I mean a suggestive -metamorphosis, a stammering translation into quite a distinct foreign -language, for which purpose however there is needed at any rate an -intermediate sphere, an intermediate force, freely composing and -freely inventing. The word "phenomenon" contains many seductions, and -on that account I avoid it as much as possible, for it is not true -that the essence of things appears in the empiric world. A painter -who had no hands and wanted to express the picture distinctly present -to his mind by the agency of song, would still reveal much more with -this permutation of spheres, than the empiric world reveals about -the essence of things. The very relation of a nerve-stimulus to the -produced percept is in itself no necessary one; but if the same percept -has been reproduced millions of times and has been the inheritance of -many successive generations of man, and in the end appears each time to -all mankind as the result of the same cause, then it attains finally -for man the same importance as if it were _the_ unique, necessary -percept and as if that relation between the original nerve-stimulus -and the percept produced were a close relation of causality: just as -a dream eternally repeated, would be perceived and judged as though -real. But the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor does not at all -guarantee the necessity and exclusive justification of that metaphor. - -Surely every human being who is at home with such contemplations has -felt a deep distrust against any idealism of that kind, as often -as he has distinctly convinced himself of the eternal rigidity, -omni-presence, and infallibility of nature's laws: he has arrived at -the conclusion that as far as we can penetrate the heights of the -telescopic and the depths of the microscopic world, everything is quite -secure, complete, infinite, determined, and continuous. Science will -have to dig in these shafts eternally and successfully and all things -found are sure to have to harmonise and not to contradict one another. -How little does this resemble a product of fancy, for if it were one -it would necessarily betray somewhere its nature of appearance and -unreality. Against this it may be objected in the first place that if -each of us had for himself a different sensibility, if we ourselves -were only able to perceive sometimes as a bird, sometimes as a worm, -sometimes as a plant, or if one of us saw the same stimulus as red, -another as blue, if a third person even perceived it as a tone, then -nobody would talk of such an orderliness of nature, but would conceive -of her only as an extremely subjective structure. Secondly, what is, -for us in general, a law of nature? It is not known in itself but -only in its effects, that is to say in its relations to other laws -of nature, which again are known to us only as sums of relations. -Therefore all these relations refer only one to another and are -absolutely incomprehensible to us in their essence; only that which we -add: time, space, _i.e.,_ relations of sequence and numbers, are really -known to us in them. Everything wonderful, however, that we marvel -at in the laws of nature, everything that demands an explanation and -might seduce us into distrusting idealism, lies really and solely in -the mathematical rigour and inviolability of the conceptions of time -and space. These however we produce within ourselves and throw them -forth with that necessity with which the spider spins; since we are -compelled to conceive all things under these forms only, then it is no -longer wonderful that in all things we actually conceive none but these -forms: for they all must bear within themselves the laws of number, -and this very idea of number is the most marvellous in all things. All -obedience to law which impresses us so forcibly in the orbits of stars -and in chemical processes coincides at the bottom with those qualities -which we ourselves attach to those things, so that it is we who -thereby make the impression upon ourselves. Whence it clearly follows -that that artistic formation of metaphors, with which every sensation -in us begins, already presupposes those forms, and is therefore only -consummated within them; only out of the persistency of these primal -forms the possibility explains itself, how afterwards--out of the -metaphors themselves a structure of ideas, could again be compiled. For -the latter is an imitation of the relations of time, space and number -in the realm of metaphors. - - -[1] The German poet, Lessing, had been married for just a little over -one year to Eva König. A son was born and died the same day, and the -mother's life was despaired of. In a letter to his friend Eschenburg -the poet wrote: "... and I lost him so unwillingly, this son! For he -had so much understanding! so much understanding! Do not suppose that -the few hours of fatherhood have made me an ape of a father! I know -what I say. Was it not understanding, that they had to drag him into -the world with a pair of forceps? that he so soon suspected the evil -of this world? Was it not understanding, that he seized the first -opportunity to get away from it?..." - -Eva König died a week later.--TR. - -[2] In German _the tree--der Baum_--is masculine.--TR. - -[3] In German _the plant--die Pflanze--_-is feminine--TR. - -[4] _Cf._ the German _die Schlange_ and _schlingen,_ the English -_serpent_ from the Latin _serpere._--TR. - - - -2 - - -As we saw, it is _language_ which has worked originally at the -construction of ideas; in later times it is _science._ Just as the -bee works at the same time at the cells and fills them with honey, -thus science works irresistibly at that great columbarium of ideas, -the cemetery of perceptions, builds ever newer and higher storeys; -supports, purifies, renews the old cells, and endeavours above all to -fill that gigantic framework and to arrange within it the whole of the -empiric world, _i.e.,_ the anthropomorphic world. And as the man of -action binds his life to reason and its ideas, in order to avoid being -swept away and losing himself, so the seeker after truth builds his hut -close to the towering edifice of science in order to collaborate with -it and to find protection. And he needs protection. For there are awful -powers which continually press upon him, and which hold out against the -"truth" of science "truths" fashioned in quite another way, bearing -devices of the most heterogeneous character. - -That impulse towards the formation of metaphors, mat fundamental -impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one moment--for thereby -we should reason away man himself--is in truth not defeated nor even -subdued by the fact that out of its evaporated products, the ideas, a -regular and rigid new world has been built as a stronghold for it. This -impulse seeks for itself a new realm of action and another river-bed, -and finds it in _Mythos_ and more generally in _Art._ This impulse -constantly confuses the rubrics and cells of the ideas, by putting -up new figures of speech, metaphors, metonymies; it constantly shows -its passionate longing for shaping the existing world of waking man -as motley, irregular, inconsequentially incoherent, attractive, and -eternally new as the world of dreams is. For indeed, waking man _per -se_ is only clear about his being awake through the rigid and orderly -woof of ideas, and it is for this very reason that he sometimes comes -to believe that he was dreaming when that woof of ideas has for a -moment been torn by Art. Pascal is quite right, when he asserts, that -if the same dream came to us every night we should be just as much -occupied by it as by the things which we see every day; to quote his -words, "If an artisan were certain that he would dream every night -for fully twelve hours that he was a king, I believe that he would -be just as happy as a king who dreams every night for twelve hours -that he is an artisan." The wide-awake day of a people mystically -excitable, let us say of the earlier Greeks, is in fact through the -continually-working wonder, which the mythos presupposes, more akin to -the dream than to the day of the thinker sobered by science. If every -tree may at some time talk as a nymph, or a god under the disguise of -a bull, carry away virgins, if the goddess Athene herself be suddenly -seen as, with a beautiful team, she drives, accompanied by Pisistratus, -through the markets of Athens--and every honest Athenian did believe -this--at any moment, as in a dream, everything is possible; and all -nature swarms around man as if she were nothing but the masquerade -of the gods, who found it a huge joke to deceive man by assuming all -possible forms. - -Man himself, however, has an invincible tendency to let himself -be deceived, and he is like one enchanted with happiness when the -rhapsodist narrates to him epic romances in such a way that they appear -real or when the actor on the stage makes the king appear more kingly -than reality shows him. Intellect, that master of dissimulation, is -free and dismissed from his service as slave, so long as It is able -to deceive without _injuring,_ and then It celebrates Its Saturnalia. -Never is It richer, prouder, more luxuriant, more skilful and daring; -with a creator's delight It throws metaphors into confusion, shifts the -boundary-stones of the abstractions, so that for instance It designates -the stream as the mobile way which carries man to that place whither -he would otherwise go. Now It has thrown off Its shoulders the emblem -of servitude. Usually with gloomy officiousness It endeavours to point -out the way to a poor individual coveting existence, and It fares forth -for plunder and booty like a servant for his master, but now It Itself -has become a master and may wipe from Its countenance the expression -of indigence. Whatever It now does, compared with Its former doings, -bears within itself dissimulation, just as Its former doings bore the -character of distortion. It copies human life, but takes it for a -good thing and seems to rest quite satisfied with it. That enormous -framework and hoarding of ideas, by clinging to which needy man saves -himself through life, is to the freed intellect only a scaffolding and -a toy for Its most daring feats, and when It smashes it to pieces, -throws it into confusion, and then puts it together ironically, pairing -the strangest, separating the nearest items, then It manifests that It -has no use for those makeshifts of misery, and that It is now no longer -led by ideas but by intuitions. From these intuitions no regular road -leads into the land of the spectral schemata, the abstractions; for -them the word is not made, when man sees them he is dumb, or speaks in -forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of ideas, in order -to correspond creatively with the impression of the powerful present -intuition at least by destroying and jeering at the old barriers of -ideas. - -There are ages, when the rational and the intuitive man stand side by -side, the one full of fear of the intuition, the other full of scorn -for the abstraction; the latter just as irrational as the former is -inartistic. Both desire to rule over life; the one by knowing how to -meet the most important needs with foresight, prudence, regularity; -the other as an "over-joyous" hero by ignoring those needs and taking -that life only as real which simulates appearance and beauty. Wherever -intuitive man, as for instance in the earlier history of Greece, -brandishes his weapons more powerfully and victoriously than his -opponent, there under favourable conditions, a culture can develop and -art can establish her rule over life. That dissembling, that denying of -neediness, that splendour of metaphorical notions and especially that -directness of dissimulation accompany all utterances of such a life. -Neither the house of man, nor his way of walking, nor his clothing, nor -his earthen jug suggest that necessity invented them; it seems as if -they all were intended as the expressions of a sublime happiness, an -Olympic cloudlessness, and as it were a playing at seriousness. Whereas -the man guided by ideas and abstractions only wards off misfortune by -means of them, without even enforcing for himself happiness out of the -abstractions; whereas he strives after the greatest possible freedom -from pains, the intuitive man dwelling in the midst of culture has from -his intuitions a harvest: besides the warding off of evil, he attains a -continuous in-pouring of enlightenment, enlivenment and redemption. Of -course when he _does_ suffer, he suffers more: and he even suffers more -frequently since he cannot learn from experience, but again and again -falls into the same ditch into which he has fallen before. In suffering -he is just as irrational as in happiness; he cries aloud and finds no -consolation. How different matters are in the same misfortune with -the Stoic, taught by experience and ruling himself by ideas! He who -otherwise only looks for uprightness, truth, freedom from deceptions -and shelter from ensnaring and sudden attack, in his misfortune -performs the masterpiece of dissimulation, just as the other did in -his happiness; he shows no twitching mobile human face but as it were a -mask with dignified, harmonious features; he does not cry out and does -not even alter his voice; when a heavy thundercloud bursts upon him, -he wraps himself up in his cloak and with slow and measured step walks -away from beneath it. - - -THE END. - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY, OTHER ESSAYS *** - -***** This file should be named 51548-0.txt or 51548-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/4/51548/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays - Collected Works, Volume Two - -Author: Friedrich Nietzsche - -Editor: Oscar Levy - -Translator: Maximilian A. Mügge - -Release Date: March 25, 2016 [EBook #51548] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY, OTHER ESSAYS *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h1>EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY & OTHER ESSAYS</h1> - -<h3>By</h3> - -<h2>FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE</h2> - -<h3>TRANSLATED BY</h3> - -<h4>MAXIMILIAN A. MÜGGE</h4> - -<h4>AUTHOR OF "FR. NIETZSCHE, HIS LIFE AND WORK," ETC.</h4> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 150px;"> -<img src="images/ill_niet.jpg" width="150" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h4>The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche</h4> - -<h5>The First Complete and Authorised English Translation</h5> - -<h4>Edited by Dr Oscar Levy</h4> - -<h4>Volume Two</h4> - -<h5>T.N. FOULIS</h5> - -<h5>13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET</h5> - -<h5>EDINBURGH: AND LONDON</h5> - -<h5>1911</h5> -<hr class="full" /> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;"> -<span class="caption">CONTENTS</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.25em;"><a href="#TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE</a></span><br /> -1. <a href="#THE_GREEK_STATE">THE GREEK STATE</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Preface to an unwritten book(1871)</span><br /> -2. <a href="#THE_GREEK_WOMAN">THE GREEK WOMAN</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Fragment (1871)</span><br /> -3. <a href="#ON_MUSIC_AND_WORDS">ON MUSIC AND WORDS</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Fragment (1871)</span><br /> -4. <a href="#HOMERS_CONTEST">HOMER'S CONTEST</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Preface to an unwritten book (1872)</span><br /> -5. <a href="#THE_RELATION_OF_SCHOPENHAUERS_PHILOSOPHY_TO_A_GERMAN_CULTURE">THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE</a><br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1.25em;">—Preface to an unwritten book (1872)</span><br /> -6. <a href="#PHILOSOPHY_DURING_THE_TRAGIC_AGE_OF_THE_GREEKS">PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS</a> (1873)<br /> -7. <a href="#ON_TRUTH_AND_FALSITY_IN_THEIR_ULTRAMORAL_SENSE">ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE</a> (1873)<br /> -</p> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE" id="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE</a></h4> - - -<p>The essays contained in this volume treat of various subjects. With -the exception of perhaps one we must consider all these papers as -fragments. Written during the early Seventies, and intended mostly as -prefaces, they are extremely interesting, since traces of Nietzsche's -later tenets—like Slave and Master morality, the Superman—can be -found everywhere. But they are also very valuable on account of the -young philosopher's daring and able handling of difficult and abstruse -subjects. "Truth and Falsity," and "The Greek Woman" are probably the -two essays which will prove most attractive to the average reader.</p> - -<p>In the essay on <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE GREEK STATE</span> the two tenets mentioned above -are clearly discernible, though the Superman still goes by the -Schopenhauerian label "genius." Our philosopher attacks the modern -ideas of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of labour," because -Existence seems to be without worth and dignity. The preponderance -of such illusory ideas is due to the political power nowadays vested -in the "slaves." The Greeks saw no dignity in labour. They saw the -necessity of it, and the necessity of slavery, but felt ashamed of -both. Not even the labour of the artist did they admire, although they -praised his completed work.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span></p> - -<p>If the Greeks perished through their slavery, one thing is still more -certain: we shall perish through the lack of slavery. To the essence -of Culture slavery is innate. It is part of it. A vast multitude must -labour and "slave" in order that a few may lead an existence devoted to -beauty and art.</p> - -<p>Strife and war are necessary for the welfare of the State. War -consecrates and purines the State. The purpose of the military State -is the creating of the military genius, the ruthless conqueror, the -War-lord. There also exists a mysterious connection between the State -in general and the creating of the genius.</p> - -<p>In <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE GREEK WOMAN</span>, Nietzsche, the man who said, "One cannot think -highly enough of women," delineates his ideal of woman. Penelope, -Antigone, Electra are his ideal types.</p> - -<p>Plato's dictum that in the perfect State the family would cease to -exist, belongs to the most intimate things uttered about the relation -between women and the State. The Greek woman as mother had to vegetate -in obscurity, to lead a kind of Cranfordian existence for the greater -welfare of the body politic. Only in Greek antiquity did woman occupy -her proper position, and for this reason she was more honoured than she -has ever been since. Pythia was the mouthpiece, the symbol of Greek -unity.</p> - -<p><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">ON MUSIC AND WORDS</span>. Music is older, more fundamental than language. -Music is an expression of cosmic consciousness. Language is only a -gesture-symbolism.</p> - -<p>It is true the music of every people was at first allied to lyric -poetry; "absolute music" always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> appeared much later. But that is due -to the double nature in the essence of language. The <i>tone</i> of the -speaker expresses the basic pleasure- and displeasure-sensations of the -individual. These form the tonal subsoil common to all languages; they -are comprehensible everywhere. Language itself is a super-structure on -that subsoil; it is a gesture-symbolism for all the other conceptions -which man adds to that subsoil.</p> - -<p>The endeavour to illustrate a poem by music is futile. The text of -an opera is therefore quite negligible. Modern opera in its music is -therefore often only a stimulant or a remembrancer for set, stereotyped -feelings. Great music, <i>i.e.,</i> Dionysean music, makes us forget to -listen to the words.</p> - -<p><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">HOMER'S CONTEST</span>. The Greek genius acknowledged strife, struggle, -contest to be necessary in this life. Only through competition and -emulation will the Common-Wealth thrive. Yet there was no unbridled -ambition. Everyone's individual endeavours were subordinated to the -welfare of the community. The curse of present-day contest is that it -does not do the same.</p> - -<p>In <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE</span> an -amusing and yet serious attack is made on the hollow would-be culture -of the German Philistines who after the Franco-Prussian war were -swollen with self-conceit, self-sufficiency, and were a great danger to -real Culture. Nietzsche points out Schopenhauer's great philosophy as -the only possible means of escaping the humdrum of Philistia with its -hypocrisy and intellectual ostrichisation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> - -<p>The essay on <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">GREEK PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE</span> is a performance -of great interest to the scholar. It brims with ideas. The Hegelian -School, especially Zeller, has shown what an important place is held by -the earlier thinkers in the history of Greek thought and how necessary -a knowledge of their work is for all who wish to understand Plato and -Aristotle. <i>Diels'</i> great book: "Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker", -<i>Benn's, Burnet's</i> and <i>Fairbanks'</i> books we may regard as the -peristyle through which we enter the temple of Early Greek Philosophy. -Nietzsche's essay then is like a beautiful festoon swinging between the -columns erected by Diels and the others out of the marble of facts.</p> - -<p>Beauty and the personal equation are the two "leitmotive" of -Nietzsche's history of the pre-Socratian philosophers. Especially -does he lay stress upon the personal equation, since that is the -only permanent item of interest, considering that every "System" -crumbles into nothing with the appearance of a new thinker. In this -way Nietzsche treats of <i>Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, -Xenophanes, Anaxagoras.</i> There are also some sketches of a draft for -an intended but never accomplished continuation, in which Empedocles, -Democritus and Plato were to be dealt with.</p> - -<p>Probably the most popular of the Essays in this book will prove to be -the one on <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">TRUTH AND FALSITY</span>. It is an epistemological rhapsody on the -relativity of truth, on "Appearance and Reality," on "perceptual flux" -versus—"conceptual conceit."</p> - -<p>Man's intellect is only a means in the struggle for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> existence, a means -taking the place of the animal's horns and teeth. It adapts itself -especially to deception and dissimulation.</p> - -<p>There are no absolute truths. Truth is relative and always imperfect. -Yet fictitious values fixed by convention and utility are set down as -truth. The liar does not use these standard coins of the realm. He is -hated; not out of love for truth, no, but because he is dangerous.</p> - -<p>Our words never hit the essence, the "X" of a thing, but indicate only -external characteristics. Language is the columbarium of the ideas, the -cemetery of perceptions.</p> - -<p>Truths are metaphors, illusions, anthropomorphisms about which one has -forgotten that they are such. There are different truths to different -beings. Like a spider man sits in the web of his truths and ideas. He -wants to be deceived. By means of error he mostly lives; truth is often -fatal. When the liar, the story-teller, the poet, the rhapsodist lie to -him without hurting him he—loves them!—</p> - -<p>The text underlying this translation is that of Vol. I. of the -"Taschenausgabe." One or two obscure passages I hope my conjectures may -have elucidated. The dates following the titles indicate the year when -these essays were written.</p> - -<p>In no other work have I felt so deeply the great need of the science of -Signifies with its ultimate international standardisation of terms, as -attempted by Eisler and Baldwin. I hope, however, I have succeeded in -conveying accurately the meaning of the author in spite of a certain -<i>looseness</i> in his philosophical terminology.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></p> - -<p>The English language is somewhat at a disadvantage through its lack -of a Noun-Infinitive. I can best illustrate this by a passage from -<i>Parmenides</i>:</p> - -<p>χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῑν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εῖναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ -ἔστιν· τά σ' ἐγὼ ψράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.</p> - -<p>In his usual masterly manner <i>Diels</i> translates these lines with: "Das -Sagen und Denken musz ein Seiendes sein. Denn das Sein existiert, das -Nichts existiert nicht; das heisz ich dich wohl zu beherzigen." On -the other hand in <i>Fairbanks'</i> "version" we read: "It is necessary -both to say and to think that being is; for it is possible that being -is, and it is impossible that not being is; this is what I bid thee -ponder." In order to avoid a similar obscurity, throughout the paper on -"<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY</span>" I have rendered "das Seiende" (τὸ ἐὸν) with -"Existent", "das Nicht-Seiende" with "Non-Existent"; "das Sein" (εῖναι) -with "Being" and "das Nicht-Sein" with "Not-Being."</p> - -<p>I am directly or indirectly indebted for many suggestions to several -friends of mine, especially to two of my colleagues, J. Charlton -Hipkins, M.A., and R. Miller, B.A., for their patient revision of the -whole of the proofs.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 70%; font-size: 0.8em;">M. A. MÜGGE.</p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">LONDON, <i>July</i> 1911.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a><br /><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a><br /><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_GREEK_STATE" id="THE_GREEK_STATE">THE GREEK STATE</a></h4> - - -<h5>Preface to an Unwritten Book (1871)</h5> - - -<p>We moderns have an advantage over the Greeks in two ideas, which are -given as it were as a compensation to a world behaving thoroughly -slavishly and yet at the same time anxiously eschewing the word -"slave": we talk of the "dignity of man" and of the "dignity of -labour." Everybody worries in order miserably to perpetuate a miserable -existence; this awful need compels him to consuming labour; man -(or, more exactly, the human intellect) seduced by the "Will" now -occasionally marvels at labour as something dignified. However in -order that labour might have a claim on titles of honour, it would be -necessary above all, that Existence itself, to which labour after all -is only a painful means, should have more dignity and value than it -appears to have had, up to the present, to serious philosophies and -religions. What else may we find in the labour-need of all the millions -but the impulse to exist at any price, the same all-powerful impulse by -which stunted plants stretch their roots through earthless rocks!</p> - -<p>Out of this awful struggle for existence only individuals can emerge, -and they are at once occupied with the noble phantoms of artistic -culture, lest they should arrive at practical pessimism, which Nature -abhors as her exact opposite. In the modern world, which, compared -with the Greek, usually produces<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> only abnormalities and centaurs, in -which the individual, like that fabulous creature in the beginning of -the Horatian Art of Poetry, is jumbled together out of pieces, here in -the modern world in one and the same man the greed of the struggle for -existence and the need for art show themselves at the same time: out of -this unnatural amalgamation has originated the dilemma, to excuse and -to consecrate that first greed before this need for art. Therefore; we -believe in the "Dignity of man" and the "Dignity of labour."</p> - -<p>The Greeks did not require such conceptual hallucinations, for among -them the idea that labour is a disgrace is expressed with startling -frankness; and another piece of wisdom, more hidden and less -articulate, but everywhere alive, added that the human thing also was -an ignominious and piteous nothing and the "dream of a shadow." Labour -is a disgrace, because existence has no value in itself; but even -though this very existence in the alluring embellishment of artistic -illusions shines forth and really seems to have a value in itself, then -that proposition is still valid that labour is a disgrace—a disgrace -indeed by the fact that it is impossible for man, fighting for the -continuance of bare existence, to become an <i>artist.</i> In modern times -it is not the art-needing man but the slave who determines the general -conceptions, the slave who according to his nature must give deceptive -names to all conditions in order to be able to live. Such phantoms as -the dignity of man, the dignity of labour, are the needy products of -slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woful time, in which the slave<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> -requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and -beyond himself! Cursed seducers, who have destroyed the slave's state -of innocence by the fruit of the tree of knowledge! Now the slave must -vainly scrape through from one day to another with transparent lies -recognisable to every one of deeper insight, such as the alleged "equal -rights of all" or the so-called "fundamental rights of man," of man as -such, or the "dignity of labour." Indeed he is not to understand at -what stage and at what height dignity can first be mentioned—namely, -at the point, where the individual goes wholly beyond himself and no -longer has to work and to produce in order to preserve his individual -existence.</p> - -<p>And even on this height of "labour" the Greek at times is overcome by -a feeling, that looks like shame. In one place Plutarch with earlier -Greek instinct says that no nobly born youth on beholding the Zeus in -Pisa would have the desire to become himself a Phidias, or on seeing -the Hera in Argos, to become himself a Polyklet; and just as little -would he wish to be Anacreon, Philetas or Archilochus, however much he -might revel in their poetry. To the Greek the work of the artist falls -just as much under the undignified conception of labour as any ignoble -craft. But if the compelling force of the artistic impulse operates in -him, then he <i>must</i> produce and submit himself to that need of labour. -And as a father admires the beauty and the gift of his child but thinks -of the act of procreation with shamefaced dislike, so it was with the -Greek. The joyful astonishment at the beautiful has not blinded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> him -as to its origin which appeared to him, like all "Becoming" in nature, -to be a powerful necessity, a forcing of itself into existence. That -feeling by which the process of procreation is considered as something -shamefacedly to be hidden, although by it man serves a higher purpose -than his individual preservation, the same feeling veiled also the -origin of the great works of art, in spite of the fact that through -them a higher form of existence is inaugurated, just as through -that other act comes a new generation. The feeling of <i>shame</i> seems -therefore to occur where man is merely a tool of manifestations of will -infinitely greater than he is permitted to consider himself in the -isolated shape of the individual.</p> - -<p>Now we have the general idea to which are to be subordinated the -feelings which the Greek had with regard to labour and slavery. Both -were considered by them as a necessary disgrace, of which one feels -<i>ashamed,</i> as a disgrace and as a necessity at the same time. In this -feeling of shame is hidden the unconscious discernment that the real -aim <i>needs</i> those conditional factors, but that in that <i>need</i> lies the -fearful and beast-of-prey-like quality of the Sphinx Nature, who in -the glorification of the artistically free culture-life so beautifully -stretches forth her virgin-body. Culture, which is chiefly a real need -for art, rests upon a terrible basis: the latter however makes itself -known in the twilight sensation of shame. In order that there may be a -broad, deep, and fruitful soil for the development of art, the enormous -majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly subjected -to life's struggle, to a <i>greater</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> degree than their own wants -necessitate. At their cost, through the surplus of their labour, that -privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in -order to create and to satisfy a new world of want.</p> - -<p>Accordingly we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that <i>slavery -is of the essence of Culture;</i> a truth of course, which leaves no -doubt as to the absolute value of Existence. <i>This truth</i> is the -vulture, that gnaws at the liver of the Promethean promoter of Culture. -The misery of toiling men must still increase in order to make the -production of the world of art possible to a small number of Olympian -men. Here is to be found the source of that secret wrath nourished -by Communists and Socialists of all times, and also by their feebler -descendants, the white race of the "Liberals," not only against -the arts, but also against classical antiquity. If Culture really -rested upon the will of a people, if here inexorable powers did not -rule, powers which are law and barrier to the individual, then the -contempt for Culture, the glorification of a "poorness in spirit," the -iconoclastic annihilation of artistic claims would be <i>more than</i> an -insurrection of the suppressed masses against drone-like individuals; -it would be the cry of compassion tearing down the walls of Culture; -the desire for justice, for the equalization of suffering, would -swamp all other ideas. In fact here and there sometimes an exuberant -degree of compassion has for a short time opened all the flood gates -of Culture-life; a rainbow of compassionate love and of peace appeared -with the first radiant rise of Christianity and under it was born -Christianity's most beautiful fruit, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> gospel according to St John. -But there are also instances to show that powerful religions for long -periods petrify a given degree of Culture, and cut off with inexorable -sickle everything that still grows on strongly and luxuriantly. For it -is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we found in the -essence of every Culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful -religion and in general in the essence of <i>power,</i> which is always -evil; so that we shall understand it just as well, when a Culture is -shattering, with a cry for liberty or at least justice, a too highly -piled bulwark of religious claims. That which in this "sorry scheme" of -things will live (<i>i.e.,</i> must live), is at the bottom of its nature a -reflex of the primal-pain and primal-contradiction, and must therefore -strike our eyes—"an organ fashioned for this world and earth"—as -an insatiable greed for existence and an eternal self-contradiction, -within the form of time, therefore as Becoming. Every moment devours -the preceding one, every birth is the death of innumerable beings; -begetting, living, murdering, all is one. Therefore we may compare -this grand Culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his triumphal -procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot, -slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by -the wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless still exclaim: "Dignity of -labour!" "Dignity of Man!" The voluptuous Cleopatra-Culture throws ever -again the most priceless pearls, the tears of compassion for the misery -of slaves, into her golden goblet. Out of the emasculation of modern -man has been born the enormous social distress of the present time, -not out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> of the true and deep commiseration for that misery; and if it -should be true that the Greeks perished through their slavedom then -another fact is much more certain, that we shall perish through the -<i>lack</i> of slavery. Slavedom did not appear in any way objectionable, -much less abominable, either to early Christianity or to the Germanic -race. What an uplifting effect on us has the contemplation of the -mediæval bondman, with his legal and moral relations,—relations that -were inwardly strong and tender,—towards the man of higher rank, with -the profound fencing-in of his narrow existence—how uplifting!—and -how reproachful!</p> - -<p>He who cannot reflect upon the position of affairs in Society without -melancholy, who has learnt to conceive of it as the continual painful -birth of those privileged Culture-men, in whose service everything -else must be devoured—he will no longer be deceived by that false -glamour, which the moderns have spread over the origin and meaning -of the State. For what can the State mean to us, if not the means by -which that social-process described just now is to be fused and to -be guaranteed in its unimpeded continuance? Be the sociable instinct -in individual man as strong as it may, it is only the iron clamp of -the State that constrains the large masses upon one another in such a -fashion that a chemical decomposition of Society, with its pyramid-like -super-structure, is <i>bound</i> to take place. Whence however originates -this sudden power of the State, whose aim lies much beyond the insight -and beyond the egoism of the individual? How did the slave, the blind -mole of Culture, <i>originate</i>?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> The Greeks in their instinct relating -to the law of nations have betrayed it to us, in an instinct, which -even in the ripest fulness of their civilisation and humanity never -ceased to utter as out of a brazen mouth such words as: "to the victor -belongs the vanquished, with wife and child, life and property. Power -gives the first <i>right</i> and there is no right, which at bottom is not -presumption, usurpation, violence."</p> - -<p>Here again we see with what pitiless inflexibility Nature, in order -to arrive at Society, forges for herself the cruel tool of the -State—namely, that <i>conqueror</i> with the iron hand, who is nothing else -than the objectivation of the instinct indicated. By the indefinable -greatness and power of such conquerors the spectator feels, that they -are only the means of an intention manifesting itself through them -and yet hiding itself from them. The weaker forces attach themselves -to them with such mysterious speed, and transform themselves so -wonderfully, in the sudden swelling of that violent avalanche, under -the charm of that creative kernel, into an affinity hitherto not -existing, that it seems as if a magic will were emanating from them.