summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/51183-h/51183-h.htm
blob: faf2a3a8865084998e2a8848d74879db45a974eb (plain) 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
1370
1371
1372
1373
1374
1375
1376
1377
1378
1379
1380
1381
1382
1383
1384
1385
1386
1387
1388
1389
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396
1397
1398
1399
1400
1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
1410
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
1439
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457
1458
1459
1460
1461
1462
1463
1464
1465
1466
1467
1468
1469
1470
1471
1472
1473
1474
1475
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
1484
1485
1486
1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493
1494
1495
1496
1497
1498
1499
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
1513
1514
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
1524
1525
1526
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
1539
1540
1541
1542
1543
1544
1545
1546
1547
1548
1549
1550
1551
1552
1553
1554
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620
1621
1622
1623
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
1633
1634
1635
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1688
1689
1690
1691
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
1700
1701
1702
1703
1704
1705
1706
1707
1708
1709
1710
1711
1712
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068
2069
2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
2083
2084
2085
2086
2087
2088
2089
2090
2091
2092
2093
2094
2095
2096
2097
2098
2099
2100
2101
2102
2103
2104
2105
2106
2107
2108
2109
2110
2111
2112
2113
2114
2115
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124
2125
2126
2127
2128
2129
2130
2131
2132
2133
2134
2135
2136
2137
2138
2139
2140
2141
2142
2143
2144
2145
2146
2147
2148
2149
2150
2151
2152
2153
2154
2155
2156
2157
2158
2159
2160
2161
2162
2163
2164
2165
2166
2167
2168
2169
2170
2171
2172
2173
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180
2181
2182
2183
2184
2185
2186
2187
2188
2189
2190
2191
2192
2193
2194
2195
2196
2197
2198
2199
2200
2201
2202
2203
2204
2205
2206
2207
2208
2209
2210
2211
2212
2213
2214
2215
2216
2217
2218
2219
2220
2221
2222
2223
2224
2225
2226
2227
2228
2229
2230
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236
2237
2238
2239
2240
2241
2242
2243
2244
2245
2246
2247
2248
2249
2250
2251
2252
2253
2254
2255
2256
2257
2258
2259
2260
2261
2262
2263
2264
2265
2266
2267
2268
2269
2270
2271
2272
2273
2274
2275
2276
2277
2278
2279
2280
2281
2282
2283
2284
2285
2286
2287
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292
2293
2294
2295
2296
2297
2298
2299
2300
2301
2302
2303
2304
2305
2306
2307
2308
2309
2310
2311
2312
2313
2314
2315
2316
2317
2318
2319
2320
2321
2322
2323
2324
2325
2326
2327
2328
2329
2330
2331
2332
2333
2334
2335
2336
2337
2338
2339
2340
2341
2342
2343
2344
2345
2346
2347
2348
2349
2350
2351
2352
2353
2354
2355
2356
2357
2358
2359
2360
2361
2362
2363
2364
2365
2366
2367
2368
2369
2370
2371
2372
2373
2374
2375
2376
2377
2378
2379
2380
2381
2382
2383
2384
2385
2386
2387
2388
2389
2390
2391
2392
2393
2394
2395
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409
2410
2411
2412
2413
2414
2415
2416
2417
2418
2419
2420
2421
2422
2423
2424
2425
2426
2427
2428
2429
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
2436
2437
2438
2439
2440
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
2449
2450
2451
2452
2453
2454
2455
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460
2461
2462
2463
2464
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
2471
2472
2473
2474
2475
2476
2477
2478
2479
2480
2481
2482
2483
2484
2485
2486
2487
2488
2489
2490
2491
2492
2493
2494
2495
2496
2497
2498
2499
2500
2501
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
2510
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516
2517
2518
2519
2520
2521
2522
2523
2524
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
2534
2535
2536
2537
2538
2539
2540
2541
2542
2543
2544
2545
2546
2547
2548
2549
2550
2551
2552
2553
2554
2555
2556
2557
2558
2559
2560
2561
2562
2563
2564
2565
2566
2567
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572
2573
2574
2575
2576
2577
2578
2579
2580
2581
2582
2583
2584
2585
2586
2587
2588
2589
2590
2591
2592
2593
2594
2595
2596
2597
2598
2599
2600
2601
2602
2603
2604
2605
2606
2607
2608
2609
2610
2611
2612
2613
2614
2615
2616
2617
2618
2619
2620
2621
2622
2623
2624
2625
2626
2627
2628
2629
2630
2631
2632
2633
2634
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639
2640
2641
2642
2643
2644
2645
2646
2647
2648
2649
2650
2651
2652
2653
2654
2655
2656
2657
2658
2659
2660
2661
2662
2663
2664
2665
2666
2667
2668
2669
2670
2671
2672
2673
2674
2675
2676
2677
2678
2679
2680
2681
2682
2683
2684
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
2690
2691
2692
2693
2694
2695
2696
2697
2698
2699
2700
2701
2702
2703
2704
2705
2706
2707
2708
2709
2710
2711
2712
2713
2714
2715
2716
2717
2718
2719
2720
2721
2722
2723
2724
2725
2726
2727
2728
2729
2730
2731
2732
2733
2734
2735
2736
2737
2738
2739
2740
2741
2742
2743
2744
2745
2746
2747
2748
2749
2750
2751
2752
2753
2754
2755
2756
2757
2758
2759
2760
2761
2762
2763
2764
2765
2766
2767
2768
2769
2770
2771
2772
2773
2774
2775
2776
2777
2778
2779
2780
2781
2782
2783
2784
2785
2786
2787
2788
2789
2790
2791
2792
2793
2794
2795
2796
2797
2798
2799
2800
2801
2802
2803
2804
2805
2806
2807
2808
2809
2810
2811
2812
2813
2814
2815
2816
2817
2818
2819
2820
2821
2822
2823
2824
2825
2826
2827
2828
2829
2830
2831
2832
2833
2834
2835
2836
2837
2838
2839
2840
2841
2842
2843
2844
2845
2846
2847
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852
2853
2854
2855
2856
2857
2858
2859
2860
2861
2862
2863
2864
2865
2866
2867
2868
2869
2870
2871
2872
2873
2874
2875
2876
2877
2878
2879
2880
2881
2882
2883
2884
2885
2886
2887
2888
2889
2890
2891
2892
2893
2894
2895
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
2901
2902
2903
2904
2905
2906
2907
2908
2909
2910
2911
2912
2913
2914
2915
2916
2917
2918
2919
2920
2921
2922
2923
2924
2925
2926
2927
2928
2929
2930
2931
2932
2933
2934
2935
2936
2937
2938
2939
2940
2941
2942
2943
2944
2945
2946
2947
2948
2949
2950
2951
2952
2953
2954
2955
2956
2957
2958
2959
2960
2961
2962
2963
2964
2965
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
2971
2972
2973
2974
2975
2976
2977
2978
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
2984
2985
2986
2987
2988
2989
2990
2991
2992
2993
2994
2995
2996
2997
2998
2999
3000
3001
3002
3003
3004
3005
3006
3007
3008
3009
3010
3011
3012
3013
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
3023
3024
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
3031
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
3041
3042
3043
3044
3045
3046
3047
3048
3049
3050
3051
3052
3053
3054
3055
3056
3057
3058
3059
3060
3061
3062
3063
3064
3065
3066
3067
3068
3069
3070
3071
3072
3073
3074
3075
3076
3077
3078
3079
3080
3081
3082
3083
3084
3085
3086
3087
3088
3089
3090
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
3097
3098
3099
3100
3101
3102
3103
3104
3105
3106
3107
3108
3109
3110
3111
3112
3113
3114
3115
3116
3117
3118
3119
3120
3121
3122
3123
3124
3125
3126
3127
3128
3129
3130
3131
3132
3133
3134
3135
3136
3137
3138
3139
3140
3141
3142
3143
3144
3145
3146
3147
3148
3149
3150
3151
3152
3153
3154
3155
3156
3157
3158
3159
3160
3161
3162
3163
3164
3165
3166
3167
3168
3169
3170
3171
3172
3173
3174
3175
3176
3177
3178
3179
3180
3181
3182
3183
3184
3185
3186
3187
3188
3189
3190
3191
3192
3193
3194
3195
3196
3197
3198
3199
3200
3201
3202
3203
3204
3205
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
3211
3212
3213
3214
3215
3216
3217
3218
3219
3220
3221
3222
3223
3224
3225
3226
3227
3228
3229
3230
3231
3232
3233
3234
3235
3236
3237
3238
3239
3240
3241
3242
3243
3244
3245
3246
3247
3248
3249
3250
3251
3252
3253
3254
3255
3256
3257
3258
3259
3260
3261
3262
3263
3264
3265
3266
3267
3268
3269
3270
3271
3272
3273
3274
3275
3276
3277
3278
3279
3280
3281
3282
3283
3284
3285
3286
3287
3288
3289
3290
3291
3292
3293
3294
3295
3296
3297
3298
3299
3300
3301
3302
3303
3304
3305
3306
3307
3308
3309
3310
3311
3312
3313
3314
3315
3316
3317
3318
3319
3320
3321
3322
3323
3324
3325
3326
3327
3328
3329
3330
3331
3332
3333
3334
3335
3336
3337
3338
3339
3340
3341
3342
3343
3344
3345
3346
3347
3348
3349
3350
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355
3356
3357
3358
3359
3360
3361
3362
3363
3364
3365
3366
3367
3368
3369
3370
3371
3372
3373
3374
3375
3376
3377
3378
3379
3380
3381
3382
3383
3384
3385
3386
3387
3388
3389
3390
3391
3392
3393
3394
3395
3396
3397
3398
3399
3400
3401
3402
3403
3404
3405
3406
3407
3408
3409
3410
3411
3412
3413
3414
3415
3416
3417
3418
3419
3420
3421
3422
3423
3424
3425
3426
3427
3428
3429
3430
3431
3432
3433
3434
3435
3436
3437
3438
3439
3440
3441
3442
3443
3444
3445
3446
3447
3448
3449
3450
3451
3452
3453
3454
3455
3456
3457
3458
3459
3460
3461
3462
3463
3464
3465
3466
3467
3468
3469
3470
3471
3472
3473
3474
3475
3476
3477
3478
3479
3480
3481
3482
3483
3484
3485
3486
3487
3488
3489
3490
3491
3492
3493
3494
3495
3496
3497
3498
3499
3500
3501
3502
3503
3504
3505
3506
3507
3508
3509
3510
3511
3512
3513
3514
3515
3516
3517
3518
3519
3520
3521
3522
3523
3524
3525
3526
3527
3528
3529
3530
3531
3532
3533
3534
3535
3536
3537
3538
3539
3540
3541
3542
3543
3544
3545
3546
3547
3548
3549
3550
3551
3552
3553
3554
3555
3556
3557
3558
3559
3560
3561
3562
3563
3564
3565
3566
3567
3568
3569
3570
3571
3572
3573
3574
3575
3576
3577
3578
3579
3580
3581
3582
3583
3584
3585
3586
3587
3588
3589
3590
3591
3592
3593
3594
3595
3596
3597
3598
3599
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
3609
3610
3611
3612
3613
3614
3615
3616
3617
3618
3619
3620
3621
3622
3623
3624
3625
3626
3627
3628
3629
3630
3631
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636
3637
3638
3639
3640
3641
3642
3643
3644
3645
3646
3647
3648
3649
3650
3651
3652
3653
3654
3655
3656
3657
3658
3659
3660
3661
3662
3663
3664
3665
3666
3667
3668
3669
3670
3671
3672
3673
3674
3675
3676
3677
3678
3679
3680
3681
3682
3683
3684
3685
3686
3687
3688
3689
3690
3691
3692
3693
3694
3695
3696
3697
3698
3699
3700
3701
3702
3703
3704
3705
3706
3707
3708
3709
3710
3711
3712
3713
3714
3715
3716
3717
3718
3719
3720
3721
3722
3723
3724
3725
3726
3727
3728
3729
3730
3731
3732
3733
3734
3735
3736
3737
3738
3739
3740
3741
3742
3743
3744
3745
3746
3747
3748
3749
3750
3751
3752
3753
3754
3755
3756
3757
3758
3759
3760
3761
3762
3763
3764
3765
3766
3767
3768
3769
3770
3771
3772
3773
3774
3775
3776
3777
3778
3779
3780
3781
3782
3783
3784
3785
3786
3787
3788
3789
3790
3791
3792
3793
3794
3795
3796
3797
3798
3799
3800
3801
3802
3803
3804
3805
3806
3807
3808
3809
3810
3811
3812
3813
3814
3815
3816
3817
3818
3819
3820
3821
3822
3823
3824
3825
3826
3827
3828
3829
3830
3831
3832
3833
3834
3835
3836
3837
3838
3839
3840
3841
3842
3843
3844
3845
3846
3847
3848
3849
3850
3851
3852
3853
3854
3855
3856
3857
3858
3859
3860
3861
3862
3863
3864
3865
3866
3867
3868
3869
3870
3871
3872
3873
3874
3875
3876
3877
3878
3879
3880
3881
3882
3883
3884
3885
3886
3887
3888
3889
3890
3891
3892
3893
3894
3895
3896
3897
3898
3899
3900
3901
3902
3903
3904
3905
3906
3907
3908
3909
3910
3911
3912
3913
3914
3915
3916
3917
3918
3919
3920
3921
3922
3923
3924
3925
3926
3927
3928
3929
3930
3931
3932
3933
3934
3935
3936
3937
3938
3939
3940
3941
3942
3943
3944
3945
3946
3947
3948
3949
3950
3951
3952
3953
3954
3955
3956
3957
3958
3959
3960
3961
3962
3963
3964
3965
3966
3967
3968
3969
3970
3971
3972
3973
3974
3975
3976
3977
3978
3979
3980
3981
3982
3983
3984
3985
3986
3987
3988
3989
3990
3991
3992
3993
3994
3995
3996
3997
3998
3999
4000
4001
4002
4003
4004
4005
4006
4007
4008
4009
4010
4011
4012
4013
4014
4015
4016
4017
4018
4019
4020
4021
4022
4023
4024
4025
4026
4027
4028
4029
4030
4031
4032
4033
4034
4035
4036
4037
4038
4039
4040
4041
4042
4043
4044
4045
4046
4047
4048
4049
4050
4051
4052
4053
4054
4055
4056
4057
4058
4059
4060
4061
4062
4063
4064
4065
4066
4067
4068
4069
4070
4071
4072
4073
4074
4075
4076
4077
4078
4079
4080
4081
4082
4083
4084
4085
4086
4087
4088
4089
4090
4091
4092
4093
4094
4095
4096
4097
4098
4099
4100
4101
4102
4103
4104
4105
4106
4107
4108
4109
4110
4111
4112
4113
4114
4115
4116
4117
4118
4119
4120
4121
4122
4123
4124
4125
4126
4127
4128
4129
4130
4131
4132
4133
4134
4135
4136
4137
4138
4139
4140
4141
4142
4143
4144
4145
4146
4147
4148
4149
4150
4151
4152
4153
4154
4155
4156
4157
4158
4159
4160
4161
4162
4163
4164
4165
4166
4167
4168
4169
4170
4171
4172
4173
4174
4175
4176
4177
4178
4179
4180
4181
4182
4183
4184
4185
4186
4187
4188
4189
4190
4191
4192
4193
4194
4195
4196
4197
4198
4199
4200
4201
4202
4203
4204
4205
4206
4207
4208
4209
4210
4211
4212
4213
4214
4215
4216
4217
4218
4219
4220
4221
4222
4223
4224
4225
4226
4227
4228
4229
4230
4231
4232
4233
4234
4235
4236
4237
4238
4239
4240
4241
4242
4243
4244
4245
4246
4247
4248
4249
4250
4251
4252
4253
4254
4255
4256
4257
4258
4259
4260
4261
4262
4263
4264
4265
4266
4267
4268
4269
4270
4271
4272
4273
4274
4275
4276
4277
4278
4279
4280
4281
4282
4283
4284
4285
4286
4287
4288
4289
4290
4291
4292
4293
4294
4295
4296
4297
4298
4299
4300
4301
4302
4303
4304
4305
4306
4307
4308
4309
4310
4311
4312
4313
4314
4315
4316
4317
4318
4319
4320
4321
4322
4323
4324
4325
4326
4327
4328
4329
4330
4331
4332
4333
4334
4335
4336
4337
4338
4339
4340
4341
4342
4343
4344
4345
4346
4347
4348
4349
4350
4351
4352
4353
4354
4355
4356
4357
4358
4359
4360
4361
4362
4363
4364
4365
4366
4367
4368
4369
4370
4371
4372
4373
4374
4375
4376
4377
4378
4379
4380
4381
4382
4383
4384
4385
4386
4387
4388
4389
4390
4391
4392
4393
4394
4395
4396
4397
4398
4399
4400
4401
4402
4403
4404
4405
4406
4407
4408
4409
4410
4411
4412
4413
4414
4415
4416
4417
4418
4419
4420
4421
4422
4423
4424
4425
4426
4427
4428
4429
4430
4431
4432
4433
4434
4435
4436
4437
4438
4439
4440
4441
4442
4443
4444
4445
4446
4447
4448
4449
4450
4451
4452
4453
4454
4455
4456
4457
4458
4459
4460
4461
4462
4463
4464
4465
4466
4467
4468
4469
4470
4471
4472
4473
4474
4475
4476
4477
4478
4479
4480
4481
4482
4483
4484
4485
4486
4487
4488
4489
4490
4491
4492
4493
4494
4495
4496
4497
4498
4499
4500
4501
4502
4503
4504
4505
4506
4507
4508
4509
4510
4511
4512
4513
4514
4515
4516
4517
4518
4519
4520
4521
4522
4523
4524
4525
4526
4527
4528
4529
4530
4531
4532
4533
4534
4535
4536
4537
4538
4539
4540
4541
4542
4543
4544
4545
4546
4547
4548
4549
4550
4551
4552
4553
4554
4555
4556
4557
4558
4559
4560
4561
4562
4563
4564
4565
4566
4567
4568
4569
4570
4571
4572
4573
4574
4575
4576
4577
4578
4579
4580
4581
4582
4583
4584
4585
4586
4587
4588
4589
4590
4591
4592
4593
4594
4595
4596
4597
4598
4599
4600
4601
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4608
4609
4610
4611
4612
4613
4614
4615
4616
4617
4618
4619
4620
4621
4622
4623
4624
4625
4626
4627
4628
4629
4630
4631
4632
4633
4634
4635
4636
4637
4638
4639
4640
4641
4642
4643
4644
4645
4646
4647
4648
4649
4650
4651
4652
4653
4654
4655
4656
4657
4658
4659
4660
4661
4662
4663
4664
4665
4666
4667
4668
4669
4670
4671
4672
4673
4674
4675
4676
4677
4678
4679
4680
4681
4682
4683
4684
4685
4686
4687
4688
4689
4690
4691
4692
4693
4694
4695
4696
4697
4698
4699
4700
4701
4702
4703
4704
4705
4706
4707
4708
4709
4710
4711
4712
4713
4714
4715
4716
4717
4718
4719
4720
4721
4722
4723
4724
4725
4726
4727
4728
4729
4730
4731
4732
4733
4734
4735
4736
4737
4738
4739
4740
4741
4742
4743
4744
4745
4746
4747
4748
4749
4750
4751
4752
4753
4754
4755
4756
4757
4758
4759
4760
4761
4762
4763
4764
4765
4766
4767
4768
4769
4770
4771
4772
4773
4774
4775
4776
4777
4778
4779
4780
4781
4782
4783
4784
4785
4786
4787
4788
4789
4790
4791
4792
4793
4794
4795
4796
4797
4798
4799
4800
4801
4802
4803
4804
4805
4806
4807
4808
4809
4810
4811
4812
4813
4814
4815
4816
4817
4818
4819
4820
4821
4822
4823
4824
4825
4826
4827
4828
4829
4830
4831
4832
4833
4834
4835
4836
4837
4838
4839
4840
4841
4842
4843
4844
4845
4846
4847
4848
4849
4850
4851
4852
4853
4854
4855
4856
4857
4858
4859
4860
4861
4862
4863
4864
4865
4866
4867
4868
4869
4870
4871
4872
4873
4874
4875
4876
4877
4878
4879
4880
4881
4882
4883
4884
4885
4886
4887
4888
4889
4890
4891
4892
4893
4894
4895
4896
4897
4898
4899
4900
4901
4902
4903
4904
4905
4906
4907
4908
4909
4910
4911
4912
4913
4914
4915
4916
4917
4918
4919
4920
4921
4922
4923
4924
4925
4926
4927
4928
4929
4930
4931
4932
4933
4934
4935
4936
4937
4938
4939
4940
4941
4942
4943
4944
4945
4946
4947
4948
4949
4950
4951
4952
4953
4954
4955
4956
4957
4958
4959
4960
4961
4962
4963
4964
4965
4966
4967
4968
4969
4970
4971
4972
4973
4974
4975
4976
4977
4978
4979
4980
4981
4982
4983
4984
4985
4986
4987
4988
4989
4990
4991
4992
4993
4994
4995
4996
4997
4998
4999
5000
5001
5002
5003
5004
5005
5006
5007
5008
5009
5010
5011
5012
5013
5014
5015
5016
5017
5018
5019
5020
5021
5022
5023
5024
5025
5026
5027
5028
5029
5030
5031
5032
5033
5034
5035
5036
5037
5038
5039
5040
5041
5042
5043
5044
5045
5046
5047
5048
5049
5050
5051
5052
5053
5054
5055
5056
5057
5058
5059
5060
5061
5062
5063
5064
5065
5066
5067
5068
5069
5070
5071
5072
5073
5074
5075
5076
5077
5078
5079
5080
5081
5082
5083
5084
5085
5086
5087
5088
5089
5090
5091
5092
5093
5094
5095
5096
5097
5098
5099
5100
5101
5102
5103
5104
5105
5106
5107
5108
5109
5110
5111
5112
5113
5114
5115
5116
5117
5118
5119
5120
5121
5122
5123
5124
5125
5126
5127
5128
5129
5130
5131
5132
5133
5134
5135
5136
5137
5138
5139
5140
5141
5142
5143
5144
5145
5146
5147
5148
5149
5150
5151
5152
5153
5154
5155
5156
5157
5158
5159
5160
5161
5162
5163
5164
5165
5166
5167
5168
5169
5170
5171
5172
5173
5174
5175
5176
5177
5178
5179
5180
5181
5182
5183
5184
5185
5186
5187
5188
5189
5190
5191
5192
5193
5194
5195
5196
5197
5198
5199
5200
5201
5202
5203
5204
5205
5206
5207
5208
5209
5210
5211
5212
5213
5214
5215
5216
5217
5218
5219
5220
5221
5222
5223
5224
5225
5226
5227
5228
5229
5230
5231
5232
5233
5234
5235
5236
5237
5238
5239
5240
5241
5242
5243
5244
5245
5246
5247
5248
5249
5250
5251
5252
5253
5254
5255
5256
5257
5258
5259
5260
5261
5262
5263
5264
5265
5266
5267
5268
5269
5270
5271
5272
5273
5274
5275
5276
5277
5278
5279
5280
5281
5282
5283
5284
5285
5286
5287
5288
5289
5290
5291
5292
5293
5294
5295
5296
5297
5298
5299
5300
5301
5302
5303
5304
5305
5306
5307
5308
5309
5310
5311
5312
5313
5314
5315
5316
5317
5318
5319
5320
5321
5322
5323
5324
5325
5326
5327
5328
5329
5330
5331
5332
5333
5334
5335
5336
5337
5338
5339
5340
5341
5342
5343
5344
5345
5346
5347
5348
5349
5350
5351
5352
5353
5354
5355
5356
5357
5358
5359
5360
5361
5362
5363
5364
5365
5366
5367
5368
5369
5370
5371
5372
5373
5374
5375
5376
5377
5378
5379
5380
5381
5382
5383
5384
5385
5386
5387
5388
5389
5390
5391
5392
5393
5394
5395
5396
5397
5398
5399
5400
5401
5402
5403
5404
5405
5406
5407
5408
5409
5410
5411
5412
5413
5414
5415
5416
5417
5418
5419
5420
5421
5422
5423
5424
5425
5426
5427
5428
5429
5430
5431
5432
5433
5434
5435
5436
5437
5438
5439
5440
5441
5442
5443
5444
5445
5446
5447
5448
5449
5450
5451
5452
5453
5454
5455
5456
5457
5458
5459
5460
5461
5462
5463
5464
5465
5466
5467
5468
5469
5470
5471
5472
5473
5474
5475
5476
5477
5478
5479
5480
5481
5482
5483
5484
5485
5486
5487
5488
5489
5490
5491
5492
5493
5494
5495
5496
5497
5498
5499
5500
5501
5502
5503
5504
5505
5506
5507
5508
5509
5510
5511
5512
5513
5514
5515
5516
5517
5518
5519
5520
5521
5522
5523
5524
5525
5526
5527
5528
5529
5530
5531
5532
5533
5534
5535
5536
5537
5538
5539
5540
5541
5542
5543
5544
5545
5546
5547
5548
5549
5550
5551
5552
5553
5554
5555
5556
5557
5558
5559
5560
5561
5562
5563
5564
5565
5566
5567
5568
5569
5570
5571
5572
5573
5574
5575
5576
5577
5578
5579
5580
5581
5582
5583
5584
5585
5586
5587
5588
5589
5590
5591
5592
5593
5594
5595
5596
5597
5598
5599
5600
5601
5602
5603
5604
5605
5606
5607
5608
5609
5610
5611
5612
5613
5614
5615
5616
5617
5618
5619
5620
5621
5622
5623
5624
5625
5626
5627
5628
5629
5630
5631
5632
5633
5634
5635
5636
5637
5638
5639
5640
5641
5642
5643
5644
5645
5646
5647
5648
5649
5650
5651
5652
5653
5654
5655
5656
5657
5658
5659
5660
5661
5662
5663
5664
5665
5666
5667
5668
5669
5670
5671
5672
5673
5674
5675
5676
5677
5678
5679
5680
5681
5682
5683
5684
5685
5686
5687
5688
5689
5690
5691
5692
5693
5694
5695
5696
5697
5698
5699
5700
5701
5702
5703
5704
5705
5706
5707
5708
5709
5710
5711
5712
5713
5714
5715
5716
5717
5718
5719
5720
5721
5722
5723
5724
5725
5726
5727
5728
5729
5730
5731
5732
5733
5734
5735
5736
5737
5738
5739
5740
5741
5742
5743
5744
5745
5746
5747
5748
5749
5750
5751
5752
5753
5754
5755
5756
5757
5758
5759
5760
5761
5762
5763
5764
5765
5766
5767
5768
5769
5770
5771
5772
5773
5774
5775
5776
5777
5778
5779
5780
5781
5782
5783
5784
5785
5786
5787
5788
5789
5790
5791
5792
5793
5794
5795
5796
5797
5798
5799
5800
5801
5802
5803
5804
5805
5806
5807
5808
5809
5810
5811
5812
5813
5814
5815
5816
5817
5818
5819
5820
5821
5822
5823
5824
5825
5826
5827
5828
5829
5830
5831
5832
5833
5834
5835
5836
5837
5838
5839
5840
5841
5842
5843
5844
5845
5846
5847
5848
5849
5850
5851
5852
5853
5854
5855
5856
5857
5858
5859
5860
5861
5862
5863
5864
5865
5866
5867
5868
5869
5870
5871
5872
5873
5874
5875
5876
5877
5878
5879
5880
5881
5882
5883
5884
5885
5886
5887
5888
5889
5890
5891
5892
5893
5894
5895
5896
5897
5898
5899
5900
5901
5902
5903
5904
5905
5906
5907
5908
5909
5910
5911
5912
5913
5914
5915
5916
5917
5918
5919
5920
5921
5922
5923
5924
5925
5926
5927
5928
5929
5930
5931
5932
5933
5934
5935
5936
5937
5938
5939
5940
5941
5942
5943
5944
5945
5946
5947
5948
5949
5950
5951
5952
5953
5954
5955
5956
5957
5958
5959
5960
5961
5962
5963
5964
5965
5966
5967
5968
5969
5970
5971
5972
5973
5974
5975
5976
5977
5978
5979
5980
5981
5982
5983
5984
5985
5986
5987
5988
5989
5990
5991
5992
5993
5994
5995
5996
5997
5998
5999
6000
6001
6002
6003
6004
6005
6006
6007
6008
6009
6010
6011
6012
6013
6014
6015
6016
6017
6018
6019
6020
6021
6022
6023
6024
6025
6026
6027
6028
6029
6030
6031
6032
6033
6034
6035
6036
6037
6038
6039
6040
6041
6042
6043
6044
6045
6046
6047
6048
6049
6050
6051
6052
6053
6054
6055
6056
6057
6058
6059
6060
6061
6062
6063
6064
6065
6066
6067
6068
6069
6070
6071
6072
6073
6074
6075
6076
6077
6078
6079
6080
6081
6082
6083
6084
6085
6086
6087
6088
6089
6090
6091
6092
6093
6094
6095
6096
6097
6098
6099
6100
6101
6102
6103
6104
6105
6106
6107
6108
6109
6110
6111
6112
6113
6114
6115
6116
6117
6118
6119
6120
6121
6122
6123
6124
6125
6126
6127
6128
6129
6130
6131
6132
6133
6134
6135
6136
6137
6138
6139
6140
6141
6142
6143
6144
6145
6146
6147
6148
6149
6150
6151
6152
6153
6154
6155
6156
6157
6158
6159
6160
6161
6162
6163
6164
6165
6166
6167
6168
6169
6170
6171
6172
6173
6174
6175
6176
6177
6178
6179
6180
6181
6182
6183
6184
6185
6186
6187
6188
6189
6190
6191
6192
6193
6194
6195
6196
6197
6198
6199
6200
6201
6202
6203
6204
6205
6206
6207
6208
6209
6210
6211
6212
6213
6214
6215
6216
6217
6218
6219
6220
6221
6222
6223
6224
6225
6226
6227
6228
6229
6230
6231
6232
6233
6234
6235
6236
6237
6238
6239
6240
6241
6242
6243
6244
6245
6246
6247
6248
6249
6250
6251
6252
6253
6254
6255
6256
6257
6258
6259
6260
6261
6262
6263
6264
6265
6266
6267
6268
6269
6270
6271
6272
6273
6274
6275
6276
6277
6278
6279
6280
6281
6282
6283
6284
6285
6286
6287
6288
6289
6290
6291
6292
6293
6294
6295
6296
6297
6298
6299
6300
6301
6302
6303
6304
6305
6306
6307
6308
6309
6310
6311
6312
6313
6314
6315
6316
6317
6318
6319
6320
6321
6322
6323
6324
6325
6326
6327
6328
6329
6330
6331
6332
6333
6334
6335
6336
6337
6338
6339
6340
6341
6342
6343
6344
6345
6346
6347
6348
6349
6350
6351
6352
6353
6354
6355
6356
6357
6358
6359
6360
6361
6362
6363
6364
6365
6366
6367
6368
6369
6370
6371
6372
6373
6374
6375
6376
6377
6378
6379
6380
6381
6382
6383
6384
6385
6386
6387
6388
6389
6390
6391
6392
6393
6394
6395
6396
6397
6398
6399
6400
6401
6402
6403
6404
6405
6406
6407
6408
6409
6410
6411
6412
6413
6414
6415
6416
6417
6418
6419
6420
6421
6422
6423
6424
6425
6426
6427
6428
6429
6430
6431
6432
6433
6434
6435
6436
6437
6438
6439
6440
6441
6442
6443
6444
6445
6446
6447
6448
6449
6450
6451
6452
6453
6454
6455
6456
6457
6458
6459
6460
6461
6462
6463
6464
6465
6466
6467
6468
6469
6470
6471
6472
6473
6474
6475
6476
6477
6478
6479
6480
6481
6482
6483
6484
6485
6486
6487
6488
6489
6490
6491
6492
6493
6494
6495
6496
6497
6498
6499
6500
6501
6502
6503
6504
6505
6506
6507
6508
6509
6510
6511
6512
6513
6514
6515
6516
6517
6518
6519
6520
6521
6522
6523
6524
6525
6526
6527
6528
6529
6530
6531
6532
6533
6534
6535
6536
6537
6538
6539
6540
6541
6542
6543
6544
6545
6546
6547
6548
6549
6550
6551
6552
6553
6554
6555
6556
6557
6558
6559
6560
6561
6562
6563
6564
6565
6566
6567
6568
6569
6570
6571
6572
6573
6574
6575
6576
6577
6578
6579
6580
6581
6582
6583
6584
6585
6586
6587
6588
6589
6590
6591
6592
6593
6594
6595
6596
6597
6598
6599
6600
6601
6602
6603
6604
6605
6606
6607
6608
6609
6610
6611
6612
6613
6614
6615
6616
6617
6618
6619
6620
6621
6622
6623
6624
6625
6626
6627
6628
6629
6630
6631
6632
6633
6634
6635
6636
6637
6638
6639
6640
6641
6642
6643
6644
6645
6646
6647
6648
6649
6650
6651
6652
6653
6654
6655
6656
6657
6658
6659
6660
6661
6662
6663
6664
6665
6666
6667
6668
6669
6670
6671
6672
6673
6674
6675
6676
6677
6678
6679
6680
6681
6682
6683
6684
6685
6686
6687
6688
6689
6690
6691
6692
6693
6694
6695
6696
6697
6698
6699
6700
6701
6702
6703
6704
6705
6706
6707
6708
6709
6710
6711
6712
6713
6714
6715
6716
6717
6718
6719
6720
6721
6722
6723
6724
6725
6726
6727
6728
6729
6730
6731
6732
6733
6734
6735
6736
6737
6738
6739
6740
6741
6742
6743
6744
6745
6746
6747
6748
6749
6750
6751
6752
6753
6754
6755
6756
6757
6758
6759
6760
6761
6762
6763
6764
