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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy - And other essays in contemporary thought - -Author: John Dewey - -Release Date: March 22, 2016 [EBook #51525] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Charlie Howard, and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - - - - - THE INFLUENCE OF - DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY - - And Other Essays in Contemporary - Thought - - BY - JOHN DEWEY - _Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University_ - - [Illustration] - - NEW YORK - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1910, - BY - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - - - _Published April, 1910_ - - - - -PREFACE - - -An elaborate preface to a philosophic work usually impresses one as a -last desperate effort on the part of its author to convey what he feels -he has not quite managed to say in the body of his book. Nevertheless, -a collection of essays on various topics written during a series -of years may perhaps find room for an independent word to indicate -the kind of unity they seem, to their writer, to possess. Probably -every one acquainted with present philosophic thought--found, with -some notable exceptions, in periodicals rather than in books--would -term it a philosophy of transition and reconstruction. Its various -representatives agree in what they oppose--the orthodox British -empiricism of two generations ago and the orthodox Neo-Kantian idealism -of the last generation--rather than in what they proffer. - -The essays of this volume belong, I suppose, to what has come -to be known (since the earlier of them were written) as the -pragmatic phase of the newer movement. Now a recent German critic -has described pragmatism as, “Epistemologically, nominalism; -psychologically, voluntarism; cosmologically, energism; metaphysically, -agnosticism; ethically, meliorism on the basis of the Bentham-Mill -utilitarianism.”[1] It may be that pragmatism will turn out to be all -of this formidable array; but even should it, the one who thus defines -it has hardly come within earshot of it. For whatever else pragmatism -is or is not, the pragmatic spirit is primarily a revolt against that -habit of mind which disposes of anything whatever--even so humble an -affair as a new method in Philosophy--by tucking it away, after this -fashion, in the pigeon holes of a filing cabinet. There are other vital -phases of contemporary transition and revision; there are, for example, -a new realism and naturalistic idealism. When I recall that I find -myself more interested (even though their representatives might decline -to reciprocate) in such phases than in the systems marked by the labels -of our German critic, I am confirmed in a belief that after all it is -better to view pragmatism quite vaguely as part and parcel of a general -movement of intellectual reconstruction. For otherwise we seem to have -no recourse save to define pragmatism--as does our German author--in -terms of the very past systems against which it is a reaction; or, in -escaping that alternative, to regard it as a fixed rival system making -like claim to completeness and finality. And if, as I believe, one of -the marked traits of the pragmatic movement is just the surrender of -every such claim, how have we furthered our understanding of pragmatism? - -Classic philosophies have to be revised because they must be squared -up with the many social and intellectual tendencies that have -revealed themselves since those philosophies matured. The conquest -of the sciences by the experimental method of inquiry; the injection -of evolutionary ideas into the study of life and society; the -application of the historic method to religions and morals as well -as to institutions; the creation of the sciences of “origins” and -of the cultural development of mankind--how can such intellectual -changes occur and leave philosophy what it was and where it was? Nor -can philosophy remain an indifferent spectator of the rise of what -may be termed the new individualism in art and letters, with its -naturalistic method applied in a religious, almost mystic spirit to -what is primitive, obscure, varied, inchoate, and growing in nature -and human character. The age of Darwin, Helmholtz, Pasteur, Ibsen, -Maeterlinck, Rodin, and Henry James must feel some uneasiness until -it has liquidated its philosophic inheritance in current intellectual -coin. And to accuse those who are concerned in this transaction of -ignorant contempt for the classic past of philosophy is to overlook -the inspiration the movement of translation draws from the fact that -the history of philosophy has become only too well understood. - -Any revision of customary notions with its elimination--instead of -“solution”--of many traditionary problems cannot hope, however, for -any unity save that of tendency and operation. Elaborate and imposing -system, the regimenting and uniforming of thoughts, are, at present, -evidence that we are assisting at a stage performance in which -borrowed--or hired--figures are maneuvering. Tentatively and piecemeal -must the reconstruction of our stock notions proceed. As a contribution -to such a revision, the present collection of essays is submitted. With -one or two exceptions, their order is that of a reversed chronology, -the later essays coming first. The facts regarding the conditions of -their first appearance are given in connection with each essay. I -wish to thank the Editors of the _Philosophical Review_, of _Mind_, -of the _Hibbert Journal_, of the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, -and Scientific Methods_, and of the _Popular Science Monthly_, and -the Directors of the Press of Chicago and Columbia Universities, -respectively, for permission to reprint such of the essays as appeared -originally under their several auspices. - - JOHN DEWEY - - COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, - NEW YORK CITY, March 1, 1910. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - THE INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON PHILOSOPHY 1 - - NATURE AND ITS GOOD: A CONVERSATION 20 - - INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS 46 - - THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 77 - - THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION FOR TRUTH 112 - - A SHORT CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH 154 - - BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES 169 - - EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 198 - - THE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM 226 - - “CONSCIOUSNESS” AND EXPERIENCE 242 - - THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 271 - - - - -THE INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON PHILOSOPHY[2] - - -I - -That the publication of the “Origin of Species” marked an epoch in -the development of the natural sciences is well known to the layman. -That the combination of the very words origin and species embodied -an intellectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual temper is -easily overlooked by the expert. The conceptions that had reigned -in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, -the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, -rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; -they rested upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and -unreality. In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, -in treating the forms that had been regarded as types of fixity and -perfection as originating and passing away, the “Origin of Species” -introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform -the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics, -and religion. - -No wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin’s book, a half century -ago, precipitated a crisis. The true nature of the controversy is -easily concealed from us, however, by the theological clamor that -attended it. The vivid and popular features of the anti-Darwinian row -tended to leave the impression that the issue was between science -on one side and theology on the other. Such was not the case--the -issue lay primarily within science itself, as Darwin himself early -recognized. The theological outcry he discounted from the start, -hardly noticing it save as it bore upon the “feelings of his -female relatives.” But for two decades before final publication he -contemplated the possibility of being put down by his scientific peers -as a fool or as crazy; and he set, as the measure of his success, -the degree in which he should affect three men of science: Lyell in -geology, Hooker in botany, and Huxley in zoology. - -Religious considerations lent fervor to the controversy, but they did -not provoke it. Intellectually, religious emotions are not creative but -conservative. They attach themselves readily to the current view of -the world and consecrate it. They steep and dye intellectual fabrics -in the seething vat of emotions; they do not form their warp and woof. -There is not, I think, an instance of any large idea about the world -being independently generated by religion. Although the ideas that rose -up like armed men against Darwinism owed their intensity to religious -associations, their origin and meaning are to be sought in science and -philosophy, not in religion. - - -II - -Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual history as much -as does the word species. The Greeks, in initiating the intellectual -life of Europe, were impressed by characteristic traits of the life of -plants and animals; so impressed indeed that they made these traits the -key to defining nature and to explaining mind and society. And truly, -life is so wonderful that a seemingly successful reading of its mystery -might well lead men to believe that the key to the secrets of heaven -and earth was in their hands. The Greek rendering of this mystery, -the Greek formulation of the aim and standard of knowledge, was in -the course of time embodied in the word species, and it controlled -philosophy for two thousand years. To understand the intellectual -face-about expressed in the phrase “Origin of Species,” we must, then, -understand the long dominant idea against which it is a protest. - -Consider how men were impressed by the facts of life. Their eyes fell -upon certain things slight in bulk, and frail in structure. To every -appearance, these perceived things were inert and passive. Suddenly, -under certain circumstances, these things--henceforth known as seeds -or eggs or germs--begin to change, to change rapidly in size, form, -and qualities. Rapid and extensive changes occur, however, in many -things--as when wood is touched by fire. But the changes in the living -thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend constantly in one -direction; they do not, like other changes, destroy or consume, or -pass fruitless into wandering flux; they realize and fulfil. Each -successive stage, no matter how unlike its predecessor, preserves -its net effect and also prepares the way for a fuller activity on -the part of its successor. In living beings, changes do not happen -as they seem to happen elsewhere, any which way; the earlier changes -are regulated in view of later results. This progressive organization -does not cease till there is achieved a true final term, a τελὸς, a -completed, perfected end. This final form exercises in turn a plenitude -of functions, not the least noteworthy of which is production of germs -like those from which it took its own origin, germs capable of the same -cycle of self-fulfilling activity. - -But the whole miraculous tale is not yet told. The same drama is -enacted to the same destiny in countless myriads of individuals so -sundered in time, so severed in space, that they have no opportunity -for mutual consultation and no means of interaction. As an old -writer quaintly said, “things of the same kind go through the same -formalities”--celebrate, as it were, the same ceremonial rites. - -This formal activity which operates throughout a series of changes and -holds them to a single course; which subordinates their aimless flux to -its own perfect manifestation; which, leaping the boundaries of space -and time, keeps individuals distant in space and remote in time to a -uniform type of structure and function: this principle seemed to give -insight into the very nature of reality itself. To it Aristotle gave -the name, εῖδος. This term the scholastics translated as _species_. - -The force of this term was deepened by its application to everything -in the universe that observes order in flux and manifests constancy -through change. From the casual drift of daily weather, through the -uneven recurrence of seasons and unequal return of seed time and -harvest, up to the majestic sweep of the heavens--the image of eternity -in time--and from this to the unchanging pure and contemplative -intelligence beyond nature lies one unbroken fulfilment of ends. -Nature as a whole is a progressive realization of purpose strictly -comparable to the realization of purpose in any single plant or animal. - -The conception of εῖδος, species, a fixed form and final cause, -was the central principle of knowledge as well as of nature. Upon -it rested the logic of science. Change as change is mere flux and -lapse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely to know is to grasp a -permanent end that realizes itself through changes, holding them -thereby within the metes and bounds of fixed truth. Completely to -know is to relate all special forms to their one single end and good: -pure contemplative intelligence. Since, however, the scene of nature -which directly confronts us is in change, nature as directly and -practically experienced does not satisfy the conditions of knowledge. -Human experience is in flux, and hence the instrumentalities of -sense-perception and of inference based upon observation are condemned -in advance. Science is compelled to aim at realities lying behind and -beyond the processes of nature, and to carry on its search for these -realities by means of rational forms transcending ordinary modes of -perception and inference. - -There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. We must either find the -appropriate objects and organs of knowledge in the mutual interactions -of changing things; or else, to escape the infection of change, we -_must_ seek them in some transcendent and supernal region. The human -mind, deliberately as it were, exhausted the logic of the changeless, -the final, and the transcendent, before it essayed adventure on the -pathless wastes of generation and transformation. We dispose all too -easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to interpret nature and mind in -terms of real essences, hidden forms, and occult faculties, forgetful -of the seriousness and dignity of the ideas that lay behind. We dispose -of them by laughing at the famous gentleman who accounted for the -fact that opium put people to sleep on the ground it had a dormitive -faculty. But the doctrine, held in our own day, that knowledge of the -plant that yields the poppy consists in referring the peculiarities -of an individual to a type, to a universal form, a doctrine so firmly -established that any other method of knowing was conceived to be -unphilosophical and unscientific, is a survival of precisely the same -logic. This identity of conception in the scholastic and anti-Darwinian -theory may well suggest greater sympathy for what has become unfamiliar -as well as greater humility regarding the further unfamiliarities that -history has in store. - -Darwin was not, of course, the first to question the classic philosophy -of nature and of knowledge. The beginnings of the revolution are in -the physical science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. -When Galileo said: “It is my opinion that the earth is very noble -and admirable by reason of so many and so different alterations and -generations which are incessantly made therein,” he expressed the -changed temper that was coming over the world; the transfer of interest -from the permanent to the changing. When Descartes said: “The nature -of physical things is much more easily conceived when they are beheld -coming gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as -produced at once in a finished and perfect state,” the modern world -became self-conscious of the logic that was henceforth to control -it, the logic of which Darwin’s “Origin of Species” is the latest -scientific achievement. Without the methods of Copernicus, Kepler, -Galileo, and their successors in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, -Darwin would have been helpless in the organic sciences. But prior -to Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, -and politics, had been arrested, because between these ideal or moral -interests and the inorganic world intervened the kingdom of plants and -animals. The gates of the garden of life were barred to the new ideas; -and only through this garden was there access to mind and politics. The -influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the -phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed -the new logic for application to mind and morals and life. When he said -of species what Galileo had said of the earth, _e pur si muove_, he -emancipated, once for all, genetic and experimental ideas as an organon -of asking questions and looking for explanations. - - -III - -The exact bearings upon philosophy of the new logical outlook are, of -course, as yet, uncertain and inchoate. We live in the twilight of -intellectual transition. One must add the rashness of the prophet to -the stubbornness of the partizan to venture a systematic exposition of -the influence upon philosophy of the Darwinian method. At best, we can -but inquire as to its general bearing--the effect upon mental temper -and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious, half-instinctive -intellectual aversions and preferences which determine, after all, our -more deliberate intellectual enterprises. In this vague inquiry there -happens to exist as a kind of touchstone a problem of long historic -currency that has also been much discussed in Darwinian literature. -I refer to the old problem of design _versus_ chance, mind _versus_ -matter, as the causal explanation, first or final, of things. - -As we have already seen, the classic notion of species carried with it -the idea of purpose. In all living forms, a specific type is present -directing the earlier stages of growth to the realization of its own -perfection. Since this purposive regulative principle is not visible -to the senses, it follows that it must be an ideal or rational force. -Since, however, the perfect form is gradually approximated through the -sensible changes, it also follows that in and through a sensible realm -a rational ideal force is working out its own ultimate manifestation. -These inferences were extended to nature: (_a_) She does nothing in -vain; but all for an ulterior purpose. (_b_) Within natural sensible -events there is therefore contained a spiritual causal force, which -as spiritual escapes perception, but is apprehended by an enlightened -reason. (_c_) The manifestation of this principle brings about a -subordination of matter and sense to its own realization, and this -ultimate fulfilment is the goal of nature and of man. The design -argument thus operated in two directions. Purposefulness accounted for -the intelligibility of nature and the possibility of science, while -the absolute or cosmic character of this purposefulness gave sanction -and worth to the moral and religious endeavors of man. Science was -underpinned and morals authorized by one and the same principle, and -their mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed. - -This philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical and polemic outbursts, -the official and the regnant philosophy of Europe for over two thousand -years. The expulsion of fixed first and final causes from astronomy, -physics, and chemistry had indeed given the doctrine something of -a shock. But, on the other hand, increased acquaintance with the -details of plant and animal life operated as a counterbalance and -perhaps even strengthened the argument from design. The marvelous -adaptations of organisms to their environment, of organs to the -organism, of unlike parts of a complex organ--like the eye--to the -organ itself; the foreshadowing by lower forms of the higher; the -preparation in earlier stages of growth for organs that only later had -their functioning--these things were increasingly recognized with the -progress of botany, zoology, paleontology, and embryology. Together, -they added such prestige to the design argument that by the late -eighteenth century it was, as approved by the sciences of organic life, -the central point of theistic and idealistic philosophy. - -The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut straight under this -philosophy. If all organic adaptations are due simply to constant -variation and the elimination of those variations which are harmful -in the struggle for existence that is brought about by excessive -reproduction, there is no call for a prior intelligent causal force -to plan and preordain them. Hostile critics charged Darwin with -materialism and with making chance the cause of the universe. - -Some naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the Darwinian principle -and attempted to reconcile it with design. Gray held to what may be -called design on the installment plan. If we conceive the “stream of -variations” to be itself intended, we may suppose that each successive -variation was designed from the first to be selected. In that case, -variation, struggle, and selection simply define the mechanism of -“secondary causes” through which the “first cause” acts; and the -doctrine of design is none the worse off because we know more of its -_modus operandi_. - -Darwin could not accept this mediating proposal. He admits or rather he -asserts that it is “impossible to conceive this immense and wonderful -universe including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and -far into futurity as the result of blind chance or necessity.”[3] But -nevertheless he holds that since variations are in useless as well as -useful directions, and since the latter are sifted out simply by the -stress of the conditions of struggle for existence, the design argument -as applied to living beings is unjustifiable; and its lack of support -there deprives it of scientific value as applied to nature in general. -If the variations of the pigeon, which under artificial selection give -the pouter pigeon, are not preordained for the sake of the breeder, by -what logic do we argue that variations resulting in natural species are -pre-designed?[4] - - -IV - -So much for some of the more obvious facts of the discussion of design -_versus_ chance, as causal principles of nature and of life as a whole. -We brought up this discussion, you recall, as a crucial instance. What -does our touchstone indicate as to the bearing of Darwinian ideas -upon philosophy? In the first place, the new logic outlaws, flanks, -dismisses--what you will--one type of problems and substitutes for -it another type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins -and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the -specific conditions that generate them. - -Darwin concluded that the impossibility of assigning the world to -chance as a whole and to design in its parts indicated the insolubility -of the question. Two radically different reasons, however, may be -given as to why a problem is insoluble. One reason is that the problem -is too high for intelligence; the other is that the question in its -very asking makes assumptions that render the question meaningless. -The latter alternative is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated -case of design _versus_ chance. Once admit that the sole verifiable -or fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes that -generate the object of study together with the consequences that then -flow from it, and no intelligible question can be asked about what, -by assumption, lies outside. To assert--as is often asserted--that -specific values of particular truth, social bonds and forms of beauty, -if they can be shown to be generated by concretely knowable conditions, -are meaningless and in vain; to assert that they are justified only -when they and their particular causes and effects have all at once been -gathered up into some inclusive first cause and some exhaustive final -goal, is intellectual atavism. Such argumentation is reversion to the -logic that explained the extinction of fire by water through the formal -essence of aqueousness and the quenching of thirst by water through the -final cause of aqueousness. Whether used in the case of the special -event or that of life as a whole, such logic only abstracts some -aspect of the existing course of events in order to reduplicate it as -a petrified eternal principle by which to explain the very changes of -which it is the formalization. - -When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a letter that as he grew older -his interest in what or who made the world was altered into interest in -what kind of a world it is anyway, his voicing of a common experience -of our own day illustrates also the nature of that intellectual -transformation effected by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts from -the wholesale essence back of special changes to the question of -how special changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; shifts from -an intelligence that shaped things once for all to the particular -intelligences which things are even now shaping; shifts from an -ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice and happiness -that intelligent administration of existent conditions may beget and -that present carelessness or stupidity will destroy or forego. - -In the second place, the classic type of logic inevitably set -philosophy upon proving that life _must_ have certain qualities and -values--no matter how experience presents the matter--because of some -remote cause and eventual goal. The duty of wholesale justification -inevitably accompanies all thinking that makes the meaning of special -occurrences depend upon something that once and for all lies behind -them. The habit of derogating from present meanings and uses prevents -our looking the facts of experience in the face; it prevents serious -acknowledgment of the evils they present and serious concern with the -goods they promise but do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to the -business of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy for the one and -guarantee for the other. One is reminded of the way many moralists and -theologians greeted Herbert Spencer’s recognition of an unknowable -energy from which welled up the phenomenal physical processes without -and the conscious operations within. Merely because Spencer labeled his -unknowable energy “God,” this faded piece of metaphysical goods was -greeted as an important and grateful concession to the reality of the -spiritual realm. Were it not for the deep hold of the habit of seeking -justification for ideal values in the remote and transcendent, surely -this reference of them to an unknowable absolute would be despised in -comparison with the demonstrations of experience that knowable energies -are daily generating about us precious values. - -The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy will doubtless not -arrive by sheer logical disproof, but rather by growing recognition -of its futility. Were it a thousand times true that opium produces -sleep because of its dormitive energy, yet the inducing of sleep in -the tired, and the recovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not -be thereby one least step forwarded. And were it a thousand times -dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a -transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth -and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the -concrete, would remain just what and where they now are. To improve our -education, to ameliorate our manners, to advance our politics, we must -have recourse to specific conditions of generation. - -Finally, the new logic introduces responsibility into the intellectual -life. To idealize and rationalize the universe at large is after -all a confession of inability to master the courses of things that -specifically concern us. As long as mankind suffered from this -impotency, it naturally shifted a burden of responsibility that -it could not carry over to the more competent shoulders of the -transcendent cause. But if insight into specific conditions of value -and into specific consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must -in time become a method of locating and interpreting the more serious -of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways -for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and -prognosis. - -The claim to formulate _a priori_ the legislative constitution of the -universe is by its nature a claim that may lead to elaborate dialectic -developments. But it is also one that removes these very conclusions -from subjection to experimental test, for, by definition, these results -make no differences in the detailed course of events. But a philosophy -that humbles its pretensions to the work of projecting hypotheses for -the education and conduct of mind, individual and social, is thereby -subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it propounds work out -in practice. In having modesty forced upon it, philosophy also acquires -responsibility. - -Doubtless I seem to have violated the implied promise of my earlier -remarks and to have turned both prophet and partizan. But in -anticipating the direction of the transformations in philosophy to -be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and experimental logic, I do not -profess to speak for any save those who yield themselves consciously -or unconsciously to this logic. No one can fairly deny that at present -there are two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one -hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to revise our -traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance with its demands. On -the other hand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of absolutistic -philosophies; an assertion of a type of philosophic knowing distinct -from that of the sciences, one which opens to us another kind of -reality from that to which the sciences give access; an appeal through -experience to something that essentially goes beyond experience. This -reaction affects popular creeds and religious movements as well as -technical philosophies. The very conquest of the biological sciences by -the new ideas has led many to proclaim an explicit and rigid separation -of philosophy from science. - -Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract -logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions, -deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. Moreover, -the conviction persists--though history shows it to be a -hallucination--that all the questions that the human mind has asked -are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that -the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress -usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with -both of the alternatives they assume--an abandonment that results from -their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not -solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, -evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude -of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest -dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest -precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one -effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the -“Origin of Species.” - - - - -NATURE AND ITS GOOD: A CONVERSATION[5] - - -A group of people are scattered near one another, on the sands of an -ocean beach; wraps, baskets, etc., testify to a day’s outing. Above the -hum of the varied conversations are heard the mock sobs of one of the -party. - -_Various voices._ What’s the matter, Eaton? - -_Eaton._ Matter enough. I was watching a beautiful wave; its lines were -perfect; at its crest, the light glinting through its infinitely varied -and delicate curves of foam made a picture more ravishing than any -dream. And now it has gone; it will never come back. So I weep. - -_Grimes._ That’s right, Eaton; give it to them. Of course well-fed and -well-read persons--with their possessions of wealth and of knowledge -both gained at the expense of others--finally get bored; then they -wax sentimental over their boredom and are worried about “Nature” and -its relation to life. Not everybody takes it out that way, of course; -some take motor cars and champagne for that tired feeling. But the -rest--those who aren’t in that class financially, or who consider -themselves too refined for that kind of relief--seek a new sensation in -speculating why that brute old world out there will not stand for what -you call spiritual and ideal values--for short, your egotisms. - -The fact is that the whole discussion is only a symptom of the leisure -class disease. If you had to work to the limit and beyond, to keep -soul and body together, and, more than that, to keep alive the soul of -your family in its body, you would know the difference between your -artificial problems and the genuine problem of life. Your philosophic -problems about the relation of “the universe to moral and spiritual -good” exist only in the sentimentalism that generates them. The -genuine question is why social arrangements will not permit the amply -sufficient body of natural resources to sustain all men and women in -security and decent comfort, with a margin for the cultivation of their -human instincts of sociability, love of knowledge and of art. - -As I read Plato, philosophy began with some sense of its essentially -political basis and mission--a recognition that its problems were those -of the organization of a just social order. But it soon got lost in -dreams of another world; and even those of you philosophers who pride -yourselves on being so advanced that you no longer believe in “another -world,” are still living and thinking with reference to it. You may -not call it supernatural; but when you talk about a realm of spiritual -or ideal values in general, and ask about its relation to Nature in -general, you have only changed the labels on the bottles, not the -contents in them. For what makes anything transcendental--that is, -in common language, supernatural--is simply and only aloofness from -practical affairs--which affairs in their ultimate analysis are the -business of making a living. - -_Eaton._ Yes; Grimes has about hit off the point of my little -parable--in one of its aspects at least. In matters of daily life you -say a man is “off,” more or less insane, when he deliberately goes -on looking for a certain kind of result from conditions which he has -already found to be such that they cannot possibly yield it. If he -keeps on looking, and then goes about mourning because stage money -won’t buy beefsteaks, or because he cannot keep himself warm by burning -the sea-sands here, you dismiss him as a fool or a hysteric. If you -would condescend to reason with him at all, you would tell him to look -for the conditions that will yield the results; to occupy himself -with some of the countless goods of life for which, by intelligently -directed search, adequate means may be found. - -Well, before lunch, Moore was reiterating the old tale. “Modern science -has completely transformed our conceptions of Nature. It has stripped -the universe bare not only of all the moral values which it wore alike -to antique pagan and to our medieval ancestors, but also of any regard, -any preference, for such values. They are mere incidents, transitory -accidents, in her everlasting redistribution of matter in motion; like -the rise and fall of the wave I lament, or like a single musical note -that a screeching, rumbling railway train might happen to emit.” This -is a one-sided view; but suppose it were all so, what is the moral? -Surely, to change our standpoint, our angle of vision; to stop looking -for results among conditions that we know will not yield them; to turn -our gaze to the goods, the values that exist actually and indubitably -in experience; and consider by what natural conditions these particular -values may be strengthened and widened. - -Insist, if you please, that Nature as a whole does not stand for good -as a whole. Then, in heaven’s name, just because good is both so plural -(so “numerous”) and so partial, bend your energies of intelligence -and of effort to selecting the specific plural and partial natural -conditions which will at least render values that we do have more -secure and more extensive. Any other course is the way of madness; it -is the way of the spoilt child who cries at the seashore because the -waves do not stand still, and who cries even more frantically in the -mountains because the hills do not melt and flow. - -But no. Moore and his school will not have it so: we must “go back of -the returns.” All this science, after all, is a mode of knowledge. -Examine knowledge itself and find it implies a complete all-inclusive -intelligence; and then find (by taking another tack) that intelligence -involves sentiency, feeling, and also will. Hence your very physical -science, if you will only criticise it, examine it, shows that its -object, mechanical nature, is itself an included and superseded element -in an all-embracing spiritual and ideal whole. And there you are. - -Well, I do not now insist that all this is mere dialectic -prestidigitation. No; accept it; let it go at its face value. But -what of it? Is any value more concretely and securely in life than it -was before? Does this perfect intelligence enable us to correct one -single mis-step, one paltry error, here and now? Does this perfect -all-inclusive goodness serve to heal one disease? Does it rectify one -transgression? Does it even give the slightest inkling of how to go to -work at any of these things? No; it just tells you: Never mind, for -they are already eternally corrected, eternally healed in the eternal -consciousness which alone is really Real. Stop: there is one evil, one -pain, which the doctrine mitigates--the hysteric sentimentalism which -is troubled because the universe as a whole does not sustain good as a -whole. But that is the only thing it alters. The “pathetic fallacy” of -Ruskin magnified to the _n_th power is the _motif_ of modern idealism. - -_Moore._ Certainly nobody will accuse Eaton of -tender-mindedness--except in his logic, which, _as_ certainly, is not -tough-minded. His excitement, however, convinces me that he has at -least an inkling that he is begging the question; and like the true -pragmatist that he is, is trying to prevent by action (to wit, his -flood of speech) his false logic from becoming articulate to him. The -question being whether the values we seem to apprehend, the purposes -we entertain, the goods we possess, are anything more than transitory -waves, Eaton meets it by saying: “Oh, of course, they are waves; but -don’t think about that--just sit down hard on the wave or get another -wave to buttress it with!” No wonder he recommends action instead -of thinking! Men have tried this method before, as a counsel of -desperation or as cynical pessimism. But it remained for contemporary -pragmatism to label the drowning of sorrow in the intoxication of -thoughtless action, the highest achievement of philosophic method, and -to preach wilful restlessness as a doctrine of hope and illumination. -Meantime, I prefer to be tender-minded in my attitude toward Reality, -and to make that attitude more reasonable by a tough-minded logic. - -_Eaton._ I am willing to be quiet long enough for you to translate your -metaphor into logic, and show how I have begged the question. - -_Moore._ It is plain enough. You bid us turn to the cultivation, the -nurture, of certain values in human life. But the question is whether -these are or are not values. And that is a question of their relation -to the Universe--to Reality. If Reality substantiates them, then indeed -they are values; if it mocks and flouts them--as it surely does if what -mechanical science calls Nature be ultimate and absolute--then they are -_not_ values. You and your kind are really the sentimentalists, because -you are sheer subjectivists. You say: Accept the dream as real; do not -question about it; add a little iridescence to its fog and extend it -till it obscure even more of Reality than it naturally does, and all -is well! I say: Perhaps the dream is no dream but an intimation of the -solidest and most ultimate of all realities; and a thorough examination -of what the positivist, the materialist, accepts as solid, namely, -science, reveals as its own aim, standard, and presupposition that -Reality is one all-exhaustive spiritual Being. - -_Eaton._ This is about the way I thought my begging of the question -would turn out. You insist upon translating my position into terms of -your own; I am not then surprised to hear that it would be a begging -of the question for _you_ to hold my views. My point is precisely -that it is only as long as you take the position that some Reality -beyond--some metaphysical or transcendental reality--is necessary to -substantiate empirical values that you can even discuss whether the -latter are genuine or illusions. Drop the presupposition that you read -into everything I say, the idea that the reality of things as they are -is dependent upon something beyond and behind, and the facts of the -case just stare you in the eyes: Goods _are_, a multitude of them--but, -unfortunately, evils also _are_; and all grades, pretty much, of both. -Not the contrast and relation of experience _in toto_ to something -beyond experience drives men to religion and then to philosophy; but -the contrast _within_ experience of the better and the worse, and the -consequent problem of how to substantiate the former and reduce the -latter. Until you set up the notion of a transcendental reality at -large, you cannot even raise the question of whether goods and evils -are, or only seem to be. The trouble and the joy, the good and the -evil, is _that_ they are; the hope is that they may be regulated, -guided, increased in one direction and minimized in another. Instead -of neglecting thought, we (I mean the pragmatists) exalt it, because -we say that intelligent discrimination of means and ends is the sole -final resource in this problem of all problems, the control of the -factors of good and ill in life. We say, indeed, not merely that that -is what intelligence _does_, but rather what it _is_. - -Historically, it is quite possible to show how under certain social -conditions this human and practical problem of the relation of good and -intelligence generated the notion of the transcendental good and the -pure reason. As Grimes reminded us, Plato---- - -_Moore._ Yes, and Protagoras--don’t forget him; for unfortunately we -know both the origin and the consequences of your doctrine that being -and seeming are the same. We know quite well that pure empiricism leads -to the identification of being and seeming, and that is just why every -deeply moral and religious soul from the time of Plato and Aristotle to -the present has insisted upon a transcendent reality. - -_Eaton._ Personally I don’t need an absolute to enable me to -distinguish between, say, the good of kindness and the evil of slander, -or the good of health and the evil of valetudinarianism. In experience, -things bear their own specific characters. Nor has the absolute -idealist as yet answered the question of _how_ the absolute reality -enables him to distinguish between being and seeming in one single -concrete case. The trouble is that for him _all_ Being is on the other -side of experience, and _all_ experience is seeming. - -_Grimes._ I think I heard you mention history. I wish both of you -would drop dialectics and go to history. You would find history to be -a struggle for existence--for bread, for a roof, for protected and -nourished offspring. You would find history a picture of the masses -always going under--just missing--in the struggle, because others have -captured the control of natural resources, which in themselves, if not -as benign as the eighteenth century imagined, are at least abundantly -ample for the needs of all. But because of the monopolization of Nature -by a few persons, most men and women only stick their heads above the -welter just enough to catch a glimpse of better things, then to be -shoved down and under. The only problem of the relation of Nature to -human good which is real is the economic problem of the exploitation -of natural resources in the equal interests of all, instead of in the -unequal interests of a class. The problem you two men are discussing -has no existence--and never had any--outside of the heads of a few -metaphysicians. The latter would never have amounted to anything, -would never have had any career at all, had not shrewd monopolists -or tyrants (with the skill that characterizes them) have seen that -these speculations about reality and a transcendental world could be -distilled into opiates and distributed among the masses to make them -less rebellious. That, if you would know, Eaton, is the real historic -origin of the ideal world beyond. When you realize that, you will -perceive that the pragmatists are only half-way over. You will see -that practical questions _are_ practical, and are not to be solved -merely by having a theory _about_ theory different from the traditional -one--which is all your pragmatism comes to. - -_Moore._ If you mean that your own crass Philistinism is all that -pragmatism comes to, I fancy you are about right. Forget that the -only end of action is to bring about an approximation to the complete -inclusive consciousness; make, as the pragmatists do, consciousness -a means to action, and one form of external activity is just as -good as another. Art, religion, all the generous reaches of science -which do not show up immediately in the factory--these things become -meaningless, and all that remains is that hard and dry satisfaction of -economic wants which is Grimes’s ideal. - -_Grimes._ An ideal which exists, by the way, only in your imagination. -I know of no more convincing proof of the futile irrelevancy of -idealism than the damning way in which it narrows the content of actual -daily life in the minds of those who uphold idealism. I sometimes think -I am the only true idealist. If the conditions of an equitable and -ample physical existence for all were once secured, I, for one, have -no fears as to the bloom and harvest of art and science, and all the -“higher” things of leisure. Life is interesting enough for me; give it -a show for all. - -_Arthur._ I find myself in a peculiar position in respect to this -discussion. An analysis of what is involved in this peculiarity may -throw some light on the points at issue, for I have to believe that -analysis and definition of what exists is the essential matter both -in resolution of doubts and in steps at reform. For brevity, not from -conceit, I will put the peculiarity to which I refer in a personal -form. I do not believe for a moment in some different Reality beyond -and behind Nature. I do not believe that a manipulation of the logical -implications of science can give results which are to be put in the -place of those which Science herself yields in her direct application. -I accept Nature as something which is, not seems, and Science as her -faithful transcript. Yet because I believe these things, not in spite -of them, I believe in the existence of purpose and of good. How Eaton -can believe that fulfilment and the increasing realization of purpose -can exist in human consciousness unless they first exist in the world -which is revealed in that consciousness is as much beyond me as how -Moore can believe that a manipulation of the method of knowledge can -yield considerations of a totally different order from those directly -obtained by use of the method. If purpose and fulfilment exist as -natural goods, then, and only then, can consciousness itself be a -fulfilment of Nature, and be also a natural good. Any other view is -inexplicable to sound thinking--save, historically, as a product of -modern political individualism and literary romanticism which have -combined to produce that idealistic philosophy according to which the -mind in knowing the universe creates it. - -The view that purpose and realization are profoundly natural, -and that consciousness--or, if you will, experience--is itself a -culmination and climax of Nature, is not a new view. Formulated by -Aristotle, it has always persisted wherever the traditions of sound -thinking have not been obscured by romanticism. The modern scientific -doctrine of evolution confirms and specifies the metaphysical insight -of Aristotle. This doctrine sets forth in detail, and in verified -detail, as a genuine characteristic of existence, the tendency toward -cumulative results, the definite trend of things toward culmination and -achievement. It describes the universe as possessing, in terms of and -by right of its own subject-matter (not as an addition of subsequent -reflection), differences of value and importance--differences, -moreover, that exercise selective influence upon the course of things, -that is to say, genuinely determine the events that occur. It tells us -that consciousness itself is such a cumulative and culminating natural -event. Hence it is relevant to the world in which it dwells, and its -determinations of value are not arbitrary, not _obiter dicta_, but -descriptions of Nature herself. - -Recall the words of Spencer which Moore quoted this morning: “There is -no pleasure in the consciousness of being an infinitesimal bubble on -a globe that is infinitesimal compared with the totality of things. -Those on whom the unpitying rush of changes inflicts sufferings which -are often without remedy, find no consolation in the thought that -they are at the mercy of blind forces,--which cause indifferently -now the destruction of a sun and now the death of an animalcule. -Contemplation of a universe which is without conceivable beginning or -end and without intelligible purpose, yields no satisfaction.” I am -naïve enough to believe that the only question is whether the object -of our “consciousness,” of our “thought,” of our “contemplation,” -is or is not as the quotation states it to be. If the statement be -correct, pragmatism, like subjectivism (of which I suspect it is -only a variation, putting emphasis upon will instead of idea), is an -invitation to close our eyes to what is, in order to encourage the -delusion that things are other than they are. But the case is not so -desperate. Speaking dogmatically, the account given of the universe -is just--not true. And the doctrine of evolution of which Spencer -professedly made so much is the evidence. A universe describable in -evolutionary terms is a universe which shows, not indeed design, but -tendency and purpose; which exhibits achievement, not indeed of a -single end, but of a multiplicity of natural goods at whose apex is -consciousness. No account of the universe in terms _merely_ of the -redistribution of matter in motion is complete, no matter how true as -far as it goes, for it ignores the cardinal fact that the character -of matter in motion and of its redistribution is such as cumulatively -to achieve ends--to effect the world of values we know. Deny this -and you deny evolution; admit it and you admit purpose in the only -objective--that is, the only intelligible--sense of that term. I do not -say that in addition to the mechanism there are other ideal causes or -factors which intervene. I only insist that the whole story be told, -that the character of the mechanism be noted--namely, that it is such -as to produce and sustain good in a multiplicity of forms. Mechanism is -the mechanism of achieving results. To ignore this is to refuse to open -our eyes to the total aspects of existence. - -Among these multiple natural goods, I repeat, is consciousness itself. -One of the ends in which Nature genuinely terminates is just awareness -of itself--of its processes and ends. For note the implication as to -why consciousness is a natural good: not because it is cut off and -exists in isolation, nor yet because we may, pragmatically, cut off and -cultivate certain values which have no existence beyond it; but because -it _is_ good that things should be known in their own characters. And -this view carries with it a precious result: to know things as they are -is to know them as culminating in consciousness; it is to know that the -universe genuinely achieves and maintains its own self-manifestation. - -A final word as to the bearing of this view upon Grimes’s position. -To conceive of human history as a scene of struggle of classes for -domination, a struggle caused by love of power or greed for gain, -is the very mythology of the emotions. What we call history is -largely non-human, but so far as it is human, it is dominated by -intelligence: history is the history of increasing consciousness. Not -that intelligence is actually sovereign in life, but that at least it -is sovereign over stupidity, error, and ignorance. The acknowledgment -of things as they are--that is the causal source of every step in -progress. Our present system of industry is not the product of greed -or tyrannic lust of power, but of physical science giving the mastery -over the mechanism of Nature’s energy. If the existing system is ever -displaced, it will be displaced not by good intentions and vague -sentiments, but by a more extensive insight into Nature’s secrets. - -Modern sentimentalism is revolted at the frank naturalism of Aristotle -in saying that some are slaves by nature and others free by nature. -But let socialism come to-morrow and somebody--not anybody, but -_some_body--will be managing its machinery and somebody else will be -managed by the machinery. I do not wonder that my