</p> - -<p>Now when we see how little the vanquished trouble themselves after a -short time about the horrible origin of the State, so that history -informs us of no class of events worse than the origins of those -sudden, violent, bloody and, at least in <i>one</i> point, inexplicable -usurpations: when hearts involuntarily go out towards the magic of -the growing State with the presentiment of an invisible deep purpose, -where the calculating intellect is enabled to see an addition of forces -only; when now the State<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> is even contemplated with fervour as the -goal and ultimate aim of the sacrifices and duties of the individual: -then out of all that speaks the enormous necessity of the State, -without which Nature might not succeed in coming, through Society, -to her deliverance in semblance, in the mirror of the genius. What -discernments does the instinctive pleasure in the State not overcome! -One would indeed feel inclined to think that a man who looks into the -origin of the State will henceforth seek his salvation at an awful -distance from it; and where can one not see the monuments of its -origin—devastated lands, destroyed cities, brutalised men, devouring -hatred of nations! The State, of ignominiously low birth, for the -majority of men a continually flowing source of hardship, at frequently -recurring periods the consuming torch of mankind—and yet a word, at -which we forget ourselves, a battle cry, which has filled men with -enthusiasm for innumerable really heroic deeds, perhaps the highest and -most venerable object for the blind and egoistic multitude which only -in the tremendous moments of State-life has the strange expression of -greatness on its face!</p> - -<p>We have, however, to consider the Greeks, with regard to the unique -sun-height of their art, as the "political men in themselves," and -certainly history knows of no second instance of such an awful -unchaining of the political passion, such an unconditional immolation -of all other interests in the service of this State-instinct; at the -best one might distinguish the men of the Renascence in Italy with a -similar title for like reasons and by way of comparison. So overloaded -is that passion among the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> Greeks that it begins ever anew to rage -against itself and to strike its teeth into its own flesh. This bloody -jealousy of city against city, of party against party, this murderous -greed of those little wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse -of the slain enemy, in short, the incessant renewal of those Trojan -scenes of struggle and horror, in the spectacle of which, as a genuine -Hellene, Homer stands before us absorbed with <i>delight</i>—whither does -this naïve barbarism of the Greek State point? What is its excuse -before the tribunal of eternal justice? Proud and calm, the State steps -before this tribunal and by the hand it leads the flower of blossoming -womanhood: Greek society. For this Helena the State waged those -wars—and what grey-bearded judge could here condemn?—</p> - -<p>Under this mysterious connection, which we here divine between State -and art, political greed and artistic creation, battlefield and work -of art, we understand by the State, as already remarked, only the -cramp-iron, which compels the Social process; whereas without the -State, in the natural <i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i> Society cannot -strike root at all on a larger scale and beyond the reach of the -family. Now, after States have been established almost everywhere, that -bent of the <i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i> concentrates itself from time -to time into a terrible gathering of war-clouds and discharges itself -as it were in rare but so much the more violent shocks and lightning -flashes. But in consequence of the effect of that <i>bellum,</i>—an effect -which is turned inwards and compressed,—Society is given time during -the intervals to germinate and burst into leaf,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> in order, as soon as -warmer days come, to let the shining blossoms of genius sprout forth.</p> - -<p>In face of the political world of the Hellenes, I will not hide those -phenomena of the present in which I believe I discern dangerous -atrophies of the political sphere equally critical for art and society. -If there should exist men, who as it were through birth are placed -outside the national-and State-instincts, who consequently have to -esteem the State only in so far as they conceive that it coincides -with their own interest, then such men will necessarily imagine as the -ultimate political aim the most undisturbed collateral existence of -great political communities possible, which <i>they</i> might be permitted -to pursue their own purposes without restriction. With this idea in -their heads they will promote <i>that</i> policy which will offer the -greatest security to these purposes; whereas it is unthinkable, that -they, against their intentions, guided perhaps by an unconscious -instinct, should sacrifice themselves for the State-tendency, -unthinkable because they lack that very instinct. All other citizens -of the State are in the dark about what Nature intends with her -State-instinct within them, and they follow blindly; only those who -stand outside this instinct know what <i>they</i> want from the State and -what the State is to grant them. Therefore it is almost unavoidable -that such men should gain great influence in the State because they -are allowed to consider it as a <i>means,</i> whereas all the others under -the sway of those unconscious purposes of the State are themselves -only means for the fulfilment of the State-purpose. In order now to -attain, through the medium of the State,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> the highest furtherance -of their selfish aims, it is above all necessary, that the State be -wholly freed from those awfully incalculable war-convulsions so that -it may be used rationally; and thereby they strive with all their -might for a condition of things in which war is an impossibility. For -that purpose the thing to do is first to curtail and to enfeeble the -political separatisms and factions and through the establishment of -large <i>equipoised</i> State-bodies and the mutual safeguarding of them -to make the successful result of an aggressive war and consequently -war itself the greatest improbability; as on the other hand they will -endeavour to wrest the question of war and peace from the decision of -individual lords, in order to be able rather to appeal to the egoism -of the masses or their representatives; for which purpose they again -need slowly to dissolve the monarchic instincts of the nations. This -purpose they attain best through the most general promulgation of -the liberal optimistic view of the world, which has its roots in the -doctrines of French Rationalism and the French Revolution, <i>i.e.,</i> in -a wholly un-Germanic, genuinely neo-Latin shallow and unmetaphysical -philosophy. I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international -movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of -universal suffrage, the effects of the <i>fear of war</i> above everything -else, yea I behold behind these movements, those truly international -homeless money-hermits, as the really alarmed, who, with their -natural lack of the State-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as -a means of the Exchange, and State and Society as an apparatus for -their own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> enrichment. Against the deviation of the State-tendency -into a money-tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy -is war and once again war, in the emotions of which this at least -becomes obvious, that the State is not founded upon the fear of the -war-demon, as a protective institution for egoistic individuals, but -in love to fatherland and prince, it produces an ethical impulse, -indicative of a much higher destiny. If I therefore designate as a -dangerous and characteristic sign of the present political situation -the application of revolutionary thought in the service of a selfish -State-less money-aristocracy, if at the same time I conceive of the -enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern -financial affairs fallen into strange hands, and if I imagine all evils -of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to -have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one -will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a Pæan on war. Horribly -clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes along like the night, -war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and -purifying the State. First of all, however, as is said in the beginning -of the "Iliad," he lets fly his arrow on the mules and dogs. Then he -strikes the men themselves, and everywhere pyres break into flames. -Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the -State as the slave is for society, and who can avoid this verdict if -he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equalled Greek -art-perfection?</p> - -<p>He who contemplates war and its uniformed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> possibility, the <i>soldier's -profession,</i> with respect to the hitherto described nature of the -State, must arrive at the conviction, that through war and in the -profession of arms is placed before our eyes an image, or even perhaps -the <i>prototype of the State.</i> Here we see as the most general effect of -the war-tendency an immediate decomposition and division of the chaotic -mass into <i>military castes,</i> out of which rises, pyramid-shaped, -on an exceedingly broad base of slaves the edifice of the "martial -society." The unconscious purpose of the whole movement constrains -every individual under its yoke, and produces also in heterogeneous -natures as it were a chemical transformation of their qualities until -they are brought into affinity with that purpose. In the highest -castes one perceives already a little more of what in this internal -process is involved at the bottom, namely the creation of the <i>military -genius</i>—with whom we have become acquainted as the original founder of -states. In the case of many States, as, for example, in the Lycurgian -constitution of Sparta, one can distinctly perceive the impress of that -fundamental idea of the State, that of the creation of the military -genius. If we now imagine the military primal State in its greatest -activity, at its proper "labour," and if we fix our glance upon the -whole technique of war, we cannot avoid correcting our notions picked -up from everywhere, as to the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of -labour" by the question, whether the idea of dignity is applicable -also to that labour, which has as its purpose the destruction of the -"dignified" man, as well as to the man who is entrusted with that -"dignified labour," or whether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> in this warlike task of the State those -mutually contradictory ideas do not neutralise one another. I should -like to think the warlike man to be a <i>means</i> of the military genius -and his labour again only a tool in the hands of that same genius; and -not to him, as absolute man and non-genius, but to him as a means of -the genius—whose pleasure also can be to choose his tool's destruction -as a mere pawn sacrificed on the strategist's chessboard—is due a -degree of dignity, of that dignity namely, <i>to have been deemed worthy -of being a means of the genius.</i> But what is shown here in a single -instance is valid in the most general sense; every human being, with -his total activity, only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of <i>the</i> -genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately -deduce the ethical conclusion, that "man in himself," the absolute man -possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties; only as a wholly -determined being serving unconscious purposes can man excuse his -existence.</p> - -<p><i>Plato's perfect State</i> is according to these considerations certainly -something still greater than even the warm-blooded among his admirers -believe, not to mention the smiling mien of superiority with which -our "historically" educated refuse such a fruit of antiquity. The -proper aim of the State, the Olympian existence and ever-renewed -procreation and preparation of the genius,—compared with which -all other things are only tools, expedients and factors towards -realisation—is here discovered with a poetic intuition and painted -with firmness. Plato saw through the awfully devastated Herma of the -then-existing State-life and perceived even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> then something divine in -its interior. He <i>believed</i> that one might be able to take out this -divine image and that the grim and barbarically distorted outside and -shell did not belong to the essence of the State: the whole fervour -and sublimity of his political passion threw itself upon this belief, -upon that desire—and in the flames of this fire he perished. That in -his perfect State he did not place at the head <i>the</i> genius in its -general meaning, but only the genius of wisdom and of knowledge, that -he altogether excluded the inspired artist from his State, that was -a rigid consequence of the Socratian judgment on art, which Plato, -struggling against himself, had made his own. This more external, -almost incidental gap must not prevent our recognising in the total -conception of the Platonic State the wonderfully great hieroglyph of -a profound and eternally to be interpreted <i>esoteric doctrine of the -connection between State and Genius.</i> What we believed we could divine -of this cryptograph we have said in this preface.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></p> -<h4><a name="THE_GREEK_WOMAN" id="THE_GREEK_WOMAN">THE GREEK WOMAN</a></h4> - - -<h5>(Fragment, 1871)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>Just as Plato from disguises and obscurities brought to light the -innermost purpose of the State, so also he conceived the chief cause -of the position of the <i>Hellenic Woman</i> with regard to the State; in -both cases he saw in what existed around him the image of the ideas -manifested to him, and of these ideas of course the actual was only a -hazy picture and phantasmagoria. He who according to the usual custom -considers the position of the Hellenic Woman to be altogether unworthy -and repugnant to humanity, must also turn with this reproach against -the Platonic conception of this position; for, as it were, the existing -forms were only precisely set forth in this latter conception. Here -therefore our question repeats itself: should not the nature and the -position of the Hellenic Woman have a <i>necessary</i> relation to the goals -of the Hellenic Will?</p> - -<p>Of course there is one side of the Platonic conception of woman, which -stands in abrupt contrast with Hellenic custom: Plato gives to woman a -full share in the rights, knowledge and duties of man, and considers -woman only as the weaker sex, in that she will not achieve remarkable -success in all things, without however disputing this sex's title to -all those things. We must not attach more value to; this strange notion -than to the expulsion of the artist out of the ideal State; these are -side-lines daringly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> mis-drawn, aberrations as it were of the hand -otherwise so sure and of the so calmly contemplating eye which at times -under the influence of the deceased master becomes dim and dejected; in -this mood he exaggerates the master's paradoxes and in the abundance of -his love gives himself satisfaction by very eccentrically intensifying -the latter's doctrines even to foolhardiness.</p> - -<p>The most significant word however that Plato as a Greek could say on -the relation of woman to the State, was that so objectionable demand, -that in the perfect State, the <i>Family was to cease.</i> At present let us -take no account of his abolishing even marriage, in order to carry out -this demand fully, and of his substituting solemn nuptials arranged by -order of the State, between the bravest men and the noblest women, for -the attainment of beautiful offspring. In that principal proposition -however he has indicated most distinctly—indeed too distinctly, -offensively distinctly—an important preparatory step of the Hellenic -Will towards the procreation of the genius. But in the customs of the -Hellenic people the claim of the family on man and child was extremely -limited: the man lived in the State, the child grew up for the State -and was guided by the hand of the State. The Greek Will took care that -the need of culture could not be satisfied in the seclusion of a small -circle. From the State the individual has to receive everything in -order to return everything to the State. Woman accordingly means to the -State, what <i>sleep</i> does to man. In her nature lies the healing power, -which replaces that which has been used up, the beneficial rest in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> -which everything immoderate confines itself, the eternal Same, by which -the excessive and the surplus regulate themselves. In her the future -generation dreams. Woman is more closely related to Nature than man and -in all her essentials she remains ever herself. Culture is with her -always something external, a something which does not touch the kernel -that is eternally faithful to Nature, therefore the culture of woman -might well appear to the Athenian as something indifferent, yea—if one -only wanted to conjure it up in one's mind, as something ridiculous. -He who at once feels himself compelled from that to infer the position -of women among the Greeks as unworthy and all too cruel, should not -indeed take as his criterion the "culture" of modern woman and her -claims, against which it is sufficient just to point out the Olympian -women together with Penelope, Antigone, Elektra. Of course it is true -that these are ideal figures, but who would be able to create such -ideals out of the present world?—Further indeed is to be considered -<i>what sons</i> these women have borne, and what women they must have been -to have given birth to such sons! The Hellenic woman as <i>mother</i> had -to live in obscurity, because the political instinct together with -its highest aim demanded it. She had to vegetate like a plant, in -the narrow circle, as a symbol of the Epicurean wisdom λάθε βυώσας. -Again, in more recent times, with the complete disintegration of the -principle of the State, she had to step in as helper; the family as a -makeshift for the State is her work; and in this sense the <i>artistic -aim</i> of the State had to abase itself to the level of a <i>domestic</i> art. -Thereby it has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> been brought about, that the passion of love, as the -one realm wholly accessible to women, regulates our art to the very -core. Similarly, home-education considers itself so to speak as the -only natural one and suffers State-education only as a questionable -infringement upon the right of home-education: all this is right as -far as the modern State only is concerned.—With that the nature of -woman withal remains unaltered, but her <i>power</i> is, according to the -position which the State takes up with regard to women, a different -one. Women have indeed really the power to make good to a certain -extent the deficiencies of the State—ever faithful to their nature, -which I have compared to sleep. In Greek antiquity they held that -position, which the most supreme will of the State assigned to them: -for that reason they have been glorified as never since. The goddesses -of Greek mythology are their images: the Pythia and the Sibyl, as well -as the Socratic Diotima are the priestesses out of whom divine wisdom -speaks. Now one understands why the proud resignation of the Spartan -woman at the news of her son's death in battle can be no fable. Woman -in relation to the State felt herself in her proper position, therefore -she had more <i>dignity</i> than woman has ever had since. Plato who through -abolishing family and marriage still intensifies the position of woman, -feels now so much <i>reverence</i> towards them, that oddly enough he is -misled by a subsequent statement of their equality with man, to abolish -again the order of rank which is their due: the highest triumph of the -woman of antiquity, to have seduced even the wisest!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> - -<p>As long as the State is still in an embryonic condition woman as -<i>mother</i> preponderates and determines the grade and the manifestations -of Culture: in the same way as woman is destined to complement the -disorganised State. What Tacitus says of German women: <i>inesse -quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut consilia -earum aspernantur aut responsa neglegunt,</i> applies on the whole to -all nations not yet arrived at the real State. In such stages one -feels only the more strongly that which at all times becomes again -manifest, that the instincts of woman as the bulwark of the future -generation are invincible and that in her care for the preservation -of the species Nature speaks out of these instincts very distinctly. -How far this divining power reaches is determined, it seems, by the -greater or lesser consolidation of the State: in disorderly and more -arbitrary conditions, where the whim or the passion of the individual -man carries along with itself whole tribes, then woman suddenly comes -forward as the warning prophetess. But in Greece too there was a never -slumbering care that the terribly overcharged political instinct might -splinter into dust and atoms the little political organisms before -they attained their goals in any way. Here the Hellenic Will created -for itself ever new implements by means of which it spoke, adjusting, -moderating, warning: above all it is in the <i>Pythia,</i> that the power -of woman to compensate the State manifested itself so clearly, as it -has never done since. That a people split up thus into small tribes -and municipalities, was yet at bottom <i>whole</i> and was performing the -task of its nature within its faction,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> was assured by that wonderful -phenomenon the Pythia and the Delphian oracle: for always, as long as -Hellenism created its great works of art, it spoke out of <i>one</i> mouth -and as <i>one</i> Pythia. We cannot hold back the portentous discernment -that to the Will individuation means much suffering, and that in order -to reach those <i>individuals</i> It <i>needs</i> an enormous step-ladder of -individuals. It is true our brains reel with the consideration whether -the Will in order to arrive at <i>Art,</i> has perhaps effused Itself out -into these worlds, stars, bodies, and atoms: at least it ought to -become clear to us then, that Art is not necessary for the individuals, -but for the Will itself: a sublime outlook at which we shall be -permitted to glance once more from another position.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></p> -<h4><a name="ON_MUSIC_AND_WORDS" id="ON_MUSIC_AND_WORDS">ON MUSIC AND WORDS</a></h4> - - -<h5>(Fragment, 1871)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>What we here have asserted of the relationship between language and -music must be valid too, for equal reasons concerning the relationship -of <i>Mime</i> to <i>Music.</i> The Mime too, as the intensified symbolism of -man's gestures, is, measured by the eternal significance of music, -only a simile, which brings into expression the innermost secret -of music but very superficially, namely on the substratum of the -passionately moved human body. But if we include language also in the -category of bodily symbolism, and compare the <i>drama,</i> according to -the canon advanced, with music, then I venture to think, a proposition -of Schopenhauer will come into the clearest light, to which reference -must be made again later on. "It might be admissible, although a purely -musical mind does not demand it, to join and adapt words or even a -clearly represented action to the pure language of tones, although the -latter, being self-sufficient, needs no help; so that our perceiving -and reflecting intellect, which does not like to be quite idle, may -meanwhile have light and analogous occupation also. By this concession -to the intellect man's attention adheres even more closely to music, -by this at the same time, too, is placed underneath that which the -tones indicate in their general metaphorless language of the heart, -a visible picture, as it were a schema, as an example illustrating a -general idea ... indeed such things will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> even heighten the effect -of music." (Schopenhauer, Parerga, II., "On the Metaphysics of the -Beautiful and Æsthetics," § 224.) If we disregard the naturalistic -external motivation according to which our perceiving and reflecting -intellect does not like to be quite idle when listening to music, and -attention led by the hand of an obvious action follows better—then -the drama in relation to music has been characterised by Schopenhauer -for the best reasons as a schema, as an example illustrating a general -idea: and when he adds "indeed such things will even heighten the -effect of music" then the enormous universality and originality of -vocal music, of the connection of tone with metaphor and idea guarantee -the correctness of this utterance. The music of every people begins in -closest connection with lyricism and long before absolute music can be -thought of, the music of a people in that connection passes through -the most important stages of development. If we understand this primal -lyricism of a people, as indeed we must, to be an imitation of the -artistic typifying Nature, then as the original prototype of that union -of music and lyricism must be regarded: <i>the duality in the essence -of language,</i> already typified by Nature. Now, after discussing the -relation of music to metaphor we will fathom deeper this essence of -language.</p> - -<p>In the multiplicity of languages the fact at once manifests itself, -that word and thing do not necessarily coincide with one another -completely, but that the word is a symbol. But what does the word -symbolise? Most certainly only conceptions, be these now conscious -ones or as in the greater number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> cases, unconscious; for how -should a word-symbol correspond to that innermost nature of which we -and the world are images? Only as conceptions we know that kernel, -only in its metaphorical expressions are we familiar with it; beyond -that point there is nowhere a direct bridge which could lead us to it. -The whole life of impulses, too, the play of feelings, sensations, -emotions, volitions, is known to us—as I am forced to insert here in -opposition to Schopenhauer—after a most rigid self-examination, not -according to its essence but merely as conception; and we may well be -permitted to say, that even Schopenhauer's "Will" is nothing else but -the most general phenomenal form of a Something otherwise absolutely -indecipherable. If therefore we must acquiesce in the rigid necessity -of getting nowhere beyond the conceptions we can nevertheless again -distinguish two main species within their realm. The one species -manifest themselves to us as pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations and -accompany all other conceptions as a never-lacking fundamental basis. -This most general manifestation, out of which and by which alone we -understand all Becoming and all Willing and for which we will retain -the name "Will" has now too in language its own symbolic sphere: -and in truth this sphere is equally fundamental to the language, -as that manifestation is fundamental to all other conceptions. All -degrees of pleasure and displeasure—expressions of <i>one</i> primal -cause unfathomable to us—symbolise themselves in <i>the tone of the -speaker:</i> whereas all the other conceptions are indicated by the -<i>gesture-symbolism</i> of the speaker. In so far as that primal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> cause -is the same in all men, the <i>tonal subsoil</i> is also the common -one, comprehensible beyond the difference of language. Out of it -now develops the more arbitrary gesture-symbolism which is not -wholly adequate for its basis: and with which begins the diversity -of languages, whose multiplicity we are permitted to consider—to -use a simile—as a strophic text to that primal melody of the -pleasure-and-displeasure-language. The whole realm of the consonantal -and vocal we believe we may reckon only under gesture-symbolism: -consonants <i>and</i> vowels without that fundamental tone which is -necessary above all else, are nothing but <i>positions</i> of the organs -of speech, in short, gestures—; as soon as we imagine the <i>word</i> -proceeding out of the mouth of man, then first of all the root of the -word, and the basis of that gesture-symbolism, the <i>tonal subsoil,</i> -the echo of the pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations originate. As our -whole corporeality stands in relation to that original phenomenon, the -"Will," so the word built out of its consonants and vowels stands in -relation to its tonal basis.</p> - -<p>This original phenomenon, the "Will," with its scale of -pleasure-and-displeasure-sensations attains in the development of music -an ever more adequate symbolic expression: and to this historical -process the continuous effort of lyric poetry runs parallel, the effort -to transcribe music into metaphors: exactly as this double-phenomenon, -according to the just completed disquisition, lies typified in language.</p> - -<p>He who has followed us into these difficult contemplations readily, -attentively, and with some imagination—and with kind indulgence where -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> expression has been too scanty or too unconditional—will now -have the advantage with us, of laying before himself more seriously and -answering more deeply than is usually the case some stirring points of -controversy of present-day æsthetics and still more of contemporary -artists. Let us think now, after all our assumptions, what an -undertaking it must be, to set music to a poem; <i>i.e.,</i> to illustrate -a poem by music, in order to help music thereby to obtain a language -of ideas. What a perverted world! A task that appears to my mind like -that of a son wanting to create his father! Music can create metaphors -out of itself, which will always however be but schemata, instances as -it were of her intrinsic general contents. But how should the metaphor, -the conception, create music out of itself! Much less could the idea, -or, as one has said, the "poetical idea" do this. As certainly as a -bridge leads out of the mysterious castle of the musician into the free -land of the metaphors—and the lyric poet steps across it—as certainly -is it impossible to go the contrary way, although some are said to -exist who fancy they have done so. One might people the air with the -phantasy of a Raphael, one might see St. Cecilia, as he does, listening -enraptured to the harmonies of the choirs of angels—no tone issues -from this world apparently lost in music: even if we imagined that that -harmony in reality, as by a miracle, began to sound for us, whither -would Cecilia, Paul and Magdalena disappear from us, whither even -the singing choir of angels! We should at once cease to be Raphael: -and as in that picture the earthly instruments lie shattered on the -ground,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> so our painter's vision, defeated by the higher, would fade -and die away.—How nevertheless could the miracle happen? How should -the Apollonian world of the eye quite engrossed in contemplation be -able to create out of itself the tone, which on the contrary symbolises -a sphere which is excluded and conquered just by that very Apollonian -absorption in Appearance? The delight at Appearance cannot raise out -of itself the pleasure at Non-appearance; the delight of perceiving is -delight only by the fact that nothing reminds us of a sphere in which -individuation is broken and abolished. If we have characterised at -all correctly the Apollonian in opposition to the Dionysean, then the -thought which attributes to the metaphor, the idea, the appearance, -in some way the power of producing out of itself the tone, must -appear to us strangely wrong. We will not be referred, in order to be -refuted, to the musician who writes music to existing lyric poems; for -after all that has been said we shall be compelled to assert that the -relationship between the lyric poem and its setting must in any case -be a different one from that between a father and his child. Then what -exactly?</p> - -<p>Here now we may be met on the ground of a favourite æsthetic notion -with the proposition, "It is not the poem which gives birth to -the setting but the <i>sentiment</i> created by the poem." I do not -agree with that; the more subtle or powerful stirring-up of that -pleasure-and-displeasure-subsoil is in the realm of productive art -<i>the</i> element which is inartistic in itself; indeed only its total -exclusion makes the complete self-absorption and disinterested<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -perception of the artist possible. Here perhaps one might retaliate -that I myself just now predicated about the "Will," that in music -"Will" came to an ever more adequate symbolic expression. My answer, -condensed into an æsthetic axiom, is this: <i>the Will is the object of -music but not the origin of it,</i> that is the Will in its very greatest -universality, as the most original manifestation, under which is to -be understood all Becoming. That, which we call <i>feeling,</i> is with -regard to this Will already permeated and saturated with conscious and -unconscious conceptions and is therefore no longer directly the object -of music; it is unthinkable then that these feelings should be able -to create music out of themselves. Take for instance the feelings of -love, fear and hope: music can no longer do anything with them in a -direct way, every one of them is already so filled with conceptions. -On the contrary these feelings can serve to symbolise music, as the -lyric poet does who translates for himself into the simile-world of -feelings that conceptually and metaphorically unapproachable realm -of the Will, the proper content and object of music. The lyric poet -resembles all those hearers of music who are conscious of an <i>effect -of music on their emotions;</i> the distant and removed power of music -appeals, with them, to an <i>intermediate realm</i> which gives to them -as it were a foretaste, a symbolic preliminary conception of music -proper, it appeals to the intermediate realm of the emotions. One might -be permitted to say about them, with respect to the Will, the only -object of music, that they bear the same relation to this Will, as the -analogous morning-dream,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> according to Schopenhauer's theory, bears to -the dream proper. To all those, however, who are unable to get at music -except with their emotions, is to be said, that they will ever remain -in the entrance-hall, and will never have access to the sanctuary of -music: which, as I said, emotion cannot show but only symbolise.</p> - -<p>With regard however to the origin of music, I have already explained -that that can never lie in the Will, but must rather rest in the lap of -that force, which under the form of the "Will" creates out of itself a -visionary world: <i>the origin of music lies beyond all individuation,</i> a -proposition, which after our discussion on the Dionysean self-evident. -At this point I take the liberty of setting forth again comprehensively -side by side those decisive propositions which the antithesis of the -Dionysean and Apollonian dealt with has compelled us to enunciate:</p> - -<p>The "Will," as the most original manifestation, is the object of music: -in this sense music can be called imitation of Nature, but of Nature in -its most general form.—</p> - -<p>The "Will" itself and the feelings—manifestations of the Will already -permeated with conceptions—are wholly incapable of creating music out -of themselves, just as on the other hand it is utterly denied to music -to represent feelings, or to have feelings as its object, while Will is -its only object.—</p> - -<p>He who carries away feelings as effects of music has within them as -it were a symbolic intermediate realm, which can give him a foretaste -of music, but excludes him at the same time from her innermost -sanctuaries.—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> - -<p>The lyric poet interprets music to himself through the symbolic -world of emotions, whereas he himself, in the calm of the Apollonian -contemplation, is exempted from those emotions.—</p> - -<p>When, therefore, the musician writes a setting to a lyric poem he is -moved as musician neither through the images nor through the emotional -language in the text; but a musical inspiration coming from quite a -different sphere <i>chooses</i> for itself that song-text as allegorical -expression. There cannot therefore be any question as to a necessary -relation between poem and music; for the two worlds brought here into -connection are too strange to one another to enter into more than a -superficial alliance; the song-text is just a symbol and stands to -music in the same relation as the Egyptian hieroglyph of bravery did to -the brave warrior himself. During the highest revelations of music we -even feel involuntarily the <i>crudeness</i> of every figurative effort and -of every emotion dragged in for purposes of analogy; for example, the -last quartets of Beethoven quite put to shame all illustration and the -entire realm of empiric reality. The symbol, in face of the god really -revealing himself, has no longer any meaning; moreover it appears as an -offensive superficiality.</p> - -<p>One must not think any the worse of us for considering from this point -of view one item so that we may speak about it without reserve, namely -the <i>last movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony,</i> a movement which -is unprecedented and unanalysable in its charms. To the dithyrambic -world-redeeming exultation of this music Schiller's poem<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> "To Joy," -is wholly incongruous, yea, like cold moon-light, pales beside that -sea of flame. Who would rob me of this sure feeling? Yea, who would -be able to dispute that that feeling during the hearing of this music -does not find expression in a scream only because we, wholly impotent -through music for metaphor and word, already <i>hear nothing at all -from Schiller's poem.</i> All that noble sublimity, yea the grandeur of -Schiller's verses has, beside the truly naïve-innocent folk-melody of -joy, a disturbing, troubling, even crude and offensive effect; only -the ever fuller development of the choir's song and the masses of the -orchestra preventing us from hearing them, keep from us that sensation -of incongruity. What therefore shall we think of that awful æsthetic -superstition that Beethoven himself made a solemn statement as to his -belief in the limits of absolute music, in that fourth movement of the -Ninth Symphony, yea that he as it were with it unlocked the portals -of a new art, within which music had been enabled to represent even -metaphor and idea and whereby music had been opened to the "conscious -mind." And what does Beethoven himself tell us when he has choir-song -introduced by a recitative? "Alas friends, let us intonate not these -tones but more pleasing and joyous ones!" More pleasing and joyous -ones! For that he needed the convincing tone of the human voice, for -that he needed the music of innocence in the folk-song. Not the word, -but the "more pleasing" sound, not the idea but the most heartfelt -joyful tone was chosen by the sublime master in his longing for the -most soul-thrilling ensemble of his orchestra. And how could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> one -misunderstand him! Rather may the same be said of this movement as -<i>Richard Wagner</i> says of the great "<i>Missa Solemnis</i>" which he calls "a -pure symphonic work of the most genuine Beethoven-spirit" (Beethoven, -p. 42). "The voices are treated here quite in the sense of human -instruments, in which sense Schopenhauer quite rightly wanted these -human voices to be considered; the text underlying them is understood -by us in these great Church compositions, not in its conceptual -meaning, but it serves in the sense of the musical work of art, merely -as material for vocal music and does not stand to our musically -determined sensation in a disturbing position simply because it does -not incite in us any rational conceptions but, as its ecclesiastical -character conditions too, only touches us with the impression of -well-known symbolic creeds." Besides I do not doubt that Beethoven, had -he written the Tenth Symphony—of which drafts are still extant—would -have composed just the <i>Tenth</i> Symphony.