6765
6766
6767
6768
6769
6770
6771
6772
6773
6774
6775
6776
6777
6778
6779
6780
6781
6782
6783
6784
6785
6786
6787
6788
6789
6790
6791
6792
6793
6794
6795
6796
6797
6798
6799
6800
6801
6802
6803
6804
6805
6806
6807
6808
6809
6810
6811
6812
6813
6814
6815
6816
6817
6818
6819
6820
6821
6822
6823
6824
6825
6826
6827
6828
6829
6830
6831
6832
6833
6834
6835
6836
6837
6838
6839
6840
6841
6842
6843
6844
6845
6846
6847
6848
6849
6850
6851
6852
6853
6854
6855
6856
6857
6858
6859
6860
6861
6862
6863
6864
6865
6866
6867
6868
6869
6870
6871
6872
6873
6874
6875
6876
6877
6878
6879
6880
6881
6882
6883
6884
6885
6886
6887
6888
6889
6890
6891
6892
6893
6894
6895
6896
6897
6898
6899
6900
6901
6902
6903
6904
6905
6906
6907
6908
6909
6910
6911
6912
6913
6914
6915
6916
6917
6918
6919
6920
6921
6922
6923
6924
6925
6926
6927
6928
6929
6930
6931
6932
6933
6934
6935
6936
6937
6938
6939
6940
6941
6942
6943
6944
6945
6946
6947
6948
6949
6950
6951
6952
6953
6954
6955
6956
6957
6958
6959
6960
6961
6962
6963
6964
6965
6966
6967
6968
6969
6970
6971
6972
6973
6974
6975
6976
6977
6978
6979
6980
6981
6982
6983
6984
6985
6986
6987
6988
6989
6990
6991
6992
6993
6994
6995
6996
6997
6998
6999
7000
7001
7002
7003
7004
7005
7006
7007
7008
7009
7010
7011
7012
7013
7014
7015
7016
7017
7018
7019
7020
7021
7022
7023
7024
7025
7026
7027
7028
7029
7030
7031
7032
7033
7034
7035
7036
7037
7038
7039
7040
7041
7042
7043
7044
7045
7046
7047
7048
7049
7050
7051
7052
7053
7054
7055
7056
7057
7058
7059
7060
7061
7062
7063
7064
7065
7066
7067
7068
7069
7070
7071
7072
7073
7074
7075
7076
7077
7078
7079
7080
7081
7082
7083
7084
7085
7086
7087
7088
7089
7090
7091
7092
7093
7094
7095
7096
7097
7098
7099
7100
7101
7102
7103
7104
7105
7106
7107
7108
7109
7110
7111
7112
7113
7114
7115
7116
7117
7118
7119
7120
7121
7122
7123
7124
7125
7126
7127
7128
7129
7130
7131
7132
7133
7134
7135
7136
7137
7138
7139
7140
7141
7142
7143
7144
7145
7146
7147
7148
7149
7150
7151
7152
7153
7154
7155
7156
7157
7158
7159
7160
7161
7162
7163
7164
7165
7166
7167
7168
7169
7170
7171
7172
7173
7174
7175
7176
7177
7178
7179
7180
7181
7182
7183
7184
7185
7186
7187
7188
7189
7190
7191
7192
7193
7194
7195
7196
7197
7198
7199
7200
7201
7202
7203
7204
7205
7206
7207
7208
7209
7210
7211
7212
7213
7214
7215
7216
7217
7218
7219
7220
7221
7222
7223
7224
7225
7226
7227
7228
7229
7230
7231
7232
7233
7234
7235
7236
7237
7238
7239
7240
7241
7242
7243
7244
7245
7246
7247
7248
7249
7250
7251
7252
7253
7254
7255
7256
7257
7258
7259
7260
7261
7262
7263
7264
7265
7266
7267
7268
7269
7270
7271
7272
7273
7274
7275
7276
7277
7278
7279
7280
7281
7282
7283
7284
7285
7286
7287
7288
7289
7290
7291
7292
7293
7294
7295
7296
7297
7298
7299
7300
7301
7302
7303
7304
7305
7306
7307
7308
7309
7310
7311
7312
7313
7314
7315
7316
7317
7318
7319
7320
7321
7322
7323
7324
7325
7326
7327
7328
7329
7330
7331
7332
7333
7334
7335
7336
7337
7338
7339
7340
7341
7342
7343
7344
7345
7346
7347
7348
7349
7350
7351
7352
7353
7354
7355
7356
7357
7358
7359
7360
7361
7362
7363
7364
7365
7366
7367
7368
7369
7370
7371
7372
7373
7374
7375
7376
7377
7378
7379
7380
7381
7382
7383
7384
7385
7386
7387
7388
7389
7390
7391
7392
7393
7394
7395
7396
7397
7398
7399
7400
7401
7402
7403
7404
7405
7406
7407
7408
7409
7410
7411
7412
7413
7414
7415
7416
7417
7418
7419
7420
7421
7422
7423
7424
7425
7426
7427
7428
7429
7430
7431
7432
7433
7434
7435
7436
7437
7438
7439
7440
7441
7442
7443
7444
7445
7446
7447
7448
7449
7450
7451
7452
7453
7454
7455
7456
7457
7458
7459
7460
7461
7462
7463
7464
7465
7466
7467
7468
7469
7470
7471
7472
7473
7474
7475
7476
7477
7478
7479
7480
7481
7482
7483
7484
7485
7486
7487
7488
7489
7490
7491
7492
7493
7494
7495
7496
7497
7498
7499
7500
7501
7502
7503
7504
7505
7506
7507
7508
7509
7510
7511
7512
7513
7514
7515
7516
7517
7518
7519
7520
7521
7522
7523
7524
7525
7526
7527
7528
7529
7530
7531
7532
7533
7534
7535
7536
7537
7538
7539
7540
7541
7542
7543
7544
7545
7546
7547
7548
7549
7550
7551
7552
7553
7554
7555
7556
7557
7558
7559
7560
7561
7562
7563
7564
7565
7566
7567
7568
7569
7570
7571
7572
7573
7574
7575
7576
7577
7578
7579
7580
7581
7582
7583
7584
7585
7586
7587
7588
7589
7590
7591
7592
7593
7594
7595
7596
7597
7598
7599
7600
7601
7602
7603
7604
7605
7606
7607
7608
7609
7610
7611
7612
7613
7614
7615
7616
7617
7618
7619
7620
7621
7622
7623
7624
7625
7626
7627
7628
7629
7630
7631
7632
7633
7634
7635
7636
7637
7638
7639
7640
7641
7642
7643
7644
7645
7646
7647
7648
7649
7650
7651
7652
7653
7654
7655
7656
7657
7658
7659
7660
7661
7662
7663
7664
7665
7666
7667
7668
7669
7670
7671
7672
7673
7674
7675
7676
7677
7678
7679
7680
7681
7682
7683
7684
7685
7686
7687
7688
7689
7690
7691
7692
7693
7694
7695
7696
7697
7698
7699
7700
7701
7702
7703
7704
7705
7706
7707
7708
7709
7710
7711
7712
7713
7714
7715
7716
7717
7718
7719
7720
7721
7722
7723
7724
7725
7726
7727
7728
7729
7730
7731
7732
7733
7734
7735
7736
7737
7738
7739
7740
7741
7742
7743
7744
7745
7746
7747
7748
7749
7750
7751
7752
7753
7754
7755
7756
7757
7758
7759
7760
7761
7762
7763
7764
7765
7766
7767
7768
7769
7770
7771
7772
7773
7774
7775
7776
7777
7778
7779
7780
7781
7782
7783
7784
7785
7786
7787
7788
7789
7790
7791
7792
7793
7794
7795
7796
7797
7798
7799
7800
7801
7802
7803
7804
7805
7806
7807
7808
7809
7810
7811
7812
7813
7814
7815
7816
7817
7818
7819
7820
7821
7822
7823
7824
7825
7826
7827
7828
7829
7830
7831
7832
7833
7834
7835
7836
7837
7838
7839
7840
7841
7842
7843
7844
7845
7846
7847
7848
7849
7850
7851
7852
7853
7854
7855
7856
7857
7858
7859
7860
7861
7862
7863
7864
7865
7866
7867
7868
7869
7870
7871
7872
7873
7874
7875
7876
7877
7878
7879
7880
7881
7882
7883
7884
7885
7886
7887
7888
7889
7890
7891
7892
7893
7894
7895
7896
7897
7898
7899
7900
7901
7902
7903
7904
7905
7906
7907
7908
7909
7910
7911
7912
7913
7914
7915
7916
7917
7918
7919
7920
7921
7922
7923
7924
7925
7926
7927
7928
7929
7930
7931
7932
7933
7934
7935
7936
7937
7938
7939
7940
7941
7942
7943
7944
7945
7946
7947
7948
7949
7950
7951
7952
7953
7954
7955
7956
7957
7958
7959
7960
7961
7962
7963
7964
7965
7966
7967
7968
7969
7970
7971
7972
7973
7974
7975
7976
7977
7978
7979
7980
7981
7982
7983
7984
7985
7986
7987
7988
7989
7990
7991
7992
7993
7994
7995
7996
7997
7998
7999
8000
8001
8002
8003
8004
8005
8006
8007
8008
8009
8010
8011
8012
8013
8014
8015
8016
8017
8018
8019
8020
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8026
8027
8028
8029
8030
8031
8032
8033
8034
8035
8036
8037
8038
8039
8040
8041
8042
8043
8044
8045
8046
8047
8048
8049
8050
8051
8052
8053
8054
8055
8056
8057
8058
8059
8060
8061
8062
8063
8064
8065
8066
8067
8068
8069
8070
8071
8072
8073
8074
8075
8076
8077
8078
8079
8080
8081
8082
8083
8084
8085
8086
8087
8088
8089
8090
8091
8092
8093
8094
8095
8096
8097
8098
8099
8100
8101
8102
8103
8104
8105
8106
8107
8108
8109
8110
8111
8112
8113
8114
8115
8116
8117
8118
8119
8120
8121
8122
8123
8124
8125
8126
8127
8128
8129
8130
8131
8132
8133
8134
8135
8136
8137
8138
8139
8140
8141
8142
8143
8144
8145
8146
8147
8148
8149
8150
8151
8152
8153
8154
8155
8156
8157
8158
8159
8160
8161
8162
8163
8164
8165
8166
8167
8168
8169
8170
8171
8172
8173
8174
8175
8176
8177
8178
8179
8180
8181
8182
8183
8184
8185
8186
8187
8188
8189
8190
8191
8192
8193
8194
8195
8196
8197
8198
8199
8200
8201
8202
8203
8204
8205
8206
8207
8208
8209
8210
8211
8212
8213
8214
8215
8216
8217
8218
8219
8220
8221
8222
8223
8224
8225
8226
8227
8228
8229
8230
8231
8232
8233
8234
8235
8236
8237
8238
8239
8240
8241
8242
8243
8244
8245
8246
8247
8248
8249
8250
8251
8252
8253
8254
8255
8256
8257
8258
8259
8260
8261
8262
8263
8264
8265
8266
8267
8268
8269
8270
8271
8272
8273
8274
8275
8276
8277
8278
8279
8280
8281
8282
8283
8284
8285
8286
8287
8288
8289
8290
8291
8292
8293
8294
8295
8296
8297
8298
8299
8300
8301
8302
8303
8304
8305
8306
8307
8308
8309
8310
8311
8312
8313
8314
8315
8316
8317
8318
8319
8320
8321
8322
8323
8324
8325
8326
8327
8328
8329
8330
8331
8332
8333
8334
8335
8336
8337
8338
8339
8340
8341
8342
8343
8344
8345
8346
8347
8348
8349
8350
8351
8352
8353
8354
8355
8356
8357
8358
8359
8360
8361
8362
8363
8364
8365
8366
8367
8368
8369
8370
8371
8372
8373
8374
8375
8376
8377
8378
8379
8380
8381
8382
8383
8384
8385
8386
8387
8388
8389
8390
8391
8392
8393
8394
8395
8396
8397
8398
8399
8400
8401
8402
8403
8404
8405
8406
8407
8408
8409
8410
8411
8412
8413
8414
8415
8416
8417
8418
8419
8420
8421
8422
8423
8424
8425
8426
8427
8428
8429
8430
8431
8432
8433
8434
8435
8436
8437
8438
8439
8440
8441
8442
8443
8444
8445
8446
8447
8448
8449
8450
8451
8452
8453
8454
8455
8456
8457
8458
8459
8460
8461
8462
8463
8464
8465
8466
8467
8468
8469
8470
8471
8472
8473
8474
8475
8476
8477
8478
8479
8480
8481
8482
8483
8484
8485
8486
8487
8488
8489
8490
8491
8492
8493
8494
8495
8496
8497
8498
8499
8500
8501
8502
8503
8504
8505
8506
8507
8508
8509
8510
8511
8512
8513
8514
8515
8516
8517
8518
8519
8520
8521
8522
8523
8524
8525
8526
8527
8528
8529
8530
8531
8532
8533
8534
8535
8536
8537
8538
8539
8540
8541
8542
8543
8544
8545
8546
8547
8548
8549
8550
8551
8552
8553
8554
8555
8556
8557
8558
8559
8560
8561
8562
8563
8564
8565
8566
8567
8568
8569
8570
8571
8572
8573
8574
8575
8576
8577
8578
8579
8580
8581
8582
8583
8584
8585
8586
8587
8588
8589
8590
8591
8592
8593
8594
8595
8596
8597
8598
8599
8600
8601
8602
8603
8604
8605
8606
8607
8608
8609
8610
8611
8612
8613
8614
8615
8616
8617
8618
8619
8620
8621
8622
8623
8624
8625
8626
8627
8628
8629
8630
8631
8632
8633
8634
8635
8636
8637
8638
8639
8640
8641
8642
8643
8644
8645
8646
8647
8648
8649
8650
8651
8652
8653
8654
8655
8656
8657
8658
8659
8660
8661
8662
8663
8664
8665
8666
8667
8668
8669
8670
8671
8672
8673
8674
8675
8676
8677
8678
8679
8680
8681
8682
8683
8684
8685
8686
8687
8688
8689
8690
8691
8692
8693
8694
8695
8696
8697
8698
8699
8700
8701
8702
8703
8704
8705
8706
8707
8708
8709
8710
8711
8712
8713
8714
8715
8716
8717
8718
8719
8720
8721
8722
8723
8724
8725
8726
8727
8728
8729
8730
8731
8732
8733
8734
8735
8736
8737
8738
8739
8740
8741
8742
8743
8744
8745
8746
8747
8748
8749
8750
8751
8752
8753
8754
8755
8756
8757
8758
8759
8760
8761
8762
8763
8764
8765
8766
8767
8768
8769
8770
8771
8772
8773
8774
8775
8776
8777
8778
8779
8780
8781
8782
8783
8784
8785
8786
8787
8788
8789
8790
8791
8792
8793
8794
8795
8796
8797
8798
8799
8800
8801
8802
8803
8804
8805
8806
8807
8808
8809
8810
8811
8812
8813
8814
8815
8816
8817
8818
8819
8820
8821
8822
8823
8824
8825
8826
8827
8828
8829
8830
8831
8832
8833
8834
8835
8836
8837
8838
8839
8840
8841
8842
8843
8844
8845
8846
8847
8848
8849
8850
8851
8852
8853
8854
8855
8856
8857
8858
8859
8860
8861
8862
8863
8864
8865
8866
8867
8868
8869
8870
8871
8872
8873
8874
8875
8876
8877
8878
8879
8880
8881
8882
8883
8884
8885
8886
8887
8888
8889
8890
8891
8892
8893
8894
8895
8896
8897
8898
8899
8900
8901
8902
8903
8904
8905
8906
8907
8908
8909
8910
8911
8912
8913
8914
8915
8916
8917
8918
8919
8920
8921
8922
8923
8924
8925
8926
8927
8928
8929
8930
8931
8932
8933
8934
8935
8936
8937
8938
8939
8940
8941
8942
8943
8944
8945
8946
8947
8948
8949
8950
8951
8952
8953
8954
8955
8956
8957
8958
8959
8960
8961
8962
8963
8964
8965
8966
8967
8968
8969
8970
8971
8972
8973
8974
8975
8976
8977
8978
8979
8980
8981
8982
8983
8984
8985
8986
8987
8988
8989
8990
8991
8992
8993
8994
8995
8996
8997
8998
8999
9000
9001
9002
9003
9004
9005
9006
9007
9008
9009
9010
9011
9012
9013
9014
9015
9016
9017
9018
9019
9020
9021
9022
9023
9024
9025
9026
9027
9028
9029
9030
9031
9032
9033
9034
9035
9036
9037
9038
9039
9040
9041
9042
9043
9044
9045
9046
9047
9048
9049
9050
9051
9052
9053
9054
9055
9056
9057
9058
9059
9060
9061
9062
9063
9064
9065
9066
9067
9068
9069
9070
9071
9072
9073
9074
9075
9076
9077
9078
9079
9080
9081
9082
9083
9084
9085
9086
9087
9088
9089
9090
9091
9092
9093
9094
9095
9096
9097
9098
9099
9100
9101
9102
9103
9104
9105
9106
9107
9108
9109
9110
9111
9112
9113
9114
9115
9116
9117
9118
9119
9120
9121
9122
9123
9124
9125
9126
9127
9128
9129
9130
9131
9132
9133
9134
9135
9136
9137
9138
9139
9140
9141
9142
9143
9144
9145
9146
9147
9148
9149
9150
9151
9152
9153
9154
9155
9156
9157
9158
9159
9160
9161
9162
9163
9164
9165
9166
9167
9168
9169
9170
9171
9172
9173
9174
9175
9176
9177
9178
9179
9180
9181
9182
9183
9184
9185
9186
9187
9188
9189
9190
9191
9192
9193
9194
9195
9196
9197
9198
9199
9200
9201
9202
9203
9204
9205
9206
9207
9208
9209
9210
9211
9212
9213
9214
9215
9216
9217
9218
9219
9220
9221
9222
9223
9224
9225
9226
9227
9228
9229
9230
9231
9232
9233
9234
9235
9236
9237
9238
9239
9240
9241
9242
9243
9244
9245
9246
9247
9248
9249
9250
9251
9252
9253
9254
9255
9256
9257
9258
9259
9260
9261
9262
9263
9264
9265
9266
9267
9268
9269
9270
9271
9272
9273
9274
9275
9276
9277
9278
9279
9280
9281
9282
9283
9284
9285
9286
9287
9288
9289
9290
9291
9292
9293
9294
9295
9296
9297
9298
9299
9300
9301
9302
9303
9304
9305
9306
9307
9308
9309
9310
9311
9312
9313
9314
9315
9316
9317
9318
9319
9320
9321
9322
9323
9324
9325
9326
9327
9328
9329
9330
9331
9332
9333
9334
9335
9336
9337
9338
9339
9340
9341
9342
9343
9344
9345
9346
9347
9348
9349
9350
9351
9352
9353
9354
9355
9356
9357
9358
9359
9360
9361
9362
9363
9364
9365
9366
9367
9368
9369
9370
9371
9372
9373
9374
9375
9376
9377
9378
9379
9380
9381
9382
9383
9384
9385
9386
9387
9388
9389
9390
9391
9392
9393
9394
9395
9396
9397
9398
9399
9400
9401
9402
9403
9404
9405
9406
9407
9408
9409
9410
9411
9412
9413
9414
9415
9416
9417
9418
9419
9420
9421
9422
9423
9424
9425
9426
9427
9428
9429
9430
9431
9432
9433
9434
9435
9436
9437
9438
9439
9440
9441
9442
9443
9444
9445
9446
9447
9448
9449
9450
9451
9452
9453
9454
9455
9456
9457
9458
9459
9460
9461
9462
9463
9464
9465
9466
9467
9468
9469
9470
9471
9472
9473
9474
9475
9476
9477
9478
9479
9480
9481
9482
9483
9484
9485
9486
9487
9488
9489
9490
9491
9492
9493
9494
9495
9496
9497
9498
9499
9500
9501
9502
9503
9504
9505
9506
9507
9508
9509
9510
9511
9512
9513
9514
9515
9516
9517
9518
9519
9520
9521
9522
9523
9524
9525
9526
9527
9528
9529
9530
9531
9532
9533
9534
9535
9536
9537
9538
9539
9540
9541
9542
9543
9544
9545
9546
9547
9548
9549
9550
9551
9552
9553
9554
9555
9556
9557
9558
9559
9560
9561
9562
9563
9564
9565
9566
9567
9568
9569
9570
9571
9572
9573
9574
9575
9576
9577
9578
9579
9580
9581
9582
9583
9584
9585
9586
9587
9588
9589
9590
9591
9592
9593
9594
9595
9596
9597
9598
9599
9600
9601
9602
9603
9604
9605
9606
9607
9608
9609
9610
9611
9612
9613
9614
9615
9616
9617
9618
9619
9620
9621
9622
9623
9624
9625
9626
9627
9628
9629
9630
9631
9632
9633
9634
9635
9636
9637
9638
9639
9640
9641
9642
9643
9644
9645
9646
9647
9648
9649
9650
9651
9652
9653
9654
9655
9656
9657
9658
9659
9660
9661
9662
9663
9664
9665
9666
9667
9668
9669
9670
9671
9672
9673
9674
9675
9676
9677
9678
9679
9680
9681
9682
9683
9684
9685
9686
9687
9688
9689
9690
9691
9692
9693
9694
9695
9696
9697
9698
9699
9700
9701
9702
9703
9704
9705
9706
9707
9708
9709
9710
9711
9712
9713
9714
9715
9716
9717
9718
9719
9720
9721
9722
9723
9724
9725
9726
9727
9728
9729
9730
9731
9732
9733
9734
9735
9736
9737
9738
9739
9740
9741
9742
9743
9744
9745
9746
9747
9748
9749
9750
9751
9752
9753
9754
9755
9756
9757
9758
9759
9760
9761
9762
9763
9764
9765
9766
9767
9768
9769
9770
9771
9772
9773
9774
9775
9776
9777
9778
9779
9780
9781
9782
9783
9784
9785
9786
9787
9788
9789
9790
9791
9792
9793
9794
9795
9796
9797
9798
9799
9800
9801
9802
9803
9804
9805
9806
9807
9808
9809
9810
9811
9812
9813
9814
9815
9816
9817
9818
9819
9820
9821
9822
9823
9824
9825
9826
9827
9828
9829
9830
9831
9832
9833
9834
9835
9836
9837
9838
9839
9840
9841
9842
9843
9844
9845
9846
9847
9848
9849
9850
9851
9852
9853
9854
9855
9856
9857
9858
9859
9860
9861
9862
9863
9864
9865
9866
9867
9868
9869
9870
9871
9872
9873
9874
9875
9876
9877
9878
9879
9880
9881
9882
9883
9884
9885
9886
9887
9888
9889
9890
9891
9892
9893
9894
9895
9896
9897
9898
9899
9900
9901
9902
9903
9904
9905
9906
9907
9908
9909
9910
9911
9912
9913
9914
9915
9916
9917
9918
9919
9920
9921
9922
9923
9924
9925
9926
9927
9928
9929
9930
9931
9932
9933
9934
9935
9936
9937
9938
9939
9940
9941
9942
9943
9944
9945
9946
9947
9948
9949
9950
9951
9952
9953
9954
9955
9956
9957
9958
9959
9960
9961
9962
9963
9964
9965
9966
9967
9968
9969
9970
9971
9972
9973
9974
9975
9976
9977
9978
9979
9980
9981
9982
9983
9984
9985
9986
9987
9988
9989
9990
9991
9992
9993
9994
9995
9996
9997
9998
9999
10000
10001
10002
10003
10004
10005
10006
10007
10008
10009
10010
10011
10012
10013
10014
10015
10016
10017
10018
10019
10020
10021
10022
10023
10024
10025
10026
10027
10028
10029
10030
10031
10032
10033
10034
10035
10036
10037
10038
10039
10040
10041
10042
10043
10044
10045
10046
10047
10048
10049
10050
10051
10052
10053
10054
10055
10056
10057
10058
10059
10060
10061
10062
10063
10064
10065
10066
10067
10068
10069
10070
10071
10072
10073
10074
10075
10076
10077
10078
10079
10080
10081
10082
10083
10084
10085
10086
10087
10088
10089
10090
10091
10092
10093
10094
10095
10096
10097
10098
10099
10100
10101
10102
10103
10104
10105
10106
10107
10108
10109
10110
10111
10112
10113
10114
10115
10116
10117
10118
10119
10120
10121
10122
10123
10124
10125
10126
10127
10128
10129
10130
10131
10132
10133
10134
10135
10136
10137
10138
10139
10140
10141
10142
10143
10144
10145
10146
10147
10148
10149
10150
10151
10152
10153
10154
10155
10156
10157
10158
10159
10160
10161
10162
10163
10164
10165
10166
10167
10168
10169
10170
10171
10172
10173
10174
10175
10176
10177
10178
10179
10180
10181
10182
10183
10184
10185
10186
10187
10188
10189
10190
10191
10192
10193
10194
10195
10196
10197
10198
10199
10200
10201
10202
10203
10204
10205
10206
10207
10208
10209
10210
10211
10212
10213
10214
10215
10216
10217
10218
10219
10220
10221
10222
10223
10224
10225
10226
10227
10228
10229
10230
10231
10232
10233
10234
10235
10236
10237
10238
10239
10240
10241
10242
10243
10244
10245
10246
10247
10248
10249
10250
10251
10252
10253
10254
10255
10256
10257
10258
10259
10260
10261
10262
10263
10264
10265
10266
10267
10268
10269
10270
10271
10272
10273
10274
10275
10276
10277
10278
10279
10280
10281
10282
10283
10284
10285
10286
10287
10288
10289
10290
10291
10292
10293
10294
10295
10296
10297
10298
10299
10300
10301
10302
10303
10304
10305
10306
10307
10308
10309
10310
10311
10312
10313
10314
10315
10316
10317
10318
10319
10320
10321
10322
10323
10324
10325
10326
10327
10328
10329
10330
10331
10332
10333
10334
10335
10336
10337
10338
10339
10340
10341
10342
10343
10344
10345
10346
10347
10348
10349
10350
10351
10352
10353
10354
10355
10356
10357
10358
10359
10360
10361
10362
10363
10364
10365
10366
10367
10368
10369
10370
10371
10372
10373
10374
10375
10376
10377
10378
10379
10380
10381
10382
10383
10384
10385
10386
10387
10388
10389
10390
10391
10392
10393
10394
10395
10396
10397
10398
10399
10400
10401
10402
10403
10404
10405
10406
10407
10408
10409
10410
10411
10412
10413
10414
10415
10416
10417
10418
10419
10420
10421
10422
10423
10424
10425
10426
10427
10428
10429
10430
10431
10432
10433
10434
10435
10436
10437
10438
10439
10440
10441
10442
10443
10444
10445
10446
10447
10448
10449
10450
10451
10452
10453
10454
10455
10456
10457
10458
10459
10460
10461
10462
10463
10464
10465
10466
10467
10468
10469
10470
10471
10472
10473
10474
10475
10476
10477
10478
10479
10480
10481
10482
10483
10484
10485
10486
10487
10488
10489
10490
10491
10492
10493
10494
10495
10496
10497
10498
10499
10500
10501
10502
10503
10504
10505
10506
10507
10508
10509
10510
10511
10512
10513
10514
10515
10516
10517
10518
10519
10520
10521
10522
10523
10524
10525
10526
10527
10528
10529
10530
10531
10532
10533
10534
10535
10536
10537
10538
10539
10540
10541
10542
10543
10544
10545
10546
10547
10548
10549
10550
10551
10552
10553
10554
10555
10556
10557
10558
10559
10560
10561
10562
10563
10564
10565
10566
10567
10568
10569
10570
10571
10572
10573
10574
10575
10576
10577
10578
10579
10580
10581
10582
10583
10584
10585
10586
10587
10588
10589
10590
10591
10592
10593
10594
10595
10596
10597
10598
10599
10600
10601
10602
10603
10604
10605
10606
10607
10608
10609
10610
10611
10612
10613
10614
10615
10616
10617
10618
10619
10620
10621
10622
10623
10624
10625
10626
10627
10628
10629
10630
10631
10632
10633
10634
10635
10636
10637
10638
10639
10640
10641
10642
10643
10644
10645
10646
10647
10648
10649
10650
10651
10652
10653
10654
10655
10656
10657
10658
10659
10660
10661
10662
10663
10664
10665
10666
10667
10668
10669
10670
10671
10672
10673
10674
10675
10676
10677
10678
10679
10680
10681
10682
10683
10684
10685
10686
10687
10688
10689
10690
10691
10692
10693
10694
10695
10696
10697
10698
10699
10700
10701
10702
10703
10704
10705
10706
10707
10708
10709
10710
10711
10712
10713
10714
10715
10716
10717
10718
10719
10720
10721
10722
10723
10724
10725
10726
10727
10728
10729
10730
10731
10732
10733
10734
10735
10736
10737
10738
10739
10740
10741
10742
10743
10744
10745
10746
10747
10748
10749
10750
10751
10752
10753
10754
10755
10756
10757
10758
10759
10760
10761
10762
10763
10764
10765
10766
10767
10768
10769
10770
10771
10772
10773
10774
10775
10776
10777
10778
10779
10780
10781
10782
10783
10784
10785
10786
10787
10788
10789
10790
10791
10792
10793
10794
10795
10796
10797
10798
10799
10800
10801
10802
10803
10804
10805
10806
10807
10808
10809
10810
10811
10812
10813
10814
10815
10816
10817
10818
10819
10820
10821
10822
10823
10824
10825
10826
10827
10828
10829
10830
10831
10832
10833
10834
10835
10836
10837
10838
10839
10840
10841
10842
10843
10844
10845
10846
10847
10848
10849
10850
10851
10852
10853
10854
10855
10856
10857
10858
10859
10860
10861
10862
10863
10864
10865
10866
10867
10868
10869
10870
10871
10872
10873
10874
10875
10876
10877
10878
10879
10880
10881
10882
10883
10884
10885
10886
10887
10888
10889
10890
10891
10892
10893
10894
10895
10896
10897
10898
10899
10900
10901
10902
10903
10904
10905
10906
10907
10908
10909
10910
10911
10912
10913
10914
10915
10916
10917
10918
10919
10920
10921
10922
10923
10924
10925
10926
10927
10928
10929
10930
10931
10932
10933
10934
10935
10936
10937
10938
10939
10940
10941
10942
10943
10944
10945
10946
10947
10948
10949
10950
10951
10952
10953
10954
10955
10956
10957
10958
10959
10960
10961
10962
10963
10964
10965
10966
10967
10968
10969
10970
10971
10972
10973
10974
10975
10976
10977
10978
10979
10980
10981
10982
10983
10984
10985
10986
10987
10988
10989
10990
10991
10992
10993
10994
10995
10996
10997
10998
10999
11000
11001
11002
11003
11004
11005
11006
11007
11008
11009
11010
11011
11012
11013
11014
11015
11016
11017
11018
11019
11020
11021
11022
11023
11024
11025
11026
11027
11028
11029
11030
11031
11032
11033
11034
11035
11036
11037
11038
11039
11040
11041
11042
11043
11044
11045
11046
11047
11048
11049
11050
11051
11052
11053
11054
11055
11056
11057
11058
11059
11060
11061
11062
11063
11064
11065
11066
11067
11068
11069
11070
11071
11072
11073
11074
11075
11076
11077
11078
11079
11080
11081
11082
11083
11084
11085
11086
11087
11088
11089
11090
11091
11092
11093
11094
11095
11096
11097
11098
11099
11100
11101
11102
11103
11104
11105
11106
11107
11108
11109
11110
11111
11112
11113
11114
11115
11116
11117
11118
11119
11120
11121
11122
11123
11124
11125
11126
11127
11128
11129
11130
11131
11132
11133
11134
11135
11136
11137
11138
11139
11140
11141
11142
11143
11144
11145
11146
11147
11148
11149
11150
11151
11152
11153
11154
11155
11156
11157
11158
11159
11160
11161
11162
11163
11164
11165
11166
11167
11168
11169
11170
11171
11172
11173
11174
11175
11176
11177
11178
11179
11180
11181
11182
11183
11184
11185
11186
11187
11188
11189
11190
11191
11192
11193
11194
11195
11196
11197
11198
11199
11200
11201
11202
11203
11204
11205
11206
11207
11208
11209
11210
11211
11212
11213
11214
11215
11216
11217
11218
11219
11220
11221
11222
11223
11224
11225
11226
11227
11228
11229
11230
11231
11232
11233
11234
11235
11236
11237
11238
11239
11240
11241
11242
11243
11244
11245
11246
11247
11248
11249
11250
11251
11252
11253
11254
11255
11256
11257
11258
11259
11260
11261
11262
11263
11264
11265
11266
11267
11268
11269
11270
11271
11272
11273
11274
11275
11276
11277
11278
11279
11280
11281
11282
11283
11284
11285
11286
11287
11288
11289
11290
11291
11292
11293
11294
11295
11296
11297
11298
11299
11300
11301
11302
11303
11304
11305
11306
11307
11308
11309
11310
11311
11312
11313
11314
11315
11316
11317
11318
11319
11320
11321
11322
11323
11324
11325
11326
11327
11328
11329
11330
11331
11332
11333
11334
11335
11336
11337
11338
11339
11340
11341
11342
11343
11344
11345
11346
11347
11348
11349
11350
11351
11352
11353
11354
11355
11356
11357
11358
11359
11360
11361
11362
11363
11364
11365
11366
11367
11368
11369
11370
11371
11372
11373
11374
11375
11376
11377
11378
11379
11380
11381
11382
11383
11384
11385
11386
11387
11388
11389
11390
11391
11392
11393
11394
11395
11396
11397
11398
11399
11400
11401
11402
11403
11404
11405
11406
11407
11408
11409
11410
11411
11412
11413
11414
11415
11416
11417
11418
11419
11420
11421
11422
11423
11424
11425
11426
11427
11428
11429
11430
11431
11432
11433
11434
11435
11436
11437
11438
11439
11440
11441
11442
11443
11444
11445
11446
11447
11448
11449
11450
11451
11452
11453
11454
11455
11456
11457
11458
11459
11460
11461
11462
11463
11464
11465
11466
11467
11468
11469
11470
11471
11472
11473
11474
11475
11476
11477
11478
11479
11480
11481
11482
11483
11484
11485
11486
11487
11488
11489
11490
11491
11492
11493
11494
11495
11496
11497
11498
11499
11500
11501
11502
11503
11504
11505
11506
11507
11508
11509
11510
11511
11512
11513
11514
11515
11516
11517
11518
11519
11520
11521
11522
11523
11524
11525
11526
11527
11528
11529
11530
11531
11532
11533
11534
11535
11536
11537
11538
11539
11540
11541
11542
11543
11544
11545
11546
11547
11548
11549
11550
11551
11552
11553
11554
11555