socialistic friends -always imagine themselves active in the first capacity--perhaps by -way of compensation for doing all of the imagining and none of the -executive management at present. But those who are managed, who are -controlled, deserve at least a moment’s attention. Would you not at -once agree that if there is any justice at all in these positions of -relative inferiority and superiority, it is because those who are -capable by insight deserve to rule, and those who are incapable on -account of ignorance, deserve to be ruled? If so, how do you differ, -save verbally, from Aristotle? - -Or do you think that all that men want in order to _be_ men is to have -their bellies filled, with assurance of constant plenty and without too -much antecedent labor? No; believe me, Grimes, men _are_ men, and hence -their aspiration is for the divine--even when they know it not; their -desire is for the ruling element, for intelligence. Till they achieve -that they will still be discontented, rebellious, unruly--and hence -ruled--shuffle your social cards as much as you may. - -_Grimes_ (after shrugging his shoulders contemptuously, finally says): -There is one thing I like about Arthur: he is frank. He comes out -with what you in all your hearts really believe--theory, supreme and -sublime. All is to the good in this best of all possible worlds, if -only some one be defining and classifying and syllogizing, according to -the lines already laid down. Aristotle’s God of pure intelligence (as -_he_ well knew) was the glorification of leisure; and Arthur’s point of -view, if Arthur but knew it, is as much the intellectual snobbery of a -leisure class economy, as the luxury and display he condemns are its -material snobbery. There is really nothing more to be said. - -_Moore._ To get back into the game which Grimes despises. Doesn’t -Arthur practically say that the universe is good because it culminates -in intelligence, and that intelligence is good because it perceives -that the universe culminates in--itself? And, on this theory, are -ignorance and error, and consequent evil, any less genuine achievements -of Nature than intelligence and good? And on what basis does he -call by the titles of achievement and end that which at best is an -infinitesimally fragmentary and transitory episode? I said Eaton -begged the question. Arthur seems to regard it as proof of a superior -intelligence (one which realistically takes things as they are) to beg -the question. What is this Nature, this universe in which evil is as -stubborn a fact as good, in which good is constantly destroyed by the -very power that produces it, in which there resides a temporary bird of -passage--consciousness doomed to ultimate extinction--what is such a -Nature (all that Arthur offers us) save the problem, the contradiction -originally in question? A complacent optimism may gloss over its -intrinsic self-contradictions, but a more serious mind is forced to go -behind and beyond this scene to a permanent good which includes and -transcends goods defeated and hopes suborned. Not because idealists -have refused to note the facts as they are, but precisely because -Nature is, on its face, such a scene as Arthur describes, idealists -have always held that it is but Appearance, and have attempted to mount -through it to Reality. - -_Stair._ I had not thought to say anything. My attitude is so different -from that of any one of you that it seemed unnecessary to inject -another varying opinion where already disagreement reigns. But when -Arthur was speaking, I felt that perhaps this disagreement exists -precisely because the solvent word had not been uttered. For, at -bottom, all of you agree with Arthur, and that is the cause of your -disagreement with him and one another. You have agreed to make reason, -intellect in some sense, the final umpire. But reason, intellect, is -the principle of analysis, of division, of discord. When I appeal -to feeling as the ultimate organ of unity, and hence of truth, you -smile courteously; say--or think--mysticism; and the case for you is -dismissed. Words like feeling, sensation, immediate appreciation, -self-communication of Being, I must indeed use when I try to tell -the truth I see. But I well know how inadequate the words are. And -why? Because language is the chosen tool of intelligence, and hence -inevitably bewrayeth the truth it would convey. But remember that words -are but symbols, and that intelligence must dwell in the realm of -symbols, and you realize a way out. These words, sensation, feeling, -etc., as I utter them are but invitations to woo you to put yourselves -into the one attitude that reveals truth--an attitude of direct vision. - -The beatific vision? Yes, and No. No, if you mean something rare, -extreme, almost abnormal. Yes, if you mean the commonest and most -convincing, the _only_ convincing self-impartation of the ultimate -good in the scale of goods; the vision of blessedness in God. For -this doctrine is empirical; mysticism is the heart of all positive -empiricism, of all empiricism which is not more interested in denying -rationalism than in asserting itself. The mystical experience marks -every man’s realization of the supremacy of good, and hence measures -the distance that separates him from pure materialism. And since the -unmitigated materialist is the rarest of creatures, and the man with -faith in an unseen good the commonest, every man is a mystic--and the -most so in his best moments. - -What an idle contradiction that Moore and Arthur should try to -adduce proofs of the supremacy of ideal values in the universe! The -sole possible proof is the proof that actually exists--the direct -unhindered realization of those values. For each value brings with it -of necessity its own depth of being. Let the pride of intellect and -the pride of will cease their clamor, and in the silences Being speaks -its own final word, not an argument or external ground of belief, but -the self-impartation of itself to the soul. Who are the prophets and -teachers of the ages? Those who have been accessible at the greatest -depths to these communications. - -_Grimes._ I suppose that poverty--and possibly disease--are specially -competent ministers to the spiritual vision? The moral is obvious. -Economic changes are purely irrelevant, because purely material and -external. Indeed, upon the whole, efforts at reform are undesirable, -for they distract attention from the fact that the final thing, the -vision of good, is totally disconnected from external circumstance. -I do not say, Stair, you personally believe this; but is not such a -quietism the logical conclusion of all mysticism? - -_Stair._ This is not so true as to say that in your efforts at reform -you are really inspired by the divine vision of justice; and that this -mystic vision and not the mere increase of quantity of eatables and -drinkables is your animating motive. - -_Grimes_. Well, to my mind this whole affair of mystical values and -experiences comes down to a simple straight-away proposition. The -submerged masses do not occupy themselves with such questions as those -you are discussing. They haven’t the time even to consider whether -they want to consider them. Nor does the occasional free citizen -who even now exists--a sporadic reminder and prophecy of ultimate -democracy--bother himself about the relation of the cosmos to value. -Why? Not from mystic insight any more than from metaphysical proof; -but because he has so many other interests that are worth while. -His friends, his vocation and avocations, his books, his music, his -club--these things engage him and they reward him. To multiply such -men with such interests--that is the genuine problem, I repeat; and -it is a problem to be solved only through an economic and material -redistribution. - -_Eaton_. Gladly, Stair, do all of us absolve ourselves from the -responsibility of having to create the goods that life--call it God -or Nature or Chance--provides. But we cannot, if we would, absolve -ourselves from responsibility for maintaining and extending these -goods when they have happened. To find it very wonderful--as Arthur -does--that intelligence perceives values as they are is trivial, for -it is only an elaborate way of saying that they have happened. To -invite us, ceasing struggle and effort, to commune with Being through -the moments of insight and joy that life provides, is to bid us to -self-indulgence--to enjoyment at the expense of those upon whom the -burden of conducting life’s affairs falls. For even the mystics still -need to eat and drink, be clothed and housed, and somebody must do -these unmystic things. And to ignore others in the interest of our own -perfection is not conducive to genuine unity of Being. - -Intelligence is, indeed, as you say, discrimination, distinction. -But why? Because we have to _act_ in order to keep secure amid the -moving flux of circumstance, some slight but precious good that Nature -has bestowed; and because, in order to act successfully, we must act -after conscious selection--after discrimination of means and ends. -Of course, all goods arrive, as Arthur says, as natural results, but -so do all bads, and all grades of good and bad. To label the results -that occur culminations, achievements, and then argue to a quasi-moral -constitution of Nature because she effects such results, is to employ -a logic which applies to the life-cycle of the germ that, in achieving -itself, kills man with malaria, as well as to the process of human -life that in reaching its fullness cuts short the germ-fulfilment. It -is putting the cart before the horse to say that because Nature is -so constituted as to produce results of all types of value, therefore -Nature is actuated by regard for differences of value, Nature, till it -produces a being who strives and who thinks in order that he may strive -more effectively, does not know whether it cares more for justice -or for cruelty, more for the ravenous wolf-like competition of the -struggle for existence, or for the improvements incidentally introduced -through that struggle. Literally it has no mind of its own. Nor would -the mere introduction of a consciousness that pictured indifferently -the scene out of which consciousness developed, add one iota of reason -for attributing eulogistically to Nature regard for value. But when the -sentient organism, having experienced natural values, good and bad, -begins to select, to prefer, and to make battle for its preference; and -in order that it may make the most gallant fight possible picks out -and gathers together in perception and thought what is favorable to -its aims and what hostile, then and there Nature has at last achieved -significant regard for good. And this is the same thing as the birth -of intelligence. For the holding an end in view and the selecting -and organizing out of the natural flux, on the basis of this end, -conditions that are means, _is_ intelligence. Not, then, when Nature -produces health or efficiency or complexity does Nature exhibit regard -for value, but only when it produces a living organism that has settled -preferences and endeavors. The mere happening of complexity, health, -adjustment, is all that Nature effects, as rightly called accident as -purpose. But when Nature produces an intelligence--ah, then, indeed -Nature has achieved something. Not, however, because this intelligence -impartially pictures the nature which has produced it, but because -in human consciousness Nature becomes genuinely partial. Because in -consciousness an end is preferred, is selected for maintenance, and -because intelligence pictures not a world just as it is _in toto_, -but images forth the conditions and obstacles of the continued -maintenance of the selected good. For in an experience where values -are demonstrably precarious, an intelligence that is not a principle -of emphasis and valuation (an intelligence which defines, describes, -and classifies merely for the sake of knowledge,) is a principle of -stupidity and catastrophe. - -As for Grimes, it is indeed true that problems are solved only where -they arise--namely, in action, in the adjustments of behavior. But, -for good or for evil, they can be solved there only with method; and -ultimately method is intelligence, and intelligence is method. The -larger, the more human, the less technical the problem of practice, -the more open-eyed and wide-viewing must be the corresponding method. -I do not say that all things that have been called philosophy -participate in this method; I do say, however, that a catholic and -far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of -life _is_--whatever it be called--philosophy. And unless technical -philosophy is to go the way of dogmatic theology, it must loyally -identify itself with such a view of its own aim and destiny. - - - - -INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS[6] - - -“Except the blind forces of nature,” said Sir Henry Maine, “nothing -moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin.” And if we ask -why this is so, the response comes that the Greek discovered the -business of man to be pursuit of good, and intelligence to be central -in this quest. The utmost to be said in praise of Plato and Aristotle -is not that they invented excellent moral theories, but that they rose -to the opportunity which the spectacle of Greek life afforded. For -Athens presented an all but complete microcosm for the study of the -interaction of social organization and individual character. A public -life of rich diversity in concentrated and intense splendor trained -the civic sense. Strife of faction and the rapid oscillations of types -of polity provided the occasion for intellectual inquiry and analysis. -The careers of dramatic personalities, habits of discussion, ease of -legislative change, facilities for personal ambitions, distraction by -personal rivalries, fixed attention upon the elements of character, -and upon consideration of the effect of individual character on -social vitality and stability. Happy exemption from ecclesiastic -preoccupations, susceptibility to natural harmony, and natural piety -conspired with frank and open observation to acknowledgment of the rôle -played by natural conditions. Social instability and shock made equally -pertinent and obvious the remark that only intelligence can confirm -the values that natural conditions generate, and that intelligence is -itself nurtured and matured only in a free and stable society. - -In Plato the resultant analysis of the mutual implications of the -individual, the social and the natural, converged in the ideas that -morals and philosophy are one: namely, a love of that wisdom which -is the source of secure and social good; that mathematics and the -natural sciences focused upon the problem of the perception of the good -furnish the materials of moral science; that logic is the method of the -pregnant organization of social conditions with respect to good; that -politics and psychology are sciences of one and the same human nature, -taken first in the large and then in the little. So far that large and -expansive vision of Plato. - -But projection of a better life must be based upon reflection of the -life already lived. The inevitable limitations of the Greek city-state -were inevitably wrought into the texture of moral theory. - -The business of thought was to furnish a substitute for customs which -were then relaxing from the pressure of contact and intercourse without -and the friction of strife within. Reason was to take the place of -custom as a guide of life; but it was to furnish rules as final, as -unalterable as those of custom. In short, the thinkers were fascinated -by the afterglow of custom. They took for their own ideal the -distillation from custom of its essence--ends and laws which should be -rigid and invariable. Thus Morals was set upon the track which it dared -not leave for nigh twenty-five hundred years: search for _the_ final -good, and for _the_ single moral force. - -Aristotle’s assertions that the state exists by nature, and that in the -state alone does the individual achieve independence and completeness -of life, are indeed pregnant sayings. But as uttered by Aristotle they -meant that, in an isolated state, the Greek city-state, set a garlanded -island in the waste sea of _barbaroi_, a community indifferent when not -hostile to all other social groupings, individuals attain their full -end. In a social unity which signified social contraction, contempt, -and antagonism, in a social order which despised intercourse and -glorified war, is realized the life of excellence! - -There is likewise a profound saying of Aristotle’s that the individual -who otherwise than by accident is not a member of a state is either a -brute or a god. But it is generally forgotten that elsewhere Aristotle -identified the highest excellence, the chief virtue, with pure thought, -and identifying this with the divine, isolated it in lonely grandeur -from the life of society. That man, so far as in him lay, should be -godlike, meant that he should be non-social, because supra-civic. -Plato the idealist had shared the belief that reason is the divine; -but he was also a reformer and a radical and he would have those who -attained rational insight descend again into the civic cave, and in -its obscurity labor patiently for the enlightenment of its blear-eyed -inhabitants. Aristotle, the conservative and the definer of what is, -gloried in the exaltation of intelligence in man above civic excellence -and social need; and thereby isolated the life of truest knowledge -from contact with social experience and from responsibility for -discrimination of values in the course of life. - -Moral theory, however, accepted from social custom more than its -cataleptic rigidity, its exclusive area of common good, and its -unfructified and irresponsible reason. The city-state was a superficial -layer of cultured citizens, cultured through a participation in affairs -made possible by relief from economic pursuits, superimposed upon -the dense mass of serfs, artizans, and laborers. For this division, -moral philosophy made itself spiritual sponsor, and thus took it up -into its own being. Plato wrestled valiantly with the class problem; -but his outcome was the necessity of decisive demarcation, after -education, of the masses in whom reason was asleep and appetite much -awake, from the few who were fit to rule because alertly wise. The most -generously imaginative soul of all philosophy could not far outrun the -institutional practices of his people and his times. This might have -warned his successors of the danger of deserting the sober path of a -critical discernment of the better and the worse within contemporary -life for the more exciting adventure of a final determination of -absolute good and evil. It might have taught the probability that some -brute residuum or unrationalized social habit would be erected into an -apotheosis of pure reason. But the lesson was not learned. Aristotle -promptly yielded to the besetting sin of all philosophers, the -idealization of the existent: he declared that the class distinctions -of superiority and inferiority as between man and woman, master and -slave, liberal-minded and base mechanic, exist and are justified by -nature--a nature which aims at embodied reason. - -What, finally, is this Nature to which the philosophy of society and -the individual so bound itself? It is the nature which figures in -Greek customs and myth; the nature resplendent and adorned which -confronts us in Greek poetry and art: the animism of savage man purged -of grossness and generalized by unerring esthetic taste into beauty -and system. The myths had told of the loves and hates, the caprices -and desertions of the gods, and behind them all, inevitable Fate. -Philosophy translated these tales into formulæ of the brute fluctuation -of rapacious change held in bounds by the final and supreme end: the -rational good. The animism of the popular mind died to reappear as -cosmology. - -Repeatedly in this course we have heard of sciences which began as -parts of philosophy and which gradually won their independence. Another -statement of the same history is that both science and philosophy began -in subjection to mythological animism. Both began with acceptance of -a nature whose irregularities displayed the meaningless variability -of foolish wants held within the limits of order and uniformity by an -underlying movement toward a final and stable purpose. And when the -sciences gradually assumed the task of reducing irregular caprice to -regular conjunction, philosophy bravely took upon itself the task of -substantiating, under the caption of a spiritual view of the universe, -the animistic survival. Doubtless Socrates brought philosophy to earth; -but his injunction to man to know himself was incredibly compromised -in its execution by the fact that later philosophers submerged man in -the world to which philosophy was brought: a world which was the heavy -and sunken center of hierarchic heavens located in their purity and -refinement as remotely as possible from the gross and muddy vesture of -earth. - -The various limitations of Greek custom, its hostile indifference to -all outside the narrow city-state, its assumption of fixed divisions of -wise and blind among men, its inability socially to utilize science, -its subordination of human intention to cosmic aim--all of these -things were worked into moral theory. Philosophy had no active hand in -producing the condition of barbarism in Europe from the fifth to the -fifteenth centuries. By an unwitting irony which would have shocked -none so much as the lucid moralists of Athens, their philosophic -idealization, under captions of Nature and Reason, of the inherent -limitations of Athenian society and Greek science, furnished the -intellectual tools for defining, standardizing, and justifying all -the fundamental clefts and antagonisms of feudalism. When practical -conditions are not frozen in men’s imagination into crystalline truths, -they are naturally fluid. They come and go. But when intelligence fixes -fluctuating circumstances into final ideals, petrifaction is likely to -occur; and philosophy gratuitously took upon itself the responsibility -for justifying the worst defects of barbarian Europe by showing their -necessary connection with divine reason. - -The division of mankind into the two camps of the redeemed and the -condemned had not needed philosophy to produce it. But the Greek -cleavage of men into separate kinds on the basis of their position -within or without the city-state was used to rationalize this harsh -intolerance. The hierarchic organization of feudalism, within church -and state, of those possessed of sacred rule and those whose sole -excellence was obedience, did not require moral theory to generate -or explain it. But it took philosophy to furnish the intellectual -tools by which such chance episodes were emblazoned upon the cosmic -heavens as a grandiose spiritual achievement. No; it is all too easy -to explain bitter intolerance and desire for domination. Stubborn as -they are, it was only when Greek moral theory had put underneath them -the distinction between the irrational and the rational, between divine -truth and good and corrupt and weak human appetite, that intolerance -on system and earthly domination for the sake of eternal excellence -were philosophically sanctioned. The health and welfare of the body and -the securing for all of a sure and a prosperous livelihood were not -matters for which medieval conditions fostered care in any case. But -moral philosophy was prevailed upon to damn the body on principle, -and to relegate to insignificance as merely mundane and temporal the -problem of a just industrial order. Circumstances of the times bore -with sufficient hardness upon successful scientific investigation; but -philosophy added the conviction that in any case truth is so supernal -that it must be supernaturally revealed, and so important that it must -be authoritatively imparted and enforced. Intelligence was diverted -from the critical consideration of the natural sources and social -consequences of better and worse into the channel of metaphysical -subtleties and systems, acceptance of which was made essential -to participation in the social order and in rational excellence. -Philosophy bound the once erect form of human endeavor and progress to -the chariot wheels of cosmology and theology. - -Since the Renaissance, moral philosophy has repeatedly reverted to -the Greek ideal of natural excellence realized in social life, under -the fostering care of intelligence in action. The return, however, -has taken place under the influence of democratic polity, commercial -expansion, and scientific reorganization. It has been a liberation -more than a reversion. This combined return and emancipation, having -transformed our practice of life in the last four centuries, will not -be content till it has written itself clear in our theory of that -practice. Whether the consequent revolution in moral philosophy be -termed pragmatism or be given the happier title of the applied and -experimental habit of mind is of little account. What is of moment is -that intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation at the remote -edge of things, whence it operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, -to take its seat in the moving affairs of men. Theory may therefore -become responsible to the practices that have generated it; the good be -connected with nature, but with nature naturally, not metaphysically, -conceived, and social life be cherished in behalf of its own immediate -possibilities, not on the ground of its remote connections with a -cosmic reason and an absolute end. - -There is a notion, more familiar than correct, that Greek thought -sacrificed the individual to the state. None has ever known better -than the Greek that the individual comes to himself and to his own -only in association with others. But Greek thought subjected, as we -have seen, both state and individual to an external cosmic order; and -thereby it inevitably restricted the free use in doubt, inquiry, and -experimentation, of the human intelligence. The _anima libera_, the -free mind of the sixteenth century, of Galileo and his successors, was -the counterpart of the disintegration of cosmology and its animistic -teleology. The lecturer on political economy reminded us that his -subject began, in the Middle Ages, as a branch of ethics, though, -as he hastened to show, it soon got into better association. Well, -the same company was once kept by all the sciences, mathematical and -physical as well as social. According to all accounts it was the -integrity of the number one and the rectitude of the square that -attracted the attention of Pythagoras to arithmetic and geometry as -promising fields of study. Astronomy was the projected picture book of -a cosmic object lesson in morals, Dante’s transcript of which is none -the less literal because poetic. If physics alone remained outside the -moral fold, while noble essences redeemed chemistry, occult forces -blessed physiology, and the immaterial soul exalted psychology, physics -is the exception that proves the rule: matter was so inherently immoral -that no high-minded science would demean itself by contact with it. - -If we do not join with many in lamenting the stripping from nature -of those idealistic properties in which animism survived, if we do -not mourn the secession of the sciences from ethics, it is because -the abandonment by intelligence of a fixed and static moral end was -the necessary precondition of a free and progressive science of both -things and morals; because the emancipation of the sciences from ready -made, remote, and abstract values was necessary to make the sciences -available for creating and maintaining more and specific values here -and now. The divine comedy of modern medicine and hygiene is one of -the human epics yet to be written; but when composed it may prove no -unworthy companion of the medieval epic of other worldly beatific -visions. The great ideas of the eighteenth century, that expansive -epoch of moral perception which ranks in illumination and fervor -along with classic Greek thought, the great ideas of the indefinitely -continuous progress of humanity and of the power and significance of -freed intelligence, were borne by a single mother--experimental inquiry. - -The growth of industry and commerce is at once cause and effect of -the growth in science. Democritus and other ancients conceived the -mechanical theory of the universe. The notion was not only blank and -repellent, because it ignored the rich social material which Plato and -Aristotle had organized into their rival idealistic views; but it was -scientifically sterile, a piece of dialectics. Contempt for machines as -the accouterments of despised mechanics kept the mechanical conception -aloof from these specific and controllable experiences which alone -could fructify it. This conception, then, like the idealistic, was -translated into a speculative cosmology and thrown like a vast net -around the universe at large, as if to keep it from coming to pieces. -It is from respect for the lever, the pulley, and the screw that modern -experimental and mathematical mechanics derives itself. Motion, traced -through the workings of a machine, was followed out into natural -events and studied just as motion, not as a poor yet necessary device -for realizing final causes. So studied, it was found to be available -for new machines and new applications, which in creating new ends -also promoted new wants, and thereby stimulated new activities, new -discoveries, and new inventions. The recognition that natural energy -can be systematically applied, through experimental observation, to -the satisfaction and multiplication of concrete wants is doubtless the -greatest single discovery ever imported into the life of man--save -perhaps the discovery of language. Science, borrowing from industry, -repaid the debt with interest, and has made the control of natural -forces for the aims of life so inevitable that for the first time -man is relieved from overhanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to -possess and accumulate, and is freed to consider the more gracious -question of securing to all an ample and liberal life. The industrial -life had been condemned by Greek exaltation of abstract thought and by -Greek contempt for labor, as representing the brute struggle of carnal -appetite for its own satiety. The industrial movement, offspring of -science, restored it to its central position in morals. When Adam Smith -made economic activity the moving spring of man’s unremitting effort, -from the cradle to the grave, to better his own lot, he recorded this -change. And when he made sympathy the central spring in man’s conscious -moral endeavor, he reported the effect which the increasing intercourse -of men, due primarily to commerce, had in breaking down suspicion and -jealousy and in liberating man’s kindlier impulses. - -Democracy, the crucial expression of modern life, is not so much an -addition to the scientific and industrial tendencies as it is the -perception of their social or spiritual meaning. Democracy is an -absurdity where faith in the individual as individual is impossible; -and this faith is impossible when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic -power, not an adjustment and application of individual tendencies. -It is also impossible when appetites and desires are conceived to be -the dominant factor in the constitution of most men’s characters, and -when appetite and desire are conceived to be manifestations of the -disorderly and unruly principle of nature. To put the intellectual -center of gravity in the objective cosmos, outside of men’s own -experiments and tests, and then to invite the application of individual -intelligence to the determination of society, is to invite chaos. -To hold that want is mere negative flux and hence requires external -fixation by reason, and then to invite the wants to give free play to -themselves in social construction and intercourse, is to call down -anarchy. Democracy is estimable only through the changed conception of -intelligence, that forms modern science, and of want, that forms modern -industry. It is essentially a changed psychology. The substitution, for -_a priori_ truth and deduction, of fluent doubt and inquiry meant trust -in human nature in the concrete; in individual honesty, curiosity, -and sympathy. The substitution of moving commerce for fixed custom -meant a view of wants as the dynamics of social progress, not as the -pathology of private greed. The nineteenth century indeed turned sour -on that somewhat complacent optimism in which the eighteenth century -rested: the ideas that the intelligent self-love of individuals would -conduce to social cohesion, and competition among individuals usher in -the kingdom of social welfare. But the conception of a social harmony -of interests in which the achievement by each individual of his own -freedom should contribute to a like perfecting of the powers of all, -through a fraternally organized society, is the permanent contribution -of the industrial movement to morals--even though so far it be but the -contribution of a problem. - -Intellectually speaking, the centuries since the fourteenth are the -true middle ages. They mark the transitional period of mental habit, -as the so-called medieval period represents the petrifaction, under -changed outward conditions, of Greek ideas. The conscious articulation -of genuinely modern tendencies has yet to come, and till it comes the -ethic of our own life must remain undescribed. But the system of morals -which has come nearest to the reflection of the movements of science, -democracy, and commerce, is doubtless the utilitarian. Scientific, -after the modern mode, it certainly would be. Newton’s influence dyes -deep the moral thought of the eighteenth century. The arrangements of -the solar system had been described in terms of a homogeneous matter -and motion, worked by two opposed and compensating forces: all because -a method of analysis, of generalization by analogy, and of mathematical -deduction back to new empirical details had been followed. The -imagination of the eighteenth century was a Newtonian imagination; and -this no less in social than in physical matters. Hume proclaims that -morals is about to become an experimental science. Just as, almost in -our own day, Mill’s interest in a method for social science led him to -reformulate the logic of experimental inquiry, so all the great men of -the Enlightenment were in search for the organon of morals which should -repeat the physical triumphs of Newton. Bentham notes that physics has -had its Bacon and Newton; that morals has had its Bacon in Helvétius, -but still awaits its Newton; and he leaves us in no doubt that at the -moment of writing he was ready, modestly but firmly, to fill the -waiting niche with its missing figure. - -The industrial movement furnished the concrete imagery for this ethical -renovation. The utilitarians borrowed from Adam Smith the notion that -through industrial exchange in a free society the individual pursuing -his own good is led, under the guidance of the “invisible hand,” to -promote the general good more effectually than if he had set out to do -it. This idea was dressed out in the atomistic psychology which Hartley -built out from Locke--and was returned at usurious rates to later -economists. - -From the great French writers who had sought to justify and promote -democratic individualism, came the conception that, since it is -perverted political institutions which deprave individuals and bring -them into hostility, nation against nation, class against class, -individual against individual, the great political problem is such a -reform of law and legislation, civil and criminal, of administration, -and of education as will force the individual to find his own interests -in pursuits conducing to the welfare of others. - -Tremendously effective as a tool of criticism, operative in -abolition and elimination, utilitarianism failed to measure up to -the constructive needs of the time. Its theoretical equalization of -the good of each with that of every other was practically perverted -by its excessive interest in the middle and manufacturing classes. -Its speculative defect of an atomistic psychology combined with this -narrowness of vision to make light of the constructive work that -needs to be done by the state, before all can have, otherwise than in -name, an equal chance to count in the common good. Thus the age-long -subordination of economics to politics was revenged in the submerging -of both politics and ethics in a narrow theory of economic profit; and -utilitarianism, in its orthodox descendants, proffered the disjointed -pieces of a mechanism, with a monotonous reiteration that looked at -aright they form a beautifully harmonious organism. - -Prevision, and to some extent experience, of this failure, conjoined -with differing social traditions and ambitions, evoked German idealism, -the transcendental morals of Kant and his successors. German thought -strove to preserve the traditions which bound culture to the past, -while revising these traditions to render them capable of meeting -novel conditions. It found weapons at hand in the conceptions borrowed -by Roman law from Stoic philosophy, and in the conceptions by which -Protestant humanism had re-edited scholastic Catholicism. Grotius had -made the idea of natural law, natural right and obligation, the central -idea of German morals, as thoroughly as Locke had made the individual -desire for liberty and happiness the focus of English and then of -French speculation. Materialized idealism is the happy monstrosity in -which the popular demand for vivid imagery is most easily reconciled -with the equally strong demand for supremacy of moral values; and the -complete idealistic materialism of Stoicism has always given its ideas -a practical influence out of all proportion to their theoretical vogue -as a system. To the Protestant, that is the German, humanist, Natural -Law, the bond of harmonious reason in nature, the spring of social -intercourse among men, the inward light of individual conscience, -united Cicero, St. Paul, and Luther in blessed union; gave a rational, -not superrational basis for morals, and provided room for social -legislation which at the same time could easily be held back from too -ruthless application to dominant class interests. - -Kant saw the mass of empirical and hence irrelevant detail that had -found refuge within this liberal and diffusive reason. He saw that the -idea of reason could be made self-consistent only by stripping it naked -of these empirical accretions. He then provided, in his critiques, a -somewhat cumbrous moving van for transferring the resultant pure or -naked reason out of nature and the objective world, and for locating -it in new quarters, with a new stock of goods and new customers. The -new quarters were particular subjects, individuals; the stock of goods -were the forms of perception and the functions of thought by which -empirical flux is woven into durable fabrics; the new customers were a -society of individuals in which all are ends in themselves. There ought -to be an injunction issued that Kant’s saying about Hume’s awakening of -him should not be quoted save in connection with his other saying that -Rousseau brought him to himself, in teaching him that the philosopher -is of less account than the laborer in the fields unless he contributes -to human freedom. But none the less, the new tenant, the universal -reason, and the old homestead, the empirical tumultuous individual, -could not get on together. Reason became a mere voice which, having -nothing in particular to say, said Law, Duty, in general, leaving to -the existing social order of the Prussia of Frederick the Great the -congenial task of declaring just what was obligatory in the concrete. -The marriage of freedom and authority was thus celebrated with the -understanding that sentimental primacy went to the former and practical -control to the latter. - -The effort to force a universal reason that had been used to the broad -domains of the cosmos into the cramped confines of individuality -conceived as merely “empirical,” a highly particularized creature of -sense, could have but one result: an explosion. The products of that -explosion constitute the Post-Kantian philosophies. It was the work of -Hegel to attempt to fill in the empty reason of Kant with the concrete -contents of history. The voice sounded like the voice of Aristotle, -Thomas of Aquino, and Spinoza translated into Swabian German; but the -hands were as the hands of Montesquieu, Herder, Condorcet, and the -rising historical school. The outcome was the assertion that history -is reason, and reason is history: the actual is rational, the rational -is the actual. It gave the pleasant appearance (which Hegel did not -strenuously discourage) of being specifically an idealization of the -Prussian nation, and incidentally a systematized apologetic for the -universe at large. But in intellectual and practical effect, it lifted -the idea of process above that of fixed origins and fixed ends, and -presented the social and moral order, as well as the intellectual, as a -scene of becoming, and it located reason somewhere within the struggles -of life. - -Unstable equilibrium, rapid fermentation, and a succession of explosive -reports are thus the chief notes of modern ethics. Scepticism and -traditionalism, empiricism and rationalism, crude naturalisms and -all-embracing idealisms, flourish side by side--all the more flourish, -one suspects, because side by side. Spencer exults because natural -science reveals that a rapid transit system of evolution is carrying -us automatically to the goal of perfect man in perfect society; and -his English idealistic contemporary, Green, is so disturbed by the -removal from nature of its moral qualities, that he tries to show that -this makes no difference, since nature in any case is constituted and -known through a spiritual principle which is as permanent as nature is -changing. An Amiel genteelly laments the decadence of the inner life, -while his neighbor Nietzsche brandishes in rude ecstasy the banner of -brute survival as a happy omen of the final victory of nobility of -mind. The reasonable conclusion from such a scene is that there is -taking place a transformation of attitude towards moral theory rather -than mere propagation of varieties among theories. The classic theories -all agreed in one regard. They all alike assumed the existence of -_the_ end, the _summum bonum_, the final goal; and of _the_ separate -moral force that moves to that goal. Moralists have disputed as to -whether the end is an aggregate of pleasurable state of consciousness, -enjoyment of the divine essence, acknowledgment of the law of duty, -or conformity to environment. So they have disputed as to the path by -which the final goal is to be reached: fear or benevolence? reverence -for pure law or pity for others? self-love or altruism? But these very -controversies implied that there was but the one end and the one means. - -The transformation in attitude, to which I referred, is the growing -belief that the proper business of intelligence is discrimination -of multiple and present goods and of the varied immediate means of -their realization; not search for the one remote aim. The progress of -biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not -an outside power presiding supremely but statically over the desires -and efforts of man, but is a method of adjustment of capacities and -conditions within specific situations. History, as the lecturer on -that subject told us, has discovered itself in the idea of process. -The genetic standpoint makes us aware that the systems of the past are -neither fraudulent impostures nor absolute revelations; but are the -products of political, economic, and scientific conditions whose change -carries with it change of theoretical formulations. The recognition -that intelligence is properly an organ of adjustment in difficult -situations makes us aware that past theories were of value so far as -they helped carry to an issue the social perplexities from which they -emerged. But the chief impact of the evolutionary method is upon the -present. Theory having learned what it cannot do, is made responsible -for the better performance of what needs to be done, and what only a -broadly equipped intelligence can undertake: study of the conditions -out of which come the obstacles and the resources of adequate life, -and developing and testing the ideas that, as working hypotheses, may -be used to diminish the causes of evil and to buttress and expand the -sources of good. This program is indeed vague, but only unfamiliarity -with it could lead one to the conclusion that it is less vague than the -idea that there is a single moral ideal and a single moral motive force. - -From this point of view there is no separate body of moral rules; no -separate system of motive powers; no separate subject-matter of moral -knowledge, and hence no such thing as an isolated ethical science. -If the business of morals is not to speculate upon man’s final end -and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, -anthropology, and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of -man, his organic powers and propensities. If its business is not to -search for the one separate moral motive, it is to converge all the -instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics, -and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of -improving the common lot. - -If we still wish to make our peace with the past, and to sum up the -plural and changing goods of life in a single word, doubtless the term -happiness is the one most apt. But we should again exchange free morals -for sterile metaphysics, if we imagine that “happiness” is any less -unique than the individuals who experience it; any less complex than -the constitution of their capacities, or any less variable than the -objects upon which their capacities are directed. - -To many timid, albeit sincere, souls of an earlier century, the decay -of the doctrine that all true and worthful science is knowledge of -final causes seemed fraught with danger to science and to morals. The -rival conception of a wide open universe, a universe without bounds in -time or space, without final limits of origin or destiny, a universe -with the lid off, was a menace. We now face in moral science a similar -crisis and like opportunity, as well as share in a like dreadful -suspense. The abolition of a fixed and final goal and causal force in -nature did not, as matter of fact, render rational conviction less -important or less attainable. It was accompanied by the provision of -a technique of persistent and detailed inquiry in all special fields -of fact, a technique which led to the detection of unsuspected forces -and the revelation of undreamed of uses. In like fashion we may -anticipate that the abolition of _the_ final goal and _the_ single -motive power and _the_ separate and infallible faculty in morals, will -quicken inquiry into the diversity of specific goods of experience, fix -attention upon their conditions, and bring to light values now dim and -obscure. The change may relieve men from responsibility for what they -cannot do, but it will promote thoughtful consideration of what they -may do and the definition of responsibility for what they do amiss -because of failure to think straight and carefully. Absolute goods -will fall into the background, but the question of making more sure -and extensive the share of all men in natural and social goods will be -urgent, a problem not to be escaped nor evaded. - -Morals, philosophy, returns to its first love; love of the wisdom that -is nurse, as nature is mother, of good. But it returns to the Socratic -principle equipped with a multitude of special methods of inquiry and -testing; with an organized mass of knowledge, and with control of the -arrangements by which industry, law, and education may concentrate upon -the problem of the participation by all men and women, up to their -capacity of absorption, in all attained values. Morals may then well -leave to poetry and to art, the task (so unartistically performed by -philosophy since Plato) of gathering together and rounding out, into -one abiding picture, the separate and special goods of life. It may -leave this task with the assurance that the resultant synthesis will -not depict any final and all-inclusive good, but will add just one more -specific good to the enjoyable excellencies of life. - -Humorous irony shines through most of the harsh glances turned towards -the idea of an experimental basis and career for morals. Some shiver -in the fear that morals will be plunged into anarchic confusion--a -view well expressed by a recent writer in the saying that if the _a -priori_ and transcendental basis of morals be abandoned “we shall have -merely the same certainty that now exists in physics and chemistry”! -Elsewhere lurks the apprehension that the progress of scientific method -will deliver the purposive freedom of man bound hand and foot to the -fatal decrees of iron necessity, called natural law. The notion that -laws govern and forces rule is an animistic survival. It is a product -of reading nature in terms of politics in order to turn around and then -read politics in the light of supposed sanctions of nature. This idea -passed from medieval theology into the science of Newton, to whom the -universe was the dominion of a sovereign whose laws were the laws of -nature. From Newton it passed into the deism of the eighteenth century, -whence it migrated into the philosophy of the Enlightenment, to make -its last stand in Spencer’s philosophy of the fixed environment and the -static goal. - -No, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding itself majestically -from the reel of law under the control of deified forces. It is an -indefinite congeries of changes. Laws are not governmental regulations -which limit change, but are convenient formulations of selected -portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of -time, and then registered in statistical forms that are amenable to -mathematical manipulation. That this device of shorthand symbolization -presages the subjection of man’s intelligent effort to fixity of law -and environment is interesting as a culture survival, but is not -important for moral theory. Savage and child delight in creating -bogeys from which, their origin and structure being conveniently -concealed, interesting thrills and shudders may be had. Civilized -man in the nineteenth century outdid these bugaboos in his image of -a fixed universe hung on a cast-iron framework of fixed, necessary, -and universal laws. Knowledge of nature does not mean subjection to -predestination, but insight into courses of change; an insight which is -formulated in “laws,” that is, methods of subsequent procedure. - -Knowledge of the process and conditions of physical and social -change through experimental science and genetic history has one -result with a double name: increase of control, and increase of -responsibility; increase of power to direct natural change, and -increase of responsibility for its equitable direction toward fuller -good. Theory located within progressive practice instead of reigning -statically supreme over it, means practice itself made responsible -to intelligence; to intelligence which relentlessly scrutinizes the -consequences of every practice, and which exacts liability by an -equally relentless publicity. As long as morals occupies itself with -mere ideals, forces and conditions as they are will be good enough for -“practical” men, since they are then left free to their own devices -in turning these to their own account. As long as moralists plume -themselves upon possession of the domain of the categorical imperative -with its bare precepts, men of executive habits will always be at -their elbows to regulate the concrete social conditions through which -the form of law gets its actual filling of specific injunctions. When -freedom is conceived to be transcendental, the coercive restraint of -immediate necessity will lay its harsh hand upon the mass of men. - -In the end, men do what they can do. They refrain from doing what they -cannot do. They do what their own specific powers in conjunction with -the limitations and resources of the environment permit. The effective -control of their powers is not through precepts, but through the -regulation of their conditions. If this regulation is to be not merely -physical or coercive, but moral, it must consist of the intelligent -selection and determination of the environments in which we act; and -in an intelligent exaction of responsibility for the use of men’s -powers. Theorists inquire after the “motive” to morality, to virtue and -the good, under such circumstances. What then, one wonders, is their -conception of the make-up of human nature and of its relation to virtue -and to goodness? The pessimism that dictates such a question, if it be -justified, precludes any consideration of morals. - -The diversion of intelligence from discrimination of plural and -concrete goods, from noting their conditions and obstacles, and from -devising methods for holding men responsible for their concrete use -of powers and conditions, has done more than brute love of power -to establish inequality and injustice among men. It has done more, -because it has confirmed with social sanctions the principle of feudal -domination. All men require moral sanctions in their conduct: the -consent of their kind. Not getting it otherwise, they go insane to -feign it. No man ever lived with the exclusive approval of his own -conscience. Hence the vacuum left in practical matters by the remote -irrelevancy of transcendental morals has to be filled in somehow. -It is filled in. It is filled in with class-codes, class-standards, -class-approvals--with codes which recommend the practices and habits -already current in a given circle, set, calling, profession, trade, -industry, club, or gang. These class-codes always lean back upon -and support themselves by the professed ideal code. This latter -meets them more than half-way. Being in its pretense a theory for -regulating practice, it must demonstrate its practicability. It is -uneasy in isolation, and travels hastily to meet with compromise and -accommodation the actual situation in all its brute unrationality. -Where the pressure is greatest--in the habitual practice of the -political and economic chieftains--there it accommodates the most. - -Class-codes of morals are sanctions, under the caption of ideals, of -uncriticised customs; they are recommendations, under the head of -duties, of what the members of the class are already most given to -doing. If there are to obtain more equable and comprehensive principles -of action, exacting a more impartial exercise of natural power and -resource in the interests of a common good, members of a class must -no longer rest content in responsibility to a class whose traditions -constitute its conscience, but be made responsible to a society whose -conscience is its free and effectively organized intelligence. - -In such a conscience alone will the Socratic injunction to man to know -himself be fulfilled. - - - - -THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE[7] - - -It should be possible to discern and describe a knowing as one -identifies any object, concern, or event. It must have its own marks; -it must offer characteristic features--as much so as a thunder-storm, -the constitution of a State, or a leopard. In the search for this -affair, we are first of all desirous for something which is for itself, -contemporaneously with its occurrence, a cognition, not something -called knowledge by another and from without--whether this other be -logician, psychologist, or epistemologist. The “knowledge” may turn -out false, and hence no knowledge; but this is an after-affair; it may -prove to be rich in fruitage of wisdom, but if this outcome be only -wisdom after the event, it does not concern us. What we want is just -something which takes itself as knowledge, rightly or wrongly. - - -I - -This means a specific case, a sample. Yet instances are proverbially -dangerous--so naïvely and graciously may they beg the questions at -issue. Our recourse is to an example so simple, so much on its face -as to be as innocent as may be of assumptions. This case we shall -gradually complicate, mindful at each step to state just what new -elements are introduced. Let us suppose a smell, just a floating -odor. This odor may be anchored by supposing that it moves to action; -it starts changes that end in picking and enjoying a rose. This -description is intended to apply to the course of events witnessed and -recounted from without. What sort of a course must it be to constitute -a knowledge, or to have somewhere within its career that which -deserves this title? The smell, _imprimis_, is there; the movements -that it excites are there; the final plucking and gratification are -experienced. But, let us say, the smell is not the smell of the rose; -the resulting change of the organism is not a sense of walking and -reaching; the delicious finale is not the fulfilment of the movement, -and, through that, of the original smell; “is not,” in each case -meaning is “not experienced as” such. We may take, in short, these -experiences in a brutely serial fashion. The smell, _S_, is replaced -(and displaced) by a felt movement, _K_, this is replaced by the -gratification, _G_. Viewed from without, as we are now regarding it, -there is _S-K-G_. But from within, for itself, it is now _S_, now -_K_, now _G_, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is there -looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born. Such an -experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor does it -exercise a cognitive function. - -Here, however, we may be halted. If there is anything present in -“consciousness” at all, we may be told (at least we constantly are so -told) there must be knowledge of it as present--present, at all events, -in “consciousness.” There is, so it is argued, knowledge at least -of a simple apprehensive type, knowledge of the acquaintance order, -knowledge _that_, even though not knowledge _what_. The smell, it is -admitted, does not know _about_ anything else, nor is anything known -_about_ the smell (the same thing, perhaps); but the smell is known, -either by itself, or by the mind, or by some subject, some unwinking, -unremitting eye. No, we must reply; there is no apprehension without -some (however slight) context; no acquaintance which is not either -recognition or expectation. Acquaintance is presence honored with an -escort; presence is introduced as familiar, or an associate springs up -to greet it. Acquaintance always implies a little friendliness; a trace -of re-knowing, of anticipatory welcome or dread of the trait to follow. - -This claim cannot be dismissed as trivial. If valid, it carries with -it the distance between being and knowing: and the recognition of -an element of mediation, that is, of art, in all knowledge. This -disparity, this transcendence, is not something which holds of _our_ -knowledge, of finite knowledge, just marking the gap between our -type of consciousness and some other with which we may contrast it -after the manner of the agnostic or the transcendentalist (who hold -so much property in joint ownership!), but exists because knowing is -knowing, that way of bringing things to bear upon things which we call -reflection--a manipulation of things experienced in the light one of -another. - -“Feeling,” I read in a recent article, “feeling is immediately -acquainted with its own quality, with its own subjective being.”