</p> - -<p>Let us now approach, after these preparations, the discussion of the -<i>opera,</i> so as to be able to proceed afterwards from the opera to -its counterpart in the Greek tragedy. What we had to observe in the -last movement of the Ninth, <i>i.e.,</i> on the highest level of modern -music-development, viz., that the word-content goes down unheard in -the general sea of sound, is nothing isolated and peculiar, but the -general and eternally valid norm in the vocal music of all times, the -norm which alone is adequate to the origin of lyric song. The man in -a state of Dionysean excitement has a <i>listener</i> just as little as -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> orgiastic crowd, a listener to whom he might have something to -communicate, a listener as the epic narrator and generally speaking the -Apollonian artist, to be sure, presupposes. It is rather in the nature -of the Dionysean art, that it has no consideration for the listener: -the inspired servant of Dionysos is, as I said in a former place, -understood only by his compeers. But if we now imagine a listener at -those endemic outbursts of Dionysean excitement then we shall have to -prophesy for him a fate similar to that which Pentheus the discovered -eavesdropper suffered, namely, to be torn to pieces by the Mænads. The -lyric musician sings "as the bird sings,"<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> alone, out of innermost -compulsion; when the listener comes to him with a demand he must -become dumb. Therefore it would be altogether unnatural to ask from -the lyric musician that one should also understand the text-words of -his song, unnatural because here a demand is made by the listener, who -has no right at all during the lyric outburst to claim anything. Now -with the poetry of the great ancient lyric poets in your hand, put -the question honestly to yourself whether they can have even thought -of making themselves clear to the mass of the people standing around -and listening, clear with their world of metaphors and thoughts; -answer this serious question with a look at Pindar and the Æschylian -choir songs. These most daring and obscure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> intricacies of thought, -this whirl of metaphors, ever impetuously reproducing itself, this -oracular tone of the whole, which we, <i>without</i> the diversion of music -and orchestration, so often cannot penetrate even with the closest -attention—was this whole world of miracles transparent as glass to -the Greek crowd, yea, a metaphorical-conceptual interpretation of -music? And with such mysteries of thought as are to be found in Pindar -do you think the wonderful poet could have wished to elucidate the -music already strikingly distinct? Should we here not be forced to an -insight into the very nature of the lyricist—the artistic man, who -to <i>himself</i> must interpret music through the symbolism of metaphors -and emotions, but who has nothing to communicate to the listener; an -artist who, in complete aloofness, even forgets those who stand eagerly -listening near him. And as the lyricist his hymns, so the people sing -the folk-song, for themselves, out of in-most impulse, unconcerned -whether the word is comprehensible to him who does not join in the -song. Let us think of our own experiences in the realm of higher -art-music: what did we understand of the text of a Mass of Palestrina, -of a Cantata of Bach, of an Oratorio of Händel, if we ourselves perhaps -did not join in singing? Only for <i>him who joins</i> in singing do lyric -poetry and vocal music exist; the listener stands before it as before -absolute music.</p> - -<p>But now the <i>opera</i> begins, according to the clearest testimonies, with -the <i>demand of the listener to understand the word.</i></p> - -<p>What? The listener <i>demands?</i> The word is to be understood?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> - -<p>But to bring music into the service of a series of metaphors and -conceptions, to use it as a means to an end, to the strengthening -and elucidation of such conceptions and metaphors—such a peculiar -presumption as is found in the concept of an "opera," reminds me of -that ridiculous person who endeavours to lift himself up into the air -with his own arms; that which this fool and which the opera according -to that idea attempt are absolute impossibilities. That idea of the -opera does not demand perhaps an abuse from music but—as I said—an -impossibility. Music never <i>can</i> become a means; one may push, -screw, torture it; as tone, as roll of the drum, in its crudest and -simplest stages, it still defeats poetry and abases the latter to its -reflection. The opera as a species of art according to that concept is -therefore not only an aberration of music, but an erroneous conception -of æsthetics. If I herewith, after all, justify the nature of the opera -for æsthetics, I am of course far from justifying at the same time bad -opera music or bad opera-verses. The worst music can still mean, as -compared with the best poetry, the Dionysean world-subsoil, and the -worst poetry can be mirror, image and reflection of this subsoil, if -together with the best music: as certainly, namely, as the single tone -against the metaphor is already Dionysean, and the single metaphor -together with idea and word against music is already Apollonian. Yea, -even bad music together with bad poetry can still inform as to the -nature of music and poesy.</p> - -<p>When therefore Schopenhauer felt Bellini's "Norma," for example, as the -fulfilment of tragedy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> with regard to that opera's music and poetry, -then he, in Dionysean-Apollonian emotion and self-forgetfulness, was -quite entitled to do so, because he perceived music and poetry in -their most general, as it were, philosophical value, <i>as</i> music and -poetry: but with that judgment he showed a poorly educated taste,—for -good taste always has historical perspective. To us, who intentionally -in this investigation avoid any question of the historic value of an -art-phenomenon and endeavour to focus only the phenomenon itself, -in its unaltered eternal meaning, and consequently in its <i>highest</i> -type, too,—to us the art-species of the "opera" seems to be justified -as much as the folk-song, in so far as we find in both that union -of the Dionysean and Apollonian and are permitted to assume for the -opera—namely for the highest type of the opera—an origin analogous to -that of the folk-song. Only in so far as the opera historically known -to us has a completely different origin from that of the folk-song -do we reject this "opera," which stands in the same relation to that -generic notion just defended by us, as the marionette does to a living -human being. It is certain, music never can become a means in the -service of the text, but must always defeat the text, yet music must -become bad when the composer interrupts every Dionysean force rising -within himself by an anxious regard for the words and gestures of his -marionettes. If the poet of the opera-text has offered him nothing more -than the usual schematised figures with their Egyptian regularity, then -the freer, more unconditional, more Dionysean is the development of the -music; and the more she despises all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> dramatic requirements, so much -the higher will be the value of the opera. In this sense it is true the -opera is, at its best, good music, and nothing but music: whereas the -jugglery performed at the same time is, as it were, only a fantastic -disguise of the orchestra, above all, of the most important instruments -the orchestra has: the singers; and from this jugglery the judicious -listener turns away laughing. If the mass is diverted by <i>this very -jugglery</i> and only <i>permits</i> the music with it, then the mob fares as -all those do who value the frame of a good picture higher than the -picture itself. Who treats such naïve aberrations with a serious or -even pathetic reproach?</p> - -<p>But what will the opera mean as "dramatic" music, in its possibly -farthest distance from pure music, efficient in itself, and purely -Dionysean? Let us imagine a passionate drama full of incidents which -carries away the spectator, and which is already sure of success -by its plot: what will "dramatic" music be able to add, if it does -not take away something? Firstly, it <i>will</i> take away much: for in -every moment where for once the Dionysean power of music strikes -the listener, the eye is dimmed that sees the action, the eye that -became absorbed in the individuals appearing before it: the listener -now <i>forgets</i> the drama and becomes alive again to it only when the -Dionysean spell over him has been broken. In so far, however, as music -makes the listener forget the drama, it is not yet "dramatic" music: -but what kind of music is that which is not <i>allowed</i> to exercise -any Dionysean power over the listener? And how is it possible? It is -possible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> as <i>purely conventional symbolism,</i> out of which convention -has sucked all natural strength: as music which has diminished to -symbols of remembrance: and its effect aims at reminding the spectator -of something, which at the sight of the drama must not escape him lest -he should misunderstand it: as a trumpet signal is an invitation for -the horse to trot. Lastly, before the drama commenced and in interludes -or during tedious passages, doubtful as to dramatic effect, yea, -even in its highest moments, there would still be permitted another -species of remembrance-music, no longer purely conventional, namely -<i>emotional-music,</i> music, as a stimulant to dull or wearied nerves. -I am able to distinguish in the so-called dramatic music these two -elements only: a conventional rhetoric and remembrance-music, and a -sensational music with an effect essentially physical: and thus it -vacillates between the noise of the drum and the signal-horn, like -the mood of the warrior who goes into the battle. But now the mind, -regaling itself on pure music and educated through comparison, demands -a <i>masquerade</i> for those two wrong tendencies of music; "Remembrance" -and "Emotion" are to be played, but in good music, which must be -in itself enjoyable, yea, valuable; what despair for the dramatic -musician, who must mask the big drum by good music, which, however, -must nevertheless have no purely musical, but only a stimulating -effect! And now comes the great Philistine public nodding its thousand -heads and enjoys this "dramatic music" which is ever ashamed of itself, -enjoys it to the very last morsel, without perceiving anything of its -shame and embarrassment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> Rather the public feels its skin agreeably -tickled, for indeed homage is being rendered in all forms and ways to -the public! To the pleasure-hunting, dull-eyed sensualist, who needs -excitement, to the conceited "educated person" who has accustomed -himself to good drama and good music as to good food, without after all -making much out of it, to the forgetful and absent-minded egoist, who -must be led back to the work of art with force and with signal-horns -because selfish plans continually pass through his mind aiming at -gain or pleasure. Woe-begone dramatic musicians! "Draw near and view -your Patrons' faces! The half are coarse, the half are cold." "Why -should you rack, poor foolish Bards, for ends like these the gracious -Muses?"<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And that the muses are tormented, even tortured and flayed, -these veracious miserable ones do not themselves deny!</p> - -<p>We had assumed a passionate drama, carrying away the spectator, which -even without music would be sure of its effect. I fear that that in -it which is "poetry" and <i>not</i> action proper will stand in relation -to true poetry as dramatic music to music in general: it will be -remembrance-and emotional-poetry. Poetry will serve as a means, in -order to recall in a conventional fashion feelings and passions, -the expression of which has been found by real poets and has become -celebrated, yea, normal with them. Further, this poetry will be -expected in dangerous moments to assist the proper "action,"—whether -a criminalistic horror-story or an exhibition of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> witchery mad with -shifting the scenes,—and to spread a covering veil over the crudeness -of the action itself. Shamefully conscious, that the poetry is only -masquerade which cannot bear the light of day, such a "dramatic" -rime-jingle clamours now for "dramatic" music, as on the other hand -again the poetaster of such dramas is met after one-fourth of the -way by the dramatic musician with his talent for the drum and the -signal-horn and his shyness of genuine music, trusting in itself and -self-sufficient. And now they see one another; and these Apollonian and -Dionysean caricatures, this <i>par nobile fratrum,</i> embrace one another!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A reference to Goethe's ballad, The Minstrel, st. 5: -</p> -<p> -"I sing as sings the bird, whose note<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">The leafy bough is heard on.</span><br /> -The song that falters from my throat<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">For me is ample guerdon." TR.</span><br /> -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A quotation from Goethe's "Faust": Part I., lines 91, 92, -and 95, 96.—TR.</p> -</div> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></p> -<h4><a name="HOMERS_CONTEST" id="HOMERS_CONTEST">HOMER'S CONTEST</a></h4> - - -<h5>Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>When one speaks of "<i>humanity</i>" the notion lies at the bottom, -that humanity is that which <i>separates</i> and distinguishes man from -Nature. But such a distinction does not in reality exist: the -"natural" qualities and the properly called "human" ones have grown -up inseparably together. Man in his highest and noblest capacities -<i>is</i> Nature and bears in himself her awful twofold character. His -abilities generally considered dreadful and inhuman are perhaps indeed -the fertile soil, out of which alone can grow forth all humanity in -emotions, actions and works.</p> - -<p>Thus the Greeks, the most humane men of ancient times, have in -themselves a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction: -a trait, which in the grotesquely magnified image of the Hellene, in -Alexander the Great, is very plainly visible, which, however, in their -whole history, as well as in their mythology, must terrify us who -meet them with the emasculate idea of modern humanity. When Alexander -has the feet of Batis, the brave defender of Gaza, bored through, -and binds the living body to his chariot in order to drag him about -exposed to the scorn of his soldiers, that is a sickening caricature of -Achilles, who at night ill-uses Hector's corpse by a similar trailing; -but even this trait has for us something offensive, something which -inspires<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> horror. It gives us a peep into the abysses of hatred. With -the same sensation perhaps we stand before the bloody and insatiable -self-laceration of two Greek parties, as for example in the Corcyrean -revolution. When the victor, in a fight of the cities, according to -the <i>law</i> of warfare, executes the whole male population and sells all -the women and children into slavery, we see, in the sanction of such a -law, that the Greek deemed it a positive necessity to allow his hatred -to break forth unimpeded; in such moments the compressed and swollen -feeling relieved itself; the tiger bounded forth, a voluptuous cruelty -shone out of his fearful eye. Why had the Greek sculptor to represent -again and again war and fights in innumerable repetitions, extended -human bodies whose sinews are tightened through hatred or through the -recklessness of triumph, fighters wounded and writhing with pain, or -the dying with the last rattle in their throat? Why did the whole Greek -world exult in the fighting scenes of the "Iliad"? I am afraid, we do -not understand them enough in "Greek fashion," and that we should even -shudder, if for once we <i>did</i> understand them thus.</p> - -<p>But what lies, as the mother-womb of the Hellenic, <i>behind</i> the Homeric -world? In the <i>latter,</i> by the extremely artistic definiteness, and the -calm and purity of the lines we are already lifted far above the purely -material amalgamation: its colours, by an artistic deception, appear -lighter, milder, warmer; its men, in this coloured, warm illumination, -appear better and more sympathetic—but where do we look, if, no -longer guided and protected by Homer's hand,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> we step backwards into -the pre-Homeric world? Only into night and horror, into the products -of a fancy accustomed to the horrible. What earthly existence is -reflected in the loathsome-awful theogonian lore: a life swayed only -by the <i>children of the night,</i> strife, amorous desires, deception, -age and death. Let us imagine the suffocating atmosphere of Hesiod's -poem, still thickened and darkened and without all the mitigations and -purifications, which poured over Hellas from Delphi and the numerous -seats of the gods! If we mix this thickened Boeotian air with the grim -voluptuousness of the Etruscans, then such a reality would <i>extort</i> -from us a world of myths within which Uranos, Kronos and Zeus and -the struggles of the Titans would appear as a relief. Combat in this -brooding atmosphere is salvation and safety; the cruelty of victory is -the summit of life's glories. And just as in truth the idea of Greek -law has developed from <i>murder</i> and expiation of murder, so also nobler -Civilisation takes her first wreath of victory from the altar of the -expiation of murder. Behind that bloody age stretches a wave-furrow -deep into Hellenic history. The names of Orpheus, of Musæus, and -their cults indicate to what consequences the uninterrupted sight of -a world of warfare and cruelty led—to the loathing of existence, to -the conception of this existence as a punishment to be borne to the -end, to the belief in the identity of existence and indebtedness. But -these particular conclusions are not specifically Hellenic; through -them Greece comes into contact with India and the Orient generally. The -Hellenic genius had ready yet another answer to the question: what does -a life of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> fighting and of victory mean? and gives this answer in the -whole breadth of Greek history.</p> - -<p>In order to understand the latter we must start from the fact that -the Greek genius admitted the existing fearful impulse, and deemed it -<i>justified;</i> whereas in the Orphic phase of thought was contained the -belief that life with such an impulse as its root would not be worth -living. Strife and the pleasure of victory were acknowledged; and -nothing separates the Greek world more from ours than the <i>colouring,</i> -derived hence, of some ethical ideas, <i>e.g.,</i> of <i>Eris</i> and of <i>Envy</i>.</p> - -<p>When the traveller Pausanius during his wanderings through Greece -visited the Helicon, a very old copy of the first didactic poem of the -Greeks, "The Works and Days" of Hesiod, was shown to him, inscribed -upon plates of lead and severely damaged by time and weather. However -he recognised this much, that, unlike the usual copies, it had <i>not</i> -at its head that little hymnus on Zeus, but began at once with the -declaration: "<i>Two</i> Eris-goddesses are on earth." This is one of the -most noteworthy Hellenic thoughts and worthy to be impressed on the -new-comer immediately at the entrance-gate of Greek ethics. "One would -like to praise the one Eris, just as much as to blame the other, if -one uses one's reason. For these two goddesses have quite different -dispositions. For the one, the cruel one, furthers the evil war and -feud! No mortal likes her, but under the yoke of need one pays honour -to the burdensome Eris, according to the decree of the immortals. She, -as the elder, gave birth to black night. Zeus the high-ruling one, -however, placed the other Eris upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> roots of the earth and among -men as a much better one. She urges even the unskilled man to work, and -if one who lacks property beholds another who is rich, then he hastens -to sow in similar fashion and to plant and to put his house in order; -the neighbour vies with the neighbour who strives after fortune. Good -is this Eris to men. The potter also has a grudge against the potter, -and the carpenter against the carpenter; the beggar envies the beggar, -and the singer the singer."</p> - -<p>The two last verses which treat of the <i>odium figulinum</i> appear to -our scholars to be incomprehensible in this place. According to their -judgment the predicates: "grudge" and "envy" fit only the nature of -the evil Eris, and for this reason they do not hesitate to designate -these verses as spurious or thrown by chance into this place. For -that judgment however a system of Ethics other than the Hellenic must -have inspired these scholars unawares; for in these verses to the -good Eris Aristotle finds no offence. And not only Aristotle but the -whole Greek antiquity thinks of spite and envy otherwise than we do -and agrees with Hesiod, who first designates as an evil one that Eris -who leads men against one another to a hostile war of extermination, -and secondly praises another Eris as the good one, who as jealousy, -spite, envy, incites men to activity but not to the action of war to -the knife but to the action of <i>contest.</i> The Greek is <i>envious</i> and -conceives of this quality not as a blemish, but as the effect of a -<i>beneficent</i> deity. What a gulf of ethical judgment between us and him? -Because he is envious he also feels, with every superfluity of honour, -riches, splendour and fortune, the envious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> eye of a god resting on -himself, and he fears this envy; in this case the latter reminds him -of the transitoriness of every human lot; he dreads his very happiness -and, sacrificing the best of it, he bows before the divine envy. -This conception does not perhaps estrange him from his gods; their -significance on the contrary is expressed by the thought that with them -man in whose soul jealousy is enkindled against every other living -being, is <i>never</i> allowed to venture into contest. In the fight of -Thamyris with the Muses, of Marsyas with Apollo, in the heart-moving -fate of Niobe appears the horrible opposition of the two powers, who -must never fight with one another, man and god.</p> - -<p>The greater and more sublime however a Greek is, the brighter in him -appears the ambitious flame, devouring everybody who runs with him on -the same track. Aristotle once made a list of such contests on a large -scale; among them is the most striking instance how even a dead person -can still incite a living one to consuming jealousy; thus for example -Aristotle designates the relation between the Kolophonian Xenophanes -and Homer. We do not understand this attack on the national hero of -poetry in all its strength, if we do not imagine, as later on also with -Plato, the root of this attack to be the ardent desire to step into -the place of the overthrown poet and to inherit his fame. Every great -Hellene hands on the torch of the contest; at every great virtue a new -light is kindled. If the young Themistocles could not sleep at the -thought of the laurels of Miltiades so his early awakened bent released -itself only in the long emulation with Aristides in that uniquely -noteworthy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> purely instinctive genius of his political activity, which -Thucydides describes. How characteristic are both question and answer, -when a notable opponent of Pericles is asked, whether he or Pericles -was the better wrestler in the city, and he gives the answer: "Even if -I throw him down he denies that he has fallen, attains his purpose and -convinces those who saw him fall."</p> - -<p>If one wants to see that sentiment unashamed in its naïve expressions, -the sentiment as to the necessity of contest lest the State's welfare -be threatened, one should think of the original meaning of <i>Ostracism,</i> -as for example the Ephesians pronounced it at the banishment of -Hermodor. "Among us nobody shall be the best; if however someone is the -best, then let him be so elsewhere and among others." Why should not -someone be the best? Because with that the contest would fail, and the -eternal life-basis of the Hellenic State would be endangered. Later on -Ostracism receives quite another position with regard to the contest; -it is applied, when the danger becomes obvious that one of the great -contesting politicians and party-leaders feels himself urged on in -the heat of the conflict towards harmful and destructive measures and -dubious <i>coups d'état.</i> The original sense of this peculiar institution -however is not that of a safety-valve but that of a stimulant. -The all-excelling individual was to be removed in order that the -contest of forces might re-awaken, a thought which is hostile to the -"exclusiveness" of genius in the modern sense but which assumes that in -the natural order of things there are always <i>several</i> geniuses which -incite one another to action, as much<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> also as they hold one another -within the bounds of moderation. That is the kernel of the Hellenic -contest-conception: it abominates autocracy, and fears its dangers; it -desires as a <i>preventive</i> against the genius—a second genius.</p> - -<p>Every natural gift must develop itself by contest. Thus the Hellenic -national pedagogy demands, whereas modern educators fear nothing as -much as, the unchaining of the so-called ambition. Here one fears -selfishness as the "evil in itself"—with the exception of the -Jesuits, who agree with the Ancients and who, possibly, for that -reason, are the most efficient educators of our time. They seem to -believe that Selfishness, <i>i.e.,</i> the individual element is only the -most powerful <i>agens</i> but that it obtains its character as "good" and -"evil" essentially from the aims towards which it strives. To the -Ancients however the aim of the agonistic education was the welfare of -the whole, of the civic society. Every Athenian for instance was to -cultivate his Ego in contest, so far that it should be of the highest -service to Athens and should do the least harm. It was not unmeasured -and immeasurable as modern ambition generally is; the youth thought of -the welfare of his native town when he vied with others in running, -throwing or singing; it was her glory that he wanted to increase with -his own; it was to his town's gods that he dedicated the wreaths which -the umpires as a mark of honour set upon his head. Every Greek from -childhood felt within himself the burning wish to be in the contest -of the towns an instrument for the welfare of his own town; in this -his selfishness was kindled into flame, by this his selfishness was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> -bridled and restricted. Therefore the individuals in antiquity were -freer, because their aims were nearer and more tangible. Modern man, on -the contrary, is everywhere hampered by infinity, like the fleet-footed -Achilles in the allegory of the Eleate Zeno: infinity impedes him, he -does not even overtake the tortoise.</p> - -<p>But as the youths to be educated were brought up struggling against -one another, so their educators were in turn in emulation amongst -themselves. Distrustfully jealous, the great musical masters, Pindar -and Simonides, stepped side by side; in rivalry the sophist, the higher -teacher of antiquity meets his fellow-sophist; even the most universal -kind of instruction, through the drama, was imparted to the people -only under the form of an enormous wrestling of the great musical and -dramatic artists. How wonderful! "And even the artist has a grudge -against the artist!" And the modern man dislikes in an artist nothing -so much as the personal battle-feeling, whereas the Greek recognises -the artist <i>only in such a personal struggle.</i> There where the modern -suspects weakness of the work of art, the Hellene seeks the source of -his highest strength! That, which by way of example in Plato is of -special artistic importance in his dialogues, is usually the result -of an emulation with the art of the orators, of the sophists, of the -dramatists of his time, invented deliberately in order that at the end -he could say: "Behold, I can also do what my great rivals can; yea -I can do it even better than they. No Protagoras has composed such -beautiful myths as I, no dramatist such a spirited and fascinating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -whole as the Symposion, no orator penned such an oration as I put -up in the Georgias—and now I reject all that together and condemn -all imitative art! Only the contest made me a poet, a sophist, an -orator!" What a problem unfolds itself there before us, if we ask -about the relationship between the contest and the conception of the -work of art!—If on the other hand we remove the contest from Greek -life, then we look at once into the pre-Homeric abyss of horrible -savagery, hatred, and pleasure in destruction. This phenomenon alas! -shows itself frequently when a great personality was, owing to an -enormously brilliant deed, suddenly withdrawn from the contest and -became <i>hors de concours</i> according to his, and his fellow-citizens' -judgment. Almost without exception the effect is awful; and if one -usually draws from these consequences the conclusion that the Greek was -unable to bear glory and fortune, one should say more exactly that he -was unable to bear fame without further struggle, and fortune at the -end of the contest. There is no more distinct instance than the fate -of Miltiades. Placed upon a solitary height and lifted far above every -fellow-combatant through his incomparable success at Marathon, he feels -a low thirsting for revenge awakened within himself against a citizen -of Para, with whom he had been at enmity long ago. To satisfy his -desire he misuses reputation, the public exchequer and civic honour and -disgraces himself. Conscious of his ill-success he falls into unworthy -machinations. He forms a clandestine and godless connection with Timo -a priestess of Demeter, and enters at night the sacred temple, from -which every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> man was excluded. After he has leapt over the wall and -comes ever nearer the shrine of the goddess, the dreadful horror of a -panic-like terror suddenly seizes him; almost prostrate and unconscious -he feels himself driven back and leaping the wall once more, he falls -down paralysed and severely injured. The siege must be raised and a -disgraceful death impresses its seal upon a brilliant heroic career, -in order to darken it for all posterity. After the battle at Marathon -the envy of the celestials has caught him. And this divine envy breaks -into flames when it beholds man without rival, without opponent, on -the solitary height of glory. He now has beside him only the gods—and -therefore he has them against him. These however betray him into a deed -of the Hybris, and under it he collapses.</p> - -<p>Let us well observe that just as Miltiades perishes so the noblest -Greek States perish when they, by merit and fortune, have arrived from -the racecourse at the temple of Nike. Athens, which had destroyed the -independence of her allies and avenged with severity the rebellions -of her subjected foes, Sparta, which after the battle of Ægospotamoi -used her preponderance over Hellas in a still harsher and more cruel -fashion, both these, as in the case of Miltiades, brought about their -ruin through deeds of the Hybris, as a proof that without envy, -jealousy, and contesting ambition the Hellenic State like the Hellenic -man degenerates. He becomes bad and cruel, thirsting for revenge, and -godless; in short, he becomes "pre-Homeric"—and then it needs only a -panic in order to bring about his fall and to crush him. Sparta and -Athens surrender to Persia, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> Themistocles and Alcibiades have done; -they betray Hellenism after they have given up the noblest Hellenic -fundamental thought, the contest, and Alexander, the coarsened copy and -abbreviation of Greek history, now invents the cosmopolitan Hellene, -and the so-called "Hellenism."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></p> -<h4><a name="THE_RELATION_OF_SCHOPENHAUERS_PHILOSOPHY_TO_A_GERMAN_CULTURE" id="THE_RELATION_OF_SCHOPENHAUERS_PHILOSOPHY_TO_A_GERMAN_CULTURE">THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY TO A GERMAN CULTURE</a></h4> - - -<h5>Preface to an Unwritten Book (1872)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>In dear vile Germany culture now lies so decayed in the streets, -jealousy of all that is great rules so shamelessly, and the general -tumult of those who race for "Fortune" resounds so deafeningly, that -one must have a strong faith, almost in the sense of <i>credo quia -absurdum est,</i> in order to hope still for a growing Culture, and above -all—in opposition to the press with her "public opinion"—to be able -to work by public teaching. With violence must those, in whose hearts -lies the immortal care for the people, free themselves from all the -inrushing impressions of that which is just now actual and valid, and -evoke the appearance of reckoning them indifferent things. They must -appear so, because they want to think, and because a loathsome sight -and a confused noise, perhaps even mixed with the trumpet-flourishes -of war-glory, disturb their thinking, and above all, because they want -to <i>believe</i> in the German character and because with this faith they -would lose their strength. Do not find fault with these believers if -they look from their distant aloofness and from the heights towards -their Promised Land! They fear those experiences, to which the kindly -disposed foreigner surrenders himself, when he lives among the Germans, -and must be surprised how little German life corresponds to those great -individuals, works and actions, which, in his kind disposition he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> -has learned to revere as the true German character. Where the German -cannot lift himself into the sublime he makes an impression less than -the mediocre. Even the celebrated German scholarship, in which a number -of the most useful domestic and homely virtues such as faithfulness, -self-restriction, industry, moderation, cleanliness appear transposed -into a purer atmosphere and, as it were, transfigured, is by no means -the result of these virtues; looked at closely, the motive urging to -unlimited knowledge appears in Germany much more like a defect, a gap, -than an abundance of forces, it looks almost like the consequence -of a needy formless atrophied life and even like a flight from the -moral narrow-mindedness and malice to which the German without such -diversions is subjected, and which also in spite of that scholarship, -yea still within scholarship itself, often break forth. As the true -virtuosi of philistinism the Germans are at home in narrowness of life, -discerning and judging; if any one will carry them above themselves -into the sublime, then they make themselves heavy as lead, and as such -lead-weights they hang to their truly great men, in order to pull them -down out of the ether to the level of their own necessitous indigence. -Perhaps this Philistine homeliness may be only the degeneration of -a genuine German virtue—a profound submersion into the detail, the -minute, the nearest and into the mysteries of the individual—but this -virtue grown mouldy is now worse than the most open vice, especially -since one has now become conscious, with gladness of the heart, of this -quality, even to literary self-glorification. Now the <i>"Educated"</i> -among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> the proverbially so cultured Germans and the <i>"Philistines"</i> -among the, as everybody knows, so uncultured Germans shake hands -in public and agree with one another concerning the way in which -henceforth one will have to write, compose poetry, paint, make music -and even philosophise, yea—rule, so as neither to stand too much aloof -from the culture of the one, nor to give offence to the "homeliness" -of the other. This they call now "The German Culture of our times." -Well, it is only necessary to inquire after the characteristic by which -that "educated" person is to be recognised; now that we know that his -foster-brother, the German Philistine, makes himself known as such to -all the world, without bashfulness, as it were, after innocence is lost.</p> - -<p>The educated person nowadays is educated above all <i>"historically,"</i> by -his historic consciousness he saves himself from the sublime in which -the Philistine succeeds by his "homeliness." No longer that enthusiasm -which history inspires—as Goethe was allowed to suppose—but just the -blunting of all enthusiasm is now the goal of these admirers of the -<i>nil admirari,</i> when they try to conceive everything historically; to -them however we should exclaim: Ye are the fools of all centuries! -History will make to you only those confessions, which you are worthy -to receive. The world has been at all times full of trivialities and -nonentities; to your historic hankering just these and only these -unveil themselves. By your thousands you may pounce upon an epoch—you -will afterwards hunger as before and be allowed to boast of your sort -of starved soundness. <i>Illam ipsam quam iactant sanitatem non firmitate -sed iciunio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> consequuntur. (Dialogus de oratoribus, cap.</i> 25.) History -has not thought fit to tell you anything that is essential, but -scorning and invisible she stood by your side, slipping into this one's -hand some state proceedings, into that one's an ambassadorial report, -into another's a date or an etymology or a pragmatic cobweb. Do you -really believe yourself able to reckon up history like an addition -sum, and do you consider your common intellect and your mathematical -education good enough for that? How it must vex you to hear, that -others narrate things, out of the best known periods, which you will -never conceive, never!