11556
11557
11558
11559
11560
11561
11562
11563
11564
11565
11566
11567
11568
11569
11570
11571
11572
11573
11574
11575
11576
11577
11578
11579
11580
11581
11582
11583
11584
11585
11586
11587
11588
11589
11590
11591
11592
11593
11594
11595
11596
11597
11598
11599
11600
11601
11602
11603
11604
11605
11606
11607
11608
11609
11610
11611
11612
11613
11614
11615
11616
11617
11618
11619
11620
11621
11622
11623
11624
11625
11626
11627
11628
11629
11630
11631
11632
11633
11634
11635
11636
11637
11638
11639
11640
11641
11642
11643
11644
11645
11646
11647
11648
11649
11650
11651
11652
11653
11654
11655
11656
11657
11658
11659
11660
11661
11662
11663
11664
11665
11666
11667
11668
11669
11670
11671
11672
11673
11674
11675
11676
11677
11678
11679
11680
11681
11682
11683
11684
11685
11686
11687
11688
11689
11690
11691
11692
11693
11694
11695
11696
11697
11698
11699
11700
11701
11702
11703
11704
11705
11706
11707
11708
11709
11710
11711
11712
11713
11714
11715
11716
11717
11718
11719
11720
11721
11722
11723
11724
11725
11726
11727
11728
11729
11730
11731
11732
11733
11734
11735
11736
11737
11738
11739
11740
11741
11742
11743
11744
11745
11746
11747
11748
11749
11750
11751
11752
11753
11754
11755
11756
11757
11758
11759
11760
11761
11762
11763
11764
11765
11766
11767
11768
11769
11770
11771
11772
11773
11774
11775
11776
11777
11778
11779
11780
11781
11782
11783
11784
11785
11786
11787
11788
11789
11790
11791
11792
11793
11794
11795
11796
11797
11798
11799
11800
11801
11802
11803
11804
11805
11806
11807
11808
11809
11810
11811
11812
11813
11814
11815
11816
11817
11818
11819
11820
11821
11822
11823
11824
11825
11826
11827
11828
11829
11830
11831
11832
11833
11834
11835
11836
11837
11838
11839
11840
11841
11842
11843
11844
11845
11846
11847
11848
11849
11850
11851
11852
11853
11854
11855
11856
11857
11858
11859
11860
11861
11862
11863
11864
11865
11866
11867
11868
11869
11870
11871
11872
11873
11874
11875
11876
11877
11878
11879
11880
11881
11882
11883
11884
11885
11886
11887
11888
11889
11890
11891
11892
11893
11894
11895
11896
11897
11898
11899
11900
11901
11902
11903
11904
11905
11906
11907
11908
11909
11910
11911
11912
11913
11914
11915
11916
11917
11918
11919
11920
11921
11922
11923
11924
11925
11926
11927
11928
11929
11930
11931
11932
11933
11934
11935
11936
11937
11938
11939
11940
11941
11942
11943
11944
11945
11946
11947
11948
11949
11950
11951
11952
11953
11954
11955
11956
11957
11958
11959
11960
11961
11962
11963
11964
11965
11966
11967
11968
11969
11970
11971
11972
11973
11974
11975
11976
11977
11978
11979
11980
11981
11982
11983
11984
11985
11986
11987
11988
11989
11990
11991
11992
11993
11994
11995
11996
11997
11998
11999
12000
12001
12002
12003
12004
12005
12006
12007
12008
12009
12010
12011
12012
12013
12014
12015
12016
12017
12018
12019
12020
12021
12022
12023
12024
12025
12026
12027
12028
12029
12030
12031
12032
12033
12034
12035
12036
12037
12038
12039
12040
12041
12042
12043
12044
12045
12046
12047
12048
12049
12050
12051
12052
12053
12054
12055
12056
12057
12058
12059
12060
12061
12062
12063
12064
12065
12066
12067
12068
12069
12070
12071
12072
12073
12074
12075
12076
12077
12078
12079
12080
12081
12082
12083
12084
12085
12086
12087
12088
12089
12090
12091
12092
12093
12094
12095
12096
12097
12098
12099
12100
12101
12102
12103
12104
12105
12106
12107
12108
12109
12110
12111
12112
12113
12114
12115
12116
12117
12118
12119
12120
12121
12122
12123
12124
12125
12126
12127
12128
12129
12130
12131
12132
12133
12134
12135
12136
12137
12138
12139
12140
12141
12142
12143
12144
12145
12146
12147
12148
12149
12150
12151
12152
12153
12154
12155
12156
12157
12158
12159
12160
12161
12162
12163
12164
12165
12166
12167
12168
12169
12170
12171
12172
12173
12174
12175
12176
12177
12178
12179
12180
12181
12182
12183
12184
12185
12186
12187
12188
12189
12190
12191
12192
12193
12194
12195
12196
12197
12198
12199
12200
12201
12202
12203
12204
12205
12206
12207
12208
12209
12210
12211
12212
12213
12214
12215
12216
12217
12218
12219
12220
12221
12222
12223
12224
12225
12226
12227
12228
12229
12230
12231
12232
12233
12234
12235
12236
12237
12238
12239
12240
12241
12242
12243
12244
12245
12246
12247
12248
12249
12250
12251
12252
12253
12254
12255
12256
12257
12258
12259
12260
12261
12262
12263
12264
12265
12266
12267
12268
12269
12270
12271
12272
12273
12274
12275
12276
12277
12278
12279
12280
12281
12282
12283
12284
12285
12286
12287
12288
12289
12290
12291
12292
12293
12294
12295
12296
12297
12298
12299
12300
12301
12302
12303
12304
12305
12306
12307
12308
12309
12310
12311
12312
12313
12314
12315
12316
12317
12318
12319
12320
12321
12322
12323
12324
12325
12326
12327
12328
12329
12330
12331
12332
12333
12334
12335
12336
12337
12338
12339
12340
12341
12342
12343
12344
12345
12346
12347
12348
12349
12350
12351
12352
12353
12354
12355
12356
12357
12358
12359
12360
12361
12362
12363
12364
12365
12366
12367
12368
12369
12370
12371
12372
12373
12374
12375
12376
12377
12378
12379
12380
12381
12382
12383
12384
12385
12386
12387
12388
12389
12390
12391
12392
12393
12394
12395
12396
12397
12398
12399
12400
12401
12402
12403
12404
12405
12406
12407
12408
12409
12410
12411
12412
12413
12414
12415
12416
12417
12418
12419
12420
12421
12422
12423
12424
12425
12426
12427
12428
12429
12430
12431
12432
12433
12434
12435
12436
12437
12438
12439
12440
12441
12442
12443
12444
12445
12446
12447
12448
12449
12450
12451
12452
12453
12454
12455
12456
12457
12458
12459
12460
12461
12462
12463
12464
12465
12466
12467
12468
12469
12470
12471
12472
12473
12474
12475
12476
12477
12478
12479
12480
12481
12482
12483
12484
12485
12486
12487
12488
12489
12490
12491
12492
12493
12494
12495
12496
12497
12498
12499
12500
12501
12502
12503
12504
12505
12506
12507
12508
12509
12510
12511
12512
12513
12514
12515
12516
12517
12518
12519
12520
12521
12522
12523
12524
12525
12526
12527
12528
12529
12530
12531
12532
12533
12534
12535
12536
12537
12538
12539
12540
12541
12542
12543
12544
12545
12546
12547
12548
12549
12550
12551
12552
12553
12554
12555
12556
12557
12558
12559
12560
12561
12562
12563
12564
12565
12566
12567
12568
12569
12570
12571
12572
12573
12574
12575
12576
12577
12578
12579
12580
12581
12582
12583
12584
12585
12586
12587
12588
12589
12590
12591
12592
12593
12594
12595
12596
12597
12598
12599
12600
12601
12602
12603
12604
12605
12606
12607
12608
12609
12610
12611
12612
12613
12614
12615
12616
12617
12618
12619
12620
12621
12622
12623
12624
12625
12626
12627
12628
12629
12630
12631
12632
12633
12634
12635
12636
12637
12638
12639
12640
12641
12642
12643
12644
12645
12646
12647
12648
12649
12650
12651
12652
12653
12654
12655
12656
12657
12658
12659
12660
12661
12662
12663
12664
12665
12666
12667
12668
12669
12670
12671
12672
12673
12674
12675
12676
12677
12678
12679
12680
12681
12682
12683
12684
12685
12686
12687
12688
12689
12690
12691
12692
12693
12694
12695
12696
12697
12698
12699
12700
12701
12702
12703
12704
12705
12706
12707
12708
12709
12710
12711
12712
12713
12714
12715
12716
12717
12718
12719
12720
12721
12722
12723
12724
12725
12726
12727
12728
12729
12730
12731
12732
12733
12734
12735
12736
12737
12738
12739
12740
12741
12742
12743
12744
12745
12746
12747
12748
12749
12750
12751
12752
12753
12754
12755
12756
12757
12758
12759
12760
12761
12762
12763
12764
12765
12766
12767
12768
12769
12770
12771
12772
12773
12774
12775
12776
12777
12778
12779
12780
12781
12782
12783
12784
12785
12786
12787
12788
12789
12790
12791
12792
12793
12794
12795
12796
12797
12798
12799
12800
12801
12802
12803
12804
12805
12806
12807
12808
12809
12810
12811
12812
12813
12814
12815
12816
12817
12818
12819
12820
12821
12822
12823
12824
12825
12826
12827
12828
12829
12830
12831
12832
12833
12834
12835
12836
12837
12838
12839
12840
12841
12842
12843
12844
12845
12846
12847
12848
12849
12850
12851
12852
12853
12854
12855
12856
12857
12858
12859
12860
12861
12862
12863
12864
12865
12866
12867
12868
12869
12870
12871
12872
12873
12874
12875
12876
12877
12878
12879
12880
12881
12882
12883
12884
12885
12886
12887
12888
12889
12890
12891
12892
12893
12894
12895
12896
12897
12898
12899
12900
12901
12902
12903
12904
12905
12906
12907
12908
12909
12910
12911
12912
12913
12914
12915
12916
12917
12918
12919
12920
12921
12922
12923
12924
12925
12926
12927
12928
12929
12930
12931
12932
12933
12934
12935
12936
12937
12938
12939
12940
12941
12942
12943
12944
12945
12946
12947
12948
12949
12950
12951
12952
12953
12954
12955
12956
12957
12958
12959
12960
12961
12962
12963
12964
12965
12966
12967
12968
12969
12970
12971
12972
12973
12974
12975
12976
12977
12978
12979
12980
12981
12982
12983
12984
12985
12986
12987
12988
12989
12990
12991
12992
12993
12994
12995
12996
12997
12998
12999
13000
13001
13002
13003
13004
13005
13006
13007
13008
13009
13010
13011
13012
13013
13014
13015
13016
13017
13018
13019
13020
13021
13022
13023
13024
13025
13026
13027
13028
13029
13030
13031
13032
13033
13034
13035
13036
13037
13038
13039
13040
13041
13042
13043
13044
13045
13046
13047
13048
13049
13050
13051
13052
13053
13054
13055
13056
13057
13058
13059
13060
13061
13062
13063
13064
13065
13066
13067
13068
13069
13070
13071
13072
13073
13074
13075
13076
13077
13078
13079
13080
13081
13082
13083
13084
13085
13086
13087
13088
13089
13090
13091
13092
13093
13094
13095
13096
13097
13098
13099
13100
13101
13102
13103
13104
13105
13106
13107
13108
13109
13110
13111
13112
13113
13114
13115
13116
13117
13118
13119
13120
13121
13122
13123
13124
13125
13126
13127
13128
13129
13130
13131
13132
13133
13134
13135
13136
13137
13138
13139
13140
13141
13142
13143
13144
13145
13146
13147
13148
13149
13150
13151
13152
13153
13154
13155
13156
13157
13158
13159
13160
13161
13162
13163
13164
13165
13166
13167
13168
13169
13170
13171
13172
13173
13174
13175
13176
13177
13178
13179
13180
13181
13182
13183
13184
13185
13186
13187
13188
13189
13190
13191
13192
13193
13194
13195
13196
13197
13198
13199
13200
13201
13202
13203
13204
13205
13206
13207
13208
13209
13210
13211
13212
13213
13214
13215
13216
13217
13218
13219
13220
13221
13222
13223
13224
13225
13226
13227
13228
13229
13230
13231
13232
13233
13234
13235
13236
13237
13238
13239
13240
13241
13242
13243
13244
13245
13246
13247
13248
13249
13250
13251
13252
13253
13254
13255
13256
13257
13258
13259
13260
13261
13262
13263
13264
13265
13266
13267
13268
13269
13270
13271
13272
13273
13274
13275
13276
13277
13278
13279
13280
13281
13282
13283
13284
13285
13286
13287
13288
13289
13290
13291
13292
13293
13294
13295
13296
13297
13298
13299
13300
13301
13302
13303
13304
13305
13306
13307
13308
13309
13310
13311
13312
13313
13314
13315
13316
13317
13318
13319
13320
13321
13322
13323
13324
13325
13326
13327
13328
13329
13330
13331
13332
13333
13334
13335
13336
13337
13338
13339
13340
13341
13342
13343
13344
13345
13346
13347
13348
13349
13350
13351
13352
13353
13354
13355
13356
13357
13358
13359
13360
13361
13362
13363
13364
13365
13366
13367
13368
13369
13370
13371
13372
13373
13374
13375
13376
13377
13378
13379
13380
13381
13382
13383
13384
13385
13386
13387
13388
13389
13390
13391
13392
13393
13394
13395
13396
13397
13398
13399
13400
13401
13402
13403
13404
13405
13406
13407
13408
13409
13410
13411
13412
13413
13414
13415
13416
13417
13418
13419
13420
13421
13422
13423
13424
13425
13426
13427
13428
13429
13430
13431
13432
13433
13434
13435
13436
13437
13438
13439
13440
13441
13442
13443
13444
13445
13446
13447
13448
13449
13450
13451
13452
13453
13454
13455
13456
13457
13458
13459
13460
13461
13462
13463
13464
13465
13466
13467
13468
13469
13470
13471
13472
13473
13474
13475
13476
13477
13478
13479
13480
13481
13482
13483
13484
13485
13486
13487
13488
13489
13490
13491
13492
13493
13494
13495
13496
13497
13498
13499
13500
13501
13502
13503
13504
13505
13506
13507
13508
13509
13510
13511
13512
13513
13514
13515
13516
13517
13518
13519
13520
13521
13522
13523
13524
13525
13526
13527
13528
13529
13530
13531
13532
13533
13534
13535
13536
13537
13538
13539
13540
13541
13542
13543
13544
13545
13546
13547
13548
13549
13550
13551
13552
13553
13554
13555
13556
13557
13558
13559
13560
13561
13562
13563
13564
13565
13566
13567
13568
13569
13570
13571
13572
13573
13574
13575
13576
13577
13578
13579
13580
13581
13582
13583
13584
13585
13586
13587
13588
13589
13590
13591
13592
13593
13594
13595
13596
13597
13598
13599
13600
13601
13602
13603
13604
13605
13606
13607
13608
13609
13610
13611
13612
13613
13614
13615
13616
13617
13618
13619
13620
13621
13622
13623
13624
13625
13626
13627
13628
13629
13630
13631
13632
13633
13634
13635
13636
13637
13638
13639
13640
13641
13642
13643
13644
13645
13646
13647
13648
13649
13650
13651
13652
13653
13654
13655
13656
13657
13658
13659
13660
13661
13662
13663
13664
13665
13666
13667
13668
13669
13670
13671
13672
13673
13674
13675
13676
13677
13678
13679
13680
13681
13682
13683
13684
13685
13686
13687
13688
13689
13690
13691
13692
13693
13694
13695
13696
13697
13698
13699
13700
13701
13702
13703
13704
13705
13706
13707
13708
13709
13710
13711
13712
13713
13714
13715
13716
13717
13718
13719
13720
13721
13722
13723
13724
13725
13726
13727
13728
13729
13730
13731
13732
13733
13734
13735
13736
13737
13738
13739
13740
13741
13742
13743
13744
13745
13746
13747
13748
13749
13750
13751
13752
13753
13754
13755
13756
13757
13758
13759
13760
13761
13762
13763
13764
13765
13766
13767
13768
13769
13770
13771
13772
13773
13774
13775
13776
13777
13778
13779
13780
13781
13782
13783
13784
13785
13786
13787
13788
13789
13790
13791
13792
13793
13794
13795
13796
13797
13798
13799
13800
13801
13802
13803
13804
13805
13806
13807
13808
13809
13810
13811
13812
13813
13814
13815
13816
13817
13818
13819
13820
13821
13822
13823
13824
13825
13826
13827
13828
13829
13830
13831
13832
13833
13834
13835
13836
13837
13838
13839
13840
13841
13842
13843
13844
13845
13846
13847
13848
13849
13850
13851
13852
13853
13854
13855
13856
13857
13858
13859
13860
13861
13862
13863
13864
13865
13866
13867
13868
13869
13870
13871
13872
13873
13874
13875
13876
13877
13878
13879
13880
13881
13882
13883
13884
13885
13886
13887
13888
13889
13890
13891
13892
13893
13894
13895
13896
13897
13898
13899
13900
13901
13902
13903
13904
13905
13906
13907
13908
13909
13910
13911
13912
13913
13914
13915
13916
13917
13918
13919
13920
13921
13922
13923
13924
13925
13926
13927
13928
13929
13930
13931
13932
13933
13934
13935
13936
13937
13938
13939
13940
13941
13942
13943
13944
13945
13946
13947
13948
13949
13950
13951
13952
13953
13954
13955
13956
13957
13958
13959
13960
13961
13962
13963
13964
13965
13966
13967
13968
13969
13970
13971
13972
13973
13974
13975
13976
13977
13978
13979
13980
13981
13982
13983
13984
13985
13986
13987
13988
13989
13990
13991
13992
13993
13994
13995
13996
13997
13998
13999
14000
14001
14002
14003
14004
14005
14006
14007
14008
14009
14010
14011
14012
14013
14014
14015
14016
14017
14018
14019
14020
14021
14022
14023
14024
14025
14026
14027
14028
14029
14030
14031
14032
14033
14034
14035
14036
14037
14038
14039
14040
14041
14042
14043
14044
14045
14046
14047
14048
14049
14050
14051
14052
14053
14054
14055
14056
14057
14058
14059
14060
14061
14062
14063
14064
14065
14066
14067
14068
14069
14070
14071
14072
14073
14074
14075
14076
14077
14078
14079
14080
14081
14082
14083
14084
14085
14086
14087
14088
14089
14090
14091
14092
14093
14094
14095
14096
14097
14098
14099
14100
14101
14102
14103
14104
14105
14106
14107
14108
14109
14110
14111
14112
14113
14114
14115
14116
14117
14118
14119
14120
14121
14122
14123
14124
14125
14126
14127
14128
14129
14130
14131
14132
14133
14134
14135
14136
14137
14138
14139
14140
14141
14142
14143
14144
14145
14146
14147
14148
14149
14150
14151
14152
14153
14154
14155
14156
14157
14158
14159
14160
14161
14162
14163
14164
14165
14166
14167
14168
14169
14170
14171
14172
14173
14174
14175
14176
14177
14178
14179
14180
14181
14182
14183
14184
14185
14186
14187
14188
14189
14190
14191
14192
14193
14194
14195
14196
14197
14198
14199
14200
14201
14202
14203
14204
14205
14206
14207
14208
14209
14210
14211
14212
14213
14214
14215
14216
14217
14218
14219
14220
14221
14222
14223
14224
14225
14226
14227
14228
14229
14230
14231
14232
14233
14234
14235
14236
14237
14238
14239
14240
14241
14242
14243
14244
14245
14246
14247
14248
14249
14250
14251
14252
14253
14254
14255
14256
14257
14258
14259
14260
14261
14262
14263
14264
14265
14266
14267
14268
14269
14270
14271
14272
14273
14274
14275
14276
14277
14278
14279
14280
14281
14282
14283
14284
14285
14286
14287
14288
14289
14290
14291
14292
14293
14294
14295
14296
14297
14298
14299
14300
14301
14302
14303
14304
14305
14306
14307
14308
14309
14310
14311
14312
14313
14314
14315
14316
14317
14318
14319
14320
14321
14322
14323
14324
14325
14326
14327
14328
14329
14330
14331
14332
14333
14334
14335
14336
14337
14338
14339
14340
14341
14342
14343
14344
14345
14346
14347
14348
14349
14350
14351
14352
14353
14354
14355
14356
14357
14358
14359
14360
14361
14362
14363
14364
14365
14366
14367
14368
14369
14370
14371
14372
14373
14374
14375
14376
14377
14378
14379
14380
14381
14382
14383
14384
14385
14386
14387
14388
14389
14390
14391
14392
14393
14394
14395
14396
14397
14398
14399
14400
14401
14402
14403
14404
14405
14406
14407
14408
14409
14410
14411
14412
14413
14414
14415
14416
14417
14418
14419
14420
14421
14422
14423
14424
14425
14426
14427
14428
14429
14430
14431
14432
14433
14434
14435
14436
14437
14438
14439
14440
14441
14442
14443
14444
14445
14446
14447
14448
14449
14450
14451
14452
14453
14454
14455
14456
14457
14458
14459
14460
14461
14462
14463
14464
14465
14466
14467
14468
14469
14470
14471
14472
14473
14474
14475
14476
14477
14478
14479
14480
14481
14482
14483
14484
14485
14486
14487
14488
14489
14490
14491
14492
14493
14494
14495
14496
14497
14498
14499
14500
14501
14502
14503
14504
14505
14506
14507
14508
14509
14510
14511
14512
14513
14514
14515
14516
14517
14518
14519
14520
14521
14522
14523
14524
14525
14526
14527
14528
14529
14530
14531
14532
14533
14534
14535
14536
14537
14538
14539
14540
14541
14542
14543
14544
14545
14546
14547
14548
14549
14550
14551
14552
14553
14554
14555
14556
14557
14558
14559
14560
14561
14562
14563
14564
14565
14566
14567
14568
14569
14570
14571
14572
14573
14574
14575
14576
14577
14578
14579
14580
14581
14582
14583
14584
14585
14586
14587
14588
14589
14590
14591
14592
14593
14594
14595
14596
14597
14598
14599
14600
14601
14602
14603
14604
14605
14606
14607
14608
14609
14610
14611
14612
14613
14614
14615
14616
14617
14618
14619
14620
14621
14622
14623
14624
14625
14626
14627
14628
14629
14630
14631
14632
14633
14634
14635
14636
14637
14638
14639
14640
14641
14642
14643
14644
14645
14646
14647
14648
14649
14650
14651
14652
14653
14654
14655
14656
14657
14658
14659
14660
14661
14662
14663
14664
14665
14666
14667
14668
14669
14670
14671
14672
14673
14674
14675
14676
14677
14678
14679
14680
14681
14682
14683
14684
14685
14686
14687
14688
14689
14690
14691
14692
14693
14694
14695
14696
14697
14698
14699
14700
14701
14702
14703
14704
14705
14706
14707
14708
14709
14710
14711
14712
14713
14714
14715
14716
14717
14718
14719
14720
14721
14722
14723
14724
14725
14726
14727
14728
14729
14730
14731
14732
14733
14734
14735
14736
14737
14738
14739
14740
14741
14742
14743
14744
14745
14746
14747
14748
14749
14750
14751
14752
14753
14754
14755
14756
14757
14758
14759
14760
14761
14762
14763
14764
14765
14766
14767
14768
14769
14770
14771
14772
14773
14774
14775
14776
14777
14778
14779
14780
14781
14782
14783
14784
14785
14786
14787
14788
14789
14790
14791
14792
14793
14794
14795
14796
14797
14798
14799
14800
14801
14802
14803
14804
14805
14806
14807
14808
14809
14810
14811
14812
14813
14814
14815
14816
14817
14818
14819
14820
14821
14822
14823
14824
14825
14826
14827
14828
14829
14830
14831
14832
14833
14834
14835
14836
14837
14838
14839
14840
14841
14842
14843
14844
14845
14846
14847
14848
14849
14850
14851
14852
14853
14854
14855
14856
14857
14858
14859
14860
14861
14862
14863
14864
14865
14866
14867
14868
14869
14870
14871
14872
14873
14874
14875
14876
14877
14878
14879
14880
14881
14882
14883
14884
14885
14886
14887
14888
14889
14890
14891
14892
14893
14894
14895
14896
14897
14898
14899
14900
14901
14902
14903
14904
14905
14906
14907
14908
14909
14910
14911
14912
14913
14914
14915
14916
14917
14918
14919
14920
14921
14922
14923
14924
14925
14926
14927
14928
14929
14930
14931
14932
14933
14934
14935
14936
14937
14938
14939
14940
14941
14942
14943
14944
14945
14946
14947
14948
14949
14950
14951
14952
14953
14954
14955
14956
14957
14958
14959
14960
14961
14962
14963
14964
14965
14966
14967
14968
14969
14970
14971
14972
14973
14974
14975
14976
14977
14978
14979
14980
14981
14982
14983
14984
14985
14986
14987
14988
14989
14990
14991
14992
14993
14994
14995
14996
14997
14998
14999
15000
15001
15002
15003
15004
15005
15006
15007
15008
15009
15010
15011
15012
15013
15014
15015
15016
15017
15018
15019
15020
15021
15022
15023
15024
15025
15026
15027
15028
15029
15030
15031
15032
15033
15034
15035
15036
15037
15038
15039
15040
15041
15042
15043
15044
15045
15046
15047
15048
15049
15050
15051
15052
15053
15054
15055
15056
15057
15058
15059
15060
15061
15062
15063
15064
15065
15066
15067
15068
15069
15070
15071
15072
15073
15074
15075
15076
15077
15078
15079
15080
15081
15082
15083
15084
15085
15086
15087
15088
15089
15090
15091
15092
15093
15094
15095
15096
15097
15098
15099
15100
15101
15102
15103
15104
15105
15106
15107
15108
15109
15110
15111
15112
15113
15114
15115
15116
15117
15118
15119
15120
15121
15122
15123
15124
15125
15126
15127
15128
15129
15130
15131
15132
15133
15134
15135
15136
15137
15138
15139
15140
15141
15142
15143
15144
15145
15146
15147
15148
15149
15150
15151
15152
15153
15154
15155
15156
15157
15158
15159
15160
15161
15162
15163
15164
15165
15166
15167
15168
15169
15170
15171
15172
15173
15174
15175
15176
15177
15178
15179
15180
15181
15182
15183
15184
15185
15186
15187
15188
15189
15190
15191
15192
15193
15194
15195
15196
15197
15198
15199
15200
15201
15202
15203
15204
15205
15206
15207
15208
15209
15210
15211
15212
15213
15214
15215
15216
15217
15218
15219
15220
15221
15222
15223
15224
15225
15226
15227
15228
15229
15230
15231
15232
15233
15234
15235
15236
15237
15238
15239
15240
15241
15242
15243
15244
15245
15246
15247
15248
15249
15250
15251
15252
15253
15254
15255
15256
15257
15258
15259
15260
15261
15262
15263
15264
15265
15266
15267
15268
15269
15270
15271
15272
15273
15274
15275
15276
15277
15278
15279
15280
15281
15282
15283
15284
15285
15286
15287
15288
15289
15290
15291
15292
15293
15294
15295
15296
15297
15298
15299
15300
15301
15302
15303
15304
15305
15306
15307
15308
15309
15310
15311
15312
15313
15314
15315
15316
15317
15318
15319
15320
15321
15322
15323
15324
15325
15326
15327
15328
15329
15330
15331
15332
15333
15334
15335
15336
15337
15338
15339
15340
15341
15342
15343
15344
15345
15346
15347
15348
15349
15350
15351
15352
15353
15354
15355
15356
15357
15358
15359
15360
15361
15362
15363
15364
15365
15366
15367
15368
15369
15370
15371
15372
15373
15374
15375
15376
15377
15378
15379
15380
15381
15382
15383
15384
15385
15386
15387
15388
15389
15390
15391
15392
15393
15394
15395
15396
15397
15398
15399
15400
15401
15402
15403
15404
15405
15406
15407
15408
15409
15410
15411
15412
15413
15414
15415
15416
15417
15418
15419
15420
15421
15422
15423
15424
15425
15426
15427
15428
15429
15430
15431
15432
15433
15434
15435
15436
15437
15438
15439
15440
15441
15442
15443
15444
15445
15446
15447
15448
15449
15450
15451
15452
15453
15454
15455
15456
15457
15458
15459
15460
15461
15462
15463
15464
15465
15466
15467
15468
15469
15470
15471
15472
15473
15474
15475
15476
15477
15478
15479
15480
15481
15482
15483
15484
15485
15486
15487
15488
15489
15490
15491
15492
15493
15494
15495
15496
15497
15498
15499
15500
15501
15502
15503
15504
15505
15506
15507
15508
15509
15510
15511
15512
15513
15514
15515
15516
15517
15518
15519
15520
15521
15522
15523
15524
15525
15526
15527
15528
15529
15530
15531
15532
15533
15534
15535
15536
15537
15538
15539
15540
15541
15542
15543
15544
15545
15546
15547
15548
15549
15550
15551
15552
15553
15554
15555
15556
15557
15558
15559
15560
15561
15562
15563
15564
15565
15566
15567
15568
15569
15570
15571
15572
15573
15574
15575
15576
15577
15578
15579
15580
15581
15582
15583
15584
15585
15586
15587
15588
15589
15590
15591
15592
15593
15594
15595
15596
15597
15598
15599
15600
15601
15602
15603
15604
15605
15606
15607
15608
15609
15610
15611
15612
15613
15614
15615
15616
15617
15618
15619
15620
15621
15622
15623
15624
15625
15626
15627
15628
15629
15630
15631
15632
15633
15634
15635
15636
15637
15638
15639
15640
15641
15642
15643
15644
15645
15646
15647
15648
15649
15650
15651
15652
15653
15654
15655
15656
15657
15658
15659
15660
15661
15662
15663
15664
15665
15666
15667
15668
15669
15670
15671
15672
15673
15674
15675
15676
15677
15678
15679
15680
15681
15682
15683
15684
15685
15686
15687
15688
15689
15690
15691
15692
15693
15694
15695
15696
15697
15698
15699
15700
15701
15702
15703
15704
15705
15706
15707
15708
15709
15710
15711
15712
15713
15714
15715
15716
15717
15718
15719
15720
15721
15722
15723
15724
15725
15726
15727
15728
15729
15730
15731
15732
15733
15734
15735
15736
15737
15738
15739
15740
15741
15742
15743
15744
15745
15746
15747
15748
15749
15750
15751
15752
15753
15754
15755
15756
15757
15758
15759
15760
15761
15762
15763
15764
15765
15766
15767
15768
15769
15770
15771
15772
15773
15774
15775
15776
15777
15778
15779
15780
15781
15782
15783
15784
15785
15786
15787
15788
15789
15790
15791
15792
15793
15794
15795
15796
15797
15798
15799
15800
15801
15802
15803
15804
15805
15806
15807
15808
15809
15810
15811
15812