[8] How -and whence this duplication in the inwards of feeling into feeling -the knower and feeling the known? into feeling as being and feeling -as acquaintance? Let us frankly deny such monsters. Feeling _is_ -its own quality; is its own _specific_ (whence and why, once more, -_subjective_?) being. If this statement be dogmatism, it is at least -worth insistent declaration, were it only by way of counter-irritant -to that other dogmatism which asserts that being in “consciousness” is -always presence for or in knowledge. So let us repeat once more, that -to be a smell (or anything else) is one thing, to be _known_ as smell, -another; to be a “feeling” one thing, to be _known_ as a “feeling” -another.[9] The first is thinghood; existence indubitable, direct; -in this way all things _are_ that are in “consciousness” at all.[10] -The second is _reflected_ being, things indicating and calling for -other things--something offering the possibility of truth and hence -of falsity. The first is genuine immediacy; the second is (in the -instance discussed) a pseudo-immediacy, which in the same breath that -it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in another term (and one which -is unexperienced both in itself and in its relation) the subject or -“consciousness,” to which the immediate is related.[11] - -But we need not remain with dogmatic assertions. To be acquainted -with a thing or with a person has a definite empirical meaning; we -have only to call to mind what it is to be genuinely and empirically -acquainted, to have done forever with this uncanny presence which, -though bare and simple presence, is yet known, and thus is clothed -upon and complicated. To be acquainted with a thing is to be assured -(from the standpoint of the experience itself) that it is of such and -such a character; that it will behave, if given an opportunity, in -such and such a way; that the obviously and flagrantly present trait -is associated with fellow traits that will show themselves, if the -leadings of the present trait are followed out. To be acquainted is -to anticipate to some extent, on the basis of prior experience. I am, -say, barely acquainted with Mr. Smith: then I have no extended body of -associated qualities along with those palpably present, but at least -some one suggested trait occurs; his nose, his tone of voice, the -place where I saw him, his calling in life, an interesting anecdote -about him, etc. To be acquainted is to know what a thing is _like_ in -some particular. If one is acquainted with the smell of a flower it -means that the smell is not just smell, but reminds one of some other -experienced thing which stands in continuity with the smell. There is -thus supplied a condition of control over or purchase upon what is -present, the possibility of translating it into terms of some other -trait not now sensibly present. - -Let us return to our example. Let us suppose that _S_ is not just -displaced by _K_ and then by _G_. Let us suppose it persists; and -persists not as an unchanged _S_ alongside _K_ and _G_, nor yet as -fused with them into a new further quale _J_. For in such events, we -have only the type already considered and rejected. For an observer -the new quale might be more complex, or fuller of meaning, than the -original _S_, _K_, or _G_, but might not be experienced as complex. We -might thus suppose a composite photograph which should suggest nothing -of the complexity of its origin and structure. In this case we should -have simply another picture. - -But we may also suppose that the blur of the photograph suggests -the superimposition of pictures and something of their character. -Then we get another, and for our problem, much more fruitful kind of -persistence. We will imagine that the final _G_ assumes this form: -Gratification-terminating-movement-induced-by-smell. The smell is still -present; it has persisted. It is not present in its original form, -but is represented with a quality, an office, that of having excited -activity and thereby terminating its career in a certain quale of -gratification. It is not _S_, but Σ; that is _S_ with an increment of -meaning due to maintenance and fulfilment through a process. _S_ is no -longer just smell, but smell which has excited and thereby secured. - -Here we have a cognitive, but not a cognitional thing. In saying that -the smell is finally experienced as _meaning_ gratification (through -intervening handling, seeing, etc.) and meaning it not in a hapless -way, but in a fashion which operates to effect what is meant, we -retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the -smell--and this is what is signified by “cognitive.” Yet the smell is -not cognitional, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this; but -is found, after the event, to have meant it. Nor again is the final -experience, the Σ or transformed _S_, a knowledge. - -Here again the statement may be challenged. Those who agree with the -denial that bare presence of a quale in “consciousness” constitutes -acquaintance and simple apprehension, may now turn against us, saying -that experience of fulfilment of meaning is just what we mean by -knowledge, and this is just what the Σ of our illustration is. The -point is fundamental. As the smell at first was presence or being, less -than knowing, so the fulfilment is an experience that is more than -knowing. Seeing and handling the flower, enjoying the full meaning of -the smell as the odor of just this beautiful thing, is not knowledge -because it is more than knowledge. - -As this may seem dogmatic, let us suppose that the fulfilment, -the realization, experience, is a knowledge. Then how shall it be -distinguished from and yet classed with other things called knowledge, -viz., reflective, discursive cognitions? Such knowledges are what -they are precisely because they are not fulfilments, but intentions, -aims, schemes, symbols of overt fulfilment. Knowledge, perceptual and -conceptual, of a hunting dog is prerequisite in order that I may really -hunt with the hounds. The hunting in turn may increase my knowledge of -dogs and their ways. But the knowledge of the dog, _qua_ knowledge, -remains characteristically marked off from the use of that knowledge -in the fulfilment experience, the hunt. The hunt is a _realization_ of -knowledge; it alone, if you please, verifies, validates, knowledge, or -supplies tests of truth. The prior knowledge of the dog, was, if you -wish, hypothetical, lacking in assurance or categorical certainty. The -hunting, the fulfilling, realizing experience alone _gives_ knowledge, -because it alone completely assures; makes faith good in works. - -Now there is and can be no objection to this definition of knowledge, -_provided it is consistently adhered to_. One has as much right to -identify knowledge with complete assurance, as I have to identify it -with anything else. Considerable justification in the common use of -language, in common sense, may be found for defining knowledge as -complete assurance. But even upon this definition, the fulfilling -experience is not, as such, complete assurance, and hence not a -knowledge. Assurance, cognitive validation, and guaranteeship, follow -from it, but are not coincident with its occurrence. It _gives_, -but _is_ not, assurance. The concrete construction of a story, the -manipulation of a machine, the hunting with the dogs, is not, so far as -it _is_ fulfilment, a confirmation of meanings previously entertained -as cognitional; that is, is not contemporaneously experienced as -such. To think of prior schemes, symbols, meanings, as fulfilled in a -subsequent experience, is reflectively to present in their relations -to one another both the meanings and the experiences in which they -are, as a matter of fact, embodied. This reflective attitude cannot -be identical with the fulfilment experience itself; it occurs only -in retrospect when the worth of the meanings, or cognitive ideas, is -critically inspected in the light of their fulfilment; or it occurs -as an interruption of the fulfilling experience. The hunter stops -his hunting as a fulfilment to reflect that he made a mistake in his -idea of his dog, or again, that his dog is everything he thought he -was--that his notion of him is confirmed. Or, the man stops the actual -construction of his machine and turns back upon his plan in correction -or in admiring estimate of its value. _The fulfilling experience is not -of itself knowledge_, then, even if we identify knowledge with fulness -of assurance or guarantee. Moreover it gives, affords, assurance only -in reference to a situation which we have not yet considered.[12] - -Before the category of confirmation or refutation can be introduced, -there must be something which _means_ to mean something and which -therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue--and this -is precisely what we have not as yet found. We must return to our -instance and introduce a further complication. Let us suppose that -the smell quale recurs at a later date, and that it recurs neither -as the original _S_ nor yet as the final Σ but as an _S_’ which is -fated or charged with the sense of the possibility of a fulfilment -like unto Σ. The _S_’ that recurs is aware of something else which -it means, which it intends to effect through an operation incited -by it and without which its own presence is abortive, and, so to -say, unjustified, senseless. Now we have an experience which is -_cognitional_, not merely cognitive; which is contemporaneously aware -of meaning something beyond itself, instead of having this meaning -ascribed by another at a later period. _The odor knows the rose; the -rose is known by the odor; and the import of each term is constituted -by the relationship in which it stands to the other._ That is, the -import of the smell is the indicating and demanding relation which it -sustains to the enjoyment of the rose as its fulfilling experience; -while this enjoyment is just the content or definition of what the -smell consciously meant, _i.e._, meant to mean. Both the thing -meaning and the thing meant are elements in the same situation. Both -are present, but both are not present in the same way. In fact, one -is present as-_not_-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-the-other-is. -It is present as something to be rendered present in the same way -through the intervention of an operation. We must not balk at a purely -verbal difficulty. It suggests a verbal inconsistency to speak of -a thing present-as-absent. But all ideal contents, all aims (that -is, things aimed at) are present in just such fashion. Things can -be presented as absent, just as they can be presented as hard or -soft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away from the body. -The assumption that an ideal content must be either totally absent, -or else present _in just the same fashion_ as it will be when it is -realized, is not only dogmatic, but self-contradictory. The only -way in which an ideal content can be experienced at all is to be -presented as _not-present-in-the-same-way_ in which something else is -present, the latter kind of presence affording the standard or type -of _satisfactory_ presence. When present in the same way it ceases to -be an ideal content. Not a contrast of bare existence over against -non-existence, or of present consciousness over against reality out of -present consciousness, but of a satisfactory with an unsatisfactory -mode of presence makes the difference between the “really” and the -“ideally” present. - -In terms of our illustration, handling and enjoying the rose are -present, but they are not present in the same way that the smell is -present. They are present as _going_ to be there in the same way, -through an operation which the smell stands sponsor for. The situation -is inherently an uneasy one--one in which everything hangs upon the -performance of the operation indicated; upon the adequacy of movement -as a connecting link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and -the thing meant. Generalizing from the instance, we get the following -definition: An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an -experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following -sort: _one means or intends the presence of the other in the same -fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that -which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present -if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be -fulfilled through the operation it sets up_. - - -II - -We now return briefly to the question of knowledge as acquaintance, and -at greater length to that of knowledge as assurance, or as fulfilment -which confirms and validates. With the recurrence of the odor as -meaning something beyond itself, there is apprehension, knowledge -_that_. One may now say I know what a _rose_ smells like; or I know -what _this_ smell is like; I am acquainted with the rose’s agreeable -odor. In short, on the basis of a present quality, the odor anticipates -and forestalls some further trait. - -We have also the conditions of knowledge of the confirmation and -refutation type. In the working out of the situation just described, -in the transformation, self-indicated and self-demanded, of the -tensional into a harmonious or satisfactory situation, fulfilment -_or_ disappointment results. The odor either does or does not fulfil -itself in the rose. The smell as intention is borne out by the facts, -or is nullified. As has already been pointed out, the subsequent -experience of the fulfilment type is not primarily a confirmation or -refutation. Its import is too vital, too urgent to be reduced _in -itself_ just to the value of testing an intention or meaning.[13] -But it gets _in reflection_ just such verificatory significance. -If the smell’s intention is unfulfilled, the discrepancy may throw -one back, in reflection, upon the original situation. Interesting -developments then occur. The smell meant a rose; and yet it did not -(so it turns out) mean a rose; it meant another flower, or something, -one can’t just tell what. Clearly there is _something else_ which -enters in; something else beyond the odor as it was first experienced -determined the validity of its meaning. Here then, perhaps, we have a -transcendental, as distinct from an experimental reference? _Only if -this something else makes no difference, or no detectable difference, -in the smell itself._ If the utmost observation and reflection can find -no difference in the smell quales that fail and those that succeed -in executing their intentions, then there is an outside controlling -and disturbing factor, which, since it is outside of the situation, -can never be utilized in knowledge, and hence can never be employed -in any concrete testing or verifying. In this case, knowing depends -upon an extra-experimental or transcendental factor. But this very -transcendental quality makes both confirmation and refutation, -correction, criticism, of the pretensions or meanings of things, -impossible. For the conceptions of truth and error, we must, upon -the transcendental basis, substitute those of accidental success or -failure. Sometimes the intention chances upon one, sometimes upon -another. Why or how, the gods only know--and they only if to them -the extra-experimental factor is not extra-experimental, but makes -a concrete difference in the concrete smell. But fortunately the -situation is not one to be thus described. The factor that determines -the success or failure, does institute a difference in the thing which -means the object, and this difference is detectable, once attention, -through failure, has been called to the need of its discovery. At the -very least, it makes this difference: the smell is infected with an -element of uncertainty of meaning--and this as a part of the thing -experienced, not for an observer. This additional _awareness_ at least -brings about an additional _wariness_. Meaning is more critical, and -operation more cautious. - -But we need not stop here. Attention may be fully directed to the -subject of smells. Smells may become the object of knowledge. They -may take, _pro tempore_,[14] the place which the rose formerly -occupied. One may, that is, observe the cases in which odors mean -other things than just roses, may voluntarily produce new cases for -the sake of further inspection, and thus account for the cases where -meanings had been falsified in the issue; discriminate more carefully -the peculiarities of those meanings which the event verified, and -thus safeguard and bulwark to some extent the employing of similar -meanings in the future. Superficially, it may then seem as if odors -were treated after the fashion of Locke’s simple ideas, or Hume’s -“distinct ideas which are separate existences.” Smells apparently -assume an independent, isolated status during this period of -investigation. “Sensations,” as the laboratory psychologist and the -analytic psychologist generally studies them, are examples of just -such detached things. But egregious error results if we forget that -this seeming isolation and detachment is the outcome of a deliberate -scientific device--that it is simply a part of the scientific technique -of an inquiry directed upon securing _tested_ conclusions. Just and -only because odors (or any group of qualities) are parts of a connected -world are they signs of things beyond themselves; and only because they -are signs is it profitable and necessary to study them _as if_ they -were complete, self-enclosed entities. - -In the reflective determination of things with reference to their -specifically meaning other things, experiences of fulfilment, -disappointment, and going astray inevitably play an important and -recurrent _rôle_. They also are realistic facts, related in realistic -ways to the things that intend to mean other things and to the things -intended. When these fulfilments and refusals _are reflected upon_ -in the determinate relations in which they stand to their relevant -meanings, they obtain a quality which is quite lacking to them in their -immediate occurrence as just fulfilments or disappointments; viz., -the property of affording assurance and correction--of confirming -and refuting. Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience -or thing, in and of itself or in its first intention; _but of things -where the problem of assurance consciously enters in_. _Truth and -falsity present themselves as significant facts only in situations -in which specific meanings and their already experienced fulfilments -and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and contrasted with -reference to the question of the worth, as to reliability of meaning, -of the given meaning or class of meanings._ Like knowledge itself, -truth is an experienced relation of things, and it has no meaning -outside of such relation,[15] any more than such adjectives as -comfortable applied to a lodging, correct applied to speech, persuasive -applied to an orator, etc., have worth apart from the _specific_ things -to which they are applied. It would be a great gain for logic and -epistemology, if we were always to translate the noun “truth” back into -the adjective “true,” and this back into the adverb “truly”; at least, -if we were to do so until we have familiarized ourselves thoroughly -with the fact that “truth” is an abstract noun, summarizing a quality -presented by specific affairs in their own specific contents. - - -III - -I have attempted, in the foregoing pages, a description of the function -of knowledge in its own terms and on its merits--a description which -in intention is realistic, if by realistic we are content to mean -naturalistic, a description undertaken on the basis of what Mr. -Santayana has well called “following the lead of the subject-matter.” -Unfortunately at the present time all such undertakings contend with -a serious extraneous obstacle. Accomplishing the undertaking has -difficulties enough of its own to reckon with; and first attempts -are sure to be imperfect, if not radically wrong. But at present the -attempts are not, for the most part, even listened to on their own -account, they are not examined and criticised as naturalistic attempts. -_They are compared with undertakings of a wholly different nature, with -an epistemological theory of knowledge, and the assumptions of this -extraneous theory are taken as a ready-made standard by which to test -their validity._ Literally of course, “epistemology” means only theory -of knowledge; the term _might_ therefore have been employed simply as -a synonym for a descriptive logic; for a theory that takes knowledge -as it finds it and attempts to give the same kind of an account of it -that would be given of any other natural function or occurrence. But -the mere mention of what _might_ have been only accentuates what is. -The things that pass for epistemology all assume that knowledge is not -a natural function or event, but a mystery. - -Epistemology starts from the assumption that certain conditions lie -back of knowledge. The mystery would be great enough if knowledge -were constituted by non-natural conditions back of knowledge, but the -mystery is increased by the fact that the conditions are defined so -as to be incompatible with knowledge. Hence the primary problem of -epistemology is: How is knowledge _überhaupt_, knowledge at large, -_possible_? Because of the incompatibility between the concrete -occurrence and function of knowledge and the conditions back of it to -which it must conform, a second problem arises: How is knowledge in -general, knowledge _überhaupt_, _valid_? Hence the complete divorce -in contemporary thought between epistemology as theory of knowledge -and logic as an account of the specific ways in which particular -beliefs that are better than other alternative beliefs regarding the -same matters are formed; and also the complete divorce between a -naturalistic, a biological and social psychology, setting forth how -the function of knowledge is evolved out of other natural activities, -and epistemology as an account of how knowledge is possible anyhow. - -It is out of the question to set forth in this place in detail the -contrast between transcendental epistemology and an experimental theory -of knowledge. It may assist the understanding of the latter, however, -if I point out, baldly and briefly, how, _out of the distinctively -empirical situation_, there arise those assumptions which make -knowledge a mystery, and hence a topic for a peculiar branch of -philosophizing. - -As just pointed out, epistemology makes the possibility of knowledge a -problem, because it assumes back of knowledge conditions incompatible -with the obvious traits of knowledge as it empirically exists. These -assumptions are that the organ or instrument of knowledge is not a -natural object, but some ready-made state of mind or consciousness, -something purely “subjective,” a peculiar kind of existence which -lives, moves, and has its being in a realm different from things to -be known; and that the ultimate goal and content of knowledge is a -fixed, ready-made thing which has no organic connections with the -origin, purpose, and growth of the attempt to know it, some kind of -_Ding-an-sich_ or absolute, extra-empirical “Reality.” - -(1) It is not difficult to see at what point in the development -of natural knowledge, or the signifying of one thing by another, -there arises the notion of the knowing medium as something radically -different in the order of existence from the thing to be known. It -arises subsequent to the repeated experience of non-fulfilment, of -frustration and disappointment. The odor did not after all mean the -rose; it meant something quite different; and yet its indicative -function was exercised so forcibly that we could not help--or at least -_did_ not help--believing in the existence of the rose. This is a -familiar and typical kind of experience, one which very early leads -to the recognition that “things are not what they seem.” There are -two contrasted methods of dealing with this recognition: one is the -method indicated above (p. 93). We go more thoroughly, patiently, and -carefully into the facts of the case. We employ all sorts of methods, -invented for the purpose, of examining the things that are signs and -the things that are signified, and we experimentally produce various -situations, in order that we may tell _what_ smells mean roses _when_ -roses are meant, what it is about the smell and the rose that led us -into error; and that we may be able to discriminate those cases in -which a suspended conclusion is all that circumstances admit. We simply -do the best we can to regulate our system of signs so that they become -as instructive as possible, utilizing for this purpose (as indicated -above) all possible experiences of success and of failure, and -deliberately instituting cases which will throw light on the specific -empirical causes of success and failure. - -Now it so happens that when the facts of error were consciously -generalized and formulated, namely in Greek thought, such a technique -of specific inquiry and rectification did not exist--in fact, it hardly -could come into existence until _after_ error had been seized upon as -constituting a fundamental anomaly. Hence the method just outlined of -dealing with the situation was impossible. We can imagine disconsolate -ghosts willing to postpone any professed solution of the difficulty -till subsequent generations have thrown more light on the question -itself; we can hardly imagine passionate human beings exercising -such reserve. At all events, Greek thought provided what seemed a -satisfactory way out: there are two orders of existence, one permanent -and complete, the noumenal region, to which alone the characteristic -of Being is properly applicable, the other transitory, phenomenal, -sensible, a region of non-Being, or at least of mere Coming-to-be, a -region in which Being is hopelessly mixed with non-Being, with the -unreal. The former alone is the domain of knowledge, of truth; the -latter is the territory of opinion, confusion, and error. In short, the -contrast _within_ experience of the cases in which things successfully -and unsuccessfully maintained and executed the meanings of other things -was erected into a wholesale difference of status in the intrinsic -characters of the things involved in the two types of cases. - -With the beginnings of modern thought, the region of the “unreal,” the -source of opinion and error, was located exclusively in the individual. -The object was _all_ real and _all_ satisfactory, but the “subject” -could approach the object only through his own subjective states, -his “sensations” and “ideas.” The Greek conception of two orders of -existence was retained, but instead of the two orders characterizing -the “universe” itself, one _was_ the universe, the other was the -individual mind trying to know that universe. This scheme would -obviously easily account for error and hallucination; but how could -_knowledge_, truth, ever come about such a basis? The Greek problem of -the possibility of error became the modern problem of the possibility -of knowledge. - -Putting the matter in terms that are independent of history, -experiences of failure, disappointment, non-fulfilment of the -function of meaning and contention may lead the individual to the -path of science--to more careful and extensive investigation of -the things themselves, with a view to detecting specific sources -of error, and guarding against them, and regulating, so far as -possible, the conditions under which objects are bearers of meanings -beyond themselves. But impatient of such slow and tentative methods -(which insure not infallibility but increased probability of -valid conclusions), by reason of disappointment a person may turn -epistemologist. He may then take the discrepancy, the failure of the -smell to execute its own intended meaning, as a wholesale, rather -than as a specific fact: as evidence of a contrast in general between -things meaning and things meant, instead of as evidence of the need -of a more cautious and thorough inspection of odors and execution of -operations indicated by them. One may then say: Woe is me; smells are -only _my_ smells, subjective states existing in an order of being made -out of consciousness, while roses exist in another order made out of a -radically different sort of stuff; or, odors are made out of “finite” -consciousness as their stuff, while the real things, the objects which -fulfil them, are made out of an “infinite” consciousness as their -material. Hence some purely metaphysical tie has to be called in to -bring them into connection with each other. And yet this tie does not -concern knowledge; it does not make the meaning of one odor any more -correct than that of another, nor enable us to discriminate relative -degrees of correctness. As a principle of control, this transcendental -connection is related to all alike, and hence condemns and justifies -all alike.[16] - -It is interesting to note that the transcendentalist almost invariably -first falls into the psychological fallacy; and then having himself -taken the psychologist’s attitude (the attitude which is interested in -meanings as themselves self-inclosed “ideas”) accuses the empiricist -whom he criticises of having confused mere psychological existence -with logical validity. That is, he begins by supposing that the smell -of our illustration (and all the cognitional objects for which this -is used as a symbol) is a purely mental or psychical state, so that -the question of logical reference or intention is the problem of how -the merely mental can “know” the extra-mental. But from a strictly -empirical point of view, the smell which knows is no more merely mental -than is the rose known. We may, if we please, say that the smell when -involving conscious meaning or intention is “mental,” but this term -“mental” does not denote some separate type of existence--existence -as a state of consciousness. It denotes only the fact that the smell, -a real and non-psychical object, now exercises an intellectual -_function_. This new property involves, as James has pointed out, an -_additive_ relation--a new property possessed by a non-mental object, -when that object, occurring in a new context, assumes a further -office and use.[17] To be “in the mind” means to be in a situation -in which the function of intending is directly concerned.[18] Will -not some one who believes that the knowing experience is _ab origine_ -a strictly “mental” thing, explain how, as matter of fact, it does -get a specific, extra-mental reference, capable of being tested, -confirmed, or refuted? Or, if he believes that viewing it as merely -mental expresses only the form it takes for psychological analysis, -will he not explain why he so persistently attributes the inherently -“mental” characterization of it to the empiricist whom he criticises? -An object _becomes_ meaning when used empirically in a certain way; -and, under certain circumstances, the exact character and worth of -this meaning _becomes_ an object of solicitude. But the transcendental -epistemologist with his purely psychical “meanings” and his purely -extra-empirical “truths” assumes a _Deus ex Machina_ whose mechanism -is preserved a secret. And as if to add to the arbitrary character of -his assumption, he has to admit that the transcendental _a priori_ -faculty by which mental states get objective reference does not in the -least help us to discriminate, _in the concrete_, between an objective -reference that is false and one that is valid. - -(2) The counterpart assumption to that of pure aboriginal “mental -states” is, of course, that of an Absolute Reality, fixed and complete -in itself, of which our “mental states” are bare transitory hints, -their true meaning and their transcendent goal being the Truth _in -rerum natura_. If the organ and medium of knowing is a self-inclosed -order of existence different in kind from the Object to be known, -then that Object must stand out there in complete aloofness from the -concrete purpose and procedure of knowing it. But if we go back to -the knowing as a natural occurrence, capable of description, we find -that just as a smell does not mean Rose in general (or anything else -at large), but means a _specific_ group of qualities whose experience -is intended and anticipated, so the function of knowing is always -expressed in connections between a given experience and a specific -possible wanted experience. The “rose” that is meant in a particular -situation _is_ the rose of that situation. When this experience is -consummated, it is achieved as the fulfilment of the conditions in -which just _that_ intention was entertained--not as the fulfilment of -a faculty of knowledge or a meaning in general. Subsequent meanings -and subsequent fulfilments may increase, may enrich the consummating -experience; the object or content of the rose as known may be other and -fuller next time and so on. But we have no right to set up “a rose” at -large or in general as the object of the knowing odor; the object of a -knowledge is always strictly correlative to that particular thing which -means it. It is not something which can be put in a wholesale way over -against that which cognitively refers to it, as when the epistemologist -puts the “real” rose (object) over against a merely phenomenal or -empirical rose which _this_ smell happens to mean. As the meaning gets -more complex, fuller, more finely discriminated, the object which -realizes or fulfils the meaning grows similarly in quality. But we -cannot set up a rose, an object of fullest, complete, and exhaustive -content as that which is really meant by any and every odor of a -rose, whether it consciously meant to mean it or not. The test of -the cognitional rectitude of the odor lies in the _specific_ object -which it sets out to secure. This is the meaning of the statement that -the import of _each_ term is found in its relationship to the other. -It applies to object meant as well as to the meaning. Fulfilment, -completion are always relative terms. _Hence the criterion of the truth -or falsity of the meaning, of the adequacy, of the cognitional thing -lies within the relationships of the situation and not without._ The -thing that means another by means of an intervening operation either -succeeds or fails in accomplishing the operation indicated, while this -operation either gives or fails to give the object meant. Hence the -truth or falsity of the original cognitional object. - - -IV - -From this excursion, I return in conclusion to a brief general -characterization of those situations in which we are aware that -things mean other things and are so critically aware of it that, in -order to increase the probability of fulfilment and to decrease the -chance of frustration, all possible pains are taken to regulate the -meanings that attach to things. These situations define that type of -knowing which we call _scientific_. There are things that claim to -mean other experiences; in which the trait of meaning other objects -is not discovered _ab extra_, and after the event, but is part of the -thing itself. This trait of the thing is as realistic, as specific, -as any other of its traits. It is, therefore, as open to inspection -and determination as to its nature, as is any other trait. Moreover, -since it is upon this trait that assurance (as distinct from accident) -of fulfilment depends, an especial interest, an absorbing interest, -attaches to its determination. Hence the scientific type of knowledge -and its growing domination over other sorts. - -We _employ_ meanings in all intentional constructions of experience--in -all anticipations, whether artistic, utilitarian or technological, -social or moral. The success of the anticipation is found to depend -upon the character of the meaning. Hence the stress upon a right -determination of these meanings. Since they are the instruments upon -which fulfilment depends _so far as that is controlled_ or other than -accidental, they become themselves objects of surpassing interest. For -all persons at some times, and for one class of persons (scientists) -at almost all times, the determination of the meanings employed in -the control of fulfilments (of acting upon meanings) is central. The -experimental or pragmatic theory of knowledge explains the dominating -importance of science; it does not depreciate it or explain it away. - -Possibly pragmatic writers are to blame for the tendency of their -critics to assume that the practice they have in mind is utilitarian -in some narrow sense, referring to some preconceived and inferior -use--though I cannot recall any evidence for this admission. But -what the pragmatic theory has in mind is precisely the fact that -all the affairs of life which need regulation--_all values of all -types_--depend upon utilizations of meanings. Action is not to be -limited to anything less than the carrying out of ideas, than the -execution, whether strenuous or easeful, of meanings. Hence the -surpassing importance which comes to attach to the careful, impartial -construction of the meanings, and to their constant survey and resurvey -with reference to their value as evidenced by experiences of fulfilment -and deviation. - -That truth denotes _truths_, that is, specific verifications, -combinations of meanings and outcomes reflectively viewed, is, -one may say, the central point of the experimental theory. Truth, -in general or in the abstract, is a just name for an experienced -relation among the things of experience: that sort of relation in -which intents are retrospectively viewed from the standpoint of the -fulfilment which they secure through their own natural operation -or incitement. Thus the experimental theory explains directly and -simply the absolutistic tendency to translate concrete true things -into the general relationship, Truth, and then to hypostatize this -abstraction into identity with real being, Truth _per se_ and _in se_, -of which all transitory things and events--that is, all experienced -realities--are only shadowy futile approximations. This type of -relationship is central for man’s will, for man’s conscious endeavor. -To select, to conserve, to extend, to propagate those meanings which -the course of events has generated, to note their peculiarities, to -be in advance on the alert for them, to search for them anxiously, to -substitute them for meanings that eat up our energy in vain, defines -the aim of rational effort and the goal of legitimate ambition. The -absolutistic theory is the transfer of this moral or voluntary law of -selective action into a quasi-physical (that is, metaphysical) law of -indiscriminate being. Identify metaphysical being with _significant -excellent_ being--that is, with those relationships of things which, in -our moments of deepest insight and largest survey, we would continue -and reproduce--and the experimentalist, rather than the absolutist, -is he who has a right to proclaim the supremacy of Truth, and the -superiority of the life devoted to Truth for its own sake over that of -“mere” activity. But to read back into an order of things which exists -without the participation of our reflection and aim, the quality which -defines the purpose of our thought and endeavor is at one and the same -stroke to mythologize reality and to deprive the life of thoughtful -endeavor of its ground for being. - - - - -THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION FOR TRUTH[19] - - -I - -Among the influences that have worked in contemporary philosophy -towards disintegration of intellectualism of the epistemological type, -and towards the substitution of a philosophy of experience, the work of -Mr. Bradley must be seriously counted. One has, for example, only to -compare his metaphysics with the two fundamental contentions of T. H. -Green, namely, that reality is a single, eternal, and all-inclusive -system of relations, and that this system of relations is one in kind -with that process of relating which constitutes our thinking, to be -instantly aware of a changed atmosphere. Much of Bradley’s writings -is a sustained and deliberate polemic against intellectualism of the -Neo-Kantian type. When, however, we find conjoined to this criticism -an equally sustained contention that the philosophic conception of -reality must be based on an exclusively intellectual criterion, a -criterion belonging to and confined to theory, we have a situation -that is thought-provoking. The situation grows in interest when it is -remembered that there is a general and growing tendency among those -who appeal in philosophy to a strictly intellectualistic _method_ of -defining “reality,” to insist that the reality reached by this method -has a super-intellectual _content_: that intellectual, affectional, -and volitional features are all joined and fused in “ultimate” -reality. The curious character of the situation is that Reality is -an “absolute experience” of which the intellectual is simply one -partial and transmuted moment. Yet this reality is attained unto, -in philosophic method, by exclusive emphasis upon the intellectual -aspect of present experience and by systematic exclusion of exactly -the emotional, volitional features which with respect to content are -insisted upon! Under such circumstances the cynically-minded are moved -to wonder whether this tremendous insistence upon one factor in present -experience at the expense of others, is not because this is the only -way to maintain the notion of “Absolute Experience,” and to prevent -it from collapsing into ordinary everyday experience. This paradox is -not peculiar to Mr. Bradley. Looking at the Neo-Kantian movement in -the broad in its modern form, one might almost say that its prominent -feature is its insistence upon reaching a “Reality” that includes -extra-intellectual factors and phases, traits that are ideal in a moral -and emotional sense, by an exclusive recognition of the function of -knowledge in its isolation. - -Such being the case, an examination of Mr. Bradley’s method and -criterion may have far-reaching implications. First, let us set -before ourselves the general points of Mr. Bradley’s indictment of -intellectualism.[20] Knowledge or judgment works by means of thought; -it is predication of idea (meaning) of existence as its subject. Its -final aim is to effect a complete union or harmony of existence and -meaning. But it is fore-doomed to failure, for in realizing its end -it must employ means which contradict its own purpose. This inherent -incapacity lurks in judgment with respect to subject, predicate, and -copula. The predicate or meaning necessary to complete the reality -presented in the subject can be referred to the latter and united with -it only by being itself alienated from existence. It heals the wounds -or deficiencies of its own subject (and in the end all deficiencies are -to the modern idealist discrepancies) only on condition of inflicting -another wound,--only by sundering meaning from a prior union with -existence in some other phase. This latter existence, therefore, is -always left out in the cold. It is as if we wanted to get all the cloth -in the world into one garment and our only way of accomplishing this -were to tear off a portion from one piece of goods in order to patch it -on to another. - -The subject of the judgment, moreover, as well as the predicate, -stands in the way of judgment fulfilling its own task. It has -“sensuous infinitude” and it has “immediacy,” but these two traits -contradict each other. The details of the subject always go beyond -itself, being indefinitely related to something beyond. “In its given -content it has relations which do not terminate within that content” -(_ibid._, p. 176), while in its immediacy it presents an undivided -union of existence and meaning. No subject can be mere existence any -more than it can be mere meaning. It is always existent or embodied -meaning. As such it claims individuality or the character of a single -subsistent whole. But this indispensable claim is inconsistent with its -ragged-edged character, its indefinite external reference, which is -indispensable to it as subject that it may require and receive further -meaning from predication. - -With respect to the copula the following quotation from the -“Principles” of Logic (p. 10) may serve: “Judgment proper is the -_act_ which refers the ideal content (recognized as such) to the -reality beyond the act.” In other words, judgment as act (and it is -the act which is expressed in the copula) must always fall outside -of the content of knowledge as such; yet since this act certainly -falls within reality, it would have to be recognized and stated by -any knowledge pretending to competency with respect to reality as a -whole. These considerations, stated in this way, are highly technical -and presuppose a knowledge not merely of Mr. Bradley’s own logic, but -also of the logical analysis of knowledge initiated by Kant and carried -on by Herbart, Lotze, and others. Their main import may, however, be -stated in comparatively non-technical form. Human experience is full of -discrepancies. Were experience purely a matter of brute existence (such -as we sometimes imagine the animals’ experience to be) it would be -totally lacking in meaning and there would be no problems, no thinking, -no occasion for thinking, and hence no philosophy. On the other hand, -if experience were a complete, tight-jointed union of existence and -meaning, there would be no dissatisfaction, no problems, no cause for -efforts to patch up defects and contradictions. Existences, things, -would embody all the meanings that they suggest; while abstract -meanings, values that are _merely_ ideal, that are projected or thought -of but not fulfilled, would be totally unheard of. But our experience -stands in marked contrast to both these types of experience. It -is neither an affair of meaningless existence nor of existence -self-luminous with fulfilled meaning. All things that we experience -have _some_ meaning, but that meaning is always so partially embodied -in things that we cannot rest in them. They point beyond themselves; -they indicate meanings which they do not fulfil; they suggest values -which they fail to embody, and when we go to other things for the -fruition of what is denied, we either find the same situation of -division over again, or we find even more positive disappointment -and frustration--we find contrary meanings set up. Now all thinking -grows out of this discrepancy between existence and the meaning which -it partially embodies and partially refuses, which it suggests but -declines to express. Yet thinking, the mode of bringing existence and -meaning into harmony with each other, always works by selection, by -abstraction; it sets up and projects meanings which are ideal only, -footless, in the air, matters of thought only, not of sentiency or -immediate existence. It emphasizes the ideal of a completed union -of existence and meaning, but is helpless to effect it. And this -helplessness (according to Mr. Bradley) is not due to external pressure -but to the very structure of thought itself. - -From every point of view knowledge operates under conditions, (and -these not externally imposed but inherent in its own nature as -judgment,) that render it incapable of realizing its aim of complete -union of existence and meaning. Granted the argument, and it is -difficult to imagine a more serious indictment against the pretensions -of philosophy to reach “Reality” _via_ the exclusive path of knowledge. - -The presence of contradiction is Mr. Bradley’s criterion for -“appearance,” just as its absence is his criterion for “reality.” It -thus goes without saying that knowledge and truth which we can attain -are matters of appearance. Contradiction between existence and meaning -is its last word. This is not merely a logical deduction from Mr. -Bradley’s position, but is expressly stated by him. “Thus the truth -belongs to existence, but it does not as such exist.... Truth shows -a dissection but never an actual life” (“Appearance and Reality,” p. -167). Again, “every truth is appearance since in it we have divorce -of quality from being” (_ibid._, p. 187). “Even absolute truth seems -in the end to turn out erroneous.... Internal discrepancy belongs -irremovably to truth’s proper character.... Truth is one aspect of -experience and is therefore made imperfect and limited by what it fails -to include” (_ibid._, pp. 544-545). Nothing could be more explicit as -to the inherently contradictory character of truth, both as an ideal -and as an accomplished fact; nothing more positive as to the unreality -or appearance-character of truth. We cannot, on Mr. Bradley’s method, -stop here. Not only is knowledge--working as it does through thought -which is always partial, selective, abstractive--doomed to failure -in accomplishing its task, but the existence of the contradiction -between the suggestion of meanings by existence and this realization in -existence is itself due to thought. - -Speaking of thought he says: “The relational form is a compromise on -which thought stands and which it develops.” And all the particular -antinomies which he discusses are interpreted as having their basis -in the category of relation (_ibid._, p. 180). In his section on -Appearance he goes through various aspects and distinctions of the -world, such as primary and secondary qualities, substance and its -properties, relation and qualitative elements, space and time, motion -and change, causation, etc., pointing out irreconcilable discrepancies -in them. He does not, in a _generalized_ way, expressly refer them -to any common source or root. But it seems a fair inference that the -relational character of thought is at the bottom of the whole trouble: -so that we have in the cases mentioned precisely the same situation -_in concreto_ which is set forth _in abstracto_ in the discussion of -thought. The contradictions brought up are in every case resolved -into the fundamental discrepancy supposed to exist between relations -and elements related. In each case there is the ideal of a final -unity in which relations and elements as such disappear, while in -every case the nature of relation is such as to prevent the desired -consummation. In at least one place, it is expressly declared that it -is the knowledge function which is responsible for the degradation of -reality to appearance. “We do not suggest that the thing always itself -is an appearance. We mean its character is such _that it becomes one as -soon as we judge it_. And this character we have seen throughout our -work, is ideality. Appearance consists in the looseness of content from -existence.... And we have found that everywhere throughout the world -such ideality prevails” (_ibid._, p. 486, italics not in the original). -It is not then strictly true that the divorce of meaning and existence -instigates thought; rather thought is the unruly member that creates -the divorce and then engages in the task (in which it is self-condemned -to failure) of trying to establish the unity which it has gratuitously -destroyed. Thinking, self-consciousness, is disease of the naïve unity -of thoughtless experience. - -On the one hand there is a systematic discrediting of the ultimate -claims of the knowledge function, and this not from external -physiological or psychological reasons such as are sometimes alleged -against its capacity, but on the basis of its own interior logic. But -on the other hand, a strictly logical criterion is deliberately adopted -and employed as the fundamental and final criterion for the philosophic -conception of reality. Long familiarity has not dulled my astonishment -at finding exactly the same set of considerations which in the earlier -portion of the book are employed to condemn things as experienced by us -to the region of Appearance, employed in the latter portion of the book -to afford a triumphant demonstration of the existence and character of -Absolute Reality. The argument I take up first on its formal side, and -then with reference to material considerations.