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- margin-bottom: .1em; - visibility: hidden; - color: white; - width: .01em; - display: none; - } - - ul {margin-left: 1em; padding-left: 0;} - li {list-style-type: none; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1.5em;} - - blockquote {margin: 1.5em 3% 1.5em 3%;} - - .poem-container {text-align: left; margin-left: 5%;} - .poem {display: block;} - .poem .stanza {page-break-inside: avoid;} - - .index {margin-left: 0;} - - .transnote { - page-break-inside: avoid; - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - padding: .5em; - } - .covernote {visibility: visible; display: block; text-align: center;} -} - </style> - </head> - -<body> - - -<pre> - -Project Gutenberg's The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, by John Dewey - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy - And other essays in contemporary thought - -Author: John Dewey - -Release Date: March 22, 2016 [EBook #51525] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Charlie Howard, and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote covernote"> -<p class="center">Transcriber’s Note<br /> -Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p> -</div> - - -<h1 class="vspace">THE INFLUENCE OF<br /> -DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY</h1> - -<p class="p2 center larger">And Other Essays in Contemporary -Thought</p> - -<p class="p2 center">BY<br /> -<br /> -<span class="large">JOHN DEWEY</span><br /> -<i class="smaller">Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University</i></p> - -<div class="p2 figcenter" style="width: 102px;"> -<img src="images/000.jpg" width="102" height="130" alt="Publisher’s logo" /> -</div> - -<p class="p2 center vspace">NEW YORK<br /> -<span class="larger">HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY</span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 center vspace small"> -<span class="smcap">Copyright</span>, 1910,<br /> -BY<br /> -HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY<br /> -<br /> -<i>Published April, 1910</i> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii">iii</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2> -</div> - - -<p>An elaborate preface to a philosophic work -usually impresses one as a last desperate effort on -the part of its author to convey what he feels -he has not quite managed to say in the body of -his book. Nevertheless, a collection of essays on -various topics written during a series of years -may perhaps find room for an independent word -to indicate the kind of unity they seem, to their -writer, to possess. Probably every one acquainted -with present philosophic thought—found, with -some notable exceptions, in periodicals rather -than in books—would term it a philosophy of -transition and reconstruction. Its various representatives -agree in what they oppose—the orthodox -British empiricism of two generations ago and -the orthodox Neo-Kantian idealism of the last -generation—rather than in what they proffer.</p> - -<p>The essays of this volume belong, I suppose, to -what has come to be known (since the earlier of -them were written) as the pragmatic phase of the -newer movement. Now a recent German critic has -described pragmatism as, “Epistemologically, -nominalism; psychologically, voluntarism; cosmologically, -energism; metaphysically, agnosticism; -ethically, meliorism on the basis of the Bentham-<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iv">iv</a></span>Mill -utilitarianism.”<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> It may be that pragmatism -will turn out to be all of this formidable array; -but even should it, the one who thus defines it has -hardly come within earshot of it. For whatever -else pragmatism is or is not, the pragmatic spirit -is primarily a revolt against that habit of mind -which disposes of anything whatever—even so -humble an affair as a new method in Philosophy—by -tucking it away, after this fashion, in the -pigeon holes of a filing cabinet. There are other -vital phases of contemporary transition and revision; -there are, for example, a new realism and -naturalistic idealism. When I recall that I find -myself more interested (even though their representatives -might decline to reciprocate) in such -phases than in the systems marked by the labels -of our German critic, I am confirmed in a belief -that after all it is better to view pragmatism quite -vaguely as part and parcel of a general movement -of intellectual reconstruction. For otherwise -we seem to have no recourse save to define -pragmatism—as does our German author—in -terms of the very past systems against which it is -a reaction; or, in escaping that alternative, to regard -it as a fixed rival system making like claim to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">v</a></span> -completeness and finality. And if, as I believe, one -of the marked traits of the pragmatic movement is -just the surrender of every such claim, how have -we furthered our understanding of pragmatism?</p> - -<p>Classic philosophies have to be revised because -they must be squared up with the many social -and intellectual tendencies that have revealed -themselves since those philosophies matured. The -conquest of the sciences by the experimental -method of inquiry; the injection of evolutionary -ideas into the study of life and society; the application -of the historic method to religions and -morals as well as to institutions; the creation of -the sciences of “origins” and of the cultural -development of mankind—how can such intellectual -changes occur and leave philosophy what it -was and where it was? Nor can philosophy remain -an indifferent spectator of the rise of what -may be termed the new individualism in art and -letters, with its naturalistic method applied in a -religious, almost mystic spirit to what is primitive, -obscure, varied, inchoate, and growing in -nature and human character. The age of Darwin, -Helmholtz, Pasteur, Ibsen, Maeterlinck, Rodin, and -Henry James must feel some uneasiness until it -has liquidated its philosophic inheritance in current -intellectual coin. And to accuse those who -are concerned in this transaction of ignorant contempt -for the classic past of philosophy is to overlook<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi">vi</a></span> -the inspiration the movement of translation -draws from the fact that the history of philosophy -has become only too well understood.</p> - -<p>Any revision of customary notions with its -elimination—instead of “solution”—of many -traditionary problems cannot hope, however, for -any unity save that of tendency and operation. -Elaborate and imposing system, the regimenting -and uniforming of thoughts, are, at present, evidence -that we are assisting at a stage performance -in which borrowed—or hired—figures are maneuvering. -Tentatively and piecemeal must the reconstruction -of our stock notions proceed. As a -contribution to such a revision, the present collection -of essays is submitted. With one or two -exceptions, their order is that of a reversed -chronology, the later essays coming first. The -facts regarding the conditions of their first appearance -are given in connection with each essay. -I wish to thank the Editors of the <cite>Philosophical -Review</cite>, of <cite>Mind</cite>, of the <cite>Hibbert Journal</cite>, of the -<cite>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific -Methods</cite>, and of the <cite>Popular Science Monthly</cite>, -and the Directors of the Press of Chicago and -Columbia Universities, respectively, for permission -to reprint such of the essays as appeared originally -under their several auspices.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="smcap">John Dewey</span> -</p> - -<p class="in0 in2"> -<span class="smcap"><span class="in2">Columbia University,</span><br /> -New York City</span>, March 1, 1910. -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">vii</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - - - -<table summary="Contents"> - <tr class="small"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Nature and Its Good: A Conversation</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_20">20</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Intelligence and Morals</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Experimental Theory of Knowledge</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_77">77</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Short Catechism Concerning Truth</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_154">154</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Beliefs and Existences</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_169">169</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Experience and Objective Idealism</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_226">226</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">“Consciousness” and Experience</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_242">242</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_271">271</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="THE INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON PHILOSOPHY"><a id="THE_INFLUENCE_OF_DARWINISM_ON_PHILOSOPHY"></a>THE INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON PHILOSOPHY<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor smaller">2</a></h2> -</div> - - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">That</span> the publication of the “Origin of -Species” marked an epoch in the development -of the natural sciences is well known to the -layman. That the combination of the very words -origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt -and introduced a new intellectual temper is easily -overlooked by the expert. The conceptions that -had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge -for two thousand years, the conceptions that -had become the familiar furniture of the mind, -rested on the assumption of the superiority of the -fixed and final; they rested upon treating change -and origin as signs of defect and unreality. In -laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute -permanency, in treating the forms that had been -regarded as types of fixity and perfection as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">2</a></span> -originating and passing away, the “Origin of -Species” introduced a mode of thinking that in -the end was bound to transform the logic of -knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, -politics, and religion.</p> - -<p>No wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin’s -book, a half century ago, precipitated a crisis. -The true nature of the controversy is easily concealed -from us, however, by the theological clamor -that attended it. The vivid and popular features -of the anti-Darwinian row tended to leave the impression -that the issue was between science on one -side and theology on the other. Such was not the -case—the issue lay primarily within science itself, -as Darwin himself early recognized. The theological -outcry he discounted from the start, hardly -noticing it save as it bore upon the “feelings of -his female relatives.” But for two decades before -final publication he contemplated the possibility -of being put down by his scientific peers as a fool -or as crazy; and he set, as the measure of his -success, the degree in which he should affect three -men of science: Lyell in geology, Hooker in botany, -and Huxley in zoology.</p> - -<p>Religious considerations lent fervor to the controversy, -but they did not provoke it. Intellectually, -religious emotions are not creative but conservative. -They attach themselves readily to the -current view of the world and consecrate it. They<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3">3</a></span> -steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething -vat of emotions; they do not form their warp -and woof. There is not, I think, an instance of -any large idea about the world being independently -generated by religion. Although the ideas that -rose up like armed men against Darwinism owed -their intensity to religious associations, their origin -and meaning are to be sought in science and philosophy, -not in religion.</p> - - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual -history as much as does the word species. -The Greeks, in initiating the intellectual life of -Europe, were impressed by characteristic traits -of the life of plants and animals; so impressed -indeed that they made these traits the key to -defining nature and to explaining mind and society. -And truly, life is so wonderful that a seemingly -successful reading of its mystery might well lead -men to believe that the key to the secrets of -heaven and earth was in their hands. The Greek -rendering of this mystery, the Greek formulation -of the aim and standard of knowledge, was in the -course of time embodied in the word species, and it -controlled philosophy for two thousand years. To -understand the intellectual face-about expressed -in the phrase “Origin of Species,” we must, then,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4">4</a></span> -understand the long dominant idea against which it -is a protest.</p> - -<p>Consider how men were impressed by the facts -of life. Their eyes fell upon certain things slight -in bulk, and frail in structure. To every appearance, -these perceived things were inert and passive. -Suddenly, under certain circumstances, these -things—henceforth known as seeds or eggs or -germs—begin to change, to change rapidly in size, -form, and qualities. Rapid and extensive changes -occur, however, in many things—as when wood is -touched by fire. But the changes in the living -thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend -constantly in one direction; they do not, like other -changes, destroy or consume, or pass fruitless into -wandering flux; they realize and fulfil. Each successive -stage, no matter how unlike its predecessor, -preserves its net effect and also prepares the way -for a fuller activity on the part of its successor. In -living beings, changes do not happen as they seem -to happen elsewhere, any which way; the earlier -changes are regulated in view of later results. -This progressive organization does not cease till -there is achieved a true final term, a τελὸς, a completed, -perfected end. This final form exercises -in turn a plenitude of functions, not the least noteworthy -of which is production of germs like those -from which it took its own origin, germs capable -of the same cycle of self-fulfilling activity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span> -But the whole miraculous tale is not yet told. -The same drama is enacted to the same destiny -in countless myriads of individuals so sundered in -time, so severed in space, that they have no opportunity -for mutual consultation and no means of -interaction. As an old writer quaintly said, -“things of the same kind go through the same -formalities”—celebrate, as it were, the same -ceremonial rites.</p> - -<p>This formal activity which operates throughout -a series of changes and holds them to a single -course; which subordinates their aimless flux to its -own perfect manifestation; which, leaping the -boundaries of space and time, keeps individuals -distant in space and remote in time to a uniform -type of structure and function: this principle -seemed to give insight into the very nature of -reality itself. To it Aristotle gave the name, εῖδος. -This term the scholastics translated as <em>species</em>.</p> - -<p>The force of this term was deepened by its -application to everything in the universe that observes -order in flux and manifests constancy -through change. From the casual drift of daily -weather, through the uneven recurrence of seasons -and unequal return of seed time and harvest, up -to the majestic sweep of the heavens—the image -of eternity in time—and from this to the unchanging -pure and contemplative intelligence beyond nature -lies one unbroken fulfilment of ends. Nature<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span> -as a whole is a progressive realization of purpose -strictly comparable to the realization of purpose -in any single plant or animal.</p> - -<p>The conception of εῖδος, species, a fixed form -and final cause, was the central principle of knowledge -as well as of nature. Upon it rested the -logic of science. Change as change is mere flux -and lapse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely to -know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes -itself through changes, holding them thereby within -the metes and bounds of fixed truth. Completely -to know is to relate all special forms to their one -single end and good: pure contemplative intelligence. -Since, however, the scene of nature which -directly confronts us is in change, nature as -directly and practically experienced does not satisfy -the conditions of knowledge. Human experience -is in flux, and hence the instrumentalities -of sense-perception and of inference based upon -observation are condemned in advance. Science -is compelled to aim at realities lying behind and -beyond the processes of nature, and to carry on -its search for these realities by means of rational -forms transcending ordinary modes of perception -and inference.</p> - -<p>There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. -We must either find the appropriate objects and -organs of knowledge in the mutual interactions -of changing things; or else, to escape the infection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span> -of change, we <em>must</em> seek them in some transcendent -and supernal region. The human mind, -deliberately as it were, exhausted the logic of the -changeless, the final, and the transcendent, before -it essayed adventure on the pathless wastes of -generation and transformation. We dispose all -too easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to interpret -nature and mind in terms of real essences, -hidden forms, and occult faculties, forgetful of -the seriousness and dignity of the ideas that lay -behind. We dispose of them by laughing at the -famous gentleman who accounted for the fact that -opium put people to sleep on the ground it had a -dormitive faculty. But the doctrine, held in our -own day, that knowledge of the plant that yields -the poppy consists in referring the peculiarities -of an individual to a type, to a universal form, -a doctrine so firmly established that any other -method of knowing was conceived to be unphilosophical -and unscientific, is a survival of precisely -the same logic. This identity of conception in -the scholastic and anti-Darwinian theory may well -suggest greater sympathy for what has become -unfamiliar as well as greater humility regarding -the further unfamiliarities that history has in -store.</p> - -<p>Darwin was not, of course, the first to question -the classic philosophy of nature and of knowledge. -The beginnings of the revolution are in the physical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">8</a></span> -science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. -When Galileo said: “It is my opinion that -the earth is very noble and admirable by reason -of so many and so different alterations and generations -which are incessantly made therein,” he -expressed the changed temper that was coming over -the world; the transfer of interest from the permanent -to the changing. When Descartes said: -“The nature of physical things is much more -easily conceived when they are beheld coming gradually -into existence, than when they are only considered -as produced at once in a finished and perfect -state,” the modern world became self-conscious -of the logic that was henceforth to control it, the -logic of which Darwin’s “Origin of Species” is -the latest scientific achievement. Without the -methods of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and their -successors in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, -Darwin would have been helpless in the organic -sciences. But prior to Darwin the impact of the -new scientific method upon life, mind, and politics, -had been arrested, because between these ideal or -moral interests and the inorganic world intervened -the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of -the garden of life were barred to the new ideas; -and only through this garden was there access -to mind and politics. The influence of Darwin -upon philosophy resides in his having conquered -the phenomena of life for the principle of transition,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span> -and thereby freed the new logic for application -to mind and morals and life. When he said -of species what Galileo had said of the earth, -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">e pur si muove</i>, he emancipated, once for all, -genetic and experimental ideas as an organon of -asking questions and looking for explanations.</p> - - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>The exact bearings upon philosophy of the -new logical outlook are, of course, as yet, uncertain -and inchoate. We live in the twilight -of intellectual transition. One must add the rashness -of the prophet to the stubbornness of the -partizan to venture a systematic exposition of -the influence upon philosophy of the Darwinian -method. At best, we can but inquire as to its -general bearing—the effect upon mental temper -and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious, -half-instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences -which determine, after all, our more deliberate -intellectual enterprises. In this vague inquiry -there happens to exist as a kind of touchstone -a problem of long historic currency that -has also been much discussed in Darwinian literature. -I refer to the old problem of design <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">versus</i> -chance, mind <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">versus</i> matter, as the causal explanation, -first or final, of things.</p> - -<p>As we have already seen, the classic notion of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span> -species carried with it the idea of purpose. In -all living forms, a specific type is present directing -the earlier stages of growth to the realization of -its own perfection. Since this purposive regulative -principle is not visible to the senses, it follows -that it must be an ideal or rational force. Since, -however, the perfect form is gradually approximated -through the sensible changes, it also follows -that in and through a sensible realm a rational -ideal force is working out its own ultimate manifestation. -These inferences were extended to -nature: (<em>a</em>) She does nothing in vain; but all for -an ulterior purpose. (<em>b</em>) Within natural sensible -events there is therefore contained a spiritual -causal force, which as spiritual escapes perception, -but is apprehended by an enlightened reason. -(<em>c</em>) The manifestation of this principle brings -about a subordination of matter and sense to its -own realization, and this ultimate fulfilment is the -goal of nature and of man. The design argument -thus operated in two directions. Purposefulness -accounted for the intelligibility of nature -and the possibility of science, while the absolute -or cosmic character of this purposefulness gave -sanction and worth to the moral and religious endeavors -of man. Science was underpinned and -morals authorized by one and the same principle, -and their mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span> -This philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical -and polemic outbursts, the official and the regnant -philosophy of Europe for over two thousand years. -The expulsion of fixed first and final causes from -astronomy, physics, and chemistry had indeed given -the doctrine something of a shock. But, on the -other hand, increased acquaintance with the details -of plant and animal life operated as a counterbalance -and perhaps even strengthened the -argument from design. The marvelous adaptations -of organisms to their environment, of organs -to the organism, of unlike parts of a complex -organ—like the eye—to the organ itself; the foreshadowing -by lower forms of the higher; the -preparation in earlier stages of growth for organs -that only later had their functioning—these -things were increasingly recognized with the progress -of botany, zoology, paleontology, and embryology. -Together, they added such prestige to the -design argument that by the late eighteenth century -it was, as approved by the sciences of organic -life, the central point of theistic and idealistic -philosophy.</p> - -<p>The Darwinian principle of natural selection -cut straight under this philosophy. If all organic -adaptations are due simply to constant variation -and the elimination of those variations which are -harmful in the struggle for existence that is -brought about by excessive reproduction, there<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -is no call for a prior intelligent causal force to -plan and preordain them. Hostile critics charged -Darwin with materialism and with making chance -the cause of the universe.</p> - -<p>Some naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the -Darwinian principle and attempted to reconcile -it with design. Gray held to what may be called -design on the installment plan. If we conceive -the “stream of variations” to be itself intended, -we may suppose that each successive variation was -designed from the first to be selected. In that -case, variation, struggle, and selection simply define -the mechanism of “secondary causes” through -which the “first cause” acts; and the doctrine -of design is none the worse off because we know -more of its <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">modus operandi</i>.</p> - -<p>Darwin could not accept this mediating proposal. -He admits or rather he asserts that it -is “impossible to conceive this immense and wonderful -universe including man with his capacity -of looking far backwards and far into futurity -as the result of blind chance or necessity.”<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> But -nevertheless he holds that since variations are in -useless as well as useful directions, and since the -latter are sifted out simply by the stress of the -conditions of struggle for existence, the design -argument as applied to living beings is unjustifiable; -and its lack of support there deprives it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span> -of scientific value as applied to nature in general. -If the variations of the pigeon, which under artificial -selection give the pouter pigeon, are not preordained -for the sake of the breeder, by what logic -do we argue that variations resulting in natural -species are pre-designed?<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>So much for some of the more obvious facts -of the discussion of design <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">versus</i> chance, as causal -principles of nature and of life as a whole. We -brought up this discussion, you recall, as a crucial -instance. What does our touchstone indicate as -to the bearing of Darwinian ideas upon philosophy? -In the first place, the new logic outlaws, -flanks, dismisses—what you will—one type of -problems and substitutes for it another type. -Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins -and absolute finalities in order to explore specific -values and the specific conditions that generate -them.</p> - -<p>Darwin concluded that the impossibility of -assigning the world to chance as a whole and to -design in its parts indicated the insolubility of -the question. Two radically different reasons,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span> -however, may be given as to why a problem is -insoluble. One reason is that the problem is too -high for intelligence; the other is that the question -in its very asking makes assumptions that render -the question meaningless. The latter alternative -is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case -of design <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">versus</i> chance. Once admit that the sole -verifiable or fruitful object of knowledge is the -particular set of changes that generate the object -of study together with the consequences that then -flow from it, and no intelligible question can be -asked about what, by assumption, lies outside. -To assert—as is often asserted—that specific -values of particular truth, social bonds and forms -of beauty, if they can be shown to be generated -by concretely knowable conditions, are meaningless -and in vain; to assert that they are justified only -when they and their particular causes and effects -have all at once been gathered up into some inclusive -first cause and some exhaustive final goal, -is intellectual atavism. Such argumentation is reversion -to the logic that explained the extinction -of fire by water through the formal essence of -aqueousness and the quenching of thirst by water -through the final cause of aqueousness. Whether -used in the case of the special event or that of -life as a whole, such logic only abstracts some -aspect of the existing course of events in order -to reduplicate it as a petrified eternal principle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span> -by which to explain the very changes of which it -is the formalization.</p> - -<p>When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a -letter that as he grew older his interest in what -or who made the world was altered into interest -in what kind of a world it is anyway, his voicing -of a common experience of our own day illustrates -also the nature of that intellectual transformation -effected by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts -from the wholesale essence back of special changes -to the question of how special changes serve and -defeat concrete purposes; shifts from an intelligence -that shaped things once for all to the -particular intelligences which things are even now -shaping; shifts from an ultimate goal of good to -the direct increments of justice and happiness -that intelligent administration of existent conditions -may beget and that present carelessness or -stupidity will destroy or forego.</p> - -<p>In the second place, the classic type of logic -inevitably set philosophy upon proving that life -<em>must</em> have certain qualities and values—no matter -how experience presents the matter—because of -some remote cause and eventual goal. The duty -of wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all -thinking that makes the meaning of special occurrences -depend upon something that once and for -all lies behind them. The habit of derogating -from present meanings and uses prevents our looking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span> -the facts of experience in the face; it prevents -serious acknowledgment of the evils they present -and serious concern with the goods they promise -but do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to the -business of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy -for the one and guarantee for the other. One -is reminded of the way many moralists and theologians -greeted Herbert Spencer’s recognition of -an unknowable energy from which welled up the -phenomenal physical processes without and the -conscious operations within. Merely because -Spencer labeled his unknowable energy “God,” -this faded piece of metaphysical goods was greeted -as an important and grateful concession to the -reality of the spiritual realm. Were it not for -the deep hold of the habit of seeking justification -for ideal values in the remote and transcendent, -surely this reference of them to an unknowable -absolute would be despised in comparison with the -demonstrations of experience that knowable energies -are daily generating about us precious values.</p> - -<p>The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy -will doubtless not arrive by sheer logical disproof, -but rather by growing recognition of its -futility. Were it a thousand times true that -opium produces sleep because of its dormitive energy, -yet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the -recovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not -be thereby one least step forwarded. And were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span> -it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that -life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle -to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth -and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope -and fear in the concrete, would remain just what -and where they now are. To improve our education, -to ameliorate our manners, to advance our -politics, we must have recourse to specific conditions -of generation.</p> - -<p>Finally, the new logic introduces responsibility -into the intellectual life. To idealize and rationalize -the universe at large is after all a confession -of inability to master the courses of things that -specifically concern us. As long as mankind suffered -from this impotency, it naturally shifted a -burden of responsibility that it could not carry -over to the more competent shoulders of the transcendent -cause. But if insight into specific conditions -of value and into specific consequences of -ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become -a method of locating and interpreting the more -serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a -method of projecting ways for dealing with them: -a method of moral and political diagnosis and -prognosis.</p> - -<p>The claim to formulate <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> the legislative -constitution of the universe is by its nature -a claim that may lead to elaborate dialectic developments. -But it is also one that removes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span> -these very conclusions from subjection to experimental -test, for, by definition, these results make no -differences in the detailed course of events. But -a philosophy that humbles its pretensions to the -work of projecting hypotheses for the education -and conduct of mind, individual and social, is -thereby subjected to test by the way in which the -ideas it propounds work out in practice. In having -modesty forced upon it, philosophy also acquires -responsibility.</p> - -<p>Doubtless I seem to have violated the implied -promise of my earlier remarks and to have turned -both prophet and partizan. But in anticipating -the direction of the transformations in philosophy -to be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and experimental -logic, I do not profess to speak for -any save those who yield themselves consciously -or unconsciously to this logic. No one can fairly -deny that at present there are two effects of the -Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one hand, -there are making many sincere and vital efforts -to revise our traditional philosophic conceptions -in accordance with its demands. On the other -hand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of -absolutistic philosophies; an assertion of a type -of philosophic knowing distinct from that of the -sciences, one which opens to us another kind of -reality from that to which the sciences give access; -an appeal through experience to something<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span> -that essentially goes beyond experience. This reaction -affects popular creeds and religious movements -as well as technical philosophies. The very -conquest of the biological sciences by the new ideas -has led many to proclaim an explicit and rigid -separation of philosophy from science.</p> - -<p>Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more -than abstract logical forms and categories. They -are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes -of aversion and preference. Moreover, the -conviction persists—though history shows it to be -a hallucination—that all the questions that the -human mind has asked are questions that can be -answered in terms of the alternatives that the questions -themselves present. But in fact intellectual -progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment -of questions together with both of the alternatives -they assume—an abandonment that results from -their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent -interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. -Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, -while new questions corresponding to the -changed attitude of endeavor and preference take -their place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in -contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest -precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new -problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution -that found its climax in the “Origin of -Species.”</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="NATURE AND ITS GOOD: A CONVERSATION"><a id="NATURE_AND_ITS_GOOD_A_CONVERSATION"></a>NATURE AND ITS GOOD: A CONVERSATION<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor smaller">5</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="smcap1">A</span> group of people are scattered near one -another, on the sands of an ocean beach; -wraps, baskets, etc., testify to a day’s outing. -Above the hum of the varied conversations are -heard the mock sobs of one of the party.</p> - -<p><em>Various voices.</em> What’s the matter, Eaton?</p> - -<p><em>Eaton.</em> Matter enough. I was watching a -beautiful wave; its lines were perfect; at its crest, -the light glinting through its infinitely varied and -delicate curves of foam made a picture more ravishing -than any dream. And now it has gone; it -will never come back. So I weep.</p> - -<p><em>Grimes.</em> That’s right, Eaton; give it to them. -Of course well-fed and well-read persons—with -their possessions of wealth and of knowledge both -gained at the expense of others—finally get bored; -then they wax sentimental over their boredom and -are worried about “Nature” and its relation to -life. Not everybody takes it out that way, of -course; some take motor cars and champagne for -that tired feeling. But the rest—those who aren’t<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span> -in that class financially, or who consider themselves -too refined for that kind of relief—seek a new -sensation in speculating why that brute old world -out there will not stand for what you call spiritual -and ideal values—for short, your egotisms.</p> - -<p>The fact is that the whole discussion is only a -symptom of the leisure class disease. If you had -to work to the limit and beyond, to keep soul and -body together, and, more than that, to keep alive -the soul of your family in its body, you would -know the difference between your artificial problems -and the genuine problem of life. Your philosophic -problems about the relation of “the universe -to moral and spiritual good” exist only in -the sentimentalism that generates them. The genuine -question is why social arrangements will not -permit the amply sufficient body of natural resources -to sustain all men and women in security -and decent comfort, with a margin for the cultivation -of their human instincts of sociability, love -of knowledge and of art.</p> - -<p>As I read Plato, philosophy began with some -sense of its essentially political basis and mission—a -recognition that its problems were those of the -organization of a just social order. But it soon -got lost in dreams of another world; and even those -of you philosophers who pride yourselves on being -so advanced that you no longer believe in “another -world,” are still living and thinking with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span> -reference to it. You may not call it supernatural; -but when you talk about a realm of spiritual or -ideal values in general, and ask about its relation -to Nature in general, you have only changed the -labels on the bottles, not the contents in them. -For what makes anything transcendental—that is, -in common language, supernatural—is simply and -only aloofness from practical affairs—which affairs -in their ultimate analysis are the business of -making a living.</p> - -<p><em>Eaton.</em> Yes; Grimes has about hit off the point -of my little parable—in one of its aspects at least. -In matters of daily life you say a man is “off,” -more or less insane, when he deliberately goes on -looking for a certain kind of result from conditions -which he has already found to be such that -they cannot possibly yield it. If he keeps on looking, -and then goes about mourning because stage -money won’t buy beefsteaks, or because he cannot -keep himself warm by burning the sea-sands -here, you dismiss him as a fool or a hysteric. If -you would condescend to reason with him at all, you -would tell him to look for the conditions that will -yield the results; to occupy himself with some of -the countless goods of life for which, by intelligently -directed search, adequate means may be -found.</p> - -<p>Well, before lunch, Moore was reiterating the -old tale. “Modern science has completely transformed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span> -our conceptions of Nature. It has stripped -the universe bare not only of all the moral values -which it wore alike to antique pagan and to our -medieval ancestors, but also of any regard, any -preference, for such values. They are mere incidents, -transitory accidents, in her everlasting redistribution -of matter in motion; like the rise and -fall of the wave I lament, or like a single musical -note that a screeching, rumbling railway train -might happen to emit.” This is a one-sided view; -but suppose it were all so, what is the moral? -Surely, to change our standpoint, our angle of -vision; to stop looking for results among conditions -that we know will not yield them; to turn our -gaze to the goods, the values that exist actually -and indubitably in experience; and consider by -what natural conditions these particular values -may be strengthened and widened.</p> - -<p>Insist, if you please, that Nature as a whole -does not stand for good as a whole. Then, in -heaven’s name, just because good is both so plural -(so “numerous”) and so partial, bend your energies -of intelligence and of effort to selecting the -specific plural and partial natural conditions which -will at least render values that we do have more -secure and more extensive. Any other course is -the way of madness; it is the way of the spoilt -child who cries at the seashore because the waves -do not stand still, and who cries even more frantically<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span> -in the mountains because the hills do not melt -and flow.</p> - -<p>But no. Moore and his school will not have it -so: we must “go back of the returns.” All this -science, after all, is a mode of knowledge. Examine -knowledge itself and find it implies a complete -all-inclusive intelligence; and then find (by -taking another tack) that intelligence involves -sentiency, feeling, and also will. Hence your very -physical science, if you will only criticise it, examine -it, shows that its object, mechanical nature, -is itself an included and superseded element in an -all-embracing spiritual and ideal whole. And there -you are.</p> - -<p>Well, I do not now insist that all this is mere -dialectic prestidigitation. No; accept it; let it go -at its face value. But what of it? Is any value -more concretely and securely in life than it was -before? Does this perfect intelligence enable us -to correct one single mis-step, one paltry error, -here and now? Does this perfect all-inclusive -goodness serve to heal one disease? Does it rectify -one transgression? Does it even give the slightest -inkling of how to go to work at any of these -things? No; it just tells you: Never mind, for -they are already eternally corrected, eternally -healed in the eternal consciousness which alone is -really Real. Stop: there is one evil, one pain, -which the doctrine mitigates—the hysteric sentimentalism<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span> -which is troubled because the universe -as a whole does not sustain good as a whole. But -that is the only thing it alters. The “pathetic -fallacy” of Ruskin magnified to the <em>n</em>th power is -the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">motif</i> of modern idealism.</p> - -<p><em>Moore.</em> Certainly nobody will accuse Eaton of -tender-mindedness—except in his logic, which, <em>as</em> -certainly, is not tough-minded. His excitement, -however, convinces me that he has at least an inkling -that he is begging the question; and like the -true pragmatist that he is, is trying to prevent -by action (to wit, his flood of speech) his false -logic from becoming articulate to him. The question -being whether the values we seem to apprehend, -the purposes we entertain, the goods we possess, -are anything more than transitory waves, -Eaton meets it by saying: “Oh, of course, they -are waves; but don’t think about that—just sit -down hard on the wave or get another wave to buttress -it with!” No wonder he recommends action -instead of thinking! Men have tried this method -before, as a counsel of desperation or as cynical -pessimism. But it remained for contemporary -pragmatism to label the drowning of sorrow in the -intoxication of thoughtless action, the highest -achievement of philosophic method, and to preach -wilful restlessness as a doctrine of hope and illumination. -Meantime, I prefer to be tender-minded -in my attitude toward Reality, and to make<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span> -that attitude more reasonable by a tough-minded -logic.</p> - -<p><em>Eaton.</em> I am willing to be quiet long enough -for you to translate your metaphor into logic, and -show how I have begged the question.</p> - -<p><em>Moore.</em> It is plain enough. You bid us turn -to the cultivation, the nurture, of certain values -in human life. But the question is whether these -are or are not values. And that is a question of -their relation to the Universe—to Reality. If -Reality substantiates them, then indeed they are -values; if it mocks and flouts them—as it surely -does if what mechanical science calls Nature be -ultimate and absolute—then they are <em>not</em> values. -You and your kind are really the sentimentalists, -because you are sheer subjectivists. You say: Accept -the dream as real; do not question about it; -add a little iridescence to its fog and extend it -till it obscure even more of Reality than it naturally -does, and all is well! I say: Perhaps the -dream is no dream but an intimation of the -solidest and most ultimate of all realities; and a -thorough examination of what the positivist, the -materialist, accepts as solid, namely, science, reveals -as its own aim, standard, and presupposition -that Reality is one all-exhaustive spiritual -Being.</p> - -<p><em>Eaton.</em> This is about the way I thought my -begging of the question would turn out. You insist<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span> -upon translating my position into terms of -your own; I am not then surprised to hear that it -would be a begging of the question for <em>you</em> to hold -my views. My point is precisely that it is only -as long as you take the position that some Reality -beyond—some metaphysical or transcendental reality—is -necessary to substantiate empirical values -that you can even discuss whether the latter are -genuine or illusions. Drop the presupposition that -you read into everything I say, the idea that the -reality of things as they are is dependent upon something -beyond and behind, and the facts of the case -just stare you in the eyes: Goods <em>are</em>, a multitude -of them—but, unfortunately, evils also <em>are</em>; and -all grades, pretty much, of both. Not the contrast -and relation of experience <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in toto</i> to something -beyond experience drives men to religion and -then to philosophy; but the contrast <em>within</em> experience -of the better and the worse, and the consequent -problem of how to substantiate the former -and reduce the latter. Until you set up the notion -of a transcendental reality at large, you cannot -even raise the question of whether goods and -evils are, or only seem to be. The trouble and the -joy, the good and the evil, is <em>that</em> they are; the -hope is that they may be regulated, guided, increased -in one direction and minimized in another. -Instead of neglecting thought, we (I mean the -pragmatists) exalt it, because we say that intelligent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span> -discrimination of means and ends is the sole -final resource in this problem of all problems, the -control of the factors of good and ill in life. We -say, indeed, not merely that that is what intelligence -<em>does</em>, but rather what it <em>is</em>.</p> - -<p>Historically, it is quite possible to show how -under certain social conditions this human and -practical problem of the relation of good and intelligence -generated the notion of the transcendental -good and the pure reason. As Grimes reminded -us, <span class="locked">Plato——</span></p> - -<p><em>Moore.</em> Yes, and Protagoras—don’t forget -him; for unfortunately we know both the origin -and the consequences of your doctrine that being -and seeming are the same. We know quite well -that pure empiricism leads to the identification -of being and seeming, and that is just why every -deeply moral and religious soul from the time of -Plato and Aristotle to the present has insisted upon -a transcendent reality.</p> - -<p><em>Eaton.</em> Personally I don’t need an absolute to -enable me to distinguish between, say, the good -of kindness and the evil of slander, or the good of -health and the evil of valetudinarianism. In experience, -things bear their own specific characters. -Nor has the absolute idealist as yet answered the -question of <em>how</em> the absolute reality enables him -to distinguish between being and seeming in one -single concrete case. The trouble is that for him<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span> -<em>all</em> Being is on the other side of experience, and <em>all</em> -experience is seeming.</p> - -<p><em>Grimes.</em> I think I heard you mention history. -I wish both of you would drop dialectics and go -to history. You would find history to be a struggle -for existence—for bread, for a roof, for protected -and nourished offspring. You would find -history a picture of the masses always going -under—just missing—in the struggle, because -others have captured the control of natural resources, -which in themselves, if not as benign as -the eighteenth century imagined, are at least abundantly -ample for the needs of all. But because of -the monopolization of Nature by a few persons, -most men and women only stick their heads above -the welter just enough to catch a glimpse of better -things, then to be shoved down and under. The -only problem of the relation of Nature to human -good which is real is the economic problem of the -exploitation of natural resources in the equal interests -of all, instead of in the unequal interests -of a class. The problem you two men are discussing -has no existence—and never had any—outside -of the heads of a few metaphysicians. The latter -would never have amounted to anything, would -never have had any career at all, had not shrewd -monopolists or tyrants (with the skill that characterizes -them) have seen that these speculations -about reality and a transcendental world could be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span> -distilled into opiates and distributed among the -masses to make them less rebellious. That, if you -would know, Eaton, is the real historic origin of -the ideal world beyond. When you realize that, -you will perceive that the pragmatists are only -half-way over. You will see that practical questions -<em>are</em> practical, and are not to be solved merely -by having a theory <em>about</em> theory different from -the traditional one—which is all your pragmatism -comes to.</p> - -<p><em>Moore.</em> If you mean that your own crass Philistinism -is all that pragmatism comes to, I fancy -you are about right. Forget that the only end of -action is to bring about an approximation to the -complete inclusive consciousness; make, as the -pragmatists do, consciousness a means to action, -and one form of external activity is just as good as -another. Art, religion, all the generous reaches -of science which do not show up immediately in -the factory—these things become meaningless, and -all that remains is that hard and dry satisfaction -of economic wants which is Grimes’s ideal.</p> - -<p><em>Grimes.</em> An ideal which exists, by the way, only -in your imagination. I know of no more convincing -proof of the futile irrelevancy of idealism than -the damning way in which it narrows the content -of actual daily life in the minds of those who uphold -idealism. I sometimes think I am the only -true idealist. If the conditions of an equitable and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span> -ample physical existence for all were once secured, -I, for one, have no fears as to the bloom and harvest -of art and science, and all the “higher” things of -leisure. Life is interesting enough for me; give -it a show for all.</p> - -<p><em>Arthur.</em> I find myself in a peculiar position in -respect to this discussion. An analysis of what -is involved in this peculiarity may throw some light -on the points at issue, for I have to believe that -analysis and definition of what exists is the essential -matter both in resolution of doubts and in -steps at reform. For brevity, not from conceit, -I will put the peculiarity to which I refer in a -personal form. I do not believe for a moment in -some different Reality beyond and behind Nature. -I do not believe that a manipulation of the logical -implications of science can give results which are -to be put in the place of those which Science herself -yields in her direct application. I accept Nature -as something which is, not seems, and Science as -her faithful transcript. Yet because I believe -these things, not in spite of them, I believe in the -existence of purpose and of good. How Eaton can -believe that fulfilment and the increasing realization -of purpose can exist in human consciousness -unless they first exist in the world which is revealed -in that consciousness is as much beyond me as how -Moore can believe that a manipulation of the -method of knowledge can yield considerations of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span> -totally different order from those directly obtained -by use of the method. If purpose and fulfilment -exist as natural goods, then, and only then, can -consciousness itself be a fulfilment of Nature, and -be also a natural good. Any other view is inexplicable -to sound thinking—save, historically, as a -product of modern political individualism and literary -romanticism which have combined to produce -that idealistic philosophy according to which the -mind in knowing the universe creates it.</p> - -<p>The view that purpose and realization are profoundly -natural, and that consciousness—or, if -you will, experience—is itself a culmination and -climax of Nature, is not a new view. Formulated -by Aristotle, it has always persisted wherever the -traditions of sound thinking have not been obscured -by romanticism. The modern scientific doctrine -of evolution confirms and specifies the metaphysical -insight of Aristotle. This doctrine sets -forth in detail, and in verified detail, as a genuine -characteristic of existence, the tendency toward -cumulative results, the definite trend of things toward -culmination and achievement. It describes -the universe as possessing, in terms of and by right -of its own subject-matter (not as an addition of -subsequent reflection), differences of value and importance—differences, -moreover, that exercise selective -influence upon the course of things, that is -to say, genuinely determine the events that occur.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span> -It tells us that consciousness itself is such a cumulative -and culminating natural event. Hence it is -relevant to the world in which it dwells, and its -determinations of value are not arbitrary, not <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">obiter -dicta</i>, but descriptions of Nature herself.</p> - -<p>Recall the words of Spencer which Moore quoted -this morning: “There is no pleasure in the consciousness -of being an infinitesimal bubble on a -globe that is infinitesimal compared with the totality -of things. Those on whom the unpitying rush -of changes inflicts sufferings which are often without -remedy, find no consolation in the thought that -they are at the mercy of blind forces,—which cause -indifferently now the destruction of a sun and now -the death of an animalcule. Contemplation of a -universe which is without conceivable beginning or -end and without intelligible purpose, yields no satisfaction.” -I am naïve enough to believe that the -only question is whether the object of our “consciousness,” -of our “thought,” of our “contemplation,” -is or is not as the quotation states it to be. -If the statement be correct, pragmatism, like subjectivism -(of which I suspect it is only a variation, -putting emphasis upon will instead of idea), is an -invitation to close our eyes to what is, in order to -encourage the delusion that things are other than -they are. But the case is not so desperate. Speaking -dogmatically, the account given of the universe -is just—not true. And the doctrine of evolution<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span> -of which Spencer professedly made so much -is the evidence. A universe describable in evolutionary -terms is a universe which shows, not indeed -design, but tendency and purpose; which exhibits -achievement, not indeed of a single end, but of a -multiplicity of natural goods at whose apex is consciousness. -No account of the universe in terms -<em>merely</em> of the redistribution of matter in motion is -complete, no matter how true as far as it goes, for -it ignores the cardinal fact that the character of -matter in motion and of its redistribution is such -as cumulatively to achieve ends—to effect the -world of values we know. Deny this and you deny -evolution; admit it and you admit purpose in the -only objective—that is, the only intelligible—sense -of that term. I do not say that in addition to the -mechanism there are other ideal causes or factors -which intervene. I only insist that the whole story -be told, that the character of the mechanism be -noted—namely, that it is such as to produce and -sustain good in a multiplicity of forms. Mechanism -is the mechanism of achieving results. To ignore -this is to refuse to open our eyes to the total -aspects of existence.</p> - -<p>Among these multiple natural goods, I repeat, is -consciousness itself. One of the ends in which Nature -genuinely terminates is just awareness of itself—of -its processes and ends. For note the implication -as to why consciousness is a natural good:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span> -not because it is cut off and exists in isolation, nor -yet because we may, pragmatically, cut off and -cultivate certain values which have no existence beyond -it; but because it <em>is</em> good that things should -be known in their own characters. And this view -carries with it a precious result: to know things as -they are is to know them as culminating in consciousness; -it is to know that the universe genuinely -achieves and maintains its own self-manifestation.</p> - -<p>A final word as to the bearing of this view upon -Grimes’s position. To conceive of human history -as a scene of struggle of classes for domination, a -struggle caused by love of power or greed for gain, -is the very mythology of the emotions. What we -call history is largely non-human, but so far as it -is human, it is dominated by intelligence: history -is the history of increasing consciousness. Not -that intelligence is actually sovereign in life, but -that at least it is sovereign over stupidity, error, -and ignorance. The acknowledgment of things as -they are—that is the causal source of every step -in progress. Our present system of industry is not -the product of greed or tyrannic lust of power, -but of physical science giving the mastery over the -mechanism of Nature’s energy. If the existing -system is ever displaced, it will be displaced not -by good intentions and vague sentiments, but by a -more extensive insight into Nature’s secrets.