15813
15814
15815
15816
15817
15818
15819
15820
15821
15822
15823
15824
15825
15826
15827
15828
15829
15830
15831
15832
15833
15834
15835
15836
15837
15838
15839
15840
15841
15842
15843
15844
15845
15846
15847
15848
15849
15850
15851
15852
15853
15854
15855
15856
15857
15858
15859
15860
15861
15862
15863
15864
15865
15866
15867
15868
15869
15870
15871
15872
15873
15874
15875
15876
15877
15878
15879
15880
15881
15882
15883
15884
15885
15886
15887
15888
15889
15890
15891
15892
15893
15894
15895
15896
15897
15898
15899
15900
15901
15902
15903
15904
15905
15906
15907
15908
15909
15910
15911
15912
15913
15914
15915
15916
15917
15918
15919
15920
15921
15922
15923
15924
15925
15926
15927
15928
15929
15930
15931
15932
15933
15934
15935
15936
15937
15938
15939
15940
15941
15942
15943
15944
15945
15946
15947
15948
15949
15950
15951
15952
15953
15954
15955
15956
15957
15958
15959
15960
15961
15962
15963
15964
15965
15966
15967
15968
15969
15970
15971
15972
15973
15974
15975
15976
15977
15978
15979
15980
15981
15982
15983
15984
15985
15986
15987
15988
15989
15990
15991
15992
15993
15994
15995
15996
15997
15998
15999
16000
16001
16002
16003
16004
16005
16006
16007
16008
16009
16010
16011
16012
16013
16014
16015
16016
16017
16018
16019
16020
16021
16022
16023
16024
16025
16026
16027
16028
16029
16030
16031
16032
16033
16034
16035
16036
16037
16038
16039
16040
16041
16042
16043
16044
16045
16046
16047
16048
16049
16050
16051
16052
16053
16054
16055
16056
16057
16058
16059
16060
16061
16062
16063
16064
16065
16066
16067
16068
16069
16070
16071
16072
16073
16074
16075
16076
16077
16078
16079
16080
16081
16082
16083
16084
16085
16086
16087
16088
16089
16090
16091
16092
16093
16094
16095
16096
16097
16098
16099
16100
16101
16102
16103
16104
16105
16106
16107
16108
16109
16110
16111
16112
16113
16114
16115
16116
16117
16118
16119
16120
16121
16122
16123
16124
16125
16126
16127
16128
16129
16130
16131
16132
16133
16134
16135
16136
16137
16138
16139
16140
16141
16142
16143
16144
16145
16146
16147
16148
16149
16150
16151
16152
16153
16154
16155
16156
16157
16158
16159
16160
16161
16162
16163
16164
16165
16166
16167
16168
16169
16170
16171
16172
16173
16174
16175
16176
16177
16178
16179
16180
16181
16182
16183
16184
16185
16186
16187
16188
16189
16190
16191
16192
16193
16194
16195
16196
16197
16198
16199
16200
16201
16202
16203
16204
16205
16206
16207
16208
16209
16210
16211
16212
16213
16214
16215
16216
16217
16218
16219
16220
16221
16222
16223
16224
16225
16226
16227
16228
16229
16230
16231
16232
16233
16234
16235
16236
16237
16238
16239
16240
16241
16242
16243
16244
16245
16246
16247
16248
16249
16250
16251
16252
16253
16254
16255
16256
16257
16258
16259
16260
16261
16262
16263
16264
16265
16266
16267
16268
16269
16270
16271
16272
16273
16274
16275
16276
16277
16278
16279
16280
16281
16282
16283
16284
16285
16286
16287
16288
16289
16290
16291
16292
16293
16294
16295
16296
16297
16298
16299
16300
16301
16302
16303
16304
16305
16306
16307
16308
16309
16310
16311
16312
16313
16314
16315
16316
16317
16318
16319
16320
16321
16322
16323
16324
16325
16326
16327
16328
16329
16330
16331
16332
16333
16334
16335
16336
16337
16338
16339
16340
16341
16342
16343
16344
16345
16346
16347
16348
16349
16350
16351
16352
16353
16354
16355
16356
16357
16358
16359
16360
16361
16362
16363
16364
16365
16366
16367
16368
16369
16370
16371
16372
16373
16374
16375
16376
16377
16378
16379
16380
16381
16382
16383
16384
16385
16386
16387
16388
16389
16390
16391
16392
16393
16394
16395
16396
16397
16398
16399
16400
16401
16402
16403
16404
16405
16406
16407
16408
16409
16410
16411
16412
16413
16414
16415
16416
16417
16418
16419
16420
16421
16422
16423
16424
16425
16426
16427
16428
16429
16430
16431
16432
16433
16434
16435
16436
16437
16438
16439
16440
16441
16442
16443
16444
16445
16446
16447
16448
16449
16450
16451
16452
16453
16454
16455
16456
16457
16458
16459
16460
16461
16462
16463
16464
16465
16466
16467
16468
16469
16470
16471
16472
16473
16474
16475
16476
16477
16478
16479
16480
16481
16482
16483
16484
16485
16486
16487
16488
16489
16490
16491
16492
16493
16494
16495
16496
16497
16498
16499
16500
16501
16502
16503
16504
16505
16506
16507
16508
16509
16510
16511
16512
16513
16514
16515
16516
16517
16518
16519
16520
16521
16522
16523
16524
16525
16526
16527
16528
16529
16530
16531
16532
16533
16534
16535
16536
16537
16538
16539
16540
16541
16542
16543
16544
16545
16546
16547
16548
16549
16550
16551
16552
16553
16554
16555
16556
16557
16558
16559
16560
16561
16562
16563
16564
16565
16566
16567
16568
16569
16570
16571
16572
16573
16574
16575
16576
16577
16578
16579
16580
16581
16582
16583
16584
16585
16586
16587
16588
16589
16590
16591
16592
16593
16594
16595
16596
16597
16598
16599
16600
16601
16602
16603
16604
16605
16606
16607
16608
16609
16610
16611
16612
16613
16614
16615
16616
16617
16618
16619
16620
16621
16622
16623
16624
16625
16626
16627
16628
16629
16630
16631
16632
16633
16634
16635
16636
16637
16638
16639
16640
16641
16642
16643
16644
16645
16646
16647
16648
16649
16650
16651
16652
16653
16654
16655
16656
16657
16658
16659
16660
16661
16662
16663
16664
16665
16666
16667
16668
16669
16670
16671
16672
16673
16674
16675
16676
16677
16678
16679
16680
16681
16682
16683
16684
16685
16686
16687
16688
16689
16690
16691
16692
16693
16694
16695
16696
16697
16698
16699
16700
16701
16702
16703
16704
16705
16706
16707
16708
16709
16710
16711
16712
16713
16714
16715
16716
16717
16718
16719
16720
16721
16722
16723
16724
16725
16726
16727
16728
16729
16730
16731
16732
16733
16734
16735
16736
16737
16738
16739
16740
16741
16742
16743
16744
16745
16746
16747
16748
16749
16750
16751
16752
16753
16754
16755
16756
16757
16758
16759
16760
16761
16762
16763
16764
16765
16766
16767
16768
16769
16770
16771
16772
16773
16774
16775
16776
16777
16778
16779
16780
16781
16782
16783
16784
16785
16786
16787
16788
16789
16790
16791
16792
16793
16794
16795
16796
16797
16798
16799
16800
16801
16802
16803
16804
16805
16806
16807
16808
16809
16810
16811
16812
16813
16814
16815
16816
16817
16818
16819
16820
16821
16822
16823
16824
16825
16826
16827
16828
16829
16830
16831
16832
16833
16834
16835
16836
16837
16838
16839
16840
16841
16842
16843
16844
16845
16846
16847
16848
16849
16850
16851
16852
16853
16854
16855
16856
16857
16858
16859
16860
16861
16862
16863
16864
16865
16866
16867
16868
16869
16870
16871
16872
16873
16874
16875
16876
16877
16878
16879
16880
16881
16882
16883
16884
16885
16886
16887
16888
16889
16890
16891
16892
16893
16894
16895
16896
16897
16898
16899
16900
16901
16902
16903
16904
16905
16906
16907
16908
16909
16910
16911
16912
16913
16914
16915
16916
16917
16918
16919
16920
16921
16922
16923
16924
16925
16926
16927
16928
16929
16930
16931
16932
16933
16934
16935
16936
16937
16938
16939
16940
16941
16942
16943
16944
16945
16946
16947
16948
16949
16950
16951
16952
16953
16954
16955
16956
16957
16958
16959
16960
16961
16962
16963
16964
16965
16966
16967
16968
16969
16970
16971
16972
16973
16974
16975
16976
16977
16978
16979
16980
16981
16982
16983
16984
16985
16986
16987
16988
16989
16990
16991
16992
16993
16994
16995
16996
16997
16998
16999
17000
17001
17002
17003
17004
17005
17006
17007
17008
17009
17010
17011
17012
17013
17014
17015
17016
17017
17018
17019
17020
17021
17022
17023
17024
17025
17026
17027
17028
17029
17030
17031
17032
17033
17034
17035
17036
17037
17038
17039
17040
17041
17042
17043
17044
17045
17046
17047
17048
17049
17050
17051
17052
17053
17054
17055
17056
17057
17058
17059
17060
17061
17062
17063
17064
17065
17066
17067
17068
17069
17070
17071
17072
17073
17074
17075
17076
17077
17078
17079
17080
17081
17082
17083
17084
17085
17086
17087
17088
17089
17090
17091
17092
17093
17094
17095
17096
17097
17098
17099
17100
17101
17102
17103
17104
17105
17106
17107
17108
17109
17110
17111
17112
17113
17114
17115
17116
17117
17118
17119
17120
17121
17122
17123
17124
17125
17126
17127
17128
17129
17130
17131
17132
17133
17134
17135
17136
17137
17138
17139
17140
17141
17142
17143
17144
17145
17146
17147
17148
17149
17150
17151
17152
17153
17154
17155
17156
17157
17158
17159
17160
17161
17162
17163
17164
17165
17166
17167
17168
17169
17170
17171
17172
17173
17174
17175
17176
17177
17178
17179
17180
17181
17182
17183
17184
17185
17186
17187
17188
17189
17190
17191
17192
17193
17194
17195
17196
17197
17198
17199
17200
17201
17202
17203
17204
17205
17206
17207
17208
17209
17210
17211
17212
17213
17214
17215
17216
17217
17218
17219
17220
17221
17222
17223
17224
17225
17226
17227
17228
17229
17230
17231
17232
17233
17234
17235
17236
17237
17238
17239
17240
17241
17242
17243
17244
17245
17246
17247
17248
17249
17250
17251
17252
17253
17254
17255
17256
17257
17258
17259
17260
17261
17262
17263
17264
17265
17266
17267
17268
17269
17270
17271
17272
17273
17274
17275
17276
17277
17278
17279
17280
17281
17282
17283
17284
17285
17286
17287
17288
17289
17290
17291
17292
17293
17294
17295
17296
17297
17298
17299
17300
17301
17302
17303
17304
17305
17306
17307
17308
17309
17310
17311
17312
17313
17314
17315
17316
17317
17318
17319
17320
17321
17322
17323
17324
17325
17326
17327
17328
17329
17330
17331
17332
17333
17334
17335
17336
17337
17338
17339
17340
17341
17342
17343
17344
17345
17346
17347
17348
17349
17350
17351
17352
17353
17354
17355
17356
17357
17358
17359
17360
17361
17362
17363
17364
17365
17366
17367
17368
17369
17370
17371
17372
17373
17374
17375
17376
17377
17378
17379
17380
17381
17382
17383
17384
17385
17386
17387
17388
17389
17390
17391
17392
17393
17394
17395
17396
17397
17398
17399
17400
17401
17402
17403
17404
17405
17406
17407
17408
17409
17410
17411
17412
17413
17414
17415
17416
17417
17418
17419
17420
17421
17422
17423
17424
17425
17426
17427
17428
17429
17430
17431
17432
17433
17434
17435
17436
17437
17438
17439
17440
17441
17442
17443
17444
17445
17446
17447
17448
17449
17450
17451
17452
17453
17454
17455
17456
17457
17458
17459
17460
17461
17462
17463
17464
17465
17466
17467
17468
17469
17470
17471
17472
17473
17474
17475
17476
17477
17478
17479
17480
17481
17482
17483
17484
17485
17486
17487
17488
17489
17490
17491
17492
17493
17494
17495
17496
17497
17498
17499
17500
17501
17502
17503
17504
17505
17506
17507
17508
17509
17510
17511
17512
17513
17514
17515
17516
17517
17518
17519
17520
17521
17522
17523
17524
17525
17526
17527
17528
17529
17530
17531
17532
17533
17534
17535
17536
17537
17538
17539
17540
17541
17542
17543
17544
17545
17546
17547
17548
17549
17550
17551
17552
17553
17554
17555
17556
17557
17558
17559
17560
17561
17562
17563
17564
17565
17566
17567
17568
17569
17570
17571
17572
17573
17574
17575
17576
17577
17578
17579
17580
17581
17582
17583
17584
17585
17586
17587
17588
17589
17590
17591
17592
17593
17594
17595
17596
17597
17598
17599
17600
17601
17602
17603
17604
17605
17606
17607
17608
17609
17610
17611
17612
17613
17614
17615
17616
17617
17618
17619
17620
17621
17622
17623
17624
17625
17626
17627
17628
17629
17630
17631
17632
17633
17634
17635
17636
17637
17638
17639
17640
17641
17642
17643
17644
17645
17646
17647
17648
17649
17650
17651
17652
17653
17654
17655
17656
17657
17658
17659
17660
17661
17662
17663
17664
17665
17666
17667
17668
17669
17670
17671
17672
17673
17674
17675
17676
17677
17678
17679
17680
17681
17682
17683
17684
17685
17686
17687
17688
17689
17690
17691
17692
17693
17694
17695
17696
17697
17698
17699
17700
17701
17702
17703
17704
17705
17706
17707
17708
17709
17710
17711
17712
17713
17714
17715
17716
17717
17718
17719
17720
17721
17722
17723
17724
17725
17726
17727
17728
17729
17730
17731
17732
17733
17734
17735
17736
17737
17738
17739
17740
17741
17742
17743
17744
17745
17746
17747
17748
17749
17750
17751
17752
17753
17754
17755
17756
17757
17758
17759
17760
17761
17762
17763
17764
17765
17766
17767
17768
17769
17770
17771
17772
17773
17774
17775
17776
17777
17778
17779
17780
17781
17782
17783
17784
17785
17786
17787
17788
17789
17790
17791
17792
17793
17794
17795
17796
17797
17798
17799
17800
17801
17802
17803
17804
17805
17806
17807
17808
17809
17810
17811
17812
17813
17814
17815
17816
17817
17818
17819
17820
17821
17822
17823
17824
17825
17826
17827
17828
17829
17830
17831
17832
17833
17834
17835
17836
17837
17838
17839
17840
17841
17842
17843
17844
17845
17846
17847
17848
17849
17850
17851
17852
17853
17854
17855
17856
17857
17858
17859
17860
17861
17862
17863
17864
17865
17866
17867
17868
17869
17870
17871
17872
17873
17874
17875
17876
17877
17878
17879
17880
17881
17882
17883
17884
17885
17886
17887
17888
17889
17890
17891
17892
17893
17894
17895
17896
17897
17898
17899
17900
17901
17902
17903
17904
17905
17906
17907
17908
17909
17910
17911
17912
17913
17914
17915
17916
17917
17918
17919
17920
17921
17922
17923
17924
17925
17926
17927
17928
17929
17930
17931
17932
17933
17934
17935
17936
17937
17938
17939
17940
17941
17942
17943
17944
17945
17946
17947
17948
17949
17950
17951
17952
17953
17954
17955
17956
17957
17958
17959
17960
17961
17962
17963
17964
17965
17966
17967
17968
17969
17970
17971
17972
17973
17974
17975
17976
17977
17978
17979
17980
17981
17982
17983
17984
17985
17986
17987
17988
17989
17990
17991
17992
17993
17994
17995
17996
17997
17998
17999
18000
18001
18002
18003
18004
18005
18006
18007
18008
18009
18010
18011
18012
18013
18014
18015
18016
18017
18018
18019
18020
18021
18022
18023
18024
18025
18026
18027
18028
18029
18030
18031
18032
18033
18034
18035
18036
18037
18038
18039
18040
18041
18042
18043
18044
18045
18046
18047
18048
18049
18050
18051
18052
18053
18054
18055
18056
18057
18058
18059
18060
18061
18062
18063
18064
18065
18066
18067
18068
18069
18070
18071
18072
18073
18074
18075
18076
18077
18078
18079
18080
18081
18082
18083
18084
18085
18086
18087
18088
18089
18090
18091
18092
18093
18094
18095
18096
18097
18098
18099
18100
18101
18102
18103
18104
18105
18106
18107
18108
18109
18110
18111
18112
18113
18114
18115
18116
18117
18118
18119
18120
18121
18122
18123
18124
18125
18126
18127
18128
18129
18130
18131
18132
18133
18134
18135
18136
18137
18138
18139
18140
18141
18142
18143
18144
18145
18146
18147
18148
18149
18150
18151
18152
18153
18154
18155
18156
18157
18158
18159
18160
18161
18162
18163
18164
18165
18166
18167
18168
18169
18170
18171
18172
18173
18174
18175
18176
18177
18178
18179
18180
18181
18182
18183
18184
18185
18186
18187
18188
18189
18190
18191
18192
18193
18194
18195
18196
18197
18198
18199
18200
18201
18202
18203
18204
18205
18206
18207
18208
18209
18210
18211
18212
18213
18214
18215
18216
18217
18218
18219
18220
18221
18222
18223
18224
18225
18226
18227
18228
18229
18230
18231
18232
18233
18234
18235
18236
18237
18238
18239
18240
18241
18242
18243
18244
18245
18246
18247
18248
18249
18250
18251
18252
18253
18254
18255
18256
18257
18258
18259
18260
18261
18262
18263
18264
18265
18266
18267
18268
18269
18270
18271
18272
18273
18274
18275
18276
18277
18278
18279
18280
18281
18282
18283
18284
18285
18286
18287
18288
18289
18290
18291
18292
18293
18294
18295
18296
18297
18298
18299
18300
18301
18302
18303
18304
18305
18306
18307
18308
18309
18310
18311
18312
18313
18314
18315
18316
18317
18318
18319
18320
18321
18322
18323
18324
18325
18326
18327
18328
18329
18330
18331
18332
18333
18334
18335
18336
18337
18338
18339
18340
18341
18342
18343
18344
18345
18346
18347
18348
18349
18350
18351
18352
18353
18354
18355
18356
18357
18358
18359
18360
18361
18362
18363
18364
18365
18366
18367
18368
18369
18370
18371
18372
18373
18374
18375
18376
18377
18378
18379
18380
18381
18382
18383
18384
18385
18386
18387
18388
18389
18390
18391
18392
18393
18394
18395
18396
18397
18398
18399
18400
18401
18402
18403
18404
18405
18406
18407
18408
18409
18410
18411
18412
18413
18414
18415
18416
18417
18418
18419
18420
18421
18422
18423
18424
18425
18426
18427
18428
18429
18430
18431
18432
18433
18434
18435
18436
18437
18438
18439
18440
18441
18442
18443
18444
18445
18446
18447
18448
18449
18450
18451
18452
18453
18454
18455
18456
18457
18458
18459
18460
18461
18462
18463
18464
18465
18466
18467
18468
18469
18470
18471
18472
18473
18474
18475
18476
18477
18478
18479
18480
18481
18482
18483
18484
18485
18486
18487
18488
18489
18490
18491
18492
18493
18494
18495
18496
18497
18498
18499
18500
18501
18502
18503
18504
18505
18506
18507
18508
18509
18510
18511
18512
18513
18514
18515
18516
18517
18518
18519
18520
18521
18522
18523
18524
18525
18526
18527
18528
18529
18530
18531
18532
18533
18534
18535
18536
18537
18538
18539
18540
18541
18542
18543
18544
18545
18546
18547
18548
18549
18550
18551
18552
18553
18554
18555
18556
18557
18558
18559
18560
18561
18562
18563
18564
18565
18566
18567
18568
18569
18570
18571
18572
18573
18574
18575
18576
18577
18578
18579
18580
18581
18582
18583
18584
18585
18586
18587
18588
18589
18590
18591
18592
18593
18594
18595
18596
18597
18598
18599
18600
18601
18602
18603
18604
18605
18606
18607
18608
18609
18610
18611
18612
18613
18614
18615
18616
18617
18618
18619
18620
18621
18622
18623
18624
18625
18626
18627
18628
18629
18630
18631
18632
18633
18634
18635
18636
18637
18638
18639
18640
18641
18642
18643
18644
18645
18646
18647
18648
18649
18650
18651
18652
18653
18654
18655
18656
18657
18658
18659
18660
18661
18662
18663
18664
18665
18666
18667
18668
18669
18670
18671
18672
18673
18674
18675
18676
18677
18678
18679
18680
18681
18682
18683
18684
18685
18686
18687
18688
18689
18690
18691
18692
18693
18694
18695
18696
18697
18698
18699
18700
18701
18702
18703
18704
18705
18706
18707
18708
18709
18710
18711
18712
18713
18714
18715
18716
18717
18718
18719
18720
18721
18722
18723
18724
18725
18726
18727
18728
18729
18730
18731
18732
18733
18734
18735
18736
18737
18738
18739
18740
18741
18742
18743
18744
18745
18746
18747
18748
18749
18750
18751
18752
18753
18754
18755
18756
18757
18758
18759
18760
18761
18762
18763
18764
18765
18766
18767
18768
18769
18770
18771
18772
18773
18774
18775
18776
18777
18778
18779
18780
18781
18782
18783
18784
18785
18786
18787
18788
18789
18790
18791
18792
18793
18794
18795
18796
18797
18798
18799
18800
18801
18802
18803
18804
18805
18806
18807
18808
18809
18810
18811
18812
18813
18814
18815
18816
18817
18818
18819
18820
18821
18822
18823
18824
18825
18826
18827
18828
18829
18830
18831
18832
18833
18834
18835
18836
18837
18838
18839
18840
18841
18842
18843
18844
18845
18846
18847
18848
18849
18850
18851
18852
18853
18854
18855
18856
18857
18858
18859
18860
18861
18862
18863
18864
18865
18866
18867
18868
18869
18870
18871
18872
18873
18874
18875
18876
18877
18878
18879
18880
18881
18882
18883
18884
18885
18886
18887
18888
18889
18890
18891
18892
18893
18894
18895
18896
18897
18898
18899
18900
18901
18902
18903
18904
18905
18906
18907
18908
18909
18910
18911
18912
18913
18914
18915
18916
18917
18918
18919
18920
18921
18922
18923
18924
18925
18926
18927
18928
18929
18930
18931
18932
18933
18934
18935
18936
18937
18938
18939
18940
18941
18942
18943
18944
18945
18946
18947
18948
18949
18950
18951
18952
18953
18954
18955
18956
18957
18958
18959
18960
18961
18962
18963
18964
18965
18966
18967
18968
18969
18970
18971
18972
18973
18974
18975
18976
18977
18978
18979
18980
18981
18982
18983
18984
18985
18986
18987
18988
18989
18990
18991
18992
18993
18994
18995
18996
18997
18998
18999
19000
19001
19002
19003
19004
19005
19006
19007
19008
19009
19010
19011
19012
19013
19014
19015
19016
19017
19018
19019
19020
19021
19022
19023
19024
19025
19026
19027
19028
19029
19030
19031
19032
19033
19034
19035
19036
19037
19038
19039
19040
19041
19042
19043
19044
19045
19046
19047
19048
19049
19050
19051
19052
19053
19054
19055
19056
19057
19058
19059
19060
19061
19062
19063
19064
19065
19066
19067
19068
19069
19070
19071
19072
19073
19074
19075
19076
19077
19078
19079
19080
19081
19082
19083
19084
19085
19086
19087
19088
19089
19090
19091
19092
19093
19094
19095
19096
19097
19098
19099
19100
19101
19102
19103
19104
19105
19106
19107
19108
19109
19110
19111
19112
19113
19114
19115
19116
19117
19118
19119
19120
19121
19122
19123
19124
19125
19126
19127
19128
19129
19130
19131
19132
19133
19134
19135
19136
19137
19138
19139
19140
19141
19142
19143
19144
19145
19146
19147
19148
19149
19150
19151
19152
19153
19154
19155
19156
19157
19158
19159
19160
19161
19162
19163
19164
19165
19166
19167
19168
19169
19170
19171
19172
19173
19174
19175
19176
19177
19178
19179
19180
19181
19182
19183
19184
19185
19186
19187
19188
19189
19190
19191
19192
19193
19194
19195
19196
19197
19198
19199
19200
19201
19202
19203
19204
19205
19206
19207
19208
19209
19210
19211
19212
19213
19214
19215
19216
19217
19218
19219
19220
19221
19222
19223
19224
19225
19226
19227
19228
19229
19230
19231
19232
19233
19234
19235
19236
19237
19238
19239
19240
19241
19242
19243
19244
19245
19246
19247
19248
19249
19250
19251
19252
19253
19254
19255
19256
19257
19258
19259
19260
19261
19262
19263
19264
19265
19266
19267
19268
19269
19270
19271
19272
19273
19274
19275
19276
19277
19278
19279
19280
19281
19282
19283
19284
19285
19286
19287
19288
19289
19290
19291
19292
19293
19294
19295
19296
19297
19298
19299
19300
19301
19302
19303
19304
19305
19306
19307
19308
19309
19310
19311
19312
19313
19314
19315
19316
19317
19318
19319
19320
19321
19322
19323
19324
19325
19326
19327
19328
19329
19330
19331
19332
19333
19334
19335
19336
19337
19338
19339
19340
19341
19342
19343
19344
19345
19346
19347
19348
19349
19350
19351
19352
19353
19354
19355
19356
19357
19358
19359
19360
19361
19362
19363
19364
19365
19366
19367
19368
19369
19370
19371
19372
19373
19374
19375
19376
19377
19378
19379
19380
19381
19382
19383
19384
19385
19386
19387
19388
19389
19390
19391
19392
19393
19394
19395
19396
19397
19398
19399
19400
19401
19402
19403
19404
19405
19406
19407
19408
19409
19410
19411
19412
19413
19414
19415
19416
19417
19418
19419
19420
19421
19422
19423
19424
19425
19426
19427
19428
19429
19430
19431
19432
19433
19434
19435
19436
19437
19438
19439
19440
19441
19442
19443
19444
19445
19446
19447
19448
19449
19450
19451
19452
19453
19454
19455
19456
19457
19458
19459
19460
19461
19462
19463
19464
19465
19466
19467
19468
19469
19470
19471
19472
19473
19474
19475
19476
19477
19478
19479
19480
19481
19482
19483
19484
19485
19486
19487
19488
19489
19490
19491
19492
19493
19494
19495
19496
19497
19498
19499
19500
19501
19502
19503
19504
19505
19506
19507
19508
19509
19510
19511
19512
19513
19514
19515
19516
19517
19518
19519
19520
19521
19522
19523
19524
19525
19526
19527
19528
19529
19530
19531
19532
19533
19534
19535
19536
19537
19538
19539
19540
19541
19542
19543
19544
19545
19546
19547
19548
19549
19550
19551
19552
19553
19554
19555
19556
19557
19558
19559
19560
19561
19562
19563
19564
19565
19566
19567
19568
19569
19570
19571
19572
19573
19574
19575
19576
19577
19578
19579
19580
19581
19582
19583
19584
19585
19586
19587
19588
19589
19590
19591
19592
19593
19594
19595
19596
19597
19598
19599
19600
19601
19602
19603
19604
19605
19606
19607
19608
19609
19610
19611
19612
19613
19614
19615
19616
19617
19618
19619
19620
19621
19622
19623
19624
19625
19626
19627
19628
19629
19630
19631
19632
19633
19634
19635
19636
19637
19638
19639
19640
19641
19642
19643
19644
19645
19646
19647
19648
19649
19650
19651
19652
19653
19654
19655
19656
19657
19658
19659
19660
19661
19662
19663
19664
19665
19666
19667
19668
19669
19670
19671
19672
19673
19674
19675
19676
19677
19678
19679
19680
19681
19682
19683
19684
19685
19686
19687
19688
19689
19690
19691
19692
19693
19694
19695
19696
19697
19698
19699
19700
19701
19702
19703
19704
19705
19706
19707
19708
19709
19710
19711
19712
19713
19714
19715
19716
19717
19718
19719
19720
19721
19722
19723
19724
19725
19726
19727
19728
19729
19730
19731
19732
19733
19734
19735
19736
19737
19738
19739
19740
19741
19742
19743
19744
19745
19746
19747
19748
19749
19750
19751
19752
19753
19754
19755
19756
19757
19758
19759
19760
19761
19762
19763
19764
19765
19766
19767
19768
19769
19770
19771
19772
19773
19774
19775
19776
19777
19778
19779
19780
19781
19782
19783
19784
19785
19786
19787
19788
19789
19790
19791
19792
19793
19794
19795
19796
19797
19798
19799
19800
19801
19802
19803
19804
19805
19806
19807
19808
19809
19810
19811
19812
19813
19814
19815
19816
19817
19818
19819
19820
19821
19822
19823
19824
19825
19826
19827
19828
19829
19830
19831
19832
19833
19834
19835
19836
19837
19838
19839
19840
19841
19842
19843
19844
19845
19846
19847
19848
19849
19850
19851
19852
19853
19854
19855
19856
19857
19858
19859
19860
19861
19862
19863
19864
19865
19866
19867
19868
19869
19870
19871
19872
19873
19874
19875
19876
19877
19878
19879
19880
19881
19882
19883
19884
19885
19886
19887
19888
19889
19890
19891
19892
19893
19894
19895
19896
19897
19898
19899
19900
19901
19902
19903
19904
19905
19906
19907
19908
19909
19910
19911
19912
19913
19914
19915
19916
19917
19918
19919
19920
19921
19922
19923
19924
19925
19926
19927
19928
19929
19930
19931
19932
19933
19934
19935
19936
19937
19938
19939
19940
19941
19942
19943
19944
19945
19946
19947
19948
19949
19950
19951
19952
19953
19954
19955
19956
19957
19958
19959
19960
19961
19962
19963
19964
19965
19966
19967
19968
19969
19970
19971
19972
19973
19974
19975
19976
19977
19978
19979
19980
19981
19982
19983
19984
19985
19986
19987
19988
19989
19990
19991
19992
19993
19994
19995
19996
19997
19998
19999
20000
20001
20002
20003
20004
20005
20006
20007
20008
20009
20010
20011
20012
20013
20014
20015
20016
20017
20018
20019
20020
20021
20022
20023
20024
20025
20026
20027
20028
20029
20030
20031
20032
20033
20034
20035
20036
20037
20038
20039
20040
20041
20042
20043
20044
20045
20046
20047
20048
20049
20050
20051
20052
20053
20054
20055
20056
20057
20058
20059
20060
20061
20062
20063
20064
20065
20066
20067
20068
20069