</p> - -<p>If now to this "education," calling itself historic but destitute of -enthusiasm, and to the hostile Philistine activity, foaming with rage -against all that is great, is added that third brutal and excited -company of those who race after "Fortune"—then that in <i>summa</i> results -in such a confused shrieking and such a limb-dislocating turmoil that -the thinker with stopped-up ears and blindfolded eyes flees into the -most solitary wilderness,—where he may see, what those never will -see, where he must hear sounds which rise to him out of all the depths -of nature and come down to him from the stars. Here he confers with -the great problems floating towards him, whose voices of course sound -just as comfortless-awful, as unhistoric-eternal. The feeble person -flees back from their cold breath, and the calculating one runs right -through them without perceiving them. They deal worst, however, with -the "educated man" who at times bestows great pains upon them. To him -these phantoms transform themselves into conceptual cobwebs and hollow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -sound-figures. Grasping after them he imagines he has philosophy; in -order to search for them he climbs about in the so-called history -of philosophy—and when at last he has collected and piled up quite -a cloud of such abstractions and stereotyped patterns, then it may -happen to him that a real thinker crosses his path and—puffs them -away. What a desperate annoyance indeed to meddle with philosophy as -an "educated person"! From time to time it is true it appears to him -as if the impossible connection of philosophy with that which nowadays -gives itself airs as "German Culture" has become possible; some mongrel -dallies and ogles between the two spheres and confuses fantasy on -this side and on the other. Meanwhile however <i>one</i> piece of advice -is to be given to the Germans, if they do not wish to let themselves -be confused. They may put to themselves the question about everything -that they now call Culture: is <i>this</i> the hoped-for German Culture, so -serious and creative, so redeeming for the German mind, so purifying -for the German virtues that their only philosopher in this century, -Arthur <i>Schopenhauer,</i> should have to espouse its cause?</p> - -<p>Here you have the philosopher—now search for the Culture proper to -him! And if you are able to divine what kind of culture that would have -to be, which would correspond to such a philosopher, then you have, in -this divination, already <i>passed sentence</i> on all your culture and on -yourselves!</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></p> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></p> -<h4><a name="PHILOSOPHY_DURING_THE_TRAGIC_AGE_OF_THE_GREEKS" id="PHILOSOPHY_DURING_THE_TRAGIC_AGE_OF_THE_GREEKS">PHILOSOPHY DURING THE TRAGIC AGE OF THE GREEKS</a></h4> - - -<h5>(1873)</h5> - - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></p> -<h4>PREFACE</h4> - - -<h5>(<i>Probably</i> 1874)</h5> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -If we know the aims of men who are strangers to us, it is sufficient -for us to approve of or condemn them as wholes. Those who stand nearer -to us we judge according to the means by which they further their -aims; we often disapprove of their aims, but love them for the sake of -their means and the style of their volition. Now philosophical systems -are absolutely true only to their founders, to all later philosophers -they are usually <i>one</i> big mistake, and to feebler minds a sum of -mistakes and truths; at any rate if regarded as highest aim they are -an error, and in so far reprehensible. Therefore many disapprove of -every philosopher, because his aim is not theirs; they are those whom I -called "strangers to us." Whoever on the contrary finds any pleasure at -all in great men finds pleasure also in such systems, be they ever so -erroneous, for they all have in them one point which is irrefutable, a -personal touch, and colour; one can use them in order to form a picture -of the philosopher, just as from a plant growing in a certain place one -can form conclusions as to the soil. <i>That</i> mode of life, of viewing -human affairs at any rate, has existed once and is therefore possible; -the "system" is the growth in this soil or at least a part of this -system....</p> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></p> - -<p>I narrate the history of those philosophers simplified: I shall bring -into relief only <i>that</i> point in every system which is a little bit -of <i>personality,</i> and belongs to that which is irrefutable, and -indiscussable, which history has to preserve: it is a first attempt -to regain and recreate those natures by comparison, and to let the -polyphony of Greek nature at least resound once again: the task is, to -bring to light that which we must <i>always love and revere</i> and of which -no later knowledge can rob us: the great man.</p> - - - -<h4>LATER PREFACE</h4> - - -<h5>(<i>Towards the end of</i> 1879)</h5> - - -<p>This attempt to relate the history of the earlier Greek philosophers -distinguishes itself from similar attempts by its brevity. This has -been accomplished by mentioning but a small number of the doctrines of -every philosopher, <i>i.e.,</i> by incompleteness. Those doctrines, however, -have been selected in which the personal element of the philosopher -re-echoes most strongly; whereas a complete enumeration of all possible -propositions handed down to us—as is the custom in text-books—merely -brings about one thing, the absolute silencing of the personal element. -It is through this that those records become so tedious; for in systems -which have been refuted it is only this personal element that can still -interest us, for this alone is eternally irrefutable. It is possible -to shape the picture of a man out of three anecdotes. I endeavour to -bring into relief three anecdotes out of every system and abandon the -remainder.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span></p> - - - -<h4>1.</h4> - - -<p>There are opponents of philosophy, and one does well to listen to them; -especially if they dissuade the distempered heads of Germans from -metaphysics and on the other hand preach to them purification through -the Physis, as Goethe did, or healing through Music, as Wagner. The -physicians of the people condemn philosophy; he, therefore, who wants -to justify it, must show to what purpose healthy nations use and have -used philosophy. If he can show that, perhaps even the sick people -will benefit by learning why philosophy is harmful just to them. There -are indeed good instances of a health which can exist without any -philosophy or with quite a moderate, almost a toying use of it; thus -the Romans at their best period lived without philosophy. But where is -to be found the instance of a nation becoming diseased whom philosophy -had restored to health? Whenever philosophy showed itself helping, -saving, prophylactic, it was with healthy people; it made sick people -still more ill. If ever a nation was disintegrated and but loosely -connected with the individuals, never has philosophy bound these -individuals closer to the whole. If ever an individual was willing to -stand aside and plant around himself the hedge of self-sufficiency, -philosophy was always ready to isolate him still more and to destroy -him through isolation. She is dangerous where she is not in her full -right, and it is only the health of a nation but not that of every -nation which gives her this right.</p> - -<p>Let us now look around for the highest authority<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> as to what -constitutes the health of a nation. I he Greeks, as <i>the</i> truly -healthy nation, have <i>justified</i> philosophy once for all by having -philosophised; and that indeed more than all other nations. They could -not even stop at the right time, for still in their withered age -they comported themselves as heated notaries of philosophy, although -they understood by it only the pious sophistries and the sacrosanct -hair-splittings of Christian dogmatics. They themselves have much -lessened their merit for barbarian posterity by not being able to stop -at the right time, because that posterity in its uninstructed and -impetuous youth necessarily became entangled in those artfully woven -nets and ropes.</p> - -<p>On the contrary, the Greek knew how to begin at the right time, and -this lesson, when one ought to begin philosophising, they teach more -distinctly than any other nation. For it should not be begun when -trouble comes as perhaps some presume who derive philosophy from -moroseness; no, but in good fortune, in mature manhood, out of the -midst of the fervent serenity of a brave and victorious man's estate. -The fact that the Greeks philosophised at that time throws light on -the nature of philosophy and her task as well as on the nature of the -Greeks themselves. Had they at that time been such commonsense and -precocious experts and gayards as the learned Philistine of our days -perhaps imagines, or had their life been only a state of voluptuous -soaring, chiming, breathing and feeling, as the unlearned visionary is -pleased to assume, then the spring of philosophy would not have come to -light among them. At the best there would have come forth a brook soon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> -trickling away in the sand or evaporating into fogs, but never that -broad river flowing forth with the proud beat of its waves, the river -which we know as Greek Philosophy.</p> - -<p>True, it has been eagerly pointed out how much the Greeks could -find and learn abroad, in the Orient, and how many different things -they may easily have brought from there. Of course an odd spectacle -resulted, when certain scholars brought together the alleged masters -from the Orient and the possible disciples from Greece, and exhibited -Zarathustra near Heraclitus, the Hindoos near the Eleates, the -Egyptians near Empedocles, or even Anaxagoras among the Jews and -Pythagoras among the Chinese. In detail little has been determined; -but we should in no way object to the general idea, if people did not -burden us with the conclusion that therefore Philosophy had only been -imported into Greece and was not indigenous to the soil, yea, that -she, as something foreign, had possibly ruined rather than improved -the Greek. Nothing is more foolish than to swear by the fact that the -Greeks had an aboriginal culture; no, they rather absorbed all the -culture flourishing among other nations, and they advanced so far, -just because they understood how to hurl the spear further from the -very spot where another nation had let it rest. They were admirable -in the art of learning productively, and so, like them, we <i>ought</i> -to learn from our neighbours, with a view to Life not to pedantic -knowledge, using everything learnt as a foothold whence to leap -high and still higher than our neighbour. The questions as to the -beginning of philosophy are quite negligible, for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> everywhere in the -beginning there is the crude, the unformed, the empty and the ugly; -and in all things only the higher stages come into consideration. -He who in the place of Greek philosophy prefers to concern himself -with that of Egypt and Persia, because the latter are perhaps more -"original" and certainly older, proceeds just as ill-advisedly as -those who cannot be at ease before they have traced back the Greek -mythology, so grand and profound, to such physical trivialities as -sun, lightning, weather and fog, as its prime origins, and who fondly -imagine they have rediscovered for instance in the restricted worship -of the one celestial vault among the other Indo-Germans a purer form -of religion than the poly-theistic worship of the Greek had been. The -road towards the beginning always leads into barbarism, and he who is -concerned with the Greeks ought always to keep in mind the fact that -the unsubdued thirst for knowledge in itself always barbarises just as -much as the hatred of knowledge, and that the Greeks have subdued their -inherently insatiable thirst for knowledge by their regard for Life, -by an ideal need of Life,—since they wished to live immediately that -which they learnt. The Greeks also philosophised as men of culture and -with the aims of culture, and therefore saved themselves the trouble -of inventing once again the elements of philosophy and knowledge -out of some autochthonous conceit, and with a will they at once set -themselves to fill out, enhance, raise and purify these elements they -had taken over in such a way, that only now in a higher sense and in a -purer sphere they became inventors. For they discovered the <i>typical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -philosopher's genius,</i> and the inventions of all posterity have added -nothing essential.</p> - -<p>Every nation is put to shame if one points out such a wonderfully -idealised company of philosophers as that of the early Greek masters, -Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, -Democritus and Socrates. All those men are integral, entire and -self-contained,<a name="FNanchor_1_3" id="FNanchor_1_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_3" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and hewn out of one stone. Severe necessity exists -between their thinking and their character. They are not bound by any -convention, because at that time no professional class of philosophers -and scholars existed. They all stand before us in magnificent solitude -as the only ones who then devoted their life exclusively to knowledge. -They all possess the virtuous energy of the Ancients, whereby they -excel all the later philosophers in finding their own form and in -perfecting it by metamorphosis in its most minute details and general -aspect. For they were met by no helpful and facilitating fashion. Thus -together they form what Schopenhauer, in opposition to the Republic of -Scholars, has called a Republic of Geniuses; one giant calls to another -across the arid intervals of ages, and, undisturbed by a wanton, noisy -race of dwarfs, creeping about beneath them, the sublime intercourse of -spirits continues.</p> - -<p>Of this sublime intercourse of spirits I have resolved to relate those -items which our modern hardness of hearing might perhaps hear and -understand; that means certainly the least of all. It seems to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> me -that those old sages from Thales to Socrates have discussed in that -intercourse, although in its most general aspect, everything that -constitutes for our contemplation the peculiarly Hellenic. In their -intercourse, as already in their personalities, they express distinctly -the great features of Greek genius of which the whole of Greek history -is a shadowy impression, a hazy copy, which consequently speaks less -clearly. If we could rightly interpret the total life of the Greek -nation, we should ever find reflected only that picture which in her -highest geniuses shines with more resplendent colours. Even the first -experience of philosophy on Greek soil, the sanction of the Seven Sages -is a distinct and unforgettable line in the picture of the Hellenic. -Other nations have their Saints, the Greeks have Sages. Rightly it has -been said that a nation is characterised not only by her great men -but rather by the manner in which she recognises and honours them. In -other ages the philosopher is an accidental solitary wanderer in the -most hostile environment, either slinking through or pushing himself -through with clenched fists. With the Greek however the philosopher is -not accidental; when in the Sixth and Fifth centuries amidst the most -frightful dangers and seductions of secularisation he appears and as -it were steps forth from the cave of Trophonios into the very midst of -luxuriance, the discoverers' happiness, the wealth and the sensuousness -of the Greek colonies, then we divine that he comes as a noble warner -for the same purpose for which in those centuries Tragedy was born -and which the Orphic mysteries in their grotesque hieroglyphics give -us to understand. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> opinion of those philosophers on Life and -Existence altogether means so much more than a modern opinion because -they had before themselves Life in a luxuriant perfection, and because -with them, unlike us, the sense of the thinker was not muddled by -the disunion engendered by the wish for freedom, beauty, fulness of -life and the love for truth that only asks: What is the good of Life -at all? The mission which the philosopher has to discharge within a -real Culture, fashioned in a homogeneous style, cannot be clearly -conjectured out of our circumstances and experiences for the simple -reason that we have no such culture. No, it is only a Culture like the -Greek which can answer the question as to that task of the philosopher, -only such a Culture can, as I said before, justify philosophy at all; -because such a Culture alone knows and can demonstrate why and how the -philosopher is <i>not</i> an accidental, chance wanderer driven now hither, -now thither. There is a steely necessity which fetters the philosopher -to a true Culture: but what if this Culture does not exist? Then the -philosopher is an incalculable and therefore terror-inspiring comet, -whereas in the favourable case, he shines as the central star in the -solar-system of culture. It is for this reason that the Greeks justify -the philosopher, because with them he is no comet.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_3" id="Footnote_1_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_3"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> Napoleon's word about Goethe: "Voilà un homme!"—TR.</p></div> - - - -<h4>2</h4> - - -<p>After such contemplations it will be accepted without offence if I -speak of the pre-Platonic philosophers as of a homogeneous company, and -devote this paper to them exclusively. Something quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> new begins with -Plato; or it might be said with equal justice that in comparison with -that Republic of Geniuses from Thales to Socrates, the philosophers -since Plato lack something essential.</p> - -<p>Whoever wants to express himself unfavourably about those older masters -may call them one-sided, and their <i>Epigones,</i> with Plato as head, -many-sided. Yet it would be more just and unbiassed to conceive of -the latter as philosophic hybrid-characters, of the former as the -pure types. Plato himself is the first magnificent hybrid-character, -and as such finds expression as well in his philosophy as in his -personality. In his ideology are united Socratian, Pythagorean, and -Heraclitean elements, and for this reason it is no typically pure -phenomenon. As man, too, Plato mingles the features of the royally -secluded, all-sufficing Heraclitus, of the melancholy-compassionate and -legislatory Pythagoras and of the psycho-expert dialectician Socrates. -All later philosophers are such hybrid-characters; wherever something -one-sided does come into prominence with them as in the case of the -Cynics, it is not type but caricature. Much more important however is -the fact that they are founders of sects and that the sects founded -by them are all institutions in direct opposition to the Hellenic -culture and the unity of its style prevailing up to that time. In -their way they seek a redemption, but only for the individuals or at -the best for groups of friends and disciples closely connected with -them. The activity of the older philosophers tends, although they were -unconscious of it, towards a cure and purification on a large scale; -the mighty course of Greek culture is not to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> be stopped; awful dangers -are to be removed out of the way of its current; the philosopher -protects and defends his native country. Now, since Plato, he is in -exile and conspires against his fatherland.</p> - -<p>It is a real misfortune that so very little of those older philosophic -masters has come down to us and that all complete works of theirs are -withheld from us. Involuntarily, on account of that loss, we measure -them according to wrong standards and allow ourselves to be influenced -unfavourably towards them by the mere accidental fact that Plato -and Aristotle never lacked appreciators and copyists. Some people -presuppose a special providence for books, a <i>fatum libellorum;</i> such -a providence however would at any rate be a very malicious one if it -deemed it wise to withhold from us the works of Heraclitus, Empedocles' -wonderful poem, and the writings of Democritus, whom the ancients put -on a par with Plato, whom he even excels as far as ingenuity goes, -and as a substitute put into our hand Stoics, Epicureans and Cicero. -Probably the most sublime part of Greek thought and its expression -in words is lost to us; a fate which will not surprise the man who -remembers the misfortunes of Scotus Erigena or of Pascal, and who -considers that even in this enlightened century the first edition of -Schopenhauer's "<i>The World As Will And Idea</i>" became waste-paper. If -somebody will presuppose a special fatalistic power with respect to -such things he may do so and say with Goethe: "Let no one complain -about and grumble at things vile and mean, they <i>are</i> the real -rulers,—however much this be gainsaid!" In particular they are more -powerful than the power of truth. Mankind very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> rarely produces a good -book in which with daring freedom is intonated the battle-song of -truth, the song of philosophic heroism; and yet whether it is to live a -century longer or to crumble and moulder into dust and ashes, depends -on the most miserable accidents, on the sudden mental eclipse of men's -heads, on superstitious convulsions and antipathies, finally on fingers -not too fond of writing or even on eroding bookworms and rainy weather. -But we will not lament but rather take the advice of the reproving and -consolatory words which Hamann addresses to scholars who lament over -lost works. "Would not the artist who succeeded in throwing a lentil -through the eye of a needle have sufficient, with a bushel of lentils, -to practise his acquired skill? One would like to put this question to -all scholars who do not know how to use the works of the Ancients any -better than that man used his lentils." It might be added in our case -that not one more word, anecdote, or date needed to be transmitted to -us than has been transmitted, indeed that even much less might have -been preserved for us and yet we should have been able to establish the -general doctrine that the Greeks justify philosophy.</p> - -<p>A time which suffers from the so-called "general education" but has -no culture and no unity of style in her life hardly knows what to -do with philosophy, even if the latter were proclaimed by the very -Genius of Truth in the streets and market-places. She rather remains -at such a time the learned monologue of the solitary rambler, the -accidental booty of the individual, the hidden closet-secret or the -innocuous chatter between academic senility and childhood.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> Nobody -dare venture to fulfil in himself the law of philosophy, nobody -lives philosophically, with that simple manly faith which compelled -an Ancient, wherever he was, whatever he did, to deport himself as -a Stoic, when he had once pledged his faith to the Stoa. All modern -philosophising is limited politically and regulated by the police to -learned semblance. Thanks to governments, churches, academies, customs, -fashions, and the cowardice of man, it never gets beyond the sigh: "If -only!..." or beyond the knowledge: "Once upon a time there was..." -Philosophy is without rights; therefore modern man, if he were at all -courageous and conscientious, ought to condemn her and perhaps banish -her with words similar to those by which Plato banished the tragic -poets from his State. Of course there would be left a reply for her, as -there remained to those poets against Plato. If one once compelled her -to speak out she might say perhaps: "Miserable Nation! Is it my fault -if among you I am on the tramp, like a fortune teller through the land, -and must hide and disguise myself, as if I were a great sinner and ye -my judges? Just look at my sister, Art! It is with her as with me; we -have been cast adrift among the Barbarians and no longer know how to -save ourselves. Here we are lacking, it is true, every good right; but -the judges before whom we find justice judge you also and will tell -you: First acquire a culture; then you shall experience what Philosophy -can and will do."—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> - - - -<h4>3.</h4> - - -<p>Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous fancy, with the -proposition that <i>water</i> is the origin and mother-womb of all things. -Is it really necessary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and -for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunciate -something about the origin of things; secondly, because it does -so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because in it is -contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea: Everything -is one. The first mentioned reason leaves Thales still in the company -of religious and superstitious people, the second however takes him -out of this company and shows him to us as a natural philosopher, but -by virtue of the third, Thales becomes the first Greek philosopher. -If he had said: "Out of water earth is evolved," we should only have -a scientific hypothesis; a false one, though nevertheless difficult -to refute. But he went beyond the scientific. In his presentation of -this concept of unity through the hypothesis of water, Thales has not -surmounted the low level of the physical discernments of his time, but -at the best overleapt them. The deficient and unorganised observations -of an empiric nature which Thales had made as to the occurrence and -transformations of water, or to be more exact, of the Moist, would -not in the least have made possible or even suggested such an immense -generalisation. That which drove him to this generalisation was a -metaphysical dogma, which had its origin in a mystic intuition and -which together with the ever renewed endeavours to express it better,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> -we find in all philosophies,—the proposition: <i>Everything is one!</i></p> - -<p>How despotically such a faith deals with all empiricism is worthy of -note; with Thales especially one can learn how Philosophy has behaved -at all times, when she wanted to get beyond the hedges of experience -to her magically attracting goal. On light supports she leaps in -advance; hope and divination wing her feet. Calculating reason too, -clumsily pants after her and seeks better supports in its attempt to -reach that alluring goal, at which its divine companion has already -arrived. One sees in imagination two wanderers by a wild forest-stream -which carries with it rolling stones; the one, light-footed, leaps -over it using the stones and swinging himself upon them ever further -and further, though they precipitously sink into the depths behind -him. The other stands helpless there most of the time; he has first -to build a pathway which will bear his heavy, weary step; sometimes -that cannot be done and then no god will help him across the stream. -What therefore carries philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? -Does it distinguish itself from calculating and measuring thought -only by its more rapid flight through large spaces? No, for a strange -illogical power wings the foot of philosophical thinking; and this -power is Fancy. Lifted by the latter, philosophical thinking leaps -from possibility to possibility, and these for the time being are -taken as certainties; and now and then even whilst on the wing it -gets hold of certainties. An ingenious presentiment shows them to -the flier; demonstrable certainties are divined at a distance to be -at this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> point. Especially powerful is the strength of Fancy in the -lightning-like seizing and illuminating of similarities; afterwards -reflection applies its standards and models and seeks to substitute -the similarities by equalities, that which was seen side by side by -causalities. But though this should never be possible, even in the case -of Thales the indemonstrable philosophising has yet its value; although -all supports are broken when Logic and the rigidity of Empiricism want -to get across to the proposition: Everything is water; yet still there -is always, after the demolition of the scientific edifice, a remainder, -and in this very remainder lies a moving force and as it were the hope -of future fertility.</p> - -<p>Of course I do not mean that the thought in any restriction or -attenuation, or as allegory, still retains some kind of "truth"; as -if, for instance, one might imagine the creating artist standing -near a waterfall, and seeing in the forms which leap towards him, -an artistically prefiguring game of the water with human and animal -bodies, masks, plants, rocks, nymphs, griffins, and with all existing -types in general, so that to him the proposition: Everything is water, -is confirmed. The thought of Thales has rather its value—even after -the perception of its indemonstrableness—in the very fact, that it was -meant unmythically and unallegorically. The Greeks among whom Thales -became so suddenly conspicuous were the anti-type of all realists -by only believing essentially in the reality of men and gods, and -by contemplating the whole of nature as if it were only a disguise, -masquerade and metamorphosis of these god-men. Man was to them the -truth, and essence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> of things; everything else mere phenomenon and -deceiving play. For that very reason they experienced incredible -difficulty in conceiving of ideas as ideas. Whilst with the moderns -the most personal item sublimates itself into abstractions, with -them the most abstract notions became personified. Thales, however, -said, "Not man but water is the reality of things "; he began to -believe in nature, in so far that he at least believed in water. As -a mathematician and astronomer he had grown cold towards everything -mythical and allegorical, and even if he did not succeed in becoming -disillusioned as to the pure abstraction, Everything is one, and -although he left off at a physical expression he was nevertheless among -the Greeks of his time a surprising rarity. Perhaps the exceedingly -conspicuous <i>Orpheans</i> possessed in a still higher degree than he the -faculty of conceiving abstractions and of thinking unplastically; only -they did not succeed in expressing these abstractions except in the -form of the allegory. Also Pherecydes of Syrus who is a contemporary -of Thales and akin to him in many physical conceptions hovers with -the expression of the latter in that middle region where Allegory is -wedded to Mythos, so that he dares, for example, to compare the earth -with a winged oak, which hangs in the air with spread pinions and which -Zeus bedecks, after the defeat of Kronos, with a magnificent robe of -honour, into which with his own hands Zeus embroiders lands, water -and rivers. In contrast with such gloomy allegorical philosophising -scarcely to be translated into the realm of the comprehensible, Thales' -are the works of a creative master who began to look into Nature's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> -depths without fantastic fabling. If as it is true he used Science -and the demonstrable but soon out-leapt them, then this likewise -is a typical characteristic of the philosophical genius. The Greek -word which designates the Sage belongs etymologically to <i>sapio,</i> I -taste, <i>sapiens,</i> the tasting one, <i>sisyphos,</i> the man of the most -delicate taste; the peculiar art of the philosopher therefore consists, -according to the opinion of the people, in a delicate selective -judgment by taste, by discernment, by significant differentiation. He -is not prudent, if one calls <i>him</i> prudent, who in his own affairs -finds out the good; Aristotle rightly says: "That which Thales and -Anaxagoras know, people will call unusual, astounding, difficult, -divine but—useless, since human possessions were of no concern to -those two." Through thus selecting and precipitating the unusual, -astounding, difficult, and divine, Philosophy marks the boundary-lines -dividing her from Science in the same way as she does it from Prudence -by the emphasising of the useless. Science without thus selecting, -without such delicate taste, pounces upon everything knowable, in the -blind covetousness to know all at any price; philosophical thinking -however is always on the track of the things worth knowing, on the -track of the great and most important discernments. Now the idea of -greatness is changeable, as well in the moral as in the æsthetic -realm, thus Philosophy begins with a legislation with respect to -greatness, she becomes a Nomenclator. "That is great," she says, -and therewith she raises man above the blind, untamed covetousness -of his thirst for knowledge. By the idea of greatness she assuages<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -this thirst: and it is chiefly by this, that she contemplates the -greatest discernment, that of the essence and kernel of things, as -attainable and attained. When Thales says, "Everything is water," man -is startled up out of his worm-like mauling of and crawling about among -the individual sciences; he divines the last solution of things and -masters through this divination the common perplexity of the lower -grades of knowledge. The philosopher tries to make the total-chord of -the universe re-echo within himself and then to project it into ideas -outside himself: whilst he is contemplative like the creating artist, -sympathetic like the religionist, looking out for ends and causalities -like the scientific man, whilst he feels himself swell up to the -macrocosm, he still retains the circumspection to contemplate himself -coldly as the reflex of the world; he retains that cool-headedness, -which the dramatic artist possesses, when he transforms himself into -other bodies, speaks out of them, and yet knows how to project this -transformation outside himself into written verses. What the verse is -to the poet, dialectic thinking is to the philosopher; he snatches -at it in order to hold fast his enchantment, in order to petrify it. -And just as words and verse to the dramatist are only stammerings in -a foreign language, to tell in it what he lived, what he saw, and -what he can directly promulgate by gesture and music only, thus the -expression of every deep philosophical intuition by means of dialectics -and scientific reflection is, it is true, on the one hand the only -means to communicate what has been seen, but on the other hand it is -a paltry means, and at the bottom a metaphorical,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> absolutely inexact -translation into a different sphere and language. Thus Thales saw the -Unity of the "Existent," and when he wanted to communicate this idea he -talked of water.</p> - - - -<h4>4</h4> - - -<p>Whilst the general type of the philosopher in the picture of Thales -is set off rather hazily, the picture of his great successor already -speaks much more distinctly to us. <i>Anaximander</i> of Milet, the -first philosophical author of the Ancients, writes in the very way -that the typical philosopher will always write as long as he is -not alienated from ingenuousness and <i>naïveté</i> by odd claims: in -a grand lapidarian style of writing, sentence for sentence ... a -witness of a new inspiration, and an expression of the sojourning in -sublime contemplations. The thought and its form are milestones on -the path towards the highest wisdom. With such a lapidarian emphasis -Anaximander once said: "Whence things originated, thither, according -to necessity, they must return and perish; for they must pay penalty -and be judged for their injustices according to the order of time." -Enigmatical utterance of a true pessimist, oracular inscription on the -boundary-stone of Greek philosophy, how shall we explain thee?</p> - -<p>The only serious moralist of our century in the Parergis (Vol. ii., -chap. 12, "Additional Remarks on The Doctrine about the Suffering in -the World, Appendix of Corresponding Passages") urges on us a similar -contemplation: "The right standard by which to judge every human -being is that he really is a being who ought not to exist at all, -but who is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> expiating his existence by manifold forms of suffering -and death:—What can one expect from such a being? Are we not all -sinners condemned to death? We expiate our birth firstly by our -life and secondly by our death." He who in the physiognomy of our -universal human lot reads this doctrine and already recognises the -fundamental bad quality of every human life, in the fact that none -can stand a very close and careful contemplation—although our time, -accustomed to the biographical epidemic, seems to think otherwise and -more loftily about the dignity of man; he who, like Schopenhauer, on -"the heights of the Indian breezes" has heard the sacred word about -the moral value of existence, will be kept with difficulty from -making an extremely anthropomorphic metaphor and from generalizing -that melancholy doctrine—at first only limited to human life—and -applying it by transmission to the general character of all existence. -It may not be very logical, it is however at any rate very human and -moreover quite in harmony with the philosophical leaping described -above, now with Anaximander to consider all Becoming as a punishable -emancipation from eternal "Being," as a wrong that is to be atoned -for by destruction. Everything that has once come into existence also -perishes, whether we think of human life or of water or of heat and -cold; everywhere where definite qualities are to be noticed, we are -allowed to prophesy the extinction of these qualities—according to -the all-embracing proof of experience. Thus a being that possesses -definite qualities and consists of them, can never be the origin and -principle of things; the veritable <i>ens,</i> the "Existent,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> Anaximander -concluded, cannot possess any definite qualities, otherwise, like -all other things, it would necessarily have originated and perished. -In order that Becoming may not cease, the Primordial-being must be -indefinite. The immortality and eternity of the Primordial-being lies -not in an infiniteness and inexhaustibility—as usually the expounders -of Anaximander presuppose—but in this, that it lacks the definite -qualities which lead to destruction, for which reason it bears also its -name: The Indefinite. The thus labelled Primordial-being is superior -to all Becoming and for this very reason it guarantees the eternity -and unimpeded course of Becoming. This last unity in that Indefinite, -the mother-womb of all things, can, it is true, be designated only -negatively by man, as something to which no predicate out of the -existing world of Becoming can be allotted, and might be considered a -peer to the Kantian "Thing-in-itself."