</p> - -<p>Modern sentimentalism is revolted at the frank<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span> -naturalism of Aristotle in saying that some are -slaves by nature and others free by nature. But -let socialism come to-morrow and somebody—not -anybody, but <em>some</em>body—will be managing its machinery -and somebody else will be managed by the -machinery. I do not wonder that my socialistic -friends always imagine themselves active in the first -capacity—perhaps by way of compensation for -doing all of the imagining and none of the executive -management at present. But those who are managed, -who are controlled, deserve at least a moment’s -attention. Would you not at once agree -that if there is any justice at all in these positions -of relative inferiority and superiority, it is because -those who are capable by insight deserve to rule, -and those who are incapable on account of ignorance, -deserve to be ruled? If so, how do you differ, -save verbally, from Aristotle?</p> - -<p>Or do you think that all that men want in order -to <em>be</em> men is to have their bellies filled, with assurance -of constant plenty and without too much antecedent -labor? No; believe me, Grimes, men <em>are</em> -men, and hence their aspiration is for the divine—even -when they know it not; their desire is for the -ruling element, for intelligence. Till they achieve -that they will still be discontented, rebellious, unruly—and -hence ruled—shuffle your social cards -as much as you may.</p> - -<p><em>Grimes</em> (after shrugging his shoulders contemptuously,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span> -finally says): There is one thing I like -about Arthur: he is frank. He comes out with -what you in all your hearts really believe—theory, -supreme and sublime. All is to the good in this -best of all possible worlds, if only some one be -defining and classifying and syllogizing, according -to the lines already laid down. Aristotle’s God -of pure intelligence (as <em>he</em> well knew) was the -glorification of leisure; and Arthur’s point of view, -if Arthur but knew it, is as much the intellectual -snobbery of a leisure class economy, as the luxury -and display he condemns are its material snobbery. -There is really nothing more to be said.</p> - -<p><em>Moore.</em> To get back into the game which -Grimes despises. Doesn’t Arthur practically say -that the universe is good because it culminates in -intelligence, and that intelligence is good because -it perceives that the universe culminates in—itself? -And, on this theory, are ignorance and error, -and consequent evil, any less genuine achievements -of Nature than intelligence and good? -And on what basis does he call by the titles of -achievement and end that which at best is an -infinitesimally fragmentary and transitory episode? -I said Eaton begged the question. Arthur -seems to regard it as proof of a superior intelligence -(one which realistically takes things as they -are) to beg the question. What is this Nature, -this universe in which evil is as stubborn a fact as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span> -good, in which good is constantly destroyed by the -very power that produces it, in which there resides -a temporary bird of passage—consciousness -doomed to ultimate extinction—what is such a Nature -(all that Arthur offers us) save the problem, -the contradiction originally in question? A complacent -optimism may gloss over its intrinsic self-contradictions, -but a more serious mind is forced to -go behind and beyond this scene to a permanent -good which includes and transcends goods defeated -and hopes suborned. Not because idealists have -refused to note the facts as they are, but precisely -because Nature is, on its face, such a scene as -Arthur describes, idealists have always held that it -is but Appearance, and have attempted to mount -through it to Reality.</p> - -<p><em>Stair.</em> I had not thought to say anything. My -attitude is so different from that of any one of -you that it seemed unnecessary to inject another -varying opinion where already disagreement reigns. -But when Arthur was speaking, I felt that perhaps -this disagreement exists precisely because the solvent -word had not been uttered. For, at bottom, -all of you agree with Arthur, and that is the cause -of your disagreement with him and one another. -You have agreed to make reason, intellect in some -sense, the final umpire. But reason, intellect, is -the principle of analysis, of division, of discord. -When I appeal to feeling as the ultimate organ<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span> -of unity, and hence of truth, you smile courteously; -say—or think—mysticism; and the case for you -is dismissed. Words like feeling, sensation, immediate -appreciation, self-communication of Being, -I must indeed use when I try to tell the truth I see. -But I well know how inadequate the words are. -And why? Because language is the chosen tool -of intelligence, and hence inevitably bewrayeth the -truth it would convey. But remember that words -are but symbols, and that intelligence must dwell -in the realm of symbols, and you realize a way out. -These words, sensation, feeling, etc., as I utter -them are but invitations to woo you to put yourselves -into the one attitude that reveals truth—an -attitude of direct vision.</p> - -<p>The beatific vision? Yes, and No. No, if you -mean something rare, extreme, almost abnormal. -Yes, if you mean the commonest and most convincing, -the <em>only</em> convincing self-impartation of the ultimate -good in the scale of goods; the vision of -blessedness in God. For this doctrine is empirical; -mysticism is the heart of all positive empiricism, -of all empiricism which is not more interested in -denying rationalism than in asserting itself. The -mystical experience marks every man’s realization -of the supremacy of good, and hence measures the -distance that separates him from pure materialism. -And since the unmitigated materialist is the rarest -of creatures, and the man with faith in an unseen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span> -good the commonest, every man is a mystic—and -the most so in his best moments.</p> - -<p>What an idle contradiction that Moore and Arthur -should try to adduce proofs of the supremacy -of ideal values in the universe! The sole possible -proof is the proof that actually exists—the direct -unhindered realization of those values. For each -value brings with it of necessity its own depth of -being. Let the pride of intellect and the pride of -will cease their clamor, and in the silences Being -speaks its own final word, not an argument or external -ground of belief, but the self-impartation of -itself to the soul. Who are the prophets and -teachers of the ages? Those who have been accessible -at the greatest depths to these communications.</p> - -<p><em>Grimes.</em> I suppose that poverty—and possibly -disease—are specially competent ministers to the -spiritual vision? The moral is obvious. Economic -changes are purely irrelevant, because purely material -and external. Indeed, upon the whole, efforts -at reform are undesirable, for they distract -attention from the fact that the final thing, the -vision of good, is totally disconnected from external -circumstance. I do not say, Stair, you personally -believe this; but is not such a quietism the -logical conclusion of all mysticism?</p> - -<p><em>Stair.</em> This is not so true as to say that in your -efforts at reform you are really inspired by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span> -divine vision of justice; and that this mystic vision -and not the mere increase of quantity of eatables -and drinkables is your animating motive.</p> - -<p><em>Grimes</em>. Well, to my mind this whole affair of -mystical values and experiences comes down to a -simple straight-away proposition. The submerged -masses do not occupy themselves with such questions -as those you are discussing. They haven’t -the time even to consider whether they want to -consider them. Nor does the occasional free citizen -who even now exists—a sporadic reminder and -prophecy of ultimate democracy—bother himself -about the relation of the cosmos to value. Why? -Not from mystic insight any more than from metaphysical -proof; but because he has so many other -interests that are worth while. His friends, his -vocation and avocations, his books, his music, his -club—these things engage him and they reward -him. To multiply such men with such interests—that -is the genuine problem, I repeat; and it is a -problem to be solved only through an economic and -material redistribution.</p> - -<p><em>Eaton</em>. Gladly, Stair, do all of us absolve ourselves -from the responsibility of having to create -the goods that life—call it God or Nature or -Chance—provides. But we cannot, if we would, -absolve ourselves from responsibility for maintaining -and extending these goods when they have -happened. To find it very wonderful—as Arthur<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span> -does—that intelligence perceives values as they are -is trivial, for it is only an elaborate way of saying -that they have happened. To invite us, ceasing -struggle and effort, to commune with Being through -the moments of insight and joy that life provides, -is to bid us to self-indulgence—to enjoyment at -the expense of those upon whom the burden of conducting -life’s affairs falls. For even the mystics -still need to eat and drink, be clothed and housed, -and somebody must do these unmystic things. And -to ignore others in the interest of our own perfection -is not conducive to genuine unity of Being.</p> - -<p>Intelligence is, indeed, as you say, discrimination, -distinction. But why? Because we have to -<em>act</em> in order to keep secure amid the moving flux -of circumstance, some slight but precious good that -Nature has bestowed; and because, in order to act -successfully, we must act after conscious selection—after -discrimination of means and ends. Of -course, all goods arrive, as Arthur says, as natural -results, but so do all bads, and all grades of good -and bad. To label the results that occur culminations, -achievements, and then argue to a quasi-moral -constitution of Nature because she effects -such results, is to employ a logic which applies to -the life-cycle of the germ that, in achieving itself, -kills man with malaria, as well as to the process of -human life that in reaching its fullness cuts short -the germ-fulfilment. It is putting the cart before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span> -the horse to say that because Nature is so constituted -as to produce results of all types of value, -therefore Nature is actuated by regard for differences -of value, Nature, till it produces a being -who strives and who thinks in order that he may -strive more effectively, does not know whether it -cares more for justice or for cruelty, more for the -ravenous wolf-like competition of the struggle for -existence, or for the improvements incidentally introduced -through that struggle. Literally it has -no mind of its own. Nor would the mere introduction -of a consciousness that pictured indifferently -the scene out of which consciousness developed, -add one iota of reason for attributing eulogistically -to Nature regard for value. But when -the sentient organism, having experienced natural -values, good and bad, begins to select, to prefer, -and to make battle for its preference; and in order -that it may make the most gallant fight possible -picks out and gathers together in perception -and thought what is favorable to its aims and -what hostile, then and there Nature has at last -achieved significant regard for good. And this is -the same thing as the birth of intelligence. For -the holding an end in view and the selecting and organizing -out of the natural flux, on the basis of -this end, conditions that are means, <em>is</em> intelligence. -Not, then, when Nature produces health or efficiency -or complexity does Nature exhibit regard<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span> -for value, but only when it produces a living organism -that has settled preferences and endeavors. -The mere happening of complexity, health, adjustment, -is all that Nature effects, as rightly called -accident as purpose. But when Nature produces -an intelligence—ah, then, indeed Nature has -achieved something. Not, however, because this intelligence -impartially pictures the nature which -has produced it, but because in human consciousness -Nature becomes genuinely partial. Because -in consciousness an end is preferred, is selected for -maintenance, and because intelligence pictures not -a world just as it is <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in toto</i>, but images forth the -conditions and obstacles of the continued maintenance -of the selected good. For in an experience -where values are demonstrably precarious, an intelligence -that is not a principle of emphasis and -valuation (an intelligence which defines, describes, -and classifies merely for the sake of knowledge,) is -a principle of stupidity and catastrophe.</p> - -<p>As for Grimes, it is indeed true that problems -are solved only where they arise—namely, in action, -in the adjustments of behavior. But, for -good or for evil, they can be solved there only with -method; and ultimately method is intelligence, and -intelligence is method. The larger, the more human, -the less technical the problem of practice, the -more open-eyed and wide-viewing must be the corresponding -method. I do not say that all things<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -that have been called philosophy participate in this -method; I do say, however, that a catholic and far-sighted -theory of the adjustment of the conflicting -factors of life <em>is</em>—whatever it be called—philosophy. -And unless technical philosophy is to go the -way of dogmatic theology, it must loyally identify -itself with such a view of its own aim and destiny.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS"><a id="INTELLIGENCE_AND_MORALS"></a>INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor smaller">6</a></h2> -</div> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">“Except</span> the blind forces of nature,” said -Sir Henry Maine, “nothing moves in this -world which is not Greek in its origin.” And if -we ask why this is so, the response comes that the -Greek discovered the business of man to be pursuit -of good, and intelligence to be central in this quest. -The utmost to be said in praise of Plato and Aristotle -is not that they invented excellent moral theories, -but that they rose to the opportunity which -the spectacle of Greek life afforded. For Athens -presented an all but complete microcosm for the -study of the interaction of social organization and -individual character. A public life of rich diversity -in concentrated and intense splendor trained -the civic sense. Strife of faction and the rapid -oscillations of types of polity provided the occasion -for intellectual inquiry and analysis. The careers -of dramatic personalities, habits of discussion, ease -of legislative change, facilities for personal ambitions,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span> -distraction by personal rivalries, fixed attention -upon the elements of character, and upon consideration -of the effect of individual character on -social vitality and stability. Happy exemption -from ecclesiastic preoccupations, susceptibility to -natural harmony, and natural piety conspired with -frank and open observation to acknowledgment of -the rôle played by natural conditions. Social instability -and shock made equally pertinent and obvious -the remark that only intelligence can confirm -the values that natural conditions generate, and -that intelligence is itself nurtured and matured -only in a free and stable society.</p> - -<p>In Plato the resultant analysis of the mutual -implications of the individual, the social and the -natural, converged in the ideas that morals and -philosophy are one: namely, a love of that wisdom -which is the source of secure and social good; that -mathematics and the natural sciences focused upon -the problem of the perception of the good furnish -the materials of moral science; that logic is the -method of the pregnant organization of social conditions -with respect to good; that politics and psychology -are sciences of one and the same human -nature, taken first in the large and then in the -little. So far that large and expansive vision of -Plato.</p> - -<p>But projection of a better life must be based -upon reflection of the life already lived. The inevitable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span> -limitations of the Greek city-state were inevitably -wrought into the texture of moral theory.</p> - -<p>The business of thought was to furnish a substitute -for customs which were then relaxing from -the pressure of contact and intercourse without -and the friction of strife within. Reason was to -take the place of custom as a guide of life; but it -was to furnish rules as final, as unalterable as those -of custom. In short, the thinkers were fascinated -by the afterglow of custom. They took for their -own ideal the distillation from custom of its essence—ends -and laws which should be rigid and invariable. -Thus Morals was set upon the track which -it dared not leave for nigh twenty-five hundred -years: search for <em>the</em> final good, and for <em>the</em> single -moral force.</p> - -<p>Aristotle’s assertions that the state exists by nature, -and that in the state alone does the individual -achieve independence and completeness of life, are -indeed pregnant sayings. But as uttered by Aristotle -they meant that, in an isolated state, the -Greek city-state, set a garlanded island in the -waste sea of <i xml:lang="it" lang="it">barbaroi</i>, a community indifferent -when not hostile to all other social groupings, individuals -attain their full end. In a social unity -which signified social contraction, contempt, and -antagonism, in a social order which despised intercourse -and glorified war, is realized the life of -excellence!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span> -There is likewise a profound saying of Aristotle’s -that the individual who otherwise than by accident -is not a member of a state is either a brute or a -god. But it is generally forgotten that elsewhere -Aristotle identified the highest excellence, the chief -virtue, with pure thought, and identifying this with -the divine, isolated it in lonely grandeur from the -life of society. That man, so far as in him lay, -should be godlike, meant that he should be non-social, -because supra-civic. Plato the idealist had -shared the belief that reason is the divine; but he -was also a reformer and a radical and he would -have those who attained rational insight descend -again into the civic cave, and in its obscurity labor -patiently for the enlightenment of its blear-eyed -inhabitants. Aristotle, the conservative and the -definer of what is, gloried in the exaltation of intelligence -in man above civic excellence and social -need; and thereby isolated the life of truest knowledge -from contact with social experience and from -responsibility for discrimination of values in the -course of life.</p> - -<p>Moral theory, however, accepted from social custom -more than its cataleptic rigidity, its exclusive -area of common good, and its unfructified and irresponsible -reason. The city-state was a superficial -layer of cultured citizens, cultured through a participation -in affairs made possible by relief from -economic pursuits, superimposed upon the dense<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span> -mass of serfs, artizans, and laborers. For this division, -moral philosophy made itself spiritual sponsor, -and thus took it up into its own being. Plato -wrestled valiantly with the class problem; but his -outcome was the necessity of decisive demarcation, -after education, of the masses in whom reason was -asleep and appetite much awake, from the few who -were fit to rule because alertly wise. The most -generously imaginative soul of all philosophy could -not far outrun the institutional practices of his -people and his times. This might have warned his -successors of the danger of deserting the sober -path of a critical discernment of the better and the -worse within contemporary life for the more exciting -adventure of a final determination of absolute -good and evil. It might have taught the probability -that some brute residuum or unrationalized -social habit would be erected into an apotheosis of -pure reason. But the lesson was not learned. -Aristotle promptly yielded to the besetting sin of -all philosophers, the idealization of the existent: he -declared that the class distinctions of superiority -and inferiority as between man and woman, master -and slave, liberal-minded and base mechanic, exist -and are justified by nature—a nature which aims -at embodied reason.</p> - -<p>What, finally, is this Nature to which the philosophy -of society and the individual so bound itself? -It is the nature which figures in Greek customs<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span> -and myth; the nature resplendent and adorned -which confronts us in Greek poetry and art: the -animism of savage man purged of grossness and -generalized by unerring esthetic taste into beauty -and system. The myths had told of the loves and -hates, the caprices and desertions of the gods, -and behind them all, inevitable Fate. Philosophy -translated these tales into formulæ of the brute -fluctuation of rapacious change held in bounds -by the final and supreme end: the rational good. -The animism of the popular mind died to reappear -as cosmology.</p> - -<p>Repeatedly in this course we have heard of sciences -which began as parts of philosophy and -which gradually won their independence. Another -statement of the same history is that both science -and philosophy began in subjection to mythological -animism. Both began with acceptance of a nature -whose irregularities displayed the meaningless variability -of foolish wants held within the limits of -order and uniformity by an underlying movement -toward a final and stable purpose. And when -the sciences gradually assumed the task of reducing -irregular caprice to regular conjunction, philosophy -bravely took upon itself the task of substantiating, -under the caption of a spiritual view -of the universe, the animistic survival. Doubtless -Socrates brought philosophy to earth; but his injunction -to man to know himself was incredibly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span> -compromised in its execution by the fact that later -philosophers submerged man in the world to which -philosophy was brought: a world which was the -heavy and sunken center of hierarchic heavens located -in their purity and refinement as remotely as -possible from the gross and muddy vesture of -earth.</p> - -<p>The various limitations of Greek custom, its -hostile indifference to all outside the narrow city-state, -its assumption of fixed divisions of wise and -blind among men, its inability socially to utilize -science, its subordination of human intention to -cosmic aim—all of these things were worked into -moral theory. Philosophy had no active hand in -producing the condition of barbarism in Europe -from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries. By an -unwitting irony which would have shocked none -so much as the lucid moralists of Athens, their -philosophic idealization, under captions of Nature -and Reason, of the inherent limitations of Athenian -society and Greek science, furnished the intellectual -tools for defining, standardizing, and justifying all -the fundamental clefts and antagonisms of feudalism. -When practical conditions are not frozen in -men’s imagination into crystalline truths, they are -naturally fluid. They come and go. But when -intelligence fixes fluctuating circumstances into -final ideals, petrifaction is likely to occur; and -philosophy gratuitously took upon itself the responsibility<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span> -for justifying the worst defects of -barbarian Europe by showing their necessary connection -with divine reason.</p> - -<p>The division of mankind into the two camps of -the redeemed and the condemned had not needed -philosophy to produce it. But the Greek cleavage -of men into separate kinds on the basis of their -position within or without the city-state was used -to rationalize this harsh intolerance. The hierarchic -organization of feudalism, within church -and state, of those possessed of sacred rule and -those whose sole excellence was obedience, did not -require moral theory to generate or explain it. -But it took philosophy to furnish the intellectual -tools by which such chance episodes were emblazoned -upon the cosmic heavens as a grandiose -spiritual achievement. No; it is all too easy to -explain bitter intolerance and desire for domination. -Stubborn as they are, it was only when -Greek moral theory had put underneath them the -distinction between the irrational and the rational, -between divine truth and good and corrupt and -weak human appetite, that intolerance on system -and earthly domination for the sake of eternal -excellence were philosophically sanctioned. The -health and welfare of the body and the securing -for all of a sure and a prosperous livelihood -were not matters for which medieval conditions fostered -care in any case. But moral philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span> -was prevailed upon to damn the body on principle, -and to relegate to insignificance as merely mundane -and temporal the problem of a just industrial -order. Circumstances of the times bore with sufficient -hardness upon successful scientific investigation; -but philosophy added the conviction that in -any case truth is so supernal that it must be supernaturally -revealed, and so important that it must -be authoritatively imparted and enforced. Intelligence -was diverted from the critical consideration -of the natural sources and social consequences -of better and worse into the channel of metaphysical -subtleties and systems, acceptance of -which was made essential to participation in the -social order and in rational excellence. Philosophy -bound the once erect form of human endeavor and -progress to the chariot wheels of cosmology and -theology.</p> - -<p>Since the Renaissance, moral philosophy has repeatedly -reverted to the Greek ideal of natural excellence -realized in social life, under the fostering -care of intelligence in action. The return, however, -has taken place under the influence of democratic -polity, commercial expansion, and scientific -reorganization. It has been a liberation more than -a reversion. This combined return and emancipation, -having transformed our practice of life in the -last four centuries, will not be content till it has -written itself clear in our theory of that practice.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span> -Whether the consequent revolution in moral philosophy -be termed pragmatism or be given the happier -title of the applied and experimental habit of -mind is of little account. What is of moment is -that intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation -at the remote edge of things, whence it -operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to -take its seat in the moving affairs of men. Theory -may therefore become responsible to the practices -that have generated it; the good be connected -with nature, but with nature naturally, not metaphysically, -conceived, and social life be cherished -in behalf of its own immediate possibilities, not on -the ground of its remote connections with a cosmic -reason and an absolute end.</p> - -<p>There is a notion, more familiar than correct, -that Greek thought sacrificed the individual to the -state. None has ever known better than the Greek -that the individual comes to himself and to his -own only in association with others. But Greek -thought subjected, as we have seen, both state and -individual to an external cosmic order; and thereby -it inevitably restricted the free use in doubt, inquiry, -and experimentation, of the human intelligence. -The <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">anima libera</i>, the free mind of the -sixteenth century, of Galileo and his successors, -was the counterpart of the disintegration of cosmology -and its animistic teleology. The lecturer -on political economy reminded us that his subject<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span> -began, in the Middle Ages, as a branch of ethics, -though, as he hastened to show, it soon got into -better association. Well, the same company was -once kept by all the sciences, mathematical and -physical as well as social. According to all accounts -it was the integrity of the number one and -the rectitude of the square that attracted the -attention of Pythagoras to arithmetic and geometry -as promising fields of study. Astronomy was -the projected picture book of a cosmic object lesson -in morals, Dante’s transcript of which is none -the less literal because poetic. If physics alone remained -outside the moral fold, while noble essences -redeemed chemistry, occult forces blessed physiology, -and the immaterial soul exalted psychology, -physics is the exception that proves the rule: matter -was so inherently immoral that no high-minded -science would demean itself by contact with it.</p> - -<p>If we do not join with many in lamenting the -stripping from nature of those idealistic properties -in which animism survived, if we do not mourn the -secession of the sciences from ethics, it is because -the abandonment by intelligence of a fixed and -static moral end was the necessary precondition of -a free and progressive science of both things and -morals; because the emancipation of the sciences -from ready made, remote, and abstract values was -necessary to make the sciences available for creating -and maintaining more and specific values here<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span> -and now. The divine comedy of modern medicine -and hygiene is one of the human epics yet to be -written; but when composed it may prove no unworthy -companion of the medieval epic of other -worldly beatific visions. The great ideas of the -eighteenth century, that expansive epoch of moral -perception which ranks in illumination and fervor -along with classic Greek thought, the great ideas -of the indefinitely continuous progress of humanity -and of the power and significance of freed intelligence, -were borne by a single mother—experimental -inquiry.</p> - -<p>The growth of industry and commerce is at once -cause and effect of the growth in science. Democritus -and other ancients conceived the mechanical -theory of the universe. The notion was not only -blank and repellent, because it ignored the rich -social material which Plato and Aristotle had organized -into their rival idealistic views; but it was -scientifically sterile, a piece of dialectics. Contempt -for machines as the accouterments of despised -mechanics kept the mechanical conception -aloof from these specific and controllable experiences -which alone could fructify it. This conception, -then, like the idealistic, was translated into a -speculative cosmology and thrown like a vast net -around the universe at large, as if to keep it from -coming to pieces. It is from respect for the lever, -the pulley, and the screw that modern experimental<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span> -and mathematical mechanics derives itself. Motion, -traced through the workings of a machine, -was followed out into natural events and studied -just as motion, not as a poor yet necessary device -for realizing final causes. So studied, it was found -to be available for new machines and new applications, -which in creating new ends also promoted new -wants, and thereby stimulated new activities, new -discoveries, and new inventions. The recognition -that natural energy can be systematically applied, -through experimental observation, to the satisfaction -and multiplication of concrete wants is doubtless -the greatest single discovery ever imported -into the life of man—save perhaps the discovery of -language. Science, borrowing from industry, repaid -the debt with interest, and has made the control -of natural forces for the aims of life so inevitable -that for the first time man is relieved from -overhanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to possess -and accumulate, and is freed to consider the -more gracious question of securing to all an ample -and liberal life. The industrial life had been condemned -by Greek exaltation of abstract thought -and by Greek contempt for labor, as representing -the brute struggle of carnal appetite for its own -satiety. The industrial movement, offspring of -science, restored it to its central position in morals. -When Adam Smith made economic activity the -moving spring of man’s unremitting effort, from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span> -the cradle to the grave, to better his own lot, he -recorded this change. And when he made sympathy -the central spring in man’s conscious moral endeavor, -he reported the effect which the increasing -intercourse of men, due primarily to commerce, had -in breaking down suspicion and jealousy and in -liberating man’s kindlier impulses.</p> - -<p>Democracy, the crucial expression of modern -life, is not so much an addition to the scientific -and industrial tendencies as it is the perception of -their social or spiritual meaning. Democracy is -an absurdity where faith in the individual as individual -is impossible; and this faith is impossible -when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power, -not an adjustment and application of individual -tendencies. It is also impossible when appetites -and desires are conceived to be the dominant factor -in the constitution of most men’s characters, and -when appetite and desire are conceived to be manifestations -of the disorderly and unruly principle of -nature. To put the intellectual center of gravity -in the objective cosmos, outside of men’s own experiments -and tests, and then to invite the application -of individual intelligence to the determination -of society, is to invite chaos. To hold that want -is mere negative flux and hence requires external -fixation by reason, and then to invite the wants to -give free play to themselves in social construction -and intercourse, is to call down anarchy. Democracy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span> -is estimable only through the changed conception -of intelligence, that forms modern science, -and of want, that forms modern industry. It is -essentially a changed psychology. The substitution, -for <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> truth and deduction, of fluent -doubt and inquiry meant trust in human nature -in the concrete; in individual honesty, curiosity, -and sympathy. The substitution of moving commerce -for fixed custom meant a view of wants as -the dynamics of social progress, not as the pathology -of private greed. The nineteenth century indeed -turned sour on that somewhat complacent optimism -in which the eighteenth century rested: the -ideas that the intelligent self-love of individuals -would conduce to social cohesion, and competition -among individuals usher in the kingdom of social -welfare. But the conception of a social harmony -of interests in which the achievement by each individual -of his own freedom should contribute to -a like perfecting of the powers of all, through a -fraternally organized society, is the permanent -contribution of the industrial movement to morals—even -though so far it be but the contribution -of a problem.</p> - -<p>Intellectually speaking, the centuries since the -fourteenth are the true middle ages. They mark -the transitional period of mental habit, as the so-called -medieval period represents the petrifaction, -under changed outward conditions, of Greek ideas.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span> -The conscious articulation of genuinely modern -tendencies has yet to come, and till it comes the -ethic of our own life must remain undescribed. -But the system of morals which has come nearest -to the reflection of the movements of science, democracy, -and commerce, is doubtless the utilitarian. -Scientific, after the modern mode, it certainly -would be. Newton’s influence dyes deep the moral -thought of the eighteenth century. The arrangements -of the solar system had been described in -terms of a homogeneous matter and motion, worked -by two opposed and compensating forces: all because -a method of analysis, of generalization by -analogy, and of mathematical deduction back to -new empirical details had been followed. The imagination -of the eighteenth century was a Newtonian -imagination; and this no less in social -than in physical matters. Hume proclaims that -morals is about to become an experimental science. -Just as, almost in our own day, Mill’s interest in a -method for social science led him to reformulate -the logic of experimental inquiry, so all the great -men of the Enlightenment were in search for the -organon of morals which should repeat the physical -triumphs of Newton. Bentham notes that physics -has had its Bacon and Newton; that morals has -had its Bacon in Helvétius, but still awaits its -Newton; and he leaves us in no doubt that at the -moment of writing he was ready, modestly but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -firmly, to fill the waiting niche with its missing -figure.</p> - -<p>The industrial movement furnished the concrete -imagery for this ethical renovation. The utilitarians -borrowed from Adam Smith the notion that -through industrial exchange in a free society the -individual pursuing his own good is led, under the -guidance of the “invisible hand,” to promote the -general good more effectually than if he had set -out to do it. This idea was dressed out in the -atomistic psychology which Hartley built out from -Locke—and was returned at usurious rates to later -economists.</p> - -<p>From the great French writers who had sought -to justify and promote democratic individualism, -came the conception that, since it is perverted -political institutions which deprave individuals and -bring them into hostility, nation against nation, -class against class, individual against individual, -the great political problem is such a reform of law -and legislation, civil and criminal, of administration, -and of education as will force the individual -to find his own interests in pursuits conducing to -the welfare of others.</p> - -<p>Tremendously effective as a tool of criticism, operative -in abolition and elimination, utilitarianism -failed to measure up to the constructive needs of -the time. Its theoretical equalization of the good -of each with that of every other was practically<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span> -perverted by its excessive interest in the middle -and manufacturing classes. Its speculative defect -of an atomistic psychology combined with this -narrowness of vision to make light of the constructive -work that needs to be done by the state, before -all can have, otherwise than in name, an equal -chance to count in the common good. Thus the -age-long subordination of economics to politics was -revenged in the submerging of both politics and -ethics in a narrow theory of economic profit; and -utilitarianism, in its orthodox descendants, proffered -the disjointed pieces of a mechanism, with a -monotonous reiteration that looked at aright they -form a beautifully harmonious organism.</p> - -<p>Prevision, and to some extent experience, of this -failure, conjoined with differing social traditions -and ambitions, evoked German idealism, the transcendental -morals of Kant and his successors. German -thought strove to preserve the traditions -which bound culture to the past, while revising -these traditions to render them capable of meeting -novel conditions. It found weapons at hand in the -conceptions borrowed by Roman law from Stoic -philosophy, and in the conceptions by which Protestant -humanism had re-edited scholastic Catholicism. -Grotius had made the idea of natural law, -natural right and obligation, the central idea of -German morals, as thoroughly as Locke had made -the individual desire for liberty and happiness the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span> -focus of English and then of French speculation. -Materialized idealism is the happy monstrosity in -which the popular demand for vivid imagery is -most easily reconciled with the equally strong demand -for supremacy of moral values; and the complete -idealistic materialism of Stoicism has always -given its ideas a practical influence out of all proportion -to their theoretical vogue as a system. -To the Protestant, that is the German, humanist, -Natural Law, the bond of harmonious reason in -nature, the spring of social intercourse among -men, the inward light of individual conscience, -united Cicero, St. Paul, and Luther in blessed -union; gave a rational, not superrational basis for -morals, and provided room for social legislation -which at the same time could easily be held back -from too ruthless application to dominant class interests.</p> - -<p>Kant saw the mass of empirical and hence irrelevant -detail that had found refuge within this liberal -and diffusive reason. He saw that the idea of -reason could be made self-consistent only by stripping -it naked of these empirical accretions. He -then provided, in his critiques, a somewhat cumbrous -moving van for transferring the resultant -pure or naked reason out of nature and the objective -world, and for locating it in new quarters, -with a new stock of goods and new customers. The -new quarters were particular subjects, individuals;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span> -the stock of goods were the forms of perception and -the functions of thought by which empirical flux is -woven into durable fabrics; the new customers were -a society of individuals in which all are ends in themselves. -There ought to be an injunction issued -that Kant’s saying about Hume’s awakening of -him should not be quoted save in connection with -his other saying that Rousseau brought him to himself, -in teaching him that the philosopher is of less -account than the laborer in the fields unless he contributes -to human freedom. But none the less, the -new tenant, the universal reason, and the old homestead, -the empirical tumultuous individual, could -not get on together. Reason became a mere voice -which, having nothing in particular to say, said -Law, Duty, in general, leaving to the existing -social order of the Prussia of Frederick the Great -the congenial task of declaring just what was obligatory -in the concrete. The marriage of freedom -and authority was thus celebrated with the -understanding that sentimental primacy went to -the former and practical control to the latter.</p> - -<p>The effort to force a universal reason that had -been used to the broad domains of the cosmos into -the cramped confines of individuality conceived as -merely “empirical,” a highly particularized creature -of sense, could have but one result: an explosion. -The products of that explosion constitute -the Post-Kantian philosophies. It was the work of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span> -Hegel to attempt to fill in the empty reason of -Kant with the concrete contents of history. The -voice sounded like the voice of Aristotle, Thomas -of Aquino, and Spinoza translated into Swabian -German; but the hands were as the hands of Montesquieu, -Herder, Condorcet, and the rising historical -school. The outcome was the assertion that -history is reason, and reason is history: the actual -is rational, the rational is the actual. It gave the -pleasant appearance (which Hegel did not strenuously -discourage) of being specifically an idealization -of the Prussian nation, and incidentally a systematized -apologetic for the universe at large. -But in intellectual and practical effect, it lifted the -idea of process above that of fixed origins and fixed -ends, and presented the social and moral order, as -well as the intellectual, as a scene of becoming, and -it located reason somewhere within the struggles of -life.</p> - -<p>Unstable equilibrium, rapid fermentation, and a -succession of explosive reports are thus the chief -notes of modern ethics. Scepticism and traditionalism, -empiricism and rationalism, crude naturalisms -and all-embracing idealisms, flourish side by -side—all the more flourish, one suspects, because -side by side. Spencer exults because natural science -reveals that a rapid transit system of evolution is -carrying us automatically to the goal of perfect -man in perfect society; and his English idealistic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span> -contemporary, Green, is so disturbed by the removal -from nature of its moral qualities, that he -tries to show that this makes no difference, since nature -in any case is constituted and known through -a spiritual principle which is as permanent as nature -is changing. An Amiel genteelly laments the -decadence of the inner life, while his neighbor Nietzsche -brandishes in rude ecstasy the banner of brute -survival as a happy omen of the final victory of -nobility of mind. The reasonable conclusion from -such a scene is that there is taking place a transformation -of attitude towards moral theory rather -than mere propagation of varieties among theories. -The classic theories all agreed in one regard. They -all alike assumed the existence of <em>the</em> end, the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">summum -bonum</i>, the final goal; and of <em>the</em> separate -moral force that moves to that goal. Moralists -have disputed as to whether the end is an aggregate -of pleasurable state of consciousness, enjoyment -of the divine essence, acknowledgment of the -law of duty, or conformity to environment. So they -have disputed as to the path by which the final -goal is to be reached: fear or benevolence? reverence -for pure law or pity for others? self-love or -altruism? But these very controversies implied -that there was but the one end and the one -means.</p> - -<p>The transformation in attitude, to which I referred, -is the growing belief that the proper business<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span> -of intelligence is discrimination of multiple -and present goods and of the varied immediate -means of their realization; not search for the one -remote aim. The progress of biology has accustomed -our minds to the notion that intelligence is -not an outside power presiding supremely but statically -over the desires and efforts of man, but -is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions -within specific situations. History, as the -lecturer on that subject told us, has discovered itself -in the idea of process. The genetic standpoint -makes us aware that the systems of the past are -neither fraudulent impostures nor absolute revelations; -but are the products of political, economic, -and scientific conditions whose change carries with -it change of theoretical formulations. The recognition -that intelligence is properly an organ of adjustment -in difficult situations makes us aware that -past theories were of value so far as they helped -carry to an issue the social perplexities from which -they emerged. But the chief impact of the evolutionary -method is upon the present. Theory -having learned what it cannot do, is made responsible -for the better performance of what needs to -be done, and what only a broadly equipped intelligence -can undertake: study of the conditions out -of which come the obstacles and the resources of -adequate life, and developing and testing the ideas -that, as working hypotheses, may be used to diminish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span> -the causes of evil and to buttress and expand -the sources of good. This program is indeed -vague, but only unfamiliarity with it could lead -one to the conclusion that it is less vague than the -idea that there is a single moral ideal and a single -moral motive force.</p> - -<p>From this point of view there is no separate body -of moral rules; no separate system of motive powers; -no separate subject-matter of moral knowledge, -and hence no such thing as an isolated ethical -science. If the business of morals is not to speculate -upon man’s final end and upon an ultimate -standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology, -and psychology to discover all that -can be discovered of man, his organic powers and -propensities. If its business is not to search for -the one separate moral motive, it is to converge all -the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, -economics, and political science upon the -construction of intelligent methods of improving -the common lot.</p> - -<p>If we still wish to make our peace with the past, -and to sum up the plural and changing goods of -life in a single word, doubtless the term happiness -is the one most apt. But we should again exchange -free morals for sterile metaphysics, if we -imagine that “happiness” is any less unique than -the individuals who experience it; any less complex -than the constitution of their capacities, or any less<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span> -variable than the objects upon which their capacities -are directed.</p> - -<p>To many timid, albeit sincere, souls of an earlier -century, the decay of the doctrine that all true -and worthful science is knowledge of final causes -seemed fraught with danger to science and to morals. -The rival conception of a wide open universe, -a universe without bounds in time or space, without -final limits of origin or destiny, a universe with the -lid off, was a menace. We now face in moral science -a similar crisis and like opportunity, as well -as share in a like dreadful suspense. The abolition -of a fixed and final goal and causal force in nature -did not, as matter of fact, render rational conviction -less important or less attainable. It was accompanied -by the provision of a technique of persistent -and detailed inquiry in all special fields of -fact, a technique which led to the detection of unsuspected -forces and the revelation of undreamed -of uses. In like fashion we may anticipate that -the abolition of <em>the</em> final goal and <em>the</em> single motive -power and <em>the</em> separate and infallible faculty in -morals, will quicken inquiry into the diversity of -specific goods of experience, fix attention upon -their conditions, and bring to light values now dim -and obscure. The change may relieve men from -responsibility for what they cannot do, but it will -promote thoughtful consideration of what they -may do and the definition of responsibility for what<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span> -they do amiss because of failure to think straight -and carefully. Absolute goods will fall into the -background, but the question of making more sure -and extensive the share of all men in natural and -social goods will be urgent, a problem not to be -escaped nor evaded.</p> - -<p>Morals, philosophy, returns to its first love; love -of the wisdom that is nurse, as nature is mother, -of good. But it returns to the Socratic principle -equipped with a multitude of special methods of inquiry -and testing; with an organized mass of -knowledge, and with control of the arrangements -by which industry, law, and education may concentrate -upon the problem of the participation by all -men and women, up to their capacity of absorption, -in all attained values. Morals may then well leave -to poetry and to art, the task (so unartistically -performed by philosophy since Plato) of gathering -together and rounding out, into one abiding picture, -the separate and special goods of life. It -may leave this task with the assurance that the resultant -synthesis will not depict any final and all-inclusive -good, but will add just one more specific -good to the enjoyable excellencies of life.</p> - -<p>Humorous irony shines through most of the -harsh glances turned towards the idea of an experimental -basis and career for morals. Some -shiver in the fear that morals will be plunged into -anarchic confusion—a view well expressed by a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span> -recent writer in the saying that if the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> and -transcendental basis of morals be abandoned “we -shall have merely the same certainty that now exists -in physics and chemistry”! Elsewhere lurks -the apprehension that the progress of scientific -method will deliver the purposive freedom of man -bound hand and foot to the fatal decrees of iron -necessity, called natural law. The notion that -laws govern and forces rule is an animistic survival. -It is a product of reading nature in terms -of politics in order to turn around and then read -politics in the light of supposed sanctions of nature. -This idea passed from medieval theology -into the science of Newton, to whom the universe -was the dominion of a sovereign whose laws were -the laws of nature. From Newton it passed into -the deism of the eighteenth century, whence it migrated -into the philosophy of the Enlightenment, -to make its last stand in Spencer’s philosophy of -the fixed environment and the static goal.</p> - -<p>No, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding -itself majestically from the reel of law -under the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite -congeries of changes. Laws are not governmental -regulations which limit change, but are -convenient formulations of selected portions of -change followed through a longer or shorter period -of time, and then registered in statistical forms -that are amenable to mathematical manipulation.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span> -That this device of shorthand symbolization presages -the subjection of man’s intelligent effort to -fixity of law and environment is interesting as a -culture survival, but is not important for moral -theory. Savage and child delight in creating -bogeys from which, their origin and structure being -conveniently concealed, interesting thrills and -shudders may be had. Civilized man in the nineteenth -century outdid these bugaboos in his image -of a fixed universe hung on a cast-iron framework -of fixed, necessary, and universal laws. Knowledge -of nature does not mean subjection to predestination, -but insight into courses of change; an -insight which is formulated in “laws,” that is, -methods of subsequent procedure.</p> - -<p>Knowledge of the process and conditions of physical -and social change through experimental science -and genetic history has one result with a double -name: increase of control, and increase of responsibility; -increase of power to direct natural change, -and increase of responsibility for its equitable direction -toward fuller good. Theory located within -progressive practice instead of reigning statically -supreme over it, means practice itself made responsible -to intelligence; to intelligence which relentlessly -scrutinizes the consequences of every practice, -and which exacts liability by an equally relentless -publicity. As long as morals occupies itself -with mere ideals, forces and conditions as they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span> -are will be good enough for “practical” men, -since they are then left free to their own devices -in turning these to their own account. As long as -moralists plume themselves upon possession of the -domain of the categorical imperative with its bare -precepts, men of executive habits will always be at -their elbows to regulate the concrete social conditions -through which the form of law gets its actual -filling of specific injunctions. When freedom is -conceived to be transcendental, the coercive restraint -of immediate necessity will lay its harsh -hand upon the mass of men.</p> - -<p>In the end, men do what they can do. They -refrain from doing what they cannot do. They -do what their own specific powers in conjunction -with the limitations and resources of the environment -permit. The effective control of their powers -is not through precepts, but through the regulation -of their conditions. If this regulation is to -be not merely physical or coercive, but moral, it -must consist of the intelligent selection and determination -of the environments in which we act; -and in an intelligent exaction of responsibility for -the use of men’s powers. Theorists inquire after -the “motive” to morality, to virtue and the good, -under such circumstances. What then, one wonders, -is their conception of the make-up of human -nature and of its relation to virtue and to goodness? -The pessimism that dictates such a question,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span> -if it be justified, precludes any consideration -of morals.</p> - -<p>The diversion of intelligence from discrimination -of plural and concrete goods, from noting -their conditions and obstacles, and from devising -methods for holding men responsible for their -concrete use of powers and conditions, has done -more than brute love of power to establish inequality -and injustice among men. It has done -more, because it has confirmed with social sanctions -the principle of feudal domination. All -men require moral sanctions in their conduct: the -consent of their kind. Not getting it otherwise, -they go insane to feign it. No man ever lived -with the exclusive approval of his own conscience. -Hence the vacuum left in practical matters by the -remote irrelevancy of transcendental morals has to -be filled in somehow. It is filled in. It is filled in -with class-codes, class-standards, class-approvals—with -codes which recommend the practices and -habits already current in a given circle, set, calling, -profession, trade, industry, club, or gang. These -class-codes always lean back upon and support -themselves by the professed ideal code. This latter -meets them more than half-way. Being in its pretense -a theory for regulating practice, it must demonstrate -its practicability. It is uneasy in isolation, -and travels hastily to meet with compromise and -accommodation the actual situation in all its brute<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span> -unrationality. Where the pressure is greatest—in -the habitual practice of the political and economic -chieftains—there it accommodates the most.</p> - -<p>Class-codes of morals are sanctions, under the -caption of ideals, of uncriticised customs; they are -recommendations, under the head of duties, of what -the members of the class are already most given -to doing. If there are to obtain more equable and -comprehensive principles of action, exacting a -more impartial exercise of natural power and resource -in the interests of a common good, members -of a class must no longer rest content in responsibility -to a class whose traditions constitute its -conscience, but be made responsible to a society -whose conscience is its free and effectively organized -intelligence.</p> - -<p>In such a conscience alone will the Socratic injunction -to man to know himself be fulfilled.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE"><a id="THE_EXPERIMENTAL_THEORY_OF_KNOWLEDGE"></a>THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor smaller">7</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It</span> should be possible to discern and describe a -knowing as one identifies any object, concern, -or event. It must have its own marks; it must -offer characteristic features—as much so as a -thunder-storm, the constitution of a State, or a -leopard. In the search for this affair, we are first -of all desirous for something which is for itself, -contemporaneously with its occurrence, a cognition, -not something called knowledge by another and -from without—whether this other be logician, -psychologist, or epistemologist. The “knowledge” -may turn out false, and hence no knowledge; -but this is an after-affair; it may prove -to be rich in fruitage of wisdom, but if this -outcome be only wisdom after the event, it -does not concern us. What we want is just something -which takes itself as knowledge, rightly or -wrongly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span></p> - - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p>This means a specific case, a sample. Yet instances -are proverbially dangerous—so naïvely -and graciously may they beg the questions at issue. -Our recourse is to an example so simple, so much -on its face as to be as innocent as may be of assumptions. -This case we shall gradually complicate, -mindful at each step to state just what new -elements are introduced. Let us suppose a smell, -just a floating odor. This odor may be anchored -by supposing that it moves to action; it starts -changes that end in picking and enjoying a rose. -This description is intended to apply to the course -of events witnessed and recounted from without. -What sort of a course must it be to constitute a -knowledge, or to have somewhere within its career -that which deserves this title? The smell, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">imprimis</i>, -is there; the movements that it excites are -there; the final plucking and gratification are experienced. -But, let us say, the smell is not the -smell of the rose; the resulting change of the organism -is not a sense of walking and reaching; the -delicious finale is not the fulfilment of the movement, -and, through that, of the original smell; “is -not,” in each case meaning is “not experienced as” -such. We may take, in short, these experiences in -a brutely serial fashion. The smell, <em>S</em>, is replaced -(and displaced) by a felt movement, <em>K</em>, this is replaced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span> -by the gratification, <em>G</em>. Viewed from without, -as we are now regarding it, there is <em>S-K-G</em>. -But from within, for itself, it is now <em>S</em>, now -<em>K</em>, now <em>G</em>, and so on to the end of the chapter. -Nowhere is there looking before and after; -memory and anticipation are not born. Such -an experience neither is, in whole or in part, -a knowledge, nor does it exercise a cognitive -function.