20070
20071
20072
20073
20074
20075
20076
20077
20078
20079
20080
20081
20082
20083
20084
20085
20086
20087
20088
20089
20090
20091
20092
20093
20094
20095
20096
20097
20098
20099
20100
20101
20102
20103
20104
20105
20106
20107
20108
20109
20110
20111
20112
20113
20114
20115
20116
20117
20118
20119
20120
20121
20122
20123
20124
20125
20126
20127
20128
20129
20130
20131
20132
20133
20134
20135
20136
20137
20138
20139
20140
20141
20142
20143
20144
20145
20146
20147
20148
20149
20150
20151
20152
20153
20154
20155
20156
20157
20158
20159
20160
20161
20162
20163
20164
20165
20166
20167
20168
20169
20170
20171
20172
20173
20174
20175
20176
20177
20178
20179
20180
20181
20182
20183
20184
20185
20186
20187
20188
20189
20190
20191
20192
20193
20194
20195
20196
20197
20198
20199
20200
20201
20202
20203
20204
20205
20206
20207
20208
20209
20210
20211
20212
20213
20214
20215
20216
20217
20218
20219
20220
20221
20222
20223
20224
20225
20226
20227
20228
20229
20230
20231
20232
20233
20234
20235
20236
20237
20238
20239
20240
20241
20242
20243
20244
20245
20246
20247
20248
20249
20250
20251
20252
20253
20254
20255
20256
20257
20258
20259
20260
20261
20262
20263
20264
20265
20266
20267
20268
20269
20270
20271
20272
20273
20274
20275
20276
20277
20278
20279
20280
20281
20282
20283
20284
20285
20286
20287
20288
20289
20290
20291
20292
20293
20294
20295
20296
20297
20298
20299
20300
20301
20302
20303
20304
20305
20306
20307
20308
20309
20310
20311
20312
20313
20314
20315
20316
20317
20318
20319
20320
20321
20322
20323
20324
20325
20326
20327
20328
20329
20330
20331
20332
20333
20334
20335
20336
20337
20338
20339
20340
20341
20342
20343
20344
20345
20346
20347
20348
20349
20350
20351
20352
20353
20354
20355
20356
20357
20358
20359
20360
20361
20362
20363
20364
20365
20366
20367
20368
20369
20370
20371
20372
20373
20374
20375
20376
20377
20378
20379
20380
20381
20382
20383
20384
20385
20386
20387
20388
20389
20390
20391
20392
20393
20394
20395
20396
20397
20398
20399
20400
20401
20402
20403
20404
20405
20406
20407
20408
20409
20410
20411
20412
20413
20414
20415
20416
20417
20418
20419
20420
20421
20422
20423
20424
20425
20426
20427
20428
20429
20430
20431
20432
20433
20434
20435
20436
20437
20438
20439
20440
20441
20442
20443
20444
20445
20446
20447
20448
20449
20450
20451
20452
20453
20454
20455
20456
20457
20458
20459
20460
20461
20462
20463
20464
20465
20466
20467
20468
20469
20470
20471
20472
20473
20474
20475
20476
20477
20478
20479
20480
20481
20482
20483
20484
20485
20486
20487
20488
20489
20490
20491
20492
20493
20494
20495
20496
20497
20498
20499
20500
20501
20502
20503
20504
20505
20506
20507
20508
20509
20510
20511
20512
20513
20514
20515
20516
20517
20518
20519
20520
20521
20522
20523
20524
20525
20526
20527
20528
20529
20530
20531
20532
20533
20534
20535
20536
20537
20538
20539
20540
20541
20542
20543
20544
20545
20546
20547
20548
20549
20550
20551
20552
20553
20554
20555
20556
20557
20558
20559
20560
20561
20562
20563
20564
20565
20566
20567
20568
20569
20570
20571
20572
20573
20574
20575
20576
20577
20578
20579
20580
20581
20582
20583
20584
20585
20586
20587
20588
20589
20590
20591
20592
20593
20594
20595
20596
20597
20598
20599
20600
20601
20602
20603
20604
20605
20606
20607
20608
20609
20610
20611
20612
20613
20614
20615
20616
20617
20618
20619
20620
20621
20622
20623
20624
20625
20626
20627
20628
20629
20630
20631
20632
20633
20634
20635
20636
20637
20638
20639
20640
20641
20642
20643
20644
20645
20646
20647
20648
20649
20650
20651
20652
20653
20654
20655
20656
20657
20658
20659
20660
20661
20662
20663
20664
20665
20666
20667
20668
20669
20670
20671
20672
20673
20674
20675
20676
20677
20678
20679
20680
20681
20682
20683
20684
20685
20686
20687
20688
20689
20690
20691
20692
20693
20694
20695
20696
20697
20698
20699
20700
20701
20702
20703
20704
20705
20706
20707
20708
20709
20710
20711
20712
20713
20714
20715
20716
20717
20718
20719
20720
20721
20722
20723
20724
20725
20726
20727
20728
20729
20730
20731
20732
20733
20734
20735
20736
20737
20738
20739
20740
20741
20742
20743
20744
20745
20746
20747
20748
20749
20750
20751
20752
20753
20754
20755
20756
20757
20758
20759
20760
20761
20762
20763
20764
20765
20766
20767
20768
20769
20770
20771
20772
20773
20774
20775
20776
20777
20778
20779
20780
20781
20782
20783
20784
20785
20786
20787
20788
20789
20790
20791
20792
20793
20794
20795
20796
20797
20798
20799
20800
20801
20802
20803
20804
20805
20806
20807
20808
20809
20810
20811
20812
20813
20814
20815
20816
20817
20818
20819
20820
20821
20822
20823
20824
20825
20826
20827
20828
20829
20830
20831
20832
20833
20834
20835
20836
20837
20838
20839
20840
20841
20842
20843
20844
20845
20846
20847
20848
20849
20850
20851
20852
20853
20854
20855
20856
20857
20858
20859
20860
20861
20862
20863
20864
20865
20866
20867
20868
20869
20870
20871
20872
20873
20874
20875
20876
20877
20878
20879
20880
20881
20882
20883
20884
20885
20886
20887
20888
20889
20890
20891
20892
20893
20894
20895
20896
20897
20898
20899
20900
20901
20902
20903
20904
20905
20906
20907
20908
20909
20910
20911
20912
20913
20914
20915
20916
20917
20918
20919
20920
20921
20922
20923
20924
20925
20926
20927
20928
20929
20930
20931
20932
20933
20934
20935
20936
20937
20938
20939
20940
20941
20942
20943
20944
20945
20946
20947
20948
20949
20950
20951
20952
20953
20954
20955
20956
20957
20958
20959
20960
20961
20962
20963
20964
20965
20966
20967
20968
20969
20970
20971
20972
20973
20974
20975
20976
20977
20978
20979
20980
20981
20982
20983
20984
20985
20986
20987
20988
20989
20990
20991
20992
20993
20994
20995
20996
20997
20998
20999
21000
21001
21002
21003
21004
21005
21006
21007
21008
21009
21010
21011
21012
21013
21014
21015
21016
21017
21018
21019
21020
21021
21022
21023
21024
21025
21026
21027
21028
21029
21030
21031
21032
21033
21034
21035
21036
21037
21038
21039
21040
21041
21042
21043
21044
21045
21046
21047
21048
21049
21050
21051
21052
21053
21054
21055
21056
21057
21058
21059
21060
21061
21062
21063
21064
21065
21066
21067
21068
21069
21070
21071
21072
21073
21074
21075
21076
21077
21078
21079
21080
21081
21082
21083
21084
21085
21086
21087
21088
21089
21090
21091
21092
21093
21094
21095
21096
21097
21098
21099
21100
21101
21102
21103
21104
21105
21106
21107
21108
21109
21110
21111
21112
21113
21114
21115
21116
21117
21118
21119
21120
21121
21122
21123
21124
21125
21126
21127
21128
21129
21130
21131
21132
21133
21134
21135
21136
21137
21138
21139
21140
21141
21142
21143
21144
21145
21146
21147
21148
21149
21150
21151
21152
21153
21154
21155
21156
21157
21158
21159
21160
21161
21162
21163
21164
21165
21166
21167
21168
21169
21170
21171
21172
21173
21174
21175
21176
21177
21178
21179
21180
21181
21182
21183
21184
21185
21186
21187
21188
21189
21190
21191
21192
21193
21194
21195
21196
21197
21198
21199
21200
21201
21202
21203
21204
21205
21206
21207
21208
21209
21210
21211
21212
21213
21214
21215
21216
21217
21218
21219
21220
21221
21222
21223
21224
21225
21226
21227
21228
21229
21230
21231
21232
21233
21234
21235
21236
21237
21238
21239
21240
21241
21242
21243
21244
21245
21246
21247
21248
21249
21250
21251
21252
21253
21254
21255
21256
21257
21258
21259
21260
21261
21262
21263
21264
21265
21266
21267
21268
21269
21270
21271
21272
21273
21274
21275
21276
21277
21278
21279
21280
21281
21282
21283
21284
21285
21286
21287
21288
21289
21290
21291
21292
21293
21294
21295
21296
21297
21298
21299
21300
21301
21302
21303
21304
21305
21306
21307
21308
21309
21310
21311
21312
21313
21314
21315
21316
21317
21318
21319
21320
21321
21322
21323
21324
21325
21326
21327
21328
21329
21330
21331
21332
21333
21334
21335
21336
21337
21338
21339
21340
21341
21342
21343
21344
21345
21346
21347
21348
21349
21350
21351
21352
21353
21354
21355
21356
21357
21358
21359
21360
21361
21362
21363
21364
21365
21366
21367
21368
21369
21370
21371
21372
21373
21374
21375
21376
21377
21378
21379
21380
21381
21382
21383
21384
21385
21386
21387
21388
21389
21390
21391
21392
21393
21394
21395
21396
21397
21398
21399
21400
21401
21402
21403
21404
21405
21406
21407
21408
21409
21410
21411
21412
21413
21414
21415
21416
21417
21418
21419
21420
21421
21422
21423
21424
21425
21426
21427
21428
21429
21430
21431
21432
21433
21434
21435
21436
21437
21438
21439
21440
21441
21442
21443
21444
21445
21446
21447
21448
21449
21450
21451
21452
21453
21454
21455
21456
21457
21458
21459
21460
21461
21462
21463
21464
21465
21466
21467
21468
21469
21470
21471
21472
21473
21474
21475
21476
21477
21478
21479
21480
21481
21482
21483
21484
21485
21486
21487
21488
21489
21490
21491
21492
21493
21494
21495
21496
21497
21498
21499
21500
21501
21502
21503
21504
21505
21506
21507
21508
21509
21510
21511
21512
21513
21514
21515
21516
21517
21518
21519
21520
21521
21522
21523
21524
21525
21526
21527
21528
21529
21530
21531
21532
21533
21534
21535
21536
21537
21538
21539
21540
21541
21542
21543
21544
21545
21546
21547
21548
21549
21550
21551
21552
21553
21554
21555
21556
21557
21558
21559
21560
21561
21562
21563
21564
21565
21566
21567
21568
21569
21570
21571
21572
21573
21574
21575
21576
21577
21578
21579
21580
21581
21582
21583
21584
21585
21586
21587
21588
21589
21590
21591
21592
21593
21594
21595
21596
21597
21598
21599
21600
21601
21602
21603
21604
21605
21606
21607
21608
21609
21610
21611
21612
21613
21614
21615
21616
21617
21618
21619
21620
21621
21622
21623
21624
21625
21626
21627
21628
21629
21630
21631
21632
21633
21634
21635
21636
21637
21638
21639
21640
21641
21642
21643
21644
21645
21646
21647
21648
21649
21650
21651
21652
21653
21654
21655
21656
21657
21658
21659
21660
21661
21662
21663
21664
21665
21666
21667
21668
21669
21670
21671
21672
21673
21674
21675
21676
21677
21678
21679
21680
21681
21682
21683
21684
21685
21686
21687
21688
21689
21690
21691
21692
21693
21694
21695
21696
21697
21698
21699
21700
21701
21702
21703
21704
21705
21706
21707
21708
21709
21710
21711
21712
21713
21714
21715
21716
21717
21718
21719
21720
21721
21722
21723
21724
21725
21726
21727
21728
21729
21730
21731
21732
21733
21734
21735
21736
21737
21738
21739
21740
21741
21742
21743
21744
21745
21746
21747
21748
21749
21750
21751
21752
21753
21754
21755
21756
21757
21758
21759
21760
21761
21762
21763
21764
21765
21766
21767
21768
21769
21770
21771
21772
21773
21774
21775
21776
21777
21778
21779
21780
21781
21782
21783
21784
21785
21786
21787
21788
21789
21790
21791
21792
21793
21794
21795
21796
21797
21798
21799
21800
21801
21802
21803
21804
21805
21806
21807
21808
21809
21810
21811
21812
21813
21814
21815
21816
21817
21818
21819
21820
21821
21822
21823
21824
21825
21826
21827
21828
21829
21830
21831
21832
21833
21834
21835
21836
21837
21838
21839
21840
21841
21842
21843
21844
21845
21846
21847
21848
21849
21850
21851
21852
21853
21854
21855
21856
21857
21858
21859
21860
21861
21862
21863
21864
21865
21866
21867
21868
21869
21870
21871
21872
21873
21874
21875
21876
21877
21878
21879
21880
21881
21882
21883
21884
21885
21886
21887
21888
21889
21890
21891
21892
21893
21894
21895
21896
21897
21898
21899
21900
21901
21902
21903
21904
21905
21906
21907
21908
21909
21910
21911
21912
21913
21914
21915
21916
21917
21918
21919
21920
21921
21922
21923
21924
21925
21926
21927
21928
21929
21930
21931
21932
21933
21934
21935
21936
21937
21938
21939
21940
21941
21942
21943
21944
21945
21946
21947
21948
21949
21950
21951
21952
21953
21954
21955
21956
21957
21958
21959
21960
21961
21962
21963
21964
21965
21966
21967
21968
21969
21970
21971
21972
21973
21974
21975
21976
21977
21978
21979
21980
21981
21982
21983
21984
21985
21986
21987
21988
21989
21990
21991
21992
21993
21994
21995
21996
21997
21998
21999
22000
22001
22002
22003
22004
22005
22006
22007
22008
22009
22010
22011
22012
22013
22014
22015
22016
22017
22018
22019
22020
22021
22022
22023
22024
22025
22026
22027
22028
22029
22030
22031
22032
22033
22034
22035
22036
22037
22038
22039
22040
22041
22042
22043
22044
22045
22046
22047
22048
22049
22050
22051
22052
22053
22054
22055
22056
22057
22058
22059
22060
22061
22062
22063
22064
22065
22066
22067
22068
22069
22070
22071
22072
22073
22074
22075
22076
22077
22078
22079
22080
22081
22082
22083
22084
22085
22086
22087
22088
22089
22090
22091
22092
22093
22094
22095
22096
22097
22098
22099
22100
22101
22102
22103
22104
22105
22106
22107
22108
22109
22110
22111
22112
22113
22114
22115
22116
22117
22118
22119
22120
22121
22122
22123
22124
22125
22126
22127
22128
22129
22130
22131
22132
22133
22134
22135
22136
22137
22138
22139
22140
22141
22142
22143
22144
22145
22146
22147
22148
22149
22150
22151
22152
22153
22154
22155
22156
22157
22158
22159
22160
22161
22162
22163
22164
22165
22166
22167
22168
22169
22170
22171
22172
22173
22174
22175
22176
22177
22178
22179
22180
22181
22182
22183
22184
22185
22186
22187
22188
22189
22190
22191
22192
22193
22194
22195
22196
22197
22198
22199
22200
22201
22202
22203
22204
22205
22206
22207
22208
22209
22210
22211
22212
22213
22214
22215
22216
22217
22218
22219
22220
22221
22222
22223
22224
22225
22226
22227
22228
22229
22230
22231
22232
22233
22234
22235
22236
22237
22238
22239
22240
22241
22242
22243
22244
22245
22246
22247
22248
22249
22250
22251
22252
22253
22254
22255
22256
22257
22258
22259
22260
22261
22262
22263
22264
22265
22266
22267
22268
22269
22270
22271
22272
22273
22274
22275
22276
22277
22278
22279
22280
22281
22282
22283
22284
22285
22286
22287
22288
22289
22290
22291
22292
22293
22294
22295
22296
22297
22298
22299
22300
22301
22302
22303
22304
22305
22306
22307
22308
22309
22310
22311
22312
22313
22314
22315
22316
22317
22318
22319
22320
22321
22322
22323
22324
22325
22326
22327
22328
22329
22330
22331
22332
22333
22334
22335
22336
22337
22338
22339
22340
22341
22342
22343
22344
22345
22346
22347
22348
22349
22350
22351
22352
22353
22354
22355
22356
22357
22358
22359
22360
22361
22362
22363
22364
22365
22366
22367
22368
22369
22370
22371
22372
22373
22374
22375
22376
22377
22378
22379
22380
22381
22382
22383
22384
22385
22386
22387
22388
22389
22390
22391
22392
22393
22394
22395
22396
22397
22398
22399
22400
22401
22402
22403
22404
22405
22406
22407
22408
22409
22410
22411
22412
22413
22414
22415
22416
22417
22418
22419
22420
22421
22422
22423
22424
22425
22426
22427
22428
22429
22430
22431
22432
22433
22434
22435
22436
22437
22438
22439
22440
22441
22442
22443
22444
22445
22446
22447
22448
22449
22450
22451
22452
22453
22454
22455
22456
22457
22458
22459
22460
22461
22462
22463
22464
22465
22466
22467
22468
22469
22470
22471
22472
22473
22474
22475
22476
22477
22478
22479
22480
22481
22482
22483
22484
22485
22486
22487
22488
22489
22490
22491
22492
22493
22494
22495
22496
22497
22498
22499
22500
22501
22502
22503
22504
22505
22506
22507
22508
22509
22510
22511
22512
22513
22514
22515
22516
22517
22518
22519
22520
22521
22522
22523
22524
22525
22526
22527
22528
22529
22530
22531
22532
22533
22534
22535
22536
22537
22538
22539
22540
22541
22542
22543
22544
22545
22546
22547
22548
22549
22550
22551
22552
22553
22554
22555
22556
22557
22558
22559
22560
22561
22562
22563
22564
22565
22566
22567
22568
22569
22570
22571
22572
22573
22574
22575
22576
22577
22578
22579
22580
22581
22582
22583
22584
22585
22586
22587
22588
22589
22590
22591
22592
22593
22594
22595
22596
22597
22598
22599
22600
22601
22602
22603
22604
22605
22606
22607
22608
22609
22610
22611
22612
22613
22614
22615
22616
22617
22618
22619
22620
22621
22622
22623
22624
22625
22626
22627
22628
22629
22630
22631
22632
22633
22634
22635
22636
22637
22638
22639
22640
22641
22642
22643
22644
22645
22646
22647
22648
22649
22650
22651
22652
22653
22654
22655
22656
22657
22658
22659
22660
22661
22662
22663
22664
22665
22666
22667
22668
22669
22670
22671
22672
22673
22674
22675
22676
22677
22678
22679
22680
22681
22682
22683
22684
22685
22686
22687
22688
22689
22690
22691
22692
22693
22694
22695
22696
22697
22698
22699
22700
22701
22702
22703
22704
22705
22706
22707
22708
22709
22710
22711
22712
22713
22714
22715
22716
22717
22718
22719
22720
22721
22722
22723
22724
22725
22726
22727
22728
22729
22730
22731
22732
22733
22734
22735
22736
22737
22738
22739
22740
22741
22742
22743
22744
22745
22746
22747
22748
22749
22750
22751
22752
22753
22754
22755
22756
22757
22758
22759
22760
22761
22762
22763
22764
22765
22766
22767
22768
22769
22770
22771
22772
22773
22774
22775
22776
22777
22778
22779
22780
22781
22782
22783
22784
22785
22786
22787
22788
22789
22790
22791
22792
22793
22794
22795
22796
22797
22798
22799
22800
22801
22802
22803
22804
22805
22806
22807
22808
22809
22810
22811
22812
22813
22814
22815
22816
22817
22818
22819
22820
22821
22822
22823
22824
22825
22826
22827
22828
22829
22830
22831
22832
22833
22834
22835
22836
22837
22838
22839
22840
22841
22842
22843
22844
22845
22846
22847
22848
22849
22850
22851
22852
22853
22854
22855
22856
22857
22858
22859
22860
22861
22862
22863
22864
22865
22866
22867
22868
22869
22870
22871
22872
22873
22874
22875
22876
22877
22878
22879
22880
22881
22882
22883
22884
22885
22886
22887
22888
22889
22890
22891
22892
22893
22894
22895
22896
22897
22898
22899
22900
22901
22902
22903
22904
22905
22906
22907
22908
22909
22910
22911
22912
22913
22914
22915
22916
22917
22918
22919
22920
22921
22922
22923
22924
22925
22926
22927
22928
22929
22930
22931
22932
22933
22934
22935
22936
22937
22938
22939
22940
22941
22942
22943
22944
22945
22946
22947
22948
22949
22950
22951
22952
22953
22954
22955
22956
22957
22958
22959
22960
22961
22962
22963
22964
22965
22966
22967
22968
22969
22970
22971
22972
22973
22974
22975
22976
22977
22978
22979
22980
22981
22982
22983
22984
22985
22986
22987
22988
22989
22990
22991
22992
22993
22994
22995
22996
22997
22998
22999
23000
23001
23002
23003
23004
23005
23006
23007
23008
23009
23010
23011
23012
23013
23014
23015
23016
23017
23018
23019
23020
23021
23022
23023
23024
23025
23026
23027
23028
23029
23030
23031
23032
23033
23034
23035
23036
23037
23038
23039
23040
23041
23042
23043
23044
23045
23046
23047
23048
23049
23050
23051
23052
23053
23054
23055
23056
23057
23058
23059
23060
23061
23062
23063
23064
23065
23066
23067
23068
23069
23070
23071
23072
23073
23074
23075
23076
23077
23078
23079
23080
23081
23082
23083
23084
23085
23086
23087
23088
23089
23090
23091
23092
23093
23094
23095
23096
23097
23098
23099
23100
23101
23102
23103
23104
23105
23106
23107
23108
23109
23110
23111
23112
23113
23114
23115
23116
23117
23118
23119
23120
23121
23122
23123
23124
23125
23126
23127
23128
23129
23130
23131
23132
23133
23134
23135
23136
23137
23138
23139
23140
23141
23142
23143
23144
23145
23146
23147
23148
23149
23150
23151
23152
23153
23154
23155
23156
23157
23158
23159
23160
23161
23162
23163
23164
23165
23166
23167
23168
23169
23170
23171
23172
23173
23174
23175
23176
23177
23178
23179
23180
23181
23182
23183
23184
23185
23186
23187
23188
23189
23190
23191
23192
23193
23194
23195
23196
23197
23198
23199
23200
23201
23202
23203
23204
23205
23206
23207
23208
23209
23210
23211
23212
23213
23214
23215
23216
23217
23218
23219
23220
23221
23222
23223
23224
23225
23226
23227
23228
23229
23230
23231
23232
23233
23234
23235
23236
23237
23238
23239
23240
23241
23242
23243
23244
23245
23246
23247
23248
23249
23250
23251
23252
23253
23254
23255
23256
23257
23258
23259
23260
23261
23262
23263
23264
23265
23266
23267
23268
23269
23270
23271
23272
23273
23274
23275
23276
23277
23278
23279
23280
23281
23282
23283
23284
23285
23286
23287
23288
23289
23290
23291
23292
23293
23294
23295
23296
23297
23298
23299
23300
23301
23302
23303
23304
23305
23306
23307
23308
23309
23310
23311
23312
23313
23314
23315
23316
23317
23318
23319
23320
23321
23322
23323
23324
23325
23326
23327
23328
23329
23330
23331
23332
23333
23334
23335
23336
23337
23338
23339
23340
23341
23342
23343
23344
23345
23346
23347
23348
23349
23350
23351
23352
23353
23354
23355
23356
23357
23358
23359
23360
23361
23362
23363
23364
23365
23366
23367
23368
23369
23370
23371
23372
23373
23374
23375
23376
23377
23378
23379
23380
23381
23382
23383
23384
23385
23386
23387
23388
23389
23390
23391
23392
23393
23394
23395
23396
23397
23398
23399
23400
23401
23402
23403
23404
23405
23406
23407
23408
23409
23410
23411
23412
23413
23414
23415
23416
23417
23418
23419
23420
23421
23422
23423
23424
23425
23426
23427
23428
23429
23430
23431
23432
23433
23434
23435
23436
23437
23438
23439
23440
23441
23442
23443
23444
23445
23446
23447
23448
23449
23450
23451
23452
23453
23454
23455
23456
23457
23458
23459
23460
23461
23462
23463
23464
23465
23466
23467
23468
23469
23470
23471
23472
23473
23474
23475
23476
23477
23478
23479
23480
23481
23482
23483
23484
23485
23486
23487
23488
23489
23490
23491
23492
23493
23494
23495
23496
23497
23498
23499
23500
23501
23502
23503
23504
23505
23506
23507
23508
23509
23510
23511
23512
23513
23514
23515
23516
23517
23518
23519
23520
23521
23522
23523
23524
23525
23526
23527
23528
23529
23530
23531
23532
23533
23534
23535
23536
23537
23538
23539
23540
23541
23542
23543
23544
23545
23546
23547
23548
23549
23550
23551
23552
23553
23554
23555
23556
23557
23558
23559
23560
23561
23562
23563
23564
23565
23566
23567
23568
23569
23570
23571
23572
23573
23574
23575
23576
23577
23578
23579
23580
23581
23582
23583
23584
23585
23586
23587
23588
23589
23590
23591
23592
23593
23594
23595
23596
23597
23598
23599
23600
23601
23602
23603
23604
23605
23606
23607
23608
23609
23610
23611
23612
23613
23614
23615
23616
23617
23618
23619
23620
23621
23622
23623
23624
23625
23626
23627
23628
23629
23630
23631
23632
23633
23634
23635
23636
23637
23638
23639
23640
23641
23642
23643
23644
23645
23646
23647
23648
23649
23650
23651
23652
23653
23654
23655
23656
23657
23658
23659
23660
23661
23662
23663
23664
23665
23666
23667
23668
23669
23670
23671
23672
23673
23674
23675
23676
23677
23678
23679
23680
23681
23682
23683
23684
23685
23686
23687
23688
23689
23690
23691
23692
23693
23694
23695
23696
23697
23698
23699
23700
23701
23702
23703
23704
23705
23706
23707
23708
23709
23710
23711
23712
23713
23714
23715
23716
23717
23718
23719
23720
23721
23722
23723
23724
23725
23726
23727
23728
23729
23730
23731
23732
23733
23734
23735
23736
23737
23738
23739
23740
23741
23742
23743
23744
23745
23746
23747
23748
23749
23750
23751
23752
23753
23754
23755
23756
23757
23758
23759
23760
23761
23762
23763
23764
23765
23766
23767
23768
23769
23770
23771
23772
23773
23774
23775
23776
23777
23778
23779
23780
23781
23782
23783
23784
23785
23786
23787
23788
23789
23790
23791
23792
23793
23794
23795
23796
23797
23798
23799
23800
23801
23802
23803
23804
23805
23806
23807
23808
23809
23810
23811
23812
23813
23814
23815
23816
23817
23818
23819
23820
23821
23822
23823
23824
23825
23826
23827
23828
23829
23830
23831
23832
23833
23834
23835
23836
23837
23838
23839
23840
23841
23842
23843
23844
23845
23846
23847
23848
23849
23850
23851
23852
23853
23854
23855
23856
23857
23858
23859
23860
23861
23862
23863
23864
23865
23866
23867
23868
23869
23870
23871
23872
23873
23874
23875
23876
23877
23878
23879
23880
23881
23882
23883
23884
23885
23886
23887
23888
23889
23890
23891
23892
23893
23894
23895
23896
23897
23898
23899
23900
23901
23902
23903
23904
23905
23906
23907
23908
23909
23910
23911
23912
23913
23914
23915
23916
23917
23918
23919
23920
23921
23922
23923
23924
23925
23926
23927
23928
23929
23930
23931
23932
23933
23934
23935
23936
23937
23938
23939
23940
23941
23942
23943
23944
23945
23946
23947
23948
23949
23950
23951
23952
23953
23954
23955
23956
23957
23958
23959
23960
23961
23962
23963
23964
23965
23966
23967
23968
23969
23970
23971
23972
23973
23974
23975
23976
23977
23978
23979
23980
23981
23982
23983
23984
23985
23986
23987
23988
23989
23990
23991
23992
23993
23994
23995
23996
23997
23998
23999
24000
24001
24002
24003
24004
24005
24006
24007
24008
24009
24010
24011
24012
24013
24014
24015
24016
24017
24018
24019
24020
24021
24022
24023
24024
24025
24026
24027
24028
24029
24030
24031
24032
24033
24034
24035
24036
24037
24038
24039
24040
24041
24042
24043
24044
24045
24046
24047
24048
24049
24050
24051
24052
24053
24054
24055
24056
24057
24058
24059
24060
24061
24062
24063
24064
24065
24066
24067
24068
24069
24070
24071
24072
24073
24074
24075
24076
24077
24078
24079
24080
24081
24082
24083
24084
24085
24086
24087
24088
24089
24090
24091
24092
24093
24094
24095
24096
24097
24098
24099
24100
24101
24102
24103
24104
24105
24106
24107
24108
24109
24110
24111
24112
24113
24114
24115
24116
24117
24118
24119
24120
24121
24122
24123
24124
24125
24126
24127
24128
24129
24130
24131
24132
24133
24134
24135
24136
24137
24138
24139
24140
24141
24142
24143
24144
24145
24146
24147
24148
24149
24150
24151
24152
24153
24154
24155
24156
24157
24158
24159
24160
24161
24162
24163
24164
24165
24166
24167
24168
24169
24170
24171
24172
24173
24174
24175
24176
24177
24178
24179
24180
24181
24182
24183
24184
24185
24186
24187
24188
24189
24190
24191
24192
24193
24194
24195
24196
24197
24198
24199
24200
24201
24202
24203
24204
24205
24206
24207
24208
24209
24210
24211
24212
24213
24214
24215
24216
24217
24218
24219
24220
24221
24222
24223
24224
24225
24226
24227
24228
24229
24230
24231
24232
24233
24234
24235
24236
24237
24238
24239
24240
24241
24242
24243
24244
24245
24246
24247
24248
24249
24250
24251
24252
24253
24254
24255
24256
24257
24258
24259
24260
24261
24262
24263
24264
24265
24266
24267
24268
24269
24270
24271
24272
24273
24274
24275
24276
24277
24278
24279
24280
24281
24282
24283
24284
24285
24286
24287
24288
24289
24290
24291
24292
24293
24294
24295
24296
24297
24298
24299
24300
24301
24302
24303
24304
24305
24306
24307
24308
24309
24310
24311
24312
24313
24314
24315
24316
24317
24318
24319
24320
24321
24322
24323
24324
24325
24326