</p> - -<p>Of course he who is able to wrangle persistently with others as to what -kind of thing that primordial substance really was, whether perhaps an -intermediate thing between air and water, or perhaps between air and -fire, has not understood our philosopher at all; this is likewise to -be said about those, who seriously ask themselves, whether Anaximander -had thought of his primordial substance as a mixture of all existing -substances. Rather we must direct our gaze to the place where we can -learn that Anaximander no longer treated the question of the origin -of the world as purely physical; we must direct our gaze towards that -first stated lapidarian proposition. When on the contrary he saw a sum -of wrongs to be expiated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> in the plurality of things that have become, -then he, as the first Greek, with daring grasp caught up the tangle of -the most profound ethical problem. How can anything perish that has a -right to exist? Whence that restless Becoming and giving-birth, whence -that expression of painful distortion on the face of Nature, whence the -never-ending dirge in all realms of existence? Out of this world of -injustice, of audacious apostasy from the primordial-unity of things -Anaximander flees into a metaphysical castle, leaning out of which he -turns his gaze far and wide in order at last, after a pensive silence, -to address to all beings this question: "What is your existence worth? -And if it is worth nothing why are you there? By your guilt, I observe, -you sojourn in this world. You will have to expiate it by death. Look -how your earth fades; the seas decrease and dry up, the marine-shell -on the mountain shows you how much already they have dried up; fire -destroys your world even now, finally it will end in smoke and ashes. -But again and again such a world of transitoriness will ever build -itself up; who shall redeem you from the curse of Becoming?"</p> - -<p>Not every kind of life may have been welcome to a man who put such -questions, whose upward-soaring thinking continually broke the empiric -ropes, in order to take at once to the highest, superlunary flight. -Willingly we believe tradition, that he walked along in especially -dignified attire and showed a truly tragic hauteur in his gestures -and habits of life. He lived as he wrote; he spoke as solemnly as he -dressed himself, he raised his hand and placed his foot as if this -existence was a tragedy, and he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> had been born in order to co-operate -in that tragedy by playing the <i>rôle</i> of hero. In all that he was the -great model of Empedocles. His fellow-citizens elected him the leader -of an emigrating colony—perhaps they were pleased at being able to -honour him and at the same time to get rid of him. His thought also -emigrated and founded colonies; in Ephesus and in Elea they could not -get rid of him; and if they could not resolve upon staying at the spot -where he stood, they nevertheless knew that they had been led there by -him, whence they now prepared to proceed without him.</p> - -<p>Thales shows the need of simplifying the empire of plurality, and -of reducing it to a mere expansion or disguise of the <i>one single</i> -existing quality, water. Anaximander goes beyond him with two steps. -Firstly he puts the question to himself: How, if there exists an -eternal Unity at all, is that Plurality possible? and he takes the -answer out of the contradictory, self-devouring and denying character -of this Plurality. The existence of this Plurality becomes a moral -phenomenon to him; it is not justified, it expiates itself continually -through destruction. But then the questions occur to him: Yet why has -not everything that has become perished long ago, since, indeed, quite -an eternity of time has already gone by? Whence the ceaseless current -of the River of Becoming? He can save himself from these questions -only by mystic possibilities: the eternal Becoming can have its origin -only in the eternal "Being," the conditions for that apostasy from -that eternal "Being" to a Becoming in injustice are ever the same, the -constellation of things cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> help itself being thus fashioned, that -no end is to be seen of that stepping forth of the individual being out -of the lap of the "Indefinite." At this Anaximander stayed; that is, -he remained within the deep shadows which like gigantic spectres were -lying on the mountain range of such a world-perception. The more one -wanted to approach the problem of solving how out of the Indefinite the -Definite, out of the Eternal the Temporal, out of the Just the Unjust -could by secession ever originate, the darker the night became.——</p> - - - -<h4>5</h4> - - -<p>Towards the midst of this mystic night, in which Anaximander's problem -of the Becoming was wrapped up, Heraclitus of Ephesus approached and -illuminated it by a divine flash of lightning. "I contemplate the -Becoming," he exclaimed,—"and nobody has so attentively watched this -eternal wave-surging and rhythm of things. And what do I behold? -Lawfulness, infallible certainty, ever equal paths of Justice, -condemning Erinyes behind all transgressions of the laws, the whole -world the spectacle of a governing justice and of demoniacally -omnipresent natural forces subject to justice's sway. I do not behold -the punishment of that which has become, but the justification of -Becoming. When has sacrilege, when has apostasy manifested itself in -inviolable forms, in laws esteemed sacred? Where injustice sways, there -is caprice, disorder, irregularity, contradiction; where however Law -and Zeus' daughter, Dike, rule alone, as in this world, how could the -sphere of guilt, of expiation, of judgment, and as it were the place of -execution of all condemned ones be there?"</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> - -<p>From this intuition Heraclitus took two coherent negations, which are -put into the right light only by a comparison with the propositions of -his predecessor. Firstly, he denied the duality of two quite diverse -worlds, into the assumption of which Anaximander had been pushed; he -no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical, a realm -of definite qualities from a realm of indefinable indefiniteness. Now -after this first step he could neither be kept back any longer from -a still greater audacity of denying: he denied "Being" altogether. -For this one world which was left to him,—shielded all round by -eternal, unwritten laws, flowing up and down in the brazen beat of -rhythm,—shows nowhere persistence, indestructibility, a bulwark in the -stream. Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus exclaimed: "I see nothing -but Becoming. Be not deceived! It is the fault of your limited outlook -and not the fault of the essence of things if you believe that you see -firm land anywhere in the ocean of Becoming and Passing. You need names -for things, just as if they had a rigid permanence, but the very river -in which you bathe a second time is no longer the same one which you -entered before."</p> - -<p>Heraclitus has as his royal property the highest power of intuitive -conception, whereas towards the other mode of conception which is -consummated by ideas and logical combinations, that is towards reason, -he shows himself cool, apathetic, even hostile, and he seems to -derive a pleasure when he is able to contradict reason by means of a -truth gained intuitively, and this he does in such propositions as: -"Everything has always its opposite within itself,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> so fearlessly -that Aristotle before the tribunal of Reason accuses him of the -highest crime, of having sinned against the law of opposition. -Intuitive representation however embraces two things: firstly, the -present, motley, changing world, pressing on us in all experiences, -secondly, the conditions by means of which alone any experience of -this world becomes possible: time and space. For these are able to be -intuitively apprehended, purely in themselves and independent of any -experience; <i>i.e.,</i> they can be perceived, although they are without -definite contents. If now Heraclitus considered time in this fashion, -dissociated from all experiences, he had in it the most instructive -monogram of all that which falls within the realm of intuitive -conception. Just as he conceived of time, so also for instance did -Schopenhauer, who repeatedly says of it: that in it every instant -exists only in so far as it has annihilated the preceding one, its -father, in order to be itself effaced equally quickly; that past -and future are as unreal as any dream; that the present is only the -dimensionless and unstable boundary between the two; that however, like -time, so space, and again like the latter, so also everything that -is simultaneously in space and time, has only a relative existence, -only through and for the sake of a something else, of the same kind -as itself, <i>i.e.,</i> existing only under the same limitations. This -truth is in the highest degree self-evident, accessible to everyone, -and just for that very reason, abstractly and rationally, it is only -attained with great difficulty. Whoever has this truth before his eyes -must however also proceed at once to the next Heraclitean consequence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> -and say that the whole essence of actuality is in fact activity, and -that for actuality there is no other kind of existence and reality, -as Schopenhauer has likewise expounded ("The World As Will And Idea," -Vol. I., Bk. I, sec. 4): "Only as active does it fill space and time: -its action upon the immediate object determines the perception in -which alone it exists: the effect of the action of any material object -upon any other, is known only in so far as the latter acts upon the -immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted before; -it consists in this alone. Cause and effect thus constitute the whole -nature of matter; its true being <i>is</i> its action. The totality of -everything material is therefore very appropriately called in German -<i>Wirklichkeit</i> (actuality)—a word which is far more expressive than -<i>Realität</i> (reality).<a name="FNanchor_2_4" id="FNanchor_2_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_4" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> That upon which actuality acts is always -matter; actuality's whole 'Being' and essence therefore consist only in -the orderly change, which <i>one</i> part of it causes in another, and is -therefore wholly relative, according to a relation which is valid only -within the boundary of actuality, as in the case of time and space."</p> - -<p>The eternal and exclusive Becoming, the total instability of all -reality and actuality, which continually works and becomes and never -<i>is,</i> as Heraclitus teaches—is an awful and appalling conception, -and in its effects most nearly related to that sensation, by which -during an earthquake one loses confidence in the firmly-grounded earth. -It required an astonishing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> strength to translate this effect into -its opposite, into the sublime, into happy astonishment. Heraclitus -accomplished this through an observation of the proper course of all -Becoming and Passing, which he conceived of under the form of polarity, -as the divergence of a force into two qualitatively different, opposite -actions, striving after reunion. A quality is set continually at -variance with itself and separates itself into its opposites: these -opposites continually strive again one towards another. The common -people of course think to recognise something rigid, completed, -consistent; but the fact of the matter is that at any instant, bright -and dark, sour and sweet are side by side and attached to one another -like two wrestlers of whom sometimes the one succeeds, sometimes the -other. According to Heraclitus honey is at the same time sweet and -bitter, and the world itself an amphora whose contents constantly need -stirring up. Out of the war of the opposites all Becoming originates; -the definite and to us seemingly persistent qualities express only the -momentary predominance of the one fighter, but with that the war is not -at an end; the wrestling continues to all eternity. Everything happens -according to this struggle, and this very struggle manifests eternal -justice. It is a wonderful conception, drawn from the purest source -of Hellenism, which considers the struggle as the continual sway of a -homogeneous, severe justice bound by eternal laws. Only a Greek was -able to consider this conception as the fundament of a <i>Cosmodicy;</i> it -is Hesiod's good Eris transfigured into the cosmic principle, it is -the idea of a contest, an idea held by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> individual Greeks and by their -State, and translated out of the gymnasia and palæstra, out of the -artistic agonistics, out of the struggle of the political parties and -of the towns into the most general principle, so that the machinery of -the universe is regulated by it. Just as every Greek fought as though -he alone were in the right, and as though an absolutely sure standard -of judicial opinion could at any instant decide whither victory is -inclining, thus the qualities wrestle one with another, according to -inviolable laws and standards which are inherent in the struggle. The -Things themselves in the permanency of which the limited intellect of -man and animal believes, do not "exist" at all; they are as the fierce -flashing and fiery sparkling of drawn swords, as the stars of Victory -rising with a radiant resplendence in the battle of the opposite -qualities.</p> - -<p>That struggle which is peculiar to all Becoming, that eternal -interchange of victory is again described by Schopenhauer: ("The World -As Will And Idea," Vol. I., Bk. 2, sec. 27) "The permanent matter -must constantly change its form; for under the guidance of causality, -mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving -to appear, wrest the matter from each other, for each desires to -reveal its own Idea. This strife may be followed up through the whole -of nature; indeed nature exists only through it." The following pages -give the most noteworthy illustrations of this struggle, only that -the prevailing tone of this description ever remains other than that -of Heraclitus in so far as to Schopenhauer the struggle is a proof of -the Will to Life falling out with itself; it is to him a feasting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> -on itself on the part of this dismal, dull impulse, as a phenomenon -on the whole horrible and not at all making for happiness. The arena -and the object of this struggle is Matter,—which some natural forces -alternately endeavour to disintegrate and build up again at the expense -of other natural forces,—as also Space and Time, the union of which -through causality <i>is</i> this very matter.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_4" id="Footnote_2_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_4"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et -consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat (Seneca, -Epist. 81).—TR.</p></div> - - - -<h4>6</h4> - - -<p>Whilst the imagination of Heraclitus measured the restlessly moving -universe, the "actuality" (<i>Wirklichkeit</i>), with the eye of the happy -spectator, who sees innumerable pairs wrestling in joyous combat -entrusted to the superintendence of severe umpires, a still higher -presentiment seized him, he no longer could contemplate the wrestling -pairs and the umpires, separated one from another; the very umpires -seemed to fight, and the fighters seemed to be their own judges—yea, -since at the bottom he conceived only of the one Justice eternally -swaying, he dared to exclaim: "The contest of The Many is itself pure -justice. And after all: The One is The Many. For what are all those -qualities according to their nature? Are they immortal gods? Are they -separate beings working for themselves from the beginning and without -end? And if the world which we see knows only Becoming and Passing but -no Permanence, should perhaps those qualities constitute a differently -fashioned metaphysical world, true, not a world of unity as Anaximander -sought behind the fluttering veil of plurality, but a world of eternal -and essential pluralities?" Is it possible that however violently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> he -had denied such duality, Heraclitus has after all by a round-about way -accidentally got into the dual cosmic order, an order with an Olympus -of numerous immortal gods and demons,—viz., <i>many</i> realities,—and -with a human world, which sees only the dust-cloud of the Olympic -struggle and the flashing of divine spears,—<i>i.e.,</i> only a Becoming? -Anaximander had fled just from these definite qualities into the lap of -the metaphysical "Indefinite"; because the former <i>became</i> and passed, -he had denied them a true and essential existence; however should it -not seem now as if the Becoming is only the looming-into-view of a -struggle of eternal qualities? When we speak of the Becoming, should -not the original cause of this be sought in the peculiar feebleness of -human cognition—whereas in the nature of things there is perhaps no -Becoming, but only a co-existing of many true increate indestructible -realities?</p> - -<p>These are Heraclitean loop-holes and labyrinths; he exclaims once -again: "The 'One' is the 'Many'." The many perceptible qualities are -neither eternal entities, nor phantasmata of our senses (Anaxagoras -conceives them later on as the former, Parmenides as the latter), -they are neither rigid, sovereign "Being" nor fleeting Appearance -hovering in human minds. The third possibility which alone was left -to Heraclitus nobody will be able to divine with dialectic sagacity -and as it were by calculation, for what he invented here is a rarity -even in the realm of mystic incredibilities and unexpected cosmic -metaphors.—The world is the <i>Game</i> of Zeus, or expressed more -physically, the game of fire with itself, the "One" is only in this -sense at the same time the "Many."—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span></p> - -<p>In order to elucidate in the first place the introduction of fire as -a world-shaping force, I recall how Anaximander had further developed -the theory of water as the origin of things. Placing confidence in the -essential part of Thales' theory, and strengthening and adding to the -latter's observations, Anaximander however was not to be convinced -that before the water and, as it were, after the water there was no -further stage of quality: no, to him out of the Warm and the Cold -the Moist seemed to form itself, and the Warm and the Cold therefore -were supposed to be the preliminary stages, the still more original -qualities. With their issuing forth from the primordial existence -of the "Indefinite," Becoming begins. Heraclitus who as physicist -subordinated himself to the importance of Anaximander, explains to -himself this Anaximandrian "Warm" as the respiration, the warm breath, -the dry vapours, in short as the fiery element: about this fire he now -enunciates the same as Thales and Anaximander had enunciated about -the water: that in innumerable metamorphoses it was passing along the -path of Becoming, especially in the three chief aggregate stages as -something Warm, Moist, and Firm. For water in descending is transformed -into earth, in ascending into fire: or as Heraclitus appears to have -expressed himself more exactly: from the sea ascend only the pure -vapours which serve as food to the divine fire of the stars, from the -earth only the dark, foggy ones, from which the Moist derives its -nourishment. The pure vapours are the transitional stage in the passing -of sea into fire, the impure the transitional stage<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> in the passing -of earth into water. Thus the two paths of metamorphosis of the fire -run continuously side by side, upwards and downwards, to and fro, from -fire to water, from water to earth, from earth back again to water, -from water to fire. Whereas Heraclitus is a follower of Anaximander in -the most important of these conceptions, <i>e.g.,</i> that the fire is kept -up by the evaporations, or herein, that out of the water is dissolved -partly earth, partly fire; he is on the other hand quite independent -and in opposition to Anaximander in excluding the "Cold" from the -physical process, whilst Anaximander had put it side by side with the -"Warm" as having the same rights, so as to let the "Moist" originate -out of both. To do so, was of course a necessity to Heraclitus, for -if everything is to be fire, then, however many possibilities of its -transformation might be assumed, nothing can exist that would be the -absolute antithesis to fire; he has, therefore, probably interpreted -only as a degree of the "Warm" that which is called the "Cold," and -he could justify this interpretation without difficulty. Much more -important than this deviation from the doctrine of Anaximander is a -further agreement; he, like the latter, believes in an end of the -world periodically repeating itself and in an ever-renewed emerging of -another world out of the all-destroying world-fire. The period during -which the world hastens towards that world-fire and the dissolution -into pure fire is characterised by him most strikingly as a demand -and a need; the state of being completely swallowed up by the fire as -satiety; and now to us remains the question as to how he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> understood -and named the newly awakening impulse for world-creation, the -pouring-out-of-itself into the forms of plurality. The Greek proverb -seems to come to our assistance with the thought that "satiety gives -birth to crime" (the Hybris) and one may indeed ask oneself for a -minute whether perhaps Heraclitus has derived that return to plurality -out of the Hybris. Let us just take this thought seriously: in its -light the face of Heraclitus changes before our eyes, the proud gleam -of his eyes dies out, a wrinkled expression of painful resignation, of -impotence becomes distinct, it seems that we know why later antiquity -called him the "weeping philosopher." Is not the whole world-process -now an act of punishment of the Hybris? The plurality the result of a -crime? The transformation of the pure into the impure, the consequence -of injustice? Is not the guilt now shifted into the essence of the -things and indeed, the world of Becoming and of individuals accordingly -exonerated from guilt; yet at the same time are they not condemned for -ever and ever to bear the consequences of guilt?</p> - - - -<h4>7</h4> - - -<p>That dangerous word, Hybris, is indeed the touchstone for every -Heraclitean; here he may show whether he has understood or mistaken -his master. Is there in this world: Guilt, injustice, contradiction, -suffering?</p> - -<p>Yes, exclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human being, who -sees divergently and not convergently, not for the contuitive god; -to him everything opposing converges into one harmony, invisible it -is true to the common human eye, yet comprehensible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> to him who like -Heraclitus resembles the contemplative god. Before his fiery eye no -drop of injustice is left in the world poured out around him, and even -that cardinal obstacle—how pure fire can take up its quarters in -forms so impure—he masters by means of a sublime simile. A Becoming -and Passing, a building and destroying, without any moral bias, in -perpetual innocence is in this world only the play of the artist and of -the child. And similarly, just as the child and the artist play, the -eternally living fire plays, builds up and destroys, in innocence—and -this game the <i>Æon</i> plays with himself. Transforming himself into water -and earth, like a child he piles heaps of sand by the sea, piles up -and demolishes; from time to time he recommences the game. A moment of -satiety, then again desire seizes him, as desire compels the artist to -create. Not wantonness, but the ever newly awakening impulse to play, -calls into life other worlds. The child throws away his toys; but soon -he starts again in an innocent frame of mind. As soon however as the -child builds he connects, joins and forms lawfully and according to an -innate sense of order.</p> - -<p>Thus only is the world contemplated by the æsthetic man, who has -learned from the artist and the genesis of the latter's work, how the -struggle of plurality can yet bear within itself law and justice, -how the artist stands contemplative above, and working within the -work of art, how necessity and play, antagonism and harmony must pair -themselves for the procreation of the work of art.</p> - -<p>Who now will still demand from such a philosophy a system of Ethics -with the necessary imperative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span>s—Thou Shalt,—or even reproach -Heraclitus with such a deficiency. Man down to his last fibre is -Necessity and absolutely "unfree "—if by freedom one understands the -foolish claim to be able to change at will one's <i>essentia</i> like a -garment, a claim, which up to the present every serious philosophy -has rejected with due scorn. That so few human beings live with -consciousness in the <i>Logos</i> and in accordance with the all-overlooking -artist's eye originates from their souls being wet and from the fact -that men's eyes and ears, their intellect in general is a bad witness -when "moist ooze fills their souls." Why that is so, is not questioned -any more than why fire becomes water and earth. Heraclitus is not -<i>compelled</i> to prove (as Leibnitz was) that this world was even the -best of all; it was sufficient for him that the world is the beautiful, -innocent play of the <i>Æon.</i> Man on the whole is to him even an -irrational being, with which the fact that in all his essence the law -of all-ruling reason is fulfilled does lot clash. He does not occupy -a specially favoured position in nature, whose highest phenomenon is -not simple-minded man, but fire, for instance, as stars. In so far as -man has through necessity received a share of fire, he is a little -more rational; as far as he consists of earth and water it stands -badly with his reason. He is not compelled to take cognisance of the -<i>Logos</i> simply because he is a human being. Why is there water, why -earth? This to Heraclitus is a much more serious problem than to ask, -why men are so stupid and bad. In the highest and the most perverted -men the same inherent lawfulness and justice manifest themselves.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> -If however one would ask Heraclitus the question "Why is fire not -always fire, why is it now water, now earth?" then he would only just -answer: "It is a game, don't take it too pathetically and still less, -morally." Heraclitus describes only the existing world and has the same -contemplative pleasure in it which the artist experiences when looking -at his growing work. Only those who have cause to be discontented -with his natural history of man find him gloomy, melancholy, tearful, -sombre, atrabilarious, pessimistic and altogether hateful. He however -would take these discontented people, together with their antipathies -and sympathies, their hatred und their love, as negligible and perhaps -answer them with some such comment as: "Dogs bark at anything they do -not know," or, "To the ass chaff is preferable to gold."</p> - -<p>With such discontented persons also originate the numerous complaints -as to the obscurity of the Heraclitean style; probably no man has ever -written clearer and more illuminatingly; of course, very abruptly, -and therefore naturally obscure to the racing readers. But why a -philosopher should intentionally write obscurely—a thing habitually -said about Heraclitus—is absolutely inexplicable; unless he has some -cause to hide his thoughts or is sufficiently a rogue to conceal his -thoughtlessness underneath words. One is, as Schopenhauer says, indeed -compelled by lucid expression to prevent misunderstandings even in -affairs of practical every-day life, how then should one be allowed to -express oneself indistinctly, indeed puzzlingly in the most difficult, -most abstruse, scarcely attainable object of thinking,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> the tasks of -philosophy? With respect to brevity however Jean Paul gives a good -precept: "On the whole it is right that everything great—of deep -meaning to a rare mind—should be uttered with brevity and (therefore) -obscurely so that the paltry mind would rather proclaim it to be -nonsense than translate it into the realm of his empty-headedness. -For common minds have an ugly ability to perceive in the deepest and -richest saying nothing but their own every-day opinion." Moreover and -in spite of it Heraclitus has not escaped the "paltry minds"; already -the Stoics have "re-expounded" him into the shallow and dragged down -his æsthetic fundamental-perception as to the play of the world to the -miserable level of the common regard for the practical ends of the -world and more explicitly for the advantages of man, so that out of his -Physics has arisen in those heads a crude optimism, with the continual -invitation to Dick, Tom, and Harry, "<i>Plaudite amici!</i>"</p> - - - -<h4>8</h4> - - -<p>Heraclitus was proud; and if it comes to pride with a philosopher then -it is a great pride. His work never refers him to a "public," the -applause of the masses and the hailing chorus of contemporaries. To -wander lonely along his path belongs to the nature of the philosopher. -His talents are the most rare, in a certain sense the most unnatural -and at the same time exclusive and hostile even toward kindred talents. -The wall of his self-sufficiency must be of diamond, if it is not to -be demolished and broken, for everything is in motion against him. His -journey to immortality is more cumbersome and impeded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> than any other -and yet nobody can believe more firmly than the philosopher that he -will attain the goal by that journey—because he does not know where -he is to stand if not on the widely spread wings of all time; for the -disregard of everything present and momentary lies in the essence of -the great philosophic nature. He has truth; the wheel of time may roll -whither it pleases, never can it escape from truth. It is important -to hear that such men have lived. Never for example would one be able -to imagine the pride of Heraclitus as an idle possibility. In itself -every endeavour after knowledge seems by its nature to be eternally -unsatisfied and unsatisfactory. Therefore nobody unless instructed -by history will like to believe in such a royal self-esteem and -conviction of being the only wooer of truth. Such men live in their -own solar-system—one has to look for them there. A Pythagoras, an -Empedocles treated themselves too with a super-human esteem, yea, with -almost religious awe; but the tie of sympathy united with the great -conviction of the metempsychosis and the unity of everything living, -led them back to other men, for their welfare and salvation. Of that -feeling of solitude, however, which permeated the Ephesian recluse -of the Artemis Temple, one can only divine something, when growing -benumbed in the wildest mountain desert. No paramount feeling of -compassionate agitation, no desire to help, heal and save emanates from -him. He is a star without an atmosphere. His eye, directed blazingly -inwards, looks outward, for appearance's sake only, extinct and icy. -All around him, immediately upon the citadel of his pride beat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> the -waves of folly and perversity: with loathing he turns away from them. -But men with a feeling heart would also shun such a Gorgon monster -as cast out of brass; within an out-of-the-way sanctuary, among the -statues of gods, by the side of cold composedly-sublime architecture -such a being may appear more comprehensible. As man among men -Heraclitus was incredible; and though he was seen paying attention to -the play of noisy children, even then he was reflecting upon what never -man thought of on such an occasion: the play of the great world-child, -Zeus. He had no need of men, not even for his discernments. He was -not interested in all that which one might perhaps ascertain from -them, and in what the other sages before him had been endeavouring to -ascertain. He spoke with disdain of such questioning, collecting, in -short "historic" men. "I sought and investigated myself," he said, with -a word by which one designates the investigation of an oracle; as if -he and no one else were the true fulfiller and achiever of the Delphic -precept: "Know thyself."</p> - -<p>What he learned from this oracle, he deemed immortal wisdom, and -eternally worthy of explanation, of unlimited effect even in the -distance, after the model of the prophetic speeches of the Sibyl. -It is sufficient for the latest mankind: let the latter have that -expounded to her, as oracular sayings, which he like the Delphic god -"neither enunciates nor conceals." Although it is proclaimed by him, -"without smiles, finery and the scent of ointments," but rather as with -"foaming mouth," it <i>must</i> force its way through the millenniums of -the future. For<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> the world needs truth eternally, therefore she needs -also Heraclitus eternally; although he has no need of her. What does -his fame matter to <i>him?</i>—fame with "mortals ever flowing on!" as he -exclaims scornfully. His fame is of concern to man, not to himself; -the immortality of mankind needs him, not he the immortality of the -man Heraclitus. That which he beheld, <i>the doctrine of the Law in the -Becoming, and of the Play in the Necessity,</i> must henceforth be beheld -eternally; he has raised the curtain of this greatest stage-play.</p> - - - -<h4>9</h4> - - -<p>Whereas in every word of Heraclitus are expressed the pride and the -majesty of truth, but of truth caught by intuitions, not scaled by -the rope-ladder of Logic, whereas in sublime ecstasy he beholds but -does not espy, discerns but does not reckon, he is contrasted with his -contemporary <i>Parmenides,</i> a man likewise with the type of a prophet -of truth, but formed as it were out of ice and not out of fire, and -shedding around himself cold, piercing light.</p> - -<p>Parmenides once had, probably in his later years, a moment of the -very purest abstraction, undimmed by any reality, perfectly lifeless; -this moment—un-Greek, like no other in the two centuries of the -Tragic Age—the product of which is the doctrine of "Being," became a -boundary-stone for his own life, which divided it into two periods; at -the same time however the same moment divides the pre-Socratic thinking -into two halves, of which the first might be called the Anaximandrian, -the second the Parmenidean. The first period in Parmenides' own -philosophising<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> bears still the signature of Anaximander; this -period produced a detailed philosophic-physical system as answer to -Anaximander's questions. When later that icy abstraction-horror caught -him, and the simplest proposition treating of "Being" and "Not-Being" -was advanced by him, then among the many older doctrines thrown by him -upon the scrap heap was also his own system. However he does not appear -to have lost all paternal piety towards the strong and well-shapen -child of his youth, and he saved himself therefore by saying: "It is -true there is only one right way; if one however wants at any time to -betake oneself to another, then my earlier opinion according to its -purity and consequence alone is right." Sheltering himself with this -phrase he has allowed his former physical system a worthy and extensive -space in his great poem on Nature, which really was to proclaim the -new discernment as the only signpost to truth. This fatherly regard, -even though an error should have crept in through it, is a remainder -of human feeling, in a nature quite petrified by logical rigidity and -almost changed into a thinking-machine.</p> - -<p>Parmenides, whose personal intercourse with Anaximander does not seem -incredible to me, and whose starting from Anaximander's doctrine is -not only credible but evident, had the same distrust for the complete -separation of a world which only is, and a world which only becomes, as -had also caught Heraclitus and led to a denying of "Being" altogether. -Both sought a way out from that contrast and divergence of a dual order -of the world. That leap into the Indefinite, Indefinable, by which -once<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> for all Anaximander had escaped from the realm of Becoming and -from the empirically given qualities of such realm, that leap did not -become an easy matter to minds so independently fashioned as those of -Heraclitus and Parmenides; first they endeavoured to walk as far as -they could and reserved to themselves the leap for that place, where -the foot finds no more hold and one has to leap, in order not to fall. -Both looked repeatedly at that very world, which Anaximander had -condemned in so melancholy a way and declared to be the place of wanton -crime and at the same time the penitentiary cell for the injustice of -Becoming. Contemplating this world Heraclitus, as we know already, had -discovered what a wonderful order, regularity and security manifest -themselves in every Becoming; from that he concluded that the Becoming -could not be anything evil and unjust. Quite a different outlook had -Parmenides; he compared the qualities one with another, and believed -that they were not all of the same kind, but ought to be classified -under two headings. If for example he compared bright and dark, then -the second quality was obviously only the <i>negation</i> of the first; -and thus he distinguished positive and negative qualities, seriously -endeavouring to rediscover and register that fundamental antithesis -in the whole realm of Nature. His method was the following: He took a -few antitheses, <i>e.g.,</i> light and heavy, rare and dense, active and -passive, and compared them with that typical antithesis of bright and -dark: that which corresponded with the bright was the positive, that -which corresponded with the dark the negative quality. If<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> he took -perhaps the heavy and light, the light fell to the side of the bright, -the heavy to the side of the dark; and thus "heavy" was to him only -the negation of "light," but the "light" a positive quality. This -method alone shows that he had a defiant aptitude for abstract logical -procedure, closed against the suggestions of the senses. The "heavy" -seems indeed to offer itself very forcibly to the senses as a positive -quality; that did not keep Parmenides from stamping it as a negation. -Similarly he placed the earth in opposition to the fire, the "cold" -in opposition to the "warm," the "dense" in opposition to the "rare," -the "female" in opposition to the "male," the "passive" in opposition -to the "active," merely as negations: so that before his gaze our -empiric world divided itself into two separate spheres, into that -of the positive qualities—with a bright, fiery, warm, light, rare, -active-masculine character—and into that of the negative qualities. -The latter express really only the lack, the absence of the others, the -positive ones. He therefore described the sphere in which the positive -qualities are absent as dark, earthy, cold, heavy, dense and altogether -as of feminine-passive character. Instead of the expressions "positive" -and "negative" he used the standing term "existent" and "non-existent" -and had arrived with this at the proposition, that, in contradiction to -Anaximander, this our world itself contains something "existent," and -of course something "non-existent." One is not to seek that "existent" -outside the world and as it were above our horizon; but before us, -and everywhere in every Becoming, something "existent" and active is -contained.