[21] - -The positive conception of Reality is reached by the conception that -“ultimate reality must be such that it does not contradict itself; -here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact -that either in endeavoring to deny it or even in attempting to doubt -it, we tacitly assume its validity” (_ibid._, pp. 136-137). That is -to say, when one sets out to think one must avoid self-contradiction; -this avoidance, or, put positively, the attainment of consistency, -harmony, is the basic law of all thinking. Since in thinking we -set out to attain reality, it follows that reality itself must be -self-consistent, and that its self-consistency determines the law -of thought. Or, as Mr. Bradley again puts the matter, “In order to -think at all you must subject yourself to the standard, a standard -which implies an absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt -this, you accept it, and obey, while you rebel” (_ibid._, p. 153). The -absolute knowledge referred to is, of course, the knowledge of the -thoroughly self-consistent, non-contradictory character of reality. -Every reader of Mr. Bradley’s book knows how he goes on from this point -to supply positive content to reality; to give an outline sketch of the -characters it must possess and the way in which it must possess them -in order to maintain its thoroughly self-consistent character. It is, -however, only the strictly formal aspect of the matter that I am here -concerned with. - -On this side we reach, I think, the heart of the matter by asking, -in reference to the first quotation: Absolute _for what_? Surely -absolute for the process under consideration, that is absolute for -thought. But the significance of this absolute for thought is, one -may say, “absolutely” (since we are here confessedly in the realm -just of thought) determined by the nature of thought itself. Now -this nature has been already referred by considerations “belonging -irremovably to truth’s proper character,” to the world of appearance -and of internal discrepancy. Yes, one may say (speaking formally), -the criterion of thought is absolute--that is to say absolute or final -for thought; but how can one imagine that this in any way alters the -essential nature and value of thought? If knowledge works by thought, -and thought institutes appearance over against reality, any further -fact about thought--such as a statement of its criterion--falls wholly -within the limits of this situation. It is comical to suppose that a -_special_ trait of thought can be employed to alter the fundamental and -essential nature of thought. The criterion of thought must be infected -by the nature of thought, instead of being a redeeming angel which at -a critical juncture transforms the fragile creature, thought, into an -ambassador with power plenipotentiary to the court of the Absolute. - -There really seems to be ground for supposing that the whole argument -turns on an ambiguity in the use of the word “absolute.” Keeping -strictly within the limits of the argument, it means nothing more than -that thinking has a certain principle, a law of its own; that it has -an appropriate mode of procedure which must not be violated. It means, -in short, whatever is finally controlling for the thought-function. -But Mr. Bradley immediately takes the word to mean absolute in the -sense of describing a reality which by its very nature is totally -contradistinguished from appearance--that is to say, from the realm -of thought. Upon the ambiguity of a word, the systematic indictment -of intellectualism becomes the cornerstone of a systematically -intellectualistic method of conceiving reality! - -Mr. Bradley has himself recognized the seeming contradiction between -his indictment of thought and his use of the criterion of thought as -the exclusive path to a philosophic notion of the real. In dealing -with it, he (to my mind) comes within an ace of stating a truer -doctrine, and also exhibits even more clearly the weakness of his own -position. He goes so far as to put the following words into the mouth -of an objector, and to accept their general import: “All axioms, as -a matter of fact, are practical ... for none of them in the end can -amount to more than the impulse to behave in a certain way. And they -cannot express more than this impulse, together with the impossibility -of satisfaction unless it is complied with” (p. 151). After accepting -this (p. 152) he goes on to say: “Take for example the law of avoiding -contradiction. When two elements will not remain quietly together, -but collide and struggle, we cannot rest satisfied with that state. -Our impulse is to alter it and, on the theoretical side, to bring -the content to such shape that the variety remains peaceably in one. -And this inability to rest otherwise and this tendency to alter in a -certain way and direction is, _when reflected upon and made explicit_, -our axiom and our intellectual standard” (p. 152; italics mine). - -The retort is obvious: if _the_ intellectual criterion, the principle -of non-contradiction on which his whole Absolute Reality rests, is -itself a practical principle, then surely the ultimate criterion for -regulating intellectual undertakings is practical. To this obvious -answer Mr. Bradley makes reply as follows: “You may call the intellect, -if you like, a mere tendency to a movement, but you must remember that -it is a movement of a _very special kind_.... Thinking is the attempt -to satisfy a _special_ impulse, and the attempt implies an assumption -about reality.... But why, it may be objected, is this assumption -better than what holds for practice? Why is the theoretical to be -superior to the practical end? I have never said that this is so, only -_here_, that is, in _metaphysics_, I must be allowed to reply, we are -acting theoretically.... The _theoretical standard within theory must -surely be absolute_” (p. 153. The italics again are mine; compare with -the quotation this, from p. 485: “Our attitude, however, in metaphysics -must be theoretical.” So, also, p. 154, “Since metaphysics is mere -theory and since theory from its nature must be made by the intellect, -it is here the intellect alone which is to be satisfied”). - -Grant that intellect is a special movement or mode of practice; grant -that we are not merely acting (are we ever _merely_ acting?) but are -“specially occupied and therefore subject to special conditions,” -and the problem remains _what_ special kind of activity is thinking? -what is its experienced differentia from other kinds? what is its -commerce with them? When the problem is _what_ special kind of an -activity is thinking and of _what_ nature is the consistency which -is its criterion, somehow we do not get forward by being told that -thinking _is_ a special mode of practice and that its criterion _is_ -consistency. The unquestioned presupposition of Mr. Bradley is that -thinking is such a wholly separate activity (the “intellect _alone_” -which has to be satisfied), that to give it autonomy is to say that it, -and its criterion, have nothing to do with other activities; that it is -“independent” as to criterion, in a way which excludes interdependence -in function and outcome. Unless the term “special” be interpreted to -mean _isolated_, to say that thinking is a _special_ mode of activity -no more nullifies the proposition that it arises in a practical contest -and operates for practical ends, than to say that blacksmithing is a -_special_ activity, negates its being one connected mode of industrial -activity. - -His underlying presupposition of the separate character of thought -comes out in the passage last quoted. “Our impulse,” he says, “is to -alter the conflicting situation and, _on the theoretical side_, to -bring its contents into peaceable unity.” If one substitutes for the -word “on” the word “through,” one gets a conception of theory and of -thinking that does justice to the autonomy of the operation and yet so -connects it with other activities as to give it a serious business, -real purpose, and concrete responsibility and hence testibility. -From this point of view the theoretical activity is simply the form -that certain practical activities take after colliding, as the most -effective and fruitful way of securing their own harmonization. -The collision is not theoretical; the issue in “peaceable unity” -is not theoretical. But theory names the type of activity by which -the transformation from war to peace is most amply and securely -effected.[22] - -Admit, however, the force of Mr. Bradley’s contention on its own terms -and see how futile is the result. It is quite true, as Mr. Bradley -says (p. 153), that if a man sits down to play the metaphysical game, -he must abide by the rules of thinking; but if thinking be already, -with respect to reality, an idle and futile game, simply abiding by -the rules does not give additional value to its stakes. Grant the -premises as to the character of thought, and the assertion of the -final character of the theoretical standard within metaphysics--since -metaphysics is a form of theory--is a warning against metaphysics. If -the intellect involves self-contradiction, it is either impossible that -it should be satisfied, or else self-contradiction is its satisfaction. - - -II - -Let us, however, turn from Mr. Bradley’s formal proof that the -criterion of philosophic truth must be exclusively a canon of formal -thought. Let us ignore the contradiction involved in first making the -work of thought to be the producing of appearance and then making -the law of this thought the law of an Absolute Reality. What about -the intellectualist criterion? The intellectualism of Mr. Bradley’s -philosophy is represented in the statement that it is “the theoretical -standard which guarantees that reality is a self-consistent system” -(p. 148). But how can the fact that the criterion of thinking is -consistency be employed to determine the nature of the consistency of -its object? Consistency in one sense, consistency of reasoning with -itself, we know; but what is the nature of the consistency of reality -which this consistency necessitates? Thinking without doubt must be -logical; but does it follow from this that the reality about which -one thinks, and about which one must think consistently if one is to -think to any purpose, must itself be already logical? The pivot of -the argument is, of course, the old ontological argument, stripped of -all theological irrelevancies and reduced to its fighting weight as -a metaphysical proposition. Those who question this basic principle -of intellectualism will, of course, question it here. They will urge -that, instead of the consistency of “reality” resting on the basis of -consistency in the reasoning process the latter derives its meaning -from the material consistency at which it aims. They will say that -the definition of the nature of the consistency which is the end of -thinking and which prescribes its technique is to be reached from -inquiry into such questions as these: What sort of an activity in the -concrete is thinking? what are the specific conditions which it has -to fulfil? what is its use; its relevancy; its purport in present -concrete experiences? The more it is insisted that the theoretical -standard--consistency--is final within theory, the more germane and -the more urgent is the question: What then in the concrete is theory? -and of what nature _is_ the material consistency which is the test of -its formal consistency?[23] - -Take the instance of a man who wishes to deny the criterion of -self-consistency in thinking. Is he refuted by pointing to the “fact” -that eternal reality is eternally self-consistent? Would not his -obvious answer to such a mode of refutation be: “What of it? What is -the relevancy of that proposition to my procedure in thinking here -and now? Doubtless absolute reality may be a great number of things, -possibly very sublime and precious things; but what I am concerned with -is a particular job of thinking, and until you show me the intermediate -terms which link that job to the asserted self-consistent character -of absolute reality, I fail to see what difference this doubtless -wholly amiable trait of reality has to make in what I am here and now -concerned with. You might as well quote any other irrelevant fact, such -as the height of the Empress of China.” We take another tack in dealing -with the man in question. We call his attention to his specific aim in -the situation with reference to which he is thinking, and point out the -conditions that have to be observed if that aim is to fulfil itself. We -show that if he does not observe the conditions imposed by his aim his -thinking will go on so wildly as to defeat itself. It is to consistency -of means with the end of the concrete activity that we appeal. “Try -thinking,” we tell such a man, “experiment with it, taking pains -sometimes to have your reasonings consistent with one another, and at -other times deliberately introducing inconsistencies; then see what -you get in the two cases and how the result reached is related to your -purpose in thinking.” We point out that since that purpose is to reach -a settled conclusion, that purpose will be defeated unless the steps of -reasoning are kept consistent with one another. We do not appeal from -the mere consistency of the reasoning process--the intellectual aspect -of the matter--to an absolute self-consistent reality; but we appeal -from the material character of the end to be reached to the type of the -formal procedure necessary to accomplish it. - -With all our heart, then, the standard of thinking is absolute -(that is final) within thinking. But what is thinking? The standard -of blacksmithing must be absolute within blacksmithing, but what is -blacksmithing? No prejudice prevents acknowledging that blacksmithing -is one practical activity existing as a distinct and relevant member -of a like system of activities: that it is because men use horses to -transport persons and goods that horses need to be shod. The ultimate -criterion of blacksmithing is producing a good shoe, but the nature -of a good shoe is fixed, not by blacksmithing, but by the activities -in which horses are used. The end is ultimate (absolute) for the -operation, but this very finality is evidence that the operation is not -absolute and self-inclosed, but is related and responsible. Why must -the fact that the end of thinking is ultimate for thought stand on any -different footing? - -Let us then, by way of experiment, follow this suggestion. Let us -assume that among real objects in their values and significances, real -oppositions and incompatibilities exist; that these conflicts are both -troublesome in themselves, and the source of all manner of further -difficulties--so much so that they may be suspected of being the source -of all man’s woe, of all encroachment upon and destruction of value, -of good. Suppose that thinking is, not accidentally but essentially, -a way, and the only way that proves adequate, of dealing with these -predicaments--that being “in a hole,” in difficulty, is the fundamental -“predicament” of intelligence. Suppose when effort is made in a brute -way to remove these oppositions and to secure an arrangement of things -which means satisfaction, fulfilment, happiness, that the method of -brute attack, of trying directly to force warrings into peace fails; -suppose then an effort to effect the transformation by an indirect -method--by inquiry into the disordered state of affairs and by framing -views, conceptions, of what the situation would be like were it reduced -to harmonious order. Finally, suppose that upon this basis a plan of -action is worked out, and that this plan, when carried into overt -effect, succeeds infinitely better than the brute method of attack in -bringing about the desired consummation. Suppose again this indirection -of activity is precisely what we mean by thinking. Would it not hold -that harmony is the end and the test of thinking? that observations are -pertinent and ideas correct just in so far as, overtly acted upon, they -succeed in removing the undesirable, the inconsistent. - -But, it is said, the very process of thinking makes a certain -assumption regarding the nature of reality, viz., that reality is -self-consistent. This statement puts the end for the beginning. The -assumption is not that “reality” _is_ self-consistent, but that by -thinking it may, for some special purpose, or as respects some -concrete problem, attain greater consistency. Why should the assumption -regarding “reality” be other than that specific realities with which -thought is concerned are _capable of receiving_ harmonization? To say -that thought must assume, in order to go on, that reality already -possesses harmony is to say that thought must begin by contradicting -its own direct data, and by assuming that its concrete aim is vain and -illusory. Why put upon thought the onus of introducing discrepancies -into reality in order just to give itself exercise in the gymnastic -of removing them? The assumption that concrete thinking makes about -“reality” is that things just as they exist may acquire _through -activity, guided by thinking_, a certain character which it is -excellent for them to possess; and may acquire it more liberally and -effectively than by other methods. One might as well say that the -blacksmith could not think to any effect concerning iron, without a -Platonic archetypal horseshoe, laid up in the heavens. His thinking -also makes an assumption about present, given reality, viz., that -this piece of iron, through the exercise of intelligently directed -activity, may be shaped into a satisfactory horseshoe. The assumption -is practical: the assumption that a specific thing may take on in a -specific way a specific needed value. The test, moreover, of this -assumption is practical; it consists in acting upon it to see if it -will do what it pretends it can do, namely, guide activities to the -required result. The assumption about reality is not something in -addition to the idea, which an idea already in existence makes; some -assumption about the possibility of a change in the state of things as -experienced _is_ the idea--and its test or criterion is whether this -possible change can be effected when the idea is acted upon in good -faith. - -In any case, how much simpler the case becomes when we stick by the -empirical facts. According to them there is no wholesale discrepancy -of existence and meaning; there is simply a “loosening” of the two -when objects do not fulfil our plans and meet our desires; or when we -project inventions and cannot find immediately the means for their -realization. The “collisions” are neither physical, metaphysical, nor -logical; they are moral and practical. They exist between an aim and -the means of its execution. Consequently the object of thinking is -not to effect some wholesale and “Absolute” reconciliation of meaning -and existence, but to make a specific adjustment of things to our -purposes and of our purposes to things at just the crucial point of -the crisis. Making the utmost concessions to Mr. Bradley’s account -of the discrepancy of meaning and existence in our experience, to -his statement of the relation of this to the function of judgment -(as involving namely an explicit _statement_ at once of the actual -sundering and the ideal union) and to his account of consistency as -the goal and standard, there is still not a detail of the account -that is not met amply and with infinitely more empirical warrant by -the conception that the “collision” in which thinking starts and the -“consistency” in which it terminates are practical and human. - - -III - -This brings us explicitly to the question of truth, “truth” being -confessedly the end and standard of thinking. I confess to being much -at a loss to realize just what the intellectualists conceive to be the -relation of truth to ideas on one side and to “reality” on the other. -My difficulty occurs, I think, because they describe so little in -analytical detail; in writing of truth they seem rather to be under a -strong emotional influence--as if they were victims of an uncritical -pragmatism--which leaves much of their thought to be guessed at. The -implication of their discussions assigns three distinct values to the -term “truth.” On the one hand, truth is something which characterizes -ideas, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, judgments, propositions, -assertions, etc.,--anything whatsoever involving _intellectual_ -statement. From this standpoint a criterion of truth means the test -of the worth of the intellectual intent, import, or claim of any -intellectual statement as intellectual. This is an intelligible sense -of the term truth. In the second place, it seems to be assumed that -a certain kind of reality is already, apart from ideas or meanings, -Truth, and that _this_ Truth is the criterion of that lower and more -unworthy kind of truth that may be possessed or aimed at by ideas. -But we do not stop here. The conception that _all_ truth must have a -criterion haunts the intellectualist, so that the reality, which, as -contrasted with ideas, is taken to be The Truth (and the criterion -of _their_ truth) is treated as if it itself had to have support and -warrant from some other Reality, lying back of it, which is _its_ -criterion. This, then, gives the third type of truth, _The Absolute -Truth_. (Just why this process should not go on indefinitely is not -clear, but the necessity of infinite regress may be emotionally -prevented by always referring to this last type of truth as Absolute). -Now this scheme may be “true,” but it is not self-explanatory or even -easily apprehensible. In just what sense, truth is (1) that to which -ideas as ideas lay claim and yet is (2) Reality which as reality is -the criterion of truth of ideas, and yet again is (3) a Reality which -completely annuls and transcends all reference to ideas, is not in the -least clear to me: nor, till better informed, shall I believe it to be -clear to any one. - -In his more strictly logical discussions, Mr. Bradley sets out from -the notion that truth refers to intellectual statements and positions -as such. But the Truth soon becomes a sort of transcendent essence -on its own account. The identification of reality and truth on page -146 may be a mere casual phrase, but the distinction drawn between -validity and absolute truth (p. 362), and the discussion of Degrees -of Truth and Reality, involve assumptions of an identity of truth and -reality. Truth in this sense turns out to be the criterion for the -truth, the truth, that is, of ideas. But, again (p. 545), a distinction -is made between “Finite Truth,” that is, a view of reality which would -completely satisfy intelligence as such, and “Absolute Truth,” which is -obtained only by _passing beyond intelligence_--only when intelligence -as such is absorbed in some Absolute in which it loses its distinctive -character. - -It would advance the state of discussion, I am sure, if there were -more explicit statements regarding the relations of “true idea,” -“truth,” “the criterion of truth” and “reality,” to one another. A -more explicit exposition also of the view that is held concerning the -relation of verification and truth could hardly fail to be of value. -Not infrequently the intellectualist admits that the process of -verification is experimental, consisting in setting on foot various -activities that express the intent of the idea and confirm or refute -it according to the changes effected. This seems to mean that truth -is simply the tested or verified belief as such. But then a curious -reservation is introduced; the experimental process _finds_, it is -said, that an idea is true, while the error of the pragmatist is to -take the process by which truth is _found_ as one by which it is made. -The claim of “making truth” is treated as blasphemy against the very -notion of truth: such are the consequences of venturing to translate -the Latin “verification” into the English “making true.” - -If we face the bogie thus called up, it will be found that the horror -is largely sentimental. Suppose we stick to the notion that truth is a -character which belongs to a meaning so far as tested through action -that carries it to successful completion. In this case, to make an idea -true is to modify and transform it until it reaches this successful -outcome: until it initiates a mode of response which in its issue -realizes its claim to be the method of harmonizing the discrepancies of -a given situation. The meaning is remade by constantly acting upon it, -and by introducing into its content such characters as are indicated -by any resulting failures to secure harmony. From this point of view, -verification and truth are two names for the same thing. We call it -“verification” when we regard it as process; when the development of -the idea is strung out and exposed to view in all that makes it true. -We call it “truth” when we take it as product, as process telescoped -and condensed. - -Suppose the idea to be an invention, say of the telephone. In this -case, is not the verification of the idea and the construction of -the device which carries out its intent one and the same? In this -case, does the truth of the idea mean anything else than that the -issue proves the idea can be carried into effect? There are certain -intellectualists who are not of the absolutist type; who do not believe -that all of men’s aims, designs, projects, that have to do with action, -whether industrial, social, or moral in scope, have been from all -eternity registered as already accomplished in reality. How do such -persons dispose of this problem of the truth of practical ideas? - -Is not the truth of _such_ ideas an affair of _making_ them true by -constructing, through appropriate behavior, a condition that satisfies -the requirements of the case? If, in this case, truth means the -effective capacity of the idea “to make good,” what is there in the -logic of the case to forbid the application of analogous considerations -to any idea? - -I hear a noise in the street. It suggests as its meaning a street-car. -To test this idea I go to the window and through listening and -looking intently--the listening and the looking being modes of -behavior--organize into a single situation elements of existence and -meaning which were previously disconnected. In this way an idea is made -true; that which was a proposal or hypothesis is no longer merely a -propounding or a guess. If I had not reacted in a way appropriate to -the idea it would have remained a mere idea; at most a candidate for -truth that, unless acted upon upon the spot, would always have remained -a theory. Now in such a case--where the end to be accomplished is the -discovery of a certain order of facts--would the intellectualist claim -that apart from the forming and entertaining of some interpretation, -the category of truth has either existence or meaning? Will he claim -that without an original practical uneasiness introducing a practical -aim of inquiry there must have been, whether or no, an idea? Must -the world for some purely intellectual reason be intellectually -reduplicated? Could not that occurrence which I now identify as a noisy -street-car have retained, so far as pure intelligence is concerned, -its unidentified status of being mere physical alteration in a vast -unidentified complex of matter-in-motion? Was there any _intellectual_ -necessity that compelled the event to arouse just this judgment, -that it meant a street-car? Was there any physical or metaphysical -necessity? Was there any necessity save a need of characterizing -it for some purpose of our own? And why should we be mealy-mouthed -about calling this need practical? If the necessity which led to the -formation and development of an intellectual judgment was purely -objective (whether physical or metaphysical) why should not the thing -have also to be characterized in countless millions of other ways; for -example, as to its distance from some crater in the moon, or its effect -upon the circulation of my blood, or upon my irascible neighbor’s -temper, or bearing upon the Monroe Doctrine? In short, do not -intellectual positions and statements mean new and significant events -in the treatment of things? - -It is perhaps dangerous to attempt to follow the inner workings of -the processes by which truth is first identified with some superior -type of Reality, and then this Truth is taken as the criterion of the -truth of ideas; while all the time it is held that truth is something -already possessed by ideas as purely intellectual. But there seems -to be some ground for believing that this identification is due to a -twofold confusion, one having to do with ideas, and the other with -things. As to the first point: After an idea is made true, we naturally -say, in retrospect, “it _was_ true all the time.” Now this truism is -quite innocuous as a truism, being just a restatement of the fact that -the idea has, as matter of fact, worked successfully. But it may be -regarded not as a truism but as furnishing some additional knowledge; -as if it were, indeed, the dawning of a revelation regarding truth. -Then it is said that the idea worked or was verified because it was -already inherently, just as idea, the truth; the pragmatist, so it -is said, making the error of supposing that it is true because it -works. If one remembers that what the experimentalist means is that -the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same -thing--this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of truth -but its nature--it is hard to see the point of this statement. A -man under peculiarly precarious circumstances has been rescued from -drowning. A by-stander remarks that now he is a saved man. “Yes,” -replies some one, “but he was a saved man all the time, and the process -of rescuing, while it gives evidence of that fact, does not constitute -it.” Now even such a statement as pure tautology, as characterizing the -entire process in terms of its issue, is objectionable only in the fact -that, like all tautology, it seems to say something but does not. But -if it be regarded as revealing the earlier condition of affairs, apart -from the active process by which it was carried to a happy conclusion, -such a statement would be monstrously false; and would declare its -falsity in the fact that, if acted upon, the man would have been left -to drown. In like fashion, to say, _after the event_, that a given -idea was true all the time, is to lose sight of what makes an idea an -idea, its hypothetical character; and thereby deliberately to transform -it into brute dogma--something to which no canon of verification can -ever be applied. The intellectualist almost always treats the pragmatic -account as if it were, from the standpoint of the pragmatist as well as -from his own, a denial of the existence of truth, while it is nothing -but a statement of its nature. When the intellectualist realizes this, -he will, I hope, ask himself: What, then, on the pragmatic basis is -meant by the proposition that an idea is true all the time? If the -statement that an idea was true all the time has no meaning except that -the idea was one which as matter of fact succeeded through action in -achieving its intent, mere reiteration that the idea was true all the -time or it could not have succeeded, does not take us far.[24] - -On the side of things, _reality_ is identified with truth; then on the -principle that two things that are equal to the same thing are equal -to each other, truth as idea and truth as reality are taken to be one -and the same thing. Wherever there is an improved or tested idea, an -idea which has made good, there is a concrete existence in the way of a -completed or harmonized situation. The same activity which proves the -idea constructs an inherently satisfied situation out of an inherently -dissentient one,--for it is precisely the capacity of the idea as an -aim and method of action to determine such transformation that is the -criterion of its truth. Now unless all the elements in the situation -are held steadily in view, the specific way in which the harmonized -reality affords the criterion of truth (namely, through its function of -being the last term of a process of active determination) is lost from -sight; and the achieved existence in its merely existent character, -apart from its practical or fulfilment character, is treated as The -Truth. But when the reality is thus separated from the process by which -it is achieved, when it is taken just as given, it is neither truth -nor a criterion of truth. It is a state of facts like any other. The -achieved telephone is a criterion of the validity of a certain prior -idea in so far as it is the fulfilment of activities that embody the -nature of that idea, but just as telephone, as a machine actually in -existence, it is no more truth nor criterion of truth than is a crack -in the wall or a cobble-stone on the street. - -The intervening term that mediates and completes the confusion of truth -with ideas on one hand and “reality” on the other, is, I think, the -fact that ideas after they have been tested in action are employed -in the development and grounding of further beliefs. There are cases -in which an idea ceases to exist as idea as soon as it is made true; -this is so as matter of fact and it is impossible to conceive any -reason why it should not be so in point of theory. Such is the case, I -take it, with a large part--possibly the major portion--of the ideas -that mediate the smaller and transient crises of daily practice. -I cannot imagine the situation in which the truth to which I have -referred above--the verification of a certain idea about a certain -noise--would ever function again as truth--save as I have given it a -function in this paper by using it as a corroboration of a certain -theory. Such ideas mostly cease, giving way to a matter-of-fact status: -say, the perception of the noisy street-car. One at the time may say -“My idea regarding that noise was a true idea”; or one may not even -go so far as that, he may just stop with the eventual perception. -But the tested idea need not ever recur as a factor of proof in any -other problem. Such, however, is conspicuously not the case with -our scientific ideas. In its first value, the idea or hypothesis of -gravitation entertained by Newton, stood, when verified, on exactly -the same level as the hypothesis regarding the noise in the street. -Theoretically, that truth might have been so isolated that its truth -character would disappear from thought as soon as a certain factual -condition was ascertained. But practically quite the opposite has -happened. The idea operates in many other inquiries, and operates no -longer as mere idea, but as _proved_ idea. Such truths get an “eternal” -status;--one irrespective of application just now and here, because -there are so many nows and heres in which they are useful. Just as to -say an idea was true all the time is a way of saying _in retrospect_ -that it has come out in a certain fashion, so to say that an idea is -“eternally true” is to indicate _prospective_ modes of application -which are indefinitely anticipated. Its meaning, therefore, is -strictly pragmatic. It does not indicate a property inherent in the -idea as intellectualized existence, but denotes a property of use and -employment. Always at hand when needed is a good enough eternal for -reasonably minded persons. - - -IV - -I have gone from the very general considerations which occupied us in -the earlier portions of this article to matters which relatively at -least are specific. I conclude with a summary in the hope that it may -bind together the earlier and the later parts of this paper. - -1. The condition which antecedes and provokes any particular exercise -of reflective knowing is always one of discrepancy, struggle, -“collision.” This condition is practical, for it involves the habits -and interests of the organism, an agent. This does not mean that the -struggle is merely personal, or subjective, or psychological. The -agent or individual is one factor in the situation--not the situation -something subsisting in the individual. The individual has to be -identified in the situation, before any situation can be referred--as -in psychology--to the individual. But the discrepancy calls out and -controls reflective knowing only as the fortunes of an agent are -implicated in the crisis. Certain elements stand out as obstacles, -as interferences, as deficiencies--in short as unsatisfactory and as -requiring something for their completion. Other elements stand out -as wanted--as required, as a satisfaction which does not exist. This -clash (an accompaniment of all desire) between the given and the -wanted, between the present and the absent, is at once the root and -the type of that peculiar paradoxical relation between existence and -meaning which Bradley insists upon as the essence of judgment. It -is not irrational in the sense that we are dealing with appearance -wholesale, but it is non-rational--an evidence that we are dealing with -a practical affair. - -2. The intellectual or reflective and logical is a _statement_ of -this conflict: an attempt to describe and define it. It is, as it -were, the practical clash held off at arm’s length for inspection -and investigation. In this way brute blind reaction against the -unsatisfactoriness of the situation is suspended. Action is turned -into the channel of observing, of inferring, of reasoning, or defining -means and end. It is this change in the quality of activity, from -directly overt, to indirect, or inquiring with view to stating, that -constitutes the _specific_ nature of reflective practice to which Mr. -Bradley calls attention. The discovery of the nature of the conflict -supplies materials for the fact or existence side of the judgement. -The conception or projection of the object in which the conflict -would be terminated furnishes material for the meaning side of the -judgment. It is ideal because anticipatory, just as the fact side -is existential, because reminiscent or recording. Hence the two are -necessarily both distinguished from and yet referred to each other: -only through location of a problem can a solution be conceived; only -in reference to the intent of finding a solution can the elements of -a problem be selected and interpreted. In origin and in destiny, this -correlative determination of existence and meaning is tentative and -experimental. The aim of the subject of the judgment is not to include -all possible reality, but to select those elements of a reality that -are useful in locating the source and nature of the difficulty in -hand. The aim of the predicate is not to bunch all possible meaning -and refer it in one final act indiscriminately to all existence, but -to state the standpoint and method through which the difficulty of the -particular situation may most effectively be dealt with. The selection -of what is relevant to the characterization of the problem and the -projection of the method of dealing with it are theoretic, hypothetic, -intellectual:--that is, they are tentative ways of viewing the matter -for the sake of guiding, economizing, and freeing the activities -through which it may _really_ be dealt with. - -3. The criterion of the worth of the idea is thus the capacity of -the idea (as a definition of the end or outcome in terms of what is -likely to be serviceable as a method) to operate in fulfilling the -object for the sake of which it was projected. Capacity of operation -in this fashion is the test, measure, or criterion of truth. Hence the -criterion is practical in the most overt sense of that term. We may, -if we choose, regard the object in which the idea terminates through -its use in guiding action, as the criterion; but if we so choose, it is -at our peril that we forget that this object serves as criterion in its -capacity of fulfilment and not as sheer objective existence. - -4. Difficulties overlap; problems recur which resemble each other -in the kind of treatment they demand for solution. Various modes of -activity with their respective ends, going on at some time more or -less independently, get organized into single comprehensive systems of -behavior. The solution of one problem is found to create difficulties -elsewhere; or the truth that is made in the solution of one problem -is found to afford an effective method of dealing with questions -arising apparently from unallied sources. Thus certain tested ideas -in performing a constant or recurrent function secure a certain -permanent status. The prospective use of such truths, the satisfaction -that we anticipate in their employ, the assurance of control that we -feel in their possession, becomes relatively much more important than -the circumstances under which they were first made true. In becoming -permanent resources, such tested ideas get a generalized energy of -position. They are truths in general, truths “in themselves” or in the -abstract, truths to which positive value is assigned on their own -account. Such truths are the “eternal truths” of current discussion. -They naturally and properly add to their intellectual and to their -practical worth a certain esthetic quality. They are interesting to -contemplate, and their contemplation arouses emotions of admiration -and reverence. To make these emotions the basis of assigning peculiar -inherent sanctity to them apart from their warrant in use, is simply -to give way to that mood which in primitive man is the cause of -attributing magical efficacy to physical things. Esthetically such -truths are more than instrumentalities. But to ignore both the -instrumental and the esthetic aspect, and to ascribe values due to an -instrumental and esthetic character to some interior and _a priori_ -constitution of truth is to make fetishes of them. - -We may not exaggerate the permanence and stability of such truths with -respect to their recurring and prospective use. It is only relatively -that they are unchanging. When applied to new cases, used as resources -for coping with new difficulties, the oldest of truths are to some -extent remade. Indeed it is only through such application and such -remaking that truths retain their freshness and vitality. Otherwise -they are relegated to faint reminiscences of an antique tradition. Even -the truth that two and two make four has gained a new meaning, has had -its truth in some degree remade, in the development of the modern -theory of number. If we put ourselves in the attitude of a scientific -inquirer in asking what is the meaning of truth _per se_, there spring -up before us those ideas which are actively employed in the mastery -of new fields, in the organization of new materials. This is the -essential difference between truth and dogma; between the living and -the dead and decaying. Above all, it is in the region of moral truth -that this perception stands out. Moral truths that are not recreated in -application to the urgencies of the passing hour, no matter how true -in the place and time of their origin, are pernicious and misleading, -_i.e._, false. And it is perhaps through emphasizing this fact, -embodied in one form or another in every system of morals and in every -religion of moral import, that one most readily realizes the character -of truth. - - - - -A SHORT CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH[25] - - -_Pupil._ I am desirous, respected teacher, of forming an independent -judgment concerning the novel theory of truth that you are said to -profess. My eagerness is whetted because the theory as expounded -to me by my old teacher, Professor Purus Intellectus, so obviously -contravenes common sense, science, and philosophy that I do not -understand how it can be advanced in good faith by any reasonable man. - -_Teacher._ As you are already somewhat acquainted with the theory (or -at least with what it purports to be), perhaps if you will set forth -in order your objections, it will appear that the theory that you are -acquainted with is not advanced by any reasonable persons, and that by -understanding the theory as it is you will also be led to embrace it. - -_Pupil: Objection One._ Pragmatism makes truth a subjective affair, -namely the satisfaction afforded individuals by ideas, while everybody -knows that the truth of ideas depends upon their relation to things. - -_Teacher: Reply._ If I were to reply that I hold to existences -independent of ideas, existences prior to, synchronous with, and -subsequent to ideas, that might seem to you to express only my personal -opinion and to have no logical connection with pragmatism. So I beg -to remind you that, according to pragmatism, ideas (judgments and -reasonings being included for convenience in this term) are attitudes -of response taken toward extra-ideal, extra-mental things. Instinct and -habit express, for instance, modes of response, but modes inadequate -for a progressive being, or for adaptation to an environment presenting -novel and unmastered features. Under such conditions, ideas are -their surrogates. The origin of an idea is thus in some empirical, -extra-mental situation which provokes ideas as modes of response, while -their meaning is found in the modifications--the “differences”--they -make in this extra-mental situation. Their validity is in turn measured -by their capacity to effect the transformation they intend. Origin, -content, and value--all alike are extra-ideational. The satisfaction -upon which the pragmatist dwells is just the better adjustment of -living beings to their environment effected by transformations of the -environment through forming and applying ideas. - -_Pupil: Objection Two._ But, as I understand it and as you have -yourself confessed in your language, these external things, while they -may be external to the particular idea in question, are _empirical_; -they are just other experiences and so mental after all. You hold, I -have been informed, that truth is an _experienced_ relation, instead -of a relation between experience and what transcends it; why then be -mealy-mouthed (pardon my eagerness if it leads me astray) in admitting -that the whole business is intra-mental? - -_Teacher: Reply._ Your objection combines and confuses two things. -To disentangle them is to answer the objection. (1) The notion of -transcendence has a double meaning; first, it denotes that which lies -inherently and essentially beyond experience. It is interesting to note -that the opponents of pragmatism have been forced by the exigencies -of their hostility to resuscitate a doctrine supposedly dead: the -doctrine of unexperienceable, unknowable “Things in Themselves.” And -as if this were not enough, they identify Truth with relationship to -this unknowable. Thereby in behalf of the notion of Truth in general, -they land in scepticism with reference to the possibility of any truth -in particular. The pragmatist _is_ bound to deny _such_ transcendence. -(2) That he is thereby landed in pure subjectivism or the reduction of -every existence to the purely mental, follows only if experience means -only mental states. The critic appears to hold the Humian doctrine -that experience is made up of states of mind, of sensations and -ideas. It is then for _him_ to decide how, on _his_ basis, he escapes -subjective idealism, or “mentalism.” The pragmatist starts from a -much more commonplace notion of experience, that of the plain man who -never dreams that to experience a thing is first to destroy the thing -and then to substitute a mental state for it. More particularly, the -pragmatist has insisted that experience is a matter of functions and -habits, of active adjustments and re-adjustments, of co-ordinations -and activities, rather than of states of consciousness. To criticise -the pragmatist by reading into him exactly the notion of experience -that he denies and replaces, may be psychological and unregenerately -“pragmatic,” but it is hardly “intellectual.” - -_Pupil: Objection Three._ You remind me, curiously enough, of a -contention of my old instructor to the effect that the pragmatist, -when criticised, always shifts his ground. To avoid solipsism and -subjectivism, he falls back on things independent of ideas, adducing -them in order to pass upon the truth or falsity of the latter. But -thereby he only covertly recognizes the intellectualistic standard. -Thus he swings unevenly between a denial of science and a clamorous -reiteration, in new phraseology, of what all philosophers hold. - -_Teacher: Reply._ Your words have indeed a familiar sound. Apparently, -the average intellectualist has got so accustomed to taking truth as a -Relation at Large, without specification or analysis, that any attempt -at a concrete statement of just what the relationship is appears to -be a denial of the relation itself; in which case, he interprets an -occasional reminder from the pragmatist that the latter is, after all, -attempting to specify the nature of the relation, to be a surrender of -the pragmatist’s own case, since it admits after all that there is some -relation! - -However that may be, the pragmatist holds that the relation in -question is one of correspondence between existence and thought; -but he holds that correspondence instead of being an ultimate and -unanalyzable mystery, to be defined by iteration, is precisely a -matter of cor-respondence in its plain, familiar sense. A condition of -dubious and conflicting tendencies calls out thinking as a method of -handling it. This condition produces its own appropriate consequences, -bearing its own fruits of weal and woe. The thoughts, the estimates, -intents, and projects it calls out, just because they are attitudes -of response and of attempted adjustment (_not_ mere “states of -consciousness”), produce their effects also. The kind of interlocking, -of interadjustment that then occurs between these two sorts of -consequences constitutes the correspondence that makes truth, just as -failure to respond to each other, to work together, constitutes mistake -and error--mishandling and wandering. This account may, of course, be -wrong--may involve a maladjustment of consequences--but the error in -the account, if it exists, must be specific and empirical, and cannot -be located by general epistemological accusations. - -_Pupil: Objection Four._ Well, even admitting this version of -pragmatism, you cannot deny it still contravenes common sense; for, -according to you, the correspondence that constitutes truth does not -exist till _after_ ideas have worked, while common sense perceives and -knows that it is the antecedent agreement of the ideas with reality -that enables them to work. If you make the truth of the existence of a -Carboniferous age, or the landing of Columbus in 1492, depend upon a -future working of an idea about them, you commit yourself to the most -fantastic of philosophies. - -_Teacher: Reply._ May I recall to your attention the accusation of -“shifting ground” when hard pressed? The intellectualist began, if I -remember correctly, with conceiving