24327
24328
24329
24330
24331
24332
24333
24334
24335
24336
24337
24338
24339
24340
24341
24342
24343
24344
24345
24346
24347
24348
24349
24350
24351
24352
24353
24354
24355
24356
24357
24358
24359
24360
24361
24362
24363
24364
24365
24366
24367
24368
24369
24370
24371
24372
24373
24374
24375
24376
24377
24378
24379
24380
24381
24382
24383
24384
24385
24386
24387
24388
24389
24390
24391
24392
24393
24394
24395
24396
24397
24398
24399
24400
24401
24402
24403
24404
24405
24406
24407
24408
24409
24410
24411
24412
24413
24414
24415
24416
24417
24418
24419
24420
24421
24422
24423
24424
24425
24426
24427
24428
24429
24430
24431
24432
24433
24434
24435
24436
24437
24438
24439
24440
24441
24442
24443
24444
24445
24446
24447
24448
24449
24450
24451
24452
24453
24454
24455
24456
24457
24458
24459
24460
24461
24462
24463
24464
24465
24466
24467
24468
24469
24470
24471
24472
24473
24474
24475
24476
24477
24478
24479
24480
24481
24482
24483
24484
24485
24486
24487
24488
24489
24490
24491
24492
24493
24494
24495
24496
24497
24498
24499
24500
24501
24502
24503
24504
24505
24506
24507
24508
24509
24510
24511
24512
24513
24514
24515
24516
24517
24518
24519
24520
24521
24522
24523
24524
24525
24526
24527
24528
24529
24530
24531
24532
24533
24534
24535
24536
24537
24538
24539
24540
24541
24542
24543
24544
24545
24546
24547
24548
24549
24550
24551
24552
24553
24554
24555
24556
24557
24558
24559
24560
24561
24562
24563
24564
24565
24566
24567
24568
24569
24570
24571
24572
24573
24574
24575
24576
24577
24578
24579
24580
24581
24582
24583
24584
24585
24586
24587
24588
24589
24590
24591
24592
24593
24594
24595
24596
24597
24598
24599
24600
24601
24602
24603
24604
24605
24606
24607
24608
24609
24610
24611
24612
24613
24614
24615
24616
24617
24618
24619
24620
24621
24622
24623
24624
24625
24626
24627
24628
24629
24630
24631
24632
24633
24634
24635
24636
24637
24638
24639
24640
24641
24642
24643
24644
24645
24646
24647
24648
24649
24650
24651
24652
24653
24654
24655
24656
24657
24658
24659
24660
24661
24662
24663
24664
24665
24666
24667
24668
24669
24670
24671
24672
24673
24674
24675
24676
24677
24678
24679
24680
24681
24682
24683
24684
24685
24686
24687
24688
24689
24690
24691
24692
24693
24694
24695
24696
24697
24698
24699
24700
24701
24702
24703
24704
24705
24706
24707
24708
24709
24710
24711
24712
24713
24714
24715
24716
24717
24718
24719
24720
24721
24722
24723
24724
24725
24726
24727
24728
24729
24730
24731
24732
24733
24734
24735
24736
24737
24738
24739
24740
24741
24742
24743
24744
24745
24746
24747
24748
24749
24750
24751
24752
24753
24754
24755
24756
24757
24758
24759
24760
24761
24762
24763
24764
24765
24766
24767
24768
24769
24770
24771
24772
24773
24774
24775
24776
24777
24778
24779
24780
24781
24782
24783
24784
24785
24786
24787
24788
24789
24790
24791
24792
24793
24794
24795
24796
24797
24798
24799
24800
24801
24802
24803
24804
24805
24806
24807
24808
24809
24810
24811
24812
24813
24814
24815
24816
24817
24818
24819
24820
24821
24822
24823
24824
24825
24826
24827
24828
24829
24830
24831
24832
24833
24834
24835
24836
24837
24838
24839
24840
24841
24842
24843
24844
24845
24846
24847
24848
24849
24850
24851
24852
24853
24854
24855
24856
24857
24858
24859
24860
24861
24862
24863
24864
24865
24866
24867
24868
24869
24870
24871
24872
24873
24874
24875
24876
24877
24878
24879
24880
24881
24882
24883
24884
24885
24886
24887
24888
24889
24890
24891
24892
24893
24894
24895
24896
24897
24898
24899
24900
24901
24902
24903
24904
24905
24906
24907
24908
24909
24910
24911
24912
24913
24914
24915
24916
24917
24918
24919
24920
24921
24922
24923
24924
24925
24926
24927
24928
24929
24930
24931
24932
24933
24934
24935
24936
24937
24938
24939
24940
24941
24942
24943
24944
24945
24946
24947
24948
24949
24950
24951
24952
24953
24954
24955
24956
24957
24958
24959
24960
24961
24962
24963
24964
24965
24966
24967
24968
24969
24970
24971
24972
24973
24974
24975
24976
24977
24978
24979
24980
24981
24982
24983
24984
24985
24986
24987
24988
24989
24990
24991
24992
24993
24994
24995
24996
24997
24998
24999
25000
25001
25002
25003
25004
25005
25006
25007
25008
25009
25010
25011
25012
25013
25014
25015
25016
25017
25018
25019
25020
25021
25022
25023
25024
25025
25026
25027
25028
25029
25030
25031
25032
25033
25034
25035
25036
25037
25038
25039
25040
25041
25042
25043
25044
25045
25046
25047
25048
25049
25050
25051
25052
25053
25054
25055
25056
25057
25058
25059
25060
25061
25062
25063
25064
25065
25066
25067
25068
25069
25070
25071
25072
25073
25074
25075
25076
25077
25078
25079
25080
25081
25082
25083
25084
25085
25086
25087
25088
25089
25090
25091
25092
25093
25094
25095
25096
25097
25098
25099
25100
25101
25102
25103
25104
25105
25106
25107
25108
25109
25110
25111
25112
25113
25114
25115
25116
25117
25118
25119
25120
25121
25122
25123
25124
25125
25126
25127
25128
25129
25130
25131
25132
25133
25134
25135
25136
25137
25138
25139
25140
25141
25142
25143
25144
25145
25146
25147
25148
25149
25150
25151
25152
25153
25154
25155
25156
25157
25158
25159
25160
25161
25162
25163
25164
25165
25166
25167
25168
25169
25170
25171
25172
25173
25174
25175
25176
25177
25178
25179
25180
25181
25182
25183
25184
25185
25186
25187
25188
25189
25190
25191
25192
25193
25194
25195
25196
25197
25198
25199
25200
25201
25202
25203
25204
25205
25206
25207
25208
25209
25210
25211
25212
25213
25214
25215
25216
25217
25218
25219
25220
25221
25222
25223
25224
25225
25226
25227
25228
25229
25230
25231
25232
25233
25234
25235
25236
25237
25238
25239
25240
25241
25242
25243
25244
25245
25246
25247
25248
25249
25250
25251
25252
25253
25254
25255
25256
25257
25258
25259
25260
25261
25262
25263
25264
25265
25266
25267
25268
25269
25270
25271
25272
25273
25274
25275
25276
25277
25278
25279
25280
25281
25282
25283
25284
25285
25286
25287
25288
25289
25290
25291
25292
25293
25294
25295
25296
25297
25298
25299
25300
25301
25302
25303
25304
25305
25306
25307
25308
25309
25310
25311
25312
25313
25314
25315
25316
25317
25318
25319
25320
25321
25322
25323
25324
25325
25326
25327
25328
25329
25330
25331
25332
25333
25334
25335
25336
25337
25338
25339
25340
25341
25342
25343
25344
25345
25346
25347
25348
25349
25350
25351
25352
25353
25354
25355
25356
25357
25358
25359
25360
25361
25362
25363
25364
25365
25366
25367
25368
25369
25370
25371
25372
25373
25374
25375
25376
25377
25378
25379
25380
25381
25382
25383
25384
25385
25386
25387
25388
25389
25390
25391
25392
25393
25394
25395
25396
25397
25398
25399
25400
25401
25402
25403
25404
25405
25406
25407
25408
25409
25410
25411
25412
25413
25414
25415
25416
25417
25418
25419
25420
25421
25422
25423
25424
25425
25426
25427
25428
25429
25430
25431
25432
25433
25434
25435
25436
25437
25438
25439
25440
25441
25442
25443
25444
25445
25446
25447
25448
25449
25450
25451
25452
25453
25454
25455
25456
25457
25458
25459
25460
25461
25462
25463
25464
25465
25466
25467
25468
25469
25470
25471
25472
25473
25474
25475
25476
25477
25478
25479
25480
25481
25482
25483
25484
25485
25486
25487
25488
25489
25490
25491
25492
25493
25494
25495
25496
25497
25498
25499
25500
25501
25502
25503
25504
25505
25506
25507
25508
25509
25510
25511
25512
25513
25514
25515
25516
25517
25518
25519
25520
25521
25522
25523
25524
25525
25526
25527
25528
25529
25530
25531
25532
25533
25534
25535
25536
25537
25538
25539
25540
25541
25542
25543
25544
25545
25546
25547
25548
25549
25550
25551
25552
25553
25554
25555
25556
25557
25558
25559
25560
25561
25562
25563
25564
25565
25566
25567
25568
25569
25570
25571
25572
25573
25574
25575
25576
25577
25578
25579
25580
25581
25582
25583
25584
25585
25586
25587
25588
25589
25590
25591
25592
25593
25594
25595
25596
25597
25598
25599
25600
25601
25602
25603
25604
25605
25606
25607
25608
25609
25610
25611
25612
25613
25614
25615
25616
25617
25618
25619
25620
25621
25622
25623
25624
25625
25626
25627
25628
25629
25630
25631
25632
25633
25634
25635
25636
25637
25638
25639
25640
25641
25642
25643
25644
25645
25646
25647
25648
25649
25650
25651
25652
25653
25654
25655
25656
25657
25658
25659
25660
25661
25662
25663
25664
25665
25666
25667
25668
25669
25670
25671
25672
25673
25674
25675
25676
25677
25678
25679
25680
25681
25682
25683
25684
25685
25686
25687
25688
25689
25690
25691
25692
25693
25694
25695
25696
25697
25698
25699
25700
25701
25702
25703
25704
25705
25706
25707
25708
25709
25710
25711
25712
25713
25714
25715
25716
25717
25718
25719
25720
25721
25722
25723
25724
25725
25726
25727
25728
25729
25730
25731
25732
25733
25734
25735
25736
25737
25738
25739
25740
25741
25742
25743
25744
25745
25746
25747
25748
25749
25750
25751
25752
25753
25754
25755
25756
25757
25758
25759
25760
25761
25762
25763
25764
25765
25766
25767
25768
25769
25770
25771
25772
25773
25774
25775
25776
25777
25778
25779
25780
25781
25782
25783
25784
25785
25786
25787
25788
25789
25790
25791
25792
25793
25794
25795
25796
25797
25798
25799
25800
25801
25802
25803
25804
25805
25806
25807
25808
25809
25810
25811
25812
25813
25814
25815
25816
25817
25818
25819
25820
25821
25822
25823
25824
25825
25826
25827
25828
25829
25830
25831
25832
25833
25834
25835
25836
25837
25838
25839
25840
25841
25842
25843
25844
25845
25846
25847
25848
25849
25850
25851
25852
25853
25854
25855
25856
25857
25858
25859
25860
25861
25862
25863
25864
25865
25866
25867
25868
25869
25870
25871
25872
25873
25874
25875
25876
25877
25878
25879
25880
25881
25882
25883
25884
25885
25886
25887
25888
25889
25890
25891
25892
25893
25894
25895
25896
25897
25898
25899
25900
25901
25902
25903
25904
25905
25906
25907
25908
25909
25910
25911
25912
25913
25914
25915
25916
25917
25918
25919
25920
25921
25922
25923
25924
25925
25926
25927
25928
25929
25930
25931
25932
25933
25934
25935
25936
25937
25938
25939
25940
25941
25942
25943
25944
25945
25946
25947
25948
25949
25950
25951
25952
25953
25954
25955
25956
25957
25958
25959
25960
25961
25962
25963
25964
25965
25966
25967
25968
25969
25970
25971
25972
25973
25974
25975
25976
25977
25978
25979
25980
25981
25982
25983
25984
25985
25986
25987
25988
25989
25990
25991
25992
25993
25994
25995
25996
25997
25998
25999
26000
26001
26002
26003
26004
26005
26006
26007
26008
26009
26010
26011
26012
26013
26014
26015
26016
26017
26018
26019
26020
26021
26022
26023
26024
26025
26026
26027
26028
26029
26030
26031
26032
26033
26034
26035
26036
26037
26038
26039
26040
26041
26042
26043
26044
26045
26046
26047
26048
26049
26050
26051
26052
26053
26054
26055
26056
26057
26058
26059
26060
26061
26062
26063
26064
26065
26066
26067
26068
26069
26070
26071
26072
26073
26074
26075
26076
26077
26078
26079
26080
26081
26082
26083
26084
26085
26086
26087
26088
26089
26090
26091
26092
26093
26094
26095
26096
26097
26098
26099
26100
26101
26102
26103
26104
26105
26106
26107
26108
26109
26110
26111
26112
26113
26114
26115
26116
26117
26118
26119
26120
26121
26122
26123
26124
26125
26126
26127
26128
26129
26130
26131
26132
26133
26134
26135
26136
26137
26138
26139
26140
26141
26142
26143
26144
26145
26146
26147
26148
26149
26150
26151
26152
26153
26154
26155
26156
26157
26158
26159
26160
26161
26162
26163
26164
26165
26166
26167
26168
26169
26170
26171
26172
26173
26174
26175
26176
26177
26178
26179
26180
26181
26182
26183
26184
26185
26186
26187
26188
26189
26190
26191
26192
26193
26194
26195
26196
26197
26198
26199
26200
26201
26202
26203
26204
26205
26206
26207
26208
26209
26210
26211
26212
26213
26214
26215
26216
26217
26218
26219
26220
26221
26222
26223
26224
26225
26226
26227
26228
26229
26230
26231
26232
26233
26234
26235
26236
26237
26238
26239
26240
26241
26242
26243
26244
26245
26246
26247
26248
26249
26250
26251
26252
26253
26254
26255
26256
26257
26258
26259
26260
26261
26262
26263
26264
26265
26266
26267
26268
26269
26270
26271
26272
26273
26274
26275
26276
26277
26278
26279
26280
26281
26282
26283
26284
26285
26286
26287
26288
26289
26290
26291
26292
26293
26294
26295
26296
26297
26298
26299
26300
26301
26302
26303
26304
26305
26306
26307
26308
26309
26310
26311
26312
26313
26314
26315
26316
26317
26318
26319
26320
26321
26322
26323
26324
26325
26326
26327
26328
26329
26330
26331
26332
26333
26334
26335
26336
26337
26338
26339
26340
26341
26342
26343
26344
26345
26346
26347
26348
26349
26350
26351
26352
26353
26354
26355
26356
26357
26358
26359
26360
26361
26362
26363
26364
26365
26366
26367
26368
26369
26370
26371
26372
26373
26374
26375
26376
26377
26378
26379
26380
26381
26382
26383
26384
26385
26386
26387
26388
26389
26390
26391
26392
26393
26394
26395
26396
26397
26398
26399
26400
26401
26402
26403
26404
26405
26406
26407
26408
26409
26410
26411
26412
26413
26414
26415
26416
26417
26418
26419
26420
26421
26422
26423
26424
26425
26426
26427
26428
26429
26430
26431
26432
26433
26434
26435
26436
26437
26438
26439
26440
26441
26442
26443
26444
26445
26446
26447
26448
26449
26450
26451
26452
26453
26454
26455
26456
26457
26458
26459
26460
26461
26462
26463
26464
26465
26466
26467
26468
26469
26470
26471
26472
26473
26474
26475
26476
26477
26478
26479
26480
26481
26482
26483
26484
26485
26486
26487
26488
26489
26490
26491
26492
26493
26494
26495
26496
26497
26498
26499
26500
26501
26502
26503
26504
26505
26506
26507
26508
26509
26510
26511
26512
26513
26514
26515
26516
26517
26518
26519
26520
26521
26522
26523
26524
26525
26526
26527
26528
26529
26530
26531
26532
26533
26534
26535
26536
26537
26538
26539
26540
26541
26542
26543
26544
26545
26546
26547
26548
26549
26550
26551
26552
26553
26554
26555
26556
26557
26558
26559
26560
26561
26562
26563
26564
26565
26566
26567
26568
26569
26570
26571
26572
26573
26574
26575
26576
26577
26578
26579
26580
26581
26582
26583
26584
26585
26586
26587
26588
26589
26590
26591
26592
26593
26594
26595
26596
26597
26598
26599
26600
26601
26602
26603
26604
26605
26606
26607
26608
26609
26610
26611
26612
26613
26614
26615
26616
26617
26618
26619
26620
26621
26622
26623
26624
26625
26626
26627
26628
26629
26630
26631
26632
26633
26634
26635
26636
26637
26638
26639
26640
26641
26642
26643
26644
26645
26646
26647
26648
26649
26650
26651
26652
26653
26654
26655
26656
26657
26658
26659
26660
26661
26662
26663
26664
26665
26666
26667
26668
26669
26670
26671
26672
26673
26674
26675
26676
26677
26678
26679
26680
26681
26682
26683
26684
26685
26686
26687
26688
26689
26690
26691
26692
26693
26694
26695
26696
26697
26698
26699
26700
26701
26702
26703
26704
26705
26706
26707
26708
26709
26710
26711
26712
26713
26714
26715
26716
26717
26718
26719
26720
26721
26722
26723
26724
26725
26726
26727
26728
26729
26730
26731
26732
26733
26734
26735
26736
26737
26738
26739
26740
26741
26742
26743
26744
26745
26746
26747
26748
26749
26750
26751
26752
26753
26754
26755
26756
26757
26758
26759
26760
26761
26762
26763
26764
26765
26766
26767
26768
26769
26770
26771
26772
26773
26774
26775
26776
26777
26778
26779
26780
26781
26782
26783
26784
26785
26786
26787
26788
26789
26790
26791
26792
26793
26794
26795
26796
26797
26798
26799
26800
26801
26802
26803
26804
26805
26806
26807
26808
26809
26810
26811
26812
26813
26814
26815
26816
26817
26818
26819
26820
26821
26822
26823
26824
26825
26826
26827
26828
26829
26830
26831
26832
26833
26834
26835
26836
26837
26838
26839
26840
26841
26842
26843
26844
26845
26846
26847
26848
26849
26850
26851
26852
26853
26854
26855
26856
26857
26858
26859
26860
26861
26862
26863
26864
26865
26866
26867
26868
26869
26870
26871
26872
26873
26874
26875
26876
26877
26878
26879
26880
26881
26882
26883
26884
26885
26886
26887
26888
26889
26890
26891
26892
26893
26894
26895
26896
26897
26898
26899
26900
26901
26902
26903
26904
26905
26906
26907
26908
26909
26910
26911
26912
26913
26914
26915
26916
26917
26918
26919
26920
26921
26922
26923
26924
26925
26926
26927
26928
26929
26930
26931
26932
26933
26934
26935
26936
26937
26938
26939
26940
26941
26942
26943
26944
26945
26946
26947
26948
26949
26950
26951
26952
26953
26954
26955
26956
26957
26958
26959
26960
26961
26962
26963
26964
26965
26966
26967
26968
26969
26970
26971
26972
26973
26974
26975
26976
26977
26978
26979
26980
26981
26982
26983
26984
26985
26986
26987
26988
26989
26990
26991
26992
26993
26994
26995
26996
26997
26998
26999
27000
27001
27002
27003
27004
27005
27006
27007
27008
27009
27010
27011
27012
27013
27014
27015
27016
27017
27018
27019
27020
27021
27022
27023
27024
27025
27026
27027
27028
27029
27030
27031
27032
27033
27034
27035
27036
27037
27038
27039
27040
27041
27042
27043
27044
27045
27046
27047
27048
27049
27050
27051
27052
27053
27054
27055
27056
27057
27058
27059
27060
27061
27062
27063
27064
27065
27066
27067
27068
27069
27070
27071
27072
27073
27074
27075
27076
27077
27078
27079
27080
27081
27082
27083
27084
27085
27086
27087
27088
27089
27090
27091
27092
27093
27094
27095
27096
27097
27098
27099
27100
27101
27102
27103
27104
27105
27106
27107
27108
27109
27110
27111
27112
27113
27114
27115
27116
27117
27118
27119
27120
27121
27122
27123
27124
27125
27126
27127
27128
27129
27130
27131
27132
27133
27134
27135
27136
27137
27138
27139
27140
27141
27142
27143
27144
27145
27146
27147
27148
27149
27150
27151
27152
27153
27154
27155
27156
27157
27158
27159
27160
27161
27162
27163
27164
27165
27166
27167
27168
27169
27170
27171
27172
27173
27174
27175
27176
27177
27178
27179
27180
27181
27182
27183
27184
27185
27186
27187
27188
27189
27190
27191
27192
27193
27194
27195
27196
27197
27198
27199
27200
27201
27202
27203
27204
27205
27206
27207
27208
27209
27210
27211
27212
27213
27214
27215
27216
27217
27218
27219
27220
27221
27222
27223
27224
27225
27226
27227
27228
27229
27230
27231
27232
27233
27234
27235
27236
27237
27238
27239
27240
27241
27242
27243
27244
27245
27246
27247
27248
27249
27250
27251
27252
27253
27254
27255
27256
27257
27258
27259
27260
27261
27262
27263
27264
27265
27266
27267
27268
27269
27270
27271
27272
27273
27274
27275
27276
27277
27278
27279
27280
27281
27282
27283
27284
27285
27286
27287
27288
27289
27290
27291
27292
27293
27294
27295
27296
27297
27298
27299
27300
27301
27302
27303
27304
27305
27306
27307
27308
27309
27310
27311
27312
27313
27314
27315
27316
27317
27318
27319
27320
27321
27322
27323
27324
27325
27326
27327
27328
27329
27330
27331
27332
27333
27334
27335
27336
27337
27338
27339
27340
27341
27342
27343
27344
27345
27346
27347
27348
27349
27350
27351
27352
27353
27354
27355
27356
27357
27358
27359
27360
27361
27362
27363
27364
27365
27366
27367
27368
27369
27370
27371
27372
27373
27374
27375
27376
27377
27378
27379
27380
27381
27382
27383
27384
27385
27386
27387
27388
27389
27390
27391
27392
27393
27394
27395
27396
27397
27398
27399
27400
27401
27402
27403
27404
27405
27406
27407
27408
27409
27410
27411
27412
27413
27414
27415
27416
27417
27418
27419
27420
27421
27422
27423
27424
27425
27426
27427
27428
27429
27430
27431
27432
27433
27434
27435
27436
27437
27438
27439
27440
27441
27442
27443
27444
27445
27446
27447
27448
27449
27450
27451
27452
27453
27454
27455
27456
27457
27458
27459
27460
27461
27462
27463
27464
27465
27466
27467
27468
27469
27470
27471
27472
27473
27474
27475
27476
27477
27478
27479
27480
27481
27482
27483
27484
27485
27486
27487
27488
27489
27490
27491
27492
27493
27494
27495
27496
27497
27498
27499
27500
27501
27502
27503
27504
27505
27506
27507
27508
27509
27510
27511
27512
27513
27514
27515
27516
27517
27518
27519
27520
27521
27522
27523
27524
27525
27526
27527
27528
27529
27530
27531
27532
27533
27534
27535
27536
27537
27538
27539
27540
27541
27542
27543
27544
27545
27546
27547
27548
27549
27550
27551
27552
27553
27554
27555
27556
27557
27558
27559
27560
27561
27562
27563
27564
27565
27566
27567
27568
27569
27570
27571
27572
27573
27574
27575
27576
27577
27578
27579
27580
27581
27582
27583
27584
27585
27586
27587
27588
27589
27590
27591
27592
27593
27594
27595
27596
27597
27598
27599
27600
27601
27602
27603
27604
27605
27606
27607
27608
27609
27610
27611
27612
27613
27614
27615
27616
27617
27618
27619
27620
27621
27622
27623
27624
27625
27626
27627
27628
27629
27630
27631
27632
27633
27634
27635
27636
27637
27638
27639
27640
27641
27642
27643
27644
27645
27646
27647
27648
27649
27650
27651
27652
27653
27654
27655
27656
27657
27658
27659
27660
27661
27662
27663
27664
27665
27666
27667
27668
27669
27670
27671
27672
27673
27674
27675
27676
27677
27678
27679
27680
27681
27682
27683
27684
27685
27686
27687
27688
27689
27690
27691
27692
27693
27694
27695
27696
27697
27698
27699
27700
27701
27702
27703
27704
27705
27706
27707
27708
27709
27710
27711
27712
27713
27714
27715
27716
27717
27718
27719
27720
27721
27722
27723
27724
27725
27726
27727
27728
27729
27730
27731
27732
27733
27734
27735
27736
27737
27738
27739
27740
27741
27742
27743
27744
27745
27746
27747
27748
27749
27750
27751
27752
27753
27754
27755
27756
27757
27758
27759
27760
27761
27762
27763
27764
27765
27766
27767
27768
27769
27770
27771
27772
27773
27774
27775
27776
27777
27778
27779
27780
27781
27782
27783
27784
27785
27786
27787
27788
27789
27790
27791
27792
27793
27794
27795
27796
27797
27798
27799
27800
27801
27802
27803
27804
27805
27806
27807
27808
27809
27810
27811
27812
27813
27814
27815
27816
27817
27818
27819
27820
27821
27822
27823
27824
27825
27826
27827
27828
27829
27830
27831
27832
27833
27834
27835
27836
27837
27838
27839
27840
27841
27842
27843
27844
27845
27846
27847
27848
27849
27850
27851
27852
27853
27854
27855
27856
27857
27858
27859
27860
27861
27862
27863
27864
27865
27866
27867
27868
27869
27870
27871
27872
27873
27874
27875
27876
27877
27878
27879
27880
27881
27882
27883
27884
27885
27886
27887
27888
27889
27890
27891
27892
27893
27894
27895
27896
27897
27898
27899
27900
27901
27902
27903
27904
27905
27906
27907
27908
27909
27910
27911
27912
27913
27914
27915
27916
27917
27918
27919
27920
27921
27922
27923
27924
27925
27926
27927
27928
27929
27930
27931
27932
27933
27934
27935
27936
27937
27938
27939
27940
27941
27942
27943
27944
27945
27946
27947
27948
27949
27950
27951
27952
27953
27954
27955
27956
27957
27958
27959
27960
27961
27962
27963
27964
27965
27966
27967
27968
27969
27970
27971
27972
27973
27974
27975
27976
27977
27978
27979
27980
27981
27982
27983
27984
27985
27986
27987
27988
27989
27990
27991
27992
27993
27994
27995
27996
27997
27998
27999
28000
28001
28002
28003
28004
28005
28006
28007
28008
28009
28010
28011
28012
28013
28014
28015
28016
28017
28018
28019
28020
28021
28022
28023
28024
28025
28026
28027
28028
28029
28030
28031
28032
28033
28034
28035
28036
28037
28038
28039
28040
28041
28042
28043
28044
28045
28046
28047
28048
28049
28050
28051
28052
28053
28054
28055
28056
28057
28058
28059
28060
28061
28062
28063
28064
28065
28066
28067
28068
28069
28070
28071
28072
28073
28074
28075
28076
28077
28078
28079
28080
28081
28082
28083
28084
28085
28086
28087
28088
28089
28090
28091
28092
28093
28094
28095
28096
28097
28098
28099
28100
28101
28102
28103
28104
28105
28106
28107
28108
28109
28110
28111
28112
28113
28114
28115
28116
28117
28118
28119
28120
28121
28122
28123
28124
28125
28126
28127
28128
28129
28130
28131
28132
28133
28134
28135
28136
28137
28138
28139
28140
28141
28142
28143
28144
28145
28146
28147
28148
28149
28150
28151
28152
28153
28154
28155
28156
28157
28158
28159
28160
28161
28162
28163
28164
28165
28166
28167
28168
28169
28170
28171
28172
28173
28174
28175
28176
28177
28178
28179
28180
28181
28182
28183
28184
28185
28186
28187
28188
28189
28190
28191
28192
28193
28194
28195
28196
28197
28198
28199
28200
28201
28202
28203
28204
28205
28206
28207
28208
28209
28210
28211
28212
28213
28214
28215
28216
28217
28218
28219
28220
28221
28222
28223
28224
28225
28226
28227
28228
28229
28230
28231
28232
28233
28234
28235
28236
28237
28238
28239
28240
28241
28242
28243
28244
28245
28246
28247
28248
28249
28250
28251
28252
28253
28254
28255
28256
28257
28258
28259
28260
28261
28262
28263
28264
28265
28266
28267
28268
28269
28270
28271
28272
28273
28274
28275
28276
28277
28278
28279
28280
28281
28282
28283
28284
28285
28286
28287
28288
28289
28290
28291
28292
28293
28294
28295
28296
28297
28298
28299
28300
28301
28302
28303
28304
28305
28306
28307
28308
28309
28310
28311
28312
28313
28314
28315
28316
28317
28318
28319
28320
28321
28322
28323
28324
28325
28326
28327
28328
28329
28330
28331
28332
28333
28334
28335
28336
28337
28338
28339
28340
28341
28342
28343
28344
28345
28346
28347
28348
28349
28350
28351
28352
28353
28354
28355
28356
28357
28358
28359
28360
28361
28362
28363
28364
28365
28366
28367
28368
28369
28370
28371
28372
28373
28374
28375
28376
28377
28378
28379
28380
28381
28382
28383
28384
28385
28386
28387
28388
28389
28390
28391
28392
28393
28394
28395
28396
28397
28398
28399
28400
28401
28402
28403
28404
28405
28406
28407
28408
28409
28410
28411
28412
28413
28414
28415
28416
28417
28418
28419
28420
28421
28422
28423
28424
28425
28426
28427
28428
28429
28430
28431
28432
28433
28434
28435
28436
28437
28438
28439
28440
28441
28442
28443
28444
28445
28446
28447
28448
28449
28450
28451
28452
28453
28454
28455
28456
28457
28458
28459
28460
28461
28462
28463
28464
28465
28466
28467
28468
28469
28470
28471
28472
28473
28474
28475
28476
28477
28478
28479
28480
28481
28482
28483
28484
28485
28486
28487
28488
28489
28490
28491
28492
28493
28494
28495
28496
28497
28498
28499
28500
28501
28502
28503
28504
28505
28506
28507
28508
28509
28510
28511
28512
28513
28514
28515
28516
28517
28518
28519
28520
28521
28522
28523
28524
28525
28526
28527
28528
28529
28530
28531
28532
28533
28534
28535
28536
28537
28538
28539
28540
28541
28542
28543
28544
28545
28546
28547
28548
28549
28550
28551
28552
28553
28554
28555
28556
28557
28558
28559
28560
28561
28562
28563
28564
28565
28566
28567
28568
28569
28570
28571
28572
28573
28574
28575
28576
28577
28578
28579
28580
28581
28582
28583