</p> - -<p>Here, however, we may be halted. If there is -anything present in “consciousness” at all, we -may be told (at least we constantly are so told) -there must be knowledge of it as present—present, -at all events, in “consciousness.” There is, so it -is argued, knowledge at least of a simple apprehensive -type, knowledge of the acquaintance order, -knowledge <em>that</em>, even though not knowledge <em>what</em>. -The smell, it is admitted, does not know <em>about</em> anything -else, nor is anything known <em>about</em> the smell -(the same thing, perhaps); but the smell is known, -either by itself, or by the mind, or by some subject, -some unwinking, unremitting eye. No, we -must reply; there is no apprehension without some -(however slight) context; no acquaintance which -is not either recognition or expectation. Acquaintance -is presence honored with an escort; -presence is introduced as familiar, or an associate -springs up to greet it. Acquaintance always implies -a little friendliness; a trace of re-knowing, of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span> -anticipatory welcome or dread of the trait to follow.</p> - -<p>This claim cannot be dismissed as trivial. If -valid, it carries with it the distance between being -and knowing: and the recognition of an element of -mediation, that is, of art, in all knowledge. This -disparity, this transcendence, is not something -which holds of <em>our</em> knowledge, of finite knowledge, -just marking the gap between our type of consciousness -and some other with which we may contrast -it after the manner of the agnostic or the -transcendentalist (who hold so much property in -joint ownership!), but exists because knowing is -knowing, that way of bringing things to bear upon -things which we call reflection—a manipulation of -things experienced in the light one of another.</p> - -<p>“Feeling,” I read in a recent article, “feeling -is immediately acquainted with its own quality, -with its own subjective being.”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> How and whence -this duplication in the inwards of feeling into feeling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span> -the knower and feeling the known? into feeling -as being and feeling as acquaintance? Let us -frankly deny such monsters. Feeling <em>is</em> its own -quality; is its own <em>specific</em> (whence and why, once -more, <em>subjective</em>?) being. If this statement be -dogmatism, it is at least worth insistent declaration, -were it only by way of counter-irritant to that -other dogmatism which asserts that being in “consciousness” -is always presence for or in knowledge. -So let us repeat once more, that to be a smell (or -anything else) is one thing, to be <em>known</em> as smell, -another; to be a “feeling” one thing, to be <em>known</em> -as a “feeling” another.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> The first is thinghood; -existence indubitable, direct; in this way all things -<em>are</em> that are in “consciousness” at all.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> The -second is <em>reflected</em> being, things indicating and calling -for other things—something offering the possibility -of truth and hence of falsity. The first is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span> -genuine immediacy; the second is (in the instance -discussed) a pseudo-immediacy, which in the same -breath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in -another term (and one which is unexperienced both -in itself and in its relation) the subject or “consciousness,” -to which the immediate is related.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>But we need not remain with dogmatic assertions. -To be acquainted with a thing or with a -person has a definite empirical meaning; we have -only to call to mind what it is to be genuinely and -empirically acquainted, to have done forever with -this uncanny presence which, though bare and simple -presence, is yet known, and thus is clothed -upon and complicated. To be acquainted with a -thing is to be assured (from the standpoint of the -experience itself) that it is of such and such a -character; that it will behave, if given an opportunity, -in such and such a way; that the obviously -and flagrantly present trait is associated with fellow -traits that will show themselves, if the leadings -of the present trait are followed out. To be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span> -acquainted is to anticipate to some extent, on the -basis of prior experience. I am, say, barely acquainted -with Mr. Smith: then I have no extended -body of associated qualities along with those palpably -present, but at least some one suggested trait -occurs; his nose, his tone of voice, the place where -I saw him, his calling in life, an interesting anecdote -about him, etc. To be acquainted is to know -what a thing is <em>like</em> in some particular. If one is -acquainted with the smell of a flower it means that -the smell is not just smell, but reminds one of -some other experienced thing which stands in continuity -with the smell. There is thus supplied a -condition of control over or purchase upon what -is present, the possibility of translating it into -terms of some other trait not now sensibly present.</p> - -<p>Let us return to our example. Let us suppose -that <em>S</em> is not just displaced by <em>K</em> and then by <em>G</em>. -Let us suppose it persists; and persists not as an -unchanged <em>S</em> alongside <em>K</em> and <em>G</em>, nor yet as fused -with them into a new further quale <em>J</em>. For in such -events, we have only the type already considered -and rejected. For an observer the new quale might -be more complex, or fuller of meaning, than the -original <em>S</em>, <em>K</em>, or <em>G</em>, but might not be experienced -as complex. We might thus suppose a composite -photograph which should suggest nothing of the -complexity of its origin and structure. In this -case we should have simply another picture.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span> -But we may also suppose that the blur of the -photograph suggests the superimposition of pictures -and something of their character. Then we -get another, and for our problem, much more fruitful -kind of persistence. We will imagine that the -final <em>G</em> assumes this form: Gratification-terminating-movement-induced-by-smell. -The smell is -still present; it has persisted. It is not present in -its original form, but is represented with a quality, -an office, that of having excited activity and thereby -terminating its career in a certain quale of gratification. -It is not <em>S</em>, but Σ; that is <em>S</em> with an -increment of meaning due to maintenance and fulfilment -through a process. <em>S</em> is no longer just -smell, but smell which has excited and thereby secured.</p> - -<p>Here we have a cognitive, but not a cognitional -thing. In saying that the smell is finally experienced -as <em>meaning</em> gratification (through intervening -handling, seeing, etc.) and meaning it not in a -hapless way, but in a fashion which operates to -effect what is meant, we retrospectively attribute -intellectual force and function to the smell—and -this is what is signified by “cognitive.” Yet the -smell is not cognitional, because it did not knowingly -intend to mean this; but is found, after the -event, to have meant it. Nor again is the final -experience, the Σ or transformed <em>S</em>, a knowledge.</p> - -<p>Here again the statement may be challenged.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span> -Those who agree with the denial that bare presence -of a quale in “consciousness” constitutes acquaintance -and simple apprehension, may now turn -against us, saying that experience of fulfilment of -meaning is just what we mean by knowledge, and -this is just what the Σ of our illustration is. The -point is fundamental. As the smell at first was -presence or being, less than knowing, so the fulfilment -is an experience that is more than knowing. -Seeing and handling the flower, enjoying the full -meaning of the smell as the odor of just this -beautiful thing, is not knowledge because it is more -than knowledge.</p> - -<p>As this may seem dogmatic, let us suppose that -the fulfilment, the realization, experience, is a -knowledge. Then how shall it be distinguished -from and yet classed with other things called knowledge, -viz., reflective, discursive cognitions? Such -knowledges are what they are precisely because they -are not fulfilments, but intentions, aims, schemes, -symbols of overt fulfilment. Knowledge, perceptual -and conceptual, of a hunting dog is prerequisite in -order that I may really hunt with the hounds. The -hunting in turn may increase my knowledge of dogs -and their ways. But the knowledge of the dog, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">qua</i> -knowledge, remains characteristically marked off -from the use of that knowledge in the fulfilment -experience, the hunt. The hunt is a <em>realization</em> of -knowledge; it alone, if you please, verifies, validates,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span> -knowledge, or supplies tests of truth. The -prior knowledge of the dog, was, if you wish, -hypothetical, lacking in assurance or categorical -certainty. The hunting, the fulfilling, realizing -experience alone <em>gives</em> knowledge, because it alone -completely assures; makes faith good in works.</p> - -<p>Now there is and can be no objection to this -definition of knowledge, <em>provided it is consistently -adhered to</em>. One has as much right to identify -knowledge with complete assurance, as I have to -identify it with anything else. Considerable justification -in the common use of language, in common -sense, may be found for defining knowledge as complete -assurance. But even upon this definition, the -fulfilling experience is not, as such, complete assurance, -and hence not a knowledge. Assurance, cognitive -validation, and guaranteeship, follow from -it, but are not coincident with its occurrence. It -<em>gives</em>, but <em>is</em> not, assurance. The concrete construction -of a story, the manipulation of a machine, -the hunting with the dogs, is not, so far as it <em>is</em> -fulfilment, a confirmation of meanings previously -entertained as cognitional; that is, is not contemporaneously -experienced as such. To think of -prior schemes, symbols, meanings, as fulfilled in a -subsequent experience, is reflectively to present -in their relations to one another both the meanings -and the experiences in which they are, as -a matter of fact, embodied. This reflective attitude<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span> -cannot be identical with the fulfilment experience -itself; it occurs only in retrospect when -the worth of the meanings, or cognitive ideas, is -critically inspected in the light of their fulfilment; -or it occurs as an interruption of the fulfilling -experience. The hunter stops his hunting as -a fulfilment to reflect that he made a mistake -in his idea of his dog, or again, that his dog -is everything he thought he was—that his notion -of him is confirmed. Or, the man stops the actual -construction of his machine and turns back upon -his plan in correction or in admiring estimate of its -value. <em>The fulfilling experience is not of itself -knowledge</em>, then, even if we identify knowledge -with fulness of assurance or guarantee. Moreover -it gives, affords, assurance only in reference -to a situation which we have not yet considered.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>Before the category of confirmation or refutation -can be introduced, there must be something -which <em>means</em> to mean something and which therefore -can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue—and -this is precisely what we have not as yet found. -We must return to our instance and introduce a -further complication. Let us suppose that the -smell quale recurs at a later date, and that it -recurs neither as the original <em>S</em> nor yet as the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span> -final Σ but as an <em>S</em>’ which is fated or charged -with the sense of the possibility of a fulfilment like -unto Σ. The <em>S</em>’ that recurs is aware of something -else which it means, which it intends to effect -through an operation incited by it and without -which its own presence is abortive, and, so to say, -unjustified, senseless. Now we have an experience -which is <em>cognitional</em>, not merely cognitive; which -is contemporaneously aware of meaning something -beyond itself, instead of having this meaning ascribed -by another at a later period. <em>The odor -knows the rose; the rose is known by the odor; and -the import of each term is constituted by the relationship -in which it stands to the other.</em> That -is, the import of the smell is the indicating and -demanding relation which it sustains to the enjoyment -of the rose as its fulfilling experience; while -this enjoyment is just the content or definition -of what the smell consciously meant, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, meant -to mean. Both the thing meaning and the thing -meant are elements in the same situation. Both -are present, but both are not present in the same -way. In fact, one is present as-<em>not</em>-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-the-other-is. -It is present -as something to be rendered present in the same -way through the intervention of an operation. -We must not balk at a purely verbal difficulty. -It suggests a verbal inconsistency to speak of a -thing present-as-absent. But all ideal contents,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span> -all aims (that is, things aimed at) are present in -just such fashion. Things can be presented as -absent, just as they can be presented as hard or -soft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away -from the body. The assumption that an ideal -content must be either totally absent, or else -present <em>in just the same fashion</em> as it will be -when it is realized, is not only dogmatic, but self-contradictory. -The only way in which an ideal -content can be experienced at all is to be presented -as <em>not-present-in-the-same-way</em> in which something -else is present, the latter kind of presence affording -the standard or type of <em>satisfactory</em> presence. -When present in the same way it ceases to be an -ideal content. Not a contrast of bare existence -over against non-existence, or of present consciousness -over against reality out of present consciousness, -but of a satisfactory with an unsatisfactory -mode of presence makes the difference between the -“really” and the “ideally” present.</p> - -<p>In terms of our illustration, handling and enjoying -the rose are present, but they are not -present in the same way that the smell is present. -They are present as <em>going</em> to be there in the -same way, through an operation which the smell -stands sponsor for. The situation is inherently -an uneasy one—one in which everything hangs -upon the performance of the operation indicated; -upon the adequacy of movement as a connecting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span> -link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and -the thing meant. Generalizing from the instance, -we get the following definition: An experience is a -knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced -distinction and connection of two elements of the -following sort: <em>one means or intends the presence -of the other in the same fashion in which itself is -already present, while the other is that which, while -not present in the same fashion, must become so -present if the meaning or intention of its companion -or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the -operation it sets up</em>.</p> - - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>We now return briefly to the question of knowledge -as acquaintance, and at greater length to -that of knowledge as assurance, or as fulfilment -which confirms and validates. With the recurrence -of the odor as meaning something beyond itself, -there is apprehension, knowledge <em>that</em>. One may -now say I know what a <em>rose</em> smells like; or I know -what <em>this</em> smell is like; I am acquainted with the -rose’s agreeable odor. In short, on the basis of a -present quality, the odor anticipates and forestalls -some further trait.</p> - -<p>We have also the conditions of knowledge of the -confirmation and refutation type. In the working -out of the situation just described, in the transformation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span> -self-indicated and self-demanded, of the -tensional into a harmonious or satisfactory situation, -fulfilment <em>or</em> disappointment results. The -odor either does or does not fulfil itself in the rose. -The smell as intention is borne out by the facts, -or is nullified. As has already been pointed out, -the subsequent experience of the fulfilment type is -not primarily a confirmation or refutation. Its -import is too vital, too urgent to be reduced <em>in -itself</em> just to the value of testing an intention or -meaning.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> But it gets <em>in reflection</em> just such verificatory -significance. If the smell’s intention is -unfulfilled, the discrepancy may throw one back, -in reflection, upon the original situation. Interesting -developments then occur. The smell meant -a rose; and yet it did not (so it turns out) mean -a rose; it meant another flower, or something, one -can’t just tell what. Clearly there is <em>something else</em><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span> -which enters in; something else beyond the odor -as it was first experienced determined the validity -of its meaning. Here then, perhaps, we have a -transcendental, as distinct from an experimental -reference? <em>Only if this something else makes no -difference, or no detectable difference, in the smell -itself.</em> If the utmost observation and reflection -can find no difference in the smell quales that fail -and those that succeed in executing their intentions, -then there is an outside controlling and disturbing -factor, which, since it is outside of the situation, -can never be utilized in knowledge, and -hence can never be employed in any concrete testing -or verifying. In this case, knowing depends -upon an extra-experimental or transcendental factor. -But this very transcendental quality makes -both confirmation and refutation, correction, criticism, -of the pretensions or meanings of things, -impossible. For the conceptions of truth and -error, we must, upon the transcendental basis, substitute -those of accidental success or failure. -Sometimes the intention chances upon one, sometimes -upon another. Why or how, the gods only -know—and they only if to them the extra-experimental -factor is not extra-experimental, but makes -a concrete difference in the concrete smell. But -fortunately the situation is not one to be thus described. -The factor that determines the success -or failure, does institute a difference in the thing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span> -which means the object, and this difference is detectable, -once attention, through failure, has been -called to the need of its discovery. At the very -least, it makes this difference: the smell is infected -with an element of uncertainty of meaning—and -this as a part of the thing experienced, not for -an observer. This additional <em>awareness</em> at least -brings about an additional <em>wariness</em>. Meaning is -more critical, and operation more cautious.</p> - -<p>But we need not stop here. Attention may be -fully directed to the subject of smells. Smells may -become the object of knowledge. They may take, -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">pro tempore</i>,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> the place which the rose formerly -occupied. One may, that is, observe the cases in -which odors mean other things than just roses, may -voluntarily produce new cases for the sake of -further inspection, and thus account for the -cases where meanings had been falsified in the -issue; discriminate more carefully the peculiarities -of those meanings which the event verified, and -thus safeguard and bulwark to some extent the -employing of similar meanings in the future. Superficially, -it may then seem as if odors were -treated after the fashion of Locke’s simple ideas,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span> -or Hume’s “distinct ideas which are separate -existences.” Smells apparently assume an independent, -isolated status during this period of investigation. -“Sensations,” as the laboratory psychologist -and the analytic psychologist generally -studies them, are examples of just such detached -things. But egregious error results if we forget -that this seeming isolation and detachment is the -outcome of a deliberate scientific device—that it is -simply a part of the scientific technique of an inquiry -directed upon securing <em>tested</em> conclusions. -Just and only because odors (or any group of -qualities) are parts of a connected world are -they signs of things beyond themselves; and only -because they are signs is it profitable and necessary -to study them <em>as if</em> they were complete, self-enclosed -entities.</p> - -<p>In the reflective determination of things with -reference to their specifically meaning other things, -experiences of fulfilment, disappointment, and going -astray inevitably play an important and recurrent -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">rôle</i>. They also are realistic facts, related in -realistic ways to the things that intend to mean -other things and to the things intended. When -these fulfilments and refusals <em>are reflected upon</em> in -the determinate relations in which they stand to -their relevant meanings, they obtain a quality which -is quite lacking to them in their immediate occurrence -as just fulfilments or disappointments; viz.,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span> -the property of affording assurance and correction—of -confirming and refuting. Truth and falsity -are not properties of any experience or thing, in -and of itself or in its first intention; <em>but of things -where the problem of assurance consciously enters -in</em>. <em>Truth and falsity present themselves as significant -facts only in situations in which specific -meanings and their already experienced fulfilments -and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and -contrasted with reference to the question of the -worth, as to reliability of meaning, of the given -meaning or class of meanings.</em> Like knowledge -itself, truth is an experienced relation of things, -and it has no meaning outside of such relation,<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> any -more than such adjectives as comfortable applied -to a lodging, correct applied to speech, persuasive -applied to an orator, etc., have worth apart from -the <em>specific</em> things to which they are applied. It -would be a great gain for logic and epistemology, -if we were always to translate the noun “truth” -back into the adjective “true,” and this back into -the adverb “truly”; at least, if we were to do so -until we have familiarized ourselves thoroughly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span> -with the fact that “truth” is an abstract noun, -summarizing a quality presented by specific affairs -in their own specific contents.</p> - - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>I have attempted, in the foregoing pages, a description -of the function of knowledge in its own -terms and on its merits—a description which in -intention is realistic, if by realistic we are content -to mean naturalistic, a description undertaken on -the basis of what Mr. Santayana has well called -“following the lead of the subject-matter.” Unfortunately -at the present time all such undertakings -contend with a serious extraneous obstacle. -Accomplishing the undertaking has difficulties -enough of its own to reckon with; and first attempts -are sure to be imperfect, if not radically wrong. -But at present the attempts are not, for the most -part, even listened to on their own account, they -are not examined and criticised as naturalistic attempts. -<em>They are compared with undertakings of -a wholly different nature, with an epistemological -theory of knowledge, and the assumptions of this -extraneous theory are taken as a ready-made standard -by which to test their validity.</em> Literally of -course, “epistemology” means only theory of -knowledge; the term <em>might</em> therefore have been -employed simply as a synonym for a descriptive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span> -logic; for a theory that takes knowledge as it -finds it and attempts to give the same kind of an -account of it that would be given of any other natural -function or occurrence. But the mere mention -of what <em>might</em> have been only accentuates what is. -The things that pass for epistemology all assume -that knowledge is not a natural function or event, -but a mystery.</p> - -<p>Epistemology starts from the assumption that -certain conditions lie back of knowledge. The -mystery would be great enough if knowledge were -constituted by non-natural conditions back of -knowledge, but the mystery is increased by the fact -that the conditions are defined so as to be incompatible -with knowledge. Hence the primary -problem of epistemology is: How is knowledge -<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">überhaupt</i>, knowledge at large, <i>possible</i>? Because -of the incompatibility between the concrete occurrence -and function of knowledge and the conditions -back of it to which it must conform, a second -problem arises: How is knowledge in general, -knowledge <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">überhaupt</i>, <em>valid</em>? Hence the complete -divorce in contemporary thought between epistemology -as theory of knowledge and logic as an -account of the specific ways in which particular -beliefs that are better than other alternative beliefs -regarding the same matters are formed; and also -the complete divorce between a naturalistic, a biological -and social psychology, setting forth how<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span> -the function of knowledge is evolved out of other -natural activities, and epistemology as an account -of how knowledge is possible anyhow.</p> - -<p>It is out of the question to set forth in this place -in detail the contrast between transcendental epistemology -and an experimental theory of knowledge. -It may assist the understanding of the latter, -however, if I point out, baldly and briefly, how, -<em>out of the distinctively empirical situation</em>, there -arise those assumptions which make knowledge a -mystery, and hence a topic for a peculiar branch -of philosophizing.</p> - -<p>As just pointed out, epistemology makes the -possibility of knowledge a problem, because it -assumes back of knowledge conditions incompatible -with the obvious traits of knowledge as it empirically -exists. These assumptions are that the -organ or instrument of knowledge is not a natural -object, but some ready-made state of mind or consciousness, -something purely “subjective,” a peculiar -kind of existence which lives, moves, and has -its being in a realm different from things to be -known; and that the ultimate goal and content -of knowledge is a fixed, ready-made thing which -has no organic connections with the origin, purpose, -and growth of the attempt to know it, some -kind of <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Ding-an-sich</i> or absolute, extra-empirical -“Reality.”</p> - -<p>(1) It is not difficult to see at what point in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span> -the development of natural knowledge, or the signifying -of one thing by another, there arises the -notion of the knowing medium as something radically -different in the order of existence from the -thing to be known. It arises subsequent to the repeated -experience of non-fulfilment, of frustration -and disappointment. The odor did not after all -mean the rose; it meant something quite different; -and yet its indicative function was exercised so -forcibly that we could not help—or at least <em>did</em> -not help—believing in the existence of the rose. -This is a familiar and typical kind of experience, -one which very early leads to the recognition that -“things are not what they seem.” There are -two contrasted methods of dealing with this recognition: -one is the method indicated above (p. 93). -We go more thoroughly, patiently, and carefully -into the facts of the case. We employ all sorts -of methods, invented for the purpose, of examining -the things that are signs and the things that -are signified, and we experimentally produce various -situations, in order that we may tell <em>what</em> smells -mean roses <em>when</em> roses are meant, what it is about -the smell and the rose that led us into error; and -that we may be able to discriminate those cases in -which a suspended conclusion is all that circumstances -admit. We simply do the best we can to -regulate our system of signs so that they become as -instructive as possible, utilizing for this purpose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span> -(as indicated above) all possible experiences of -success and of failure, and deliberately instituting -cases which will throw light on the specific empirical -causes of success and failure.</p> - -<p>Now it so happens that when the facts of error -were consciously generalized and formulated, -namely in Greek thought, such a technique of specific -inquiry and rectification did not exist—in fact, -it hardly could come into existence until <em>after</em> error -had been seized upon as constituting a fundamental -anomaly. Hence the method just outlined -of dealing with the situation was impossible. We -can imagine disconsolate ghosts willing to postpone -any professed solution of the difficulty till subsequent -generations have thrown more light on the -question itself; we can hardly imagine passionate -human beings exercising such reserve. At all -events, Greek thought provided what seemed a satisfactory -way out: there are two orders of existence, -one permanent and complete, the noumenal -region, to which alone the characteristic of Being -is properly applicable, the other transitory, phenomenal, -sensible, a region of non-Being, or at -least of mere Coming-to-be, a region in which Being -is hopelessly mixed with non-Being, with the -unreal. The former alone is the domain of knowledge, -of truth; the latter is the territory of opinion, -confusion, and error. In short, the contrast <em>within</em> -experience of the cases in which things successfully<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span> -and unsuccessfully maintained and executed -the meanings of other things was erected into -a wholesale difference of status in the intrinsic -characters of the things involved in the two types -of cases.</p> - -<p>With the beginnings of modern thought, the -region of the “unreal,” the source of opinion and -error, was located exclusively in the individual. -The object was <em>all</em> real and <em>all</em> satisfactory, but -the “subject” could approach the object only -through his own subjective states, his “sensations” -and “ideas.” The Greek conception of -two orders of existence was retained, but instead -of the two orders characterizing the “universe” -itself, one <em>was</em> the universe, the other was the -individual mind trying to know that universe. -This scheme would obviously easily account for -error and hallucination; but how could <em>knowledge</em>, -truth, ever come about such a basis? The Greek -problem of the possibility of error became -the modern problem of the possibility of knowledge.</p> - -<p>Putting the matter in terms that are independent -of history, experiences of failure, disappointment, -non-fulfilment of the function of meaning -and contention may lead the individual to the -path of science—to more careful and extensive -investigation of the things themselves, with a view -to detecting specific sources of error, and guarding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span> -against them, and regulating, so far as -possible, the conditions under which objects are -bearers of meanings beyond themselves. But impatient -of such slow and tentative methods (which -insure not infallibility but increased probability of -valid conclusions), by reason of disappointment -a person may turn epistemologist. He may then -take the discrepancy, the failure of the smell to -execute its own intended meaning, as a wholesale, -rather than as a specific fact: as evidence of a -contrast in general between things meaning and -things meant, instead of as evidence of the need -of a more cautious and thorough inspection of -odors and execution of operations indicated by -them. One may then say: Woe is me; smells are -only <em>my</em> smells, subjective states existing in an -order of being made out of consciousness, while -roses exist in another order made out of a radically -different sort of stuff; or, odors are made out of -“finite” consciousness as their stuff, while the real -things, the objects which fulfil them, are made out -of an “infinite” consciousness as their material. -Hence some purely metaphysical tie has to be called -in to bring them into connection with each other. -And yet this tie does not concern knowledge; it -does not make the meaning of one odor any more -correct than that of another, nor enable us to -discriminate relative degrees of correctness. As -a principle of control, this transcendental connection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span> -is related to all alike, and hence condemns and -justifies all alike.<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>It is interesting to note that the transcendentalist -almost invariably first falls into the psychological -fallacy; and then having himself taken the -psychologist’s attitude (the attitude which is interested -in meanings as themselves self-inclosed -“ideas”) accuses the empiricist whom he criticises -of having confused mere psychological existence -with logical validity. That is, he begins by supposing -that the smell of our illustration (and all -the cognitional objects for which this is used as a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span> -symbol) is a purely mental or psychical state, -so that the question of logical reference or intention -is the problem of how the merely mental can -“know” the extra-mental. But from a strictly -empirical point of view, the smell which knows is -no more merely mental than is the rose known. -We may, if we please, say that the smell when -involving conscious meaning or intention is “mental,” -but this term “mental” does not denote some -separate type of existence—existence as a state of -consciousness. It denotes only the fact that the -smell, a real and non-psychical object, now exercises -an intellectual <em>function</em>. This new property -involves, as James has pointed out, an <em>additive</em> -relation—a new property possessed by a non-mental -object, when that object, occurring in -a new context, assumes a further office and -use.<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> To be “in the mind” means to be in a -situation in which the function of intending is -directly concerned.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Will not some one who believes -that the knowing experience is <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ab origine</i> a -strictly “mental” thing, explain how, as matter -of fact, it does get a specific, extra-mental reference, -capable of being tested, confirmed, or refuted?<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span> -Or, if he believes that viewing it as -merely mental expresses only the form it takes -for psychological analysis, will he not explain -why he so persistently attributes the inherently -“mental” characterization of it to the empiricist -whom he criticises? An object <em>becomes</em> meaning -when used empirically in a certain way; and, under -certain circumstances, the exact character and -worth of this meaning <em>becomes</em> an object of solicitude. -But the transcendental epistemologist with -his purely psychical “meanings” and his purely -extra-empirical “truths” assumes a <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Deus ex Machina</i> -whose mechanism is preserved a secret. And -as if to add to the arbitrary character of his assumption, -he has to admit that the transcendental -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> faculty by which mental states get objective -reference does not in the least help us to -discriminate, <em>in the concrete</em>, between an objective -reference that is false and one that is valid.</p> - -<p>(2) The counterpart assumption to that of pure -aboriginal “mental states” is, of course, that of -an Absolute Reality, fixed and complete in itself, -of which our “mental states” are bare transitory -hints, their true meaning and their transcendent -goal being the Truth <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in rerum natura</i>. If the -organ and medium of knowing is a self-inclosed -order of existence different in kind from the Object -to be known, then that Object must stand out there -in complete aloofness from the concrete purpose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span> -and procedure of knowing it. But if we go back to -the knowing as a natural occurrence, capable of -description, we find that just as a smell does not -mean Rose in general (or anything else at large), -but means a <em>specific</em> group of qualities whose experience -is intended and anticipated, so the function -of knowing is always expressed in connections -between a given experience and a specific possible -wanted experience. The “rose” that is meant in a -particular situation <em>is</em> the rose of that situation. -When this experience is consummated, it is achieved -as the fulfilment of the conditions in which just -<em>that</em> intention was entertained—not as the fulfilment -of a faculty of knowledge or a meaning in -general. Subsequent meanings and subsequent fulfilments -may increase, may enrich the consummating -experience; the object or content of the rose -as known may be other and fuller next time and -so on. But we have no right to set up “a rose” -at large or in general as the object of the knowing -odor; the object of a knowledge is always strictly -correlative to that particular thing which means it. -It is not something which can be put in a wholesale -way over against that which cognitively refers to -it, as when the epistemologist puts the “real” rose -(object) over against a merely phenomenal or empirical -rose which <em>this</em> smell happens to mean. As -the meaning gets more complex, fuller, more finely -discriminated, the object which realizes or fulfils<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span> -the meaning grows similarly in quality. But we -cannot set up a rose, an object of fullest, complete, -and exhaustive content as that which is really -meant by any and every odor of a rose, whether -it consciously meant to mean it or not. The test -of the cognitional rectitude of the odor lies in the -<em>specific</em> object which it sets out to secure. This -is the meaning of the statement that the import of -<em>each</em> term is found in its relationship to the other. -It applies to object meant as well as to the meaning. -Fulfilment, completion are always relative -terms. <em>Hence the criterion of the truth or falsity -of the meaning, of the adequacy, of the cognitional -thing lies within the relationships of the situation -and not without.</em> The thing that means another -by means of an intervening operation either succeeds -or fails in accomplishing the operation indicated, -while this operation either gives or fails -to give the object meant. Hence the truth or -falsity of the original cognitional object.</p> - - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>From this excursion, I return in conclusion to a -brief general characterization of those situations -in which we are aware that things mean other -things and are so critically aware of it that, in -order to increase the probability of fulfilment and -to decrease the chance of frustration, all possible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span> -pains are taken to regulate the meanings that attach -to things. These situations define that type -of knowing which we call <em>scientific</em>. There are -things that claim to mean other experiences; in -which the trait of meaning other objects is not discovered -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ab extra</i>, and after the event, but is part of -the thing itself. This trait of the thing is as realistic, -as specific, as any other of its traits. It is, -therefore, as open to inspection and determination -as to its nature, as is any other trait. Moreover, -since it is upon this trait that assurance (as distinct -from accident) of fulfilment depends, an especial -interest, an absorbing interest, attaches to its determination. -Hence the scientific type of knowledge -and its growing domination over other sorts.</p> - -<p>We <em>employ</em> meanings in all intentional constructions -of experience—in all anticipations, whether -artistic, utilitarian or technological, social or -moral. The success of the anticipation is found -to depend upon the character of the meaning. -Hence the stress upon a right determination of -these meanings. Since they are the instruments -upon which fulfilment depends <em>so far as that is -controlled</em> or other than accidental, they become -themselves objects of surpassing interest. For all -persons at some times, and for one class of persons -(scientists) at almost all times, the determination -of the meanings employed in the control of fulfilments -(of acting upon meanings) is central.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span> -The experimental or pragmatic theory of knowledge -explains the dominating importance of science; -it does not depreciate it or explain it away.</p> - -<p>Possibly pragmatic writers are to blame for the -tendency of their critics to assume that the practice -they have in mind is utilitarian in some narrow -sense, referring to some preconceived and inferior -use—though I cannot recall any evidence for this -admission. But what the pragmatic theory has in -mind is precisely the fact that all the affairs of -life which need regulation—<em>all values of all types</em>—depend -upon utilizations of meanings. Action -is not to be limited to anything less than the carrying -out of ideas, than the execution, whether strenuous -or easeful, of meanings. Hence the surpassing -importance which comes to attach to the careful, -impartial construction of the meanings, and to -their constant survey and resurvey with reference -to their value as evidenced by experiences of fulfilment -and deviation.</p> - -<p>That truth denotes <em>truths</em>, that is, specific verifications, -combinations of meanings and outcomes -reflectively viewed, is, one may say, the central -point of the experimental theory. Truth, in general -or in the abstract, is a just name for an experienced -relation among the things of experience: -that sort of relation in which intents are retrospectively -viewed from the standpoint of the fulfilment -which they secure through their own natural<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span> -operation or incitement. Thus the experimental -theory explains directly and simply the absolutistic -tendency to translate concrete true things into the -general relationship, Truth, and then to hypostatize -this abstraction into identity with real being, -Truth <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">per se</i> and <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in se</i>, of which all transitory -things and events—that is, all experienced realities—are -only shadowy futile approximations. This -type of relationship is central for man’s will, for -man’s conscious endeavor. To select, to conserve, -to extend, to propagate those meanings which the -course of events has generated, to note their peculiarities, -to be in advance on the alert for them, to -search for them anxiously, to substitute them for -meanings that eat up our energy in vain, defines -the aim of rational effort and the goal of legitimate -ambition. The absolutistic theory is the transfer -of this moral or voluntary law of selective action -into a quasi-physical (that is, metaphysical) law -of indiscriminate being. Identify metaphysical being -with <em>significant excellent</em> being—that is, with -those relationships of things which, in our moments -of deepest insight and largest survey, we would -continue and reproduce—and the experimentalist, -rather than the absolutist, is he who has a right -to proclaim the supremacy of Truth, and the superiority -of the life devoted to Truth for its own -sake over that of “mere” activity. But to read -back into an order of things which exists without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span> -the participation of our reflection and aim, the -quality which defines the purpose of our thought -and endeavor is at one and the same stroke to -mythologize reality and to deprive the life of -thoughtful endeavor of its ground for being.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION FOR TRUTH"><a id="THE_INTELLECTUALIST_CRITERION_FOR_TRUTH"></a>THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION FOR TRUTH<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor smaller">19</a></h2> -</div> - - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1">Among</span> the influences that have worked in -contemporary philosophy towards disintegration -of intellectualism of the epistemological -type, and towards the substitution of a philosophy -of experience, the work of Mr. Bradley must be -seriously counted. One has, for example, only to -compare his metaphysics with the two fundamental -contentions of T. H. Green, namely, that reality -is a single, eternal, and all-inclusive system of -relations, and that this system of relations is one -in kind with that process of relating which constitutes -our thinking, to be instantly aware of a -changed atmosphere. Much of Bradley’s writings -is a sustained and deliberate polemic against intellectualism -of the Neo-Kantian type. When, -however, we find conjoined to this criticism an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span> -equally sustained contention that the philosophic -conception of reality must be based on an exclusively -intellectual criterion, a criterion belonging -to and confined to theory, we have a situation that -is thought-provoking. The situation grows in interest -when it is remembered that there is a general -and growing tendency among those who appeal in -philosophy to a strictly intellectualistic <em>method</em> of -defining “reality,” to insist that the reality reached -by this method has a super-intellectual <em>content</em>: -that intellectual, affectional, and volitional features -are all joined and fused in “ultimate” reality. -The curious character of the situation is that -Reality is an “absolute experience” of which the -intellectual is simply one partial and transmuted -moment. Yet this reality is attained unto, in philosophic -method, by exclusive emphasis upon the intellectual -aspect of present experience and by systematic -exclusion of exactly the emotional, volitional -features which with respect to content are insisted -upon! Under such circumstances the cynically-minded -are moved to wonder whether this tremendous -insistence upon one factor in present experience -at the expense of others, is not because -this is the only way to maintain the notion of -“Absolute Experience,” and to prevent it from collapsing -into ordinary everyday experience. This -paradox is not peculiar to Mr. Bradley. Looking -at the Neo-Kantian movement in the broad in its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span> -modern form, one might almost say that its prominent -feature is its insistence upon reaching a -“Reality” that includes extra-intellectual factors -and phases, traits that are ideal in a moral -and emotional sense, by an exclusive recognition of -the function of knowledge in its isolation.</p> - -<p>Such being the case, an examination of Mr. -Bradley’s method and criterion may have far-reaching -implications. First, let us set before -ourselves the general points of Mr. Bradley’s indictment -of intellectualism.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> Knowledge or judgment -works by means of thought; it is predication -of idea (meaning) of existence as its subject. Its -final aim is to effect a complete union or harmony -of existence and meaning. But it is fore-doomed -to failure, for in realizing its end it must employ -means which contradict its own purpose. This -inherent incapacity lurks in judgment with respect -to subject, predicate, and copula. The predicate -or meaning necessary to complete the reality presented -in the subject can be referred to the latter -and united with it only by being itself alienated -from existence. It heals the wounds or deficiencies -of its own subject (and in the end all deficiencies -are to the modern idealist discrepancies) only on -condition of inflicting another wound,—only by -sundering meaning from a prior union with existence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span> -in some other phase. This latter existence, -therefore, is always left out in the cold. It is as -if we wanted to get all the cloth in the world into -one garment and our only way of accomplishing -this were to tear off a portion from one piece of -goods in order to patch it on to another.</p> - -<p>The subject of the judgment, moreover, as well -as the predicate, stands in the way of judgment -fulfilling its own task. It has “sensuous infinitude” -and it has “immediacy,” but these two -traits contradict each other. The details of the -subject always go beyond itself, being indefinitely -related to something beyond. “In its given content -it has relations which do not terminate within -that content” (<cite>ibid.</cite>, p. 176), while in its immediacy -it presents an undivided union of existence -and meaning. No subject can be mere existence -any more than it can be mere meaning. It is always -existent or embodied meaning. As such it -claims individuality or the character of a single -subsistent whole. But this indispensable claim is -inconsistent with its ragged-edged character, its -indefinite external reference, which is indispensable -to it as subject that it may require and receive -further meaning from predication.</p> - -<p>With respect to the copula the following quotation -from the “Principles” of Logic (p. 10) -may serve: “Judgment proper is the <em>act</em> which -refers the ideal content (recognized as such) to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span> -reality beyond the act.” In other words, judgment -as act (and it is the act which is expressed -in the copula) must always fall outside of -the content of knowledge as such; yet since this -act certainly falls within reality, it would have to -be recognized and stated by any knowledge pretending -to competency with respect to reality as a -whole. These considerations, stated in this way, -are highly technical and presuppose a knowledge -not merely of Mr. Bradley’s own logic, but also of -the logical analysis of knowledge initiated by Kant -and carried on by Herbart, Lotze, and others. -Their main import may, however, be stated in -comparatively non-technical form. Human experience -is full of discrepancies. Were experience -purely a matter of brute existence (such as we sometimes -imagine the animals’ experience to be) it -would be totally lacking in meaning and there -would be no problems, no thinking, no occasion for -thinking, and hence no philosophy. On the other -hand, if experience were a complete, tight-jointed -union of existence and meaning, there would be -no dissatisfaction, no problems, no cause for efforts -to patch up defects and contradictions. Existences, -things, would embody all the meanings that they -suggest; while abstract meanings, values that are -<em>merely</em> ideal, that are projected or thought of -but not fulfilled, would be totally unheard of. But -our experience stands in marked contrast to both<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span> -these types of experience. It is neither an affair -of meaningless existence nor of existence self-luminous -with fulfilled meaning. All things that we -experience have <em>some</em> meaning, but that meaning -is always so partially embodied in things that we -cannot rest in them. They point beyond themselves; -they indicate meanings which they do not -fulfil; they suggest values which they fail to embody, -and when we go to other things for the -fruition of what is denied, we either find the same -situation of division over again, or we find even -more positive disappointment and frustration—we -find contrary meanings set up. Now all thinking -grows out of this discrepancy between existence -and the meaning which it partially embodies and -partially refuses, which it suggests but declines to -express. Yet thinking, the mode of bringing existence -and meaning into harmony with each other, -always works by selection, by abstraction; it sets -up and projects meanings which are ideal only, -footless, in the air, matters of thought only, not of -sentiency or immediate existence. It emphasizes -the ideal of a completed union of existence and -meaning, but is helpless to effect it. And this -helplessness (according to Mr. Bradley) is not due -to external pressure but to the very structure of -thought itself.</p> - -<p>From every point of view knowledge operates -under conditions, (and these not externally imposed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span> -but inherent in its own nature as judgment,) that -render it incapable of realizing its aim of complete -union of existence and meaning. Granted the -argument, and it is difficult to imagine a more -serious indictment against the pretensions of philosophy -to reach “Reality” <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">via</i> the exclusive path -of knowledge.</p> - -<p>The presence of contradiction is Mr. Bradley’s -criterion for “appearance,” just as its absence -is his criterion for “reality.” It thus goes without -saying that knowledge and truth which we can -attain are matters of appearance. Contradiction -between existence and meaning is its last word. -This is not merely a logical deduction from Mr. -Bradley’s position, but is expressly stated by him. -“Thus the truth belongs to existence, but it does -not as such exist.... Truth shows a dissection -but never an actual life” (“Appearance -and Reality,” p. 167). Again, “every truth is -appearance since in it we have divorce of quality -from being” (<cite>ibid.</cite>, p. 187). “Even absolute -truth seems in the end to turn out erroneous.... -Internal discrepancy belongs irremovably -to truth’s proper character.... Truth is -one aspect of experience and is therefore made imperfect -and limited by what it fails to include” -(<cite>ibid.</cite>, pp. 544–545). Nothing could be more -explicit as to the inherently contradictory character -of truth, both as an ideal and as an accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span> -fact; nothing more positive as to the unreality -or appearance-character of truth. We -cannot, on Mr. Bradley’s method, stop here. Not -only is knowledge—working as it does through -thought which is always partial, selective, abstractive—doomed -to failure in accomplishing its task, -but the existence of the contradiction between the -suggestion of meanings by existence and this realization -in existence is itself due to thought.</p> - -<p>Speaking of thought he says: “The relational -form is a compromise on which thought stands and -which it develops.” And all the particular antinomies -which he discusses are interpreted as having -their basis in the category of relation (<cite>ibid.</cite>, -p. 180). In his section on Appearance he goes -through various aspects and distinctions of the -world, such as primary and secondary qualities, -substance and its properties, relation and qualitative -elements, space and time, motion and change, -causation, etc., pointing out irreconcilable discrepancies -in them. He does not, in a <em>generalized</em> way, -expressly refer them to any common source or root. -But it seems a fair inference that the relational -character of thought is at the bottom of the whole -trouble: so that we have in the cases mentioned -precisely the same situation <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in concreto</i> which -is set forth <i>in abstracto</i> in the discussion of -thought. The contradictions brought up are in -every case resolved into the fundamental discrepancy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span> -supposed to exist between relations and elements -related. In each case there is the ideal of -a final unity in which relations and elements as -such disappear, while in every case the nature of -relation is such as to prevent the desired consummation. -In at least one place, it is expressly -declared that it is the knowledge function which is -responsible for the degradation of reality to appearance. -“We do not suggest that the thing -always itself is an appearance. We mean its -character is such <em>that it becomes one as soon as -we judge it</em>. And this character we have seen -throughout our work, is ideality. Appearance -consists in the looseness of content from existence.... -And we have found that everywhere -throughout the world such ideality prevails” -(<cite>ibid.</cite>, p. 486, italics not in the original). It -is not then strictly true that the divorce of meaning -and existence instigates thought; rather -thought is the unruly member that creates the -divorce and then engages in the task (in which it -is self-condemned to failure) of trying to establish -the unity which it has gratuitously destroyed. -Thinking, self-consciousness, is disease of the naïve -unity of thoughtless experience.</p> - -<p>On the one hand there is a systematic discrediting -of the ultimate claims of the knowledge function, -and this not from external physiological or -psychological reasons such as are sometimes alleged<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span> -against its capacity, but on the basis of its own -interior logic. But on the other hand, a strictly -logical criterion is deliberately adopted and employed -as the fundamental and final criterion for -the philosophic conception of reality. Long familiarity -has not dulled my astonishment at finding -exactly the same set of considerations which in -the earlier portion of the book are employed to -condemn things as experienced by us to the region -of Appearance, employed in the latter portion of -the book to afford a triumphant demonstration of -the existence and character of Absolute Reality. -The argument I take up first on its formal side, -and then with reference to material considerations.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<p>The positive conception of Reality is reached -by the conception that “ultimate reality must be -such that it does not contradict itself; here is an -absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by -the fact that either in endeavoring to deny it or -even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume -its validity” (<cite>ibid.