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span></p> - -<p>With that however still remained to him the task of giving the more -exact answer to the question: What is the Becoming? and here was the -moment where he had to leap, in order not to fall, although perhaps to -such natures as that of Parmenides, even any leaping means a falling. -Enough! we get into fog, into the mysticism of <i>qualitates occultæ,</i> -and even a little into mythology. Parmenides, like Heraclitus, looks -at the general Becoming and Not-remaining and explains to himself a -Passing only thus, that the "Non-Existent" bore the guilt. For how -should the "Existent" bear the guilt of Passing? Likewise, however, -the Originating, i.e., the Becoming, must come about through the -assistance of the "Non-Existent"; for the "Existent" is always there -and could not of itself first originate and it could not explain any -Originating, any Becoming. Therefore the Originating, the Becoming -as well as the Passing and Perishing have been brought about by the -negative qualities. But that the originating "thing" has a content, -and the passing "thing" loses a content, presupposes that the positive -qualities—and that just means that very content—participate -likewise in both processes. In short the proposition results: "For the -Becoming the 'Existent' as well as the 'Non-Existent' is necessary; -when they co-operate then a Becoming results." But how come the -"positive" and the "negative" to one another? Should they not on the -contrary eternally flee one another as antitheses and thereby make -every Becoming impossible? Here Parmenides appeals to a <i>qualitas -occulta,</i> to a mystic tendency of the antithetical pairs to approach -and attract one another, and he allegorises that peculiar contrariety -by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> name of Aphrodite, and by the empirically known relation of -the male and female principle. It is the power of Aphrodite which -plays the matchmaker between the antithetical pair, the "Existent" -and the "Non-Existent." Passion brings together the antagonistic and -antipathetic elements: the result is a Becoming. When Desire has become -satiated, Hatred and the innate antagonism again drive asunder the -"Existent" and the "Non-Existent"—then man says: the thing perishes, -passes.</p> - - - -<h4>10</h4> - - -<p>But no one with impunity lays his profane hands on such awful -abstractions as the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent"; the blood -freezes slowly as one touches them. There was a day upon which an odd -idea suddenly occurred to Parmenides, an idea which seemed to take -all value away from his former combinations, so that he felt inclined -to throw them aside, like a money bag with old worn-out coins. It is -commonly believed that an external impression, in addition to the -centrifugal consequence of such ideas as "existent" and "non-existent," -has also been co-active in the invention of that day; this impression -was an acquaintance with the theology of the old roamer and rhapsodist, -the singer of a mystic deification of Nature, the Kolophonian -<i>Xenophanes.</i> Throughout an extraordinary life Xenophanes lived as -a wandering poet and became through his travels a well-informed and -most instructive man who knew how to question and how to narrate, for -which reason Heraclitus reckoned him amongst the polyhistorians and -above<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> all amongst the "historic" natures, in the sense mentioned. -Whence and when came to him the mystic bent into the One and the -eternally Resting, nobody will be able to compute; perhaps it is only -the conception of the finally settled old man, to whom, after the -agitation of his erratic wanderings, and after the restless learning -and searching for truth, the vision of a divine rest, the permanence of -all things within a pantheistic primal peace appears as <i>the</i> highest -and greatest ideal. After all it seems to me quite accidental that in -the same place in Elea two men lived together for a time, each of whom -carried in his head a conception of unity; they formed no school and -had nothing in common which perhaps the one might have learned from -the other and then might have handed on. For, in the case of these two -men, the origin of that conception of unity is quite different, yea -opposite; and if either of them has become at all acquainted with the -doctrine of the other then, in order to understand it at all, he had to -translate it first into his own language. With this translation however -the very specific element of the other doctrine was lost. Whereas -Parmenides arrived at the unity of the "Existent" purely through an -alleged logical consequence and whereas he span that unity out of the -ideas "Being" and "Not-Being," Xenophanes was a religious mystic and -belonged, with that mystic unity, very properly to the Sixth Century. -Although he was no such revolutionising personality as Pythagoras -he had nevertheless in his wanderings the same bent and impulse to -improve, purify, and cure men. He was the ethical teacher, but still -in the stage of the rhapsodist; in a later time<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> he would have been -a sophist. In the daring disapproval of the existing customs and -valuations he had not his equal in Greece; moreover he did not, like -Heraclitus and Plato, retire into solitude but placed himself before -the very public, whose exulting admiration of Homer, whose passionate -propensity for the honours of the gymnastic festivals, whose adoration -of stones in human shape, he criticised severely with wrath and scorn, -yet not as a brawling Thersites. The freedom of the individual was with -him on its zenith; and by this almost limitless stepping free from all -conventions he was more closely related to Parmenides than by that last -divine unity, which once he had beheld, in a visionary state worthy of -that century. His unity scarcely had expression and word in common with -the one "Being" of Parmenides, and certainly had not the same origin.</p> - -<p>It was rather an opposite state of mind in which Parmenides found his -doctrine of "Being," On that day and in that state he examined his -two co-operating antitheses, the "Existent" and the "Non-Existent," -the positive and the negative qualities, of which Desire and Hatred -constitute the world and the Becoming. He was suddenly caught up, -mistrusting, by the idea of negative quality, of the "Non-Existent." -For can something which does not exist be a quality? or to put the -question in a broader sense: can anything indeed which does not exist, -exist? The only form of knowledge in which we at once put unconditional -trust and the disapproval of which amounts to madness, is the tautology -A = A. But this very tautological knowledge called inexorably to him: -what does not exist, exists not! What is, is!<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> Suddenly he feels -upon his life the load of an enormous logical sin; for had he not -always without hesitation assumed that <i>there were existing</i> negative -qualities, in short a "Non-Existent," that therefore, to express it by -a formula, A = Not-A, which indeed could only be advanced by the most -out and out perversity of thinking. It is true, as he recollected, the -whole great mass of men judge with the same perversity; he himself -has only participated in the general crime against logic. But the -same moment which charges him with this crime surrounds him with the -light of the glory of an invention, he has found, apart from all human -illusion, a principle, the key to the world-secret, he now descends -into the abyss of things, guided by the firm and fearful hand of the -tautological truth as to "Being."</p> - -<p>On the way thither he meets Heraclitus—an unfortunate encounter! Just -now Heraclitus' play with antinomies was bound to be very hateful to -him, who placed the utmost importance upon the severest separation of -"Being" and "Not-Being"; propositions like this: "We are and at the -same time we are not" —"'Being' and 'Not-Being' is at the same time -the same thing and again not the same thing," propositions through -which all that he had just elucidated and disentangled became again -dim and inextricable, incited him to wrath. "Away with the men," he -exclaimed, "who seem to have two heads and yet know nothing! With them -truly everything is in flux, even their thinking! They stare at things -stupidly, but they must be deaf as well as blind so to mix up the -opposites"! The want of judgment on the part of the masses, glorified -by playful<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> antinomies and praised as the acme of all knowledge was to -him a painful and incomprehensible experience.</p> - -<p>Now he dived into the cold bath of his awful abstractions. That which -is true must exist in eternal presence, about it cannot be said "it -was," "it will be." The "Existent" cannot have become; for out of what -should it have become? Out of the "Non-Existent"? But that does not -exist and can produce nothing. Out of the "Existent"? This would not -produce anything but itself. The same applies to the Passing, it is -just as impossible as the Becoming, as any change, any increase, any -decrease. On the whole the proposition is valid: Everything about which -it can be said: "it has been" or "it will be" does not exist; about -the "Existent" however it can never be said "it does not exist." The -"Existent" is indivisible, for where is the second power, which should -divide it? It is immovable, for whither should it move itself? It -cannot be infinitely great nor infinitely small, for it is perfect and -a perfectly given infinitude is a contradiction. Thus the "Existent" -is suspended, delimited, perfect, immovable, everywhere equally -balanced and such equilibrium equally perfect at any point, like a -globe, but not in a space, for otherwise this space would be a second -"Existent." But there cannot exist several "Existents," for in order to -separate them, something would have to exist which was not existing, an -assumption which neutralises itself. Thus there exists only the eternal -Unity.</p> - -<p>If now, however, Parmenides turned back his gaze to the world of -Becoming, the existence of which he had formerly tried to understand -by such ingenious conjectures, he was wroth at his eye seeing the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> -Becoming at all, his ear hearing it. "Do not follow the dim-sighted -eyes," now his command runs, "not the resounding ear nor the -tongue, but examine only by the power of the thought." Therewith he -accomplished the extremely important first critique of the apparatus -of knowledge, although this critique was still inadequate and proved -disastrous in its consequences. By tearing entirely asunder the -senses and the ability to think in abstractions, <i>i.e.</i> reason, just -as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he demolished -the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous -separation of "mind" and "body" which, especially since Plato, lies -like a curse on philosophy. All sense perceptions, Parmenides judges, -cause only illusions and their chief illusion is their deluding us to -believe that even the "Non-Existent" exists, that even the Becoming has -a "Being." All that plurality, diversity and variety of the empirically -known world, the change of its qualities, the order in its ups and -downs, is thrown aside mercilessly as mere appearance and delusion; -from there nothing is to be learnt, therefore all labour is wasted -which one bestows upon this false, through-and-through futile world, -the conception of which has been obtained by being hum-bugged by the -senses. He who judges in such generalisations as Parmenides did, ceases -therewith to be an investigator of natural philosophy in detail; his -interest in phenomena withers away; there develops even a hatred of -being unable to get rid of this eternal fraud of the senses. Truth is -now to dwell only in the most faded, most abstract generalities, in the -empty husks of the most indefinite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> words, as in a maze of cobwebs; and -by such a "truth" now the philosopher sits, bloodless as an abstraction -and surrounded by a web of formulæ. The spider undoubtedly wants the -blood of its victims; but the Parmenidean philosopher hates the very -blood of his victims, the blood of Empiricism sacrificed by him.</p> - - - -<h4>11</h4> - - -<p>And that was a Greek who "flourished" about the time of the outbreak -of the Ionic Revolution. At that time it was possible for a Greek -to flee out of the superabundant reality, as out of a mere delusive -schematism of the imaginative faculties—not perhaps like Plato into -the land of the eternal ideas, into the workshop of the world-creator, -in order to feast the eyes on unblemished, unbreakable primal-forms of -things—but into the rigid death-like rest of the coldest and emptiest -conception, that of the "Being." We will indeed beware of interpreting -such a remarkable fact by false analogies. That flight was not a -world-flight in the sense of Indian philosophers; no deep religious -conviction as to the depravity, transitoriness and accursedness of -Existence demanded that flight—that ultimate goal, the rest in the -"Being," was not striven after as the mystic absorption in <i>one</i> -all-sufficing enrapturing conception which is a puzzle and a scandal -to common men. The thought of Parmenides bears in itself not the -slightest trace of the intoxicating mystical Indian fragrance, which -is perhaps not wholly imperceptible in Pythagoras and Empedocles; the -strange thing in that fact, at this period, is rather the very absence -of fragrance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> colour, soul, form, the total lack of blood, religiosity -and ethical warmth, the abstract-schematic—in a Greek!—above all -however our philosopher's awful energy of striving after <i>Certainty,</i> -in a mythically thinking and highly emotional—fantastic age is quite -remarkable. "Grant me but a certainty, ye gods!"is the prayer of -Parmenides, "and be it, in the ocean of Uncertainty, only a board, -broad enough to lie on! Everything becoming, everything luxuriant, -varied, blossoming, deceiving, stimulating, living, take all that for -yourselves, and give to me but the single poor empty Certainty!"</p> - -<p>In the philosophy of Parmenides the theme of ontology forms the -prelude. Experience offered him nowhere a "Being" as he imagined it to -himself, but from the fact that he could conceive of it he concluded -that it must exist; a conclusion which rests upon the supposition -that we have an organ of knowledge which reaches into the nature of -things and is independent of experience. The material of our thinking -according to Parmenides does not exist in perception at all but is -brought in from somewhere else, from an extra-material world to which -by thinking we have a direct access. Against all similar chains of -reasoning Aristotle has already asserted that existence never belongs -to the essence, never belongs to the nature of a thing. For that very -reason from the idea of "Being"—of which the <i>essentia</i> precisely is -only the "Being"—cannot be inferred an <i>existentia</i> of the "Being" at -all. The logical content of that antithesis "Being" and "Not-Being" -is perfectly nil, if the object lying at the bottom of it, if the -precept cannot be given from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> which this antithesis has been deduced -by abstraction; without this going back to the precept the antithesis -is only a play with conceptions, through which indeed nothing is -discerned. For the merely logical criterion of truth, as Kant teaches, -namely the agreement of a discernment with the general and the formal -laws of intellect and reason is, it is true, the <i>conditio sine qua -non,</i> consequently the negative condition of all truth; further however -logic cannot go, and logic cannot discover by any touchstone the error -which pertains not to the form but to the contents. As soon, however, -as one seeks the content for the logical truth of the antithesis: -"That which is, is; that which is not, is not," one will find indeed -not a simple reality, which is fashioned rigidly according to that -antithesis: about a tree I can say as well "it is" in comparison with -all the other things, as well "it becomes" in comparison with itself -at another moment of time as finally also "it is not," <i>e.g.</i>," it is -not yet tree," as long as I perhaps look at the shrub. Words are only -symbols for the relations of things among themselves and to us, and -nowhere touch absolute truth; and now to crown all, the word "Being" -designates only the most general relation, which connects all things, -and so does the word "Not-Being." If however the Existence of the -things themselves be unprovable, then the relation of the things among -themselves, the so-called "Being" and "Not-Being," will not bring us -any nearer to the land of truth. By means of words and ideas we shall -never get behind the wall of the relations, let us say into some -fabulous primal cause of things, and even in the pure forms of the -sensitive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> faculty and of the intellect, in space, time and causality -we gain nothing, which might resemble a "<i>Veritas æterna?</i>" It is -absolutely impossible for the subject to see and discern something -beyond himself, so impossible that Cognition and "Being" are the most -contradictory of all spheres. And if in the uninstructed <i>naïveté</i> -of the then critique of the intellect Parmenides was permitted to -fancy that out of the eternally subjective idea he had come to a -"Being-In-itself," then it is to-day, after Kant, a daring ignorance, -if here and there, especially among badly informed theologians who -want to play the philosopher, is proposed as the task of philosophy: -"to conceive the Absolute by means of consciousness," perhaps even -in the form: "the Absolute is already extant, else how could it be -sought?" as Hegel has expressed himself, or with the saying of Beneke: -"that the 'Being' must be given somehow, must be attainable for us -somehow, since otherwise we could not even have the idea of 'Being.'" -The idea of "Being"! As though that idea did not indicate the most -miserable empiric origin already in the etymology of the word. For -<i>esse</i> means at the bottom: "to breathe," if man uses it of all other -things, then he transmits the conviction that he himself breathes and -lives by means of a metaphor, <i>i.e.,</i> by means of something illogical -to the other things and conceives of their Existence as a Breathing -according to human analogy. Now the original meaning of the word soon -becomes effaced; so much however still remains that man conceives of -the existence of other things according to the analogy of his own -existence, therefore anthropomorphically, and at any rate by means<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -of an illogical transmission. Even to man, therefore apart from that -transmission, the proposition: "I breathe, therefore a 'Being' exists" -is quite insufficient since against it the same objection must be made, -as against the <i>ambulo, ergo sum,</i> or <i>ergo est</i>.</p> - - - -<h4>12</h4> - - -<p>The other idea, of greater import than that of the "Existent," and -likewise invented already by Parmenides, although not yet so clearly -applied as by his disciple Zeno is the idea of the Infinite. Nothing -Infinite can exist; for from such an assumption the contradictory -idea of a perfect Infinitude would result. Since now our actuality, -our existing world everywhere shows the character of that perfect -Infinitude, our world signifies in its nature a contradiction against -logic and therewith also against reality and is deception, lie, -fantasma. Zeno especially applied the method of indirect proof; he -said for example, "There can be no motion from one place to another; -for if there were such a motion, then an Infinitude would be given as -perfect, this however is an impossibility." Achilles cannot catch up -the tortoise which has a small start in a race, for in order to reach -only the point from which the tortoise began, he would have had to run -through innumerable, infinitely many spaces, viz., first half of that -space, then the fourth, then the sixteenth, and so on <i>ad infinitum.</i> -If he does in fact overtake the tortoise then this is an illogical -phenomenon, and therefore at any rate not a truth, not a reality, not -real "Being," but only a delusion. For it is never possible to finish -the infinite. Another popular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> expression of this doctrine is the -flying and yet resting arrow. At any instant of its flight it has a -position; in this position it rests. Now would the sum of the infinite -positions of rest be identical with motion? Would now the Resting, -infinitely often repeated, be Motion, therefore its own opposite? -The Infinite is here used as the <i>aqua fortis</i> of reality, through -it the latter is dissolved. If however the Ideas are fixed, eternal -and entitative—and for Parmenides "Being" and Thinking coincide—if -therefore the Infinite can never be perfect, if Rest can never become -Motion, then in fact the arrow has not flown at all; it never left its -place and resting position; no moment of time has passed. Or expressed -in another way: in this so-called yet only alleged Actuality there -exists neither time, nor space, nor motion. Finally the arrow itself is -only an illusion; for it originates out of the Plurality, out of the -phantasmagoria of the "Non-One" produced by the senses. Suppose the -arrow had a "Being," then it would be immovable, timeless, increate, -rigid and eternal—an impossible conception! Supposing that Motion was -truly real, then there would be no rest, therefore no position for the -arrow, therefore no space—an impossible conception! Supposing that -time were real, then it could not be of an infinite divisibility; the -time which the arrow needed, would have to consist of a limited number -of time-moments, each of these moments would have to be an <i>Atomon</i>—an -impossible conception! All our conceptions, as soon as their -empirically-given content, drawn out of this concrete world, is taken -as a <i>Veritas æterna,</i> lead to contradictions. If there is absolute -motion, then<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> there is no space; if there is absolute space then there -is no motion; if there is absolute "Being," then there is no Plurality; -if there is an absolute Plurality, then there is no Unity. It should -at least become clear to <i>us</i> how little we touch the heart of things -or untie the knot of reality with such ideas, whereas Parmenides and -Zeno inversely hold fast to the truth and omnivalidity of ideas and -condemn the perceptible world as the opposite of the true and omnivalid -ideas, as an objectivation of the illogical and contradictory. With all -their proofs they start from the wholly undemonstrable, yea improbable -assumption that in that apprehensive faculty we possess the decisive, -highest criterion of "Being" and "Not-Being," <i>i.e.,</i> of objective -reality and its opposite; those ideas are not to prove themselves -true, to correct themselves by Actuality, as they are after all really -derived from it, but on the contrary they are to measure and to judge -Actuality, and in case of a contradiction with logic, even to condemn. -In order to concede to them this judicial competence Parmenides had to -ascribe to them the same "Being," which alone he allowed in general -as <i>the</i> "Being"; Thinking and that one increate perfect ball of the -"Existent" were now no longer to be conceived as two different kinds -of "Being," since there was not permitted a duality of "Being." Thus -the over-risky flash of fancy had become necessary to declare Thinking -and "Being" identical. No form of perceptibility, no symbol, no simile -could possibly be of any help here; the fancy was wholly inconceivable, -but it was necessary, yea in the lack of every possibility of -illustration it celebrated the highest triumph over<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> the world and -the claims of the senses. Thinking and that clod-like, ball-shaped, -through-and-through dead-massive, and rigid-immovable "Being," must, -according to the Parmenidean imperative, dissolve into one another and -be the same in every respect, to the horror of fantasy. What does it -matter that this identity contradicts the senses! This contradiction -is just the guarantee that such an identity is not borrowed from the -senses.</p> - - - -<h4>13</h4> - - -<p>Moreover against Parmenides could be produced a strong couple of -<i>argumenta ad hominem</i> or <i>ex concessis,</i> by which, it is true, truth -itself could not be brought to light, but at any rate the untruth of -that absolute separation of the world of the senses and the world of -the ideas, and the untruth of the identity of "Being" and Thinking -could be demonstrated. Firstly, if the Thinking of Reason in ideas is -real, then also Plurality and Motion must have reality, for rational -Thinking is mobile; and more precisely, it is a motion from idea to -idea, therefore within a plurality of realities. There is no subterfuge -against that; it is quite impossible to designate Thinking as a rigid -Permanence, as an eternally immobile, intellectual Introspection of -Unity. Secondly, if only fraud and illusion come from the senses, -and if in reality there exists only the real identity of "Being" and -Thinking, what then are the senses themselves? They too are certainly -Appearance only since they do not coincide with the Thinking, and -their product, the world of senses, does not coincide with "Being." -If however the senses themselves are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> Appearance to whom then are -they Appearance? How can they, being unreal, still deceive? The -"Non-Existent" cannot even deceive. Therefore the Whence? of deception -and Appearance remains an enigma, yea, a contradiction. We call these -<i>argumenta ad hominem:</i> The Objection Of The Mobile Reason and that -of The Origin Of Appearance. From the first would result the reality -of Motion and of Plurality, from the second the impossibility of the -Parmenidean Appearance, assuming that the chief-doctrine of Parmenides -on the "Being" were accepted as true. This chief-doctrine however only -says: The "Existent" only has a "Being," the "Non-Existent" does not -exist. If Motion however has such a "Being," then to Motion applies -what applies to the "Existent" in general: it is increate, eternal, -indestructible, without increase or decrease. But if the "Appearance" -is denied and a belief in it made untenable, by means of that question -as to the Whence? of the "Appearance," if the stage of the so-called -Becoming, of change, our many-shaped, restless, coloured and rich -Existence is protected from the Parmenidean rejection, then it is -necessary to characterise this world of change and alteration as a -<i>sum</i> of such really existing Essentials, existing simultaneously -into all eternity. Of a change in the strict sense, of a Becoming -there cannot naturally be any question even with this assumption. But -now Plurality has a real "Being," all qualities have a real "Being" -and motion not less; and of any moment of this world—although these -moments chosen at random lie at a distance of millenniums from one -another—it would have to be possible to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> say: all real Essentials -extant in this world are without exception co-existent, unaltered, -undiminished, without increase, without decrease. A millennium later -the world is exactly the same. Nothing has altered. If in spite of -that the appearance of the world at the one time is quite different -from that at the other time, then that is no deception, nothing merely -apparent, but the effect of eternal motion. The real "Existent" is -moved sometimes thus, sometimes thus: together, asunder, upwards, -downwards, into one another, pell-mell.</p> - - - -<h4>14</h4> - - -<p>With this conception we have already taken a step into the realm -of the doctrine of <i>Anaxagoras.</i> By him both objections against -Parmenides are raised in full strength; that of the mobile Thinking -and that of the Whence? of "Appearance"; but in the chief proposition -Parmenides has subjugated him as well as all the younger philosophers -and nature-explorers. They all deny the possibility of Becoming and -Passing, as the mind of the people conceives them and as Anaximander -and Heraclitus had assumed with greater circumspection and yet still -heedlessly. Such a mythological Originating out of the Nothing, such -a Disappearing into the Nothing, such an arbitrary Changing of the -Nothing into the Something, such a random exchanging, putting on and -putting off of the qualities was henceforth considered senseless; but -so was, and for the same reasons, an originating of the Many out of the -One, of the manifold qualities out of the one primal-quality, in short -the derivation of the world out of a primary substance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> as argued by -Thales and Heraclitus. Rather was now the real problem advanced of -applying the doctrine of increate imperishable "Being" to this existing -world, without taking one's refuge in the theory of appearance and -deception. But if the empiric world is not to be Appearance, if the -things are not to be derived out of Nothing and just as little out of -the one Something, then these things must contain in themselves a real -"Being," their matter and content must be unconditionally real, and -all change can refer only to the form, <i>i.e.,</i> to the position, order, -grouping, mixing, separation of these eternally co-existing Essentials. -It is just as in a game of dice; they are ever the same dice; but -falling sometimes thus, sometimes thus, they mean to us something -different. All older theories had gone back to a primal element, as -womb and cause of Becoming, be this water, air, fire or the Indefinite -of Anaximander. Against that Anaxagoras now asserts that out of the -Equal the Unequal could never come forth, and that out of the one -"Existent" the change could never be explained. Whether now one were -to imagine that assumed matter to be rarefied or condensed, one would -never succeed by such a condensation or rarefaction in explaining the -problem one would like to explain: the plurality of qualities. But if -the world in fact is full of the most different qualities then these -must, in case they are not appearance, have a "Being," <i>i.e.,</i> must -be eternal, increate, imperishable and ever co-existing. Appearance, -however, they cannot be, since the question as to the Whence? of -Appearance remains unanswered, yea answers itself in the negative! The -earlier seekers after Truth had intended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> to simplify the problem of -Becoming by advancing only one substance, which bore in its bosom the -possibilities of all Becoming; now on the contrary it is asserted: -there are innumerable substances, but never more, never less, and never -new ones. Only Motion, playing dice with them throws them into ever -new combinations. That Motion however is a truth and not Appearance, -Anaxagoras proved in opposition to Parmenides by the indisputable -succession of our conceptions in thinking. We have therefore in the -most direct fashion the insight into the truth of motion and succession -in the fact that we think and have conceptions. Therefore at any rate -the <i>one</i> rigid, resting, dead "Being" of Parmenides has been removed -out of the way, there are many "Existents" just as surely as all -these many "Existents" (existing things, substances) are in motion. -Change is motion—but whence originates motion? Does this motion leave -perhaps wholly untouched the proper essence of those many independent, -isolated substances, and, according to the most severe idea of the -"Existent," <i>must</i> not motion in itself be foreign to them? Or does -it after all belong to the things themselves? We stand here at an -important decision; according to which way we turn, we shall step into -the realm either of Anaxagoras or of Empedocles or of Democritus. The -delicate question must be raised: if there are many substances, and if -these many move, what moves them? Do they move one another? Or is it -perhaps only gravitation? Or are there magic forces of attraction and -repulsion within the things themselves? Or does the cause of motion -lie outside<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> these many real substances? Or putting the question -more pointedly: if two things show a succession, a mutual change of -position, does that originate from themselves? And is this to be -explained mechanically or magically? Or if this should not be the case -is it a third something which moves them? It is a sorry problem, for -Parmenides would still have been able to prove against Anaxagoras the -impossibility of motion, even granted that there are many substances. -For he could say: Take two Substances existing of themselves, each with -quite differently fashioned, autonomous, unconditioned "Being"—and -of such kind are the Anaxagorean substances—they can never clash -together, never move, never attract one another, there exists between -them no causality, no bridge, they do not come into contact with one -another, do not disturb one another, they do not interest one another, -they are utterly indifferent. The impact then is just as inexplicable -as the magic attraction: that which is utterly foreign cannot exercise -any effect upon another, therefore cannot move itself nor allow -itself to be moved. Parmenides would even have added: the only way of -escape which is left to you is this, to ascribe motion to the things -themselves; then however all that you know and see as motion is indeed -only a deception and not true motion, for the only kind of motion which -could belong to those absolutely original substances, would be merely -an autogenous motion limited to themselves without any effect. But -you <i>assume</i> motion in order to explain those effects of change, of -the disarrangement in space, of alteration, in short the causalities -and relations of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> the things among themselves. But these very effects -would not be explained and would remain as problematic as ever; for -this reason one cannot conceive why it should be necessary to assume a -motion since it does not perform that which you demand from it. Motion -does not belong to the nature of things and is eternally foreign to -them.</p> - -<p>Those opponents of the Eleatean unmoved Unity were induced to make -light of such an argument by prejudices of a perceptual character. It -seems so irrefutable that each veritable "Existent" is a space-filling -body, a lump of matter, large or small but in any case spacially -dimensioned; so that two or more such lumps cannot be in one space. -Under this hypothesis Anaxagoras, as later on Democritus, assumed that -they must knock against each other; if in their motions they came by -chance upon one another, that they would dispute the same space with -each other, and that this struggle was the very cause of all Change. -In other words: those wholly isolated, thoroughly heterogeneous and -eternally unalterable substances were after all not conceived as -being absolutely heterogeneous but all had in addition to a specific, -wholly peculiar quality, also one absolutely homogeneous substratum: a -piece of space-filling matter. In their participation in matter they -all stood equal and therefore could act upon one another, <i>i.e.,</i> -knock one another. Moreover all Change did not in the least depend on -the heterogeneity of those substances but on their homogeneity, as -matter. At the bottom of the assumption of Anaxagoras is a logical -oversight; for that which is <i>the</i> "Existent-In-Itself" must be wholly -unconditional and coherent,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> is therefore not allowed to assume as its -cause anything,—whereas all those Anaxagorean substances have still -a conditioning Something: matter, and already assume its existence; -the substance "Red" for example was to Anaxagoras not just merely red -in itself but also in a reserved or suppressed way a piece of matter -without any qualities. Only with this matter the "Red-In-Itself" acted -upon other substances, not with the "Red," but with that which is -not red, not coloured, nor in any way qualitatively definite. If the -"Red" had been taken strictly as "Red," as the real substance itself, -therefore without that substratum, then Anaxagoras would certainly not -have dared to speak of an effect of the "Red" upon other substances, -perhaps even with the phrase that the "Red-In-Itself" was transmitting -the impact received from the "Fleshy-In-Itself." Then it would be clear -that such an "Existent" <i>par excellence</i> could never be moved.</p> - - - -<h4>15</h4> - - -<p>One has to glance at the opponents of the Eleates, in order to -appreciate the extraordinary advantages in the assumption of -Parmenides. What embarrassments,—from which Parmenides had -escaped,—awaited Anaxagoras and all who believed in a plurality of -substances, with the question, How many substances? Anaxagoras made the -leap, closed his eyes and said, "Infinitely many"; thus he had flown -at least beyond the incredibly laborious proof of a definite number -of elementary substances. Since these "Infinitely Many" had to exist -without increase and unaltered for eternities, in that assumption was -given the contradiction of an infinity to be conceived as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> completed -and perfect. In short, Plurality, Motion, Infinity driven into flight -by Parmenides with the amazing proposition of the one "Being," returned -from their exile and hurled their projectiles at the opponents of -Parmenides, causing them wounds for which there is no cure. Obviously -those opponents have no real consciousness and knowledge as to the -awful force of those Eleatean thoughts, "There can be no time, no -motion, no space; for all these we can only think of as infinite, -and to be more explicit, firstly infinitely large, then infinitely -divisible; but everything infinite has no 'Being,' does not exist," and -this nobody doubts, who takes the meaning of the word "Being" severely -and considers the existence of something contradictory impossible, -<i>e.g.,</i> the existence of a completed infinity. If however the very -Actuality shows us everything under the form of the completed infinity -then it becomes evident that it contradicts itself and therefore has no -true reality. If those opponents however should object: "but in your -thinking itself there does exist succession, therefore neither could -your thinking be real and consequently could not prove anything," then -Parmenides perhaps like Kant in a similar case of an equal objection -would have answered: "I can, it is true, say my conceptions follow upon -one another, but that means only that we are not conscious of them -unless within a chronological order, <i>i.e.,</i> according to the form of -the inner sense. For that reason time is not a something in itself -nor any order or quality objectively adherent to things." We should -therefore have to distinguish between the Pure Thinking, that would -be timeless like the one Parmenidean "Being," and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> the consciousness -of this thinking, and the latter would already translate the thinking -into the form of appearance, <i>i.e.,</i> of succession, plurality and -motion. It is probable that Parmenides would have availed himself -of this loophole; however, the same objection would then have to be -raised against him which is raised against Kant by A. Spir ("Thinking -And Reality," 2nd ed., vol. i., pp. 209, &c). "Now, in the first place -however it is clear, that I cannot know anything of a succession as -such, unless I have the successive members of the same simultaneously -in my consciousness. Thus the conception of a succession itself is -not at all successive, hence also quite different from the succession -of our conceptions. Secondly Kant's assumption implies such obvious -absurdities that one is surprised that he could leave them unnoticed. -Cæsar and Socrates according to this assumption are not really dead, -they still live exactly as they did two thousand years ago and only -seem to be dead, as a consequence of an organisation of my inner -sense." Future men already live and if they do not now step forward as -living that organisation of the "inner sense" is likewise the cause -of it. Here above all other things the question is to be put: How can -the beginning and the end of conscious life itself, together with -all its internal and external senses, exist merely in the conception -of the inner sense? <i>The</i> fact is indeed this, that one certainly -cannot deny the reality of Change. If it is thrown out through the -window it slips in again through the keyhole. If one says: "It merely -seems to me, that conditions and conceptions change,"—then this very -semblance and appearance itself is something objectively<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> existing and -within it without doubt the succession has objective reality, some -things in it really do succeed one another.