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
    "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" />
    <title>
      History of Greece - Vol. 10/12, by George Grote — A Project Gutenberg eBook
    </title>
    <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" />
    <style type="text/css">

      body { margin: 0 auto; max-width: 40em; }
      p    { margin: 0.75em 0 0 0; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; }

      h1, h2     { text-align: center; clear: both; font-weight: normal; }
      h1         { line-height: 1.5em; }
      h2         { margin: 0.75em 0 1em 0; font-size: 120%; line-height: 130%; }

      h2:first-line { line-height: 2em; font-size: 1.3em; }
      h2.nobreak    { page-break-before: avoid; }

      .falseh1   { margin: 0 0 1em 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center;
                   font-weight: normal; font-size: 175%; clear: both; }

      .p1        { margin-top: 1em;   }
      .p2        { margin-top: 2em;   }
      .p4        { margin-top: 4em;   }

      .xs        { font-size: x-small;  }
      .small     { font-size: small;    }
      .medium    { font-size: medium;   }
      .large     { font-size: large;    }
      .xl        { font-size: x-large;  }

      .front     { margin: 3em 0; page-break-before: always; }
      .front p   { margin: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: left; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 90%; }
      .tit       { margin: 3em auto 0 auto; page-break-before: always; }
      .tit p     { text-indent: 0; text-align: center; }
      .chapter   { page-break-before: always; margin-top: 2em; }
      .goright   { text-align: right; padding-right: 1.5em; }

      hr         { clear: both; width: 33%; text-align: center; margin: 3em auto; }
      hr.chap    { width: 20%; }
      hr.sep2    { width: 6%;  margin: 1.5em auto; }
      hr.tb      { width: 30%; }

      .smcap     { font-variant: small-caps; }
      .gesperrt  { letter-spacing: 0.15em; margin-right: -0.15em; }
      .noindent  { text-indent: 0; }
      .center    { text-align: center; text-indent: 0; }

      .contents           { font-size: 90%; }
      .contents p         { clear: both; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1em; }
      .contents p.chap    { padding-top: 1em; padding-left: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center; }
      .contents p.toright { margin: 0; padding: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: right; }

      table  { margin: 0.5em auto; padding-right: 2em; }
      .tdr   { text-align: right; white-space: nowrap; }