</cite>, pp. 136–137). That is to -say, when one sets out to think one must avoid self-contradiction; -this avoidance, or, put positively, -the attainment of consistency, harmony, is the basic -law of all thinking. Since in thinking we set out -to attain reality, it follows that reality itself -must be self-consistent, and that its self-consistency<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span> -determines the law of thought. Or, as Mr. Bradley -again puts the matter, “In order to think at -all you must subject yourself to the standard, a -standard which implies an absolute knowledge of -reality; and while you doubt this, you accept it, -and obey, while you rebel” (<cite>ibid.</cite>, p. 153). -The absolute knowledge referred to is, of course, -the knowledge of the thoroughly self-consistent, -non-contradictory character of reality. Every -reader of Mr. Bradley’s book knows how he goes -on from this point to supply positive content to -reality; to give an outline sketch of the characters -it must possess and the way in which it must possess -them in order to maintain its thoroughly self-consistent -character. It is, however, only the -strictly formal aspect of the matter that I am -here concerned with.</p> - -<p>On this side we reach, I think, the heart of the -matter by asking, in reference to the first quotation: -Absolute <em>for what</em>? Surely absolute for the -process under consideration, that is absolute for -thought. But the significance of this absolute for -thought is, one may say, “absolutely” (since we -are here confessedly in the realm just of thought) -determined by the nature of thought itself. Now -this nature has been already referred by considerations -“belonging irremovably to truth’s proper -character,” to the world of appearance and of internal -discrepancy. Yes, one may say (speaking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span> -formally), the criterion of thought is absolute—that -is to say absolute or final for thought; but -how can one imagine that this in any way alters -the essential nature and value of thought? If -knowledge works by thought, and thought institutes -appearance over against reality, any further fact -about thought—such as a statement of its criterion—falls -wholly within the limits of this situation. -It is comical to suppose that a <em>special</em> trait of -thought can be employed to alter the fundamental -and essential nature of thought. The criterion of -thought must be infected by the nature of thought, -instead of being a redeeming angel which at a -critical juncture transforms the fragile creature, -thought, into an ambassador with power plenipotentiary -to the court of the Absolute.</p> - -<p>There really seems to be ground for supposing -that the whole argument turns on an ambiguity -in the use of the word “absolute.” Keeping -strictly within the limits of the argument, it means -nothing more than that thinking has a certain -principle, a law of its own; that it has an appropriate -mode of procedure which must not be violated. -It means, in short, whatever is finally controlling -for the thought-function. But Mr. Bradley -immediately takes the word to mean absolute -in the sense of describing a reality which by its very -nature is totally contradistinguished from appearance—that -is to say, from the realm of thought.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span> -Upon the ambiguity of a word, the systematic indictment -of intellectualism becomes the cornerstone -of a systematically intellectualistic method of -conceiving reality!</p> - -<p>Mr. Bradley has himself recognized the seeming -contradiction between his indictment of thought -and his use of the criterion of thought as the exclusive -path to a philosophic notion of the real. -In dealing with it, he (to my mind) comes within -an ace of stating a truer doctrine, and also exhibits -even more clearly the weakness of his own -position. He goes so far as to put the following -words into the mouth of an objector, and to -accept their general import: “All axioms, as a -matter of fact, are practical ... for none of -them in the end can amount to more than the impulse -to behave in a certain way. And they cannot -express more than this impulse, together with -the impossibility of satisfaction unless it is complied -with” (p. 151). After accepting this (p. -152) he goes on to say: “Take for example the -law of avoiding contradiction. When two elements -will not remain quietly together, but collide and -struggle, we cannot rest satisfied with that state. -Our impulse is to alter it and, on the theoretical -side, to bring the content to such shape that the -variety remains peaceably in one. And this inability -to rest otherwise and this tendency to alter -in a certain way and direction is, <em>when reflected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span> -upon and made explicit</em>, our axiom and our intellectual -standard” (p. 152; italics mine).</p> - -<p>The retort is obvious: if <em>the</em> intellectual criterion, -the principle of non-contradiction on which -his whole Absolute Reality rests, is itself a practical -principle, then surely the ultimate criterion -for regulating intellectual undertakings is practical. -To this obvious answer Mr. Bradley makes -reply as follows: “You may call the intellect, if -you like, a mere tendency to a movement, but you -must remember that it is a movement of a <em>very -special kind</em>.... Thinking is the attempt -to satisfy a <em>special</em> impulse, and the attempt implies -an assumption about reality.... But -why, it may be objected, is this assumption better -than what holds for practice? Why is the theoretical -to be superior to the practical end? I have -never said that this is so, only <em>here</em>, that is, in <em>metaphysics</em>, -I must be allowed to reply, we are acting -theoretically.... The <em>theoretical standard -within theory must surely be absolute</em>” (p. 153. -The italics again are mine; compare with the quotation -this, from p. 485: “Our attitude, however, -in metaphysics must be theoretical.” So, also, p. -154, “Since metaphysics is mere theory and since -theory from its nature must be made by the intellect, -it is here the intellect alone which is to be -satisfied”).</p> - -<p>Grant that intellect is a special movement or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span> -mode of practice; grant that we are not merely -acting (are we ever <em>merely</em> acting?) but are “specially -occupied and therefore subject to special conditions,” -and the problem remains <em>what</em> special kind -of activity is thinking? what is its experienced -differentia from other kinds? what is its commerce -with them? When the problem is <em>what</em> special kind -of an activity is thinking and of <em>what</em> nature is the -consistency which is its criterion, somehow we do -not get forward by being told that thinking <em>is</em> a -special mode of practice and that its criterion <em>is</em> -consistency. The unquestioned presupposition of -Mr. Bradley is that thinking is such a wholly separate -activity (the “intellect <em>alone</em>” which has to -be satisfied), that to give it autonomy is to say -that it, and its criterion, have nothing to do with -other activities; that it is “independent” as to -criterion, in a way which excludes interdependence -in function and outcome. Unless the term “special” -be interpreted to mean <em>isolated</em>, to say that -thinking is a <em>special</em> mode of activity no more nullifies -the proposition that it arises in a practical contest -and operates for practical ends, than to say -that blacksmithing is a <em>special</em> activity, negates its -being one connected mode of industrial activity.</p> - -<p>His underlying presupposition of the separate -character of thought comes out in the passage last -quoted. “Our impulse,” he says, “is to alter the -conflicting situation and, <em>on the theoretical side</em>,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span> -to bring its contents into peaceable unity.” If -one substitutes for the word “on” the word -“through,” one gets a conception of theory and -of thinking that does justice to the autonomy -of the operation and yet so connects it with other -activities as to give it a serious business, real purpose, -and concrete responsibility and hence testibility. -From this point of view the theoretical -activity is simply the form that certain practical -activities take after colliding, as the most effective -and fruitful way of securing their own harmonization. -The collision is not theoretical; the issue in -“peaceable unity” is not theoretical. But theory -names the type of activity by which the transformation -from war to peace is most amply and -securely effected.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>Admit, however, the force of Mr. Bradley’s -contention on its own terms and see how futile is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span> -the result. It is quite true, as Mr. Bradley says -(p. 153), that if a man sits down to play the metaphysical -game, he must abide by the rules of thinking; -but if thinking be already, with respect to -reality, an idle and futile game, simply abiding -by the rules does not give additional value to its -stakes. Grant the premises as to the character -of thought, and the assertion of the final character -of the theoretical standard within metaphysics—since -metaphysics is a form of theory—is a warning -against metaphysics. If the intellect involves -self-contradiction, it is either impossible that it -should be satisfied, or else self-contradiction is its -satisfaction.</p> - - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Let us, however, turn from Mr. Bradley’s formal -proof that the criterion of philosophic truth must -be exclusively a canon of formal thought. Let -us ignore the contradiction involved in first making -the work of thought to be the producing of -appearance and then making the law of this -thought the law of an Absolute Reality. What -about the intellectualist criterion? The intellectualism -of Mr. Bradley’s philosophy is represented -in the statement that it is “the theoretical standard -which guarantees that reality is a self-consistent -system” (p. 148). But how can the fact that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span> -the criterion of thinking is consistency be employed -to determine the nature of the consistency of its -object? Consistency in one sense, consistency of -reasoning with itself, we know; but what is the -nature of the consistency of reality which this consistency -necessitates? Thinking without doubt -must be logical; but does it follow from this that -the reality about which one thinks, and about which -one must think consistently if one is to think to any -purpose, must itself be already logical? The pivot -of the argument is, of course, the old ontological -argument, stripped of all theological irrelevancies -and reduced to its fighting weight as a metaphysical -proposition. Those who question this basic -principle of intellectualism will, of course, question -it here. They will urge that, instead of the consistency -of “reality” resting on the basis of -consistency in the reasoning process the latter derives -its meaning from the material consistency at -which it aims. They will say that the definition -of the nature of the consistency which is the end -of thinking and which prescribes its technique is -to be reached from inquiry into such questions as -these: What sort of an activity in the concrete is -thinking? what are the specific conditions which it -has to fulfil? what is its use; its relevancy; its -purport in present concrete experiences? The -more it is insisted that the theoretical standard—consistency—is -final within theory, the more germane<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span> -and the more urgent is the question: What -then in the concrete is theory? and of what nature -<em>is</em> the material consistency which is the test of its -formal consistency?<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>Take the instance of a man who wishes to deny -the criterion of self-consistency in thinking. Is -he refuted by pointing to the “fact” that eternal -reality is eternally self-consistent? Would not his -obvious answer to such a mode of refutation be: -“What of it? What is the relevancy of that -proposition to my procedure in thinking here and -now? Doubtless absolute reality may be a great -number of things, possibly very sublime and precious -things; but what I am concerned with is a -particular job of thinking, and until you show me -the intermediate terms which link that job to the -asserted self-consistent character of absolute reality, -I fail to see what difference this doubtless<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -wholly amiable trait of reality has to make in what -I am here and now concerned with. You might as -well quote any other irrelevant fact, such as the -height of the Empress of China.” We take another -tack in dealing with the man in question. -We call his attention to his specific aim in the situation -with reference to which he is thinking, and -point out the conditions that have to be observed -if that aim is to fulfil itself. We show that if he -does not observe the conditions imposed by his aim -his thinking will go on so wildly as to defeat itself. -It is to consistency of means with the end -of the concrete activity that we appeal. “Try -thinking,” we tell such a man, “experiment with -it, taking pains sometimes to have your reasonings -consistent with one another, and at other times -deliberately introducing inconsistencies; then see -what you get in the two cases and how the result -reached is related to your purpose in thinking.” -We point out that since that purpose is to reach a -settled conclusion, that purpose will be defeated unless -the steps of reasoning are kept consistent with -one another. We do not appeal from the mere consistency -of the reasoning process—the intellectual -aspect of the matter—to an absolute self-consistent -reality; but we appeal from the material -character of the end to be reached to the type of -the formal procedure necessary to accomplish it.</p> - -<p>With all our heart, then, the standard of thinking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span> -is absolute (that is final) within thinking. -But what is thinking? The standard of blacksmithing -must be absolute within blacksmithing, -but what is blacksmithing? No prejudice prevents -acknowledging that blacksmithing is one -practical activity existing as a distinct and relevant -member of a like system of activities: that it -is because men use horses to transport persons and -goods that horses need to be shod. The ultimate -criterion of blacksmithing is producing a good -shoe, but the nature of a good shoe is fixed, -not by blacksmithing, but by the activities in -which horses are used. The end is ultimate (absolute) -for the operation, but this very finality is -evidence that the operation is not absolute and -self-inclosed, but is related and responsible. Why -must the fact that the end of thinking is ultimate -for thought stand on any different footing?</p> - -<p>Let us then, by way of experiment, follow this -suggestion. Let us assume that among real objects -in their values and significances, real oppositions -and incompatibilities exist; that these conflicts are -both troublesome in themselves, and the source of -all manner of further difficulties—so much so that -they may be suspected of being the source of all -man’s woe, of all encroachment upon and destruction -of value, of good. Suppose that thinking -is, not accidentally but essentially, a way, and the -only way that proves adequate, of dealing with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span> -these predicaments—that being “in a hole,” in -difficulty, is the fundamental “predicament” of intelligence. -Suppose when effort is made in a brute -way to remove these oppositions and to secure an -arrangement of things which means satisfaction, -fulfilment, happiness, that the method of brute attack, -of trying directly to force warrings into -peace fails; suppose then an effort to effect the -transformation by an indirect method—by inquiry -into the disordered state of affairs and by framing -views, conceptions, of what the situation would be -like were it reduced to harmonious order. Finally, -suppose that upon this basis a plan of action -is worked out, and that this plan, when carried into -overt effect, succeeds infinitely better than the -brute method of attack in bringing about the desired -consummation. Suppose again this indirection -of activity is precisely what we mean by thinking. -Would it not hold that harmony is the end -and the test of thinking? that observations are pertinent -and ideas correct just in so far as, overtly -acted upon, they succeed in removing the undesirable, -the inconsistent.</p> - -<p>But, it is said, the very process of thinking makes -a certain assumption regarding the nature of reality, -viz., that reality is self-consistent. This statement -puts the end for the beginning. The assumption -is not that “reality” <em>is</em> self-consistent, but -that by thinking it may, for some special purpose,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span> -or as respects some concrete problem, attain -greater consistency. Why should the assumption -regarding “reality” be other than that -specific realities with which thought is concerned -are <em>capable of receiving</em> harmonization? To say -that thought must assume, in order to go on, that -reality already possesses harmony is to say that -thought must begin by contradicting its own direct -data, and by assuming that its concrete aim is vain -and illusory. Why put upon thought the onus of -introducing discrepancies into reality in order just -to give itself exercise in the gymnastic of removing -them? The assumption that concrete thinking -makes about “reality” is that things just as they -exist may acquire <em>through activity, guided by -thinking</em>, a certain character which it is excellent -for them to possess; and may acquire it more liberally -and effectively than by other methods. -One might as well say that the blacksmith could -not think to any effect concerning iron, without a -Platonic archetypal horseshoe, laid up in the -heavens. His thinking also makes an assumption -about present, given reality, viz., that this piece -of iron, through the exercise of intelligently directed -activity, may be shaped into a satisfactory -horseshoe. The assumption is practical: the assumption -that a specific thing may take on in a -specific way a specific needed value. The test, -moreover, of this assumption is practical; it consists<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span> -in acting upon it to see if it will do what -it pretends it can do, namely, guide activities to -the required result. The assumption about reality -is not something in addition to the idea, which an -idea already in existence makes; some assumption -about the possibility of a change in the state of -things as experienced <em>is</em> the idea—and its test or -criterion is whether this possible change can be -effected when the idea is acted upon in good -faith.</p> - -<p>In any case, how much simpler the case becomes -when we stick by the empirical facts. According -to them there is no wholesale discrepancy of existence -and meaning; there is simply a “loosening” -of the two when objects do not fulfil our -plans and meet our desires; or when we project -inventions and cannot find immediately the means -for their realization. The “collisions” are neither -physical, metaphysical, nor logical; they are moral -and practical. They exist between an aim and -the means of its execution. Consequently the -object of thinking is not to effect some wholesale -and “Absolute” reconciliation of meaning and -existence, but to make a specific adjustment of -things to our purposes and of our purposes to -things at just the crucial point of the crisis. Making -the utmost concessions to Mr. Bradley’s account -of the discrepancy of meaning and existence -in our experience, to his statement of the relation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span> -of this to the function of judgment (as involving -namely an explicit <em>statement</em> at once of the actual -sundering and the ideal union) and to his account -of consistency as the goal and standard, there is -still not a detail of the account that is not met -amply and with infinitely more empirical warrant -by the conception that the “collision” in which -thinking starts and the “consistency” in which it -terminates are practical and human.</p> - - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>This brings us explicitly to the question of -truth, “truth” being confessedly the end and -standard of thinking. I confess to being much -at a loss to realize just what the intellectualists -conceive to be the relation of truth to ideas on one -side and to “reality” on the other. My difficulty -occurs, I think, because they describe so little in -analytical detail; in writing of truth they seem -rather to be under a strong emotional influence—as -if they were victims of an uncritical pragmatism—which -leaves much of their thought to be -guessed at. The implication of their discussions -assigns three distinct values to the term “truth.” -On the one hand, truth is something which characterizes -ideas, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, judgments, -propositions, assertions, etc.,—anything -whatsoever involving <em>intellectual</em> statement. From<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span> -this standpoint a criterion of truth means the test -of the worth of the intellectual intent, import, or -claim of any intellectual statement as intellectual. -This is an intelligible sense of the term truth. In -the second place, it seems to be assumed that a -certain kind of reality is already, apart from ideas -or meanings, Truth, and that <em>this</em> Truth is the -criterion of that lower and more unworthy kind -of truth that may be possessed or aimed at by -ideas. But we do not stop here. The conception -that <em>all</em> truth must have a criterion haunts the -intellectualist, so that the reality, which, as contrasted -with ideas, is taken to be The Truth (and -the criterion of <em>their</em> truth) is treated as if it itself -had to have support and warrant from some other -Reality, lying back of it, which is <em>its</em> criterion. -This, then, gives the third type of truth, <em>The -Absolute Truth</em>. (Just why this process should -not go on indefinitely is not clear, but the necessity -of infinite regress may be emotionally prevented -by always referring to this last type of -truth as Absolute). Now this scheme may be -“true,” but it is not self-explanatory or even -easily apprehensible. In just what sense, truth is -(1) that to which ideas as ideas lay claim and yet -is (2) Reality which as reality is the criterion of -truth of ideas, and yet again is (3) a Reality -which completely annuls and transcends all reference -to ideas, is not in the least clear to me: nor,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span> -till better informed, shall I believe it to be clear -to any one.</p> - -<p>In his more strictly logical discussions, Mr. -Bradley sets out from the notion that truth refers -to intellectual statements and positions as such. -But the Truth soon becomes a sort of transcendent -essence on its own account. The identification -of reality and truth on page 146 may be a -mere casual phrase, but the distinction drawn between -validity and absolute truth (p. 362), and the -discussion of Degrees of Truth and Reality, involve -assumptions of an identity of truth and -reality. Truth in this sense turns out to be the -criterion for the truth, the truth, that is, of ideas. -But, again (p. 545), a distinction is made between -“Finite Truth,” that is, a view of reality which -would completely satisfy intelligence as such, and -“Absolute Truth,” which is obtained only by -<em>passing beyond intelligence</em>—only when intelligence -as such is absorbed in some Absolute in which it -loses its distinctive character.</p> - -<p>It would advance the state of discussion, I am -sure, if there were more explicit statements regarding -the relations of “true idea,” “truth,” “the -criterion of truth” and “reality,” to one another. -A more explicit exposition also of the view -that is held concerning the relation of verification -and truth could hardly fail to be of value. Not -infrequently the intellectualist admits that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span> -process of verification is experimental, consisting -in setting on foot various activities that express -the intent of the idea and confirm or refute it according -to the changes effected. This seems to -mean that truth is simply the tested or verified -belief as such. But then a curious reservation is -introduced; the experimental process <em>finds</em>, it is -said, that an idea is true, while the error of the -pragmatist is to take the process by which truth -is <em>found</em> as one by which it is made. The claim -of “making truth” is treated as blasphemy -against the very notion of truth: such are the consequences -of venturing to translate the Latin -“verification” into the English “making true.”</p> - -<p>If we face the bogie thus called up, it will be -found that the horror is largely sentimental. Suppose -we stick to the notion that truth is a character -which belongs to a meaning so far as tested -through action that carries it to successful completion. -In this case, to make an idea true is to -modify and transform it until it reaches this successful -outcome: until it initiates a mode of response -which in its issue realizes its claim to be the method -of harmonizing the discrepancies of a given situation. -The meaning is remade by constantly acting -upon it, and by introducing into its content such -characters as are indicated by any resulting failures -to secure harmony. From this point of view, -verification and truth are two names for the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span> -thing. We call it “verification” when we regard -it as process; when the development of the idea is -strung out and exposed to view in all that makes -it true. We call it “truth” when we take it as -product, as process telescoped and condensed.</p> - -<p>Suppose the idea to be an invention, say of the -telephone. In this case, is not the verification of -the idea and the construction of the device which -carries out its intent one and the same? In this -case, does the truth of the idea mean anything -else than that the issue proves the idea can be -carried into effect? There are certain intellectualists -who are not of the absolutist type; who do -not believe that all of men’s aims, designs, projects, -that have to do with action, whether industrial, -social, or moral in scope, have been from all -eternity registered as already accomplished in reality. -How do such persons dispose of this problem -of the truth of practical ideas?</p> - -<p>Is not the truth of <em>such</em> ideas an affair of <em>making</em> -them true by constructing, through appropriate -behavior, a condition that satisfies the requirements -of the case? If, in this case, truth -means the effective capacity of the idea “to make -good,” what is there in the logic of the case to -forbid the application of analogous considerations -to any idea?</p> - -<p>I hear a noise in the street. It suggests as its -meaning a street-car. To test this idea I go to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span> -the window and through listening and looking intently—the -listening and the looking being modes -of behavior—organize into a single situation elements -of existence and meaning which were previously -disconnected. In this way an idea is made -true; that which was a proposal or hypothesis is -no longer merely a propounding or a guess. If I -had not reacted in a way appropriate to the idea -it would have remained a mere idea; at most a -candidate for truth that, unless acted upon upon -the spot, would always have remained a theory. -Now in such a case—where the end to be accomplished -is the discovery of a certain order of facts—would -the intellectualist claim that apart from -the forming and entertaining of some interpretation, -the category of truth has either existence or -meaning? Will he claim that without an original -practical uneasiness introducing a practical aim of -inquiry there must have been, whether or no, an -idea? Must the world for some purely intellectual -reason be intellectually reduplicated? Could not -that occurrence which I now identify as a noisy -street-car have retained, so far as pure intelligence -is concerned, its unidentified status of being mere -physical alteration in a vast unidentified complex -of matter-in-motion? Was there any <em>intellectual</em> -necessity that compelled the event to arouse just -this judgment, that it meant a street-car? Was -there any physical or metaphysical necessity?<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span> -Was there any necessity save a need of characterizing -it for some purpose of our own? And why -should we be mealy-mouthed about calling this -need practical? If the necessity which led to the -formation and development of an intellectual judgment -was purely objective (whether physical or -metaphysical) why should not the thing have also to -be characterized in countless millions of other ways; -for example, as to its distance from some crater in -the moon, or its effect upon the circulation of my -blood, or upon my irascible neighbor’s temper, or -bearing upon the Monroe Doctrine? In short, do -not intellectual positions and statements mean new -and significant events in the treatment of things?</p> - -<p>It is perhaps dangerous to attempt to follow -the inner workings of the processes by which truth -is first identified with some superior type of Reality, -and then this Truth is taken as the criterion -of the truth of ideas; while all the time it is held -that truth is something already possessed by ideas -as purely intellectual. But there seems to be some -ground for believing that this identification is due -to a twofold confusion, one having to do with ideas, -and the other with things. As to the first point: -After an idea is made true, we naturally say, in -retrospect, “it <em>was</em> true all the time.” Now this -truism is quite innocuous as a truism, being just a -restatement of the fact that the idea has, as matter -of fact, worked successfully. But it may be regarded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span> -not as a truism but as furnishing some additional -knowledge; as if it were, indeed, the dawning -of a revelation regarding truth. Then it is -said that the idea worked or was verified because -it was already inherently, just as idea, the truth; -the pragmatist, so it is said, making the error -of supposing that it is true because it works. If -one remembers that what the experimentalist means -is that the effective working of an idea and its -truth are one and the same thing—this working -being neither the cause nor the evidence of truth -but its nature—it is hard to see the point of this -statement. A man under peculiarly precarious -circumstances has been rescued from drowning. A -by-stander remarks that now he is a saved man. -“Yes,” replies some one, “but he was a saved man -all the time, and the process of rescuing, while it -gives evidence of that fact, does not constitute it.” -Now even such a statement as pure tautology, -as characterizing the entire process in terms of its -issue, is objectionable only in the fact that, like -all tautology, it seems to say something but does -not. But if it be regarded as revealing the earlier -condition of affairs, apart from the active process -by which it was carried to a happy conclusion, such -a statement would be monstrously false; and would -declare its falsity in the fact that, if acted upon, -the man would have been left to drown. In like -fashion, to say, <em>after the event</em>, that a given idea<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span> -was true all the time, is to lose sight of what makes -an idea an idea, its hypothetical character; and -thereby deliberately to transform it into brute -dogma—something to which no canon of verification -can ever be applied. The intellectualist almost -always treats the pragmatic account as if it -were, from the standpoint of the pragmatist as well -as from his own, a denial of the existence of truth, -while it is nothing but a statement of its nature. -When the intellectualist realizes this, he will, I hope, -ask himself: What, then, on the pragmatic basis is -meant by the proposition that an idea is true all -the time? If the statement that an idea was true -all the time has no meaning except that the idea -was one which as matter of fact succeeded through -action in achieving its intent, mere reiteration that -the idea was true all the time or it could not have -succeeded, does not take us far.<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span> -On the side of things, <em>reality</em> is identified with -truth; then on the principle that two things -that are equal to the same thing are equal to -each other, truth as idea and truth as reality are -taken to be one and the same thing. Wherever -there is an improved or tested idea, an idea which -has made good, there is a concrete existence in the -way of a completed or harmonized situation. The -same activity which proves the idea constructs an -inherently satisfied situation out of an inherently -dissentient one,—for it is precisely the capacity -of the idea as an aim and method of action to -determine such transformation that is the criterion -of its truth. Now unless all the elements -in the situation are held steadily in view, the specific -way in which the harmonized reality affords the -criterion of truth (namely, through its function -of being the last term of a process of active determination) -is lost from sight; and the achieved -existence in its merely existent character, apart -from its practical or fulfilment character, is treated -as The Truth. But when the reality is thus separated -from the process by which it is achieved, -when it is taken just as given, it is neither truth -nor a criterion of truth. It is a state of facts like -any other. The achieved telephone is a criterion -of the validity of a certain prior idea in so far -as it is the fulfilment of activities that embody -the nature of that idea, but just as telephone, as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -a machine actually in existence, it is no more truth -nor criterion of truth than is a crack in the wall -or a cobble-stone on the street.</p> - -<p>The intervening term that mediates and completes -the confusion of truth with ideas on one -hand and “reality” on the other, is, I think, the -fact that ideas after they have been tested in action -are employed in the development and grounding of -further beliefs. There are cases in which an idea -ceases to exist as idea as soon as it is made true; -this is so as matter of fact and it is impossible to -conceive any reason why it should not be so in point -of theory. Such is the case, I take it, with a large -part—possibly the major portion—of the ideas -that mediate the smaller and transient crises of -daily practice. I cannot imagine the situation in -which the truth to which I have referred above—the -verification of a certain idea about a certain -noise—would ever function again as truth—save -as I have given it a function in this paper by using -it as a corroboration of a certain theory. Such -ideas mostly cease, giving way to a matter-of-fact -status: say, the perception of the noisy street-car. -One at the time may say “My idea regarding -that noise was a true idea”; or one may -not even go so far as that, he may just stop with -the eventual perception. But the tested idea need -not ever recur as a factor of proof in any other -problem. Such, however, is conspicuously not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span> -the case with our scientific ideas. In its first -value, the idea or hypothesis of gravitation entertained -by Newton, stood, when verified, on -exactly the same level as the hypothesis regarding -the noise in the street. Theoretically, that -truth might have been so isolated that its truth -character would disappear from thought as -soon as a certain factual condition was ascertained. -But practically quite the opposite has -happened. The idea operates in many other inquiries, -and operates no longer as mere idea, but -as <em>proved</em> idea. Such truths get an “eternal” -status;—one irrespective of application just now -and here, because there are so many nows and heres -in which they are useful. Just as to say an idea -was true all the time is a way of saying <em>in retrospect</em> -that it has come out in a certain fashion, -so to say that an idea is “eternally true” is to -indicate <em>prospective</em> modes of application which -are indefinitely anticipated. Its meaning, therefore, -is strictly pragmatic. It does not indicate -a property inherent in the idea as intellectualized -existence, but denotes a property of use and -employment. Always at hand when needed is -a good enough eternal for reasonably minded -persons.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span></p> - - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>I have gone from the very general considerations -which occupied us in the earlier portions of this -article to matters which relatively at least are -specific. I conclude with a summary in the hope -that it may bind together the earlier and the later -parts of this paper.</p> - -<p>1. The condition which antecedes and provokes -any particular exercise of reflective knowing is always -one of discrepancy, struggle, “collision.” -This condition is practical, for it involves the habits -and interests of the organism, an agent. This -does not mean that the struggle is merely personal, -or subjective, or psychological. The agent or -individual is one factor in the situation—not the -situation something subsisting in the individual. -The individual has to be identified in the situation, -before any situation can be referred—as in psychology—to -the individual. But the discrepancy -calls out and controls reflective knowing only as -the fortunes of an agent are implicated in the -crisis. Certain elements stand out as obstacles, as -interferences, as deficiencies—in short as unsatisfactory -and as requiring something for their completion. -Other elements stand out as wanted—as -required, as a satisfaction which does not exist. -This clash (an accompaniment of all desire) between -the given and the wanted, between the present<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span> -and the absent, is at once the root and the -type of that peculiar paradoxical relation between -existence and meaning which Bradley insists upon -as the essence of judgment. It is not irrational -in the sense that we are dealing with appearance -wholesale, but it is non-rational—an evidence that -we are dealing with a practical affair.</p> - -<p>2. The intellectual or reflective and logical is a -<em>statement</em> of this conflict: an attempt to describe -and define it. It is, as it were, the practical clash -held off at arm’s length for inspection and investigation. -In this way brute blind reaction -against the unsatisfactoriness of the situation is -suspended. Action is turned into the channel of -observing, of inferring, of reasoning, or defining -means and end. It is this change in the quality -of activity, from directly overt, to indirect, or inquiring -with view to stating, that constitutes the -<em>specific</em> nature of reflective practice to which Mr. -Bradley calls attention. The discovery of the nature -of the conflict supplies materials for the fact -or existence side of the judgement. The conception -or projection of the object in which the conflict -would be terminated furnishes material for -the meaning side of the judgment. It is ideal -because anticipatory, just as the fact side is -existential, because reminiscent or recording. -Hence the two are necessarily both distinguished -from and yet referred to each other: only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span> -through location of a problem can a solution be -conceived; only in reference to the intent of finding -a solution can the elements of a problem be -selected and interpreted. In origin and in destiny, -this correlative determination of existence and -meaning is tentative and experimental. The aim -of the subject of the judgment is not to include all -possible reality, but to select those elements of a -reality that are useful in locating the source and -nature of the difficulty in hand. The aim of the -predicate is not to bunch all possible meaning and -refer it in one final act indiscriminately to all existence, -but to state the standpoint and method -through which the difficulty of the particular situation -may most effectively be dealt with. The selection -of what is relevant to the characterization of -the problem and the projection of the method of -dealing with it are theoretic, hypothetic, intellectual:—that -is, they are tentative ways of viewing -the matter for the sake of guiding, economizing, -and freeing the activities through which it may -<em>really</em> be dealt with.</p> - -<p>3. The criterion of the worth of the idea is thus -the capacity of the idea (as a definition of the end -or outcome in terms of what is likely to be serviceable -as a method) to operate in fulfilling the object -for the sake of which it was projected. Capacity -of operation in this fashion is the test, measure, or -criterion of truth. Hence the criterion is practical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span> -in the most overt sense of that term. We -may, if we choose, regard the object in which the -idea terminates through its use in guiding action, -as the criterion; but if we so choose, it is at our -peril that we forget that this object serves as -criterion in its capacity of fulfilment and not as -sheer objective existence.</p> - -<p>4. Difficulties overlap; problems recur which resemble -each other in the kind of treatment they -demand for solution. Various modes of activity -with their respective ends, going on at some time -more or less independently, get organized into -single comprehensive systems of behavior. The solution -of one problem is found to create difficulties -elsewhere; or the truth that is made in the solution -of one problem is found to afford an effective -method of dealing with questions arising apparently -from unallied sources. Thus certain tested -ideas in performing a constant or recurrent function -secure a certain permanent status. The prospective -use of such truths, the satisfaction that -we anticipate in their employ, the assurance of -control that we feel in their possession, becomes -relatively much more important than the circumstances -under which they were first made true. In -becoming permanent resources, such tested ideas -get a generalized energy of position. They are -truths in general, truths “in themselves” or in the -abstract, truths to which positive value is assigned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span> -on their own account. Such truths are the “eternal -truths” of current discussion. They naturally -and properly add to their intellectual and to their -practical worth a certain esthetic quality. They -are interesting to contemplate, and their contemplation -arouses emotions of admiration and -reverence. To make these emotions the basis of -assigning peculiar inherent sanctity to them apart -from their warrant in use, is simply to give way -to that mood which in primitive man is the cause -of attributing magical efficacy to physical things. -Esthetically such truths are more than instrumentalities. -But to ignore both the instrumental and -the esthetic aspect, and to ascribe values due to an -instrumental and esthetic character to some interior -and <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> constitution of truth is to make -fetishes of them.</p> - -<p>We may not exaggerate the permanence and -stability of such truths with respect to their recurring -and prospective use. It is only relatively -that they are unchanging. When applied to new -cases, used as resources for coping with new difficulties, -the oldest of truths are to some extent -remade. Indeed it is only through such application -and such remaking that truths retain their -freshness and vitality. Otherwise they are relegated -to faint reminiscences of an antique tradition. -Even the truth that two and two make four -has gained a new meaning, has had its truth in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span> -some degree remade, in the development of the -modern theory of number. If we put ourselves in -the attitude of a scientific inquirer in asking what -is the meaning of truth <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">per se</i>, there spring up -before us those ideas which are actively employed -in the mastery of new fields, in the organization -of new materials. This is the essential difference -between truth and dogma; between the living and -the dead and decaying. Above all, it is in the -region of moral truth that this perception stands -out. Moral truths that are not recreated in application -to the urgencies of the passing hour, no matter -how true in the place and time of their origin, -are pernicious and misleading, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, false. And it -is perhaps through emphasizing this fact, embodied -in one form or another in every system of morals -and in every religion of moral import, that one -most readily realizes the character of truth.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="A SHORT CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH"><a id="A_SHORT_CATECHISM_CONCERNING_TRUTH"></a>A SHORT CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor smaller">25</a></h2> -</div> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><em>Pupil.</em></span> I am desirous, respected teacher, of -forming an independent judgment concerning -the novel theory of truth that you are said -to profess. My eagerness is whetted because the -theory as expounded to me by my old teacher, -Professor Purus Intellectus, so obviously contravenes -common sense, science, and philosophy that I -do not understand how it can be advanced in good -faith by any reasonable man.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher.</em> As you are already somewhat acquainted -with the theory (or at least with what -it purports to be), perhaps if you will set forth in -order your objections, it will appear that the -theory that you are acquainted with is not advanced -by any reasonable persons, and that by -understanding the theory as it is you will also be -led to embrace it.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection One.</em> Pragmatism makes -truth a subjective affair, namely the satisfaction -afforded individuals by ideas, while everybody<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -knows that the truth of ideas depends upon their -relation to things.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> If I were to reply that I -hold to existences independent of ideas, existences -prior to, synchronous with, and subsequent to ideas, -that might seem to you to express only my personal -opinion and to have no logical connection with -pragmatism. So I beg to remind you that, according -to pragmatism, ideas (judgments and -reasonings being included for convenience in this -term) are attitudes of response taken toward extra-ideal, -extra-mental things. Instinct and habit -express, for instance, modes of response, but modes -inadequate for a progressive being, or for adaptation -to an environment presenting novel and unmastered -features. Under such conditions, ideas -are their surrogates. The origin of an idea is thus -in some empirical, extra-mental situation which -provokes ideas as modes of response, while their -meaning is found in the modifications—the “differences”—they -make in this extra-mental situation. -Their validity is in turn measured by their capacity -to effect the transformation they intend. -Origin, content, and value—all alike are extra-ideational. -The satisfaction upon which the -pragmatist dwells is just the better adjustment of -living beings to their environment effected by -transformations of the environment through forming -and applying ideas.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span> -<em>Pupil: Objection Two.</em> But, as I understand -it and as you have yourself confessed in your language, -these external things, while they may be -external to the particular idea in question, are <em>empirical</em>; -they are just other experiences and so -mental after all. You hold, I have been informed, -that truth is an <em>experienced</em> relation, instead of -a relation between experience and what transcends -it; why then be mealy-mouthed (pardon my eagerness -if it leads me astray) in admitting that the -whole business is intra-mental?</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> Your objection combines and -confuses two things. To disentangle them is to -answer the objection. (1) The notion of transcendence -has a double meaning; first, it denotes -that which lies inherently and essentially beyond -experience. It is interesting to note that the opponents -of pragmatism have been forced by the -exigencies of their hostility to resuscitate a doctrine -supposedly dead: the doctrine of unexperienceable, -unknowable “Things in Themselves.” -And as if this were not enough, they identify Truth -with relationship to this unknowable. Thereby -in behalf of the notion of Truth in general, they -land in scepticism with reference to the possibility -of any truth in particular. The pragmatist <em>is</em> -bound to deny <em>such</em> transcendence. (2) That he is -thereby landed in pure subjectivism or the reduction -of every existence to the purely mental, follows<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span> -only if experience means only mental states. The -critic appears to hold the Humian doctrine that -experience is made up of states of mind, of sensations -and ideas. It is then for <em>him</em> to decide how, -on <em>his</em> basis, he escapes subjective idealism, or -“mentalism.” The pragmatist starts from a much -more commonplace notion of experience, that of -the plain man who never dreams that to experience -a thing is first to destroy the thing and then to -substitute a mental state for it. More particularly, -the pragmatist has insisted that experience -is a matter of functions and habits, of active adjustments -and re-adjustments, of co-ordinations -and activities, rather than of states of consciousness. -To criticise the pragmatist by reading into -him exactly the notion of experience that he denies -and replaces, may be psychological and unregenerately -“pragmatic,” but it is hardly “intellectual.”</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Three.</em> You remind me, curiously -enough, of a contention of my old instructor -to the effect that the pragmatist, when criticised, -always shifts his ground. To avoid solipsism and -subjectivism, he falls back on things independent -of ideas, adducing them in order to pass upon the -truth or falsity of the latter. But thereby he only -covertly recognizes the intellectualistic standard. -Thus he swings unevenly between a denial of science -and a clamorous reiteration, in new phraseology, -of what all philosophers hold.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span> -<em>Teacher: Reply.</em> Your words have indeed a -familiar sound. Apparently, the average intellectualist -has got so accustomed to taking truth -as a Relation at Large, without specification or -analysis, that any attempt at a concrete statement -of just what the relationship is appears to be a -denial of the relation itself; in which case, he interprets -an occasional reminder from the pragmatist -that the latter is, after all, attempting to -specify the nature of the relation, to be a surrender -of the pragmatist’s own case, since it admits -after all that there is some relation!</p> - -<p>However that may be, the pragmatist holds that -the relation in question is one of correspondence -between existence and thought; but he holds that -correspondence instead of being an ultimate and -unanalyzable mystery, to be defined by iteration, -is precisely a matter of cor-respondence in its -plain, familiar sense. A condition of dubious and -conflicting tendencies calls out thinking as a method -of handling it. This condition produces its own -appropriate consequences, bearing its own fruits -of weal and woe. The thoughts, the estimates, -intents, and projects it calls out, just because -they are attitudes of response and of attempted -adjustment (<em>not</em> mere “states of consciousness”), -produce their effects also. The kind of interlocking, -of interadjustment that then occurs between -these two sorts of consequences constitutes the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span> -correspondence that makes truth, just as failure to -respond to each other, to work together, constitutes -mistake and error—mishandling and wandering. -This account may, of course, be wrong—may -involve a maladjustment of consequences—but -the error in the account, if it exists, must be -specific and empirical, and cannot be located by -general epistemological accusations.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Four.</em> Well, even admitting -this version of pragmatism, you cannot deny it -still contravenes common sense; for, according to -you, the correspondence that constitutes truth does -not exist till <em>after</em> ideas have worked, while common -sense perceives and knows that it is the antecedent -agreement of the ideas with reality that enables -them to work. If you make the truth of the existence -of a Carboniferous age, or the landing of -Columbus in 1492, depend upon a future working -of an idea about them, you commit yourself to the -most fantastic of philosophies.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> May I recall to your attention -the accusation of “shifting ground” when -hard pressed? The intellectualist began, if I remember -correctly, with conceiving truth as a relation -of thought and existence; has he not, in your -last objection, substituted for this conception an -identification of the bare existence or event with -truth? Which does he mean? How will he have -it? The existence of the Carboniferous age, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">160</a></span> -discovery of America by Columbus are not truths; -they are events. Some conviction, some belief, -some judgment with reference to them is necessary -to introduce the category of truth and falsity. -And since the conviction, the judgment, is as matter -of fact subsequent to the event, how can its -truth consist in the kind of blank, wholesale relationship -the intellectualist contends for? How -can the present belief jump out of its present -skin, dive into the past, and land upon just the -one event (that <em>as</em> past is gone forever) which, by -definition, constitutes its truth? I do not wonder -the intellectualist has much to say about “transcendence” -when he comes to dealing with the truth -of judgments about the past; but why does he -not tell us how we manage to know when one -thought lands straight on the devoted head of -something past and gone, while another thought -comes down on the wrong thing in the past?</p> - -<p><em>Pupil.</em> Well, of course, knowledge of the past -is very mysterious, but how is the pragmatist -any better off?</p> - -<p><em>Teacher.</em> The reply to that may be inferred -from what has already been said. The past event -has left effects, consequences, that are present -and that will continue in the future. Our belief -about it, if genuine, must also modify action in -<em>some</em> way and so have objective effects. If these -two sets of effects interlock harmoniously, then the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">161</a></span> -judgment is true. If perchance the past event -had no discoverable consequences or our thought of -it can work out to no assignable difference anywhere, -then there is no possibility of genuine judgment.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil.</em> You have, perhaps, anticipated my next -objection, which was that upon the pragmatic -theory (by which truth is constituted by future -consequences) there are no truths about what is -past and gone, since in respect to that ideas can -make no difference. For, I suppose, you would -say that the difference made is in the effects that -continue, since ideas may work out to facilitate or -to confuse our relations to these effects. Nevertheless, -I am not quite satisfied. For when I say -it is true that it rained yesterday, surely the -object of my judgment is something past, not -future, while pragmatism makes all objects of -judgment future.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> You confuse the content of -a judgment with the <em>reference</em> of that content. -The content of any idea about yesterday’s rain -certainly involves past time, but the distinctive -or characteristic aim of judgment is none the -less to give this content a future reference and -function.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Five.</em> But your argument requires -an absurd identification of truth and verification. -To verify ideas is to find out that they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">162</a></span> -were already true; or possessed of the truth relation -prior to its discovery in verification. But the -pragmatist holds that the act of finding out that -ideas are true creates the thing that is found. -In short, you confuse the psychology of finding -out with the reality found out.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> Many intellectualists have -now gone so far as to admit that <em>verification</em> is -the testing of a judgment by the consequence it -imports, the difference it makes—its working. But -they still deny any organic connection between the -“antecedent” truth property of ideas and the -verification (or “making true”) process. Surely -they admit either too much or too little. (i) If -an idea about a past event is already true because -of some mysterious static correspondence that -it possesses to that past event, how in the world -can its truth be <em>proved</em> by the <em>future consequences</em> -of that idea? Why is it that the intellectualist -has not produced any positive theory about the -relation of verification to his notion of truth? -(ii) Moreover, if verification consists in the experimental -working out of a belief, the intellectualist -thereby admits that his <em>own</em> theory of truth -can be <em>known</em> to be true only as it is verified by its -workings. But if the theory that truth is a ready-made -static property of judgments <em>is</em> true, how -in the world <em>can</em> it be verified by making any specific -differences in the course of events? Everywhere<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163">163</a></span> -we have to proceed <em>as if</em> the pragmatic -theory were the right one. (iii) If he admits -that the pragmatic theory of verification is true, -what meaning remains to the statement that the -idea had the truth property in advance? Why, -simply that it had the property of <em>ability to work</em>—an -ability revealed by its actual working. How -can a given fact be an objection to the pragmatic -theory when that fact has a definitely assignable -meaning on the pragmatic theory, while upon the -anti-pragmatic theory it just has to be accepted -as an ultimate, unanalyzable fact?</p> - -<p>As to your remark about verification being -merely psychological, I have something to say. -Colleagues of mine are steadily at work in various -laboratories on various researches, forming -hypotheses, experimenting, testing, corroborating, -refuting, modifying ideas. One of them, for example, -recently put an immense pendulum in place -in order to repeat and test Foucault’s experiment -with reference to the earth’s rotation. Do you regard -such verification processes as merely psychological?</p> - -<p><em>Pupil.</em> I don’t know. Why do you ask?</p> - -<p><em>Teacher.</em> Because if the objector means that -such experimental provings are <em>merely</em> psychological, -he has of course relegated to the merely psychological -(wherever that may be) all the technique -of all the physical sciences—a rather high<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164">164</a></span> -price to pay for the confutation of the pragmatist. -The intellectualist is thus in the dilemma -either of conceding to the pragmatist the whole -sphere of concrete scientific logic or else of himself -regarding all science as merely subjective? Which -horn does he choose?</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Six.</em> I noticed a moment -ago that you spoke of the pragmatic theory of -truth being true. Surely the pragmatist does not -live up to his reputation of having a sense of -humor when he claims assent to his theory on the -ground that it is true. What is this but to admit -intellectualism?