—Besides one must observe -that indeed the whole critique of reason only has cause and right of -existence under the assumption that to us our <i>conceptions</i> themselves -appear exactly as they are. For if the conceptions also appeared to us -otherwise than they really are, then one would not be able to advance -any solid proposition about them, and therefore would not be able to -accomplish any gnosiology or any "transcendental" investigation of -objective validity. Now it remains however beyond all doubt that our -conceptions themselves appear to us as successive."</p> - -<p>The contemplation of this undoubted succession and agitation has now -urged Anaxagoras to a memorable hypothesis. Obviously the conceptions -themselves moved themselves, were not pushed and had no cause of -motion outside themselves. Therefore he said to himself, there exists -a something which bears in itself the origin and the commencement -of motion; secondly, however, he notices that this conception was -moving not only itself but also something quite different, the body. -He discovers therefore, in the most immediate experience an effect -of conceptions upon expansive matter, which makes itself known as -motion in the latter. That was to him a fact; and only incidentally -it stimulated him to explain this fact. Let it suffice that he had a -regulative schema for the motion in the world,—this motion he now -understood either as a motion of the true isolated essences through -the Conceptual Principle, the Nous, or as a motion through a something -already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> moved. That with his fundamental assumption the latter kind, -the mechanical transmission of motions and impacts likewise contained -in itself a problem, probably escaped him; the commonness and every-day -occurrence of the effect through impact most probably dulled his eye to -the mysteriousness of impact. On the other hand he certainly felt the -problematic, even contradictory nature of an effect of conceptions upon -substances existing in themselves and he also tried therefore to trace -this effect back to a mechanical push and impact which were considered -by him as quite comprehensible. For the Nous too was without doubt such -a substance existing in itself and was characterised by him as a very -delicate and subtle matter, with the specific quality of thinking. -With a character assumed in this way, the effect of this matter upon -other matter had of course to be of exactly the same kind as that -which another substance exercises upon a third, <i>i.e.,</i> a mechanical -effect, moving by pressure and impact. Still the philosopher had now a -substance which moves itself and other things, a substance of which the -motion did not come from outside and depended on no one else: whereas -it seemed almost a matter of indifference how this automobilism was -to be conceived of, perhaps similar to that pushing themselves hither -and thither of very fragile and small globules of quicksilver. Among -all questions which concern motion there is none more troublesome than -the question as to the beginning of motion. For if one may be allowed -to conceive of all remaining motions as effect and consequences, then -nevertheless the first primal motion is still to be explained;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> for the -mechanical motions, the first link of the chain certainly cannot lie in -a mechanical motion, since that would be as good as recurring to the -nonsensical idea of the <i>causa sui.</i> But likewise it is not feasible -to attribute to the eternal, unconditional things a motion of their -own, as it were from the beginning, as dowry of their existence. For -motion cannot be conceived without a direction whither and whereupon, -therefore only as relation and condition; but a thing is no longer -"entitative-in-itself" and "unconditional," if according to its nature -it refers necessarily to something existing outside of it. In this -embarrassment Anaxagoras thought he had found an extraordinary help -and salvation in that Nous, automobile and otherwise independent; the -nature of that Nous being just obscure and veiled enough to produce the -deception about it, that its assumption also involves that forbidden -<i>causa sui.</i> To empiric observation it is even an established fact that -Conception is not a <i>causa sui</i> but the effect of the brain, yea, it -must appear to that observation as an odd eccentricity to separate the -"mind," the product of the brain, from its <i>causa</i> and still to deem it -existing after this severing. This Anaxagoras did; he forgot the brain, -its marvellous design, the delicacy and intricacy of its convolutions -and passages and he decreed the "Mind-In-Itself." This "Mind-In-Itself" -alone among all substances had Free-will,—a grand discernment! This -Mind was able at any odd time to begin with the motion of the things -outside it; on the other hand for ages and ages it could occupy itself -with itself—in short Anaxagoras was allowed to assume a <i>first</i> moment -of motion in some primeval<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> age, as the <i>Chalaza</i> of all so-called -Becoming; <i>i.e.,</i> of all Change, namely of all shifting and rearranging -of the eternal substances and their particles, Although the Mind itself -is eternal, it is in no way compelled to torment itself for eternities -with the shifting about of grains of matter; and certainly there was a -time and a state of those matters—it is quite indifferent whether that -time was of long or short duration—during which the Nous had not acted -upon them, during which they were still unmoved. That is the period of -the Anaxagorean chaos.</p> - - - -<h4>16</h4> - - -<p>The Anaxagorean chaos is not an immediately evident conception; in -order to grasp it one must have understood the conception which our -philosopher had with respect to the so-called "Becoming." For in -itself the state of all heterogeneous "Elementary-existences" before -all motion would by no means necessarily result in an absolute mixture -of all "seeds of things," as the expression of Anaxagoras runs, an -intermixture, which he imagined as a complete pell-mell, disordered -in its smallest parts, after all these "Elementary-existences" had -been, as in a mortar, pounded and resolved into atoms of dust, so that -now in that chaos, as in an amphora, they could be whirled into a -medley. One might say that this conception of the chaos did not contain -anything inevitable, that one merely needed rather to assume any chance -position of all those "existences," but not an infinite decomposition -of them; an irregular side-by-side arrangement was already sufficient; -there was no need of a pell-mell, let alone<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> such a total pell-mell. -What therefore put into Anaxagoras' head that difficult and complex -conception? As already said: his conception of the empirically given -Becoming. From his experience he drew first a most extraordinary -proposition on the Becoming, and this proposition necessarily resulted -in that doctrine of the chaos, as its consequence.</p> - -<p>The observation of the processes of evolution in nature, not a -consideration of an earlier philosophical system, suggested to -Anaxagoras the doctrine, that <i>All originated from All;</i> this was the -conviction of the natural philosopher based upon a manifold, and at the -bottom, of course, excessively inadequate induction. He proved it thus: -if even the contrary could originate out of the contrary, <i>e.g.,</i> the -Black out of the White, everything is possible; that however did happen -with the dissolution of white snow into black water. The nourishment of -the body he explained to himself in this way: that in the articles of -food there must be invisibly small constituents of flesh or blood or -bone which during alimentation became disengaged and united with the -homogeneous in the body. But if All can become out of All, the Firm out -of the Liquid, the Hard out of the Soft, the Black out of the White, -the Fleshy out of Bread, then also All must be contained in All. The -names of things in that case express only the preponderance of the one -substance over the other substances to be met with in smaller, often -imperceptible quantities. In gold, that is to say, in that which one -designates <i>a potiore</i> by the name "gold," there must be also contained -silver, snow, bread, and flesh, but in very small quantities; the -whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> is called after the preponderating item, the gold-substance.</p> - -<p>But how is it possible, that one substance preponderates and fills a -thing in greater mass than the others present? Experience shows, that -this preponderance is gradually produced only through Motion, that -the preponderance is the result of a process, which we commonly call -Becoming. On the other hand, that "All is in All" is not the result -of a process, but, on the contrary, the preliminary condition of all -Becoming and all Motion, and is consequently previous to all Becoming. -In other words: experience teaches, that continually the like is -added to the like, <i>e.g.,</i> through nourishment, therefore originally -those homogeneous substances were not together and agglomerated, but -they were separate. Rather, in all empiric processes coming before -our eyes, the homogeneous is always segregated from the heterogeneous -and transmitted (<i>e.g.,</i> during nourishment, the particles of flesh -out of the bread, &c), consequently the pell-mell of the different -substances is the older form of the constitution of things and in point -of time previous to all Becoming and Moving. If all so-called Becoming -is a segregating and presupposes a mixture, the question arises, -what degree of intermixture this pell-mell must have had originally. -Although the process of a moving on the part of the homogeneous to -the homogeneous—<i>i.e.,</i> Becoming—has already lasted an immense -time, one recognises in spite of that, that even yet in all things -remainders and seed-grains of all other things are enclosed, waiting -for their segregation, and one recognises further that only here and -there a preponderance has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> brought about; the primal mixture -must have been a complete one, <i>i.e.,</i> going down to the infinitely -small, since the separation and unmixing takes up an infinite length of -time. Thereby strict adherence is paid to the thought: that everything -which possesses an essential "Being" is infinitely divisible, without -forfeiting its specificum.</p> - -<p>According to these hypotheses Anaxagoras conceives of the world's -primal existence: perhaps as similar to a dust-like mass of infinitely -small, concrete particles of which every one is specifically simple -and possesses one quality only, yet so arranged that every specific -quality is represented in an infinite number of individual particles. -Such particles Aristotle has called <i>Homoiomere</i> in consideration of -the fact that they are the Parts, all equal one to another, of a Whole -which is homogeneous with its Parts. One would however commit a serious -mistake to equate this primal pell-mell of all such particles, such -"seed-grains of things" to the one primal matter of Anaximander; for -the latter's primal matter called the "Indefinite" is a thoroughly -coherent and peculiar mass, the former's primal pell-mell is an -aggregate of substances. It is true one can assert about this Aggregate -of Substances exactly the same as about the Indefinite of Anaximander, -as Aristotle does: it could be neither white nor grey, nor black, nor -of any other colour; it was tasteless, scentless, and altogether as a -Whole defined neither quantitatively nor qualitatively: so far goes the -similarity of the Anaximandrian Indefinite and the Anaxagorean Primal -Mixture. But disregarding this negative equality they distinguish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> -themselves one from another positively by the latter being a compound, -the former a unity. Anaxagoras had by the assumption of his Chaos at -least so much to his advantage, that he was not compelled to deduce the -Many from the One, the Becoming out of the "Existent."</p> - -<p>Of course with his complete intermixture of the "seeds" he had to -admit one exception: the Nous was not then, nor is It now admixed with -any thing. For if It were admixed with only one "Existent," It would -have, in infinite divisions, to dwell in all things. This exception -is logically very dubious, especially considering the previously -described material nature of the Nous, it has something mythological in -itself and seems arbitrary, but was however, according to Anaxagorean -<i>prœmissa,</i> a strict necessity. The Mind, which is moreover infinitely -divisible like any other matter, only not through other matters but -through Itself, has, if It divides Itself, in dividing and conglobating -sometimes in large, sometimes in small masses, Its equal mass and -quality from all eternity; and that which at this minute exists as Mind -in animals, plants, men, was also Mind without a more or less, although -distributed in another way a thousand years ago. But wherever It had a -relation to another substance, there It never was admixed with it, but -voluntarily seized it, moved and pushed it arbitrarily—in short, ruled -it. Mind, which alone has motion in Itself, alone possesses ruling -power in this world and shows it through moving the grains of matter. -But whither does It move them? Or is a motion conceivable, without -direction, without path? Is Mind in Its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> impacts just as arbitrary -as it is, with regard to the time when It pushes, and when It does -not push? In short, does Chance, <i>i.e.,</i> the blindest option, rule -within Motion? At this boundary we step into the Most Holy within the -conceptual realm of Anaxagoras.</p> - - - -<h4>17</h4> - - -<p>What had to be done with that chaotic pell-mell of the primal state -previous to all motion, so that out of it, without any increase of -new substances and forces, the existing world might originate, with -its regular stellar orbits, with its regulated forms of seasons and -days, with its manifold beauty and order,—in short, so that out of -the Chaos might come a Cosmos? This can be only the effect of Motion, -and of a definite and well-organised motion. This Motion itself is -the means of the Nous, Its goal would be the perfect segregation of -the homogeneous, a goal up to the present not yet attained, because -the disorder and the mixture in the beginning was infinite. This -goal is to be striven after only by an enormous process, not to be -realized suddenly by a mythological stroke of the wand. If ever, at -an infinitely distant point of time, it is achieved that everything -homogeneous is brought together and the "primal-existences" undivided -are encamped side by side in beautiful order, and every particle has -found its comrades and its home, and the great peace comes about after -the great division and splitting up of the substances, and there will -be no longer anything that is divided ind split up, then the Nous will -again return into Its automobilism and, no longer Itself divided, -roam through the world, sometimes in larger, sometimes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> in smaller -masses, as plant-mind or animal-mind, and no longer will It take up Its -new dwelling-place in other matter. Meanwhile the task has not been -completed; but the kind of motion which the Nous has thought out, in -order to solve the task, shows a marvellous suitableness, for by this -motion the task is further solved in each new moment. For this motion -has the character of concentrically progressive circular motion; it -began at some one point of the chaotic mixture, in the form of a little -gyration, and in ever larger paths this circular movement traverses -all existing "Being," jerking forth everywhere the homogeneous to -the homogeneous. At first this revolution brings everything Dense -to the Dense, everything Rare to the Rare, and likewise all that is -Dark, Bright, Moist, Dry to their kind; above these general groups or -classifications there are again two still more comprehensive, namely -<i>Ether,</i> that is to say everything that is Warm, Bright, Rare, and -<i>Aër,</i> that is to say everything that is Dark, Cold, Heavy, Firm. -Through the segregation of the ethereal masses from the aërial, -there is formed, as the most immediate effect of that epicycle whose -centre moves along in the circumference of ever greater circles, a -something as in an eddy made in standing water; heavy compounds are -led towards the middle and compressed. Just in the same way that -travelling waterspout in chaos forms itself on the outer side out of -the Ethereal, Rare, Bright Constituents, on the inner side out of the -Cloudy, Heavy, Moist Constituents. Then in the course of this process -out of that Aërial mass, conglomerating in its interior, water is -separated, and again out of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> water the earthy element, and then -out of the earthy element, under the effect of the awful cold are -separated the stones. Again at some juncture masses of stone, through -the momentum of the rotation, are torn away sideways from the earth and -thrown into the realm of the hot light Ether; there in the latter's -fiery element they are made to glow and, carried along in the ethereal -rotation, they irradiate light, and as sun and stars illuminate and -warm the earth, in herself dark and cold. The whole conception is of -a wonderful daring and simplicity and has nothing of that clumsy and -anthropomorphical teleology, which has been frequently connected with -the name of Anaxagoras. That conception has its greatness just in this, -that it derives the whole Cosmos of Becoming out of the moved circle, -whereas Parmenides contemplated the true "Existent" as a resting, dead -ball. Once that circle is put into motion and caused to roll by the -Nous, then all the order, law and beauty of the world is the natural -consequence of that first impetus. How very much one wrongs Anaxagoras -if one reproaches him for the wise abstention from teleology which -shows itself in this conception and talks scornfully of his Nous as -of a <i>deus ex machina.</i> Rather, on account of the elimination of -mythological and theistic miracle-working and anthropomorphic ends and -utilities, Anaxagoras might have made use of proud words similar to -those which Kant used in his Natural History of the Heavens. For it is -indeed a sublime thought, to retrace that grandeur of the cosmos and -the marvellous arrangement of the orbits of the stars, to retrace all -that, in all forms to a simple, purely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> mechanical motion and, as it -were, to a moved mathematical figure, and therefore not to reduce all -that to purposes and intervening hands of a machine-god, but only to -a kind of oscillation, which, having once begun, is in its progress -necessary and definite, and effects result which resemble the wisest -computation of sagacity and extremely well thought-out fitness without -being anything of the sort. "I enjoy the pleasure," says Kant, of -seeing how a well-ordered whole produces itself without the assistance -of arbitrary fabrications, under the impulse of fixed laws of motion—a -well-ordered whole which looks so similar to that world-system which -is ours, that I cannot abstain from considering it to be the same. -It seems to me that one might say here, in a certain sense without -presumption: 'Give me matter and I will build a world out of it.'"</p> - - - -<h4>18</h4> - - -<p>Suppose now, that for once we allow that primal mixture as rightly -concluded, some considerations especially from Mechanics seem to oppose -the grand plan of the world edifice. For even though the Mind at a -point causes a circular movement its continuation is only conceivable -with great difficulty, especially since it is to be infinite and -gradually to make all existing masses rotate. As a matter of course one -would assume that the pressure of all the remaining matter would have -crushed out this small circular movement when it had scarcely begun; -that this does not happen presupposes on the part of the stimulating -Nous, that the latter began to work suddenly with awful force, or at -any rate so quickly, that we must call the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> motion a whirl: such a -whirl as Democritus himself imagined. And since this whirl must be -infinitely strong in order not to be checked through the whole world of -the Infinite weighing heavily upon it, it will be infinitely quick, for -strength can manifest itself originally only in speed. On the contrary -the broader the concentric rings are, the slower will be this motion; -if once the motion could reach the end of the infinitely extended -world, then this motion would have already infinitely little speed of -rotation. <i>Vice versa,</i> if we conceive of the motion as infinitely -great, <i>i.e.,</i> infinitely quick, at the moment of the very first -beginning of motion, then the original circle must have been infinitely -small; we get therefore as the beginning a particle rotated round -itself, a particle with an infinitely small material content. This -however would not at all explain the further motion; one might imagine -even all particles of the primal mass to rotate round themselves and -yet the whole mass would remain unmoved and unseparated. If, however, -that material particle of infinite smallness, caught and swung by the -Nous, was not turned round itself but described a circle somewhat -larger than a point, this would cause it to knock against other -material particles, to move them on, to hurl them, to make them rebound -and thus gradually to stir up a great and spreading tumult within -which, as the next result, that separation of the aërial masses from -the ethereal had to take place. Just as the commencement of the motion -itself is an arbitrary act of the Nous, arbitrary also is the manner of -this commencement in so far as the first motion circumscribes a circle -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> which the radius is chosen somewhat larger than a point.</p> - - - -<h4>19</h4> - - -<p>Here of course one might ask, what fancy had at that time so suddenly -occurred to the Nous, to knock against some chance material particle -out of that number of particles and to turn it around in whirling dance -and why that did not occur to It earlier. Whereupon Anaxagoras would -answer: "The Nous has the privilege of arbitrary action; It may begin -at any chance time, It depends on Itself, whereas everything else is -determined from outside. It has no duty, and no end which It might -be compelled to pursue; if It did once begin with that motion and -set Itself an end, this after all was only—the answer is difficult, -Heraclitus would say—<i>play!</i>"</p> - -<p>That seems always to have been the last solution or answer hovering on -the lips of the Greek. The Anaxagorean Mind is an artist and in truth -the most powerful genius of mechanics and architecture, creating with -the simplest means the most magnificent forms and tracks and as it were -a mobile architecture, but always out of that irrational arbitrariness -which lies in the soul of the artist. It is as though Anaxagoras was -pointing at Phidias and in face of the immense work of art, the Cosmos, -was calling out to us as he would do in front of the Parthenon: "The -Becoming is no moral, but only an artistic phenomenon." Aristotle -relates that, to the question what made life worth living, Anaxagoras -had answered: "Contemplating the heavens and the total order of the -Cosmos." He treated physical things so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> devotionally, and with that -same mysterious awe, which we feel when standing in front of an antique -temple; his doctrine became a species of free-thinking religious -exercise, protecting itself through the <i>odi profanum vulgus et arceo</i> -and choosing its adherents with precaution out of the highest and -noblest society of Athens. In the exclusive community of the Athenian -Anaxagoreans the mythology of the people was allowed only as a symbolic -language; all myths, all gods, all heroes were considered here only as -hieroglyphics of the interpretation of nature, and even the Homeric -epic was said to be the canonic song of the sway of the Nous and the -struggles and laws of Nature. Here and there a note from this society -of sublime free-thinkers penetrated to the people; and especially -Euripides, the great and at all times daring Euripides, ever thinking -of something new, dared to let many things become known by means of the -tragic mask, many things which pierced like an arrow through the senses -of the masses and from which the latter freed themselves only by means -of ludicrous caricatures and ridiculous re-interpretations.</p> - -<p>The greatest of all Anaxagoreans however is Pericles, the mightiest and -worthiest man of the world; and Plato bears witness that the philosophy -of Anaxagoras alone had given that sublime flight to the genius of -Pericles. When as a public orator he stood before his people, in the -beautiful rigidity and immobility of a marble Olympian and now, calm, -wrapped in his mantle, with unruffled drapery, without any change of -facial expression, without smile, with a voice the strong tone of -which remained ever the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> same, and when he now spoke in an absolutely -un-Demosthenic but merely Periclean fashion, when he thundered, struck -with lightnings, annihilated and redeemed—then he was the epitome -of the Anaxagorean Cosmos, the image of the Nous, who has built for -Itself the most beautiful and dignified receptacle, then Pericles was -as it were the visible human incarnation of the building, moving, -eliminating, ordering, reviewing, artistically-undetermined force of -the Mind. Anaxagoras himself said man was the most rational being or -he must necessarily shelter the Nous within himself in greater fulness -than all other beings, because he had such admirable organs as his -hands; Anaxagoras concluded therefore, that that Nous, according to -the extent to which It made Itself master of a material body, was -always forming for Itself out of this material the tools corresponding -to Its degree of power, consequently the Nous made the most beautiful -and appropriate tools, when It was appearing in his greatest fulness. -And as the most wondrous and appropriate action of the Nous was that -circular primal-motion, since at that time the Mind was still together, -undivided, in Itself, thus to the listening Anaxagoras the effect -of the Periclean speech often appeared perhaps as a simile of that -circular primal-motion; for here too he perceived a whirl of thoughts -moving itself at first with awful force but in an orderly manner, which -in concentric circles gradually caught and carried away the nearest and -farthest and which, when it reached its end, had reshaped—organising -and segregating—the whole nation.</p> - -<p>To the later philosophers of antiquity the way in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> which Anaxagoras -made use of his Nous for the interpretation of the world was strange, -indeed scarcely pardonable; to them it seemed as though he had found a -grand tool but had not well understood it and they tried to retrieve -what the finder had neglected. They therefore did not recognise what -meaning the abstention of Anaxagoras, inspired by the purest spirit -of the method of natural science, had, and that this abstention first -of all in every case puts to itself the question: "What is the cause -of Something"? (<i>causa efficiens</i>)—and not "What is the purpose of -Something"? (<i>causa finalis</i>). The Nous has not been dragged in by -Anaxagoras for the purpose of answering the special question: "What -is the cause of motion and what causes regular motions?"; Plato -however reproaches him, that he ought to have, but had not shown that -everything was in its own fashion and its own place the most beautiful, -the best and the most appropriate. But this Anaxagoras would not have -dared to assert in any individual case, to him the existing world was -not even the most conceivably perfect world, for he saw everything -originate out of everything, and he found the segregation of the -substances through the Nous complete and done with, neither at the -end of the filled space of the world nor in the individual beings. -For his understanding it was sufficient that he had found a motion, -which, by simple continued action could create the visible order out -of a chaos mixed through and through; and he took good care not to put -the question as to the Why? of the motion, as to the rational purpose -of motion. For if the Nous had to fulfil by means of motion a purpose -innate in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> noumenal essence, then it was no longer in Its free will -to commence the motion at any chance time; in so far as the Nous is -eternal, It had also to be determined eternally by this purpose, and -then no point of time could have been allowed to exist in which motion -was still lacking, indeed it would have been logically forbidden to -assume a starting point for motion: whereby again the conception of -original chaos, the basis of the whole Anaxagorean interpretation of -the world would likewise have become logically impossible. In order -to escape such difficulties, which teleology creates, Anaxagoras had -always to emphasise and asseverate that the Mind has free will; all -Its actions, including that of the primal motion, were actions of the -"free will," whereas on the contrary after that primeval moment the -whole remaining world was shaping itself in a strictly determined, and -more precisely, mechanically determined form. That absolutely free -will however can be conceived only as purposeless, somewhat after the -fashion of children's play or the artist's bent for play. It is an -error to ascribe to Anaxagoras the common confusion of the teleologist, -who, marvelling at the extraordinary appropriateness, at the agreement -of the parts with the whole, especially in the realm of the organic, -assumes that that which exists for the intellect had also come into -existence through intellect, and that that which man brings about only -under the guidance of the idea of purpose, must have been brought about -by Nature through reflection and ideas of purpose. (Schopenhauer, "The -World As Will And Idea," vol. ii., Second Book, chap. 26: On Teleology). -Conceived in the manner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> of Anaxagoras, however, the order and -appropriateness of things on the contrary is nothing but the immediate -result of a blind mechanical motion; and only in order to cause this -motion, in order to get for once out of the dead-rest of the Chaos, -Anaxagoras assumed the free-willed Nous who depends only on Itself. -He appreciated in the Nous just the very quality of being a thing of -chance, a chance agent, therefore of being able to act unconditioned, -undetermined, guided neither by causes nor by purposes.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></p> -<h4><a name="Notes_for_a_Continuation" id="Notes_for_a_Continuation">Notes for a Continuation</a></h4> - - -<h5>(Early Part of 1873)</h5> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></p> -<h5>1</h5> - - -<p>That this total conception of the Anaxagorean doctrine must be -right, is proved most clearly by the way in which the successors -of Anaxagoras, the Agrigentine Empedocles and the atomic teacher -Democritus in their counter-systems actually criticised and improved -that doctrine. The method of this critique is more than anything a -continued renunciation in that spirit of natural science mentioned -above, the law of economy applied to the interpretation of nature. -That hypothesis, which explains the existing world with the smallest -expenditure of assumptions and means is to have preference: for in such -a hypothesis is to be found the least amount of arbitrariness, and in -it free play with possibilities is prohibited. Should there be two -hypotheses which both explain the world, then a strict test must be -applied as to which of the two better satisfies that demand of economy. -He who can manage this explanation with the simpler and more known -forces, especially the mechanical ones, he who deduces the existing -edifice of the world out of the smallest possible number of forces, -will always be preferred to him who allows the more complicated and -less-known forces, and these moreover in greater number, to carry on a -world-creating play. So then we see Empedocles endeavouring to remove -the <i>superfluity</i> of hypotheses from the doctrine of Anaxagoras.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span></p> - -<p>The first hypothesis which falls as unnecessary is that of the -Anaxagorean Nous, for its assumption is much too complex to explain -anything so simple as motion. After all it is only necessary to explain -the two kinds of motion: the motion of a body towards another, and the -motion away from another.</p> - - - -<h5>2</h5> - - -<p>If our present Becoming is a segregating, although not a complete one, -then Empedocles asks: what prevents complete segregation? Evidently a -force works against it, <i>i.e.,</i> a latent motion of attraction.</p> - -<p>Further: in order to explain that Chaos, a force must already have -been at work; a movement is necessary to bring about this complicated -entanglement.</p> - -<p>Therefore periodical preponderance of the one and the other force is -certain. They are opposites.</p> - -<p>The force of attraction is still at work; for otherwise there would be -no Things at all, everything would be segregated.</p> - -<p>This is the actual fact: two kinds of motion. The Nous does not explain -them. On the contrary, Love and Hatred; indeed we certainly see that -these move as well as that the Nous moves.</p> - -<p>Now the conception of the primal state undergoes a change: it is -the most <i>blessed.</i> With Anaxagoras it was the chaos before the -architectural work, the heap of stones as it were upon the building -site.</p> - - - -<h5>3</h5> - - -<p>Empedocles had conceived the thought of a tangential force originated -by revolution and working<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> against gravity ("de coelo," i., p. 284), -Schopenhauer, "W. A. W.," ii. 390.</p> - -<p>He considered the continuation of the circular movement according -to Anaxagoras <i>impossible.</i> It would result in a <i>whirl, i.e.,</i> the -contrary of ordered motion.</p> - -<p>If the particles were infinitely mixed, pell-mell, then one would be -able to break asunder the bodies without any exertion of power, they -would not cohere or hold together, they would be as dust.</p> - -<p>The forces, which press the atoms against one another, and which give -stability to the mass, Empedocles calls "Love." It is a molecular -force, a constitutive force of the bodies.</p> - - - -<h5>4</h5> - - -<p>Against Anaxagoras.</p> - -<p>1. The Chaos already presupposes motion.</p> - -<p>2. Nothing prevented the complete segregation.</p> - -<p>3. Our bodies would be dust-forms. How can motion exist, if there are -not counter-motions in all bodies?</p> - -<p>4. An ordered permanent circular motion impossible; only a whirl. He -assumes the whirl itself to be an effect of the νεῑκος.—ἀπορροιαί. How -do distant things operate on one another, sun upon earth? If everything -were still in a whirl, that would be impossible. Therefore at least two -moving powers: which must be inherent in Things.</p> - -<p>5. Why infinite ὄντα? Transgression of experience. Anaxagoras meant -the chemical atoms. Empedocles tried the assumption of four kinds of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> -chemical atoms. He took the aggregate states to be essential, and heat -to be co-ordinated. Therefore the aggregate states through repulsion -and attraction; matter in four forms.</p> - -<p>6. The periodical principle is necessary.</p> - -<p>7. With the living beings Empedocles will also deal still on the same -principle. Here also he denies purposiveness. His greatest deed. With -Anaxagoras a dualism.</p> - - - -<h5>5</h5> - - -<p>The symbolism of <i>sexual love.</i> Here as in the Platonic fable the -longing after Oneness shows itself, and here, likewise, is shown -that once a greater unity already existed; were this greater unity -established, then this would again strive after a still greater one. -The conviction of the unity of everything living guarantees that once -there was an <i>immense Living Something,</i> of which we are pieces; -that is probably the Sphairos itself. He is the most blessed deity. -Everything was connected only through love, therefore in the highest -degree appropriate. Love has been torn to pieces and splintered by -hatred, love has been divided into her elements and killed—bereft -of life. In the whirl no living individuals originate. Eventually -everything is segregated and now our period begins. (He opposes the -Anaxagorean Primal Mixture by a Primal Discord.) Love, blind as she -is, with furious haste again throws the elements one against another -endeavouring to see whether she can bring them back to life again or -not. Here and there she is successful. It continues. A presentiment -originates in the living beings, that they are to strive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> after still -higher unions than home and the primal state. Eros. It is a terrible -crime to kill life, for thereby one works back to the Primal Discord. -Some day everything will be again one <i>single life,</i> the most blissful -state.</p> - -<p>The Pythagorean-orphean doctrine re-interpreted in the manner of -natural science. Empedocles consciously masters both means of -expression, therefore he is the first rhetor. Political aims.</p> - -<p>The double-nature—the agonal and the loving, the compassionate.</p> - -<p>Attempt of the <i>Hellenic total reform</i>.