truth as a relation of thought -and existence; has he not, in your last objection, substituted for -this conception an identification of the bare existence or event with -truth? Which does he mean? How will he have it? The existence of the -Carboniferous age, the discovery of America by Columbus are not -truths; they are events. Some conviction, some belief, some judgment -with reference to them is necessary to introduce the category of truth -and falsity. And since the conviction, the judgment, is as matter of -fact subsequent to the event, how can its truth consist in the kind of -blank, wholesale relationship the intellectualist contends for? How -can the present belief jump out of its present skin, dive into the -past, and land upon just the one event (that _as_ past is gone forever) -which, by definition, constitutes its truth? I do not wonder the -intellectualist has much to say about “transcendence” when he comes to -dealing with the truth of judgments about the past; but why does he not -tell us how we manage to know when one thought lands straight on the -devoted head of something past and gone, while another thought comes -down on the wrong thing in the past? - -_Pupil._ Well, of course, knowledge of the past is very mysterious, but -how is the pragmatist any better off? - -_Teacher._ The reply to that may be inferred from what has already been -said. The past event has left effects, consequences, that are present -and that will continue in the future. Our belief about it, if genuine, -must also modify action in _some_ way and so have objective effects. If -these two sets of effects interlock harmoniously, then the judgment is -true. If perchance the past event had no discoverable consequences or -our thought of it can work out to no assignable difference anywhere, -then there is no possibility of genuine judgment. - -_Pupil._ You have, perhaps, anticipated my next objection, which was -that upon the pragmatic theory (by which truth is constituted by future -consequences) there are no truths about what is past and gone, since -in respect to that ideas can make no difference. For, I suppose, you -would say that the difference made is in the effects that continue, -since ideas may work out to facilitate or to confuse our relations to -these effects. Nevertheless, I am not quite satisfied. For when I say -it is true that it rained yesterday, surely the object of my judgment -is something past, not future, while pragmatism makes all objects of -judgment future. - -_Teacher: Reply._ You confuse the content of a judgment with -the _reference_ of that content. The content of any idea about -yesterday’s rain certainly involves past time, but the distinctive or -characteristic aim of judgment is none the less to give this content a -future reference and function. - -_Pupil: Objection Five._ But your argument requires an absurd -identification of truth and verification. To verify ideas is to find -out that they were already true; or possessed of the truth relation -prior to its discovery in verification. But the pragmatist holds that -the act of finding out that ideas are true creates the thing that is -found. In short, you confuse the psychology of finding out with the -reality found out. - -_Teacher: Reply._ Many intellectualists have now gone so far as -to admit that _verification_ is the testing of a judgment by the -consequence it imports, the difference it makes--its working. But -they still deny any organic connection between the “antecedent” truth -property of ideas and the verification (or “making true”) process. -Surely they admit either too much or too little. (i) If an idea -about a past event is already true because of some mysterious static -correspondence that it possesses to that past event, how in the world -can its truth be _proved_ by the _future consequences_ of that idea? -Why is it that the intellectualist has not produced any positive -theory about the relation of verification to his notion of truth? -(ii) Moreover, if verification consists in the experimental working -out of a belief, the intellectualist thereby admits that his _own_ -theory of truth can be _known_ to be true only as it is verified by -its workings. But if the theory that truth is a ready-made static -property of judgments _is_ true, how in the world _can_ it be verified -by making any specific differences in the course of events? Everywhere -we have to proceed _as if_ the pragmatic theory were the right one. -(iii) If he admits that the pragmatic theory of verification is true, -what meaning remains to the statement that the idea had the truth -property in advance? Why, simply that it had the property of _ability -to work_--an ability revealed by its actual working. How can a given -fact be an objection to the pragmatic theory when that fact has a -definitely assignable meaning on the pragmatic theory, while upon -the anti-pragmatic theory it just has to be accepted as an ultimate, -unanalyzable fact? - -As to your remark about verification being merely psychological, I have -something to say. Colleagues of mine are steadily at work in various -laboratories on various researches, forming hypotheses, experimenting, -testing, corroborating, refuting, modifying ideas. One of them, for -example, recently put an immense pendulum in place in order to repeat -and test Foucault’s experiment with reference to the earth’s rotation. -Do you regard such verification processes as merely psychological? - -_Pupil._ I don’t know. Why do you ask? - -_Teacher._ Because if the objector means that such experimental -provings are _merely_ psychological, he has of course relegated to the -merely psychological (wherever that may be) all the technique of all -the physical sciences--a rather high price to pay for the confutation -of the pragmatist. The intellectualist is thus in the dilemma either -of conceding to the pragmatist the whole sphere of concrete scientific -logic or else of himself regarding all science as merely subjective? -Which horn does he choose? - -_Pupil: Objection Six._ I noticed a moment ago that you spoke of the -pragmatic theory of truth being true. Surely the pragmatist does not -live up to his reputation of having a sense of humor when he claims -assent to his theory on the ground that it is true. What is this but to -admit intellectualism? - -_Teacher: Reply._ My son, we are evidently nearing the end. Naturally, -the pragmatist claims his theory to be true in the pragmatic sense of -truth: it works, it clears up difficulties, removes obscurities, puts -individuals into more experimental, less dogmatic, and less arbitrarily -sceptical relations to life; aligns philosophic with scientific -method; does away with self-made problems of epistemology; clarifies -and reorganizes logical theory, etc. He is quite content to have the -truth of his theory consist in its working in these various ways, and -to leave to the intellectualist the proud possession of a static, -unanalyzable, unverifiable, unworking property. - -_Pupil: Objection Seven._ Nevertheless, the pragmatist is always -appealing to the judgments of others to corroborate his own judgment. -Surely this admits the principle of a judgment that is correct, true, -_in se_. - -_Teacher: Reply._ The pragmatist says that judgment _is_ pragmatic, -_i.e._, originated under conditions of need for a survey and statement, -and tested by efficiency in meeting this need. And then you think -you have refuted him by saying that any appeal to judgment is -intellectualistic! Such begging of the question convinces me that the -radical difficulty of the intellectualist is that he conceives of the -pragmatist as beginning with a theory of truth, when in reality the -latter begins with a theory about judgments and meanings of which the -theory of truth is a corollary. - -_Pupil: Objection Eight._ Nevertheless, you are endeavoring to convert -your opponent to a certain theory. Surely that is an intellectual -undertaking, and in theory (at least) the theoretical criterion, as Mr. -Bradley has well said, must be supreme. - -_Teacher: Reply._ A little reflection will convince you that you are -going around in the same old circle. Since men have to act together, -since the individual subsists in social bonds and activities, to -convert another to a certain way of looking at things is to make social -ties and functions better adapted, more prosperous in their workings. -Only if the pragmatist held the _intellectualist’s_ position, would -he appeal to other than what is ultimately a practical need and a -practical criterion in endeavoring to convert others. - -_Pupil: Objection Nine._ Still the pragmatic criterion, being -satisfactory working, is purely personal and subjective. Whatever works -so as to please me is true. Either this is your result (in which case -your reference to social relations only denotes at bottom a _number_ of -purely subjectivistic satisfactions) or else you unconsciously assume -an intellectual department of our nature that has to be satisfied; and -whose satisfaction is truth. Thereby you admit the intellectualistic -criterion. - -_Teacher: Reply._ We seem to have got back to our starting-point, the -nature of satisfaction. The intellectualist seems to think that because -the pragmatist insists upon the factor of human want, purpose, and -realization in the making and testing of judgments, the impersonal -factor is therefore denied. But what the pragmatist does is to insist -that the human factor must work itself out in _co-operation_ with -the environmental factor, and that their co-adaptation _is_ both -“correspondence” and “satisfaction.” As long as the human factor -is ignored and denied, or is regarded as _merely_ psychological -(whatever, once more, that means), this human factor will assert -itself in irresponsible ways. So long as, particularly in philosophy, -a flagrantly unchastened pragmatism reigns, we shall find, as at -present, the most ambitious intellectualistic systems accepted simply -because of the personal comfort they yield those who contrive and -accept them. Once recognize the human factor, and pragmatism is at -hand to insist that the believer must accept the full consequences of -his beliefs, and that his beliefs must be tried out, through acting -upon them, to discover what is their meaning or consequence. Till so -tested, he insists that beliefs, no matter how noble and seemingly -edifying, are dogmas, not truths. Till the testing has been worked out -very completely and patiently, he holds his beliefs as but provisional, -as working hypotheses, as methods:--and he recognizes the probability -that, as additional modes of testing develop, more and more so-called -truths will be relegated to the category of working hypotheses--till -the dogmatic mind is crowded out and starved out. At present, the -ignoring by philosophers of the part played by personal education, -temperament, and preference in their philosophies is the chief source -of pretentiousness and insincerity in their systems, and is the ground -of the popular disregard for them. - -_Pupil._ What you say calls to mind something of Chesterton’s that I -read recently: “I agree with the pragmatists that apparent objective -truth is not the whole matter; that there is an authoritative need to -believe the things that are necessary to the human mind. But I say -that one of those necessities precisely is a belief in objective truth. -Pragmatism is a matter of human needs and one of the first of human -needs is to be something more than a pragmatist.” You would say, if I -understand you aright, that to fall back upon a supposed necessity of -the “human mind” to believe in certain absolute truths, is to evade a -proper demand for testing the human mind and all its works. - -_Teacher._ My son, I am glad to leave the last word with you. This -_enfant terrible_ of intellectualism has revealed that the chief -objection of absolutists to the pragmatic doctrine of the personal (or -“subjective”) factor in belief is that the pragmatist has spilled the -personal milk in the absolutist’s cocoanut. - - - - -BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES[26] - - -I - -Beliefs look both ways, towards persons and toward things. They are -the original Mr. Facing-both-ways. They form or judge--justify or -condemn--the agents who entertain them and who insist upon them. They -are of things whose immediate meanings form their content. To believe -is to ascribe value, impute meaning, assign import. The collection and -interaction of these appraisals and assessments is the world of the -common man,--that is, of man as an individual and not as a professional -being or class specimen. Thus things are characters, not mere entities; -they behave and respond and provoke. In the behavior that exemplifies -and tests their character, they help and hinder; disturb and pacify; -resist and comply; are dismal and mirthful, orderly and deformed, queer -and commonplace; they agree and disagree; are better and worse. - -Thus the human world, whether or no it have core and axis, has presence -and transfiguration. It means here and now, not in some transcendent -sphere. It moves, of itself, to varied incremental meaning, not to some -far off event, whether divine or diabolic. Such movement constitutes -conduct, for conduct is the working out of the commitments of belief. -That believed better is held to, asserted, affirmed, acted upon. The -moments of its crucial fulfilment are the natural “transcendentals”; -the decisive, the critical, standards of further estimation, selection, -and rejection. That believed worse is fled, resisted, transformed into -an instrument for the better. Characters, in being condensations of -belief, are thus at once the reminders and the prognostications of -weal and woe; they concrete and they regulate the terms of effective -apprehension and appropriation of things. This general regulative -function is what we mean in calling them characters, forms. - -For beliefs, made in the course of existence, reciprocate by making -existence still farther, by developing it. Beliefs are not made -_by_ existence in a mechanical or logical or psychological sense. -“Reality” naturally instigates belief. It appraises itself and -through this self-appraisal manages its affairs. As things are -surcharged valuations, so “consciousness” means ways of believing and -disbelieving. It is interpretation; not merely existence aware of -itself as fact, but existence discerning, judging itself, approving and -disapproving. - -This double outlook and connection of belief, its implication, on one -side, with beings who suffer and endeavor, and, its complication on -the other, with the meanings and worths of things, is its glory or -its unpardonable sin. We cannot keep connection on one side and throw -it away on the other. We cannot preserve significance and decline the -personal attitude in which it is inscribed and operative, any more than -we can succeed in making things “states” of a “consciousness” whose -business is to be an interpretation of things. Beliefs are personal -affairs, and personal affairs are adventures, and adventures are, if -you please, shady. But equally discredited, then, is the universe of -meanings. For the world has meaning as somebody’s, somebody’s at a -juncture, taken for better or worse, and you shall not have completed -your metaphysics till you have told whose world is meant and how and -what for--in what bias and to what effect. Here is a cake that is had -only by eating it, just as there is digestion only _for_ life as well -as _by_ life. - -So far the standpoint of the common man. But the professional man, -the philosopher, has been largely occupied in a systematic effort -to discredit the standpoint of the common man, that is, to disable -belief as an ultimately valid principle. Philosophy is shocked at -the frank, almost brutal, evocation of beliefs by and in natural -existence, like witches out of a desert heath--at a mode of production -which is neither logical, nor physical, nor psychological, but just -natural, empirical. For modern philosophy is, as every college senior -recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps our books and -lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior, has absorbed Stoic dogma. -Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete subjection -to a ready-made and finished reality--physical it may be, mental it -may be, logical it may be--is its professed ideal. Forswearing the -reality of affection, and the gallantry of adventure, the genuineness -of the incomplete, the tentative, it has taken an oath of allegiance to -Reality, objective, universal, complete; made perhaps of atoms, perhaps -of sensations, perhaps of logical meanings. This ready-made reality, -already including everything, must of course swallow and absorb -belief, must produce it psychologically, mechanically, or logically, -according to its own nature; must in any case, instead of acquiring -aid and support from belief, resolve it into one of its own preordained -creatures, making a desert and calling it harmony, unity, totality.[27] - -Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is other than -the propitious outgrowth of beliefs that shall develop aforetime their -ulterior implications in order to recast them, to rectify their errors, -cultivate their waste places, heal their diseases, fortify their -feeblenesses:--the dream of a knowledge that has to do with objects -having no nature save to be known. - -Not that their philosophers have admitted the concrete realizability -of their scheme. On the contrary, the assertion of the absolute -“Reality” of what is empirically unrealizable is a part of the scheme; -the ideal of a universe of pure, cognitional objects, fixed elements -in fixed relations. Sensationalist and idealist, positivist and -transcendentalist, materialist and spiritualist, defining this object -in as many differing ways as they have different conceptions of the -ideal and method of knowledge, are at one in their devotion to an -identification of Reality with something that connects monopolistically -with passionless knowledge, belief purged of all personal reference, -origin, and outlook.[28] - -What is to be said of this attempt to sever the cord which naturally -binds together personal attitudes and the meaning of things? This much -at least: the effort to extract meanings, values, from the beliefs that -ascribe them, and to give the former absolute metaphysical validity -while the latter are sent to wander as scapegoats in the wilderness -of mere phenomena, is an attempt, which, as long as “our interest’s -on the dangerous edge of things,” will attract an admiring, even if -suspicious, audience. Moreover, we may admit that the attempt to -catch the universe of immediate experience, of action and passion, -coming and going, to damn it in its present body in order expressly -to glorify its spirit to all eternity, to validate the meaning of -beliefs by discrediting their natural existence, to attribute absolute -worth to the intent of human convictions just because of the absolute -worthlessness of their content--that the performance of this feat -of virtuosity has developed philosophy to its present wondrous, if -formidable, technique. - -But can we claim more than a _succès d’estime_? Consider again the -nature of the effort. The world of immediate meanings, of the world -empirically sustained in beliefs, is to be sorted out into two -portions, metaphysically discontinuous, one of which shall alone be -good and true “Reality,” the fit material of passionless, beliefless -knowledge; while the other part, that which is excluded, shall be -referred exclusively to belief and treated as mere appearance, -purely subjective, impressions or effects in consciousness, or as -that ludicrously abject modern discovery--an epiphenomenon. And this -division into the real and the unreal is accomplished by the very -individual whom his own “absolute” results reduce to phenomenality, -in terms of the very immediate experience which is infected with -worthlessness, and on the basis of preference, of selection that are -declared to be unreal! Can the thing be done? - -Anyway, the snubbed and excluded factor may always reassert itself. -The very pushing it out of “Reality” may but add to its potential -energy, and invoke a more violent recoil. When affections and -aversions, with the beliefs in which they record themselves and the -efforts they exact, are reduced to epiphenomena, dancing an idle -attendance upon a reality complete without them, to which they vainly -strive to accommodate themselves by mirroring, then may the emotions -flagrantly burst forth with the claim that, as a friend of mine puts -it, reason is _only_ a fig leaf for _their_ nakedness. When one -man says that need, uncertainty, choice, novelty, and strife have -no place in Reality, which is made up wholly of established things -behaving by foregone rules, then may another man be provoked to reply -that all such fixities, whether named atoms or God, whether they be -fixtures of a sensational, a positivistic, or an idealistic system, -have existence and import only in the problems, needs, struggles, and -instrumentalities of conscious agents and patients. For home rule may -be found in the unwritten efficacious constitution of experience. - -That contemporaneously we are in the presence of such a reaction is -apparent. Let us, in pursuit of our topic, inquire how it came about -and why it takes the form that it takes. This consideration may not -only occupy the hour, but may help diagram some future parallelogram -of forces. The account calls for some sketching (1) of the historical -tendencies which have shaped the situation in which a Stoic theory of -knowledge claims metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies that -have furnished the despised principle of belief opportunity and means -of reassertion. - - -II - -Imagination readily travels to a period when a gospel of intense, -and, one may say, deliberate passionate disturbance appeared to be -conquering the Stoic ideal of passionless reason; when the demand -for individual assertion by faith against the established, embodied -objective order was seemingly subduing the idea of the total -subordination of the individual to the universal. By what course -of events came about the dramatic reversal, in which an ethically -conquered Stoicism became the conqueror, epistemologically, of -Christianity? - -How are our imaginations haunted by the idea of what might have -happened if Christianity had found ready to its hand intellectual -formulations corresponding to its practical proclamations! - -That the ultimate principle of conduct is affectional and volitional; -that God is love; that access to the principle is by faith, a personal -attitude; that belief, surpassing logical basis and warrant, works -out through its own operation its own fulfilling evidence: such was -the implied moral metaphysic of Christianity. But this implication -needed to become a theory, a theology, a formulation; and in this -need, it found no recourse save to philosophies that had identified -true existence with the proper object of logical reason. For, in Greek -thought, after the valuable meanings, the meanings of industry and art -that appealed to sustained and serious choice, had given birth and -status to reflective reason, reason denied its ancestry of organized -endeavor, and proclaimed itself in its function of self-conscious -logical thought to be the author and warrant of all genuine things. -Yet how nearly Christianity had found prepared for it the needed means -of its own intellectual statement! We recall Aristotle’s account -of moral knowing, and his definition of man. Man as man, he tells -us, is a principle that may be termed either desiring thought or -thinking desire. Not as pure intelligence does _man_ know, but as an -organization of desires effected through reflection upon their own -conditions and consequences. What if Aristotle had only assimilated -his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowledge! Because -practical thinking was so human, Aristotle rejected it in favor of -pure, passionless cognition, something superhuman. Thinking desire is -experimental, is tentative, not absolute. It looks to the future and -to the past for help in the future. It is contingent, not necessary. -It doubly relates to the individual: to the individual thing as -experienced by an individual agent; not to the universal. Hence -desire is a sure sign of defect, of privation, of non-being, and -seeks surcease in something which knows it not. Hence desiring reason -culminating in beliefs relating to imperfect existence, stands forever -in contrast with passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge, -logically complete, of perfect being. - -I need not remind you how through Neo-Platonism, St. Augustine, and the -Scholastic renaissance, these conceptions became imbedded in Christian -philosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the original practical -principle of Christianity. Belief is henceforth important because -it is the mere antecedent in a finite and fallen world, a temporal -and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of true knowledge to -be achieved only in a world of completed Being. Desire is but the -self-consciousness of defect striving to its own termination in -perfect possession, through perfect knowledge of perfect being. I -need not remind you that the _prima facie_ subordination of reason to -authority, of knowledge to faith, in the medieval code, is, after all, -but the logical result of the doctrine that man as man (since only -reasoning desire) is merely phenomenal; and has his reality in God, who -as God is the complete union of rational insight and being--the term -of man’s desire, and the fulfilment of his feeble attempts at knowing. -Authority, “faith” as it then had to be conceived, meant just that this -Being comes externally to the aid of man, otherwise hopelessly doomed -to misery in long drawn out error and non-being, and disciplines him -till, in the next world under more favoring auspices, he may have his -desires stilled in good, and his faith may yield to knowledge:--for we -forget that the doctrine of immortality was not an appendage, but an -integral part of the theory that since knowledge is the _true_ function -of man, happiness is attained only in knowledge, which itself exists -only in achievement of perfect Being or God. - -For my part, I can but think that medieval absolutism, with its -provision for authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and -assertion of supernatural realization in the next, was more logical, -as well as more humane, than the modern absolutism, that, with the -same logical premises, bids man find adequate consolation and support -in the fact that, after all, his strivings are already eternally -fulfilled, his errors already eternally transcended, his partial -beliefs already eternally comprehended. - -The modern age is marked by a refusal to be satisfied with the -postponement of the exercise and function of reason to another and -supernatural sphere, and by a resolve to practise itself upon its -present object, nature, with all the joys thereunto appertaining. The -pure intelligence of Aristotle, thought thinking itself, expresses -itself as free inquiry directed upon the present conditions of its -own most effective exercise. The principle of the inherent relation -of thought to being was preserved intact, but its practical locus was -moved down from the next world to this. Spinoza’s “God or Nature” is -the logical outcome; as is also his strict correlation of the attribute -of matter with the attribute of thought; while his combination of -thorough distrust of passion and faith with complete faith in reason -and all-absorbing passion for knowledge is so classic an embodiment of -the whole modern contradiction that it may awaken admiration where less -thorough-paced formulations call out irritation. - -In the practical devotion of present intelligence to its present -object, nature, science was born, and also its philosophical -counterpart, the theory of knowledge. Epistemology only generalized in -its loose, although narrow and technical way, the question practically -urgent in Europe: How is science possible? How can intelligence -actively and directly get at its object? - -Meantime, through Protestantism the values, the meanings formerly -characterizing the next life (the opportunity for full perception -of perfect being), were carried over into present-day emotions and -responses. - -The dualism between faith authoritatively supported as the principle of -this life, and knowledge supernaturally realized as the principle of -the next, was transmuted into the dualism between intelligence now and -here occupied with natural things, and the affections and accompanying -beliefs, now and here realizing spiritual worths. For a time this -dualism operated as a convenient division of labor. Intelligence, freed -from responsibility for and preoccupation with supernatural truths, -could occupy itself the more fully and efficiently with the world -that now is; while the affections, charged with the values evoked in -the medieval discipline, entered into the present enjoyment of the -delectations previously reserved for the saints. Directness took the -place of systematic intermediation; the present of the future; the -individual’s emotional consciousness of the supernatural institution. -Between science and faith, thus conceived, a bargain was struck. -Hands off; each to his own, was the compact; the natural world to -intelligence, the moral, the spiritual world to belief. This (natural) -world for knowledge; that (supernatural) world for belief. Thus the -antithesis, unexpressed, ignored, _within experience_, between belief -and knowledge, between the purely objective values of thought and the -personal values of passion and volition, was more fundamental, more -determining, than the opposition, explicit and harassing, _within -knowledge_, between subject and object, mind and matter. - -This latent antagonism worked out into the open. In scientific detail, -knowledge encroached upon the historic traditions and opinions with -which the moral and religious life had identified itself. It made -history to be as natural, as much its spoil, as physical nature. It -turned itself upon man, and proceeded remorselessly to account for -his emotions, his volitions, his opinions. Knowledge, in its general -theory, as philosophy, went the same way. It was pre-committed to -the old notion: the absolutely real is the object of _knowledge_, -and hence is something universal and impersonal. So, whether by the -road of sensationalism or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism -or objective idealism, it came about that concrete selves, specific -feeling and willing beings, were relegated with the beliefs in which -they declare themselves to the “phenomenal.” - - -III - -So much for the situation against which some contemporary tendencies -are a deliberate protest. - -What of the positive conditions that give us not mere protest, like -the unreasoning revolt of heart against head found at all epochs, but -something articulate and constructive? The field is only too large, -and I shall limit myself to the evolution of the knowledge standpoint -itself. I shall suggest, first, that the progress of intelligence -directed upon natural materials has evolved a procedure of knowledge -that renders untenable the inherited conception of knowledge; and, -secondly, that this result is reinforced by the specific results of -some of the special sciences. - -1. First, then, the very use of the knowledge standpoint, the very -expression of the knowledge preoccupation, has produced methods and -tests that, when formulated, intimate a radically different conception -of knowledge, and of its relation to existence and belief, than the -orthodox one. - -The one thing that stands out is that thinking is inquiry, and that -knowledge as science is the outcome of systematically directed inquiry. -For a time it was natural enough that inquiry should be interpreted -in the old sense, as just change of subjective attitudes and opinions -to make them square up with a “reality” that is already there in -ready-made, fixed, and finished form. The rationalist had one notion -of the reality, _i.e._, that it was of the nature of laws, genera, -or an ordered system, and so thought of concepts, axioms, etc., -as the indicated modes of representation. The empiricist, holding -reality to be a lot of little discrete particular lumps, thought of -disjointed sensations as its appropriate counterpart. But both alike -were thorough conformists. If “reality” is already and completely -given, and if knowledge is just submissive acceptance, then, of -course, inquiry is only a subjective change in the human “mind” or in -“consciousness,”--these being subjective and “unreal.” - -But the very development of the sciences served to reveal a peculiar -and intolerable paradox. Epistemology, having condemned inquiry once -for all to the region of subjectivity in an invidious sense, finds -itself in flat opposition in principle and in detail to the assumption -and to the results of the sciences. Epistemology is bound to deny to -the results of the special sciences in detail any ulterior objectivity -just because they always _are_ in a process of inquiry--_in_ solution. -While a man may not be halted at being told that his mental activities, -since his, are not genuinely real, many men will draw violently back -at being told that all the discoveries, conclusions, explanations, -and theories of the sciences share the same fate, being the products -of a discredited mind. And, in general, epistemology, in relegating -human thinking as inquiry to a merely phenomenal region, makes concrete -approximation and conformity to objectivity hopeless. Even if it did -square itself up to and by “reality” it never could be sure of it. -The ancient myth of Tantalus and his effort to drink the water before -him seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern epistemology. The -thirstier, the needier of truth the human mind, and the intenser the -efforts put forth to slake itself in the ocean of being just beyond -the edge of consciousness, the more surely the living waters of truth -recede! - -When such self-confessed sterility is joined with consistent derogation -of all the special results of the special sciences, some one is sure to -raise the cry of “dog in the manger,” or of “sour grapes.” A revision -of the theory of thinking, of inquiry, would seem to be inevitable; -a revision which should cease trying to construe knowledge as an -attempted approximation to a reproduction of reality under conditions -that condemn it in advance to failure; a revision which should start -frankly from the fact of thinking as inquiring, and purely external -realities as terms in inquiries, and which should construe validity, -objectivity, truth, and the test and system of truths, on the basis of -what they actually mean and do within inquiry. - -Such a standpoint promises ample revenge for the long damnation and -longer neglect to which the principle of belief has been subjected. -The whole procedure of thinking as developed in those extensive and -intensive inquiries that constitute the sciences, is but rendering -into a systematic technique, into an art deliberately and delightfully -pursued, the rougher and cruder means by which practical human beings -have in all ages worked out the implications of their beliefs, tested -them, and endeavored in the interests of economy, efficiency, and -freedom, to render them coherent with one another. Belief, sheer, -direct, unmitigated belief, reappears as the working hypothesis; action -that at once develops and tests belief reappears in experimentation, -deduction, demonstration; while the machinery of universals, axioms, -_a priori_ truths, etc., becomes a systematization of the way in which -men have always worked out, in anticipation of overt action, the -implications of their beliefs, with a view to revising them, in the -interests of obviating unfavorable, and securing welcome consequences. -Observation, with its machinery of sensations, measurements, etc., -is the resurrection of the way in which agents have always faced and -tried to define the problems that face them; truth is the union of -abstract postulated meanings and of concrete brute facts in a way that -circumvents the latter by judging them from a new standpoint, while it -tests concepts by using them as methods in the same active experience. -It all comes to experience personally conducted and personally -consummated. - -Let consciousness of these facts dawn a little more brightly over the -horizon of epistemological prejudices, and it will be seen that nothing -prevents admitting the genuineness both of thinking activities and of -their characteristic results, except the notion that belief itself is -not a genuine ingredient of existence--a notion which itself is not -only a belief, but a belief which, unlike the convictions of the common -man and the hypotheses of science, finds its proud proof in the fact -that it does not demean itself so unworthily as to work. - -Once believe that beliefs themselves are as “real” as anything else -can ever be, and we have a world in which uncertainty, doubtfulness, -really inhere; and in which personal attitudes and responses are real -both in their own distinctive existence, and as the only ways in which -an as yet undetermined factor of reality takes on shape, meaning, -value, truth. If “to wilful men the injuries that they themselves -procure, must be their schoolmasters”--and all beliefs are wilful--then -by the same token the propitious evolutions of meaning, which wilful -men secure to an expectant universe, must be their compensation and -their justification. In a doubtful and needy universe elements must be -beggarly, and the development of personal beliefs into experimentally -executed systems of actions, is the organized bureau of philanthropy -which confers upon a travailing universe the meaning for which it cries -out. The apostrophe of the poet is above all to man the thinker, the -inquirer, the knower: - - O Dreamer! O Desirer, goer down - Unto untraveled seas in untried ships, - O crusher of the unimagined grape, - On unconceivèd lips. - -2. Biology, psychology, and the social sciences proffer an imposing -body of concrete facts that also point to the rehabilitation of -belief--to the interpretation of knowledge as a human and practical -outgrowth of belief, not to belief as the state to which knowledge is -condemned in a merely finite and phenomenal world. I need not, as I -cannot, here summarize the psychological revision which the notions of -sensation, perception, conception, cognition in general have undergone, -all to one intent. “Motor” is writ large on their face. The testimony -of biology is unambiguous to the effect that the organic instruments -of the whole intellectual life, the sense-organs and brain and their -connections, have been developed on a definitely practical basis and -for practical aims, for the purpose of such control over conditions -as will sustain and vary the meanings of life. The historic sciences -are equally explicit in their evidence that knowledge as a system of -information and instruction is a coöperative social achievement, at -all times socially toned, sustained, and directed; and that logical -thinking is a reweaving through individual activity of this social -fabric at such points as are indicated by prevailing needs and aims. - -This bulky and coherent body of testimony is not, of course, of itself -philosophy. But it supplies, at all events, facts that have scientific -backing, and that are as worthy of regard as the facts pertinent to any -science. At the present time these facts seem to have some peculiar -claim just because they present traits largely ignored in prior -philosophic formulations, while those belonging to mathematics and -physics have so largely wrought their sweet will on systems. Again, it -would seem as if in philosophies built deliberately upon the knowledge -principle, any body of known facts should not have to clamor for -sympathetic attention. - -Such being the case, the reasons for ruling psychology and sociology -and allied sciences out of competency to give philosophic testimony -have more significance than the bare denial of jurisdiction. They are -evidences of the deep-rooted preconception that whatever concerns a -particular conscious agent, a wanting, struggling, satisfied and -dissatisfied being, must of course be only “phenomenal” in import. - -This aversion is the more suggestive when the professed idealist -appears as the special champion of the virginity of pure knowledge. -The idealist, so content with the notion that consciousness determines -reality, provided it be done once for all, at a jump and in lump, is -so uneasy in presence of the idea that empirical conscious beings -genuinely determine existences now and here! One is reminded of the -story told, I think, by Spencer. Some committee had organized and -contended, through a long series of parliaments, for the passage of -a measure. At last one of their meetings was interrupted with news -of success. Consternation was the result. What was to become of the -occupation of the committee? So, one asks, what is to become of -idealism at large, of the wholesale unspecifiable determination of -“reality” by or in “consciousness,” if specific conscious beings, John -Smiths, and Susan Smiths (to say nothing of their animal relations), -beings with bowels and brains, are found to exercise influence upon the -character and existence of reals? - -One would be almost justified in construing idealism as a Pickwickian -scheme, so willing is it to idealize the principle of intelligence -at the expense of its specific undertakings, were it not that this -reluctance is the necessary outcome of the Stoic basis and tenor of -idealism--its preoccupation with logical contents and relations in -abstraction from their _situs_ and function in conscious living beings. - - -IV - -I have suggested to you the naïve conception of the relation of beliefs -to realities: that beliefs are themselves real without discount, -manifesting their reality in the usual proper way, namely, by modifying -and shaping the reality of other things, so that they connect the bias, -the preferences and affections, the needs and endeavors of personal -lives with the values, the characters ascribed to things:--the latter -thus becoming worthy of human acquaintance and responsive to human -intercourse. This was followed by a sketch of the history of thought, -indicating how beliefs and all they insinuate were subjected to -preconceived notions of knowledge and of “reality” as a monopolistic -possession of pure intellect. Then I traced some of the _motifs_ that -make for reconsideration of the supposed uniquely exclusive relation -of logical knowledge and “reality”; _motifs_ that make for a less -invidiously superior attitude towards the convictions of the common man. - -In concluding, I want to say a word or two to mitigate--for escape is -impossible--some misunderstandings. And, to begin with, while possible -doubts inevitably troop with actual beliefs, the doctrine in question -is not particularly sceptical. The radical empiricist, the humanist, -the pragmatist, label him as you will, believes not in fewer but in -more “realities” than the orthodox philosophers warrant. He is not -concerned, for example, in discrediting objective realities and logical -or universal thinking; he is interested in such a reinterpretation of -the sort of “reality” which these things possess as will accredit, -without depreciation, concrete empirical conscious centers of action -and passion. - -My second remark is to the opposite effect. The intent is not -especially credulous, although it starts from and ends with the radical -credulity of all knowledge. To suppose that because the sciences are -ultimately instrumental to human beliefs, we are therefore to be -careless of the most exact possible use of extensive and systematic -scientific methods, is like supposing that because a watch is made to -tell present time, and not to be an exemplar of transcendent, absolute -time, watches might as well be made of cheap stuffs, casually wrought -and clumsily put together. It is the task of telling present time, with -all its urgent implications, that brings home, steadies, and enlarges -the responsibility for the best possible use of intelligence, the -instrument. - -For one, I have no interest in the old, old scheme of derogating from -the worth of knowledge in order to give an uncontrolled field for some -_special_ beliefs to run riot in,--be these beliefs even faith in -immortality, in some special sort of a Deity, or in some particular -brand of freedom. Any one of our beliefs is subject to criticism, -revision, and even ultimate elimination through the development of its -own implications by intelligently directed action. Because reason is -a scheme of working out the meanings of convictions in terms of one -another and of the consequences they import in further experience, -convictions are the more, not the less, amenable and responsible to the -full exercise of reason.[29] - -Thus we are put on the road to that most desirable thing,--the union -of acknowledgment of moral powers and demands with thoroughgoing -naturalism. No one really wants to lame man’s practical nature; it is -the supposed exigencies of natural science that force the hand. No one -really bears a grudge against naturalism for the sake of obscurantism. -It is the need of some sacred reservation for moral interests that -coerces. We all want to be as naturalistic as we can be. But the “can -be” is the rub. If we set out with a fixed dualism of belief and -knowledge, then the uneasy fear that the natural sciences are going -to encroach and destroy “spiritual values” haunts us. So we build -them a citadel and fortify it; that is, we isolate, professionalize, -and thereby weaken beliefs. But if beliefs are the most natural, and -in that sense, the most metaphysical of all things, and if knowledge -is an organized technique for working out their implications and -interrelations, for directing their formation and employ, how -unnecessary, how petty the fear and the caution. Because freedom of -belief is ours, free thought may exercise itself; the freer the thought -the more sure the emancipation of belief. Hug some special belief and -one fears knowledge; believe in belief and one loves and cleaves to -knowledge. - -We have here, too, the possibility of a common understanding, in -thought, in language, in outlook, of the philosopher and the common -man. What would not the philosopher give, did he not have to part -with some of his common humanity in order to join a class? Does he -not always, when challenged, justify himself with the contention that -all men naturally philosophize, and that he but does in a conscious -and orderly way what leads to harm when done in an indiscriminate -and irregular way? If philosophy be at once a natural history _and_ -a logic--an art--of beliefs, then its technical justification is at -one with its human justification. The natural attitude of man, said -Emerson, is believing; “the philosopher, after some struggle, having -only reasons for believing.” Let the struggle then enlighten and -enlarge beliefs; let the reasons kindle and engender new beliefs. - -Finally, it is not a solution, but a problem which is presented. As -philosophers, our disagreements as to conclusions are trivial compared -with our disagreement as to problems. To see the problem another -sees, in the same perspective and at the same angle--that amounts to -something. Agreement in solutions is in comparison perfunctory. To -experience the same problem another feels--that perhaps is agreement. -In a world where distinctions are as invidious as comparisons are -odious, and where intellect works only by comparison and distinction, -pray what is one to do? - -But beliefs are personal matters, and the person, we may still -believe, is social. To be a man is to be thinking desire; and the -agreement of desires is not in oneness of intellectual conclusion, -but in the sympathies of passion and the concords of action:--and yet -significant union in affection and behavior may depend upon a consensus -in thought that is secured only by discrimination and comparison. - - - - -EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM[30] - - -I - -Idealism as a philosophic system stands in such a delicate relation -to experience as to invite attention. In its subjective form, or -sensationalism, it claims to be the last word of empiricism. In its -objective, or rational form, it claims to make good the deficiencies of -the subjective type, by emphasizing the work of thought that supplies -the factors of objectivity and universality lacking in sensationalism. -With reference to experience _as it now is_, such idealism is half -opposed to empiricism and half committed to it,--antagonistic, so -far as existing experience is regarded as tainted with a sensational -character; favorable, so far as this experience is even now prophetic -of some final, all-comprehensive, or absolute experience, which in -truth is one with reality. - -That this combination of opposition to present experience with devotion -to the cause of experience in the abstract leaves objective idealism -in a position of unstable equilibrium from which it can find release -only by euthanasia in a thorough-going empiricism seems evident. -Some of the reasons for this belief may be readily approached by -a summary sketch of three historic episodes in which have emerged -important conceptions of experience and its relation to reason. The -first takes us to classic Greek thought. Here experience means the -preservation, through memory, of the net result of a multiplicity of -particular doings and sufferings; a preservation that affords positive -skill in maintaining further practice, and promise of success in new -emergencies. The craft of the carpenter, the art of the physician -are standing examples of its nature. It differs from instinct and -blind routine or servile practice because there is some knowledge of -materials, methods, and aims, in their adjustment to one another. -Yet the marks of its passive, habitual origin are indelibly stamped -upon it. On the knowledge side it can never aspire beyond opinion, -and if true opinion be achieved, it is only by happy chance. On the -active side it is limited to the accomplishment of a special work or -a particular product, following some unjustified, because assumed, -method. Thus it contrasts with the true knowledge of reason, which -is direct apprehension, self-revealing and self-validating, of an -eternal and harmonious content. The regions in which experience and -reason respectively hold sway are thus explained. Experience has to do -with production, which, in turn, is relative to decay. It deals with -generation, becoming, not with finality, being. Hence it is infected -with the trait of relative non-being, of mere imitativeness; hence its -multiplicity, its logical inadequacy, its relativity to a standard and -end beyond itself. Reason, _per contra_, has to do with meaning, with -significance (ideas, forms), that is eternal and ultimate. Since the -meaning of anything is the worth, the good, the end of that thing, -experience presents us with partial and tentative efforts to achieve -the embodiment of purpose, under conditions that doom the attempt to -inconclusiveness. It has, however, its meed of reality in the degree in -which its results _participate_ in meaning, the good, reason. - -From this classic period, then, comes the antithesis of experience as -the historically achieved _embodiments_ of meaning, partial, multiple, -insecure, to reason as the source, author, and container of _meaning_, -permanent, assured, unified. Idealism means ideality, experience means -brute and broken facts. That things exist because of and for the -sake of meaning, and that experience gives us meaning in a servile, -interrupted, and inherently deficient way--such is the standpoint. -Experience gives us meaning in process of becoming; special and -isolated instances in which it _happens_, temporally, to appear, rather -than meaning pure, undefiled, independent. Experience presents purpose, -the good, struggling against obstacles, “involved in matter.” - -Just how much the vogue of modern neo-Kantian idealism, professedly -built upon a strictly epistemological instead of upon a cosmological -basis, is due, in days of a declining theology, to a vague sense that -affirming the function of reason in the constitution of a knowable -world (which in its own constitution as logically knowable may be, -morally and spiritually, anything you please), carries with it an -assurance of the superior reality of the good and the beautiful as -well as of the “true,” it would be hard to say. Certainly unction -seems to have descended upon epistemology, in apostolic succession, -from classic idealism; so that neo-Kantianism is rarely without a tone -of edification, as if feeling itself the patron of man’s spiritual -interests in contrast to the supposed crudeness and insensitiveness -of naturalism and empiricism. At all events, we find here one element -in our problem: Experience considered as the summary of past episodic -adventures and happenings in relation to fulfilled and adequately -expressed meaning. - -The second historic event centers about the controversy of innate -ideas, or pure concepts. The issue is between empiricism and -rationalism as theories of the origin and validation of scientific -knowledge. The empiricist is he who feels that the chief obstacle -which prevents scientific method from making way is the belief in -pure thoughts, not derived from particular observations and hence not -responsible to the course of experience. His objection to the “high _a -priori_ road” is that it introduces in irresponsible fashion a mode -of presumed knowledge which may be used at any turn to stand sponsor -for mere tradition and prejudice, and thus to nullify the results of -science resting upon and verified by observable facts. Experience -thus comes to mean, to use the words of Peirce, “that which is forced -upon a man’s recognition will-he, nill-he, and shapes his thoughts -to something quite different from what they naturally would have -taken.”