</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> My son, we are evidently -nearing the end. Naturally, the pragmatist claims -his theory to be true in the pragmatic sense of -truth: it works, it clears up difficulties, removes -obscurities, puts individuals into more experimental, -less dogmatic, and less arbitrarily sceptical -relations to life; aligns philosophic with scientific -method; does away with self-made problems of -epistemology; clarifies and reorganizes logical theory, -etc. He is quite content to have the truth -of his theory consist in its working in these various -ways, and to leave to the intellectualist the proud -possession of a static, unanalyzable, unverifiable, -unworking property.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Seven.</em> Nevertheless, the pragmatist -is always appealing to the judgments of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">165</a></span> -others to corroborate his own judgment. Surely -this admits the principle of a judgment that is -correct, true, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in se</i>.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> The pragmatist says that -judgment <em>is</em> pragmatic, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, originated under conditions -of need for a survey and statement, and -tested by efficiency in meeting this need. And -then you think you have refuted him by saying -that any appeal to judgment is intellectualistic! -Such begging of the question convinces me that -the radical difficulty of the intellectualist is that -he conceives of the pragmatist as beginning with -a theory of truth, when in reality the latter begins -with a theory about judgments and meanings of -which the theory of truth is a corollary.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Eight.</em> Nevertheless, you are -endeavoring to convert your opponent to a certain -theory. Surely that is an intellectual undertaking, -and in theory (at least) the theoretical criterion, -as Mr. Bradley has well said, must be -supreme.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> A little reflection will convince -you that you are going around in the same old -circle. Since men have to act together, since the -individual subsists in social bonds and activities, -to convert another to a certain way of looking -at things is to make social ties and functions better -adapted, more prosperous in their workings. Only -if the pragmatist held the <em>intellectualist’s</em> position,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">166</a></span> -would he appeal to other than what is ultimately -a practical need and a practical criterion in endeavoring -to convert others.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil: Objection Nine.</em> Still the pragmatic -criterion, being satisfactory working, is purely -personal and subjective. Whatever works so as -to please me is true. Either this is your result (in -which case your reference to social relations only -denotes at bottom a <em>number</em> of purely subjectivistic -satisfactions) or else you unconsciously assume an -intellectual department of our nature that has -to be satisfied; and whose satisfaction is truth. -Thereby you admit the intellectualistic criterion.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher: Reply.</em> We seem to have got back -to our starting-point, the nature of satisfaction. -The intellectualist seems to think that because the -pragmatist insists upon the factor of human want, -purpose, and realization in the making and testing -of judgments, the impersonal factor is therefore -denied. But what the pragmatist does is to insist -that the human factor must work itself out in -<em>co-operation</em> with the environmental factor, and -that their co-adaptation <em>is</em> both “correspondence” -and “satisfaction.” As long as the human factor -is ignored and denied, or is regarded as <em>merely</em> -psychological (whatever, once more, that means), -this human factor will assert itself in irresponsible -ways. So long as, particularly in philosophy, a -flagrantly unchastened pragmatism reigns, we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">167</a></span> -shall find, as at present, the most ambitious intellectualistic -systems accepted simply because of the -personal comfort they yield those who contrive -and accept them. Once recognize the human factor, -and pragmatism is at hand to insist that the -believer must accept the full consequences of his -beliefs, and that his beliefs must be tried out, -through acting upon them, to discover what is -their meaning or consequence. Till so tested, he -insists that beliefs, no matter how noble and seemingly -edifying, are dogmas, not truths. Till the -testing has been worked out very completely and -patiently, he holds his beliefs as but provisional, -as working hypotheses, as methods:—and he recognizes -the probability that, as additional modes of -testing develop, more and more so-called truths -will be relegated to the category of working hypotheses—till -the dogmatic mind is crowded out and -starved out. At present, the ignoring by philosophers -of the part played by personal education, -temperament, and preference in their philosophies -is the chief source of pretentiousness and insincerity -in their systems, and is the ground of the -popular disregard for them.</p> - -<p><em>Pupil.</em> What you say calls to mind something -of Chesterton’s that I read recently: “I agree with -the pragmatists that apparent objective truth is -not the whole matter; that there is an authoritative -need to believe the things that are necessary to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">168</a></span> -the human mind. But I say that one of those -necessities precisely is a belief in objective truth. -Pragmatism is a matter of human needs and one -of the first of human needs is to be something more -than a pragmatist.” You would say, if I understand -you aright, that to fall back upon a supposed -necessity of the “human mind” to believe -in certain absolute truths, is to evade a proper -demand for testing the human mind and all its -works.</p> - -<p><em>Teacher.</em> My son, I am glad to leave the last -word with you. This <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">enfant terrible</i> of intellectualism -has revealed that the chief objection of absolutists -to the pragmatic doctrine of the personal -(or “subjective”) factor in belief is that the -pragmatist has spilled the personal milk in the -absolutist’s cocoanut.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">169</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES"><a id="BELIEFS_AND_EXISTENCES"></a>BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor smaller">26</a></h2> -</div> - - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Beliefs</span> look both ways, towards persons and -toward things. They are the original Mr. -Facing-both-ways. They form or judge—justify -or condemn—the agents who entertain them and -who insist upon them. They are of things whose -immediate meanings form their content. To believe -is to ascribe value, impute meaning, assign -import. The collection and interaction of these -appraisals and assessments is the world of the -common man,—that is, of man as an individual -and not as a professional being or class specimen. -Thus things are characters, not mere entities; they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">170</a></span> -behave and respond and provoke. In the behavior -that exemplifies and tests their character, they -help and hinder; disturb and pacify; resist and -comply; are dismal and mirthful, orderly and -deformed, queer and commonplace; they agree and -disagree; are better and worse.</p> - -<p>Thus the human world, whether or no it have -core and axis, has presence and transfiguration. -It means here and now, not in some transcendent -sphere. It moves, of itself, to varied incremental -meaning, not to some far off event, whether divine -or diabolic. Such movement constitutes conduct, -for conduct is the working out of the commitments -of belief. That believed better is held to, asserted, -affirmed, acted upon. The moments of its crucial -fulfilment are the natural “transcendentals”; the -decisive, the critical, standards of further estimation, -selection, and rejection. That believed worse -is fled, resisted, transformed into an instrument for -the better. Characters, in being condensations of -belief, are thus at once the reminders and the -prognostications of weal and woe; they concrete -and they regulate the terms of effective apprehension -and appropriation of things. This general -regulative function is what we mean in calling -them characters, forms.</p> - -<p>For beliefs, made in the course of existence, -reciprocate by making existence still farther, by -developing it. Beliefs are not made <em>by</em> existence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">171</a></span> -in a mechanical or logical or psychological sense. -“Reality” naturally instigates belief. It appraises -itself and through this self-appraisal manages -its affairs. As things are surcharged valuations, -so “consciousness” means ways of believing -and disbelieving. It is interpretation; not merely -existence aware of itself as fact, but existence discerning, -judging itself, approving and disapproving.</p> - -<p>This double outlook and connection of belief, its -implication, on one side, with beings who suffer -and endeavor, and, its complication on the other, -with the meanings and worths of things, is its glory -or its unpardonable sin. We cannot keep connection -on one side and throw it away on the -other. We cannot preserve significance and decline -the personal attitude in which it is inscribed -and operative, any more than we can succeed in -making things “states” of a “consciousness” -whose business is to be an interpretation of things. -Beliefs are personal affairs, and personal affairs -are adventures, and adventures are, if you please, -shady. But equally discredited, then, is the universe -of meanings. For the world has meaning -as somebody’s, somebody’s at a juncture, taken for -better or worse, and you shall not have completed -your metaphysics till you have told whose world -is meant and how and what for—in what bias and -to what effect. Here is a cake that is had only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">172</a></span> -by eating it, just as there is digestion only <em>for</em> -life as well as <em>by</em> life.</p> - -<p>So far the standpoint of the common man. -But the professional man, the philosopher, has been -largely occupied in a systematic effort to discredit -the standpoint of the common man, that is, to -disable belief as an ultimately valid principle. Philosophy -is shocked at the frank, almost brutal, -evocation of beliefs by and in natural existence, -like witches out of a desert heath—at a mode of -production which is neither logical, nor physical, -nor psychological, but just natural, empirical. -For modern philosophy is, as every college senior -recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps -our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell -the senior, has absorbed Stoic dogma. Passionless -imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete -subjection to a ready-made and finished reality—physical -it may be, mental it may be, logical it may -be—is its professed ideal. Forswearing the reality -of affection, and the gallantry of adventure, the -genuineness of the incomplete, the tentative, it has -taken an oath of allegiance to Reality, objective, -universal, complete; made perhaps of atoms, perhaps -of sensations, perhaps of logical meanings. -This ready-made reality, already including everything, -must of course swallow and absorb belief, -must produce it psychologically, mechanically, or -logically, according to its own nature; must in any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">173</a></span> -case, instead of acquiring aid and support from -belief, resolve it into one of its own preordained -creatures, making a desert and calling it harmony, -unity, totality.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge -which is other than the propitious outgrowth -of beliefs that shall develop aforetime their ulterior -implications in order to recast them, to -rectify their errors, cultivate their waste places, -heal their diseases, fortify their feeblenesses:—the -dream of a knowledge that has to do with objects -having no nature save to be known.</p> - -<p>Not that their philosophers have admitted the -concrete realizability of their scheme. On the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">174</a></span> -contrary, the assertion of the absolute “Reality” -of what is empirically unrealizable is a part of the -scheme; the ideal of a universe of pure, cognitional -objects, fixed elements in fixed relations. -Sensationalist and idealist, positivist and transcendentalist, -materialist and spiritualist, defining -this object in as many differing ways as they have -different conceptions of the ideal and method of -knowledge, are at one in their devotion to an identification -of Reality with something that connects -monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief -purged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>What is to be said of this attempt to sever the -cord which naturally binds together personal attitudes -and the meaning of things? This much at -least: the effort to extract meanings, values, from -the beliefs that ascribe them, and to give the -former absolute metaphysical validity while the -latter are sent to wander as scapegoats in the wilderness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">175</a></span> -of mere phenomena, is an attempt, which, -as long as “our interest’s on the dangerous edge -of things,” will attract an admiring, even if suspicious, -audience. Moreover, we may admit that -the attempt to catch the universe of immediate -experience, of action and passion, coming and -going, to damn it in its present body in order expressly -to glorify its spirit to all eternity, to validate -the meaning of beliefs by discrediting their -natural existence, to attribute absolute worth to -the intent of human convictions just because of -the absolute worthlessness of their content—that -the performance of this feat of virtuosity has -developed philosophy to its present wondrous, if -formidable, technique.</p> - -<p>But can we claim more than a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">succès d’estime</i>? -Consider again the nature of the effort. The -world of immediate meanings, of the world empirically -sustained in beliefs, is to be sorted out -into two portions, metaphysically discontinuous, -one of which shall alone be good and true “Reality,” -the fit material of passionless, beliefless knowledge; -while the other part, that which is excluded, -shall be referred exclusively to belief and treated -as mere appearance, purely subjective, impressions -or effects in consciousness, or as that ludicrously -abject modern discovery—an epiphenomenon. -And this division into the real and the unreal is -accomplished by the very individual whom his own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">176</a></span> -“absolute” results reduce to phenomenality, in -terms of the very immediate experience which is -infected with worthlessness, and on the basis of -preference, of selection that are declared to be -unreal! Can the thing be done?</p> - -<p>Anyway, the snubbed and excluded factor may -always reassert itself. The very pushing it out -of “Reality” may but add to its potential energy, -and invoke a more violent recoil. When affections -and aversions, with the beliefs in which they record -themselves and the efforts they exact, are reduced -to epiphenomena, dancing an idle attendance -upon a reality complete without them, to which -they vainly strive to accommodate themselves by -mirroring, then may the emotions flagrantly burst -forth with the claim that, as a friend of mine puts -it, reason is <em>only</em> a fig leaf for <em>their</em> nakedness. -When one man says that need, uncertainty, choice, -novelty, and strife have no place in Reality, which -is made up wholly of established things behaving -by foregone rules, then may another man be provoked -to reply that all such fixities, whether named -atoms or God, whether they be fixtures of a sensational, -a positivistic, or an idealistic system, have -existence and import only in the problems, needs, -struggles, and instrumentalities of conscious -agents and patients. For home rule may be found -in the unwritten efficacious constitution of experience.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">177</a></span> -That contemporaneously we are in the presence -of such a reaction is apparent. Let us, in pursuit -of our topic, inquire how it came about and why -it takes the form that it takes. This consideration -may not only occupy the hour, but may help -diagram some future parallelogram of forces. -The account calls for some sketching (1) of the -historical tendencies which have shaped the situation -in which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims -metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies -that have furnished the despised principle of belief -opportunity and means of reassertion.</p> - - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>Imagination readily travels to a period when a -gospel of intense, and, one may say, deliberate -passionate disturbance appeared to be conquering -the Stoic ideal of passionless reason; when the demand -for individual assertion by faith against the -established, embodied objective order was seemingly -subduing the idea of the total subordination -of the individual to the universal. By what course -of events came about the dramatic reversal, in -which an ethically conquered Stoicism became the -conqueror, epistemologically, of Christianity?</p> - -<p>How are our imaginations haunted by the idea -of what might have happened if Christianity had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">178</a></span> -found ready to its hand intellectual formulations -corresponding to its practical proclamations!</p> - -<p>That the ultimate principle of conduct is affectional -and volitional; that God is love; that access -to the principle is by faith, a personal attitude; -that belief, surpassing logical basis and warrant, -works out through its own operation its own fulfilling -evidence: such was the implied moral metaphysic -of Christianity. But this implication needed -to become a theory, a theology, a formulation; -and in this need, it found no recourse save to -philosophies that had identified true existence with -the proper object of logical reason. For, in -Greek thought, after the valuable meanings, the -meanings of industry and art that appealed to sustained -and serious choice, had given birth and -status to reflective reason, reason denied its ancestry -of organized endeavor, and proclaimed itself -in its function of self-conscious logical thought to -be the author and warrant of all genuine things. -Yet how nearly Christianity had found prepared -for it the needed means of its own intellectual -statement! We recall Aristotle’s account of moral -knowing, and his definition of man. Man as man, -he tells us, is a principle that may be termed -either desiring thought or thinking desire. Not -as pure intelligence does <em>man</em> know, but as an -organization of desires effected through reflection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">179</a></span> -upon their own conditions and consequences. What -if Aristotle had only assimilated his idea of theoretical -to his notion of practical knowledge! Because -practical thinking was so human, Aristotle -rejected it in favor of pure, passionless cognition, -something superhuman. Thinking desire is experimental, -is tentative, not absolute. It looks to -the future and to the past for help in the future. -It is contingent, not necessary. It doubly relates -to the individual: to the individual thing as experienced -by an individual agent; not to the universal. -Hence desire is a sure sign of defect, of -privation, of non-being, and seeks surcease in -something which knows it not. Hence desiring -reason culminating in beliefs relating to imperfect -existence, stands forever in contrast with passionless -reason functioning in pure knowledge, logically -complete, of perfect being.</p> - -<p>I need not remind you how through Neo-Platonism, -St. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance, -these conceptions became imbedded in Christian -philosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the -original practical principle of Christianity. Belief -is henceforth important because it is the mere -antecedent in a finite and fallen world, a temporal -and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of -true knowledge to be achieved only in a world -of completed Being. Desire is but the self-consciousness -of defect striving to its own termination<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180">180</a></span> -in perfect possession, through perfect knowledge of -perfect being. I need not remind you that the -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">prima facie</i> subordination of reason to authority, -of knowledge to faith, in the medieval code, is, after -all, but the logical result of the doctrine that man -as man (since only reasoning desire) is merely -phenomenal; and has his reality in God, who as -God is the complete union of rational insight and -being—the term of man’s desire, and the fulfilment -of his feeble attempts at knowing. Authority, -“faith” as it then had to be conceived, meant just -that this Being comes externally to the aid of man, -otherwise hopelessly doomed to misery in long -drawn out error and non-being, and disciplines -him till, in the next world under more favoring -auspices, he may have his desires stilled in good, -and his faith may yield to knowledge:—for we -forget that the doctrine of immortality was not an -appendage, but an integral part of the theory that -since knowledge is the <em>true</em> function of man, happiness -is attained only in knowledge, which itself -exists only in achievement of perfect Being or God.</p> - -<p>For my part, I can but think that medieval -absolutism, with its provision for authoritative -supernatural assistance in this world and assertion -of supernatural realization in the next, was more -logical, as well as more humane, than the modern -absolutism, that, with the same logical premises, -bids man find adequate consolation and support in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">181</a></span> -the fact that, after all, his strivings are already -eternally fulfilled, his errors already eternally -transcended, his partial beliefs already eternally -comprehended.</p> - -<p>The modern age is marked by a refusal to be -satisfied with the postponement of the exercise and -function of reason to another and supernatural -sphere, and by a resolve to practise itself upon its -present object, nature, with all the joys thereunto -appertaining. The pure intelligence of Aristotle, -thought thinking itself, expresses itself as free -inquiry directed upon the present conditions of its -own most effective exercise. The principle of the -inherent relation of thought to being was preserved -intact, but its practical locus was moved -down from the next world to this. Spinoza’s -“God or Nature” is the logical outcome; as is also -his strict correlation of the attribute of matter with -the attribute of thought; while his combination -of thorough distrust of passion and faith with -complete faith in reason and all-absorbing passion -for knowledge is so classic an embodiment of the -whole modern contradiction that it may awaken admiration -where less thorough-paced formulations -call out irritation.</p> - -<p>In the practical devotion of present intelligence -to its present object, nature, science was born, -and also its philosophical counterpart, the theory -of knowledge. Epistemology only generalized in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182">182</a></span> -its loose, although narrow and technical way, the -question practically urgent in Europe: How is -science possible? How can intelligence actively -and directly get at its object?</p> - -<p>Meantime, through Protestantism the values, -the meanings formerly characterizing the next life -(the opportunity for full perception of perfect -being), were carried over into present-day emotions -and responses.</p> - -<p>The dualism between faith authoritatively supported -as the principle of this life, and knowledge -supernaturally realized as the principle of the next, -was transmuted into the dualism between intelligence -now and here occupied with natural things, -and the affections and accompanying beliefs, now -and here realizing spiritual worths. For a time -this dualism operated as a convenient division of -labor. Intelligence, freed from responsibility for -and preoccupation with supernatural truths, could -occupy itself the more fully and efficiently with the -world that now is; while the affections, charged -with the values evoked in the medieval discipline, -entered into the present enjoyment of the delectations -previously reserved for the saints. Directness -took the place of systematic intermediation; -the present of the future; the individual’s emotional -consciousness of the supernatural institution. -Between science and faith, thus conceived, a -bargain was struck. Hands off; each to his own,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">183</a></span> -was the compact; the natural world to intelligence, -the moral, the spiritual world to belief. This -(natural) world for knowledge; that (supernatural) -world for belief. Thus the antithesis, unexpressed, -ignored, <em>within experience</em>, between belief -and knowledge, between the purely objective values -of thought and the personal values of passion and -volition, was more fundamental, more determining, -than the opposition, explicit and harassing, <em>within -knowledge</em>, between subject and object, mind and -matter.</p> - -<p>This latent antagonism worked out into the -open. In scientific detail, knowledge encroached -upon the historic traditions and opinions with -which the moral and religious life had identified -itself. It made history to be as natural, as much -its spoil, as physical nature. It turned itself upon -man, and proceeded remorselessly to account for -his emotions, his volitions, his opinions. Knowledge, -in its general theory, as philosophy, went -the same way. It was pre-committed to the old -notion: the absolutely real is the object of <em>knowledge</em>, -and hence is something universal and impersonal. -So, whether by the road of sensationalism -or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or -objective idealism, it came about that concrete -selves, specific feeling and willing beings, were -relegated with the beliefs in which they declare -themselves to the “phenomenal.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">184</a></span></p> - - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>So much for the situation against which some -contemporary tendencies are a deliberate protest.</p> - -<p>What of the positive conditions that give us -not mere protest, like the unreasoning revolt of -heart against head found at all epochs, but something -articulate and constructive? The field is -only too large, and I shall limit myself to the -evolution of the knowledge standpoint itself. I -shall suggest, first, that the progress of intelligence -directed upon natural materials has evolved a procedure -of knowledge that renders untenable the -inherited conception of knowledge; and, secondly, -that this result is reinforced by the specific results -of some of the special sciences.</p> - -<p>1. First, then, the very use of the knowledge -standpoint, the very expression of the knowledge -preoccupation, has produced methods and tests -that, when formulated, intimate a radically different -conception of knowledge, and of its relation to -existence and belief, than the orthodox one.</p> - -<p>The one thing that stands out is that thinking -is inquiry, and that knowledge as science is the -outcome of systematically directed inquiry. For -a time it was natural enough that inquiry should -be interpreted in the old sense, as just change of -subjective attitudes and opinions to make them -square up with a “reality” that is already there<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">185</a></span> -in ready-made, fixed, and finished form. The -rationalist had one notion of the reality, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, that it -was of the nature of laws, genera, or an ordered -system, and so thought of concepts, axioms, etc., -as the indicated modes of representation. The -empiricist, holding reality to be a lot of little discrete -particular lumps, thought of disjointed sensations -as its appropriate counterpart. But -both alike were thorough conformists. If “reality” -is already and completely given, and if knowledge -is just submissive acceptance, then, of course, -inquiry is only a subjective change in the human -“mind” or in “consciousness,”—these being subjective -and “unreal.”</p> - -<p>But the very development of the sciences served -to reveal a peculiar and intolerable paradox. -Epistemology, having condemned inquiry once for -all to the region of subjectivity in an invidious -sense, finds itself in flat opposition in principle and -in detail to the assumption and to the results of the -sciences. Epistemology is bound to deny to the -results of the special sciences in detail any ulterior -objectivity just because they always <em>are</em> in a process -of inquiry—<em>in</em> solution. While a man may not -be halted at being told that his mental activities, -since his, are not genuinely real, many men will -draw violently back at being told that all the discoveries, -conclusions, explanations, and theories of -the sciences share the same fate, being the products<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">186</a></span> -of a discredited mind. And, in general, epistemology, -in relegating human thinking as inquiry to a -merely phenomenal region, makes concrete approximation -and conformity to objectivity hopeless. -Even if it did square itself up to and by “reality” -it never could be sure of it. The ancient myth of -Tantalus and his effort to drink the water before -him seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern -epistemology. The thirstier, the needier of truth -the human mind, and the intenser the efforts put -forth to slake itself in the ocean of being just -beyond the edge of consciousness, the more surely -the living waters of truth recede!</p> - -<p>When such self-confessed sterility is joined with -consistent derogation of all the special results of -the special sciences, some one is sure to raise the cry -of “dog in the manger,” or of “sour grapes.” A -revision of the theory of thinking, of inquiry, would -seem to be inevitable; a revision which should cease -trying to construe knowledge as an attempted approximation -to a reproduction of reality under conditions -that condemn it in advance to failure; a -revision which should start frankly from the fact -of thinking as inquiring, and purely external realities -as terms in inquiries, and which should construe -validity, objectivity, truth, and the test and -system of truths, on the basis of what they actually -mean and do within inquiry.</p> - -<p>Such a standpoint promises ample revenge for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187">187</a></span> -the long damnation and longer neglect to which -the principle of belief has been subjected. The -whole procedure of thinking as developed in those -extensive and intensive inquiries that constitute -the sciences, is but rendering into a systematic -technique, into an art deliberately and delightfully -pursued, the rougher and cruder means by which -practical human beings have in all ages worked -out the implications of their beliefs, tested them, -and endeavored in the interests of economy, efficiency, -and freedom, to render them coherent with -one another. Belief, sheer, direct, unmitigated -belief, reappears as the working hypothesis; -action that at once develops and tests belief reappears -in experimentation, deduction, demonstration; -while the machinery of universals, axioms, -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> truths, etc., becomes a systematization of -the way in which men have always worked out, in -anticipation of overt action, the implications of -their beliefs, with a view to revising them, in the -interests of obviating unfavorable, and securing -welcome consequences. Observation, with its machinery -of sensations, measurements, etc., is the -resurrection of the way in which agents have always -faced and tried to define the problems that face -them; truth is the union of abstract postulated -meanings and of concrete brute facts in a way -that circumvents the latter by judging them from -a new standpoint, while it tests concepts by using<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">188</a></span> -them as methods in the same active experience. -It all comes to experience personally conducted -and personally consummated.</p> - -<p>Let consciousness of these facts dawn a little -more brightly over the horizon of epistemological -prejudices, and it will be seen that nothing prevents -admitting the genuineness both of thinking -activities and of their characteristic results, except -the notion that belief itself is not a genuine -ingredient of existence—a notion which itself is not -only a belief, but a belief which, unlike the convictions -of the common man and the hypotheses of -science, finds its proud proof in the fact that it -does not demean itself so unworthily as to work.</p> - -<p>Once believe that beliefs themselves are as -“real” as anything else can ever be, and we have -a world in which uncertainty, doubtfulness, really -inhere; and in which personal attitudes and responses -are real both in their own distinctive existence, -and as the only ways in which an as yet -undetermined factor of reality takes on shape, -meaning, value, truth. If “to wilful men the injuries -that they themselves procure, must be their -schoolmasters”—and all beliefs are wilful—then -by the same token the propitious evolutions of -meaning, which wilful men secure to an expectant -universe, must be their compensation and their -justification. In a doubtful and needy universe -elements must be beggarly, and the development<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">189</a></span> -of personal beliefs into experimentally executed -systems of actions, is the organized bureau of -philanthropy which confers upon a travailing universe -the meaning for which it cries out. The -apostrophe of the poet is above all to man the -thinker, the inquirer, the knower:</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">O Dreamer! O Desirer, goer down<br /></span> -<span class="i0">Unto untraveled seas in untried ships,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">O crusher of the unimagined grape,<br /></span> -<span class="i0">On unconceivèd lips.<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p>2. Biology, psychology, and the social sciences -proffer an imposing body of concrete facts that -also point to the rehabilitation of belief—to the -interpretation of knowledge as a human and practical -outgrowth of belief, not to belief as the state -to which knowledge is condemned in a merely finite -and phenomenal world. I need not, as I cannot, -here summarize the psychological revision which -the notions of sensation, perception, conception, -cognition in general have undergone, all to one intent. -“Motor” is writ large on their face. The -testimony of biology is unambiguous to the effect -that the organic instruments of the whole intellectual -life, the sense-organs and brain and their -connections, have been developed on a definitely -practical basis and for practical aims, for the -purpose of such control over conditions as will -sustain and vary the meanings of life. The historic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">190</a></span> -sciences are equally explicit in their evidence -that knowledge as a system of information and -instruction is a coöperative social achievement, -at all times socially toned, sustained, and directed; -and that logical thinking is a reweaving through -individual activity of this social fabric at such -points as are indicated by prevailing needs and -aims.</p> - -<p>This bulky and coherent body of testimony is -not, of course, of itself philosophy. But it supplies, -at all events, facts that have scientific backing, -and that are as worthy of regard as the facts -pertinent to any science. At the present time these -facts seem to have some peculiar claim just because -they present traits largely ignored in prior -philosophic formulations, while those belonging to -mathematics and physics have so largely wrought -their sweet will on systems. Again, it would seem -as if in philosophies built deliberately upon the -knowledge principle, any body of known facts -should not have to clamor for sympathetic attention.</p> - -<p>Such being the case, the reasons for ruling -psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of -competency to give philosophic testimony have -more significance than the bare denial of jurisdiction. -They are evidences of the deep-rooted -preconception that whatever concerns a particular -conscious agent, a wanting, struggling, satisfied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">191</a></span> -and dissatisfied being, must of course be only “phenomenal” -in import.</p> - -<p>This aversion is the more suggestive when the -professed idealist appears as the special champion -of the virginity of pure knowledge. The idealist, -so content with the notion that consciousness determines -reality, provided it be done once for all, -at a jump and in lump, is so uneasy in presence -of the idea that empirical conscious beings genuinely -determine existences now and here! One is -reminded of the story told, I think, by Spencer. -Some committee had organized and contended, -through a long series of parliaments, for the -passage of a measure. At last one of their meetings -was interrupted with news of success. Consternation -was the result. What was to become -of the occupation of the committee? So, one asks, -what is to become of idealism at large, of the -wholesale unspecifiable determination of “reality” -by or in “consciousness,” if specific conscious beings, -John Smiths, and Susan Smiths (to say nothing -of their animal relations), beings with bowels -and brains, are found to exercise influence upon -the character and existence of reals?</p> - -<p>One would be almost justified in construing -idealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to -idealize the principle of intelligence at the expense -of its specific undertakings, were it not that this -reluctance is the necessary outcome of the Stoic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">192</a></span> -basis and tenor of idealism—its preoccupation -with logical contents and relations in abstraction -from their <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">situs</i> and function in conscious living -beings.</p> - - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>I have suggested to you the naïve conception of -the relation of beliefs to realities: that beliefs are -themselves real without discount, manifesting their -reality in the usual proper way, namely, by modifying -and shaping the reality of other things, so that -they connect the bias, the preferences and affections, -the needs and endeavors of personal lives -with the values, the characters ascribed to things:—the -latter thus becoming worthy of human acquaintance -and responsive to human intercourse. -This was followed by a sketch of the history of -thought, indicating how beliefs and all they insinuate -were subjected to preconceived notions of -knowledge and of “reality” as a monopolistic possession -of pure intellect. Then I traced some of -the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">motifs</i> that make for reconsideration of the -supposed uniquely exclusive relation of logical -knowledge and “reality”; <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">motifs</i> that make for a -less invidiously superior attitude towards the convictions -of the common man.</p> - -<p>In concluding, I want to say a word or two to -mitigate—for escape is impossible—some misunderstandings.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">193</a></span> -And, to begin with, while possible -doubts inevitably troop with actual beliefs, the doctrine -in question is not particularly sceptical. The -radical empiricist, the humanist, the pragmatist, -label him as you will, believes not in fewer but in -more “realities” than the orthodox philosophers -warrant. He is not concerned, for example, in -discrediting objective realities and logical or universal -thinking; he is interested in such a reinterpretation -of the sort of “reality” which these -things possess as will accredit, without depreciation, -concrete empirical conscious centers of action -and passion.</p> - -<p>My second remark is to the opposite effect. The -intent is not especially credulous, although it starts -from and ends with the radical credulity of all -knowledge. To suppose that because the sciences -are ultimately instrumental to human beliefs, we -are therefore to be careless of the most exact possible -use of extensive and systematic scientific -methods, is like supposing that because a watch is -made to tell present time, and not to be an exemplar -of transcendent, absolute time, watches might -as well be made of cheap stuffs, casually wrought -and clumsily put together. It is the task of telling -present time, with all its urgent implications, that -brings home, steadies, and enlarges the responsibility -for the best possible use of intelligence, the -instrument.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194">194</a></span> -For one, I have no interest in the old, old scheme -of derogating from the worth of knowledge in -order to give an uncontrolled field for some <em>special</em> -beliefs to run riot in,—be these beliefs even faith -in immortality, in some special sort of a Deity, -or in some particular brand of freedom. Any one -of our beliefs is subject to criticism, revision, and -even ultimate elimination through the development -of its own implications by intelligently directed -action. Because reason is a scheme of working out -the meanings of convictions in terms of one another -and of the consequences they import in -further experience, convictions are the more, not -the less, amenable and responsible to the full exercise -of reason.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<p>Thus we are put on the road to that most desirable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195">195</a></span> -thing,—the union of acknowledgment of -moral powers and demands with thoroughgoing -naturalism. No one really wants to lame man’s -practical nature; it is the supposed exigencies of -natural science that force the hand. No one -really bears a grudge against naturalism for the -sake of obscurantism. It is the need of some sacred -reservation for moral interests that coerces. We -all want to be as naturalistic as we can be. But -the “can be” is the rub. If we set out with a -fixed dualism of belief and knowledge, then the -uneasy fear that the natural sciences are going to -encroach and destroy “spiritual values” haunts -us. So we build them a citadel and fortify it; -that is, we isolate, professionalize, and thereby -weaken beliefs. But if beliefs are the most natural, -and in that sense, the most metaphysical of -all things, and if knowledge is an organized technique -for working out their implications and interrelations, -for directing their formation and employ, -how unnecessary, how petty the fear and the -caution. Because freedom of belief is ours, free -thought may exercise itself; the freer the thought -the more sure the emancipation of belief. Hug -some special belief and one fears knowledge; believe -in belief and one loves and cleaves to knowledge.</p> - -<p>We have here, too, the possibility of a common -understanding, in thought, in language, in outlook,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">196</a></span> -of the philosopher and the common man. What -would not the philosopher give, did he not have -to part with some of his common humanity in order -to join a class? Does he not always, when challenged, -justify himself with the contention that all -men naturally philosophize, and that he but does -in a conscious and orderly way what leads to -harm when done in an indiscriminate and irregular -way? If philosophy be at once a natural history -<em>and</em> a logic—an art—of beliefs, then its technical -justification is at one with its human justification. -The natural attitude of man, said Emerson, -is believing; “the philosopher, after some -struggle, having only reasons for believing.” Let -the struggle then enlighten and enlarge beliefs; -let the reasons kindle and engender new beliefs.</p> - -<p>Finally, it is not a solution, but a problem which -is presented. As philosophers, our disagreements -as to conclusions are trivial compared with our disagreement -as to problems. To see the problem -another sees, in the same perspective and at the -same angle—that amounts to something. Agreement -in solutions is in comparison perfunctory. -To experience the same problem another feels—that -perhaps is agreement. In a world where distinctions -are as invidious as comparisons are odious, -and where intellect works only by comparison -and distinction, pray what is one to do?</p> - -<p>But beliefs are personal matters, and the person,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">197</a></span> -we may still believe, is social. To be a man is to -be thinking desire; and the agreement of desires is -not in oneness of intellectual conclusion, but in the -sympathies of passion and the concords of action:—and -yet significant union in affection and behavior -may depend upon a consensus in thought -that is secured only by discrimination and comparison.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">198</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM"><a id="EXPERIENCE_AND_OBJECTIVE_IDEALISM"></a>EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor smaller">30</a></h2> -</div> - - -<h3>I</h3> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Idealism</span> as a philosophic system stands in -such a delicate relation to experience as to invite -attention. In its subjective form, or sensationalism, -it claims to be the last word of empiricism. -In its objective, or rational form, it claims -to make good the deficiencies of the subjective type, -by emphasizing the work of thought that supplies -the factors of objectivity and universality lacking -in sensationalism. With reference to experience -<em>as it now is</em>, such idealism is half opposed to empiricism -and half committed to it,—antagonistic, -so far as existing experience is regarded as tainted -with a sensational character; favorable, so far as -this experience is even now prophetic of some final, -all-comprehensive, or absolute experience, which -in truth is one with reality.</p> - -<p>That this combination of opposition to present -experience with devotion to the cause of experience<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">199</a></span> -in the abstract leaves objective idealism in a position -of unstable equilibrium from which it can find -release only by euthanasia in a thorough-going -empiricism seems evident. Some of the reasons for -this belief may be readily approached by a summary -sketch of three historic episodes in which have -emerged important conceptions of experience and -its relation to reason. The first takes us to classic -Greek thought. Here experience means the preservation, -through memory, of the net result of a multiplicity -of particular doings and sufferings; a -preservation that affords positive skill in maintaining -further practice, and promise of success in -new emergencies. The craft of the carpenter, the -art of the physician are standing examples of its -nature. It differs from instinct and blind routine -or servile practice because there is some knowledge -of materials, methods, and aims, in their adjustment -to one another. Yet the marks of its passive, -habitual origin are indelibly stamped upon it. On -the knowledge side it can never aspire beyond opinion, -and if true opinion be achieved, it is only by -happy chance. On the active side it is limited to -the accomplishment of a special work or a particular -product, following some unjustified, because -assumed, method. Thus it contrasts with the true -knowledge of reason, which is direct apprehension, -self-revealing and self-validating, of an eternal -and harmonious content. The regions in which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200">200</a></span> -experience and reason respectively hold sway are -thus explained. Experience has to do with production, -which, in turn, is relative to decay. It -deals with generation, becoming, not with finality, -being. Hence it is infected with the trait of relative -non-being, of mere imitativeness; hence its -multiplicity, its logical inadequacy, its relativity -to a standard and end beyond itself. Reason, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">per -contra</i>, has to do with meaning, with significance -(ideas, forms), that is eternal and ultimate. Since -the meaning of anything is the worth, the good, -the end of that thing, experience presents us with -partial and tentative efforts to achieve the embodiment -of purpose, under conditions that doom -the attempt to inconclusiveness. It has, however, -its meed of reality in the degree in which -its results <em>participate</em> in meaning, the good, -reason.</p> - -<p>From this classic period, then, comes the antithesis -of experience as the historically achieved -<em>embodiments</em> of meaning, partial, multiple, insecure, -to reason as the source, author, and container -of <em>meaning</em>, permanent, assured, unified. -Idealism means ideality, experience means brute -and broken facts. That things exist because of -and for the sake of meaning, and that experience -gives us meaning in a servile, interrupted, and -inherently deficient way—such is the standpoint. -Experience gives us meaning in process of becoming;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201">201</a></span> -special and isolated instances in which it -<em>happens</em>, temporally, to appear, rather than meaning -pure, undefiled, independent. Experience presents -purpose, the good, struggling against obstacles, -“involved in matter.”</p> - -<p>Just how much the vogue of modern neo-Kantian -idealism, professedly built upon a strictly epistemological -instead of upon a cosmological basis, -is due, in days of a declining theology, to a vague -sense that affirming the function of reason in the -constitution of a knowable world (which in its own -constitution as logically knowable may be, morally -and spiritually, anything you please), carries with -it an assurance of the superior reality of the good -and the beautiful as well as of the “true,” it would -be hard to say. Certainly unction seems to have -descended upon epistemology, in apostolic succession, -from classic idealism; so that neo-Kantianism -is rarely without a tone of edification, as if feeling -itself the patron of man’s spiritual interests in -contrast to the supposed crudeness and insensitiveness -of naturalism and empiricism. At all events, -we find here one element in our problem: Experience -considered as the summary of past episodic -adventures and happenings in relation to fulfilled -and adequately expressed meaning.</p> - -<p>The second historic event centers about the controversy -of innate ideas, or pure concepts. The -issue is between empiricism and rationalism as theories<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202">202</a></span> -of the origin and validation of scientific -knowledge. The empiricist is he who feels that -the chief obstacle which prevents scientific method -from making way is the belief in pure thoughts, -not derived from particular observations and hence -not responsible to the course of experience. His -objection to the “high <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> road” is that it -introduces in irresponsible fashion a mode of presumed -knowledge which may be used at any turn -to stand sponsor for mere tradition and prejudice, -and thus to nullify the results of science resting -upon and verified by observable facts. Experience -thus comes to mean, to use the words of -Peirce, “that which is forced upon a man’s recognition -will-he, nill-he, and shapes his thoughts to -something quite different from what they naturally -would have taken.”<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> The same definition is -found in James, in his chapter on Necessary -Truths: “Experience means experience of something -foreign supposed to impress us whether -spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions -and acts.”<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> As Peirce points out, this -notion of experience as the foreign element that -forces the hand of thought and controls its -efficacy, goes back to Locke. Experience is “observation -employed either about external sensible -objects, or about the internal operations of our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203">203</a></span> -minds”<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a>—as furnishing in short all the valid data -and tests of thinking and knowledge. This meaning, -thinks Peirce, should be accepted “as a landmark -which it would be a crime to disturb or displace.”</p> - -<p>The contention of idealism, here bound up with -rationalism, is that perception and observation -cannot guarantee knowledge in its honorific sense -(science); that the peculiar differentia of scientific -knowledge is a constancy, a universality, and necessity -that contrast at every point with perceptual -data, and that indispensably require the function -of conception.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> In short, <em>qualitative transformation</em> -of <em>facts</em> (data of perception), not their mechanical -subtraction and recombination, is the difference -between scientific and perceptual knowledge. -Here the problem which emerges is, of -course, the significance of perception and of conception -in respect to experience.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204">204</a></span> -The third episode reverses in a curious manner -(which confuses present discussion) the notion -of experience as a foreign, alien, coercive material. -It regards experience as a fortuitous association, -by merely psychic connections, of individualistic -states of consciousness. This is due to the Humian -development of Locke. The “objects” and “operations,” -which to Locke were just given and -secured in observation, become shifting complexes -of subjective sensations and ideas, whose apparent -permanency is due to discoverable illusions. This, -of course, is the empiricism which made Kant so -uneasily toss in his dogmatic slumbers (a tossing -that he took for an awakening); and which, by reaction, -called out the conception of thought as a -function operating both to elevate perceptual -data to scientific status, and also to confer objective -status, or knowable character, upon even -sensational data and their associative combinations.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> -Here emerges the third element in our -problem: The function of thought as furnishing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205">205</a></span> -objectivity to any experience that claims cognitive -reference or capacity.</p> - -<p>Summing up the matter, idealism stands forth -with its assertion of thought or reason as (1) the -sponsor for all significance, ideality, purpose, in -experience,—the author of the good and the beautiful -as well as the true; (2) the power, located in -pure conceptions, required to elevate perceptive or -observational material to the plane of science; and -(3) the constitution that gives objectivity, even -the semblance of order, system, connection, mutual -reference, to sensory data that without its assistance -are mere subjective flux.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206">206</a></span></p> - - -<h3>II</h3> - -<p>I begin the discussion with the last-named function. -Thought is here conceived as <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i>, not -in the sense of particular innate ideas, but of a -function that constitutes the very possibility of -any objective experience, any experience involving -reference beyond its own mere subjective happening. -I shall try to show that idealism is condemned -to move back and forth between two inconsistent -interpretations of this <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> thought. -It is taken to mean both the organized, the regulated, -the informed, established character of experience, -an order immanent and constitutional; -and an agency which organizes, regulates, forms, -synthesizes, a power operative and constructive. -And the oscillation between and confusion of these -two diverse senses is necessary to Neo-Kantian -idealism.</p> - -<p>When Kant compared his work in philosophy to -that of the men who introduced construction into -geometry, and experimentation into physics and -chemistry, the point of his remarks depends upon -taking the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> worth of thought in a regulative, -directive, controlling sense, thought as consciously, -intentionally, making an experience <em>different</em> -in a <em>determinate</em> sense and manner. But the -point of his answer to Hume consists in taking the -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> in the other sense, as something which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207">207</a></span> -is <em>already</em> immanent in <em>any</em> experience, and which -accordingly makes no determinate difference to any -one experience as compared with any other, or with -any past or future form of itself. The concept is -treated first as that which makes an experience -actually different, controlling its evolution towards -consistency, coherency, and objective reliability; -then, it is treated as that which has already effected -the organization of any and every experience that -comes to recognition at all. The fallacy from -which he never emerges consists in vibrating between -the definition of a concept as a rule of constructive -synthesis in a <em>differential</em> sense, and the -definition of it as a static endowment lurking in -“mind,” and giving automatically a hard and fixed -law for the determination of every experienced -object. The <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> conceptions of Kant as immanent -fall, like the rain, upon the just and the -unjust; upon error, opinion, and hallucination. -But Kant slides into these <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> functions the -preferential values exercised by empirical reflective -thought. The concept of triangle, taken geometrically, -means doubtless a determinate method -of construing space elements; but to Kant it also -means something that exists in the mind <em>prior</em> to -all such geometrical constructions and that unconsciously -lays down the law not only for their -conscious elaboration, but also for any space perception, -even for that which takes a rectangle to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208">208</a></span> -be a triangle. The first of the meanings is intelligible, -and marks a definite contribution to the logic -of science. But it is not “objective idealism”; -it is a contribution to a revised empiricism. The -second is a dark saying.</p> - -<p>That organization of some sort exists in every -experience I make no doubt. That isolation, discrepancy, -the fragmentary, the incompatible, are -brought to recognition and to logical function only -with reference to some prior existential mode of -organization seems clear. And it seems equally -clear that reflection goes on with profit only because -the materials with which it deals have already -some degree of organization, or exemplify -various relationships. As against Hume, or even -Locke, we may be duly grateful to Kant for enforcing -acknowledgment of these facts. But the -acknowledgment means simply an improved and -revised empiricism.