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diff --git a/old/51292-0.txt b/old/51292-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f7276ab..0000000 --- a/old/51292-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17777 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. I - Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946: Vol. I - -Author: Various - -Release Date: February 24, 2016 [EBook #51292] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS NUREMBERG *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US - - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME I - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - - OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS - - - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - - HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, - ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED - ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER - FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL - DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED - JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, - ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, - Individually and as Members of Any of the Following Groups or - Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE - REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN - LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI - (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER - NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known - as the “SS”) and including DER SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known - as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, - commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP - (commonly known as the “SA”); and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH - COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, all as defined in Appendix B - of the Indictment, - - Defendants. - - - - - P R E F A C E - -Recognizing the importance of establishing for history an authentic text -of the Trial of major German war criminals, the International Military -Tribunal directed the publication of the Record of the Trial. The -proceedings are published in English, French, Russian, and German, the -four languages used throughout the hearings. The documents admitted in -evidence are printed only in their original language. - -The first volume contains basic, official, pre-trial documents together -with the Tribunal’s judgment and sentence of the defendants. In -subsequent volumes the Trial proceedings are published in full from the -preliminary session of 14 November 1945 to the closing session of 1 -October 1946. They are followed by an index volume. Documents admitted -in evidence conclude the publication. - -The proceedings of the International Military Tribunal were recorded in -full by stenographic notes, and an electric sound recording of all oral -proceedings was maintained. - -Reviewing sections have verified in the four languages citations, -statistics, and other data, and have eliminated obvious grammatical -errors and verbal irrelevancies. Finally, corrected texts have been -certified for publication by Colonel Ray for the United States, Mr. -Mercer for the United Kingdom, Mr. Fuster for France, and Major Poltorak -for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - =Members and alternate members of the Tribunal= 1 - - =Officials of the General Secretariat= 2 - - =Prosecution Counsel= 3 - - =Individual defendants and Defense Counsel= 6 - - =Establishment of the Tribunal= - London Agreement of 8 August 1945 8 - Charter of the International Military Tribunal 10 - Protocol rectifying discrepancy in text of the - Charter 17 - - =Rules of Procedure= 19 - - =Minutes of the opening session of the Tribunal,= - =at Berlin, 18 October 1945= 24 - - =Indictment= - Text of Indictment 27 - Motion of the Prosecution for correcting - discrepancies in the Indictment 93 - Pleas of individual defendants 94 - Letter of reservation by the United States Prosecutor - in regard to wording of the Indictment 95 - - =Notice= - Order of the Tribunal regarding notice to individual - defendants 96 - Order of the Tribunal regarding notice to members of - groups and organizations 97 - Order of the Tribunal regarding notice to Defendant - Bormann 102 - - =Service= - Certificates of compliance with orders of the - Tribunal regarding notice to members of groups and - organizations and to Defendant Bormann 104 - Certificates of service on individual defendants 117 - Certificate of service on Defendant Gustav Krupp von - Bohlen and medical certificates attached thereto 118 - Acknowledgment of service by Defendant Fritzsche and - Defendant Raeder 123 - - =Motion on behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp von= - =Bohlen for postponement of the Trial as to him,= - =and action taken thereon= - Motion, and medical certificates attached thereto 124 - Report of medical commission appointed to examine - Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 127 - Answer of the United States Prosecution to the motion 134 - Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion 139 - Memorandum of the French Prosecution on the motion 141 - Supplemental memorandum of the French Prosecution 142 - Order of the Tribunal granting postponement of - proceedings against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 143 - Supplementary statement of the United States - Prosecution 144 - Motion of the Committee of Chief Prosecutors to amend - the Indictment by adding the name of Alfried Krupp - von Bohlen as a defendant 145 - Order of the Tribunal rejecting the motion to amend - the Indictment 146 - Memorandum of the French Prosecution on the order of - the Tribunal rejecting the motion to amend the - Indictment 147 - - =Motion on behalf of Defendant Streicher for= - =postponement of the Trial as to him,= - =and action taken thereon= - Motion on behalf of Defendant Streicher 148 - Memorandum of the United States Prosecution on the - motion 149 - Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion 150 - Motion of the Soviet Prosecution for a psychiatric - examination of Defendant Streicher 152 - Order of the Tribunal regarding a psychiatric - examination of Defendant Streicher 153 - Report of examination of Defendant Streicher 154 - - =Medical examination of Defendant Hess= - Motion on behalf of Defendant Hess for an examination - by a neutral expert 155 - Order of the Tribunal rejecting the motion, and - designating a commission to examine Defendant Hess 157 - Report of commission to examine Defendant Hess 159 - Report of prison psychologist 166 - - =Motion adopted by all Defense Counsel,= - =19 November 1945= 168 - - =Judgment= 171 - - =Dissenting opinion of the Soviet Judge= 342 - - =Sentences= 365 - - - - - MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS - OF THE TRIBUNAL - - - LORD JUSTICE LAWRENCE, Member for the United Kingdom of Great - Britain and Northern Ireland, President - - MR. JUSTICE BIRKETT, Alternate Member - - MR. FRANCIS BIDDLE, Member for the United States of America - - JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER, Alternate Member - - M. LE PROFESSEUR DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Member for the French - Republic - - M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO, Alternate Member - - MAJOR GENERAL I. T. NIKITCHENKO, Member for the Union of Soviet - Socialist Republics - - LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. F. VOLCHKOV, Alternate Member - - - - - OFFICIALS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT - - - BRIGADIER GENERAL - WM. L. MITCHELL General Secretary (from 6 November - 1945 to 24 June 1946) - COLONEL JOHN E. RAY General Secretary (from 24 June - 1946) - MR. HAROLD B. WILLEY General Secretary (to 6 November - 1945) - American Secretary (to 11 July - 1946) - MR. WALTER GILKYSON American Secretary (from 16 July - 1946) - MR. IAN D. McILWRAITH British Secretary - MAJOR A. POLTORAK Soviet Secretary - MR. A. MARTIN-HAVARD French Secretary - COLONEL CHARLES W. MAYS Marshal (to 26 June 1946) - LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES - R. GIFFORD Marshal (from 26 June 1946) - COLONEL LEON DOSTERT Chief of Interpreters - (From the Office of (to 17 April 1946) - U.S. Chief of Counsel) - COMMANDER ALFRED STEER, - U.S.N.R. Chief of Interpreters - (From the Office of (from 18 April 1946) - U.S. Chief of Counsel) - - * * * * * - - MAJOR JACK L. BAILEY Administrative Section - CAPTAIN D. P. SULLIVAN Witness Notification and - Procurement - LIEUTENANT COLONEL - A. M. S. NEAVE, B.A.O.R. Applications and Motions Section - LIEUTENANT COMMANDER - ALBERT E. SCHRADER, U.S.N.R. Defendants’ Information Center - MR. BERNARD REYMON Custodian of Documents and Records - - * * * * * - - LIEUTENANT COLONEL - LAWRENCE D. EGBERT Editor of the Record - CAPTAIN SIGMUND ROTH Director of Printing - - - - - PROSECUTION COUNSEL[1] - - - United States of America - - CHIEF OF COUNSEL: - Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson - EXECUTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL: - Colonel Robert G. Storey - Mr. Thomas J. Dodd - ASSOCIATE TRIAL COUNSEL: - Mr. Sidney S. Alderman - Brigadier General Telford Taylor - Colonel John Harlan Amen - Mr. Ralph G. Albrecht - ASSISTANT TRIAL COUNSEL: - Colonel Leonard Wheeler, Jr. - Lieutenant Colonel William H. Baldwin - Lieutenant Colonel Smith W. Brockhart, Jr. - Commander James Britt Donovan, U.S.N.R. - Major Frank B. Wallis - Major William F. Walsh - Major Warren F. Farr - Captain Samuel Harris - Captain Drexel A. Sprecher - Lieutenant Commander Whitney R. Harris, U.S.N.R. - Lieutenant Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., U.S.N.R. - Lieutenant Henry K. Atherton - Lieutenant Brady O. Bryson, U.S.N.R. - Lieutenant (j. g.) Bernard D. Meltzer, U.S.N.R. - Dr. Robert M. Kempner - Mr. Walter W. Brudno - - United Kingdom of Great Britain and - Northern Ireland - - CHIEF PROSECUTOR: - H. M. Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, - K.C., M.P. - DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR: - The Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, P.C., K.C., - M.P. - LEADING COUNSEL: - Mr. G. D. Roberts, K.C., O.B.E. - JUNIOR COUNSEL: - Lieutenant Colonel J. M. G. Griffith-Jones, M.C., - Barrister-at-Law - Colonel H. J. Phillimore, O.B.E., Barrister-at-Law - Major F. Elwyn Jones, M.P., Barrister-at-Law - Major J. Harcourt Barrington, Barrister-at-Law - - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - - CHIEF PROSECUTOR: - General R. A. Rudenko - DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR: - Colonel Y. V. Pokrovsky - ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS: - State Counsellor of Justice of the 2nd Class, L. - R. Shenin - State Counsellor of Justice of the 2nd Class, M. - Y. Raginsky - State Counsellor of Justice of the 3rd Class, N. - D. Zorya - Chief Counsellor of Justice, L. N. Smirnov - Colonel D. S. Karev - Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Ozol - Captain V. V. Kuchin - - French Republic - - CHIEF PROSECUTOR: - M. François de Menthon - M. Auguste Champetier de Ribes - DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTORS: - M. Charles Dubost - M. Edgar Faure - ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS (Chiefs of Sections): - M. Pierre Mounier - M. Charles Gerthoffer - M. Delphin Debenest - ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS: - M. Jacques B. Herzog - M. Henry Delpech - M. Serge Fuster - M. Constant Quatre - M. Henri Monneray - ------ - -[1] Only those members of the Prosecution Counsel who spoke before the -Tribunal are listed. - - - - - DEFENDANTS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL - - - =INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS:= =COUNSEL:= - GÖRING, HERMANN Dr. Otto Stahmer - WILHELM - HESS, RUDOLF Dr. Günther von Rohrscheidt - (to 5 February 1946) - Dr. Alfred Seidl (from 5 - February 1946) - VON RIBBENTROP, JOACHIM Dr. Fritz Sauter (to 5 January - 1946) - Dr. Martin Horn (from 5 - January 1946) - LEY, ROBERT[2] - KEITEL, WILHELM Dr. Otto Nelte - KALTENBRUNNER, ERNST Dr. Kurt Kauffmann - ROSENBERG, ALFRED Dr. Alfred Thoma - FRANK, HANS Dr. Alfred Seidl - FRICK, WILHELM Dr. Otto Pannenbecker - STREICHER, JULIUS Dr. Hanns Marx - FUNK, WALTER Dr. Fritz Sauter - SCHACHT, HJALMAR Dr. Rudolf Dix - Professor Dr. Herbert Kraus, - Associate[5] - DÖNITZ, KARL Flottenrichter Otto - Kranzbuehler - RAEDER, ERICH Dr. Walter Siemers - VON SCHIRACH, BALDUR Dr. Fritz Sauter - SAUCKEL, FRITZ Dr. Robert Servatius - JODL, ALFRED Professor Dr. Franz Exner - Professor Dr. Hermann - Jahreiss, Associate[6] - BORMANN, MARTIN[3] Dr. Friedrich Bergold - VON PAPEN, FRANZ Dr. Egon Kubuschok - SEYSS-INQUART, ARTHUR Dr. Gustav Steinbauer - SPEER, ALBERT Dr. Hans Flächsner - VON NEURATH, CONSTANTIN Dr. Otto Freiherr von - Lüdinghausen - FRITZSCHE, HANS Dr. Heinz Fritz - Dr. Alfred Schilf, - Associate[7] - KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND Dr. Theodor Klefisch - HALBACH, GUSTAV[4] (to 15 November 1945) - Dr. Walter Ballas, - Associate[8] (to 15 November - 1945) - ------ - -[2] All individual defendants named in the Indictment appeared before -the Tribunal except: Robert Ley, who committed suicide 25 October 1945; -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, owing to serious illness; and -Martin Bormann, who was not in custody and whom the Tribunal decided to -try in absentia. - -[3] See footnote 2. - -[4] See footnote 2. - -[5] Only Associates who spoke before the Tribunal are listed. - -[6] See footnote 5. - -[7] See footnote 5. - -[8] See footnote 5. - - - - - =GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS:= =COUNSEL:= - REICH CABINET Dr. Egon Kubuschok - - LEADERSHIP CORPS OF - NAZI PARTY Dr. Robert Servatius - - SS and SD Ludwig Babel, Counsel for SS - and SD (to 18 March 1946), - Counsel for SS (to 1 June - 1946), - Co-counsel for SS (to 27 - August 1946) - Horst Pelckmann, Co-counsel - for SS (from 2 March 1946), - Counsel for SS (from 1 - June 1946) - Dr. Carl Haensel, Associate[9] - to Dr. H. Pelckmann (from 1 - April 1946) - Dr. Hans Gawlik, Counsel for - SD (from 18 March 1946) - - SA Georg Boehm - Dr. Martin Loeffler - - GESTAPO Dr. Rudolf Merkel - - GENERAL STAFF and Professor Dr. Franz Exner - HIGH COMMAND of the (to 27 January 1946) - GERMAN ARMED FORCES Dr. Hans Laternser (from 27 - January 1946) - ------ - -[9] Only Associates who spoke before the Tribunal are listed. - - - - - LONDON AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST 1945 - - - _Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, - the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the - Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern - Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War - Criminals of the European Axis._ - -WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of -their intention that war criminals shall be brought to justice; - -AND WHEREAS the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 on German -atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German officers and men -and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have -taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to -the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that -they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated -countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein; - -AND WHEREAS this Declaration was stated to be without prejudice to the -case of major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographic -location and who will be punished by the joint decision of the -Governments of the Allies; - -NOW THEREFORE the Government of the United States of America, the -Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the -United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government -of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter called “the -Signatories”) acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by -their representatives duly authorized thereto have concluded this -Agreement. - -_Article 1._ There shall be established after consultation with the -Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the -trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical -location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as -members of organizations or groups or in both capacities. - -_Article 2._ The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the -International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter -annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of -this Agreement. - -_Article 3._ Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to -make available for the investigation of the charges and trial the major -war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the International -Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their best endeavors -to make available for investigation of the charges against and the trial -before the International Military Tribunal such of the major war -criminals as are not in the territories of any of the Signatories. - -_Article 4._ Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions -established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war -criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes. - -_Article 5._ Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this -Agreement by notice given through the diplomatic channel to the -Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other signatory -and adhering Governments of each such adherence.[10] - -_Article 6._ Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction -or the powers of any national or occupation court established or to be -established in any Allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war -criminals. - -_Article 7._ This Agreement shall come into force on the day of -signature and shall remain in force for the period of one year and shall -continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to give, -through the diplomatic channel, one month’s notice of intention to -terminate it. Such termination shall not prejudice any proceedings -already taken or any findings already made in pursuance of this -Agreement. - -IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement. - -DONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945 each in -English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity. - - For the Government of the United States of America - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - - For the Provisional Government of the French Republic - /s/ ROBERT FALCO - - For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern - Ireland - /s/ JOWITT - - For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - /s/ I. NIKITCHENKO - /s/ A. TRAININ - ------ - -[10] In accordance with Article 5, the following Governments of the -United Nations have expressed their adherence to the Agreement: Greece, -Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, -Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New -Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay. - - - - - CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - - I. CONSTITUTION OF THE - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -_Article 1._ In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of -August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the -Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the -United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government -of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established -an International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”) -for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals -of the European Axis. - -_Article 2._ The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an -alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of -the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they are able, be -present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness of any -member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason to -fulfill his functions, his alternate shall take his place. - -_Article 3._ Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can -be challenged by the Prosecution, or by the defendants or their counsel. -Each Signatory may replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate -for reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no -replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by an alternate. - -_Article 4._ - -(a) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the alternate for - any absent member shall be necessary to constitute the quorum. -(b) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins, agree - among themselves upon the selection from their number of a President, - and the President shall hold office during that trial, or as may - otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three members. The - principle of rotation of presidency for successive trials is agreed. - If, however, a session of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of - one of the four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on - the Tribunal shall preside. -(c) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a majority vote - and in case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President - shall be decisive: provided always that convictions and sentences - shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three members - of the Tribunal. - -_Article 5._ In case of need and depending on the number of the matters -to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the establishment, -functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall -be governed by this Charter. - - - II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -_Article 6._ The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in -Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals -of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish -persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, -whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of -the following crimes. - -The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the -jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual -responsibility: - -(a) _CRIMES AGAINST PEACE_: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or - waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international - treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan - or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; -(b) _WAR CRIMES_: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such - violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment - or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian - population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of - prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder - of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or - villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; -(c) _CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY_: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, - deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian - population, before or during the war,[11] or persecutions on - political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in - connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, - whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where - perpetrated. - -Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the -formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of -the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any -persons in execution of such plan. - -_Article 7._ The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of -State or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be -considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. - -_Article 8._ The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his -Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but -may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine -that justice so requires. - -_Article 9._ At the trial of any individual member of any group or -organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of -which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of -which the individual was a member was a criminal organization. - -After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as -it thinks fit that the Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make -such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to -apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the -question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal -shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application -is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall -be represented and heard. - -_Article 10._ In cases where a group or organization is declared -criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any -Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for -membership therein before national, military, or occupation courts. In -any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is -considered proved and shall not be questioned. - -_Article 11._ Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before -a national, military, or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of -this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group -or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon -him punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed -by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such -group or organization. - -_Article 12._ The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings -against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this -Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for -any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct -the hearing in his absence. - -_Article 13._ The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These -rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter. - - - III. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION - AND PROSECUTION OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - -_Article 14._ Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the -investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of major war -criminals. - -The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following -purposes: - -(a) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the Chief - Prosecutors and his staff, -(b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be tried by - the Tribunal, -(c) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted therewith, -(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents with the - Tribunal, -(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft rules - of procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal - shall have power to accept, with or without amendments, or to reject, - the rules so recommended. - -The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority vote and -shall appoint a Chairman as may be convenient and in accordance with the -principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal division of -vote concerning the designation of a defendant to be tried by the -Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, that proposal -will be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the -particular defendant be tried, or the particular charges be preferred -against him. - -_Article 15._ The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in -collaboration with one another, also undertake the following duties: - -(a) investigation, collection, and production before or at the Trial of - all necessary evidence, -(b) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the Committee in - accordance with paragraph (c) of Article 14 hereof, -(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the - defendants, -(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial, -(e) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as may be assigned - to them, -(f) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary to them for - the purposes of the preparation for and conduct of the Trial. - -It is understood that no witness or defendant detained by any Signatory -shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory without its -assent. - - - IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS - -_Article 16._ In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the -following procedure shall be followed: - -(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the - charges against the defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all - the documents lodged with the Indictment, translated into a language - which he understands, shall be furnished to the defendant at a - reasonable time before the Trial. -(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a defendant he shall - have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made - against him. -(c) A preliminary examination of a defendant and his trial shall be - conducted in, or translated into, a language which the defendant - understands. -(d) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense before the - Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel. -(e) A defendant shall have the right through himself or through his - counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his defense, - and to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution. - - - V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL - -_Article 17._ The Tribunal shall have the power: - -(a) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their attendance and - testimony and to put questions to them, -(b) to interrogate any defendant, -(c) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary material, -(d) to administer oaths to witnesses, -(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the - Tribunal including the power to have evidence taken on commission. - -_Article 18_. The Tribunal shall: - -(a) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues - raised by the charges, -(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause - unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of - any kind whatsoever, -(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, - including exclusion of any defendant or his counsel from some or all - further proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the - charges. - -_Article 19._ The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of -evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent -expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence -which it deems to have probative value. - -_Article 20._ The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of -any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon the relevance -thereof. - -_Article 21._ The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common -knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take -judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the -United Nations, including the acts and documents of the committees set -up in the various Allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, -and the records and findings of military or other Tribunals of any of -the United Nations. - -_Article 22._ The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. The -first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief -Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated by the -Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at Nuremberg, -and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places as the Tribunal -may decide. - -_Article 23._ One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in the -prosecution at each trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor may be -discharged by him personally, or by any person or persons authorized by -him. - -The function of counsel for a defendant may be discharged at the -defendant’s request by any counsel professionally qualified to conduct -cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other person who -may be specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal. - -_Article 24._ The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following -course: - -(a) The Indictment shall be read in court. -(b) The Tribunal shall ask each defendant whether he pleads “guilty” or - “not guilty”. -(c) The Prosecution shall make an opening statement. -(d) The Tribunal shall ask the Prosecution and the Defense what evidence - (if any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall - rule upon the admissibility of any such evidence. -(e) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after that the - witnesses for the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may - be held by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be called by either the - Prosecution or the Defense. -(f) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any defendant, - at any time. -(g) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may - cross-examine any witnesses and any defendant who gives testimony. -(h) The Defense shall address the Court. -(i) The Prosecution shall address the Court. -(j) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal. -(k) The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence. - -_Article 25._ All official documents shall be produced, and all court -proceedings conducted, in English, French, and Russian, and in the -language of the defendant. So much of the record and of the proceedings -may also be translated into the language of any country in which the -Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable in the -interests of justice and public opinion. - - - VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE - -_Article 26._ The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the -innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based, -and shall be final and not subject to review. - -_Article 27._ The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a -defendant on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be -determined by it to be just. - -_Article 28._ In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal -shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen -property and order its delivery to the Control Council for Germany. - -_Article 29._ In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in -accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may -at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not -increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Germany, after -any defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh evidence -which, in its opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the -Council shall report accordingly to the Committee established under -Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may consider proper, having -regard to the interests of justice. - - - VII. EXPENSES - -_Article 30._ The expenses of the Tribunal and of the trials, shall be -charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of -the Control Council for Germany. - ------ - -[11] Comma substituted in place of semicolon by Protocol of 6 October -1945. - - - - - PROTOCOL RECTIFYING DISCREPANCY - IN TEXT OF CHARTER - - -Whereas an Agreement and Charter regarding the Prosecution of War -Criminals was signed in London on the 8th August 1945, in the English, -French, and Russian languages; - -And whereas a discrepancy has been found to exist between the originals -of Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter in the Russian language, on -the one hand, and the originals in the English and French languages, on -the other, to wit, the semicolon in Article 6, paragraph (c), of the -Charter between the words “war” and “or”, as carried in the English and -French texts, is a comma in the Russian text; - -And whereas it is desired to rectify this discrepancy: - -NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, signatories of the said Agreement on -behalf of their respective Governments, duly authorized thereto, have -agreed that Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter in the Russian text -is correct, and that the meaning and intention of the Agreement and -Charter require that the said semicolon in the English text should be -changed to a comma, and that the French text should be amended to read -as follows: - -(c) _LES CRIMES CONTRE L’HUMANITE_: c’est-à-dire l’assassinat, - l’extermination, la réduction en esclavage, la déportation, et tout - autre acte inhumain commis contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou - pendant la guerre, ou bien les persécutions pour des motifs - politiques, raciaux, ou religieux, lorsque ces actes ou persécutions, - qu’ils aient constitué ou non une violation du droit interne du pays - où ils ont été perpétrés, ont été commis à la suite de tout crime - rentrant dans la compétence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime. - -IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Protocol. - -DONE in quadruplicate in Berlin this 6th day of October, 1945, each in -English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity. - -For the Government of the United States of America - - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - -For the Provisional Government of the French Republic - - /s/ FRANÇOIS de MENTHON - -For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern -Ireland - - /s/ HARTLEY SHAWCROSS - -For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - - /s/ R. RUDENKO - - - - - RULES OF PROCEDURE - (Adopted 29 October 1945) - - -Rule 1. _Authority to Promulgate Rules._ - -The present Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal -for the trial of the major war criminals (hereinafter called “the -Tribunal”) as established by the Charter of the Tribunal dated 8 August -1945 (hereinafter called “the Charter”) are hereby promulgated by the -Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Charter. - -Rule 2. _Notice to Defendants and Right to Assistance of Counsel._ - -(a) Each individual defendant in custody shall receive not less than 30 -days before trial a copy, translated into a language which he -understands, (1) of the Indictment, (2) of the Charter, (3) of any other -documents lodged with the Indictment, and (4) of a statement of his -right to the assistance of counsel as set forth in sub-paragraph (d) of -this Rule, together with a list of counsel. He shall also receive copies -of such rules of procedure as may be adopted by the Tribunal from time -to time. - -(b) Any individual defendant not in custody shall be informed of the -indictment against him and of his right to receive the documents -specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, by notice in such form and manner -as the Tribunal may prescribe. - -(c) With respect to any group or organization as to which the -Prosecution indicates its intention to request a finding of criminality -by the Tribunal, notice shall be given by publication in such form and -manner as the Tribunal may prescribe and such publication shall include -a declaration by the Tribunal that all members of the named groups or -organizations are entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be -heard in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the Charter. -Nothing herein contained shall be construed to confer immunity of any -kind upon such members of said groups or organizations as may appear in -answer to the said declaration. - -(d) Each defendant has the right to conduct his own defense or to have -the assistance of counsel. Application for particular counsel shall be -filed at once with the General Secretary of the Tribunal at the Palace -of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany. The Tribunal will designate counsel for -any defendant who fails to apply for particular counsel or, where -particular counsel requested is not within ten (10) days to be found or -available, unless the defendant elects in writing to conduct his own -defense. If a defendant has requested particular counsel who is not -immediately to be found or available, such counsel or a counsel of -substitute choice may, if found and available before trial, be -associated with or substituted for counsel designated by the Tribunal, -provided that (1) only one counsel shall be permitted to appear at the -trial for any defendant, unless by special permission of the Tribunal, -and (2) no delay of trial will be allowed for making such substitution -or association. - -Rule 3. _Service of Additional Documents._ - -If, before the trial, the Chief Prosecutors offer amendments or -additions to the Indictment, such amendments or additions, including any -accompanying documents shall be lodged with the Tribunal and copies of -the same, translated into a language which they each understand, shall -be furnished to the defendants in custody as soon as practicable and -notice given in accordance with Rule 2 (b) to those not in custody. - -Rule 4. _Production of Evidence for the Defense._ - -(a) The Defense may apply to the Tribunal for the production of -witnesses or of documents by written application to the General -Secretary of the Tribunal. The application shall state where the witness -or document is thought to be located, together with a statement of their -last known location. It shall also state the facts proposed to be proved -by the witness or the document and the reasons why such facts are -relevant to the Defense. - -(b) If the witness or the document is not within the area controlled by -the occupation authorities, the Tribunal may request the Signatory and -adhering Governments to arrange for the production, if possible, of any -such witnesses and any such documents as the Tribunal may deem necessary -to proper presentation of the Defense. - -(c) If the witness or the document is within the area controlled by the -occupation authorities, the General Secretary shall, if the Tribunal is -not in session, communicate the application to the Chief Prosecutors -and, if they make no objection, the General Secretary shall issue a -summons for the attendance of such witness or the production of such -documents, informing the Tribunal of the action taken. If any Chief -Prosecutor objects to the issuance of a summons, or if the Tribunal is -in session, the General Secretary shall submit the application to the -Tribunal, which shall decide whether or not the summons shall issue. - -(d) A summons shall be served in such manner as may be provided by the -appropriate occupation authority to ensure its enforcement and the -General Secretary shall inform the Tribunal of the steps taken. - -(e) Upon application to the General Secretary of the Tribunal, a -defendant shall be furnished with a copy, translated into a language -which he understands, of all documents referred to in the Indictment so -far as they may be made available by the Chief Prosecutors and shall be -allowed to inspect copies of any such documents as are not so available. - -Rule 5. _Order at the Trial._ - -In conformity with the provisions of Article 18 of the Charter, and the -disciplinary powers therein set out, the Tribunal, acting through its -President, shall provide for the maintenance of order at the Trial. Any -defendant or any other person may be excluded from open sessions of the -Tribunal for failure to observe and respect the directives and dignity -of the Tribunal. - -Rule 6. _Oaths; Witnesses._ - -(a) Before testifying before the Tribunal, each witness shall make such -oath or declaration as is customary in his own country. - -(b) Witnesses while not giving evidence shall not be present in court. -The President of the Tribunal shall direct, as circumstances demand, -that witnesses shall not confer among themselves before giving evidence. - -Rule 7. _Applications and Motions before Trial and Rulings during the -Trial._ - -(a) All motions, applications or other requests addressed to the -Tribunal prior to the commencement of trial shall be made in writing and -filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal at the Palace of -Justice, Nuremberg, Germany. - -(b) Any such motion, application or other request shall be communicated -by the General Secretary of the Tribunal to the Chief Prosecutors and, -if they make no objection, the President of the Tribunal may make the -appropriate order on behalf of the Tribunal. If any Chief Prosecutor -objects, the President may call a special session of the Tribunal for -the determination of the question raised. - -(c) The Tribunal, acting through its President, will rule in court upon -all questions arising during the trial, such as questions as to -admissibility of evidence offered during the trial, recesses, and -motions; and before so ruling the Tribunal may, when necessary, order -the closing or clearing of the Tribunal or take any other steps which to -the Tribunal seem just. - -Rule 8. _Secretariat of the Tribunal._ - -(a) The Secretariat of the Tribunal shall be composed of a General -Secretary, four Secretaries and their Assistants. The Tribunal shall -appoint the General Secretary and each Member shall appoint one -Secretary. The General Secretary shall appoint such clerks, -interpreters, stenographers, ushers, and all such other persons as may -be authorized by the Tribunal and each Secretary may appoint such -assistants as may be authorized by the Member of the Tribunal by whom he -was appointed. - -(b) The General Secretary, in consultation with the Secretaries, shall -organize and direct the work of the Secretariat, subject to the approval -of the Tribunal in the event of a disagreement by any Secretary. - -(c) The Secretariat shall receive all documents addressed to the -Tribunal, maintain the records of the Tribunal, provide necessary -clerical services to the Tribunal and its Members, and perform such -other duties as may be designated by the Tribunal. - -(d) Communications addressed to the Tribunal shall be delivered to the -General Secretary. - -Rule 9. _Record, Exhibits, and Documents._ - -(a) A stenographic record shall be maintained of all oral proceedings. -Exhibits will be suitably identified and marked with consecutive -numbers. All exhibits and transcripts of the proceedings and all -documents lodged with and produced to the Tribunal will be filed with -the General Secretary of the Tribunal and will constitute part of the -Record. - -(b) The term “official documents” as used in Article 25 of the Charter -includes the Indictment, rules, written motions, orders that are reduced -to writing, findings, and judgments of the Tribunal. These shall be in -the English, French, Russian, and German languages. Documentary evidence -or exhibits may be received in the language of the document, but a -translation thereof into German shall be made available to the -defendants. - -(c) All exhibits and transcripts of proceedings, all documents lodged -with and produced to the Tribunal and all official acts and documents of -the Tribunal may be certified by the General Secretary of the Tribunal -to any Government or to any other tribunal or wherever it is appropriate -that copies of such documents or representations as to such acts should -be supplied upon a proper request. - -Rule 10. _Withdrawal of Exhibits and Documents._ - -In cases where original documents are submitted by the Prosecution or -the Defense as evidence, and upon a showing (a) that because of -historical interest or for any other reason one of the Governments -signatory to the Four Power Agreement of 8 August 1945, or any other -Government having received the consent of said four signatory Powers, -desires to withdraw from the records of the Tribunal and preserve any -particular original documents and (b) that no substantial injustice will -result, the Tribunal shall permit photostatic copies of said original -documents, certified by the General Secretary of the Tribunal, to be -substituted for the originals in the records of the Court and shall -deliver said original documents to the applicants. - -Rule 11. _Effective Date and Powers of Amendment and Addition._ - -These Rules shall take effect upon their approval by the Tribunal. -Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Tribunal -from, at any time, in the interest of fair and expeditious trials, -departing from, amending, or adding to these Rules, either by general -rules or special orders for particular cases, in such form and upon such -notice as may appear just to the Tribunal. - - - - - MINUTES OF THE OPENING SESSION - OF THE TRIBUNAL, AT BERLIN, 18 OCTOBER 1945 - - - GENERAL NIKITCHENKO, President[12] - -Present: All of the Members of the Tribunal and their Alternates. - -The International Military Tribunal held its first public session in -Berlin, as required by Article 22 of the Charter, in the Grand -Conference Room of the Allied Control Authority Building at 10:30 a.m. - -The President, General Nikitchenko, said: - -“In pursuance of the Agreement by the Government of the Union of Soviet -Socialist Republics, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, -the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of -the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the -prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European -Axis dated at London, 8 August 1945, and of Article 22 of the Charter -annexed thereto constituting this International Military Tribunal, this -meeting is held at Berlin for the reception of the Indictment under the -Agreement and Charter.” - -This statement was translated orally in French, English, and German. - -The Members of the Tribunal and their Alternates then made the following -declaration, each in his own language: - - “I solemnly declare that I will exercise all my powers and - duties as a Member of the International Military Tribunal - honorably, impartially, and conscientiously.” - -The President then declared the session opened. - -The Chief British Prosecutor, Mr. Shawcross, introduced in succession -the Soviet Chief Prosecutor, General Rudenko; the French Deputy Chief -Prosecutor, M. Dubost; and a representative of the American Prosecutor, -Mr. Shea. Each on being introduced made a brief statement, which was -translated orally into the other languages, and lodged a copy of the -Indictment, in his own language, with the President of the Tribunal. - -The President said: - -“An Indictment has now been lodged with the Tribunal by the Committee of -the Chief Prosecutors setting out the charges made against the following -defendants: - - Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, - Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred - Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter - Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl - Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred - Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, - Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath, and Hans Fritzsche. - -“Copies of the Charter and of the Indictment and of its accompanying -documents will be served upon the defendants in the German language -immediately. - -“Notices will also be served upon them in writing drawing their -attention to Articles 16 and 23 of the Charter which provide that they -may either conduct their own defense or be defended by any counsel -professionally qualified to conduct cases before the courts of his own -country or by any other person who may be specially authorized thereto -by the Tribunal; and a special clerk of the Tribunal has been appointed -to advise the defendants of their right and to take instructions from -them personally as to their choice of counsel, and generally to see that -their rights of defense are made known to them. - -“If any defendant who desires to be represented by counsel is unable to -secure the services of counsel the Tribunal will appoint counsel to -defend him. - -“The Tribunal has formulated Rules of Procedure, shortly to be -published, relating to the production of witnesses and documents in -order to see that the defendants have a fair trial with full opportunity -to present their defense. - -“The individual defendants in custody will be notified that they must be -ready for Trial within 30 days after the service of the Indictment upon -them. Promptly thereafter the Tribunal shall fix and announce the date -of the Trial in Nuremberg to take place not less than 30 days after the -service of the Indictment and the defendants shall be advised of such -date as soon as it is fixed. - -“It must be understood that the Tribunal which is directed by the -Charter to secure an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the -charges will not permit any delay either in the preparation of the -defense or of the Trial. - -“Lord Justice Lawrence will preside at the Trial at Nuremberg. - -“Notice will also be given under Article 9 of the Charter that the -Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to declare that the following -organizations or groups of which the defendants or some of them were -members are criminal organizations, and any member of any such group or -organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be -heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of -such group or organization. These organizations referred to are the -following: - - Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps der Politischen - Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei - (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die Schutzstaffeln der - Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly known - as the “SS”) and including Der Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known - as the “SD”); Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, - commonly known as the “Gestapo”); Die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP - (commonly known as the “SA”); and the General Staff and High - Command of the German Armed Forces. - -“The Indictment having been duly lodged by the Prosecutors in conformity -with the provisions of the Charter, it becomes the duty of the Tribunal -to give the necessary directions for the publication of the text. - -“The Tribunal would like to order its immediate publication but this is -not possible inasmuch as the Indictment must be published simultaneously -in Moscow, London, Washington, and Paris. - -“This result may be achieved, as the Tribunal is informed, by permitting -publication in the press of the Indictment not earlier than 8 p.m., -G.M.T., i. e. 2000 hours today, Thursday, October 18th.” - -This statement was translated orally in French, English, and German. - -The meeting adjourned at 11:25 a.m. - ------ - -[12] General Nikitchenko was selected as President for the session at -Berlin, and Lord Justice Lawrence was elected President of the Tribunal -for the Trial in Nuremberg, in accordance with Article 4 (b) of the -Charter. - - - - - INDICTMENT[13] - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED - KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF - SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS - - — against — - - HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, - ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED - ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER - FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL - DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED - JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, - ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, - Individually and as Members of Any of the Following Groups or - Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE - REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN - LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI - (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER - NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known - as the “SS”) and including DER SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known - as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, - commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP - (commonly known as the “SA”); and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH - COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, all as defined in Appendix - B, - - Defendants. - ------ - -[13] This text of the Indictment has been corrected in accordance with -the Prosecution’s motion of 4 June 1946 which was accepted by the Court -7 June 1946 to rectify certain discrepancies between the German text and -the text in other languages. - - - - -=I.= The United States of America, the French Republic, the United -Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet -Socialist Republics by the undersigned, Robert H. Jackson, François de -Menthon, Hartley Shawcross, and R. A. Rudenko, duly appointed to -represent their respective Governments in the investigation of the -charges against and the prosecution of the major war criminals, pursuant -to the Agreement of London dated 8 August 1945, and the Charter of this -Tribunal annexed thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects -hereinafter set forth, of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes -against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those -Crimes, all as defined in the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly -name as defendants in this cause and as indicted on the counts -hereinafter set out: HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON -RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED -ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, -HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH -RAEDER, BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, -FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON -NEURATH and HANS FRITZSCHE, individually and as members of any of the -groups or organizations next hereinafter named. - -=II.= The following are named as groups or organizations (since -dissolved) which should be declared criminal by reason of their aims and -the means used for the accomplishment thereof and in connection with the -conviction of such of the named defendants as were members thereof: DIE -REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER -NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF -THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN -DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DER -SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME -STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); -DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (commonly known as the “SA”); and the -GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES. - -The identity and membership of the groups or organizations referred to -in the foregoing titles are hereinafter in Appendix B more particularly -defined. - - - COUNT ONE—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY - - (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (a)) - III. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years -preceding 8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, -or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or -conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes -against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in -the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the provisions of -the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all -acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or -conspiracy. The common plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of -Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, -initiated, and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. In the -development and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to -embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the -defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against -countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war, -including as typical and systematic means by which the wars were -prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and for -other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, murder -and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the high seas, -the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public and private -property, the indiscriminate destruction of cities, towns, and villages, -and devastation not justified by military necessity. The common plan or -conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic -means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against -Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories, including -murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts -committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and -persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of -the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many -of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of -the countries where perpetrated. - - IV. Particulars of the Nature and Development - of the Common Plan or Conspiracy - - (A) NAZI PARTY AS THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE - COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY - -In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Führer of the -Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist -German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been -founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period -covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together with certain of its -subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of cohesion among the -defendants and their co-conspirators and an instrument for the carrying -out of the aims and purposes of their conspiracy. Each defendant became -a member of the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of -their aims and purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to -their aims and purposes at some stage of the development of the -conspiracy. - - (B) COMMON OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF - CONSPIRACY - -The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants and divers -other persons from time to time associated as leaders, members, -supporters, or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter called -collectively the “Nazi conspirators”) were, or came to be, to accomplish -the following by any means deemed opportune, including unlawful means, -and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of force, force, and -aggressive war: (i) to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles -and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany; -(ii) to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the -World War of 1914-18 and other territories in Europe asserted by the -Nazi conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called “racial -Germans”; (iii) to acquire still further territories in continental -Europe and elsewhere claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by -the “racial Germans” as “Lebensraum,” or living space, all at the -expense of neighboring and other countries. The aims and purposes of the -Nazi conspirators were not fixed or static but evolved and expanded as -they acquired progressively greater power and became able to make more -effective application of threats of force and threats of aggressive war. -When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great as to -provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown only by armed -force and aggressive war, and not simply by the opportunistic methods -theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, intimidation, fifth -column activities, and propaganda, the Nazi conspirators deliberately -planned, determined upon, and launched their aggressive wars and wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances by the -phases and steps hereinafter more particularly described. - - (C) DOCTRINAL TECHNIQUES OF THE COMMON PLAN OR - CONSPIRACY - -To incite others to join in the common plan or conspiracy, and as a -means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree of -control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated, and -exploited certain doctrines, among others, as follows: - -1. That persons of so-called “German blood” (as specified by the Nazi - conspirators) were a “master race” and were accordingly entitled to - subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other “races” and peoples; -2. That the German people should be ruled under the Führerprinzip - (Leadership Principle) according to which power was to reside in a - Führer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority in a - hierarchical order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience to - his immediate superior but to be absolute in his own sphere of - jurisdiction; and the power of the leadership was to be unlimited, - extending to all phases of public and private life; -3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans; -4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of the - foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was entitled to shape - the structure, policies, and practices of the German State and all - related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all - individuals within the State, and to destroy all opponents. - - (D) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OF - GERMANY: POLITICAL - -1. _First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery._ - -In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi conspirators -prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to assure that no -effective resistance against them could arise within Germany itself. -After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 aimed at the overthrow of -the Weimar Republic by direct action, the Nazi conspirators set out -through the Nazi Party to undermine and overthrow the German Government -by “legal” forms supported by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a -Party formation, Die Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary -organization of young men trained for and committed to the use of -violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of the streets. - -2. _Control acquired._ - -On 30 January 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. -After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses of the Weimar -constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the -press, of association and assembly were suspended. The Nazi conspirators -secured the passage by the Reichstag of a “Law for the Protection of the -People and the Reich” giving Hitler and the members of his then cabinet -plenary powers of legislation. The Nazi conspirators retained such -powers after having changed the members of the cabinet. The conspirators -caused all political parties except the Nazi Party to be prohibited. -They caused the Nazi Party to be established as a paragovernmental -organization with extensive and extraordinary privileges. - -3. _Consolidation of control._ - -Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi -conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power -within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance, and -the placing of the German Nation on a military footing. - -(a) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of their own - nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular elections throughout - the country. They transformed the several states, provinces, and - municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers, - into hardly more than administrative organs of the central - Government. They united the offices of the President and the - Chancellor in the person of Hitler; instituted a widespread purge of - civil servants; and severely restricted the independence of the - judiciary and rendered it subservient to Nazi ends. The conspirators - greatly enlarged existing State and Party organizations; established - a network of new State and Party organizations; and “coordinated” - State agencies with the Nazi Party and its branches and affiliates, - with the result that German life was dominated by Nazi doctrine and - practice and progressively mobilized for the accomplishment of their - aims. -(b) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instil fear in - the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators established - and extended a system of terror against opponents and supposed or - suspected opponents of the regime. They imprisoned such persons - without judicial process, holding them in “protective custody” and - concentration camps, and subjected them to persecution, degradation, - despoilment, enslavement, torture, and murder. These concentration - camps were established early in 1933 under the direction of the - Defendant GÖRING and expanded as a fixed part of the terroristic - policy and method of the conspirators and used by them for the - commission of the Crimes against Humanity hereinafter alleged. Among - the principal agencies utilized in the perpetration of these crimes - were the SS and the GESTAPO, which, together with other favored - branches or agencies of the State and Party, were permitted to - operate without restraint of law. -(c) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the suppression - of distinctively political opposition, it was necessary to suppress - or exterminate certain other movements or groups which they regarded - as obstacles to their retention of total control in Germany and to - the aggressive aims of the conspiracy abroad. Accordingly: - - (1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in Germany - by confiscating their funds and properties, persecuting their - leaders, prohibiting their activities, and supplanting them by an - affiliated Party organization. The Leadership Principle was - introduced into industrial relations, the entrepreneur becoming - the leader and the workers becoming his followers. Thus any - potential resistance of the workers was frustrated and the - productive labor capacity of the German Nation was brought under - the effective control of the conspirators. - (2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices - incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert the - influence of the churches over the people and in particular over - the youth of Germany. They avowed their aim to eliminate the - Christian churches in Germany and sought to substitute therefor - Nazi institutions and Nazi beliefs, and pursued a program of - persecution of priests, clergy, and members of monastic orders - whom they deemed opposed to their purposes, and confiscated - church property. - (3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist groups, - including religious movements dedicated to pacifism, was - particularly relentless and cruel. - -(d) Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators joined in a - program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed to - exterminate them. Annihilation of the Jews became an official State - policy, carried out both by official action and by incitements to mob - and individual violence. The conspirators openly avowed their - purpose. For example, the Defendant ROSENBERG stated: “Anti-Semitism - is the unifying element of the reconstruction of Germany.” On another - occasion he also stated: “Germany will regard the Jewish question as - solved only after the very last Jew has left the greater German - living space . . . Europe will have its Jewish question solved only - after the very last Jew has left the Continent.” The Defendant LEY - declared: “We swear we are not going to abandon the struggle until - the last Jew in Europe has been exterminated and is actually dead. It - is not enough to isolate the Jewish enemy of mankind—the Jew has got - to be exterminated.” On another occasion he also declared: “The - second German secret weapon is anti-Semitism because if it is - consistently pursued by Germany, it will become a universal problem - which all nations will be forced to consider.” The Defendant - STREICHER declared: “The sun will not shine on the nations of the - earth until the last Jew is dead.” These avowals and incitements were - typical of the declarations of the Nazi conspirators throughout the - course of their conspiracy. The program of action against the Jews - included disfranchisement, stigmatization, denial of civil rights, - subjecting their persons and property to violence, deportation, - enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, murder, and mass - extermination. The extent to which the conspirators succeeded in - their purpose can only be estimated, but the annihilation was - substantially complete in many localities of Europe. Of the 9,600,000 - Jews who lived in the parts of Europe under Nazi domination, it is - conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 have disappeared, most of - them deliberately put to death by the Nazi conspirators. Only - remnants of the Jewish population of Europe remain. -(e) In order to make the German people amenable to their will, and to - prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi conspirators reshaped - the educational system and particularly the education and training of - the German youth. The Leadership Principle was introduced into the - schools and the Party and affiliated organizations were given wide - supervisory powers over education. The Nazi conspirators imposed a - supervision of all cultural activities, controlled the dissemination - of information and the expression of opinion within Germany as well - as the movement of intelligence of all kinds from and into Germany, - and created vast propaganda machines. -(f) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their dominated - organizations on a progressively militarized footing with a view to - the rapid transformation and use of such organizations whenever - necessary as instruments of war. - - (E) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL IN - GERMANY: ECONOMIC; AND THE ECONOMIC PLANNING - AND MOBILIZATION FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR - -Having gained political power the conspirators organized Germany’s -economy to give effect to their political aims. - -1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic -sphere, they deprived labor of its rights of free industrial and -political association as particularized in paragraph (D) 3 (c) (1) -herein. - -2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of economic -mobilization for war. - -3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and equipment of -the military machine. To this end they directed finance, capital -investment, and foreign trade. - -4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists among -them, embarked upon a huge re-armament program and set out to produce -and develop huge quantities of materials of war and to create a powerful -military potential. - -5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the Nazi -conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and authorities. -For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose the office of the -Four Year Plan with the Defendant GÖRING as Plenipotentiary, vesting it -with overriding control over Germany’s economy. Furthermore, on 28 -August 1939, immediately before launching their aggression against -Poland, they appointed the Defendant FUNK Plenipotentiary for Economics; -and on 30 August 1939, they set up the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Reich to act as a War Cabinet. - - (F) UTILIZATION OF NAZI CONTROL FOR FOREIGN - AGGRESSION - -1. _Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected plans._ - -By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having acquired -governmental control over Germany, were in a position to enter upon -further and more detailed planning with particular relationship to -foreign policy. Their plan was to re-arm and to re-occupy and fortify -the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other -treaties, in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining -power to be used against other nations. - -2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the Treaty of -Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans were made by -them and put into operation by 7 March 1936, all of which opened the way -for the major aggressive steps to follow, as hereinafter set forth. In -the execution of this phase of the conspiracy the Nazi conspirators did -the following acts: - - (_a_) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret rearmament from - 1933 to March 1935, including the training of military personnel - and the production of munitions of war, and the building of an air - force. - (_b_) On 14 October 1933, they led Germany to leave the International - Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. - (_c_) On 10 March 1935, the Defendant GÖRING announced that Germany was - building a military air force. - (_d_) On 16 March 1935, the Nazi conspirators promulgated a law for - universal military service, in which they stated the peace-time - strength of the German Army would be fixed at 500,000 men. - (_e_) On 21 May 1935, they falsely announced to the world, with intent - to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they - would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty - and comply with the Locarno Pacts. - (_f_) On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, in - violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of - Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world - that “we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.” - -3. _Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia._ - - (_a_) _The 1936-1938 phase of the plan: planning for the assault on - Austria and Czechoslovakia._ - -The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning for the -acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, realizing it would be -necessary, for military reasons, first to seize Austria before -assaulting Czechoslovakia. On 21 May 1935, in a speech to the Reichstag, -Hitler stated that: “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in -the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an -Anschluss.” On 1 May 1936, within two months after the reoccupation of -the Rhineland, Hitler stated: “The lie goes forth again that Germany -tomorrow or the day after will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.” -Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused a treaty to be entered into -between Austria and Germany on 11 July 1936, Article 1 of which stated -that “The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the -Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the -German Führer and Chancellor of 21 May 1935.” Meanwhile, plans for -aggression in violation of that treaty were being made. By the autumn of -1937, all noteworthy opposition within the Reich had been crushed. -Military preparation for the Austrian action was virtually concluded. An -influential group of the Nazi conspirators met with Hitler on 5 November -1937, to review the situation. It was reaffirmed that Nazi Germany must -have “Lebensraum” in central Europe. It was recognized that such -conquest would probably meet resistance which would have to be crushed -by force and that their decision might lead to a general war, but this -prospect was discounted as a risk worth taking. There emerged from this -meeting three possible plans for the conquest of Austria and -Czechoslovakia. Which of the three was to be used was to depend upon the -developments in the political and military situation in Europe. It was -contemplated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia would, -through compulsory emigration of 2,000,000 persons from Czechoslovakia -and 1,000,000 persons from Austria, provide additional food to the Reich -for 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 people, strengthen it militarily by providing -shorter and better frontiers, and make possible the constituting of new -armies up to about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim of the plan against -Austria and Czechoslovakia was conceived of not as an end in itself but -as a preparatory measure toward the next aggressive steps in the Nazi -conspiracy. - - (_b_) _The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November 1937 to - March 1938._ - -Hitler, on 8 February 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a -conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12 February 1938, under -threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of amnesty to -imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to ministerial posts. He -agreed to remain silent until Hitler’s 20 February speech in which -Austria’s independence was to be reaffirmed, but Hitler in his speech, -instead of affirming Austrian independence, declared himself protector -of all Germans. Meanwhile, underground activities of Nazis in Austria -increased. Schuschnigg, on 9 March 1938, announced a plebiscite on the -question of Austrian independence. On 11 March Hitler sent an ultimatum, -demanding that the plebiscite be called off or that Germany would invade -Austria. Later the same day a second ultimatum threatened invasion -unless Schuschnigg should resign in three hours. Schuschnigg resigned. -The Defendant SEYSS-INQUART, who was appointed Chancellor, immediately -invited Hitler to send German troops into Austria to “preserve order”. -The invasion began on 12 March 1938. On 13 March, Hitler by proclamation -assumed office as Chief of State of Austria and took command of its -armed forces. By a law of the same date Austria was annexed to Germany. - - (_c_) _The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia: April 1938 to - March 1939._ - -1. Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria the Nazi conspirators -gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak Government that they would not -attack that country. But within a month they met to plan specific ways -and means of attacking Czechoslovakia, and to revise, in the light of -the acquisition of Austria, the previous plans for aggression against -Czechoslovakia. - -2. On 21 April 1938, the Nazi conspirators met and prepared to launch an -attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1 October 1938. They planned -specifically to create an “incident” to “justify” the attack. They -decided to launch a military attack only after a period of diplomatic -squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for -war, or, in the alternative, to unleash a lightning attack as a result -of an “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was given to -assassinating the German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite -incident. From and after 21 April 1938, the Nazi conspirators caused to -be prepared detailed and precise military plans designed to carry out -such an attack at any opportune moment and calculated to overcome all -Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with -a _fait accompli_, and so forestalling outside resistance. Throughout -the months of May, June, July, August, and September, these plans were -made more specific and detailed, and by 3 September 1938, it was decided -that all troops were to be ready for action on 28 September 1938. - -3. Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were agitating the -minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the -Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis in August and September -1938. After the Nazi conspirators threatened war, the United Kingdom and -France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on 29 September -1938, involving the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to -Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. On 1 October 1938, -German troops occupied the Sudetenland. - -4. On 15 March 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich Pact -itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of their plan by -seizing and occupying the major part of Czechoslovakia not ceded to -Germany by the Munich Pact. - -4. _Formulation of the plan to attack Poland: preparation and initiation -of aggressive war: March 1939 to September 1939._ - -(_a_) With these aggressions successfully consummated, the conspirators -had obtained much desired resources and bases and were ready to -undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following assurances to -the world of peaceful intentions, an influential group of the -conspirators met on 23 May 1939, to consider the further implementation -of their plan. The situation was reviewed and it was observed that “the -past six years have been put to good use and all measures have been -taken in correct sequence and in accordance with our aims”; that the -national-political unity of the Germans had been substantially achieved; -and that further successes could not be achieved without war and -bloodshed. It was decided nevertheless next to attack Poland at the -first suitable opportunity. It was admitted that the questions -concerning Danzig which they had agitated with Poland were not true -questions, but rather that the question was one of aggressive expansion -for food and “Lebensraum”. It was recognized that Poland would fight if -attacked and that a repetition of the Nazi success against -Czechoslovakia without war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was -determined that the problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible, -prevent a simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless, -it was agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and that -war with England and her ally France must eventually result, and -therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to overwhelm -England with a “Blitzkrieg”. It was thereupon determined immediately to -prepare detailed plans for an attack on Poland at the first suitable -opportunity and thereafter for an attack on England and France, together -with plans for the simultaneous occupation by armed force of air bases -in the Netherlands and Belgium. - -(_b_) Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact of 1934 -on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir up the Danzig -issue, to prepare frontier “incidents” to “justify” the attack, and to -make demands for the cession of Polish territory. Upon refusal by Poland -to yield, they caused German armed forces to invade Poland on 1 -September 1939, thus precipitating war also with the United Kingdom and -France. - -5. _Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning and -execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, -Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to April 1941._ - -Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators through -their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively launched by -their attack on Poland. After the total defeat of Poland, in order to -facilitate the carrying out of their military operations against France -and the United Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made active preparations -for an extension of the war in Europe. In accordance with those plans, -they caused the German armed forces to invade Denmark and Norway on 9 -April 1940; Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10 May 1940; -Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1941. All these invasions had been -specifically planned in advance, in violation of the terms of the -Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. - -6. _German invasion on 22 June 1941, of the U.S.S.R. territory in -violation of Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939._ - -On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the -Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without any -declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby beginning a War of -Aggression against the U.S.S.R. - -From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory the -Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began to -carry out the destruction of cities, towns, and villages, the demolition -of factories, collective farms, electric stations, and railroads, the -robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural institutions of -the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of museums, schools, -hospitals, churches, and historic monuments, the mass deportation of the -Soviet citizens for slave labor to Germany, as well as the annihilation -of adults, old people, women and children, especially Bielorussians and -Ukrainians, and the extermination of Jews committed throughout the -occupied territory of the Soviet Union. - -The above mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the German -troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Government and the -General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces. - -7. _Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against the -United States: November 1936 to December 1941._ - -After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi -conspirators brought about a German-Italian-Japanese 10-year -military-economic alliance signed at Berlin on 27 September 1940. This -agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those three -nations established by the earlier but more limited pact of 25 November -1936, stated: “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, considering -it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the -world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and -co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East -Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime -purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to -promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.” The -Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and -handicap those nations with whom they were at war, and those with whom -they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan -to seek “a new order of things.” Taking advantage of the wars of -aggression then being waged by the Nazi conspirators, Japan commenced an -attack on 7 December 1941, against the United States of America at Pearl -Harbor and the Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth of -Nations, French Indo-China, and the Netherlands in the southwest -Pacific. Germany declared war against the United States on 11 December -1941. - - (G) WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED - IN THE COURSE OF EXECUTING THE CONSPIRACY - FOR WHICH THE CONSPIRATORS ARE RESPONSIBLE. - -1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1 September -1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving almost the entire -world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their common plan or conspiracy -to wage war in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws -and customs of war. In the course of executing the common plan or -conspiracy there were committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in -Count Three of this Indictment. - -2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain total -control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their utilization -of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators carried -out their common plan or conspiracy in ruthless and complete disregard -and violation of the laws of humanity. In the course of executing the -common plan or conspiracy there were committed the Crimes against -Humanity detailed hereinafter in Count Four of this Indictment. - -3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers other -persons are guilty of a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment -of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit Crimes against -Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of -prosecution of war; and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only -against the armed forces of their enemies but also against -non-belligerent civilian populations. - - (H) INDIVIDUAL, GROUP AND ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITY - FOR THE OFFENSE STATED IN COUNT ONE - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count One of the indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count One of -the Indictment. - - - COUNT TWO—CRIMES AGAINST PEACE - - (_Charter, Article 6_ (_a_)) - V. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years -preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, -initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. - - VI. Particulars of the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged - -(_A_) The wars referred to in the Statement of Offense in this Count Two -of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were the following: -against Poland, 1 September 1939; against the United Kingdom and France, -3 September 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9 April 1940; against -Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, 10 May 1940; against -Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April 1941; against the U.S.S.R., 22 June 1941; -and against the United States of America, 11 December 1941. - -(_B_) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the -allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression on the part -of the defendants. - -(_C_) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this Indictment -for a statement of particulars of the charges of violations of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances caused by the -defendants in the course of planning, preparing, and initiating these -wars. - - VII. Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense - Stated - in Count Two - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Two of -the Indictment. - - - COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES - - (_Charter, Article 6, especially 6_ (_b_)) - VIII. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8 -May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied -by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Austria, -Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things, -the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military -occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the -commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during -encounters with enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in -occupied territories against the civilian population of such -territories. - -The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other -persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 -of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War -Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy -to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which -plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, -organizers, instigators, and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. - - (A) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS - OF OR IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND ON THE HIGH - SEAS - -Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by -their armed forces the defendants, for the purpose of systematically -terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, and -ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process. - -The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, -including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, -systematic under-nutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond -the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of -surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality and torture -of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of -fingernails and the performance of experiments by means of operations -and otherwise on living human subjects. In some occupied territories the -defendants interfered in religious matters, persecuted members of the -clergy and monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They -conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of -racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain -occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of -people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, -Poles, and Gypsies and others. - -Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with -the object of obtaining information. - -Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to -“protective arrests” whereby they were arrested and imprisoned without -any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and they were -imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions. - -In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified -“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were -allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without -trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German -authorities. - -Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international -conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, -the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in -this count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive -of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right -of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and -ill-treatment of civilians. - -1. _In France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, and -the Channel Islands (hereinafter called the “Western Countries”) and in -that part of Germany which lies west of a line drawn due north and south -through the center of Berlin (hereinafter called “Western Germany”)._ - -Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps and -similar establishments set up by the defendants, and particularly in the -concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Breendonck, -Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbrück, Vught, and Amersfoort, and in numerous -cities, towns, and villages, including Oradour-sur-Glane, Trondheim, and -Oslo. - -Crimes committed in France or Against French citizens took the following -forms: - - Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial - pretexts: they were both individual and collective; notably in - Paris (round-up of the 18th Arrondissement by the Field - Gendarmerie, round-up of the Jewish population of the 11th - Arrondissement in August 1941, round-up of Jewish intellectuals - in December 1941, round-up in July 1942); at Clermont-Ferrand - (round-up of professors and students of the University of - Strasbourg, who were taken to Clermont-Ferrand on 25 November - 1943); at Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000 persons in - January 1943); at Grenoble (round-up on 24 December 1943); at - Cluny (round-up on 24 December 1944); at Figeac (round-up in May - 1944); at Saint Pol de Léon (round-up in July 1944); at Locminé - (round-up on 3 July 1944); at Eysieux (round-up in May 1944) and - at Moussey (round-up in September 1944). These arrests were - followed by brutal treatment and tortures carried out by the - most diverse methods, such as immersion in icy water, - asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and the use of instruments - of torture, such as the iron helmet and electric current, and - practiced in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris, Lyons, - Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice, - Grenoble, Annecy, Arras, Béthune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, - Nancy, Troyes, and Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up - at the Gestapo centers. - -In the concentration camps, the health regime and the labor regime were -such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from natural causes) -attained enormous proportions, for instance: - - 1. Out of a convoy of 230 French women deported from Compiègne to - Auschwitz in January 1943, 180 died of exhaustion by the end of four - months. - 2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23 March and 6 May 1943, - in Block 8 at Dachau. - 3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21 November 1943, and 15 - March 1945, in the Block at Dora. - 4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November 1944, at Dora. - 5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between 1 January - 1943, and 15 April 1945. - 6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of them in - Block 30 reserved for the sick and the infirm) between 1 January and - 15 April 1945. - 7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen. - 8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600 died - from supposedly natural causes. - -Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration camps were: - -Bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of women at -Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution of cancer of the -womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatomical research at -Natzweiler, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone grafting and muscular -excisions at Ravensbrück, etc.), gas chambers, gas wagons, and crematory -ovens. Of 228,000 French political and racial deportees in concentration -camps, only 28,000 survived. - -In France systematic extermination was practiced also, notably at Asq on -1 April 1944, at Colpo on 22 July 1944, at Buzet-sur-Tarn on 6 July 1944 -and on 17 August 1944, at Pluvignier on 8 July 1944, at Rennes on 8 June -1944, at Grenoble on 8 July 1944, at Saint Flour on 10 June 1944, at -Ruisnes on 10 July 1944, at Nimes, at Tulle, and at Nice, where, in July -1944, the victims of torture were exposed to the population, and at -Oradour-sur-Glane where the entire village population was shot or burned -alive in the church. - -The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most notable of -these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de Boulogne), -Lyons, Saint-Genis-Laval, Besançon, Petit-Saint-Bernard, Aulnat, Caen, -Port-Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, Gabaudet, L’hermitage -Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe. - -In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated in -Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish subjects -were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German occupation of -Denmark, large numbers of Danish subjects were subjected to torture and -ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approximately 500 Danish -subjects were murdered, by torture and otherwise, in German prisons and -concentration camps. - -In Belgium between 1940 and 1944 tortures by various means, but -identical in each place, were carried out at Brussels, Liége, Mons, -Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi, and Dinant. - -At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated about 400 persons were -murdered by shooting. - -In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were murdered -and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by order of such -special tribunals as the so-called “Sondergericht”. Many more persons in -Luxembourg were subjected to torture and mistreatment by the Gestapo. -Not less than 4,000 Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the -period of German occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered. - -Between March 1944 and April 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men, women, -and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age were -murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the Ardeatine Caves in -Rome, and at other places. - -2. _In the U.S.S.R., i. e., in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Estonian, -Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet Socialist -Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist -Republic, and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the -Balkans (hereinafter called “the Eastern Countries”) and in that part of -Germany which lies east of a line drawn north and south through the -center of Berlin (hereinafter called “Eastern Germany”)._ - -From 1 September 1939, when the German Armed Forces invaded Poland, and -from 22 June 1941, when they invaded the U.S.S.R., the German Government -and the German High Command adopted a systematic policy of murder and -ill-treatment of the civilian populations of and in the Eastern -Countries as they were successively occupied by the German Armed Forces. -These murders and ill-treatments were carried on continuously until the -German Armed Forces were driven out of the said countries. - -Such murders and ill-treatments included: - -(_a_) Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and similar -establishments set up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries and in -Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek and Auschwitz. - -The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers means -including all those set out above, as follows: - -About 1,500,000 persons were exterminated in Maidanek and about -4,000,000 persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among whom were -citizens of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, Great -Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, and other countries. - -In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exterminated -about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the field of the -arts, science, and technology, and also citizens of the United States of -America, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Holland, brought -to this region from other concentration camps. - -In the Jewish ghetto from 7 September 1941 to 6 July 1943, over 133,000 -persons were tortured and shot. - -Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the city and -in the Livenitz forest. - -In the Ganov camp 200,000 peaceful citizens were exterminated. The most -refined methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, such as -disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs of water. Mass -shootings took place to the accompaniment of the music of an orchestra -recruited from the persons interned. - -Beginning with June 1943, the Germans carried out measures to hide the -evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses, and they -crushed the bones with machines and used them for fertilizer. - -At the beginning of 1944 in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian -S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans established three -concentration camps without shelters, to which they committed tens of -thousands of persons from the neighboring territories. They brought many -people to these camps from typhus hospitals intentionally, for the -purpose of infecting the other persons interned and for spreading the -disease in territories from which the Germans were being driven by the -Red Army. In these camps there were many murders and crimes. - -In the Estonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons and in one -day alone, 19 September 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans shot 2,000 -peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on bonfires. - -In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet citizens, -namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than 70,000; in -Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol about -8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighboring towns 37,640. - -In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered. - -As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in all -camps, the interned persons were doomed to die. - -In a secret instruction entitled “the internal regime in concentration -camps”, signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe measures of -punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses of prisoners of war -were shot, or died from the cold and torture. - -(_b_) Murders and ill-treatments at places in the Eastern Countries and -in the Soviet Union, other than in the camps referred to in (_a_) above, -included, on various dates during the occupation by the German Armed -Forces: - -The destruction in the Smolensk region of over 135,000 Soviet citizens. - -Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev region, when the -military authorities were required to remove the mines from an area, on -the order of the Commander of the 101st German Infantry Division, -Major-General Fisler, the German soldiers gathered the inhabitants of -the village of Kholmetz and forced them to remove mines from the road. -All of these people lost their lives as a result of exploding mines. - -In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000 -persons, including over 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of -Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings. - -In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the station of -Mineralny Vody, and in other cities, tens of thousands of persons were -exterminated. - -In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal treatment, -including suspension from the ceiling and other methods. Many of the -victims of these tortures were then shot. - -In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas in gas -vans, or were tortured and shot. - -In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were tortured and -killed. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, more than a -thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were found with marks of -torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women had their arms painfully bent -backward and held by wires. From some their breasts had been cut off and -their ears, fingers, and toes had been amputated. The bodies bore the -marks of burns. On the bodies of the men the five pointed star was -burned with an iron or cut with a knife. Some were disembowelled. - -In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered. - -In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of Soviet citizens -were killed by shooting, starvation, and torture. In Minsk tens of -thousands of citizens were similarly killed. - -In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken out to -sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated in this manner. - -In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of the Nazi -conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over 100,000 men, women, -children, and old people. In this city in January 1942, after the -explosion in German Headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Street the Germans -arrested as hostages 1,250 persons—old men, minors, women with nursing -infants. In Kiev they killed over 195,000 persons. - -In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over 100,000 -peaceful citizens. - -In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or threw -alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men, and children. - -In Kamenetz-Podolsk Region 31,000 Jews were shot and exterminated, -including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary. - -In the Odessa Region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed. - -In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death, shot, or -gassed in gas vans. - -In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, and tortured -and tormented them, and then took them to the center of the city and -shot them in public. - -In the city of Lyda in the Grodnen region on 8 May 1942, 5,670 persons -were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of 100, and then -shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the graves while they were -still alive. - -Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed even -children. They killed them with their parents, in groups, and alone. -They killed them in children’s homes and hospitals, burying the living -in the graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them with bayonets, -poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them, extracting their blood -for the use of the German Army, throwing them into prison and Gestapo -torture chambers and concentration camps, where the children died from -hunger, torture, and epidemic diseases. - -From 6 September to 24 November 1942, in the region of Brest, Pinsk, -Kobren, Dyvina, Malority, and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400 children were -shot by German punitive units. - -In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed 8,000 children -in two months. - -In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children suffering -from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium for the cure. - -On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers killed -thousands of children, whom they had brought there with their parents -from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, Kaluga, and other -regions of the R.S.F.S.R. - -In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and -shootings, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim, and -other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover, many thousands of internees -were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings, and torture. - -Both before the war, as well as during the war, thousands of Czech -patriots, in particular Catholics and Protestants, lawyers, doctors, -teachers, etc., were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. A large number -of these hostages were killed by the Germans. - -In Greece in October 1941, the male populations between 16 and 60 years -of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia Mesovunos, -Selli, Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion were shot—in all 416 persons. - -In Yugoslavia many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other examples -are given under paragraph (D), “Killing of Hostages”, below. - - (B) DEPORTATION FOR SLAVE LABOR AND FOR OTHER - PURPOSES OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF AND IN - OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - -During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of both the Western -and the Eastern Countries it was the policy of the German Government and -of the German High Command to deport able-bodied citizens from such -occupied countries to Germany and to other occupied countries for the -purpose of slave labor upon defense works, in factories, and in other -tasks connected with the German war effort. - -In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from all the -Western and Eastern Countries for such purposes during the whole period -of the occupation. - -Such deportations were contrary to international conventions, in -particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) -of the Charter. - -Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without -prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases are as follows: - -1. From the Western Countries: - -From France the following deportations of persons for political and -racial reasons took place—each of which consisted of from 1,500 to -2,500 deportees: - - 1940 ... 3 Transports - 1941 ... 14 Transports - 1942 ... 104 Transports - 1943 ... 257 Transports - 1944 ... 326 Transports - -Such deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions of -overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient clothing and -were given little or no food for several days. - -The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died in the -course of the journey, for example: - -In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiègne for Buchenwald, -on 17 September 1943, 80 men died out of 130; - -On 4 June 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of the train at Sarrebourg; - -In a train which left Compiègne on 2 July 1944 for Dachau, more than 600 -dead were found on arrival, i. e. one-third of the total number; - -In a train which left Compiègne on 16 January 1944 for Buchenwald, more -than 100 men were confined in each wagon, the dead and the wounded being -heaped in the last wagon during the journey; - -In April 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald, 4,000 only -were still alive when the marching column arrived near Regensburg. - -During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects were -deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration camps and -other places. - -In 1942 and thereafter 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were deported from -their country under deplorable conditions as a result of which many of -them perished. - -From Belgium between 1940 and 1944 at least 190,000 civilians were -deported to Germany and used as slave labor. Such deportees were -subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled to work in -armament factories. - -From Holland, between 1940 and 1944, nearly half a million civilians -were deported to Germany and to other occupied countries. - -2. From the Eastern Countries: - -The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet Union to -slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens. - -Seven hundred and fifty thousand Czechoslovakian citizens were taken -away from Czechoslovakia and forced to work in the German war machine in -the interior of Germany. - -On 4 June 1941, in the city of Zagreb (Yugoslavia) a meeting of German -representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll presiding. The -purpose was to set up the means of deporting the Yugoslav population -from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons were deported in carrying -out this plan. - - (C) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, - AND OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE - COUNTRIES WITH WHOM GERMANY WAS AT WAR, AND OF - PERSONS ON THE HIGH SEAS - -The defendants murdered and ill-treated prisoners of war by denying them -adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care and attention; by -forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; by torturing them and -subjecting them to inhuman indignities and by killing them. The German -Government and the German High Command imprisoned prisoners of war in -various concentration camps, where they were killed and subjected to -inhuman treatment by the various methods set forth in paragraph VIII -(A). Members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany was -at war were frequently murdered while in the act of surrendering. These -murders and ill-treatment were contrary to International Conventions, -particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, and -to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the Prisoners of War Convention (Geneva -1929), the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal -law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the -internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were -committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. In the Western Countries: - -French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over to the -Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their guards; others -sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among others, the men of -Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald. - -Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were obliged to march -to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some of them walked more -than 600 kilometers with hardly any food; they marched on for 48 hours -running, without being fed; among them a certain number died of -exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers were systematically murdered. - -The same crimes have been committed in 1943, 1944, and 1945 when the -occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied advance; -particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners of Sagan on 8 -February 1945. - -Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned officers and -cadets who refused to work. On 24 December 1943, three French -non-commissioned officers were murdered for that motive in Stalag IV A. -Many ill-treatments were inflicted without motive on other ranks: -stabbing with bayonets, striking with riflebutts, and whipping; in -Stalag XX B the sick themselves were beaten many times by sentries; in -Stalag III B and Stalag III C, worn-out prisoners were murdered or -grievously wounded. In military jails in Graudenz for instance, in -reprisal camps as in Rava-Ruska, the food was so insufficient that the -men lost more than 15 kilograms in a few weeks. In May 1942, one loaf of -bread only was distributed in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men. - -Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the camp of -Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arrival in camp they -were murdered, either by shooting or by gas, and their bodies destroyed -in the crematorium. - -American prisoners, officers and men, were murdered in Normandy during -the summer of 1944 and in the Ardennes in December 1944. American -prisoners were starved, beaten, and otherwise mistreated in numerous -Stalags in Germany and in the occupied countries, particularly in 1943, -1944, and 1945. - -2. In the Eastern Countries: - -At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation, shooting, -exposure, and poisoning. - -Soviet prisoners of war were murdered en masse on orders from the High -Command and the Headquarters of the SIPO and SD. Tens of thousands of -Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and murdered at the “Gross -Lazaret” at Slavuta. - -In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in paragraph VIII -(A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war. - -Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed over to -SIPO and SD for shooting. - -Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured were handed -over to the Vichy Government for “proceedings”. - -In March 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at -Sagan, when recaptured, were murdered. - -In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers who were prisoners of war were -killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. - -In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying authorities in the -person of the chief officials of the Police, the SS troops (Police -Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Command (General -Kübler and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered the shooting of -prisoners of war. - - (D) KILLING OF HOSTAGES - -Throughout the territories occupied by the German Armed Forces in the -course of waging aggressive wars, the defendants adopted and put into -effect on a wide scale the practice of taking, and of killing, hostages -from the civilian population. These acts were contrary to international -conventions, particularly Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the -laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. In the Western Countries: - -In France hostages were executed either individually or collectively; -these executions took place in all the big cities of France, among -others in Paris, Bordeaux, and Nantes, as well as at Châteaubriant. - -In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the following among -other places—Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam, Benschop, and Haarlem. - -In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the period 1940 to -1944. - -2. In the Eastern Countries: - -At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in October 1941. - -At Kralevo in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot. - - (E) PLUNDER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY - -The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material -resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the -Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, to -enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German economic -supremacy over Europe. - -The defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, among -others: - -1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied countries - and caused starvation, by stripping occupied countries of foodstuffs - for removal to Germany. -2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of the - occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them in the - interest of the German war effort and the German economy. -3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated - businesses, plants, and other property. -4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions of - property, they forced owners of property to go through the forms of - “voluntary” and “legal” transfers. -5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies of all of - the occupied countries and directed their resources, their production - and their labor in the interests of the German war economy, depriving - the local populations of the products of essential industries. -6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of the - occupied countries of essential commodities and accumulated wealth, - debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local economies. - They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries through - clearing arrangements by which they exacted loans from the occupied - countries. They imposed occupation levies, exacted financial - contributions, and issued occupation currency, far in excess of - occupation costs. They used these excess funds to finance the purchase - of business properties and supplies in the occupied countries. -7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the occupied - portions of the U.S.S.R. and in Poland and in other countries to - develop or manage agricultural and industrial properties, and reserved - this area for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by - Germans and their so-called racial brethren. -8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, they - destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific - institutions, and property of all types in the occupied territories to - eliminate the possibility of competition with Germany. -9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation, and organized - outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal - profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents. They - secured for themselves and their adherents: - -(_a_) Positions in administration of business involving power, influence, - and lucrative perquisites. -(_b_) The use of cheap forced labor. -(_c_) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties, - business interests, and raw materials. -(_d_) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany. - -These acts were contrary to international conventions, particularly -Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_) -of the Charter. - -Particulars (by way of example and without prejudice to the production -of evidence of other cases) are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -There was plundered from the Western Countries, from 1940 to 1944, works -of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture, textiles, -antique pieces, and similar articles of enormous value to the number of -21,903. - -In France statistics show the following: - - _Removal of Raw Materials._ - - Coal 63,000,000 tons - Electric energy 20,976 Mkwh - Petrol and fuel 1,943,750 tons - Iron ore 74,848,000 ” - Siderurgical 3,822,000 ” - products - Bauxite 1,211,800 ” - Cement 5,984,000 ” - Lime 1,888,000 ” - Quarry products 25,872,000 ” - -and various other products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs. - - _Removal of Industrial Equipment._ - -Total: 9,759,861,000 francs, of which 2,626,479,000 francs of machine -tools. - - _Removal of Agricultural Produce._ - -Total: 126,655,852,000 francs, i. e., for the principal products. - - Wheat 2,947,337 tons - Oats 2,354,080 ” - Milk 790,000 hectolitres - ” (concentrated and in - powder) 460,000 ” - Butter 76,000 tons - Cheese 49,000 ” - Potatoes 725,975 ” - Various vegetables 575,000 ” - Wine 7,647,000 hectolitres - Champagne 87,000,000 bottles - Beer 3,821,520 hectolitres - Various kinds of alcohol 1,830,000 ” - - _Removal of Manufactured Products._ - -To a total of 184,640,000,000 francs. - - _Plundering._ - -Francs: 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise. - -Francs: 55,000,100,000 from the State. - - _Financial Exploitation._ - -From June 1940 to September 1944 the French Treasury was compelled to -pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 francs. - - _Looting and Destruction of Works of Art._ - -The museums of Nantes, Nancy, Old-Marseilles were looted. - -Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way Raphaels, -Vermeers, Van Dycks, and works of Rubens, Holbein, Rembrandt, Watteau, -Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled France to deliver up “The Mystic -Lamb” by Van Eyck, which Belgium had entrusted to her. - -In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by which the -property of many civilians, societies, etc., was confiscated. An immense -amount of property of every kind was plundered from France, Belgium, -Norway, Holland, and Luxembourg. - -As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940 and 1944 -the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian francs. - -2. Eastern Countries: - -During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German Government and -the German High Command carried out, as a systematic policy, a -continuous course of plunder and destruction including: - -On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators destroyed or -severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets, -more than 6,000,000 buildings and made homeless about 25,000,000 -persons. - -Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad, -Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel, -Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino, and Leningrad. - -As is evident from an official memorandum of the German command, the -Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of entire Soviet -cities. In a completely secret order of the Chief of the Naval Staff -(Staff Ia No. 1601/41, dated 29. IX. 1941) addressed only to Staff -officers, it was said: - -“The Führer has decided to erase from the face of the earth St. -Petersburg. The existence of this large city will have no further -interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has also said that -the existence of this city on her new border is not desirable from her -point of view. The original request of the Navy that docks, harbor, etc. -necessary for the fleet be preserved—is known to the Supreme Commander -of the Military Forces, but the basic principles of carrying out -operations against St. Petersburg do not make it possible to satisfy -this request. - -“It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy it with the -aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different calibers and with -long air attacks . . . . - -“The problem of the life of the population and the provisioning of them -is a problem which cannot and must not be decided by us. - -“In this war . . . we are not interested in preserving even a part of -the population of this large city.” - -The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy museums of -Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava, and others. - -In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov museum were -seized. - -The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the Stalin -region amount to 2,000,000,000 rubles. There was colossal destruction of -industrial establishments in Makerevka, Carlovka, Yenakievo, -Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the machinery and factories -were removed. - -Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial, cultural, -and other property was typified in Kiev. More than 4,000,000 books, -magazines, and manuscripts (many of which were very valuable and even -unique) and a large number of artistic productions and valuables of -different kinds were stolen and carried away. - -Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga. - -The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by the fact -that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and -precious monographs were carried away by ROSENBERG’S staff alone. - -Among further examples of these crimes are: - -Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many historical and -artistic monuments there. Wanton devastation and plunder of the city of -Rovno and of its province. The destruction of the industrial, cultural, -and other property in Odessa. The destruction of cities and villages in -Soviet Karelia. The destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and -other buildings. - -The destruction of medical and prophylactic institutes, the destruction -of agriculture and industry in Lithuania, the destruction of cities in -Latvia. - -The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the Soviet people, -with special hatred. They broke up the estate of the poet Pushkin in -Mikhailovskoye, desecrating his grave, and destroying the neighboring -villages and the Svyatogor monastery. - -They destroyed the estate and museum of Leo Tolstoy, “Yasnaya Polyana,” -and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They destroyed in Klin the -museum of Tchaikovsky and in Penaty, the museum of the painter Repin and -many others. - -The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox churches, 237 Roman -Catholic churches, 67 chapels, 532 synagogues, etc. They broke up, -desecrated, and senselessly destroyed also the most valuable monuments -of the Christian Church, such as Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, Novy Jerusalem -in the Istrin region, and the most ancient monasteries and churches. - -Destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and other premises: -burning down of many thousands of residential buildings; removal of -10,000 works of art; destruction of medical and prophylactic -institutions; plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities of -agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, beehives, and -agricultural machines of all kinds. - -Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants, and looting of -stock and produce in Lithuania. - -In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the looting of -all stock, machinery, and produce. - -The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay waste -the land and cause utter desolation. - -The overall value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has borne, is -computed to be 679,000,000,000 rubles, in state prices of 1941. - -Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 the -defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, copper, tin, -iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany large amounts of -railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages, steam vessels, and -trolley buses; plundered libraries, laboratories, and art museums of -books, pictures, objects of art, scientific apparatus, and furniture; -stole all gold reserves and foreign exchange of Czechoslovakia, -including 23,000 kilograms of gold of a nominal value of £5,265,000; -fraudulently acquired control and thereafter looted the Czech banks and -many Czech industrial enterprises; and otherwise stole, looted, and -misappropriated Czechoslovak public and private property. The total sum -of defendants’ economic spoliation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 -is estimated at 200,000,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns. - - (F) THE EXACTION OF COLLECTIVE PENALTIES - -The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the -occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise, upon -the population for acts of individuals for which it could not be -regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many places, -including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim, and Rogaland. - -Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon, Nantes, and -as regards the Jewish population in the occupied territories. The total -amount of fines imposed on French communities add up to 1,157,179,484 -francs made up as follows: - - A fine on the Jewish population 1,000,000,000 - Various fines 157,179,484 - -These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (_b_) -of the Charter. - - (G) WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS, AND - VILLAGES AND DEVASTATION NOT JUSTIFIED BY - MILITARY NECESSITY - -The defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns, and villages and -committed other acts of devastation without military justification or -necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed, and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of example only and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -In March 1941, part of Lofoten in Norway was destroyed. - -In April 1942, the town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed. - -Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others -Oradour-sur-Glane, Saint-Nizier and, in the Vercors, La Mure, Vassieux, -La Chapelle en Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and -destroyed. The Old Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in the -beginning of 1943 and resorts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean -coasts, particularly the town of Sanary, were demolished. - -In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, not -justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbors, -locks, dikes, and bridges: immense devastation was also caused by -inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity. - -2. Eastern Countries: - -In the Eastern Countries the defendants pursued a policy of wanton -destruction and devastation: some particulars of this (without prejudice -to the production of evidence of other cases) are set out above under -the heading “Plunder of Public and Private Property”. - -In Greece the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia, Messovunos, -Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly destroyed. - -In Yugoslavia on 15 August 1941, the German military command officially -announced that the village of Skela was burned to the ground and the -inhabitants killed on the order of the command. - -On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive expedition -from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the villages of -Machkovats, and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the inhabitants were -killed. - -General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division) on 11 September 1944, -gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and Udora, hanging -all the men and driving away all the women and children. - -In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practiced the senseless -destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were burned to the -ground and the inhabitants killed. - - (H) CONSCRIPTION OF CIVILIAN LABOR - -Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and -forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services for -purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occupation and to -an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the countries -involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to work for the -German war effort. Civilians were required to register and many of those -who registered were forced to join the Todt Organization and the Speer -Legion, both of which were semi-military organizations involving some -military training. These acts violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to work in -Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German Army. - -In Luxembourg in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were conscripted -for forced labor. - -2. Eastern Countries: - -Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of -Czechoslovakia referred to under Count Three VIII (B) 2 above many were -so conscripted for forced labor. - - (I) FORCING CIVILIANS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO - SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO A HOSTILE POWER - -Civilians who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in paragraph (H) -above, were required, under threat of depriving them of food, money, and -identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging unconditional -obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany, which was to them a -hostile power. - -In Lorraine, civil servants were obliged, in order to retain their -positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged the “return -of their country to the Reich”, pledged themselves to obey without -reservation the orders of their chiefs and put themselves “at the active -service of the Führer and the Great National Socialist Germany”. - -A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian civil servants by threat of -deportation or internment. - -These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws -and customs of war, the general principles of international law, and -Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - - (J) GERMANIZATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - -In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the -defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavored to assimilate -those territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically -into the German Reich. The defendants endeavored to obliterate the -former national character of these territories. In pursuance of these -plans and endeavors, the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who -were predominantly non-German and introduced thousands of German -colonists. - -This plan included economic domination, physical conquest, installation -of puppet governments, purported de jure annexation and enforced -conscription into the German Armed Forces. - -This was carried out in most of the occupied countries including: -Norway, France (particularly in the Departments of Upper Rhine, Lower -Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle), Luxembourg, -the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland. - -In France in the Departments of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle, and -especially in that of Ardennes, rural properties were seized by a German -state organization which tried to have them exploited under German -direction; the landowners of these exploitations were dispossessed and -turned into agricultural laborers. - -In the Department of Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine, and Moselle, the methods -of Germanization were those of annexation followed by conscription. - -1. From the month of August 1940, officials who refused to take the oath -of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On 21 September expulsions and -deportation of populations began and on 22 November 1940, more than -70,000 Lorrainers or Alsatians were driven into the south zone of -France. From 31 July 1941 onwards, more than 100,000 persons were -deported into the eastern regions of the Reich or to Poland. All the -property of the deportees or expelled persons was confiscated. At the -same time, 80,000 Germans coming from the Saar or from Westphalia were -installed in Lorraine and 2,000 farms belonging to French people were -transferred to Germans. - -2. From 2 January 1942, all the young people of the Departments of Upper -Rhine and Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were incorporated in -the Hitler Youth. The same thing was done in Moselle from 4 August 1942. -From 1940 all the French schools were closed, their staffs expelled, and -the German school system was introduced in the three Departments. - -3. On the 28 September 1940, an order applicable to the Department of -Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the surnames and Christian -names which were French in form. The same thing was done from 15 January -1943, in the Departments of Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine. - -4. Two orders from 23 to 24 August 1942 imposed by force German -nationality on French citizens. - -5. On 8 May 1941, for Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, 23 April 1941, for -Moselle, orders were promulgated enforcing compulsory labor service on -all French citizens of either sex aged from 17 to 25 years. From 1 -January 1942 for young men and from 26 January 1942 for young girls, -national labor service was effectively organized in Moselle. It was from -27 August 1942 in Upper Rhine and in Lower Rhine for young men only. The -classes 1940, 1941, 1942 were called up. - -6. These classes were retained in the Wehrmacht on the expiration of -their time and labor service. On 19 August 1942, an order instituted -compulsory military service in Moselle. On 25 August 1942, the classes -1940-44 were called up in three departments. Conscription was enforced -by the German authorities in conformity with the provisions of German -legislation. The first revision boards took place from 3 September 1942. -Later in Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine new levies were effected everywhere -on classes 1928 to 1939 inclusive. The French people who refused to obey -these laws were considered as deserters and their families were -deported, while their property was confiscated. - -These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed, and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - - IX. Individual, group, and organization responsibility for the offense - stated In Count Three - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Three -of the Indictment. - - - COUNT FOUR—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY - - (_Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (c)_) - X. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of -years preceding 8 May 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and -territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1 September 1939 -and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity -as defined in Article 6 (_c_) of the Charter. This plan involved, among -other things, the murder and persecution of all who were or who were -suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who -were suspected of being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One. - -The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants and by -other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under -Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, when committing the -said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a common plan and -conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and -execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated -as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. The -said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter. - -The Prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as -also constituting Crimes against Humanity. - - (A) MURDER, EXTERMINATION, ENSLAVEMENT, DEPORTATION, - AND OTHER INHUMANE ACTS COMMITTED - AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BEFORE AND DURING - THE WAR - -For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy of -persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany -who were, or who were believed to be, or who were believed likely to -become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the common plan or conspiracy -described in Count One. They imprisoned such persons without judicial -process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration camps, -and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment, -enslavement, torture, and murder. - -Special courts were established to carry out the will of the -conspirators; favored branches or agencies of the State and Party were -permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to crush -all tendencies and elements which were considered “undesirable”. The -various concentration camps included Buchenwald, which was established -in 1933, and Dachau, which was established in 1934. At these and other -camps the civilians were put to slave labor, and murdered and -ill-treated by divers means, including those set out in Count Three -above, and these acts and policies were continued and extended to the -occupied countries after 1 September 1939, and until 8 May 1945. - - (B) PERSECUTION ON POLITICAL, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS - GROUNDS IN EXECUTION OF AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE - COMMON PLAN MENTIONED IN COUNT ONE - -As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the common plan -mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Government were -exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions were directed against -Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or -spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the -Nazis. - -Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of -their liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered -and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands -of Jews were so treated before 1 September 1939. - -Since 1 September 1939, the persecution of the Jews was redoubled: -millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied Western Countries -were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases are as follows: - -The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social -Democrat Breitscheid, and the Communist Thälmann. They imprisoned in -concentration camps numerous political and religious personages, for -example Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemöller. - -In November 1938, by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish -demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property was -destroyed, 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps and -their property confiscated. - -Under paragraph VIII (A), above, millions of the persons there mentioned -as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews. - -Among other mass murders of Jews were the following: - -At Kislovdosk all Jews were made to give up their property: 2,000 were -shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineraliye Vodi: 4,300 other Jews were -shot in the same ditch. - -60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina near Riga. - -20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk. - -32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny. - -60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk. - -Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke -down from overwork. - -As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated Jews -rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration camps and -ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured, -starved, subjected to merciless atrocities, and finally exterminated. - -About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia. - - XI. Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense - Stated in Count Four - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Four of -the Indictment. - -Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in English, -French, and Russian, each text having equal authenticity, and the -charges herein made against the above named defendants are hereby -presented to the Tribunal. - - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON. - _Acting on Behalf of the United - States of America._ - - /s/ FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON. - _Acting on Behalf of the French - Republic._ - - /s/ HARTLEY SHAWCROSS. - _Acting on Behalf of the United - Kingdom of Great Britain and - Northern Ireland._ - - /s/ R. RUDENKO. - _Acting on Behalf of the Union of - Soviet Socialist Republics._ - -Berlin, 6 October 1945. - - - APPENDIX A - _Statement of Individual Responsibility for Crimes Set Out in - Counts One, Two, Three, and Four_ - -The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each -individual defendant constitute matters upon which the prosecution will -rely _inter alia_ as establishing the individual responsibility of the -defendant according to Article 6 of the Charter of the Tribunal. - -GÖRING: - -The Defendant GÖRING between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Supreme Leader of the SA, General in the SS, a member and -President of the Reichstag, Minister of the Interior of Prussia, Chief -of the Prussian Police and Prussian Secret State Police, Chief of the -Prussian State Council, Trustee of the Four Year Plan, Reich Minister -for Air, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, President of the Council -of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, head of the Hermann Göring Industrial Combine, and Successor -Designate to Hitler. The Defendant GÖRING used the foregoing positions, -his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in -such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi -conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Germany set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the military and -economic preparation for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; -he participated in the planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, -Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a -wide variety of crimes against persons and property. - -RIBBENTROP: - -The Defendant RIBBENTROP between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Nazi Reichstag, Advisor to the Führer on matters -of foreign policy, representative of the Nazi Party for matters of -foreign policy, special German delegate for disarmament questions, -Ambassador Extraordinary, Ambassador in London, organizer and director -of Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, member -of the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Führer’s political staff at -general headquarters, and General in the SS. The Defendant RIBBENTROP -used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate -connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances as set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the -Führer Principle he executed and assumed responsibility for the -execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth -in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment, and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes against persons -and property in occupied territories. - -HESS: - -The Defendant HESS between 1921 and 1941 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Deputy to the Führer, Reich Minister without Portfolio, member of -the Reichstag, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the -Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, Successor Designate to the -Führer after the Defendant Göring, a General in the SS and a General in -the SA. The Defendant HESS used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner -that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; he promoted the military, economic, and psychological -preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the political planning and preparation for Wars of -Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, -and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he -participated in the preparation and planning of foreign policy plans of -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes -against persons and property. - -KALTENBRUNNER: - -The Defendant KALTENBRUNNER between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the -Nazi Party, a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, a General of -the Police, State Secretary for Security in Austria in charge of the -Austrian Police, Police Leader of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, Head -of the Reich Main Security Office, and Chief of the Security Police and -Security Service. The Defendant KALTENBRUNNER used the foregoing -positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: He promoted -the consolidation of control over Austria seized by the Nazi -conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the Crimes -against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps. - -ROSENBERG: - -The Defendant ROSENBERG between 1920 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for -Ideology and Foreign Policy, the editor of the Nazi newspaper -_Völkischer Beobachter_ and of the _NS Monatshefte_, head of the Foreign -Political Office of the Nazi Party, Special Delegate for the entire -Spiritual and Ideological Training of the Nazi Party, Reich Minister for -the Eastern Occupied Territories, organizer of the “Einsatzstab -Rosenberg”, a General in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defendant -ROSENBERG used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He developed, -disseminated, and exploited the doctrinal techniques of the Nazi -conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the psychological preparations for war set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -FRANK: - -The Defendant FRANK between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister -without Portfolio, Reich Commissar for the Coordination of Justice, -President of the International Chamber of Law and Academy of German Law, -Chief of the Civil Administration of Lodz, Supreme Administrative Chief -of the military district of West Prussia, Poznan, Lodz and Krakow, and -Governor General of the occupied Polish territories. The Defendant FRANK -used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate -connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes -and Crimes against Humanity involved in the administration of occupied -territories. - -BORMANN: - -The Defendant BORMANN between 1925 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, member of the Reichstag, a member of the Staff of the Supreme -Command of the SA, founder and head of “Hilfskasse der NSDAP”, -Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the Führer’s Deputy, head of the -Party Chancery, Secretary of the Führer, member of the Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, organizer and head of the -Volkssturm, a General in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defendant -BORMANN used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide -variety of crimes against persons and property. - -FRICK: - -The Defendant FRICK between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Reichsleiter, General in the SS, member of the Reichstag, Reich -Minister of the Interior, Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich -Director of Elections, General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of -the Reich, head of the Central Office for the Reunification of Austria -and the German Reich, Director of the Central Office for the -Incorporation of Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, the eastern incorporated -territories, Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet, Director of the Central -Office for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the Governor General -of Lower Styria, Upper Carinthia, Norway, Alsace, Lorraine and all other -occupied territories and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The -Defendant FRICK used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he participated in the planning and preparation of the -Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Count -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes against persons -and property in occupied territories. - -LEY: - -The Defendant LEY between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi Party, -Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager, member of the Reichstag, -leader of the German Labor Front, a General in the SA, and Joint -Organizer of the Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers. The -Defendant LEY used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and -his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany as set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and in the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity relating to the -abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of the aggressive wars. - -SAUCKEL: - -The Defendant SAUCKEL between 1921 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, a member of the -Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor under the -Four Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the Defendant Ley of the Central -Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a General in the SS and a -General in the SA. The Defendant SAUCKEL used the foregoing positions -and his personal influence in such a manner that: He promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he participated in the economic preparations for Wars of -Aggression and Wars in Violation of Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances -set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of -the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four -of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity involved in forcing the inhabitants of occupied -countries to work as slave laborers in occupied countries and in -Germany. - -SPEER: - -The Defendant SPEER between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for -Armament and Munitions, Chief of the Organization Todt, General -Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and -Chairman of the Armaments Council. The Defendant SPEER used the -foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: He -participated in the military and economic planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the abuse and exploitation -of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive war. - -FUNK: - -The Defendant FUNK between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, Economic Adviser of Hitler, National Socialist Deputy to the -Reichstag, Press Chief of the Reich Government, State Secretary of the -Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Reich Minister of -Economics, Prussian Minister of Economics, President of the German -Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary for Economy, and member of the Ministerial -Council for the Defense of the Reich. The Defendant FUNK used the -foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection -with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to -power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control -over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the -preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the military and economic planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly crimes against persons and -property in connection with the economic exploitation of occupied -territories. - -SCHACHT: - -The Defendant SCHACHT between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister of Economics, Reich -Minister without Portfolio and President of the German Reichsbank. The -Defendant SCHACHT used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; and he participated in the military and economic plans and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression, and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -PAPEN: - -The Defendant PAPEN between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor, Vice Chancellor -under Hitler, special Plenipotentiary for the Saar, negotiator of the -Concordat with the Vatican, Ambassador in Vienna and Ambassador in -Turkey. The Defendant PAPEN used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such manner that: -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -participated in the consolidation of their control over Germany set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he participated in the -political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of -Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, -and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -KRUPP: - -The Defendant KRUPP was between 1932 and 1945: Head of Friedrich KRUPP -A.G., a member of the General Economic Council, President of the Reich -Union of German Industry, and head of the Group for Mining and -Production of Iron and Metals under the Reich Ministry of Economics. The -Defendant KRUPP used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; he participated in the military and economic planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of -the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four -of the Indictment, including more particularly the exploitation and -abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of aggressive wars. - -NEURATH: - -The Defendant NEURATH between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister, -Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Secret Cabinet -Council, and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The Defendant -NEURATH used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -close connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the -Führer Principle he executed, and assumed responsibility for the -execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth -in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and -property in the occupied territories. - -SCHIRACH: - -The Defendant SCHIRACH between 1924 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Youth Leader on the Staff of the -SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for Youth Education, -Leader of Youth of the German Reich, head of the Hitler Jugend, Reich -Defense Commissioner and Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter of Vienna. The -Defendant SCHIRACH used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational -preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi dominated -organizations set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes against Humanity -set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including, particularly, -anti-Jewish measures. - -SEYSS-INQUART: - -The Defendant SEYSS-INQUART between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the -Nazi Party, a General in the SS, State Councillor of Austria, Minister -of the Interior and Security of Austria, Chancellor of Austria, a member -of the Reichstag, a member of the Reich Cabinet, Reich Minister without -Portfolio, Chief of the Civil Administration in South Poland, Deputy -Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, and Reich Commissar -for the Occupied Netherlands. The Defendant SEYSS-INQUART used the -foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: He -promoted the seizure and the consolidation of control over Austria by -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi -conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -STREICHER: - -The Defendant STREICHER between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Reichstag, a General in the SA, Gauleiter of -Franconia, editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper _Der Stürmer_. -The Defendant STREICHER used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner -that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One -of the Indictment: he authorized, directed, and participated in the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set -forth in Count One and Count Four of the Indictment. - -KEITEL: - -The Defendant KEITEL between 1938 and 1945 was: Chief of the High -Command of the German Armed Forces, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the -Reich, and Field Marshal. The Defendant KEITEL used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the -Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the military preparations for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the -political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of -Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, -and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he -executed and assumed responsibility for the execution of the plans of -the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated -in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity -involved in the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian -population of occupied territories. - -JODL: - -The Defendant JODL between 1932 and 1945 was: Lt. Colonel, Army -Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel, Chief of OKW Operations -Department, Major-General, Chief of Staff OKW and Colonel-General. The -Defendant JODL used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and -his close connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; he participated in the military planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -RAEDER: - -The Defendant RAEDER between 1928 and 1945 was: Commander-in-Chief of -the German Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral, Admiralinspekteur of the -German Navy, and a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. The Defendant -RAEDER used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a -manner that: He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed, and assumed -responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators -for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, -Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the war -crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, including -particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare. - -DÖNITZ: - -The Defendant DÖNITZ between 1932 and 1945 was: Commanding Officer of -the Weddigen U-boat flotilla, Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm, -Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral and Commander-in-Chief of the German -Navy, Advisor to Hitler, and Successor to Hitler as head of the German -Government. The Defendant DÖNITZ used the foregoing positions, his -personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such -a manner that: He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of -the Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and -property on the High Seas. - -FRITZSCHE: - -The Defendant FRITZSCHE between 1933 and 1945 was: A member of the Nazi -Party, editor-in-chief of the official German news agency, “Deutsche -Nachrichten Büro”, head of the Wireless News Service and of the Home -Press Division of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, Ministerialdirektor -of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, head of the Radio Division of the -Propaganda Department of the Nazi Party, and Plenipotentiary for the -Political Organization of the Greater German Radio. The Defendant -FRITZSCHE used the foregoing positions and his personal influence to -disseminate and exploit the principal doctrines of the Nazi conspirators -set forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to advocate, encourage and -incite the commission of the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment including, particularly, anti-Jewish measures and the -ruthless exploitation of occupied territories. - - - APPENDIX B - _Statement of Criminality of Groups and Organizations_ - -The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of each group -or organization named in the Indictment as one which should be declared -criminal, constitute matters upon which the prosecution will rely _inter -alia_ as establishing the criminality of the group or organization: - - DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET) - -“Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)” referred to in the Indictment -consists of persons who were: - - (i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the date on - which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The term - “ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers, i. e., - heads of departments of the central Government; Reich Ministers - without portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and - other officials entitled to take part in meetings of this cabinet. - (ii) Members of der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung (Council of - Ministers for the Defense of the Reich). -(iii) Members of der Geheimer Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet Council). - -Under the Führer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capacities -and in association as a group, possessed and exercised legislative, -executive, administrative, and political powers and functions of a very -high order in the system of German Government. Accordingly, they are -charged with responsibility for the policies adopted and put into effect -by the Government including those which comprehended and involved the -commission of the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four -of the Indictment. - - DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN - DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI - (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY) - -“Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)” referred to in the -Indictment consists of persons who were at any time, according to common -Nazi terminology, “Politischen Leiter” (Political Leaders) of any grade -or rank. - -The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various functional -offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung, or Party Reich -Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Directorate), as well as -the territorial leaders of the Party (for example, the Gauleiter). - -The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within the -Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerogatives. -They were organized according to the Leadership Principle and were -charged with planning, developing and imposing upon their followers the -policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the territorial leaders among them were -called Hoheitsträger, or bearers of sovereignty, and were entitled to -call upon and utilize the various Party formations when necessary for -the execution of Party policies. - -Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of the -Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core of the -common plan or conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen Leiter, as -a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning in the -capacities above described and in association as a group, joined in the -common plan or conspiracy, and accordingly share responsibility for the -crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. - -The prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any time -before sentence is pronounced, that Politische Leiter of subordinate -grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified by the -Prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this Case No. 1, -but without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them. - - DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN - DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (COMMONLY KNOWN AS - THE SS) INCLUDING DER SICHERHEITSDIENST (COMMONLY - KNOWN AS THE SD) - -“Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei -(commonly known as the SS) including Der Sicherheitsdienst (commonly -known as the SD)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the entire -corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies, -branches, formations, organizations, and groups of which it was at any -time comprised or which were at any time integrated in it, including but -not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf -Verbände, SS Polizei Regimente, and the Sicherheitsdienst des -Reichsführers-SS (commonly known as the SD). - -The SS, originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite section of -the SA to furnish a protective guard for the Führer and Nazi Party -leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi Party in 1934 under -the leadership of the Reichsführer-SS, Heinrich Himmler. It was composed -of voluntary members, selected in accordance with Nazi biological, -racial, and political theories, completely indoctrinated in Nazi -ideology and pledged to uncompromising obedience to the Führer. After -the accession of the Nazi conspirators to power, it developed many -departments, agencies, formations, and branches and extended its -influence and control over numerous fields of Governmental and Party -activity. Through Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the -German Police, agencies and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined -in operation to form a unified repressive police force. The -Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS (commonly known as the SD), a -department of the SS, was developed into a vast espionage and -counter-intelligence system which operated in conjunction with the -Gestapo and criminal police in detecting, suppressing and eliminating -tendencies, groups and individuals deemed hostile or potentially hostile -to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles and objectives, and -eventually was combined with the Gestapo and criminal police in a single -security police department, the Reich Main Security Office. - -Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and served in the -wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. -Through other departments and branches the SS controlled the -administration of concentration camps and the execution of Nazi racial, -biological, and resettlement policies. Through its numerous functions -and activities it served as the instrument for insuring the domination -of Nazi ideology and protecting and extending the Nazi regime over -Germany and occupied territories. It thus participated in and is -responsible for the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and -Four of the Indictment. - - DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, - COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE GESTAPO) - -“Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the -Gestapo)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the headquarters, -departments, offices, branches, and all the forces and personnel of the -Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing at any time after 30 January -1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei of Prussia and equivalent -secret or political police forces of the Reich and the components -thereof. - -The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately after their -accession to power, first in Prussia by the Defendant GÖRING and shortly -thereafter in all other states in the Reich. These separate secret and -political police forces were developed into a centralized, uniform -organization operating through a central headquarters and through a -network of regional offices in Germany and in occupied territories. Its -officials and operatives were selected on the basis of unconditional -acceptance of Nazi ideology, were largely drawn from members of the SS, -and were trained in SS and SD schools. It acted to suppress and -eliminate tendencies, groups, and individuals deemed hostile or -potentially hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and -objectives, and to repress resistance and potential resistance to German -control in occupied territories. In performing these functions it -operated free from legal control, taking any measures it deemed -necessary for the accomplishment of its missions. - -Through its purposes, activities, and the means it used, it participated -in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set forth in -Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. - - DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN - DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI - (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE SA) - -“Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA)” referred to in the Indictment -was a formation of the Nazi Party under the immediate jurisdiction of -the Führer, organized on military lines, whose membership was composed -of volunteers serving as political soldiers of the Party. It was one of -the earliest formations of the Nazi Party and the original guardian of -the National Socialist movement. Founded in 1921 as a voluntary militant -formation, it was developed by the Nazi conspirators before their -accession to power into a vast private army and utilized for the purpose -of creating disorder, and terrorizing and eliminating political -opponents. It continued to serve as an instrument for the physical, -ideological, and military training of Party members and as a reserve for -the German Armed Forces. After the launching of the wars of aggression, -referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment, the SA not only -operated as an organization for military training but provided auxiliary -police and security forces in occupied territories, guarded -prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps and supervised and -controlled persons forced to labor in Germany and occupied territories. - -Through its purposes and activities and the means it used, it -participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set -forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. - - GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE GERMAN - ARMED FORCES - -The “General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces” referred -to in the Indictment consist of those individuals who between February -1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders of the Wehrmacht, the -Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The individuals comprising this -group are the persons who held the following appointments: - - Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief of the Navy); - Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung (Chief of - Naval War Staff); - Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the Army); - Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (Chief of the General Staff of the - Army); - Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Air Force); - Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff of - the Air Force); - Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of the - Armed Forces); - Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the - Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces); - Stellvertretender Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der - Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command - of the Armed Forces); - Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of Oberbefehlshaber, - of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force. - -Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group at a -highest level in the German Armed Forces Organization, these persons had -a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation, and -waging of illegal wars as set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved -in the execution of the common plan or conspiracy set forth in Counts -Three and Four of the Indictment. - - - APPENDIX C - -_Charges and Particulars of Violations of International Treaties, -Agreements, and Assurances Caused by the Defendants in the Course of -Planning, Preparing, and Initiating the Wars_ - - I - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of -International Disputes, signed at The Hague, 29 July 1899._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on the dates -specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the Sovereigns specified -in Column 2, respectively, without first having attempted to settle its -disputes with said Sovereigns by pacific means. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia - - II - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of -International Disputes, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the Sovereigns -specified in Column 2, respectively, without having first attempted to -settle its dispute with said Sovereigns by pacific means. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - - III - -CHARGE: _Violation of Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of -Hostilities, Signed 18 October 1907._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, commence hostilities against the Countries specified in Column -2, respectively, without previous warning in the form of a reasoned -declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 10 May 1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - - IV - -CHARGE: _Violation of Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and -Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, signed 18 -October 1907._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, by force and arms of its military forces, cross into, invade, -and occupy the territories of the Sovereigns specified in Column 2, -respectively, then and thereby violating the neutrality of said -Sovereigns. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - - V - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and -Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, known -as the Versailles Treaty._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March 1936, -maintain and assemble armed forces and maintain and construct military -fortifications in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in violation -of the provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex Austria into -the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 80 of the -Treaty of Versailles. - -(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate the -district of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the provisions -of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incorporate the -Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation of the provisions -of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate the -Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, into -the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 81 of the -Treaty of Versailles. - -(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter, -repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of -the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force, by use of compulsory -military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty -limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits. - - VI - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty between the United States and Germany -Restoring Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin, 25 August 1921._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and -thereafter, repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air -Clauses of the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring -Friendly Relations by creating an air force, by use of compulsory -military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty -limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits. - - VII - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, -Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October -1925._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, -unlawfully send armed forces into the Rhineland demilitarized zone of -Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. - -(2) In that Germany did, in or about March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized zone of -Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. - -(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the Rhineland -demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee. - -(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee. - -(5) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle its dispute -with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee. - - VIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Czechoslovakia, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 15 March 1939, unlawfully -by duress and threats of military might force Czechoslovakia to deliver -the destiny of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants into the hands of the -Führer and Reichschancellor of Germany without having attempted to -settle its dispute with Czechoslovakia by peaceful means. - - IX - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and -Belgium, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully -attack and invade Belgium without first having attempted to settle its -dispute with Belgium by peaceful means. - - X - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, -done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, -unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted to -settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means. - - XI - -CHARGE: _Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature -whatever which might arise between it and the Netherlands which were not -capable of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by -mutual agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, -on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and -occupy the Netherlands, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial -integrity and destroying its sovereign independence. - - XII - -CHARGE: _Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature -whatever which might arise between it and Denmark which were not capable -of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual -agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or -about 9 April 1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy -Denmark, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and -destroying its sovereign independence. - - XIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty between Germany and other Powers providing -for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at -Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, with a military force, attack the Sovereigns specified in -Column 2, respectively, and resort to war against such Sovereigns, in -violation of its solemn declaration condemning recourse to war for the -solution of international controversies, its solemn renunciation of war -as an instrument of national policy in its relations with such -Sovereigns, and its solemn covenant that settlement or solution of all -disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or origin arising between it -and such Sovereigns should never be sought except by pacific means. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - 11 December 1941 United States of America - - XIV - -CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September 1929._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes which might -arise between it and Luxembourg which were not capable of settlement by -diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack, -invade, and occupy Luxembourg, thereby violating its neutrality and -territorial integrity and destroying its sovereign independence. - - XV - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression entered into -between Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany proceeding to the application of force for -the purpose of reaching a decision did, on or about 1 September 1939, at -various places along the German-Polish frontier employ military forces -to attack, invade, and commit other acts of aggression against Poland. - - XVI - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurance given on 21 May 1935 that the -Inviolability and Integrity of the Federal State of Austria Would Be -Recognized._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 11 March 1938, at various -points and places along the German-Austria frontier, with a military -force and in violation of its solemn declaration and assurance, invade -and annex to Germany the territory of the Federal State of Austria. - - XVII - -CHARGE: _Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany during the period from 12 February 1938 to -13 March 1938 did by duress and various aggressive acts, including the -use of military force, cause the Federal State of Austria to yield up -its sovereignty to the German State in violation of Germany’s agreement -to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria. - - XVIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January 1937, 28 -April 1939, 26 August 1939, and 6 October 1939 To Respect the Neutrality -and Territorial Inviolability of the Netherlands._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to -peaceful means of settling any considered differences did, on or about -10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn -assurances, invade, occupy, and attempt to subjugate the sovereign -territory of the Netherlands. - - XIX - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January 1937, 13 -October 1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939, and 6 October 1939 To -Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of -Belgium._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, did on or about 10 May -1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn assurances -and declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the sovereign territory of -Belgium. - - XX - -CHARGE: _Violation of Assurances given on 11 March 1938 and 26 September -1938 to Czechoslovakia._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939 did, by -establishing a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under duress and by -the threat of force, violate the assurance given on 11 March 1938 to -respect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the -assurance given on 26 September 1938 that, if the so-called Sudeten -territories were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims -on Czechoslovakia would be made. - - XXI - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29 September -1938._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany on or about 15 March 1939, did by -duress and the threat of military intervention force the Republic of -Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country -into the hands of the Führer of the German Reich. - -(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international -guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakia state as provided -for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement. - - XXII - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Solemn Assurances of Germany given on 3 -September 1939, 28 April 1939, and 6 October 1939 Not To Violate the -Independence or Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Norway._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning did, on or about 9 April -1940, with its military and naval forces attack, invade, and commit -other acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Norway. - - XXIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 28 April 1939 and 26 -August 1939 To Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Inviolability of -Luxembourg._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to -peaceful means of settling any considered differences, did, on or about -10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of the solemn -assurances, invade, occupy, and absorb into Germany the sovereign -territory of Luxembourg. - - XXIV - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and -Denmark, signed at Berlin, 31 May 1939._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany without prior warning, did, on or about 9 -April 1940, with its military forces, attack, invade, and commit other -acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Denmark. - - XXV - -CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into between -Germany and U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ -military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the -U.S.S.R. - -(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly exchange -of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military -forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R. - - XXVI - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurance given on 6 October 1939 To -Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity of Yugoslavia._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany without prior warning did, on or about 6 -April 1941, with its military forces attack, invade, and commit other -acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. - - - - - MOTION OF THE PROSECUTION - FOR CORRECTING DISCREPANCIES - IN THE INDICTMENT[14] - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - _Motion as to Amendment of the Indictment_ - -To The Honorable Tribunal: - -WHEREAS - -(1) Certain discrepancies (as set out in the attached schedule) have -been discovered in the Indictment, as between the English, French, -Russian, and German texts thereof; - -(2) The Indictment was lodged with the Tribunal in English, French, and -Russian, each text having equal authenticity, - -(3) The Indictment was served on the defendants in the German language -only; - -The Prosecution respectfully submits the following MOTION: - -That the Tribunal direct that the discrepancies in the Indictment -specified in the attached schedule be rectified as between the -respective texts of the Indictment by making the English, French, and -Russian texts conform to the German text in each of the specified cases -so far as the sense of the context permits. - - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - For the Government of the United States of - America. - - /s/ CHAMPETIER DE RIBES - Per CH. DUBOST - For the Provisional Government of France. - - /s/ DAVID MAXWELL FYFE - For the Government of the United Kingdom of - Great Britain and Northern Ireland. - - /s/ R. RUDENKO - For the Government of the Union of Soviet - Socialist Republics. - -4th June, 1946. - ------ - -[14] This motion, was accepted by the Court at a meeting of the -International Military Tribunal, 7 June 1946. - - - - - PLEAS OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS - - -All individual defendants, with the exception of MARTIN BORMANN who -could not be located, in effect pleaded not guilty to the Indictment. -The plea of ERNST KALTENBRUNNER was entered 10 December 1945; the pleas -of the other defendants, 21 November 1945. - - - - - LETTER OF RESERVATION - BY THE UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR - IN REGARD TO WORDING OF THE INDICTMENT - - - 6 October 1945 - -M. François de Menthon, - -Sir Hartley Shawcross, - -General R. A. Rudenko. - -Dear Sirs: - -In the Indictment of German War Criminals signed today, reference is -made to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and certain other territories as -being within the area of the U.S.S.R. This language is proposed by -Russia and is accepted to avoid the delay which would be occasioned by -insistence on an alteration in the text. The Indictment is signed -subject to this reservation and understanding: - -I have no authority either to admit or to challenge on behalf of the -United States of America, Soviet claims to sovereignty over such -territories. Nothing, therefore, in this Indictment is to be construed -as a recognition by the United States of such sovereignty or as -indicating any attitude, either on the part of the United States or on -the part of the undersigned, toward any claim to recognition of such -sovereignty. - - Respectfully submitted, - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON, - Chief of Counsel for the United - States. - -To the Clerk or Recording Officer, - -International Military Tribunal: - -The representative of the United States has found it necessary to make -certain reservations as to the possible bearing of certain language in -the Indictment upon political questions which are considered to be -irrelevant to the proceedings before this Tribunal. However, it is -considered appropriate to disclose such reservations that they may not -be unknown to the Tribunal in the event they should at any time be -considered relevant. For that purpose, the foregoing copy is filed. - - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL - REGARDING NOTICE - TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - -The International Military Tribunal for the trial of the major war -criminals having been duly constituted and an indictment having been -lodged with the Tribunal by the Chief Prosecutors, in order to make fair -provision for notice to defendants: - -IT IS ORDERED that each individual defendant in custody shall receive, -not less than 30 days before trial, a copy, translated into a language -which he understands, of the documents set out in paragraph (a) of Rule -2 of the Rules of the Tribunal, in accordance with the terms of that -paragraph. - - Form of Notice to Individual Defendants - -To the Defendants above named: - -You and each of you is hereby notified that an indictment has been filed -against you in the International Military Tribunal. A copy of this -indictment and of the Charter constituting the International Military -Tribunal are attached hereto. Your trial will take place at the Palace -of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany, not less than 30 days from the service -of the indictment upon you. The exact date will be made known to you -later. Your attention is specifically directed to your right to counsel -under Article 23 and Article 16 of the Charter and Rule 2 (d) of the -Tribunal, a copy of which and a list of counsel are attached hereto for -your information. - -An officer has been designated by the Tribunal to deliver this Notice -and accompanying documents to you and to confer with you with respect to -the employment and designation of counsel. - - For the International Military Tribunal - (no signature) - General Secretary - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL - REGARDING NOTICE TO MEMBERS - OF GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - -WHEREAS an indictment has been lodged with this Tribunal against the -above named defendants: - -AND WHEREAS such indictment shows that the Chief Prosecutors intend to -ask this Tribunal: - -(1) to find that certain of the defendants were members of DIE -REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER -NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF -THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN -DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”), and including DER -SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME -STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); -DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (commonly known as the “SA”); and the -GENERAL STAFF and the HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, and - -(2) to declare that said groups and organizations were criminal -organizations - -IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that notice shall be given to the members of such -groups and organizations in the following form and manner: - - (a) _Form of Notice_ - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, -WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, -WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV -KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON -SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, -ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, and HANS -FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following Groups or -Organizations to Which They Respectively Belong, Namely: DIE -REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER -NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF -THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN -DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DER -SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME -STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); -DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (commonly known as the “SA”); and the -GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, - - Defendants. - -Notice is hereby given to all members of the following groups and -organizations: - -1. Die Reichsregierung, consisting of persons who were: - - a) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933. The term - “ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers; i. - e., heads of departments of the central government; Reich - Ministers without portfolio; State ministers acting as Reich - Ministers; and other officials entitled to take part in meetings - of this cabinet. - b) Members of Der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung. - c) Members of Der Geheime Kabinettsrat. - -2. Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen - Arbeiterpartei, consisting of persons who were at any time, according - to common Nazi terminology, Politische Leiter of any grade or rank. -3. Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen - Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SS) and consisting of the entire - corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies, - branches, formations, organizations and groups of which it was at any - time comprised or which at any time integrated in it, including but - not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf - Verbände, SS Polizei Regimenter and the Sicherheitsdienst des - Reichsführers-SS (commonly known as the SD). -4. Die Geheime Staatspolizei (commonly known as the Gestapo) consisting - of the headquarters, departments, offices, branches, and all the - forces and personnel of the Geheime Staatspolizei of Prussia and - equivalent secret or political police forces of the Reich and the - components thereof. -5. Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen - Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA). -6. The General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces, - consisting of those individuals who between February 1938 and May 1945 - were the highest commanders of the Wehrmacht, the Army, the Navy, and - the Air Forces. The individuals comprising this group are the persons - who held the following appointments: - - Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) - Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung (Chief of - Naval War Staff) - Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander-in-Chief of the Army) - Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff of the - Air Force) - Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force) - Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of the - Armed Forces) - Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the - Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces) - Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of Oberbefehlshaber of - the Wehrmacht; Navy, Army, Air Force. - -THAT such groups and organizations are accused by the Chief Prosecutors -for the prosecution of major war criminals of being criminal -organizations and this Tribunal has been asked by the Chief Prosecutors -to declare said groups and organizations criminal. - -THAT if any of such groups and organizations are found by this Tribunal -to have been criminal in character members will be subject to trial and -punishment on account of their membership in accordance with the -provisions of the Charter of this Tribunal and upon any such trial the -criminal character of the group or organization shall be considered -proved and shall not be questioned. - -THAT the issue of the criminal character of these groups and -organizations will be tried commencing the 20th day of November 1945 at -the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany. - -THAT any person who acknowledges membership in any of the said groups or -organizations may be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be -heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the -group or organization. Such application shall be made without delay, in -writing, and addressed to the General Secretary, International Military -Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany. - -THAT in the case of members of any of the said groups or organizations -who - - (i) may be in the custody of the prosecuting powers, such applications - shall be handed to the Commanding Officer of the place where the - said members are detained; -(ii) may not be in custody, such applications shall be handed to the - nearest military unit. - -THAT the Tribunal has power to allow or reject any such application. If -the application is allowed, the Tribunal will direct in what manner the -applicant shall be represented and heard. - -THAT nothing contained in this notice shall be construed to confer -immunity of any kind upon such applicants. - - For the International Military Tribunal - (no signature) - General Secretary - (b) _Manner of Notice_ - -IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: - -THAT publication in the German language be made throughout the zones of -occupation in Germany over the radio, in newspapers and, if practicable, -by the form of postings ordinarily employed by the military authorities -in conveying information to the civilian population. Such radio and -newspaper publications shall be made once a week for four weeks and over -a sufficient number of radio stations, in a sufficient number of -newspapers or by posting in a sufficient number of places to give the -widest possible dissemination throughout the occupied territory of the -notice set forth in paragraph (a) above. - -THAT publication in the German language be made wherever practicable in -the prisoner of war camps in which Germans are imprisoned, in such -manner as the officers commanding such camps may decide. - -The appropriate occupation authorities are requested to cooperate with -the General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal in making -this publication and the General Secretary shall make written report to -the Tribunal of the action taken. - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL - REGARDING NOTICE TO DEFENDANT BORMANN - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - -The International Military Tribunal having been duly constituted and an -indictment having been lodged with the Tribunal by the Chief Prosecutors - -AND one of the defendants, Martin Bormann, not having been found - -IT IS ORDERED that notice be given said Martin Bormann in the following -form and manner: - - (a) _Form of Notice_ - Take Notice: - -Martin Bormann is charged with having committed Crimes against Peace, -War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity all as particularly set forth in -an indictment which has been lodged with this Tribunal. - -The indictment is available at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, -Germany. - -If Martin Bormann appears, he is entitled to be heard in person or by -counsel. - -If he fails to appear, he may be tried in his absence, commencing -November 20, 1945 at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany, and if -found guilty the sentence pronounced upon him will, without further -hearing, and subject to the orders of the Control Council for Germany, -be executed whenever he is found. - - By order of - The International Military Tribunal - (no signature) - General Secretary - (b) _Manner of Notice_ - -This notice shall be read in full once a week for four weeks over the -radio, the first reading to be during the week of October 22, 1945. It -shall also be published in four separate issues of a newspaper -circulated in the home city of Martin Bormann. - -The Orders and Forms of Notice above set forth have been adopted by the -International Military Tribunal. - - /s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE - President - -October 18, 1945 - -Attest: /s/ HAROLD B. WILLEY - General Secretary - - - - - CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE - WITH ORDERS OF THE TRIBUNAL - REGARDING NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF GROUPS - AND ORGANIZATIONS AND TO DEFENDANT - BORMANN - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - _Declaration_ - -I, Richard William Hurlstone Hortin, a Major in H. M. Army serving with -the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) at Berlin, solemnly -and sincerely declare as follows— - -1. I make this Declaration in my capacity of Berlin Secretary of the -International Military Tribunal. - -2. Pursuant to the order of the International Military Tribunal as to -publication of Notice No. 1 as to Nazi Organisations, I served a copy of -the said notice on each of the four Allied Secretariats; at the same -time I served on the four Allied Secretariats a copy of the said order -and a copy of the order of the International Military Tribunal as to -Martin Bormann. Service was effected by delivery by me personally of the -said notice and orders to duly authorised persons of the said Allied -Secretariats. - -The order as to Martin Bormann states that publication must be made in -four separate issues of a newspaper circulated in the home city of -Martin Bormann. After full enquiries I ascertained that the last known -place of residence of Martin Bormann was Berlin. A former place of -residence was Mecklenburg. It was also believed that the birthplace was -Halberstadt. I gave these details to the Soviet Secretariat. I also -arranged for publication in Berlin newspapers and on the radio. -Newspaper circulation in the Russian Zone normally extends to both -Halberstadt and Mecklenburg. - -3. As a result of careful enquiries I ascertained that a reasonable -number of notices for the whole of the four Zones would be 200,000 and, -in consultation with the Legal Division of the Office of the Military -Government for Germany (United States) and with the French and Soviet -Allied Secretariats, I arranged for the printing of this number of -notices. At the same time I arranged for the printing of a similar -number of notices to Martin Bormann. These two notices were both printed -on the same sheet of paper and a copy is annexed hereto and marked -“Exhibit I”. - -9,000 of these notices were distributed by me to the appropriate -officers in the French, Soviet, British and American Sectors, namely -2,500 each for the American and Soviet Sectors and 2,000 each for the -French and British Sectors. I am informed, and verily believe, that -these notices were posted and exhibited in public places before midnight -of the 27th October, 1945. 