[31] The same definition is found in James, in his chapter on -Necessary Truths: “Experience means experience of something foreign -supposed to impress us whether spontaneously or in consequence of our -own exertions and acts.”[32] As Peirce points out, this notion of -experience as the foreign element that forces the hand of thought and -controls its efficacy, goes back to Locke. Experience is “observation -employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal -operations of our minds”[33]--as furnishing in short all the valid -data and tests of thinking and knowledge. This meaning, thinks Peirce, -should be accepted “as a landmark which it would be a crime to disturb -or displace.” - -The contention of idealism, here bound up with rationalism, is that -perception and observation cannot guarantee knowledge in its honorific -sense (science); that the peculiar differentia of scientific knowledge -is a constancy, a universality, and necessity that contrast at every -point with perceptual data, and that indispensably require the -function of conception.[34] In short, _qualitative transformation_ -of _facts_ (data of perception), not their mechanical subtraction -and recombination, is the difference between scientific and -perceptual knowledge. Here the problem which emerges is, of course, -the significance of perception and of conception in respect to -experience.[35] - -The third episode reverses in a curious manner (which confuses present -discussion) the notion of experience as a foreign, alien, coercive -material. It regards experience as a fortuitous association, by merely -psychic connections, of individualistic states of consciousness. -This is due to the Humian development of Locke. The “objects” -and “operations,” which to Locke were just given and secured in -observation, become shifting complexes of subjective sensations and -ideas, whose apparent permanency is due to discoverable illusions. -This, of course, is the empiricism which made Kant so uneasily toss -in his dogmatic slumbers (a tossing that he took for an awakening); -and which, by reaction, called out the conception of thought as a -function operating both to elevate perceptual data to scientific -status, and also to confer objective status, or knowable character, -upon even sensational data and their associative combinations.[36] -Here emerges the third element in our problem: The function of thought -as furnishing objectivity to any experience that claims cognitive -reference or capacity. - -Summing up the matter, idealism stands forth with its assertion of -thought or reason as (1) the sponsor for all significance, ideality, -purpose, in experience,--the author of the good and the beautiful -as well as the true; (2) the power, located in pure conceptions, -required to elevate perceptive or observational material to the plane -of science; and (3) the constitution that gives objectivity, even the -semblance of order, system, connection, mutual reference, to sensory -data that without its assistance are mere subjective flux. - - -II - -I begin the discussion with the last-named function. Thought is -here conceived as _a priori_, not in the sense of particular innate -ideas, but of a function that constitutes the very possibility -of any objective experience, any experience involving reference -beyond its own mere subjective happening. I shall try to show that -idealism is condemned to move back and forth between two inconsistent -interpretations of this _a priori_ thought. It is taken to mean both -the organized, the regulated, the informed, established character -of experience, an order immanent and constitutional; and an agency -which organizes, regulates, forms, synthesizes, a power operative and -constructive. And the oscillation between and confusion of these two -diverse senses is necessary to Neo-Kantian idealism. - -When Kant compared his work in philosophy to that of the men who -introduced construction into geometry, and experimentation into physics -and chemistry, the point of his remarks depends upon taking the _a -priori_ worth of thought in a regulative, directive, controlling sense, -thought as consciously, intentionally, making an experience _different_ -in a _determinate_ sense and manner. But the point of his answer to -Hume consists in taking the _a priori_ in the other sense, as something -which is _already_ immanent in _any_ experience, and which accordingly -makes no determinate difference to any one experience as compared with -any other, or with any past or future form of itself. The concept is -treated first as that which makes an experience actually different, -controlling its evolution towards consistency, coherency, and objective -reliability; then, it is treated as that which has already effected -the organization of any and every experience that comes to recognition -at all. The fallacy from which he never emerges consists in vibrating -between the definition of a concept as a rule of constructive synthesis -in a _differential_ sense, and the definition of it as a static -endowment lurking in “mind,” and giving automatically a hard and fixed -law for the determination of every experienced object. The _a priori_ -conceptions of Kant as immanent fall, like the rain, upon the just and -the unjust; upon error, opinion, and hallucination. But Kant slides -into these _a priori_ functions the preferential values exercised -by empirical reflective thought. The concept of triangle, taken -geometrically, means doubtless a determinate method of construing space -elements; but to Kant it also means something that exists in the mind -_prior_ to all such geometrical constructions and that unconsciously -lays down the law not only for their conscious elaboration, but also -for any space perception, even for that which takes a rectangle to -be a triangle. The first of the meanings is intelligible, and marks a -definite contribution to the logic of science. But it is not “objective -idealism”; it is a contribution to a revised empiricism. The second is -a dark saying. - -That organization of some sort exists in every experience I make no -doubt. That isolation, discrepancy, the fragmentary, the incompatible, -are brought to recognition and to logical function only with reference -to some prior existential mode of organization seems clear. And -it seems equally clear that reflection goes on with profit only -because the materials with which it deals have already some degree -of organization, or exemplify various relationships. As against -Hume, or even Locke, we may be duly grateful to Kant for enforcing -acknowledgment of these facts. But the acknowledgment means simply an -improved and revised empiricism. - -For, be it noted, this organization, first, is not the work of reason -or thought, unless “reason” be stretched beyond all identification; -and, secondly, it has no sacrosanct or finally valid and worthful -character. (1) Experience always carries with it and within it certain -systematized arrangements, certain classifications (using the term -without intellectualistic prejudice), coexistent and serial. If we -attribute these to “thought” then the structure of the brain of a -Mozart which hears and combines sounds in certain groupings, the -psycho-physical visual habit of the Greek, the locomotor apparatus of -the human body in the laying-out and plotting of space is “thought.” -Social institutions, established political customs, effect and -perpetuate modes of reaction and of perception that compel a certain -grouping of objects, elements, and values. A national constitution -brings about a definite arrangement of the factors of human action -which holds even physical things together in certain determinate -orders. Every successful economic process, with its elaborate divisions -and adjustments of labor, of materials and instruments, is just such -an objective organization. Now it is one thing to say that thought has -played a part in the origin and development of such organizations, and -continues to have a rôle in their judicious employment and application; -it is another to say that these organizations _are_ thought, or -are its exclusive product. Thought that functions in these ways is -distinctively _reflective_ thought, thought as practical, volitional, -deliberately exercised for specific aims--thought as an act, an art of -skilled mediation. As _reflective_ thought, its end is to terminate its -own first and experimental forms, and to secure an organization which, -while it may evoke new reflective thinking, puts an end to the thinking -that secured the organization. _As organizations_, as established, -effectively controlling arrangements of objects in experience, their -mark is that they are not thoughts, but habits, customs of action.[37] - -Moreover, such reflective thought as does intervene in the formation -and maintenance of these practical organizations harks back to prior -practical organizations, biological and social in nature. It serves -to _valuate_ organizations already existent as biological functions -and instincts, while, as itself a biological activity, it redirects -them to new conditions and results. Recognize, for example, that a -geometric concept is a practical locomotor function of arranging -stimuli in reference to maintenance of life activities _brought into -consciousness_, and then serving as a center of reorganization of -such activities to freer, more varied flexible and valuable forms; -recognize this, and we have the truth of the Kantian idea, without -its excrescences and miracles. The concept is the practical activity -doing consciously and artfully what it had aforetime done blindly and -aimlessly, and thereby not only doing it better but opening up a freer -world of significant activities. Thought as such a reorganization -of natural functions does naturally what Kantian forms and -schematizations do only supernaturally. In a word, the constructive -or organizing activity of “thought” does not inhere in thought as a -transcendental function, a form or mode of some supra-empirical ego, -mind, or consciousness, but in thought as itself vital activity. And -in any case we have passed to the idea of thought as reflectively -reconstructive and directive, and away from the notion of thought as -immanently constitutional and organizational. To make this passage -and yet to ignore its existence and import is essential to objective -idealism. - -(2) No final or ultimate validity attaches to these original -arrangements and institutionalizations in any case. Their value is -teleological and experimental, not fixedly ontological. “Law and -order” are good things, but not when they become rigidity, and create -mechanical uniformity or routine. Prejudice is the acme of the _a -priori_. Of the _a priori_ in this sense we may say what is always -to be said of habits and institutions: They are good servants, but -harsh and futile masters. Organization as already effected is always -in danger of becoming a _mortmain_; it may be a way of sacrificing -novelty, flexibility, freedom, creation to static standards. The -curious inefficiency of idealism at this point is evident in the fact -that genuine thought, empirical reflective thought, is required -precisely for the purpose of re-forming established and set formations. - -In short, (_a_) _a priori_ character is no exclusive function of -thought. Every biological function, every motor attitude, every vital -impulse as the carrying vehicle of experience is thus _apriorily_ -regulative in prospective reference; what we call apperception, -expectation, anticipation, desire, demand, choice, are pregnant with -this constitutive and organizing power. (_b_) In so far as “thought” -does exercise such reorganizing power, it is because thought is itself -still a _vital_ function. (_c_) Objective idealism depends not only -upon ignoring the existence and capacity of vital functions, but upon a -profound confusion of the constitutional _a priori_, the unconsciously -dominant, with empirically reflective thought. In the sense in which -the _a priori_ is worth while as an attribute of thought, thought -cannot be what the objective idealist defines it as being. Plain, -ordinary, everyday empirical reflections, operating as centers of -inquiry, of suggestion, of experimentation, exercise the valuable -function of regulation, in an auspicious direction, of subsequent -experiences. - -The categories of accomplished systematization cover alike the just -and the unjust, the false and the true, while (unlike God’s rain) they -exercise no _specific_ or _differential_ activity of stimulation and -control. Error and inefficiency, as well as value and energy, are -embodied in our objective institutional classifications. As a special -favor, will not the objective idealist show how, in some one single -instance, his immanent “reason” makes any difference as respects -the detection and elimination of error, or gives even the slightest -assistance in discovering and validating the truly worthful? This -practical work, the life blood of intelligence in everyday life and -in critical science, is done by the despised and rejected matter of -concrete empirical contexts and functions. Generalizing the issue: If -the immanent organization be ascribed to thought, why should its work -be such as to demand continuous correction and revision? If specific -reflective thought, as empirical, be subject to all the limitations -supposed to inhere in experience as such, how can it assume the burden -of making good, of supplementing, reconstructing, and developing -meanings? The logic of the case seems to be that Neo-Kantian idealism -gets its status against empiricism by first accepting the Humian idea -of experience, while the express import of its positive contribution -is to show the _non-existence_ (not merely the cognitive invalidity) -of anything describable as mere states of subjective consciousness. -Thus in the end it tends to destroy itself and to make way for a more -adequate empiricism. - - -III - -In the above discussion, I have unavoidably anticipated the second -problem: the relation of conceptual thought to perceptual data. -A distinct aspect still remains, however. Perception, as well as -apriority, is a term harboring a fundamental ambiguity. It may mean -(1) a distinct type of activity, predominantly practical in character, -though carrying at its heart important cognitive and esthetic -qualities; or (2) a distinctively cognitional experience, the function -of observation as explicitly logical--a factor in science _qua_ science. - -In the first sense, as recent functional empiricism (working in -harmony with psychology, but not itself peculiarly psychological) has -abundantly shown, perception is primarily an act of adjustment of -organism and environment, differing from a mere reflex or instinctive -adaptation in that, in order to compensate for the failure of the -instinctive adjustment, it requires an objective or discriminative -presentation of conditions of action: the negative conditions or -obstacles, and the positive conditions or means and resources.[38] -This, of course, is its cognitive phase. In so far as the material -thus presented not only serves as a direct cue to further successful -activity (successful in the overcoming of obstacles to the maintenance -of the function entered upon) but presents auxiliary collateral -objects and qualities that give additional range and depth of meaning -to the activity of adjustment, perceiving is esthetic as well as -intellectual.[39] - -Now such perception cannot be made antithetical to thought, for it may -itself be surcharged with any amount of imaginatively supplied and -reflectively sustained ideal factors--such as are needed to determine -and select relevant stimuli and to suggest and develop an appropriate -plan and course of behavior. The amount of such saturating intellectual -material depends upon the complexity and maturity of the behaving -agent. Such perception, moreover, is strictly teleological, since it -arises from an experienced need and functions to fulfil the purpose -indicated by this need. The cognitional content is, indeed, carried by -affectional and intentional contexts. - -Then we have perception as scientific observation. This involves the -deliberate, artful exclusion of affectional and purposive factors as -exercising mayhap a vitiating influence upon the cognitive or objective -content; or, more strictly speaking, a transformation of the more -ordinary or “natural” emotional and purposive concomitants, into what -Bain calls “neutral” emotion, and a purpose of finding out what the -present conditions of the problem are. (The practical feature is not -thus denied or eliminated, but the overweening influence of a present -dominating end is avoided, so that _change of the character of the end_ -may be effected, if found desirable.) Here observation may be opposed -to thought, in the sense that exact and minute description may be set -over against interpretation, explanation, theorizing, and inference. -In the wider sense of thought as equaling reflective process, the work -of observation and description forms a constituent division of labor -_within_ thought. The impersonal demarcation and accurate registration -of what is objectively there or present occurs for the sake (_a_) of -eliminating meaning which is habitually but uncritically referred, and -(_b_) of getting a basis for a meaning (at first purely inferential -or hypothetical) that may be consistently referred; and that (_c_), -resting upon examination and not upon mere _a priori_ custom, may -weather the strain of subsequent experiences. But in so far as -thought is identified with the conceptual phase as such of the entire -logical function, observation is, of course, set over against thought: -deliberately, purposely, and artfully so. - -It is not uncommon to hear it said that the Lockeian movement was -all well enough for psychology, but went astray because it invaded -the field of logic. If we mean by psychology a natural history of -what at any time _passes_ for knowledge, and by logic conscious -control in the direction of grounded assurance, this remark appears -to reverse the truth. As a natural history of knowledge in the sense -of opinion and belief, Locke’s account of discrete, simple ideas or -meanings, which are compounded and then distributed, does palpable -violence to the facts. But every line of Locke shows that he was -interested in knowledge in its honorific sense--controlled certainty, -or, where this is not feasible, measured probability. And to logic -as an account of the way in which we by art build up a _tested_ -assurance, a rationalized conviction, Locke makes an important positive -contribution. The pity is that he inclined to take it for the whole -of the logic of science,[40] not seeing that it was but a correlative -division of labor to the work of hypotheses or inference; and that he -tended to identify it with a natural history or psychology. The latter -tendency exposed Locke to the Humian interpretation, and permanently -sidetracked the positive contribution of his theory to logic, while it -led to that confusion of an untrue psychology with a logic valid within -limits, of which Mill is the standard example. - -In analytic observation, it is a positive object to strip off all -inferential meaning so far as may be--to reduce the facts as nearly -as may be to derationalized data, in order to make possible a new and -better rationalization. In and because of this process, the perceptual -data approach the limit of a disconnected manifold, of the brutely -given, of the merely sensibly present; while meaning stands out as -a searched for principle of unification and explanation, that is, -as a thought, a concept, an hypothesis. The extent to which this is -carried depends wholly upon the character of the specific situation and -problem; but, speaking generally, or of limiting tendencies, one may -say it is carried to mere observation, pure brute description, on the -one side, and to mere thought, that is hypothetical inference, on the -other. - -So far as Locke ignored this instrumental character of observation, he -naturally evoked and strengthened rationalistic idealism; he called -forth its assertion of the need of reason, of concepts, of universals, -to constitute knowledge in its eulogistic sense. But two contrary -errors do not make a truth, although they suggest and determine the -nature of some relevant truth. This truth is the empirical origin, in -a determinate type of situation, of the contrast of observation and -conception; the empirical relevancy and the empirical worth of this -contrast in controlling the character of subsequent experiences. To -suppose that perception as it concretely exists, either in the early -experiences of the animal, the race, or the individual, or in its -later refined and expanded experiences, is identical with the sharply -analyzed, objectively discriminated and internally disintegrated -elements of scientific observation, is a perversion of experience; a -perversion for which, indeed, professed empiricists set the example, -but which idealism must perpetuate if it is not to find its end in an -improved, functional empiricism.[41] - - -IV - -We come now to the consideration of the third element in our problem; -ideality, important and normative value, in relation to experience; -the antithesis of experience as a tentative, fragmentary, and -ineffectual embodiment of meaning over against the perfect, eternal -system of meanings which experience suggests even in nullifying and -mutilating. - -That from the _memory_ standpoint experience presents itself as a -multiplicity of episodic events with just enough continuity among -them to suggest principles true “on the whole” or usually, but -without furnishing instruction as to their exact range and bearing, -seems obvious enough. Why should it not? The motive which leads to -reflection on _past_ experience could be satisfied in no other way. -Continuities, connecting links, dynamic transitions drop out because, -for the purpose of the recollection, they would be hindrances if now -repeated; or because they are now available only when themselves -objectified in definite terms and thus given a _quasi_ independent, a -_quasi_ atomistic standing of their own. This is the only alternative -to what the psychologists term “total reminiscence,” which, so far -as total, leave us with an elephant on our hands. Unless we are -going to have a wholesale revivification of the past, giving us just -another embarrassing present experience, illusory because irrelevant, -memory must work by retail--by summoning _distinct_ cases, events, -sequences, precedents. Dis-membering is a positively necessary part -of re-membering. But the resulting _disjecta membra_ are in no sense -experience as it was or is; they are simply elements held apart, and -yet tentatively implicated together, in present experience for the -sake of its most favorable evolution; evolution in the direction of -the most excellent meaning or value conceived. If the remembering is -efficacious and pertinent, it reveals the possibilities of the present; -that is to say, it clarifies the transitive, transforming character -that belongs inherently to the present. The dismembering of the vital -present into the disconnected past is correlative to an anticipation, -an idealization of the future. - -Moreover, the contingent character of the principle or rule that -emerges from a survey of cases, instances, as distinct from a fixed or -necessary character, secures just what is wanted in the exigency of -a prospective idealization, or refinement of excellence. It is just -this character that secures flexibility and variety of outlook, that -makes possible a consideration of alternatives and an attempt to select -and to execute the more worthy among them. The fixed or necessary law -would mean a future like the past--a dead, an unidealized future. It -is exasperating to imagine how completely different would have been -Aristotle’s valuation of “experience” with respect to its contingency, -if he had but once employed the function of developing and perfecting -value, instead of the function of knowing an unalterable object, as the -standard by which to estimate and measure intelligence. - -The one constant trait of experience from its crudest to its most -mature forms is that its contents undergo change of meaning, and -of meaning in the sense of excellence, value. Every experience -is in-course,[42] in course of becoming worse or better as to -its contents, or in course of conscious endeavor to sustain some -satisfactory level of value against encroachment or lapse. In this -effort, both precedent, the reduction of the present idealization, -the anticipation of the possible, though doubtful, future, emerge. -Without idealization, that is, without conception of the favorable -issue that the present, defined in terms of precedents, may portend in -its transition, the recollection of precedents, and the formulation -of tentative rules is nonsense. But without the identification of -the present in terms of elements suggested by the past, without -recognition, the ideal, the value projected as end, remains inert, -helpless, sentimental, without means of realization. Resembling cases -and anticipation, memory and idealization, are the corresponding terms -in which a present experience has its transitive force analyzed into -reciprocally pertinent means and ends. - -_That_ an experience will change in content and value is the one thing -certain. _How_ it will change is the one thing naturally uncertain. -Hence the import of the art of reflection and invention. Control of -the character of the change in the direction of the worthful is the -common business of theory and practice. Here is the province of the -episodic recollection of past history and of the idealized foresight -of possibilities. The irrelevancy of an objective idealism lies in the -fact that it totally ignores the position and function of ideality in -sustained and serious endeavor. Were values automatically injected and -kept in the world of experience by any force not reflected in human -memories and projects, it would make no difference whether this force -were a Spencerian environment or an Absolute Reason. Did purpose ride -in a cosmic automobile toward a predestined goal, it would not cease to -be physical and mechanical in quality because labeled Divine Idea, or -Perfect Reason. The moral would be “let us eat, drink, and be merry,” -for to-morrow--or if not this to-morrow, then upon some to-morrow, -unaffected by our empirical memories, reflections, inventions, and -idealizations--the cosmic automobile arrives. Spirituality, ideality, -meaning as purpose, would be the last things to present themselves if -objective idealism were true. Values cannot be both ideal and given, -and their “given” character is emphasized, not transformed, when they -are called eternal and absolute. But natural values become ideal the -moment their maintenance is dependent upon the intentional activities -of an empirical agent. To suppose that values are ideal because -they are so eternally given is the contradiction in which objective -idealism has intrenched itself. Objective ontological teleology -spells machinery. Reflective and volitional, experimental teleology -alone spells ideality.[43] Objective, rationalistic idealism breaks -upon the fact that it can have no intermediary between a brutally -achieved embodiment of meaning (physical in character or else of that -peculiar quasi-physical character which goes generally by the name -of metaphysical) and a total opposition of the given and the ideal, -connoting their mutual indifference and incapacity. An empiricism -that acknowledges the transitive character of experience, and that -acknowledges the possible control of the character of the transition -by means of intelligent effort, has abundant opportunity to celebrate -in productive art, genial morals, and impartial inquiry the grace and -the severity of the ideal. - - - - -THE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM[44] - - -The criticisms made upon that vital but still unformed movement -variously termed radical empiricism, pragmatism, humanism, -functionalism, according as one or another aspect of it is uppermost, -have left me with a conviction that the _fundamental_ difference is -not so much in matters overtly discussed as in a presupposition that -remains tacit: a presupposition as to what experience is and means. To -do my little part in clearing up the confusion, I shall try to make -my own presupposition explicit. The object of this paper is, then, to -set forth what I understand to be the postulate and the criterion of -_immediate empiricism_.[45] - -Immediate empiricism postulates that things--anything, everything, in -the ordinary or non-technical use of the term “thing”--are what they -are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly, -his task is to tell what it is experienced as being. If it is a horse -that is to be described, or the _equus_ that is to be defined, then -must the horse-trader, or the jockey, or the timid family man who -wants a “safe driver,” or the zoologist or the paleontologist tell us -what the horse is which is experienced. If these accounts turn out -different in some respects, as well as congruous in others, this is -no reason for assuming the content of one to be exclusively “real,” -and that of others to be “phenomenal”; for each account of what is -experienced will manifest that it is the account _of_ the horse-dealer, -or _of_ the zoologist, and hence will give the conditions requisite -for understanding the differences as well as the agreements of the -various accounts. And the principle varies not a whit if we bring in -the psychologist’s horse, the logician’s horse, or the metaphysician’s -horse. - -In each case, the nub of the question is, _what sort of experience_ is -denoted or indicated: a concrete and determinate experience, varying, -when it varies, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when it -agrees, in specific real elements, so that we have a contrast, not -between _a_ Reality, and various approximations to, or phenomenal -representations of Reality, but between different reals of experience. -And the reader is begged to bear in mind that from this standpoint, -when “an experience” or “some sort of experience” is referred to, “some -thing” or “some sort of thing” is always meant. - -Now, this statement that things are what they are experienced to be -is usually translated into the statement that things (or, ultimately, -Reality, Being) _are_ only and just what they are _known_ to be or that -things are, or Reality _is_, what it is for a conscious knower--whether -the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a thinker -being a further, and secondary, question. This is the root-paralogism -of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective, psychological -or epistemological. By our postulate, things are what they are -experienced to be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine -mode of experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and -exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; or -even that it _is_, relatively and piecemeal, what it is to a finite -and partial knower. Or, put more positively, knowing is one mode of -experiencing, and the primary philosophic demand (from the standpoint -of immediatism) is to find out _what_ sort of an experience knowing -is--or, concretely how things are experienced when they are experienced -_as_ known things.[46] By concretely is meant, obviously enough -(among other things), such an account of the experience of things as -known that will bring out the characteristic traits and distinctions -they possess as things of a knowing experience, as compared with -things experienced esthetically, or morally, or economically, or -technologically. To assume that, because from the _standpoint of -the knowledge experience_ things _are_ what they are known to be, -therefore, metaphysically, absolutely, without qualification, -everything in its reality (as distinct from its “appearance,” or -phenomenal occurrence) is what a knower would find it to be, is, from -the immediatist’s standpoint, if not the root of all philosophic evil, -at least one of its main roots. For this leaves out of account what -the knowledge standpoint is itself _experienced as_. - -I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise -_is_ fearsome; it _really_ is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively -so. That _is what_ it is experienced as being. But, when I experience -the noise as a _known_ thing, I find it to be innocent of harm. It -is the tapping of a shade against the window, owing to movements of -the wind. The experience has changed; that is, the thing experienced -has changed--not that an unreality has given place to a reality, nor -that some transcendental (unexperienced) Reality has changed,[47] -not that truth has changed, but just and only the concrete reality -experienced has changed. I now feel ashamed of my fright; and the noise -as fearsome is changed to noise as a wind-curtain fact, and hence -practically indifferent to my welfare. This is a change of experienced -existence effected through the medium of cognition. The content of the -latter experience cognitively regarded is doubtless _truer_ than the -content of the earlier; but it is in no sense more real. To call it -truer, moreover, must, from the empirical standpoint, mean a concrete -_difference_ in actual things experienced.[48] Again, in many cases, -only in retrospect is the prior experience cognitionally regarded at -all. In such cases, it is only in regard to contrasted content _in_ a -subsequent experience that the determination “truer” has force. - -Perhaps some reader may now object that as matter of fact the entire -experience _is_ cognitive, but that the earlier parts of it are only -imperfectly so, resulting in a phenomenon that is not real; while -the latter part, being a more complete cognition, results in what -is relatively, at least, more real.[49] In short, a critic may say -that, when I was frightened by the noise, I _knew_ I was frightened; -otherwise there would have been no experience at all. At this point, it -is necessary to make a distinction so simple and yet so all-fundamental -that I am afraid the reader will be inclined to pooh-pooh it away as -a mere verbal distinction. But to see that to the empiricist this -distinction is not verbal, but genuine, is the precondition of any -understanding of him. The immediatist must, by his postulate, ask -what is the fright experienced _as_. Is what is actually experienced, -I-know-I-am-frightened, or I-_am_-frightened? I see absolutely no -reason for claiming that the experience _must_ be described by the -former phrase. In all probability (and all the empiricist logically -needs is just one case of this sort) the experience is simply and just -of fright-at-the-noise. Later one may (or may not) have an experience -describable _as_ I-know-I-am-(or-was) and improperly or properly, -frightened. But this is a different experience--that is, a different -_thing_. And if the critic goes on to urge that the person “_really_” -must have known that he was frightened, I can only point out that the -critic is shifting the venue. He may be right, but, if so, it is only -because the “really” is something not concretely experienced (whose -nature accordingly is the critic’s business); and this is to depart -from the empiricist’s point of view, to attribute to him a postulate he -expressly repudiates. - -The material point may come out more clearly if I say that we must -make a distinction between a thing as _cognitive_, and one as -_cognized_.[50] I should define a cognitive experience as one that has -certain bearings or implications which induce, and fulfil themselves -in, a subsequent experience in which the relevant thing is experienced -_as_ cognized, _as_ a known object, and is thereby transformed, or -reorganized. The fright-at-the-noise in the case cited is obviously -_cognitive_, in this sense. By description, it induces an investigation -or inquiry in which both noise and fright are objectively stated or -presented--the noise as a shade-wind fact, the fright as an organic -reaction to a sudden acoustic stimulus, a reaction that under the -given circumstances was useless or even detrimental, a maladaptation. -Now, pretty much all of experience is of this sort (the “is” meaning, -of course, is experienced _as_), and the empiricist is false to his -principle if he does not duly note this fact.[51] But he is equally -false to his principle if he permits himself to be confused as to the -concrete differences in the two things experienced. - -There are two little words through explication of which the -empiricist’s position may be brought out--“_as_” and “_that_.” We may -express his presupposition by saying that things are what they are -experienced _as_ being; or that to give a just account of anything -is to tell what _that_ thing is experienced to be. By these words I -want to indicate the absolute, final, irreducible, and inexpugnable -concrete _quale_ which everything experienced not so much _has_ as -_is_. To grasp this aspect of empiricism is to see what the empiricist -means by objectivity, by the element of control. Suppose we take, -as a crucial case for the empiricist, an out and out illusion, say -of Zöllner’s lines. These are experienced as convergent; they are -“truly” parallel. If things are what they are experienced as being, -how can the distinction be drawn between illusion and the true state -of the case? There is no answer to this question except by sticking -to the fact that the experience of the lines as divergent is a -concrete qualitative thing or _that_. It is _that_ experience which -it is, and no other. And if the reader rebels at the iteration of -such obvious tautology, I can only reiterate that the realization of -the _meaning_ of this tautology is the key to the whole question of -the objectivity of experience, as that stands to the empiricist. The -lines of _that_ experience _are_ divergent; not merely _seem_ so. The -question of truth is not as to whether Being or Non-Being, Reality or -mere Appearance, is experienced, but as to the _worth_ of a certain -concretely experienced thing. The only way of passing upon this -question is by sticking in the most uncompromising fashion to _that_ -experience as real. _That_ experience is that two lines with certain -cross-hatchings are apprehended as convergent; only by taking that -experience as real and as fully real, is there any basis for, or way of -going to, an experienced knowledge that the lines are parallel. It is -in the concrete thing _as experienced_ that all the grounds and clues -to its own intellectual or logical rectification are contained. It is -because this thing, afterwards adjudged false, is a concrete _that_, -that it develops into a corrected experience (that is, experience of a -corrected thing--we reform things just as we reform ourselves or a bad -boy) whose full content is not a whit more real, but which is true or -truer.[52] - -If _any_ experience, then a _determinate_ experience; and this -determinateness is the only, and is the adequate, principle of -control, or “objectivity.” The experience may be of the vaguest sort. -I may not see anything which I can identify as a familiar object--a -table, a chair, etc. It may be dark; I may have only the vaguest -impression that there is something which looks like a table. Or I may -be completely befogged and confused, as when one rises quickly from -sleep in a pitch-dark room. But this vagueness, this doubtfulness, -this confusion is the thing experienced, and, _qua_ real, is as “good” -a reality as the self-luminous vision of an Absolute. It is not just -vagueness, doubtfulness, confusion, at large or in general. It is -_this_ vagueness, and no other; absolutely unique, absolutely what -_it_ is.[53] Whatever gain in clearness, in fullness, in trueness of -content is experienced must grow out of some element in the experience -of _this_ experienced _as_ what it is. To return to the illusion: If -the experience of the lines as convergent is illusory, it is because of -some elements in the thing as experienced, not because of something -defined in terms of externality to this particular experience. If the -illusoriness can be detected, it is because the thing experienced -is real, having within its experienced reality elements whose _own -mutual_ tension effects its reconstruction. Taken concretely, the -experience of convergent lines contains within itself the elements -of the transformation of its own content. It is _this_ thing, and -not some separate truth, that clamors for its own reform. There is, -then, from the empiricist’s point of view, no need to search for some -aboriginal _that_ to which all successive experiences are attached, -and which is somehow thereby undergoing continuous change. Experience -is always of _thats_; and the most comprehensive and inclusive -experience of the universe that the philosopher himself can obtain -is the experience of a characteristic _that_. From the empiricist’s -point of view, this is as true of the exhaustive and complete insight -of a hypothetical all-knower as of the vague, blind experience of the -awakened sleeper. As reals, they stand on the same level. As trues, -the latter has by definition the better of it; but if this insight is -in any way the truth of the blind awakening, it is because the latter -has, in its _own_ determinate _quale_, elements of real continuity -with the former; it is, _ex hypothesi_, transformable through a series -of experienced reals without break of continuity, into the absolute -thought-experience. There is no need of logical manipulation to effect -the transformation, nor _could_ any logical consideration effect it. -If effected at all it is just by immediate experiences, each of which -is just as real (no more, no less) as either of the two terms between -which they lie. Such, at least, is the meaning of the empiricist’s -contention. So, when he talks of experience, he does not mean some -grandiose, remote affair that is cast like a net around a succession -of fleeting experiences; he does not mean an indefinite total, -comprehensive experience which somehow engirdles an endless flux; he -means that _things_ are what they are experienced to be, and that every -experience is _some_ thing. - -From the postulate of empiricism, then (or, what is the same thing, -from a _general_ consideration of the concept of experience), nothing -can be deduced, not a single philosophical proposition.[54] The -reader may hence conclude that all this just comes to the truism that -experience is experience, or is what it is. If one attempts to draw -conclusions from the bare concept of experience, the reader is quite -right. But the real significance of the principle is that of a method -of philosophical analysis--a method identical in kind (but differing -in problem and hence in operation) with that of the scientist. If you -wish to find out what subjective, objective, physical, mental, cosmic, -psychic, cause, substance, purpose, activity, evil, being, quality--any -philosophic term, in short--means, go to experience and see what the -thing is experienced _as_. - -Such a method is not spectacular; it permits of no offhand -demonstrations of God, freedom, immortality, nor of the exclusive -reality of matter, or ideas, or consciousness, etc. But it supplies a -way of telling what all these terms mean. It may seem insignificant, -or chillingly disappointing, but only upon condition that it be not -worked. Philosophic conceptions have, I believe, outlived their -usefulness considered as stimulants to emotion, or as a species of -sanctions; and a larger, more fruitful and more valuable career awaits -them considered as specifically experienced meanings. - - [NOTE: The reception of this essay proved that I was unreasonably - sanguine in thinking that the foot-note of warning, appended - to the title, would forfend radical misapprehension. I see now - that it was unreasonable to expect that the word “immediate” - in a philosophic writing could be generally understood to - apply to anything except _knowledge_, even though the body of - the essay is a protest against such limitation. But I venture - to repeat that the essay is not a denial of the necessity of - “mediation,” or reflection, in knowledge, but is an assertion - that the inferential factor must _exist_, or must occur, and - that all existence is direct and vital, so that philosophy can - pass upon its nature--as upon the nature of all of the rest of - its subject-matter--only by first ascertaining what it exists or - occurs _as_. - - I venture to repeat also another statement of the text: I do not - mean by “immediate experience” any aboriginal stuff out of which - things are evolved, but I use the term to indicate the necessity - of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method that - has now made its way in all the natural sciences, with such - modifications, of course, as the subject itself entails. - - There is nothing in the text to imply that things exist - in experience atomically or in isolation. When it is said - that a thing as cognized is _different_ from an earlier - non-cognitionally experienced thing, the saying no more implies - lack of continuity between the things, than the obvious remark - that a seed is different from a flower or a leaf denies their - continuity. The amount and kind of continuity or discreteness - that exists is to be discovered by recurring to what actually - occurs in experience. - - Finally, there is nothing in the text that denies the existence - of things temporally prior to human experiencing of them. - Indeed, I should think it fairly obvious that we experience most - things _as_ temporally prior to our experiencing of them. The - import of the article is to the effect that we are not entitled - to draw philosophic (as distinct from scientific) conclusions - as to the meaning of prior temporal existence till we have - ascertained what it is to experience a thing as past. These four - disclaimers cover, I think, all the misapprehensions disclosed in - the four or five controversial articles (noted below) that the - original essay evoked. One of these articles (that of Professor - Woodbridge), raised a point of fact, holding that cognitional - experience tells us, without alteration, just what the things - of other types of experience are, and in that sense transcends - other experiences. This is too fundamental an issue to discuss - in a note, and I content myself with remarking that with respect - to it, the bearing of the article is that the issue must be - settled by a careful descriptive survey of things as experienced, - to see whether modifications do not occur in existences when - they are experienced _as_ known; _i.e._, as true or false in - character. The reader interested in following up this discussion - is referred to the following articles: Vol. II. of the _Journal - of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, two articles - by Bakewell, p. 520 and p. 687; one by Bode, p. 658; one by - Woodbridge, p. 573; Vol. III. of the same Journal, by Leighton, - p. 174.] - - - - -“CONSCIOUSNESS” AND EXPERIENCE[55] - - -Every science in its final standpoint and working aims is controlled -by conditions lying outside itself--conditions that subsist in the -practical life of the time. With no science is this as obviously true -as with psychology. Taken without nicety of analysis, no one would -deny that psychology is specially occupied with the individual; that -it wishes to find out those things that proceed peculiarly from the -individual, and the mode of their connection with him. Now, the way -in which the individual is conceived, the value that is attributed to -him, the things in his make-up that arouse interest, are not due at the -outset to psychology. The scientific view regards these matters in a -reflected, a borrowed, medium. They are revealed in the light of social -life. An autocratic, an aristocratic, a democratic society propound -such different estimates of the worth and place of individuality; -they procure for the individual as an individual such different sorts -of experience; they aim at arousing such different impulses and -at organizing them according to such different purposes, that the -psychology arising in each must show a different temper. - -In this sense, psychology is a political science. While the professed -psychologist, in his conscious procedure, may easily cut his -subject-matter loose from these practical ties and references, yet the -starting point and goal of his course are none the less socially set. -In this conviction I venture to introduce to an audience that could -hardly be expected to be interested in the technique of psychology, a -technical subject, hoping that the human meaning may yet appear. - -There is at present a strong, apparently a growing tendency to conceive -of psychology as an account of the consciousness of the individual, -considered as something in and by itself; consciousness, the assumption -virtually runs, being of such an order that it may be analyzed, -described, and explained in terms of just itself. The statement, as -commonly made, is that psychology is an account of consciousness, _qua_ -consciousness; and the phrase is supposed to limit psychology to a -certain definite sphere of fact that may receive adequate discussion -for scientific purposes, without troubling itself with what lies -outside. Now if this conception be true, there is no intimate, no -important connection of psychology and philosophy at large. That -philosophy, whose range is comprehensive, whose problems are catholic, -should be held down by a discipline whose voice is as partial as its -material is limited, is out of the range of intelligent discussion. - -But there is another possibility. If the individual of whom psychology -treats be, after all, a social individual, any absolute setting off and -apart of a sphere of consciousness as, even for scientific purposes, -self-sufficient, is condemned in advance. All such limitation, and -all inquiries, descriptions, explanations that go with it, are only -preliminary. “Consciousness” is but a symbol, an anatomy whose life is -in natural and social operations. To know the symbol, the psychical -letter, is important; but its necessity lies not within itself, but -in the need of a language for reading the things signified. If this -view be correct, we cannot be so sure that psychology is without large -philosophic significance. Whatever meaning the individual has for the -social life that he both incorporates and animates, that meaning has -psychology for philosophy. - -This problem is too important and too large to suffer attack in -an evening’s address. Yet I venture to consider a portion of it, -hoping that such things as appear will be useful clues in entering -wider territory. We may ask what is the effect upon psychology of -considering its material as something so distinct as to be capable -of treatment without involving larger issues. In this inquiry we -take as representative some such account of the science as this: -Psychology deals with consciousness “as such” in its various modes and -processes. It aims at an isolation of each such as will permit accurate -description: at statement of its place in the serial order such as will -enable us to state the laws by which one calls another into being, -or as will give the natural history of its origin, maturing, and -dissolution. It is both analytic and synthetic--analytic in that it -resolves each state into its constituent elements; synthetic in that it -discovers the processes by which these elements combine into complex -wholes and series. It leaves alone--it shuts out--questions concerning -the validity, the objective import of these modifications: of their -value in conveying truth, in effecting goodness, in constituting -beauty. For it is just with such questions of worth, of validity, that -philosophy has to do. - -Some such view as this is held by the great majority of working -psychologists to-day. A variety of reasons have conspired to bring -about general acceptance. Such a view seems to enroll one in the ranks -of the scientific men rather than of the metaphysicians--and there are -those who distrust the metaphysicians. Others desire to take problems -piecemeal and in detail, avoiding that excursion into ultimates, into -that never-ending panorama of new questions and new possibilities -that seems to be the fate of the philosopher. While no temperate -mind can do other than sympathize with this view, it is hardly more -than an expedient. For, as Mr. James remarks, after disposing of -the question of free-will by relegating it to the domain of the -metaphysician:--“Metaphysics means only an unusually obstinate attempt -to think clearly and consistently”--and clearness and consistency are -not things to be put off beyond a certain point. When the metaphysician -chimes in with this new-found modesty of the psychologist, so different -from the disposition of Locke and Hume and the Mills, salving his -metaphysical conscience with the remark--it hardly possesses the -dignity of a conviction--that the partial sciences, just because they -are partial, are not expected to be coherent with themselves nor with -one another; when the metaphysician, I say, praises the psychologist -for sticking to his last, we are reminded that another motive is -also at work. There is a half-conscious irony in this abnegation of -psychology. It is not the first time that science has assumed the work -of Cinderella; and, since Mr. Huxley has happily reminded her, she is -not altogether oblivious, in her modesty, of a possible future check to -the pride of her haughty sister, and of a certain coronation that shall -mark her coming to her own. - -But, be the reasons as they may, there is little doubt of the fact. -Almost all our working psychologists admit, nay, herald this limitation -of their work. I am not presumptuous enough to set myself against this -array. I too proclaim myself of those who believe that psychology has -to do (at a certain point, that is) with “consciousness as such.” But -I do not believe that the limitation is final. Quite the contrary: -if “consciousness” or “state of consciousness” be given intelligible -meaning, I believe that this conception is the open gateway into the -fair fields of philosophy. For, note you, the phrase is an ambiguous -one. It may mean one thing to the metaphysician who proclaims: Here -finally we have psychology recognizing her due metes and bounds, -giving bonds to trespass no more. It may mean quite another thing to -the psychologist in his work--whatever he may happen to say about it. -It may be that the psychologist deals with states of consciousness -as the significant, the analyzable and describable form, to which he -reduces the things he is studying. Not that they _are_ that existence, -but that they are its indications, its clues, in shape for handling -by scientific methods. So, for example, does the paleontologist -work. Those curiously shaped and marked forms to which he is devoted -are not life, nor are they the literal termini of his endeavor; but -through them as signs and records he construes a life. And again, the -painter-artist might well say that he is concerned only with colored -paints as such. Yet none the less through them as registers and -indices, he reveals to us the mysteries of sunny meadow, shady forest, -and twilight wave. These are the things-in-themselves of which the oils -on his palette are phenomena. - -So the preoccupation of the psychologist with states of consciousness -may signify that they are the media, the concrete conditions to which -he purposely reduces his material, in order, _through them_, as -methodological helps, to get at and understand that which is anything -but a state of consciousness. To him, however, who insists upon the -fixed and final limitation of psychology, the state of consciousness is -not the shape some fact takes from the exigency of investigation; it -is literally the full fact itself. It is not an intervening term; it -bounds the horizon. Here, then, the issue defines itself. I conceive -that states of consciousness (and I hope you will take the phrase -broadly enough to cover all the specific data of psychology) have no -existence before the psychologist begins to work. He brings them into -existence. What we are really after is the process of experience, the -way in which it arises and behaves. We want to know its course, its -history, its laws. We want to know its various typical forms; how -each originates; how it is related to others; the part it plays in -maintaining an inclusive, expanding, connected course of experience. -Our problem as psychologists is to learn its _modus operandi_, its -method. - -The paleontologist is again summoned to our aid. In a given district -he finds a great number and variety of footprints. From these he goes -to work to construct the structure and the life habits of the animals -that made them. The tracks exist undoubtedly; they are there; but yet -he deals with them not as final existences but as signs, phenomena in -the literal sense. Imagine the hearing that the critic would receive -who should inform the paleontologist that he is transcending his -field of scientific activity; that his concern is with footprints -as such, aiming to describe each, to analyze it into its simplest -forms, to compare the different kinds with one another so as to detect -common elements, and finally, thereby, to discover the laws of their -arrangement in space! - -Yet the immediate data are footprints, and footprints only. The -paleontologist does in a way do all these things that our imaginary -critic is urging upon him. The difference is not that he arbitrarily -lugs in other data; that he invents entities and faculties that are -not there. The difference is in his standpoint. His interest is in -the animals, and the data are treated in whatever way seems likely to -serve this interest. So with the psychologist. He is continually and -perforce occupied with minute and empirical investigation of special -facts--states of consciousness, if you please. But these neither define -nor exhaust his scientific problem. They are his footprints, his -clues through which he places before himself the life-process he is -studying--with the further difference that his footprints are not after -all given to him, but are developed by his investigation.