</p> - -<p>For, be it noted, this organization, first, is not -the work of reason or thought, unless “reason” be -stretched beyond all identification; and, secondly, -it has no sacrosanct or finally valid and worthful -character. (1) Experience always carries with -it and within it certain systematized arrangements, -certain classifications (using the term without intellectualistic -prejudice), coexistent and serial. If -we attribute these to “thought” then the structure -of the brain of a Mozart which hears and combines<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209">209</a></span> -sounds in certain groupings, the psycho-physical -visual habit of the Greek, the locomotor apparatus -of the human body in the laying-out and plotting -of space is “thought.” Social institutions, established -political customs, effect and perpetuate -modes of reaction and of perception that compel -a certain grouping of objects, elements, and values. -A national constitution brings about a definite -arrangement of the factors of human action which -holds even physical things together in certain -determinate orders. Every successful economic -process, with its elaborate divisions and adjustments -of labor, of materials and instruments, is -just such an objective organization. Now it is one -thing to say that thought has played a part in -the origin and development of such organizations, -and continues to have a rôle in their judicious employment -and application; it is another to say that -these organizations <em>are</em> thought, or are its exclusive -product. Thought that functions in these -ways is distinctively <em>reflective</em> thought, thought as -practical, volitional, deliberately exercised for specific -aims—thought as an act, an art of skilled -mediation. As <em>reflective</em> thought, its end is to -terminate its own first and experimental forms, and -to secure an organization which, while it may evoke -new reflective thinking, puts an end to the thinking -that secured the organization. <em>As organizations</em>, -as established, effectively controlling arrangements<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210">210</a></span> -of objects in experience, their mark -is that they are not thoughts, but habits, customs -of action.<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> - -<p>Moreover, such reflective thought as does intervene -in the formation and maintenance of these -practical organizations harks back to prior practical -organizations, biological and social in nature. -It serves to <em>valuate</em> organizations already existent -as biological functions and instincts, while, as itself -a biological activity, it redirects them to new conditions -and results. Recognize, for example, that -a geometric concept is a practical locomotor -function of arranging stimuli in reference to maintenance -of life activities <em>brought into consciousness</em>, -and then serving as a center of reorganization of -such activities to freer, more varied flexible and -valuable forms; recognize this, and we have the -truth of the Kantian idea, without its excrescences -and miracles. The concept is the practical activity -doing consciously and artfully what it had -aforetime done blindly and aimlessly, and thereby -not only doing it better but opening up a freer -world of significant activities. Thought as such a -reorganization of natural functions does naturally<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211">211</a></span> -what Kantian forms and schematizations do only -supernaturally. In a word, the constructive or -organizing activity of “thought” does not inhere -in thought as a transcendental function, a form or -mode of some supra-empirical ego, mind, or consciousness, -but in thought as itself vital activity. -And in any case we have passed to the idea of -thought as reflectively reconstructive and directive, -and away from the notion of thought as -immanently constitutional and organizational. -To make this passage and yet to ignore its -existence and import is essential to objective -idealism.</p> - -<p>(2) No final or ultimate validity attaches to -these original arrangements and institutionalizations -in any case. Their value is teleological and -experimental, not fixedly ontological. “Law and -order” are good things, but not when they become -rigidity, and create mechanical uniformity or routine. -Prejudice is the acme of the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i>. Of -the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> in this sense we may say what is always -to be said of habits and institutions: They are good -servants, but harsh and futile masters. Organization -as already effected is always in danger of -becoming a <em>mortmain</em>; it may be a way of sacrificing -novelty, flexibility, freedom, creation to -static standards. The curious inefficiency of idealism -at this point is evident in the fact that genuine -thought, empirical reflective thought, is required<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212">212</a></span> -precisely for the purpose of re-forming established -and set formations.</p> - -<p>In short, (<em>a</em>) <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> character is no exclusive -function of thought. Every biological function, -every motor attitude, every vital impulse as the -carrying vehicle of experience is thus <em>apriorily</em> -regulative in prospective reference; what we call -apperception, expectation, anticipation, desire, demand, -choice, are pregnant with this constitutive -and organizing power. (<em>b</em>) In so far as -“thought” does exercise such reorganizing power, -it is because thought is itself still a <em>vital</em> function. -(<em>c</em>) Objective idealism depends not only upon ignoring -the existence and capacity of vital functions, -but upon a profound confusion of the constitutional -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i>, the unconsciously dominant, -with empirically reflective thought. In the sense -in which the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> is worth while as an attribute -of thought, thought cannot be what the objective -idealist defines it as being. Plain, ordinary, everyday -empirical reflections, operating as centers of -inquiry, of suggestion, of experimentation, exercise -the valuable function of regulation, in an -auspicious direction, of subsequent experiences.</p> - -<p>The categories of accomplished systematization -cover alike the just and the unjust, the false and -the true, while (unlike God’s rain) they exercise -no <em>specific</em> or <em>differential</em> activity of stimulation -and control. Error and inefficiency, as well as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213">213</a></span> -value and energy, are embodied in our objective -institutional classifications. As a special favor, -will not the objective idealist show how, in some -one single instance, his immanent “reason” makes -any difference as respects the detection and elimination -of error, or gives even the slightest assistance -in discovering and validating the truly worthful? -This practical work, the life blood of intelligence -in everyday life and in critical science, is -done by the despised and rejected matter of concrete -empirical contexts and functions. Generalizing -the issue: If the immanent organization be -ascribed to thought, why should its work be such -as to demand continuous correction and revision? -If specific reflective thought, as empirical, be subject -to all the limitations supposed to inhere in -experience as such, how can it assume the burden -of making good, of supplementing, reconstructing, -and developing meanings? The logic of the -case seems to be that Neo-Kantian idealism gets -its status against empiricism by first accepting -the Humian idea of experience, while the express -import of its positive contribution is to show the -<em>non-existence</em> (not merely the cognitive invalidity) -of anything describable as mere states of subjective -consciousness. Thus in the end it tends to destroy -itself and to make way for a more adequate empiricism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214">214</a></span></p> - - -<h3>III</h3> - -<p>In the above discussion, I have unavoidably anticipated -the second problem: the relation of conceptual -thought to perceptual data. A distinct -aspect still remains, however. Perception, as well -as apriority, is a term harboring a fundamental -ambiguity. It may mean (1) a distinct type of -activity, predominantly practical in character, -though carrying at its heart important cognitive -and esthetic qualities; or (2) a distinctively cognitional -experience, the function of observation as -explicitly logical—a factor in science <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">qua</i> science.</p> - -<p>In the first sense, as recent functional empiricism -(working in harmony with psychology, but not -itself peculiarly psychological) has abundantly -shown, perception is primarily an act of adjustment -of organism and environment, differing from -a mere reflex or instinctive adaptation in that, in -order to compensate for the failure of the instinctive -adjustment, it requires an objective or discriminative -presentation of conditions of action: -the negative conditions or obstacles, and the positive -conditions or means and resources.<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> This, of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215">215</a></span> -course, is its cognitive phase. In so far as the -material thus presented not only serves as a direct -cue to further successful activity (successful in -the overcoming of obstacles to the maintenance of -the function entered upon) but presents auxiliary -collateral objects and qualities that give additional -range and depth of meaning to the activity -of adjustment, perceiving is esthetic as well as -intellectual.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>Now such perception cannot be made antithetical -to thought, for it may itself be surcharged with -any amount of imaginatively supplied and reflectively -sustained ideal factors—such as are needed -to determine and select relevant stimuli and to -suggest and develop an appropriate plan and -course of behavior. The amount of such saturating -intellectual material depends upon the complexity -and maturity of the behaving agent. Such -perception, moreover, is strictly teleological, since -it arises from an experienced need and functions to -fulfil the purpose indicated by this need. The -cognitional content is, indeed, carried by affectional -and intentional contexts.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216">216</a></span> -Then we have perception as scientific observation. -This involves the deliberate, artful exclusion -of affectional and purposive factors as exercising -mayhap a vitiating influence upon the cognitive -or objective content; or, more strictly speaking, -a transformation of the more ordinary or -“natural” emotional and purposive concomitants, -into what Bain calls “neutral” emotion, and a -purpose of finding out what the present conditions -of the problem are. (The practical feature is not -thus denied or eliminated, but the overweening influence -of a present dominating end is avoided, so -that <em>change of the character of the end</em> may be -effected, if found desirable.) Here observation -may be opposed to thought, in the sense that exact -and minute description may be set over against -interpretation, explanation, theorizing, and inference. -In the wider sense of thought as equaling -reflective process, the work of observation and description -forms a constituent division of labor -<em>within</em> thought. The impersonal demarcation and -accurate registration of what is objectively there -or present occurs for the sake (<em>a</em>) of eliminating -meaning which is habitually but uncritically referred, -and (<em>b</em>) of getting a basis for a meaning -(at first purely inferential or hypothetical) that -may be consistently referred; and that (<em>c</em>), resting -upon examination and not upon mere <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> -custom, may weather the strain of subsequent experiences.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217">217</a></span> -But in so far as thought is identified -with the conceptual phase as such of the entire -logical function, observation is, of course, set over -against thought: deliberately, purposely, and artfully -so.</p> - -<p>It is not uncommon to hear it said that the -Lockeian movement was all well enough for psychology, -but went astray because it invaded the -field of logic. If we mean by psychology a natural -history of what at any time <em>passes</em> for knowledge, -and by logic conscious control in the direction -of grounded assurance, this remark appears -to reverse the truth. As a natural history of -knowledge in the sense of opinion and belief, -Locke’s account of discrete, simple ideas or meanings, -which are compounded and then distributed, -does palpable violence to the facts. But every -line of Locke shows that he was interested in knowledge -in its honorific sense—controlled certainty, -or, where this is not feasible, measured probability. -And to logic as an account of the way in which -we by art build up a <em>tested</em> assurance, a rationalized -conviction, Locke makes an important positive -contribution. The pity is that he inclined to -take it for the whole of the logic of science,<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> not -seeing that it was but a correlative division of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218">218</a></span> -labor to the work of hypotheses or inference; and -that he tended to identify it with a natural history -or psychology. The latter tendency exposed -Locke to the Humian interpretation, and permanently -sidetracked the positive contribution of his -theory to logic, while it led to that confusion of -an untrue psychology with a logic valid within -limits, of which Mill is the standard example.</p> - -<p>In analytic observation, it is a positive object -to strip off all inferential meaning so far as may -be—to reduce the facts as nearly as may be to -derationalized data, in order to make possible a -new and better rationalization. In and because of -this process, the perceptual data approach the -limit of a disconnected manifold, of the brutely -given, of the merely sensibly present; while meaning -stands out as a searched for principle of unification -and explanation, that is, as a thought, a -concept, an hypothesis. The extent to which this -is carried depends wholly upon the character of -the specific situation and problem; but, speaking -generally, or of limiting tendencies, one may say -it is carried to mere observation, pure brute description, -on the one side, and to mere thought, -that is hypothetical inference, on the other.</p> - -<p>So far as Locke ignored this instrumental character -of observation, he naturally evoked and -strengthened rationalistic idealism; he called forth -its assertion of the need of reason, of concepts, of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219">219</a></span> -universals, to constitute knowledge in its eulogistic -sense. But two contrary errors do not make a -truth, although they suggest and determine the -nature of some relevant truth. This truth is the -empirical origin, in a determinate type of situation, -of the contrast of observation and conception; -the empirical relevancy and the empirical -worth of this contrast in controlling the character -of subsequent experiences. To suppose that perception -as it concretely exists, either in the early -experiences of the animal, the race, or the individual, -or in its later refined and expanded experiences, -is identical with the sharply analyzed, -objectively discriminated and internally disintegrated -elements of scientific observation, is a perversion -of experience; a perversion for which, indeed, -professed empiricists set the example, but -which idealism must perpetuate if it is not to find -its end in an improved, functional empiricism.<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> - - -<h3>IV</h3> - -<p>We come now to the consideration of the third -element in our problem; ideality, important and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220">220</a></span> -normative value, in relation to experience; the antithesis -of experience as a tentative, fragmentary, -and ineffectual embodiment of meaning over -against the perfect, eternal system of meanings -which experience suggests even in nullifying and -mutilating.</p> - -<p>That from the <em>memory</em> standpoint experience -presents itself as a multiplicity of episodic events -with just enough continuity among them to suggest -principles true “on the whole” or usually, -but without furnishing instruction as to their exact -range and bearing, seems obvious enough. -Why should it not? The motive which leads to -reflection on <em>past</em> experience could be satisfied in -no other way. Continuities, connecting links, dynamic -transitions drop out because, for the purpose -of the recollection, they would be hindrances -if now repeated; or because they are now available -only when themselves objectified in definite terms -and thus given a <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">quasi</i> independent, a <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">quasi</i> atomistic -standing of their own. This is the only alternative -to what the psychologists term “total reminiscence,” -which, so far as total, leave us with -an elephant on our hands. Unless we are going -to have a wholesale revivification of the past, giving -us just another embarrassing present experience, -illusory because irrelevant, memory must -work by retail—by summoning <em>distinct</em> cases, -events, sequences, precedents. Dis-membering is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221">221</a></span> -a positively necessary part of re-membering. But -the resulting <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">disjecta membra</i> are in no sense -experience as it was or is; they are simply elements -held apart, and yet tentatively implicated together, -in present experience for the sake of its most favorable -evolution; evolution in the direction of the -most excellent meaning or value conceived. If the -remembering is efficacious and pertinent, it reveals -the possibilities of the present; that is to say, it -clarifies the transitive, transforming character -that belongs inherently to the present. The dismembering -of the vital present into the disconnected -past is correlative to an anticipation, an -idealization of the future.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the contingent character of the principle -or rule that emerges from a survey of cases, -instances, as distinct from a fixed or necessary -character, secures just what is wanted in the exigency -of a prospective idealization, or refinement -of excellence. It is just this character that -secures flexibility and variety of outlook, that -makes possible a consideration of alternatives and -an attempt to select and to execute the more -worthy among them. The fixed or necessary law -would mean a future like the past—a dead, an -unidealized future. It is exasperating to imagine -how completely different would have been Aristotle’s -valuation of “experience” with respect to -its contingency, if he had but once employed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222">222</a></span> -function of developing and perfecting value, instead -of the function of knowing an unalterable -object, as the standard by which to estimate and -measure intelligence.</p> - -<p>The one constant trait of experience from its -crudest to its most mature forms is that its contents -undergo change of meaning, and of meaning -in the sense of excellence, value. Every experience -is in-course,<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> in course of becoming worse or -better as to its contents, or in course of conscious -endeavor to sustain some satisfactory level of -value against encroachment or lapse. In this effort, -both precedent, the reduction of the present -idealization, the anticipation of the possible, -though doubtful, future, emerge. Without idealization, -that is, without conception of the favorable -issue that the present, defined in terms of -precedents, may portend in its transition, the -recollection of precedents, and the formulation of -tentative rules is nonsense. But without the identification -of the present in terms of elements suggested -by the past, without recognition, the ideal,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223">223</a></span> -the value projected as end, remains inert, helpless, -sentimental, without means of realization. Resembling -cases and anticipation, memory and idealization, -are the corresponding terms in which a -present experience has its transitive force analyzed -into reciprocally pertinent means and ends.</p> - -<p><em>That</em> an experience will change in content and -value is the one thing certain. <em>How</em> it will change -is the one thing naturally uncertain. Hence the -import of the art of reflection and invention. Control -of the character of the change in the direction -of the worthful is the common business of theory -and practice. Here is the province of the episodic -recollection of past history and of the idealized -foresight of possibilities. The irrelevancy of an -objective idealism lies in the fact that it totally -ignores the position and function of ideality in -sustained and serious endeavor. Were values automatically -injected and kept in the world of experience -by any force not reflected in human memories -and projects, it would make no difference -whether this force were a Spencerian environment -or an Absolute Reason. Did purpose ride in a -cosmic automobile toward a predestined goal, it -would not cease to be physical and mechanical in -quality because labeled Divine Idea, or Perfect -Reason. The moral would be “let us eat, drink, -and be merry,” for to-morrow—or if not this to-morrow, -then upon some to-morrow, unaffected by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224">224</a></span> -our empirical memories, reflections, inventions, -and idealizations—the cosmic automobile arrives. -Spirituality, ideality, meaning as purpose, would -be the last things to present themselves if objective -idealism were true. Values cannot be both ideal -and given, and their “given” character is emphasized, -not transformed, when they are called -eternal and absolute. But natural values become -ideal the moment their maintenance is dependent -upon the intentional activities of an empirical -agent. To suppose that values are ideal because -they are so eternally given is the contradiction in -which objective idealism has intrenched itself. Objective -ontological teleology spells machinery. Reflective -and volitional, experimental teleology alone -spells ideality.<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Objective, rationalistic idealism -breaks upon the fact that it can have no intermediary -between a brutally achieved embodiment of -meaning (physical in character or else of that peculiar -quasi-physical character which goes generally -by the name of metaphysical) and a total opposition -of the given and the ideal, connoting their mutual -indifference and incapacity. An empiricism that -acknowledges the transitive character of experience, -and that acknowledges the possible control<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225">225</a></span> -of the character of the transition by means of -intelligent effort, has abundant opportunity to -celebrate in productive art, genial morals, and -impartial inquiry the grace and the severity of -the ideal.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226">226</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="THE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM"><a id="THE_POSTULATE_OF_IMMEDIATE_EMPIRICISM"></a>THE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor smaller">44</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> criticisms made upon that vital but still -unformed movement variously termed radical -empiricism, pragmatism, humanism, functionalism, -according as one or another aspect of it is uppermost, -have left me with a conviction that the -<em>fundamental</em> difference is not so much in matters -overtly discussed as in a presupposition that remains -tacit: a presupposition as to what experience -is and means. To do my little part in clearing -up the confusion, I shall try to make my own -presupposition explicit. The object of this paper -is, then, to set forth what I understand to be the -postulate and the criterion of <em>immediate empiricism</em>.<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227">227</a></span> -Immediate empiricism postulates that things—anything, -everything, in the ordinary or non-technical -use of the term “thing”—are what they -are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe -anything truly, his task is to tell what it is -experienced as being. If it is a horse that is to -be described, or the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">equus</i> that is to be defined, -then must the horse-trader, or the jockey, or the -timid family man who wants a “safe driver,” or -the zoologist or the paleontologist tell us what the -horse is which is experienced. If these accounts -turn out different in some respects, as well as congruous -in others, this is no reason for assuming -the content of one to be exclusively “real,” and -that of others to be “phenomenal”; for each account -of what is experienced will manifest that it is -the account <em>of</em> the horse-dealer, or <em>of</em> the zoologist, -and hence will give the conditions requisite -for understanding the differences as well as the -agreements of the various accounts. And the -principle varies not a whit if we bring in the psychologist’s -horse, the logician’s horse, or the metaphysician’s -horse.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228">228</a></span> -In each case, the nub of the question is, <em>what -sort of experience</em> is denoted or indicated: a concrete -and determinate experience, varying, when it -varies, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when -it agrees, in specific real elements, so that we have -a contrast, not between <em>a</em> Reality, and various -approximations to, or phenomenal representations -of Reality, but between different reals of experience. -And the reader is begged to bear in mind -that from this standpoint, when “an experience” -or “some sort of experience” is referred to, “some -thing” or “some sort of thing” is always -meant.</p> - -<p>Now, this statement that things are what they -are experienced to be is usually translated into -the statement that things (or, ultimately, Reality, -Being) <em>are</em> only and just what they are <em>known</em> to -be or that things are, or Reality <em>is</em>, what it is for -a conscious knower—whether the knower be conceived -primarily as a perceiver or as a thinker being -a further, and secondary, question. This is -the root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective -or objective, psychological or epistemological. -By our postulate, things are what they are -experienced to be; and, unless knowing is the sole -and only genuine mode of experiencing, it is fallacious -to say that Reality is just and exclusively -what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; -or even that it <em>is</em>, relatively and piecemeal,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229">229</a></span> -what it is to a finite and partial knower. Or, -put more positively, knowing is one mode of experiencing, -and the primary philosophic demand -(from the standpoint of immediatism) is to find out -<em>what</em> sort of an experience knowing is—or, concretely -how things are experienced when they are -experienced <em>as</em> known things.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> By concretely is -meant, obviously enough (among other things), -such an account of the experience of things as -known that will bring out the characteristic traits -and distinctions they possess as things of a knowing -experience, as compared with things experienced -esthetically, or morally, or economically, or -technologically. To assume that, because from -the <em>standpoint of the knowledge experience</em> things -<em>are</em> what they are known to be, therefore, metaphysically, -absolutely, without qualification, everything -in its reality (as distinct from its “appearance,” -or phenomenal occurrence) is what a knower -would find it to be, is, from the immediatist’s standpoint, -if not the root of all philosophic evil, at -least one of its main roots. For this leaves out<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230">230</a></span> -of account what the knowledge standpoint is itself -<em>experienced as</em>.</p> - -<p>I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, -that noise <em>is</em> fearsome; it <em>really</em> is, not -merely phenomenally or subjectively so. That <em>is -what</em> it is experienced as being. But, when I experience -the noise as a <em>known</em> thing, I find it to -be innocent of harm. It is the tapping of a shade -against the window, owing to movements of the -wind. The experience has changed; that is, the -thing experienced has changed—not that an unreality -has given place to a reality, nor that -some transcendental (unexperienced) Reality has -changed,<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> not that truth has changed, but just -and only the concrete reality experienced has -changed. I now feel ashamed of my fright; and -the noise as fearsome is changed to noise as a wind-curtain -fact, and hence practically indifferent to -my welfare. This is a change of experienced existence -effected through the medium of cognition.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231">231</a></span> -The content of the latter experience cognitively regarded -is doubtless <em>truer</em> than the content of the -earlier; but it is in no sense more real. To call it -truer, moreover, must, from the empirical standpoint, -mean a concrete <em>difference</em> in actual things -experienced.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> Again, in many cases, only in retrospect -is the prior experience cognitionally regarded -at all. In such cases, it is only in regard to contrasted -content <em>in</em> a subsequent experience that -the determination “truer” has force.</p> - -<p>Perhaps some reader may now object that as -matter of fact the entire experience <em>is</em> cognitive, -but that the earlier parts of it are only imperfectly -so, resulting in a phenomenon that is not real; -while the latter part, being a more complete cognition, -results in what is relatively, at least, more -real.<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> In short, a critic may say that, when I was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232">232</a></span> -frightened by the noise, I <em>knew</em> I was frightened; -otherwise there would have been no experience at -all. At this point, it is necessary to make a distinction -so simple and yet so all-fundamental that -I am afraid the reader will be inclined to pooh-pooh -it away as a mere verbal distinction. But -to see that to the empiricist this distinction is not -verbal, but genuine, is the precondition of any understanding -of him. The immediatist must, by his -postulate, ask what is the fright experienced <em>as</em>. -Is what is actually experienced, I-know-I-am-frightened, -or I-<em>am</em>-frightened? I see absolutely -no reason for claiming that the experience <em>must</em> -be described by the former phrase. In all probability -(and all the empiricist logically needs is just -one case of this sort) the experience is simply and -just of fright-at-the-noise. Later one may (or -may not) have an experience describable <em>as</em> I-know-I-am-(or-was) -and improperly or properly, -frightened. But this is a different experience—that -is, a different <em>thing</em>. And if the critic goes -on to urge that the person “<em>really</em>” must have -known that he was frightened, I can only point -out that the critic is shifting the venue. He may -be right, but, if so, it is only because the “really”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233">233</a></span> -is something not concretely experienced (whose nature -accordingly is the critic’s business); and this -is to depart from the empiricist’s point of view, -to attribute to him a postulate he expressly -repudiates.</p> - -<p>The material point may come out more clearly -if I say that we must make a distinction between -a thing as <em>cognitive</em>, and one as <em>cognized</em>.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> I -should define a cognitive experience as one that -has certain bearings or implications which induce, -and fulfil themselves in, a subsequent experience -in which the relevant thing is experienced <em>as</em> cognized, -<em>as</em> a known object, and is thereby transformed, -or reorganized. The fright-at-the-noise -in the case cited is obviously <em>cognitive</em>, in this sense. -By description, it induces an investigation or inquiry -in which both noise and fright are objectively -stated or presented—the noise as a shade-wind -fact, the fright as an organic reaction to a sudden -acoustic stimulus, a reaction that under the given -circumstances was useless or even detrimental, a -maladaptation. Now, pretty much all of experience -is of this sort (the “is” meaning, of course, -is experienced <em>as</em>), and the empiricist is false to his -principle if he does not duly note this fact.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234">234</a></span> -he is equally false to his principle if he permits -himself to be confused as to the concrete differences -in the two things experienced.</p> - -<p>There are two little words through explication -of which the empiricist’s position may be brought -out—“<em>as</em>” and “<em>that</em>.” We may express his -presupposition by saying that things are what they -are experienced <em>as</em> being; or that to give a just -account of anything is to tell what <em>that</em> thing is -experienced to be. By these words I want to indicate -the absolute, final, irreducible, and inexpugnable -concrete <em>quale</em> which everything experienced -not so much <em>has</em> as <em>is</em>. To grasp this aspect -of empiricism is to see what the empiricist means -by objectivity, by the element of control. Suppose -we take, as a crucial case for the empiricist, -an out and out illusion, say of Zöllner’s lines. -These are experienced as convergent; they are -“truly” parallel. If things are what they are -experienced as being, how can the distinction be -drawn between illusion and the true state of the -case? There is no answer to this question except -by sticking to the fact that the experience of the -lines as divergent is a concrete qualitative thing or -<em>that</em>. It is <em>that</em> experience which it is, and no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235">235</a></span> -other. And if the reader rebels at the iteration of -such obvious tautology, I can only reiterate that -the realization of the <em>meaning</em> of this tautology is -the key to the whole question of the objectivity of -experience, as that stands to the empiricist. The -lines of <em>that</em> experience <em>are</em> divergent; not merely -<em>seem</em> so. The question of truth is not as to -whether Being or Non-Being, Reality or mere -Appearance, is experienced, but as to the <em>worth</em> of -a certain concretely experienced thing. The only -way of passing upon this question is by sticking -in the most uncompromising fashion to <em>that</em> experience -as real. <em>That</em> experience is that two -lines with certain cross-hatchings are apprehended -as convergent; only by taking that experience as -real and as fully real, is there any basis for, or -way of going to, an experienced knowledge that -the lines are parallel. It is in the concrete thing -<em>as experienced</em> that all the grounds and clues to -its own intellectual or logical rectification are contained. -It is because this thing, afterwards adjudged -false, is a concrete <em>that</em>, that it develops -into a corrected experience (that is, experience of -a corrected thing—we reform things just as we -reform ourselves or a bad boy) whose full content -is not a whit more real, but which is true or truer.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236">236</a></span> -If <em>any</em> experience, then a <em>determinate</em> experience; -and this determinateness is the only, and is -the adequate, principle of control, or “objectivity.” -The experience may be of the vaguest sort. -I may not see anything which I can identify as a -familiar object—a table, a chair, etc. It may be -dark; I may have only the vaguest impression that -there is something which looks like a table. Or I -may be completely befogged and confused, as when -one rises quickly from sleep in a pitch-dark room. -But this vagueness, this doubtfulness, this confusion -is the thing experienced, and, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">qua</i> real, is as -“good” a reality as the self-luminous vision of -an Absolute. It is not just vagueness, doubtfulness, -confusion, at large or in general. It is <em>this</em> -vagueness, and no other; absolutely unique, absolutely -what <em>it</em> is.<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Whatever gain in clearness, in -fullness, in trueness of content is experienced must -grow out of some element in the experience of <em>this</em> -experienced <em>as</em> what it is. To return to the illusion: -If the experience of the lines as convergent -is illusory, it is because of some elements in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237">237</a></span> -thing as experienced, not because of something defined -in terms of externality to this particular experience. -If the illusoriness can be detected, it is -because the thing experienced is real, having within -its experienced reality elements whose <em>own mutual</em> -tension effects its reconstruction. Taken concretely, -the experience of convergent lines contains -within itself the elements of the transformation -of its own content. It is <em>this</em> thing, and not -some separate truth, that clamors for its own -reform. There is, then, from the empiricist’s point -of view, no need to search for some aboriginal <em>that</em> -to which all successive experiences are attached, -and which is somehow thereby undergoing continuous -change. Experience is always of <em>thats</em>; and -the most comprehensive and inclusive experience -of the universe that the philosopher himself can -obtain is the experience of a characteristic <em>that</em>. -From the empiricist’s point of view, this is as true -of the exhaustive and complete insight of a hypothetical -all-knower as of the vague, blind experience -of the awakened sleeper. As reals, they stand -on the same level. As trues, the latter has by -definition the better of it; but if this insight is in -any way the truth of the blind awakening, it is -because the latter has, in its <em>own</em> determinate <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">quale</i>, -elements of real continuity with the former; it is, -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex hypothesi</i>, transformable through a series of -experienced reals without break of continuity, into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238">238</a></span> -the absolute thought-experience. There is no need -of logical manipulation to effect the transformation, -nor <em>could</em> any logical consideration effect it. -If effected at all it is just by immediate experiences, -each of which is just as real (no more, no less) -as either of the two terms between which they lie. -Such, at least, is the meaning of the empiricist’s -contention. So, when he talks of experience, he -does not mean some grandiose, remote affair that -is cast like a net around a succession of fleeting -experiences; he does not mean an indefinite total, -comprehensive experience which somehow engirdles -an endless flux; he means that <em>things</em> are what -they are experienced to be, and that every experience -is <em>some</em> thing.</p> - -<p>From the postulate of empiricism, then (or, what -is the same thing, from a <em>general</em> consideration of -the concept of experience), nothing can be deduced, -not a single philosophical proposition.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> The reader<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239">239</a></span> -may hence conclude that all this just comes to the -truism that experience is experience, or is what it is. -If one attempts to draw conclusions from the bare -concept of experience, the reader is quite right. -But the real significance of the principle is that of -a method of philosophical analysis—a method identical -in kind (but differing in problem and hence -in operation) with that of the scientist. If you -wish to find out what subjective, objective, physical, -mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose, -activity, evil, being, quality—any philosophic -term, in short—means, go to experience and -see what the thing is experienced <em>as</em>.</p> - -<p>Such a method is not spectacular; it permits of -no offhand demonstrations of God, freedom, immortality, -nor of the exclusive reality of matter, -or ideas, or consciousness, etc. But it supplies a -way of telling what all these terms mean. It may -seem insignificant, or chillingly disappointing, but -only upon condition that it be not worked. Philosophic -conceptions have, I believe, outlived their -usefulness considered as stimulants to emotion, or -as a species of sanctions; and a larger, more fruitful -and more valuable career awaits them considered -as specifically experienced meanings.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>[<span class="smcap">Note</span>: The reception of this essay proved that I was unreasonably -sanguine in thinking that the foot-note of warning, -appended to the title, would forfend radical misapprehension. -I see now that it was unreasonable to expect -that the word “immediate” in a philosophic writing could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240">240</a></span> -be generally understood to apply to anything except <em>knowledge</em>, -even though the body of the essay is a protest -against such limitation. But I venture to repeat that the -essay is not a denial of the necessity of “mediation,” or reflection, -in knowledge, but is an assertion that the inferential -factor must <em>exist</em>, or must occur, and that all existence is -direct and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon its nature—as -upon the nature of all of the rest of its subject-matter—only -by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs <em>as</em>.</p> - -<p>I venture to repeat also another statement of the text: -I do not mean by “immediate experience” any aboriginal -stuff out of which things are evolved, but I use the term -to indicate the necessity of employing in philosophy the -direct descriptive method that has now made its way in -all the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course, -as the subject itself entails.</p> - -<p>There is nothing in the text to imply that things exist in -experience atomically or in isolation. When it is said that a -thing as cognized is <em>different</em> from an earlier non-cognitionally -experienced thing, the saying no more implies lack of -continuity between the things, than the obvious remark -that a seed is different from a flower or a leaf denies their -continuity. The amount and kind of continuity or discreteness -that exists is to be discovered by recurring to -what actually occurs in experience.</p> - -<p>Finally, there is nothing in the text that denies the -existence of things temporally prior to human experiencing -of them. Indeed, I should think it fairly obvious that we -experience most things <em>as</em> temporally prior to our experiencing -of them. The import of the article is to the -effect that we are not entitled to draw philosophic (as distinct -from scientific) conclusions as to the meaning of prior -temporal existence till we have ascertained what it is to -experience a thing as past. These four disclaimers cover, -I think, all the misapprehensions disclosed in the four or -five controversial articles (noted below) that the original -essay evoked. One of these articles (that of Professor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241">241</a></span> -Woodbridge), raised a point of fact, holding that cognitional -experience tells us, without alteration, just what the -things of other types of experience are, and in that sense -transcends other experiences. This is too fundamental an -issue to discuss in a note, and I content myself with remarking -that with respect to it, the bearing of the article -is that the issue must be settled by a careful descriptive -survey of things as experienced, to see whether modifications -do not occur in existences when they are experienced <em>as</em> -known; <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, as true or false in character. The reader -interested in following up this discussion is referred to -the following articles: Vol. II. of the <cite>Journal of Philosophy, -Psychology, and Scientific Methods</cite>, two articles by Bakewell, -p. 520 and p. 687; one by Bode, p. 658; one by Woodbridge, -p. 573; Vol. III. of the same Journal, by Leighton, -p. 174.]</p></blockquote> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242">242</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="“CONSCIOUSNESS” AND EXPERIENCE"><a id="CONSCIOUSNESS_AND_EXPERIENCE"></a>“CONSCIOUSNESS” AND EXPERIENCE<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor smaller">55</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Every</span> science in its final standpoint and working -aims is controlled by conditions lying outside -itself—conditions that subsist in the practical -life of the time. With no science is this as -obviously true as with psychology. Taken without -nicety of analysis, no one would deny that psychology -is specially occupied with the individual; -that it wishes to find out those things that proceed -peculiarly from the individual, and the mode of -their connection with him. Now, the way in which -the individual is conceived, the value that is attributed -to him, the things in his make-up that arouse -interest, are not due at the outset to psychology. -The scientific view regards these matters in a reflected, -a borrowed, medium. They are revealed -in the light of social life. An autocratic, an -aristocratic, a democratic society propound such -different estimates of the worth and place of -individuality; they procure for the individual as -an individual such different sorts of experience;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243">243</a></span> -they aim at arousing such different impulses and at -organizing them according to such different purposes, -that the psychology arising in each must -show a different temper.</p> - -<p>In this sense, psychology is a political science. -While the professed psychologist, in his conscious -procedure, may easily cut his subject-matter loose -from these practical ties and references, yet the -starting point and goal of his course are none the -less socially set. In this conviction I venture to -introduce to an audience that could hardly be -expected to be interested in the technique of psychology, -a technical subject, hoping that the -human meaning may yet appear.</p> - -<p>There is at present a strong, apparently a growing -tendency to conceive of psychology as an account -of the consciousness of the individual, considered -as something in and by itself; consciousness, -the assumption virtually runs, being of such -an order that it may be analyzed, described, and -explained in terms of just itself. The statement, -as commonly made, is that psychology is an account -of consciousness, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">qua</i> consciousness; and the -phrase is supposed to limit psychology to a certain -definite sphere of fact that may receive adequate -discussion for scientific purposes, without troubling -itself with what lies outside. Now if this conception -be true, there is no intimate, no important -connection of psychology and philosophy at large.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244">244</a></span> -That philosophy, whose range is comprehensive, -whose problems are catholic, should be held down -by a discipline whose voice is as partial as its -material is limited, is out of the range of intelligent -discussion.</p> - -<p>But there is another possibility. If the individual -of whom psychology treats be, after all, a -social individual, any absolute setting off and -apart of a sphere of consciousness as, even for scientific -purposes, self-sufficient, is condemned in advance. -All such limitation, and all inquiries, -descriptions, explanations that go with it, are only -preliminary. “Consciousness” is but a symbol, -an anatomy whose life is in natural and social -operations. To know the symbol, the psychical -letter, is important; but its necessity lies not within -itself, but in the need of a language for reading -the things signified. If this view be correct, we -cannot be so sure that psychology is without large -philosophic significance. Whatever meaning the -individual has for the social life that he both incorporates -and animates, that meaning has psychology -for philosophy.</p> - -<p>This problem is too important and too large to -suffer attack in an evening’s address. Yet I venture -to consider a portion of it, hoping that such -things as appear will be useful clues in entering -wider territory. We may ask what is the effect -upon psychology of considering its material as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245">245</a></span> -something so distinct as to be capable of treatment -without involving larger issues. In this inquiry -we take as representative some such account of the -science as this: Psychology deals with consciousness -“as such” in its various modes and processes. -It aims at an isolation of each such as will permit -accurate description: at statement of its place in -the serial order such as will enable us to state the -laws by which one calls another into being, or as -will give the natural history of its origin, maturing, -and dissolution. It is both analytic and synthetic—analytic -in that it resolves each state into -its constituent elements; synthetic in that it discovers -the processes by which these elements combine -into complex wholes and series. It leaves -alone—it shuts out—questions concerning the -validity, the objective import of these modifications: -of their value in conveying truth, in effecting -goodness, in constituting beauty. For it is -just with such questions of worth, of validity, that -philosophy has to do.</p> - -<p>Some such view as this is held by the great -majority of working psychologists to-day. A variety -of reasons have conspired to bring about -general acceptance. Such a view seems to enroll -one in the ranks of the scientific men rather than -of the metaphysicians—and there are those who -distrust the metaphysicians. Others desire to take -problems piecemeal and in detail, avoiding that excursion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246">246</a></span> -into ultimates, into that never-ending panorama -of new questions and new possibilities that -seems to be the fate of the philosopher. While no -temperate mind can do other than sympathize with -this view, it is hardly more than an expedient. -For, as Mr. James remarks, after disposing of the -question of free-will by relegating it to the domain -of the metaphysician:—“Metaphysics means only -an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and -consistently”—and clearness and consistency are -not things to be put off beyond a certain point. -When the metaphysician chimes in with this new-found -modesty of the psychologist, so different -from the disposition of Locke and Hume and the -Mills, salving his metaphysical conscience with the -remark—it hardly possesses the dignity of a conviction—that -the partial sciences, just because they -are partial, are not expected to be coherent with -themselves nor with one another; when the metaphysician, -I say, praises the psychologist for sticking -to his last, we are reminded that another motive -is also at work. There is a half-conscious -irony in this abnegation of psychology. It is not -the first time that science has assumed the work -of Cinderella; and, since Mr. Huxley has happily -reminded her, she is not altogether oblivious, in her -modesty, of a possible future check to the pride -of her haughty sister, and of a certain coronation -that shall mark her coming to her own.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247">247</a></span> -But, be the reasons as they may, there is little -doubt of the fact. Almost all our working psychologists -admit, nay, herald this limitation of -their work. I am not presumptuous enough to -set myself against this array. I too proclaim -myself of those who believe that psychology has to -do (at a certain point, that is) with “consciousness -as such.” But I do not believe that the limitation -is final. Quite the contrary: if “consciousness” -or “state of consciousness” be given intelligible -meaning, I believe that this conception is -the open gateway into the fair fields of philosophy. -For, note you, the phrase is an ambiguous one. It -may mean one thing to the metaphysician who -proclaims: Here finally we have psychology recognizing -her due metes and bounds, giving bonds -to trespass no more. It may mean quite another -thing to the psychologist in his work—whatever -he may happen to say about it. It may be that -the psychologist deals with states of consciousness -as the significant, the analyzable and describable -form, to which he reduces the things he is studying. -Not that they <em>are</em> that existence, but that -they are its indications, its clues, in shape for -handling by scientific methods. So, for example, -does the paleontologist work. Those curiously -shaped and marked forms to which he is devoted -are not life, nor are they the literal termini of his -endeavor; but through them as signs and records<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248">248</a></span> -he construes a life. And again, the painter-artist -might well say that he is concerned only with -colored paints as such. Yet none the less through -them as registers and indices, he reveals to us -the mysteries of sunny meadow, shady forest, and -twilight wave. These are the things-in-themselves -of which the oils on his palette are phenomena.</p> - -<p>So the preoccupation of the psychologist with -states of consciousness may signify that they are -the media, the concrete conditions to which he -purposely reduces his material, in order, <em>through -them</em>, as methodological helps, to get at and understand -that which is anything but a state of consciousness. -To him, however, who insists upon the -fixed and final limitation of psychology, the state -of consciousness is not the shape some fact takes -from the exigency of investigation; it is literally -the full fact itself. It is not an intervening term; -it bounds the horizon. Here, then, the issue defines -itself. I conceive that states of consciousness -(and I hope you will take the phrase broadly -enough to cover all the specific data of psychology) -have no existence before the psychologist -begins to work. He brings them into existence. -What we are really after is the process of experience, -the way in which it arises and behaves. -We want to know its course, its history, its laws. -We want to know its various typical forms; how -each originates; how it is related to others; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249">249</a></span> -part it plays in maintaining an inclusive, expanding, -connected course of experience. Our problem -as psychologists is to learn its <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">modus operandi</i>, its -method.</p> - -<p>The paleontologist is again summoned to our -aid. In a given district he finds a great number -and variety of footprints. From these he goes to -work to construct the structure and the life habits -of the animals that made them. The tracks exist -undoubtedly; they are there; but yet he deals with -them not as final existences but as signs, phenomena -in the literal sense. Imagine the hearing -that the critic would receive who should inform the -paleontologist that he is transcending his field of -scientific activity; that his concern is with footprints -as such, aiming to describe each, to analyze -it into its simplest forms, to compare the different -kinds with one another so as to detect common elements, -and finally, thereby, to discover the laws -of their arrangement in space!</p> - -<p>Yet the immediate data are footprints, and footprints -only. The paleontologist does in a way do -all these things that our imaginary critic is urging -upon him. The difference is not that he arbitrarily -lugs in other data; that he invents entities and -faculties that are not there. The difference is -in his standpoint. His interest is in the animals, -and the data are treated in whatever way seems -likely to serve this interest. So with the psychologist.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250">250</a></span> -He is continually and perforce occupied -with minute and empirical investigation of special -facts—states of consciousness, if you please. But -these neither define nor exhaust his scientific problem. -They are his footprints, his clues through -which he places before himself the life-process he is -studying—with the further difference that his footprints -are not after all given to him, but are developed -by his investigation.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p> - -<p>The supposition that these states are somehow -existent by themselves and in this existence provide -the psychologist with ready-made material is just -the supreme case of the “psychological fallacy”: -the confusion of experience as it is to the one experiencing -with what the psychologist makes out -of it with his reflective analysis.</p> - -<p>The psychologist begins with certain operations, -acts, functions as his data. If these fall out of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251">251</a></span> -sight in the course of discussion, it is only because -having been taken for granted, they remain to -control the whole development of the inquiry, and -to afford the sterling medium of redemption. Acts -such as perceiving, remembering, intending, loving -give the points of departure; they alone are -concrete experiences. To understand these experiences, -under what conditions they arise, and -what effects they produce, analysis into states of -consciousness occurs. And the modes of consciousness -that are figured remain unarranged and unimportant, -save as they may be translated back -into acts.</p> - -<p>To remember is to do something, as much as -to shoe a horse, or to cherish a keepsake. To propose, -to observe, to be kindly affectioned, are terms -of value, of practice, of operation; just as digestion, -respiration, locomotion express functions, not -observable “objects.” But there is an object -that may be described: lungs, stomach, leg-muscles, -or whatever. Through the structure we present -to ourselves the function; it appears laid out -before us, spread forth in detail—objectified in a -word. The anatomist who devotes himself to this -detail may, if he please (and he probably does -please to concentrate his devotion) ignore the -function: to discover what is there, to analyze, to -measure, to describe, gives him outlet enough. -But nevertheless it is the function that fixed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252">252</a></span> -point of departure, that prescribed the problem -and that set the limits, physical as well as intellectual, -of subsequent investigation. Reference to -function makes the details discovered other than a -jumble of incoherent trivialities. One might as -well devote himself to the minute description of a -square yard of desert soil were it not for this translation. -States of consciousness are the morphology -of certain functions.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> What is true of analysis, -of description, is true equally of classification. -Knowing, willing, feeling, name states of -consciousness not in terms of themselves, but in -terms of acts, attitudes, found in experience.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253">253</a></span> -Explanation, even of an “empirical sort” is as -impossible as determination of a “state” and its -classification, when we rigidly confine ourselves to -modifications of consciousness as a self-existent. -Sensations are always defined, classified, and explained -by reference to conditions which, according -to the theory, are extraneous—sense-organs and -stimuli. The whole physiological side assumes a -ludicrously anomalous aspect on this basis.