</p> - -<p>All inorganic matter has originated out of organic, it is dead organic -matter. Corpse and man.</p> - - - -<h5>6</h5> - - -<p>DEMOCRITUS</p> - -<p>The greatest possible simplification of the hypotheses.</p> - -<p>1. There is motion, therefore vacuum, therefore a "Non-Existent." -Thinking is motion.</p> - -<p>2. If there is a "Non-Existent" it must be indivisible, <i>i.e.,</i> -absolutely filled. Division is only explicable in case of empty spaces -and pores. The "Non-Existent" alone is an absolutely porous thing.</p> - -<p>3. The secondary qualities of matter, νόμῳ, not of Matter-In-Itself.</p> - -<p>4. Establishment of the primary qualities of the ἄτομα. Wherein -homogeneous, wherein heterogeneous?</p> - -<p>5. The aggregate-states of Empedocles (four elements)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> presuppose only -the homogeneous atoms, they themselves cannot therefore be ὄντα.</p> - -<p>6. Motion is connected indissolubly with the atoms, effect of gravity. -Epicur. Critique: what does gravity signify in an infinite vacuum?</p> - -<p>7. Thinking is the motion of the fire-atoms. Soul, life, perceptions of -the senses.</p> - -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>Value of materialism and its embarrassment.</p> - -<p>Plato and Democritus.</p> - -<p>The hermit-like homeless noble searcher for truth. Democritus and the -Pythagoreans together find the basis of natural sciences.</p> -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p>What are the causes which have interrupted a flourishing science of -experimental physics in antiquity after Democritus?</p> - - - -<h5>7</h5> - - -<p>Anaxagoras has taken from Heraclitus the idea that in every Becoming -and in every Being the opposites are together.</p> - -<p>He felt strongly the contradiction that a body has many qualities and -he <i>pulverised</i> it in the belief that he had now dissolved it into -its true qualities.</p> - -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p><i>Plato:</i> first Heraclitean, later Sceptic: Everything, even -Thinking, is in a state of flux.</p> - -<p>Brought through Socrates to the permanence of the good, the beautiful.</p> - -<p>These assumed as entitative.</p> - -<p>All generic ideals partake of the idea of the good, the beautiful, and -they too are therefore <i>entitative</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> <i>being</i> (as the soul partakes of -the idea of Life). The idea is <i>formless</i>.</p> - -<p>Through Pythagoras' metempsychosis has been answered the question: how -we can know anything about the ideas.</p> - -<p>Plato's end: scepticism in Parmenides. Refutation of ideology.</p> - - - -<h5>8</h5> - -<p>CONCLUSION</p> - - -<p>Greek thought during the <i>tragic age is pessimistic</i> or <i>artistically -optimistic</i>.</p> - -<p>Their judgment about <i>life</i> implies more.</p> - -<p>The One, flight from the Becoming. <i>Aut</i> unity, <i>aut</i> artistic play.</p> - -<p>Deep distrust of reality: nobody assumes a good god, who has made -everything <i>optime</i>.</p> - -<p> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Pythagoreans, religious sect.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Anaximander.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Empedocles.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">Eleates.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Anaxagoras.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">{Heraclitus.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">Democritus: the world without moral</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">and æsthetic meaning, pessimism of</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">chance.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>If one placed a tragedy before all these, the three former would see -in it the mirror of the fatality of existence, Parmenides a transitory -appearance, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras an artistic edifice and image of -the world-laws, Democritus the result of machines.</p> -<p> . . . . . . .</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span></p> - -<p>With Socrates <i>Optimism</i> begins, an optimism no longer artistic, with -teleology and faith in the good god; faith in the enlightened good -man. Dissolution of the instincts, Socrates breaks with the hitherto -prevailing <i>knowledge</i> and <i>culture;</i> he intends returning to the old -citizen-virtue and to the State.</p> - -<p>Plato dissociates himself from the State, when he observes that the -State has become identical with the new Culture.</p> - -<p>The Socratic scepticism is a weapon against the hitherto prevailing -culture and knowledge.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></p> -<h4><a name="ON_TRUTH_AND_FALSITY_IN_THEIR_ULTRAMORAL_SENSE" id="ON_TRUTH_AND_FALSITY_IN_THEIR_ULTRAMORAL_SENSE">ON TRUTH AND FALSITY IN THEIR ULTRAMORAL SENSE</a></h4> - - -<h5>(1873)</h5> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></p> -<h5>1.</h5> - - -<p>In some remote corner of the universe, effused into innumerable -solar-systems, there was once a star upon which clever animals invented -cognition. It was the haughtiest, most mendacious moment in the history -of this world, but yet only a moment. After Nature had taken breath -awhile the star congealed and the clever animals had to die.—Someone -might write a fable after this style, and yet he would not have -illustrated sufficiently, how wretched,; shadow-like, transitory, -purposeless and fanciful the human intellect appears in Nature. There -were eternities during which this intellect did not exist, and when it -has once more passed away there will be nothing to show that it has -existed. For this intellect is not concerned with any further mission -transcending the sphere of human life. No, it is purely human and none -but its owner and procreator regards it so pathetically as to suppose -that the world revolves around it. If, however, we and the gnat could -understand each other we should learn that even the gnat swims through -the air with the same pathos, and feels within itself the flying centre -of the world. Nothing in Nature is so bad or so insignificant that it -will not, at the smallest puff of that force cognition, immediately -swell up like a balloon, and just as a mere porter wants to have his -admirer, so the very proudest man, the philosopher,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> imagines he sees -from all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically directed upon -his actions and thoughts.</p> - -<p>It is remarkable that this is accomplished by the intellect, which -after all has been given to the most unfortunate, the most delicate, -the most transient beings only as an expedient, in order to detain them -for a moment in existence, from which without that extra-gift they -would have every cause to flee as swiftly as Lessing's son.<a name="FNanchor_1_5" id="FNanchor_1_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_5" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> That -haughtiness connected with cognition and sensation, spreading blinding -fogs before the eyes and over the senses of men, deceives itself -therefore as to the value of existence owing to the fact that it bears -within itself the most flattering evaluation of cognition. Its most -general effect is deception; but even its most particular effects have -something of deception in their nature.</p> - -<p>The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, -develops its chief power in dissimulation; for it is by dissimulation -that the feebler, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> less robust individuals preserve themselves, -since it has been denied them to fight the battle of existence -with horns or the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. In man this art -of dissimulation reaches its acme of perfection: in him deception, -flattery, falsehood and fraud, slander, display, pretentiousness, -disguise, cloaking convention, and acting to others and to himself -in short, the continual fluttering to and fro around the <i>one</i> -flame—Vanity: all these things are so much the rule, and the law, -that few things are more incomprehensible than the way in which an -honest and pure impulse to truth could have arisen among men. They -are deeply immersed in illusions and dream-fancies; their eyes glance -only over the surface of things and see "forms"; their sensation -nowhere leads to truth, but contents itself with receiving stimuli -and, so to say, with playing hide-and-seek on the back of things. -In addition to that, at night man allows his dreams to lie to him a -whole life-time long, without his moral sense ever trying to prevent -them; whereas men are said to exist who by the exercise of a strong -will have overcome the habit of snoring. What indeed <i>does</i> man know -about himself? Oh! that he could but once see himself complete, placed -as it were in an illuminated glass-case! Does not nature keep secret -from him most things, even about his body, <i>e.g.,</i> the convolutions of -the intestines, the quick flow of the blood-currents, the intricate -vibrations of the fibres, so as to banish and lock him up in proud, -delusive knowledge? Nature threw away the key; and woe co the fateful -curiosity which might be able for a moment to look out and down through -a crevice in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> the chamber of consciousness, and discover that man, -indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the pitiless, the -greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging in -dreams on the back of a tiger. Whence, in the wide world, with this -state of affairs, arises the impulse to truth?</p> - -<p>As far as the individual tries to preserve himself against other -individuals, in the natural state of things he uses the intellect -in most cases only for dissimulation; since, however, man both from -necessity and boredom wants to exist socially and gregariously, he -must needs make peace and at least endeavour to cause the greatest -<i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i> to disappear from his world. This first -conclusion of peace brings with it a something which looks like the -first step towards the attainment of that enigmatical bent for truth. -For that which henceforth is to be "truth" is now fixed; that is to -say, a uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented -and the legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth: -since here, for the first time, originates the contrast between truth -and falsity. The liar uses the valid designations, the words, in order -to make the unreal appear as real; <i>e.g.,</i> he says, "I am rich," -whereas the right designation for his state would be "poor." He abuses -the fixed conventions by convenient substitution or even inversion -of terms. If he does this in a selfish and moreover harmful fashion, -society will no longer trust him but will even exclude him. In this way -men avoid not so much being defrauded, but being injured by fraud. At -bottom, at this juncture too, they hate not deception, but the evil, -hostile consequences of certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> species of deception. And it is in -a similarly limited sense only that man desires truth: he covets the -agreeable, life-preserving consequences of truth; he is indifferent -towards pure, ineffective knowledge; he is even inimical towards truths -which possibly might prove harmful or destroying. And, moreover, what -after all are those conventions op language? Are they possibly products -of knowledge, of the love of truth; do the designations and the things -coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?</p> - -<p>Only by means of forgetfulness can man ever arrive at imagining that he -possesses "truth" in that degree just indicated. If he does not mean -to content himself with truth in the shape of tautology, that is, with -empty husks, he will always obtain illusions instead of truth. What -is a word? The expression of a nerve-stimulus in sounds. But to infer -a cause outside us from the nerve-stimulus is already the result of a -wrong and unjustifiable application of the proposition of causality. -How should we dare, if truth with the genesis of language, if the point -of view of certainty with the designations had alone been decisive; how -indeed should we dare to say: the stone is hard; as if "hard" was known -to us otherwise; and not merely as an entirely subjective stimulus! -We divide things according to genders; we designate the tree as -masculine,<a name="FNanchor_2_6" id="FNanchor_2_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_6" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> the plant as feminine:<a name="FNanchor_3_7" id="FNanchor_3_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_7" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> what arbitrary metaphors! How -far flown beyond the canon of certainty! We<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> speak of a "serpent";<a name="FNanchor_4_8" id="FNanchor_4_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_8" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -the designation fits nothing but the sinuosity, and could therefore -also appertain to the worm. What arbitrary demarcations! what one-sided -preferences given sometimes to this, sometimes to that quality of a -thing! The different languages placed side by side show that with words -truth or adequate expression matters little: for otherwise there would -not be so many languages. The "Thing-in-itself" (it is just this which -would be the pure ineffective truth) is also quite incomprehensible -to the creator of language and not worth making any great endeavour -to obtain. He designates only the relations of things to men and for -their expression he calls to his help the most daring metaphors. A -nerve-stimulus, first transformed into a percept! First metaphor! The -percept again copied into a sound! Second metaphor! And each time he -leaps completely out of one sphere right into the midst of an entirely -different one. One can imagine a man who is quite deaf and has never -had a sensation of tone and of music; just as this man will possibly -marvel at Chladni's sound figures in the sand, will discover their -cause in the vibrations of the string, and will then proclaim that -now he knows what man calls "tone"; even so does it happen to us all -with language. When we talk about trees, colours, snow and flowers, -we believe we know something about the things themselves, and yet we -only possess metaphors of the things, and these metaphors do not in the -least correspond to the original essentials. Just as the sound shows -itself as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> sand-figure, in the same way the enigmatical <i>x</i> of the -Thing-in-itself is seen first as nerve-stimulus, then as percept, and -finally as sound. At any rate the genesis of language did not therefore -proceed on logical lines, and the whole material in which and with -which the man of truth, the investigator, the philosopher works and -builds, originates, if not from Nephelococcygia, cloud-land, at any -rate not from the essence of things.</p> - -<p>Let us especially think about the formation of ideas. Every word -becomes at once an idea not by having, as one might presume, to serve -as a reminder for the original experience happening but once and -absolutely individualised, to which experience such word owes its -origin, no, but by having simultaneously to fit innumerable, more or -less similar (which really means never equal, therefore altogether -unequal) cases. Every idea originates through equating the unequal. As -certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar to any other, so certain -is it that the idea "leaf" has been formed through an arbitrary -omission of these individual differences, through a forgetting of the -differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in -nature there is, besides the leaves, a something called <i>the</i> "leaf," -perhaps a primal form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, -accurately measured, coloured, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled -hands, so that no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a -true copy of the primal form. We call a man "honest"; we ask, why has -he acted so honestly to-day? Our customary answer runs, "On account of -his honesty." <i>The</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> Honesty! That means again: the "leaf" is the -cause of the leaves. We really and truly do not know anything at all -about an essential quality which might be called <i>the</i> honesty, but we -do know about numerous individualised, and therefore unequal actions, -which we equate by omission of the unequal, and now designate as honest -actions; finally out of them we formulate a <i>qualitas occulta</i> with the -name "Honesty." The disregarding of the individual and real furnishes -us with the idea, as it likewise also gives us the form; whereas nature -knows of no forms and ideas, and therefore knows no species but only -an <i>x,</i> to us inaccessible and indefinable. For our antithesis of -individual and species is anthropomorphic too and does not come from -the essence of things, although on the other hand we do not dare to -say that it does not correspond to it; for that would be a dogmatic -assertion and as such just as undemonstrable as its contrary.</p> - -<p>What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, -anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became -poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and -after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths -are illusions of which one has forgotten that they <i>are</i> illusions; -worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; -coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account -as coins but merely as metal.</p> - -<p>Still we do not yet know whence the impulse to truth comes, for up to -now we have heard only about the obligation which society imposes in -order to exist: to be truthful, that is, to use the usual metaphors,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> -therefore expressed morally: we have heard only about the obligation -to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie gregariously in a style -binding for all. Now man of course forgets that matters are going thus -with him; he therefore lies in that fashion pointed out unconsciously -and according to habits of centuries' standing—and by <i>this very -unconsciousness,</i> by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for -truth. Through this feeling of being obliged to designate one thing as -"red," another as "cold," a third one as "dumb," awakes a moral emotion -relating to truth. Out of the antithesis "liar" whom nobody trusts, -whom all exclude, man demonstrates to himself the venerableness, -reliability, usefulness of truth. Now as a "<i>rational</i>" being he -submits his actions to the sway of abstractions; he no longer suffers -himself to be carried away by sudden impressions, by sensations, he -first generalises all these impressions into paler, cooler ideas, in -order to attach to them the ship of his life and actions. Everything -which makes man stand out in bold relief against the animal depends on -this faculty of volatilising the concrete metaphors into a schema, and -therefore resolving a perception into an idea. For within the range of -those schemata a something becomes possible that never could succeed -under the first perceptual impressions: to build up a pyramidal order -with castes and grades, to create a new world of laws, privileges, -sub-orders, delimitations, which now stands opposite the other -perceptual world of first impressions and assumes the appearance of -being the more fixed, general, known, human of the two and therefore -the regulating and imperative one. Whereas every metaphor of perception -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> individual and without its equal and therefore knows how to escape -all attempts to classify it, the great "edifice of ideas shows the -rigid regularity of a Roman Columbarium and in logic breathes forth the -sternness and coolness which we find in mathematics. He who has been -breathed upon by this coolness will scarcely believe, that the idea -too, bony and hexa-hedral, and permutable as a die, remains however -only as the <i>residuum of a metaphor,</i> and that the illusion of the -artistic metamorphosis of a nerve-stimulus into percepts is, if not -the mother, then the grand-mother of every idea. Now in this game of -dice, "Truth" means to use every die as it is designated, to count its -points carefully, to form exact classifications, and never lo violate -the order of castes and the sequences of rank. Just as the Romans -and Etruscans for their benefit cut up the sky by means of strong -mathematical lines and banned a god as it were into a <i>templum,</i> into a -space limited in this fashion, so every nation has above its head such -a sky of ideas divided up mathematically, and it understands the demand -for truth to mean that every conceptual god is to be looked for only -in <i>his</i> own sphere. One may here well admire man, who succeeded in -piling up an infinitely complex dome of ideas on a movable foundation -and as it were on running water, as a powerful genius of architecture. -Of course in order to obtain hold on such a foundation it must be as -an edifice piled up out of cobwebs, so fragile, as to be carried away -by the waves: so firm, as not to be blown asunder by every wind. In -this way man as an architectural genius rises high above the bee; -she builds with wax, which she brings together out of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> nature; he -with the much more delicate material of ideas, which he must first -manufacture within himself. He is very much to be admired here—but -not on account of his impulse for truth, his bent for pure cognition -of things. If somebody hides a thing behind a bush, seeks it again and -finds it in the self-same place, then there is not much to boast of, -respecting this seeking and finding; thus, however, matters stand with -the seeking and finding of "truth" within the realm of reason. If I -make the definition of the mammal and then declare after inspecting a -camel, "Behold a mammal," then no doubt a truth is brought to light -thereby, but it is of very limited value, I mean it is anthropomorphic -through and through, and does not contain one single point which is -"true-in-itself," real and universally valid, apart from man. The -seeker after such truths seeks at the bottom only the metamorphosis -of the world in man, he strives for an understanding of the world as -a human-like thing and by his battling gains at best the feeling of -an assimilation. Similarly, as the astrologer contemplated the stars -in the service of man and in connection with their happiness and -unhappiness, such a seeker contemplates the whole world as related to -man, as the infinitely protracted echo of an original sound: man; as -the multiplied copy of the one arch-type: man. His procedure is to -apply man as the measure of all things, whereby he starts from the -error of believing that he has these things immediately before him -as pure objects. He therefore forgets that the original metaphors of -perception <i>are</i> metaphors, and takes them for the things themselves.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span></p> - -<p>Only by forgetting that primitive world of metaphors, only by the -congelation and coagulation of an original mass of similes and percepts -pouring forth as a fiery liquid out of the primal faculty of human -fancy, only by the invincible faith, that <i>this</i> sun, <i>this</i> window, -<i>this</i> table is a truth in itself: in short only by the fact that -man forgets himself as subject, and what is more as an <i>artistically -creating</i> subject: only by all this does he live with some repose, -safety and consequence. If he were able to get out of the prison walls -of this faith, even for an instant only, his "self-consciousness would -be destroyed at once. Already it costs him some trouble to admit to -himself that the insect and the bird perceive a world different from -his own, and that the question, which of the two world-perceptions is -more accurate, is quite a senseless one, since to decide this question -it would be necessary to apply the standard of <i>right perception,</i> -i.e., to apply a standard which <i>does not exist.</i> On the whole it -seems to me that the "right perception"—which would mean the adequate -expression of an object in the subject—is a nonentity full of -contradictions: for between two utterly different spheres, as between -subject and object, there is no causality, no accuracy, no expression, -but at the utmost an <i>æsthetical</i> relation, I mean a suggestive -metamorphosis, a stammering translation into quite a distinct foreign -language, for which purpose however there is needed at any rate an -intermediate sphere, an intermediate force, freely composing and -freely inventing. The word "phenomenon" contains many seductions, and -on that account I avoid it as much as possible, for it is not true -that the essence of things appears in the empiric<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> world. A painter -who had no hands and wanted to express the picture distinctly present -to his mind by the agency of song, would still reveal much more with -this permutation of spheres, than the empiric world reveals about -the essence of things. The very relation of a nerve-stimulus to the -produced percept is in itself no necessary one; but if the same percept -has been reproduced millions of times and has been the inheritance of -many successive generations of man, and in the end appears each time to -all mankind as the result of the same cause, then it attains finally -for man the same importance as if it were <i>the</i> unique, necessary -percept and as if that relation between the original nerve-stimulus -and the percept produced were a close relation of causality: just as -a dream eternally repeated, would be perceived and judged as though -real. But the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor does not at all -guarantee the necessity and exclusive justification of that metaphor.</p> - -<p>Surely every human being who is at home with such contemplations has -felt a deep distrust against any idealism of that kind, as often -as he has distinctly convinced himself of the eternal rigidity, -omni-presence, and infallibility of nature's laws: he has arrived at -the conclusion that as far as we can penetrate the heights of the -telescopic and the depths of the microscopic world, everything is quite -secure, complete, infinite, determined, and continuous. Science will -have to dig in these shafts eternally and successfully and all things -found are sure to have to harmonise and not to contradict one another. -How little does this resemble a product of fancy, for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> if it were one -it would necessarily betray somewhere its nature of appearance and -unreality. Against this it may be objected in the first place that if -each of us had for himself a different sensibility, if we ourselves -were only able to perceive sometimes as a bird, sometimes as a worm, -sometimes as a plant, or if one of us saw the same stimulus as red, -another as blue, if a third person even perceived it as a tone, then -nobody would talk of such an orderliness of nature, but would conceive -of her only as an extremely subjective structure. Secondly, what is, -for us in general, a law of nature? It is not known in itself but -only in its effects, that is to say in its relations to other laws -of nature, which again are known to us only as sums of relations. -Therefore all these relations refer only one to another and are -absolutely incomprehensible to us in their essence; only that which we -add: time, space, <i>i.e.,</i> relations of sequence and numbers, are really -known to us in them. Everything wonderful, however, that we marvel -at in the laws of nature, everything that demands an explanation and -might seduce us into distrusting idealism, lies really and solely in -the mathematical rigour and inviolability of the conceptions of time -and space. These however we produce within ourselves and throw them -forth with that necessity with which the spider spins; since we are -compelled to conceive all things under these forms only, then it is no -longer wonderful that in all things we actually conceive none but these -forms: for they all must bear within themselves the laws of number, -and this very idea of number is the most marvellous in all things. All -obedience to law which impresses us so forcibly in the orbits of stars<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> -and in chemical processes coincides at the bottom with those qualities -which we ourselves attach to those things, so that it is we who -thereby make the impression upon ourselves. Whence it clearly follows -that that artistic formation of metaphors, with which every sensation -in us begins, already presupposes those forms, and is therefore only -consummated within them; only out of the persistency of these primal -forms the possibility explains itself, how afterwards—out of the -metaphors themselves a structure of ideas, could again be compiled. For -the latter is an imitation of the relations of time, space and number -in the realm of metaphors.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_5" id="Footnote_1_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_5"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The German poet, Lessing, had been married for just a -little over one year to Eva König. A son was born and died the same -day, and the mother's life was despaired of. In a letter to his friend -Eschenburg the poet wrote: "... and I lost him so unwillingly, this -son! For he had so much understanding! so much understanding! Do not -suppose that the few hours of fatherhood have made me an ape of a -father! I know what I say. Was it not understanding, that they had -to drag him into the world with a pair of forceps? that he so soon -suspected the evil of this world? Was it not understanding, that he -seized the first opportunity to get away from it?..." -</p> -<p> -Eva König died a week later.—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_6" id="Footnote_2_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_6"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> In German <i>the tree—der Baum—is</i> masculine.—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_7" id="Footnote_3_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_7"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In German <i>the plant—die Pflanze—</i>-is feminine—TR.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_8" id="Footnote_4_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_8"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> the German <i>die Schlange</i> and <i>schlingen,</i> the -English <i>serpent</i> from the Latin <i>serpere.</i>—TR.</p></div> - - - -<h5>2</h5> - - -<p>As we saw, it is <i>language</i> which has worked originally at the -construction of ideas; in later times it is <i>science.</i> Just as the -bee works at the same time at the cells and fills them with honey, -thus science works irresistibly at that great columbarium of ideas, -the cemetery of perceptions, builds ever newer and higher storeys; -supports, purifies, renews the old cells, and endeavours above all to -fill that gigantic framework and to arrange within it the whole of the -empiric world, <i>i.e.,</i> the anthropomorphic world. And as the man of -action binds his life to reason and its ideas, in order to avoid being -swept away and losing himself, so the seeker after truth builds his hut -close to the towering edifice of science in order to collaborate with -it and to find protection. And he needs protection. For there are awful -powers which continually press upon him, and which hold out against the -"truth" of science "truths" fashioned in quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> another way, bearing -devices of the most heterogeneous character.</p> - -<p>That impulse towards the formation of metaphors, mat fundamental -impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one moment—for thereby -we should reason away man himself—is in truth not defeated nor even -subdued by the fact that out of its evaporated products, the ideas, a -regular and rigid new world has been built as a stronghold for it. This -impulse seeks for itself a new realm of action and another river-bed, -and finds it in <i>Mythos</i> and more generally in <i>Art.</i> This impulse -constantly confuses the rubrics and cells of the ideas, by putting -up new figures of speech, metaphors, metonymies; it constantly shows -its passionate longing for shaping the existing world of waking man -as motley, irregular, inconsequentially incoherent, attractive, and -eternally new as the world of dreams is. For indeed, waking man <i>per -se</i> is only clear about his being awake through the rigid and orderly -woof of ideas, and it is for this very reason that he sometimes comes -to believe that he was dreaming when that woof of ideas has for a -moment been torn by Art. Pascal is quite right, when he asserts, that -if the same dream came to us every night we should be just as much -occupied by it as by the things which we see every day; to quote his -words, "If an artisan were certain that he would dream every night -for fully twelve hours that he was a king, I believe that he would -be just as happy as a king who dreams every night for twelve hours -that he is an artisan." The wide-awake day of a people mystically -excitable, let us say of the earlier Greeks, is in fact through the -continually-working<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> wonder, which the mythos presupposes, more akin to -the dream than to the day of the thinker sobered by science. If every -tree may at some time talk as a nymph, or a god under the disguise of -a bull, carry away virgins, if the goddess Athene herself be suddenly -seen as, with a beautiful team, she drives, accompanied by Pisistratus, -through the markets of Athens—and every honest Athenian did believe -this—at any moment, as in a dream, everything is possible; and all -nature swarms around man as if she were nothing but the masquerade -of the gods, who found it a huge joke to deceive man by assuming all -possible forms.</p> - -<p>Man himself, however, has an invincible tendency to let himself -be deceived, and he is like one enchanted with happiness when the -rhapsodist narrates to him epic romances in such a way that they appear -real or when the actor on the stage makes the king appear more kingly -than reality shows him. Intellect, that master of dissimulation, is -free and dismissed from his service as slave, so long as It is able -to deceive without <i>injuring,</i> and then It celebrates Its Saturnalia. -Never is It richer, prouder, more luxuriant, more skilful and daring; -with a creator's delight It throws metaphors into confusion, shifts the -boundary-stones of the abstractions, so that for instance It designates -the stream as the mobile way which carries man to that place whither -he would otherwise go. Now It has thrown off Its shoulders the emblem -of servitude. Usually with gloomy officiousness It endeavours to point -out the way to a poor individual coveting existence, and It fares forth -for plunder and booty like a servant for his master, but now It Itself -has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> become a master and may wipe from Its countenance the expression -of indigence. Whatever It now does, compared with Its former doings, -bears within itself dissimulation, just as Its former doings bore the -character of distortion. It copies human life, but takes it for a -good thing and seems to rest quite satisfied with it. That enormous -framework and hoarding of ideas, by clinging to which needy man saves -himself through life, is to the freed intellect only a scaffolding and -a toy for Its most daring feats, and when It smashes it to pieces, -throws it into confusion, and then puts it together ironically, pairing -the strangest, separating the nearest items, then It manifests that It -has no use for those makeshifts of misery, and that It is now no longer -led by ideas but by intuitions. From these intuitions no regular road -leads into the land of the spectral schemata, the abstractions; for -them the word is not made, when man sees them he is dumb, or speaks in -forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of ideas, in order -to correspond creatively with the impression of the powerful present -intuition at least by destroying and jeering at the old barriers of -ideas.</p> - -<p>There are ages, when the rational and the intuitive man stand side by -side, the one full of fear of the intuition, the other full of scorn -for the abstraction; the latter just as irrational as the former is -inartistic. Both desire to rule over life; the one by knowing how to -meet the most important needs with foresight, prudence, regularity; -the other as an "over-joyous" hero by ignoring those needs and taking -that life only as real which simulates appearance and beauty. Wherever -intuitive man, as for instance in the earlier<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> history of Greece, -brandishes his weapons more powerfully and victoriously than his -opponent, there under favourable conditions, a culture can develop and -art can establish her rule over life. That dissembling, that denying of -neediness, that splendour of metaphorical notions and especially that -directness of dissimulation accompany all utterances of such a life. -Neither the house of man, nor his way of walking, nor his clothing, nor -his earthen jug suggest that necessity invented them; it seems as if -they all were intended as the expressions of a sublime happiness, an -Olympic cloudlessness, and as it were a playing at seriousness. Whereas -the man guided by ideas and abstractions only wards off misfortune by -means of them, without even enforcing for himself happiness out of the -abstractions; whereas he strives after the greatest possible freedom -from pains, the intuitive man dwelling in the midst of culture has from -his intuitions a harvest: besides the warding off of evil, he attains a -continuous in-pouring of enlightenment, enlivenment and redemption. Of -course when he <i>does</i> suffer, he suffers more: and he even suffers more -frequently since he cannot learn from experience, but again and again -falls into the same ditch into which he has fallen before. In suffering -he is just as irrational as in happiness; he cries aloud and finds no -consolation. How different matters are in the same misfortune with -the Stoic, taught by experience and ruling himself by ideas! He who -otherwise only looks for uprightness, truth, freedom from deceptions -and shelter from ensnaring and sudden attack, in his misfortune -performs the masterpiece of dissimulation, just as the other did<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> in -his happiness; he shows no twitching mobile human face but as it were a -mask with dignified, harmonious features; he does not cry out and does -not even alter his voice; when a heavy thundercloud bursts upon him, -he wraps himself up in his cloak and with slow and measured step walks -away from beneath it.</p> - - -<h4>THE END.</h4> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY, OTHER ESSAYS *** - -***** This file should be named 51548-h.htm or 51548-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/4/51548/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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