[56] - -The supposition that these states are somehow existent by themselves -and in this existence provide the psychologist with ready-made -material is just the supreme case of the “psychological fallacy”: the -confusion of experience as it is to the one experiencing with what the -psychologist makes out of it with his reflective analysis. - -The psychologist begins with certain operations, acts, functions as -his data. If these fall out of sight in the course of discussion, it -is only because having been taken for granted, they remain to control -the whole development of the inquiry, and to afford the sterling medium -of redemption. Acts such as perceiving, remembering, intending, loving -give the points of departure; they alone are concrete experiences. -To understand these experiences, under what conditions they arise, -and what effects they produce, analysis into states of consciousness -occurs. And the modes of consciousness that are figured remain -unarranged and unimportant, save as they may be translated back into -acts. - -To remember is to do something, as much as to shoe a horse, or to -cherish a keepsake. To propose, to observe, to be kindly affectioned, -are terms of value, of practice, of operation; just as digestion, -respiration, locomotion express functions, not observable “objects.” -But there is an object that may be described: lungs, stomach, -leg-muscles, or whatever. Through the structure we present to -ourselves the function; it appears laid out before us, spread forth -in detail--objectified in a word. The anatomist who devotes himself -to this detail may, if he please (and he probably does please to -concentrate his devotion) ignore the function: to discover what -is there, to analyze, to measure, to describe, gives him outlet -enough. But nevertheless it is the function that fixed the point -of departure, that prescribed the problem and that set the limits, -physical as well as intellectual, of subsequent investigation. -Reference to function makes the details discovered other than a -jumble of incoherent trivialities. One might as well devote himself -to the minute description of a square yard of desert soil were it not -for this translation. States of consciousness are the morphology of -certain functions.[57] What is true of analysis, of description, is -true equally of classification. Knowing, willing, feeling, name states -of consciousness not in terms of themselves, but in terms of acts, -attitudes, found in experience.[58] - -Explanation, even of an “empirical sort” is as impossible as -determination of a “state” and its classification, when we -rigidly confine ourselves to modifications of consciousness as -a self-existent. Sensations are always defined, classified, and -explained by reference to conditions which, according to the theory, -are extraneous--sense-organs and stimuli. The whole physiological -side assumes a ludicrously anomalous aspect on this basis.[59] While -experimentation is retained, and even made much of, it is at the cost -of logical coherence. To experiment with reference to a bare state -of consciousness is a performance of which one cannot imagine the -nature, to say nothing of doing it; while to experiment with reference -to acts and the conditions of their occurrence is a natural and -straightforward undertaking. Such simple processes as association are -concretely inexplicable when we assume states of consciousness as -existences by themselves. As recent psychology testifies, we again have -to resort to conditions that have no place nor calling on the basis -of the theory--the principle of habit, of neural action, or else some -connection in the object.[60] - -We have only to note that there are two opposing schools in psychology -to see in what an unscientific status is the subject. We have only -to consider that these two schools are the result of assuming states -of consciousness as existences _per se_ to locate the source of -the scientific scandal. No matter what the topic, whether memory -or association or attention or effort, the same dualisms present -themselves, the same necessity of choosing between two schools. One, -lost in the distinctions that it has developed, denies the function -because it can find objectively presented only states of consciousness. -So it abrogates the function, regarding it as a mere aggregate of -such states, or as a purely external and factitious relation between -them. The other school, recognizing that this procedure explains away -rather than explains, the values of experience, attempts to even up -by declaring that certain functions are themselves immediately given -data of consciousness, existing side by side with the “states,” but -indefinitely transcending them in worth, and apprehended by some higher -organ. So against the elementary contents and external associations of -the analytic school in psychology, we have the complicated machinery -of the intellectualist school, with its pure self-consciousness as a -source of ultimate truths, its hierarchy of intuitions, its ready-made -faculties. To be sure, these “spiritual faculties” are now largely -reduced to some one comprehensive form--Apperception, or Will, or -Attention, or whatever the fashionable term may be. But the principle -remains the same; the assumption of a function as a given existent, -distinguishable in itself and acting upon other existences--as if -the functions digestion and vision were regarded as separate from -organic structures, somehow acting upon them from the outside so as -to bring co-operation and harmony into them![61] This division into -psychological schools is as reasonable as would be one of botanists -into rootists and flowerists; of those proclaiming the root to be -the rudimentary and essential structure, and those asserting that -since the function of seed-bearing is the main thing, the flower is -really the controlling “synthetic” principle. Both sensationalist and -intellectualist suppose that psychology has some special sphere of -“reality” or of experience marked off for it within which the data are -just lying around, self-existent and ready-made, to be picked up and -assorted as pebbles await the visitor on the beach. Both alike fail to -recognize that the psychologist first has experience to deal with; the -same experience that the zoologist, geologist, chemist, mathematician, -and historian deal with, and that what characterizes his specialty is -not some data or existences which he may call uniquely his own; but the -problem raised--the problem of the _course_ of the acts that constitute -experiencing. - -Here psychology gets its revenge upon those who would rule it out of -possession of important philosophical bearing. As a matter of fact, -the larger part of the questions that are being discussed in current -epistemology and what is termed metaphysic of logic and ethic arise -out of (and are hopelessly compromised by) this original assumption -of “consciousness as such”--in other words, are provoked by the exact -reason that is given for denying to psychology any essential meaning -for epistemology and metaphysic. Such is the irony of the situation. -The epistemologist’s problem is, indeed, usually put as the question of -how the subject can so far “transcend” itself as to get valid assurance -of the objective world. The very phraseology in which the problem is -put reveals the thoroughness of the psychologist’s revenge. Just and -only because experience has been reduced to “states of consciousness” -as independent existences, does the question of self-transcendence -have any meaning. The entire epistemological industry is one--shall -I say it--of a Sisyphean nature. _Mutatis mutandis_, the same holds -of the metaphysic of logic, ethic, and esthetic. In each case, the -basic problem has come to be how a mere state of consciousness can be -the vehicle of a system of truth, of an objectively valid good, of -beauty which is other than agreeable feeling. We may, indeed, excuse -the psychologist for not carrying on the special inquiries that are -the business of logical, ethical, and esthetical philosophy; but can -we excuse ourselves for forcing his results into such a shape as to -make philosophic problems so arbitrary that they are soluble only by -arbitrarily wrenching scientific facts? - -Undoubtedly we are between two fires. In placing upon psychology -the responsibility of discovering the method of experience, as a -sequence of acts and passions, do we not destroy just that limitation -to concrete detail which now constitutes it a science? Will not the -psychologist be the first to repudiate this attempt to mix him up -in matters philosophical? We need only to keep in mind the specific -facts involved in the term Course or Process of Experience to avoid -this danger. The immediate preoccupation of the psychologist is with -very definite and empirical facts--questions like the limits of -audition, of the origin of pitch, of the structure and conditions of -the musical scale, etc. Just so the immediate affair of the geologist -is with particular rock-structures, of the botanist with particular -plants, and so on. But through the collection, description, location, -classification of rocks the geologist is led to the splendid story -of world-forming. The limited, fixed, and separate piece of work is -dissolved away in the fluent and dynamic drama of the earth. So, the -plant leads with inevitableness to the whole process of life and its -evolution. - -In form, the botanist still studies the genus, the species, the -plant--hardly, indeed, that; rather the special parts, the structural -elements, of the plant. In reality, he studies life itself; the -structures are the indications, the signature through which he -renders transparent the mystery of life growing in the changing -world. It was doubtless necessary for the botanist to go through the -Linnean period--the period of engagement with rigid detail and fixed -classifications; of tearing apart and piecing together; of throwing -all emphasis upon peculiarities of number, size, and appearance of -matured structure; of regarding change, growth, and function as -external, more or less interesting, attachments to form. Examination -of this period is instructive; there is much in contemporary -investigation and discussion that is almost unpleasantly reminiscent in -its suggestiveness. The psychologist should profit by the intervening -history of science. The conception of evolution is not so much an -additional law as it is a face-about. The fixed structure, the separate -form, the isolated element, is henceforth at best a mere stepping-stone -to knowledge of process, and when not at its best, marks the end of -comprehension, and betokens failure to grasp the problem. - -With the change in standpoint from self-included existence to including -process, from structural unit of composition to controlling unity -of function, from changeless form to movement in growth, the whole -scheme of values is transformed. Faculties are definite directions of -development; elements are products that are starting-points for new -processes; bare facts are indices of change; static conditions are -modes of accomplished adjustment. Not that the concrete, empirical -phenomenon loses in worth, much less that unverifiable “metaphysical” -entities are impertinently introduced; but that our aim is the -discovery of a process of actions in its adaptations to circumstance. -If we apply this evolutionary logic in psychology, where shall we -stop? Questions of limits of stimuli in a given sense, say hearing, -are in reality questions of temporary arrests, adjustments marking the -favorable equilibrium of the whole organism; they connect with the -question of the use of sensation in general and auditory sensations -in particular for life-habits; of the origin and use of localized and -distinguished perception; and this, in turn, involves within itself -the whole question of space and time recognition; the significance -of the thing-and-quality experience, and so on. And when we are told -that the question of the origin of space experience has nothing at all -to do with the question of the nature and significance of the space -experienced, the statement is simply evidence that the one who makes -it is still at the static standpoint; he believes that things, that -relations, have existence and significance apart from the particular -conditions under which they come into experience, and apart from the -special service rendered in those particular conditions. - -Of course, I am far from saying that every psychologist must make the -whole journey. Each individual may contract, as he pleases, for any -section or subsection he prefers; and undoubtedly the well-being of -the science is advanced by such division of labor. But psychology -goes over the whole ground from detecting every distinct act of -experiencing, to seeing what need calls out the special organ fitted to -cope with the situation, and discovering the machinery through which it -operates to keep a-going the course of action. - -But, I shall be told, the wall that divides psychology from philosophy -cannot be so easily treated as non-existent. Psychology is a matter of -natural history, even though it may be admitted that it is the natural -history of the course of experience. But philosophy is a matter of -values; of the criticism and justification of certain validities. One -deals, it is said, with genesis, with conditions of temporal origin -and transition; the other with analysis, with eternal constitution. I -shall have to repeat that just this rigid separation of genesis and -analysis seems to me a survival from a pre-evolutionary, a pre-historic -age. It indicates not so much an assured barrier between philosophy -and psychology as the distance dividing philosophy from all science. -For the lesson that mathematicians first learned, that physics and -chemistry pondered over, in which the biological disciplines were -finally tutored, is that sure and delicate analysis is possible only -through the patient study of conditions of origin and development. -The method of analysis in mathematics is the method of construction. -The experimental method is the method of making, of following the -history of production; the term “cause” that has (when taken as an -existent entity) so hung on the heels of science as to impede its -progress, has universal meaning when read as condition of appearance -in a process. And, as already intimated, the conception of evolution -is no more and no less the discovery of a general law of life than it -is the generalization of all scientific method. Everywhere analysis -that cannot proceed by examining the successive stages of its subject, -from its beginning up to its culmination, that cannot control this -examination by discovering the conditions under which successive stages -appear, is only preliminary. It may further the invention of proper -tools of inquiry, it may help define problems, it may serve to suggest -valuable hypotheses. But as science it breathes an air already tainted. -There is no way to sort out the results flowing from the subject-matter -itself from those introduced by the assumptions and presumptions of -our own reflection. Not so with natural history when it is worthy of -its name. Here the analysis is the unfolding of the existence itself. -Its distinctions are not pigeon-holes of our convenience; they are -stakes that mark the parting of the ways in the process itself. Its -classifications are not a grasp at factors resisting further analysis; -they are the patient tracings of the paths pursued. Nothing is more -out of date than to suppose that interest in genesis is interest in -reducing higher forms to cruder ones: it is interest in locating the -exact and objective conditions under which a given fact appears, and -in relation to which accordingly it has its meaning. Nothing is more -naïve than to suppose that in pursuing “natural history” (term of scorn -in which yet resides the dignity of the world-drama) we simply learn -something of the temporal conditions under which a given value appears, -while its own eternal essential quality remains as opaque as before. -Nature knows no such divorce of quality and circumstance. Things come -when they are wanted and as they are wanted; their quality is precisely -the response they give to the conditions that call for them, while -the furtherance they afford to the movement of their whole is their -meaning. The severance of analysis and genesis, instead of serving as -a ready-made test by which to try out the empirical, temporal events -of psychology from the rational abiding constitution of philosophy, -is a brand of philosophic dualism: the supposition that values are -externally obtruded and statically set in irrelevant rubbish. - -There are those who will admit that “states of consciousness” are -but the cross-sections of flow of behavior, arrested for inspection, -made in order that we may reconstruct experience in its lifehistory. -Yet in the knowledge of the course and method of our experience, -they will hold that we are far from the domain proper of philosophy. -Experience, they say, is just the historic achievement of finite -individuals; it tells the tale of approach to the treasures of truth, -of partial victory, but larger defeat, in laying hold of the treasure. -But, they say, reality is not the path to reality, and record of -devious wanderings in the path is hardly a safe account of the goal. -Psychology, in other words, may tell us something of how we mortals -lay hold of the world of things and truths; of how we appropriate -and assimilate its contents; and of how we react. It may trace the -issues of such approaches and apprehensions upon the course of our -own individual destinies. But it cannot wisely ignore nor sanely deny -the distinction between these individual strivings and achievements, -and the “Reality” that subsists and supports its own structure -outside these finite futilities. The processes by which we turn over -The Reality into terms of our fragmentary unconcluded, inconclusive -experiences are so extrinsic to the Reality itself as to have no -revealing power with reference to it. There is the _ordo ad universum_, -the subject of philosophy; there is the _ordo ad individuum_, the -subject of psychology. - -Some such assumption as this lies latent, I am convinced, in all -forswearings of the kinship of psychology and philosophy. Two -conceptions hang together. The opinion that psychology is an account -only and finally of states of consciousness, and therefore can throw -no light upon the objects with which philosophy deals, is twin to -the doctrine that the whole conscious life of the individual is not -organic to the world. The philosophic basis and scope of this doctrine -lie beyond examination here. But even in passing one cannot avoid -remarking that the doctrine is almost never consistently held; the -doctrine logically carried out leads so directly to intellectual and -moral scepticism that the theory usually prefers to work in the dark -background as a disposition and temper of thought rather than to make a -frank statement of itself. Even in the half-hearted expositions of the -process of human experience as something merely annexed to the reality -of the universe, we are brought face to face to the consideration with -which we set out: the dependence of theories of the individual upon -the position at a given time of the individual practical and social. -The doctrine of the accidental, futile, transitory significance of the -individual’s experience as compared with eternal realities; the notion -that at best the individual is simply realizing for and in himself -what already has fixed completeness in itself is congruous only with -a certain intellectual and political scheme and must modify itself as -that shifts. When such rearrangement comes, our estimate of the nature -and importance of psychology will mirror the change. - -When man’s command of the methods that control action was precarious -and disturbed; when the tools that subject the world of things and -forces to use and operation were rare and clumsy, it was unavoidable -that the individual should submit his perception and purpose blankly to -the blank reality beyond. Under such circumstances, external authority -must reign; the belief that human experience in itself is approximate, -not intrinsic, is inevitable. Under such circumstances, reference to -the individual, to the subject, is a resort only for explaining error, -illusion, and uncertainty. The necessity of external control and -external redemption of experience reports itself in a low valuation of -the self, and of all the factors and phases of experience that spring -from the self. That the psychology of medievalism should appear only as -a portion of its theology of sin and salvation is as obvious as that -the psychology of the Greeks should be a chapter of cosmology. - -As against all this, the assertion is ventured that psychology, -supplying us with knowledge of the behavior of experience, is a -conception of democracy. Its postulate is that since experience -fulfils itself in individuals, since it administers itself through -their instrumentality, the account of the course and method of this -achievement is a significant and indispensable affair. - -Democracy is possible only because of a change in intellectual -conditions. It implies tools for getting at truth in detail, and day -by day, as we go along. Only such possession justifies the surrender -of fixed, all-embracing principles to which, as universals, all -particulars and individuals are subject for valuation and regulation. -Without such possession, it is only the courage of the fool that would -undertake the venture to which democracy has committed itself--the -ordering of life in response to the needs of the moment in accordance -with the ascertained truth of the moment. Modern life involves the -deification of the here and the now; of the specific, the particular, -the unique, that which happens once and has no measure of value save -such as it brings with itself. Such deification is monstrous fetishism, -unless the deity be there; unless the universal lives, moves, and has -its being in experience as individualized.[62] This conviction of the -value of the individualized finds its further expression in psychology, -which undertakes to show how this individualization proceeds, and in -what aspect it presents itself. - -Of course, such a conception means something for philosophy as well -as for psychology; possibly it involves for philosophy the larger -measure of transformation. It involves surrender of any claim on -the part of philosophy to be the sole source of some truths and the -exclusive guardian of some values. It means that philosophy be a -method; not an assurance company, nor a knight errant. It means an -alignment with science. Philosophy may not be sacrificed to the -partial and superficial clamor of that which sometimes officiously -and pretentiously exhibits itself as Science. But there is a sense -in which philosophy must go to school to the sciences; must have no -data save such as it receives at their hands; and be hospitable to no -method of inquiry or reflection not akin to those in daily use among -the sciences. As long as it claims for itself special territory of -fact, or peculiar modes of access to truth, so long must it occupy a -dubious position. Yet this claim it has to make until psychology comes -to its own. There is something in experience, something in things, -which the physical and the biological sciences do not touch; something, -moreover, which is not just more experiences or more existences; -but without which their materials are inexperienced, unrealized. -Such sciences deal only with what _might_ be experienced; with the -content of experience, provided and assumed there be experience. It is -psychology which tells us how this possible experience loses its barely -hypothetical character, and is stamped with categorical unquestioned -experiencedness; how, in a word, it becomes here and now in some -uniquely individualized life. Here is the necessary transition of -science into philosophy; a passage that carries the verified and solid -body of the one into the large and free form of the other. - - [NOTE: I have let this paper stand much as written, though now - conscious that much more is crowded into it than could properly - be presented in one paper. The drift of the ten years from ’99 to - ’09 has made, I venture to believe, for increased clearness in - the main positions of the paper: The revival of a naturalistic - realism, the denial of the existence of “consciousness,” the - development of functional and dynamic psychology (accompanied - by aversion to interpretation of functions as faculties of a - soul-substance)--all of these tendencies are sympathetic with - the aim of the paper. There is another reason for letting it - stand: the new functional and pragmatic empiricism proffered - in this volume has been constantly objected to on the ground - that its conceptions of knowledge and verification lead only - to subjectivism and solipsism. The paper may indicate that the - identification of experience with bare states of consciousness - represents the standpoint of the critic, not of the empiricism - criticised, and that it is for him, not for me, to fear the - subjective implications of such a position. The paper also - clearly raises the question as to how far the isolation of - “consciousness” from nature and social life, which characterizes - the procedure of many psychologists of to-day, is responsible for - keeping alive quite unreal problems in philosophy.] - - - - -THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE[63] - - -It is now something over a century since Kant called upon philosophers -to cease their discussion regarding the nature of the world and the -principles of existence until they had arrived at some conclusion -regarding the nature of the knowing process. But students of philosophy -know that Kant formulated the question “how knowledge is possible” -rather than created it. As matter of fact, reflective thought for two -centuries before Kant had been principally interested in just this -problem, although it had not generalized its own interest. Kant brought -to consciousness the controlling motive. The discussion, both in Kant -himself and in his successors, often seems scholastic, lost in useless -subtlety, scholastic argument, and technical distinctions. Within the -last decade in particular there have been signs of a growing weariness -as to epistemology, and a tendency to turn away to more fertile -fields. The interest shows signs of exhaustion. - -Students of philosophy will recognize what I mean when I say that this -growing conviction of futility and consequent distaste are associated -with the outcome of the famous dictum of Kant, that perception without -conception is blind, while conception without perception is empty. The -whole course of reflection since Kant’s time has tended to justify this -remark. The sensationalist and the rationalist have worked themselves -out. Pretty much all students are convinced that we can reduce -knowledge neither to a set of associated sensations, nor yet to a -purely rational system of relations of thought. Knowledge is judgment, -and judgment requires both a material of sense perception and an -ordering, regulating principle, reason; so much seems certain, but we -do not get any further. Sensation and thought themselves seem to stand -out more rigidly opposed to each other in their own natures than ever. -Why both are necessary, and how two such opposed factors coöperate in -bringing about the unified result of science, becomes more and more of -a mystery. It is the continual running up against this situation which -accounts for the flagging of interest and the desire to direct energy -where it will have more outcome. - -This situation creates a condition favorable to taking stock of the -question as it stands; to inquiring what this interest, prolonged -for over three centuries, in the possibility and nature of knowledge, -stands for; what the conviction as to the necessity of the union of -sensation and thought, together with the inability to reach conclusions -regarding the nature of the union, signifies. - -I propose then to raise this evening precisely this question: What -is the meaning of the problem of knowledge? What is its meaning, not -simply for reflective philosophy or in terms of epistemology itself, -but what is its meaning in the historical movement of humanity and as -a part of a larger and more comprehensive experience? My thesis is -perhaps sufficiently indicated in the mere taking of this point of -view. It implies that the abstractness of the discussion of knowledge, -its remoteness from everyday experience, is one of form, rather than of -substance. It implies that the problem of knowledge is not a problem -that has its origin, its value, or its destiny within itself. The -problem is one which social life, the organized practice of mankind, -has had to face. The seemingly technical and abstruse discussion of the -philosophers results from the formulation and statement of the question. - -I suggest that the problem of the possibility of knowledge is but -an aspect of the question of the relation of knowing to acting, of -theory to practice. The distinctions which the philosophers raise, the -oppositions which they erect, the weary treadmill which they pursue -between sensation and thought, subject and object, mind and matter, are -not invented _ad hoc_, but are simply the concise reports and condensed -formula of points of view and practical conflicts having their source -in the very nature of modern life, conflicts which must be met and -solved if modern life is to go on its way untroubled, with clear -consciousness of what it is about. As the philosopher has received his -problem from the world of action, so he must return his account there -for auditing and liquidation. - -More especially, I suggest that the tendency of all the points at issue -to precipitate in the opposition of sensationalism and rationalism -is due to the fact that sensation and reason stand for the two -forces contending for mastery in social life: the radical and the -conservative. The reason that the contest does not end, the reason for -the necessity of the combination of the two in the resultant statement, -is that both factors are necessary in action; one stands for stimulus, -for initiative; the other for control, for direction. - -I cannot hope, in the time at my command this evening, to justify -these wide and sweeping assertions regarding either the origin, the -work, or the final destiny of philosophic reflection. I simply hope, -by reference to some of the chief periods of the development of -philosophy, to illustrate to you something of what I mean. - -At the outset we take a long scope in our survey and present to -ourselves the epoch when philosophy was still consciously, and not -simply by implication, human, when reflective thought had not developed -its own technique of method, and was in no danger of being caught in -its own machinery--the time of Socrates. What does the assertion of -Socrates that an unexamined life is not one fit to be led by man; what -does his injunction “Know thyself” mean? It means that the corporate -motives and guarantees of conduct are breaking down. We have got away -from the time when the individual could both regulate and justify his -course of life by reference to the ideals incarnate in the habits of -the community of which he is a member. The time of direct and therefore -unconscious union with corporate life, finding therein stimuli, codes, -and values, has departed. The development of industry and commerce, of -war and politics, has brought face to face communities with different -aims and diverse habits; the development of myth and animism into crude -but genuine scientific observation and imagination has transformed -the physical widening of the horizon, brought about by commerce -and intercourse, into an intellectual and moral expansion. The old -supports fail precisely at the time when they are most needed--before -a widening and more complex scene of action. Where, then, shall the -agent of action turn? The “Know thyself” of Socrates is the reply to -the practical problem which confronted Athens in his day. Investigation -into the true ends and worths of human life, sifting and testing of all -competing ends, the discovery of a method which should validate the -genuine and dismiss the spurious, had henceforth to do for man what -consolidated and incorporate custom had hitherto presented as a free -and precious gift. - -With Socrates the question is as direct and practical as the question -of making one’s living or of governing the state; it is indeed the -same question put in its general form. It is a question that the flute -player, the cobbler, and the politician must face no more and no less -than the reflective philosopher. The question is addressed by Socrates -to every individual and to every group with which he comes in contact. -Because the question is practical it is individual and direct. It is a -question which every one must face and answer for himself, just as in -the Protestant scheme every individual must face and solve for himself -the question of his final destiny. - -Yet the very attitude of Socrates carried with it the elements of its -own destruction. Socrates could only raise the question, or rather -demand of every individual that he raise it for himself. Of the answer -he declared himself to be as ignorant as was any one. The result -could be only a shifting of the center of interest. If the question is -so all-important, and yet the wisest of all men must confess that he -only knows his own ignorance as to its answer, the inevitable point -of further consideration is the discovery of a method which shall -enable the question to be answered. This is the significance of Plato. -The problem is the absolutely inevitable outgrowth of the Socratic -position; and yet it carried with it just as inevitably the separation -of philosopher from shoemaker and statesman, and the relegation of -theory to a position remote for the time being from conduct. - -If the Socratic command, “Know thyself,” runs against the dead wall of -inability to conduct this knowledge, some one must take upon himself -the discovery of how the requisite knowledge may be obtained. A new -profession is born, that of the thinker. At this time the means, -the discovery of how the aims and worths of the self may be known -and measured, becomes, for this class, an end in itself. Theory is -ultimately to be applied to practice; but in the meantime the theory -must be worked out as theory or else no application. This represents -the peculiar equilibrium and the peculiar point of contradiction in -the Platonic system. All philosophy is simply for the sake of the -organization and regulation of social life; and yet the philosophers -must be a class by themselves, working out their peculiar problems -with their own particular tools. - -With Aristotle the attempted balance failed. Social life is -disintegrating beyond the point of hope of a successful reorganization, -and thinking is becoming a fascinating pursuit for its own sake. The -world of practice is now the world of compromise and of adjustment. -It is relative to partial aims and finite agents. The sphere of -absolute and enduring truth and value can be reached only in and -through thought. The one who acts compromises himself with the animal -desire that inspires his action and with the alien material that forms -its stuff. In two short generations the divorce of philosophy from -life, the isolation of reflective theory from practical conduct, has -completed itself. So great is the irony of history that this sudden and -effective outcome was the result of the attempt to make thought the -instrument of action, and action the manifestation of truth reached by -thinking. - -But this statement must not be taken too literally. It is impossible -that men should really separate their ideas from their acts. If we -look ahead a few centuries we find that the philosophy of Plato and -Aristotle has accomplished, in an indirect and unconscious way, -what perhaps it could never have effected by the more immediate and -practical method of Socrates. Philosophy became an organ of vision, -an instrument of interpretation; it furnished the medium through which -the world was seen and the course of life estimated. Philosophy died -as philosophy, to rise as the set and bent of the human mind. Through -a thousand and devious and roundabout channels, the thoughts of the -philosophers filtered through the strata of human consciousness and -conduct. Through the teachings of grammarians, rhetoricians, and a -variety of educational schools, they were spread in diluted form -through the whole Roman Empire and were again precipitated in the -common forms of speech. Through the earnestness of the moral propaganda -of the Stoics they became the working rules of life for the more -strenuous and earnest spirits. Through the speculations of the Sceptics -and Epicureans they became the chief reliance and consolation of a -large number of highly cultured individuals amid social turmoil and -political disintegration. All these influences and many more finally -summed themselves up in the two great media through which Greek -philosophy finally fixed the intellectual horizon of man, determined -the values of its perspective, and meted out the boundaries and -divisions of the scene of human action. - -These two influences were the development of Christian theology -and moral theory, and the organization of the system of Roman -jurisprudence. There is perhaps no more fascinating chapter in -the history of humanity than the slow and tortuous processes by -which the ideas set in motion by that Athenian citizen who faced -death as serenely as he conversed with a friend, finally became the -intellectually organizing centers of the two great movements that -bridge the span between ancient civilization and modern. As the -personal and immediate force and enthusiasm of the movement initiated -by Jesus began to grow fainter and the commanding influence of his own -personality commenced to dim, the ideas of the world and of life, of -God and of man, elaborated in Greek philosophy, served to transform -moral enthusiasm and personal devotion to the redemption of humanity, -into a splendid and coherent view of the universe; a view that resisted -all disintegrating influences and gathered into itself the permanent -ideas and progressive ideals thus far developed in the history of man. - -We have only a faint idea of how this was accomplished, or of the -thoroughness of the work done. We have perhaps even more inadequate -conceptions of the great organizing and centralizing work done by Greek -thought in the political sphere. When the military and administrative -genius of Rome brought the whole world in subjection to itself, the -most pressing of practical problems was to give unity of practical -aim and harmony of working machinery to the vast and confused -mass of local custom and tradition, religious, social, economic, -and intellectual, as well as political. In this juncture the great -administrators and lawyers of Rome seized with avidity upon the -results of the intellectual analysis of social and political relations -elaborated in Greek philosophy. Caring naught for these results in -their reflective and theoretical character, they saw in them the -possible instrument of introducing order into chaos and of transforming -the confused and conflicting medley of practice and opinion into a -harmonious social structure. Roman law, that formed the vertebral -column of civilization for a thousand years, and which articulated the -outer order of life as distinctly as Christianity controlled the inner, -was the outcome. - -Thought was once more in unity with action, philosophy had become the -instrument of conduct. Mr. Bosanquet makes the pregnant remark “that -the weakness of medieval science and philosophy are connected rather -with excess of practice than with excess of theory. The subordination -of philosophy to theology is a subordination of science to a formulated -conception of human welfare. Its essence is present, not wherever there -is metaphysics but wherever the spirit of truth is subordinated to any -preconceived practical intent.” (“History of Esthetics,” p. 146.) - -Once more the irony of history displays itself. Thought has become -practical, it has become the regulator of individual conduct and -social organization, but at the expense of its own freedom and power. -The defining characteristic of medievalism in state and in church, in -political and spiritual life, is that truth presents itself to the -individual only through the medium of organized authority. - -There was a historical necessity on the external as well as the -internal side. We have not the remotest way of imagining what the -outcome would finally have been if, at the time when the intellectual -structure of the Christian church and the legal structure of the -Roman Empire had got themselves thoroughly organized, the barbarians -had not made their inroads and seized upon all this accumulated and -consolidated wealth as their own legitimate prey. But this was what did -happen. As a result, truths originally developed by the freest possible -criticism and investigation became external, and imposed themselves -upon the mass of individuals by the mere weight of authoritative law. -The external, transcendental, and supernatural character of spiritual -truth and of social control during the Middle Ages is naught but -the mirror, in consciousness, of the relation existing between the -eager, greedy, undisciplined horde of barbarians on one side, and the -concentrated achievements of ancient civilization on the other. There -was no way out save that the keen barbarian whet his appetite upon -the rich banquet spread before him. But there was equally no way out -so far as the continuity of civilization was concerned save that the -very fullness and richness of this banquet set limits to the appetite, -and finally, when assimilated and digested, it be transformed into the -flesh and blood, the muscles and sinew of him who sat at the feast. -Thus the barbarian ceased to be a barbarian and a new civilization -arose. - -But the time came when the work of absorption was fairly complete. -The northern barbarians had eaten the food and drunk the wine of -Græco-Roman civilization. The authoritative truth embodied in medieval -state and church succeeded, in principle, in disciplining the untrained -masses. Its very success issued its own death warrant. To say that it -had succeeded means that the new people had finally eaten their way -into the heart of the ideas offered them, had got from them what they -wanted, and were henceforth prepared to go their own way and make their -own living. Here a new rhythm of the movement of thought and action -begins to show itself. - -The beginning of this change in the swing of thought and action forms -the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern times. It is the -epoch of the Renaissance. The individual comes to a new birth and -asserts his own individuality and demands his own rights in the way -of feeling, doing, and knowing for himself. Science, art, religion, -political life, must all be made over on the basis of recognizing the -claims of the individual. - -Pardon me these commonplaces, but they are necessary to the course of -the argument. By historic fallacy we often suppose, or imagine that -we suppose, that the individual had been present as a possible center -of action all through the Middle Ages, but through some external -and arbitrary interference had been weighted down by political and -intellectual despotism. All this inverts the true order of the case. -The very possibility of the individual making such unlimited demands -for himself, claiming to be the legitimate center of all action and -standard for all organization, was dependent, as I have already -indicated, upon the intervening medievalism. Save as having passed -through this period of tremendous discipline, and having gradually -worked over into his own habits and purposes the truths embodied in -the church and state that controlled his conduct, the individual could -be only a source of disorder and a disturber of civilization. The very -maintenance of the spiritual welfare of mankind was bound up in the -extent to which the claim of truth and reality to be universal and -objective, far above all individual feeling and thought, could make -itself valid. The logical realism and universalism of scholastic -philosophy simply reflect the actual subjection of the individual to -that associated and corporate life which, in conserving the past, -provided the principle of control. - -But the eager, hungry barbarian was there, implicated in this -universalism. He must be active in receiving and in absorbing the -truth authoritatively doled out to him. Even the most rigid forms of -medieval Christianity could not avoid postulating the individual will -as having a certain initiative with reference to its own salvation. The -impulses, the appetite, the instinct of the individual were all assumed -in medieval morals, religion, and politics. The imagined medieval -tyranny took them for granted as completely as does the modern herald -of liberty and equality. But the medieval civilization knew that the -time had not come when these appetites and impulses could be trusted to -work themselves out. They must be controlled by the incorporate truths -inherited from Athens and Rome. - -The very logic of the relationship, however, required that the time -come when the individual makes his own the objective and universal -truths. He is now the incorporation of truth. He now has the control as -well as the stimulus of action within himself. He is the standard and -the end, as well as the initiator and the effective force of execution. -Just because the authoritative truth of medievalism has succeeded, has -fulfilled its function, the individual can begin to assert himself. - -Contrast this critical period, finding its expression equally in -the art of the Renaissance, the revival of learning, the Protestant -Reformation, and political democracy, with Athens in the time of -Socrates. Then individuals felt their own social life disintegrated, -dissolving under their very feet. The problem was how the value of that -social life was to be maintained against the external and internal -forces that were threatening it. The problem was on the side neither -of the individual nor of progress; save as the individual was seen -to be an intervening instrument in the reconstruction of the social -unity. But with the individual of the fourteenth century, it was not -his own intimate community life which was slipping away from him. It -was an alien and remote life which had finally become his own; which -had passed over into his own inner being. The problem was not how a -unity of social life should be conserved, but what the individual -should do with the wealth of resources of which he found himself the -rightful heir and administrator. The problem looked out upon the -future, not back to the past. It was how to create a new order, both -of modes of individual conduct and forms of social life that should -be the appropriate manifestations of the vigorous and richly endowed -individual. - -Hence the conception of progress as a ruling idea; the conception of -the individual as the source and standard of rights; and the problem -of knowledge, were all born together. Given the freed individual, who -feels called upon to create a new heaven and a new earth, and who -feels himself gifted with the power to perform the task to which he is -called:--and the demand for science, for a method of discovering and -verifying truth, becomes imperious. The individual is henceforth to -supply control, law, and not simply stimulation and initiation. What -does this mean but that instead of any longer receiving or assimilating -truth, he is now to search for and create it? Having no longer the -truth imposed by authority to rely upon, there is no resource save -to secure the authority of truth. The possibility of getting at and -utilizing this truth becomes therefore the underlying and conditioning -problem of modern life. Strange as it may sound, the question which -was formulated by Kant as that of the possibility of knowledge, is the -fundamental political problem of modern life. - -Science and metaphysics or philosophy, though seeming often to be at -war, with their respective adherents often throwing jibes and slurs -at each other, are really the most intimate allies. The philosophic -movement is simply the coming to consciousness of this claim of the -individual to be able to discover and verify truth for himself, -and thereby not only to direct his own conduct, but to become an -influential and decisive factor in the organization of life itself. -Modern philosophy is the formulation of this creed, both in general and -in its more specific implications. We often forget that the technical -problem “_how_ knowledge is possible,” also means “how _knowledge_ is -possible”; how, that is, shall the individual be able to back himself -up by truth which has no authority save that of its own intrinsic -truthfulness. Science, on the other hand, is simply this general faith -or creed asserting itself in detail; it is the practical faith at work -engaged in subjugating the foreign territory of ignorance and falsehood -step by step. If the ultimate outcome depends upon this detailed and -concrete work, we must not forget that the earnestness and courage, as -well as the intelligence and clearness with which the task has been -undertaken, have depended largely upon the wider, even if vaguer, -operation of philosophy. - -But the student of philosophy knows more than that the problem of -knowledge has been with increasing urgency and definiteness the -persistent and comprehensive problem. So conscious is he of the two -opposed theories regarding the nature of