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> -While experimentation is retained, and even made -much of, it is at the cost of logical coherence. To -experiment with reference to a bare state of consciousness -is a performance of which one cannot -imagine the nature, to say nothing of doing it; -while to experiment with reference to acts and the -conditions of their occurrence is a natural and -straightforward undertaking. Such simple processes -as association are concretely inexplicable when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254">254</a></span> -we assume states of consciousness as existences by -themselves. As recent psychology testifies, we -again have to resort to conditions that have no -place nor calling on the basis of the theory—the -principle of habit, of neural action, or else some -connection in the object.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a></p> - -<p>We have only to note that there are two opposing -schools in psychology to see in what an unscientific -status is the subject. We have only to -consider that these two schools are the result of -assuming states of consciousness as existences <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">per -se</i> to locate the source of the scientific scandal. -No matter what the topic, whether memory or -association or attention or effort, the same dualisms -present themselves, the same necessity of -choosing between two schools. One, lost in the distinctions -that it has developed, denies the function -because it can find objectively presented only -states of consciousness. So it abrogates the function, -regarding it as a mere aggregate of such -states, or as a purely external and factitious relation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255">255</a></span> -between them. The other school, recognizing -that this procedure explains away rather than -explains, the values of experience, attempts to even -up by declaring that certain functions are themselves -immediately given data of consciousness, existing -side by side with the “states,” but indefinitely -transcending them in worth, and apprehended -by some higher organ. So against the -elementary contents and external associations of -the analytic school in psychology, we have the -complicated machinery of the intellectualist school, -with its pure self-consciousness as a source of ultimate -truths, its hierarchy of intuitions, its ready-made -faculties. To be sure, these “spiritual faculties” -are now largely reduced to some one comprehensive -form—Apperception, or Will, or Attention, -or whatever the fashionable term may be. -But the principle remains the same; the assumption -of a function as a given existent, distinguishable -in itself and acting upon other existences—as if -the functions digestion and vision were regarded -as separate from organic structures, somehow acting -upon them from the outside so as to bring co-operation -and harmony into them!<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> This division -into psychological schools is as reasonable as would -be one of botanists into rootists and flowerists; of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256">256</a></span> -those proclaiming the root to be the rudimentary -and essential structure, and those asserting that -since the function of seed-bearing is the main thing, -the flower is really the controlling “synthetic” -principle. Both sensationalist and intellectualist -suppose that psychology has some special sphere -of “reality” or of experience marked off for it -within which the data are just lying around, self-existent -and ready-made, to be picked up and -assorted as pebbles await the visitor on the beach. -Both alike fail to recognize that the psychologist -first has experience to deal with; the same experience -that the zoologist, geologist, chemist, mathematician, -and historian deal with, and that what -characterizes his specialty is not some data or existences -which he may call uniquely his own; but -the problem raised—the problem of the <em>course</em> of -the acts that constitute experiencing.</p> - -<p>Here psychology gets its revenge upon those who -would rule it out of possession of important philosophical -bearing. As a matter of fact, the larger -part of the questions that are being discussed in -current epistemology and what is termed metaphysic -of logic and ethic arise out of (and are -hopelessly compromised by) this original assumption -of “consciousness as such”—in other words, -are provoked by the exact reason that is given -for denying to psychology any essential meaning -for epistemology and metaphysic. Such is the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257">257</a></span> -irony of the situation. The epistemologist’s problem -is, indeed, usually put as the question of how -the subject can so far “transcend” itself as to -get valid assurance of the objective world. The -very phraseology in which the problem is put reveals -the thoroughness of the psychologist’s revenge. -Just and only because experience has been -reduced to “states of consciousness” as independent -existences, does the question of self-transcendence -have any meaning. The entire epistemological -industry is one—shall I say it—of a Sisyphean -nature. <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Mutatis mutandis</i>, the same holds of the -metaphysic of logic, ethic, and esthetic. In each -case, the basic problem has come to be how a mere -state of consciousness can be the vehicle of a system -of truth, of an objectively valid good, of beauty -which is other than agreeable feeling. We may, indeed, -excuse the psychologist for not carrying on -the special inquiries that are the business of logical, -ethical, and esthetical philosophy; but can we -excuse ourselves for forcing his results into such -a shape as to make philosophic problems so arbitrary -that they are soluble only by arbitrarily -wrenching scientific facts?</p> - -<p>Undoubtedly we are between two fires. In placing -upon psychology the responsibility of discovering -the method of experience, as a sequence of -acts and passions, do we not destroy just that -limitation to concrete detail which now constitutes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258">258</a></span> -it a science? Will not the psychologist be the -first to repudiate this attempt to mix him up in -matters philosophical? We need only to keep in -mind the specific facts involved in the term Course -or Process of Experience to avoid this danger. -The immediate preoccupation of the psychologist -is with very definite and empirical facts—questions -like the limits of audition, of the origin of pitch, -of the structure and conditions of the musical scale, -etc. Just so the immediate affair of the geologist -is with particular rock-structures, of the botanist -with particular plants, and so on. But through -the collection, description, location, classification -of rocks the geologist is led to the splendid story -of world-forming. The limited, fixed, and separate -piece of work is dissolved away in the fluent -and dynamic drama of the earth. So, the plant -leads with inevitableness to the whole process of -life and its evolution.</p> - -<p>In form, the botanist still studies the genus, -the species, the plant—hardly, indeed, that; rather -the special parts, the structural elements, of the -plant. In reality, he studies life itself; the -structures are the indications, the signature -through which he renders transparent the mystery -of life growing in the changing world. It was -doubtless necessary for the botanist to go through -the Linnean period—the period of engagement -with rigid detail and fixed classifications; of tearing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259">259</a></span> -apart and piecing together; of throwing all -emphasis upon peculiarities of number, size, and -appearance of matured structure; of regarding -change, growth, and function as external, more or -less interesting, attachments to form. Examination -of this period is instructive; there is much in -contemporary investigation and discussion that is -almost unpleasantly reminiscent in its suggestiveness. -The psychologist should profit by the intervening -history of science. The conception of evolution -is not so much an additional law as it is a -face-about. The fixed structure, the separate -form, the isolated element, is henceforth at best a -mere stepping-stone to knowledge of process, and -when not at its best, marks the end of comprehension, -and betokens failure to grasp the problem.</p> - -<p>With the change in standpoint from self-included -existence to including process, from structural -unit of composition to controlling unity of -function, from changeless form to movement in -growth, the whole scheme of values is transformed. -Faculties are definite directions of development; -elements are products that are starting-points for -new processes; bare facts are indices of change; -static conditions are modes of accomplished adjustment. -Not that the concrete, empirical phenomenon -loses in worth, much less that unverifiable -“metaphysical” entities are impertinently introduced; -but that our aim is the discovery of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260">260</a></span> -process of actions in its adaptations to circumstance. -If we apply this evolutionary logic in -psychology, where shall we stop? Questions of -limits of stimuli in a given sense, say hearing, are -in reality questions of temporary arrests, adjustments -marking the favorable equilibrium of the -whole organism; they connect with the question of -the use of sensation in general and auditory sensations -in particular for life-habits; of the origin -and use of localized and distinguished perception; -and this, in turn, involves within itself the whole -question of space and time recognition; the significance -of the thing-and-quality experience, and -so on. And when we are told that the question of -the origin of space experience has nothing at all -to do with the question of the nature and significance -of the space experienced, the statement is -simply evidence that the one who makes it is still -at the static standpoint; he believes that things, -that relations, have existence and significance -apart from the particular conditions under which -they come into experience, and apart from the -special service rendered in those particular conditions.</p> - -<p>Of course, I am far from saying that every psychologist -must make the whole journey. Each individual -may contract, as he pleases, for any section -or subsection he prefers; and undoubtedly the -well-being of the science is advanced by such division<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261">261</a></span> -of labor. But psychology goes over the whole -ground from detecting every distinct act of experiencing, -to seeing what need calls out the special -organ fitted to cope with the situation, and discovering -the machinery through which it operates to -keep a-going the course of action.</p> - -<p>But, I shall be told, the wall that divides psychology -from philosophy cannot be so easily -treated as non-existent. Psychology is a matter -of natural history, even though it may be admitted -that it is the natural history of the course of experience. -But philosophy is a matter of values; -of the criticism and justification of certain validities. -One deals, it is said, with genesis, with conditions -of temporal origin and transition; the other -with analysis, with eternal constitution. I shall -have to repeat that just this rigid separation of -genesis and analysis seems to me a survival from a -pre-evolutionary, a pre-historic age. It indicates -not so much an assured barrier between philosophy -and psychology as the distance dividing philosophy -from all science. For the lesson that -mathematicians first learned, that physics and -chemistry pondered over, in which the biological -disciplines were finally tutored, is that sure and -delicate analysis is possible only through the patient -study of conditions of origin and development. -The method of analysis in mathematics is the -method of construction. The experimental method<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262">262</a></span> -is the method of making, of following the history -of production; the term “cause” that has (when -taken as an existent entity) so hung on the heels -of science as to impede its progress, has universal -meaning when read as condition of appearance in -a process. And, as already intimated, the conception -of evolution is no more and no less the discovery -of a general law of life than it is the generalization -of all scientific method. Everywhere -analysis that cannot proceed by examining the successive -stages of its subject, from its beginning -up to its culmination, that cannot control this -examination by discovering the conditions under -which successive stages appear, is only preliminary. -It may further the invention of proper tools -of inquiry, it may help define problems, it may -serve to suggest valuable hypotheses. But as -science it breathes an air already tainted. There -is no way to sort out the results flowing from the -subject-matter itself from those introduced by the -assumptions and presumptions of our own reflection. -Not so with natural history when it is -worthy of its name. Here the analysis is the unfolding -of the existence itself. Its distinctions are -not pigeon-holes of our convenience; they are -stakes that mark the parting of the ways in the -process itself. Its classifications are not a grasp -at factors resisting further analysis; they are -the patient tracings of the paths pursued. Nothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263">263</a></span> -is more out of date than to suppose that -interest in genesis is interest in reducing higher -forms to cruder ones: it is interest in locating the -exact and objective conditions under which a -given fact appears, and in relation to which accordingly -it has its meaning. Nothing is more -naïve than to suppose that in pursuing “natural -history” (term of scorn in which yet resides -the dignity of the world-drama) we simply learn -something of the temporal conditions under which -a given value appears, while its own eternal -essential quality remains as opaque as before. Nature -knows no such divorce of quality and circumstance. -Things come when they are wanted and -as they are wanted; their quality is precisely the -response they give to the conditions that call for -them, while the furtherance they afford to the -movement of their whole is their meaning. The -severance of analysis and genesis, instead of serving -as a ready-made test by which to try out the -empirical, temporal events of psychology from the -rational abiding constitution of philosophy, is a -brand of philosophic dualism: the supposition -that values are externally obtruded and statically -set in irrelevant rubbish.</p> - -<p>There are those who will admit that “states of -consciousness” are but the cross-sections of flow of -behavior, arrested for inspection, made in order -that we may reconstruct experience in its lifehistory.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264">264</a></span> -Yet in the knowledge of the course and -method of our experience, they will hold that we -are far from the domain proper of philosophy. -Experience, they say, is just the historic achievement -of finite individuals; it tells the tale of approach -to the treasures of truth, of partial victory, -but larger defeat, in laying hold of the -treasure. But, they say, reality is not the path -to reality, and record of devious wanderings in the -path is hardly a safe account of the goal. Psychology, -in other words, may tell us something of how -we mortals lay hold of the world of things and -truths; of how we appropriate and assimilate its -contents; and of how we react. It may trace the -issues of such approaches and apprehensions upon -the course of our own individual destinies. But it -cannot wisely ignore nor sanely deny the distinction -between these individual strivings and achievements, -and the “Reality” that subsists and supports -its own structure outside these finite futilities. -The processes by which we turn over The Reality -into terms of our fragmentary unconcluded, inconclusive -experiences are so extrinsic to the Reality -itself as to have no revealing power with reference -to it. There is the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ordo ad universum</i>, the -subject of philosophy; there is the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ordo ad individuum</i>, -the subject of psychology.</p> - -<p>Some such assumption as this lies latent, I am -convinced, in all forswearings of the kinship of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265">265</a></span> -psychology and philosophy. Two conceptions -hang together. The opinion that psychology is an -account only and finally of states of consciousness, -and therefore can throw no light upon the objects -with which philosophy deals, is twin to the doctrine -that the whole conscious life of the individual is -not organic to the world. The philosophic basis -and scope of this doctrine lie beyond examination -here. But even in passing one cannot avoid remarking -that the doctrine is almost never consistently -held; the doctrine logically carried out leads -so directly to intellectual and moral scepticism that -the theory usually prefers to work in the dark -background as a disposition and temper of thought -rather than to make a frank statement of itself. -Even in the half-hearted expositions of the process -of human experience as something merely annexed -to the reality of the universe, we are brought face -to face to the consideration with which we set out: -the dependence of theories of the individual upon -the position at a given time of the individual practical -and social. The doctrine of the accidental, -futile, transitory significance of the individual’s -experience as compared with eternal realities; -the notion that at best the individual is simply -realizing for and in himself what already has fixed -completeness in itself is congruous only with a -certain intellectual and political scheme and must -modify itself as that shifts. When such rearrangement<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266">266</a></span> -comes, our estimate of the nature -and importance of psychology will mirror the -change.</p> - -<p>When man’s command of the methods that control -action was precarious and disturbed; when -the tools that subject the world of things and -forces to use and operation were rare and clumsy, -it was unavoidable that the individual should submit -his perception and purpose blankly to the -blank reality beyond. Under such circumstances, -external authority must reign; the belief that human -experience in itself is approximate, not intrinsic, -is inevitable. Under such circumstances, -reference to the individual, to the subject, is a resort -only for explaining error, illusion, and uncertainty. -The necessity of external control and external -redemption of experience reports itself in a -low valuation of the self, and of all the factors and -phases of experience that spring from the self. -That the psychology of medievalism should appear -only as a portion of its theology of sin and salvation -is as obvious as that the psychology of the -Greeks should be a chapter of cosmology.</p> - -<p>As against all this, the assertion is ventured -that psychology, supplying us with knowledge of -the behavior of experience, is a conception of democracy. -Its postulate is that since experience -fulfils itself in individuals, since it administers -itself through their instrumentality, the account of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267">267</a></span> -the course and method of this achievement is a -significant and indispensable affair.</p> - -<p>Democracy is possible only because of a change -in intellectual conditions. It implies tools for getting -at truth in detail, and day by day, as we go -along. Only such possession justifies the surrender -of fixed, all-embracing principles to which, as universals, -all particulars and individuals are subject -for valuation and regulation. Without such possession, -it is only the courage of the fool that -would undertake the venture to which democracy -has committed itself—the ordering of life in response -to the needs of the moment in accordance -with the ascertained truth of the moment. Modern -life involves the deification of the here and the -now; of the specific, the particular, the unique, -that which happens once and has no measure of -value save such as it brings with itself. Such deification -is monstrous fetishism, unless the deity be -there; unless the universal lives, moves, and has its -being in experience as individualized.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> This conviction<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268">268</a></span> -of the value of the individualized finds its -further expression in psychology, which undertakes -to show how this individualization proceeds, and in -what aspect it presents itself.</p> - -<p>Of course, such a conception means something -for philosophy as well as for psychology; possibly -it involves for philosophy the larger measure of -transformation. It involves surrender of any claim -on the part of philosophy to be the sole source -of some truths and the exclusive guardian of some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269">269</a></span> -values. It means that philosophy be a method; -not an assurance company, nor a knight errant. -It means an alignment with science. Philosophy -may not be sacrificed to the partial and superficial -clamor of that which sometimes officiously and pretentiously -exhibits itself as Science. But there is -a sense in which philosophy must go to school to -the sciences; must have no data save such as it -receives at their hands; and be hospitable to no -method of inquiry or reflection not akin to those in -daily use among the sciences. As long as it claims -for itself special territory of fact, or peculiar -modes of access to truth, so long must it occupy a -dubious position. Yet this claim it has to make -until psychology comes to its own. There is something -in experience, something in things, which the -physical and the biological sciences do not touch; -something, moreover, which is not just more experiences -or more existences; but without which -their materials are inexperienced, unrealized. Such -sciences deal only with what <em>might</em> be experienced; -with the content of experience, provided and assumed -there be experience. It is psychology which -tells us how this possible experience loses its barely -hypothetical character, and is stamped with categorical -unquestioned experiencedness; how, in a -word, it becomes here and now in some uniquely -individualized life. Here is the necessary transition -of science into philosophy; a passage that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270">270</a></span> -carries the verified and solid body of the one into the -large and free form of the other.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>[<span class="smcap">Note</span>: I have let this paper stand much as written, though -now conscious that much more is crowded into it than could -properly be presented in one paper. The drift of the ten -years from ’99 to ’09 has made, I venture to believe, for increased -clearness in the main positions of the paper: The -revival of a naturalistic realism, the denial of the existence -of “consciousness,” the development of functional and -dynamic psychology (accompanied by aversion to interpretation -of functions as faculties of a soul-substance)—all of -these tendencies are sympathetic with the aim of the paper. -There is another reason for letting it stand: the new functional -and pragmatic empiricism proffered in this volume -has been constantly objected to on the ground that its conceptions -of knowledge and verification lead only to subjectivism -and solipsism. The paper may indicate that the -identification of experience with bare states of consciousness -represents the standpoint of the critic, not of the empiricism -criticised, and that it is for him, not for me, to fear the -subjective implications of such a position. The paper also -clearly raises the question as to how far the isolation of -“consciousness” from nature and social life, which characterizes -the procedure of many psychologists of to-day, is -responsible for keeping alive quite unreal problems in philosophy.]</p></blockquote> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271">271</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 title="THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE"><a id="THE_SIGNIFICANCE_OF_THE_PROBLEM_OF_KNOWLEDGE"></a>THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor smaller">63</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It</span> is now something over a century since Kant -called upon philosophers to cease their discussion -regarding the nature of the world and the -principles of existence until they had arrived at -some conclusion regarding the nature of the knowing -process. But students of philosophy know -that Kant formulated the question “how knowledge -is possible” rather than created it. As matter -of fact, reflective thought for two centuries -before Kant had been principally interested in just -this problem, although it had not generalized its -own interest. Kant brought to consciousness the -controlling motive. The discussion, both in Kant -himself and in his successors, often seems scholastic, -lost in useless subtlety, scholastic argument, -and technical distinctions. Within the last decade -in particular there have been signs of a growing -weariness as to epistemology, and a tendency to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272">272</a></span> -turn away to more fertile fields. The interest -shows signs of exhaustion.</p> - -<p>Students of philosophy will recognize what I -mean when I say that this growing conviction of -futility and consequent distaste are associated with -the outcome of the famous dictum of Kant, that -perception without conception is blind, while conception -without perception is empty. The whole -course of reflection since Kant’s time has tended to -justify this remark. The sensationalist and the -rationalist have worked themselves out. Pretty -much all students are convinced that we can reduce -knowledge neither to a set of associated sensations, -nor yet to a purely rational system of relations of -thought. Knowledge is judgment, and judgment -requires both a material of sense perception and -an ordering, regulating principle, reason; so much -seems certain, but we do not get any further. -Sensation and thought themselves seem to stand -out more rigidly opposed to each other in their -own natures than ever. Why both are necessary, -and how two such opposed factors coöperate in -bringing about the unified result of science, becomes -more and more of a mystery. It is the -continual running up against this situation which -accounts for the flagging of interest and the desire -to direct energy where it will have more outcome.</p> - -<p>This situation creates a condition favorable to -taking stock of the question as it stands; to inquiring<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273">273</a></span> -what this interest, prolonged for over three -centuries, in the possibility and nature of knowledge, -stands for; what the conviction as to the -necessity of the union of sensation and thought, -together with the inability to reach conclusions regarding -the nature of the union, signifies.</p> - -<p>I propose then to raise this evening precisely -this question: What is the meaning of the problem -of knowledge? What is its meaning, not simply -for reflective philosophy or in terms of epistemology -itself, but what is its meaning in the historical -movement of humanity and as a part of a larger -and more comprehensive experience? My thesis -is perhaps sufficiently indicated in the mere taking -of this point of view. It implies that the abstractness -of the discussion of knowledge, its remoteness -from everyday experience, is one of form, rather -than of substance. It implies that the problem of -knowledge is not a problem that has its origin, its -value, or its destiny within itself. The problem is -one which social life, the organized practice of mankind, -has had to face. The seemingly technical and -abstruse discussion of the philosophers results from -the formulation and statement of the question.</p> - -<p>I suggest that the problem of the possibility of -knowledge is but an aspect of the question of the -relation of knowing to acting, of theory to practice. -The distinctions which the philosophers raise, -the oppositions which they erect, the weary treadmill<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274">274</a></span> -which they pursue between sensation and -thought, subject and object, mind and matter, are -not invented <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad hoc</i>, but are simply the concise reports -and condensed formula of points of view and -practical conflicts having their source in the very -nature of modern life, conflicts which must be met -and solved if modern life is to go on its way untroubled, -with clear consciousness of what it is -about. As the philosopher has received his problem -from the world of action, so he must return -his account there for auditing and liquidation.</p> - -<p>More especially, I suggest that the tendency of -all the points at issue to precipitate in the opposition -of sensationalism and rationalism is due to the -fact that sensation and reason stand for the two -forces contending for mastery in social life: the -radical and the conservative. The reason that the -contest does not end, the reason for the necessity -of the combination of the two in the resultant statement, -is that both factors are necessary in action; -one stands for stimulus, for initiative; the other for -control, for direction.</p> - -<p>I cannot hope, in the time at my command this -evening, to justify these wide and sweeping assertions -regarding either the origin, the work, or the -final destiny of philosophic reflection. I simply -hope, by reference to some of the chief periods of -the development of philosophy, to illustrate to you -something of what I mean.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275">275</a></span> -At the outset we take a long scope in our survey -and present to ourselves the epoch when philosophy -was still consciously, and not simply by implication, -human, when reflective thought had not developed -its own technique of method, and was in no -danger of being caught in its own machinery—the -time of Socrates. What does the assertion of -Socrates that an unexamined life is not one fit to -be led by man; what does his injunction “Know -thyself” mean? It means that the corporate -motives and guarantees of conduct are breaking -down. We have got away from the time when the -individual could both regulate and justify his -course of life by reference to the ideals incarnate -in the habits of the community of which he is a -member. The time of direct and therefore unconscious -union with corporate life, finding therein -stimuli, codes, and values, has departed. The development -of industry and commerce, of war and -politics, has brought face to face communities with -different aims and diverse habits; the development -of myth and animism into crude but genuine scientific -observation and imagination has transformed -the physical widening of the horizon, brought -about by commerce and intercourse, into an intellectual -and moral expansion. The old supports -fail precisely at the time when they are most needed—before -a widening and more complex scene of -action. Where, then, shall the agent of action<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276">276</a></span> -turn? The “Know thyself” of Socrates is the reply -to the practical problem which confronted -Athens in his day. Investigation into the true -ends and worths of human life, sifting and testing -of all competing ends, the discovery of a -method which should validate the genuine and -dismiss the spurious, had henceforth to do for -man what consolidated and incorporate custom -had hitherto presented as a free and precious -gift.</p> - -<p>With Socrates the question is as direct and practical -as the question of making one’s living or of -governing the state; it is indeed the same question -put in its general form. It is a question that the -flute player, the cobbler, and the politician must -face no more and no less than the reflective philosopher. -The question is addressed by Socrates to -every individual and to every group with which he -comes in contact. Because the question is practical -it is individual and direct. It is a question -which every one must face and answer for himself, -just as in the Protestant scheme every individual -must face and solve for himself the question of his -final destiny.</p> - -<p>Yet the very attitude of Socrates carried with it -the elements of its own destruction. Socrates could -only raise the question, or rather demand of every -individual that he raise it for himself. Of the -answer he declared himself to be as ignorant as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277">277</a></span> -was any one. The result could be only a shifting -of the center of interest. If the question is so all-important, -and yet the wisest of all men must confess -that he only knows his own ignorance as to its -answer, the inevitable point of further consideration -is the discovery of a method which shall enable -the question to be answered. This is the significance -of Plato. The problem is the absolutely inevitable -outgrowth of the Socratic position; and -yet it carried with it just as inevitably the separation -of philosopher from shoemaker and statesman, -and the relegation of theory to a position remote -for the time being from conduct.</p> - -<p>If the Socratic command, “Know thyself,” runs -against the dead wall of inability to conduct this -knowledge, some one must take upon himself the -discovery of how the requisite knowledge may be -obtained. A new profession is born, that of the -thinker. At this time the means, the discovery of -how the aims and worths of the self may be known -and measured, becomes, for this class, an end in -itself. Theory is ultimately to be applied to practice; -but in the meantime the theory must be worked -out as theory or else no application. This represents -the peculiar equilibrium and the peculiar -point of contradiction in the Platonic system. All -philosophy is simply for the sake of the organization -and regulation of social life; and yet the philosophers -must be a class by themselves, working<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278">278</a></span> -out their peculiar problems with their own particular -tools.</p> - -<p>With Aristotle the attempted balance failed. -Social life is disintegrating beyond the point of -hope of a successful reorganization, and thinking -is becoming a fascinating pursuit for its own sake. -The world of practice is now the world of compromise -and of adjustment. It is relative to partial -aims and finite agents. The sphere of absolute -and enduring truth and value can be reached -only in and through thought. The one who acts -compromises himself with the animal desire that -inspires his action and with the alien material that -forms its stuff. In two short generations the -divorce of philosophy from life, the isolation of -reflective theory from practical conduct, has completed -itself. So great is the irony of history that -this sudden and effective outcome was the result -of the attempt to make thought the instrument of -action, and action the manifestation of truth -reached by thinking.</p> - -<p>But this statement must not be taken too literally. -It is impossible that men should really separate -their ideas from their acts. If we look ahead -a few centuries we find that the philosophy of -Plato and Aristotle has accomplished, in an indirect -and unconscious way, what perhaps it could -never have effected by the more immediate and -practical method of Socrates. Philosophy became<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279">279</a></span> -an organ of vision, an instrument of interpretation; -it furnished the medium through which the -world was seen and the course of life estimated. -Philosophy died as philosophy, to rise as the set -and bent of the human mind. Through a thousand -and devious and roundabout channels, the thoughts -of the philosophers filtered through the strata of -human consciousness and conduct. Through the -teachings of grammarians, rhetoricians, and a variety -of educational schools, they were spread in -diluted form through the whole Roman Empire -and were again precipitated in the common forms -of speech. Through the earnestness of the moral -propaganda of the Stoics they became the working -rules of life for the more strenuous and earnest -spirits. Through the speculations of the Sceptics -and Epicureans they became the chief reliance and -consolation of a large number of highly cultured -individuals amid social turmoil and political disintegration. -All these influences and many more -finally summed themselves up in the two great -media through which Greek philosophy finally -fixed the intellectual horizon of man, determined -the values of its perspective, and meted out the -boundaries and divisions of the scene of human -action.</p> - -<p>These two influences were the development of -Christian theology and moral theory, and the organization -of the system of Roman jurisprudence.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280">280</a></span> -There is perhaps no more fascinating chapter in -the history of humanity than the slow and tortuous -processes by which the ideas set in motion by -that Athenian citizen who faced death as serenely -as he conversed with a friend, finally became the -intellectually organizing centers of the two great -movements that bridge the span between ancient -civilization and modern. As the personal and immediate -force and enthusiasm of the movement -initiated by Jesus began to grow fainter and the -commanding influence of his own personality commenced -to dim, the ideas of the world and of -life, of God and of man, elaborated in Greek -philosophy, served to transform moral enthusiasm -and personal devotion to the redemption of humanity, -into a splendid and coherent view of the -universe; a view that resisted all disintegrating influences -and gathered into itself the permanent -ideas and progressive ideals thus far developed in -the history of man.</p> - -<p>We have only a faint idea of how this was accomplished, -or of the thoroughness of the work -done. We have perhaps even more inadequate -conceptions of the great organizing and centralizing -work done by Greek thought in the political -sphere. When the military and administrative -genius of Rome brought the whole world in subjection -to itself, the most pressing of practical -problems was to give unity of practical aim and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281">281</a></span> -harmony of working machinery to the vast and -confused mass of local custom and tradition, religious, -social, economic, and intellectual, as well -as political. In this juncture the great administrators -and lawyers of Rome seized with avidity -upon the results of the intellectual analysis of social -and political relations elaborated in Greek -philosophy. Caring naught for these results in -their reflective and theoretical character, they saw -in them the possible instrument of introducing order -into chaos and of transforming the confused -and conflicting medley of practice and opinion -into a harmonious social structure. Roman law, -that formed the vertebral column of civilization -for a thousand years, and which articulated the -outer order of life as distinctly as Christianity -controlled the inner, was the outcome.</p> - -<p>Thought was once more in unity with action, -philosophy had become the instrument of conduct. -Mr. Bosanquet makes the pregnant remark “that -the weakness of medieval science and philosophy -are connected rather with excess of practice than -with excess of theory. The subordination of philosophy -to theology is a subordination of science to -a formulated conception of human welfare. Its -essence is present, not wherever there is metaphysics -but wherever the spirit of truth is subordinated -to any preconceived practical intent.” (“History -of Esthetics,” p. 146.)</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282">282</a></span> -Once more the irony of history displays itself. -Thought has become practical, it has become the -regulator of individual conduct and social organization, -but at the expense of its own freedom and -power. The defining characteristic of medievalism -in state and in church, in political and spiritual -life, is that truth presents itself to the individual -only through the medium of organized authority.</p> - -<p>There was a historical necessity on the external -as well as the internal side. We have not the remotest -way of imagining what the outcome would -finally have been if, at the time when the intellectual -structure of the Christian church and the legal -structure of the Roman Empire had got themselves -thoroughly organized, the barbarians had not made -their inroads and seized upon all this accumulated -and consolidated wealth as their own legitimate -prey. But this was what did happen. As a result, -truths originally developed by the freest -possible criticism and investigation became external, -and imposed themselves upon the mass of individuals -by the mere weight of authoritative -law. The external, transcendental, and supernatural -character of spiritual truth and of social -control during the Middle Ages is naught but the -mirror, in consciousness, of the relation existing -between the eager, greedy, undisciplined horde of -barbarians on one side, and the concentrated -achievements of ancient civilization on the other.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283">283</a></span> -There was no way out save that the keen barbarian -whet his appetite upon the rich banquet spread -before him. But there was equally no way out so -far as the continuity of civilization was concerned -save that the very fullness and richness of this -banquet set limits to the appetite, and finally, when -assimilated and digested, it be transformed into the -flesh and blood, the muscles and sinew of him who -sat at the feast. Thus the barbarian ceased to be -a barbarian and a new civilization arose.</p> - -<p>But the time came when the work of absorption -was fairly complete. The northern barbarians -had eaten the food and drunk the wine of Græco-Roman -civilization. The authoritative truth embodied -in medieval state and church succeeded, in -principle, in disciplining the untrained masses. -Its very success issued its own death warrant. To -say that it had succeeded means that the new -people had finally eaten their way into the heart -of the ideas offered them, had got from them -what they wanted, and were henceforth prepared -to go their own way and make their own living. -Here a new rhythm of the movement of thought -and action begins to show itself.</p> - -<p>The beginning of this change in the swing of -thought and action forms the transition from the -Middle Ages to the modern times. It is the epoch -of the Renaissance. The individual comes to a -new birth and asserts his own individuality and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284">284</a></span> -demands his own rights in the way of feeling, doing, -and knowing for himself. Science, art, religion, -political life, must all be made over on the -basis of recognizing the claims of the individual.</p> - -<p>Pardon me these commonplaces, but they are -necessary to the course of the argument. By historic -fallacy we often suppose, or imagine that we -suppose, that the individual had been present as a -possible center of action all through the Middle -Ages, but through some external and arbitrary interference -had been weighted down by political and -intellectual despotism. All this inverts the true -order of the case. The very possibility of the -individual making such unlimited demands for himself, -claiming to be the legitimate center of all -action and standard for all organization, was dependent, -as I have already indicated, upon the intervening -medievalism. Save as having passed -through this period of tremendous discipline, and -having gradually worked over into his own habits -and purposes the truths embodied in the church -and state that controlled his conduct, the individual -could be only a source of disorder and a disturber -of civilization. The very maintenance of -the spiritual welfare of mankind was bound up in -the extent to which the claim of truth and reality -to be universal and objective, far above all individual -feeling and thought, could make itself valid. -The logical realism and universalism of scholastic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285">285</a></span> -philosophy simply reflect the actual subjection of -the individual to that associated and corporate life -which, in conserving the past, provided the principle -of control.</p> - -<p>But the eager, hungry barbarian was there, implicated -in this universalism. He must be active -in receiving and in absorbing the truth authoritatively -doled out to him. Even the most rigid forms -of medieval Christianity could not avoid postulating -the individual will as having a certain initiative -with reference to its own salvation. The impulses, -the appetite, the instinct of the individual were all -assumed in medieval morals, religion, and politics. -The imagined medieval tyranny took them for -granted as completely as does the modern herald -of liberty and equality. But the medieval civilization -knew that the time had not come when -these appetites and impulses could be trusted to -work themselves out. They must be controlled by -the incorporate truths inherited from Athens and -Rome.</p> - -<p>The very logic of the relationship, however, required -that the time come when the individual -makes his own the objective and universal truths. -He is now the incorporation of truth. He now has -the control as well as the stimulus of action within -himself. He is the standard and the end, as well -as the initiator and the effective force of execution. -Just because the authoritative truth of medievalism<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286">286</a></span> -has succeeded, has fulfilled its function, the -individual can begin to assert himself.</p> - -<p>Contrast this critical period, finding its expression -equally in the art of the Renaissance, the revival -of learning, the Protestant Reformation, and -political democracy, with Athens in the time of -Socrates. Then individuals felt their own social -life disintegrated, dissolving under their very feet. -The problem was how the value of that social life -was to be maintained against the external and internal -forces that were threatening it. The problem -was on the side neither of the individual nor of -progress; save as the individual was seen to be an -intervening instrument in the reconstruction of the -social unity. But with the individual of the fourteenth -century, it was not his own intimate community -life which was slipping away from him. It -was an alien and remote life which had finally become -his own; which had passed over into his own -inner being. The problem was not how a unity -of social life should be conserved, but what the individual -should do with the wealth of resources of -which he found himself the rightful heir and administrator. -The problem looked out upon the -future, not back to the past. It was how to create -a new order, both of modes of individual conduct -and forms of social life that should be the appropriate -manifestations of the vigorous and richly -endowed individual.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287">287</a></span> -Hence the conception of progress as a ruling -idea; the conception of the individual as -the source and standard of rights; and the problem -of knowledge, were all born together. Given the -freed individual, who feels called upon to create a -new heaven and a new earth, and who feels himself -gifted with the power to perform the task to which -he is called:—and the demand for science, for a -method of discovering and verifying truth, becomes -imperious. The individual is henceforth to supply -control, law, and not simply stimulation and initiation. -What does this mean but that instead of -any longer receiving or assimilating truth, he is -now to search for and create it? Having no -longer the truth imposed by authority to rely upon, -there is no resource save to secure the authority -of truth. The possibility of getting at and utilizing -this truth becomes therefore the underlying -and conditioning problem of modern life. Strange -as it may sound, the question which was formulated -by Kant as that of the possibility of knowledge, -is the fundamental political problem of modern -life.</p> - -<p>Science and metaphysics or philosophy, though -seeming often to be at war, with their respective -adherents often throwing jibes and slurs at each -other, are really the most intimate allies. The -philosophic movement is simply the coming to consciousness -of this claim of the individual to be able<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288">288</a></span> -to discover and verify truth for himself, and -thereby not only to direct his own conduct, but to -become an influential and decisive factor in the organization -of life itself. Modern philosophy is the -formulation of this creed, both in general and in -its more specific implications. We often forget -that the technical problem “<em>how</em> knowledge is possible,” -also means “how <em>knowledge</em> is possible”; -how, that is, shall the individual be able to back -himself up by truth which has no authority save -that of its own intrinsic truthfulness. Science, on -the other hand, is simply this general faith or creed -asserting itself in detail; it is the practical faith -at work engaged in subjugating the foreign territory -of ignorance and falsehood step by step. If -the ultimate outcome depends upon this detailed -and concrete work, we must not forget that the -earnestness and courage, as well as the intelligence -and clearness with which the task has been undertaken, -have depended largely upon the wider, even -if vaguer, operation of philosophy.</p> - -<p>But the student of philosophy knows more than -that the problem of knowledge has been with increasing -urgency and definiteness the persistent -and comprehensive problem. So conscious is he of -the two opposed theories regarding the nature of -science, that he often forgets the underlying -bond of unity of which we have been speaking. -These two opposing schools are those which we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289">289</a></span> -know as the sensationalist and the intellectualist, -the empiricist and the rationalist. Admitting that -the dominance of the question of the possibility -and nature of knowledge is at bottom a fundamental -question of practice and of social direction, -is <em>this</em> distinction anything more than the -clash of scholastic opinions, a rivalry of ideas -meaningless for conduct?</p> - -<p>I think it is. Having made so many sweeping -assertions I must venture one more. Fanciful and -forced as it may seem, I would say that the sensational -and empirical schools represent in conscious -and reflective form the continuation of the principle -of the northern and barbarian side of medieval -life; while the intellectualist and the rationalist -stand for the conscious elaboration of the principle -involved in the Græco-Roman tradition.</p> - -<p>Once more, as I cannot hope to prove, let me -expand and illustrate. The sensationalist has -staked himself upon the possibility of explaining -and justifying knowledge by conceiving it as the -grouping and combination of the qualities directly -given us in sensation. The special reasons advanced -in support of this position are sufficiently -technical and remote. But the motive which has -kept the sensationalist at work, which animated -Hobbes and Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill, -Voltaire and Diderot, was a human not a scholastic -one. It was the belief that only in sensation do<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290">290</a></span> -we get any personal contact with reality, and -hence, any genuine guarantee of vital truth. -Thought is pale, and remote from the concrete -stuff of knowledge and experience. It only formulates -and duplicates; it only divides and recombines -that fullness of vivid reality got directly and at -first hand in sense experience. Reason, compared -with sense, is indirect, emasculate, and faded.</p> - -<p>Moreover, reason and thought in their very -generality seem to lie beyond and outside the individual. -In this remoteness, when they claim any -final value, they violate the very first principle of -the modern consciousness. What is the distinguishing -characteristic of modern life, unless it be -precisely that the individual shall not simply get, -and reason about, truth in the abstract, but shall -make it his own in the most intimate and personal -way? He has not only to know the truth in the -sense of knowing about it, but he must feel it. -What is sensation but the answer to this demand -for the most individual and intimate contact with -reality? Show me a sensationalist and I will show -you not only one who believes that he is on the -side of concreteness and definiteness, as against -washed-out abstractions and misty general notions: -but also one who believes that he is identified -with the cause of the individual as distinct from -that of external authority. We have only to go -to our Locke and our Mill to see that opposition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291">291</a></span> -to the innate and the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> was felt to be opposition -to the deification of hereditary prejudice and -to the reception of ideas without examination or -criticism. Personal contact with reality through -sensation seemed to be the only safeguard from -opinions which, while masquerading in the guise of -absolute and eternal truth, were in reality but the -prejudices of the past become so ingrained as to -insist upon being standards of truth and action.</p> - -<p>Positively as well as negatively, the sensationalists -have felt themselves to represent the side of -progress. In its supposed eternal character, a -general notion stands ready made, fixed forever, -without reference to time, without the possibility -of change or diversity. As distinct from this, the -sensation represents the never-failing eruption of -the new. It is the novel, the unexpected, that -which cannot be reasoned out in eternal formula, -but must be hit upon in the ever-changing flow of -our experience. It thus represents stimulation, -excitation, momentum onwards. It gives a constant -protest against the assumption of any theory -or belief to possess finality; and it supplies the -ever-renewed presentation of material out of which -to build up new objects and new laws.</p> - -<p>The sensationalist appears to have a good case. -He stands for vividness and definiteness against -abstraction; for the engagement of the individual -in experience as against the remote and general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292">292</a></span> -thought about experience; and for progress and -for variety against the eternal fixed monotony of -the concept. But what says the rationalist? -What value has experience, he inquires, if it is simply -a chaos of disintegrated and floating débris? -What is the worth of personality and individuality -when they are reduced to crudity of brute feeling -and sheer intensity of impulsive reaction? What -is there left in progress that we should desire it, -when it has become a mere unregulated flux of -transitory sensations, coming and going without -reasonable motivation or rational purpose?</p> - -<p>Thus the intellectualist has endeavored to frame -the structure of knowledge as a well-ordered economy, -where reason is sovereign, where the permanent -is the standard of reference for the changing, -and where the individual may always escape from -his own mere individuality and find support and -reinforcement in a system of relations that lies -outside of and yet gives validity to his own passing -states of consciousness. Thus the rationalists hold -that we must find in a universal intelligence a -source of truth and guarantee of value that is -sought in vain in the confused and flowing mass -of sensations.</p> - -<p>The rationalist, in making the concept or general -idea the all-important thing in knowledge, believes -himself to be asserting the interests of order -as against destructive caprice and the license of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293">293</a></span> -momentary whim. He finds that his cause is -bound up with that of the discovery of truth as -the necessary instrument and method for action. -Only by reference to the general and the rational -can the individual find perspective, secure direction -for his appetites and impulses, and escape from -the uncontrolled and ruinous reactions of his own -immediate tendency.</p> - -<p>The concept, once more, in its very generality, -in its elevation above the intensities and conflicts of -momentary passions and interests, is the conserver -of the experience of the past. It is the wisdom of -the past put into capitalized and funded form to -enable the individual to get away from the stress -and competition of the needs of the passing moment. -It marks the difference between barbarism -and civilization, between continuity and disintegration, -between the sequence of tradition that is the -necessity of intelligent thought and action, and -the random and confused excitation of the hour.</p> - -<p>When we thus consider not the details of the -positions of the sensationalist and rationalist, but -the motives that have induced them to assume -these positions, we discover what is meant in saying -that the question is still a practical, a social one, -and that the two schools stand for certain one-sided -factors of social life. If we have on one side -the demand for freedom, for personal initiation -into experience, for variety and progress, we have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294">294</a></span> -on the other side the demand for general order, -for continuous and organized unity, for the conservation -of the dearly bought resources of the -past. This is what I mean by saying that the -sensationalist abstracts in conscious form the -position and tendency of the Germanic element in -modern civilization, the factor of appetite and impulse, -of keen enjoyment and satisfaction, of stimulus -and initiative. Just so the rationalist erects -into conscious abstraction the principle of the -Græco-Roman world, that of control, of system, -of order and authority.</p> - -<p>That the principles of freedom and order, of -past and future, or conservation and progress, of -incitement to action and control of that incitation, -are correlative, I shall not stop to argue. It may -be worth while, however, to point out that exactly -the same correlative and mutually implicating connection -exists between sensationalism and rationalism, -considered as philosophical accounts of the -origin and nature of knowledge.</p> - -<p>The strength of each school lies in the weakness -of its opponent. The more the sensationalist appears -to succeed in reducing knowledge to the associations -of sensation, the more he creates a demand -for thought to introduce background and -relationship. The more consistent the sensationalist, -the more openly he reveals the sensation in its -own nakedness crying aloud for a clothing of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295">295</a></span> -value and meaning which must be borrowed from -reflective and rational interpretation. On the -other hand, the more reason and the system of -relations that make up the functioning of reason -are magnified, the more is felt the need of sensation -to bring reason into some fruitful contact -with the materials of experience. Reason must -have the stimulus of this contact in order to be -incited to its work and to get materials to operate -with. The cause, then, why neither school can -come to rest in itself is precisely that each abstracts -one essential factor of conduct.