1,000 copies were retained by me as a reserve -to be handed to Military authorities in the four Zones for reading and -posting in P.O.W. Camps. - -4. As to the remaining 190,000 of the said notices, 50,000 were handed -personally by me to the Bureau of Information of the Soviet Military -Administration in Germany. I arranged for the delivery of 50,000 to the -Public Relations Branch of Control Commission for Germany (British -Element) at Lübeck, Germany. I have made full and continuous enquiries -and I am informed and verily believe that these notices were immediately -distributed throughout the British Zone and through the channels which -ensure the widest possible distribution. - -I am informed by the Legal Division of the Office of Military Government -for Germany (United States) that as previously arranged with me, they -delivered 40,000 copies to the French Authorities at Baden-Baden. I am -also informed by them and verily believe that the remaining 50,000 -notices were handed by them to the appropriate United States Authorities -for distribution through their Zone. - -5. During the period October 20th to November 17th 1945 there have been -four weekly publications in each of the four Zones of Germany of the -said two notices in newspapers and over radio stations. The American, -Soviet and British newspapers in Berlin have also carried the notices. -Furthermore, in pursuance of the order of the International Military -Tribunal, the said notices were handed to the appropriate Military -Authorities of each of the four Zones for reading in Prisoner-of-War -Camps and for such other form of publication as local Commanders might -think proper within their own discretion. - -6. Exhibits II, III and IV which are attached hereto, and marked by me, -are certificates by the appropriate American, French and Soviet -Authorities that the requirements of the said two orders of the -International Military Tribunal have been fulfilled. - -As to the British Zone, I have ascertained by enquiries from the said -Public Relations Branch of the Control Commission for Germany (British -Element) that the two notices have been widely distributed and -publicised through the channels most appropriate for the purpose as -stated in paragraph 4 of this my declaration. Furthermore I have -similarly ascertained that appropriate action has been taken by British -Military Authorities for reading and posting in Prisoner-of-War Camps -wherever practicable. - -“Exhibit V” attached hereto and marked by me is a certificate as to -publication of the two notices in newspapers and on the radio in Berlin -and in the British Zone of occupation. - -7. I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to -be true, and I declare that the information which I give therein has -been obtained by me through official sources and from those persons -whose duty it is to give such official information. - - /s/ R. W. H. HORTIN - Major - -Declared by the above-named Richard William Hurlstone Hortin This 17th -day of November 1945 In my presence: - - /s/ R. O. WILBERFORCE - Brigadier, - Deputy Chief, - Legal Division, - C. C. G. (B. E.). - - - - - Exhibit II. Dissemination in the American Zone - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - _Certificate_ - -I hereby certify that at the request of the above entitled tribunal, -through Harold B. Willey, General Secretary, I have performed the -following services in connection with publication, broadcast and posting -of notices in the above entitled cause under order of the above entitled -tribunal issued at Nuremberg, Germany, on or about 18 October 1945: - -1. In cooperation with Major R. W. H. Hortin, Legal Division, Advance -Headquarters, Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Berlin, -on or about 23 October 1945, I arranged for the initial printing of -10,000 copies of the attached notice by the Ullstein Press, Berlin -(Exhibit “I”). On 26 October 1945 I personally took delivery of 2,500 of -the said notices and delivered them to Major E. K. Neumann, Chief Public -Safety Officer, U. S. Headquarters, Berlin District, for posting in the -U.S. Zone of Berlin. Major Neumann’s indorsement to basic letter dated -27 October 1945 is attached as Exhibit “II A”. From my personal -knowledge the posters were posted throughout the U.S. Zone, Berlin, as -stated by Major Neumann. The remaining 7,500 posters of the original -10,000 were delivered to Major Hortin for posting in the British, -Soviet, and French sectors of Berlin. To my personal knowledge they were -so posted. - -2. On or about 26 October 1945 I arranged for the publication of 190,000 -additional posters. Ninety thousand of these were personally delivered -to me on 31 October 1945, and by me shipped to the Office of Military -Government, U.S. Zone, Frankfurt, Germany, for posting in the U.S. Zone -and the delivery of 40,000 to Headquarters, French Military Government -at Baden-Baden, Germany, for posting in the French Zone. A copy of the -cable of instruction sent to Headquarters, Office of Military -Government, U.S. Zone, is attached and marked Exhibit “II B”. - -3. To my personal knowledge the Office of Information Control Service, -Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), (Lt. Col. R. K. Fried, -Executive Officer), relayed the attached notice to all German language -newspapers and radio stations operating in the U.S. Zone with -instructions to print and broadcast same as directed in the Tribunal’s -order. A further certificate of compliance with this provision of the -Tribunal’s order will be made by the Office of Information Control upon -expiration of the fourth week on 17 November 1945. - -Dated at Berlin, Germany, this 15th day of November 1945. - - /s/ ALEXANDER G. BROWN, 0-912504, - Lt. Colonel, AUS-AC, - Legal Division, Office of Military - Government for Germany (U.S.) - -/s/ R. W. H. HORTIN - Major - - Exhibit II A. Dissemination in the American Zone - - OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) - Legal Division - APO 742 - - 27 October 1945 - - SUBJECT : Posting of International Military Tribunal Posters. - TO : Public Safety Division, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District - (Major Neumann). - -1. It is requested that necessary action be taken to post 2,500 copies -of the two orders of the International Military Tribunal in the case of -Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al. in the U.S. Sector of Berlin on or before -1800 hours, 27 October 1945. - -2. The Legal Division, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) -requests that a report be made at your earliest convenience advising as -to the posting as requested in par. 1. - -3. This request is in confirmation of arrangements previously made by -Major Neumann and Lt. Col. Alexander G. Brown (76 X6110), this -headquarters. - - /s/ Charles Fahy - Director - 1st Ind. - -U.S.Hq.B.D. & Hq. F.A.A., OMG, P.S., APO 755, U.S. Army, 31 Oct 45. - -TO: Legal Division, OMGGUS, APO 742. - -1. Pursuant to request 2,500 copies of the two orders of the -International Military Tribunal in the case of Hermann Wilhelm Göring et -al. were posted in the U.S. Sector of Berlin before 1800 hrs, 27 October -1945. - -2. Said orders were on said date and before said hour posted upon -bulletin boards and in other conspicuous places, to the approximate -number of 435, in each of the six VBKs, namely Steglitz, Zehlendorf, -Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Schöneberg, Neukölln, which constitute the U.S. -Sector of Berlin. - - /s/ E. K. NEUMANN - Major, A. C. - Chief Public Safety Officer - - Exhibit II B. Dissemination in the American Zone - - HQ. U.S. GROUP C.C. - A.G. CABLES - OUTGOING MESSAGE - _UNCLASSIFIED_ - _PRIORITY_ - -TO : LEGAL BRANCH, OMGGUS ZONE -FROM : OMGGUS FROM FAHY SIGNED CLAY -INFO : INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG - -REF NO : CC-18221 TOO: 291200 B Oct 45 em - -Legal Division, OMGGUS, at request of the International Military -Tribunal, Nuremberg, has arranged for the printing of 100,000 copies of -official notice to defendants. Shipment of approximately this number by -air priority will be made to OMGGUS Zone as soon as they are printed, -probably Thursday. It is desired that one-half of the shipment be -relayed by OMGGUS Zone, to Headquarters, French Military Government, -Baden-Baden. Court has directed that the notices be posted on official -bulletin boards throughout US Zone and read and posted in all prisoner -of war camps. Similar distribution has been ordered in other zones in -Germany. Request Legal Branch, OMGGUS Zone, take necessary action to -insure immediate relay of posters to the French and immediate -distribution to military detachments throughout US Zone with instruction -that they shall be posted within 24 hours of receipt. Distribution by -OMGGUS Zone, to include Bremen Enclave, but not Berlin District. -Distribution in Berlin District made direct by Legal Division, OMGGUS. -Request that regional military government detachments report through -Legal Branch, OMGGUS Zone, to Harold B. Willey, General Secretary, -International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, upon compliance with posting -of notices as directed, and that a copy of such report be forwarded to -Legal Division, OMGGUS. - -ORIGINATOR: Legal AUTH: F. H. GORDON - Major - -INFORMATION: O/SS, Pub. Relations, AG Records. -CC 18221 30 Oct 45 JAK/tb 0444B - _UNCLASSIFIED_ - - Exhibit II C. Dissemination in the American Zone - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - _Certificate_ - -I hereby certify that acting on instruction from Lieut. Colonel Raymond -K. Fried I have performed the following services or have been informed -of the following facts in connection with the publication and broadcast -of notices in the above entitled cause under order of the above titled -tribunal issued at Nuremberg, Germany, on or about 18 October, 1945: - -1. I caused to be transmitted to the DANA news service in Bad Nauheim -copies of the attached notices to Martin Bormann and to members of -certain organizations (Exhibit I) with instructions that these notices -were to be published in German language newspapers in the United States -Zone of Germany and the United States Sector of Berlin, and broadcast -over radio stations in the United States Zone. - -2. Through the Radio Section of Information Control Division, U.S. -Forces, European Theater, I have been informed that the above mentioned -notices were broadcast three times each between October 26 and November -8, 1945 (Exhibit II D). - -3. Through the DANA news service and through personal observation I have -learned that copies of the above mentioned notices were printed in -German language newspapers in the United States Zone and the United -States sector of Berlin between 18 October and 17 November 1945. - -Dated at Berlin, Germany, this 23rd day of November 1945. - - /s/ HOWARD DENBY - Press Control News Unit (Berlin) - Information Control Division - United States Forces, European - Theater - - Exhibit II D. Dissemination in the American Zone - -SUBJECT : War Crimes Indictments. -TO : Colonel Murphy. - -1. The general indictment of the 24 defendants and the Nazi -organizations was broadcast at 2015 on October 26, November 3 and -November 8. - -2. The notification to Bormann to the effect that he would be tried _in -absentia_ if he did not appear personally for trial was broadcast at -2000 hours October 26, November 2 and November 8. - -3. All of these broadcasts originated at Luxembourg and were relayed by -Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart. - - /s/ GERALD F. MAULSBY - Chief, Radio Section - - - - - Exhibit III A. Dissemination in the French Zone - COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF FRANÇAIS EN ALLEMAGNE - - GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE Baden-Baden, 23 November 1945 - DE LA Counsellor Furby - ZONE FRANÇAISE Director General of Justice - D’OCCUPATION Representative in Germany for - DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE the Search of War Criminals - de la - JUSTICE to - Le Directeur Général - The Delegate of the - Provisional Government of the - French Republic of the - Prosecution of the - International Military Tribunal - of the Major War Criminals - -I certify that at the date of the 21st November 1945 the notice -concerning the trial by the International Military Tribunal of the issue -of the criminal character of certain organizations had been published in -the German language in the French Zone of Occupation over the radio and -newspapers at least once a week for two weeks, and that this publication -will be continued for another two weeks over the one radio station of -the French Zone (Koblenz) and in twelve German papers to give the widest -possible dissemination throughout the French Zone. - -I further certify that this notice was also published by the form of -postings ordinarily employed by the military authorities in conveying -information to the civilian population. - -I further certify that this notice has been delivered to the appropriate -French authorities in charge of prisoners of war for publication in the -German language wherever practicable in prisoner of war camps in which -Germans are imprisoned, in such manner as the officers commanding such -camps may decide. - - The Director General of Justice - Representative in Germany for the - Search of War Criminals, - -(Seal) /s/ FURBY - - Exhibit III B. Dissemination in the French Zone - COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF FRANÇAIS EN ALLEMAGNE - - GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE Baden-Baden, 23 November 1945 - DE LA - ZONE FRANÇAISE Counsellor Furby - D’OCCUPATION Director General of Justice - DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE Representative in Germany for - de la the Search of War Criminals - JUSTICE - Le Directeur Général to - - The Delegate of the - Provisional Government of the - French Republic of the - Prosecution of the - International Military Tribunal - of the Major War Criminals - - _Certificate to General Secretary_ - -I certify that at the date of the 21st November 1945 the notice to -Martin Bormann that he is charged with having committed Crimes against -Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as set forth in an -indictment which has been lodged with this Tribunal, had been published -in the German language in the French Zone of Occupation over the radio -and newspapers at least once a week for two weeks, the first publication -having been made during the week beginning October the 12th, and that -this publication will be continued for another two weeks over the one -radio station of the French Zone (Koblenz) and in twelve German papers -to give the widest possible dissemination throughout the French Zone. - - The Director General of Justice - Representative in Germany for the - Search of War Criminals, -(Seal) /s/ FURBY - - - - - Exhibit IV A. Dissemination in the Russian Zone -General Secretary, -The International Military Tribunal, -Nuremberg. - _Certificate_ - -I hereby certify that announcement of the trial, by the International -Military Tribunal of the criminal case of certain organizations was duly -published in German in the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany in all -the newspapers under our control namely: “Tägliche Rundschau”, “Berliner -Zeitung”, “Deutsche Volkszeitung”, “Neue Zeit”, “Der Morgen”, “Das -Volk”, (all published in Berlin), “Volksstimme”, “Volkszeitung”, -“Thüringer Volkszeitung”, “Volksblatt” and “Sächsische Volksstimme” (all -published in the provinces). - -The publication was repeated weekly beginning 22nd October 1945. In -addition it was broadcast weekly over the Berlin radio. - -Furthermore I certify that this announcement was posted in bill form. - -Chief of Information Bureau, -Soviet Military Administration in Germany - /s/ I. TUGARINOV -14 November 1945 -17/11/45 A. KUDROV /s/ - Exhibit IV B. Dissemination in the Russian Zone -General Secretary, -The International Military Tribunal, -Nuremberg. - _Certificate_ - -I hereby certify that the complete text of the statement of Martin -Bormann to the effect that he is guilty in full measure of crimes -against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as set forth in -the Indictment presented to this Tribunal, has been read in German over -the radio in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany once a week -starting with Oct. 22, that is, Oct. 24, Nov. 3, Nov. 10, and Nov. 17, -1945. - -Concurrently on these same dates it was published in Berlin in the -following papers: “Tägliche Rundschau”, “Berliner Zeitung”, “Deutsche -Volkszeitung”, “Neue Zeit”, “Der Morgen”, “Das Volk”. - -Moreover, each week it was published in the following provincial -newspapers: “Volksblatt”, “Sächsische Volkszeitung”, “Volkszeitung”, -“Thüringer Volkszeitung”. - -Chief of Information Bureau, -Soviet Military Administration in Germany - /s/ I. TUGARINOV -17 November 1945 - - - - - Exhibit V A. Dissemination in the British Zone - PR/ISC Group, - Advance Headquarters, - Control Commission for Germany - (British Element), - BERLIN, B.A.O.R. -The General Secretary, -International Military Tribunal. - -I certify that the notice concerning the trial by the International -Military Tribunal of the issue of the criminal character of certain -organizations has been published in the German language in the British -Zone of occupation in the following newspapers, at least once a week for -four weeks: - - Circulation for week - ending 27 Oct 45. - Neue Westfälische Zeitung 1,000,000 - Neue Rheinische Zeitung 520,000 - Kölnischer Kurier 370,000 - Ruhr Zeitung 500,000 - Aachener Nachrichten 110,000 - Neue Hamburger Presse 402,500 - Lübecker Post 156,000 - Kieler Kurier 210,000 - Hamburger Nachrichtenblatt 108,100 - Lübecker Nachrichtenblatt 47,600 - Kieler Nachrichtenblatt 17,500 - Flensburger Nachrichtenblatt 12,500 - Neuer Hannoverscher Kurier 433,000 - Nordwest Nachrichten 301,000 - Hannoversches Nachrichtenblatt 22,500 - Neues Oldenburger Tageblatt 40,100 - Lüneburger Post 178,900 - Braunschweiger Neue Presse 150,500 - Der Berliner 300,000 - -It has also been broadcast over the transmitters at Hamburg and Cologne -(Langenberg). - -I certify that it has thereby received the widest possible dissemination -throughout the British Zone. - - /s/ W. H. A. BISHOP - Major-General, - Chief, PR/ISC Group, - Control Commission for Germany (BE). - -BERLIN, 15 Nov 45. - Exhibit V B. Dissemination in the British Zone - PR/ISC Group, - Advance Headquarters, - Control Commission for Germany - (British Element), - BERLIN, B.A.O.R. -The General Secretary, -International Military Tribunal, - -I certify that the notice to Martin Bormann that he is charged with -having committed Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity as set forth in an indictment which has been lodged with this -Tribunal has been read in full in the German language once a week for -four weeks over the radio in the British Zone, the first reading having -been during the week of October 22, 1945, and that it has also been -published in four separate issues of “Der Berliner”, the newspaper -published in the British sector of Berlin. - - /s/ W. H. A. BISHOP - Major General, - Chief, PR/ISC Group. - Control Commission for Germany (B. E.) - -BERLIN, 15 Nov 45 - /s/ R. W. H. HORTIN - - - - - CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE ON INDIVIDUAL - DEFENDANTS - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - 24 October 1945 - _Certificate to General Secretary_ - -I certify that I have served the following documents: (1) Indictment, -(2) Notice, (3) Charter of International Military Tribunal, (4) Rule 2 -(d) of the Rules of the International Military Tribunal, and (5) list of -German lawyers, on the following named defendants at the time and place -stated, by personally delivering to each of them a copy in the German -language of each of the above-named documents: - - HESS, Rudolf 19 October 45 Nuremberg - GÖRING, Hermann 19 October 45 Nuremberg - JODL, Alfred 19 October 45 Nuremberg - VON RIBBENTROP, Joachim 19 October 45 Nuremberg - KEITEL, Wilhelm 19 October 45 Nuremberg - LEY, Robert 19 October 45 Nuremberg - VON NEURATH, Constantin 19 October 45 Nuremberg - SAUCKEL, Fritz 19 October 45 Nuremberg - VON PAPEN, Franz 19 October 45 Nuremberg - DÖNITZ, Karl 19 October 45 Nuremberg - SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur 19 October 45 Nuremberg - FRANK, Hans 19 October 45 Nuremberg - ROSENBERG, Alfred 19 October 45 Nuremberg - FUNK, Walter 19 October 45 Nuremberg - FRICK, Wilhelm 19 October 45 Nuremberg - SPEER, Albert 19 October 45 Nuremberg - VON SCHIRACH, Baldur 19 October 45 Nuremberg - SCHACHT, Hjalmar 19 October 45 Nuremberg - STREICHER, Julius 19 October 45 Nuremberg - KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst 19 October 45 Nuremberg - -I further certify that I have apprised each of the above-named -defendants of his right to the employment and designation of counsel. - - /s/ A. M. S. NEAVE, - Major. - - - - - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ON DEFENDANT - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - 23 October 1945 - _Certificate to General Secretary_ - -I certify that I have served the following documents: (1) Indictment, -(2) Notice, (3) Charter of International Military Tribunal, (4) Rule -2(d) of the Rules of the International Military Tribunal, and (5) List -of German Lawyers, on the following named defendant at the time and -place stated, by personally delivering to him a copy in the German -language of each of the above-named documents: - -HERR GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN, 19 October 1945, Blühbach near Werfen, -Austria. - -I further certify that I have apprised the above-named defendant of his -right to the employment and designation of counsel to the extent that -this was possible in view of his mental condition. - -At the direction of the Tribunal I have made an investigation into the -state of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen’s health and have obtained medical -reports on this subject which are attached hereto. (Attachments I, II, -and III). - -As a result of the conclusions in these reports and my own observation, -I suggest that the General Secretary recommend to the Tribunal that a -committee of medical officers, representing each nation, be appointed by -the Tribunal to proceed to Blühbach for the purpose of giving Krupp von -Bohlen a thorough examination and reporting their findings to the -Tribunal. - - /s/ JAMES H. ROWE, JR. - - - - - Medical Certificates Attached to - Certificate of Service on Defendant - Gustav Krupp von Bohlen - (Attachment I) - 3d Battalion, Medical Section - 232d Infantry Regiment - Schloss Blühbach - Bezirk Bischofshofen, Austria - 6 October 1945 - -MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Norman A. Stoll, JAGD, Office U.S. - Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis - Criminality - -SUBJECT: Condition of Health of Mr. Gustav Krupp von - Bohlen - -1. Mr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was examined by me today, and the -following findings are noticed. - -2. Subject has suffered from progressive arteriosclerosis and senility -since 1939. He suffered an attack of cerebral thrombosis in 1942, which -resulted in a temporary facial paralysis. About a year ago he lost -bladder and sphincter control. - -3. At the present time he is bedridden, has to be fed and to be cared -for by nurses. He has no insight into his condition or situation -whatsoever and is unable to follow or keep up any conversation. - -4. I do not believe that subject can be moved without serious detriment -to his health or that interrogation would be of any value due to his -loss of speech and complete lack of any understanding. His course will -be progressively down-hill. - -5. In my judgment subject is not mentally competent to stand trial in a -court of justice. - - /s/ WALTER PICK - Capt., MC, 232d Infantry - - - - - (Attachment II) - Blühbach, 13 September 1945 -Otto Gerke, M.D. -Professor -Bad Gastein - _Medical Certificate_ - -Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, born 7 August 1870, has been -treated by me for many years; he was examined by me today. Since 1930 -there has existed an arthrosis of the spine, as well as a hypotony which -as far back as 1932 caused fainting fits. Since 1937 a rapidly -increasing sclerosis of the vessels was to be noted which occurred in -particular in the vessels of the brain. - -In 1939 a fleeting paralysis of the eye muscles made its appearance and -passing disturbances of speech occured. In the spring of 1942, the -patient suffered an apoplectic stroke on the left side, with -facialisparosis and a distinct increase of reflexes on the entire right -side. The cerebral disturbances of circulation have gradually grown -worse despite treatments with medicaments. They manifested themselves -first in the form of impaired memory and will power, indecision and -general deterioration of intellectual faculties and increased to the -point of definite depressions accompanied by apoplectic numbness and -involuntary crying. There developed an acute arteriosclerotic dementia. - -In an automobile accident in December, 1944, the patient suffered a -fracture of the nose bone and the skull basis and had to be treated for -eight days in the Schwarzach Hospital at St. Veith. Since that time, his -physical condition has also deteriorated, and several apoplectic fits -have occurred as a consequence of multiple softenings of the brain with -heart symptoms and striary syndroms. - -The patient is by now completely apathetic and disorientated. There -exists a motoric aphasy. Owing to rigor of the muscles, he can neither -walk nor stand up. For approximately the last six months he has not been -able to hold urine and stool. He is completely helpless even in the -simplest matters. There can be traced an advanced emphysen in the lungs -and a distinct myocardic impairment on the basis of a coronary sclerosis -of the heart. An enlargement of the prostate gland has existed for -years. - -The prognosis of the condition is definitely unfavorable, an improvement -is not to be expected. Herr Von Bohlen is in no way competent or capable -of being interrogated. - - /s/ DR. GERKE - - - - - (Attachment III) - - HEADQUARTERS - 42d DIVISION ARTILLERY - APO 411 US ARMY - - 20 October 1945 - -SUBJECT : Physical Examination of GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH - -TO : General Secretary, International Military Tribunal, APO 403 - -1. The following history and physical examination of Herr Gustav Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach is submitted in compliance with a request from -Mr. James Rowe. The history was obtained from Frau Von Bohlen and from -the valet. The information was obtained on the 19th and 20th of October -1945 when the patient was examined at his home at Blühbach, Austria. - -2. HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: Herr Von Bohlen has been developing -arteriosclerosis since 1932 according to his physician’s reports. It is -believed that he first had a very light apoplectic stroke in 1937. This -was very transitory in nature and cleared without noticeable -aftereffects except for some loss of the acuteness of his thought -processes and memory which his family noticed. In the latter part of -November 1944 he had a spell of unconsciousness, fell and fractured a -finger and was unable to walk alone for about 24 hours. On 15 December -1944, he was in an automobile accident and received a severe blow and -laceration of the forehead. He was hospitalized as a result of this -accident until the first week of February 1945, at which time he -returned home. Following this he was able to walk only with assistance -and he was unable to make coherent statements. He continued to have -light strokes and since March has been unable to walk even with help, -and his ability to speak has gradually decreased until at the present -time he is able only to speak an occasional single word. Also since -leaving the hospital he has had no control of the bowels or bladder and -during the past three months has given no evidence of recognizing -various members of his family or close acquaintances. - -3. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: - -GENERAL: The patient is an emaciated white male of 76 years of age who -is unable to speak or to cooperate in his own examination, and appears -to have no realization of what is going on about him. - -SKIN: Scar 2 inches long extending across the forehead and downward -between the eyes and across the bridge of the nose. - -The skin of the groin is macerated bilaterally as a result of being -constantly moistened with urine. - -EYES, EARS, NOSE AND THROAT: No marked abnormalities. - -LUNGS: Hyper-resonant throughout with moderate enlargement of the chest -cage suggesting the presence of mild emphysema. - -CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: Apex of heart palpable at a point 1 cm medial to -the left mid-clavicular line. No evidence of right heart enlargement -could be detected. Pulse 80. Blood pressure 130/75. Pulse full and -regular except for an occasional skipped beat. The distal palpable -arteries in the wrist and ankles were markedly sclerotic. - -MUSCULO-SKELETAL SYSTEM: Both legs and arms were slowly moved by the -patient although all movements of the extremities were associated with -moderate spasticity. The patient was unable to stand alone or walk when -he was held upright. - -NEUROLOGICAL SYSTEM: Pupillary reaction to light normal. Deep tendon -reflexes in arms and legs were normal. Normal reaction to plantar -stimulation. - -GENITO-URINARY SYSTEM: Incontinence of urine was noted at the time of -examination. Genitalia appeared normal. A prostatic examination was not -made. - -GASTRO-INTESTINAL SYSTEM: Abdominal examination was normal. Incontinence -of the bowels was noted at the time of the examination. - -4. IMPRESSION AND PROGNOSIS: - -It is the impression of the undersigned that this man is suffering from -far advanced generalized arteriosclerosis which is progressive and that -he has already suffered from repeated small apoplectic strokes. It is -believed that this condition has already developed to the point where -this man has lost all capacity for memory, reasoning or understanding of -statements made to him and that transporting or doing anything which -might excite him might endanger his life. - - /s/ PAUL F. CHESNUT - Capt., MC - Surgeon. - - - - - ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE - - -The following declarations were received in writing from Hans Fritzsche -and from Erich Raeder on 18 October 1945: - -I, Hans Fritzsche, have received today, on 18 October 1945, at 1950 -Berlin time, the Indictment of the Chief of Counsel of the International -Military Tribunal, a statement regarding my right to defense, a list of -German lawyers, the Rules of the International Military Tribunal in the -German language. Above documents have been handed to me by the Red Army -Officer Grishajeff, acting on orders of the International Military -Tribunal and who advised me in the German language on the contents of -the documents and on my right to defense. - -Berlin, 18 October 1945. - - /s/ HANS FRITZSCHE - -I, Erich Raeder, have received today, on 18 October 1945, at 1850 Berlin -time, the Indictment of the Chief of Counsel of the International -Military Tribunal, a statement regarding my right to defense, a list of -German lawyers, the Rules of the International Military Tribunal in the -German language. Above documents have been handed to me by the Red Army -Officer Grishajeff, acting on orders of the International Military -Tribunal and who advised me in the German language on the contents of -the documents and on my right to defense. - -Berlin, 18 October 1945. - - /s/ ERICH RAEDER - - - - - MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN - FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL AS TO HIM - - - Nuremberg, 4 November 1945 - -Theodor Klefisch -Lawyer -Cologne, 43, Blumenthalstrasse -To : The International Military Tribunal, - Nuremberg. - -As defending counsel to the accused Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und -Halbach I request that the proceedings against this accused be deferred -until he is again fit for trial. - -At any rate I request that the accused be not tried in his absence. - - _Reasons_ - -By Article 12 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal this -Court has the right to try an accused in his absence if he cannot be -found, or if the Court deem this necessary for other reasons in the -interest of justice. - -The 75-year-old accused Krupp von Bohlen has for a long time been -incapable of trial or examination owing to his severe physical and -mental infirmities. He is not in a position to be in contact with the -outside world nor to make or receive statements. The Indictment was -served on him on 19 October 1945 by a representative of the -International Military Tribunal by placing the document on his bed. The -accused had no knowledge of this event. Consequently he is not aware of -the existence of an Indictment. Naturally therefore he is not capable of -communicating either with his defense counsel nor with other persons on -the subject of his defense. - -To prove the above two medical certificates are enclosed—that of the -court medical expert Doctor Karl Gersdorf of Werfen, Salzburg of 9 -September 1945, and that of the Professor Doctor Otto Gerke of -Badgastein of 13 September. - -Lately Herr Krupp von Bohlen has been examined several times by American -military doctors. As far as it is possible I should like to request -another complete medical examination. If the accused is unable to appear -before the Court, then according to Article 12 of the Charter he could -be tried only if the Court deemed it necessary in the interests of -justice. - -Whatever may be understood by the phrase “in the interests of justice” -it would hardly be objective justice to try a defendant accused of such -serious crimes, if he were not informed of the contents of the -accusations or if he were not given the chance to conduct his own -defense or instruct a defense counsel. Particularly is he in no -condition to comprehend the following rights of an accused set out in -the Charter: - -1. By Article 16, Section (a) of the Charter a copy of the Indictment in -a language which he understands will be served on the accused at a -suitably appointed time. The assurance given hereby for a sufficient -preparation of the proceedings can not be guaranteed to Defendant Krupp -von Bohlen on account of his state of disease. According to Section (c) -of the same Article 16 a preliminary interrogation of the defendant -shall take place in a language intelligible to him. That is likewise -impossible here. According to Section (d) of Article 16 the defendant -moreover can not exercise his right of decision as to whether he will -conduct his own defense or whether he would like to be defended by -counsel. Also the right of the defendant as provided in Section (c) of -producing evidence and of cross examining witnesses himself or by his -counsel in his behalf can not be exercised by the defendant in view of -his condition. - -2. In the same manner as the Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und -Halbach is not able to exercise the confirmed rights stated above in the -preliminary proceedings he will also not be able to exercise in the -Trial those rights guaranteed to him by Article 24 of the Charter. In -the first place this concerns the statement which the accused has to -render on inquiry as to whether he admits his guilt or not, a statement -which is of particular importance for the course of the Trial and for -the decision of the Tribunal. This is all the more important as this -statement regarding guilt or innocence can be made exclusively by the -accused himself according to his own judgment and after examining his -conscience. So far as the procedure is admissible at all, the defense -counsel could not at the request of the Court express himself on the -question of guilt, as such a declaration presupposes the possibility of -communication and understanding with the accused. - -Also the defendant could not exercise the right to the last word to -which he is entitled according to Article 24, Section (j). - -The legislators who set up these guarantees for the defense cannot wish -to deny them undeservedly to an accused who can not make use of them -owing to illness. If by Article 12 of the Charter the Trial of an absent -defendant is allowed, then this exception to the rule can be applied -only to a defendant who is unwilling to appear though able to do so. As -is the case with the criminal procedure rules of nearly all countries, -it is on this principle that the rules and regulations concerning the -trial of absent defendants are based. - - /s/ KLEFISCH - Lawyer - - - - - Medical Certificates Attached to Motion - on Behalf of Defendant - Gustav Krupp von Bohlen - (Attachment I) - _Doctor’s Certificate_ - -Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, born 7 August 1870, presently -residing at Posthaus Blühbach, Werfen, Salzburg, suffers from -progressive arteriosclerotic softening of the brain (Paralysis celebri) -and as a consequence of this illness he requires constant care and -treatment. He is incapable of standing trial or of being subjected to -interrogation. An improvement of his condition is not to be expected. -Owing to his bad general physical condition (Myodegeneratio cordis and -Ataxis) he is not capable of traveling either. - - /s/ KARL GERSDORF, M. D. - District Doctor - Werfen, Salzburg - Certified Court Expert - -Werfen, 8 September 1945 - (Attachment II) - -Attachment II is a medical certificate by Dr. Otto Gerke, printed on -page 120 ante. - - - - - REPORT OF MEDICAL COMMISSION - APPOINTED TO EXAMINE DEFENDANT - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN[15] - - - 7 November 1945 - -We, the undersigned, during the morning of 6 November 1945, examined the -patient, identified as Gustav Krupp von Bohlen by the military -authorities in charge, in the presence of his wife and nurse. - -We unanimously agree that the patient was suffering from: Senile -softening of the brain, selectively affecting the frontal lobes of the -cerebral cortex and the corpus striatum, due to vascular degeneration. - -It is our unanimous, considered, professional opinion that the mental -condition of the patient, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, is such that he is -incapable of understanding court procedure, and of understanding or -cooperating in interrogation. - -The physical state of the patient is such that he cannot be moved -without endangering his life. - -We are of the considered opinion that his condition is unlikely to -improve, but rather to deteriorate even further. - -Therefore, we unanimously believe that he will never be fit, mentally or -physically, to appear before the International Military Tribunal. - - /s/ R. E. TUNBRIDGE - Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., M.Sc., F.R.C.P. - Consulting Physician, British Army of the Rhine - /s/ RENE PIEDELIEVRE - M.D., Professor of the Paris Faculty of Medicine; - Expert of the Tribunal - /s/ NICOLAS KURSHAKOV - Professor of Medicine, Medical Institute of Moscow - Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, U.S.S.R. - /s/ EUGENE SEPP - Emeritus Professor of Neurology, Medical Institute of Moscow - Member, Academy of Medical Sciences, U.S.S.R. - /s/ EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN - M. D., Professor of Psychiatry, Medical Institute of Moscow - /s/ BERTRAM SCHAFFNER - Major, Medical Corps - Neuropsychiatrist, Army of the United States - ------ - -[15] At a meeting of the International Military Tribunal on 30 October -1945, “it was agreed that a committee of four medical officers, one -appointed by each Member of the Tribunal, be sent, if the Committee of -Prosecutors made no objection, to examine Krupp and that they be -empowered to employ specialists if necessary.” The report of this -Medical Commission was presented 7 November 1945. - - - - - Report of the Medical Examination of - Herr Gustav Krupp von Bohlen - -1. History: The following information was obtained by questioning Frau -Krupp von Bohlen, wife of the patient, Herr Krupp’s valet, and Frl. -Krone, private secretary of the patient. - - The patient had been physically a very active man. He hunted, - rode and played tennis. With the aid of guides, he was hunting - deer as recently as 1943. He was abstemious in his personal - habits, did not smoke or partake of alcohol. He retired to bed - early, rarely remaining up after 2200 hours. He had eight - children, six sons and two daughters. There is no family history - of mental disorder or of drug addiction. - - Previous Illness: There is no history of any major illness. - Since 1930, he has taken spa treatment each year for arthritis - of the spine and for hypotension. No radiographs were available - to indicate the true pathology of the spinal condition. The - valet stated that the patient, on the recommendation of his - physicians, had been very careful with his diet during the past - ten years. - - Present Illness: For several years, the patient had been subject - to giddy attacks. In consequence, his wife was always anxious - when he went hunting, lest he should have an attack whilst on - the edge of a cliff, and fall and kill himself. Two reliable - guides always accompanied him on his hunting excursions, and in - 1942 Frau Krupp also joined in expeditions in order to watch - him. - - Four years ago, the patient had a disturbance of vision - primarily due to dysfunction of the eye muscles. For a period he - had double vision. From this illness, he made an apparent - complete recovery. - - Two years ago he had a stroke, with weakness of the left side of - the face, and impaired function of the right side of the body. - Following the latter incident, impairment of gait, general - weakness, and impairment of mental functions became increasingly - apparent. From the middle of 1944 onwards, the patient became - more and more dependent upon his wife; she was the only person - who seemed to understand fully his speech and his needs. - - On November 25th, 1944, he was proceeding from the garden - towards the house, and suddenly seemed to run (propulsion gait). - Just before reaching the house, he fell and injured his arm. As - a result of this accident, he attended the local hospital for - treatment, traveling by motor-car. On December 4th, whilst - traveling to the hospital at Schwarzach-St. Veith, and asleep in - the back of the car, the driver was compelled to swerve to avoid - another vehicle, and to brake suddenly. Herr Krupp von Bohlen - was thrown forward, and hit his forehead and the bridge of the - nose against a metal rail behind the driver’s seat. He did not - lose consciousness, but his condition was such that he was - detained in the hospital for approximately eight weeks. During - his stay in the hospital, he recognized his wife, his relatives - and the members of his staff, and spoke to them, albeit - haltingly. - - Since the accident mentioned above, the general condition of the - patient has deteriorated rapidly. The members of his staff had - increasing difficulty in understanding him. At first, with the - aid of two people, he was able to walk a few steps; until two - months ago he sat for short periods in a chair. The assistance - of men-servants was necessary for this task. He has been - incontinent of feces and urine since returning from the hospital - in February 1945. Since this date he has only spoken an - occasional single word, the words being simple ones and without - any rational association, apart from sporadic expletives, such - as “Ach, Gott” and “Donner Wetter”, when disturbed. At times he - has been exceedingly irritable and on occasions has had - inexplicable bouts of weeping. During the past two months, he - has become increasingly apathetic, and no longer recognized - relatives or friends. Frau Von Bohlen thinks he may still - recognize her as a familiar face, but he exhibits no emotional - reaction to her presence. She thinks he realizes occasionally - that strangers are in the room; e. g., members of the Allied - services, and responds by being very tense. - - Frl. Krone, secretary to the patient, stated that on returning - to Blühbach in September 1944, after an absence since May 1944, - she could no longer take down letters as dictated by Krupp von - Bohlen. Normally he was a very punctilious man, and his diction - and writing were correct and very precise. She stated that after - September 1944 there were frequent interruptions in his flow of - ideas, his syntax was faulty, and he occasionally did not appear - to appreciate the meaning of certain words. She would get an - idea of what he wanted to say, and then wrote the letter herself - in accordance with what she understood to be his wishes. His - handwriting also became increasingly illegible, and he had - difficulty in signing his name when giving power of attorney to - his relatives in January 1945. - - The valet had been personal valet to Krupp for 20 years, and - traveled all over the world with him. He described his master as - a very active man, physically and mentally, extremely - punctilious in all personal details. He took a great interest in - his clothes, and was very observant of any slight defect. In his - personal habits he was abstemious, never taking alcohol, and was - also a non-smoker. Although a very excellent sportsman and - physically capable of considerable feats of endurance when - hunting, playing tennis or climbing, he never overdid things and - took care of himself without in any way being overanxious about - his health. The valet first began to notice serious changes in - the patient’s personal habits two years ago, although in the - valet’s opinion, he had been failing slightly for about four to - five years. The degree of change, however, prior to two years - ago, was so slight and his master was in his opinion such a - “superman”, that the changes would not have been apparent to the - casual observer. Two years ago he began to lose interest in the - details of his personal clothing and to become careless with his - table manners. For instance, when soup was served to him one - day, he took his soup-spoon and used it to take water from his - wine-glass. Latterly, he would sit at table and ask who was - present, although the only people in the room were intimate - members of his family. He would complain that the telephone bell - was ringing, and of people speaking to him; these hallucinations - became more frequent during the latter part of 1944. The valet - was employed as caretaker of the main house by the American - Military Government after the cessation of hostilities in - Europe, and did not see his employer regularly after June 1945. - On August 7, 1945, the occasion of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen’s - birthday, he called to pay his respects, and for the first time - he was not recognized, and his master showed no appreciation of - his presence or his conversation. - -2. General Appearance: The patient was lying rigidly in bed in a -Parkinsonian position with fine tremors of the jaw and hands. The skin -was atrophic and dry, and there was pigmentation of the dorsum of the -hands. The temporal arteries were prominent and tortuous. The face was -masklike, with dilated venules over the cheeks. There was evidence of -considerable wasting of the body tissues, especially in the extremities, -which also showed evidence of trophic and acrocyanotic changes. - -3. Neuropsychiatric Examination: The patient lay in bed with a masklike -face and in a fixed position on his back. The legs were partially -flexed, and similarly the elbows, the latter being pressed firmly -against the trunk. There was generalized muscular rigidity, due to -hypertenus of an extra-pyramidal tract lesion. - - On the physicians’ entering the room, the patient fixed his gaze - on them, and replied to their greeting with “Guten Tag,” and - gave his hand when they offered theirs to him. He shook hands - normally, but he could not relax his hold or remove his hand, - and continued to squeeze the physician’s hand; this was due to - the presence of a forced grasp-reflex, which was more marked in - the left than in the right hand. When asked how he felt, he - replied “Gut,” but to all further questions he gave no reply at - all. He was silent and showed no reaction to, or comprehension - of, other questions, and simple commands, such as “Open your - mouth,” “Put out your tongue,” “Look this way.” Only painful and - disagreeable stimuli produced any reaction, and then it was - merely a facial expression of discontent, sometimes accompanied - by grunts of disapproval. - - The disturbance of verbal response was not due to dysarthria, - because the patient was able to pronounce such words as he did - use, quite distinctly. Neither was it due to motor aphasia, - because the few words he used were used correctly, and he never - exhibited the jargon responses of the true aphasic when - attempting to answer questions. - - The patient was indifferent, apathetic, and was not in good - rapport with the external world, lacked initiative, exhibited - paucity of emotion. He uttered no spontaneous speech, and his - reaction to painful stimuli was primitive. - - Neurological examination showed the following additional - abnormal findings: There was a right facial weakness of a - supranuclear origin. The pupils reacted promptly to light, and - appeared normal, save that the left was slightly larger than the - right. Ophthalmoscopic examination of the fundi, limited by lack - of cooperation from the patient, showed clear media and normal - retina and retinal vessels. The right disc, the only one - visualized, appeared normal. Extra-ocular movements could not be - tested; there was no obvious strabismus. All deep reflexes in - the arms and legs were present and very brisk. Clonus was not - elicited. The plantar reflexes were flexor. Abdominal reflexes - were absent, except for the right upper. There was incontinence - of urine and feces, of the type associated with senile dementia. - There was an associated minimal degree of intertrigo. Owing to - lack of cooperation of the patient a full sensory examination - could not be made, but the patient responded to pin-prick, deep - pressure and muscular movement throughout the body. - -4. Cardio-vascular Examination: - - Pulse: Rate 100, rhythm irregular. The irregularity was due to - extra-systoles. The radial arteries were just palpable, without - evidence of pathological thickening or tortuosity. Blood - pressure: systolic 130 mm. of mercury, diastolic 80 mm. of - mercury. - - Heart: The heart was clinically not enlarged. The cardiac sounds - were feeble, there was no accentuation of the second sound in - the aortic area, nor were any cardiac murmurs audible. There - were no vascular changes observable in the vessels of the fundi. - There was no evidence of cedema or of congestive heart failure. - -5. Respiratory Examination: Chest movement satisfactory. There was no -impairment of percussion noted. Auscultation revealed no impairment of -air entry, no alteration in the breath sounds, and the absence of any -adventitious sounds. - -6. Alimentary-renal Examination: There was slight distention of the -abdomen, due to increase in the gaseous content of the intestines. There -was no evidence of ascites. The spleen was not palpable, nor was there -any evidence of glandular enlargement. The liver was just palpable, one -finger’s breadth below the right costal margin, but there was no -evidence of enlargement upwards. Urinalysis: no sugar or albumen -present. - -7. Skeletal Examination: The patient’s rigidity limited the examination -of joints. There was limitation of movement of the neck due to muscular -hypertonus. The hypertonus was so marked in the lower dorsal and lumbar -region as to produce rigidity of the spine. Attempts to move the joints -passively stimulated involuntary contractures of the muscles. There was -evidence of crepitus in both knee-joints. - -DISCUSSION: - - The clinical record presented by this patient is that of an - organic cerebral disorder, with predominant involvement of the - frontal lobes and basal ganglia. The mental disintegration of - the patient renders him incapable of comprehending his - environment, and of reacting normally to it. He remains - uniformly apathetic and disinterested, intellectually retarded - to a very marked degree, and shows no evidence of spontaneous - activity. - - The above findings are such as are found in the degenerative - changes associated with senility. The findings in the visceral - organs are likewise compatible with the diagnosis of senile - degeneration. - - The clinical course, from the evidence obtained, has been that - of a gradual decline over a period of years, with more rapid - deterioration during the past year. Such deterioration will - continue, and would be rapidly accelerated, with immediate - danger to the patient’s life, were he to be moved from his - present location. - -DIAGNOSIS: - - Senile degeneration of the brain tissues, selectively affecting - the frontal lobes of the cerebral cortex and the basal ganglia, - with associated senile degeneration of the visceral organs. - - /s/ R. E. TUNBRIDGE - Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., M.Sc., F.R.C.P., - Consulting Physician, British Army of the - Rhine - - /s/ RENE PIEDELIEVRE - M.D., Professor of the Paris Faculty of - Medicine, Expert of the Tribunal - - /s/ NICOLAS KURSHAKOV - M.D., Professor of Medicine, Medical - Institute of Moscow, Chief Internist, - Commissariat of Public Health U.S.S.R. - - /s/ EUGENE SEPP - M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology, - Medical Inst, of Moscow; Member, Academy of - Medical Sciences, U.S.S.R. - - /s/ EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN - M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Medical - Institute of Moscow. - - /s/ BERTRAM SCHAFFNER - Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist, Army - of the United States - - - - - ANSWER OF THE UNITED STATES PROSECUTION - TO THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. -ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO THE MOTION FILED IN BEHALF OF KRUPP VON - BOHLEN - -The United States respectfully opposes the application on behalf of -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach that his trial be “deferred until he -is again fit for trial.” - -If the Tribunal should grant this application, the practical effect -would be to quash all proceedings, for all time, against Krupp von -Bohlen. - -It appears that Krupp should not be arrested and brought to the court -room for trial. But the plea is that the Tribunal also excuse him from -being tried in absentia. This form of trial admittedly is authorized by -Article 12 of the Charter of the Tribunal. Of course, trial in absentia -in circumstance of the case is an unsatisfactory proceeding either for -prosecution or for defense. But the request that Krupp von Bohlen be -neither brought to court nor tried in his absence is based on the -contention that “the interests of justice” require that he be thus -excused from any form of trial. Public interests, which transcend all -private considerations, require that Krupp von Bohlen shall not be -dismissed unless some other representative of the Krupp armament and -munitions interests be substituted. These public interests are as -follows: - -Four generations of the Krupp family have owned and operated the great -armament and munitions plants which have been the chief source of -Germany’s war supplies. For over 130 years this family has been the -focus, the symbol, and the beneficiary of the most sinister forces -engaged in menacing the peace of Europe. During the period between the -two World Wars, the management of these enterprises was chiefly in -Defendant Krupp von Bohlen. It was at all times however a Krupp family -enterprise. Only a nominal owner himself, Von Bohlen’s wife, Bertha -Krupp, owned the bulk of the stock. About 1937 their son, Alfried Krupp, -became plant manager and was actively associated in the policy making -and executive management thereafter. In 1940 Krupp von Bohlen, getting -on in years, became chairman of the board of the concern, thus making -way for Alfried who became president. In 1943 Alfried became sole owner -of the Krupp enterprises by agreement between the family and the Nazi -Government, for the purpose of perpetuating this business in Krupp -family control. It is evident that the future menace of this concern -lies in continuance of the tradition under Alfried, now reported to be -an internee of the British Army of the Rhine. - -To drop Krupp von Bohlen from this case without substitution of Alfried, -drops from the case the entire Krupp family, and defeats any effective -judgment against the German armament makers. Whether this would be “in -the interests of justice” will appear from the following recital of only -the most significant items of evidence now in possession of the United -States as to the activities of Krupp von Bohlen in which his son, -Alfried, at all times aided as did other associates in the vast armament -enterprises, all plotting to bring about the second World War, and to -aid in its ruthless and illegal conduct. - -After the first World War, the Krupp family and their associates failed -to comply with Germany’s disarmament agreements but all secretly and -knowingly conspired to evade them. - -In the 1 March 1940 issue of the Krupp Magazine, the Defendant Krupp -stated: - - “I wanted and had to maintain Krupp in spite of all opposition, - as an armament plant for the later future, even if in - camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most - intimate circles, about the real reasons which made me undertake - the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production - . . . . Even the Allied snoop commissioners were duped . . . . - After the accession to power of Adolf Hitler, I had the - satisfaction of reporting to the Führer that Krupp stood ready, - after a short warming-up period, to begin rearmament of the - German people without any gaps of experience . . . .” - -Krupp von Bohlen (and Alfried Krupp as well) lent his name, prestige and -financial support to bring the Nazi Party, with an avowed program of -renewing the war, into power over the German State. On 25 April 1931 Von -Bohlen acted as chairman of the Association of German Industry to bring -it into line with Nazi policies. On 30 May 1933 he wrote to Schacht -that: - - “It is proposed to initiate a collection in the most - far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture - and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the - Führer of the NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’ . . . . I - have accepted the chairmanship of the management council.” - -Krupp contributed from the treasury of the main Krupp company 4,738,446 -marks to the Nazi Party fund. In June 1935 he contributed 100,000 marks -to the Nazi Party out of his personal account. - -The Nazi Party did not succeed in obtaining control of Germany until it -obtained support of the industrial interests, largely through the -influence of Krupp. Alfried first became a Nazi Party member and later -Von Bohlen did also. The Krupp influence was powerful in promoting the -Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare in Europe. - -Krupp von Bohlen strongly advocated and supported Germany’s withdrawal -from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. He -personally made repeated public speeches approving and inciting Hitler’s -program of aggression: On 6 and 7 April 1938 two speeches approved -annexation of Austria; on 13 October 1938 approving Nazi occupation of -the Sudetenland; on 4 September 1939 approving the invasion of Poland; -on 6 May 1941 commemorating success of Nazi arms in the West. - -Alfried Krupp also made speeches to the same general effect. Krupps were -thus one of the most persistent and influential forces that made this -war. - -Krupps also were the chief factor in getting ready for the war. In -January 1944, in a speech at the University of Berlin, Von Bohlen -boasted, “Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork -was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed Forces -at the appointed hour without loss of time or experience.” In 1937, -before Germany went to war, Krupps booked orders to equip satellite -governments on approval of the German High Command. Krupp contributed -20,000 marks to the Defendant Rosenberg for the purpose of spreading -Nazi propaganda abroad. In a memorandum of 12 October 1939 a Krupp -official wrote offering to mail propaganda pamphlets abroad at Krupp -expense. - -Once the war was on, Krupps, both Von Bohlen and Alfried being directly -responsible therefor, led German industry in violating treaties and -international law by employing enslaved laborers, impressed and imported -from nearly every country occupied by Germany, and by compelling -prisoners of war to make arms and munitions for use against their own -countries. There is ample evidence that in Krupp’s custody and service -they were underfed and overworked, misused, and inhumanly treated. -Captured records show that in September 1944 Krupp concerns were working -54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war. - -Moreover, the Krupp companies profited greatly from destroying the peace -of the world through support of the Nazi program. The rearmament of -Germany gave Krupp huge orders and corresponding profits. Before this -Nazi menace to the peace began, the Krupps were operating at a -substantial loss. But the net profits after taxes, gifts, and reserves -steadily rose with rise of Nazi rearmament, being as follows: - - For year ending 30 September 1935— 57,216,392 marks - For year ending 30 September 1938— 97,071,632 marks - For year ending 30 September 1941— 111,555,216 marks - -The book value of the Krupp concerns mounted from 75,962,000 marks on 1 -October 1933, to 237,316,093 marks on 1 October 1943. Even this included -many going concerns in occupied countries at a book value of only 1 mark -each. These figures are subject to the adjustments and controversies -usual with financial statements of each vast enterprise but -approximately reflect the facts about property and operations. - -The services of Alfried Krupp and of Von Bohlen and their family to the -war aims of the Nazi Party were so outstanding that the Krupp -enterprises were made a special exception to the policy of -nationalization of industries. Hitler said that he would be “prepared to -arrange for any possible safeguarding for the continued existence of the -works as a family enterprise; it would be simplest to issue ‘lex Krupp’ -to start with”. After short negotiations, this was done. A decree of 12 -November 1943 preserves the Krupp works as a family enterprise in -Alfried Krupp’s control and recites that it is done in recognition of -the fact that “for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family -enterprise has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed -strength of the German people.” - -It has at all times been the position of the United States that the -great industrialists of Germany were guilty of the crimes charged in -this Indictment quite as much as its politicians, diplomats, and -soldiers. Its chief of counsel, on 7 June 1945, in a report to President -Truman, released by him and with his approval, stated that the -accusations of crimes include individuals in authority in the financial, -industrial, and economic life of Germany as well as others. - -Pursuant thereto, the United States, with approval of the Secretary Of -State, proposed to indict Alfried Krupp, son of Krupp von Bohlen, and -president and owner of the Krupp concern. The Prosecutors representing -the Soviet Union, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom -unanimously opposed inclusion of Alfried Krupp. This is not said in -criticism of them or their judgment. The necessity of limiting the -number of defendants was considered by representatives of the other -three nations to preclude the addition of Alfried Krupp. Immediately -upon service of the Indictment, learning the serious condition of Krupp -von Bohlen, the United States again called a meeting of Prosecutors and -proposed an amendment to include Alfried Krupp. Again the proposal of -the United States was defeated by a vote of 3 to 1. If now the Tribunal -shall exercise its discretion to excuse from trial the one indicted -member of the Krupp family, one of the chief purposes of the United -States will be defeated and it is submitted that such a result is not -“in the interests of justice.” - -The United States respectfully submits that no greater disservice to the -future peace of the world could be done than to excuse the entire Krupp -family and the armament enterprise from this Trial in which aggressive -war making is sought to be condemned. The “interests of justice” cannot -be determined without taking into account justice to the men of four -generations whose lives have been taken or menaced by Krupp munitions -and Krupp armament, and those of the future who can feel no safety if -such persons as this escape all condemnation in proceedings such as -this. - -While of course the United States cannot, without the concurrence of one -other Power indict a new defendant, it can under the Charter alone -oppose this motion. The United States respectfully urges that if the -favor now sought by Krupp von Bohlen is to be granted, it be upon the -condition that Alfried Krupp be substituted or added as a defendant so -that there may be a representative of the Krupp interests before the -Tribunal. - -It may be suggested that bringing in a new defendant would result in -delay. Admitting, however, that a delay which cannot exceed a few days -may be occasioned, it is respectfully suggested that the precise day -that this Trial will start is a less important consideration than -whether it is to fail of one of its principal purposes. The American -Prosecution staff has been by long odds the longest and farthest away -from home in this endeavor. On personal as well as public interest -consideration it deplores delay. But we think the future as well as the -contemporary world cannot fail to be shocked if, in a trial in which it -is sought to condemn aggressive war making, the Krupp industrial empire -is completely saved from condemnation. - -The complete trial brief of the United States on Krupp von Bohlen with -copies of the documents on which his culpability is asserted will be -made available to the Tribunal if it is desired as evidence concerning -him and Alfried Krupp and the Krupp concerns. - -Respectfully submitted: - - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - Chief of Counsel for the United States of - America - -12 November 1945 - - - - - MEMORANDUM OF THE BRITISH PROSECUTION - ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN - - - British War Crimes Executive (E.S.) - 12 November 1945 - -To: The International Military Tribunal. - -The British Chief Prosecutor has had the opportunity of considering the -application of the Defending Counsel to the accused GUSTAV KRUPP VON -BOHLEN UND HALBACH: - - 1) that the proceedings against this accused be deferred until he is - again fit for trial; - 2) at any rate, that the accused be not tried in his absence. - -The British Chief Prosecutor opposes this application for the following -reasons: - - i) The medical position is that as far as can be foreseen the said - defendant will never again be fit for trial, and therefore if he is - not tried in his absence, he will not be tried at all. - ii) Although in an ordinary case it is undesirable that a defendant - should be tried when he is unable to comprehend the charges made - against him, or to give instruction for his defence, there are - special considerations which apply to this case and make it essential - for the Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach to be tried in - his absence. -iii) As this is a case of conspiracy, the British Prosecutor submits that - all the evidence directly concerned with the actions and speeches of - the said defendant and the operations of Fried. Krupp A.G. would be - evidence against the remaining defendants, if the Prosecution - establishes a _prima facie_ case: - a) that the conspiracy existed; - b) that the said defendant was a party to the conspiracy. - Such _prima facie_ case is clearly indicated in the Indictment lodged - with the Tribunal and the evidence against the present defendant set - out in the American Answer to this Application. - iv) If this submission of the British Chief Prosecutor is correct and - this evidence can and will be given in Court, then it is at least - arguable that it is preferable for the said defendant to be - represented so that his lawyer can deal with such evidence to the - best of his ability. - v) It is a matter of common knowledge of which the Court may take - cognisance that the business of Fried. Krupp A.G. is a vast - organisation. There are, therefore, many sources within the Krupp - firm from which the defending Advocate can obtain information which - will enable him to deal with the allegations contained in the - American Answer. If the Defendant Gustav Krupp is not retained in the - list of defendants, there will be no advocate so well qualified to - deal with those allegations on behalf of the other defendants, - against whom they will still be preferred. - vi) In the circumstances of this trial the kernel of the case for the - prosecution is that a number of conspirators have agreed and worked - together for the purpose of waging aggressive war and causing untold - misery to the World. The public interest, that the defendant who is - responsible for the preparation of armaments on the one hand, and the - utilisation on arms production, of prisoners of war and forced - labour, including detainees from Concentration Camps on the other, is - one of “the interests of justice” within Article 12 of the Charter. -vii) Finally, it is earnestly desired that the wishes of the Tribunal as - publicly announced at Berlin on the 18th October that the trial - should open on the appointed day, namely, 20th November be realised - and carried into execution. The British Delegation is strongly - opposed to any postponement. - - /s/ HARTLEY SHAWCROSS - British Chief Prosecutor - - - - - MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH PROSECUTION - ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN - - - Nuremberg, 13 November 1945 - MEMORANDUM - - by the French Delegation concerning the matter of Krupp which - was discussed at the meeting of 12 November 1945 - -France is formally opposed to dropping the firm of Krupp from the Trial -since the other prosecutors do not contemplate the possibility of -preparing at this time a second trial directed against the big German -industrialists. - -France objects therefore to a simple severance. - -The remaining possibilities are either the trial of Krupp Sr. _in -absentia_ or the substitution of Krupp Jr. in his father’s place and -stead. - -The trial of an old man who is about to die and who is not before the -Court is difficult in itself. - -France would prefer to substitute his son against whom there are serious -charges. - -For simple reasons of expediency, France requests that there be no delay -in excess of the delay that will result in all probability from the -motions of the Defense. - -If the Tribunal denies these motions of the Defense, the Trial of Krupp -Sr. should take place in his absence. - -However, this is in our opinion the lesser of two evils. - - /s/ DUBOST - - - - - SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH - PROSECUTION - - - Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - ADDITIONAL MEMORANDUM - -We consider the trial of KRUPP, the father, as impossible under the -circumstances. The trial of an old, dying man, absent from the dock, -cannot take place. - -We wish that the son be prosecuted. There are serious charges against -him. - -We had requested, so far, that he be prosecuted without any delay -arising in the Trial therefrom. - -The reasons of opportunity which had induced us to adopt this attitude -are no longer so imperative since the Soviet Delegation has concurred in -Mr. Jackson’s thesis. - -Consequently we no longer raise any objection and we concur ourselves in -this thesis. - - The Deputy-Delegate of - The French Government - in the Prosecution of - The International Military Tribunal - /s/ CH. DUBOST - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL GRANTING - POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - ORDER - -ON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for the defendant, Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen, for a postponement of the proceedings against him; - -IT IS ORDERED that the application for postponement be, and the same -hereby is, granted; - -IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the charges in the indictment against Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for -trial hereafter, if the physical and mental condition of the defendant -should permit. - - BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - /s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE - President. - -Dated this 15th day -of November, 1945. -ATTEST: -/s/ WILLIAM L. MITCHELL - General Secretary. - - - - - SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF - THE UNITED STATES PROSECUTION - - - MEMORANDUM FILED BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL TO THE - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -The United States, by its Chief of Counsel, respectfully shows: - -The order of the Tribunal, that “The charges in the Indictment against -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket of the -Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the physical and mental condition of -the defendant should permit,” requires the United States to make clear -its attitude toward subsequent trials, which may have been -misapprehended by the Tribunal, in order that no inference be drawn from -its silence. - -The United States never has committed itself to participate in any Four -Power trial except the one now pending. The purpose of accusing -organizations and groups as criminal was to reach, through subsequent -and more expeditious trials before Military Government or military -courts, a large number of persons. According to estimates of the United -States Army, a finding that the organizations presently accused are -criminal organizations would result in the trial of approximately -130,000 persons now held in the custody of the United States Army; and I -am uninformed as to those held by others. It has been the great purpose -of the United States from the beginning to bring into this one trial all -that is necessary by way of defendants and evidence to reach the large -number of persons responsible for the crimes charged without going over -the entire evidence again. We, therefore, desire that it be a matter of -record that the United States has not been, and is not by this order, -committed to participate in any subsequent Four Power trial. It reserves -freedom to determine that question after the capacity to handle one -trial under difficult conditions has been tested. - - Respectfully submitted: - - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - Chief of Counsel for the United - States - -Certified a true copy: -/s/ R. L. MORGAN - Major, GSC - - - - - MOTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF CHIEF - PROSECUTORS TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT - BY ADDING THE NAME OF - ALFRIED KRUPP VON BOHLEN AS A DEFENDANT - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: - -Upon the Indictment and motion of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, -the answers thereto and all proceedings had therein, the Committee of -Prosecutors created under the Charter hereby designates Alfried Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant and respectfully moves that the -Indictment be amended by adding the name of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und -Halbach as a defendant and by the addition of appropriate allegations in -reference to him in the Appendix A thereof. It also moves that the time -of Alfried Krupp be shortened from thirty days to 2 December 1945. For -this purpose, the Committee of Prosecutors adopts and ratifies the -Answer filed on behalf of the United States on 12 November 1945 in -response to the Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach motion, and the -motion made by Robert H. Jackson in open Court on behalf of the United -States of America, the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of -France. This motion is authorized by a resolution adopted at a meeting -of the Committee of Prosecutors held 16 November 1945. - - /s/ POKROVSKY - For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - /s/ F. DE MENTHON - For the Provisional Government of France - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - For the United States of America - -16 November 1945 - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING THE - MOTION TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT BY - ADDING THE NAME OF ALFRIED KRUPP - VON BOHLEN AS A DEFENDANT - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - ORDER - -ON CONSIDERATION of the motion to amend the indictment by adding the -name of Alfried Krupp; - -IT IS ORDERED that the motion be, and the same hereby is, rejected. - - BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - /s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE - President. - -Dated this 17th day -of November, 1945. -ATTEST: -/s/ WILLIAM L. MITCHELL - General Secretary. - - - - - MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH PROSECUTION - ON THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL - REJECTING THE MOTION TO AMEND THE - INDICTMENT - - - Prosecution - International Military Tribunal - FRENCH DELEGATION - Annex 13 - The Delegate of the Provisional - Government of the French Republic - of the Prosecution to the - International Military Tribunal - to - The Members of the International - Military Tribunal - Nuremberg, 20 November 1945 - -I have the honor to inform you that the decision rendered by you on 17 -November at 1500 hours, to reject the motion signed the 16th by Mr. -Justice JACKSON, Colonel POKROVSKY and M. de MENTHON cannot reject the -declaration contained, according to which “The Committee of the -Prosecutors created according to the Charter, designates Alfried KRUPP -VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH as a defendant” because this declaration has been -made as the last resort, under Article 14 b of the Charter. - -Accordingly, Alfried KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH is specifically -designated as a major war criminal. - -Consequently, I have the honor to inform you that the following -declaration has been published by the Chief Prosecutors representing -Great Britain and the Government of the French Republic: - -“The Prosecutors representing the United States of America, the -Provisional Government of the French Republic, and the Union of -Socialist Soviet Republics having agreed in the designation of Alfried -KRUPP as a major war criminal under Article 14 b of the Charter of the -International Military Tribunal, the French and British Delegations are -now engaged in the examination of the cases of other leading German -industrialists, as well as certain other major war criminals, with a -view to their attachment with Alfried KRUPP, in an indictment to be -presented at a subsequent trial.” - -We will let you know of this new indictment as soon as it is -established. - - For the Delegate - /s/ CHARLES DUBOST - -to: 4-The Members of the I.M.T. - 1-General Secretary of the I.M.T. - 3-The Members of the Prosecution (for information) - 2-Files - - - - - MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT STREICHER - FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL AS TO HIM[16] - - - Schwaig, 5 November 1945 - -TO: The International Military Tribunal. - - I - -As defense counsel for the accused Julius Streicher I should like to -request that it be considered whether the time of commencement of the -Trial of the major war criminals fixed for 20 November could not be -postponed to a later date. My reasons for this request are as follows: - -It is not possible for me properly to prepare the defense of the accused -Streicher by 20 November 1945, nor especially to work through all the -relevant papers and documents which are in the possession of the Court -nor to produce the evidence which the accused proposes to submit nor to -discover or cause to be discovered the witnesses named by him. Therefore -I propose a postponement of the commencement of the Trial for three or -four weeks. - - II - -Furthermore I request that these documents, books, and other records in -which reference is made by the Prosecution in support of the Indictment -and which have been lodged with the Court, be put at my disposal for the -purpose of inspection and thorough examination. - - III - -Lastly I take the liberty of suggesting that the films which have been -taken of the atrocities in concentration camps and other criminal acts -be shown to all the defense counsel of the persons accused as this seems -necessary for the instruction of counsel for the defense. - - /s/ Dr. MARX - ------ - -[16] Part I of this motion was withdrawn by Dr. Marx, 15 November 1945, -with permission of the Tribunal. - - - - - MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES - PROSECUTION ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF - OF DEFENDANT STREICHER - - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - -The United States of America, acting through its Chief Prosecutor, -opposes the Motion of Counsel for Defendant STREICHER for the following -reasons: - - (1) - -Since Counsel accepted the assignment to represent said defendant on 27 -October 1945, he has been provided with a list of documents relied upon -by the Prosecutor, and has been permitted to examine the documents and -decrees referred to in such list; that such documents and exhibits will -remain available to said Counsel throughout the Trial in the Defendant’s -Information Center in Room No. 54 of the Court House in Nuremberg where -German-speaking custodians are available for assistance in expediting -such examination. - - (2) - -Said defendant will have additional time to examine documentary evidence -and further prepare his defense until the Prosecution presents its Case -in Chief. - - (3) - -Defendant STREICHER is the only defendant who has requested -postponement, and his application does not show any facts of hardship -that would follow which would be limited to his particular defense. -Further he does not show any specific injury to his defense if the -Motion should be denied. - - (4) - -No objection is made to request in Section II of the Motion. - - (5) - -It is agreed that the film on Concentration Camps may be shown to -Defense Counsel prior to the Trial. - -WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Motion be overruled. - - ROBERT H. JACKSON - U. S. Chief of Counsel - by - /s/ ROBERT G. STOREY - Asst. U. S. Chief of Counsel - -14 November 1945 - - - - - MEMORANDUM OF THE BRITISH PROSECUTION - ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT - STREICHER - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - -The Chief Prosecutor of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern -Ireland respectfully opposes the application for an adjournment of -Counsel for the Defendant STREICHER for the following reasons: - - I. - -1) Counsel for the Defendant Streicher accepted that position on 27 - October 1945. -2) The Indictment against the said defendant and others was published on - 18 October 1945 and served on the Defendant Streicher shortly - thereafter. -3) The said Counsel has therefore had a considerable time to familiarise - himself with the contents of the Indictment and especially these - which, as appears in the part of the Appendix A, page 33 relating to - the said defendant, are particularly relevant to him. In this - connection the Chief Prosecutor respectfully refers to Page 5, - Section IV(D)(3)(d) and page 26 Section X(A) and (B) of the - Indictment. -4) This Chief Prosecutor further respectfully reminds the Court that the - said Counsel has got a week from the filing of this answer until the - commencement of the Trial, and in addition any time which may be - occupied by the opening of the case and any matters preliminary to - evidence being produced requiring cross-examination by Counsel for - the Defendant Streicher. -5) If oral evidence is called relating to the part alleged to have been - played by the said defendant and the said Counsel is not ready to - cross-examine, he will be able to ask for a postponement of his - cross-examination. -6) It is therefore respectfully submitted that this Application is - premature, and that the time for applying for an adjournment to - assist Counsel for the said defendant is when a difficulty actually - arises at the Trial. -7) This Chief Prosecutor respectfully reminds the Tribunal of the words - of General Nikitchenko, then its President, uttered at Berlin on 18 - October 1945: “It must be understood that the Tribunal which is - directed by the Charter to secure an expeditious hearing of the - issues raised by the charges will not permit any delay either in the - preparation of the defense or of the Trial.” - - II. - -This Chief Prosecutor has no objection to the request made in Section II -of the said application. - - III. - -This Chief Prosecutor has also no objection to the suggestion, contained -in Section III thereof. - - /s/ HARTLEY SHAWCROSS - -14 November 1945 - - - - - MOTION OF THE SOVIET PROSECUTION - FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION - OF DEFENDANT STREICHER - - -CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE U.S.S.R. - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -As shown by the Indictment of the major war criminals, Julius Streicher -is to be tried in common with the other major war criminals and also for -acts committed by himself, including, in particular, the incitement of -the persecution of the Jews set forth in Count One and Count Four of the -Indictment. - -Thus, Streicher must bear the personal responsibility in the first -place, for deriding the Jews, for their being tortured and murdered as a -direct result of his propaganda and of that of his followers. - -Pursuant to this Indictment the interrogations of Streicher were carried -on. - -At the interrogation of 10 November 1945 by representatives of the -Delegation of the Soviet Union, Streicher declared quite unexpectedly -that he “had been holding the viewpoint of Zionism.” - -If, in addition to this, we remember the motion of Streicher’s Defense -Counsel at the session of the Military Tribunal of 15 November 1945 of -the irresponsibility (psychical) of his client, it seems to me evident -that there is every reason for appointing psychiatric experts. - -This measure should not encounter any difficulties, as right at this -moment there are in Nuremberg a sufficient number of highly qualified -specialists, who have just solved a similar problem in connection with -the Defendant Hess. - -An immediate examination would give the Tribunal, before even the -beginning of the session, exact information as to whether the Defendant -Streicher is responsible or irresponsible. There is still amply -sufficient time to do so. - -To resort to experts when the Trial had already begun, would undoubtedly -delay the normal procedure of the Tribunal. - -Given consideration to the above, I request that the Defendant Streicher -be submitted to a psychiatric examination before the beginning of the -Trial. - - /s/ POKROVSKY - Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the - U.S.S.R. - -16 November 1945 - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL REGARDING - A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION - OF DEFENDANT STREICHER - - - 17 November 1945 - - MEMORANDUM TO: DR. JEAN DELAY, Professor of Psychiatry at - the Faculty of Medicine in Paris. - PROFESSOR EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN, - Professor of the Scientific Research Institute in - Moscow. - COLONEL PAUL L. SCHROEDER, U.S. Army. - -The Tribunal desires that you examine the Defendant JULIUS STREICHER to -determine: - - 1. Is he sane or insane? - 2. Is he fit to appear before the Tribunal and present his defense? - 3. If he is insane, was he for that reason incapable of understanding - the nature and quality of his acts during the period of time covered - by the Indictment? - - FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: - - /s/ WILLIAM L. MITCHELL - Brig. General, GSC - General Secretary - - - - - REPORT OF EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT - STREICHER - - - 18 November 1945 - -MEMORANDUM FOR: Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell, - General Secretary. -FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL. - -In response to the Tribunal’s request that the Defendant Julius -Streicher be examined, the undersigned psychiatrists did examine the -Defendant Julius Streicher, on 17 November 1945. The following -examinations were made: Physical, neurological and psychiatric -examinations. - -In addition, the following documents were studied: All available -interrogations, biographical data, inspection of examples of his written -works, all psychological investigations and observations of the prison -psychiatrist. - -The following results of the examination and unanimous conclusions are -submitted: - - 1) Defendant Julius Streicher is sane. - 2) Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the Tribunal and - to present his defense. - 3) It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that Julius - Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of understanding the - nature and quality of his acts during the period of time covered by - the Indictment. - - /s/ DR. JEAN DELAY, - Professor of Psychiatry at the Faculty of - Medicine in Paris. - - /s/ EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN, - Professor of the Scientific Research - Institute in Moscow. - - /s/ COLONEL PAUL L. SCHROEDER, AUS, - Neuropsychiatric Consultant. - - - - - MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT HESS FOR - AN EXAMINATION BY A NEUTRAL EXPERT WITH - REFERENCE TO HIS MENTAL COMPETENCE AND - CAPACITY TO STAND TRIAL - - -TO: The General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, - Nuremberg. - -On behalf of the Defendant Hess I hereby make the following application -in my capacity of counsel: - - I - -A. That a medical expert be asked by the Court to make a thorough -examination of the Defendant Hess and to report in an exhaustive manner -as to whether the said defendant is - -a) mentally competent, - -b) capable of being tried, and to summon the medical expert as a witness -at the Trial. - -The expert should be named to the Tribunal by the medical faculty of the -University of Zürich or, if a competent expert should not be available -there, by the medical faculty of Lausanne. - -B. If the Court has already appointed an expert, that the expert applied -for and appointed as in I A. be appointed and summoned to act together -with the Court’s own expert at the examination, and to testify in Court. - -C. In the event of the Court’s having already in the meantime ordered a -report by a board of experts, that this panel be completed by the -appointment, as well as the expert mentioned in I A., of another expert -also to be named by the medical faculty of Zürich or Lausanne. - - II - . . . . - _Reasons:_ - -Re I. The undersigned Counsel has grave doubts as to the mental -responsibility and the fitness for Trial of the Defendant Hess owing to -defendant’s behavior during his numerous talks with him, and owing to -the numerous publications, past and present, in the German and foreign -press about the “Hess Case”. The defendant is not in a position to give -his Counsel any information whatsoever regarding the crimes imputed to -him in the Indictment. The expression of his face is lifeless and his -attitude towards his Counsel and in view of the impending Trial is the -reverse of every natural reaction of any other defendant. - -The defendant declares that he has completely lost his memory since a -long period of time, the period of which he can no longer determine. - -The official Party declaration issued by the German Propaganda Ministry -of 12 May 1941 even mentions “a disease which had been increasing over a -period of years” and of “signs of mental derangement”. English press -reports also state that defendant’s conduct after his landing in -Scotland showed an _absence_ of “mental clarity”. - -Those facts are important for the allegation of Defendant’s -irresponsibility as a result of morbid disorder of his mental capacity, -and sufficient grounds for application numbered I. - -Those facts at the same time justify the examination of defendant’s -ability to plead. In the event of the Court’s having already, on its own -authority, entrusted a panel of experts with the preparation of a -report, it would be fair to the defendant to concede the addition of -_several_ experts to be appointed by the Defense. - - . . . . - - /s/ VON ROHRSCHEIDT - Attorney - -Nuremberg, 7 November 1945 - - - - - ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING - THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT HESS, - AND DESIGNATING A COMMISSION TO - EXAMINE DEFENDANT HESS WITH REFERENCE - TO HIS MENTAL COMPETENCE AND CAPACITY - TO STAND TRIAL - - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF -GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST -REPUBLICS - - — against — - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al., - - Defendants. - ORDER - -1. Counsel for the Defendant Hess has made application to the Tribunal -to appoint an expert designated by the medical faculty of the University -of Zürich or of Lausanne to examine the Defendant Hess with reference to -his mental competence and capacity to stand trial. This application is -denied. - -2. The Tribunal has designated a commission composed of the following -members: - - Eugene Krasnushkin, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, - Medical Institute of Moscow, assisted by - Eugene Sepp, M.D., Professor of Neurology, - Medical Institute of Moscow - Member, Academy of Medical Sciences, U.S.S.R., and - Nicolas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine - Medical Institute of Moscow - Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, U.S.S.R. - Lord Moran, M.D. F.R.C.P. - President of the Royal College of Physicians, assisted by - Dr. T. Rees, M.D. F.R.C.P. - Chief Consultant Psychiatrist to the War Office, and - Dr. George Riddoch, M.D. F.R.C.P. - Director of Neurology at the London Hospital and - Chief Consultant Neurologist to the War Office - Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis, assisted by - Dr. D. Ewen Cameron and - Colonel Paul Schroeder, M.D. - Professor Jean Delay. - -The Tribunal has requested the commission to examine the Defendant Hess -and furnish a report on the mental state of the defendant with -particular reference to the question whether he is able to take his part -in the Trial, specifically: - -1. Is the defendant able to plead to the Indictment? - -2. Is the defendant sane or not, and on this last issue the Tribunal -wishes to be advised whether the defendant is of sufficient intellect to -comprehend the course of the proceedings of the Trial so as to make a -proper defense, to challenge a witness to whom he might wish to object -and to understand the details of the evidence. - -3. The examiners have presented their reports to the Tribunal in the -form which commends itself to them. It is directed that copies of the -reports be furnished to each of the Chief Prosecutors and to Defense -Counsel. The Tribunal will hear argument by the Prosecution and by -Defense Counsel on the issues presented by the reports on Friday, 30 -November at 4 P.M. - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - /s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE - President - -Dated at Nuremberg, Germany, this -24th day of November 1945. - - - - - REPORT OF COMMISSION TO EXAMINE - DEFENDANT HESS[17] - - - A - -To the International Military Tribunal: - -In pursuance of the assignment by the Tribunal, we, the medical experts -of the Soviet Delegation, together with the physicians of the English -Delegation and in the presence of one representative of the American -Medical Delegation, have examined Rudolf Hess and made a report on our -examination of Mr. Hess together with our conclusions and interpretation -of the behavior of Mr. Hess. - -The statement of the general conclusions has been signed only by the -physicians of the Soviet Delegation and by Professor Delay, the medical -expert of the French Delegation. - - Attachments: I. Conclusions, and - II. Report on the examination of Mr. Hess. - - /s/ KRASNUSHKIN - Doctor of Medicine - /s/ E. SEPP - Honorary Scientist, Regular Member - of the Academy of Medicine - /s/ KURSHAKOV - Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist - of - the Commissariat of Health of the - U.S.S.R. - -17 November 1945 - ------ - -[17] On the basis of this report and in view of the oral statement by -the defendant during the Proceedings of 30 November 1945, the Court -ruled 1 December 1945 that “Defendant Hess is capable of standing his -trial at the present time, and the motion of Counsel for the Defense -(requesting postponement) is, therefore, denied, and the Trial will -proceed.” - - Attachment I. Conclusions - -After observation and an examination of Rudolf Hess the undersigned have -reached the following conclusions: - -1. No essential physical deviations from normality were observed. - -2. His mental conditions are of a mixed type. He is an unstable person, -which in technical terms is called a psychopathic personality. The data -concerning his illness during the period of the last four years -submitted by one of us who had him under observation in England, show -that he had a delusion of being poisoned and other similar paranoic -notions. - -Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission there, the abnormal -manifestations increased and led to attempts at suicide. - -In addition to the above mentioned manifestations he has noticeable -hysterical tendencies which caused a development of various symptoms, -primarily, of amnesia that lasted from November 1943 to June of 1944 and -resisted all attempts to be cured. - -The amnesia symptom may disappear with changing circumstances. - -The second period of amnesia started in February of 1945 and has lasted -up through the present. - -3. At present, he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. His -amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding what is going -on around him but it will interfere with his ability to conduct his -defense and to understand details of the past which would appear as -factual data. - -4. To clarify the situation we recommend that a narco-analysis be -performed on him and, if the Court decides to submit him to trial, the -problem should be subsequently re-examined from a psychiatric point of -view. - -The conclusion reached on November 14 by the physicians of the British -Delegation, Lord Moran, Dr. T. Rees and Dr. G. Riddoch, and the -physicians of the Soviet Delegation, Professors Krasnushkin, Sepp, and -Kurshakov, was also arrived at on 15 November by the representative of -the French Delegation, Professor Jean Delay. - -After an examination of Mr. Hess which took place on 15 November 1945, -the undersigned Professors and experts of the Soviet Delegation, -Krasnushkin, Sepp and Kurshakov, and Professor Jean Delay, the expert -from the French Delegation, have agreed on the following statement: - -Mr. Hess categorically refused to be submitted to narco-analysis and -resisted all other procedures intended to effect a cure of his amnesia, -and stated that he would agree to undergo treatment only after the -trial. The behavior of Mr. Hess makes it impossible to apply the methods -suggested in Paragraph 4 of the report of 14 November and to follow the -suggestion of that Paragraph in present form. - - /s/ KRASNUSHKIN - Doctor of Medicine - /s/ E. SEPP - Honorary Scientist, Regular Member - of the Academy of Medicine - /s/ KURSHAKOV - Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist - of - the Commissariat of Health of the - U.S.S.R. - /s/ JEAN DELAY - Professor, School of Medicine in Paris. - -16 November 1945 - - Attachment II. Report - -According to the information obtained on 16 November 1945, during the -interrogation of Rosenberg who had seen Hess immediately before the -latter’s flight to England, Hess gave no evidence of any abnormality -either in appearance or conversation. He was, as usual, quiet and -composed. Nor was it apparent that he might have been nervous. Prior to -this, he was a calm person, habitually suffering pains in the region of -the stomach. - -As can be judged on the basis of the report of the English psychiatrist, -Doctor Rees, who had Hess under observation from the first days of his -flight to England, Hess, after the airplane crash, disclosed no evidence -of a brain injury, but, upon arrest and incarceration, he began to give -expression to ideas of persecution, he feared that he would be poisoned, -or killed, and his death represented as a suicide, and that all this -would be done by the English under the hypnotic influence of the Jews. -Furthermore, these delusions of persecution were maintained up to the -news of the catastrophe suffered by the German Army at Stalingrad when -the manifestations were replaced by amnesia. According to Doctor Rees, -the delusions of persecution and the amnesia were observed not to take -place simultaneously. Furthermore, there were two attempts at suicide. A -knife wound, inflicted during the second attempt, in the skin near the -heart gave evidence of a clearly hysterico-demonstrative character. -After this there was again observed a change from amnesia to delusions -of persecution, and during this period he wrote that he was simulating -his amnesia, and, finally, again entered into a state of amnesia which -has been prolonged up to the present. - -According to the examination of Rudolf Hess on 14 November 1945, the -following was disclosed: - -Hess complains of frequent cramping pains in the region of the stomach -which appear independent of the taking of food, and headaches in the -frontal lobes during mental strain, and, finally, of loss of memory. - -In general his condition is marked by a pallor of the skin and a -noticeable reduction in food intake. - -Regarding the internal organs of Hess, the pulse is 92, and a weakening -of the heart tone is noticeable. There has been no change in the -condition of the other internal organs. - -Concerning the neurological aspect, there are no symptoms of organic -impairment of the nervous system. - -Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness; knows that -he is in prison at Nuremberg under indictment as a war criminal; has -read, and, according to his own words, is acquainted with the charges -against him. He answers questions rapidly and to the point. His speech -is coherent, his thoughts formed with precision and correctness and they -are accompanied by sufficient emotionally expressive movements. Also, -there is no kind of evidence of paralogism. It should also be noted -here, that the present psychological examination, which was conducted by -Lieutenant Gilbert, Ph. D., bears out the testimony that the -intelligence of Hess is normal and in some instances above the average. -His movements are natural and not forced. - -He has expressed no delirious fancies nor does he give any delirious -explanation for the painful sensation in his stomach or the loss of -memory, as was previously attested to by Doctor Rees, namely, when Hess -ascribed them to poisoning. At the present time, to the question about -the reason for his painful sensations and the loss of memory, Hess -answers that this is for the doctors to know. According to his own -assertions, he can remember almost nothing of his former life. The gaps -in Hess’ memory are ascertained only on the basis of the subjective -changing of his testimony about his inability to remember this or that -person or event given at different times. What he knows at the present -time is, in his own words, what he allegedly learned only recently from -the information of those around him and the films which have been shown -him. - -On 14 November Hess refused the injection of narcotics which were -offered for the purpose of making an analysis of his psychological -condition. On 15 November, in answer to Professor Delay’s offer, he -definitely and firmly refused narcosis and explained to him that, in -general, he would take all measures to cure his amnesia only upon -completion of the Trial. - -All that has been exposed above, we are convinced, permits of the -interpretation that the deviation from the norm in the behavior of Hess -takes the following forms: - -1. In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes typical -of the progressive schizophrenic disease, and therefore the delusions, -from which he suffered periodically while in England, cannot be -considered as manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia, and must be -recognized as the expression of a psychogenic paranoia reaction, that -is, the psychologically comprehensible reaction of an unstable -(psychologically) personality to the situation (the failure of his -mission, arrest, and incarceration). Such an interpretation of the -delirious statements of Hess in England is bespoken by their -disappearance, appearance, and repeated disappearance depending on -external circumstances which affected the mental state of Hess. - -2. The loss of memory by Hess is not the result of some kind of mental -disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis of which is a -subconscious inclination toward self-defense as well as a deliberate and -conscious tendency toward it. Such behavior often terminates when the -hysterical person is faced with an unavoidable necessity of conducting -himself correctly. Therefore, the amnesia of Hess may end upon his being -brought to Trial. - -3. Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer from any -kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. At the present time -he exhibits hysterical behavior with signs of a conscious-intentional -(simulated) character, which does not exonerate him from his -responsibility under the Indictment. - - /s/ KRASNUSHKIN - Doctor of Medicine - /s/ E. SEPP - Honorary Scientist, Regular Member - of the Academy of Medicine - /s/ KURSHAKOV - Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist - of - the Commissariat of Health of the - U.S.S.R. - -17 November 1945 - - B - - To: The International Military Tribunal. - -The undersigned, having seen and examined Rudolf Hess, have come to the -following conclusions: - -1. There are no relevant physical abnormalities. - -2. His mental state is of a mixed type. He is an unstable man and what -is technically called a psychopathic personality. The evidence of his -illness in the past four years, as presented by one of us who has had -him under his care in England, indicates that he has had delusions of -poisoning and other similar paranoid ideas. - -Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission these abnormal ideas -got worse and led to a suicidal attempt. - -In addition, he has a marked hysterical tendency, as shown by various -symptoms, notably a loss of memory which lasted from November 1943 to -June 1944, and which resisted all efforts at treatment. A second loss of -memory began in February 1945 and has lasted till the present. This -amnesic symptom will eventually clear when circumstances change. - -3. At the moment he is not insane in the strict sense. His loss of -memory will not entirely interfere with his comprehension of the -proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability to make his defense -and to understand details of the past which arise in evidence. - -4. We recommend that further evidence should be obtained by -narco-analysis, and that if the Court decide to proceed with the Trial, -the question should afterwards be reviewed on psychiatric grounds. - - /s/ J. R. REES /s/ GEORGE RIDDOCH - M.D., F.R.C.P. M.D., F.R.C.P. - /s/ MORAN - M.D., F.R.C.P. - -19 November 1945. - - C - 20 November 1945 - - MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier General Wm. L. Mitchell, - General Secretary for the International - Military Tribunal. - -In response to request of the Tribunal that the Defendant Rudolf Hess be -examined, the undersigned psychiatrists examined Rudolf Hess on 15 and -19 November 1945 in his cell in the Military Prison in Nuremberg. - -The following examinations were made: physical, neurological, and -psychological. - -In addition, documents were studied bearing information concerning his -personal development and career. Reports concerning the period of his -stay in England were scrutinized. The results of all psychological, -special psychometric examinations, and observations carried out by the -prison psychiatrist and his staff were studied. Information was also -derived from the official interrogation of the defendant on 14 and 16 -November 1945. - -(1) We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations, that -Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in part by loss of -memory. The nature of this loss of memory is such that it will not -interfere with his comprehension of the proceedings, but it will -interfere with his response to questions relating to his past and will -interfere with his undertaking his defense. - -In addition there is a conscious exaggeration of his loss of memory and -a tendency to exploit it to protect himself against examination. - -(2) We consider that the existing hysterical behavior which the -defendant reveals, was initiated as a defense against the circumstances -in which he found himself, while in England; that it has now become in -part habitual and that it will continue as long as he remains under the -threat of imminent punishment, even though it may interfere with his -undertaking a more normal form of defense. - -(3) It is the unanimous conclusion of the undersigned that Rudolf Hess -is not insane at the present time in the strict sense of the word. - - /s/ DR. JEAN DELAY - Professor of Psychiatry at the Faculty - of Medicine in Paris - - /s/ DR. NOLAN D. C. LEWIS - Professor of Psychiatry, Columbia University - - /s/ DR. D. EWEN CAMERON - Professor of Psychiatry, McGill University - - /s/ COL. PAUL L. SCHROEDER - A.U.S. Neuropsychiatric Consultant - - - - - REPORT OF PRISON PSYCHOLOGIST ON - MENTAL COMPETENCE OF DEFENDANT HESS[18] - - - 17 August 1946 - -SUBJECT : Competence of Defendant Rudolf Hess -TO : General Secretary, International Military Tribunal. - -1. In compliance with the Tribunal’s request, the following facts and -studied opinions are submitted with respect to the competence of Rudolf -Hess, based on my continual tests and observations from October 1945 to -the present time, in the capacity of prison psychologist: - -2. _Amnesia at beginning of trial._ There can be no doubt that Hess was -in a state of virtually complete amnesia at the beginning of the trial. -The opinions of the psychiatric commissions in this regard and with -respect to his sanity have only been substantiated by prolonged -subsequent observation. - -3. _Recovery._ On the day of the special hearing in his case, 30 -November 1945, Rudolf Hess did, in fact, recover his memory. The cause -of his sudden recovery is an academic question, but the following event -probably played a part: Just before the hearing I told Hess (as a -challenge) that he might be considered incompetent at that time and -excluded from the proceedings, but I would sometimes see him in his -cell. Hess seemed startled and said he thought he was competent. Then he -gave his declaration of malingering in court, apparently as a -face-saving device. In later conversations he admitted to me that he had -not been malingering, and that he knew he had lost his memory twice in -England. During the months of December 1945, and January 1946, his -memory was quite in order. - -4. _Relapse._ At the end of January I began to notice the beginnings of -memory failure. This increased progressively during February, until he -returned to a state of virtually complete amnesia again about the -beginning of March, and he has remained in that state ever since. (At -the beginning of relapse, Hess expressed anxiety over it, saying that no -one would believe him this time after he had said he had faked his -amnesia the first time.) The amnesia is progressive, each day’s events -being quickly forgotten. At present his memory span is about one-half -day, and his apprehension span has dropped from 7 to 4 digits repeated -correctly immediately after hearing. - -5. _Competence and sanity._ I have read the application of Dr. Seidl -both in German and in English, and wish to make the following comment: - -_a._ Lay discussion of psychiatric concepts does not help throw any -light on this case, because psychiatrists themselves are not in -agreement on the definition of terms like “psychopathic constitution”, -“hysterical reaction”, etc., and these terms have entirely different -meanings in English and German usage. - -_b._ The psychiatric commissions have agreed, and my further -observations have confirmed, that Hess is _not_ insane (in the legal -sense of being incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or realizing -the consequences of his acts). - -_c._ Hess did recover his memory for a sufficient period of time (2-3 -months) to give his counsel ample cooperation in the preparation of his -defense. If he failed to do so, it was the result of a negativistic -personality peculiarity, which I have also observed, and not -incompetence. - -_d._ There has been no indication in his case history or present -behavior that he was insane at the time of the activities for which he -has been indicted. His behavior throughout the trial has also shown -sufficient insight and reason to dispel any doubts about his sanity. (He -may have gone through a psychotic episode in England, but that in no way -destroys the validity of the previous two statements. He has exhibited -signs of a “persecution complex” here too, but these have not been of -psychotic proportions.) - -_e._ In my opinion, another examination by a psychiatric commission at -this time would not throw any further light on the case, because the -clinical picture is the same and the conclusions would necessarily be -the same as those of the original psychiatric commissions, to wit: Hess -is not insane but suffering from hysterical amnesia. I have discussed -this case with the present prison psychiatrist, Lt. Col. Dunn, who has -recently examined Hess, and he is also of the opinion that Hess’s -present mental state is apparently the same as that indicated in the -original psychiatric reports, which he has read. - - /s/ G. M. GILBERT, Ph.D. - Prison Psychologist - ------ - -[18] This report was referred to Counsel for Defendant Hess by order of -the Tribunal, 20 August 1946, in reference to the motion of 2 August -1946 on behalf of the defendant. This motion, which reviewed at length -the previous examinations and psychiatric history of Defendant Hess, was -a request “to subject the Defendant Hess once more . . . to an -examination by psychiatric experts with regard to his ability to stand -trial and his soundness of mind.” - - - - - MOTION ADOPTED BY ALL DEFENSE COUNSEL[19] - - - 19 November 1945 - -Two frightful world wars and the violent collisions by which peace among -the States was violated during the period between these enormous and -world embracing conflicts caused the tortured peoples to realize that a -true order among the States is not possible as long as such State, by -virtue of its sovereignty, has the right to wage war at any time and for -any purpose. During the last decades public opinion in the world -challenged with ever increasing emphasis the thesis that the decision of -waging war is beyond good and evil. A distinction is being made between -just and unjust wars and it is asked that the Community of States call -to account the State which wages an unjust war and deny it, should it be -victorious, the fruits of its outrage. More than that, it is demanded -that not only should the guilty State be condemned and its liability be -established, but that furthermore those men who are responsible for -unleashing the unjust war be tried and sentenced by an International -Tribunal. In that respect one goes now-a-days further than even the -strictest jurists since the early middle ages. This thought is at the -basis of the first three counts of the Indictment which have been put -forward in this Trial, to wit, the Indictment for Crimes against Peace. -Humanity insists that this idea should in the future be more than a -demand,that it should be valid international law. - -However, today it is not as yet valid international law. Neither in the -statute of the League of Nations, world organization against war, nor in -the Kellogg-Briand Pact, nor in any other of the treaties which were -concluded after 1918 in that first upsurge of attempts to ban aggressive -warfare, has this idea been realized. But above all the practice of the -League of Nations has, up to the very recent past, been quite -unambiguous in that regard. On several occasions the League had to -decide upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of action by force of one -member against another member, but it always condemned such action by -force merely as a violation of international law by the State, and never -thought of bringing up for trial the statesmen, generals, and -industrialists of the state which recurred to force. And when the new -organization for world peace was set up last summer in San Francisco, no -new legal maxim was created under which an international tribunal would -inflict punishment upon those who unleashed an unjust war. The present -Trial can, therefore, as far as Crimes against Peace shall be avenged, -not invoke existing international law, it is rather a proceeding -pursuant to a new penal law, a penal law enacted only after the crime. -This is repugnant to a principle of jurisprudence sacred to the -civilized world, the partial violation of which by Hitler’s Germany has -been vehemently discountenanced outside and inside the Reich. This -principle is to the effect that only he can be punished who offended -against a law in existence at the time of the commission of the act and -imposing a penalty. This maxim is one of the great fundamental -principles of the political systems of the Signatories of the Charter -for this Tribunal themselves, to wit, of England since the Middle Ages, -of the United States since their creation, of France since its great -revolution, and the Soviet Union. And recently when the Control Council -for Germany enacted a law to assure the return to a just administration -of penal law in Germany, it decreed in the first place the restoration -of the maxim, “No punishment without a penal law in force at the time of -the commission of the act”. This maxim is precisely not a rule of -expediency but it derives from the recognition of the fact that any -defendant must needs consider himself unjustly treated if he is punished -under an _ex post facto_ law. - -The Defense of all defendants would be neglectful of their duty if they -acquiesced silently in a deviation from existing international law and -in disregard of a commonly recognized principle of modern penal -jurisprudence and if they suppressed doubts which are openly expressed -today outside Germany, all the more so as it is the unanimous conviction -of the Defense that this Trial could serve in a high degree the progress -of world order even if, nay in the very instance where it did not depart -from existing international law. Wherever the Indictment charges acts -which were not punishable at the time the Tribunal would have to confine -itself to a thorough examination and findings as to what acts were -committed, for which purposes the Defense would cooperate to the best of -their ability as true assistants of the Court. Under the impact of these -findings of the Tribunal the States of the international legal community -would then create a new law under which those who in the future would be -guilty of starting an unjust war would be threatened with punishment by -an International Tribunal. - -The Defense are also of the opinion that other principles of a penal -character contained in the Charter are in contradiction with the maxim, -“_Nulla Poena Sine Lege_”. - -Finally, the Defense consider it their duty to point out at this -juncture another peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the -commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence. The Judges have -been appointed exclusively by States which were the one party in this -war. This one party to the proceeding is all in one: creator of the -statute of the Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge. -It used to be until now the common legal conception that this should not -be so; just as the United States of America, as the champion for the -institution of international arbitration and jurisdiction, always -demanded that neutrals, or neutrals and representatives of all parties, -should be called to the Bench. This principle has been realized in an -exemplary manner in the case of the Permanent Court of International -Justice at The Hague. - -In view of the variety and difficulty of these questions of law the -Defense hereby pray: - -That the Tribunal direct that an opinion be submitted by internationally -recognized authorities on international law on the legal elements of -this Trial under the Charter of the Tribunal. - -On behalf of the attorneys for all defendants who are present. - - /s/ DR. STAHMER - ------ - -[19] The Tribunal rejected this motion 21 November 1945, ruling that -insofar as it was a plea to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal it was in -conflict with Article 3 of the Charter. - - - - - JUDGMENT - - -On 8 August 1945, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain -and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, -the Provisional Government of the French Republic, and the Government of -the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entered into an Agreement -establishing this Tribunal for the Trial of War Criminals whose offenses -have no particular geographical location. In accordance with Article 5, -the following Governments of the United Nations have expressed their -adherence to the Agreement: - -Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, -Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, -Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay. - -By the Charter annexed to the Agreement, the constitution, jurisdiction, -and functions of the Tribunal were defined. - -The Tribunal was invested with power to try and punish persons who had -committed Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity -as defined in the Charter. - -The Charter also provided that at the Trial of any individual member of -any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with -any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or -organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal -organization. - -In Berlin, on 18 October 1945, in accordance with Article 14 of the -Charter, an Indictment was lodged against the defendants named in the -caption above, who had been designated by the Committee of the Chief -Prosecutors of the signatory Powers as major war criminals. - -A copy of the Indictment in the German language was served upon each -defendant in custody, at least 30 days before the Trial opened. - -This Indictment charges the defendants with Crimes against Peace by the -planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, -which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -and assurances; with War Crimes; and with Crimes against Humanity. The -defendants are also charged with participating in the formulation or -execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit all these crimes. The -Tribunal was further asked by the Prosecution to declare all the named -groups or organizations to be criminal within the meaning of the -Charter. - -The Defendant Robert Ley committed suicide in prison on 25 October 1945. -On 15 November 1945 the Tribunal decided that the Defendant Gustav Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach could not then be tried because of his physical -and mental condition, but that the charges against him in the Indictment -should be retained for trial thereafter, if the physical and mental -condition of the defendant should permit. On 17 November 1945 the -Tribunal decided to try the Defendant Bormann in his absence under, the -provisions of Article 12 of the Charter. After argument, and -consideration of full medical reports, and a statement from the -defendant himself, the Tribunal decided on 1 December 1945 that no -grounds existed for a postponement of the Trial against the Defendant -Hess because of his mental condition. A similar decision was made in the -case of the Defendant Streicher. - -In accordance with Articles 16 and 23 of the Charter, Counsel were -either chosen by the defendants in custody themselves, or at their -request were appointed by the Tribunal. In his absence the Tribunal -appointed Counsel for the Defendant Bormann, and also assigned Counsel -to represent the named groups or organizations. - -The Trial, which was conducted in four languages—English, Russian, -French, and German—began on 20 November 1945, and pleas of “Not Guilty” -were made by all the defendants except Bormann. - -The hearing of evidence and the speeches of Counsel concluded on 31 -August 1946. - -Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tribunal have been held. -Thirty-three witnesses gave evidence orally for the Prosecution against -the individual defendants and 61 witnesses, in addition to 19 of the -defendants, gave evidence for the Defense. - -A further 143 witnesses gave evidence for the Defense by means of -written answers to interrogatories. - -The Tribunal appointed Commissioners to hear evidence relating to the -organizations, and 101 witnesses were heard for the Defense before the -Commissioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other witnesses were submitted. -Six reports were also submitted, summarizing the contents of a great -number of further affidavits. - -Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed by 155,000 people, were -submitted on behalf of the Political Leaders, 136,213 on behalf of the -SS, 10,000 on behalf of the SA, 7,000 on behalf of the SD, 3,000 on -behalf of the General Staff and OKW, and 2,000 on behalf of the Gestapo. - -The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the organizations. The -documents tendered in evidence for the Prosecution of the individual -defendants and the organizations numbered several thousands. A complete -stenographic record of everything said in Court has been made, as well -as an electrical recording of all the proceedings. - -Copies of all the documents put in evidence by the Prosecution have been -supplied to the Defense in the German language. The applications made by -the defendants for the production of witnesses and documents raised -serious problems in some instances, on account of the unsettled state of -the Country. It was also necessary to limit the number of witnesses to -be called, in order to have an expeditious hearing, in accordance with -Article 18 (c) of the Charter. The Tribunal, after examination, granted -all those applications which in its opinion were relevant to the defense -of any defendant or named group or organization, and were not -cumulative. Facilities were provided for obtaining those witnesses and -documents granted through the office of the General Secretary -established by the Tribunal. - -Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of the -Prosecution was documentary evidence, captured by the Allied armies in -German army headquarters, Government buildings, and elsewhere. Some of -the documents were found in salt mines, buried in the ground, hidden -behind false walls and in other places thought to be secure from -discovery. The case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a large -measure on documents of their own making, the authenticity of which has -not been challenged except in one or two cases. - - - _The Charter Provisions_ - -The individual defendants are indicted under Article 6 of the Charter, -which is as follows: - - “Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred - to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major - war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the - power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of - the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as - members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes: - - “The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within - the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be - individual responsibility: - - “(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, - initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in - violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, - or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the - accomplishment of any of the foregoing: - - “(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of - war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, - murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any - other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied - territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or - persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public of - private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or - villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity: - - “(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, - enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed - against any civilian population, before or during the war, or - persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in - execution of or in connection with any crime within the - jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the - domestic law of the country where perpetrated. - - “Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices, - participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan - or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are - responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution - of such plan.” - -These provisions are binding upon the Tribunal as the law to be applied -to the case. The Tribunal will later discuss them in more detail; but, -before doing so, it is necessary to review the facts. For the purpose of -showing the background of the aggressive war and war crimes charged in -the Indictment, the Tribunal will begin by reviewing some of the events -that followed the first World War, and in particular, by tracing the -growth of the Nazi Party under Hitler’s leadership to a position of -supreme power from which it controlled the destiny of the whole German -People, and paved the way for the alleged commission of all the crimes -charged against the defendants. - - - _The Nazi Regime in Germany - the Origin and Aims of the Nazi Party_ - -On 5 January 1919, not two months after the conclusion of the Armistice -which ended the first World War, and six months before the signing of -the peace treaties at Versailles, there came into being in Germany a -small political party called the German Labor Party. On 12 September -1919 Adolf Hitler became a member of this Party, and at the first public -meeting held in Munich, on 24 February 1920, he announced the Party’s -program. That program, which remained unaltered until the Party was -dissolved in 1945, consisted of 25 points, of which the following five -are of particular interest on account of the light they throw on the -matters with which the Tribunal is concerned: - - “_Point 1._ We demand the unification of all Germans in the - Greater Germany, on the basis of the right of self-determination - of peoples. - - _Point 2._ We demand equality of rights for the German People in - respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties - of Versailles and Saint Germain. - - _Point 3._ We demand land and territory for the sustenance of - our people, and the colonization of our surplus population. - - _Point 4._ Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member - of the race can only be one who is of German blood, without - consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of - the race . . . . - - _Point 22._ We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and - formation of a national army.” - -Of these aims, the one which seems to have been regarded as the most -important, and which figured in almost every public speech, was the -removal of the “disgrace” of the Armistice, and the restrictions of the -peace treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain. In a typical speech at -Munich on 13 April 1923, for example, Hitler said with regard to the -Treaty of Versailles: - - “The Treaty was made in order to bring 20 million Germans to - their deaths, and to ruin the German Nation . . . . At its - foundation our movement formulated three demands: - - 1. Setting aside of the Peace Treaty. - - 2. Unification of all Germans. - - 3. Land and soil to feed our Nation.” - -The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany was -to play a large part in the events preceding the seizure of Austria and -Czechoslovakia; the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles was to become -a decisive motive in attempting to justify the policy of the German -Government; the demand for land was to be the justification for the -acquisition of “living space” at the expense of other nations; the -expulsion of the Jews from membership of the race of German blood was to -lead to the atrocities against the Jewish people; and the demand for a -national army was to result in measures of rearmament on the largest -possible scale, and ultimately to war. - -On 29 July 1921, the Party which had changed its name to National -Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) was reorganized, Hitler -becoming the first “Chairman”. It was in this year that the -Sturmabteilung or SA was founded, with Hitler at its head, as a private -para-military force, which allegedly was to be used for the purpose of -protecting NSDAP leaders from attack by rival political parties, and -preserving order at NSDAP meetings, but in reality was used for fighting -political opponents on the streets. In March 1923 the Defendant Göring -was appointed head of the SA. - -The procedure within the Party was governed in the most absolute way by -the “Leadership Principle” (Führerprinzip). - -According to the principle, each Führer has the right to govern, -administer, or decree, subject to no control of any kind and at his -complete discretion, subject only to the orders he received from above. - -This principle applied in the first instance to Hitler himself as the -leader of the Party, and in a lesser degree to all other Party -officials. All members of the Party swore an oath of “eternal -allegiance” to the leader. - -There were only two ways in which Germany could achieve the three main -aims above-mentioned, by negotiation, or by force. The 25 points of the -NSDAP program do not specifically mention the methods on which the -leaders of the Party proposed to rely, but the history of the Nazi -regime shows that Hitler and his followers were only prepared to -negotiate on the terms that their demands were conceded, and that force -would be used if they were not. - -On the night of 8 November 1923, an abortive putsch took place in -Munich. Hitler and some of his followers burst into a meeting in the -Bürgerbräu Cellar, which was being addressed by the Bavarian Prime -Minister Kahr, with the intention of obtaining from him a decision to -march forthwith on Berlin. On the morning of 9 November, however, no -Bavarian support was forthcoming, and Hitler’s demonstration was met by -the armed forces of the Reichswehr and the police. Only a few volleys -were fired; and after a dozen of his followers had been killed, Hitler -fled for his life, and the demonstration was over. The Defendants -Streicher, Frick, and Hess all took part in the attempted rising. Hitler -was later tried for high treason, and was convicted and sentenced to -imprisonment. The SA was outlawed. Hitler was released from prison in -1924 and in 1925 the Schutzstaffeln, or SS, was created, nominally to -act as his personal bodyguard, but in reality to terrorize political -opponents. This was also the year of the publication of _Mein Kampf_, -containing the political views and aims of Hitler, which came to be -regarded as the authentic source of Nazi doctrine. - - - _The Seizure of Power_ - -In the eight years that followed the publication of _Mein Kampf_, the -NSDAP greatly extended its activities throughout Germany, paying -particular attention to the training of youth in the ideas of National -Socialism. The first Nazi youth organization had come into existence in -1922, but it was in 1925 that the Hitler Jugend was officially -recognized by the NSDAP. In 1931 Baldur von Schirach, who had joined the -NSDAP in 1925, became Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP. - -The Party exerted every effort to win political support from the German -People. Elections were contested both for the Reichstag and the -Landtage. The NSDAP leaders did not make any serious attempt to hide the -fact that their only purpose in entering German political life was in -order to destroy the democratic structure of the Weimar Republic, and to -substitute for it a National Socialist totalitarian regime which would -enable them to carry out their avowed policies without opposition. In -preparation for the day when he would obtain power in Germany, Hitler in -January 1929, appointed Heinrich Himmler as Reichsführer SS with the -special task of building the SS into a strong but elite group which -would be dependable in all circumstances. - -On 30 January 1933 Hitler succeeded in being appointed Chancellor of the -Reich by President Von Hindenburg. The Defendants Göring, Schacht, and -Von Papen were active in enlisting support to bring this about. Von -Papen had been appointed Reich Chancellor on 1 June 1932. On 14 June he -rescinded the decree of the Brüning Cabinet of 13 April 1932, which had -dissolved the Nazi para-military organizations, including the SA and the -SS. This was done by agreement between Hitler and Von Papen, although -Von Papen denies that it was agreed as early as 28 May, as Dr. Hans Volz -asserts in “Dates from the History of the NSDAP”; but that it was the -result of an agreement was admitted in evidence by Von Papen. - -The Reichstag elections of 31 July 1932 resulted in a great accession of -strength to the NSDAP, and Von Papen offered Hitler the post of Vice -Chancellor, which he refused, insisting upon the Chancellorship itself. -In November 1932 a petition signed by leading industrialists and -financiers was presented to President Hindenburg, calling upon him to -entrust the Chancellorship to Hitler; and in the collection of -signatures, to the petition Schacht took a prominent part. - -The election of 6 November, which followed the defeat of the Government, -reduced the number of NSDAP members, but Von Papen made further efforts -to gain Hitler’s participation, without success. On 12 November Schacht -wrote to Hitler: - - “I have no doubt that the present development of things can only - lead to your becoming Chancellor. It seems as if our attempt to - collect a number of signatures from business circles for this - purpose was not altogether in vain . . . .” - -After Hitler’s refusal of 16 November, Von Papen resigned, and was -succeeded by General Von Schleicher; but Von Papen still continued his -activities. He met Hitler at the house of the Cologne banker Von -Schröder on 4 January 1933, and attended a meeting at the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop’s house on 22 January, with the Defendant Göring and others. -He also had an interview with President Hindenburg on 9 January, and -from 22 January onwards he discussed officially with Hindenburg the -formation of a Hitler Cabinet. - -Hitler held his first Cabinet meeting on the day of his appointment as -Chancellor, at which the Defendants Göring, Frick, Funk, Von Neurath, -and Von Papen were present in their official capacities. On 28 February -1933 the Reichstag building in Berlin was set on fire. This fire was -used by Hitler and his Cabinet as a pretext for passing on the same day -a decree suspending the constitutional guarantees of freedom. The decree -was signed by President Hindenburg and countersigned by Hitler and the -Defendant Frick, who then occupied the post of Reich Minister of the -Interior. On 5 March elections were held, in which the NSDAP obtained -288 seats of the total of 647. The Hitler Cabinet was anxious to pass an -“Enabling Act” that would give them full legislative powers, including -the power to deviate from the Constitution. They were without the -necessary majority in the Reichstag to be able to do this -constitutionally. They therefore made use of the decree suspending the -guarantees of freedom and took into so-called “protective custody” a -large number of Communist deputies and Party officials. Having done -this, Hitler introduced the “Enabling Act” into the Reichstag, and after -he had made it clear that if it was not passed, further forceful -measures would be taken, the act was passed on 24 March 1933. - - - _The Consolidation of Power_ - -The NSDAP, having achieved power in this way, now proceeded to extend -its hold on every phase of German life. Other political parties were -persecuted, their property and assets confiscated, and many of their -members placed in concentration camps. On 26 April 1933 the Defendant -Göring founded in Prussia the Geheime Staatspolizei, or Gestapo, as a -secret police, and confided to the deputy leader of the Gestapo that its -main task was to eliminate political opponents of National Socialism and -Hitler. On 14 July 1933 a law was passed declaring the NSDAP to be the -only political party, and making it criminal to maintain or form any -other political party. - -In order to place the complete control of the machinery of Government in -the hands of the Nazi leaders, a series of laws and decrees were passed -which reduced the powers of regional and local governments throughout -Germany, transforming them into subordinate divisions of the Government -of the Reich. Representative assemblies in the Laender were abolished, -and with them all local elections. The Government then proceeded to -secure control of the Civil Service. This was achieved by a process of -centralization, and by a careful sifting of the whole Civil Service -administration. By a law of 7 April it was provided that officials “who -were of non-Aryan descent” should be retired; and it was also decreed -that “officials who because of their previous political activity do not -offer security that they will exert themselves for the national state -without reservation shall be discharged.” The law of 11 April 1933 -provided for the discharge of “all civil servants who belong to the -Communist Party.” Similarly, the judiciary was subjected to control. -Judges were removed from the bench for political or racial reasons. They -were spied upon and made subject to the strongest pressure to join the -Nazi Party as an alternative to being dismissed. When the Supreme Court -acquitted three of the four defendants charged with complicity in the -Reichstag fire, its jurisdiction in cases of treason was thereafter -taken away and given to a newly established “People’s Court” consisting -of two judges and five officials of the Party. Special courts were set -up to try political crimes and only party members were appointed as -judges. Persons were arrested by the SS for political reasons, and -detained in prisons and concentration camps; and the judges were without -power to intervene in any way. Pardons were granted to members of the -Party who had been sentenced by the judges for proved offenses. In 1935 -several officials of the Hohenstein concentration camp were convicted of -inflicting brutal treatment upon the inmates. High Nazi officials tried -to influence the Court, and after the officials had been convicted, -Hitler pardoned them all. In 1942 “judges’ letters” were sent to all -German judges by the Government, instructing them as to the “general -lines” that they must follow. - -In their determination to remove all sources of opposition, the NSDAP -leaders turned their attention to the trade unions, the churches, and -the Jews. In April 1933 Hitler ordered the late Defendant Ley, who was -then staff director of the political organization of the NSDAP, “to take -over the trade unions.” Most of the trade unions of Germany were joined -together in two large federations, the “Free Trade Unions” and the -“Christian Trade Unions.” Unions outside these two large federations -contained only 15 percent of the total union membership. On 21 April -1933 Ley issued an NSDAP directive announcing a “coordination action” to -be carried out on 2 May against the Free Trade Unions. The directive -ordered that SA and SS men were to be employed in the planned -“occupation of trade union properties and for the taking into protective -custody of personalities who come into question.” At the conclusion of -the action the official NSDAP press service reported that the National -Socialist Factory Cells Organization had “eliminated the old leadership -of Free Trade Unions” and taken over the leadership themselves. -Similarly, on 3 May 1933 the NSDAP press service announced that the -Christian trade unions “have unconditionally subordinated themselves to -the leadership of Adolf Hitler.” In place of the trade unions the Nazi -Government set up a Deutsche Arbeits Front (DAF), controlled by the -NSDAP, and which, in practice, all workers in Germany were compelled to -join. The chairmen of the unions were taken into custody and were -subjected to ill-treatment, ranging from assault and battery to murder. - -In their effort to combat the influence of the Christian churches, whose -doctrines were fundamentally at variance with National Socialist -philosophy and practice, the Nazi Government proceeded more slowly. The -extreme step of banning the practice of the Christian religion was not -taken, but year by year efforts were made to limit the influence of -Christianity on the German people, since, in the words used by the -Defendant Bormann to the Defendant Rosenberg in an official letter, “the -Christian religion and National Socialist doctrines are not compatible.” -In the month of June 1941 the Defendant Bormann issued a secret decree -on the relation of Christianity and National Socialism. The decree -stated that: - - “For the first time in German history the Führer consciously and - completely has the leadership in his own hand. With the Party, - its components and attached units, the Führer has created for - himself and thereby the German Reich Leadership, an instrument - which makes him independent of the Treaty . . . . More and more - the people must be separated from the churches and their organs, - the pastor . . . . Never again must an influence on leadership - of the people be yielded to the churches. This influence must be - broken completely and finally. Only the Reich Government and by - its direction the Party, its components and attached units, have - a right to leadership of the people.” - -From the earliest days of the NSDAP, anti-Semitism had occupied a -prominent place in National Socialist thought and propaganda. The Jews, -who were considered to have no right to German citizenship, were held to -have been largely responsible for the troubles with which the Nation was -afflicted following on the war of 1914-18. Furthermore, the antipathy to -the Jews was intensified by the insistence which was laid upon the -superiority of the Germanic race and blood. The second chapter of Book 1 -of _Mein Kampf_ is dedicated to what may be called the “Master Race” -theory, the doctrine of Aryan superiority over all other races, and the -right of Germans in virtue of this superiority to dominate and use other -peoples for their own ends. With the coming of the Nazis into power in -1933, persecution of the Jews became official state policy. On 1 April -1933, a boycott of Jewish enterprises was approved by the Nazi Reich -Cabinet, and during the following years a series of anti-Semitic laws -was passed, restricting the activities of Jews in the civil service, in -the legal profession, in journalism and in the armed forces. In -September 1935, the so-called Nuremberg Laws were passed, the most -important effect of which was to deprive Jews of German citizenship. In -this way the influence of Jewish elements on the affairs of Germany was -extinguished, and one more potential source of opposition to Nazi policy -was rendered powerless. - -In any consideration of the crushing of opposition, the massacre of 30 -June 1934 must not be forgotten. It has become known as the “Röhm Purge” -or “the blood bath”, and revealed the methods which Hitler and his -immediate associates, including the Defendant Göring, were ready to -employ to strike down all opposition and consolidate their power. On -that day Röhm, the Chief of Staff of the SA since 1931, was murdered by -Hitler’s orders, and the “Old Guard” of the SA was massacred without -trial and without warning. The opportunity was taken to murder a large -number of people who at one time or another had opposed Hitler. - -The ostensible ground for the murder of Röhm was that he was plotting to -overthrow Hitler, and the Defendant Göring gave evidence that knowledge -of such a plot had come to his ears. Whether this was so or not it is -not necessary to determine. - -On 3 July the Cabinet approved Hitler’s action and described it as -“legitimate self-defense by the State.” - -Shortly afterwards Hindenburg died, and Hitler became both Reich -President and Chancellor. At the Nazi-dominated plebiscite, which -followed, 38 million Germans expressed their approval, and with the -Reichswehr taking the oath of allegiance to the Führer, full power was -now in Hitler’s hands. - -Germany had accepted the dictatorship with all its methods of terror, -and its cynical and open denial of the rule of law. - -Apart from the policy of crushing the potential opponents of their -regime, the Nazi Government took active steps to increase its power over -the German population. In the field of education, everything was done to -ensure that the youth of Germany was brought up in the atmosphere of -National Socialism and accepted National Socialist teachings. As early -as 7 April 1933 the law reorganizing the civil service had made it -possible for the Nazi Government to remove all “subversive and -unreliable teachers”; and this was followed by numerous other measures -to make sure that the schools were staffed by teachers who could be -trusted to teach their pupils the full meaning of the National Socialist -creed. Apart from the influence of National Socialist teaching in the -schools, the Hitler Youth Organization was also relied upon by the Nazi -Leaders for obtaining fanatical support from the younger generation. The -Defendant Von Schirach, who had been Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP -since 1931, was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich in June 1933. -Soon all the youth organizations had been either dissolved or absorbed -by the Hitler Youth, with the exception of the “Catholic Youth”. The -Hitler Youth was organized on strict military lines, and as early as -1933 the Wehrmacht was cooperating in providing pre-military training -for the Reich Youth. - -The Nazi Government endeavored to unite the Nation in support of their -policies through the extensive use of propaganda. A number of agencies -was set up, whose duty was to control and influence the press, the -radio, films, publishing firms, etc., in Germany, and to supervise -entertainment and cultural and artistic activities. All these agencies -came under Goebbels’ Ministry of the People’s Enlightenment and -Propaganda, which together with a corresponding organization in the -NSDAP and the Reich Chamber of Culture, was ultimately responsible for -exercising this supervision. The Defendant Rosenberg played a leading -part in disseminating the National Socialist doctrines on behalf of the -Party, and the Defendant Fritzsche, in conjunction with Goebbels, -performed the same task for the State. - -The greatest emphasis was laid on the supreme mission of the German -People to lead and dominate by virtue of their Nordic blood and racial -purity; and the ground was thus being prepared for the acceptance of the -idea of German world supremacy. - -Through the effective control of the radio and the press, the German -People, during the years which followed 1933, were subjected to the most -intensive propaganda in furtherance of the regime. Hostile criticism, -indeed criticism of any kind, was forbidden, and the severest penalties -were imposed on those who indulged in it. - -Independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was rendered quite -impossible. - - - _Measures of Rearmament_ - -During the years immediately following Hitler’s appointment as -Chancellor, the Nazi Government set about reorganizing the economic life -of Germany, and in particular the armament industry. This was done on a -vast scale and with extreme thoroughness. - -It was necessary to lay a secure financial foundation for the building -of armaments, and in April 1936 the Defendant Göring was appointed -coordinator for raw materials and foreign exchange, and empowered to -supervise all State and Party activities in these fields. In this -capacity he brought together the War Minister, the Minister of -Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the Reichsbank -and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss problems connected with war -mobilization, and on 27 May 1936, in addressing these men, Göring -opposed any financial limitation of war production and added that “all -measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging -of war.” At the Party Rally in Nuremberg in 1936, Hitler announced the -establishment of the Four Year Plan and the appointment of Göring as the -Plenipotentiary in charge. Göring was already engaged in building a -strong air force and on 8 July 1938 he announced to a number of leading -German aircraft manufacturers that the German Air Force was already -superior in quality and quantity to the English. On 14 October 1938, at -another conference, Göring announced that Hitler had instructed him to -organize a gigantic armament program, which would make insignificant all -previous achievements. He said that he had been ordered to build as -rapidly as possible an air force five times as large as originally -planned, to increase the speed of the rearmament of the navy and army, -and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and -heavy tanks. He then laid down a specific program designed to accomplish -these ends. The extent to which rearmament had been accomplished was -stated by Hitler in his memorandum of 9 October 1939, after the campaign -in Poland. He said: - - “The military application of our people’s strength has been - carried through to such an extent that within a short time at - any rate it cannot be markedly improved upon by any manner of - effort . . . . - - “The warlike equipment of the German people is at present larger - in quantity and better in quality for a greater number of German - divisions than in the year 1914. The weapons themselves, taking - a substantial cross-section, are more modern than is the case of - any other country in the world at this time. They have just - proved their supreme war worthiness in their victorious campaign - . . . . There is no evidence available to show that any country - in the world disposes of a better total ammunition stock than - the Reich . . . . The A. A. artillery is not equalled by any - country in the world.” - -In this reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military -purposes, the Nazi Government found the German armament industry quite -willing to cooperate, and to play its part in the rearmament program. In -April 1933 Gustav Krupp von Bohlen submitted to Hitler on behalf of the -Reich Association of German Industry a plan for the reorganization of -German industry, which he stated was characterized by the desire to -coordinate economic measures and political necessity. In the plan itself -Krupp stated that “the turn of political events is in line with the -wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a -long time.” What Krupp meant by this statement is fully shown by the -draft text of a speech which he planned to deliver in the University of -Berlin in January 1944, though the speech was in fact never delivered. -Referring to the years 1919 to 1933, Krupp wrote: - - “It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that - it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its - activity could not be brought to light, for obvious reasons. - Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork - was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German armed - forces at the appointed hour, without loss of time or experience - . . . . Only through the secret activity of German enterprise - together with the experience gained meanwhile through the - production of peace time goods was it possible after 1933 to - fall into step with the new tasks arrived at, restoring - Germany’s military power.” - -In October 1933 Germany withdrew from the International Disarmament -Conference and the League of Nations. In 1935 the Nazi Government -decided to take the first open steps to free itself from its obligations -under the Treaty of Versailles. On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring -announced that Germany was building a military air force. Six days -later, on 16 March 1935, a law was passed bearing the signatures, among -others, of the Defendants Göring, Hess, Frank, Frick, Schacht, and Von -Neurath, instituting compulsory military service and fixing the -establishment of the German Army at a peace time strength of 500,000 -men. In an endeavor to reassure public opinion in other countries, the -Government announced on 21 May 1935 that Germany would, though -renouncing the disarmament clauses, still respect the territorial -limitations of the Versailles Treaty, and would comply with the Locarno -Pacts. Nevertheless, on the very day of this announcement, the secret -Reich Defense Law was passed and its publication forbidden by Hitler. In -this law, the powers and duties of the Chancellor and other Ministers -were defined, should Germany become involved in war. It is clear from -this law that by May of 1935 Hitler and his Government had arrived at -the stage in the carrying out of their policies when it was necessary -for them to have in existence the requisite machinery for the -administration and government of Germany in the event of their policy -leading to war. - -At the same time that this preparation of the German economy for war was -being carried out, the German armed forces themselves were preparing for -a rebuilding of Germany’s armed strength. - -The German Navy was particularly active in this regard. The official -German Naval historians, Assmann and Gladisch, admit that the Treaty of -Versailles had only been in force for a few months before it was -violated, particularly in the construction of a new submarine arm. - -The publications of Captain Schuessler and Colonel Scherff, both of -which were sponsored by the Defendant Raeder, were designed to show the -German People the nature of the Navy’s effort to rearm in defiance of -the Treaty of Versailles. - -The full details of these publications have been given in evidence. - -On 12 May 1934 the Defendant Raeder issued the Top Secret armament plan -for what was called the “Third Armament Phase”. This contained the -sentence: - - “All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up - with a primary view to readiness for a war _without any alert - period_.” - -One month later, in June 1934, the Defendant Raeder had a conversation -with Hitler in which Hitler instructed him to keep secret the -construction of U-boats and of warships over the limit of 10,000 tons -which was then being undertaken. - -And on 2 November 1934, the Defendant Raeder had another conversation -with Hitler and the Defendant Göring, in which Hitler said that he -considered it vital that the German Navy “should be increased as -planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to -safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia”. - -The large orders for building given in 1933 and 1934 are sought to be -excused by the Defendant Raeder on the ground that negotiations were in -progress for an agreement between Germany and Great Britain permitting -Germany to build ships in excess of the provisions of the Treaty of -Versailles. This agreement, which was signed in 1935, restricted the -German Navy to a tonnage equal to one-third of that of the British, -except in respect of U-boats where 45 percent was agreed, subject always -to the right to exceed this proportion after first informing the British -Government and giving them an opportunity of discussion. - -The Anglo-German Treaty followed in 1937, under which both Powers bound -themselves to notify full details of their building program at least -four months before any action was taken. - -It is admitted that these clauses were not adhered to by Germany. - -In capital vessels, for example, the displacement details were falsified -by 20 percent, whilst in the case of U-boats, the German historians -Assmann and Gladisch say: - - “It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction - that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the - German-British Treaty.” - -The importance of these breaches of the Treaty is seen when the motive -for this rearmament is considered. In the year 1940 the Defendant Raeder -himself wrote: - - “The Führer hoped until the last moment to be able to put off - the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that - time, the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful - U-boat superiority, and a much more favorable ratio as regards - strength in all other types of ships, particularly those - designed for warfare on the High Seas.” - -The Nazi Government as already stated, announced on 21 May 1935 their -intention to respect the territorial limitations of the Treaty of -Versailles. On 7 March 1936, in defiance of that Treaty, the -demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was entered by German troops. In -announcing this action to the German Reichstag, Hitler endeavored to -justify the re-entry by references to the recently concluded alliances -between France and the Soviet Union, and between Czechoslovakia and the -Soviet Union. He also tried to meet the hostile reaction which he no -doubt expected to follow this violation of the Treaty by saying: - - “We have no territorial claims to make in Europe.” - - - _The Common Plan of Conspiracy and Aggressive War_ - -The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of the Crimes against Peace -charged in the Indictment. Count One of the Indictment charges the -defendants with conspiring or having a common plan to commit crimes -against peace. Count Two of the Indictment charges the defendants with -committing specific crimes against peace by planning, preparing, -initiating, and waging wars of aggression against a number of other -States. It will be convenient to consider the question of the existence -of a common plan and the question of aggressive war together, and to -deal later in this Judgment with the question of the individual -responsibility of the defendants. - -The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged -aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an -evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States -alone, but affect the whole world. - -To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international -crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other -war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the -whole. - -The first acts of aggression referred to in the Indictment are the -seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; and the first war of aggression -charged in the Indictment is the war against Poland begun on 1 September -1939. - -Before examining that charge it is necessary to look more closely at -some of the events which preceded these acts of aggression. The war -against Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise clear sky; the -evidence has made it plain that this war of aggression, as well as the -seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, was premeditated and carefully -prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment was thought opportune -for it to be carried through as a definite part of the pre-ordained -scheme and plan. For the aggressive designs of the Nazi Government were -not accidents arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe -and the world; they were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign -policy. - -From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed that its -object was to unite the German People in the consciousness of their -mission and destiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and under the -guidance of the Führer. - -For its achievement, two things were deemed to be essential: the -disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty of -Versailles, and the creation of a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers -of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of foreign territories. - -War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least, highly probable, if -these purposes were to be accomplished. The German People, therefore, -with all their resources, were to be organized as a great -political-military army, schooled to obey without question any policy -decreed by the State. - - - _Preparation for Aggression_ - -In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler had made this view quite plain. It must be -remembered that _Mein Kampf_ was no mere private diary in which the -secret thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were rather -proclaimed from the house-tops. It was used in the schools and -Universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA, and among -the German People generally, even down to the presentation of an -official copy to all newly-married people. By the year 1945 over 6½ -million copies had been circulated. The general contents are well known. -Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the necessity of force -as the means of solving international problems, as in the following -quotation: - - “The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven - on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking their - lives. So also in the future, our people will not obtain - territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favor from - any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a - triumphant sword.” - -_Mein Kampf_ contains many such passages, and the extolling of force as -an instrument of foreign policy is openly proclaimed. - -The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in -detail. The very first page of the book asserts that “German-Austria -must be restored to the great German Motherland,” not on economic -grounds, but because “people of the same blood should be in the same -Reich.” - -The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is declared to be wholly -insufficient, and if Germany is to exist at all, it must be as a world -power with the necessary territorial magnitude. - -_Mein Kampf_ is quite explicit in stating where the increased territory -is to be found: - - “Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line - through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in - foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march - towards the South and West of Europe, and turn our eyes towards - the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and - trade policy of the pre-war times, and pass over to the - territorial policy of the future. - - “But when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we must - think principally of Russia and the border states subject to - her.” - -_Mein Kampf_ is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise, nor as -an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification. - -Its importance lies in the unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed -throughout its pages. - - - _The Planning of Aggression_ - -Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held four -secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special reference -because of the light they shed upon the question of the common plan and -aggressive war. - -These meetings took place on 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August -1939, and 23 November 1939. - -At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler as to his -purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms. - -The documents which record what took place at these meetings have been -subject to some criticism at the hands of defending Counsel. - -Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, for example, -that they do not propose to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they -record, that the document dealing with the meeting on 5 November 1937, -was dated five days after the meeting had taken place, and that the two -documents dealing with the meeting of 22 August 1939 differ from one -another, and are unsigned. - -Making the fullest allowance for criticism of this kind, the Tribunal is -of opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value, and -that their authenticity and substantial truth are established. - -They are obviously careful records of the events they describe, and they -have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Government, -from whose custody they were captured. Such documents could never be -dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or distorted; they -plainly record events which actually took place. - - - _Conferences of 23 November 1939 and 5 November 1937_ - -It will perhaps be useful to deal first of all with the meeting of 23 -November 1939, when Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together. A -record was made of what was said, by one of those present. At the date -of the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia had been incorporated into -the German Reich, Poland had been conquered by the German Armies, and -the war with Great Britain and France was still in its static phase. The -moment was opportune for a review of past events. Hitler informed the -Commanders that the purpose of the Conference was to give them an idea -of the world of his thoughts, and to tell them his decision. He -thereupon reviewed his political task since 1919, and referred to the -secession of Germany from the League of Nations, the denunciation of the -Disarmament Conference, the order for re-armament, the introduction of -compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure -of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia. He stated: - - “One year later, Austria came; this step also was considered - doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the - Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step - also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of - all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not - possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me - from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the - Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The - decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the - erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the - action against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that - time whether I should start first against the East and then in - the West or vice versa . . . . Basically I did not organize the - Armed Forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was - always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. - Under pressure it was decided that the East was to be attacked - first.” - -This address, reviewing past events and re-affirming the aggressive -intentions present from the beginning, puts beyond any question of doubt -the character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the -war against Poland. - -For they had all been accomplished according to plan; and the nature of -that plan must now be examined in a little more detail. - -At the meeting of 23 November 1939 Hitler was looking back to things -accomplished; at the earlier meetings now to be considered, he was -looking forward, and revealing his plans to his confederates. The -comparison is instructive. - -The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 -was attended by Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach, Hitler’s personal adjutant, -who compiled a long note of the proceedings, which he dated 10 November -1937 and signed. - -The persons present were Hitler, and the Defendants Göring, Von Neurath, -and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, -Reich Foreign Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy respectively, -General Von Blomberg, Minister of War, and General Von Fritsch, the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army. - -Hitler began by saying that the subject of the conference was of such -high importance that in other States it would have taken place before -the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of his speech was -the result of his detailed deliberations, and of his experiences during -his four and a half years of Government. He requested that the -statements he was about to make should be looked upon in the case of his -death as his last will and testament. Hitler’s main theme was the -problem of living space, and he discussed various possible solutions, -only to set them aside. He then said that the seizure of living space on -the continent of Europe was therefore necessary, expressing himself in -these words: - - “It is not a case of conquering people but of conquering - agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the - purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe - directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution - would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations - . . . . The history of all times—Roman Empire, British - Empire—has proved that every space expansion can only be - effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks - are unavoidable: neither formerly nor today has space been found - without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the - proprietor.” - -He concluded with this observation: - - “The question for Germany is where the greatest possible - conquest could be made at the lowest cost.” - -Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of Hitler, -and the events which soon followed showed the reality of his purpose. It -is impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did not actually mean -war; for after pointing out that Germany might expect the opposition of -England and France, and analyzing the strength and the weakness of those -powers in particular situations, he continued: - - “The German question can be solved only by way of force, and - this is never without risk . . . . If we place the decision to - apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, - then we are left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In - this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.” - -The first of these three cases set forth a hypothetical international -situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 1945, -saying: - - “If the Führer is still living then it will be his irrevocable - decision to solve the German space problem not later than 1943 - to 1945. The necessity for action before 1943 to 1945 will come - under consideration in Cases 2 and 3.” - -The second and third cases to which Hitler referred show the plain -intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in this connection -Hitler said: - - “For the improvement of our military-political position, it must - be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to conquer - Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any - threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards.” - -He further added: - - “The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and - politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to - shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel - for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new - armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions.” - -This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in some -detail; the action was to be taken as soon as a favorable opportunity -presented itself. - -The military strength which Germany had been building up since 1933 was -now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria and -Czechoslovakia. - -The Defendant Göring testified that he did not believe at that time that -Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, and that the -purpose of the conference was only to put pressure on Von Fritsch to -speed up the re-armament of the Army. - -The Defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor Von Fritsch, nor Von -Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a conviction which -the Defendant Raeder claims that he held up to 22 August 1939. The basis -of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a “political -solution” of Germany’s problems. But all that this means, when examined, -is the belief that Germany’s position would be so good, and Germany’s -armed might so overwhelming that the territory desired could be obtained -without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that Hitler’s -declared intention with regard to Austria was actually carried out -within a little over four months from the date of the meeting, and -within less than a year the first portion of Czechoslovakia was -absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts had -existed in the minds of any of his hearers in November 1937, after March -1939 there could no longer be any question that Hitler was in deadly -earnest in his decision to resort to war. The Tribunal is satisfied that -Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach’s account of the meeting is substantially -correct, and that those present knew that Austria and Czechoslovakia -would be annexed by Germany at the first possible opportunity. - - - _The Seizure of Austria_ - -The invasion of Austria was a pre-meditated aggressive step in -furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries. As -a result Germany’s flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia being -greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure of -“Lebensraum”; many new divisions of trained fighting men had been -acquired; and with the seizure of foreign exchange reserves, the -re-armament program had been greatly strengthened. - -On 21 May 1935 Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Germany did not -intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her internal affairs. -On 1 May 1936 he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia with Austria in his -avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as 11 July 1936 he recognized -by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria. - -Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March 1938. For a -number of years before that date, the National Socialists in Germany had -been cooperating with the National Socialists of Austria with the -ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. The -Putsch of 25 July 1934, which resulted in the assassination of -Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as its object; but the -Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist Party -was outlawed in Austria. On 11 July 1936 an agreement was entered into -between the two countries, Article 1 of which stated: “The German -Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federated State of -Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Führer and -Chancellor of 21 May 1935.” - -Article 2 declared: “Each of the two Governments regards the inner -political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) -obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other -country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect -influence.” - -The National Socialist movement in Austria however continued its illegal -activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists of -Germany gave the Party active support. The resulting “incidents” were -seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for -interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference of 5 November -1937, these “incidents” rapidly multiplied. The relationship between the -two countries steadily worsened, and finally the Austrian Chancellor -Schuschnigg was persuaded by the Defendant Von Papen and others to seek -a conference with Hitler, which took place at Berchtesgaden on 12 -February 1938. The Defendant Keitel was present at the conference, and -Dr. Schuschnigg was threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of -Austria. Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to -various Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart -as Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police. On -9 March 1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country, -Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian -independence, which was fixed for 13 March 1938. Hitler, two days later, -sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite must be withdrawn. -In the afternoon and evening of 11 March 1938 the Defendant Göring made -a series of demands upon the Austrian Government, each backed up by the -threat of invasion. After Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of -the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must -resign, and that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed -Chancellor. In consequence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, -after at first refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way -and appointed him. - -Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops to -cross the border at dawn on 12 March and instructed Seyss-Inquart to use -formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas and to seize -control of the Austrian Government. After the order to march had been -given to the German troops, Göring telephoned the German Embassy in -Vienna and dictated a telegram which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to -Hitler to justify the military action which had already been ordered. - -It was: - - “The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dismissal - of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to establish - peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the - urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to - prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German - Government to send German troops as soon as possible.” - -Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied: “Well, SA and SS -are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet.” - -After some further discussion, Göring stated: “Please show him -(Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are -asking him—well, he doesn’t even have to send the telegram. All he -needs to do is to say ‘Agreed’.” - -Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed -“Agreed”. - -It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time after -10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and transmit -his protests against the occupation. This action outraged the Defendant -Göring, because “it would disturb the rest of the Führer, who wanted to -go to Austria the next day”. At 11:15 p.m. an official in the Ministry -of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was -told by Keppler: “Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart -agrees”. - -At daybreak on 12 March 1938 German troops marched into Austria, and met -with no resistance. It was announced in the German press that -Seyss-Inquart had been appointed the successor to Schuschnigg, and the -telegram which Göring had suggested, but which was never sent, was -quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the presence of German -troops to prevent disorder. On 13 March 1938 a law was passed for the -reunion of Austria in the German Reich. Seyss-Inquart demanded that -President Miklas should sign this law, but he refused to do so, and -resigned his office. He was succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the -law in the name of Austria. This law was then adopted as a law of the -Reich by a Reich Cabinet decree issued the same day, and signed by -Hitler and the Defendants Göring, Frick, Von Ribbentrop, and Hess. - -It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was -justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union -of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between -the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result -the object was achieved without bloodshed. - -These matters, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts -plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those -of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany -ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. Moreover, none of -these considerations appear from the Hossbach account of the meetings of -5 November 1937 to have been the motives which actuated Hitler; on the -contrary, all the emphasis is there laid on the advantage to be gained -by Germany in her military strength by the annexation of Austria. - - - _The Seizure of Czechoslovakia_ - -The conference of 5 November 1937 made it quite plain that the seizure -of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The only -question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On -4 March 1938 the Defendant Von Ribbentrop wrote to the Defendant Keitel -with regard to a suggestion made to Von Ribbentrop by the Hungarian -Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia -should be discussed between the German and Hungarian Armies. In the -course of this letter Von Ribbentrop said: - - “I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should - discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, - the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed - about this.” - -On 11 March 1938 Göring made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the -Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then -taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence -on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and -emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of the Germans to -improve those mutual relations. On 12 March Göring asked M. Mastny to -call on him, and repeated these assurances. - -This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was absorbed was -a typical maneuver on the part of the Defendant Göring, which he was to -repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous -efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle. On the same day, 12 -March, the Defendant Von Neurath spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him -on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the -German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in -October 1925. - -The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the German -Army on 12 March and the annexation of Austria on 13 March, Conrad -Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German Party in -Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on 28 March. On the following day, -at a conference in Berlin, when Von Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, -the general situation was discussed, and later the Defendant Jodl -recorded in his diary: - - “After the annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there - is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to - be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Grün - (that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be - carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared - on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the - annexation of Austria.” - -On 21 April 1938 a discussion took place between Hitler and the -Defendant Keitel with regard to “Case Grün”, showing quite clearly that -the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully -considered. On 28 May 1938 Hitler ordered that preparations should be -made for military action against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October, and -from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was constantly under -review. On 30 May 1938 a directive signed by Hitler declared his -“unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the -near future”. - -In June 1938 as appears from a captured document taken from the files of -the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment of the SD in -Czechoslovakia had been proposed. This plan provided that “the SD -follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take upon -themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany . . . .” - -Gestapo officials were assigned to co-operate with the SD in certain -operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent -sabotage, and these agents were to be notified “before the attack in due -time . . . in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves, -avoid arrest and deportation . . . At the beginning, guerrilla or -partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary -. . . .” - -Files of information were to be compiled with notations as follows: “To -arrest.” “To liquidate.” “To confiscate.” “To deprive of passport.” etc. - -The plan provided for the temporary division of the country into larger -and smaller territorial units, and considered various “suggestions”, as -they were termed, for the incorporation into the German Reich of the -inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia. The final “suggestion” -included the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian -Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions. - -The plan was modified in some respects in September after the Munich -Conference, but the fact the plan existed in such exact detail and was -couched in such war-like language indicated a calculated design to -resort to force. - -On 31 August 1938 Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl dated 24 August -1938, concerning the timing of the order for the invasion of -Czechoslovakia and the question of defense measures. This memorandum -contained the following: - - “Operation Grün will be set in motion by means of an ‘incident’ - in Czechoslovakia, which will give Germany provocation for - military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for this - incident is of the utmost importance.” - -These facts demonstrate that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had been -planned in detail long before the Munich Conference. - -In the month of September 1938 the conferences and talks with military -leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical situation -which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, flew to -Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see Hitler. On 22 September Mr. -Chamberlain met Hitler for further discussions at Bad Godesberg. On 26 -September 1938 Hitler said in a speech in Berlin, with reference to his -conversation: - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for - Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from the - moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to - say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their - other minorities, peacefully and without oppression, I will be - no longer interested in the Czech State, and that as far as I am - concerned I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs.” - -On 29 September 1938, after a conference between Hitler and Mussolini -and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the Munich Pact -was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce in the -cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The “piece of paper” which the -British Prime Minister brought back to London, signed by himself and -Hitler, expressed the hope that for the future Britain and Germany might -live without war. That Hitler never intended to adhere to the Munich -Agreement is shown by the fact that a little later he asked the -Defendant Keitel for information with regard to the military force which -in his opinion would be required to break all Czech resistance in -Bohemia and Moravia. Keitel gave his reply on 11 October 1938. On 21 -October 1938 a directive was issued by Hitler, and countersigned by the -Defendant Keitel, to the Armed Forces on their future tasks, which -stated: - - “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. It must be - possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if - her policy should become hostile towards Germany.” - -On 14 March 1939 the Czech President Hacha and his Foreign Minister -Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and attended a -meeting at which the Defendants Von Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel were -present, with others. The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would -sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in -the German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from -destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received -orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical -force. The Defendant Göring added the threat that he would destroy -Prague completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, -Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary -agreement at 4:30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on -behalf of Germany. - -On 15 March German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and on 16 March -the German decree was issued incorporating Bohemia and Moravia into the -Reich as a protectorate, and this decree was signed by the Defendants -Von Ribbentrop and Frick. - - - _The Aggression against Poland_ - -By March 1939 the plan to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had -been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of 5 November 1937, had been -accomplished. The time had now come for the German leaders to consider -further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment because of -that accomplishment. - -On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study in the new Reich -Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland -and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision might have -on other countries. In point of time, this was the second of the -important meetings to which reference has already been made, and in -order to appreciate the full significance of what was said and done, it -is necessary to state shortly some of the main events in the history of -German-Polish relations. - -As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settlement of all -disputes between the two countries. On 26 January 1934, a German-Polish -declaration of non-aggression was made, signed on behalf of the German -Government by the Defendant Von Neurath. On 30 January 1934, and again -on 30 January 1937 Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he -expressed his view that Poland and Germany could work together in -harmony and peace. On 20 February 1938 Hitler made a third speech in the -Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard to Poland: - - “And so the way to a friendly understanding has been - successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with - Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief - makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the - relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into - a sincere, friendly cooperation . . . . Relying on her - friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save - that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is - ahead of us—peace.” - -On 26 September 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the Sudetenland, -Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been quoted, and -announced that he had informed the British Prime Minister that when the -Czechoslovakian problem was solved there would be no more territorial -problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on 24 November of the same -year, an OKW directive was issued to the German Armed Forces to make -preparations for an attack upon Danzig; it stated: - -“The Führer has ordered: - - (1) . . . Preparations are also to be made to enable the Free - State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.” - -In spite of having ordered military preparations for the occupation of -Danzig, Hitler on 30 January 1939 said in a speech in the Reichstag: -“During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship between -Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the -political life of Europe.” - -Five days previously, on 25 January 1939, Von Ribbentrop said in the -course of a speech in Warsaw: “Thus Poland and Germany can look forward -to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual -relations.” - -Following on the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on 15 -March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich Agreement, Great -Britain gave an assurance to Poland on 31 March 1939 that in the event -of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which -the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with -their National Forces, Great Britain would feel itself bound at once to -lend Poland all the support in its power. The French Government took the -same stand. It is interesting to note in this connection, that one of -the arguments frequently presented by the Defense in the present case is -that the Defendants were induced to think that their conduct was not in -breach of international law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The -declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this -view could be held no longer. - -On 3 April 1939 a revised OKW directive was issued to the Armed Forces, -which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall -Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and -stated: - - “The Führer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss. - (1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation - can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards. - (2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to - draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to arrange by - conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches - of the Armed Forces.” - -On 11 April 1939 a further directive was signed by Hitler and issued to -the Armed Forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the words -occur: - - “Quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland however - adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, ‘a final - settlement’ will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with - Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and - to create in the East a situation which satisfies the - requirements of defense. The Free State of Danzig will be - incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the - latest. Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is - considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France, - and British restraint as a result of this.” - -In spite of the contents of those two directives, Hitler made a speech -in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 in which, after describing the Polish -Government’s alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to -Danzig and the Polish Corridor, he stated: - - “I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the - Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the - worst is that now Poland like Czechoslovakia a year ago - believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, - that it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part - has not called up a single man, and had not thought of - proceeding in any way against Poland . . . . The intention to - attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented by the - international press . . . .” - -It was four weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on 23 May 1939, -held the important military conference to which reference has already -been made. Among the persons present were the Defendants Göring, Raeder, -and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that day was Lieutenant Colonel -Schmundt, and he made a record of what happened, certifying it with his -signature as a correct record. - -The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the heads of -the Armed Forces and their staffs of his views on the political -situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political situation -and reviewing the course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his -decision to attack Poland. He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over -Danzig was not the reason for this attack, but the necessity for Germany -to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies. He said: - - “The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle by - which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to - circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be - adapted to needs. This is impossible without invasion of foreign - States or attacks upon foreign property.” - -Later in his address he added: - - “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are - left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable - opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. - There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of - the isolation will be decisive . . . . The isolation of Poland - is a matter of skillful politics.” - -Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt’s record of the meeting reveals that Hitler -fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France coming to -Poland’s assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland could not be -achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should attack Great -Britain and France first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on -the war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France -quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness. Nevertheless, -Hitler stressed, that war with England and France would be a life and -death struggle, which might last a long time, and that preparations must -be made accordingly. - -During the weeks which followed this conference, other meetings were -held and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The -Defendant Von Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a -non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. - -On 22 August 1939 there took place the important meeting of that day, to -which reference has already been made. The Prosecution have put in -evidence two unsigned captured documents which appear to be records made -of this meeting by persons who were present. The first document is -headed: “The Führer’s Speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August -1939.” The purpose of the speech was to announce the decision to make -war on Poland at once, and Hitler began by saying: - - “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come - sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring, - but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few - years, and only afterwards against the East . . . I wanted to - establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to - fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable - to me, could not be executed since essential points have - changed. It became clear to me that Poland would attack us in - case of a conflict with the West.” - -Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most -favorable moment had arrived for starting the war: - - “Now”, said Hitler, “Poland is in the position in which I wanted - her . . . . I am only afraid that at the last moment some - _Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation . . . . A - beginning has been made for the destruction of England’s - hegemony.” - -This document closely resembles one of the documents put in evidence on -behalf of the Defendant Raeder. This latter document consists of a -summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it was made, by one -Admiral Boehm, from notes he had taken during the meeting. In substance -it says that the moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by -military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany and the West -was unavoidable in the long run, the likelihood of Great Britain and -France coming to Poland’s assistance was not great, and that even if a -war in the West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing -of the Polish military strength. It also contains a statement by Hitler -that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be -given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant, since “the Right -lies in Victory”. - -The second unsigned document put in evidence by the Prosecution is -headed: “Second Speech by the Führer on 22 August 1939”, and is in the -form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some of these are as -follows: - - “Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were - determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. - Struggle for life or death . . . destruction of Poland in the - foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the - arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the - West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. - I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war—never - mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be - asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and - making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory . . . . - The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morning.” (That - is to say, 26 August.) - -In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are sufficient -points of similarity with the two previously mentioned documents to make -it appear very probable that this is an account of the same speech, not -as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same. - -These three documents establish that the final decision as to the date -of Poland’s destruction, which had been agreed upon and planned earlier -in the year, was reached by Hitler shortly before 22 August 1939. They -also show that although he hoped to be able to avoid having to fight -Great Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a risk of -this happening, but it was a risk which he was determined to take. - -The events of the last days of August confirm this determination. On 22 -August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to, the British -Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said: “Having thus -made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction -that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that -could occur.” - -On 23 August Hitler replied: - - “The question of the treatment of European problems on a - peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but - primarily on those who since the crime committed by the - Versailles Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed any - peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of - the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the - relationship between England and Germany.” - -There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from forcing the -Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President Roosevelt on -24 and 25 August; from his Holiness the Pope on 24 and 31 August; and -from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of France, on 26 August. All these -appeals fell on deaf ears. - -On 25 August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual assistance with -Poland, which reinforced the undertaking she had given to Poland earlier -in the year. This, coupled with the news of Mussolini’s unwillingness to -enter the war on Germany’s side, made Hitler hesitate for a moment. The -invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on 26 August, was postponed -until a further attempt had been made to persuade Great Britain not to -intervene. Hitler offered to enter into a comprehensive agreement with -Great Britain, once the Polish question had been settled. In reply to -this, Great Britain made a counter-suggestion for the settlement of the -Polish dispute by negotiation. On 29 August Hitler informed the British -Ambassador that the German Government, though skeptical as to the -result, would be prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a -Polish emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary -powers by midnight for the following day, 30 August. The Polish -Government were informed of this, but with the example of Schuschnigg -and Hacha before them, they decided not to send such an emissary. At -midnight on 30 August the Defendant Von Ribbentrop read to the British -Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first precise -formulation of the German demands against Poland. He refused, however, -to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated that in any case it -was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived. - -In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these negotiations -were conducted by Hitler and Von Ribbentrop showed that they were not -entered into in good faith or with any desire to maintain peace, but -solely in the attempt to prevent Great Britain and France from honoring -their obligations to Poland. - -Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful attempts made by -Göring to effect the isolation of Poland by persuading Great Britain not -to stand by her pledged word, through the services of one Birger -Dahlerus, a Swede. Dahlerus, who was called as a witness by Göring, had -a considerable knowledge of England and things English, and in July 1939 -was anxious to bring about a better understanding between England and -Germany, in the hope of preventing a war between the two countries. He -got into contact with Göring as well as with official circles in London, -and during the latter part of August, Göring used him as an unofficial -intermediary to try and deter the British Government from their -opposition to Germany’s intentions towards Poland. Dahlerus, of course, -had no knowledge at the time of the decision which Hitler had secretly -announced on 22 August, nor of the German military directives for the -attack on Poland which were already in existence. As he admitted in his -evidence, it was not until 26 September, after the conquest of Poland -was virtually complete, that he first realized that Göring’s aim all -along had been to get Great Britain’s consent to Germany’s seizure of -Poland. - -After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement of her -dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler, on 31 -August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that the -attack on Poland would start in the early morning of 1 September, and -gave instructions as to what action would be taken if Great Britain and -France should enter the war in defense of Poland. - -In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately -preceding 1 September 1939 demonstrate the determination of Hitler and -his associates to carry out the declared intention of invading Poland at -all costs, despite appeals from every quarter. With the ever increasing -evidence before him that this intention would lead to war with Great -Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not to depart from the -course he had set for himself. The Tribunal is fully satisfied by the -evidence that the war initiated by Germany against Poland on 1 September -1939 was most plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due -course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in -the commission of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of -war, and against humanity. - - - _The Invasion of Denmark and Norway_ - -The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The aggression -of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country. In point of time -the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway. - -On 31 May 1939 a Treaty of Non-Aggression was made between Germany and -Denmark, and signed by the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. It was there -solemnly stated that the parties to the Treaty were “firmly resolved to -maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all circumstances.” -Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on 9 April 1940. - -On 2 September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland, Germany sent -a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms: - - “The German Reich Government is determined in view of the - friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany under - no circumstance to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of - Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In - making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, - on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable - neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches - of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. - Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ - from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party - occurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled - to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the - resulting situation might dictate.” - -On 9 April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was -invaded by Germany. - -The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the Defendants -Raeder and Rosenberg. On 3 October 1939 Raeder prepared a memorandum on -the subject of “gaining bases in Norway”, and amongst the questions -discussed was the question: “Can bases be gained by military force -against Norway’s will, if it is impossible to carry this out without -fighting?” Despite this fact, three days later, further assurances were -given to Norway by Germany, which stated: “Germany has never had any -conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern -States and neither has she any today.” - -Three days later again, the Defendant Dönitz prepared a memorandum on -the same subject of bases in Norway, and suggested the establishment of -a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supplying fuel in Narvik. At -the same time the Defendant Raeder was in correspondence with Admiral -Karls, who pointed out to him the importance of an occupation of the -Norwegian coast by Germany. On 10 October Raeder reported to Hitler the -disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have. -In the months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the -possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the “Rosenberg -Organization.” The “Rosenberg Organization” was the Foreign Affairs -Bureau of the NSDAP, and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge of it. -Early in December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor, visited -Berlin and was seen by the Defendants Rosenberg and Raeder. He put -forward a plan for a _coup d’état_ in Norway. On 12 December the -Defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together with the Defendants -Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on -his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling’s views. On 16 -December Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters. In -the report of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP -for the years 1933-43, under the heading of “Political Preparations for -the Military Occupation of Norway”, it is stated that at the interview -with Quisling Hitler said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the -part of Norway as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire -to extend the theater of war, or to draw other nations into the -conflict. If the enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled -to guard himself against that undertaking. He promised Quisling -financial support, and assigned to a special military staff the -examination of the military questions involved. - -On 27 January 1940 a memorandum was prepared by the Defendant Keitel -regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On 28 February 1940 the -Defendant Jodl entered in his diary: “I proposed first to the Chief of -OKW and then to the Führer that Case Yellow (that is the operation -against the Netherlands) and Weser Exercise (that is the operation -against Norway and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they -will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces -employed.” - -On 1 March Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser Exercise which -contained the words: - - “The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the - making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and - Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This operation - should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the - Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and - give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain - . . . . The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in - Norway must take place simultaneously . . . . It is most - important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western - opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures.” - -On 24 March the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were -issued, and on 30 March the Defendant Dönitz as Commander-in-Chief of -U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of Denmark and -Norway. On 9 April 1940 the German forces invaded