science, that he often forgets -the underlying bond of unity of which we have been speaking. These two -opposing schools are those which we know as the sensationalist and the -intellectualist, the empiricist and the rationalist. Admitting that the -dominance of the question of the possibility and nature of knowledge is -at bottom a fundamental question of practice and of social direction, -is _this_ distinction anything more than the clash of scholastic -opinions, a rivalry of ideas meaningless for conduct? - -I think it is. Having made so many sweeping assertions I must venture -one more. Fanciful and forced as it may seem, I would say that the -sensational and empirical schools represent in conscious and reflective -form the continuation of the principle of the northern and barbarian -side of medieval life; while the intellectualist and the rationalist -stand for the conscious elaboration of the principle involved in the -Græco-Roman tradition. - -Once more, as I cannot hope to prove, let me expand and illustrate. -The sensationalist has staked himself upon the possibility of -explaining and justifying knowledge by conceiving it as the grouping -and combination of the qualities directly given us in sensation. The -special reasons advanced in support of this position are sufficiently -technical and remote. But the motive which has kept the sensationalist -at work, which animated Hobbes and Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill, -Voltaire and Diderot, was a human not a scholastic one. It was the -belief that only in sensation do we get any personal contact with -reality, and hence, any genuine guarantee of vital truth. Thought is -pale, and remote from the concrete stuff of knowledge and experience. -It only formulates and duplicates; it only divides and recombines that -fullness of vivid reality got directly and at first hand in sense -experience. Reason, compared with sense, is indirect, emasculate, and -faded. - -Moreover, reason and thought in their very generality seem to lie -beyond and outside the individual. In this remoteness, when they claim -any final value, they violate the very first principle of the modern -consciousness. What is the distinguishing characteristic of modern -life, unless it be precisely that the individual shall not simply -get, and reason about, truth in the abstract, but shall make it his -own in the most intimate and personal way? He has not only to know -the truth in the sense of knowing about it, but he must feel it. What -is sensation but the answer to this demand for the most individual -and intimate contact with reality? Show me a sensationalist and I -will show you not only one who believes that he is on the side of -concreteness and definiteness, as against washed-out abstractions and -misty general notions: but also one who believes that he is identified -with the cause of the individual as distinct from that of external -authority. We have only to go to our Locke and our Mill to see that -opposition to the innate and the _a priori_ was felt to be opposition -to the deification of hereditary prejudice and to the reception of -ideas without examination or criticism. Personal contact with reality -through sensation seemed to be the only safeguard from opinions which, -while masquerading in the guise of absolute and eternal truth, were in -reality but the prejudices of the past become so ingrained as to insist -upon being standards of truth and action. - -Positively as well as negatively, the sensationalists have felt -themselves to represent the side of progress. In its supposed eternal -character, a general notion stands ready made, fixed forever, without -reference to time, without the possibility of change or diversity. -As distinct from this, the sensation represents the never-failing -eruption of the new. It is the novel, the unexpected, that which -cannot be reasoned out in eternal formula, but must be hit upon in the -ever-changing flow of our experience. It thus represents stimulation, -excitation, momentum onwards. It gives a constant protest against the -assumption of any theory or belief to possess finality; and it supplies -the ever-renewed presentation of material out of which to build up new -objects and new laws. - -The sensationalist appears to have a good case. He stands for -vividness and definiteness against abstraction; for the engagement -of the individual in experience as against the remote and general -thought about experience; and for progress and for variety against the -eternal fixed monotony of the concept. But what says the rationalist? -What value has experience, he inquires, if it is simply a chaos of -disintegrated and floating débris? What is the worth of personality and -individuality when they are reduced to crudity of brute feeling and -sheer intensity of impulsive reaction? What is there left in progress -that we should desire it, when it has become a mere unregulated flux of -transitory sensations, coming and going without reasonable motivation -or rational purpose? - -Thus the intellectualist has endeavored to frame the structure of -knowledge as a well-ordered economy, where reason is sovereign, where -the permanent is the standard of reference for the changing, and where -the individual may always escape from his own mere individuality -and find support and reinforcement in a system of relations that -lies outside of and yet gives validity to his own passing states of -consciousness. Thus the rationalists hold that we must find in a -universal intelligence a source of truth and guarantee of value that is -sought in vain in the confused and flowing mass of sensations. - -The rationalist, in making the concept or general idea the -all-important thing in knowledge, believes himself to be asserting the -interests of order as against destructive caprice and the license of -momentary whim. He finds that his cause is bound up with that of the -discovery of truth as the necessary instrument and method for action. -Only by reference to the general and the rational can the individual -find perspective, secure direction for his appetites and impulses, and -escape from the uncontrolled and ruinous reactions of his own immediate -tendency. - -The concept, once more, in its very generality, in its elevation above -the intensities and conflicts of momentary passions and interests, is -the conserver of the experience of the past. It is the wisdom of the -past put into capitalized and funded form to enable the individual to -get away from the stress and competition of the needs of the passing -moment. It marks the difference between barbarism and civilization, -between continuity and disintegration, between the sequence of -tradition that is the necessity of intelligent thought and action, and -the random and confused excitation of the hour. - -When we thus consider not the details of the positions of the -sensationalist and rationalist, but the motives that have induced them -to assume these positions, we discover what is meant in saying that the -question is still a practical, a social one, and that the two schools -stand for certain one-sided factors of social life. If we have on one -side the demand for freedom, for personal initiation into experience, -for variety and progress, we have on the other side the demand for -general order, for continuous and organized unity, for the conservation -of the dearly bought resources of the past. This is what I mean by -saying that the sensationalist abstracts in conscious form the position -and tendency of the Germanic element in modern civilization, the -factor of appetite and impulse, of keen enjoyment and satisfaction, of -stimulus and initiative. Just so the rationalist erects into conscious -abstraction the principle of the Græco-Roman world, that of control, of -system, of order and authority. - -That the principles of freedom and order, of past and future, or -conservation and progress, of incitement to action and control of that -incitation, are correlative, I shall not stop to argue. It may be -worth while, however, to point out that exactly the same correlative -and mutually implicating connection exists between sensationalism and -rationalism, considered as philosophical accounts of the origin and -nature of knowledge. - -The strength of each school lies in the weakness of its opponent. -The more the sensationalist appears to succeed in reducing knowledge -to the associations of sensation, the more he creates a demand for -thought to introduce background and relationship. The more consistent -the sensationalist, the more openly he reveals the sensation in its -own nakedness crying aloud for a clothing of value and meaning which -must be borrowed from reflective and rational interpretation. On the -other hand, the more reason and the system of relations that make up -the functioning of reason are magnified, the more is felt the need of -sensation to bring reason into some fruitful contact with the materials -of experience. Reason must have the stimulus of this contact in order -to be incited to its work and to get materials to operate with. The -cause, then, why neither school can come to rest in itself is precisely -that each abstracts one essential factor of conduct. - -This suggests, finally, that the next move in philosophy is precisely -to transfer attention from the details of the position assumed, and -the arguments used in these two schools, to the practical motives that -have unconsciously controlled the discussion. The positions have been -sufficiently elaborated. Within the past one hundred years, within -especially the last generation, each has succeeded in fully stating -its case. The result, if we remain at this point, is practically a -deadlock. Each can make out its case against the other. To stop at such -a point is a patent absurdity. If we are to get out of the cul-de-sac -it must be by bringing into consciousness the tacit reference to action -that all the time has been the controlling factor. - -In a word, another great rhythmic movement is seen to be approaching -its end. The demand for science and philosophy was the demand for -truth and a sure standard of truth which the new-born individual might -employ in his efforts to build up a new world to afford free scope -to the powers stirring within him. The urgency and acuteness of this -demand caused, for the time being, the transfer of attention from the -nature of practice to that of knowledge. The highly theoretical and -abstract character of modern epistemology, combined with the fact that -this highly abstract and theoretic problem has continuously engaged the -attention of thought for more than three centuries, is, to my mind, -proof positive that the question of knowledge was for the time being -the point in which the question of practice centered, and through which -it must find outlet and solution. - -We return, then, to our opening problem: the meaning of the question -of the possibility of knowledge raised by Kant a century ago, and of -his assertion that sensation without thought is blind, thought without -sensation empty. Once more I recall to the student of philosophy -how this assertion of Kant has haunted and determined the course of -philosophy in the intervening years--how his solution at once seems -inevitable and unsatisfactory. It is inevitable in that no one can -fairly deny that both sense and reason are implicated in every fruitful -and significant statement of the world; unconvincing because we are -after all left with these two opposed things still at war with each -other, plus the miracle of their final combination. - -When I say that the only way out is to place the whole modern industry -of epistemology in relation to the conditions that gave it birth and -the function it has to fulfil, I mean that the unsatisfactory character -of the entire neo-Kantian movement lies in its assumption that -knowledge gives birth to itself and is capable of affording its own -justification. The solution that is always sought and never found so -long as we deal with knowledge as a self-sufficing purveyor of reality, -reveals itself when we conceive of knowledge as a statement of action, -that statement being necessary, moreover, to the successful ongoing of -action. - -The entire problem of medieval philosophy is that of absorption, -of assimilation. The result was the creation of the individual. -Hence the problem of modern life is that of reconstruction, reform, -reorganization. The entire content of experience needs to be passed -through the alembic of individual agency and realization. The -individual is to be the bearer of civilization; but this involves a -remaking of the civilization that he bears. Thus we have the dual -question: How can the individual become the organ of corporate action? -How can he make over the truth authoritatively embodied in institutions -of church and state into frank, healthy, and direct expressions of -the simple act of free living? On the other hand, how can civilization -preserve its own integral value and import when subordinated to the -agency of the individual instead of exercising supreme sway over him? - -The question of knowledge, of the discovery and statement of truth, -gives the answer to this question; and it alone gives the answer. -Admitting that the practical problem of modern life is the maintenance -of the moral values of civilization through the medium of the insight -and decision of the individual, the problem is foredoomed to futile -failure save as the individual in performing his task can work with -a definite and controllable tool. This tool is science. But this -very fact, constituting the dignity of science and measuring the -importance of the philosophic theory of knowledge, conferring upon -them the religious value once attaching to dogma and the disciplinary -significance once belonging to political rules, also sets their limit. -The servant is not above his master. - -When a theory of knowledge forgets that its value rests in solving the -problem out of which it has arisen, viz., that of securing a method of -action; when it forgets that it has to work out the conditions under -which the individual may freely direct himself without loss to the -historic values of civilization--when it forgets these things it begins -to cumber the ground. It is a luxury, and hence a social nuisance and -disturber. Of course, in the very nature of things, every means or -instrument will for a while absorb attention so that it becomes the -end. Indeed it is the end when it is an indispensable condition of -onward movement. But when once the means have been worked out they must -operate as such. When the nature and method of knowledge are fairly -understood, then interest must transfer itself from the possibility of -knowledge to the possibility of its application to life. - -The sensationalist has played his part in bringing to effective -recognition the demand in valid knowledge for individuality of -experience, for personal participation in materials of knowledge. -The rationalist has served his time in making it clear once for all -that valid knowledge requires organization, and the operation of a -relatively permanent and general factor. The Kantian epistemologist -has formulated the claims of both schools in defining judgment as -the relation of perception and conception. But when it goes on to -state that this relation is itself knowledge, or can be found in -knowledge, it stultifies itself. Knowledge can define the percept and -elaborate the concept, but their union can be found only in action. The -experimental method of modern science, its erection into the ultimate -mode of verification, is simply this fact obtaining recognition. Only -action can reconcile the old, the general, and the permanent with the -changing, the individual, and the new. It is action as progress, as -development, making over the wealth of the past into capital with which -to do an enlarging and freer business, that alone can find its way -out of the cul-de-sac of the theory of knowledge. Each of the older -movements passed away because of its own success, failed because it did -its work, died in accomplishing its purpose. So also with the modern -philosophy of knowledge; there must come a time when we have so much -knowledge in detail, and understand so well its method in general, -that it ceases to be a problem. It becomes a tool. If the problem of -knowledge is not intrinsically meaningless and absurd it must in course -of time be solved. Then the dominating interest becomes the _use_ of -knowledge; the conditions under which and ways in which it may be most -organically and effectively employed to direct conduct. - -Thus the Socratic period recurs; but recurs with the deepened meaning -of the intervening weary years of struggle, confusion, and conflict -in the growth of the recognition of the need of patient and specific -methods of interrogation. So, too, the authoritative and institutional -truth of scholasticism recurs, but recurs borne up upon the vigorous -and conscious shoulders of the freed individual who is aware of his -own intrinsic relations to truth, and who glories in his ability to -carry civilization--not merely to carry it, but to carry it on. Thus -another swing in the rhythm of theory and practice begins. - -How does this concern us as philosophers? For the world it means that -philosophy is henceforth a method and not an original fountain head of -truth, nor an ultimate standard of reference. But what is involved for -philosophy itself in this change? I make no claims to being a prophet, -but I venture one more and final unproved statement, believing, with -all my heart, that it is justified both by the moving logic of the -situation, and by the signs of the times. I refer to the growing -transfer of interest from metaphysics and the theory of knowledge to -psychology and social ethics--including in the latter term all the -related concrete social sciences, so far as they may give guidance to -conduct. - -There are those who see in psychology only a particular science -which they are pleased to term purely empirical (unless it happen to -restate in changed phraseology the metaphysics with which they are -familiar). They see in it only a more or less incoherent mass of facts, -interesting because relating to human nature, but below the natural -sciences in point of certainty and definiteness, as also far below -pure philosophy as to comprehensiveness and ability to deal with -fundamental issues. But if I may be permitted to dramatize a little -the position of the psychologist, he can well afford to continue -patiently at work, unmindful of the occasional supercilious sneers of -the epistemologist. The cause of modern civilization stands and falls -with the ability of the individual to serve as its agent and bearer. -And psychology is naught but the account of the way in which individual -life is thus progressively maintained and reorganized. Psychology -is the attempt to state in detail the machinery of the individual -considered as the instrument and organ through which social action -operates. It is the answer to Kant’s demand for the formal phase of -experience--how experience as such is constituted. Just because the -whole burden and stress, both of conserving and advancing experience is -more and more thrown upon the individual, everything which sheds light -upon how the individual may weather the stress and assume the burden is -precious and imperious. - -Social ethics in inclusive sense is the correlative science. Dealing -not with the form or mode or machinery of action, it attempts rather -to make out its filling and make up the values that are necessary to -constitute an experience which is worth while. The sociologist, like -the psychologist, often presents himself as a camp follower of genuine -science and philosophy, picking up scraps here and there and piecing -them together in somewhat of an aimless fashion--fortunate indeed, if -not vague and over-ambitious. Yet social ethics represents the attempt -to translate philosophy from a general and therefore abstract method -into a working and specific method; it is the change from inquiring -into the nature of value in general to inquiring as to the _particular_ -values that ought to be realized in the life of every one, and as to -the conditions which render possible this realization. - -There are those who will see in this conception of the outcome of a -four-hundred-year discussion concerning the nature and possibility -of knowledge a derogation from the high estate of philosophy. There -are others who will see in it a sign that philosophy, after wandering -aimlessly hither and yon in a wilderness without purpose or outcome, -has finally come to its senses--has given up metaphysical absurdities -and unverifiable speculations, and become a purely positive science -of phenomena. But there are yet others who will see in this movement -the fulfilment of its vocation, the clear consciousness of a function -that it has always striven to perform; and who will welcome it as a -justification of the long centuries when it appeared to sit apart, far -from the common concerns of man, busied with discourse of essence and -cause, absorbed in argument concerning subject and object, reason and -sensation. To such this outcome will appear the inevitable sequel of -the saying of Socrates that “an unexamined life is not one fit to be -led by man”; and a better response to his injunction “Know thyself.” - - -THE END - - - - -INDEX - - - Absolutism, 18, 25, 98, 102, 109-110, 121-123, 130-132; - _Essay IV._, 142-153, 176, 180-181 - - Acquaintance, and knowledge, 79-82 - - Action, and problem of knowledge, _Essay XI._, 271-304 - - _A priori_, 206-213, 292-294 - - Appearance, and reality, 26-28, 118-121 - - Aristotle, referred to, 5, 32, 35, 37, 48, 50, 78, 221, 278 - - Assurance, 85-88 - - Awareness, 93 - - - Behavior, and intelligence, 44 - - Belief, _Essay VI._, 169-197 - - Bosanquet, B., 281 - - Bradley, F. H., _Essay IV._, 112-153 - - - Change, its supposed unreality, 1; - in modern science, 8-9; - and law, 72; - and thought, 133; - of truth, 153; - of experience, 222-224, 259-260; - - Christianity, metaphysic of, 178 - - Cognitive, 84-85, 230-233 - - Conflict, and thinking, 116-117, 126-127, 132, 148-149 - - Consistency, as criterion, 128-136 - - Consciousness, as end of nature, 34-35; - is partial, 43; - and knowledge, 79-80, 102, 171; - _Essay X._, 242-270; - non-existence of, 247-248 - - Correspondence, 158 - - Cosmology, and morals, 54 - - Custom, as background of morals, 48, 52 - - - Darwin, his influence on philosophy, _Essay I._, 1-19; - quoted, 2, 12 - - Democracy, moral meaning of, 59-60, 266-267 - - Descartes, 8 - - Design, _see_ Teleology - - - Economic Struggle, 21, 29, 35, 41, 50 - - Economics, influences on morals, 57-59 - - Empiricism, 200-202; - _Essay IX._, 226-241, 289-291 - - Epistemology, _versus_ logic, 95-107, 172, 185, 201, 296-298 - - Error, and becoming, 100 - - Evolution, of species, 1, 8; - and design, 12-13; - and teleology, 32-35; - and intelligence, 42-43 - - Experience, _Essay VII._, 198-225 - - Experiment, and knowledge, _Essay IV._, 77-111 - - Feeling, 80-81 - - - Final Cause, _see_ Teleology - - Functions, true data of psychology, 250-255 - - - Galileo, 8 - - Genesis, and value, 261-264 - - Good, is concrete and plural, 15-17, 23, 27; - of Nature, _Essay II._, 20-45; - and evolution, 31-35, 43; - and mysticism, 39, 42; - Greek view of, 46-50; - medieval view of, 52-54; - as fixed, 67 - - Gordon, K., 215 n. - - Gray, Asa, on evolution and design, 12 - - - Happiness, nature of, 69 - - Hegel, 65, 174 n. - - Hobbes, 203 n. - - Hume, 82 n., 204 n. - - - Idealism, 28, 38, 191; - _Essay VII._, 198-225, 228 - - Ideality, 89, 120, 219-225 - - Ideas, nature of, 134, 155; - their verification, 141 ff.; - are hypothetical, 144, 150-151, 187 - - Individual, 244, 265-68, 285, 297 - - Intellectualism, _Essay IV._, 112-153, 159 - - Intelligence, is discriminative, 39, 42, 75; - is the good of nature, 44; - and Morals, _Essay III._, 46-76; - cosmic and personal, 55, 59; - as biological instrument, 68; - indirection of activity, 133, 149 - - Introspection, 250 n. - - - James, Wm., 104, 194 n., 202, 222 n., 246 - - Judgment, Bradley’s theory of, 114-117; - of the past, 160-61, 165; - Kant’s theory of, 272 - - - Kant, 63-65, 206-213, 271 - - Knowledge, its proper object, 6, 10, 14; - and nature, 41; - and freedom, 73; - The Experimental Theory of, _Essay IV._, 77-111; - defined, 90; - and inquiry, 184-189; - _Essay XI._, problem of, 271-304 - - - Locke, 93, 202-204, 217-218 - - - Maine, Sir Henry, quoted, 46 - - Meaning, and knowledge, 87-90; - and judgment, 116-117, 200 - - Mechanism, 23, 34, 57 - - Memory, 220 - - Moore, A. W., 91 n. - - Morals, _Essay III._, 46-76 - - Mysticism, 38-40, 42 - - - Naturalism, 195 - - Nature, teleology of, 10; - The Good of, _Essay II._, 20-45; - animistic character of, 51; - change in, 72 - - Newton, influence of, 61, 72 - - - Organization, of experience, 208-211 - - - Perception, ambiguity of term, 214-219 - - Philosophy, changes in, 14-19; - political nature of, 21; - defined, 45; - and science, 51; - and psychology, 189-191; - _Essay X._, 242-270 - - Plato, 21, 47, 49, 72, 219 n., 278 - - Pragmatism, 25, 31, 33, 55, 95 n., 109, 130 n., 144; - _Essay V._, 154-168, 193 - - Psychical, 81 n., 104 - - Psychology, and philosophy, _Essay X._, 242-270, 301 - - - Rationalism, _Essay XI._, 271-304 - - “Reality,” 98, 105, 113, 129, 169 n., 172, 228, 264 - - Relation, and appearance, 119-120 - - - Santayana, G., 96, 224 n. - - Sciences, developed out of morals, 56; - and industry, 57-58; - as mode of knowledge, 108; - and philosophy, 268-270, 287 - - Sensation, 94, 262 n. - - Sensationalism, _Essay XI._, 271-304 - - Social Ethics, 302-304 - - Socrates, 51, 76, 275, 304 - - Species, equivalent to scholastic form, 3-4; - as eternal and teleological, 4-5; - basis of knowledge, 6-7 - - Spencer, Herbert, 16, 33, 66 - - Spinoza, 181 - - Stoicism, 172, 279 - - Stuart, H. W., 214 n. - - Subjective, 98, 155, 204 n., 270 - - - Teleology, of life, 4; - of nature, 10, 32; - basis of idealism, 11; - concrete, 15, 22; - and evolution, 32-35; - subjective, 223-224 - - Theory, 124-127 - - Thinking, practical character of, 124-127 - - Tolstoi, 173 n. - - Transcendence, of knowledge, 103 n., 156-157 - - Transcendental, and supernatural, 22, 29, 282; - view of knowledge, 24, 27; - freedom, 74 - - Truth, criterion of, 92, 95, 107-111; - _Essay IV._, 112-153; - absolute, 137; - identified with existence, 138, 145; - eternal, 147, 152; - _Essay V._, 154-168; - 230-231, 237, 282 - - - Utilitarianism, 62 - - - Verification, making true, 139 ff., 162-164 - - - Woodbridge, F. J. E., 104 n., 240 n. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] The affair is even more portentous in the German with its -capital letters and series of _muses_: “Gewiss ist der Pragmatismus -erkenntnisstheoretisch Nominalismus, psychologisch Voluntarismus, -naturphilosophisch Energismus, metaphysisch Agnosticismus, ethisch -Meliorismus auf Grundlage des Bentham-Millschen Utilitarismus.” - -[2] A lecture in a course of public lectures on “Charles Darwin and His -Influence on Science,” given at Columbia University in the winter and -spring of 1909. Reprinted from the _Popular Science Monthly_ for July, -1909. - -[3] “Life and Letters,” Vol. I., p. 282; cf. 285. - -[4] “Life and Letters,” Vol. II., pp. 146, 170, 245; Vol. I., pp. -283-84. See also the closing portion of his “Variations of Animals and -Plants under Domestication.” - -[5] Reprinted from the _Hibbert Journal_, Vol. VII., No. 4, July, 1909. - -[6] A public lecture delivered at Columbia University in March, 1908, -under the title of “Ethics,” in a series of lectures on “Science, -Philosophy, and Art.” Reprinted from a monograph published by the -Columbia University Press. - -[7] Reprinted, with considerable change in the arrangement and in the -matter of the latter portion, from _Mind_, Vol. XV., N.S., July, 1906. - -[8] I must remind the reader again of a point already suggested. It -is the identification of presence in consciousness with knowledge as -such that leads to setting up _a_ mind (_ego_, subject) which has the -peculiar property of knowing (only so often it knows wrong!), or else -that leads to supplying “sensations” with the peculiar property of -surveying their own entrails. Given the correct feeling that knowledge -involves relationship, there being, by supposition, no other _thing_ to -which the thing in consciousness is related, it is forthwith related -to a soul substance, or to its ghostly offspring, a “subject,” or to -“consciousness” itself. - -[9] Let us further recall that this theory requires either that things -present shall already be psychical things (feelings, sensations, -etc.), in order to be assimilated to the knowing mind, subject to -consciousness; or else translates genuinely naïve realism into the -miracle of a mind that gets outside itself to lay its ghostly hands -upon the things of an external world. - -[10] This means that things may be present _as_ known, just as they -be present as hard or soft, agreeable or disgusting, hoped for or -dreaded. The mediacy, or the art of intervention, which characterizes -knowledge, indicates precisely the way in which known things as known -are immediately present. - -[11] If Hume had had a tithe of the interest in the _flux_ of -perceptions and in _habit_--principles of continuity and of -organization--which he had in distinct and isolated existences, he -might have saved us both from German _Erkenntnisstheorie_, and from -that modern miracle play, the psychology of elements of consciousness, -that under the ægis of science, does not hesitate to have psychical -elements compound and breed, and in their agile intangibility put to -shame the performances of their less acrobatic cousins, physical atoms. - -[12] In other words, the situation as described is not to be confused -with the case of hunting on purpose to test an idea regarding the dog. - -[13] Dr. Moore, in an essay in “Contributions to Logical Theory” has -brought out clearly, on the basis of a criticism of the theory of -meaning and fulfilment advanced in Royce’s “World and Individual,” the -full consequences of this distinction. I quote one sentence (p. 350): -“Surely there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as -a purposive idea, and the experience which fulfils this purpose. To -call them both ‘ideas’ is at least confusing.” The text above simply -adds that there is also a discernible and important difference between -experiences which, _de facto_, are purposing and fulfilling (that is, -are seen to be such _ab extra_), and those which meant to be such, and -are found to be what they meant. - -[14] The association of science and philosophy with leisure, with a -certain economic surplus, is not accidental. It is practically worth -while to postpone practice; to substitute theorizing, to develop a new -and fascinating mode of practice. But it is the excess achievement of -practice which makes this postponement and substitution possible. - -[15] It is the failure to grasp the coupling of truth of meaning with -a _specific_ promise, undertaking, or intention expressed by a thing -which underlies, so far as I can see, the criticisms passed upon the -experimental or pragmatic view of the truth. It is the same failure -which is responsible for the wholly _at large_ view of truth which -characterizes the absolutists. - -[16] The belief in the _metaphysical_ transcendence of the object of -knowledge seems to have its real origin in an _empirical_ transcendence -of a very specific and describable sort. The thing meaning is one -thing; the thing meant is another thing, and is (as already pointed -out) a thing presented as not given in the same way as is the thing -which means. It is something _to be_ so given. No amount of careful -and thorough inspection of the indicating and signifying things can -remove or annihilate this gap. The _probability_ of correct meaning may -be increased in varying degrees--and this is what we mean by control. -But final certitude can never be reached except experimentally--except -by performing the operations indicated and discovering whether or -no the intended meaning is fulfilled _in propria persona_. In this -experimental sense, truth or the object of any given meaning is always -beyond or outside of the cognitional thing that means it. Error as well -as truth is a necessary function of knowing. But the non-empirical -account of this transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts _all_ the -error in one place (_our_ knowledge), and _all_ the truth in another -(absolute consciousness or else a thing-in-itself). - -[17] Compare his essay, “Does Consciousness Exist?” in the _Journal of -Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I., p. 480. - -[18] Compare the essay on the “Problem of Consciousness,” by Professor -Woodbridge, in the Garman Memorial Volume, entitled “Studies in -Philosophy and Psychology.” - -[19] Reprinted, with many changes, from an article in _Mind_, Vol. -XVI., N.S., July 1907. Although the changes have been made to render -the article less technical, it still remains, I fear, too technical -to be intelligible to those not familiar with recent discussions of -logical theory. - -[20] I follow chiefly Chapter XV. of “Appearance and Reality”--the -chapter on “Thought and Reality.” - -[21] The crux of the argument is contained in Chapters XIII. and XIV., -on the “General Nature of Reality.” - -[22] The same point comes out in Mr. Bradley’s treatment of the way in -which the practical demand for the good or satisfaction is to be taken -account of in a philosophical conception of the nature of reality. -He admits that it comes in; but holds that it enters not directly, -but because if left outside it indirectly introduces a feature of -“discontent” on the intellectual side (see p. 155). This, as an -argument for the supremacy of the isolated theoretical standard, loses -all its force if we cease to conceive of intellect as from the start an -independent function, and realize that intellectual discontent is the -practical conflict becoming deliberately aware of itself as the most -effective means of its own rectification. - -[23] This suggests that many of the stock arguments against pragmatism -fail to take its contention seriously enough. They proceed from the -assumption that it is an account of truth which leaves untouched -current notions of the nature of intelligence. But the essential -point of pragmatism is that it bases its changed account of truth on -a changed conception of the nature of intelligence, both as to its -objective and its method. Now this different account of intelligence -may be wrong, but controversy which leaves standing the conventionally -current theories about thought and merely discusses “truth” will not -go far. Since truth is the adequate fulfilment of the function of -intelligence, the question turns on the nature of the latter. - -[24] Such a statement as, for example, Mr. Bradley’s (_Mind_, Vol. -XIII., No. 51, N.S., p. 3, article on “Truth and Practice”) “The idea -works ... but is able to work because I have chosen the right idea” -surely loses any argumentative force it may seem to have, when it is -recalled that, upon the theory argued against, ability to work and -rightness are one and the same thing. If the wording is changed to -read “The idea is able to work because I have chosen an idea which is -able to work” the question-begging character of the implied criticism -is evident. The change of phraseology also may suggest the crucial and -pregnant question: How does any one know that an idea is able to work -excepting by setting it at work? - -[25] A paper read in the spring of 1909 before the Philosophical Club -of Smith College and not previously published. - -[26] Read as the Presidential Address at the fifth annual meeting of -the American Philosophical Association, at Cambridge, December 28, -1905, and reprinted with verbal revisions from the _Philosophical -Review_, Vol. XV., March, 1906. The substitution of the word -“Existences” for the word “Realities” (in the original title) is due -to a subsequent recognition on my part that the eulogistic historic -associations with the word “Reality” (against which the paper was a -protest) infected the interpretation of the paper itself, so that the -use of some more colorless word was desirable. - -[27] Since writing the above I have read the following words of a -candidly unsympathetic friend of philosophy: “Neither philosophy nor -science can institute man’s relation to the universe, because such -reciprocity must have existed before any kind of science or philosophy -can begin; since each investigates phenomena by means of the intellect, -and independent of the position and feeling of the investigator; -whereas the relation of man to the universe is defined, not by the -intellect alone, but by his sensitive perception aided by all his -spiritual powers. However much one may assure and instruct a man that -all real existence is an idea, that matter is made up of atoms, that -the essence of life is corporality or will, that heat, light, movement, -electricity, are different manifestations of one and the same energy, -one cannot thereby explain to a being with pains, pleasures, hopes, and -fears his position in the universe.” Tolstoi, essay on “Religion and -Morality,” in “Essays, Letters, and Miscellanies.” - -[28] Hegel may be excepted from this statement. The habit of -interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian enlarged and purified, -is a purely Anglo-American habit. This is no place to enter into the -intricacies of Hegelian exegesis, but the subordination of both logical -meaning and of mechanical existence to _Geist_, to life in its own -developing movement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased view of -Hegel. At all events, I wish to recognize my own personal debt to Hegel -for the view set forth in this paper, without, of course, implying that -it represents Hegel’s own intention. - -[29] There will of course come in time with the development of this -point of view an organon of beliefs. The signs of a genuine as against -a simulated belief will be studied; belief as a vital personal reaction -will be discriminated from habitual, incorporate, unquestioned -(because unconsciously exercised) traditions of social classes and -professions. In his “Will to Believe” Professor James has already -laid down two traits of genuine belief (viz., “forced option,” and -acceptance of responsibility for results) which are almost always -ignored in criticisms (really caricatures) of his position. In the -light of such an organon, one might come to doubt whether _belief_ -in, say, immortality (as distinct from hope on one side and a sort -of intellectual balance of probability of opinion on the other) can -genuinely exist at all. - -[30] Reprinted, with slight verbal changes, from the _Philosophical -Review_, Vol. XV. (1906). - -[31] C. S. Peirce, _Monist_, Vol. XVI., p. 150. - -[32] _Psychology_, Vol. II., p. 618. - -[33] “Essay concerning Human Understanding,” Book II., Chapter II., § -2. Locke doubtless derived this notion from Bacon. - -[34] It is hardly necessary to refer to the stress placed upon -mathematics, as well as upon fundamental propositions in logic, ethics, -and cosmology. - -[35] Of course there are internal historic connections between -experience as effective “memory,” and experience as “observation.” -But the motivation and stress, the problem, has quite shifted. It -may be remarked that Hobbes still writes under the influence of the -Aristotelian conception. “Experience is nothing but Memory” (“Elements -of Philosophy,” Part I., Chapter I., § 2), and hence is opposed to -science. - -[36] There are, of course, anticipations of Hume in Locke. But to -regard Lockeian experience as equivalent to Humian is to pervert -history. Locke, as he was to himself and to the century succeeding him, -was not a subjectivist, but in the main a common sense objectivist. -It was this that gave him his historic influence. But so completely -has the Hume-Kant controversy dominated recent thinking that it is -constantly projected backward. Within a few weeks I have seen three -articles, all insisting that the meaning of the term experience must -be subjective, and stating or implying that those who take the term -objectively are subverters of established usage! But a casual study of -the dictionary will reveal that experience has always meant “_what_ -is experienced,” observation as a source of knowledge, as well as the -act, fact, or mode of experiencing. In the Oxford Dictionary, the -(obsolete) sense of “experimental testing,” of actual “observation -of facts and events,” and “the fact of being consciously affected by -an act” have almost contemporaneous datings, viz., 1384, 1377, and -1382 respectively. A usage almost more objective than the second, the -Baconian use, is “what has been experienced; the events that have taken -place within the knowledge of an individual, a community, mankind at -large, either during a particular period or generally.” This dates back -to 1607. Let us have no more captious criticisms and plaints based -on ignorance of linguistic usage. [This pious wish has not been met. -J. D., 1909.] - -[37] The relationship of organization and thought is precisely that -which we find psychologically typified by the rhythmic functions of -habit and attention, attention being always, _ab quo_, a sign of the -failure of habit, and, _ad quem_, a reconstructive modification of -habit. - -[38] Compare, for example, Dr. Stuart’s paper in the “Studies in -Logical Theory,” pp. 253-256. I may here remark that I remain -totally unable to see how the _interpretation_ of objectivity to -mean controlling conditions of action (negative and positive as -above) derogates at all from its naïve objectivity, or how it -connotes cognitive subjectivity, or is in any way incompatible with a -common-sense realistic theory of perception. - -[39] For this suggested interpretation of the esthetic as surprising, -or unintended, gratuitous collateral reinforcement, see Gordon, -“Psychology of Meaning.” - -[40] This, however, is not strictly true, since Locke goes far -to supply the means of his own correction in his account of the -“workmanship of the understanding.” - -[41] Plato, especially in his “Theætetus,” seems to have begun the -procedure of blasting the good name of perceptive experience by -identifying a late and instrumental distinction, having to do with -logical control, with all experience whatsoever. - -[42] Compare James, “Continuous transition is one sort of conjunctive -relation; and to be a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this -conjunctive relation of all others, for this is the strategic point, -the position through which, if a hole be made, all the corruptions -of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our -philosophy.”--_Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific -Methods_, Vol. I., p. 536. - -[43] One of the not least of the many merits of Santayana’s “Life of -Reason” is the consistency and vigor with which is upheld the doctrine -that significant idealism means idealization. - -[44] Reprinted, with very slight change, from the _Journal of -Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. II., No. 15, -July, 1905. - -[45] All labels are, of course, obnoxious and misleading. I hope, -however, the term will be taken by the reader in the sense in which -it is forthwith explained, and not in some more usual and familiar -sense. Empiricism, as herein used, is as antipodal to sensationalistic -empiricism, as it is to transcendentalism, and for the same reason. -Both of these systems fall back on something which is defined in -non-directly-experienced terms in order to justify that which is -directly experienced. Hence I have criticised such empiricism -(_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI., No. 4, p. 364) as essentially -absolutistic in character; and also (“Studies in Logical Theory,” -pp. 30, 58) as an attempt to build up experience in terms of certain -methodological checks and cues of attaining _certainty_. - -[46] I hope the reader will not therefore assume that from the -empiricist’s standpoint knowledge is of small worth or import. On the -contrary, from the empiricist’s standpoint it has _all_ the worth which -it is concretely experienced as possessing--which is simply tremendous. -But the exact _nature_ of this worth is a thing to be found out in -describing what we mean by experiencing objects as known--the actual -differences made or found in experience. - -[47] Since the non-empiricist believes in things-in-themselves (which -he may term “atoms,” “sensations,” transcendental unities, _a priori_ -concepts, _an_ absolute experience, or whatever), and since he finds -that the empiricist makes much of change (as he must, since change is -continuously experienced) he assumes that the empiricist means _his -own_ non-empirical Realities are in continual flux, and he naturally -shudders at having his divinities so violently treated. But, once -recognize that the empiricist doesn’t have any such Realities at all, -and the entire problem of the relation of change to reality takes a -very different aspect. - -[48] It would lead us aside from the point to try to tell just what -is the nature of the experienced difference we call truth. Professor -James’s recent articles may well be consulted. The point to bear in -mind here is just what sort of a thing the empiricist must mean by -true, or truer (the noun Truth is, of course, a generic name for all -cases of “Trues”). The adequacy of any particular account is not a -matter to be settled by general reasoning, but by finding out what sort -of an experience the truth-experience actually is. - -[49] I say “relatively,” because the transcendentalist still holds -that finally the cognition is imperfect, giving us only some symbol -or phenomenon of Reality (which _is_ only in the Absolute or in some -Thing-in-Itself)--otherwise the curtain-wind fact would have as -much ontological reality as the existence of the Absolute itself: a -conclusion at which the non-empiricist perhorresces, for no reason -obvious to me--save that it would put an end to his transcendentalism. - -[50] In general, I think the distinction between -_ive_ and -_ed_ one -of the most fundamental of philosophic distinctions, and one of the -most neglected. The same holds of -_tion_ and -_ing_. - -[51] What is criticised, now as “geneticism” (if I may coin the word) -and now as “pragmatism” is, in its truth, just the fact that the -empiricist does take account of the experienced “drift, occasion, and -contexture” of things experienced--to use Hobbes’s phrase. - -[52] Perhaps the point would be clearer if expressed in this way: -Except as subsequent estimates of _worth_ are introduced, “real” -means only existent. The eulogistic connotation that makes the term -Reality equivalent to _true_ or _genuine_ being has great pragmatic -significance, but its confusion with reality as existence is the point -aimed at in the above paragraph. - -[53] One does not so easily escape medieval Realism as one thinks. -Either every experienced thing has its own determinateness, its own -unsubstitutable, unredeemable reality, or else “generals” _are_ -separate existences after all. - -[54] Excepting, of course, some negative ones. One could say that -certain views are certainly _not_ true, because, by hypothesis, -they refer to nonentities, _i.e._, non-empiricals. But even here -the empiricist must go slowly. From his own standpoint, even the -most professedly transcendental statements are, after all, real as -experiences, and hence negotiate some transaction with facts. For -this reason, he cannot, in theory, reject them _in toto_, but has to -show concretely how they arose and how they are to be corrected. In a -word, his logical relationship to statements that profess to relate to -things-in-themselves, unknowables, inexperienced substances, etc., is -precisely that of the psychologist to the Zöllner lines. - -[55] Delivered as a public address before the Philosophic Union of the -University of California, with the title “Psychology and Philosophic -Method,” May, 1899, and published in the _University Chronicle_ for -August, 1899. Reprinted, with slight verbal changes, mostly excisions. - -[56] This is a fact not without its bearings upon the question of the -nature and value of introspection. The objection that introspection -“alters” the reality and hence is untrustworthy, most writers dispose -of by saying that, after all, it need not alter the reality so very -much--not beyond repair--and that, moreover, memory assists in -restoring the ruins. It would be simpler to admit the fact: that the -purpose of introspection is precisely to effect the right sort of -alteration. If introspection should give us the original experience -again, we should just be living through the experience over again in -direct fashion; as psychologists we should not be forwarded one bit. -Reflection upon this obvious proposition may bring to light various -other matters worthy of note. - -[57] Thus to divorce “structure psychology” from “function psychology” -is to leave us without possibility of scientific comprehension of -function, while it deprives us of all standard of reference in -selecting, observing, and explaining the structure. - -[58] The following answer may fairly be anticipated: “This is true of -the operations cited, but only because complex processes have been -selected. Such a term as ‘knowing’ does of course express a function -involving a system of intricate references. But, for that very reason, -we go back to the sensation which is the genuine type of the ‘state of -consciousness’ as such, pure and unadulterate and unsophisticated.” The -point is large for a footnote, but the following considerations are -instructive: (1) The same psychologist will go on to inform us that -sensations, as we experience them, are networks of reference--they -are perceptual, and more or less conceptual even. From which it -would appear that whatever else they are or are not, the sensations, -for which self-inclosed existence is claimed, are _not_ states of -consciousness. And (2) we are told that these are reached by scientific -abstraction in order to account for complex forms. From which it would -appear that they are hypothecated as products of interpretation and for -purposes of further interpretation. Only the delusion that the more -complex forms are just aggregates (instead of being acts, like seeing, -hoping, etc.) prevents recognition of the point in question--that the -“state of consciousness” is an instrument of inquiry or methodological -appliance. - -[59] On the other hand, if what we are trying to get at is just the -course and procedure of experiencing, of course any consideration that -helps distinguish and make comprehensible that process is thoroughly -pertinent. - -[60] It may avoid misunderstanding if I anticipate here a subsequent -remark: that my point is not in the least that “states of -consciousness” require some “synthetic unity” or faculty of substantial -mind to effect their association. Quite the contrary; for this theory -also admits the “states of consciousness” as existences in themselves -also. My contention is that the “state of consciousness” as such is -always a methodological product, developed in the course and for the -purposes of psychological analysis. - -[61] The “functions” are in truth ordinary everyday acts and attitudes: -seeing, smelling, talking, listening, remembering, hoping, loving, -fearing. - -[62] This is perhaps a suitable moment to allude to the absence, in -this discussion, of reference to what is sometimes termed rational -psychology--the assumption of a separate, substantialized ego, soul, -or whatever, existing side by side with particular experiences and -“states of consciousness,” acting upon them and acted upon by them. In -ignoring this and confining myself to the “states of consciousness” -theory and the “natural history” theory, I may appear not only to have -unduly narrowed the concerns at issue, but to have weakened my own -point, as this doctrine seems to offer a special vantage ground whence -to defend the close relationship of psychology and philosophy. The -“narrowing,” if such it be, will have to pass--from limits of time and -other matters. But the other point I cannot concede. The independently -existing soul restricts and degrades individuality, making of it a -separate thing outside of the full flow of things, alien to things -experienced and consequently in either mechanical or miraculous -relations to them. It is vitiated by just the quality already objected -to--that psychology has a separate piece of reality apportioned to -it, instead of occupying itself with the manifestation and operation -of any and all existences in reference to concrete action. From this -point of view, the “states of consciousness” attitude is a much more -hopeful and fruitful one. It ignores certain considerations, to be -sure; and when it turns its ignoring into denial, it leaves us with -curious hieroglyphics. But after all, there is a key; these symbols -can be read; they may be translated into terms of the course of -experience. When thus translated, selfhood, individuality, is neither -wiped out nor set up as a miraculous and foreign entity; it is seen as -the unity of reference and function involved in all things when fully -experienced--the pivot about which they turn. - -[63] Delivered before the Philosophical Club of the University of -Michigan, in the winter of 1897, and reprinted with slight change from -a monograph in the “University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy,” -1897. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references. - -Page 24: “transgression” was misprinted as “trangression”; changed here. - -Page 39: “bewrayeth” was printed that way. - -Page 158: “cor-respondence” was printed with the hyphen. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, by -John Dewey - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY *** - -***** This file should be named 51525-0.txt or 51525-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/5/2/51525/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Charlie Howard, and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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