</p> - -<p>This suggests, finally, that the next move in -philosophy is precisely to transfer attention from -the details of the position assumed, and the arguments -used in these two schools, to the practical -motives that have unconsciously controlled the -discussion. The positions have been sufficiently -elaborated. Within the past one hundred years, -within especially the last generation, each has succeeded -in fully stating its case. The result, if we -remain at this point, is practically a deadlock. -Each can make out its case against the other. To -stop at such a point is a patent absurdity. If we -are to get out of the cul-de-sac it must be by bringing -into consciousness the tacit reference to action -that all the time has been the controlling factor.</p> - -<p>In a word, another great rhythmic movement is -seen to be approaching its end. The demand for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296">296</a></span> -science and philosophy was the demand for truth -and a sure standard of truth which the new-born -individual might employ in his efforts to build up -a new world to afford free scope to the powers -stirring within him. The urgency and acuteness -of this demand caused, for the time being, the -transfer of attention from the nature of practice -to that of knowledge. The highly theoretical and -abstract character of modern epistemology, combined -with the fact that this highly abstract and -theoretic problem has continuously engaged the -attention of thought for more than three centuries, -is, to my mind, proof positive that the question of -knowledge was for the time being the point in which -the question of practice centered, and through -which it must find outlet and solution.</p> - -<p>We return, then, to our opening problem: the -meaning of the question of the possibility of knowledge -raised by Kant a century ago, and of his -assertion that sensation without thought is blind, -thought without sensation empty. Once more I -recall to the student of philosophy how this assertion -of Kant has haunted and determined the course -of philosophy in the intervening years—how his -solution at once seems inevitable and unsatisfactory. -It is inevitable in that no one can fairly -deny that both sense and reason are implicated in -every fruitful and significant statement of the -world; unconvincing because we are after all left<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297">297</a></span> -with these two opposed things still at war with -each other, plus the miracle of their final combination.</p> - -<p>When I say that the only way out is to place the -whole modern industry of epistemology in relation -to the conditions that gave it birth and the function -it has to fulfil, I mean that the unsatisfactory -character of the entire neo-Kantian movement lies -in its assumption that knowledge gives birth to itself -and is capable of affording its own justification. -The solution that is always sought and -never found so long as we deal with knowledge as -a self-sufficing purveyor of reality, reveals itself -when we conceive of knowledge as a statement of -action, that statement being necessary, moreover, -to the successful ongoing of action.</p> - -<p>The entire problem of medieval philosophy is -that of absorption, of assimilation. The result -was the creation of the individual. Hence the problem -of modern life is that of reconstruction, reform, -reorganization. The entire content of experience -needs to be passed through the alembic -of individual agency and realization. The individual -is to be the bearer of civilization; but this -involves a remaking of the civilization that he -bears. Thus we have the dual question: How can -the individual become the organ of corporate action? -How can he make over the truth authoritatively -embodied in institutions of church and state<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298">298</a></span> -into frank, healthy, and direct expressions of the -simple act of free living? On the other hand, how -can civilization preserve its own integral value and -import when subordinated to the agency of the -individual instead of exercising supreme sway over -him?</p> - -<p>The question of knowledge, of the discovery and -statement of truth, gives the answer to this question; -and it alone gives the answer. Admitting -that the practical problem of modern life is the -maintenance of the moral values of civilization -through the medium of the insight and decision of -the individual, the problem is foredoomed to futile -failure save as the individual in performing his -task can work with a definite and controllable tool. -This tool is science. But this very fact, constituting -the dignity of science and measuring the importance -of the philosophic theory of knowledge, -conferring upon them the religious value once attaching -to dogma and the disciplinary significance -once belonging to political rules, also sets their -limit. The servant is not above his master.</p> - -<p>When a theory of knowledge forgets that its -value rests in solving the problem out of which it -has arisen, viz., that of securing a method of action; -when it forgets that it has to work out the conditions -under which the individual may freely direct -himself without loss to the historic values of civilization—when -it forgets these things it begins to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299">299</a></span> -cumber the ground. It is a luxury, and hence a -social nuisance and disturber. Of course, in the -very nature of things, every means or instrument -will for a while absorb attention so that it becomes -the end. Indeed it is the end when it is an indispensable -condition of onward movement. But -when once the means have been worked out they -must operate as such. When the nature and -method of knowledge are fairly understood, then -interest must transfer itself from the possibility -of knowledge to the possibility of its application -to life.</p> - -<p>The sensationalist has played his part in bringing -to effective recognition the demand in valid -knowledge for individuality of experience, for personal -participation in materials of knowledge. -The rationalist has served his time in making it -clear once for all that valid knowledge requires -organization, and the operation of a relatively permanent -and general factor. The Kantian epistemologist -has formulated the claims of both schools -in defining judgment as the relation of perception -and conception. But when it goes on to state -that this relation is itself knowledge, or can be found -in knowledge, it stultifies itself. Knowledge can -define the percept and elaborate the concept, but -their union can be found only in action. The experimental -method of modern science, its erection -into the ultimate mode of verification, is simply this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300">300</a></span> -fact obtaining recognition. Only action can reconcile -the old, the general, and the permanent with -the changing, the individual, and the new. It is -action as progress, as development, making over -the wealth of the past into capital with which to -do an enlarging and freer business, that alone can -find its way out of the cul-de-sac of the theory of -knowledge. Each of the older movements passed -away because of its own success, failed because it -did its work, died in accomplishing its purpose. -So also with the modern philosophy of knowledge; -there must come a time when we have so much -knowledge in detail, and understand so well its -method in general, that it ceases to be a problem. -It becomes a tool. If the problem of knowledge -is not intrinsically meaningless and absurd it must -in course of time be solved. Then the dominating -interest becomes the <em>use</em> of knowledge; the conditions -under which and ways in which it may be -most organically and effectively employed to direct -conduct.</p> - -<p>Thus the Socratic period recurs; but recurs with -the deepened meaning of the intervening weary -years of struggle, confusion, and conflict in the -growth of the recognition of the need of patient -and specific methods of interrogation. So, too, the -authoritative and institutional truth of scholasticism -recurs, but recurs borne up upon the vigorous -and conscious shoulders of the freed individual who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301">301</a></span> -is aware of his own intrinsic relations to truth, -and who glories in his ability to carry civilization—not -merely to carry it, but to carry it on. -Thus another swing in the rhythm of theory and -practice begins.</p> - -<p>How does this concern us as philosophers? For -the world it means that philosophy is henceforth -a method and not an original fountain head of -truth, nor an ultimate standard of reference. But -what is involved for philosophy itself in this -change? I make no claims to being a prophet, -but I venture one more and final unproved statement, -believing, with all my heart, that it is justified -both by the moving logic of the situation, and -by the signs of the times. I refer to the growing -transfer of interest from metaphysics and the theory -of knowledge to psychology and social ethics—including -in the latter term all the related concrete -social sciences, so far as they may give guidance -to conduct.</p> - -<p>There are those who see in psychology only a -particular science which they are pleased to term -purely empirical (unless it happen to restate in -changed phraseology the metaphysics with which -they are familiar). They see in it only a more -or less incoherent mass of facts, interesting because -relating to human nature, but below the natural -sciences in point of certainty and definiteness, -as also far below pure philosophy as to comprehensiveness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302">302</a></span> -and ability to deal with fundamental -issues. But if I may be permitted to dramatize a -little the position of the psychologist, he can well -afford to continue patiently at work, unmindful -of the occasional supercilious sneers of the epistemologist. -The cause of modern civilization stands -and falls with the ability of the individual to -serve as its agent and bearer. And psychology -is naught but the account of the way in which -individual life is thus progressively maintained -and reorganized. Psychology is the attempt to -state in detail the machinery of the individual -considered as the instrument and organ through -which social action operates. It is the answer -to Kant’s demand for the formal phase of experience—how -experience as such is constituted. -Just because the whole burden and stress, both -of conserving and advancing experience is more and -more thrown upon the individual, everything which -sheds light upon how the individual may weather -the stress and assume the burden is precious and -imperious.</p> - -<p>Social ethics in inclusive sense is the correlative -science. Dealing not with the form or mode -or machinery of action, it attempts rather to make -out its filling and make up the values that are -necessary to constitute an experience which is -worth while. The sociologist, like the psychologist, -often presents himself as a camp follower of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303">303</a></span> -genuine science and philosophy, picking up scraps -here and there and piecing them together in somewhat -of an aimless fashion—fortunate indeed, if -not vague and over-ambitious. Yet social ethics -represents the attempt to translate philosophy -from a general and therefore abstract method into -a working and specific method; it is the change -from inquiring into the nature of value in general -to inquiring as to the <em>particular</em> values that ought -to be realized in the life of every one, and as to the -conditions which render possible this realization.</p> - -<p>There are those who will see in this conception of -the outcome of a four-hundred-year discussion concerning -the nature and possibility of knowledge a -derogation from the high estate of philosophy. -There are others who will see in it a sign that philosophy, -after wandering aimlessly hither and yon -in a wilderness without purpose or outcome, has -finally come to its senses—has given up metaphysical -absurdities and unverifiable speculations, and -become a purely positive science of phenomena. -But there are yet others who will see in this movement -the fulfilment of its vocation, the clear consciousness -of a function that it has always striven -to perform; and who will welcome it as a justification -of the long centuries when it appeared to sit -apart, far from the common concerns of man, -busied with discourse of essence and cause, absorbed -in argument concerning subject and object,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304">304</a></span> -reason and sensation. To such this outcome will -appear the inevitable sequel of the saying of Socrates -that “an unexamined life is not one fit to -be led by man”; and a better response to his injunction -“Know thyself.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center smaller">THE END</p> - - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307">307</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="INDEX"></a>INDEX</h2> -<div class="index"> - - -<ul class="index"><li class="ifrst">Absolutism, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121–123</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130–132</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay IV.</cite>, <a href="#Page_142">142–153</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180–181</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Acquaintance, and knowledge, <a href="#Page_79">79–82</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Action, and problem of knowledge, <cite>Essay XI.</cite>, <a href="#Page_271">271–304</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><i xml:lang="la" lang="la">A priori</i>, <a href="#Page_206">206–213</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292–294</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Appearance, and reality, <a href="#Page_26">26–28</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118–121</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Aristotle, referred to, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Assurance, <a href="#Page_85">85–88</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Awareness, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Behavior, and intelligence, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Belief, <cite>Essay VI.</cite>, <a href="#Page_169">169–197</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bosanquet, B., <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Bradley, F. H., <cite>Essay IV.</cite>, <a href="#Page_112">112–153</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Change, its supposed unreality, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in modern science, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and law, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and thought, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">of truth, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">of experience, <a href="#Page_222">222–224</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259–260</a>;</li> - -<li class="indx">Christianity, metaphysic of, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cognitive, <a href="#Page_84">84–85</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230–233</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Conflict, and thinking, <a href="#Page_116">116–117</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126–127</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148–149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Consistency, as criterion, <a href="#Page_128">128–136</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Consciousness, as end of nature, <a href="#Page_34">34–35</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">is partial, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and knowledge, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay X.</cite>, <a href="#Page_242">242–270</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">non-existence of, <a href="#Page_247">247–248</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Correspondence, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Cosmology, and morals, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Custom, as background of morals, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Darwin, his influence on philosophy, <cite>Essay I.</cite>, <a href="#Page_1">1–19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">quoted, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Democracy, moral meaning of, <a href="#Page_59">59–60</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266–267</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Descartes, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Design, <i>see</i> <a href="#Teleology">Teleology</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Economic Struggle, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Economics, influences on morals, <a href="#Page_57">57–59</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Empiricism, <a href="#Page_200">200–202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay IX.</cite>, <a href="#Page_226">226–241</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289–291</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Epistemology, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">versus</i> logic, <a href="#Page_95">95–107</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296–298</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Error, and becoming, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Evolution, of species, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and design, <a href="#Page_12">12–13</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and teleology, <a href="#Page_32">32–35</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and intelligence, <a href="#Page_42">42–43</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Experience, <cite>Essay VII.</cite>, <a href="#Page_198">198–225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Experiment, and knowledge, <cite>Essay IV.</cite>, <a href="#Page_77">77–111</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Feeling, <a href="#Page_80">80–81</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308">308</a></span></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Final Cause, <i>see</i> <a href="#Teleology">Teleology</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Functions, true data of psychology, <a href="#Page_250">250–255</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Galileo, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Genesis, and value, <a href="#Page_261">261–264</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Good, is concrete and plural, <a href="#Page_15">15–17</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">of Nature, <cite>Essay II.</cite>, <a href="#Page_20">20–45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and evolution, <a href="#Page_31">31–35</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and mysticism, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Greek view of, <a href="#Page_46">46–50</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">medieval view of, <a href="#Page_52">52–54</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">as fixed, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Gordon, K., <a href="#Page_215">215</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gray, Asa, on evolution and design, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Happiness, nature of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Hegel, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hobbes, <a href="#Page_203">203</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hume, <a href="#Page_82">82</a> n., <a href="#Page_204">204</a> n.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Idealism, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay VII.</cite>, <a href="#Page_198">198–225</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ideality, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219–225</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Ideas, nature of, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">their verification, <a href="#Page_141">141</a> ff.;</li> -<li class="isub1">are hypothetical, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150–151</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Individual, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265–68</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Intellectualism, <cite>Essay IV.</cite>, <a href="#Page_112">112–153</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Intelligence, is discriminative, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">is the good of nature, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Morals, <cite>Essay III.</cite>, <a href="#Page_46">46–76</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">cosmic and personal, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">as biological instrument, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">indirection of activity, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Introspection, <a href="#Page_250">250</a> n.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">James, Wm., <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a> n., <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a> n., <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Judgment, Bradley’s theory of, <a href="#Page_114">114–117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">of the past, <a href="#Page_160">160–61</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Kant’s theory of, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Kant, <a href="#Page_63">63–65</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206–213</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Knowledge, its proper object, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and nature, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and freedom, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">The Experimental Theory of, <cite>Essay IV.</cite>, <a href="#Page_77">77–111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">defined, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and inquiry, <a href="#Page_184">184–189</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay XI.</cite>, problem of, <a href="#Page_271">271–304</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Locke, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202–204</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217–218</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Maine, Sir Henry, quoted, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Meaning, and knowledge, <a href="#Page_87">87–90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and judgment, <a href="#Page_116">116–117</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mechanism, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Memory, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Moore, A. W., <a href="#Page_91">91</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Morals, <cite>Essay III.</cite>, <a href="#Page_46">46–76</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Mysticism, <a href="#Page_38">38–40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Naturalism, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Nature, teleology of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">The Good of, <cite>Essay II.</cite>, <a href="#Page_20">20–45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">animistic character of, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">change in, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Newton, influence of, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Organization, of experience, <a href="#Page_208">208–211</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Perception, ambiguity of term, <a href="#Page_214">214–219</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Philosophy, changes in, <a href="#Page_14">14–19</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">political nature of, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">defined, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and science, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and psychology, <a href="#Page_189">189–191</a>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309">309</a></span></li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay X.</cite>, <a href="#Page_242">242–270</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Plato, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a> n., <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Pragmatism, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a> n., <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a> n., <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay V.</cite>, <a href="#Page_154">154–168</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Psychical, <a href="#Page_81">81</a> n., <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Psychology, and philosophy, <cite>Essay X.</cite>, <a href="#Page_242">242–270</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Rationalism, <cite>Essay XI.</cite>, <a href="#Page_271">271–304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">“Reality,” <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a> n., <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Relation, and appearance, <a href="#Page_119">119–120</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Santayana, G., <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sciences, developed out of morals, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and industry, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">as mode of knowledge, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and philosophy, <a href="#Page_268">268–270</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Sensation, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sensationalism, <cite>Essay XI.</cite>, <a href="#Page_271">271–304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Social Ethics, <a href="#Page_302">302–304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Socrates, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Species, equivalent to scholastic form, <a href="#Page_3">3–4</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">as eternal and teleological, <a href="#Page_4">4–5</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">basis of knowledge, <a href="#Page_6">6–7</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Spencer, Herbert, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Spinoza, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stoicism, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Stuart, H. W., <a href="#Page_214">214</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Subjective, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a> n., <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="Teleology"></a>Teleology, of life, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">of nature, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">basis of idealism, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">concrete, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and evolution, <a href="#Page_32">32–35</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">subjective, <a href="#Page_223">223–224</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Theory, <a href="#Page_124">124–127</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Thinking, practical character of, <a href="#Page_124">124–127</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Tolstoi, <a href="#Page_173">173</a> n.</li> - -<li class="indx">Transcendence, of knowledge, <a href="#Page_103">103</a> n., <a href="#Page_156">156–157</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Transcendental, and supernatural, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">view of knowledge, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">freedom, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> - -<li class="indx">Truth, criterion of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107–111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay IV.</cite>, <a href="#Page_112">112–153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">absolute, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">identified with existence, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">eternal, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><cite>Essay V.</cite>, <a href="#Page_154">154–168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><a href="#Page_230">230–231</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Utilitarianism, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Verification, making true, <a href="#Page_139">139</a> ff., <a href="#Page_162">162–164</a></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Woodbridge, F. J. E., <a href="#Page_104">104</a> n., <a href="#Page_240">240</a> n.</li> -</ul> -</div></div> - - - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="footnotes"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="FOOTNOTES"></a>FOOTNOTES</h2> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> The affair is even more portentous in the German with -its capital letters and series of <em>muses</em>: “<span xml:lang="de" lang="de">Gewiss ist der -Pragmatismus erkenntnisstheoretisch Nominalismus, psychologisch -Voluntarismus, naturphilosophisch Energismus, -metaphysisch Agnosticismus, ethisch Meliorismus auf -Grundlage des Bentham-Millschen Utilitarismus.</span>”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> A lecture in a course of public lectures on “Charles -Darwin and His Influence on Science,” given at Columbia -University in the winter and spring of 1909. Reprinted -from the <cite>Popular Science Monthly</cite> for July, 1909.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> “Life and Letters,” Vol. I., p. 282; cf. 285.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> “Life and Letters,” Vol. II., pp. 146, 170, 245; Vol. I., -pp. 283–84. See also the closing portion of his “Variations -of Animals and Plants under Domestication.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Reprinted from the <cite>Hibbert Journal</cite>, Vol. VII., No. 4, -July, 1909.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> A public lecture delivered at Columbia University in -March, 1908, under the title of “Ethics,” in a series of -lectures on “Science, Philosophy, and Art.” Reprinted -from a monograph published by the Columbia University -Press.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Reprinted, with considerable change in the arrangement -and in the matter of the latter portion, from <cite>Mind</cite>, -Vol. XV., N.S., July, 1906.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> I must remind the reader again of a point already suggested. -It is the identification of presence in consciousness -with knowledge as such that leads to setting up <em>a</em> mind -(<em>ego</em>, subject) which has the peculiar property of knowing -(only so often it knows wrong!), or else that leads to -supplying “sensations” with the peculiar property of surveying -their own entrails. Given the correct feeling that -knowledge involves relationship, there being, by supposition, -no other <em>thing</em> to which the thing in consciousness is related, -it is forthwith related to a soul substance, or to its ghostly -offspring, a “subject,” or to “consciousness” itself.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Let us further recall that this theory requires either that -things present shall already be psychical things (feelings, -sensations, etc.), in order to be assimilated to the knowing -mind, subject to consciousness; or else translates genuinely -naïve realism into the miracle of a mind that gets outside -itself to lay its ghostly hands upon the things of an -external world.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> This means that things may be present <em>as</em> known, just as -they be present as hard or soft, agreeable or disgusting, -hoped for or dreaded. The mediacy, or the art of intervention, -which characterizes knowledge, indicates precisely the -way in which known things as known are immediately -present.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> If Hume had had a tithe of the interest in the <em>flux</em> of -perceptions and in <em>habit</em>—principles of continuity and of -organization—which he had in distinct and isolated existences, -he might have saved us both from German <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Erkenntnisstheorie</i>, -and from that modern miracle play, the psychology -of elements of consciousness, that under the ægis of -science, does not hesitate to have psychical elements compound -and breed, and in their agile intangibility put to -shame the performances of their less acrobatic cousins, -physical atoms.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> In other words, the situation as described is not to be -confused with the case of hunting on purpose to test an idea -regarding the dog.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Dr. Moore, in an essay in “Contributions to Logical -Theory” has brought out clearly, on the basis of a criticism -of the theory of meaning and fulfilment advanced in -Royce’s “World and Individual,” the full consequences of -this distinction. I quote one sentence (p. 350): “Surely there -is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a -purposive idea, and the experience which fulfils this purpose. -To call them both ‘ideas’ is at least confusing.” The text -above simply adds that there is also a discernible and important -difference between experiences which, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i>, are -purposing and fulfilling (that is, are seen to be such <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ab -extra</i>), and those which meant to be such, and are found to -be what they meant.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> The association of science and philosophy with leisure, -with a certain economic surplus, is not accidental. It is -practically worth while to postpone practice; to substitute -theorizing, to develop a new and fascinating mode of practice. -But it is the excess achievement of practice which -makes this postponement and substitution possible.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> It is the failure to grasp the coupling of truth of meaning -with a <em>specific</em> promise, undertaking, or intention expressed -by a thing which underlies, so far as I can see, -the criticisms passed upon the experimental or pragmatic -view of the truth. It is the same failure which is responsible -for the wholly <em>at large</em> view of truth which characterizes -the absolutists.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> The belief in the <em>metaphysical</em> transcendence of the object -of knowledge seems to have its real origin in an -<em>empirical</em> transcendence of a very specific and describable -sort. The thing meaning is one thing; the thing meant is -another thing, and is (as already pointed out) a thing presented -as not given in the same way as is the thing which -means. It is something <em>to be</em> so given. No amount of careful -and thorough inspection of the indicating and signifying -things can remove or annihilate this gap. The <em>probability</em> -of correct meaning may be increased in varying degrees—and -this is what we mean by control. But final certitude -can never be reached except experimentally—except by -performing the operations indicated and discovering whether -or no the intended meaning is fulfilled <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in propria persona</i>. -In this experimental sense, truth or the object of any given -meaning is always beyond or outside of the cognitional thing -that means it. Error as well as truth is a necessary -function of knowing. But the non-empirical account of -this transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts <em>all</em> the -error in one place (<em>our</em> knowledge), and <em>all</em> the truth in -another (absolute consciousness or else a thing-in-itself).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Compare his essay, “Does Consciousness Exist?” in -the <cite>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific -Methods</cite>, Vol. I., p. 480.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Compare the essay on the “Problem of Consciousness,” -by Professor Woodbridge, in the Garman Memorial Volume, -entitled “Studies in Philosophy and Psychology.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Reprinted, with many changes, from an article in <cite>Mind</cite>, -Vol. XVI., N.S., July 1907. Although the changes have -been made to render the article less technical, it still remains, -I fear, too technical to be intelligible to those not -familiar with recent discussions of logical theory.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> I follow chiefly Chapter XV. of “Appearance and -Reality”—the chapter on “Thought and Reality.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> The crux of the argument is contained in Chapters XIII. -and XIV., on the “General Nature of Reality.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> The same point comes out in Mr. Bradley’s treatment -of the way in which the practical demand for the good or -satisfaction is to be taken account of in a philosophical conception -of the nature of reality. He admits that it comes -in; but holds that it enters not directly, but because if left -outside it indirectly introduces a feature of “discontent” -on the intellectual side (see p. 155). This, as an argument -for the supremacy of the isolated theoretical standard, loses -all its force if we cease to conceive of intellect as from -the start an independent function, and realize that intellectual -discontent is the practical conflict becoming deliberately -aware of itself as the most effective means of its own -rectification.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> This suggests that many of the stock arguments against -pragmatism fail to take its contention seriously enough. -They proceed from the assumption that it is an account -of truth which leaves untouched current notions of the -nature of intelligence. But the essential point of pragmatism -is that it bases its changed account of truth on a -changed conception of the nature of intelligence, both as -to its objective and its method. Now this different account -of intelligence may be wrong, but controversy which leaves -standing the conventionally current theories about thought -and merely discusses “truth” will not go far. Since truth -is the adequate fulfilment of the function of intelligence, the -question turns on the nature of the latter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> Such a statement as, for example, Mr. Bradley’s (<cite>Mind</cite>, -Vol. XIII., No. 51, N.S., p. 3, article on “Truth and -Practice”) “The idea works ... but is able to work -because I have chosen the right idea” surely loses any -argumentative force it may seem to have, when it is recalled -that, upon the theory argued against, ability to work and -rightness are one and the same thing. If the wording is -changed to read “The idea is able to work because I have -chosen an idea which is able to work” the question-begging -character of the implied criticism is evident. The -change of phraseology also may suggest the crucial and -pregnant question: How does any one know that an idea -is able to work excepting by setting it at work?</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> A paper read in the spring of 1909 before the Philosophical -Club of Smith College and not previously published.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Read as the Presidential Address at the fifth annual -meeting of the American Philosophical Association, at Cambridge, -December 28, 1905, and reprinted with verbal revisions -from the <cite>Philosophical Review</cite>, Vol. XV., March, -1906. The substitution of the word “Existences” for the -word “Realities” (in the original title) is due to a subsequent -recognition on my part that the eulogistic historic -associations with the word “Reality” (against which the -paper was a protest) infected the interpretation of the -paper itself, so that the use of some more colorless word -was desirable.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> Since writing the above I have read the following words -of a candidly unsympathetic friend of philosophy: “Neither -philosophy nor science can institute man’s relation to the -universe, because such reciprocity must have existed before -any kind of science or philosophy can begin; since each -investigates phenomena by means of the intellect, and independent -of the position and feeling of the investigator; -whereas the relation of man to the universe is defined, not -by the intellect alone, but by his sensitive perception aided -by all his spiritual powers. However much one may assure -and instruct a man that all real existence is an idea, that -matter is made up of atoms, that the essence of life is corporality -or will, that heat, light, movement, electricity, are -different manifestations of one and the same energy, one -cannot thereby explain to a being with pains, pleasures, -hopes, and fears his position in the universe.” Tolstoi, essay -on “Religion and Morality,” in “Essays, Letters, and Miscellanies.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> Hegel may be excepted from this statement. The habit -of interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian enlarged -and purified, is a purely Anglo-American habit. -This is no place to enter into the intricacies of Hegelian -exegesis, but the subordination of both logical meaning and -of mechanical existence to <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Geist</i>, to life in its own developing -movement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased -view of Hegel. At all events, I wish to recognize my own -personal debt to Hegel for the view set forth in this paper, -without, of course, implying that it represents Hegel’s own -intention.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> There will of course come in time with the development -of this point of view an organon of beliefs. The signs of -a genuine as against a simulated belief will be studied; -belief as a vital personal reaction will be discriminated from -habitual, incorporate, unquestioned (because unconsciously -exercised) traditions of social classes and professions. In -his “Will to Believe” Professor James has already laid -down two traits of genuine belief (viz., “forced option,” -and acceptance of responsibility for results) which are -almost always ignored in criticisms (really caricatures) of -his position. In the light of such an organon, one might -come to doubt whether <em>belief</em> in, say, immortality (as distinct -from hope on one side and a sort of intellectual balance -of probability of opinion on the other) can genuinely -exist at all.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Reprinted, with slight verbal changes, from the <cite>Philosophical -Review</cite>, Vol. XV. (1906).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> C. S. Peirce, <cite>Monist</cite>, Vol. XVI., p. 150.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> <cite>Psychology</cite>, Vol. II., p. 618.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> “Essay concerning Human Understanding,” Book II., -Chapter II., § 2. Locke doubtless derived this notion from -Bacon.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> It is hardly necessary to refer to the stress placed upon -mathematics, as well as upon fundamental propositions in -logic, ethics, and cosmology.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> Of course there are internal historic connections between -experience as effective “memory,” and experience as “observation.” -But the motivation and stress, the problem, has -quite shifted. It may be remarked that Hobbes still writes -under the influence of the Aristotelian conception. “Experience -is nothing but Memory” (“Elements of Philosophy,” -Part I., Chapter I., § 2), and hence is opposed to science.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> There are, of course, anticipations of Hume in Locke. -But to regard Lockeian experience as equivalent to Humian -is to pervert history. Locke, as he was to himself and to -the century succeeding him, was not a subjectivist, but in the -main a common sense objectivist. It was this that gave him -his historic influence. But so completely has the Hume-Kant -controversy dominated recent thinking that it is constantly -projected backward. Within a few weeks I have -seen three articles, all insisting that the meaning of the -term experience must be subjective, and stating or implying -that those who take the term objectively are subverters of -established usage! But a casual study of the dictionary -will reveal that experience has always meant “<em>what</em> is experienced,” -observation as a source of knowledge, as well as -the act, fact, or mode of experiencing. In the Oxford Dictionary, -the (obsolete) sense of “experimental testing,” of -actual “observation of facts and events,” and “the fact of -being consciously affected by an act” have almost contemporaneous -datings, viz., 1384, 1377, and 1382 respectively. -A usage almost more objective than the second, the Baconian -use, is “what has been experienced; the events that have -taken place within the knowledge of an individual, a community, -mankind at large, either during a particular period -or generally.” This dates back to 1607. Let us have no -more captious criticisms and plaints based on ignorance of -linguistic usage. [This pious wish has not been met. J. D., -1909.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> The relationship of organization and thought is precisely -that which we find psychologically typified by the rhythmic -functions of habit and attention, attention being always, -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ab quo</i>, a sign of the failure of habit, and, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad quem</i>, a reconstructive -modification of habit.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Compare, for example, Dr. Stuart’s paper in the “Studies -in Logical Theory,” pp. 253–256. I may here remark that I -remain totally unable to see how the <em>interpretation</em> of objectivity -to mean controlling conditions of action (negative -and positive as above) derogates at all from its naïve -objectivity, or how it connotes cognitive subjectivity, or is -in any way incompatible with a common-sense realistic -theory of perception.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> For this suggested interpretation of the esthetic as surprising, -or unintended, gratuitous collateral reinforcement, -see Gordon, “Psychology of Meaning.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> This, however, is not strictly true, since Locke goes far to -supply the means of his own correction in his account of the -“workmanship of the understanding.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Plato, especially in his “Theætetus,” seems to have -begun the procedure of blasting the good name of perceptive -experience by identifying a late and instrumental -distinction, having to do with logical control, with all experience -whatsoever.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Compare James, “Continuous transition is one sort of -conjunctive relation; and to be a radical empiricist means to -hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others, for this -is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole -be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical -fictions pour into our philosophy.”—<cite>Journal of -Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</cite>, Vol. I., p. -536.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> One of the not least of the many merits of Santayana’s -“Life of Reason” is the consistency and vigor with which -is upheld the doctrine that significant idealism means idealization.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Reprinted, with very slight change, from the <cite>Journal of -Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</cite>, Vol. II., No. -15, July, 1905.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> All labels are, of course, obnoxious and misleading. I -hope, however, the term will be taken by the reader in the -sense in which it is forthwith explained, and not in some -more usual and familiar sense. Empiricism, as herein used, -is as antipodal to sensationalistic empiricism, as it is to -transcendentalism, and for the same reason. Both of these -systems fall back on something which is defined in non-directly-experienced -terms in order to justify that which is -directly experienced. Hence I have criticised such empiricism -(<cite>Philosophical Review</cite>, Vol. XI., No. 4, p. 364) as essentially -absolutistic in character; and also (“Studies in -Logical Theory,” pp. 30, 58) as an attempt to build up experience -in terms of certain methodological checks and cues -of attaining <em>certainty</em>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> I hope the reader will not therefore assume that from -the empiricist’s standpoint knowledge is of small worth -or import. On the contrary, from the empiricist’s standpoint -it has <em>all</em> the worth which it is concretely experienced -as possessing—which is simply tremendous. But the exact -<em>nature</em> of this worth is a thing to be found out in describing -what we mean by experiencing objects as known—the actual -differences made or found in experience.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Since the non-empiricist believes in things-in-themselves -(which he may term “atoms,” “sensations,” transcendental -unities, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">a priori</i> concepts, <em>an</em> absolute experience, or whatever), -and since he finds that the empiricist makes much of -change (as he must, since change is continuously experienced) -he assumes that the empiricist means <em>his own</em> non-empirical -Realities are in continual flux, and he naturally -shudders at having his divinities so violently treated. But, -once recognize that the empiricist doesn’t have any such -Realities at all, and the entire problem of the relation of -change to reality takes a very different aspect.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> It would lead us aside from the point to try to tell -just what is the nature of the experienced difference we call -truth. Professor James’s recent articles may well be consulted. -The point to bear in mind here is just what sort -of a thing the empiricist must mean by true, or truer (the -noun Truth is, of course, a generic name for all cases of -“Trues”). The adequacy of any particular account is not -a matter to be settled by general reasoning, but by finding -out what sort of an experience the truth-experience actually -is.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> I say “relatively,” because the transcendentalist still -holds that finally the cognition is imperfect, giving us only -some symbol or phenomenon of Reality (which <em>is</em> only in -the Absolute or in some Thing-in-Itself)—otherwise the -curtain-wind fact would have as much ontological reality as -the existence of the Absolute itself: a conclusion at which -the non-empiricist perhorresces, for no reason obvious to -me—save that it would put an end to his transcendentalism.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> In general, I think the distinction between -<em>ive</em> and -<em>ed</em> -one of the most fundamental of philosophic distinctions, and -one of the most neglected. The same holds of -<em>tion</em> and -<em>ing</em>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> What is criticised, now as “geneticism” (if I may coin -the word) and now as “pragmatism” is, in its truth, just -the fact that the empiricist does take account of the experienced -“drift, occasion, and contexture” of things experienced—to -use Hobbes’s phrase.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Perhaps the point would be clearer if expressed in this -way: Except as subsequent estimates of <em>worth</em> are introduced, -“real” means only existent. The eulogistic connotation -that makes the term Reality equivalent to <em>true</em> or -<em>genuine</em> being has great pragmatic significance, but its confusion -with reality as existence is the point aimed at in the -above paragraph.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> One does not so easily escape medieval Realism as one -thinks. Either every experienced thing has its own determinateness, -its own unsubstitutable, unredeemable reality, or -else “generals” <em>are</em> separate existences after all.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Excepting, of course, some negative ones. One could -say that certain views are certainly <em>not</em> true, because, by -hypothesis, they refer to nonentities, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, non-empiricals. -But even here the empiricist must go slowly. From his -own standpoint, even the most professedly transcendental -statements are, after all, real as experiences, and hence -negotiate some transaction with facts. For this reason, he -cannot, in theory, reject them <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in toto</i>, but has to show concretely -how they arose and how they are to be corrected. -In a word, his logical relationship to statements that profess -to relate to things-in-themselves, unknowables, inexperienced -substances, etc., is precisely that of the psychologist -to the Zöllner lines.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> Delivered as a public address before the Philosophic -Union of the University of California, with the title -“Psychology and Philosophic Method,” May, 1899, and published -in the <cite>University Chronicle</cite> for August, 1899. Reprinted, -with slight verbal changes, mostly excisions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> This is a fact not without its bearings upon the question -of the nature and value of introspection. The objection that -introspection “alters” the reality and hence is untrustworthy, -most writers dispose of by saying that, after all, it -need not alter the reality so very much—not beyond repair—and -that, moreover, memory assists in restoring the ruins. -It would be simpler to admit the fact: that the purpose -of introspection is precisely to effect the right sort of alteration. -If introspection should give us the original experience -again, we should just be living through the experience -over again in direct fashion; as psychologists we should not -be forwarded one bit. Reflection upon this obvious proposition -may bring to light various other matters worthy of note.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Thus to divorce “structure psychology” from “function -psychology” is to leave us without possibility of scientific -comprehension of function, while it deprives us of all -standard of reference in selecting, observing, and explaining -the structure.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> The following answer may fairly be anticipated: “This -is true of the operations cited, but only because complex -processes have been selected. Such a term as ‘knowing’ -does of course express a function involving a system of -intricate references. But, for that very reason, we go back -to the sensation which is the genuine type of the ‘state -of consciousness’ as such, pure and unadulterate and unsophisticated.” -The point is large for a footnote, but the -following considerations are instructive: (1) The same -psychologist will go on to inform us that sensations, as -we experience them, are networks of reference—they are -perceptual, and more or less conceptual even. From which -it would appear that whatever else they are or are not, -the sensations, for which self-inclosed existence is claimed, -are <em>not</em> states of consciousness. And (2) we are told that -these are reached by scientific abstraction in order to account -for complex forms. From which it would appear -that they are hypothecated as products of interpretation -and for purposes of further interpretation. Only the delusion -that the more complex forms are just aggregates (instead -of being acts, like seeing, hoping, etc.) prevents -recognition of the point in question—that the “state of -consciousness” is an instrument of inquiry or methodological -appliance.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> On the other hand, if what we are trying to get at is -just the course and procedure of experiencing, of course -any consideration that helps distinguish and make comprehensible -that process is thoroughly pertinent.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> It may avoid misunderstanding if I anticipate here -a subsequent remark: that my point is not in the least that -“states of consciousness” require some “synthetic unity” -or faculty of substantial mind to effect their association. -Quite the contrary; for this theory also admits the “states -of consciousness” as existences in themselves also. My -contention is that the “state of consciousness” as such is -always a methodological product, developed in the course -and for the purposes of psychological analysis.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> The “functions” are in truth ordinary everyday acts -and attitudes: seeing, smelling, talking, listening, remembering, -hoping, loving, fearing.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> This is perhaps a suitable moment to allude to the absence, -in this discussion, of reference to what is sometimes -termed rational psychology—the assumption of a -separate, substantialized ego, soul, or whatever, existing -side by side with particular experiences and “states of consciousness,” -acting upon them and acted upon by them. In -ignoring this and confining myself to the “states of consciousness” -theory and the “natural history” theory, I -may appear not only to have unduly narrowed the concerns -at issue, but to have weakened my own point, as this doctrine -seems to offer a special vantage ground whence to -defend the close relationship of psychology and philosophy. -The “narrowing,” if such it be, will have to pass—from -limits of time and other matters. But the other point -I cannot concede. The independently existing soul restricts -and degrades individuality, making of it a separate thing -outside of the full flow of things, alien to things experienced -and consequently in either mechanical or miraculous -relations to them. It is vitiated by just the quality already -objected to—that psychology has a separate piece of reality -apportioned to it, instead of occupying itself with the -manifestation and operation of any and all existences in -reference to concrete action. From this point of view, the -“states of consciousness” attitude is a much more hopeful -and fruitful one. It ignores certain considerations, to be -sure; and when it turns its ignoring into denial, it leaves -us with curious hieroglyphics. But after all, there is a key; -these symbols can be read; they may be translated into -terms of the course of experience. When thus translated, -selfhood, individuality, is neither wiped out nor set up as a -miraculous and foreign entity; it is seen as the unity of -reference and function involved in all things when fully -experienced—the pivot about which they turn.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Delivered before the Philosophical Club of the University -of Michigan, in the winter of 1897, and reprinted with -slight change from a monograph in the “University of Chicago -Contributions to Philosophy,” 1897.</p></div> -</div></div> - - - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained.</p> - -<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p> - -<p>Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_24">24</a>: “transgression” was misprinted as “trangression”; changed here.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_39">39</a>: “bewrayeth” was printed that way.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_158">158</a>: “cor-respondence” was printed with the hyphen.</p> -</div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, by -John Dewey - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY *** - -***** This file should be named 51525-h.htm or 51525-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/2/51525/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Charlie Howard, and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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