Norway and Denmark. - -From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the -question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense that -has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack Norway to -forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore preventive. - -It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is -justified only in case of “an instant and overwhelming necessity for -self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation” -(The Caroline Case, Moore’s _Digest of International Law_, II, 412). How -widely the view was held in influential German circles that the Allies -intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling -asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit -consent of the Norwegian Government. The German Legation at Oslo -disagreed with this view, although the Naval Attaché at that Legation -shared it. - -The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for 13 January 1940 -stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff thought that the -most favorable solution would be the maintenance of the neutrality of -Norway, but he harbored the firm conviction that England intended to -occupy Norway in the near future relying on the tacit agreement of the -Norwegian Government. - -The directive of Hitler issued on 1 March 1940 for the attack on Denmark -and Norway stated that the operation “should prevent British -encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic.” - -It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder’s memorandum -of 3 October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the Allies, but is -based upon “the aim of improving our strategical and operational -position.” - -The memorandum itself is headed “Gaining of Bases in Norway”. The same -observation applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the memorandum of the -Defendant Dönitz of 9 October 1939. - -Furthermore, on 13 March the Defendant Jodl recorded in his diary: - - “Führer does not give order yet for ‘W’ (Weser Exercise). He is - still looking for an excuse.” (Justification?) - -On 14 March 1940 he again wrote: “Führer has not yet decided what reason -to give for ‘Weser Exercise’”. On 21 March 1940 he recorded the -misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between taking up -readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and -added: - - “Führer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for - help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it - must be ruthlessly broken.” - -On 2 April he records that all the preparations are completed; on 4 -April the Naval Operational Order was issued; and on 9 April, the -invasion was begun. - -From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on Norway -were being made, they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an -imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an -Allied occupation at some future date. - -When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were given, the -diary of the Naval Operations Staff for 23 March 1940 records: “A mass -encroachment by the English into Norwegian territorial waters . . . is -not to be expected at the present time.” - -And Admiral Assmann’s entry for 26 March says: “British landing in -Norway not considered serious.” - -Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans are relied on -to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbors and airports in Western -Norway was a definite plan, although in all points considerably behind -the German plans under which the invasion was actually carried out. -These documents indicate that an altered plan had been finally agreed -upon on 20 March 1940, that a convoy should leave England on 5 April, -and that mining in Norwegian waters would begin the same day; and that -on 5 April the sailing time had been postponed until 8 April. But these -plans were not the cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was -occupied by Germany to afford her bases from which a more effective -attack on England and France might be made, pursuant to plans prepared -long in advance of the Allied plans which are now relied on to support -the argument of self-defense. - -It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance -with the reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers at the time -of the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether preventive action -was a necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment was -conclusive. But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was -in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to -investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be -enforced. - -No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any plan by any -belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Denmark. No excuse for that -aggression has ever been offered. - -As the German Armies entered Norway and Denmark, German memoranda were -handed to the Norwegian and Danish Governments which gave the assurance -that the German troops did not come as enemies, that they did not intend -to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for -operations against England, as long as they were not forced to do so by -measures taken by England and France, and that they had come to protect -the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by -English-French forces. - -The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of infringing upon the -territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of -Norway then or in the future. Nevertheless, on 3 June 1940, a German -naval memorandum discussed the use to be made of Norway and Denmark, and -put forward one solution for consideration, that the territories of -Denmark and Norway acquired during the course of the war should continue -to be occupied and organized so that they could in the future be -considered as German possessions. - -In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to accept -the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were defensive, -and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war. - - - _The Invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg_ - -The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in August -1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being formulated, and the -possibility of war with France and England was contemplated. The -advantage to Germany of being able to use these countries for their own -purposes, particularly as air bases in the war against England and -France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when Hitler made his irrevocable -decision to attack Poland, and foresaw the possibility at least of a war -with England and France in consequence, he told his military commanders: - - “Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied . . . . - Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.” - -On 22 August in the same year, he told his military commanders that -England and France, in his opinion, would not “violate the neutrality of -these countries.” At the same time he assured Belgium and Holland and -Luxembourg that he would respect their neutrality; and on 6 October -1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this assurance. On 7 -October General Von Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare “for -the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political -situation so demands.” In a series of orders, which were signed by the -Defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for 10 November 1939, -but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of -weather conditions and transport problems. - -At the conference on 23 November 1939 Hitler said: - - “We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war - depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France - push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in - the greatest danger . . . . Certainly England and France will - assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. - England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and - Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and - Holland the sympathies are all for France and England . . . . If - the French Army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it - will be too late for us. We must anticipate them . . . . We - shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. - This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different - starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can - feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English - coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only - occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland . . . . My - decision is unchangeable; I shall attack France and England at - the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality - of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that - when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of - neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break - the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack, - the war is not to be ended victoriously.” - -On 10 May 1940 the German forces invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, and -Luxembourg. On the same day the German Ambassadors handed to the -Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memorandum alleging that the -British and French Armies, with the consent of Belgium and Holland, were -planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and -justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the -Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would -be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxembourg on the -same date. - -There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention that -the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were invaded by Germany because -their occupation had been planned by England and France. British and -French staffs had been cooperating in making certain plans for military -operations in the Low Countries, but the purpose of this planning was to -defend these countries in the event of a German attack. - -The invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg was entirely without -justification. - -It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and -prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to -invade was made without any other consideration than the advancement of -the aggressive policies of Germany. - - - _The Aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece_ - -On 12 August 1939 Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and the Defendant -Von Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He said then: - - “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the - neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process - could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one - partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with - the uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a - neutral of this kind.” - -This observation was made only two months after Hitler had given -assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and -inviolable. On the occasion of the visit to Germany of the Prince Regent -of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler had said in a public speech: - - “The firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to - Yugoslavia now that owing to historical events we have become - neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not - only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and - countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our - nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are - disposed to perform really constructive work.” - -On 6 October 1939 Germany repeated these assurances to Yugoslavia, after -Hitler and Von Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Italy to -enter the war on the side of Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. On 28 -October 1940 Italy invaded Greece, but the military operations met with -no success. In November Hitler wrote to Mussolini with regard to the -invasion of Greece, and the extension of the war in the Balkans, and -pointed out that no military operations could take place in the Balkans -before the following March, and therefore Yugoslavia must if at all -possible be won over by other means, and in other ways. But on 12 -November 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the prosecution of the war, -and it included the words: “The Balkans: The Commander-in-Chief of the -Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of -the Aegean Sea, in case of need entering through Bulgaria.” - -On 13 December he issued a directive concerning the operation “Marita,” -the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he stated: - - “1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. - Because of a dangerous situation in Albania, it is doubly - necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create air - bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be - dangerous above all to Italy as to the Rumanian oilfields. - - 2. My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task - force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after the - setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a - task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way - of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek - mainland.” - -On 20 January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which -the Defendants Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, and others were present, -Hitler stated: - - “The massing of troops in Rumania serves a threefold purpose: - - (a) An operation against Greece; - - (b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey; - - (c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Rumania . . . . - - It is desirable that this deployment be completed without - interference from the enemy. Therefore, disclose the game as - late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at - the last possible moment, and to line up for attack at the - earliest possible moment.” - -On 19 February 1941 an OKW directive regarding the operation “Marita” -stated: “On 18 February the Führer made the following decision regarding -the carrying out of Operation Marita: The following dates are envisaged: -Commencement of building bridge, 28 February; crossing of the Danube, 2 -March.” - -On 3 March 1941, British troops landed in Greece to assist the Greeks to -resist the Italians; and on 18 March, at a meeting between Hitler and -the Defendant Raeder, at which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were also -present, the Defendant Raeder asked for confirmation that the “whole of -Greece will have to be occupied, even in the event of a peaceful -settlement,” to which Hitler replied, “The complete occupation is a -prerequisite of any settlement.” - -On 25 March, on the occasion of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the -Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, on -behalf of the German Government, confirmed the determination of Germany -to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at -all times. On 26 March the Yugoslav Ministers, who had adhered to the -Tripartite Pact, were removed from office by a _coup d’état_ in Belgrade -on their return from Vienna, and the new Government repudiated the Pact. -Thereupon on 27 March, at a conference in Berlin with the High Command -at which the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Jodl were present, and the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia -was an uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack on Greece, -and even more so with regard to the attack upon Russia which was to be -conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was determined, without -waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make -all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a -national unit. He stated that he would act with “unmerciful harshness.” - -On 6 April German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning, -and Belgrade was bombed by the Luftwaffe. So swift was this particular -invasion that there had not been time to establish any “incidents” as a -usual preliminary, or to find and publish any adequate “political” -explanations. As the attack was starting on 6 April, Hitler proclaimed -to the German people that this attack was necessary because the British -forces in Greece (who were helping the Greeks to defend themselves -against the Italians) represented a British attempt to extend the war to -the Balkans. - -It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece and -Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as early as August -of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the assistance of the -Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to inflict great damage -upon German interests was made the occasion for the occupation of both -countries. - - - _The Aggressive War against the Union of - Soviet Socialist Republics_ - -On 23 August 1939 Germany signed the non-aggression pact with the Union -of Soviet Socialist Republics. - -The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on their part -conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German Government itself -had been assured of this by the highest German sources. Thus, the German -Ambassador in Moscow informed his Government that the Soviet Union would -go to war only if attacked by Germany, and this statement is recorded in -the German War Diary under the date of 6 June 1941. - -Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany began to make -preparations for an attack on the U.S.S.R., in spite of the -non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned under the code -name “Case Barbarossa”, and the former Field Marshal Paulus testified -that on 3 September 1940, when he joined the German General Staff, he -continued developing “Case Barbarossa”, which was finally completed at -the beginning of November 1940; and that even then, the German General -Staff had no information that the Soviet Union was preparing for war. - -On 18 December 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 21, initialed by Keitel -and Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations connected -with the realization of “Case Barbarossa” by 15 May 1941. This directive -stated: - - “The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia - in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England - . . . . Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of - an attack will not be recognized.” - -Before the directive of 18 December had been made, the Defendant Göring -had informed General Thomas, chief of the Office of War Economy of the -OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made surveys of the economic -possibilities of the U.S.S.R., including its raw materials, its power -and transport system, and its capacity to produce arms. - -In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the Eastern -territories with many military-economic units (inspectorates, commandos, -groups) was created under the supervision of the Defendant Göring. In -conjunction with the military command, these units were to achieve the -most complete and efficient economic exploitation of the occupied -territories in the interest of Germany. - -The framework of the future political and economic organization of the -occupied territories was designed by the Defendant Rosenberg over a -period of three months, after conferences with and assistance by the -Defendants, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Von Ribbentrop, and -Frick, or their representatives. It was made the subject of a most -detailed report immediately after the invasion. - -These plans outlined the destruction of the Soviet Union as an -independent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich -Commissariats, and the conversion of Estonia, Latvia, Bielorussia, and -other territories into German colonies. - -At the same time Germany drew Hungary, Rumania, and Finland into the war -against the U.S.S.R. In December 1940 Hungary agreed to participate on -the promise of Germany that she should have certain territories at the -expense of Yugoslavia. - -In May 1941 a final agreement was concluded with Antonescu, the Prime -Minister of Rumania, regarding the attack on the U.S.S.R., in which -Germany promised to Rumania, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the -right to occupy Soviet territory up to the Dnieper. - -On 22 June 1941, without any declaration of war, Germany invaded Soviet -territory in accordance with the plans so long made. - -The evidence which has been given before this Tribunal proves that -Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the U.S.S.R. as a -political and military power, so that Germany might expand to the east -according to her own desire. In _Mein Kampf_, Hitler had written: “If -new territory were to be acquired in Europe, it must have been mainly at -Russia’s cost, and once again the new German Empire should have set out -on its march along the same road as was formerly trodden by the Teutonic -Knights, this time to acquire soil for the German plough by means of the -German sword and thus provide the Nation with its daily bread.” But -there was a more immediate purpose, and in one of the memoranda of the -OKW, that immediate purpose was stated to be to feed the German Armies -from Soviet territory in the third year of the war, even if “as a result -many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the -country the things necessary for us.” - -The final aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were formulated at a -conference with Hitler on 16 July 1941, in which the Defendants Göring, -Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann participated: - - “There can be no talk of the creation of a military power west - of the Urals, even if we should have to fight 100 years to - achieve this . . . . All the Baltic regions must become part of - the Reich. The Crimea and adjoining regions (north of the - Crimea) must likewise be incorporated into the Reich. The region - of the Volga as well as the Baku district must likewise be - incorporated into the Reich. The Finns want Eastern Karelia. - However, in view of the large deposits of nickel, the Kola - peninsula must be ceded to Germany.” - -It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the U.S.S.R. -was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack upon -Germany, and making preparations to that end. It is impossible to -believe that this view was ever honestly entertained. - -The plans for the economic exploitation of the U.S.S.R., for the removal -of masses of the population, for the murder of Commissars and political -leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme launched on 22 -June without warning of any kind, and without the shadow of legal -excuse. It was plain aggression. - - - _War against the United States_ - -Four days after the attack launched by the Japanese on the United States -fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Germany declared war on the -United States. - -The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, had been signed -on 27 September 1940, and from that date until the attack upon the -U.S.S.R. the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, with other defendants, was -endeavoring to induce Japan to attack British possessions in the Far -East. This, it was thought, would hasten England’s defeat, and keep the -United States out of the war. - -The possibility of a direct attack on the United States was considered -and discussed as a matter for the future. Major Von Falkenstein, the -Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, -summarizing military problems which needed discussion in Berlin in -October of 1940, spoke of the possibility “of the prosecution of the war -against America at a later date.” It is clear, too, that the German -policy of keeping America out of the war, if possible, did not prevent -Germany promising support to Japan even against the United States. On 4 -April 1941 Hitler told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the -presence of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, that Germany would “strike -without delay” if a Japanese attack on Singapore should lead to war -between Japan and the United States. The next day Von Ribbentrop himself -urged Matsuoka to bring Japan into the war. - -On 28 November 1941, 10 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Von -Ribbentrop encouraged Japan, through her Ambassador in Berlin, to attack -Great Britain and the United States, and stated that should Japan become -engaged in a war with the United States, Germany would join the war -immediately. A few days later, Japanese representatives told Germany and -Italy that Japan was preparing to attack the United States, and asked -for their support. Germany and Italy agreed to do this, although in the -Tripartite Pact, Italy and Germany had undertaken to assist Japan only -if she were attacked. When the assault on Pearl Harbor did take place, -the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is reported to have been “overjoyed”, and -later, at a ceremony in Berlin, when a German medal was awarded to -Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, Hitler indicated his approval of the -tactics which the Japanese had adopted of negotiating with the United -States as long as possible, and then striking hard without any -declaration of war. - -Although it is true that Hitler and his colleagues originally did not -consider that a war with the United States would be beneficial to their -interest, it is apparent that in the course of 1941 that view was -revised, and Japan was given every encouragement to adopt a policy which -would almost certainly bring the United States into the war. And when -Japan attacked the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor and thus made -aggressive war against the United States, the Nazi Government caused -Germany to enter that war at once on the side of Japan by declaring war -themselves on the United States. - - - _Violations of International Treaties_ - -The Charter defines as a crime the planning or waging of war that is a -war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties. The -Tribunal has decided that certain of the defendants planned and waged -aggressive wars against 12 nations, and were therefore guilty of this -series of crimes. This makes it unnecessary to discuss the subject in -further detail, or even to consider at any length the extent to which -these aggressive wars were also “wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, or assurances.” - -These treaties are set out in Appendix C of the Indictment. Those of -principal importance are the following. - - - _Hague Conventions_ - -In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers agreed: “before an appeal to -arms . . . to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good -offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers.” A similar clause -was inserted in the Convention for Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes of 1907. In the accompanying Convention Relative to Opening of -Hostilities, Article I contains this far more specific language: “The -Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not -commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form of either -a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional -declaration of war.” Germany was a party to these conventions. - - - _Versailles Treaty_ - -Breaches of certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty are also relied -on by the Prosecution—Not to fortify the left bank of the Rhine -(Articles 42-44); to “respect strictly the independence of Austria” -(Article 80); renunciation of any rights in Memel (Article 99) and the -Free City of Danzig (Article 100); the recognition of the independence -of the Czechoslovak State; and the military, naval, and air clauses -against German rearmament found in Part V. There is no doubt that action -was taken by the German Government contrary to all these provisions, the -details of which are set out in Appendix C. With regard to the Treaty of -Versailles, the matters relied on are: - -1. The violation of Articles 42 to 44 in respect of the demilitarized -zone of the Rhineland; - -2. The annexation of Austria on 13 March 1938, in violation of Article -80; - -3. The incorporation of the district of Memel on 22 March 1939, in -violation of Article 99; - -4. The incorporation of the Free City of Danzig on 1 September 1939, in -violation of Article 100; - -5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia on 16 March -1939, in violation of Article 81; - -6. The repudiation of the military, naval, and air clauses of the -Treaty, in or about March of 1935. - -On 21 May 1935 Germany announced that, whilst renouncing the disarmament -clauses of the Treaty, she would still respect the territorial -limitations, and would comply with the Locarno Pact. (With regard to the -first five breaches alleged, therefore, the Tribunal finds the -allegation proved.) - - - _Treaties of Mutual Guarantee, Arbitration, and Non-Aggression_ - -It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail the various treaties entered -into by Germany with other Powers. Treaties of mutual guarantee were -signed by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Belgium, France, Great -Britain, and Italy, assuring the maintenance of the territorial _status -quo_. Arbitration treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno with -Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland. - -Article I of the latter treaty is typical, providing: “All disputes of -every kind between Germany and Poland . . . which it may not be possible -to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be -submitted for decision to an arbitral tribunal . . . .” - -Conventions of Arbitration and Conciliation were entered into between -Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark in 1926; and between Germany and -Luxembourg in 1929. Non-aggression treaties were executed by Germany -with Denmark and Russia in 1939. - - - _Kellogg-Briand Pact_ - -The Pact of Paris was signed on 27 August 1928 by Germany, the United -States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and other -countries; and subsequently by other Powers. The Tribunal has made full -reference to the nature of this Pact and its legal effect in another -part of this judgment. It is therefore not necessary to discuss the -matter further here, save to state that in the opinion of the Tribunal -this Pact was violated by Germany in all the cases of aggressive war -charged in the Indictment. It is to be noted that on 26 January 1934 -Germany signed a Declaration for the Maintenance of Permanent Peace with -Poland, which was explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and in which -the use of force was outlawed for a period of 10 years. - -The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider any of the other -treaties referred to in the Appendix, or the repeated agreements and -assurances of her peaceful intentions entered into by Germany. - - - _The Law of the Charter_ - -The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement and -Charter, and the crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, -for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in -Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the -Tribunal. - -The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative -power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally -surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for -the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world. The -Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the -victorious Nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, -it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its -creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to international -law. - -The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to -administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the Trial. In -doing so, they have done together what any one of them might have done -singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus -to set up special courts to administer law. With regard to the -constitution of the Court, all that the defendants are entitled to ask -is to receive a fair trial on the facts and law. - -The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression or a war -in violation of international treaties a crime; and it is therefore not -strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war -was a crime before the execution of the London Agreement. But in view of -the great importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has -heard full argument from the Prosecution and the Defense, and will -express its view on the matter. - -It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental principle of -all law—international and domestic—is that there can be no punishment -of crime without a pre-existing law. “_Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla -poena sine lege._“ It was submitted that _ex post facto_ punishment is -abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations, that no sovereign power -had made aggressive war a crime at the time that the alleged criminal -acts were committed, that no statute had defined aggressive war, that no -penalty had been fixed for its commission, and no court had been created -to try and punish offenders. - -In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim _nullum crimen -sine lege_ is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a -principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in -defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring states -without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the -attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being -unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go -unpunished. Occupying the positions they did in the Government of -Germany, the defendants, or at least some of them must have known of the -treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement -of international disputes; they must have known that they were acting in -defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they -carried out their designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of -the case alone, it would appear that the maxim has no application to the -present facts. - -This view is strongly reinforced by a consideration of the state of -international law in 1939, so far as aggressive war is concerned. The -General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 27 August 1928, more -generally known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was -binding on 63 nations, including Germany, Italy and Japan at the -outbreak of war in 1939. In the preamble, the signatories declared that -they were: - - “Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of - mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank - renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should - be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now - existing between their peoples should be perpetuated . . . . all - changes in their relations with one another should be sought - only by pacific means . . . thus uniting civilised nations of - the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of - their national policy . . . .” - -The first two articles are as follows: - - “Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the - names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to - war for the solution of international controversies and renounce - it as an instrument of national policy in their relations to one - another.” - - “Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the - settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever - nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among - them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.” - -The question is, what was the legal effect of this Pact? The nations who -signed the Pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to -war for the future as an instrument of policy, and expressly renounced -it. After the signing of the Pact, any nation resorting to war as an -instrument of national policy breaks the Pact. In the opinion of the -Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national -policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal -in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with -its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so -doing. War for the solution of international controversies undertaken as -an instrument of national policy certainly includes a war of aggression, -and such a war is therefore outlawed by the Pact. As Mr. Henry L. -Stimson, then Secretary of State of the United States, said in 1932: - - “War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the - Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become throughout - practically the entire world . . . an illegal thing. Hereafter, - when nations engage in armed conflict, either one or both of - them must be termed violators of this general treaty law . . . . - We denounce them as law breakers.” - -But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly enact that such wars -are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such wars. To that -extent the same is true with regard to the laws of war contained in the -Hague Convention. The Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited resort to -certain methods of waging war. These included the inhumane treatment of -prisoners, the employment of poisoned weapons, the improper use of flags -of truce, and similar matters. Many of these prohibitions had been -enforced long before the date of the Convention; but since 1907 they -have certainly been crimes, punishable as offenses against the laws of -war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere designates such practices as -criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a -court to try and punish offenders. For many years past, however, -military tribunals have tried and punished individuals guilty of -violating the rules of land warfare laid down by this Convention. In the -opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that -which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of -one of the rules of the Hague Convention. In interpreting the words of -the Pact, it must be remembered that international law is not the -product of an international legislature, and that such international -agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general principles of -law, and not with administrative matters of procedure. The law of war is -to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of -states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the -general principles of justice applied by jurists and practised by -military courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation -follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do -no more than express and define for more accurate reference the -principles of law already existing. - -The view which the Tribunal takes of the true interpretation of the Pact -is supported by the international history which preceded it. In the year -1923 the draft of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance was sponsored by the -League of Nations. In Article I the Treaty declared “that aggressive war -is an international crime”, and that the parties would “undertake that -no one of them will be guilty of its commission”. The draft treaty was -submitted to 29 states, about half of whom were in favor of accepting -the text. The principal objection appeared to be in the difficulty of -defining the acts which would constitute “aggression”, rather than any -doubt as to the criminality of aggressive war. The preamble to the -League of Nations 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of -International Disputes (“Geneva Protocol”), after “recognising the -solidarity of the members of the international community”, declared that -“a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and is -an international crime.” It went on to declare that the contracting -parties were “desirous of facilitating the complete application of the -system provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific -settlement of disputes between the States and of ensuring the repression -of international crimes.” The Protocol was recommended to the members of -the League of Nations by a unanimous resolution in the assembly of the -48 members of the League. These members included Italy and Japan, but -Germany was not then a member of the League. - -Although the Protocol was never ratified, it was signed by the leading -statesmen of the world, representing the vast majority of the civilized -states and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evidence of the -intention to brand aggressive war as an international crime. - -At the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 September -1927, all the delegations then present (including the German, the -Italian, and the Japanese), unanimously adopted a declaration concerning -wars of aggression. The preamble to the declaration stated: - -“The Assembly: - - Recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of - nations; - - Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general - peace; - - Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as a - means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence - an international crime . . . .” - -The unanimous resolution of 18 February 1928 of 21 American republics at -the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American Conference, declared that “war of -aggression constitutes an international crime against the human -species”. - -All these expressions of opinion, and others that could be cited, so -solemnly made, reinforce the construction which the Tribunal placed upon -the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not merely -illegal, but is criminal. The prohibition of aggressive war demanded by -the conscience of the world, finds its expression in the series of pacts -and treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred. - -It is also important to remember that Article 227 of the Treaty of -Versailles provided for the constitution of a special Tribunal, composed -of representatives of five of the Allied and Associated Powers which had -been belligerents in the first World War opposed to Germany, to try the -former German Emperor “for a supreme offense against international -morality and the sanctity of treaties.” The purpose of this trial was -expressed to be “to vindicate the solemn obligations of international -undertakings, and the validity of international morality”. In Article -228 of the Treaty, the German Government expressly recognized the right -of the Allied Powers “to bring before military tribunals persons accused -of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war”. - -It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of -sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and -further, that where the act in question is an act of State, those who -carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the -doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the -Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That international -law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon -States has long been recognized. In the recent case of Ex Parte Quirin -(1942 317 U.S. 1), before the Supreme Court of the United States, -persons were charged during the war with landing in the United States -for purposes of spying and sabotage. The late Chief Justice Stone, -speaking for the Court, said: - - “From the very beginning of its history this Court has applied - the law of war as including that part of the law of nations - which prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights, and - duties of enemy nations as well as enemy individuals.” - -He went on to give a list of cases tried by the Courts, where individual -offenders were charged with offenses against the laws of nations, and -particularly the laws of war. Many other authorities could be cited, but -enough has been said to show that individuals can be punished for -violations of international law. Crimes against international law are -committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing -individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international -law be enforced. - -The provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles already -referred to illustrate and enforce this view of individual -responsibility. - -The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, -protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which -are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these -acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order -to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings. Article 7 of the -Charter expressly declares: - - “The official position of Defendants, whether as heads of State, - or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be - considered as freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating - punishment.” - -On the other hand the very essence of the Charter is that individuals -have international duties which transcend the national obligations of -obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of -war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of -the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its -competence under international law. - -It was also submitted on behalf of most of these defendants that in -doing what they did they were acting under the orders of Hitler, and -therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts committed by them in -carrying out these orders. The Charter specifically provides in Article -8: - - “The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his - Government or of a superior shall not free him from - responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of - punishment.” - -The provisions of this article are in conformity with the law of all -nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of -the international law of war has never been recognized as a defense to -such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here provides, the order -may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which is -found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the -existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible. - - - _The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy_ - -In the previous recital of the facts relating to aggressive war, it is -clear that planning and preparation had been carried out in the most -systematic way at every stage of the history. - -Planning and preparation are essential to the making of war. In the -opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a crime under international -law. The Charter defines this offense as planning, preparation, -initiation, or waging of a war of aggression “or participation in a -Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment . . . of the -foregoing”. The Indictment follows this distinction. Count One charges -the Common Plan or Conspiracy. Count Two charges the planning and waging -of war. The same evidence has been introduced to support both Counts. We -shall therefore discuss both Counts together, as they are in substance -the same. The defendants have been charged under both Counts, and their -guilt under each Count must be determined. - -The “Common Plan or Conspiracy” charged in the Indictment covers 25 -years, from the formation of the Nazi Party in 1919 to the end of the -war in 1945. The Party is spoken of as “the instrument of cohesion among -the Defendants” for carrying out the purposes of the conspiracy—the -overthrowing of the Treaty of Versailles, acquiring territory lost by -Germany in the last war and “Lebensraum” in Europe, by the use, if -necessary, of armed force, of aggressive war. The “seizure of power” by -the Nazis, the use of terror, the destruction of trade unions, the -attack on Christian teaching and on churches, the persecution of Jews, -the regimentation of youth—all these are said to be steps deliberately -taken to carry out the common plan. It found expression, so it is -alleged, in secret rearmament, the withdrawal by Germany from the -Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, universal military -service, and seizure of the Rhineland. Finally, according to the -Indictment, aggressive action was planned and carried out against -Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1936-1938, followed by the planning and -waging of war against Poland; and, successively, against 10 other -countries. - -The Prosecution says, in effect, that any significant participation in -the affairs of the Nazi Party or Government is evidence of a -participation in a conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy is -not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the -conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not -be too far removed from the time of decision and of action. The -planning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the declarations of a -party program, such as are found in the 25 points of the Nazi Party, -announced in 1920, or the political affirmations expressed in _Mein -Kampf_ in later years. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan -to wage war existed, and determine the participants in that concrete -plan. - -It is not necessary to decide whether a single master conspiracy between -the defendants has been established by the evidence. The seizure of -power by the Nazi Party, and the subsequent domination by the Nazi State -of all spheres of economic and social life must of course be remembered -when the later plans for waging war are examined. That plans were made -to wage war, as early as 5 November 1937, and probably before that, is -apparent. And thereafter, such preparations continued in many -directions, and against the peace of many countries. Indeed the threat -of war—and war itself if necessary—was an integral part of the Nazi -policy. But the evidence establishes with certainty the existence of -many separate plans rather than a single conspiracy embracing them all. -That Germany was rapidly moving to complete dictatorship from the moment -that the Nazis seized power, and progressively in the direction of war, -has been overwhelmingly shown in the ordered sequence of aggressive acts -and wars already set out in this Judgment. - -In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence establishes the common -planning to prepare and wage war by certain of the defendants. It is -immaterial to consider whether a single conspiracy to the extent and -over the time set out in the Indictment has been conclusively proved. -Continued planning, with aggressive war as the objective, has been -established beyond doubt. The truth of the situation was well stated by -Paul Schmidt, official interpreter of the German Foreign Office, as -follows: - - “The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent - from the start, namely the domination of the European Continent, - to be achieved first by the incorporation of all German speaking - groups in the Reich, and secondly, by territorial expansion - under the slogan “Lebensraum”. The execution of these basic - objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by - improvisation. Each succeeding step was apparently carried out - as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the - ultimate objectives mentioned above.” - -The argument that such common planning cannot exist where there is -complete dictatorship is unsound. A plan in the execution of which a -number of persons participate is still a plan, even though conceived by -only one of them; and those who execute the plan do not avoid -responsibility by showing that they acted under the direction of the man -who conceived it. Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He -had to have the co-operation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, -and business men. When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him their -co-operation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had initiated. -They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them, if -they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks -by a dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. -The relation of leader and follower does not preclude responsibility -here any more than it does in the comparable tyranny of organized -domestic crime. - -Count One, however, charges not only the conspiracy to commit aggressive -war, but also to commit War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. But the -Charter does not define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the -one to commit acts of aggressive war. Article 6 of the Charter provides: - - “Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating - in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy - to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all - acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.” - -In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and separate -crime to those already listed. The words are designed to establish the -responsibility of persons participating in a common plan. The Tribunal -will therefore disregard the charges in Count One that the defendants -conspired to commit War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, and will -consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate, and wage aggressive -war. - - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -The evidence relating to War Crimes has been overwhelming, in its volume -and its detail. It is impossible for this Judgment adequately to review -it, or to record the mass of documentary and oral evidence that has been -presented. The truth remains that War Crimes were committed on a vast -scale, never before seen in the history of war. They were perpetrated in -all the countries occupied by Germany, and on the High Seas, and were -attended by every conceivable circumstance of cruelty and horror. There -can be no doubt that the majority of them arose from the Nazi conception -of “total war”, with which the aggressive wars were waged. For in this -conception of “total war”, the moral ideas underlying the conventions -which seek to make war more humane are no longer regarded as having -force or validity. Everything is made subordinate to the overmastering -dictates of war. Rules, regulations, assurances, and treaties all alike -are of no moment; and so, freed from the restraining influence of -international law, the aggressive war is conducted by the Nazi leaders -in the most barbaric way. Accordingly, War Crimes were committed when -and wherever the Führer and his close associates thought them to be -advantageous. They were for the most part the result of cold and -criminal calculation. - -On some occasions, War Crimes were deliberately planned long in advance. -In the case of the Soviet Union, the plunder of the territories to be -occupied, and the ill-treatment of the civilian population, were settled -in minute detail before the attack was begun. As early as the autumn of -1940, the invasion of the territories of the Soviet Union was being -considered. From that date onwards, the methods to be employed in -destroying all possible opposition were continuously under discussion. - -Similarly, when planning to exploit the inhabitants of the occupied -countries for slave labor on the very greatest scale, the German -Government conceived it as an integral part of the war economy, and -planned and organized this particular War Crime down to the last -elaborate detail. - -Other War Crimes, such as the murder of prisoners of war who had escaped -and been recaptured, or the murder of Commandos or captured airmen, or -the destruction of the Soviet Commissars, were the result of direct -orders circulated through the highest official channels. - -The Tribunal proposes, therefore, to deal quite generally with the -question of War Crimes, and to refer to them later when examining the -responsibility of the individual defendants in relation to them. -Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in -defiance of the well-established rules of international law, but in -complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity. Civilian -populations in occupied territories suffered the same fate. Whole -populations were deported to Germany for the purposes of slave labor -upon defense works, armament production, and similar tasks connected -with the war effort. Hostages were taken in very large numbers from the -civilian populations in all the occupied countries, and were shot as -suited the German purposes. Public and private property was -systematically plundered and pillaged in order to enlarge the resources -of Germany at the expense of the rest of Europe. Cities and towns and -villages were wantonly destroyed without military justification or -necessity. - - - _Murder and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War_ - - Article 6 (b) of the Charter defines War Crimes in these words: - “War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. - Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, - ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other - purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, - murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the - seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private - property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or - devastation not justified by military necessity.” - -In the course of the war, many Allied soldiers who had surrendered to -the Germans were shot immediately, often as a matter of deliberate, -calculated policy. On 18 October 1942, the Defendant Keitel circulated a -directive authorized by Hitler, which ordered that all members of Allied -“Commando” units, often when in uniform and whether armed or not, were -to be “slaughtered to the last man”, even if they attempted to -surrender. It was further provided that if such Allied troops came into -the hands of the military authorities after being first captured by the -local police, or in any other way, they should be handed over -immediately to the SD. This order was supplemented from time to time, -and was effective throughout the remainder of the war, although after -the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944 it was made clear that the order -did not apply to “Commandos” captured within the immediate battle area. -Under the provisions of this order, Allied “Commando” troops, and other -military units operating independently, lost their lives in Norway, -France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Many of them were killed on the spot, -and in no case were those who were executed later in concentration camps -ever given a trial of any kind. For example, an American military -mission which landed behind the German front in the Balkans in January -1945, numbering about twelve to fifteen men and wearing uniform, were -taken to Mauthausen under the authority of this order, and according to -the affidavit of Adolf Zutte, the adjutant of the Mauthausen -Concentration Camp, all of them were shot. - -In March 1944 the OKH issued the “Kugel” or “Bullet” decree, which -directed that every escaped officer and NCO prisoner of war who had not -been put to work, with the exception of British and American prisoners -of war, should on recapture be handed over to the SIPO and SD. This -order was distributed by the SIPO and SD to their regional offices. -These escaped officers and NCO’s were to be sent to the concentration -camp at Mauthausen, to be executed upon arrival, by means of a bullet -shot in the neck. - -In March 1944 fifty officers of the British Royal Air Force, who escaped -from the camp at Sagan where they were confined as prisoners, were shot -on recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler. Their bodies were -immediately cremated, and the urns containing their ashes were returned -to the camp. It was not contended by the defendants that this was other -than plain murder, in complete violation of international law. - -When Allied airmen were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes -killed at once by the civilian population. The police were instructed -not to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry of Justice was -informed that no one should be prosecuted for taking part in them. - -The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was characterized by particular -inhumanity. The death of so many of them was not due merely to the -action of individual guards, or to the exigencies of life in the camps. -It was the result of systematic plans to murder. More than a month -before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the OKW were making -special plans for dealing with political representatives serving with -the Soviet Armed Forces who might be captured. One proposal was that -“political Commissars _of the Army_ are not recognized as _Prisoners of -War_, and are to be _liquidated_ at the latest in the transient prisoner -of war camps.” The Defendant Keitel gave evidence that instructions -incorporating this proposal were issued to the German Army. - -On 8 September 1941 regulations for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of -war in all prisoner of war camps were issued, signed by General -Reinecke, the head of the prisoner of war department of the High -Command. Those orders stated: - - “The Bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to - treatment as an honorable opponent, in accordance with the - Geneva Convention . . . . The order for ruthless and energetic - action must be given at the slightest indication of - insubordination, especially in the case of Bolshevist fanatics. - Insubordination, active or passive resistance, must be broken - immediately by force of arms (bayonets, butts, and firearms) - . . . . Anyone carrying out the order who does not use his - weapons, or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable - . . . . Prisoners of war attempting escape are to be fired on - without previous challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired - . . . . The use of arms against prisoners of war is as a rule - legal.” - -The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suitable clothing; the -wounded without medical care; they were starved, and in many cases left -to die. - -On 17 July 1941, the Gestapo issued an order providing for the killing -of all Soviet prisoners of war who were or might be dangerous to -National Socialism. The order recited: - - “The mission of the Commanders of the SIPO and SD stationed in - Stalags is the political investigation of all camp inmates, the - elimination and further ‘treatment’ (a) of all political, - criminal, or in some other way unbearable elements among them, - (b) of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of - the occupied territories . . . . Further, the commanders must - make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners - elements which appear reliable, regardless of whether there are - Communists concerned or not, in order to use them for - intelligence purposes inside of the camp, and if advisable, - later in the occupied territories also. By use of such - informers, and by use of all other existing possibilities, the - discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners - must proceed step by step at once . . . .” - - “Above all, the following must be discovered: all important - functionaries of State and Party, especially professional - revolutionaries . . . all People’s Commissars in the Red Army, - leading personalities of the State . . . leading personalities - of the business world, members of the Soviet Russian - Intelligence, all Jews, all persons who are found to be - agitators or fanatical Communists. Executions are not to be held - in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp . . . . The - prisoners are to be taken for special treatment if possible into - the former Soviet Russian territory.” - -The affidavit of Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht, and -the testimony of Ohlendorf, former Chief of Amt III of the RSHA, and of -Lahousen, the head of one of the sections of the Abwehr, the Wehrmacht’s -Intelligence Service, all indicate the thoroughness with which this -order was carried out. - - The affidavit of Kurt Lindown, a former Gestapo official, - states: “. . . . There existed in the prisoner of war camps on - the Eastern Front small screening teams (Einsatz commandos), - headed by lower ranking members of the Secret Police (Gestapo). - These teams were assigned to the camp commanders and had the job - of segregating the prisoners of war who were candidates for - execution according to the orders that had been given, and to - report them to the office of the Secret Police.” - -On 23 October 1941 the camp commander of the Gross Rosen concentration -camp reported to Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, a list of the Soviet -prisoners of war who had been executed there on the previous day. - -An account of the general conditions and treatment of Soviet prisoners -of war during the first eight months after the German attack upon Russia -was given in a letter which the Defendant Rosenberg sent to the -Defendant Keitel on 28 February 1942: - - “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the - contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent . . . . A large part - of them has starved, or died because of the hazards of the - weather. Thousands also died from spotted fever. - - “The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to - put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather - let them starve to death. - - “In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on - the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot - before the eyes of the horrified population, and the corpses - were left. - - “In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was - provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or - snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves.” - -In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were branded with a special -permanent mark. There was put in evidence the OKW order dated 20 July -1942 which laid down that: - - “The brand is to take the shape of an acute angle of about 45 - degrees, with the long side to be 1 cm. in length, pointing - upwards and burnt on the left buttock . . . . This brand is made - with the aid of a lancet available in any military unit. The - coloring used is Chinese ink.” - -The carrying out of this order was the responsibility of the military -authorities, though it was widely circulated by the Chief of the SIPO -and the SD to German police officials for information. - -Soviet prisoners of war were also made the subject of medical -experiments of the most cruel and inhuman kind. In July 1943 -experimental work was begun in preparation for a campaign of -bacteriological warfare; Soviet prisoners of war were used in these -medical experiments, which more often than not proved fatal. In -connection with this campaign for bacteriological warfare, preparations -were also made for the spreading of bacterial emulsions from planes, -with the object of producing widespread failures of crops and consequent -starvation. These measures were never applied, possibly because of the -rapid deterioration of Germany’s military position. - -The argument in defense of the charge with regard to the murder and -ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the U.S.S.R. was not a -party to the Geneva Convention, is quite without foundation. On 15 -September 1941 Admiral Canaris protested against the regulations for the -treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, signed by General Reinecke on 8 -September 1941. He then stated: - - “The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war is - not binding in the relationship between Germany and the U.S.S.R. - Therefore only the principles of general international law on - the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century - these have gradually been established along the lines that war - captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely - protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the - prisoners of war from further participation in the war. This - principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all - armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or - injure helpless people . . . . The decrees for the treatment of - Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based on a fundamentally - different view-point.” - -This protest, which correctly stated the legal position, was ignored. -The Defendant Keitel made a note on this memorandum: - - “The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous - warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I - approve and back the measures.” - - - _Murder and Ill-treatment of Civilian Population_ - -Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that “ill-treatment . . . of -civilian population of or in occupied territory . . . killing of -hostages . . . wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages” shall -be a war crime. In the main, these provisions are merely declaratory of -the existing laws of war as expressed by the Hague Convention, Article -46, which stated: “Family honor and rights, the lives of persons and -private property, as well as religious convictions and practice must be -respected.” - -The territories occupied by Germany were administered in violation of -the laws of war. The evidence is quite overwhelming of a systematic rule -of violence, brutality, and terror. On 7 December 1941 Hitler issued the -directive since known as the “Nacht und Nebel Erlass” (Night and Fog -Decree), under which persons who committed offenses against the Reich or -the German forces in occupied territories, except where the death -sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany and handed -over to the SIPO and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. This decree -was signed by the Defendant Keitel. After these civilians arrived in -Germany, no word of them was permitted to reach the country from which -they came, or their relatives; even in cases when they died awaiting -trial the families were not informed, the purpose being to create -anxiety in the minds of the family of the arrested person. Hitler’s -purpose in issuing this decree was stated by the Defendant Keitel in a -covering letter, dated 12 December 1941, to be as follows: - - “Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved either - by capital punishment or by measures by which the relatives of - the criminal and the population do not know the fate of the - criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal is transferred - to Germany.” - -Even persons who were only suspected of opposing any of the policies of -the German occupation authorities were arrested, and on arrest were -interrogated by the Gestapo and the SD in the most shameful manner. On -12 June 1942 the Chief of the SIPO and SD published, through Müller, the -Gestapo Chief, an order authorizing the use of “third degree” methods of -interrogation, where preliminary investigation had indicated that the -person could give information on important matters, such as subversive -activities, though not for the purpose of extorting confessions of the -prisoner’s own crimes. This order provided: - - “. . . . Third degree may, under this supposition, only be - employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, - saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, - parachute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet Russian - loafers or tramps; in all other cases my permission must first - be obtained . . . . Third degree can, according to - circumstances, consist amongst other methods of very simple diet - (bread and water), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, - exhaustive drilling, also in flogging (for more than twenty - strokes a doctor must be consulted).” - -The brutal suppression of all opposition to the German occupation was -not confined to severe measures against suspected members of resistance -movements themselves, but was also extended to their families. On 19 -July 1944 the Commander of the SIPO and SD in the district of Radom, in -Poland, published an order, transmitted through the Higher SS and Police -Leaders, to the effect that in all cases of assassination or attempted -assassination of Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital -installations, not only the guilty person, but also all his or her male -relatives should be shot, and female relatives over 16 years of age put -into a concentration camp. - -In the summer of 1944 the Einsatz Commando of the SIPO and SD at -Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concentration -camp because they were relatives of deserters, and were therefore -“expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go -free.” - -The practice of keeping hostages to prevent and to punish any form of -civil disorder was resorted to by the Germans; an order issued by the -Defendant Keitel on 16 September 1941 spoke in terms of fifty or a -hundred lives from the occupied areas of the Soviet Union for one German -life taken. The order stated that “it should be remembered that a human -life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing, and a -deterrent effect can be obtained only by unusual severity.” The exact -number of persons killed as a result of this policy is not known, but -large numbers were killed in France and the other occupied territories -in the West, while in the East the slaughter was on an even more -extensive scale. In addition to the killing of hostages, entire towns -were destroyed in some cases; such massacres as those of -Oradour-sur-Glane in France and Lidice in Czechoslovakia, both of which -were described to the Tribunal in detail, are examples of the organized -use of terror by the occupying forces to beat down and destroy all -opposition to their rule. - -One of the most notorious means of terrorizing the people in occupied -territories was the use of concentration camps. They were first -established in Germany at the moment of the seizure of power by the Nazi -Government. Their original purpose was to imprison without trial all -those persons who were opposed to the Government, or who were in any way -obnoxious to German authority. With the aid of a secret police force, -this practice was widely extended, and in course of time concentration -camps became places of organized and systematic murder, where millions -of people were destroyed. - -In the administration of the occupied territories the concentration -camps were used to destroy all opposition groups. The persons arrested -by the Gestapo were as a rule sent to concentration camps. They were -conveyed to the camps in many cases without any care whatever being -taken for them, and great numbers died on the way. Those who arrived at -the camp were subject to systematic cruelty. They were given hard -physical labor, inadequate food, clothes and shelter, and were subject -at all times to the rigors of a soulless regime, and the private whims -of individual guards. In the report of the War Crimes Branch of the -Judge Advocate’s Section of the Third U.S. Army, under date 21 June -1945, the conditions at the Flossenburg concentration camp were -investigated, and one passage may be quoted: - - “Flossenburg concentration camp can best be described as a - factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the - primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor, another - of its primary objects was the elimination of human lives by the - methods employed in handling the prisoners. Hunger and - starvation rations, sadism, inadequate clothing, medical - neglect, disease, beatings, hangings, freezing, forced suicides, - shooting, etc. all played a major role in obtaining their - object. Prisoners were murdered at random; spite killings - against Jews were common, injections of poison and shooting in - the neck were everyday occurrences; epidemics of typhus and - spotted fever were permitted to run rampant as a means of - eliminating prisoners; life in this camp meant nothing. Killing - became a common thing, so common that a quick death was welcomed - by the unfortunate ones.” - -A certain number of the concentration camps were equipped with gas -chambers for the wholesale destruction of the inmates, and with furnaces -for the burning of the bodies. Some of them were in fact used for the -extermination of Jews as part of the “final solution” of the Jewish -problem. Most of the non-Jewish inmates were used for labor, although -the conditions under which they worked made labor and death almost -synonymous terms. Those inmates who became ill and were unable to work -were either destroyed in the gas chambers or sent to special -infirmaries, where they were given entirely inadequate medical -treatment, worse food if possible than the working inmates, and left to -die. - -The murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations reached its height -in the treatment of the citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland. Some -four weeks before the invasion of Russia began, special task forces of -the SIPO and SD, called Einsatz Groups, were formed on the orders of -Himmler for the purpose of following the German Armies into Russia, -combating partisans and members of Resistance Groups, and exterminating -the Jews and communist leaders and other sections of the population. In -the beginning, four such Einsatz Groups were formed, one operating in -the Baltic States, one towards Moscow, one towards Kiev, and one -operating in the south of Russia. Ohlendorf, former Chief of Amt III of -the RSHA, who led the fourth group, stated in his affidavit: - - “When the German army invaded Russia, I was leader of - Einsatzgruppe D, in the southern sector, and in the course of - the year during which I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D it - liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women, and children. The - majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also - among them some communist functionaries.” - -In an order issued by the Defendant Keitel on 23 July 1941, and drafted -by the Defendant Jodl, it was stated that: - - “In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East, the - forces available for establishing security in these areas will - be sufficient only if all resistance is punished, not by legal - prosecution of the guilty, but by the spreading of such terror - by the Armed Forces as is alone appropriate to eradicate every - inclination to resist among the population . . . . Commanders - must find the means of keeping order by applying suitable - Draconian measures.” - -The evidence has shown that this order was ruthlessly carried out in the -territory of the Soviet Union and in Poland. A significant illustration -of the measures actually applied occurs in the document which was sent -in 1943 to the Defendant Rosenberg by the Reich Commissar for Eastern -Territories, who wrote: - - “It should be possible to avoid atrocities and to bury those who - have been liquidated. To lock men, women, and children into - barns and set fire to them does not appear to be a suitable - method of combating bands, even if it is desired to exterminate - the population. This method is not worthy of the German cause, - and hurts our reputation severely.” - -The Tribunal has before it an affidavit of one Hermann Graebe, dated 10 -November 1945, describing the immense mass murders which he witnessed. -He was the manager and engineer in charge of the branch of the Solingen -firm of Josef Jung in Spolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 to January -1944. He first of all described the attack upon the Jewish ghetto at -Rowno: - - “. . . . Then the electric floodlights which had been erected - all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details - of four to six members entered or at least tried to enter the - houses. Where the doors and windows were closed, and the - inhabitants did not open upon the knocking, the SS men and - militia broke the windows, forced the doors with beams and - crowbars, and entered the dwelling. The owners were driven on to - the street just as they were, regardless of whether they were - dressed or whether they had been in bed. . . . Car after car was - filled. Over it hung the screaming of women and children, the - cracking of whips and rifle shots.” - -Graebe then described how a mass execution at Dubno, which he witnessed -on 5 October 1942, was carried out: - - “. . . . Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind one - of the earth mounds. The people who had got off the trucks, men, - women, and children of all ages, had to undress upon the orders - of an SS man, who carried a riding or dog whip . . . . Without - screaming or crying, these people undressed, stood around by - families, kissed each other, said farewells, and waited for the - command of another SS man, who stood near the excavation, also - with a whip in his hand. . . . At that moment the SS man at the - excavation called something to his comrade. The latter counted - off about 20 persons, and instructed them to walk behind the - earth mound . . . . I walked around the mound and stood in front - of a tremendous grave; closely pressed together, the people were - lying on top of each other so that only their heads were - visible. The excavation was already two-thirds full; I estimated - that it contained about a thousand people. . . . Now already the - next group approached, descended into the excavation, lined - themselves up against the previous victims and were shot.” - -The foregoing crimes against the civilian population are sufficiently -appalling, and yet the evidence shows that at any rate in the East, the -mass murders and cruelties were not committed solely for the purpose of -stamping out opposition or resistance to the German occupying forces. In -Poland and the Soviet Union these crimes were part of a plan to get rid -of whole native populations by expulsion and annihilation, in order that -their territory could be used for colonization by Germans. Hitler had -written in Mein Kampf on these lines, and the plan was clearly stated by -Himmler in July 1942, when he wrote: “It is not our task to Germanize -the East in the old sense, that is to teach the people there the German -language and the German law, but to see to it that only people of purely -Germanic blood live in the East.” - -In August 1942 the policy for the Eastern Territories as laid down by -Bormann was summarized by a subordinate of Rosenberg as follows: - - “The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we do not need them, - they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and Germanic - health services are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is - undesirable.” - -It was Himmler again who stated in October 1943: - - “What happens to a Russian, a Czech, does not interest me in the - slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood - of our type, we will take. If necessary, by kidnapping their - children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in - prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we - need them as slaves for our Kultur, otherwise it is of no - interest to me.” - -In Poland the intelligentsia had been marked down for extermination as -early as September 1939, and in May 1940 the Defendant Frank wrote in -his diary of “taking advantage of the focussing of world interest on the -Western Front, by wholesale liquidation of thousands of Poles, first -leading representatives of the Polish intelligentsia.” Earlier, Frank -had been directed to reduce the “entire Polish economy to an absolute -minimum necessary for bare existence. The Poles shall be the slaves of -the Greater German World Empire.” In January 1940 he recorded in his -diary that “cheap labor must be removed from the General Government by -hundreds of thousands. This will hamper the native biological -propagation.” So successfully did the Germans carry out this policy in -Poland that by the end of the war one-third of the population had been -killed, and the whole of the country devastated. - -It was the same story in the occupied area of the Soviet Union. At the -time of the launching of the German attack in June 1941 Rosenberg told -his collaborators: - - “The object of feeding the German People stands this year - without a doubt at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on - the East, and there the southern territories and the northern - Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the - German People . . . . A very extensive evacuation will be - necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future - will hold very hard years in store for the Russians.” - -Three or four weeks later Hitler discussed with Rosenberg, Göring, -Keitel, and others his plan for the exploitation of the Soviet -population and territory, which included among other things the -evacuation of the inhabitants of the Crimea and its settlement by -Germans. - -A somewhat similar fate was planned for Czechoslovakia by the Defendant -Von Neurath, in August 1940; the intelligentsia were to be “expelled”, -but the rest of the population was to be Germanized rather than expelled -or exterminated, since there was a shortage of Germans to replace them. - -In the West the population of Alsace were the victims of a German -“expulsion action.” Between July and December 1940, 105,000 Alsatians -were either deported from their homes or prevented from returning to -them. A captured German report dated 7 August 1942 with regard to Alsace -states that: “The problem of race will be given first consideration, and -this in such a manner that persons of racial value will be deported to -Germany proper, and racially inferior persons to France.” - - - _Pillage of Public and Private Property_ - -Article 49 of the Hague Convention provides that an occupying Power may -levy a contribution of money from the occupied territory to pay for the -needs of the army of occupation, and for the administration of the -territory in question. Article 52 of the Hague Convention provides that -an occupying Power may make requisitions in kind only for the needs of -the army of occupation, and that these requisitions shall be in -proportion to the resources of the country. These articles, together -with Article 48, dealing with the expenditure of money collected in -taxes, and Articles 53, 55, and 56, dealing with public property, make -it clear that under the rules of war, the economy of an occupied country -can only be required to bear the expense of the occupation, and these -should not be greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be -expected to bear. Article 56 reads as follows: - - “The property of municipalities, of religious, charitable, - educational, artistic, and scientific institutions, although - belonging to the State, is to be accorded the same standing as - private property. All pre-meditated seizure, destruction, or - damage of such institutions, historical monuments, works of art - and science, is prohibited and should be prosecuted.” - -The evidence in this case has established, however, that the territories -occupied by Germany were exploited for the German war effort in the most -ruthless way, without consideration of the local economy, and in -consequence of a deliberate design and policy. There was in truth a -systematic “plunder of public or private property”, which was criminal -under Article 6 (b) of the Charter. The German occupation policy was -clearly stated in a speech made by the Defendant Göring on 6 August 1942 -to the various German authorities in charge of occupied territories: - - “God knows, you are not sent out there to work for the welfare - of the people in your charge, but to get the utmost out of them, - so that the German People can live. That is what I expect of - your exertions. This everlasting concern about foreign people - must cease now, once and for all. I have here before me reports - on what you are expected to deliver. It is nothing at all, when - I consider your territories. It makes no difference to me in - this connection if you say that your people will starve.” - -The methods employed to exploit the resources of the occupied -territories to the full varied from country to country. In some of the -occupied countries in the East and the West, this exploitation was -carried out within the framework of the existing economic structure. The -local industries were put under German supervision, and the distribution -of war materials was rigidly controlled. The industries thought to be of -value to the German war effort were compelled to continue, and most of -the rest were closed down altogether. Raw materials and the finished -products alike were confiscated for the needs of the German industry. As -early as 19 October 1939 the Defendant Göring had issued a directive -giving detailed instructions for the administration of the occupied -territories; it provided: - - “The task for the economic treatment of the various - administrative regions is different, depending on whether the - country is involved which will be incorporated politically into - the German Reich, or whether we will deal with the - Government-General, which in all probability will not be made a - part of Germany. In the first mentioned territories, the . . . - safeguarding of all their productive facilities and supplies - must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into the - Greater German economic system, at the earliest possible time. - On the other hand, there must be removed from the territories of - the Government-General all raw materials, scrap materials, - machines, etc., which are of use for the German war economy. - Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the meager - maintenance of the naked existence of the population must be - transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would require an - unreasonably long period of time, and would make it more - practicable to exploit those enterprises by giving them German - orders, to be executed at their present location.” - -As a consequence of this order, agricultural products, raw materials -needed by German factories, machine tools, transportation equipment, -other finished products, and even foreign securities and holdings of -foreign exchange were all requisitioned and sent to Germany. These -resources were requisitioned in a manner out of all proportion to the -economic resources of those countries, and resulted in famine, -inflation, and an active black market. At first the German occupation -authorities attempted to suppress the black market, because it was a -channel of distribution keeping local products out of German hands. When -attempts at suppression failed, a German purchasing agency was organized -to make purchases for Germany on the black market, thus carrying out the -assurance made by the Defendant Göring that it was “necessary that all -should know that if there is to be famine anywhere, it shall in no case -be in Germany.” - -In many of the occupied countries of the East and the West, the -authorities maintained the pretense of paying for all the property which -they seized. This elaborate pretense of payment merely disguised the -fact that the goods sent to Germany from these occupied countries were -paid for by the occupied countries themselves, either by the device of -excessive occupation costs or by forced loans in return for a credit -balance on a “clearing account” which was an account merely in name. - -In most of the occupied countries of the East even this pretense of -legality was not maintained; economic exploitation became deliberate -plunder. This policy was first put into effect in the administration of -the Government General in Poland. The main exploitation of the raw -materials in the East was centered on agricultural products and very -large amounts of food were shipped from the Government General to -Germany. - -The evidence of the widespread starvation among the Polish People in the -Government General indicates the ruthlessness and the severity with -which the policy of exploitation was carried out. - -The occupation of the territories of the U.S.S.R. was characterized by -premeditated and systematic looting. Before the attack on the U.S.S.R. -an economic staff—Oldenburg—was organized to ensure the most efficient -exploitation of Soviet territories. The German Armies were to be fed out -of Soviet territory, even if “many millions of people will be starved to -death.” An OKW directive issued before the attack said: “To obtain the -greatest possible quantity of food and crude oil for Germany—that is -the main economic purpose of the campaign.” - -Similarly, a declaration by the Defendant Rosenberg of 20 June 1941 had -advocated the use of the produce from Southern Russia and of the -Northern Caucasus to feed the German People, saying: - - “We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to - feed also the Russian People with the products of that surplus - territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any - feelings.” - -When the Soviet territory was occupied, this policy was put into effect; -there was a large scale confiscation of agricultural supplies, with -complete disregard of the needs of the inhabitants of the occupied -territory. - -In addition to the seizure of raw materials and manufactured articles, a -wholesale seizure was made of art treasures, furniture, textiles, and -similar articles in all the invaded countries. - -The Defendant Rosenberg was designated by Hitler on 29 January 1940 Head -of the Center for National Socialist Ideological and Educational -Research, and thereafter the organization known as the “Einsatzstab -Rosenberg” conducted its operations on a very great scale. Originally -designed for the establishment of a research library, it developed into -a project for the seizure of cultural treasures. On 1 March 1942 Hitler -issued a further decree, authorizing Rosenberg to search libraries, -lodges, and cultural establishments, to seize material from these -establishments, as well as cultural treasures owned by Jews. Similar -directions were given where the ownership could not be clearly -established. The decree directed the co-operation of the Wehrmacht High -Command, and indicated that Rosenberg’s activities in the West were to -be conducted in his capacity as Reichsleiter, and in the East in his -capacity as Reichsminister. Thereafter, Rosenberg’s activities were -extended to the occupied countries. The report of Robert Scholz, Chief -of the special staff for Pictorial Art, stated: “During the period from -March 1941 to July 1944 the special staff for Pictorial Art brought into -the Reich 29 large shipments, including 137 freight cars with 4,174 -cases of art works.” - -The report of Scholz refers to 25 portfolios of pictures of the most -valuable works of the art collection seized in the West, which -portfolios were presented to the Führer. Thirty-nine volumes, prepared -by the Einsatzstab, contained photographs of paintings, textiles, -furniture, candelabra, and numerous other objects of art, and -illustrated the value and magnitude of the collection which had been -made. In many of the occupied countries private collections were robbed, -libraries were plundered, and private houses were pillaged. - -Museums, palaces, and libraries in the occupied territories of the -U.S.S.R. were systematically looted. Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab, Von -Ribbentrop’s special “Battalion”, the Reichscommissars and -representatives of the Military Command seized objects of cultural and -historical value belonging to the People of the Soviet Union, which were -sent to Germany. Thus the Reichscommissar of the Ukraine removed -paintings and objects of art from Kiev and Kharkov and sent them to East -Prussia. Rare volumes and objects of art from the palaces of Peterhof, -Tsarskoye Selo, and Pavlovsk were shipped to Germany. In his letter to -Rosenberg of 3 October 1941 Reichscommissar Kube stated that the value -of the objects of art taken from Bielorussia ran into millions of -rubles. The scale of this plundering can also be seen in the letter sent -from Rosenberg’s department to Von Milde-Schreden in which it is stated -that during the month of October 1943 alone, about 40 box-cars loaded -with objects of cultural value were transported to the Reich. - -With regard to the suggestion that the purpose of the seizure of art -treasures was protective and meant for their preservation, it is -necessary to say a few words. On 1 December 1939 Himmler, as the Reich -Commissioner for the “strengthening of Germanism”, issued a decree to -the regional officers of the secret police in the annexed eastern -territories, and to the commanders of the security service in Radom, -Warsaw, and Lublin. This decree contained administrative directions for -carrying out the art seizure program, and in Clause 1 it is stated: - - To strengthen Germanism in the defense of the Reich, all - articles mentioned in Section 2 of this decree are hereby - confiscated . . . . They are confiscated for the benefit of the - German Reich, and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner - for the strengthening of Germanism.” - -The intention to enrich Germany by the seizures, rather than to protect -the seized objects, is indicated in an undated report by Dr. Hans Posse, -director of the Dresden State Picture Gallery: - - “I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private - collections, as well as clerical property, in Cracow and Warsaw. - It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from - the acquisition of great art works of paintings and sculptures, - with the exception of the Veit-Stoß altar, and the plates of - Hans von Kulnback in the Church of Maria in Cracow . . . and - several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw.” - - - _Slave Labor Policy_ - -Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that the “ill-treatment or -deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian -population of or in occupied territory” shall be a War Crime. The laws -relating to forced labor by the inhabitants of occupied territories are -found in Article 52 of the Hague Convention, which provides: - - “Requisition in kind and services shall not be demanded from - municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army - of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of - the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the - inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military - operations against their own country.” - -The policy of the German occupation authorities was in flagrant -violation of the terms of this convention. Some idea of this policy may -be gathered from the statement made by Hitler in a speech on 9 November -1941: - - “The territory which now works for us contains more than - 250,000,000 men, but the territory which works indirectly for us - includes now more than 350,000,000. In the measure in which it - concerns German territory, the domain which we have taken under - our administration, it is not doubtful that we shall succeed in - harnessing the very last man to this work.” - -The actual results achieved were not so complete as this, but the German -occupation authorities did succeed in forcing many of the inhabitants of -the occupied territories to work for the German war effort, and in -deporting at least 5,000,000 persons to Germany to serve German industry -and agriculture. - -In the early stages of the war, manpower in the occupied territories was -under the control of various occupation authorities, and the procedure -varied from country to country. In all the occupied territories -compulsory labor service was promptly instituted. Inhabitants of the -occupied countries were conscripted and compelled to work in local -occupations, to assist the German war economy. In many cases they were -forced to work on German fortifications and military installations. As -local supplies of raw materials and local industrial capacity became -inadequate to meet the German requirements, the system of deporting -laborers to Germany was put into force. By the middle of April 1940 -compulsory deportation of laborers to Germany had been ordered in the -Government General; and a similar procedure was followed in other -eastern territories as they were occupied. A description of this -compulsory deportation from Poland was given by Himmler. In an address -to SS officers he recalled how in weather 40 degrees below zero they had -to “haul away thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands”. On a -later occasion Himmler stated: - - “Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from exhaustion - while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only insofar as - the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished . . . . We must - realize that we have 6-7 million foreigners in Germany . . . . - They are none of them dangerous so long as we take severe - measures at the merest trifles.” - -During the first two years of the German occupation of France, Belgium, -Holland, and Norway, however, an attempt was made to obtain the -necessary workers on a voluntary basis. How unsuccessful this was may be -seen from the report of the meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 -March 1944. The representative of the Defendant Speer, one Koehrl, -speaking of the situation in France, said: “During all this time a great -number of Frenchmen was recruited, and voluntarily went to Germany.” - -He was interrupted by the Defendant Sauckel: “Not only voluntary, some -were recruited forcibly.” - -To which Koehrl replied: “The calling up started after the recruitment -no longer yielded enough results.” - -To which the Defendant Sauckel replied: “Out of the five million workers -who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily”, and Koehrl -rejoined: “Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight -pressure was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers.” - -Committees were set up to encourage recruiting, and a vigorous -propaganda campaign was begun to induce workers to volunteer for service -in Germany. This propaganda campaign included, for example, the promise -that a prisoner of war would be returned for every laborer who -volunteered to go to Germany. In some cases it was supplemented by -withdrawing the ration cards of laborers who refused to go to Germany, -or by discharging them from their jobs and denying them unemployment -benefit or an opportunity to work elsewhere. In some cases workers and -their families were threatened with reprisals by the police if they -refused to go to Germany. It was on 21 March 1942 that the Defendant -Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary-General for the Utilization of -Labor, with authority over “all available manpower, including that of -workers recruited abroad, and of prisoners of war”. - -The Defendant Sauckel was directly under the Defendant Göring as -Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, and a Göring decree of 27 March 1942 -transferred all his authority over manpower to Sauckel. Sauckel’s -instructions, too, were that foreign labor should be recruited on a -voluntary basis, but also provided that “where, however, in the occupied -territories, the appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obligatory -service and drafting must under all circumstances be resorted to.” Rules -requiring labor service in Germany were published in all the occupied -territories. The number of laborers to be supplied was fixed by Sauckel, -and the local authorities were instructed to meet these requirements by -conscription if necessary. That conscription was the rule rather than -the exception is shown by the statement of Sauckel already quoted, on 1 -March 1944. - -The Defendant Sauckel frequently asserted that the workers belonging to -foreign nations were treated humanely, and that the conditions in which -they lived were good. But whatever the intention of Sauckel may have -been, and however much he may have desired that foreign laborers should -be treated humanely, the evidence before the Tribunal establishes the -fact that the conscription of labor was accomplished in many cases by -drastic and violent methods. The “mistakes and blunders” were on a very -great scale. Man-hunts took place in the streets, at motion picture -houses, even at churches and at night in private houses. Houses were -sometimes burnt down, and the families taken as hostages, practices -which were described by the Defendant Rosenberg as having their origin -“in the blackest periods of the slave trade”. The methods used in -obtaining forced labor from the Ukraine appear from an order issued to -SD officers which stated: - - “It will not be possible always to refrain from using force - . . . . When searching villages, especially when it has been - necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be - put at the disposal of the Commissioner by force . . . . As a - rule no more children will be shot . . . . If we limit harsh - measures through the above orders for the time being, it is only - done for the following reason . . . . The most important thing - is the recruitment of workers.” - -The resources and needs of the occupied countries were completely -disregarded in carrying out this policy. The treatment of the laborers -was governed, by Sauckel’s instructions of 20 April 1942 to the effect -that: “All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as -to exploit them to the highest possible extent, at the lowest -conceivable degree of expenditure.” - -The evidence showed that workers destined for the Reich were sent under -guard to Germany, often packed in trains without adequate heat, food, -clothing, or sanitary facilities. The evidence further showed that the -treatment of the laborers in Germany in many cases was brutal and -degrading. The evidence relating to the Krupp Works at Essen showed that -punishments of the most cruel kind were inflicted on the workers. -Theoretically at least the workers were paid, housed, and fed by the -DAF, and even permitted to transfer their savings and to send mail and -parcels back to their native country; but restrictive regulations took a -proportion of the pay; the camps in which they were housed were -unsanitary; and the food was very often less than the minimum necessary -to give the workers strength to do their jobs. In the case of Poles -employed on farms in Germany, the employers were given authority to -inflict corporal punishment and were ordered, if possible, to house them -in stables, not in their own homes. They were subject to constant -supervision by the Gestapo and the SS, and if they attempted to leave -their jobs they were sent to correction camps or concentration camps. -The concentration camps were also used to increase the supply of labor. -Concentration camp commanders were ordered to work their prisoners to -the limits of their physical power. During the latter stages of the war -the concentration camps were so productive in certain types of work that -the Gestapo was actually instructed to arrest certain classes of -laborers so that they could be used in this way. Allied prisoners of war -were also regarded as a possible source of labor. Pressure was exercised -on non-commissioned officers to force them to consent to work, by -transferring to disciplinary camps those who did not consent. Many of -the prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to military -operations, in violation of Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. They -were put to work in munition factories and even made to load bombers, to -carry ammunition and to dig trenches, often under the most hazardous -conditions. This condition applied particularly to the Soviet prisoners -of war. On 16 February 1943, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, -at which the Defendants Sauckel and Speer were present, Milch said: - - “We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage - of men in the Ack-Ack artillery must be Russians; 50,000 will be - taken altogether. Thirty thousand are already employed as - gunners. This is an amusing thing, that Russians must work the - guns.” - -And on 4 October 1943, at Posen, Himmler, speaking of the Russian -prisoners, captured in the early days of the war, said: - - “As that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we value - it today, as raw material, as labor. What, after all, thinking - in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now - deplorable by reason of the loss of labor, is that the prisoners - died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and - hunger.” - -The general policy underlying the mobilization of slave labor was stated -by Sauckel on 20 April 1942. He said: - - “The aim of this new gigantic labor mobilization is to use all - the rich and tremendous sources conquered and secured for us by - our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, - for the armament of the Armed Forces, and also for the nutrition - of the Homeland. The raw materials, as well as the fertility of - the conquered territories and their human labor power, are to be - used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and - her allies . . . . All prisoners of war from the territories of - the West, as well as the East, actually in Germany, must be - completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition - industries . . . . Consequently it is an immediate necessity to - use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the - fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary - amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately - institute conscription or forced labor. . . . The complete - employment of all prisoners of war, as well as the use of a - gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, - has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the - mobilization of the labor program in this war.” - -Reference should also be made to the policy which was in existence in -Germany by the summer of 1940, under which all aged, insane, and -incurable people, “useless eaters,” were transferred to special -institutions where they were killed, and their relatives informed that -they had died from natural causes. The victims were not confined to -German citizens, but included foreign laborers, who were no longer able -to work, and were therefore useless to the German war machine. It has -been estimated that at least some 275,000 people were killed in this -manner in nursing homes, hospitals and asylums, which were under the -jurisdiction of the Defendant Frick, in his capacity as Minister of the -Interior. How many foreign workers were included in this total it has -been quite impossible to determine. - - - _Persecution of the Jews_ - -The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazi Government has been -proved in the greatest detail before the Tribunal. It is a record of -consistent and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale. Ohlendorf, -Chief of Amt III in the RSHA from 1939 to 1943, and who was in command -of one of the Einsatz groups in the campaign against the Soviet Union -testified as to the methods employed in the extermination of the Jews. -He said that he employed firing squads to shoot the victims in order to -lessen the sense of individual guilt on the part of his men; and the -90,000 men, women, and children who were murdered in one year by his -particular group were mostly Jews. - -When the witness Bach Zelewski was asked how Ohlendorf could admit the -murder of 90,000 people, he replied: “I am of the opinion that when, for -years, for decades, the doctrine is preached that the Slav race is an -inferior race, and Jews not even human, then such an outcome is -inevitable.” - -But the Defendant Frank spoke the final words of this chapter of Nazi -history when he testified in this Court: - - “We have fought against Jewry: we have fought against it for - years: and we have allowed ourselves to make utterances and my - own diary has become a witness against me in this - connection—utterances which are terrible . . . . A thousand - years will pass and this guilt of Germany will still not be - erased.” - -The anti-Jewish policy was formulated in Point 4 of the Party Program -which declared “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of -the race can only be one who is of German blood, without consideration -of creed. Consequently, no Jew can be a member of the race.” Other -points of the program declared that Jews should be treated as -foreigners, that they should not be permitted to hold public office, -that they should be expelled from the Reich if it were impossible to -nourish the entire population of the State, that they should be denied -any further immigration into Germany, and that they should be prohibited -from publishing German newspapers. The Nazi Party preached these -doctrines throughout its history. _Der Stürmer_ and other publications -were allowed to disseminate hatred of the Jews, and in the speeches and -public declarations of the Nazi leaders, the Jews were held up to public -ridicule and contempt. - -With the seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews was intensified. -A series of discriminatory laws was passed, which limited the offices -and professions permitted to Jews; and restrictions were placed on their -family life and their rights of citizenship. By the autumn of 1938, the -Nazi policy towards the Jews had reached the stage where it was directed -towards the complete exclusion of Jews from German life. Pogroms were -organized, which included the burning and demolishing of synagogues, the -looting of Jewish businesses, and the arrest of prominent Jewish -business men. A collective fine of 1 billion marks was imposed on the -Jews, the seizure of Jewish assets was authorized, and the movement of -Jews was restricted by regulations to certain specified districts and -hours. The creation of ghettos was carried out on an extensive scale, -and by an order of the Security Police Jews were compelled to wear a -yellow star to be worn on the breast and back. - -It was contended for the Prosecution that certain aspects of this -anti-Semitic policy were connected with the plans for aggressive war. -The violent measures taken against the Jews in November 1938 were -nominally in retaliation for the killing of an official of the German -Embassy in Paris. But the decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia -had been made a year before. The imposition of a fine of one billion -marks was made, and the confiscation of the financial holdings of the -Jews was decreed, at a time when German armament expenditure had put the -German treasury in difficulties, and when the reduction of expenditure -on armaments was being considered. These steps were taken, moreover, -with the approval of the Defendant Göring, who had been given -responsibility for economic matters of this kind, and who was the -strongest advocate of an extensive rearmament program notwithstanding -the financial difficulties. - -It was further said that the connection of the anti-Semitic policy with -aggressive war was not limited to economic matters. The German Foreign -Office circular, in an article of 25 January 1939, entitled “Jewish -Question as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in the Year 1938”, -described the new phase in the Nazi anti-Semitic policy in these words: - - “It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has - brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question - simultaneously with the realization of the idea of Greater - Germany, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and - consequence of the year 1938. The advance made by Jewish - influence and the destructive Jewish spirit in politics, - economy, and culture, paralyzed the power and the will of the - German People to rise again, more perhaps even than the power - policy opposition of the former enemy Allied Powers of the first - World War. The healing of this sickness among the people, was - therefore certainly one of the most important requirements for - exerting the force which, in the year 1938, resulted in the - joining together of Greater Germany in defiance of the world.” - -The Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany before the war, severe and -repressive as it was, cannot compare, however, with the policy pursued -during the war in the occupied territories. Originally the policy was -similar to that which had been in force inside Germany. Jews were -required to register, were forced to live in ghettos, to wear the yellow -star, and were used as slave laborers. In the summer of 1941, however, -plans were made for the “final solution” of the Jewish question in -Europe. This “final solution” meant the extermination of the Jews, which -early in 1939 Hitler had threatened would be one of the consequences of -an outbreak of war, and a special section in the Gestapo under Adolf -Eichmann, as head of Section B 4 of the Gestapo, was formed to carry out -the policy. - -The plan for exterminating the Jews was developed shortly after the -attack on the Soviet Union. Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and -SD, formed for the purpose of breaking the resistance of the population -of the areas lying behind the German armies in the East, were given the -duty of exterminating the Jews in those areas. The effectiveness of the -work of the Einsatzgruppen is shown by the fact that in February 1942 -Heydrich was able to report that Estonia had already been cleared of -Jews and that in Riga the number of Jews had been reduced from 29,500 to -2,500. Altogether the Einsatzgruppen operating in the occupied Baltic -States killed over 135,000 Jews in three months. - -Nor did these special units operate completely independently of the -German Armed Forces. There is clear evidence that leaders of the -Einsatzgruppen obtained the co-operation of Army commanders. In one case -the relations between an Einsatzgruppe and the military authorities was -described at the time as being “very close, almost cordial”; in another -case the smoothness of an Einsatzcommando’s operation was attributed to -the “understanding for this procedure” shown by the Army authorities. - -Units of the Security Police and SD in the occupied territories of the -East, which were under civil administration, were given a similar task. -The planned and systematic character of the Jewish persecutions is best -illustrated by the original report of the SS Brigadier-General Stroop, -who was in charge of the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw, which took -place in 1943. The Tribunal received in evidence that report, -illustrated with photographs, bearing on its title page: “The Jewish -Ghetto in Warsaw No Longer Exists.” The volume records a series of -reports sent by Stroop to the Higher SS and Police Führer East. In April -and May of 1943, in one report, Stroop wrote: - - “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only be - suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and night. The - Reichsführer SS ordered therefore on 23 April 1943 the cleaning - out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness and merciless - tenacity. I therefore decided to destroy and burn down the - entire ghetto, without regard to the armament factories. These - factories were systematically dismantled and then burnt. Jews - usually left their hideouts, but frequently remained in the - burning buildings, and jumped out of the windows only when the - heat became unbearable. They then tried to crawl with broken - bones across the street into buildings which were not afire - . . . . Life in the sewers was not pleasant after the first - week. Many times we could hear loud voices in the sewers . . . . - Tear gas bombs were thrown into the manholes, and the Jews - driven out of the sewers and captured. Countless numbers of Jews - were liquidated in sewers and bunkers through blasting. The - longer the resistance continued, the tougher became the members - of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht, who always discharged - their duties in an exemplary manner. - -Stroop recorded that his action at Warsaw eliminated “a proved total of -56,065 people. To that we have to add the number of those killed through -blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted.” Grim evidence of mass -murders of Jews was also presented to the Tribunal in cinematograph -films depicting the communal graves of hundreds of victims which were -subsequently discovered by the Allies. - -These atrocities were all part and parcel of the policy inaugurated in -1941, and it is not surprising that there should be evidence that one or -two German officials entered vain protests against the brutal manner in -which the killings were carried out. But the methods employed never -conformed to a single pattern. The massacres of Rowno and Dubno, of -which the German engineer Graebe spoke, were examples of one method; the -systematic extermination of Jews in concentration camps, was another. -Part of the “final solution” was the gathering of Jews from all -German-occupied Europe in concentration camps. Their physical condition -was the test of life or death. All who were fit to work were used as -slave laborers in the concentration camps; all who were not fit to work -were destroyed in gas chambers and their bodies burnt. Certain -concentration camps such as Treblinka and Auschwitz were set aside for -this main purpose. With regard to Auschwitz, the Tribunal heard the -evidence of Höss, the commandant of the camp from 1 May 1940 to 1 -December 1943. He estimated that in the camp of Auschwitz alone in that -time 2,500,000 persons were exterminated, and that a further 500,000 -died from disease and starvation. Höss described the screening for -extermination by stating in evidence: - - “We had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the - incoming transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched - by one of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they - walked by. Those who were fit for work were sent into the camp. - Others were sent immediately to the extermination plants. - Children of tender years were invariably exterminated since by - reason of their youth they were unable to work. Still another - improvement we made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the - victims almost always knew that they were to be exterminated and - at Auschwitz we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking - that they were to go through a delousing process. Of course, - frequently they realized our true intentions and we sometimes - had riots and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently - women would hide their children under their clothes, but of - course when we found them we would send the children in to be - exterminated.” - -He described the actual killing by stating: - - “It took from three to fifteen minutes to kill the people in the - death chamber, depending upon climatic conditions. We knew when - the people were dead because their screaming stopped. We usually - waited about one half-hour before we opened the doors and - removed the bodies. After the bodies were removed our special - commandos took off the rings and extracted the gold from the - teeth of the corpses.” - -Beating, starvation, torture, and killing were general. The inmates were -subjected to cruel experiments; at Dachau in August 1942, victims were -immersed in cold water until their body temperature was reduced to 28° -Centigrade, when they died immediately. Other experiments included high -altitude experiments in pressure chambers, experiments to determine how -long human beings could survive in freezing water, experiments with -poison bullets, experiments with contagious diseases, and experiments -dealing with sterilization of men and women by X-rays and other methods. - -Evidence was given of the treatment of the inmates before and after -their extermination. There was testimony that the hair of women victims -was cut off before they were killed, and shipped to Germany, there to be -used in the manufacture of mattresses. The clothes, money, and valuables -of the inmates were also salvaged and sent to the appropriate agencies -for disposition. After the extermination the gold teeth and fillings -were taken from the heads of the corpses and sent to the Reichsbank. - -After cremation the ashes were used for fertilizer, and in some -instances attempts were made to utilize the fat from the bodies of the -victims in the commercial manufacture of soap. Special groups traveled -through Europe to find Jews and subject them to the “final solution”. -German missions were sent to such satellite countries as Hungary and -Bulgaria, to arrange for the shipment of Jews to extermination camps and -it is known that by the end of 1944, 400,000 Jews from Hungary had been -murdered at Auschwitz. Evidence has also been given of the evacuation of -110,000 Jews from part of Rumania for “liquidation”. Adolf Eichmann, who -had been put in charge of this program by Hitler, has estimated that the -policy pursued resulted in the killing of 6 million Jews, of which 4 -million were killed in the extermination institutions. - - - _The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -Article 6 of the Charter provides: - - “(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of - war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, - murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any - other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied - territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or - persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or - private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or - villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; - - “(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, - enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed - against any civilian population, before or during the war; or - persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in - execution of or in connection with any crime within the - jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the - domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” - -As heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate crime -any conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6 (a), dealing with -Crimes against Peace. - -The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the definition which -it gives both of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. With respect to -War Crimes, however, as has already been pointed out, the crimes defined -by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were already recognized as War -Crimes under international law. They were covered by Articles 46, 50, -52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, -and 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1929. That violation of these -provisions constituted crimes for which the guilty individuals were -punishable is too well-settled to admit of argument. - -But it is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in this case, -because of the “general participation” clause in Article 2 of the Hague -Convention of 1907. That clause provided: - - “The provisions contained in the regulations (Rules of Land - Warfare) referred to in Article I as well as in the present - Convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and - then only if all the belligerents, are parties to the - Convention.” - -Several of the belligerents in the recent war were not parties to this -Convention. - -In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this -question. The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention -undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at -the time of their adoption. But the convention expressly stated that it -was an attempt “to revise the general laws and customs of war”, which it -thus recognized to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down -in the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were -regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are -referred to in Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -A further submission was made that Germany was no longer bound by the -rules of land warfare in many of the territories occupied during the -war, because Germany had completely subjugated those countries and -incorporated them into the German Reich, a fact which gave Germany -authority to deal with the occupied countries as though they were part -of Germany. In the view of the Tribunal it is unnecessary in this case -to decide whether this doctrine of subjugation, dependent as it is upon -military conquest, has any application where the subjugation is the -result of the crime of aggressive war. The doctrine was never considered -to be applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempting to -restore the occupied countries to their true owners, and in this case, -therefore, the doctrine could not apply to any territories occupied -after 1 September 1939. As to the War Crimes committed in Bohemia and -Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these territories were never -added to the Reich, but a mere protectorate was established over them. - -With regard to Crimes against Humanity there is no doubt whatever that -political opponents were murdered in Germany before the war, and that -many of them were kept in concentration camps in circumstances of great -horror and cruelty. The policy of terror was certainly carried out on a -vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic. The policy -of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians in Germany before -the war of 1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was -most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the same -period is established beyond all doubt. To constitute Crimes against -Humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been -in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the -jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that -revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been -satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in -connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a -general declaration that the acts before 1939 were Crimes against -Humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of -the war in 1939 War Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were -also Crimes against Humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged -in the Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not -constitute War Crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in -connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted Crimes -against Humanity. - - _The Accused Organizations_ - -Article 9 of the Charter provides: - - “At the trial of any individual member of any group or - organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any - act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or - organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal - organization.” - - “After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such - notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the - Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the - organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave - to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal - character of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to - allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, - the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be - represented and heard.” - -Article 10 of the Charter makes clear that the declaration of -criminality against an accused organization is final, and cannot be -challenged in any subsequent criminal proceeding against a member of the -organization. Article 10 is as follows: - - “In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by - the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory - shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for - membership therein before national, military or occupation - courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or - organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.” - -The effect of the declaration of criminality by the Tribunal is well -illustrated by Law Number 10 of the Control Council of Germany passed on -20 December 1945, which provides: - - “Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: - . . . - “(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization - declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal. - . . . - “(3) Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above mentioned may - upon conviction be punished as shall be determined by the Tribunal to be - just. Such punishment may consist of one or more of the following: - - (a) Death. - (b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without hard - labor. - (c) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in lieu thereof.” - -In effect, therefore, a member of an organization which the Tribunal has -declared to be criminal may be subsequently convicted of the crime of -membership and be punished for that crime by death. This is not to -assume that international or military courts which will try these -individuals will not exercise appropriate standards of justice. This is -a far reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly -safeguarded, may produce great injustice. - -Article 9, it should be noted, uses the words “The Tribunal may -declare”, so that the Tribunal is vested with discretion as to whether -it will declare any organization criminal. This discretion is a judicial -one and does not permit arbitrary action, but should be exercised in -accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the most important -of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments -should be avoided. If satisfied of the criminal guilt of any -organization or group, this Tribunal should not hesitate to declare it -to be criminal because the theory of “group criminality” is new, or -because it might be unjustly applied by some subsequent tribunals. On -the other hand, the Tribunal should make such declaration of criminality -so far as possible in a manner to insure that innocent persons will not -be punished. - -A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that -the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There must be -a group bound together and organized for a common purpose. The group -must be formed or used in connection with the commission of crimes -denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with respect to the -organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out, fix the -criminality of its members, that definition should exclude persons who -had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization -and those who were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were -personally implicated in the commission of acts declared criminal by -Article 6 of the Charter as members of the organization. Membership -alone is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations. - -Since declarations of criminality which the Tribunal makes will be used -by other courts in the trial of persons on account of their membership -in the organizations found to be criminal, the Tribunal feels it -appropriate to make the following recommendations: - -1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of occupation in -Germany the classifications, sanctions, and penalties be standardized. -Uniformity of treatment so far as practical should be a basic principle. -This does not, of course, mean that discretion in sentencing should not -be vested in the court; but the discretion should be within fixed limits -appropriate to the nature of the crime. - -2. Law No. 10, to which reference has already been made, leaves -punishment entirely in the discretion of the trial court even to the -extent of inflicting the death penalty. - -The De-Nazification Law of 5 March 1946, however, passed for Bavaria, -Greater-Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden, provides definite sentences for -punishment in each type of offense. The Tribunal recommends that in no -case should punishment imposed under Law No. 10 upon any members of an -organization or group declared by the Tribunal to be criminal exceed the -punishment fixed by the De-Nazification Law. No person should be -punished under both laws. - -3. The Tribunal recommends to the Control Council that Law No. 10 be -amended to prescribe limitations on the punishment which may be imposed -for membership in a criminal group or organization so that such -punishment shall not exceed the punishment prescribed by the -De-Nazification Law. - -The Indictment asks that the Tribunal declare to be criminal the -following organizations; The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party; the -Gestapo; the SD; the SS; the SA; the Reich Cabinet, and the General -Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. - - - _THE LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY_ - -_Structure and Component Parts_: The Indictment has named the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party as a group or organization which should be -declared criminal. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party consisted, in -effect, of the official organization of the Nazi Party, with Hitler as -Führer at its head. The actual work of running the Leadership Corps was -carried out by the Chief of the Party Chancellery (Hess, succeeded by -Bormann) assisted by the Party Reich Directorate, or Reichsleitung, -which was composed of the Reichsleiters, the heads of the functional -organizations of the Party, as well as of the heads of the various main -departments and offices which were attached to the Party Reich -Directorate. Under the Chief of the Party Chancellery were the -Gauleiters, with territorial jurisdiction over the major administrative -regions of the Party, the Gaue. The Gauleiters were assisted by a Party -Gau Directorate or Gauleitung, similar in composition and in function to -the Party Reich Directorate. Under the Gauleiters in the Party hierarchy -were the Kreisleiters with territorial jurisdiction over a Kreis, -usually consisting of a single county, and assisted by a Party Kreis -Directorate, or Kreisleitung. The Kreisleiters were the lowest members -of the Party hierarchy who were full-time paid employees. Directly under -the Kreisleiters were the Ortsgruppenleiters, then the Zellenleiters and -then the Blockleiters. Directives and instructions were received from -the Party Reich Directorate. The Gauleiters had the function of -interpreting such orders and issuing them to lower formations. The -Kreisleiters had a certain discretion in interpreting orders, but the -Ortsgruppenleiters had not, but acted under definite instructions. -Instructions were only issued in writing down as far as the -Ortsgruppenleiters. The Block and Zellenleiters usually received -instructions orally. Membership in the Leadership Corps at all levels -was voluntary. - -On 28 February 1946 the Prosecution excluded from the declaration asked -for, all members of the staffs of the Ortsgruppenleiters and all -assistants of the Zellenleiters and Blockleiters. The declaration sought -against the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party thus includes the Führer, -the Reichsleitung, the Gauleiters and their staff officers, the -Kreisleiters and their staff officers, the Ortsgruppenleiters, the -Zellenleiters and the Blockleiters, a group estimated to contain at -least 600,000 people. - -_Aims and Activities_: The primary purpose of the Leadership Corps from -its beginning was to assist the Nazis in obtaining and, after 30 January -1933, in retaining, control of the German State. The machinery of the -Leadership Corps was used for the wide-spread dissemination of Nazi -propaganda and to keep a detailed check on the political attitudes of -the German People. In this activity the lower Political Leaders played a -particularly important role. The Blockleiters were instructed by the -Party Manual to report to the Ortsgruppenleiters all persons circulating -damaging rumors or criticism of the regime. The Ortsgruppenleiters, on -the basis of information supplied them by the Blockleiters and -Zellenleiters, kept a card index of the people within their Ortsgruppe -which recorded the factors which would be used in forming a judgment as -to their political reliability. - -The Leadership Corps was particularly active during plebiscites. All -members of the Leadership Corps were active in getting out the vote and -insuring the highest possible proportion of “yes” votes. -Ortsgruppenleiters and Political Leaders of higher ranks often -collaborated with the Gestapo and SD in taking steps to determine those -who refused to vote or who voted “no”, and in taking steps against them -which went as far as arrest and detention in a concentration camp. - -_Criminal Activity_: These steps, which relate merely to the -consolidation of control of the Nazi Party, are not criminal under the -view of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war which has previously been -set forth. But the Leadership Corps was also used for similar steps in -Austria and those parts of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Poland, France, -Belgium, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia which were incorporated into the -Reich and within the Gaue of the Nazi Party. In those territories the -machinery of the Leadership Corps was used for their Germanization -through the elimination of local customs and the detection and arrest of -persons who opposed German occupation. This was criminal under Article 6 -(b) of the Charter in those areas governed by the Hague Rules of Land -Warfare and criminal under Article 6 (c) of the Charter as to the -remainder. - -The Leadership Corps played its part in the persecution of the Jews. It -was involved in the economic and political discrimination against the -Jews which was put into effect shortly after the Nazis came into power. -The Gestapo and SD were instructed to coordinate with the Gauleiters and -Kreisleiters the measures taken in the pogroms of 9 and 10 November -1938. The Leadership Corps was also used to prevent German public -opinion from reacting against the measures taken against the Jews in the -East. On 9 October 1942, a confidential information bulletin was sent to -all Gauleiters and Kreisleiters entitled “Preparatory Measures for the -Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe. Rumors concerning the -Conditions of the Jews in the East.” This bulletin stated that rumors -were being started by returning soldiers concerning the conditions of -Jews in the East which some Germans might not understand, and outlined -in detail the official explanation to be given. This bulletin contained -no explicit statement that the Jews were being exterminated, but it did -indicate they were going to labor camps, and spoke of their complete -segregation and elimination and the necessity of ruthless severity. -Thus, even at its face value, it indicated the utilization of the -machinery of the Leadership Corps to keep German public opinion from -rebelling at a program which was stated to involve condemning the Jews -of Europe to a lifetime of slavery. This information continued to be -available to the Leadership Corps. The August 1944 edition of _Die -Lage_, a publication which was circulated among the Political Leaders, -described the deportation of 430,000 Jews from Hungary. - -The Leadership Corps played an important part in the administration of -the Slave Labor Program. A Sauckel decree dated 6 April 1942 appointed -the Gauleiters as Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization for their Gaue -with authority to coordinate all agencies dealing with labor questions -in their Gaue, with specific authority over the employment of foreign -workers, including their conditions of work, feeding, and housing. Under -this authority the Gauleiters assumed control over the allocation of -labor in their Gaue, including the forced laborers from foreign -countries. In carrying out this task the Gauleiters used many Party -offices within their Gaue, including subordinate Political Leaders. For -example, Sauckel’s decree of 8 September 1942, relating to the -allocation for household labor of 400,000 women laborers brought in from -the East, established a procedure under which applications filed for -such workers should be passed on by the Kreisleiters, whose judgment was -final. - -Under Sauckel’s directive the Leadership Corps was directly concerned -with the treatment given foreign workers, and the Gauleiters were -specifically instructed to prevent “politically inept factory heads” -from giving “too much consideration to the care of Eastern workers.” The -type of question which was considered in their treatment included -reports by the Kreisleiters on pregnancies among the female slave -laborers, which would result in an abortion if the child’s parentage -would not meet the racial standards laid down by the SS and usually -detention in a concentration camp for the female slave laborer. The -evidence has established that under the supervision of the Leadership -Corps, the industrial workers were housed in camps under atrocious -sanitary conditions, worked long hours and were inadequately fed. Under -similar supervision, the agricultural workers, who were somewhat better -treated, were prohibited transportation, entertainment, and religious -worship, and were worked without any time limit on their working hours -and under regulations which gave the employer the right to inflict -corporal punishment. The Political Leaders, at least down to the -Ortsgruppenleiters, were responsible for this supervision. On 5 May 1943 -a memorandum of Bormann instructing that mistreatment of slave laborers -cease was distributed down to the Ortsgruppenleiters. Similarly on 10 -November 1944 a Speer circular transmitted a Himmler directive which -provided that all members of the Nazi Party, in accordance with -instructions from the Kreisleiter, would be warned by the -Ortsgruppenleiters of their duty to keep foreign workers under careful -observation. - -The Leadership Corps was directly concerned with the treatment of -prisoners of war. On 5 November 1941 Bormann transmitted a directive -down to the level of Kreisleiter instructing them to insure compliance -by the Army with the recent directives of the Department of the Interior -ordering that dead Russian prisoners of war should be buried wrapped in -tar paper in a remote place without any ceremony or any decorations of -their graves. On 25 November 1943 Bormann sent a circular instructing -the Gauleiters to report any lenient treatment of prisoners of war. On -13 September 1944, Bormann sent a directive down to the level of -Kreisleiter ordering that liaison be established between the -Kreisleiters and the guards of the prisoners of war in order “better to -assimilate the commitment of the prisoners of war to the political and -economic demands”. On 17 October 1944 an OKW directive instructed the -officer in charge of the prisoners of war to confer with the -Kreisleiters on questions of the productivity of labor. The use of -prisoners of war, particularly those from the East, was accompanied by a -widespread violation of rules of land warfare. This evidence establishes -that the Leadership Corps down to the level of Kreisleiter was a -participant in this illegal treatment. - -The machinery of the Leadership Corps was also utilized in attempts made -to deprive Allied airmen of the protection to which they were entitled -under the Geneva Convention. On 13 March 1940 a directive of Hess -transmitted instructions through the Leadership Corps down to the -Blockleiter for the guidance of the civilian population in case of the -landing of enemy planes or parachutists, which stated that enemy -parachutists were to be immediately arrested or “made harmless”. On 30 -May 1944 Bormann sent a circular letter to all Gau- and Kreisleiters -reporting instances of lynchings of Allied low-level fliers in which no -police action was taken. It was requested that Ortsgruppenleiters be -informed orally of the contents of this letter. This letter accompanied -a propaganda drive which had been instituted by Goebbels to induce such -lynchings, and clearly amounted to instructions to induce such lynchings -or at least to violate the Geneva Convention by withdrawing any police -protection. Some lynchings were carried out pursuant to this program, -but it does not appear that they were carried out throughout all of -Germany. Nevertheless, the existence of this circular letter shows that -the heads of the Leadership Corps were utilizing it for a purpose which -was patently illegal and which involved the use of the machinery of the -Leadership Corps at least through the Ortsgruppenleiter. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Leadership Corps was used for purposes which were criminal under the -Charter and involved the Germanization of incorporated territory, the -persecution of the Jews, the administration of the slave labor program, -and the mistreatment of prisoners of war. The Defendants Bormann and -Sauckel, who were members of this organization, were among those who -used it for these purposes. The Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the -Ortsgruppenleiters participated, to one degree or another, in these -criminal programs. The Reichsleitung as the staff organization of the -Party is also responsible for these criminal programs as well as the -heads of the various staff organizations of the Gauleiters and -Kreisleiters. The decision of the Tribunal on these staff organizations -includes only the Amtsleiters who were heads of offices on the staffs of -the Reichsleitung, Gauleitung, and Kreisleitung. With respect to other -staff officers and Party organizations attached to the Leadership Corps -other than the Amtsleiters referred to above, the Tribunal will follow -the suggestion of the Prosecution in excluding them from the -declaration. - -The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter -the group composed of those members of the Leadership Corps holding the -positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became or remained -members of the organization with knowledge that it was being used for -the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter, or -who were personally implicated as members of the organization in the -commission of such crimes. The basis of this finding is the -participation of the organization in War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity connected with the war; the group declared criminal cannot -include, therefore, persons who had ceased to hold the positions -enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior to 1 September 1939. - - - _GESTAPO AND SD_ - -_Structure and Component Parts_: The Prosecution has named Die Geheime -Staatspolizei (Gestapo) and Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer SS -(SD) as groups or organizations which should be declared criminal. The -Prosecution presented the cases against the Gestapo and SD together, -stating that this was necessary because of the close working -relationship between them. The Tribunal permitted the SD to present its -defense separately because of a claim of conflicting interests, but -after examining the evidence has decided to consider the case of the -Gestapo and SD together. - -The Gestapo and the SD were first linked together on 26 June 1936 by the -appointment of Heydrich, who was the Chief of the SD, to the position of -Chief of the Security Police, which was defined to include both the -Gestapo and the Criminal Police. Prior to that time the SD had been the -intelligence agency, first of the SS, and, after 4 June 1934, of the -entire Nazi Party. The Gestapo had been composed of the various -political police forces of the several German Federal states which had -been unified under the personal leadership of Himmler, with the -assistance of Göring. Himmler had been appointed Chief of the German -Police in the Ministry of the Interior on 17 June 1936, and in his -capacity as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police issued his -decree of 26 June 1936, which placed both the Criminal Police, or Kripo, -and the Gestapo in the Security Police, and placed both the Security -Police and the SD under the command of Heydrich. - -This consolidation under the leadership of Heydrich of the Security -Police, a State organization, and the SD, a Party organization, was -formalized by the decree of 27 September 1939, which united the various -State and Party offices which were under Heydrich as Chief of the -Security Police and SD into one administrative unit, the Reichs Security -Head Office (RSHA) which was at the same time both one of the principal -offices (Hauptamter) of the SS under Himmler as Reichsführer SS and an -office in the Ministry of the Interior under Himmler as Chief of the -German Police. The internal structure of the RSHA shows the manner in -which it consolidated the offices of the Security Police with those of -the SD. The RSHA was divided into seven offices (Ämter), two of which -(Amt I and Amt II) dealt with administrative matters. The Security -Police were represented by Amt IV, the head office of the Gestapo, and -by Amt V, the head office of the Criminal Police. The SD were -represented by Amt III, the head office for SD activities inside -Germany, by Amt VI, the head office for SD activities outside of Germany -and by Amt VII, the office for ideological research. Shortly after the -creation of the RSHA, in November 1939, the Security Police was -“coordinated” with the SS by taking all officials of the Gestapo and -Criminal Police into the SS at ranks equivalent to their positions. - -The creation of the RSHA represented the formalization, at the top -level, of the relationship under which the SD served as the intelligence -agency for the Security Police. A similar coordination existed in the -local offices. Within Germany and areas which were incorporated within -the Reich for the purpose of civil administration, local offices of the -Gestapo, Criminal Police, and SD were formally separate. They were -subject to coordination by Inspectors of the Security Police and SD on -the staffs of the local Higher SS and Police Leaders, however, and one -of the principal functions of the local SD units was to serve as the -intelligence agency for the local Gestapo units. In the occupied -territories, the formal relationship between local units of the Gestapo, -Criminal Police, and SD was slightly closer. They were organized into -local units of the Security Police and SD and were under the control of -both the RSHA and of the Higher SS and Police Leader who was appointed -by Himmler to serve on the staff of the occupying authority. The offices -of the Security Police and SD in occupied territory were composed of -departments corresponding to the various Amts of the RSHA. In occupied -territories which were still considered to be operational military areas -or where German control had not been formally established, the -organization of the Security Police and SD was only slightly changed. -Members of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD were joined together into military -type organizations known as Einsatz Kommandos and Einsatzgruppen in -which the key positions were held by members of the Gestapo, Kripo, and -SD and in which members of the Order Police, the Waffen SS and even the -Wehrmacht were used as auxiliaries. These organizations were under the -over-all control of the RSHA, but in front line areas were under the -operational control of the appropriate Army Commander. - -It can thus be seen that from a functional point of view both the -Gestapo and the SD were important and closely related groups within the -organization of the Security Police and the SD. The Security Police and -SD was under a single command, that of Heydrich and later Kaltenbrunner, -as Chief of the Security Police and SD; it had a single headquarters, -the RSHA; it had its own command channels and worked as one organization -both in Germany, in occupied territories, and in the areas immediately -behind the front lines. During the period with which the Tribunal is -primarily concerned, applicants for positions in the Security Police and -SD received training in all its components, the Gestapo, Criminal -Police, and SD. Some confusion has been caused by the fact that part of -the organization was technically a formation of the Nazi Party while -another part of the organization was an office in the Government, but -this is of no particular significance in view of the law of 1 December -1933, declaring the unity of the Nazi Party and the German State. - -The Security Police and SD was a voluntary organization. It is true that -many civil servants and administrative officials were transferred into -the Security Police. The claim that this transfer was compulsory amounts -to nothing more than the claim that they had to accept the transfer or -resign their positions, with a possibility of having incurred official -disfavor. During the war a member of the Security Police and SD did not -have a free choice of assignments within that organization and the -refusal to accept a particular position, especially when serving in -occupied territory, might have led to serious punishment. The fact -remains, however, that all members of the Security Police and SD joined -the organization voluntarily under no other sanction than the desire to -retain their positions as officials. - -The organization of the Security Police and SD also included three -special units which must be dealt with separately. The first of these -was the Frontier Police or Grenzpolizei which came under the control of -the Gestapo in 1937. Their duties consisted in the control of passage -over the borders of Germany. They arrested persons who crossed -illegally. It is also clear from the evidence presented that they -received directives from the Gestapo to transfer foreign workers whom -they apprehended to concentration camps. They could also request the -local office of the Gestapo for permission to commit persons arrested to -concentration camps. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the Frontier -Police must be included in the charge of criminality against the -Gestapo. - -The border and customs protection or Zollgrenzschutz became part of the -Gestapo in the summer of 1944. The functions of this organization were -similar to the Frontier Police in enforcing border regulations with -particular respect to the prevention of smuggling. It does not appear, -however, that their transfer was complete but that about half of their -personnel of 54,000 remained under the Reich Finance Administration or -the Order Police. A few days before the end of the war the whole -organization was transferred back to the Reich Finance Administration. -The transfer of the organization to the Gestapo was so late and it -participated so little in the over-all activities of the organization -that the Tribunal does not feel that it should be dealt with in -considering the criminality of the Gestapo. - -The third organization was the so-called Secret Field Police which was -originally under the Army but which in 1942 was transferred by military -order to the Security Police. The Secret Field police was concerned with -security matters within the Army in occupied territory, and also with -the prevention of attacks by civilians on military installations or -units, and committed War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity on a wide -scale. It has not been proved, however, that it was a part of the -Gestapo and the Tribunal does not consider it as coming within the -charge of criminality contained in the Indictment, except such members -as may have been transferred to Amt IV of the RSHA or were members of -organizations declared criminal by this Judgment. - -_Criminal Activity_: Originally, one of the primary functions of the -Gestapo was the prevention of any political opposition to the Nazi -regime, a function which it performed with the assistance of the SD. The -principal weapon used in performing this function was the concentration -camp. The Gestapo did not have administrative control over the -concentration camps, but, acting through the RSHA, was responsible for -the detention of political prisoners in those camps. Gestapo officials -were usually responsible for the interrogation of political prisoners at -the camps. - -The Gestapo and the SD also dealt with charges of treason and with -questions relating to the press, the churches and the Jews. As the Nazi -program of anti-Semitic persecution increased in intensity the role -played by these groups became increasingly important. In the early -morning of 10 November 1938, Heydrich sent a telegram to all offices of -the Gestapo and SD giving instructions for the organization of the -pogroms of that date and instructing them to arrest as many Jews as the -prisons could hold “especially rich ones”, but to be careful that those -arrested were healthy and not too old. By 11 November 1938, 20,000 Jews -had been arrested and many were sent to concentration camps. On 24 -January 1939 Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, was -charged with furthering the emigration and evacuation of Jews from -Germany, and on 31 July 1941, with bringing about a complete solution of -the Jewish problem in German-dominated Europe. A special section of the -Gestapo office of the RSHA under Standartenführer Eichmann was set up -with responsibility for Jewish matters which employed its own agents to -investigate the Jewish problem in occupied territory. Local offices of -the Gestapo were used first to supervise the emigration of Jews and -later to deport them to the East both from Germany and from the -territories occupied during the war. Einsatzgruppen of the Security -Police and SD operating behind the lines of the Eastern Front engaged in -the wholesale massacre of Jews. A special detachment from Gestapo -headquarters in the RSHA was used to arrange for the deportation of Jews -from Axis satellites to Germany for the “final solution”. - -Local offices of the Security Police and SD played an important role in -the German administration of occupied territories. The nature of their -participation is shown by measures taken in the summer of 1938 in -preparation for the attack on Czechoslovakia which was then in -contemplation. Einsatzgruppen of the Gestapo and SD were organized to -follow the Army into Czechoslovakia to provide for the security of -political life in the occupied territories. Plans were made for the -infiltration of SD men into the area in advance, and for the building up -of a system of files to indicate what inhabitants should be placed under -surveillance, deprived of passports, or liquidated. These plans were -considerably altered due to the cancellation of the attack on -Czechoslovakia, but in the military operations which actually occurred, -particularly in the war against U.S.S.R., Einsatzgruppen of the Security -Police and SD went into operation, and combined brutal measures for the -pacification of the civilian population with the wholesale slaughter of -Jews. Heydrich gave orders to fabricate incidents on the Polish-German -frontier in 1939 which would give Hitler sufficient provocation to -attack Poland. Both Gestapo and SD personnel were involved in these -operations. - -The local units of the Security Police and SD continued their work in -the occupied territories after they had ceased to be an area of -operations. The Security Police and SD engaged in widespread arrests of -the civilian population of these occupied countries, imprisoned many of -them under inhumane conditions, subjected them to brutal third degree -methods, and sent many of them to concentration camps. Local units of -the Security Police and SD were also involved in the shooting of -hostages, the imprisonment of relatives, the execution of persons -charged as terrorists and saboteurs without a trial, and the enforcement -of the “Nacht und Nebel” decrees under which persons charged with a type -of offense believed to endanger the security of the occupying forces -were either executed within a week or secretly removed to Germany -without being permitted to communicate with their family and friends. - -Offices of the Security Police and SD were involved in the -administration of the Slave Labor Program. In some occupied territories -they helped local labor authorities to meet the quotas imposed by -Sauckel. Gestapo offices inside of Germany were given surveillance over -slave laborers and responsibility for apprehending those who were absent -from their place of work. The Gestapo also had charge of the so-called -work training camps. Although both German and foreign workers could be -committed to these camps, they played a significant role in forcing -foreign laborers to work for the German war effort. In the latter stages -of the war as the SS embarked on a slave labor program of its own, the -Gestapo was used to arrest workers for the purpose of insuring an -adequate supply in the concentration camps. - -The local offices of the Security Police and SD were also involved in -the commission of War Crimes involving the mistreatment and murder of -prisoners of war. Soviet prisoners of war in prisoner-of-war camps in -Germany were screened by Einsatz Kommandos acting under the directions -of the local Gestapo offices. Commissars, Jews, members of the -intelligentsia, “fanatical Communists” and even those who were -considered incurably sick were classified as “intolerable”, and -exterminated. The local offices of the Security Police and SD were -involved in the enforcement of the “Bullet” decree, put into effect on 4 -March 1944, under which certain categories of prisoners of war, who were -recaptured, were not treated as prisoners of war but taken to Mauthausen -in secret and shot. Members of the Security Police and SD were charged -with the enforcement of the decree for the shooting of parachutists and -commandos. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Gestapo and SD were used for purposes which were criminal under the -Charter involving the persecution and extermination of the Jews, -brutalities, and killings in concentration camps, excesses in the -administration of occupied territories, the administration of the slave -labor program, and the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. The -Defendant Kaltenbrunner, who was a member of this organization, was -among those who used it for these purposes. In dealing with the Gestapo -the Tribunal includes all executive and administrative officials of Amt -IV of the RSHA or concerned with Gestapo administration in other -departments of the RSHA and all local Gestapo officials serving both -inside and outside of Germany, including the members of the Frontier -Police, but not including the members of the Border and Customs -Protection or the Secret Field Police, except such members as have been -specified above. At the suggestion of the Prosecution the Tribunal does -not include persons employed by the Gestapo for purely clerical, -stenographic, janitorial, or similar unofficial routine tasks. In -dealing with the SD the Tribunal includes Ämter III, VI, and VII of the -RSHA and all other members of the SD, including all local -representatives and agents, honorary or otherwise, whether they were -technically members of the SS or not, but not including honorary -informers who were not members of the SS, and members of the Abwehr who -were transferred to the SD. - -The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter -the group composed of those members of the Gestapo and SD holding the -positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became or remained -members of the organization with knowledge that it was being used for -the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter, or -who were personally implicated as members of the organization in the -commission of such crimes. The basis for this finding is the -participation of the organization in War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity connected with the war; this group declared criminal cannot -include, therefore, persons who had ceased to hold the positions -enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior to 1 September 1939. - - - _SS_ - -_Structure and Component Parts_: The Prosecution has named Die -Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei -(commonly known as the SS) as an organization which should be declared -criminal. The portion of the Indictment dealing with the SS also -includes Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer-SS (commonly known as -the SD). This latter organization, which was originally an intelligence -branch of the SS, later became an important part of the organization of -Security Police and SD and is dealt with in the Tribunal’s Judgment on -the Gestapo. - -The SS was originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite section -of the SA for political purposes under the pretext of protecting -speakers at public meetings of the Nazi Party. After the Nazis had -obtained power the SS was used to maintain order and control audiences -at mass demonstrations and was given the additional duty of “internal -security” by a decree of the Führer. The SS played an important role at -the time of the Röhm purge of 30 June 1934, and, as a reward for its -services, was made an independent unit of the Nazi Party shortly -thereafter. - -In 1929 when Himmler was first appointed as Reichs Führer the SS -consisted of 280 men who were regarded as especially trustworthy. In -1933 it was composed of 52,000 men drawn from all walks of life. The -original formation of the SS was the Allgemeine SS, which by 1939 had -grown to a corps of 240,000 men, organized on military lines into -divisions and regiments. During the war its strength declined to well -under 40,000. - -The SS originally contained two other formations, the SS -Verfügungstruppe, a force consisting of SS members who volunteered for -four years’ armed service in lieu of compulsory service with the Army, -and the SS Totenkopf Verbände, special troops employed to guard -concentration camps, which came under the control of the SS in 1934. The -SS Verfügungstruppe was organized as an armed unit to be employed with -the Army in the event of mobilization. In the summer of 1939, the -Verfügungstruppe was equipped as a motorized division to form the -nucleus of the forces which came to be known in 1940 as the Waffen SS. -In that year the Waffen SS comprised 100,000 men, 56,000 coming from the -Verfügungstruppe and the rest from the Allgemeine SS and the Totenkopf -Verbände. At the end of the war it is estimated to have consisted of -about 580,000 men and 40 divisions. The Waffen SS was under the tactical -command of the Army, but was equipped and supplied through the -administrative branches of the SS and under SS disciplinary control. - -The SS Central Organization had 12 main offices. The most important of -these were the RSHA, which has already been discussed, the WVHA or -Economic Administration Main Office which administered concentration -camps along with its other duties, a Race and Settlement Office together -with auxiliary offices for repatriation of racial Germans -(Volksdeutschemittelstelle). The SS Central Organization also had a -legal office and the SS possessed its own legal system; and its -personnel were under the jurisdiction of special courts. Also attached -to the SS main offices was a research foundation known as the -Experiments Ahnenerbe. The scientists attached to this organization are -stated to have been mainly honorary members of the SS. During the war an -institute for military scientific research became attached to the -Ahnenerbe which conducted extensive experiments involving the use of -living human beings. An employee of this institute was a certain Dr. -Rascher, who conducted these experiments with the full knowledge of the -Ahnenerbe, which were subsidized and under the patronage of the -Reichsführer SS who was a trustee of the foundation. - -Beginning in 1933 there was a gradual but thorough amalgamation of the -police and SS. In 1936 Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, became Chief of the -German Police with authority over the regular uniformed police as well -as the Security Police. Himmler established a system under which Higher -SS and Police Leaders, appointed for each Wehrkreis, served as his -personal representatives in coordinating the activities of the Order -Police, Security Police and SD and Allgemeine SS within their -jurisdictions. In 1939 the SS and police systems were coordinated by -taking into the SS all officials of the Security and Order Police, at SS -ranks equivalent to their rank in the police. - -Until 1940 the SS was an entirely voluntary organization. After the -formation of the Waffen SS in 1940 there was a gradually increasing -number of conscripts into the Waffen SS. It appears that about a third -of the total number of people joining the Waffen SS were conscripts, -that the proportion of conscripts was higher at the end of the war than -at the beginning, but that there continued to be a high proportion of -volunteers until the end of the war. - -_Criminal Activities_: SS units were active participants in the steps -leading up to aggressive war. The Verfügungstruppe was used in the -occupation of the Sudetenland, of Bohemia and Moravia, and of Memel. The -Henlein Free Corps was under the jurisdiction of the Reichsführer SS for -operations in the Sudetenland in 1938, and the Volksdeutschemittelstelle -financed fifth-column activities there. - -The SS was even a more general participant in the commission of War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Through its control over the -organization of the Police, particularly the Security Police and SD, the -SS was involved in all the crimes which have been outlined in the -section of this Judgment dealing with the Gestapo and SD. Other branches -of the SS were equally involved in these criminal programs. There is -evidence that the shooting of unarmed prisoners of war was the general -practice in some Waffen SS divisions. On 1 October 1944 the custody of -prisoners of war and interned persons was transferred to Himmler, who in -turn transferred prisoner-of-war affairs to SS Obergruppenführer Berger -and to SS Obergruppenführer Pohl. The Race and Settlement Office of the -SS together with the Volksdeutschemittelstelle were active in carrying -out schemes for Germanization of occupied territories according to the -racial principles of the Nazi Party and were involved in the deportation -of Jews and other foreign nationals. Units of the Waffen SS and -Einsatzgruppen operating directly under the SS main office were used to -carry out these plans. These units were also involved in the widespread -murder and ill-treatment of the civilian population of occupied -territories. Under the guise of combatting partisan units, units of the -SS exterminated Jews and people deemed politically undesirable by the -SS, and their reports record the execution of enormous numbers of -persons. Waffen SS divisions were responsible for many massacres and -atrocities in occupied territories such as the massacres at Oradour and -Lidice. - -From 1934 onwards the SS was responsible for the guarding and -administration of concentration camps. The evidence leaves no doubt that -the consistently brutal treatment of the inmates of concentration camps -was carried out as a result of the general policy of the SS, which was -that the inmates were racial inferiors to be treated only with contempt. -There is evidence that where manpower considerations permitted, Himmler -wanted to rotate guard battalions so that all members of the SS would be -instructed as to the proper attitude to take to inferior races. After -1942 when the concentration camps were placed under the control of the -WVHA they were used as a source of slave labor. An agreement made with -the Ministry of Justice on 18 September 1942 provided that anti-social -elements who had finished prison sentences were to be delivered to the -SS to be worked to death. Steps were continually taken, involving the -use of the Security Police and SD and even the Waffen SS, to insure that -the SS had an adequate supply of concentration camp labor for its -projects. In connection with the administration of the concentration -camps, the SS embarked on a series of experiments on human beings which -were performed on prisoners of war or concentration camp inmates. These -experiments included freezing to death, and killing by poison bullets. -The SS was able to obtain an allocation of Government funds for this -kind of research on the grounds that they had access to human material -not available to other agencies. - -The SS played a particularly significant role in the persecution of the -Jews. The SS was directly involved in the demonstrations of 10 November -1938. The evacuation of the Jews from occupied territories was carried -out under the directions of the SS with the assistance of SS Police -units. The extermination of the Jews was carried out under the direction -of the SS Central Organizations. It was actually put into effect by SS -formations. The Einstzgruppen engaged in wholesale massacres of the -Jews. SS Police units were also involved. For example, the massacre of -Jews in the Warsaw ghetto was carried out under the directions of SS -Brigadeführer and Major General of the Police Stroop. A special group -from the SS Central Organization arranged for the deportation of Jews -from various Axis satellites and their extermination was carried out in -the concentration camps run by the WVHA. - -It is impossible to single out any one portion of the SS which was not -involved in these criminal activities. The Allgemeine SS was an active -participant in the persecution of the Jews and was used as a source of -concentration camp guards. Units of the Waffen SS were directly involved -in the killing of prisoners of war and the atrocities in occupied -countries. It supplied personnel for the Einsatzgruppen, and had command -over the concentration camp guards after its absorption of the Totenkopf -SS, which originally controlled the system. Various SS Police units were -also widely used in the atrocities in occupied countries and the -extermination of the Jews there. The SS Central Organization supervised -the activities of these various formations and was responsible for such -special projects as the human experiments and “final solution” of the -Jewish question. - -The Tribunal finds that knowledge of these criminal activities was -sufficiently general to justify declaring that the SS was a criminal -organization to the extent hereinafter described. It does appear that an -attempt was made to keep secret some phases of its activities, but its -criminal programs were so widespread, and involved slaughter on such a -gigantic scale, that its criminal activities must have been widely -known. It must be recognized, moreover, that the criminal activities of -the SS followed quite logically from the principles on which it was -organized. Every effort had been made to make the SS a highly -disciplined organization composed of the elite of National Socialism. -Himmler had stated that there were people in Germany “who become sick -when they see these black coats” and that he did not expect that “they -should be loved by too many.” Himmler also indicated his view that the -SS was concerned with perpetuating the elite racial stock with the -object of making Europe a Germanic continent and the SS was instructed -that it was designed to assist the Nazi Government in the ultimate -domination of Europe and the elimination of all inferior races. This -mystic and fanatical belief in the superiority of the Nordic German -developed into the studied contempt and even hatred of other races which -led to criminal activities of the type outlined above being considered -as a matter of course if not a matter of pride. The actions of a soldier -in the Waffen SS who in September 1939, acting entirely on his own -initiative, killed 50 Jewish laborers whom he had been guarding, were -described by the statement that as an SS man, he was “particularly -sensitive to the sight of Jews,” and had acted “quite thoughtlessly in a -youthful spirit of adventure” and a sentence of three-years imprisonment -imposed on him was dropped under an amnesty. Hess wrote with truth that -the Waffen SS were more suitable for the specific tasks to be solved in -occupied territory owing to their extensive training in questions of -race and nationality. Himmler, in a series of speeches made in 1943, -indicated his pride in the ability of the SS to carry out these criminal -acts. He encouraged his men to be “tough and ruthless”, he spoke of -shooting “thousands of leading Poles”, and thanked them for their -cooperation and lack of squeamishness at the sight of hundreds and -thousands of corpses of their victims. He extolled ruthlessness in -exterminating the Jewish race and later described this process as -“delousing.” These speeches show that the general attitude prevailing in -the SS was consistent with these criminal acts. - -_Conclusions_: The SS was utilized for purposes which were criminal -under the Charter involving the persecution and extermination of the -Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration camps, excesses in the -administration of occupied territories, the administration of the slave -labor program and the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. The -Defendant Kaltenbrunner was a member of the SS implicated in these -activities. In dealing with the SS the Tribunal includes all persons who -had been officially accepted as members of the SS including the members -of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen SS, members of the SS -Totenkopf Verbände, and the members of any of the different police -forces who were members of the SS. The Tribunal does not include the -so-called SS riding units. Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer SS -(commonly known as the SD) is dealt with in the Tribunal’s Judgment on -the Gestapo and SD. - -The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter -the group composed of those persons who had been officially accepted as -members of the SS as enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became or -remained members of the organization with knowledge that it was being -used for the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the -Charter, or who were personally implicated as members of the -organization in the commission of such crimes, excluding, however, those -who were drafted into membership by the State in such a way as to give -them no choice in the matter, and who had committed no such crimes. The -basis of this finding is the participation of the organization in War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity connected with the war; this group -declared criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased to -belong to the organizations enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior -to 1 September 1939. - - - _THE SA_ - -_Structure and Component Parts_: The Prosecution has named Die -Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei -(commonly known as the SA) as an organization which should be declared -criminal. The SA was founded in 1921 for political purposes. It was -organized on military lines. Its members wore their own uniforms and had -their own discipline and regulations. After the Nazis had obtained power -the SA greatly increased in membership due to the incorporation within -it of certain veterans organizations. In April 1933 the Stahlhelm, an -organization of 1½ million members, was transferred into the SA, with -the exception of its members over 45 years of age and some others, -pursuant to an agreement between their leader Seldte and Hitler. Another -veterans’ organization, the so-called Kyffhauserbund, was transferred in -the same manner, together with a number of rural riding organizations. - -Until 1933, there is no question but that membership in the SA was -voluntary. After 1933 civil servants were under certain political and -economic pressure to join the SA. Members of the Stahlhelm, the -Kyffhauserbund, and the rural riding associations were transferred into -the SA without their knowledge, but the Tribunal is not satisfied that -the members in general endeavored to protest against this transfer or -that there was any evidence, except in isolated cases, of the -consequences of refusal. The Tribunal therefore finds that membership in -the SA was generally voluntary. - -By the end of 1933 the SA was composed of 4½ million men. As a result of -changes made after 1934, in 1939 the SA numbered 1½ million men. - -_Activities_: In the early days of the Nazi movement the storm troopers -of the SA acted as the “strong arm of the Party”. They took part in the -beer hall feuds and were used for street-fighting in battles against -political opponents. The SA was also used to disseminate Nazi ideology -and propaganda and placed particular emphasis on anti-Semitic -propaganda, the doctrine of “Lebensraum”, the revision of the Versailles -Treaty, and the return of Germany’s colonies. - -After the Nazi advent to power, and particularly after the elections of -5 March 1933, the SA played an important role in establishing a Nazi -reign of terror over Germany. The SA was involved in outbreaks of -violence against the Jews and was used to arrest political opponents and -to guard concentration camps, where they subjected their prisoners to -brutal mistreatment. - -On 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 a purge of SA leaders occurred. The -pretext which was given for this purge, which involved the killing of -Röhm, the Chief of Staff of the SA, and many other SA leaders, was the -existence of a plot against Hitler. This purge resulted in a great -reduction in the influence and power of the SA. After 1934, it rapidly -declined in political significance. - -After 1934 the SA engaged in certain forms of military or para-military -training. The SA continued to engage in the dissemination of Nazi -propaganda. Isolated units of the SA were even involved in the steps -leading up to aggressive war and in the commission of War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity. SA units were among the first in the occupation -of Austria in March 1938. The SA supplied many of the men and a large -part of the equipment which composed the Sudeten Free Corps of Henlein, -although it appears that the corps was under the jurisdiction of SS -during its operation in Czechoslovakia. - -After the occupation of Poland, the SA group Sudeten was used for -transporting prisoners of war. Units of the SA were employed in the -guarding of prisoners in Danzig, Posen, Silesia, and the Baltic States. - -Some SA units were used to blow up synagogues in the Jewish pogrom of 10 -and 11 November 1938. Groups of the SA were concerned in the -ill-treatment of Jews in the ghettos of Vilna and Kaunas. - - _Conclusion_ - -Until the purge beginning on 30 June 1934, the SA was a group composed -in large part of ruffians and bullies who participated in the Nazi -outrages of that period. It has not been shown, however, that these -atrocities were part of a specific plan to wage aggressive war, and the -Tribunal therefore cannot hold that these activities were criminal under -the Charter. After the purge, the SA was reduced to the status of a -group of unimportant Nazi hangers-on. Although in specific instances -some units of the SA were used for the commission of War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity, it cannot be said that its members generally -participated in or even knew of the criminal acts. For these reasons the -Tribunal does not declare the SA to be a criminal organization within -the meaning of Article 9 of the Charter. - - - _THE REICH CABINET_ - -The Prosecution has named as a criminal organization the Reich Cabinet -(Die Reichsregierung) consisting of members of the ordinary cabinet -after 30 January 1933, members of the Council of Ministers for the -Defense of the Reich and members of the Secret Cabinet Council. The -Tribunal is of opinion that no declaration of criminality should be made -with respect to the Reich Cabinet for two reasons: (1) because it is not -shown that after 1937 it ever really acted as a group or organization; -(2) because the group of persons here charged is so small that members -could be conveniently tried in proper cases without resort to a -declaration that the Cabinet of which they were members was criminal. - -As to the first reason for our decision, it is to be observed that from -the time that it can be said that a conspiracy to make aggressive war -existed the Reich Cabinet did not constitute a governing body, but was -merely an aggregation of administrative officers subject to the absolute -control of Hitler. Not a single meeting of the Reich Cabinet was held -after 1937, but laws were promulgated in the name of one or more of the -cabinet members. The Secret Cabinet Council never met at all. A number -of the cabinet members were undoubtedly involved in the conspiracy to -make aggressive war; but they were involved as individuals and there is -no evidence that the Cabinet as a group or organization took any part in -these crimes. It will be remembered that when Hitler disclosed his aims -of criminal aggression at the Hossbach Conference, the disclosure was -not made before the Cabinet and that the Cabinet was not consulted with -regard to it, but, on the contrary, that it was made secretly to a small -group upon whom Hitler would necessarily rely in carrying on the war. -Likewise no cabinet order authorized the invasion of Poland. On the -contrary, the Defendant Schacht testifies that he sought to stop the -invasion by a plea to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army that Hitler’s -order was in violation of the Constitution because not authorized by the -Cabinet. - -It does appear, however, that various laws authorizing acts which were -criminal under the Charter were circulated among the members of the -Reich Cabinet and issued under its authority signed by the members whose -departments were concerned. This does not, however, prove that the Reich -Cabinet, after 1937, ever really acted as an organization. - -As to the second reason, it is clear that those members of the Reich -Cabinet who have been guilty of crimes should be brought to trial; and a -number of them are now on trial before the Tribunal. It is estimated -that there are 48 members of the group, that eight of these are dead and -17 are now on trial, leaving only 23 at the most, as to whom the -declaration could have any importance. Any others who are guilty should -also be brought to trial; but nothing would be accomplished to expedite -or facilitate their trials by declaring the Reich Cabinet to be a -criminal organization. Where an organization with a large membership is -used for such purposes, a declaration obviates the necessity of -inquiring as to its criminal character in the later trial of members who -are accused of participating through membership in its criminal purposes -and thus saves much time and trouble. There is no such advantage in the -case of a small group like the Reich Cabinet. - - - _GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND_ - -The Prosecution has also asked that the General Staff and High Command -of the German Armed Forces be declared a criminal organization. The -Tribunal believes that no declaration of criminality should be made with -respect to the General Staff and High Command. The number of persons -charged, while larger than that of the Reich Cabinet, is still so small -that individual trials of these officers would accomplish the purpose -here sought better than a declaration such as requested. But a more -compelling reason is that in the opinion of the Tribunal the General -Staff and High Command is neither an “organization” nor a “group” within -the meaning of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter. - -Some comment on the nature of this alleged group is requisite. According -to the Indictment and evidence before the Tribunal, it consists of -approximately 130 officers, living and dead, who at any time during the -period from February 1938, when Hitler reorganized the Armed Forces, and -May 1945, when Germany surrendered, held certain positions in the -military hierarchy. These men were high-ranking officers in the three -armed services: OKH—Army, OKM—Navy, and OKL—Air Force. Above them was -the overall Armed Forces authority, OKW—High Command of the German -Armed Forces with Hitler as the Supreme Commander. The officers in OKW, -including Defendant Keitel as Chief of the High Command, were in a sense -Hitler’s personal staff. In the larger sense they coordinated and -directed the three services, with particular emphasis on the functions -of planning and operations. - -The individual officers in this alleged group were, at one time or -another, in one of four categories: 1) Commanders-in-Chief of one of the -three services; 2) Chief of Staff of one of the three services; 3) -“Oberbefehlshabers”, the field Commanders-in-Chief of one of the three -services, which of course comprised by far the largest number of these -persons; or 4) an OKW officer, of which there were three, Defendants -Keitel and Jodl, and the latter’s Deputy Chief, Warlimont. This is the -meaning of the Indictment in its use of the term “General Staff and High -Command”. - -The Prosecution has here drawn the line. The Prosecution does not indict -the next level of the military hierarchy consisting of commanders of -army corps, and equivalent ranks in the Navy and Air Force, nor the -level below, the division commanders or their equivalent in the other -branches. And the staff officers of the four staff commands of OKW, OKH, -OKM, and OKL are not included, nor are the trained specialists who were -customarily called General Staff officers. - -In effect, then, those indicted as members are military leaders of the -Reich of the highest rank. No serious effort was made to assert that -they composed an “organization” in the sense of Article 9. The assertion -is rather that they were a “group”, which is a wider and more embracing -term than “organization.” - -The Tribunal does not so find. According to the evidence, their planning -at staff level, the constant conferences between staff officers and -field commanders, their operational technique in the field and at -headquarters was much the same as that of the armies, navies, and air -forces of all other countries. The over-all effort of OKW at -coordination and direction could be matched by a similar, though not -identical form of organization in other military forces, such as the -Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. - -To derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of an -association or group does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, logically -follow. On such a theory the top commanders of every other nation are -just such an association rather than what they actually are, an -aggregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a -given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions. - -Much of the evidence and the argument has centered around the question -of whether membership in these organizations was or was not voluntary; -in this case, it seems to the Tribunal to be quite beside the point. For -this alleged criminal organization has one characteristic, a controlling -one, which sharply distinguishes it from the other five indicted. When -an individual became a member of the SS for instance, he did so, -voluntarily or otherwise, but certainly with the knowledge that he was -joining something. In the case of the General Staff and High Command, -however, he could not know he was joining a group or organization for -such organization did not exist except in the charge of the Indictment. -He knew only that he had achieved a certain high rank in one of the -three services, and could not be conscious of the fact that he was -becoming a member of anything so tangible as a “group”, as that word is -commonly used. His relations with his brother officers in his own branch -of the service and his association with those of the other two branches -were, in general, like those of other services all over the world. - -The Tribunal therefore does not declare the General Staff and High -Command to be a criminal organization. - -Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term “group” in Article -9 must mean something more than this collection of military officers, it -has heard much evidence as to the participation of the officers in -planning and waging aggressive war, and in committing War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and -convincing. - -They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and -suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women, and children. They -have been a disgrace to the honorable profession of arms. Without their -military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow -Nazis would have been academic and sterile. Although they were not a -group falling within the words of the Charter, they were certainly a -ruthless military caste. The contemporary German militarism flourished -briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better -than it had in the generations of the past. - -Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier’s oath of obedience -to military orders. When it suits their defense they say they had to -obey; when confronted with Hitler’s brutal crimes, which are shown to -have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The -truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent -and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger -and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune to know. -This must be said. - -Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that -those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape -punishment. - -Article 26 of the Charter provides that the Judgment of the Tribunal as -to the guilt or innocence of any Defendant shall give the reasons on -which it is based. - -The Tribunal will now state those reasons in declaring its Judgment on -such guilt or innocence. - - - _GÖRING_ - -Göring is indicted on all four Counts. The evidence shows that after -Hitler he was the most prominent man in the Nazi regime. He was -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year -Plan, and had tremendous influence with Hitler, at least until 1943 when -their relationship deteriorated, ending in his arrest in 1945. He -testified that Hitler kept him informed of all important military and -political problems. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -From the moment he joined the Party in 1922 and took command of the -street-fighting organization, the SA, Göring was the adviser, the active -agent of Hitler, and one of the prime leaders of the Nazi movement. As -Hitler’s political deputy he was largely instrumental in bringing the -National Socialists to power in 1933, and was charged with consolidating -this power and expanding German armed might. He developed the Gestapo, -and created the first concentration camps, relinquishing them to Himmler -in 1934, conducted the Röhm purge in that year, and engineered the -sordid proceedings which resulted in the removal of Von Blomberg and Von -Fritsch from the Army. In 1936 he became Plenipotentiary for the Four -Year Plan, and in theory and in practice was the economic dictator of -the Reich. Shortly after the Pact of Munich, he announced that he would -embark on a five-fold expansion of the Luftwaffe, and speed rearmament -with emphasis on offensive weapons. - -Göring was one of the five important leaders present at the Hossbach -Conference of 5 November 1937, and he attended the other important -conferences already discussed in this Judgment. In the Austrian -Anschluss, he was indeed the central figure, the ringleader. He said in -Court: “I must take 100 percent responsibility. . . . I even overruled -objections by the Führer and brought everything to its final -development.” In the seizure of the Sudetenland, he played his role as -Luftwaffe chief by planning an air offensive which proved unnecessary, -and his role as politician by lulling the Czechs with false promises of -friendship. The night before the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the -absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, at a conference with Hitler and -President Hacha he threatened to bomb Prague if Hacha did not submit. -This threat he admitted in his testimony. - -Göring attended the Reich Chancellery meeting of 23 May 1939 when Hitler -told his military leaders “there is, therefore, no question of sparing -Poland,” and was present at the Obersalzberg briefing of 22 August 1939. -And the evidence shows he was active in the diplomatic maneuvers which -followed. With Hitler’s connivance, he used the Swedish businessman, -Dahlerus, as a go-between to the British, as described by Dahlerus to -this Tribunal, to try to prevent the British Government from keeping its -guarantee to the Poles. - -He commanded the Luftwaffe in the attack on Poland and throughout the -aggressive wars which followed. - -Even if he opposed Hitler’s plans against Norway and the Soviet Union, -as he alleged, it is clear that he did so only for strategic reasons; -once Hitler had decided the issue, he followed him without hesitation. -He made it clear in his testimony that these differences were never -ideological or legal. He was “in a rage” about the invasion of Norway, -but only because he had not received sufficient warning to prepare the -Luftwaffe offensive. He admitted he approved of the attack: “My attitude -was perfectly positive.” He was active in preparing and executing the -Yugoslavian and Greek campaigns, and testified that “Plan Marita,” the -attack on Greece, had been prepared long beforehand. The Soviet Union he -regarded as the “most threatening menace to Germany,” but said there was -no immediate military necessity for the attack. Indeed, his only -objection to the war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. was its timing; -he wished for strategic reasons to delay until Britain was conquered. He -testified: “My point of view was decided by political and military -reasons only.” - -After his own admissions to this Tribunal, from the positions which he -held, the conferences he attended, and the public words he uttered, -there can remain no doubt that Göring was the moving force for -aggressive war, second only to Hitler. He was the planner and prime -mover in the military and diplomatic preparation for war which Germany -pursued. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -The record is filled with Göring’s admissions of his complicity in the -use of slave labor. - - “We did use this labor for security reasons so that they would - not be active in their own country and would not work against - us. On the other hand, they served to help in the economic war.” - -And again: - - “Workers were forced to come to the Reich. That is something I - have not denied.” - -The man who spoke these words was Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan -charged with the recruitment and allocation of manpower. As Luftwaffe -Commander-in-Chief he demanded from Himmler more slave laborers for his -underground aircraft factories: “That I requested inmates of -concentration camps for the armament of the Luftwaffe is correct and it -is to be taken as a matter of course.” - -As Plenipotentiary, Göring signed a directive concerning the treatment -of Polish workers in Germany and implemented it by regulations of the -SD, including “special treatment.” He issued directives to use Soviet -and French prisoners of war in the armament industry; he spoke of -seizing Poles and Dutch and making them prisoners of war if necessary, -and using them for work. He agrees Russian prisoners of war were used to -man anti-aircraft batteries. - -As Plenipotentiary, Göring was the active authority in the spoliation of -conquered territory. He made plans for the spoliation of Soviet -territory long before the war on the Soviet Union. Two months prior to -the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler gave Göring the over-all -direction for the economic administration in the territory. Göring set -up an economic staff for this function. As Reichsmarshal of the Greater -German Reich, “the orders of the Reich Marshal cover all economic -fields, including nutrition and agriculture.” His so-called “Green” -folder, printed by the Wehrmacht, set up an “Economic Executive Staff, -East.” This directive contemplated plundering and abandonment of all -industry in the food deficit regions and, from the food surplus regions, -a diversion of food to German needs. Göring claims its purposes have -been misunderstood but admits “that as a matter of course and a matter -of duty we would have used Russia for our purposes,” when conquered. - -And he participated in the conference of 16 July 1941 when Hitler said -the National Socialists had no intention of ever leaving the occupied -countries, and that “all necessary measures—shooting, desettling, etc.” -should be taken. - -Göring persecuted the Jews, particularly after the November 1938 riots, -and not only in Germany where he raised the billion-mark fine as stated -elsewhere, but in the conquered territories as well. His own utterances -then and his testimony now shows this interest was primarily -economic—how to get their property and how to force them out of the -economic life of Europe. As these countries fell before the German Army, -he extended the Reich’s anti-Jewish laws to them; the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ for 1939, 1940, and 1941 contains several -anti-Jewish decrees signed by Göring. Although their extermination was -in Himmler’s hands, Göring was far from disinterested or inactive, -despite his protestations in the witness box. By decree of 31 July 1941 -he directed Himmler and Heydrich to “bring about a complete solution of -the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.” - -There is nothing to be said in mitigation. For Göring was often, indeed -almost always, the moving force, second only to his leader. He was the -leading war aggressor, both as political and as military leader; he was -the director of the slave labor program and the creator of the -oppressive program against the Jews and other races, at home and abroad. -All of these crimes he has frankly admitted. On some specific cases -there may be conflict of testimony but in terms of the broad outline, -his own admissions are more than sufficiently wide to be conclusive of -his guilt. His guilt is unique in its enormity. The record discloses no -excuses for this man. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds the Defendant Göring guilty on all four Counts of the -Indictment. - - - _HESS_ - -Hess is indicted under all four Counts. He joined the Nazi Party in 1920 -and participated in the Munich Putsch on 9 November 1923. He was -imprisoned with Hitler in the Landsberg fortress in 1924 and became -Hitler’s closest personal confidant, a relationship which lasted until -Hess’ flight to the British Isles. On 21 April 1933 he was appointed -Deputy to the Führer, and on 1 December 1933 was made Reichsminister -without Portfolio. He was appointed member of the Secret Cabinet Council -on 4 February 1938, and a member of the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Reich on 30 August 1939. In September 1939 Hess was -officially announced by Hitler as successor designate to the Führer -after Göring. On 10 May 1941 he flew from Germany to Scotland. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -As deputy to the Führer, Hess was the top man in the Nazi Party with -responsibility for handling all Party matters, and authority to make -decisions in Hitler’s name on all questions of Party leadership. As -Reichs Minister without Portfolio he had the authority to approve all -legislation suggested by the different Reichs Ministers before it could -be enacted as law. In these positions, Hess was an active supporter of -preparations for war. His signature appears on the law of 16 March 1935 -establishing compulsory military service. Throughout the years he -supported Hitler’s policy of vigorous rearmament in many speeches. He -told the people that they must sacrifice for armaments, repeating the -phrase, “Guns instead of butter.” It is true that between 1933 and 1937 -Hess made speeches in which he expressed a desire for peace and -advocated international economic cooperation. But nothing which they -contained can alter the fact that of all the defendants none knew better -than Hess how determined Hitler was to realize his ambitions, how -fanatical and violent a man he was, and how little likely he was to -refrain from resort to force, if this was the only way in which he could -achieve his aims. - -Hess was an informed and willing participant in German aggression -against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He was in touch with the -illegal Nazi Party in Austria throughout the entire period between the -murder of Dollfuss, and the Anschluss, and gave instructions to it -during that period. Hess was in Vienna on 12 March 1938 when the German -troops moved in; and on 13 March 1938 he signed the law for the reunion -of Austria within the German Reich. A law of 10 June 1939 provided for -his participation in the administration of Austria. On 24 July 1938 he -made a speech in commemoration of the unsuccessful putsch by Austrian -National Socialists which had been attempted four years before, praising -the steps leading up to Anschluss and defending the occupation of -Austria by Germany. - -In the summer of 1938 Hess was in active touch with Henlein, Chief of -the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia. On 27 September 1938, at the -time of the Munich crisis, he arranged with Keitel to carry out the -instructions of Hitler to make the machinery of the Nazi Party available -for a secret mobilization. On 14 April 1939 Hess signed a decree setting -up the Government of the Sudetenland as an integral part of the Reich; -and an ordinance of 10 June 1939 provided for his participation in the -administration of the Sudetenland. On 7 November 1938 Hess absorbed -Henlein’s Sudeten German Party into the Nazi Party, and made a speech in -which he emphasized that Hitler had been prepared to resort to war if -this had been necessary to acquire the Sudetenland. - -On 27 August 1939 when the attack on Poland had been temporarily -postponed in an attempt to induce Great Britain to abandon its guarantee -to Poland, Hess publicly praised Hitler’s “magnanimous offer” to Poland, -and attacked Poland for agitating for war and England for being -responsible for Poland’s attitude. After the invasion of Poland Hess -signed decrees incorporating Danzig and certain Polish territories into -the Reich, and setting up the General Government (Poland). - -These specific steps which this defendant took in support of Hitler’s -plans for aggressive action do not indicate the full extent of his -responsibility. Until his flight to England, Hess was Hitler’s closest -personal confidant. Their relationship was such that Hess must have been -informed of Hitler’s aggressive plans when they came into existence. And -he took action to carry out these plans whenever action was necessary. - -With him on his flight to England, Hess carried certain peace proposals -which he alleged Hitler was prepared to accept. It is significant to -note that this flight took place only 10 days after the date on which -Hitler fixed, 22 June 1941, as the time for attacking the Soviet Union. -In conversations carried on after his arrival in England Hess -wholeheartedly supported all Germany’s aggressive actions up to that -time, and attempted to justify Germany’s action in connection with -Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the -Netherlands. He blamed England and France for the war. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -There is evidence showing the participation of the Party Chancellery, -under Hess, in the distribution of orders connected with the commission -of War Crimes; that Hess may have had knowledge of, even if he did not -participate in, the crimes that were being committed in the East, and -proposed laws discriminating against Jews and Poles; and that he signed -decrees forcing certain groups of Poles to accept German citizenship. -The Tribunal, however, does not find that the evidence sufficiently -connects Hess with those crimes to sustain a finding of guilt. - -As previously indicated the Tribunal found, after a full medical -examination of and report on the condition of this defendant, that he -should be tried, without any postponement of his case. Since that time -further motions have been made that he should again be examined. These -the Tribunal denied, after having had a report from the prison -psychologist. That Hess acts in an abnormal manner, suffers from loss of -memory, and has mentally deteriorated during this Trial, may be true. -But there is nothing to show that he does not realize the nature of the -charges against him, or is incapable of defending himself. He was ably -represented at the Trial by counsel, appointed for that purpose by the -Tribunal. There is no suggestion that Hess was not completely sane when -the acts charged against him were committed. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds the Defendant Hess guilty on Counts One and Two; and -not guilty on Counts Three and Four. - - - _VON RIBBENTROP_ - -Von Ribbentrop is indicted under all four Counts. He joined the Nazi -Party in 1932. By 1933 he had been made Foreign Policy Adviser to -Hitler, and in the same year the representative of the Nazi Party on -foreign policy. In 1934 he was appointed Delegate for Disarmament -Questions, and in 1935 Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, a capacity in -which he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 and the -Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. On 11 August 1936 he was appointed -Ambassador to England. On 4 February 1938 he succeeded Von Neurath as -Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs as part of the general reshuffle -which accompanied the dismissal of Von Fritsch and Von Blomberg. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Von Ribbentrop was not present at the Hossbach Conference held on 5 -November 1937, but on 2 January 1938, while still Ambassador to England, -he sent a memorandum to Hitler indicating his opinion that a change in -the _status quo_ in the East in the German sense could only be carried -out by force and suggesting methods to prevent England and France from -intervening in a European war fought to bring about such a change. When -Von Ribbentrop became Foreign Minister Hitler told him that Germany -still had four problems to solve, Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, and -Danzig, and mentioned the possibility of “some sort of a show-down” or -“military settlement” for their solution. - -On 12 February 1938 Von Ribbentrop attended the conference between -Hitler and Schuschnigg at which Hitler, by threats of invasion, forced -Schuschnigg to grant a series of concessions designed to strengthen the -Nazis in Austria, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister -of Security and Interior, with control over the police. Von Ribbentrop -was in London when the occupation of Austria was actually carried out -and, on the basis of information supplied him by Göring, informed the -British Government that Germany had not presented Austria with an -ultimatum, but had intervened in Austria only to prevent civil war. On -13 March 1938 Von Ribbentrop signed the law incorporating Austria into -the German Reich. - -Von Ribbentrop participated in the aggressive plans against -Czechoslovakia. Beginning in March 1938, he was in close touch with the -Sudeten German Party and gave them instructions which had the effect of -keeping the Sudeten German question a live issue which might serve as an -excuse for the attack which Germany was planning against Czechoslovakia. -In August 1938 he participated in a conference for the purpose of -obtaining Hungarian support in the event of a war with Czechoslovakia. -After the Munich Pact he continued to bring diplomatic pressure with the -object of occupying the remainder of Czechoslovakia. He was instrumental -in inducing the Slovaks to proclaim their independence. He was present -at the conference of 14-15 March 1939 at which Hitler, by threats of -invasion, compelled President Hacha to consent to the German occupation -of Czechoslovakia. After the German troops had marched in, Von -Ribbentrop signed the law establishing a protectorate over Bohemia and -Moravia. - -Von Ribbentrop played a particularly significant role in the diplomatic -activity which led up to the attack on Poland. He participated in a -conference held on 12 August 1939, for the purpose of obtaining Italian -support if the attack should lead to a general European war. Von -Ribbentrop discussed the German demands with respect to Danzig and the -Polish Corridor with the British Ambassador in the period from 25 August -to 30 August 1939, when he knew that the German plans to attack Poland -had merely been temporarily postponed in an attempt to induce the -British to abandon their guarantee to the Poles. The way in which he -carried out these discussions makes it clear that he did not enter them -in good faith in an attempt to reach a settlement of the difficulties -between Germany and Poland. - -Von Ribbentrop was advised in advance of the attack on Norway and -Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries, and prepared the -official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggressive -actions. - -Von Ribbentrop attended the conference on 20 January 1941, at which -Hitler and Mussolini discussed the proposed attack on Greece, and the -conference in January 1941, at which Hitler obtained from Antonescu -permission for German troops to go through Rumania for this attack. On -25 March 1941, when Yugoslavia adhered to the Axis Tripartite Pact, Von -Ribbentrop had assured Yugoslavia that Germany would respect its -sovereignty and territorial integrity. On 27 March 1941 he attended the -meeting, held after the _coup d’état_ in Yugoslavia, at which plans were -made to carry out Hitler’s announced intention to destroy Yugoslavia. - -Von Ribbentrop attended a conference in May 1941 with Hitler and -Antonescu relating to Rumanian participation in the attack on the -U.S.S.R. He also consulted with Rosenberg in the preliminary planning -for the political exploitation of Soviet territories and in July 1941, -after the outbreak of war, urged Japan to attack the Soviet Union. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -Von Ribbentrop participated in a meeting of 6 June 1944, at which it was -agreed to start a program under which Allied aviators carrying out -machine gun attacks on the civilian population should be lynched. In -December 1944 Von Ribbentrop was informed of the plans to murder one of -the French generals held as a prisoner of war and directed his -subordinates to see that the details were worked out in such a way as to -prevent its detection by the protecting powers. Von Ribbentrop is also -responsible for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity because of his -activities with respect to occupied countries and Axis satellites. The -top German official in both Denmark and Vichy France was a Foreign -Office representative, and Von Ribbentrop is therefore responsible for -the general economic and political policies put into effect in the -occupation of those countries. He urged the Italians to adopt a ruthless -occupation policy in Yugoslavia and Greece. - -He played an important part in Hitler’s “final solution” of the Jewish -question. In September 1942 he ordered the German diplomatic -representatives accredited to various Axis satellites to hasten the -deportation of Jews to the East. In June 1942 the German Ambassador to -Vichy requested Laval to turn over 50,000 Jews for deportation to the -East. On 25 February 1943 Von Ribbentrop protested to Mussolini against -Italian slowness in deporting Jews from the Italian occupation zone of -France. On 17 April 1943 he took part in a conference between Hitler and -Horthy on the deportation of Jews from Hungary and informed Horthy that -the “Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps.” -At the same conference Hitler had likened the Jews to “tuberculosis -bacilli” and said if they did not work they were to be shot. - -Von Ribbentrop’s defense to the charges made against him is that Hitler -made all the important decisions and that he was such a great admirer -and faithful follower of Hitler that he never questioned Hitler’s -repeated assertions that he wanted peace or the truth of the reasons -that Hitler gave in explaining aggressive action. The Tribunal does not -consider this explanation to be true. Von Ribbentrop participated in all -of the Nazi aggressions from the occupation of Austria to the invasion -of the Soviet Union. Although he was personally concerned with the -diplomatic rather than the military aspect of these actions, his -diplomatic efforts were so closely connected with war that he could not -have remained unaware of the aggressive nature of Hitler’s actions. In -the administration of territories over which Germany acquired control by -illegal invasion Von Ribbentrop also assisted in carrying out criminal -policies, particularly those involving the extermination of the Jews. -There is abundant evidence, moreover, that Von Ribbentrop was in -complete sympathy with all the main tenets of the National Socialist -creed, and that his collaboration with Hitler and with other defendants -in the commission of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes -against Humanity was whole-hearted. It was because Hitler’s policy and -plans coincided with his own ideas that Von Ribbentrop served him so -willingly to the end. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Von Ribbentrop is guilty on all four Counts. - - - _KEITEL_ - -Keitel is indicted on all four Counts. He was Chief of Staff to the then -Minister of War Von Blomberg from 1935 to 4 February 1938; on that day -Hitler took command of the Armed Forces, making Keitel Chief of the High -Command of the Armed Forces. Keitel did not have command authority over -the three Wehrmacht branches which enjoyed direct access to the Supreme -Commander. OKW was in effect Hitler’s military staff. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Keitel attended the Schuschnigg conference in February 1938 with two -other generals. Their presence, he admitted, was a “military -demonstration,” but since he had been appointed OKW Chief just one week -before he had not known why he had been summoned. Hitler and Keitel then -continued to put pressure on Austria with false rumors, broadcasts, and -troop maneuvers. Keitel made the military and other arrangements, and -Jodl’s diary noted “the effect is quick and strong.” When Schuschnigg -called his plebiscite, Keitel that night briefed Hitler and his -generals, and Hitler issued “Case Otto” which Keitel initialed. - -On 21 April 1938 Hitler and Keitel considered making use of a possible -“incident,” such as the assassination of the German Minister at Prague, -to preface the attack on Czechoslovakia. Keitel signed many directives -and memoranda on “Fall Gruen”, including the directive of 30 May -containing Hitler’s statement: “It is my unalterable decision to smash -Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.” After Munich, -Keitel initialed Hitler’s directive for the attack on Czechoslovakia, -and issued two supplements. The second supplement said the attack should -appear to the outside world as “merely an act of pacification and not a -warlike undertaking.” The OKW Chief attended Hitler’s negotiations with -Hacha when the latter surrendered. - -Keitel was present on 23 May 1939 when Hitler announced his decision “to -attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity”. Already he had signed -the directive requiring the Wehrmacht to submit its “Fall Weiss” -timetable to OKW by 1 May. - -The invasion of Norway and Denmark he discussed on 12 December 1939 with -Hitler, Jodl, and Raeder. By directive of 27 January 1940 the Norway -plans were placed under Keitel’s “direct and personal guidance.” Hitler -had said on 23 May 1939 he would ignore the neutrality of Belgium and -the Netherlands, and Keitel signed orders for these attacks on 15 -October, 20 November, and 28 November 1939. Orders postponing this -attack 17 times until spring all were signed by Keitel or Jodl. - -Formal planning for attacking Greece and Yugoslavia had begun in -November 1940. On 18 March 1941 Keitel heard Hitler tell Raeder complete -occupation of Greece was a prerequisite to settlement, and also heard -Hitler decree on 27 March that the destruction of Yugoslavia should take -place with “unmerciful harshness.” - -Keitel testified that he opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union for -military reasons, and also because it would constitute a violation of -the Non-aggression Pact. Nevertheless he initialed “Case Barbarossa,” -signed by Hitler on 18 December 1940, and attended the OKW discussion -with Hitler on 3 February 1941. Keitel’s supplement of 13 March -established the relationship between the military and political -officers. He issued his timetable for the invasion on 6 June 1941, and -was present at the briefing of 14 June when the generals gave their -final reports before attack. He appointed Jodl and Warlimont as OKW -representatives to Rosenberg on matters concerning the Eastern -Territories. On 16 June he directed all army units to carry out the -economic directives issued by Göring in the so-called “Green Folder,” -for the exploitation of Russian territory, food, and raw materials. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued a directive that paratroopers were to be -turned over to the SD. On 18 October Hitler issued the Commando Order -which was carried out in several instances. After the landing in -Normandy, Keitel reaffirmed the order, and later extended it to Allied -missions fighting with partisans. He admits he did not believe the order -was legal but claims he could not stop Hitler from decreeing it. - -When, on 8 September 1941, OKW issued its ruthless regulations for the -treatment of Soviet POW’s, Canaris wrote to Keitel that under -international law the SD should have nothing to do with this matter. On -this memorandum in Keitel’s handwriting, dated 23 September and -initialed by him, is the statement: - - “The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous - warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I - approve and back the measures.” - -Keitel testified that he really agreed with Canaris and argued with -Hitler, but lost. The OKW Chief directed the military authorities to -cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in looting cultural property in -occupied territories. - -Lahousen testified that Keitel told him on 12 September 1939, while -aboard Hitler’s headquarters train, that the Polish intelligentsia, -nobility, and Jews were to be liquidated. On 20 October, Hitler told -Keitel the intelligentsia would be prevented from forming a ruling -class, the standard of living would remain low, and Poland would be used -only for labor forces. Keitel does not remember the Lahousen -conversation, but admits there was such a policy and that he had -protested without effect to Hitler about it. - -On 16 September 1941 Keitel ordered that attacks on soldiers in the East -should be met by putting to death 50 to 100 Communists for one German -soldier, with the comment that human life was less than nothing in the -East. On 1 October he ordered military commanders always to have -hostages to execute when soldiers were attacked. When Terboven, the -Reich Commissioner in Norway, wrote Hitler that Keitel’s suggestion that -workmen’s relatives be held responsible for sabotage, could work only if -firing squads were authorized, Keitel wrote on this memorandum: “Yes, -that is the best.” - -On 12 May 1941, five weeks before the invasion of the Soviet Union, OKW -urged upon Hitler a directive of OKH that political commissars be -liquidated by the Army. Keitel admitted the directive was passed on to -field commanders. And on 13 May Keitel signed an order that civilians -suspected of offenses against troops should be shot without trial, and -that prosecution of German soldiers for offenses against civilians was -unnecessary. On 27 July all copies of this directive were ordered -destroyed without affecting its validity. Four days previously he had -signed another order that legal punishment was inadequate and troops -should use terrorism. - -On 7 December 1941, as already discussed in this opinion, the so-called -“Nacht und Nebel” Decree, over Keitel’s signature, provided that in -occupied territories civilians who had been accused of crimes of -resistance against the army of occupation would be tried only if a death -sentence was likely; otherwise they would be handed to the Gestapo for -transportation to Germany. - -Keitel directed that Russian POW’s be used in German war industry. On 8 -September 1942 he ordered French, Dutch, and Belgian citizens to work on -the construction of the Atlantic Wall. He was present on 4 January 1944 -when Hitler directed Sauckel to obtain 4 million new workers from -occupied territories. - -In the face of these documents Keitel does not deny his connection with -these acts. Rather, his defense relies on the fact that he is a soldier, -and on the doctrine of “superior orders”, prohibited by Article 8 of the -Charter as a defense. - -There is nothing in mitigation. Superior orders, even to a soldier, -cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and -extensive have been committed consciously, ruthlessly, and without -military excuse or justification. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds Keitel guilty on all four Counts. - - - _KALTENBRUNNER_ - -Kaltenbrunner is indicted under Counts One, Three, and Four. He joined -the Austrian Nazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he became leader of -the SS in Austria. After the Anschluss he was appointed Austrian State -Secretary for Security and when this position was abolished in 1941 he -was made Higher SS and Police Leader. On 30 January 1943 he was -appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the Reich -Security Head Office (RSHA), a position which had been held by Heydrich -until his assassination in June 1942. He held the rank of -Obergruppenführer in the SS. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -As leader of the SS in Austria Kaltenbrunner was active in the Nazi -intrigue against the Schuschnigg Government. On the night of 11 March -1938, after Göring had ordered Austrian National Socialists to seize -control of the Austrian Government, 500 Austrian SS men under -Kaltenbrunner’s command surrounded the Federal Chancellery and a special -detachment under the command of his adjutant entered the Federal -Chancellery while Seyss-Inquart was negotiating with President Miklas. -But there is no evidence connecting Kaltenbrunner with plans to wage -aggressive war on any other front. The Anschluss, although it was an -aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence -against Kaltenbrunner under Count One does not, in the opinion of the -Tribunal, show his direct participation in any plan to wage such a war. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -When he became Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the RSHA -on 30 January 1943, Kaltenbrunner took charge of an organization which -included the main offices of the Gestapo, the SD, and the Criminal -Police. As Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had authority to order -protective custody to and release from concentration camps. Orders to -this effect were normally sent over his signature. Kaltenbrunner was -aware of conditions in concentration camps. He had undoubtedly visited -Mauthausen and witnesses testified that he had seen prisoners killed by -the various methods of execution, hanging, shooting in the back of the -neck, and gassing, as part of a demonstration. Kaltenbrunner himself -ordered the execution of prisoners in those camps and his office was -used to transmit to the camps execution orders which originated in -Himmler’s office. At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner participated in -the arrangements for the evacuation of inmates of concentration camps, -and the liquidation of many of them, to prevent them from being -liberated by the Allied armies. - -During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was Head of the RSHA, it was -engaged in a widespread program of War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity. These crimes included the mistreatment and murder of prisoners -of war. Einsatz Kommandos operating under the control of the Gestapo -were engaged in the screening of Soviet prisoners of war. Jews, -commissars, and others who were thought to be ideologically hostile to -the Nazi system were reported to the RSHA, which had them transferred to -a concentration camp and murdered. An RSHA order issued during -Kaltenbrunner’s regime established the “Bullet Decree,” under which -certain escaped prisoners of war who were recaptured were taken to -Mauthausen and shot. The order for the execution of commando troops was -extended by the Gestapo to include parachutists while Kaltenbrunner was -Chief of the RSHA. An order signed by Kaltenbrunner instructed the -police not to interfere with attacks on bailed-out Allied fliers. In -December 1944 Kaltenbrunner participated in the murder of one of the -French generals held as a prisoner of war. - -During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was head of the RSHA, the -Gestapo and SD in occupied territories continued the murder and -ill-treatment of the population, using methods which included torture -and confinement in concentration camps, usually under orders to which -Kaltenbrunner’s name was signed. - -The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid labor discipline on -the slave laborers and Kaltenbrunner established a series of labor -reformatory camps for this purpose. When the SS embarked on a slave -labor program of its own, the Gestapo was used to obtain the needed -workers by sending laborers to concentration camps. - -The RSHA played a leading part in the “final solution” of the Jewish -question by the extermination of the Jews. A special section under the -Amt IV of the RSHA was established to supervise this program. Under its -direction approximately 6 million Jews were murdered, of which 2 million -were killed by Einsatzgruppen and other units of the Security Police. -Kaltenbrunner had been informed of the activities of these -Einsatzgruppen when he was a Higher SS and Police Leader, and they -continued to function after he had become Chief of the RSHA. - -The murder of approximately 4 million Jews in concentration camps has -heretofore been described. This part of the program was also under the -supervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was head of that -organization, and special missions of the RSHA scoured the occupied -territories and the various Axis satellites arranging for the -deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kaltenbrunner -was informed of these activities. A letter which he wrote on 30 June -1944 described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews for that purpose, -and directed that all who could not work would have to be kept in -readiness for “special action,” which meant murder. Kaltenbrunner denied -his signature to this letter, as he did on a very large number of orders -on which his name was stamped or typed, and, in a few instances, -written. It is inconceivable that in matters of such importance his -signature could have appeared so many times without his authority. - -Kaltenbrunner has claimed that when he took office as Chief of the -Security Police and SD and as Head of the RSHA he did so pursuant to an -understanding with Himmler under which he was to confine his activities -to matters involving foreign intelligence, and not to assume over-all -control over the activities of the RSHA. He claims that the criminal -program had been started before his assumption of office; that he seldom -knew what was going on; and that when he was informed he did what he -could to stop them. It is true that he showed a special interest in -matters involving foreign intelligence. But he exercised control over -the activities of the RSHA, was aware of the crimes it was committing, -and was an active participant in many of them. - - _Conclusion._ - -The Tribunal finds that Kaltenbrunner is not guilty on Count One. He is -guilty under Counts Three and Four. - - - _ROSENBERG_ - -Rosenberg is indicted on all four Counts. He joined the Nazi Party in -1919, participated in the Munich Putsch of 9 November 1923, and tried to -keep the illegal Nazi Party together while Hitler was in jail. -Recognized as the Party’s ideologist, he developed and spread Nazi -doctrines in the newspapers _Völkischer Beobachter_ and _NS -Monatshefte_, which he edited, and in the numerous books he wrote. His -book, _Myth of the Twentieth Century_, had a circulation of over a -million copies. - -In 1930 Rosenberg was elected to the Reichstag and he became the Party’s -representative for Foreign Affairs. In April 1933 he was made -Reichsleiter and head of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the NSDAP (the -APA). Hitler, in January 1934, appointed Rosenberg his deputy for the -supervision of the entire spiritual and ideological training of the -NSDAP. In January 1940, he was designated to set up the “Hohe Schule,” -the Center of National Socialistic Ideological and Educational Research, -and he organized the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg” in connection with this -task. He was appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories on 17 July 1941. - - _Crimes Against Peace._ - -As head of the APA, Rosenberg was in charge of an organization whose -agents were active in Nazi intrigue in all parts of the world. His own -reports, for example, claim that the APA was largely responsible for -Rumania’s joining the Axis. As head of the APA, he played an important -role in the preparation and planning of the attack on Norway. - -Rosenberg, together with Raeder, was one of the originators of the plan -for attacking Norway. Rosenberg had become interested in Norway as early -as June 1939, when he conferred with Quisling. Quisling had pointed out -the importance of the Norwegian coast in the event of a conflict between -Germany and Great Britain, and stated his fears that Great Britain might -be able to obtain Norwegian assistance. As a result of this conference -Rosenberg arranged for Quisling to collaborate closely with the National -Socialists and to receive political assistance by the Nazis. - -When the war broke out Quisling began to express fear of British -intervention in Norway. Rosenberg supported this view, and transmitted -to Raeder a plan to use Quisling for a _coup_ in Norway. Rosenberg was -instrumental in arranging the conferences in December 1939 between -Hitler and Quisling which led to the preparation of the attack on -Norway, and at which Hitler promised Quisling financial assistance. -After these conferences Hitler assigned to Rosenberg the political -exploitation of Norway. Two weeks after Norway was occupied, Hitler told -Rosenberg that he had based his decision to attack Norway “on the -continuous warnings of Quisling as reported to him by Reichsleiter -Rosenberg.” - -Rosenberg bears a major responsibility for the formulation and execution -of occupation policies in the Occupied Eastern Territories. He was -informed by Hitler on 2 April 1941 of the coming attack against the -Soviet Union, and he agreed to help in the capacity of a “Political -Adviser.” On 20 April 1941 he was appointed Commissioner for the Central -Control of Questions Connected with the East-European Region. In -preparing the plans for the occupation, he had numerous conferences with -Keitel, Raeder, Göring, Funk, Von Ribbentrop, and other high Reich -authorities. In April and May 1941 he prepared several drafts of -instructions concerning the setting up of the administration in the -Occupied Eastern Territories. On 20 June 1941, two days before the -attack on the U.S.S.R., he made a speech to his assistants about the -problems and policies of occupation. Rosenberg attended Hitler’s -conference of 16 July 1941, in which policies of administration and -occupation were discussed. On 17 July 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg -Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and publicly -charged him with responsibility for civil administration. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -Rosenberg is responsible for a system of organized plunder of both -public and private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe. -Acting under Hitler’s orders of January 1940 to set up the “Hohe -Schule”, he organized and directed the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg”, which -plundered museums and libraries, confiscated art treasures and -collections, and pillaged private houses. His own reports show the -extent of the confiscations. In “Action-M” (Möbel), instituted in -December 1941 at Rosenberg’s suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes were -plundered in the West, 38,000 of them in Paris alone, and it took 26,984 -railroad cars to transport the confiscated furnishings to Germany. As of -14 July 1944, more than 21,903 art objects including famous paintings -and museum pieces, had been seized by the Einsatzstab in the West. - -With his appointment as Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories -on 17 July 1941, Rosenberg became the supreme authority for those areas. -He helped to formulate the policies of Germanization, exploitation, -forced labor, extermination of Jews and opponents of Nazi rule, and he -set up the administration which carried them out. He took part in the -conference of 16 July 1941, in which Hitler stated that they were faced -with the task of “cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in -order to be able: first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; and -third, to exploit it”, and indicated that ruthless action was -contemplated. Rosenberg accepted his appointment on the following day. - -Rosenberg had knowledge of the brutal treatment and terror to which the -Eastern people were subjected. He directed that the Hague Rules of Land -Warfare were not applicable in the Occupied Eastern Territories. He had -knowledge of and took an active part in stripping the Eastern -Territories of raw materials and foodstuffs, which were all sent to -Germany. He stated that feeding the German People was first on the list -of claims on the East, and that the Soviet People would suffer thereby. -His directives provided for the segregation of Jews, ultimately in -ghettos. His subordinates engaged in mass killings of Jews, and his -civil administrators in the East considered that cleansing the Eastern -Occupied Territories of Jews was necessary. In December 1941 he made the -suggestion to Hitler that in a case of shooting 100 hostages, Jews only -be used. Rosenberg had knowledge of the deportation of laborers from the -East, of the methods of “recruiting” and the transportation horrors, and -of the treatment Eastern laborers received in the Reich. He gave his -civil administrators quotas of laborers to be sent to the Reich, which -had to be met by whatever means necessary. His signature of approval -appears on the order of 14 June 1944 for the “Heu Aktion”, the -apprehension of 40,000 to 50,000 youths, aged 10-14, for shipment to the -Reich. - -Upon occasion Rosenberg objected to the excesses and atrocities -committed by his subordinates, notably in the case of Koch, but these -excesses continued and he stayed in office until the end. - - _Conclusion._ - -The Tribunal finds that Rosenberg is guilty on all four Counts. - - - _FRANK_ - -Frank is indicted under Counts One, Three, and Four. Frank joined the -Nazi Party in 1927. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1930, the -Bavarian State Minister of Justice in March 1933, and when this position -was incorporated into the Reich Government in 1934, Reich Minister -without Portfolio. He was made a Reichsleiter of the Nazi Party in -charge of Legal Affairs in 1933, and in the same year President of the -Academy of German Law. Frank was also given the honorary rank of -Obergruppenführer in the SA. In 1942 Frank became involved in a -temporary dispute with Himmler as to the type of legal system which -should be in effect in Germany. During the same year he was dismissed as -Reichsleiter of the Nazi Party and as President of the Academy of German -Law. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Frank was sufficiently -connected with the common plan to wage aggressive war to allow the -Tribunal to convict him on Count One. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -Frank was appointed Chief Civil Administration Officer for occupied -Polish territory and, on 12 October 1939, was made Governor General of -the occupied Polish territory. On 3 October 1939 he described the policy -which he intended to put into effect by stating: “Poland shall be -treated like a colony; the Poles will become the slaves of the Greater -German World Empire.” The evidence establishes that this occupation -policy was based on the complete destruction of Poland as a national -entity, and a ruthless exploitation of its human and economic resources -for the German war effort. All opposition was crushed with the utmost -harshness. A reign of terror was instituted, backed by summary police -courts which ordered such actions as the public shootings of groups of -20 to 200 Poles, and the widespread shootings of hostages. The -concentration camp system was introduced in the General Government by -the establishment of the notorious Treblinka and Maidaneck camps. As -early as 6 February 1940, Frank gave an indication of the extent of this -reign of terror by his cynical comment to a newspaper reporter on Von -Neurath’s poster announcing the execution of the Czech students: “If I -wished to order that one should hang up posters about every seven Poles -shot, there would not be enough forests in Poland with which to make the -paper for these posters.” On 30 May 1940 Frank told a police conference -that he was taking advantage of the offensive in the West which diverted -the attention of the world from Poland to liquidate thousands of Poles -who would be likely to resist German domination of Poland, including -“the leading representatives of the Polish intelligentsia.” Pursuant to -these instructions the brutal A.B. action was begun under which the -Security Police and SD carried out these exterminations which were only -partially subjected to the restraints of legal procedure. On 2 October -1943 Frank issued a decree under which any non-Germans hindering German -construction in the General Government were to be tried by summary -courts of the Security Police and SD and sentenced to death. - -The economic demands made on the General Government were far in excess -of the needs of the army of occupation, and were out of all proportion -to the resources of the country. The food raised in Poland was shipped -to Germany on such a wide scale that the rations of the population of -the occupied territories were reduced to the starvation level, and -epidemics were widespread. Some steps were taken to provide for the -feeding of the agricultural workers who were used to raise the crops, -but the requirements of the rest of the population were disregarded. It -is undoubtedly true, as argued by counsel for the Defense, that some -suffering in the General Government was inevitable as a result of the -ravages of war and the economic confusion resulting therefrom. But the -suffering was increased by a planned policy of economic exploitation. - -Frank introduced the deportation of slave laborers to Germany in the -very early stages of his administration. On 25 January 1940 he indicated -his intention of deporting 1 million laborers to Germany, suggesting on -10 May 1940 the use of police raids to meet this quota. On 18 August -1942 Frank reported that he had already supplied 800,000 workers for the -Reich, and expected to be able to supply 140,000 more before the end of -the year. - -The persecution of the Jews was immediately begun in the General -Government. The area originally contained from 2½ million to 3½ million -Jews. They were forced into ghettos, subjected to discriminatory laws, -deprived of the food necessary to avoid starvation, and finally -systematically and brutally exterminated. On 16 December 1941 Frank told -the Cabinet of the Governor General: “We must annihilate the Jews, -wherever we find them and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain -there the structure of the Reich as a whole.” By 25 January 1944, Frank -estimated that there were only 100,000 Jews left. - -At the beginning of his testimony, Frank stated that he had a feeling of -“terrible guilt” for the atrocities committed in the occupied -territories. But his defense was largely devoted to an attempt to prove -that he was not in fact responsible; that he ordered only the necessary -pacification measures; that the excesses were due to the activities of -the police which were not under his control; and that he never even knew -of the activities of the concentration camps. It had also been argued -that the starvation was due to the aftermath of the war and policies -carried out under the Four Year Plan; that the forced labor program was -under the direction of Sauckel; and that the extermination of the Jews -was by the police and SS under direct orders from Himmler. - -It is undoubtedly true that most of the criminal program charged against -Frank was put into effect through the police, that Frank had -jurisdictional difficulties with Himmler over the control of the police, -and that Hitler resolved many of these disputes in favor of Himmler. It -therefore may well be true that some of the crimes committed in the -General Government were committed without the knowledge of Frank, and -even occasionally despite his opposition. It may also be true that some -of the criminal policies put into effect in the General Government did -not originate with Frank but were carried out pursuant to orders from -Germany. But it is also true that Frank was a willing and knowing -participant in the use of terrorism in Poland; in the economic -exploitation of Poland in a way which led to the death by starvation of -a large number of people; in the deportation to Germany as slave -laborers of over a million Poles; and in a program involving the murder -of at least 3 million Jews. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Frank is not guilty on Count One but guilty -under Counts Three and Four. - - - _FRICK_ - -Frick is indicted on all four Counts. Recognized as the chief Nazi -administrative specialist and bureaucrat, he was appointed -Reichsminister of the Interior in Hitler’s first Cabinet. He retained -this important position until August 1943, when he was appointed Reich -Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. In connection with his duties at the -center of all internal and domestic administration, he became the -Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich Director of Elections, General -Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, and a member of the -Reich Defense Council, the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich, -and the “Three Man College”. As the several countries incorporated into -the Reich were overrun, he was placed at the head of the central offices -for their incorporation. - -Though Frick did not officially join the Nazi Party until 1925, he had -previously allied himself with Hitler and the National Socialist cause -during the Munich Putsch, while he was an official in the Munich Police -Department. Elected to the Reichstag in 1924, he became a Reichsleiter -as leader of the National Socialist faction in that body. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -An avid Nazi, Frick was largely responsible for bringing the German -Nation under the complete control of the NSDAP. After Hitler became -Reich Chancellor, the new Minister of the Interior immediately began to -incorporate local governments under the sovereignty of the Reich. The -numerous laws he drafted, signed, and administered abolished all -opposition parties and prepared the way for the Gestapo and their -concentration camps to extinguish all individual opposition. He was -largely responsible for the legislation which suppressed the trade -unions, the church, the Jews. He performed this task with ruthless -efficiency. - -Before the date of the Austrian aggression Frick was concerned only with -domestic administration within the Reich. The evidence does not show -that he participated in any of the conferences at which Hitler outlined -his aggressive intentions. Consequently the Tribunal takes the view, -that Frick was not a member of the common plan or conspiracy to wage -aggressive war as defined in this Judgment. - -Six months after the seizure of Austria, under the provisions of the -Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938, Frick became General -Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich. He was made -responsible for war administration, except the military and economic, in -the event of Hitler’s proclaiming a state of defense. The Reich -Ministries of Justice, Education, Religion, and the Office of Spatial -Planning were made subordinate to him. Performing his allotted duties, -Frick devised an administrative organization in accordance with wartime -standards. According to his own statement, this was actually put into -operation after Germany decided to adopt a policy of war. - -Frick signed the law of 13 March 1938 which united Austria with the -Reich, and he was made responsible for its accomplishment. In setting up -German administration in Austria, he issued decrees which introduced -German law, the Nuremberg decrees, the Military Service Law, and he -provided for police security by Himmler. - -He also signed the laws incorporating into the Reich the Sudetenland, -Memel, Danzig, the Eastern territories (West Prussia and Posen), and -Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnot. He was placed in charge of the actual -incorporation, and of the establishment of German administration over -these territories. He signed the law establishing the Protectorate of -Bohemia and Moravia. - -As the head of the Central Offices for Bohemia and Moravia, the -Government General, and Norway, he was charged with obtaining close -cooperation between the German officials in these occupied countries and -the supreme authorities of the Reich. He supplied German civil servants -for the administrations in all occupied territories, advising Rosenberg -as to their assignment in the Occupied Eastern Territories. He signed -the laws appointing Terboven Reich Commissioner to Norway and -Seyss-Inquart to Holland. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -Always rabidly anti-Semitic, Frick drafted, signed, and administered -many laws designed to eliminate Jews from German life and economy. His -work formed the basis of the Nuremberg Decrees, and he was active in -enforcing them. Responsible for prohibiting Jews from following various -professions, and for confiscating their property, he signed a final -decree in 1943, after the mass destruction of Jews in the East, which -placed them “outside the law” and handed them over to the Gestapo. These -laws paved the way for the “final solution”, and were extended by Frick -to the incorporated territories and to certain of the occupied -territories. While he was Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, -thousands of Jews were transferred from the Terezin Ghetto in -Czechoslovakia to Auschwitz, where they were killed. He issued a decree -providing for special penal laws against Jews and Poles in the -Government General. - -The police officially fell under the jurisdiction of the Reichsminister -of the Interior. But Frick actually exercised little control over -Himmler and police matters. However, he signed the law appointing -Himmler Chief of the German Police, as well as the decrees establishing -Gestapo jurisdiction over concentration camps and regulating the -execution of orders for protective custody. From the many complaints he -received, and from the testimony of witnesses, the Tribunal concludes -that he knew of atrocities committed in these Camps. With knowledge of -Himmler’s methods, Frick signed decrees authorizing him to take -necessary security measures in certain of the incorporated territories. -What these “security measures” turned out to be has already been dealt -with. - -As the Supreme Reich Authority in Bohemia and Moravia, Frick bears -general responsibility for the acts of oppression in that territory -after 20 August 1943, such as terrorism of the population, slave labor, -and the deportation of Jews to the concentration camps for -extermination. It is true that Frick’s duties as Reich Protector were -considerably more limited than those of his predecessor, and that he had -no legislative and limited personal executive authority in the -Protectorate. Nevertheless, Frick knew full well what the Nazi policies -of occupation were in Europe, particularly with respect to Jews, at that -time, and by accepting the office of Reich Protector he assumed -responsibility for carrying out those policies in Bohemia and Moravia. - -German citizenship in the occupied countries as well as in the Reich -came under his jurisdiction while he was Minister of the Interior. -Having created a racial register of persons of German extraction, Frick -conferred German citizenship on certain groups of citizens of foreign -countries. He is responsible for Germanization in Austria, Sudetenland, -Memel, Danzig, Eastern territories (West Prussia and Posen), and Eupen, -Malmedy, and Moresnot. He forced on the citizens of these territories, -German law, German courts, German education, German police security, and -compulsory military service. - -During the war nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums in which euthanasia -was practiced as described elsewhere in this Judgment, came under -Frick’s jurisdiction. He had knowledge that insane, sick, and aged -people, “useless eaters”, were being systematically put to death. -Complaints of these murders reached him, but he did nothing to stop -them. A report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission estimated that -275,000 mentally deficient and aged people, for whose welfare he was -responsible, fell victim to it. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Frick is not guilty on Count One. He is guilty -on Counts Two, Three, and Four. - - - _STREICHER_ - -Streicher is indicted on Counts One and Four. One of the earliest -members of the Nazi Party, joining in 1921, he took part in the Munich -Putsch. From 1925 to 1940 he was Gauleiter of Franconia. Elected to the -Reichstag in 1933, he was an honorary general in the SA. His persecution -of the Jews was notorious. He was the publisher of _Der Stürmer_, an -anti-Semitic weekly newspaper, from 1923 to 1945 and was its editor -until 1933. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Streicher was a staunch Nazi and supporter of Hitler’s main policies. -There is no evidence to show that he was ever within Hitler’s inner -circle of advisers; nor during his career was he closely connected with -the formulation of the policies which led to war. He was never present, -for example, at any of the important conferences when Hitler explained -his decisions to his leaders. Although he was a Gauleiter there is no -evidence to prove that he had knowledge of those policies. In the -opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence fails to establish his connection -with the conspiracy or common plan to wage aggressive war as that -conspiracy has been elsewhere defined in this Judgment. - - _Crimes against Humanity_ - -For his 25 years of speaking, writing, and preaching hatred of the Jews, -Streicher was widely known as “Jew-Baiter Number One”. In his speeches -and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the German -mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and incited the German People to -active persecution. Each issue of _Der Stürmer_, which reached a -circulation of 600,000 in 1935, was filled with such articles, often -lewd and disgusting. - -Streicher had charge of the Jewish boycott of 1 April 1933. He advocated -the Nuremberg Decrees of 1935. He was responsible for the demolition on -10 August 1938, of the synagogue in Nuremberg. And on 10 November 1938 -he spoke publicly in support of the Jewish pogrom which was taking place -at that time. - -But it was not only in Germany that this defendant advocated his -doctrines. As early as 1938 he began to call for the annihilation of the -Jewish race. Twenty-three different articles of _Der Stürmer_ between -1938 and 1941 were produced in evidence, in which extermination “root -and branch” was preached. Typical of his teachings was a leading article -in September 1938 which termed the Jew a germ and a pest, not a human -being, but “a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of -diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind”. Other -articles urged that only when world Jewry had been annihilated would the -Jewish problem have been solved, and predicted that 50 years hence the -Jewish graves “will proclaim that this people of murderers and criminals -has after all met its deserved fate”. Streicher, in February 1940, -published a letter from one of _Der Stürmer_’s readers which compared -Jews with swarms of locusts which must be exterminated completely. Such -was the poison Streicher injected into the minds of thousands of Germans -which caused them to follow the National Socialist policy of Jewish -persecution and extermination. A leading article of _Der Stürmer_ in May -1939 shows clearly his aim: - - “A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A - punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them - that every murderer and criminal must expect: Death sentence and - execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be - exterminated root and branch.” - -As the war in the early stages proved successful in acquiring more and -more territory for the Reich, Streicher even intensified his efforts to -incite the Germans against the Jews. In the record are 26 articles from -_Der Stürmer_, published between August 1941 and September 1944, 12 by -Streicher’s own hand, which demanded annihilation and extermination in -unequivocal terms. - -He wrote and published on 25 December 1941: - - “If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the - Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only - one way—the extermination of that people whose father is the - devil.” - -And in February 1944 his own article stated: - - “Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal. And he - who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the same fate, - annihilation, death.” - -With knowledge of the extermination of the Jews in the Occupied Eastern -Territory, this defendant continued to write and publish his propaganda -of death. Testifying in this trial, he vehemently denied any knowledge -of mass executions of Jews. But the evidence makes it clear that he -continually received current information on the progress of the “final -solution”. His press photographer was sent to visit the ghettos of the -East in the spring of 1943, the time of the destruction of the Warsaw -ghetto. The Jewish newspaper, _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, which -Streicher received and read, carried in each issue accounts of Jewish -atrocities in the East, and gave figures on the number of Jews who had -been deported and killed. For example, issues appearing in the summer -and fall of 1942 reported the death of 72,729 Jews in Warsaw, 17,542 in -Lodz, 18,000 in Croatia, 125,000 in Rumania, 14,000 in Latvia, 85,000 in -Yugoslavia, 700,000 in all of Poland. In November 1943 Streicher quoted -verbatim an article from the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ which stated -that the Jews had virtually disappeared from Europe, and commented “This -is not a Jewish lie.” In December 1942, referring to an article in the -_London Times_ about the atrocities, aiming at extermination, Streicher -said that Hitler had given warning that the second World War would lead -to the destruction of Jewry. In January 1943 he wrote and published an -article which said that Hitler’s prophecy was being fulfilled, that -world Jewry was being extirpated, and that it was wonderful to know that -Hitler was freeing the world of its Jewish tormentors. - -In the face of the evidence before the Tribunal it is idle for Streicher -to suggest that the solution of the Jewish problem which he favored was -strictly limited to the classification of Jews as aliens, and the -passing of discriminatory legislation such as the Nuremberg Laws, -supplemented if possible by international agreement on the creation of a -Jewish State somewhere in the world, to which all Jews should emigrate. - -Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews -in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly -constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection -with War Crimes, as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a Crime -against Humanity. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Streicher is not guilty on Count One, but that -he is guilty on Count Four. - - - _FUNK_ - -Funk is indicted under all four Counts. Funk, who had previously been a -financial journalist, joined the Nazi Party in 1931, and shortly -thereafter became one of Hitler’s personal economic advisers. On 30 -January 1933 Funk was made Press Chief in the Reich Government, and on -11 March 1933 became Under Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda and -shortly thereafter a leading figure in the various Nazi organizations -which were used to control the press, films, music, and publishing -houses. He took office as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary -General for War Economy in early 1938 and as President of the Reichsbank -in January 1939. He succeeded Schacht in all three of these positions. -He was made a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the -Reich in August 1939, and a member of the Central Planning Board in -September 1943. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Funk became active in the economic field after the Nazi plans to wage -aggressive war had been clearly defined. One of his representatives -attended a conference on 14 October 1938, at which Göring announced a -gigantic increase in armaments and instructed the Ministry of Economics -to increase exports to obtain the necessary exchange. On 28 January 1939 -one of Funk’s subordinates sent a memorandum to the OKW on the use of -prisoners of war to make up labor deficiencies which would arise in case -of mobilization. On 30 May 1939 the Under Secretary of the Ministry of -Economics attended a meeting at which detailed plans were made for the -financing of the war. - -On 25 August 1939 Funk wrote a letter to Hitler expressing his gratitude -that he was able to participate in such world-shaking events; that his -plans for the “financing of the war”, for the control of wage and price -conditions and for the strengthening of the Reichsbank had been -completed; and that he had inconspicuously transferred into gold all -foreign exchange resources available to Germany. On 14 October 1939, -after the war had begun, he made a speech in which he stated that the -economic and financial departments of Germany working under the Four -Year Plan had been engaged in the secret economic preparation for war -for over a year. - -Funk participated in the economic planning which preceded the attack on -the U.S.S.R. His deputy held daily conferences with Rosenberg on the -economic problems which would arise in the occupation of Soviet -territory. Funk himself participated in planning for the printing of -ruble notes in Germany prior to the attack to serve as occupation -currency in the U.S.S.R. After the attack he made a speech in which he -described plans he had made for the economic exploitation of the “vast -territories of the Soviet Union” which were to be used as a source of -raw material for Europe. - -Funk was not one of the leading figures in originating the Nazi plans -for aggressive war. His activity in the economic sphere was under the -Supervision of Göring as Plenipotentiary General of the Four Year Plan. -He did, however, participate in the economic preparation for certain of -the aggressive wars, notably those against Poland and the Soviet Union, -but his guilt can be adequately dealt with under Count Two of the -Indictment. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -In his capacity as Under Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda and -Vice-Chairman of the Reichs Chamber of Culture, Funk had participated in -the early Nazi program of economic discrimination against the Jews. On -12 November 1938 after the pogroms of November, he attended a meeting -held under the chairmanship of Göring to discuss the solution of the -Jewish problem and proposed a decree providing for the banning of Jews -from all business activities, which Göring issued the same day under the -authority of the Four Year Plan. Funk has testified that he was shocked -at the outbreaks of 10 November, but on 15 November he made a speech -describing these outbreaks as a “violent explosion of the disgust of the -German People, because of a criminal Jewish attack against the German -People”, and saying that the elimination of the Jews from economic life -followed logically their elimination from political life. - -In 1942 Funk entered into an agreement with Himmler under which the -Reichsbank was to receive certain gold and jewels and currency from the -SS and instructed his subordinates, who were to work out the details, -not to ask too many questions. As a result of this agreement the SS sent -to the Reichsbank the personal belongings taken from the victims who had -been exterminated in the concentration camps. The Reichsbank kept the -coins and bank notes and sent the jewels, watches, and personal -belongings to Berlin municipal pawn shops. The gold from the eyeglasses, -and gold teeth and fillings was stored in the Reichsbank vaults. Funk -has protested that he did not know that the Reichsbank was receiving -articles of this kind. The Tribunal is of the opinion that he either -knew what was being received or was deliberately closing his eyes to -what was being done. - -As Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, Funk -participated in the economic exploitation of occupied territories. He -was president of the Continental Oil Company which was charged with the -exploitation of the oil resources of occupied territories in the East. -He was responsible for the seizure of the gold reserves of the -Czechoslovakian National Bank and for the liquidation of the Yugoslavian -National Bank. On 6 June 1942 his deputy sent a letter to the OKW -requesting that funds from the French Occupation Cost Fund be made -available for black market purchases. Funk’s knowledge of German -occupation policies is shown by his presence at the meeting of 8 August -1942, at which Göring addressed the various German occupation chiefs, -told them of the products required from their territories, and added: -“It makes no difference to me in this connection if you say that your -people will starve.” - -In the fall of 1943 Funk was a member of the Central Planning Board -which determined the total number of laborers needed for German -industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually by deportation -from occupied territories. Funk did not appear to be particularly -interested in this aspect of the forced labor program, and usually sent -a deputy to attend the meetings, often SS General Ohlendorf, the former -Chief of the SD inside of Germany and the former Commander of -Einsatzgruppe D. But Funk was aware that the Board of which he was a -member was demanding the importation of slave laborers, and allocating -them to the various industries under its control. - -As President of the Reichsbank, Funk was also indirectly involved in the -utilization of concentration camp labor. Under his direction the -Reichsbank set up a revolving fund of 12,000,000 Reichsmarks to the -credit of the SS for the construction of factories to use concentration -camp laborers. - -In spite of the fact that he occupied important official positions, Funk -was never a dominant figure in the various programs in which he -participated. This is a mitigating fact of which the Tribunal takes -notice. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Funk is not guilty on Count One but is guilty -under Counts Two, Three, and Four. - - - _SCHACHT_ - -Schacht is indicted under Counts One and Two of the Indictment. Schacht -served as Commissioner of Currency and President of the Reichsbank from -1923 to 1930, was reappointed President of the Bank on 17 March 1933, -Minister of Economics in August 1934, and Plenipotentiary General for -War Economy in May 1935. He resigned from these two positions in -November 1937, and was appointed Minister without Portfolio. He was -reappointed as President of the Reichsbank for a 1-year term on 16 March -1937, and for a 4-year term on 9 March 1938, but was dismissed on 20 -January 1939. He was dismissed as Minister without Portfolio on 22 -January 1943. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Schacht was an active supporter of the Nazi Party before its accession -to power on 30 January 1933, and supported the appointment of Hitler to -the post of Chancellor. After that date he played an important role in -the vigorous rearmament program which was adopted, using the facilities -of the Reichsbank to the fullest extent in the German rearmament effort. -The Reichsbank, in its traditional capacity as financial agent for the -German Government, floated long-term Government loans, the proceeds of -which were used for rearmament. He devised a system under which 5-year -notes, known as Mefo bills, guaranteed by the Reichsbank and backed, in -effect, by nothing more than its position as a bank of issue, were used -to obtain large sums for rearmament from the short-term money market. As -Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy he -was active in organizing the German economy for war. He made detailed -plans for industrial mobilization and the coordination of the Army with -industry in the event of war. He was particularly concerned with -shortages of raw materials and started a scheme of stock-piling, and a -system of exchange control designed to prevent Germany’s weak foreign -exchange position from hindering the acquisition abroad of raw materials -needed for rearmament. On 3 May 1935 he sent a memorandum to Hitler -stating that “the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and -in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else -therefore should be subordinated to this purpose.” - -Schacht, by April 1936, began to lose his influence as the central -figure in the German rearmament effort when Göring was appointed -Coordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. Göring advocated a -greatly expanded program for the production of synthetic raw materials -which was opposed by Schacht on the ground that the resulting financial -strain might involve inflation. The influence of Schacht suffered -further when, on 16 October 1936, Göring was appointed Plenipotentiary -for the Four Year Plan with the task of putting “the entire economy in a -state of readiness for war” within four years. Schacht had opposed the -announcement of this plan and the appointment of Göring to head it, and -it is clear that Hitler’s action represented a decision that Schacht’s -economic policies were too conservative for the drastic rearmament -policy which Hitler wanted to put into effect. - -After Göring’s appointment, Schacht and Göring promptly became embroiled -in a series of disputes. Although there was an element of personal -controversy running through these disputes, Schacht disagreed with -Göring on certain basic policy issues. Schacht, on financial grounds, -advocated a retrenchment in the rearmament program, opposed as -uneconomical much of the proposed expansion of production facilities, -particularly for synthetics, urged a drastic tightening on Government -credit and a cautious policy in dealing with Germany’s foreign exchange -reserves. As a result of this dispute and of a bitter argument in which -Hitler accused Schacht of upsetting his plans by his financial methods, -Schacht went on leave of absence from the Ministry of Economics on 5 -September 1937, and resigned as Minister of Economics and as -Plenipotentiary General for War Economy on 16 November 1937. - -As President of the Reichsbank Schacht was still involved in disputes. -Throughout 1938 the Reichsbank continued to function, as the financial -agent for the German Government in floating long-term loans to finance -armaments. But on 32 March 1938 Schacht discontinued the practice of -floating short-term notes guaranteed by the Reichsbank for armament -expenditures. At the end of 1938, in an attempt to regain control of -fiscal policy through the Reichsbank, Schacht refused an urgent request -of the Reichsminister of Finance for a special credit to pay the -salaries of civil servants which were not covered by existing funds. On -2 January 1939 Schacht held a conference with Hitler at which he urged -him to reduce expenditures for armaments. On 7 January 1939 Schacht -submitted to Hitler a report signed by the Directors of the Reichsbank -which urged a drastic curtailment of armament expenditures and a -balanced budget as the only method of preventing inflation. On 19 -January Hitler dismissed Schacht as President of the Reichsbank. On 22 -January 1943 Hitler dismissed Schacht as Reichsminister without -Portfolio, because of his “whole attitude during the present fateful -fight of the German Nation.” On 23 July 1944 Schacht was arrested by the -Gestapo and confined in a concentration camp until the end of the war. - -It is clear that Schacht was a central figure in Germany’s rearmament -program, and the steps which he took, particularly in the early days of -the Nazi regime, were responsible for Nazi Germany’s rapid rise as a -military power. But rearmament of itself is not criminal under the -Charter. To be a Crime against Peace under Article 6 of the Charter it -must be shown that Schacht carried out this rearmament as part of the -Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars. - -Schacht has contended that he participated in the rearmament program -only because he wanted to build up a strong and independent Germany -which would carry out a foreign policy which would command respect on an -equal basis with other European countries; that when he discovered that -the Nazis were rearming for aggressive purposes he attempted to slow -down the speed of rearmament; and that after the dismissal of Von -Fritsch and Von Blomberg he participated in plans to get rid of Hitler, -first by deposing him and later by assassination. - -Schacht, as early as 1936, began to advocate a limitation of the -rearmament program for financial reasons. Had the policies advocated by -him been put into effect, Germany would not have been prepared for a -general European war. Insistence on his policies led to his eventual -dismissal from all positions of economic significance in Germany. On the -other hand, Schacht, with his intimate knowledge of German finance, was -in a peculiarly good position to understand the true significance of -Hitler’s frantic rearmament, and to realize that the economic policy -adopted was consistent only with war as its object. - -Moreover Schacht continued to participate in German economic life and -even, in a minor way, in some of the early Nazi aggressions. Prior to -the occupation of Austria he set a rate of exchange between the mark and -the schilling. After the occupation of Austria he arranged for the -incorporation of the Austrian National Bank into the Reichsbank and made -a violently pro-Nazi speech in which he stated that the Reichsbank would -always be Nazi as long as he was connected with it, praised Hitler, -defended the occupation of Austria, scoffed at objections to the way it -was carried out, and ended with “to our Führer a triple ‘Sieg Heil’.” He -has not contended that this speech did not represent his state of mind -at the time. After the occupation of the Sudetenland, he arranged for -currency conversion and for the incorporation into the Reichsbank of -local Czech banks of issue. On 29 November 1938 he made a speech in -which he pointed with pride to his economic policy which had created the -high degree of German armament, and added that this armament had made -Germany’s foreign policy possible. - -Schacht was not involved in the planning of any of the specific wars of -aggression charged in Count Two. His participation in the occupation of -Austria and the Sudetenland (neither of which are charged as aggressive -wars) was on such a limited basis that it does not amount to -participation in the common plan charged in Count One. He was clearly -not one of the inner circle around Hitler which was most closely -involved with this common plan. He was regarded by this group with -undisguised hostility. The testimony of Speer shows that Schacht’s -arrest on 23 July 1944 was based as much on Hitler’s enmity towards -Schacht growing out of his attitude before the war as it was on -suspicion of his complicity in the bomb plot. The case against Schacht -therefore depends on the inference that Schacht did in fact know of the -Nazi aggressive plans. - -On this all-important question evidence has been given for the -Prosecution, and a considerable volume of evidence for the Defense. The -Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with great care, and -comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has not been -established beyond a reasonable doubt. - - _Conclusion._ - -The Tribunal finds that Schacht is not guilty on this Indictment, and -directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal when the Tribunal -presently adjourns. - - - _DÖNITZ_ - -Dönitz is indicted on Counts One, Two, and Three. In 1935 he took -command of the first U-boat flotilla commissioned since 1918, became in -1936 commander of the submarine arm, was made Vice-Admiral in 1940, -Admiral in 1942, and on 30 January 1943 Commander-in-Chief of the German -Navy. On 1 May 1945 he became the Head of State, succeeding Hitler. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Although Dönitz built and trained the German U-boat arm, the evidence -does not show he was privy to the conspiracy to wage aggressive wars or -that he prepared and initiated such wars. He was a line officer -performing strictly tactical duties. He was not present at the important -conferences when plans for aggressive wars were announced, and there is -no evidence he was informed about the decisions reached there. Dönitz -did, however, wage aggressive war within the meaning of that word as -used by the Charter. Submarine warfare which began immediately upon the -outbreak of war, was fully coordinated with the other branches of the -Wehrmacht. It is clear that his U-boats, few in number at the time, were -fully prepared to wage war. - -It is true that until his appointment in January 1943 as -Commander-in-Chief he was not an “Oberbefehlshaber”. But this statement -underestimates the importance of Dönitz’ position. He was no mere army -or division commander. The U-boat arm was the principal part of the -German fleet and Dönitz was its leader. The High Seas fleet made a few -minor, if spectacular, raids during the early years of the war, but the -real damage to the enemy was done almost exclusively by his submarines -as the millions of tons of Allied and neutral shipping sunk will -testify. Dönitz was solely in charge of this warfare. The Naval War -Command reserved for itself only the decision as to the number of -submarines in each area. In the invasion of Norway, for example, Dönitz -made recommendations in October 1939 as to submarine bases, which he -claims were no more than a staff study, and in March 1940 he made out -the operational orders for the supporting U-boats, as discussed -elsewhere in this Judgment. - -That his importance to the German war effort was so regarded is -eloquently proved by Raeder’s recommendation of Dönitz as his successor -and his appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943 as Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy. Hitler, too, knew that submarine warfare was the essential -part of Germany’s naval warfare. - -From January 1943, Dönitz was consulted almost continuously by Hitler. -The evidence was that they conferred on naval problems about 120 times -during the course of the war. - -As late as April 1945, when he admits he knew the struggle was hopeless, -Dönitz as its Commander-in-Chief urged the Navy to continue its fight. -On 1 May 1945 he became the Head of State and as such ordered the -Wehrmacht to continue its war in the East, until capitulation on 9 May -1945. Dönitz explained that his reason for these orders was to insure -that the German civilian population might be evacuated and the Army -might make an orderly retreat from the East. - -In the view of the Tribunal, the evidence shows that Dönitz was active -in waging aggressive war. - - _War Crimes_ - -Dönitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to -the Naval Protocol of 1936, to which Germany acceded, and which -reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval -Agreement of 1930. - -The Prosecution has submitted that on 3 September 1939 the German U-boat -arm began to wage unrestricted submarine warfare upon all merchant -ships, whether enemy or neutral, cynically disregarding the Protocol; -and that a calculated effort was made throughout the war to disguise -this practice by making hypocritical references to international law and -supposed violations by the Allies. - -Dönitz insists that at all times the Navy remained within the confines -of international law and of the Protocol. He testified that when the war -began, the guide to submarine warfare was the German Prize Ordinance -taken almost literally from the Protocol, that pursuant to the German -view, he ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships in convoy, and -all that refused to stop or used their radio upon sighting a submarine. -When his reports indicated that British merchant ships were being used -to give information by wireless, were being armed, and were attacking -submarines on sight, he ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939 to -attack all enemy merchant ships without warning on the ground that -resistance was to be expected. Orders already had been issued on 21 -September 1939 to attack all ships, including neutrals, sailing at night -without lights in the English Channel. - -On 24 November 1939 the German Government issued a warning to neutral -shipping that, owing to the frequent engagements taking place in the -waters around the British Isles and the French Coast between U-boats and -Allied merchant ships which were armed and had instructions to use those -arms as well as to ram U-boats, the safety of neutral ships in those -waters could no longer be taken for granted. On 1 January 1940 the -German U-boat Command, acting on the instructions of Hitler, ordered -U-boats to attack all Greek merchant ships in the zone surrounding the -British Isles which was banned by the United States to its own ships and -also merchant ships of every nationality in the limited area of the -Bristol Channel. Five days later a further order was given to U-boats to -“make immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships” in an -area of the North Sea, the limits of which were defined. Finally on 18 -January 1940, U-boats were authorized to sink, without warning, all -ships “in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines -can be pretended”. Exceptions were to be made in the cases of United -States, Italian, Japanese, and Soviet ships. - -Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty, in accordance -with its _Handbook of Instructions_ of 1938 to the Merchant Navy, armed -its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed them with armed escort, -gave orders to send position reports upon sighting submarines, thus -integrating merchant vessels into the warning network of naval -intelligence. On 1 October 1939 the British Admiralty announced that -British merchant ships had been ordered to ram U-boats if possible. - -In the actual circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is not prepared -to hold Dönitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against -British armed merchant ships. - -However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of -neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different -question. This practice was employed in the war of 1914-18 by Germany -and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Washington Conference -of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the Protocol of 1936 -were entered into with full knowledge that such zones had been employed -in the first World War. Yet the Protocol made no exception for -operational zones. The order of Dönitz to sink neutral ships without -warning when found within these zones was therefore, in the opinion of -the Tribunal, a violation of the Protocol. - -It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not carry -out the warning and rescue provisions of the Protocol but that Dönitz -deliberately ordered the killing of survivors of shipwrecked vessels, -whether enemy or neutral. The Prosecution has introduced much evidence -surrounding two orders of Dönitz—War Order Number 154, issued in 1939, -and the so-called “Laconia” Order of 1942. The Defense argues that these -orders and the evidence supporting them do not show such a policy and -introduced much evidence to the contrary. The Tribunal is of the opinion -that the evidence does not establish with the certainty required that -Dönitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors. The -orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure. - -The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions were not carried -out and that the Defendant ordered that they should not be carried out. -The argument of the Defense is that the security of the submarine is, as -the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue, and that the development -of aircraft made rescue impossible. This may be so, but the Protocol is -explicit. If the commander cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot -sink a merchant vessel and should allow it to pass harmless before his -periscope. These orders, then, prove Dönitz is guilty of a violation of -the Protocol. - -In view of all of the facts proved and in particular of an order of the -British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all -vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answers to -interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unrestricted submarine -warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from -the first day that Nation entered the war, the sentence of Dönitz is not -assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of -submarine warfare. - -Dönitz was also charged with responsibility for Hitler’s Commando Order -of 18 October 1942. Dönitz admitted he received and knew of the order -when he was Flag Officer of U-boats, but disclaimed responsibility. He -points out that the order by its express terms excluded men captured in -naval warfare, that the Navy had no territorial commands on land, and -that submarine commanders would never encounter commandos. - -In one instance, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, in 1943, -the members of the crew of an Allied motor torpedo boat were captured by -German Naval Forces. They were interrogated for intelligence purposes on -behalf of the local Admiral, and then turned over by his order to the SD -and shot. Dönitz said that if they were captured by the Navy their -execution was a violation of the Commando Order, that the execution was -not announced in the Wehrmacht communiqué, and that he was never -informed of the incident. He pointed out that the Admiral in question -was not in his chain of command, but was subordinate to the Army general -in command of the Norway occupation. But Dönitz permitted the order to -remain in full force when he became Commander-in-Chief, and to that -extent he is responsible. - -Dönitz, in a conference of 11 December 1944, said “12,000 concentration -camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor”. -At this time Dönitz had no jurisdiction over shipyard construction, and -claims that this was merely a suggestion at the meeting that the -responsible officials do something about the production of ships, that -he took no steps to get these workers since it was not a matter for his -jurisdiction and that he does not know whether they ever were procured. -He admits he knew of concentration camps. A man in his position must -necessarily have known that citizens of occupied countries in large -numbers were confined in the concentration camps. - -In 1945 Hitler requested the opinion of Jodl and Dönitz whether the -Geneva Convention should be denounced. The notes of the meeting between -the two military leaders on 20 February 1945 show that Dönitz expressed -his view that the disadvantages of such an action outweighed the -advantages. The summary of Dönitz’ attitude shown in the notes taken by -an officer, included the following sentence: “It would be better to -carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all -costs to save face with the outer world.” - -The Prosecution insisted that “the measures” referred to meant the -Convention should not be denounced, but should be broken at will. The -Defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break the Convention for -two reasons: to take away from German troops the protection of the -Convention, thus preventing them from continuing to surrender in large -groups to the British and Americans, and also to permit reprisals -against Allied prisoners of war because of Allied bombing raids. Dönitz -claims that what he meant by “measures” were disciplinary measures -against German troops to prevent them from surrendering, and that his -words had no reference to measures against the Allies; moreover that -this was merely a suggestion, and that in any event no such measures -were ever taken, either against Allies or Germans. The Tribunal, -however, does not believe this explanation. The Geneva Convention was -not, however, denounced by Germany. The Defense has introduced several -affidavits to prove that British naval prisoners of war in camps under -Dönitz’ jurisdiction were treated strictly according to the Convention, -and the Tribunal takes this fact into consideration, regarding it as a -mitigating circumstance. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds Dönitz is not guilty on Count One of the Indictment, -and is guilty on Counts Two and Three. - - - _RAEDER_ - -Raeder is indicted on Counts One, Two, and Three. In 1928 he became -Chief of Naval Command and in 1935 Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine -(OKM); in 1939 Hitler made him Gross-Admiral. He was a member of the -Reich Defense Council. On 30 January 1943 Dönitz replaced him at his own -request, and he became Admiral Inspector of the Navy, a nominal title. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -In the 15 years he commanded it, Raeder built and directed the German -Navy; he accepts full responsibility until retirement in 1943. He admits -the Navy violated the Versailles Treaty, insisting it was “a matter of -honor for every man” to do so, and alleges that the violations were for -the most part minor, and Germany built less than her allowable strength. -These violations, as well as those of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement -of 1935, have already been discussed elsewhere in this Judgment. - -Raeder received the directive of 24 June 1937 from Von Blomberg -requiring special preparations for war against Austria. He was one of -the five leaders present at the Hossbach Conference of 5 November 1937. -He claims Hitler merely wished by this conference to spur the Army to -faster rearmament, insists he believed the questions of Austria and -Czechoslovakia would be settled peacefully, as they were, and points to -the new naval treaty with England which had just been signed. He -received no orders to speed construction of U-boats, indicating that -Hitler was not planning war. - -Raeder received directives on “Fall Grün” and the directives on “Fall -Weiss” beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the Navy -to support the Army by intervention from the sea. He was also one of the -few chief leaders present at the meeting of 23 May 1939. He attended the -Obersalzberg briefing of 22 August 1939. - -The conception of the invasion of Norway first arose in the mind of -Raeder and not that of Hitler. Despite Hitler’s desire, as shown by his -directive of October 1939 to keep Scandinavia neutral, the Navy examined -the advantages of naval bases there as early as October. Admiral Karls -originally suggested to Raeder the desirable aspects of bases in Norway. -A questionnaire, dated 3 October 1939, which sought comments on the -desirability of such bases, was circulated within SKL. On 10 October -Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler; his War Diary entry for that -day says Hitler intended to give the matter consideration. A few months -later Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl; OKW began its -planning and the Naval War Staff worked with OKW staff officers. Raeder -received Keitel’s directive for Norway on 27 January 1940 and the -subsequent directive of 1 March, signed by Hitler. - -Raeder defends his actions on the ground it was a move to forestall the -British. It is not necessary again to discuss this defense, which has -heretofore been treated in some detail, concluding that Germany’s -invasion of Norway and Denmark was aggressive war. In a letter to the -Navy, Raeder said: “The operations of the Navy in the occupation of -Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to -this war.” - -Raeder received the directives, including the innumerable postponements, -for the attack in the West. In a meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler he -urged the occupation of all Greece. He claims this was only after the -British had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack, and points out the -Navy had no interest in Greece. He received Hitler’s directive on -Yugoslavia. - -Raeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon the invasion of -the U.S.S.R. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an aggressive -Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on Russia. On 14 -November 1940 he urged the war against England “as our main enemy” and -that submarine and naval air force construction be continued. He voiced -“serious objections against the Russian campaign before the defeat of -England”, according to notes of the German Naval War Staff. He claims -his objections were based on the violation of the Non-Aggression Pact as -well as strategy. But once the decision had been made, he gave -permission 6 days before the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack -Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea within a specified warning area and -defends this action because these submarines were “snooping” on German -activities. - -It is clear from this evidence that Raeder participated in the planning -and waging of aggressive war. - - _War Crimes_ - -Raeder is charged with War Crimes on the High Seas. The Athenia, an -unarmed British passenger liner, was sunk on 3 September 1939, while -outward bound to America. The Germans 2 months later charged that Mr. -Churchill deliberately sank the Athenia to encourage American hostility -to Germany. In fact, it was sunk by the German U-boat 30. Raeder claims -that an inexperienced U-boat commander sank it in mistake for an armed -merchant cruiser, that this was not known until the U-30 returned -several weeks after the German denial and that Hitler then directed the -Navy and Foreign Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied knowledge -of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr. Churchill. - -The most serious charge against Raeder is that he carried out -unrestricted submarine warfare, including sinking of unarmed merchant -ships, of neutrals, non-rescue and machine-gunning of survivors, -contrary to the London Protocol of 1936. The Tribunal makes the same -finding on Raeder on this charge as it did as to Dönitz, which has -already been announced, up until 30 January 1943 when Raeder retired. - -The Commando Order of 18 October 1942, which expressly did not apply to -naval warfare, was transmitted by the Naval War Staff to the lower naval -commanders with the direction it should be distributed orally by -flotilla leaders and section commanders to their subordinates. Two -commandos were put to death by the Navy, and not the SD, at Bordeaux on -10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval War Staff was that this was -“in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is nevertheless -something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.” -Raeder admits he passed the order down through the chain of command, and -he did not object to Hitler. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Raeder is guilty on Counts One, Two, and Three. - - - _VON SCHIRACH_ - -Von Schirach is indicted under Counts One and Four. He joined the Nazi -Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the leader of the National -Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs Youth Leader of the -Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth organizations, including the -Hitler Jugend. In 1933, after the Nazis had obtained control of the -Government, Von Schirach was made Leader of Youth in the German Reich, -originally a position within the Ministry of the Interior, but, after 1 -December 1936, an office in the Reich Cabinet. In 1940 Von Schirach -resigned as head of the Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German -Reich, but retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth -Education. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor -of Vienna, and Reichs Defense Commissioner for that territory. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -After the Nazis had come to power Von Schirach, utilizing both physical -violence and official pressure, either drove out of existence or took -over all youth groups which competed with the Hitler Jugend. A Hitler -decree of 1 December 1936 incorporated all German youth within the -Hitler Jugend. By the time formal conscription was introduced in 1940, -97 percent of those eligible were already members. - -Von Schirach used the Hitler Jugend to educate German Youth “in the -spirit of National Socialism” and subjected them to an intensive program -of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as a source of -replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In October 1938 he entered -into an agreement with Himmler under which members of the Hitler Jugend -who met SS standards would be considered as the primary source of -replacements for the SS. - -Von Schirach also used the Hitler Jugend for pre-military training. -Special units were set up whose primary purpose was training specialists -for the various branches of the service. On 11 August 1939 he entered -into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend agreed to -carry out its pre-military activities under standards laid down by the -Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend -instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed particular emphasis on -the military spirit and its training program stressed the importance of -return of the colonies, the necessity for Lebensraum, and the noble -destiny of German youth to die for Hitler. - -Despite the warlike nature of the activities of the Hitler Jugend, -however, it does not appear that Von Schirach was involved in the -development of Hitler’s plan for territorial expansion by means of -aggressive war, or that he participated in the planning or preparation -of any of the wars of aggression. - - _Crimes against Humanity_ - -In July 1940 Von Schirach was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna. At the same -time he was appointed Reichs Governor for Vienna and Reichs Defense -Commissioner, originally for Military District 17, including the Gaue of -Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube and, after 17 November 1942, for -the Gaue of Vienna alone. As Reichs Defense Commissioner, he had control -of the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he was head of the -municipal administration of the City of Vienna, and, under the -supervision of the Minister of the Interior, in charge of the -governmental administration of the Reich in Vienna. - -Von Schirach is not charged with the commission of War Crimes in Vienna, -only with the commission of Crimes against Humanity. As has already been -seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its -occupation is, therefore, a “crime within the jurisdiction of the -Tribunal”, as that term is used in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. As a -result, “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other -inhumane acts” and “persecutions on political, racial, or religious -grounds” in connection with this occupation constitute a Crime against -Humanity under that Article. - -As Gauleiter of Vienna, Von Schirach came under the Sauckel decree, -dated 6 April 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel’s plenipotentiaries -for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization and treatment -of manpower within their Gaue. Sauckel’s directives provided that the -forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered, and treated so as to exploit -them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible expense. - -When Von Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna the deportation of the Jews -had already been begun, and only 60,000 out of Vienna’s original 190,000 -Jews remained. On 2 October 1940 he attended a conference at Hitler’s -office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews in Vienna which the -General Government would have to take over from him. On 3 December 1940 -Von Schirach received a letter from Lammers stating that after the -receipt of the reports made by Von Schirach, Hitler had decided to -deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining in Vienna to the General -Government because of the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of -the Jews from Vienna was then begun and continued until the early fall -of 1942. On 15 September 1942 Von Schirach made a speech in which he -defended his action in having driven “tens of thousands upon tens of -thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East” as “contributing to -European culture”. - -While the Jews were being deported from Vienna, reports, addressed to -him in his official capacity, were received in Von Schirach’s office -from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD which -contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen in -exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialed by one of Von -Schirach’s principal deputies. On 30 June 1944 Von Schirach’s office -also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that a shipment -of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential war work and that -all those who were incapable of work would have to be kept in readiness -for “special action”. - -The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach, while he did not originate the -policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation -after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews -could hope for was a miserable existence in the ghettos of the East. -Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office. - -While Gauleiter of Vienna Von Schirach continued to function as -Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was informed of -the Hitler Jugend’s participation in the plan put into effect in the -fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between the ages of 10 and -20 were evacuated into Germany from areas recaptured by the Soviet -forces and used as apprentices in German industry and as auxiliaries in -units of the German Armed Forces. In the summer of 1942 Von Schirach -telegraphed Bormann urging that a bombing attack on an English cultural -town be carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich -which, he claimed, had been planned by the British. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach is not guilty on Count One. He is -guilty under Count Four. - - - _SAUCKEL_ - -Sauckel is indicted under all four Counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi Party -in 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927. He was a member of -the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was appointed -Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932, and Thuringian Minister of the -Interior and head of the Thuringian State Ministry in May 1933. He -became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held the formal rank of -Obergruppenführer in both the SA and the SS. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Sauckel was -sufficiently connected with the common plan to wage aggressive war or -sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of the aggressive wars -to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -On 21 March 1942 Hitler appointed Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for -the Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control -“the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers -recruited abroad and of prisoners of war”. Sauckel was instructed to -operate within the fabric of the Four Year Plan, and on 27 March 1942 -Göring issued a decree as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan -transferring his manpower sections to Sauckel. On 30 September 1942 -Hitler gave Sauckel authority to appoint Commissioners in the various -occupied territories, and “to take all necessary measures for the -enforcement” of the Decree of 21 March 1942. - -Under the authority which he obtained by these decrees, Sauckel set up a -program for the mobilization of the labor resources available to the -Reich. One of the important parts of this mobilization was the -systematic exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of the -occupied territories. Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had the -governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue decrees, -establishing compulsory labor service in Germany. Under the authority of -these decrees Sauckel’s commissioners, backed up by the police -authorities of the occupied territories, obtained and sent to Germany -the laborers which were necessary to fill the quotas given them by -Sauckel. He described so-called “voluntary” recruiting by a whole batch -of male and female agents just as was done in the olden times for -shanghaiing”. That real voluntary recruiting was the exception rather -than the rule is shown by Sauckel’s statement on 1 March 1944, that “out -of five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 -came voluntarily”. Although he now claims that the statement is not -true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the evidence -presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was substantially -accurate. - -The manner in which the unfortunate slave laborers were collected and -transported to Germany, and what happened to them after they arrived, -has already been described. Sauckel argues that he is not responsible -for these excesses in the administration of the program. He says that -the total number of workers to be obtained was set by the demands from -agriculture and from industry; that obtaining the workers was the -responsibility of the occupation authorities transporting them to -Germany that of the German railways, and taking care of them in Germany -that of the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture, the German Labor Front, -and the various industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had -any authority he was constantly urging humane treatment. - -There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had over-all responsibility for -the slave labor program. At the time of the events in question he did -not fail to assert control over the fields which he now claims were the -sole responsibility of others. His regulations provided that his -commissioners should have authority for obtaining labor, and he was -constantly in the field supervising the steps which were being taken. He -was aware of ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers, and -vigorously supported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill -the quotas. - -Sauckel’s regulations also provided that he had responsibility for -transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers and -taking care of them, and that the other agencies involved in these -processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the bad conditions -which existed. It does not appear that he advocated brutality for its -own sake, or was an advocate of any program such as Himmler’s plan for -extermination through work. His attitude was thus expressed in a -regulation: - - “All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as - to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest - conceivable degree of expenditure.” - -The evidence shows that Sauckel was in charge of a program which -involved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human -beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Sauckel is not guilty on Counts One and Two. He -is guilty under Counts Three and Four. - - - _JODL_ - -Jodl is indicted on all four Counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was Chief of -the National Defense Section in the High Command. After a year in -command of troops, in August 1939 he returned to become Chief of the -Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his -immediate superior was Defendant Keitel, he reported directly to Hitler -on operational matters. In the strict military sense, Jodl was the -actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure for the -strategy and conduct of operations. - -Jodl defends himself on the ground he was a soldier sworn to obedience, -and not a politician; and that his staff and planning work left him no -time for other matters. He said that when he signed or initialed orders, -memoranda, and letters, he did so for Hitler and often in the absence of -Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier he had to obey Hitler, he -says that he often tried to obstruct certain measures by delay, which -occasionally proved successful as when he resisted Hitler’s demand that -a directive be issued to lynch Allied “terror fliers”. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Entries in Jodl’s diary of 13 and 14 February 1938 show Hitler -instructed both him and Keitel to keep up military pressure against -Austria begun at the Schuschnigg conference by simulating military -measures, and that these achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided -“not to tolerate” Schuschnigg’s plebiscite, Jodl brought to the -conference the “old draft”, the existing staff plan. His diary for 10 -March shows Hitler then ordered the preparation of “Case Otto”, and the -directive was initialed by Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions -on 11 March, and initialed Hitler’s order for the invasion on the same -date. - -In planning the attack on Czechoslovakia, Jodl was very active, -according to the Schmundt Notes. He initialed items 14, 17, 24, 36, and -37 in the Notes. Jodl admits he agreed with OKH that the “incident” to -provide German intervention must occur at the latest by 1400 on X-1 Day, -the day before the attack, and said it must occur at a fixed time in -good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the propaganda experts on -“imminent common tasks” such as German violations of international law, -exploitation of them by the enemy and refutations by the Germans, which -“task” Jodl considered “particularly important”. - -After Munich, Jodl wrote: - - “Czechoslovakia as a power is out . . . . The genius of the - Führer and his determination not to shun even a World War have - again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains - that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have - been converted and will remain that way.” - -Shortly after the Sudeten occupation, Jodl went to a post command and -did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW until the end of -August 1939. - -Jodl discussed the Norway invasion with Hitler, Keitel, and Raeder on 12 -December 1939; his diary is replete with late entries on his activities -in preparing this attack. Jodl explains his comment that Hitler was -still looking for an “excuse” to move meant he was waiting for reliable -intelligence on the British plans, and defends the invasion as a -necessary move to forestall them. His testimony shows that from October -1939 Hitler planned to attack the West through Belgium, but was doubtful -about invading Holland until the middle of November. On 8 February 1940, -Jodl, his deputy Warlimont, and Jeschonnek, the Air Forces planner, -discussed among themselves the “new idea” of attacking Norway, Denmark, -and Holland, but guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17 -orders postponing the attack in the West for various reasons including -weather conditions, until May 1940, were signed by Jodl. - -He was active in the planning against Greece and Yugoslavia. The Hitler -order of 11 January 1941 to intervene in Albania was initialed by Jodl. -On 20 January, 4 months before the attack, Hitler told a conference of -German and Italian generals in Jodl’s presence that German troop -concentrations in Rumania were to be used against Greece. Jodl was -present on 18 March when Hitler told Raeder all Greece must be occupied -before any settlement could be reached. On 27 March, when Hitler told -the German High Command that the destruction of Yugoslavia should be -accomplished with “unmerciful harshness”, and the decision was taken to -bomb Belgrade without a declaration of war, Jodl was also there. - -Jodl testified that Hitler feared an attack by Russia and so attacked -first. This preparation began almost a year before the invasion. Jodl -told Warlimont as early as 29 July 1940 to prepare the plans since -Hitler had decided to attack; and Hitler later told Warlimont he had -planned to attack in August 1940 but postponed it for military reasons. -He initialed Hitler’s directive of 12 November 1940 that preparations -verbally ordered should be continued and also initialed “Case -Barbarossa” on 18 December. On 3 February 1941 Hitler, Jodl, and Keitel -discussed the invasion, and he was present on 14 June when final reports -on “Case Barbarossa” were made. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -On 18 October 1942 Hitler issued the Commando Order and a day later a -supplementary explanation to commanding officers only. The covering -memorandum was signed by Jodl. Early drafts of the order were made by -Jodl’s staff, with his knowledge. Jodl testified he was strongly opposed -on moral and legal grounds, but could not refuse to pass it on. He -insists he tried to mitigate its harshness in practice by not informing -Hitler when it was not carried out. He initialed the OKW memorandum of -25 June 1944 reaffirming the Order after the Normandy landings. - -A plan to eliminate Soviet commissars was in the directive for “Case -Barbarossa”. The decision whether they should be killed without trial -was to be made by an officer. A draft contains Jodl’s handwriting -suggesting this should be handled as retaliation, and he testified this -was his attempt to get around it. - -When in 1945 Hitler considered denouncing the Geneva Convention, Jodl -argued the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. On 21 February he -told Hitler adherence to the Convention would not interfere with the -conduct of the war, giving as an example the sinking of a British -hospital ship as a reprisal and calling it a mistake. He said he did so -because it was the only attitude Hitler would consider, that moral or -legal arguments had no effect and argues he thus prevented Hitler from -denouncing the Convention. - -There is little evidence that Jodl was actively connected with the slave -labor program, and he must have concentrated on his strategic planning -function. But in his speech of 7 November 1943 to the Gauleiters he said -it was necessary to act “with remorseless vigor and resolution” in -Denmark, France, and the Low Countries to compel work on the Atlantic -Wall. - -By teletype of 28 October 1944 Jodl ordered the evacuation of all -persons in northern Norway and burning of their houses so they could not -help the Russians. Jodl says he was against this, but Hitler ordered it -and it was not fully carried out. A document of the Norwegian Government -says such an evacuation did take place in northern Norway and 30,000 -houses were damaged. On 7 October 1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler -would not accept an offer of surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on -the contrary he insisted that they be completely destroyed. He says this -was done because the Germans were afraid those cities would be mined by -the Russians as was Kiev. No surrender was ever offered. - -His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of “superior orders”, prohibited -by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There is nothing in -mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has never been -required of any soldier and he cannot now shield himself behind a -mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse -for commission of these crimes. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Jodl is guilty on all four Counts. - - - _VON PAPEN_ - -Von Papen is indicted under Counts One and Two. He was appointed -Chancellor of the Reich on 1 June 1932, and was succeeded by Von -Schleicher on 2 December 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor in the Hitler -Cabinet on 30 January 1933, and on 13 November 1933 Plenipotentiary for -the Saar. On 26 July 1934 he was appointed Minister to Vienna, and was -recalled on 4 February 1938. On 29 April 1939 he was appointed -Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to Germany when Turkey broke off -diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Von Papen was active in 1932 and 1933 in helping Hitler to form the -Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appointment as Chancellor on 30 -January 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated in the -Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On 16 June 1934, however, Von -Papen made a speech at Marburg which contained a denunciation of the -Nazi attempts to suppress the free press and the church, of the -existence of a reign of terror, and of “150 percent Nazis” who were -mistaking “brutality for vitality”. On 30 June 1934, in the wave of -violence which accompanied the so-called Röhm Purge, Von Papen was taken -into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of his -associates, including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg -speech, were murdered. Von Papen was released on 3 July 1934. - -Notwithstanding the murder of his associates, Von Papen accepted the -position of Minister to Austria on 26 July 1934, the day after Dollfuss -had been assassinated. His appointment was announced in a letter from -Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between the two -countries “into normal and friendly channels” and assured him of -Hitler’s “complete and unlimited confidence”. As Minister to Austria, -Von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position of the Nazi -Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. In early -1935 he attended a meeting in Berlin at which the policy was laid down -to avoid everything which would give the appearance of German -intervention in the internal affairs of Austria. Yet he arranged for -200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to “the persecuted National -Socialist sufferers in Austria”. On 17 May 1935 he reported to Hitler -the results of a conference with Captain Leopold, the leader of the -Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a statement recognizing the -national independence of Austria, and predicting that the result might -be to help the formation of a coalition between Schuschnigg’s Christian -Socialists and the Austrian Nazis against Starhemberg. On 27 July 1935 -Von Papen reported to Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could -not be brought about by external pressure but only by the strength of -the National Socialist movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party -change its character as a centralized Reich German party and become a -rallying point for all National Germans. - -Von Papen was involved in occasional Nazi political demonstrations, -supported Nazi propaganda activities and submitted detailed reports on -the activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports relating to -Austrian military defenses. His Austrian policy resulted in the -agreement of 11 July 1936, which nominally restored relations between -Germany and Austria to “normal and friendly form”, but which had a -secret supplement providing for an amnesty for Austrian Nazis, the -lifting of censorship on Nazi papers, the resumption of political -activities by Nazis and the appointment of men friendly to the Nazis in -the Schuschnigg Cabinet. - -After the signing of this agreement Von Papen offered to resign, but his -resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to bring continued -pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis into the Schuschnigg -Cabinet and to get them important positions in the Fatherland Front, -Austria’s single legal party. On 1 September 1936 Von Papen wrote Hitler -advising him that anti-Nazis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were -holding up the infiltration of the Nazis into the Austrian Government -and recommended bringing “slowly intensified pressure directed at -changing the regime”. - -On 4 February 1938 Von Papen was notified of his recall as Minister to -Austria, at the same time that Von Fritsch, Von Blomberg, and Von -Neurath were removed from their positions. He informed Hitler that he -regretted his recall because he had been trying since November 1937 to -induce Schuschnigg to hold a conference with Hitler and Schuschnigg had -indicated his willingness to do so. Acting under Hitler’s instructions, -Von Papen then returned to Austria and arranged the conference which was -held at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Von Papen accompanied -Schuschnigg to that conference, and at its conclusion advised -Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler’s demands. On 10 March 1938 Hitler -ordered Von Papen to return to Berlin. Von Papen was in the Chancellery -on 11 March when the occupation of Austria was ordered. No evidence has -been offered showing that Von Papen was in favor of the decision to -occupy Austria by force, and he has testified that he urged Hitler not -to take this step. - -After the annexation of Austria Von Papen retired into private life and -there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He accepted the -position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939, but no evidence has been -offered concerning his activities in that position implicating him in -crimes. - -The evidence leaves no doubt that Von Papen’s primary purpose as -Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg regime and -strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about -Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue and -bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such offenses against -political morality, however bad these may be. Under the Charter Von -Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the planning of -aggressive war. There is no evidence that he was a party to the plans -under which the occupation of Austria was a step in the direction of -further aggressive action, or even that he participated in plans to -occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not established -beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his activity, and -therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that he was a party to the common -plan charged in Count One or participated in the planning of the -aggressive wars charged under Count Two. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Von Papen is not guilty under this Indictment, -and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when the -Tribunal presently adjourns. - - - _SEYSS-INQUART_ - -Seyss-Inquart is indicted under all Four Counts. Seyss-Inquart, an -Austrian attorney, was appointed State Councillor in Austria in May 1937 -as a result of German pressure. He had been associated with the Austrian -Nazi Party since 1931, but had often had difficulties with that Party -and did not actually join the Nazi Party until 13 March 1938. He was -appointed Austrian Minister of Security and Interior with control over -the police, pursuant to one of the conditions which Hitler had imposed -on Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden Conference of 12 February 1938. - - _Activities in Austria_ - -Seyss-Inquart participated in the last stages of the Nazi intrigue which -preceded the German occupation of Austria, and was made Chancellor of -Austria as a result of German threats of invasion. - -On 12 March 1938 Seyss-Inquart met Hitler at Linz and made a speech -welcoming the German forces and advocating the reunion of Germany and -Austria. On 13 March he obtained the passage of a law providing that -Austria should become a province of Germany and succeeded Miklas as -President of Austria when Miklas resigned rather than sign the law. -Seyss-Inquart’s title was changed to Reich Governor of Austria on 15 -March 1938, and on the same day he was given the title of a general in -the SS. He was made a Reich Minister without Portfolio on 1 May 1939. - -On 11 March 1939 he visited the Slovakian Cabinet in Bratislava and -induced them to declare their independence in a way which fitted in -closely with Hitler’s offensive against the independence of -Czechoslovakia. - -As Reich Governor of Austria, Seyss-Inquart instituted a program of -confiscating Jewish property. Under his regime Jews were forced to -emigrate, were sent to concentration camps, and were subject to pogroms. -At the end of his regime he cooperated with the Security Police and SD -in the deportation of Jews from Austria to the East. While he was -Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Nazis were sent to -concentration camps by the Gestapo, mistreated, and often killed. - - _Criminal Activities in Poland and the Netherlands_ - -In September 1939 Seyss-Inquart was appointed Chief of Civil -Administration of South Poland. On 12 October 1939 Seyss-Inquart was -made Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland under -Frank. On 18 May 1940 Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Commissioner for -Occupied Netherlands. In these positions he assumed responsibility for -governing territory which had been occupied by aggressive wars and the -administration of which was of vital importance in the aggressive war -being waged by Germany. - -As Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland, -Seyss-Inquart was a supporter of the harsh occupation policies which -were put in effect. In November 1939, while on an inspection tour -through the General Government, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland was to -be so administered as to exploit its economic resources for the benefit -of Germany. Seyss-Inquart also advocated the persecution of Jews and was -informed of the beginning of the AB action which involved the murder of -many Polish intellectuals. - -As Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart was -ruthless in applying terrorism to suppress all opposition to the German -occupation, a program which he described as “annihilating” his -opponents. In collaboration with the local Higher SS and Police Leaders -he was involved in the shooting of hostages for offenses against the -occupation authorities and sending to concentration camps all suspected -opponents of occupation policies including priests and educators. Many -of the Dutch police were forced to participate in these programs by -threats of reprisal against their families. Dutch courts were also -forced to participate in this program, but when they indicated their -reluctance to give sentences of imprisonment because so many prisoners -were in fact killed, a greater emphasis was placed on the use of summary -police courts. - -Seyss-Inquart carried out the economic administration of the Netherlands -without regard for rules of the Hague Convention, which he described as -obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for the maximum utilization of -economic potential of the Netherlands, and executed with small regard -for its effect on the inhabitants. There was widespread pillage of -public and private property which was given color of legality by -Seyss-Inquart’s regulations, and assisted by manipulations of the -financial institutions of the Netherlands under his control. - -As Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart immediately -began sending forced laborers to Germany. Until 1942 labor service in -Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was actually coerced by strong -economic and governmental pressure. In 1942 Seyss-Inquart formally -decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the services of the -Security Police and SD to prevent evasion of his order. During the -occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Netherlands to the -Reich as laborers and only a very small proportion were actually -volunteers. - -One of Seyss-Inquart’s first steps as Reich Commissioner of the -Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws imposing economic -discriminations against the Jews. This was followed by decrees requiring -their registration, decrees compelling them to reside in ghettos and to -wear the Star of David, sporadic arrests and detention in concentration -camps, and finally, at the suggestion of Heydrich, the mass deportation -of almost 120,000 of Holland’s 140,000 Jews to Auschwitz and the “final -solution”. Seyss-Inquart admits knowing that they were going to -Auschwitz, but claims that he heard from people who had been to -Auschwitz that the Jews were comparatively well off there, and that he -thought that they were being held there for resettlement after the war. -In light of the evidence and on account of his official position it is -impossible to believe this claim. - -Seyss-Inquart contends that he was not responsible for many of the -crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they were -either ordered from the Reich, committed by the Army, over which he had -no control, or by the German Higher SS and Police Leader, who, he -claims, reported directly to Himmler. It is true that some of the -excesses were the responsibility of the Army, and that the Higher SS and -Police Leader, although he was at the disposal of Seyss-Inquart, could -always report directly to Himmler. It is also true that in certain cases -Seyss-Inquart opposed the extreme measures used by these other agencies, -as when he was largely successful in preventing the Army from carrying -out a scorched earth policy, and urged the Higher SS and Police Leaders -to reduce the number of hostages to be shot. But the fact remains that -Seyss-Inquart was a knowing and voluntary participant in War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity which were committed in the occupation of the -Netherlands. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Seyss-Inquart is guilty under Counts Two, Three, -and Four. Seyss-Inquart is not guilty on Count One. - - - _SPEER_ - -Speer is indicted under all four Counts. Speer joined the Nazi Party in -1932. In 1934 he was made Hitler’s architect and became a close personal -confidant. Shortly thereafter he was made a department head in the -German Labor Front and the official in charge of capital construction on -the staff of the deputy to the Führer, positions which he held through -1941. On 15 February 1942, after the death of Fritz Todt, Speer was -appointed Chief of the Organization Todt and Reich Minister for -Armaments and Munitions (after 2 September 1943, for Armaments and War -Production). The positions were supplemented by his appointments in -March and April 1942 as General Plenipotentiary for Armaments and as a -member of the Central Planning Board, both within the Four Year Plan. -Speer was a member of the Reichstag from 1941 until the end of the war. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer’s activities do not amount to -initiating, planning, or preparing wars of aggression, or of conspiring -to that end. He became the head of the armament industry well after all -of the wars had been commenced and were under way. His activities in -charge of German armament production were in aid of the war effort in -the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war; -but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that such activities involve -engaging in the common plan to wage aggressive war as charged under -Count One or waging aggressive war as charged under Count Two. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -The evidence introduced against Speer under Counts Three and Pour -relates entirely to his participation in the slave labor program. Speer -himself had no direct administrative responsibility for this program. -Although he had advocated the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary -for the Utilization of Labor because he wanted one central authority -with whom he could deal on labor matters, he did not obtain -administrative control over Sauckel. Sauckel was appointed directly by -Hitler, under the decree of 21 March 1942, which provided that he should -be directly responsible to Göring, as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year -Plan. - -As Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions and General -Plenipotentiary for Armaments under the Four Year Plan, Speer had -extensive authority over production. His original authority was over -construction and production of arms for the OKW. This was progressively -expanded to include naval armaments, civilian production and finally, on -1 August 1944, air armament. As the dominant member of the Central -Planning Board, which had supreme authority for the scheduling of German -production and the allocation and development of raw materials, Speer -took the position that the Board had authority to instruct Sauckel to -provide laborers for industries under its control and succeeded in -sustaining this position over the objection of Sauckel. The practice was -developed under which Speer transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the -total number of workers needed. Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated -it to the various industries in accordance with instructions supplied by -Speer. - -Speer knew when he made his demands on Sauckel that they would be -supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion. He participated -in conferences involving the extension of the slave labor program for -the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was present at a conference -held during 10 and 12 August 1942 with Hitler and Sauckel, at which it -was agreed that Sauckel should bring laborers by force from occupied -territories where this was necessary to satisfy the labor needs of the -industries under Speer’s control. Speer also attended a conference in -Hitler’s headquarters on 4 January 1944, at which the decision was made -that Sauckel should obtain “at least 4 million new workers from occupied -territories” in order to satisfy the demands for labor made by Speer, -although Sauckel indicated that he could do this only with help from -Himmler. - -Sauckel continually informed Speer and his representatives that foreign -laborers were being obtained by force. At a meeting of 1 March 1944 -Speer’s deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about his failure to live -up to the obligation to supply 4 million workers from occupied -territories. In some cases Speer demanded laborers from specific foreign -countries. Thus, at the conference of 10-12 August 1942 Sauckel was -instructed to supply Speer with “a further million Russian laborers for -the German armament industry up to and including October 1942”. At a -meeting of the Central Planning Board on 22 April 1943 Speer discussed -plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal mines, and flatly -vetoed the suggestion that this labor deficit should be made up by -German labor. - -Speer has argued that he advocated the reorganization of the labor -program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of German labor in -war production in Germany and on the use of labor in occupied countries -in local production of consumer goods formerly produced in Germany. -Speer took steps in this direction by establishing the so-called -“blocked industries” in the occupied territories which were used to -produce goods to be shipped to Germany. Employees of these industries -were immune from deportation to Germany as slave laborers and any worker -who had been ordered to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he went -to work for a blocked industry. This system, although somewhat less -inhumane than deportation to Germany, was still illegal. The system of -blocked industries played only a small part in the over-all slave labor -program, although Speer urged its cooperation with the slave labor -program, knowing the way in which it was actually being administered. In -an official sense, he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly -urged its extension. - -Speer was also directly involved in the utilization of forced labor, as -Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt functioned -principally in the occupied areas on such projects as the Atlantic Wall -and the construction of military highways, and Speer has admitted that -he relied on compulsory service to keep it adequately staffed. He also -used concentration camp labor in the industries under his control. He -originally arranged to tap this source of labor for use in small -out-of-the-way factories; and later, fearful of Himmler’s jurisdictional -ambitions, attempted to use as few concentration camp workers as -possible. - -Speer was also involved in the use of prisoners of war in armament -industries but contends that he utilized Soviet prisoners of war only in -industries covered by the Geneva Convention. - -Speer’s position was such that he was not directly concerned with the -cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program, although he -was aware of its existence. For example, at meetings of the Central -Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labor were so large -as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting. At a meeting of the -Central Planning Board on 30 October 1942, Speer voiced his opinion that -many slave laborers who claimed to be sick were malingerers and stated: -“There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic steps -and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps.” Speer, -however, insisted that the slave laborers be given adequate food and -working conditions so that they could work efficiently. - -In mitigation it must be recognized that Speer’s establishment of -blocked industries did keep many laborers in their homes and that in the -closing stages of the war he was one of the few men who had the courage -to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to prevent the -senseless destruction of production facilities, both in occupied -territories and in Germany. He carried out his opposition to Hitler’s -scorched earth program in some of the Western countries and in Germany -by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Speer is not guilty on Counts One and Two, but -is guilty under Counts Three and Four. - - - _VON NEURATH_ - -Von Neurath is indicted under all four Counts. He is a professional -diplomat who served as German Ambassador to Great Britain from 1930 to -1932. On 2 June 1932 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the -Von Papen Cabinet, a position which he held under the Cabinets of Von -Schleicher and Hitler. Von Neurath resigned as Minister of Foreign -Affairs on 4 February 1938, and was made Reich Minister without -Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet Council, and a member of the -Reich Defense Council. On 18 March 1939 he was appointed Reich Protector -for Bohemia and Moravia, and served in this capacity until 27 September -1941. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenführer in the SS. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Neurath advised Hitler in connection -with the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of -Nations on 14 October 1933, the institution of rearmament, the passage -on 16 March 1935 of the law for universal military service, and the -passage on 21 May 1935 of the secret Reich Defense Law. He was a key -figure in the negotiation of the Naval Accord entered into between -Germany and England on 18 June 1935. He played an important part in -Hitler’s decision to reoccupy the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, and -predicted that the occupation could be carried through without any -reprisals from the French. On 18 May 1936 he told the American -Ambassador to France that it was the policy of the German Government to -do nothing in foreign affairs until “the Rhineland had been digested”, -and that as soon as the fortifications in the Rhineland had been -constructed and the countries of central Europe realized that France -could not enter Germany at will, “all those countries will begin to feel -very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation -will develop”. - -Von Neurath took part in the Hossbach conference of 5 November 1937. He -has testified that he was so shocked by Hitler’s statements that he had -a heart attack. Shortly thereafter he offered to resign, and his -resignation was accepted on 4 February 1938, at the same time that Von -Fritsch and Von Blomberg were dismissed. Yet with knowledge of Hitler’s -aggressive plans he retained a formal relationship with the Nazi regime -as Reich Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet -Council and a member of the Reich Defense Council. He took charge of the -Foreign Office at the time of the occupation of Austria, assured the -British Ambassador that this had not been caused by a German ultimatum, -and informed the Czechoslovakian Minister that Germany intended to abide -by its arbitration convention with Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath -participated in the last phase of the negotiations preceding the Munich -Pact, but contends that he entered these discussions only to urge Hitler -to make every effort to settle the issues by peaceful means. - - _Criminal Activities in Czechoslovakia_ - -Von Neurath was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia on 18 -March 1939. Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by military force. Hacha’s -consent, obtained as it was by duress, cannot be considered as -justifying the occupation. Hitler’s decree of 16 March 1939, -establishing the Protectorate, stated that this new territory should -“belong henceforth to the territory of the German Reich”, an assumption -that the Republic of Czechoslovakia no longer existed. But it also went -on the theory that Bohemia and Moravia retained their sovereignty -subject only to the interests of Germany as expressed by the -Protectorate. Therefore even if the doctrine of subjugation should be -considered to be applicable to territory occupied by aggressive action, -the Tribunal does not believe that this Proclamation amounted to an -incorporation which was sufficient to bring the doctrine into effect. -The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia must therefore be considered a -military occupation covered by the rules of warfare. Although -Czechoslovakia was not a party to the Hague Convention of 1907, the -rules of land warfare expressed in this Convention are declaratory of -existing international law and hence are applicable. - -As Reich Protector, Von Neurath instituted an administration in Bohemia -and Moravia similar to that in effect in Germany. The free press, -political parties, and trade unions were abolished. All groups which -might serve as opposition were outlawed. Czechoslovakian industry was -worked into the structure of German war production, and exploited for -the German war effort. Nazi anti-Semitic policies and laws were also -introduced. Jews were barred from leading positions in Government and -business. - -In August 1939 Von Neurath issued a proclamation warning against any -acts of sabotage and stating that “the responsibility for all acts of -sabotage is attributed not only to individual perpetrators but to the -entire Czech population.” When the war broke out on 1 September 1939, -8,000 prominent Czechs were arrested by the Security Police in Bohemia -and Moravia and put into protective custody. Many of this group died in -concentration camps as a result of mistreatment. - -In October and November 1939 Czechoslovakian students held a series of -demonstrations. As a result, on Hitler’s orders, all universities were -closed, 1,200 students imprisoned, and the nine leaders of the -demonstration shot by Security Police and SD. Von Neurath testified that -he was not informed of this action in advance, but it was announced by -proclamation over his signature posted on placards throughout the -Protectorate, which he claims, however, was done without his authority. - -On 31 August 1940 Von Neurath transmitted to Lammers a memorandum which -he had prepared dealing with the future of the Protectorate, and a -memorandum with his approval prepared by Carl Herman Frank on the same -subject. Both dealt with the question of Germanization and proposed that -the majority of the Czechs might be assimilated racially into the German -Nation. Both advocated the elimination of the Czechoslovakian -intelligentsia and other groups which might resist Germanization, Von -Neurath’s by expulsion, Frank’s by expulsion or “special treatment.” - -Von Neurath has argued that the actual enforcement of the repressive -measures was carried out by the Security Police and SD who were under -the control of his State Secretary, Carl Herman Frank, who was appointed -at the suggestion of Himmler and who, as a Higher SS and Police Leader, -reported directly to Himmler. Von Neurath further argues that -anti-Semitic measures and those resulting in economic exploitation were -put into effect in the Protectorate as the result of policies decided -upon in the Reich. However this may be, he served as the chief German -official in the Protectorate when the administration of this territory -played an important role in the wars of aggression which Germany was -waging in the East, knowing that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity -were being committed under his authority. - -In mitigation it must be remembered that Von Neurath did intervene with -the Security Police and SD for the release of many of the Czechoslovaks -who were arrested on 1 September 1939, and for the release of students -arrested later in the fall. On 23 September 1941 he was summoned before -Hitler and told that he was not being harsh enough and that Heydrich was -being sent to the Protectorate to combat the Czechoslovakian resistance -groups. Von Neurath attempted to dissuade Hitler from sending Heydrich, -but in vain, and when he was not successful, offered to resign. When his -resignation was not accepted he went on leave, on 27 September 1941, and -refused to act as Protector after that date. His resignation was -formally accepted in August 1943. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Von Neurath is guilty under all four Counts. - - - _FRITZSCHE_ - -Fritzsche is indicted on Counts One, Three, and Four. He was best known -as a radio commentator, discussing once a week the events of the day on -his own program, “Hans Fritzsche Speaks.” He began broadcasting in -September 1932; in the same year he was made the head of the Wireless -News Service, a Reich Government agency. When, on 1 May 1933, this -agency was incorporated by the National Socialists into their Reich -Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Fritzsche became a -member of the Nazi Party and went to that Ministry. In December 1938 he -became head of the Home Press Division of the Ministry; in October 1942 -he was promoted to the rank of Ministerial Director. After serving -briefly on the Eastern Front in a propaganda company, he was, in -November 1942, made head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda -Ministry and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the -Greater German Radio. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -As head of the Home Press Division Fritzsche supervised the German press -of 2,300 daily newspapers. In pursuance of this function he held daily -press conferences to deliver the directives of the Propaganda Ministry -to these papers. He was, however, subordinate to Dietrich, the Reich -Press Chief, who was in turn a subordinate of Goebbels. It was Dietrich -who received the directives to the press of Goebbels and other Reich -Ministers, and prepared them as instructions, which he then handed to -Fritzsche for the press. - -From time to time, the “Daily Paroles of the Reich Press Chief”, as -these instructions were labeled, directed the press to present to the -people certain themes, such as the Leadership Principle, the Jewish -problem, the problem of living space, or other standard Nazi ideas. A -vigorous propaganda campaign was carried out before each major act of -aggression. While Fritzsche headed the Home Press Division, he -instructed the press how the actions or wars against Bohemia and -Moravia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union should be dealt with. -Fritzsche had no control of the formulation of these propaganda -policies. He was merely a conduit to the press of the instructions -handed him by Dietrich. In February 1939 and before the absorption of -Bohemia and Moravia, for instance, he received Dietrich’s order to bring -to the attention of the press Slovakia’s efforts for independence, and -the anti-Germanic policies and politics of the existing Prague -Government. This order to Dietrich originated in the Foreign Office. - -The Radio Division, of which Fritzsche became the head in November 1942, -was one of the 12 divisions of the Propaganda Ministry. In the beginning -Dietrich and other heads of divisions exerted influence over the -policies to be followed by radio. Towards the end of the war, however, -Fritzsche became the sole authority within the Ministry for radio -activities. In this capacity he formulated and issued daily radio -“paroles” to all Reich propaganda offices, according to the general -political policies of the Nazi regime, subject to the directives of the -Radio-Political Division of the Foreign Office, and the personal -supervision of Goebbels. - -Fritzsche, with other officials of the Propaganda Ministry, was present -at Goebbels’ daily staff conferences. Here they were instructed in the -news and propaganda policies of the day. After 1943 Fritzsche himself -occasionally held these conferences, but only when Goebbels and his -State Secretaries were absent. And even then his only function was to -transmit the Goebbels’ directives relayed to him by telephone. - -This is the summary of Fritzsche’s positions and influence in the Third -Reich. Never did he achieve sufficient stature to attend the planning -conferences which led to aggressive war; indeed according to his own -uncontradicted testimony he never even had a conversation with Hitler. -Nor is there any showing that he was informed of the decisions taken at -these conferences. His activities cannot be said to be those which fall -within the definition of the common plan to wage aggressive war as -already set forth in this Judgment. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -The Prosecution has asserted that Fritzsche incited and encouraged the -commission of War Crimes by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in -the German People those passions which led them to the commission of -atrocities under Counts Three and Four. His position and official duties -were not sufficiently important, however, to infer that he took part in -originating or formulating propaganda campaigns. - -Excerpts in evidence from his speeches show definite anti-Semitism on -his part. He broadcast, for example, that the war had been caused by -Jews and said their fate had turned out “as unpleasant as the Führer -predicted.” But these speeches did not urge persecution or extermination -of Jews. There is no evidence that he was aware of their extermination -in the East. The evidence moreover shows that he twice attempted to have -publication of the anti-Semitic _Der Stürmer_ suppressed, though -unsuccessfully. - -In these broadcasts Fritzsche sometimes spread false news, but it was -not proved he knew it to be false. For example, he reported that no -German U-boat was in the vicinity of the _Athenia_ when it was sunk. -This information was untrue; but Fritzsche, having received it from the -German Navy, had no reason to believe it was untrue. - -It appears that Fritzsche sometimes made strong statements of a -propagandistic nature in his broadcasts. But the Tribunal is not -prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German People to -commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to have -been a participant in the crimes charged. His aim was rather to arouse -popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war effort. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Fritzsche is not guilty under this Indictment, -and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal when the Tribunal -presently adjourns. - - - _BORMANN_ - -Bormann is indicted on Counts One, Three, and Four. He joined the -National Socialist Party in 1925, was a member of the Staff of the -Supreme Command of the SA from 1928 to 1930, was in charge of the Aid -Fund of the Party, and was Reichsleiter from 1933 to 1945. From 1933 to -1941 he was Chief of Staff in the Office of the Führer’s Deputy and, -after the flight of Hess to England, became Head of the Party -Chancellery on 12 May 1941. On 12 April 1943 he became Secretary to the -Führer. He was political and organizational head of the Volkssturm and a -general in the SS. - - _Crimes against Peace_ - -Bormann in the beginning a minor Nazi, steadily rose to a position of -power and, particularly in the closing days, of great influence over -Hitler. He was active in the Party’s rise to power and even more so in -the consolidation of that power. He devoted much of his time to the -persecution of the churches and of the Jews within Germany. - -The evidence does not show that Bormann knew of Hitler’s plans to -prepare, initiate, or wage aggressive wars. He attended none of the -important conferences when Hitler revealed piece by piece these plans -for aggression. Nor can knowledge be conclusively inferred from the -positions he held. It was only when he became head of the Party -Chancellery in 1941, and later in 1943 Secretary to the Führer when he -attended many of Hitler’s conferences, that his positions gave him the -necessary access. Under the view stated elsewhere which the Tribunal has -taken of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, there is not sufficient -evidence to bring Bormann within the scope of Count One. - - _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_ - -By decree of 29 May 1941 Bormann took over the offices and powers held -by Hess; by the decree of 24 January 1942 these powers were extended to -give him control over all laws and directives issued by Hitler. He was -thus responsible for laws and orders issued thereafter. On 1 December -1942 all Gaue became Reich defense districts, and the Party Gauleiters -responsible to Bormann were appointed Reich Defense Commissioners. In -effect, this made them the administrators of the entire civilian war -effort. This was so not only in Germany, but also in those territories -which were incorporated into the Reich from the absorbed and conquered -territories. - -Through this mechanism Bormann controlled the ruthless exploitations of -the subjected populace. His order of 12 August 1942 placed all Party -agencies at the disposal of Himmler’s program for forced resettlement -and denationalization of persons in the occupied countries. Three weeks -after the invasion of Russia, he attended the conference of 16 July 1941 -at Hitler’s field quarters with Göring, Rosenberg, and Keitel; Bormann’s -reports show that there were discussed and developed detailed plans of -enslavement and annihilation of the population of these territories. And -on 8 May 1942 he conferred with Hitler and Rosenberg on the forced -resettlement of Dutch personnel in Latvia, the extermination program in -Russia, and the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories. He was -interested in the confiscation of art and other properties in the East. -His letter of 11 January 1944 called for the creation of a large scale -organization to withdraw commodities from the occupied territories for -the bombed-out German populace. - -Bormann was extremely active in the persecution of the Jews, not only in -Germany but also in the absorbed and conquered countries. He took part -in the discussions which led to the removal of 60,000 Jews from Vienna -to Poland in cooperation with the SS and the Gestapo. He signed the -decree of 31 May 1941 extending the Nuremberg Laws to the annexed -Eastern territories. In an order of 9 October 1942 he declared that the -permanent elimination of Jews in Greater German territory could no -longer be solved by emigration, but only by applying “ruthless force” in -the special camps in the East. On 1 July 1943 he signed an ordinance -withdrawing Jews from the protection of the law courts and placing them -under the exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler’s Gestapo. - -Bormann was prominent in the slave labor program. The Party leaders -supervised slave labor matters in the respective Gaue, including -employment, conditions of work, feeding, and housing. By his circular of -5 May 1943 to the Leadership Corps, distributed down to the level of -Ortsgruppenleiter, he issued directions regulating the treatment of -foreign workers, pointing out they were subject to SS control on -security problems, and ordered the previous mistreatment to cease. A -report of 4 September 1942 relating to the transfer of 500,000 female -domestic workers from the East to Germany showed that control was to be -exercised by Sauckel, Himmler, and Bormann. Sauckel by decree of 8 -September directed the Kreisleiter to supervise the distribution and -assignment of these female laborers. - -Bormann also issued a series of orders to the Party leaders dealing with -the treatment of prisoners of war. On 5 November 1941 he prohibited -decent burials for Russian prisoners of war. On 25 November 1943 he -directed Gauleiter to report cases of lenient treatment of prisoners of -war. And on 13 September 1944 he ordered liaison between the Kreisleiter -with the camp commandants in determining the use to be made of prisoners -of war for forced labor. On 29 January 1943 he transmitted to his -leaders OKW instructions allowing the use of firearms, and corporal -punishment on recalcitrant prisoners of war, contrary to the Rules of -Land Warfare. On 30 September 1944 he signed a decree taking from the -OKW jurisdiction over prisoners of war and handing them over to Himmler -and the SS. - -Bormann is responsible for the lynching of Allied airmen. On 30 May 1944 -he prohibited any police action or criminal proceedings against persons -who had taken part in the lynching of Allied fliers. This was -accompanied by a Goebbels’ propaganda campaign inciting the German -people to take action of this nature, and the conference of 6 June 1944, -where regulations for the application of lynching were discussed. - -His Counsel, who has labored under difficulties, was unable to refute -this evidence. In the face of these documents, which bear Bormann’s -signature, it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the -defendant present. Counsel has argued that Bormann is dead and that the -Tribunal should not avail itself of Article 12 of the Charter, which -gives it the right to take proceedings _in absentia_. But the evidence -of death is not conclusive, and the Tribunal, as previously stated, is -determined to try him _in absentia_. If Bormann is not dead and is later -apprehended, the Control Council for Germany may, under Article 29 of -the Charter, consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or reduce his -sentence, if deemed proper. - - _Conclusion_ - -The Tribunal finds that Bormann is not guilty on Count One, but is -guilty on Counts Three and Four. - - 1 October 1946 - -/s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE /s/ NORMAN BIRKETT - President -/s/ FRANCIS BIDDLE /s/ JOHN J. PARKER -/s/ H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES /s/ R. FALCO -/s/ NIKITCHENKO /s/ A. VOLCHKOV - - - - - DISSENTING OPINION OF THE SOVIET MEMBER - OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - -The Tribunal decided: - -a) To acquit the Defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen, and Hans -Fritzsche; - -b) To sentence the Defendant Rudolf Hess to life imprisonment; - -c) Not to declare criminal the following organizations: the -Reichscabinet, General Staff, and OKW. - -In this respect I can not agree with the decision adopted by the -Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the case and is based -on incorrect conclusions. - - - I. _The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Schacht_ - -The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht, -confirms, the following facts: - -a) Schacht established contact with Göring in December 1930 and with -Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently established contact -between the leadership of the Nazi Party, and the foremost -representatives of the German industrial and financial circles. This, in -particular, is confirmed by the testimony of Witness Severing -(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23 May 1946; USA-615). - -b) In July 1932 Schacht demanded that Von Papen resign his post as Reich -Chancellor in favor of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by Von Papen’s -testimony at the preliminary interrogation and by Schacht’s own -testimony in Court (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). - -c) In November 1932 Schacht collected signatures of German -industrialists, urging them to come out for Hitler’s appointment as -Reich Chancellor. On 12 November 1932 Schacht wrote to Hitler: - - “I have no doubt that the way we are directing the course of - events can only lead to your appointment as Reich Chancellor. We - are trying to secure a large number of signatures among the - industrial circles to ensure your appointment to this post.” - (EC-456, USA-773; PS-3901, USA-837) - -d) In February 1933 Schacht organized the financing of the pre-election -campaign conducted by the Nazi Party, and demanded at the conference of -Hitler and Göring with the industrialists that the latter provide three -million marks (D-203). Schacht admitted in Court that he had pointed out -the necessity for providing the Nazi leaders with this sum (Transcript, -Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946), while the Defendant Funk and the former -member of the management of “I. G. Farbenindustrie” Schnitzler, who were -present at this conference, both confirmed that it was Schacht who was -the initiator of the financing of the pre-election campaign (Transcript, -4 July 1946; EC-439, USA-618). - -e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his -public statements that he asked for the support in the elections of both -the Nazi Party and of Hitler (USA-615; USA-616; Transcript, Afternoon -Session, 2 May 1946). - -On 29 August 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler: “No matter where my -activities lead me in the near future, even if some day you see me -imprisoned in a fortress, you can always depend on me as your loyal -aide” (EC-457, USA-619). - -_Thus, Schacht consciously and deliberately supported the Nazi Party and -actively aided in the seizure of power in Germany by the Fascists._ Even -prior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and -immediately after the seizure of power by the Nazis, Schacht led in -planning and developing the German armaments, as follows: - -a) On 17 March 1933, Schacht was appointed President of the Reichsbank -(PS-3021, USA-11), and as he himself stated in a speech before his -Reichsbank colleagues on 21 March 1938, the Reichsbank under his -management was “none other than a National Socialist institution” -(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946). - -b) In August 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of Economy -(PS-3021, USA-11). His Ministry “was given the task of carrying out the -economic preparation for war” (EC-128, USA-623). A special decree -granted Schacht, in his capacity of Reich Minister of Economy, unlimited -authority in the field of economy (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part 1, p. -565). - -c) Making use of these powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon the -execution of the “new program” developed by him (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, -1934, Part 1, p. 826), and, as Schacht himself noted in his speech of 29 -November 1938, this organization played a tremendous part in the course -of Germany’s rearmament (EC-611, USA-662). - -d) For the purpose of the most effective execution of this “new program” -Schacht used the property and means of those political enemies of the -Nazi regime, who either became the victims of terror or were forced to -emigrate (Schacht’s note to Hitler of 3 May 1939; PS-1168, USA-37). - -Schacht used swindler’s tactics and coercion in an effort to acquire raw -material and foreign currency for armaments (Affidavit of Vice-President -of the Reichsbank, Puhl; EC-437, USA-624). - -e) During the first days of his association with the Reichsbank, Schacht -issued a series of decrees (27 October 1933, 23 March 1934, 19 February -1935), which in the long run helped realize the broad program of the -financing of armaments, developed by him, and with the aid of which, as -he testified, he “had found the way to finance the rearmament program.” - -In his speech in Leipzig on 4 March 1935, Schacht, while summing up his -preceding economic and financial activities, announced “. . . everything -that I say and do has the Führer’s full agreement and I shall not do or -say anything which is not approved by the Führer” (Transcript, Afternoon -Session, 3 May 1946). - -Having become the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht -unified under himself the leadership of the entire German economy and -through his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerite war machine was -accomplished. - -a) The secret law of 21 May 1935, which appointed Schacht the -Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, states as follows: - - “The task of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is to - place all the economic resources in the service of warfare. The - Plenipotentiary General for War Economy within the framework of - his functions is given the right to issue legal orders, - deviating from the existing laws. He is the responsible head for - financing wars through the Reich Ministry and the Reichsbank” - (PS-2261, USA-24). - -b) Schacht financed German armaments through the Mefo system of -promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on a national scale that -has no precedent, and the success of which was dependent upon the -realization of the aggressive plans of the Hitlerites. It was because of -this that Schacht set 1942 as the date when the Mefo notes were to -mature, and he pointed out in his speech of 29 November 1938 the -relation between “the daring credit policy” of the Reichsbank and the -aims of the Hitlerite foreign policy (EC-611, USA-622). - -c) Having made full use of his plenary powers, Schacht carefully -developed and carried out a broad program of economic mobilization which -allowed the Hitlerite leaders to wage war at any time considered most -favorable. In particular, from the report of Schacht’s deputy, Wohltat, -“the preparation for mobilization carried out by the Plenipotentiary for -War Economy” shows that Schacht provided to the last detail for the -system of exploitation of the German economy in war time, all the way -from the utilization of industrial enterprises, of raw material -resources and manpower down to the distribution of 80,000,000 ration -cards (EC-258, USA-625). It is significant that this report was drawn up -a month after Hitler’s statement at the conference of 5 November 1937, -at which Hitler set forth this concrete plan of aggression (PS-386, -USA-25). - -Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937: “I worked -out the preparation for war in accordance with the principle that the -plan of our war economy must be built in peace time in such a way that -there will be no necessity for any reorganization in case of war”. -Schacht confirmed his statement in court (Transcript, Afternoon Session, -2 May 1946). - -Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared Germany for war. - -d) The former Minister of War Von Blomberg testified that: “Schacht was -fully cognizant of the plans for development and increase of the German -Armed Forces, since he was constantly informed . . . of all the -financing necessary for the development of the German armed forces” -(USA-838). - -On 31 August 1936, Von Blomberg informed Schacht that: “The -establishment of all the Air Force units must be completed by 1 April -1937, and therefore large expenditures must be entailed in 1936 . . . .” -(PS-1301, USA-123). - -In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated in the military exercises in -Godesberg (EC-174). - -e) In his memorandum to Hitler on 3 May 1935, entitled the “Financing of -Rearmament”, Schacht wrote: “A speedy fulfillment of the program for -rearmament on a mass scale is the basis of German policy, and, -therefore, everything else must be subordinate to this task; the -completion of this task, the achievement of this purpose must meet no -obstacles . . . .” (PS-1168, USA-37). - -In his speech on 29 November 1938, Schacht announced that Reichsbank’s -credit policy made it possible for Germany to create an “unsurpassed -machine, and, in turn, this war machine made possible the realization of -the aims of our policy” (EC-611, USA-622). - -One must exclude the supposition that Schacht was not informed as to -what purposes these weapons were to serve since he could not but take -into consideration their unprecedented scale and an obvious preference -for offensive types of weapons (heavy tanks, bombers, and so on). -Besides, Schacht knew perfectly well that not a single country intended -to wage war on Germany nor had it any reasons to do so. - -a) Schacht utilized the military might growing under his direction to -back Germany’s territorial demands which grew in proportion to the -increase in armaments. - -Schacht testified in Court that “at first he confined himself (in his -demands) to the colonies which had once belonged to Germany” -(Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946). - -In September 1934, during his talk with the American Ambassador Dodd, -Schacht pointed out that he desired annexation if possible without war, -but through war, if the United States would stay out of it (EC-461, -USA-58). - -In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul Fuller: - - “Colonies are essential to Germany. If it is possible, we shall - acquire them through negotiations, if not, we shall seize them.” - (EC-450, USA-629) - -Schacht admitted in Court that military pressure put upon Czechoslovakia -was “in some measure the result and the fruit of his labor” (Transcript, -Morning Session, 3 May 1946). - -b) Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and State -property of the countries which became victims of Hitlerite aggressions. - -The minutes of the conference of the Military-Economic Staff on 11 March -1938, in which Schacht participated, state that those present were given -Hitler’s latest directives about the invasion of Austria. Further, the -minutes state: “After this, at the suggestion of Schacht, it was decided -that . . . all the financial accounting will be made in Reichsmarks at -the rate of exchange: two schillings for one Reichsmark” (EC-421, -USA-645). - -Schacht admitted in Court that he personally was in charge of the -seizure of the Czechoslovak National Bank after the occupation of -Czechoslovakia (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946). - -c) At the beginning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his services for -negotiations with the United States in regard to the discontinuance of -aid to England and he informed Göring of his offer (PS-3700; USA-780). - -d) Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate Hitler -publicly after the signing of armistice with France, although Schacht, -better than anyone else, understood the usurpatory nature of the -armistice (German Documentary Film, USA-635). - -e) In his letter to Funk on 17 October 1941, Schacht suggested a more -effective exploitation of occupied territory. In this case, too, Schacht -acted on his own initiative (EC-504; USA-830). - -Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews: - -a) He testified in Court that he “agreed to the policy of the -persecution of the Jews as a matter of principle” (Transcript, Afternoon -Session, 2 May 1946) although, he stated, “to a certain extent” it was a -matter of conscience which, however, “was not serious enough to bring -about a break” between him and the Nazis (Transcript, Afternoon Session, -2 May 1946; USA-616). - -b) In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Schacht signed a series of -decrees, in accordance with which the property of the Jews in Germany -was subject to plunder with impunity (USA-832; USA-616). Schacht -confirmed in Court the fact that he had signed a series of anti-Semitic -decrees (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). - -As to the reasons for Schacht’s resignation from the post of the -Minister of Economy and the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in -November 1937, and also from the post of the President of the Reichsbank -on 20 November 1939, and finally from the post of the Minister without -Portfolio in January 1943, the evidence submitted establishes the -following: - -a) The reason is not Schacht’s disagreement with the economic -preparation for aggressive wars. - -Three weeks before leaving the Ministry of Economy and the post of -Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht wrote to Göring: “. . . -I also don’t consider that my opinion can differ from yours on economic -policy . . . .” (EC-497, USA-775). - -In his reply Göring states: - - “. . . You promised me your support and collaboration . . . . - You have repeated this promise many times, even after - differences of opinion began to creep up between us.” (EC-493, - USA-642). - -Schacht testified in Court that Göring and he only “differed in matters -of procedure” (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946). - -In the preliminary examination Göring testified that Schacht’s leaving -the Reichsbank “had no relation to the program of rearmament” (USA-648). - -The vice-president of the Reichsbank, Puhl, confirmed that Schacht’s -resignation from the Reichsbank can be explained by “his desire to -extricate himself from a dangerous situation” which developed as the -result of Schacht’s own crooked financial operations (EC-438, USA-646). - -b) The reason is not Schacht’s disapproval of mass terror conducted by -the Hitlerites. - -The witness for the Defense, Gisevius, testified that he constantly -informed Schacht of the criminal actions of the Gestapo, created by -Göring, and that nevertheless, right up to the end of 1936, Schacht -looked for “Göring’s support” (Transcript, Morning Session, 24 April -1946). - -In his letter to Von Blomberg on 24 December 1935, Schacht suggested -that the Gestapo apply “more cautious methods” since the open terror of -the Gestapo “hinders the objectives of the armament” (Transcript, -Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). - -On 30 January 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden Party insignia by -Hitler (EC-500; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). As stated in -an official German publication, “he was able to be of greater help to -the Party than if he were actually a member of the Party” (EC-460, -USA-617). - -Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Germans, the -inevitability of the failure of the Hitlerite regime, did Schacht -establish contact with the opposition circles, however, doing nothing to -help depose this regime. Therefore, it was not by chance that having -found out these connections of Schacht, Hitler still spared Schacht’s -life. - -It is thus indisputably established that: - -a) Schacht actively assisted in the seizure of power by the Nazis; - -b) During a period of 12 years Schacht closely collaborated with Hitler; - -c) Schacht provided the economic and financial basis for the creation of -the Hitlerite military machine; - -d) Schacht prepared Germany’s economy for the waging of aggressive wars; - -e) Schacht participated in the persecution of Jews and in the plunder of -territories occupied by the Germans. - -_Therefore, Schacht’s leading part in the preparation and execution of -the common criminal plan is proved._ - -The decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction with existing -evidence. - - - II. _The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Von Papen._ - -The verdict does not dispute the fact that Von Papen prepared the way -for Hitler’s appointment to the post of the Reich Chancellor and that he -actively helped the Nazis in their seizure of power. - -In a speech of November 1933, Von Papen said the following on the -subject: - - “. . . just as I at the time of taking over the Chancellorship - (this was in 1932) have advocated to pave the way to power for - the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on 30 January - was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of our - Chancellor and Führer into the hands of our beloved Field - Marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the - German People and all those who have kept confidence in me: - - “The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep - distress a leader . . . .” (PS-3375). - -_It was Von Papen who revoked Bruning’s order dissolving the SS and the -SA_, thus allowing the Nazis to realize their program of mass terror -(D-631). - -Again it was the defendant who, by the application of brute force, did -away with the Social Democrat Government of Braun and Severing -(Severing’s Testimony, Transcript, Afternoon Session, 14 June 1946). - -On 4 January 1933, Von Papen had a conference with Hitler, Hess, and -Himmler (D-632). - -Von Papen participated in the purge of the State machinery of all -personnel considered unreliable from the Nazi point of view; _on 21 -March 1933, he signed a decree creating special political tribunals_; he -had also signed an order granting amnesty to criminals whose crimes were -committed in the course of the “national revolution”; he participated in -drafting the text of the order “insuring Party and State unity”; and so -on. - -Subsequently Von Papen faithfully served the Hitler regime. - -After the Putsch of 1934, _Von Papen ordered his subordinate Tschirschky -to appear in the Gestapo_, knowing full well what awaited him there -(D-684). - -Von Papen helped to keep the bloody murder secret from public opinion -(D-717; D-718). - -The defendant played a tremendous role in helping Nazis to take -possession of Austria. - -Three weeks after the assassination of Dollfuss, on 26 July 1934, Hitler -told Von Papen that he was being appointed Minister to Vienna, -especially noting in a letter: “You have been and continue to be in -possession of my fullest and most unlimited trust . . . .” (PS-2799). - -In this connection it is impossible to ignore the testimony of the -American Ambassador Messersmith who quoted Von Papen as saying that “the -seizure of Austria is only the first step” and that he, Von Papen, was -in Austria for the purpose of “further weakening the Austrian -Government” (USA-57). - -The defendant was Hitler’s chief advisor in effecting plans for the -seizure of Austria. It was he who proposed several tactical maneuvers to -quiet the vigilance of world opinion on the one hand, and allow Germany -to conclude her war preparations, on the other. - -This follows indisputably from Von Papen’s statement to the Austrian -Minister Berger-Waldeneck (PS-1760), from the report of Gauleiter Reuner -of 6 July 1939 (USA-61), from Von Papen’s report to Hitler of 21 August -1936 (D-706), from Von Papen’s report to Hitler of 1 September 1936 -(PS-2246, USA-67), and from a series of other documents which had been -submitted in evidence. - -Von Papen played this game until the issuance of the order for alerting -the German Armed Forces for moving into Austria. He participated in -arranging the conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg of 12 February -1938 (USA-69). - -It was Von Papen who in a letter to Hitler emphatically recommended that -financial aid be given the Nazi organization in Austria known as the -“Freedom Union”, specifically for “its fight against the Jewry” -(PS-2830). - -Indisputable appears the fact of the Nazi seizure of Austria and of Von -Papen’s participation in this act of aggression. After the occupation of -Austria, Hitler rewarded Von Papen with the golden insignia of the Nazi -Party (D-632). - -Neither is it possible to ignore Von Papen’s role as agent provocateur -when in his capacity of diplomat he was the German Ambassador to -Turkey—whenever evaluation of his activity there is made. - -The post, of Ambassador to Turkey was at the time of considerable -importance in helping the Nazis realize their aggressive plans. - -The official Nazi biographer wrote about Von Papen as follows: “Shortly -(after the occupation of Austria) the Führer had need of Von Papen’s -services again and on 18 April 1939, he therefore appointed him German -Ambassador in Ankara” (D-632). - -It should also be noted that for his Turkish activities, Hitler rewarded -Von Papen with the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit Order with Swords -(D-632). - -Thus, evidence submitted establishes beyond doubt that: - -a) Von Papen actively aided the Nazis in their seizure of power. - -b) Von Papen used both his efforts and his connections to solidify and -strengthen the Hitlerian terroristic regime in Germany. - -c) Von Papen actively participated in the Nazi aggression against -Austria culminating in its occupation. - -d) Von Papen faithfully served Hitler up to the very end, aiding the -Nazi plans of aggression both with his ability and his diplomatic skill. - -It therefore follows that Defendant Von Papen bears considerable -responsibility for the crimes of the Hitlerite regime. - -For these reasons I cannot consent to the acquittal of Defendant Von -Papen. - - - III. _The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Fritzsche_ - -The acquittal of Defendant Hans Fritzsche follows from the reasoning -that Fritzsche, allegedly, had not reached in Germany the official -position making him responsible for the criminal actions of the Hitler -regime and that his own personal activity in this respect cannot be -considered criminal. The verdict characterizes him as a secondary figure -carrying out the directives of Goebbels and Von Ribbentrop, and of the -Reich Press Director Dietrich. - -The verdict does not take into consideration or mention the fact that it -was Fritzsche who until 1942 was the director _de facto_ of the Reich -press and that, according to himself, subsequent to 1942 he became the -“commander-in-chief of the German radio” (Transcript, Morning Session, -23 January 1946). - -For the correct definition of the role of Defendant Hans Fritzsche it is -necessary, firstly, to keep clearly in mind the importance attached by -Hitler and his closest associates (as Göring, for example) to propaganda -in general and to radio propaganda in particular. This was considered -one of the most important and essential factors in the success of -conducting an aggressive war. - -In the Germany of Hitler, propaganda was invariably a factor in -preparing and conducting acts of aggression and in training the German -populace to accept obediently the criminal enterprises of German -fascism. - -The aims of these enterprises were served by a huge and well centralized -propaganda machinery. With the help of the police controls and of a -system of censorship it was possible to do away altogether with the -freedom of press and of speech. - -The basic method of the Nazi propagandistic activity lay in the false -presentation of facts. This is stated quite frankly in Hitler’s _Mein -Kampf_: “With the help of a skilful and continuous application of -propaganda it is possible to make the people conceive even of heaven as -hell and also make them consider heavenly the most miserly existence” -(USA-276). - -The dissemination of provocative lies and the systematic deception of -public opinion were as necessary to the Hitlerites for the realization -of their plans as were the production of armaments and the drafting of -military plans. Without propaganda, founded on the total eclipse of the -freedom of press and of speech, it would not have been possible for -German fascism to realize its aggressive intentions, to lay the -groundwork and then to put to practice the War Crimes and the Crimes -against Humanity. - -In the propaganda system of the Hitler State it was the daily press and -the radio that were the most important weapons. - -In his court testimony, Defendant Göring named three factors as -essential in the successful conduct of modern war according to the Nazi -concept, namely, (1) the military operations of the armed forces, (2) -economic warfare, (3) propaganda. With reference to the latter he said: - - “For what great importance the war of propaganda had, enemy - propaganda which extended by way of radio far into the - hinterland, no one has experienced more strongly than Germany” - (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 15 March 1946). - -With such concepts in ascendance it is impossible to suppose that the -supreme rulers of the Reich would appoint to the post of the Director of -Radio Propaganda who supervised radio activity of all the broadcasting -companies and directed their propagandistic content—a man they -considered a secondary figure. - -The point of view of the verdict contradicts both the evidence submitted -and the actual state of affairs. - -Beginning with 1942 and into 1945 Fritzsche was not only Chief of the -Radio Department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda but also -“Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of Radio in Greater -Germany”. This circumstance is fully proven by the sworn affidavit of -Fritzsche himself (PS-3469, USA-721). It thus follows that not at all -was Fritzsche merely “one of the 12 departmental chiefs in the Ministry -of Propaganda” who acquired responsibility for all radio propaganda only -toward the end of the war, as the verdict asserts. - -Fritzsche was the political director of the German radio up and into -1945, i. e., up to the moment of German defeat and capitulation. For -this reason it is Fritzsche who bears responsibility for the false and -provocative broadcasts of the German radio during the years of the war. - -As Chief of the Press Section inside Germany it was also Fritzsche who -was responsible for the activity of the German daily press consisting of -2,300 newspapers. It was Fritzsche who created and perfected the -Information Section winning from the Reich Government for the purpose an -increase in the subsidy granted the newspapers from 400,000 to 4,000,000 -marks. Subsequently Fritzsche participated energetically in the -development of the propaganda campaigns preparatory to the acts of -aggression against Czechoslovakia and Poland. (Transcript, Morning -Session, 23 January 1946). A similar active propaganda campaign was -conducted by the defendant prior to the attack on Yugoslavia as he -himself admitted on oath in Court (Transcript, Morning Session, 23 -January 1946). - -Fritzsche was informed of the plan to attack the Soviet Union and was -made _au courant_ of the military intentions at a conference with -Rosenberg (PS-1039, USA-146, “Rosenberg’s Written Report to Hitler on -the Subject of Preliminary Work in Eastern European Questions”). - -Fritzsche headed the German press campaign falsifying reports of -Germany’s aggressive war against France, England, Norway, the Soviet -Union, the United States, and the other States. - -The assertion that Fritzsche was not informed of the War Crimes and the -Crimes against Humanity then being perpetrated by the Hitlerites in the -occupied regions does not agree with the facts. From Fritzsche’s -testimony in Court it is obvious that already in May 1942, while in the -Propaganda Section of the 6th Army, he was aware of Hitler’s decree -ordering execution for all Soviet political workers and Soviet -intellectuals, the so-called “Commissar Decree” (Transcript, Afternoon -Session, 27 June 1946). It is also established that already at the -beginning of hostilities Fritzsche was fully aware of the fact that the -Nazis were carrying out their decision to do away with all Jews in -Europe. For instance, when commenting on Hitler s statement that “among -results of the war there will be the annihilation of the Jewish race in -Europe” (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 22 November 1945), Fritzsche -stated that: “As the Führer predicted it would occur in the event of war -in Europe, the fate of the European Jewry turned out to be quite sad” -(Transcript, Morning Session, 23 January 1946). It is further -established that the defendant systematically preached the anti-social -theory of race hatred and characterized peoples inhabiting countries -victimized by aggression as “sub-humans” (Transcript, Afternoon Session, -27 June 1946; Transcript, Morning Session, 28 June 1946). - -When the fate of Nazi Germany became clear, Fritzsche came out with -energetic support of the Defendant Martin Bormann and of other fanatical -Hitler adherents who organized the undercover fascist association, the -so-called “Werewolf”. - -On 7 April 1945, for example, in his last radio address, Fritzsche -agitated for all the civilian population of Germany to take active part -in the activities of this terroristic Nazi underground organization. - -He said: - - “Let no one be surprised to find the civilian population, - wearing civilian clothes, still continuing the fight in the - regions already occupied and even after occupation has taken - place. We shall call this phenomenon “Werewolf” since it will - have arisen without any preliminary planning and without a - definite organization, out of the very instinct of life.” - (USSR-496) - -In his radio addresses Fritzsche welcomed the German use of the new -terror weapons in conducting the war, specifically the use of the “V” -rockets. On receiving a plan for the introduction of bacterial warfare -he immediately forwarded it to the OKW for acceptance. (USSR-484; -Evidence submitted during the Afternoon Session, 28 June 1946) - -I consider Fritzsche’s responsibility fully proven. His activity had a -most basic relation to the preparation and the conduct of aggressive -warfare as well as to the other crimes of the Hitler regime. - - - IV. _Concerning the Sentence of the Defendant Rudolf Hess_ - -The Judgment of the Tribunal correctly and adequately portrays the -outstanding position which Rudolf Hess occupied in the leadership of the -Nazi Party and State. He was indeed Hitler’s closest personal confidant -and his authority was exceedingly great: In this connection it is -sufficient to quote Hitler’s decree appointing Hess as his deputy: “I -hereby appoint Hess as my deputy and give him full power to make -decisions in my name on all questions of Party leadership” (Transcript, -Afternoon Session, 7 February 1946). - -But the authority of Hess was not only confined to questions of Party -leadership. - -The official NSDAP publication _National Socialist Year Book for 1941_ -states that: - - “In addition to the duties of Party leadership, the deputy of - the Führer has far-reaching powers in the field of the State. - These are: First—participation in national and state - legislation, including the preparation of the Führer’s order. - The deputy of the Führer in this way validates the conception of - the Party . . . Second—approval of the deputy of the Führer of - proposed appointments for official, and labor service leaders. - Third—securing the influence of the Party over the - self-government of the municipal units.” (USA-255, PS-3163) - -Hess was an active supporter of Hitler’s aggressive policy. The Crimes -against Peace committed by him are dealt with in sufficient detail in -the Judgment. The mission undertaken by Hess in flying to England should -be considered as the last of these crimes, as it was undertaken in the -hope of facilitating the realization of aggression against the Soviet -Union by temporarily restraining England from fighting. - -The failure of this mission led to Hess’s isolation and he took no -direct part in the planning and commission of subsequent crimes of the -Hitler regime. There can be no doubt, however, that Hess did everything -possible for the preparation of these crimes. - -Hess, together with Himmler, occupied the role of creator of the SS -police organizations of German fascism which afterwards committed the -most ruthless Crimes against Humanity. The defendant clearly pointed out -the “special tasks” which faced the SS formations in occupied -territories. - -When the Waffen SS was being formed Hess issued a special order through -the Party Chancellery which made aiding the conscription of Party -members into these organizations by all means compulsory for Party -organs. He outlined the tasks set before the Waffen SS as follows: - -“The units of the Waffen SS composed of National Socialists are more -suitable than other armed units _for the specific tasks to be solved in -the occupied Eastern territories_ due to the intensive training in -regard to questions of race and nationality” (GB-267, PS-3245). - -As early as 1934 the defendant initiated a proposal that the so-called -SD under the Reichsführer SS (Security Service) be given extraordinary -powers and thus become the leading force in Nazi Germany. - -On 9 June 1934 Hess issued a decree in accordance with which the -“Security Service of the Reichsführer SS” was declared to be the “sole -political news and defense service of the Party” (GB-257). - -Thus the defendant played a direct part in the creation and -consolidation of the system of special police organs which were being -prepared for the commission of crimes in occupied territories. - -We find Hess to have always been an advocate of the man-hating “master -race” theory. In a speech made on 16 January 1937 while speaking of the -education of the German Nation, Hess pointed out: “_Thus, they are being -educated to put Germans above the subjects of a foreign nation_, -regardless of their positions or their origin” (GB-253, PS-3124). - -Hess signed the so-called “Law for the Protection of Blood and Honor” on -15 September 1935 (USA-200, PS-3179). The body of this law states that -“the Führer’s deputy is authorized to issue all necessary decrees and -directives” for the practical realization of the “Nuremberg decrees”. - -On 14 November 1935, Hess issued an ordinance under the Reich -citizenship law in accordance with which the Jews were denied the right -to vote at elections or hold public office (GB-258, PS-1417). - -On 20 May 1938 a decree signed by Hess extended the Nuremberg laws to -Austria (GB-259, PS-2124). - -On 12 October 1939 Hess signed a decree creating the administration of -Polish occupied territories (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, No. 210, 1939, p. -2077). Article 2 of this decree gave the Defendant Frank the power of -dictator. - -There is sufficiently convincing evidence showing that this defendant -did not limit himself to this general directive which introduced into -the occupied Polish territories a regime of unbridled terror. As is -shown in the letter of the Reichsminister of Justice to the Chief of the -Reich Chancellery dated 17 April 1941, Hess was the initiator in the -formation of special “penal laws” for Poles and Jews in occupied Eastern -territories. The role of this defendant in the drawing up of these -“laws” is characterized by the Minister of Justice in the following -words: - - “In accordance with the opinion of the Führer’s deputy I started - from the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible to the - infliction of ordinary punishment . . . . Under these new kinds - of punishment, prisoners are to be lodged outside prisons in - camps and are to be forced to do heavy and heaviest labor - . . . . The introduction of corporal punishment, which the - deputy of the Führer has brought up for discussion has not been - included in the draft. I can not agree to this type of - punishment . . . . The procedure for enforcing prosecution has - been abrogated, for it seemed intolerable that Poles or Jews - should be able to instigate a public indictment. Poles and Jews - have also been deprived of the right to prosecute in their own - names or join the public prosecution in an action . . . . From - the very beginning it was intended to intensify special - treatment in case of need: When this necessity became actual a - supplementary decree was issued to which the Führer’s deputy - refers to in his letter . . . .” (GB-268, R-96) - -Thus, there can be no doubt that Hess together with the other major war -criminals is guilty of Crimes against Humanity. - -Taking into consideration that among political leaders of Hitlerite -Germany Hess was third in significance and played a decisive role in the -crimes of the Nazi regime, I consider the only justified sentence in his -case can be death. - - - V. _Incorrect Judgment with regard to the Reich Cabinet_ - -The Prosecution has posed before the Tribunal the question of declaring -the Reich Cabinet a criminal organization. The verdict rejects the claim -of the Prosecution, unfoundedly refusing to declare the Hitler -Government a criminal organization. - -With such a decision I cannot agree. - -The Tribunal considers it proven that the Hitlerites have committed -innumerable and monstrous crimes. - -The Tribunal also considers it proven that these crimes were as a rule -committed intentionally and on an organized scale, according to -previously prepared plans and directives (“Plan Barbarossa”, “Night and -Fog”, “Bullet”, etc.). - -The Tribunal has declared criminal several of the Nazi mass -organizations founded for the realization and putting into practice the -plans of the Hitler Government. - -In view of this it appears particularly untenable and rationally -incorrect to refuse to declare the Reich Cabinet the directing organ of -the State with a direct and active role in the working out of the -criminal enterprises, a criminal organization. The members of this -directing staff had great power, each headed an appropriate Government -agency, each participated in preparing and realizing the Nazi program. - -In confirmation it is deemed proper to cite several facts: - -1. Immediately after the Nazi accession to power—on 24 March -1933—there was a law passed entitled “The Law of Defense of the People -and the State” whereby the Reich Cabinet, besides the Reichstag, was -empowered to enact new laws. - -On 26 May 1933 the Reich Government issued a decree ordering the -confiscation of the property of all Communist organizations and on 14 -June, the same year, it also confiscated the property of the Social -Democrat organizations. On 1 December 1933 the Reich Government issued -the law “Ensuring Party and State Unity”. - -Following through its program of liquidating democratic institutions, in -1934 the Government passed a law of the “Reconstruction of the Reich” -whereby democratic elections were abolished for both central and local -representative bodies. The Reichstag thereby became an institution -without functional meaning. (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 22 November -1945) - -By the law of 7 April 1933 and others, all Reich Government employees, -including judges, ever noted for any anti-Nazi tendencies or ever having -belonged to leftist organizations, as well as all Jews, were to be -removed from the Government service and replaced by Nazis. In accordance -with the “Basic Positions of the German Law on Government Employees” of -26 January 1937, “the inner harmony of the official and the Nazi Party -is a necessary presupposition of his appointment to his post . . . . -Government employees must be the executors of the will of the National -Socialist State, directed by the NSDAP.” (Defense Document Number 28) - -On 1 May 1934 there was created the Ministry of Education instructed to -train students in the spirit of militarism, of racial hatred, and in -terms of reality thoroughly falsified by Nazi ideology (PS-2078). - -Free trade unions were abolished, their property confiscated, and the -majority of the leaders jailed. - -To suppress even a semblance of resistance the Government created the -Gestapo and the concentration camps. Without any trial or even a -concrete charge hundreds of thousands of persons were arrested and then -done away with merely on a suspicion of an anti-Nazi tendency. - -There were issued the so-called “Nuremberg Laws” against the Jews. Hess -and Frick, both members of the Reich Government, implemented these by -additional decrees. - -It was the activity of the Reich Cabinet that brought on the war which -took millions of human lives and caused inestimable damage in property -and in suffering borne by the many Nations. - -On 4 February 1938, Hitler organized the Secret Council of Ministers -defining its activity as follows: “To aid me by advice on problems of -foreign policies I am creating this Secret Council” -(_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, p. 112, PS-2031). The foreign policy -of the Hitler Government was the policy of aggression. For this reason -the members of the Secret Council should be held responsible for this -policy. There were attempts in Court to represent the Secret Council as -a fictitious organization, never actually functioning. This however is -an inadmissible position. It is sufficient to recall Rosenberg’s letter -to Hitler where the former insistently tried to be appointed member of -the Secret Council of Ministers—to appreciate fully the significance of -the Council. - -Even more important practically in conducting aggressive warfare was the -Reich Defense Council headed by Hitler and Göring. The following were -members of the Defense Council, as is well known: Hess, Frick, Funk, -Keitel, Raeder, Lammers (PS-2194; PS-2018). - -Göring characterized the function of the Defense Council and its role in -war preparations as follows, during the Court session of 23 June 1939: -“The Defense Council of the Reich _was the deciding Reich organ on all -questions concerning preparation for war_“ (PS-3787, USA-782). - -At the same time Göring emphasized the fact that “the meeting of the -Defense Council always took place for the purpose of making the most -important decisions”. From the minutes of these meetings, submitted as -evidence by the Prosecution, it is quite clear that the Council made -very important decisions indeed. The minutes also show that other -Cabinet Ministers sometimes took part in the meetings of the Defense -Council alongside the members of the Council when war enterprises and -war preparedness were discussed. - -For example, the following Cabinet Ministers took part in the meeting of -23 June 1939: of Labor, of Food and Agriculture, of Finance, of -Communication, and a number of others, while the minutes of the meeting -were sent to all the members of the Cabinet (USA-782). - -The verdict of the Tribunal justly points out certain peculiarities of -the Hitler Government as the directing organ of the State, namely: the -absence of regular cabinet meetings, the occasional issuance of laws by -the individual Ministers having unusual independence of action, the -tremendous personal power of Hitler himself. These peculiarities do not -refute but on the contrary further confirm the conclusion that the -Hitler Government is not an ordinary rank and file cabinet but a -criminal organization. - -Certainly Hitler had an unusual measure of personal power but this in no -way frees of responsibility the members of his Cabinet who were his -convinced followers and the actual executors of his program until and -when the day of reckoning arrived. - -I consider that there is every reason to declare the Hitler Government a -criminal organization. - - - VI. _Incorrect Judgment with regard to the General Staff - and the OKW_ - -The verdict incorrectly rejects the accusation of criminal activity -directed against the General Staff and the OKW. - -The rejection of the accusation of criminal activity of the General -Staff and of the OKW contradicts both the actual situation and the -evidence submitted in the course of the Trial. - -It has been established beyond doubt that the Leadership Corps of the -Armed Forces of Nazi Germany, together with the SS-Party machine, -represented the most important agency in preparing and realizing the -Nazi aggressive and man-hating program. This was constantly and -forcefully reiterated by the Hitlerites themselves in their official -bulletins meant for the officer personnel of the armed forces. In the -Nazi Party bulletin called “Politics and the Officer in the III Reich” -it is quite clearly stated that the Nazi regime is founded on - - “. . . two pillars: the Party and the Armed Forces. Both are - forms of expression of the same philosophy of life . . . the - tasks before the Party and the Armed Forces are in an organic - relationship to each other and each bears the same - responsibility . . . both these agencies depend on each other’s - success or failure.” (PS-4060, USA-928) - -This organic inter-relationship between the Nazi Party and the SS on the -one hand and the Nazi Armed Forces on the other hand, was particularly -evident among the upper circles of military hierarchy which the -Indictment groups together under the concept of criminal -organization—that is, among the members of the General Staff and the -OKW. - -The very selection of members of the Supreme Command of the Army in Nazi -Germany was based on the criteria of their loyalty to the regime and -their readiness not to pursue aggressive militaristic policies but also -to fulfill such special directives as related to treatment meted out to -prisoners of war and to the civilian populations of occupied -territories. - -The leaders of the German Armed Forces were not merely officers who -reached certain levels of the military hierarchy. They represented, -first of all, a closely-knit group which was entrusted with the most -secret plans of the Nazi leadership. Evidence submitted to the Tribunal -has fully confirmed the contention that the military leaders of Germany -justified this trust completely and that they were the convinced -followers and ardent executors of Hitler’s plans. - -It is not accidental that at the head of the Air Force stood the “second -man” of the Nazi Reich, namely Göring; that the Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy was Dönitz, subsequently designated by Hitler to be the -latter’s successor; that the command of the Ground Forces was -concentrated in the hands of Keitel who signed the major part of the -decrees concerning the execution of the prisoners of war and of the -civilians in occupied territories. - -Thus the comparisons made with the organization of the supreme commands -in Allied countries cannot be considered valid. In a democratic country, -not one self-respecting military expert would agree to prepare plans for -mass reprisals and merciless killings of prisoners of war side by side -with plans of a purely military and strategic character. - -Meanwhile it is precisely such matters that occupied the supreme command -of the General Staff and of the OKW in Nazi Germany. The commission by -them of the heaviest Crimes against Peace, of the War Crimes, and of the -Crimes against Humanity is not denied but is particularly emphasized in -the verdict of the Tribunal. And yet the commission of these crimes has -not brought the logical conclusion. - -The verdict states: “They have been a disgrace to the honorable -profession of arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive -ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and -sterile . . . .” - -And subsequently: - - “Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier’s oath of - obedience to military orders. When it suits their defense they - say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler’s brutal - crimes, which are shown to have been within their general - knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively - participated in all these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, - witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more - shocking than the world ever had the misfortune to know. This - must be said.” - -All these assertions in the verdict are correct and are based on -numerous and reliable depositions. It remains only incomprehensible why -“these hundred or so higher officers” who have caused the world and -their own country so much suffering should not be acknowledged a -criminal organization. - -The verdict advances the following reasons for the decision, reasons -quite contradictory to the facts: - -a) That the crimes were committed by representatives of the General -Staff and of the OKW as private individuals and not as members of a -criminal conspiracy. - -b) That the General Staff and the OKW were merely weapons in the hands -of the conspirators and interpreters or executors of the conspirators’ -will. - -Considerable evidence disputes such conclusions. - -1. _The leading representatives of the General Staff and of the OKW, -along with a small circle of the higher Hitlerite officials, were called -upon by the conspirators to participate in the development and the -realization of the plans of aggression, not as passive functionaries, -but as active participants in the conspiracy against peace and -humanity._ - -Without their advice and active cooperation, Hitler could not have -solved these problems. - -In the majority of cases their opinion was decisive. It is impossible to -imagine how the aggressive plans of Hitler’s Germany could have been -realized had it not been for the full support given him by the leading -staff members of the armed forces. - -Least of all did Hitler conceal his criminal plans and motivations from -the leaders of the High Command. - -For instance, while preparing for the attack on Poland, as early as 29 -May 1939, at a conference with the high military commanders of the new -Reich Chancellery, he stated: - - “For us the matter consists of the expansion of ‘Lebensraum’ to - the East. Thus the question of sparing Poland cannot be - considered, and, instead, we have to consider the decision to - attack Poland at the first opportunity.” (L-79) - -Long before the seizure of Czechoslovakia, in a directive of 30 May -1938, Hitler, addressing the representatives of the High Command, -cynically stated: “From the military and political point of view, the -most favorable time is a lightning attack on the basis of some incident, -by which Germany will have been strongly provoked and which will morally -justify the military measures to at least part of the world opinion” -(PS-388). - -Prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia, in a directive dated 27 March 1941, -addressing the representatives of the High Command, Hitler wrote: “Even -if Yugoslavia declares its loyalty, it must be considered an enemy and -must, therefore, be smashed as soon as possible” (PS-1746). - -While preparing for the invasion of the U.S.S.R., Hitler invited the -representatives of the General Staff and the OKW to help him work out -the related plans and directives not at all as simply the military -experts. - -In the instructions to apply propaganda in the region “Barbarossa”, -issued by the OKW in June 1941, it is pointed out that: “For the time we -should not have propaganda directed at the dismemberment of the Soviet -Union” (USSR-477). - -As early as 13 May 1941, OKW ordered the troops to use any terrorist -measures against the civilian populations of the temporarily occupied -regions of the Soviet Union. - -And the same order read: “To confirm only such sentences as are in -accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.” (G-50.) - -2. _OKW and the General Staff issued the most brutal decrees and orders -for relentless measures against the unarmed peaceful population and the -prisoners of war._ - -In the decree of special liability to punishment in the region -“Barbarossa” while preparing for the attack upon the Soviet Union, the -OKW abolished beforehand the jurisdiction of the military courts, -granting the right of repressions over the peaceful population to -individual officers and soldiers. - -It is particularly stated there that: - - “Crimes of hostile civilians are excluded from the jurisdiction - of the courts martial, . . . Suspected elements must be - immediately delivered to the officer. The latter will decide - whether they should be shot . . . it is absolutely forbidden to - hold suspects for the purpose of bringing them to trial.” - -There are also provisions for “the most extreme measures, and, in -particular, ‘measures for mass violence’, if circumstances do not permit -the rapid detection of the guilty.” - -In the same decree of the OKW the guarantee of impunity was assured in -advance to the military criminals from the service personnel of the -German Army. It states there as follows: “The bringing of suits of -actions, committed by officials of the Army and by the service personnel -against hostile civilians is not obligatory even in cases where such -actions at the same time constitute military crimes or offenses . . . .” - -In the course of the war the High Command consistently followed this -policy, increasing its terroristic actions with regard to prisoners of -war and the peaceful populations of occupied countries. - -The OKW directive of 16 September 1941, states: “At the same time, it -must be borne in mind that a human life in the countries in question is -frequently held to be of no account and that a warning example can be -made only by measures of exceptional severity” (PS-389). - -Addressing the commanders of the army groups on 23 July 1941, the OKW -simply briefed them as follows: “It is not in the demand for additional -security detachments, but in the application of appropriate draconic -measures that the commanding officers must use to keep order in the -regions under their jurisdiction” (PS-459). - -The OKW directive of 16 December 1941, states: “The troops . . . have -the right and are obliged to apply . . . any measures whatsoever _also -against women and children_ if this contributes to success . . . .” -(USSR-16). - -Among the most brutal OKW directives concerning the treatment of -prisoners of war one must consider the order entitled “Kugel (bullet)”. -The reasons for resorting to capital punishment for prisoners of war -were offenses, which according to international conventions, generally -should not carry any punishment (for example, escape from the camp). - -Another order, “Nacht und Nebel”, states: - - “Penalty for such offenses, consisting of loss of freedom and - even a life sentence is a sign of weakness. Only death sentence - or measures which entail ignorance of the fate of the guilty by - local population will achieve real effectiveness.” (L-90, - USA-224; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 25 January 1946) - -In the course of the present Trial a great deal of evidence of -application of the “Kugel” order has been submitted. One of the examples -of this kind of crime is the murder of 50 officer-pilots. The fact that -this crime was inspired by the High Command cannot be doubted. - -OKW also distributed an order for the destruction of the “commando” -units. The original order was submitted to the Court (PS-498, USA-501). -According to this order officers and soldiers of the “commando” units -had to be shot, except in cases when they were to be questioned, after -which they were shot in any case. - -These orders were unswervingly carried out by the commanding officers of -Army units. In June 1944 Rundstedt, the Commander-in-Chief of the German -troops in the West, reported that Hitler’s order in regard to “the -treatment of the ‘commando’ groups of the enemy is still being carried -out” (PS-531, USA-550). - -3. _The High Command, along with the SS and the Police, is guilty of the -most brutal police actions in the occupied regions._ - -The instructions relating to special regions, issued by OKW on 13 March -1941, contemplated the necessity of synchronizing the activities in -occupied territories between the army command and the Reichsführer of -the SS. As is seen from the testimony of the chief of the 3d Department -of RSHA and who was concurrently chief of the Einsatzgruppe “D”, Otto -Ohlendorf, and of the chief of the VI Department of RSHA, Walter -Schellenberg, in accordance with OKW instructions there was an agreement -made between the General Staff and the RSHA about the organization of -special “operational groups” of the Security Police and -SD—“Einsatzgruppen”, assigned to the appropriate army detachments. - -Crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen on the territory of the -temporarily occupied regions are countless. The Einsatzgruppen were -acting in close contact with the commanding officers of the appropriate -army groups. - -The following excerpt from the report of Einsatzgruppe “A” is extremely -characteristic as evidence: - - “. . . among our functions as the establishment of personal - liaison with the commanding officer both at the front and in the - rear. It must be pointed out that the relations with the army - were of the best, in some cases very close, almost hearty, as, - for instance, the commander of the tank group, Colonel-General - Hoppner” (L-180). - -4. _The representatives of the High Command acted in all the echelons of -the army, as members of a criminal group._ - -The directives of the OKW and the General Staff, in spite of the -manifest violations of international law and customs of warfare, not -only did not provoke any protest on the part of the higher staff -officers of the command of the various groups of the armies but were: -inflexibly applied and supplemented by still more cruel orders in the -development of such directives. - -In this connection it is characteristic to note the directive of -Fieldmarshal Von Reichenau, army group commander, addressed to his -soldiers: “The soldier in the eastern territories is not only a warrior -skilled in the art of warfare but a bearer of a merciless national -ideology.” And elsewhere, calling for the extermination of the Jews, Von -Reichenau wrote: “Thus the soldier must be in full cognizance of the -necessity for harsh and just revenge on those sub-humans, the Jews” -(USA-556). - -As another, example the order of Fieldmarshal Von Mannstein addressed to -his soldiers can be referred to. On the basis of the “political aims of -the war” the Fieldmarshal cynically appealed to his soldiers to wage the -war in violation of the “recognized laws of warfare in Europe” -(USA-927). - -Thus, in the course of the hearing of evidence it has been proven -beyond, all, doubt, that the General Staff and the High Command of the -Hitlerite Army comprised a highly dangerous criminal organization. - - * * * * - -I consider it my duty as a Judge to draw up my dissenting opinion -concerning those important questions on which I disagree with, the -decision adopted by the members of the Tribunal, - - Soviet Member, International Military Tribunal, - Major General Jurisprudence. - - /s/ I. T. Nikitchenko - -1 October 1946 - - - - - SENTENCES - - -In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter, the President of the -International Military Tribunal, at its concluding session of 1 October -1946, pronounced the sentence on the defendants convicted on the -Indictment: - -“Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring, on the Counts of the Indictment on -which you have been convicted, the International Military Tribunal -sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Rudolf Hess, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to imprisonment for -life. - -“Defendant Joachim von Ribbentrop, on the Counts of the Indictment on -which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by -hanging. - -“Defendant Wilhelm Keitel, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner, on the Counts of the Indictment on which -you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, on the Counts of the Indictment on which -you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Hans Frank, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you have -been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Wilhelm Frick, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Julius Streicher, on the Count of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Walter Funk, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to imprisonment for -life. - -“Defendant Karl Dönitz, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 10 years’ -imprisonment. - -“Defendant Erich Raeder, on the Counts of the indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to imprisonment for -life. - -“Defendant Baldur Von Schirach, on the Count of the Indictment on which -you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 20 years’ -imprisonment. - -“Defendant Fritz Sauckel, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Alfred Jodl, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging. - -“Defendant Arthur Seyss-Inquart, on the Counts of the Indictment on -which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by -hanging. - -“Defendant Albert Speer, on the Counts of the Indictment on which you -have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 20 years’ -imprisonment. - -“Defendant Constantin von Neurath, on the Counts of the Indictment on -which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 15 years’ -imprisonment. - -“The Tribunal sentences the Defendant Martin Bormann, on the Counts of -the Indictment on which he has been convicted, to death by hanging.” - - Tabulation of Sentences - 30th September 1946[20] - - Defendant Counts on Sentence - which - convicted - HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - RUDOLF HESS 1, 2 Imprisonment for life - JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - WILHELM KEITEL 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - ERNST KALTENBRUNNER 3, 4 Death by hanging - ALFRED ROSENBERG 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - HANS FRANK 3, 4 Death by hanging - WILHELM FRICK 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - JULIUS STREICHER 4 Death by hanging - WALTER FUNK 2, 3, 4 Imprisonment for life - HJALMAR SCHACHT Not guilty - KARL DÖNITZ 2, 3 Ten years’ imprisonment - ERICH RAEDER 1, 2, 3 Imprisonment for life - BALDUR VON SCHIRACH 4 Twenty years’ - imprisonment - FRITZ SAUCKEL 3, 4 Death by hanging - ALFRED JODL 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - FRANZ VON PAPEN Not guilty - ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging - ALBERT SPEER 3, 4 Twenty years’ - imprisonment - CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH 1, 2, 3, 4 Fifteen years’ - imprisonment - HANS FRITZSCHE Not guilty - MARTIN BORMANN 3, 4 Death by hanging - -/s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE, President -/s/ FRANCIS BIDDLE A TRUE COPY -/s/ H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES /s/ JOHN E. RAY -/s/ NIKITCHENKO Colonel, FA - ------ - -[20] These sentences were read in open court by the President on 1 -October 1946. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - - -Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document -depending on the author. Multiple occurrences of the following spellings -which differ and are found throughout the book are as follows: - - cooperate co-operate - fifh column fifth-column - gas wagons gas-wagons - peace time peace-time - Nazi dominated Nazi-dominated - Reichsführer SS Reichsführer-SS - Major General Major-General - Brigadier General Brigadier-General - Governor General Governor-General - Government General Government-General - -An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as -possible to the original document's presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 1)_, -by Various.] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS NUREMBURG *** - -***** This file should be named 51292-0.txt or 51292-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/2/9/51292/ - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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