      .pagenum  { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */
        /* visibility: hidden; */
        position: absolute;
        right: 90%;
        font-size: small;
        font-variant: normal;
        font-style: normal;
        font-weight: normal;
        letter-spacing: normal;
        text-align: right;
        color: #B0B0B0;
        text-indent: 0;
      }

      /* Images */
      .figcenter  { margin: 2em auto; text-align: center; }

      /* Footnotes */
      .footnotes       { margin: 3em 0; border: medium solid #C0C0C0; background-color: white;
                         page-break-before: always; }
      .footnote        { margin: 1em 2em; font-size: 90%; }
      .footnote a      { text-decoration: none; }
      .footnote p      { margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0; text-indent: 1.5em; }
      .footnote p.ni   { text-indent: 0; }
      .footnote .label { padding-right: .5em; }
      .fnanchor        { vertical-align: top; text-decoration: none; font-size: 0.75em;
                         font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; }



      /* Poetry */
      .poetry-container { text-align: center; }
      .poetry           { display: inline-block; margin: 0.75em 0; text-align: left; }
      .poetry p         { margin: 0; padding-left: 2em; text-align: left; text-indent: -2em; }
      .poetry p.i1      { padding-left: 3em; }
      .poetry p.i5      { padding-left: 7em; }
      .poetry p.rt      { text-align: right; }

      /* Transcriber's notes */
      .transnote    { border: thin solid gray; background-color: #f8f8f8; font-family: sans-serif;
                      font-size: smaller; margin: 3em 0; padding: 1em 2em 1em 0;
                      page-break-before: always; }
      #tnote li     { margin-top: 0.5em; text-align: justify; }
      .tnotetit     { font-weight: bold; text-align: center; text-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; }
      .replace      { text-decoration: none; border-bottom: thin dotted gray; }

      @media handheld, print
      {
          p        { margin: 0; }

          hr       { clear: both; width: 34%; margin-left: 33%; }
          hr.chap  { width: 20%; margin-left: 40%; }
          hr.sep2  { width: 6%;  margin-left: 47%; }
          hr.tb    { width: 30%; margin-left: 35%; }

         .screenonly { display: none; }
         .poetry     { font-size: 90%; }

         .footnotes  { border: none; }
         .footnote   { margin: 1em 0; }
         .replace    { border-bottom: none; }
      }

    </style>
  </head>
  <body>
<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51183 ***</div>

<div class="front">
  <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p>
  <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p>
</div>

<div class="screenonly">
  <div class="figcenter">
    <img src="images/cover.jpg"
         alt="Book cover" />
  </div>
</div>

<div class="tit">
  <hr class="chap" />

  <h1>HISTORY OF GREECE</h1>

  <p class="xl p2"><small>BY</small><br />
  GEORGE GROTE, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span></p>

  <p class="large p2">VOL. X.</p>

  <p class="xs p4">REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.</p>

  <p class="medium p2">NEW YORK:<br />
  HARPER &amp; BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br />
  <span class="small">329 <small>AND</small> 331 <small>PEARL STREET.</small></span></p>

  <hr class="chap" />
</div>


<div class="chapter">
  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</span></p>
  <h2 class="nobreak">PREFACE TO VOL. X.</h2>
</div>

<p class="large noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> present
Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages; yet I have
been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment, midway in the
reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that reign to its
close, one more chapter will be required, which must be reserved for
the succeeding volume.</p>

<p class="large">The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks,
forming as it does a stream essentially distinct from that of the
Peloponnesians, Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during
the interval between 409 <small>B.C.</small> (the date of the
second Carthaginian invasion) and the death of Timoleon in 336
<small>B.C.</small> It is, moreover, reported to us by authors
(Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very judicious
as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses. And it
includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters of the
Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor, and
Timoleon.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[p. iv]</span></p>

<p class="large">I thought it indispensable to give adequate
development to this important period of Grecian history, even at the
cost of that inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At
one time I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full
history of Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and
that of Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this
additional matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of
the present volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement
of my next, which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of
Chæroneia and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust,
appear without any long interval of time.</p>

<p class="large goright">G. G.</p>

<p class="large"><span class="smcap">London, Feb. 15, 1852.</span></p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="ToC">
  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[p. v]</span></p>
  <h2>CONTENTS.<br />
  <span class="large">VOL. X.</span></h2>
  <hr class="sep2" />
  <p class="xl center">PART II.</p>
  <p class="large center">CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</p>
  <hr class="sep2" />
</div>

<div class="contents">

<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVI.</p>
<p class="small center">FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF
OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.</p>

<p class="p1">Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and
character. Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia. —
Degradation in the form of the convention — an edict drawn up,
issued, and enforced, by Persia upon Greece. — Gradual loss of
Pan-hellenic dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a
means of purchasing Persian help — on the part of Sparta. — Her first
application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent applications. —
Active partnership between Sparta and Persia against Athens, after
the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. Athens is ready to follow her
example. — The Persian force aids Athens against Sparta, and breaks
up her maritime empire. — No excuse for the subservience of Sparta to
the Persians. Evidence that Hellenic independence was not destined
to last much longer. — Promise of universal autonomy — popular to
the Grecian ear — how carried out. — The Spartans never intended to
grant, nor ever really granted, general autonomy. — Immediate point
made against Corinth and Thebes — isolation of Athens. — Persian
affairs — unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer Egypt.
— Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. — Descent of Evagoras
— condition of the island of Cyprus. — Greek princes of Salamis
are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty. — Evagoras dethrones the
Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis. — Able and beneficent
government of Evagoras. — His anxiety to revive Hellenism in Cyprus
— he looks to the aid of Athens. — Relations of Evagoras with Athens
during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. — Evagoras at
war with the Persians — he receives aid both from Athens and from
Egypt — he is at first very successful, so as even to capture Tyre.
— Struggle of Evagoras against the whole force of the Persian empire
after the peace of Antalkidas. — Evagoras, after a ten years’ war,
is reduced, but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the
dispute between the two satraps jointly commanding. — Assassination
of Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave of
Nikokreon. — Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of Salamis.
Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of Antalkidas. She
becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the Corinthian isthmus.
Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta — especially of Agesilaus. — The
Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of Sparta towards Platæa. —
Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa. A politic step, as likely to
sever Thebes from Athens. — Platæa becomes a dependency and outpost
of Sparta. Main object of Sparta to prevent the reconstitution of
the Bœotiad federation — Spartan policy at this time directed by the
partisan spirit of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[p. vi]</span>
Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis. — Oppressive behavior
of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the walls of the
city to be demolished. — Agesipolis blockades the city, and forces
it to surrender, by damming up the river Ophis. The Mantineans are
forced to break up their city into villages. — Democratical leaders
of Mantinea — owed their lives to the mediation of the exiled king
Pausanias. — Mantinea is pulled down and distributed into five
villages. — High-handed despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea — signal
partiality of Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the
various cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta — case of
Phlius. — Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at sea.
Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a maritime
confederacy. — Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan leaders, of
acting against the Persians for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks.
— Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates. — State of Macedonia and
Chalkidikê — growth of Macedonian power during the last years of the
Peloponnesian war. — Perdikkas and Archelaus — energy and ability
of the latter. — Contrast of Macedonia and Athens. — Succeeding
Macedonian kings — Orestes, Æropus, Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination
frequent. — Amyntas is expelled from Macedonia by the Illyrians.
— Chalkidians of Olynthus — they take into their protection the
Macedonian cities on the coast, when Amyntas runs away before the
Illyrians. Commencement of the Olynthian confederacy. — Equal and
liberal principles on which the confederacy was framed from the
beginning. Accepted willingly by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian
cities. — The Olynthians extend their confederacy among the Grecian
cities in Chalkidic Thrace — their liberal procedure — several
cities join. — Akanthus and Apollonia resist the proposition.
Olynthus menaces. They then solicit Spartan intervention against
her. — Speech of Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta. — Envoys
from Amyntas at Sparta. — The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against
Olynthus at once, with such force as could be got ready. He checks
the career of the Olynthians. — Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas,
remains behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother
in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near Thebes.
— Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in Thebes,
to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas. — The opposing leaders
— Leontiades and Ismenias — were both Polemarchs. — Leontiades
overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and the leading
friends of Ismenias go into exile. — Phœbidas in the Kadmeia —
terror and submission at Thebes. — Mixed feelings at Sparta — great
importance of the acquisition to Spartan interests. — Displeasure
at Sparta more pretended than real, against Phœbidas; Agesilaus
defends him. — Leontiades at Sparta — his humble protestations
and assurances — the ephors decide that they will retain the
Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas. — The Lacedæmonians
cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death. Iniquity of this
proceeding. — Vigorous action of the Spartans against Olynthus —
Teleutias is sent there with a large force, including a considerable
Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates with him. — Teleutias being
at first successful, and having become over-confident, sustains a
terrible defeat from the Olynthians under the walls of their city.
— Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus from Sparta with a reinforcement.
He dies of a fever. — Polybiades succeeds Agesipolis as commander
— he reduces Olynthus to submission — extinction of the Olynthian
federation. Olynthus and the other cities are enrolled as allies
of Sparta. — Intervention of Sparta with the government of Phlius.
— Agesilaus marches an army against Phlius — reduces the town by
blockade, after a long resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy <span
class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</span>the acropolis, naming
a council of one hundred as governors.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_76">1-72</a></p>


<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVII.</p>
<p class="small center">FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS
DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371
<small>B.C.</small></p>

<p class="p1">Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379
<small>B.C.</small> — Sparta is now feared as the great despot of
Greece. — Strong complaint of the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the
Olympic festival of 384 <small>B.C.</small> — Panegyrical oration of
Isokrates. — Censure upon Sparta pronounced by the philo-Laconian
Xenophon. — His manner of marking the point of transition in his
history — from Spartan glory to Spartan disgrace. — Thebes under
Leontiades and the philo-Spartan oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison
in the Kadmeia — oppressive and tyrannical government. — Discontent
at Thebes, though under compression. Theban exiles at Athens. — The
Theban exiles at Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising
at Thebes, resolve to begin a movement themselves. — Pelopidas takes
the lead — he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task
of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the
secretary, and Charon at Thebes. — Plans of Phyllidas for admitting
the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house — he invites
the polemarchs to a banquet. — The scheme very nearly frustrated
— accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering his message. —
Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes, and conceal themselves
in the house of Charon. — Leontiades and Hypates are slain in their
houses. — Phyllidas opens the prison, and sets free the prisoners.
Epaminondas and many other citizens appear in arms. — Universal joy
among the citizens on the ensuing morning, when the event was known.
General assembly in the market-place — Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon
are named the first Bœotarchs. — Aid to the conspirators from private
sympathizers in Attica. — Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to storm
the Kadmeia — the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and are dismissed
— several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to death in trying to
go away along with them. The harmost who surrendered the Kadmeia
is put to death by the Spartans. — Powerful sensation produced by
this incident throughout the Grecian world. — Indignation in Sparta
at the revolution of Thebes — a Spartan army sent forth at once
under king Kleombrotus. He retires from Bœotia without achieving
anything. — Kleombrotus passes by the Athenian frontier — alarm at
Athens — condemnation of the two Athenian generals who had favored
the enterprise of Pelopidas. — Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ
to surprise the Peiræus by a night-march. He fails. — Different
constructions put upon this attempt and upon the character of
Sphodrias. — The Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed.
— Trial of Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor
and sympathies of Agesilaus. — Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
procedure. — The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract
alliance with Thebes. — Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime
confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls herself as
a member. — Athens sends round envoys to the islands in the Ægean.
Liberal principles on which the new confederacy is formed. — Envoys
sent round by Athens — Chabrias, Timotheus, Kallistratus. — Service
of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of Antalkidas. He marries
the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys, and acquires possession
of a Thracian seaport, Drys. — Timotheus and Kallistratus. — Synod
of the new confederates assembled at Athens — votes for war on a
large scale. — Members of the confederacy were at first willing
and harmonious — a fleet is equipped. — New property-tax imposed
at Athens. The Solonian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[p.
viii]</span> census. — The Solonian census retained in the main,
though with modifications, at the restoration under the archonship of
Eukleides in 403 <small>B.C.</small> — Archonship of Nausinikus in
378 <small>B.C.</small> — New census and schedule then introduced, of
all citizens worth twenty minæ and upwards, distributed into classes,
and entered for a fraction of their total property; each class for
a different fraction. — All metics, worth more than twenty-five
minæ, were registered in the schedule; all in one class, each man
for one-sixth of his property. Aggregate schedule. — The Symmories —
containing the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens — the three hundred
wealthiest leaders of the Symmories. — Citizens not wealthy enough
to be included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule,
and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories — extension of
the principle to the trierarchy. — Enthusiasm at Thebes in defence
of the new government and against Sparta. Military training — the
Sacred Band. — Epaminondas. — His previous character and training —
musical and intellectual, as well as gymnastic. Conversation with
philosophers, Sokratic as well as Pythagorean. — His eloquence
— his unambitious disposition — gentleness of his political
resentments. — Conduct of Epaminondas at the Theban revolution of
379 <small>B.C.</small> — he acquires influence, through Pelopidas,
in the military organization of the city. — Agesilaus marches to
attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan confederacy — good
system of defence adopted by Thebes — aid from Athens under Chabrias.
Increase of the Theban strength in Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan
oligarchies in the Bœotian cities. — Second expedition of Agesilaus
into Bœotia — he gains no decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire
greater and greater strength. Agesilaus retires — he is disabled
by a hurt in the leg. — Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to
invade Bœotia. — He retires without reaching Bœotia. — Resolution
of Sparta to equip a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The
Athenians send out a fleet under Chabrias — Victory of Chabrias at
sea near Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ. — Extension
of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the victory
at Naxos. — Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus with an
Athenian fleet — his victory over the Lacedæmonian fleet — his
success in extending the Athenian confederacy — his just dealing.
— Financial difficulties of Athens. — She becomes jealous of the
growing strength of Thebes — steady and victorious progress of Thebes
in Bœotia. — Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra over the Lacedæmonians.
— The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out of all Bœotia, except
Orchomenus — they reorganize the Bœotian federation. — They invade
Phokis — Kleombrotus is sent thither with an army for defence —
Athens makes a separate peace with the Lacedæmonians. — Jason of
Pheræ — his energetic character and formidable power. — His prudent
dealing with Polydamas. — The Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to
spare any aid for Thessaly — they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal.
He comes to terms with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly. —
Peace between Athens and Sparta — broken off almost immediately.
The Lacedæmonians declare war again, and resume their plans upon
Zakynthus and Korkyra. — Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus,
collected from all the confederates, invades Korkyra. — Mnasippus
besieges the city — high cultivation of the adjoining lands. — The
Korkyræans blocked up in the city — supplies intercepted — want
begins — no hope of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement
arrives from Athens — large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus.
Mnasippus is defeated and slain — the city supplied with provisions.
— Approach of the Athenian reinforcement — Hypermenês, successor
of Mnasippus, conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much
property behind. — Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet — it is
commanded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[p. ix]</span> not by
Timotheus, but by Iphikrates — causes of the delay — preliminary
voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted. — Discontent at Athens, in
consequence of the absence of Timotheus — distress of the armament
assembled at Kalauria — Iphikrates and Kallistratus accuse Timotheus.
Iphikrates named admiral in his place. — Return of Timotheus — an
accusation is entered against him, but trial is postponed until the
return of Iphikrates from Korkyra. — Rapid and energetic movements
of Iphikrates towards Korkyra — his excellent management of the
voyage. On reaching Kephallenia, he learns the flight of the
Lacedæmonians from Korkyra. — He goes on to Korkyra, and captures by
surprise the ten Syracusan triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of
Sparta. — Iphikrates in want of money — he sends home Kallistratus
to Athens — he finds work for his seamen at Korkyra — he obtains
funds by service in Akarnania. — Favorable tone of public opinion
at Athens, in consequence of the success at Korkyra — the trial of
Timotheus went off easily — Jason and Alketas come to support him —
his quæstor is condemned to death. — Timotheus had been guilty of
delay, not justifiable under the circumstances — though acquitted,
his reputation suffered — he accepts command under Persia. —
Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at Korkyra,
and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates. — Helikê and Bura are
destroyed by an earthquake. — The Spartans again send Antalkidas to
Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention — the Persian satraps send
down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall make up their
differences. — Athens disposed towards peace. — Athens had ceased
to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous of Thebes. —
Equivocal position of the restored Platæa now that the Lacedæmonians
had been expelled from Bœotia. — The Thebans forestall a negotiation
by seizing Platæa, and expelling the inhabitants, who again take
refuge at Athens. — Strong feeling excited in Athens against the
Thebans, on account of their dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The
Plataic discourse of Isokrates. — Increased tendency of the Athenians
towards peace with Sparta — Athens and the Athenian confederacy give
notice to Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta. — Speeches of
the Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus. — Kallistratus
and his policy. — He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide
between them the headship of Greece — Sparta on land, Athens at
sea — recognizing general autonomy. — Peace is concluded. Autonomy
of each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and
garrisons. — Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and
her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after
her, successively. — The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas,
the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of the
Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that he shall
take it for Thebes alone. — Daring and emphatic speeches delivered
by Epaminondas in the congress — protesting against the overweening
pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the ancient
institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of the federation.
— Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of Agesilaus — brief
questions exchanged — Thebes is excluded from the treaty. — General
peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the rest — Thebes
alone is excluded. — Terms of peace — compulsory and indefeasible
confederacies are renounced — voluntary alliances alone maintained.
— Real point in debate <span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[p.
x]</span>between Agesilaus and Epaminondas.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_77">72-174</a></p>

<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXVIII.</p>
<p class="small center">BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.</p>

<p class="p1">Measures for executing the stipulations made at the
congress of Sparta. — Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes.
— King Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
Leuktra. — New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas. — Confidence
of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus. — Battle of Leuktra. — Defeat
of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus. — Faint adherence of the
Spartan allies. — Spartan camp after the defeat — confession of
defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce. — Great surprise, and
immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece by the
Theban victory. — Effect of the news at Sparta — heroic self-command.
— Reinforcements sent from Sparta. — Proceedings in Bœotia after the
battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not well received at Athens.
— Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra — the Spartan army retires from
Bœotia under capitulation. — Treatment of the defeated citizens on
reaching Sparta — suspension of the law. — Lowered estimation of
Sparta in Greece — prestige of military superiority lost. — Extension
of the power of Thebes. Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ. —
Power and ambition of Jason. — Plans of Jason — Pythian festival.
— Assassination of Jason at Pheræ. — Relief to Thebes by the death
of Jason — satisfaction in Greece. — Proceedings in Peloponnesus
after the defeat of Leuktra. Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts
and dekarchies. — Skytalism at Argos — violent intestine feud. —
Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta. — Athens places herself
at the head of a new Peloponnesian land-confederacy. — Accusation
preferred in the Amphyctionic assembly, by Thebes against Sparta.
— The Spartans are condemned to a fine — importance of this fact
as an indication. — Proceedings in Arcadia. — Reëstablishment of
the city of Mantinea by its own citizens. — Humiliating refusal
experienced by Agesilaus from the Mantineans — keenly painful to a
Spartan. — Feeling against Agesilaus at Sparta. — Impulse among the
Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian union. Opposition from Orchomenus
and Tegea. — Revolution at Tegea — the philo-Spartan party are put
down or expelled. — Tegea becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to
the Pan-Arcadian union. — Pan-Arcadian union is formed. — March
of Agesilaus against Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in
Sparta. — Application by the Arcadians to Athens for aid against
Sparta; it is refused: they then apply to the Thebans. — Proceedings
and views of Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra. — Plans of
Epaminondas for restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus. — Also,
for consolidating the Arcadians against Sparta. — Epaminondas and
the Theban army arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled
there. The allies entreat him to invade Laconia. — Reluctance of
Epaminondas to invade Laconia — reasonable grounds for it. — He
marches into Laconia — four lines of invasion. — He crosses the
Eurotas and approaches close to Sparta. — Alarm at Sparta — arrival
of various allies to her aid by sea. — Discontent in Laconia among
the Periœki and Helots — danger to Sparta from that cause. — Vigilant
defence of Sparta by Agesilaus. — Violent emotion of the Spartans,
especially the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas. —
He retires without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down
to Gythium. He returns into Arcadia. — Great effect of this invasion
upon Grecian opinion — Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther
lowered. — Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis. — Foundation of
Messênê. — Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta. — Periœki
and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians on
the Lacedæmonian border. — The details of this reorganiz<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</span>ing process unhappily
unknown. — Megalopolis — the Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand. — Epaminondas
and his army evacuate Peloponnesus. — The Spartans solicit aid from
Athens — language of their envoys, as well as those from Corinth
and Phlius, at Athens. — Reception of the envoys — the Athenians
grant the prayer. — Vote passed to aid Sparta — Iphikrates is named
general. — March of Iphikrates and his army to the Isthmus. — Trial
of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining his command beyond the legal
time — his honorable and easy acquittal.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_78">174-241</a></p>

<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIX.</p>
<p class="small center">FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH
OF PELOPIDAS.</p>

<p class="p1">Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra.
— Changes out of Peloponnesus. — Amyntas prince of Macedonia.
— Ambitious views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra. — Her
aspirations to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of
kleruchies. — She wishes to recover Amphipolis — Amyntas recognizes
her right to the place. — Athens and Amphipolis. — Death of Jason
and Amyntas — state of Thessaly and Macedonia. — Alexander of Pheræ
— he is opposed by Pelopidas — influence of Thebes in Thessaly. —
State of Macedonia — Alexander son of Amyntas — Euridikê — Ptolemy.
— Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of
Amyntas. — Iphikrates and Timotheus. — The Spartan allied army
defends the line of Mount Oneium — Epaminondas breaks through
it, and marches into Peloponnesus. — Sikyon joins the Thebans —
Phlius remains faithful to Sparta. — Reinforcement from Syracuse
to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta. — Forbearance and mildness of
Epaminondas. — Energetic action and insolence of the Arcadians —
Lykomedes animates and leads them on. — Great influence of Lykomedes.
— Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the Triphylian towns,
which are admitted into the Arcadian union, to the great offence of
Elis. — Mission of Philiskus to Greece by Ariobarzanes. — Political
importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the
great subject of discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.
— Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly. — The Tearless Battle
— victory of the Spartan Archidamus over the Arcadians. — Third
expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus — his treatment of the
Achæan cities. — The Thebans reverse the policy of Epaminondas,
on complaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not reëlect him
Bœotarch. — Disturbed state of Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot —
his rapacious and sanguinary conduct. — Sufferings of the Phliasians
— their steady adherence to Sparta. — Assistance rendered to Phlius
by the Athenian Chares — surprise of the fort of Thyamia. — Euphron
is expelled from Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans — he retires
to the harbor, which he surrenders to the Spartans. — Euphron
returns to Sikyon — he goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated. —
The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes — their defence.
— They are acquitted by the Theban Senate. — Sentiment among the
Many of Sikyon, favorable to Euphron — honors shown to his body and
memory. — The Sikyonians recapture their harbor from the Spartans.
— Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship —
mission of Pelopidas and other envoys to Susa. — Pelopidas obtains
from Persia a favorable rescript. — Protest of the Athenians and
Arcadians against the rescript. — Pelopidas brings back the rescript.
It is read publicly before the Greek states convoked at Thebes.
— The states convoked at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript.
The Arcadian deputies protest against the headship of Thebes. —
The Thebans send the re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[p.
xii]</span>script to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse:
failure of the Theban object. — Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly.
He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ. — The
Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated
and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private man.
— Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes. Harsh
treatment of Pelopidas. — Second Theban army sent into Thessaly,
under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length
released by Alexander under a truce. — Oropus is taken from Athens
and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians recall Chares
from Corinth. — Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies;
she enters into alliance with Lykomedes and the Arcadians. Death of
Lykomedes. — Epaminondas is sent as envoy into Arcadia; he speaks
against Kallistratus. — Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth;
they are disappointed. — They apply to Sparta. — Refusal of the
Spartans to acknowledge the independence of Messênê; they reproach
their allies with consenting. — Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc.,
conclude peace with Thebes, but without Sparta — recognizing the
independence of Messênê. — Athens sends a fresh embassy to the
Persian king — altered rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to
be an Athenian possession. — Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia —
Agesilaus — revolt of Ariobarzanes. — Conquest of Samos by Timotheus.
— Partial readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus.
— Athenian kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors. —
Difficulties of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese.
— Kotys of Thrace. — Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates. — Timotheus
acts with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He
fails at Amphipolis. — Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
Chersonese. — Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly — Pelopidas is
sent with an army against Alexander of Pheræ. — Epaminondas exhorts
the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens. — Discussion between
him and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly. — Menekleidas seemingly
right in dissuading naval preparations. — Epaminondas in command of
a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas attacks
Alexander of Pheræ — his success in battle — his rashness — he is
slain. — Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his
death. — The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_79">242-310</a></p>

<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXX.</p>
<p class="small center">FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.</p>

<p class="p1">Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes
— destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans. — Repugnance excited
against the Thebans — regret and displeasure of Epaminondas. —
Return of Epaminondas from his cruise — renewed complications in
Peloponnesus. — State of Peloponnesus — Eleians and Achæans in
alliance with Sparta. — The Eleians aim at recovering Triphylia —
the Spartans, at recovering Messênê. — War between the Eleians and
Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia. — Second invasion of Elis by
the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians. Archidamus and the Spartans
invade Arcadia. — Archidamus establishes a Spartan garrison at
Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him — armistice. — The
Arcadians blockade Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison. — The
Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans —
excluding the Eleians. — The Eleians invade the festival by arms —
conflict on the plain of Olympia — bravery of the Eleians. — Feelings
of the spectators at Olympia. — The Arcadians take the treasures of
Olympia to pay their militia. — Violent dissensions arising among
the members of the Arcadian communion, in<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_xiii">[p. xiii]</span> consequence of this appropriation.
The Arcadian assembly pronounces against it. — Farther dissensions in
Arcadia — invitation sent to the Thebans — peace concluded with Elis.
— The peace generally popular — celebrated at Tegea — seizure of
many oligarchical members at Tegea by the Theban harmost. — Conduct
of the Theban harmost. — View taken by Epaminondas. — His view is
more consistent with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view
of Xenophon himself. — Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans. —
Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster
at Tegea. — Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for. — Night-march
of Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time
to prevent surprise. — Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds
it defended. — He marches back to Tegea — despatches his cavalry
from thence to surprise Mantinea. — The surprise is baffled, by the
accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry — battle of cavalry near
Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage. — Epaminondas
resolves to attack the enemy near Mantinea. — View of Xenophon —
that this resolution was forced upon him by despair — examined. —
Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting is
given. — Mantinico-Tegeatic plain — position of the Lacedæmonians and
Mantineans. — March of Epaminondas from Tegea. — False impression
produced upon the enemy by his manœuvres. — Theban order of battle —
plans of the commander. — Disposition of the cavalry on both sides.
— Unprepared state of the Lacedæmonian army. — Battle of Mantinea —
complete success of the dispositions of Epaminondas. — Victory of the
Thebans — Epaminondas is mortally wounded. — Extreme discouragement
caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory
and pursuit. — Victory claimed by both sides — nevertheless the
Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce. — Dying
moments of Epaminondas. — The two other best Theban officers are
slain also in the battle. — Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons
honored for it. — Peace concluded — <i>statu quo</i> recognized, including
the independence of Messênê — Sparta alone stands out — the Thebans
return home. — Results of the battle of Mantinea, as appreciated
by Xenophon — unfair to the Thebans. — Character of Epaminondas.
— Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send
thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the incorporation.
— Agesilaus and Archidamus. — State of Persia — revolted satraps
and provinces — Datames. — Formidable revolt of the satraps in Asia
Minor — it is suppressed by the Persian court, through treachery.
— Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt — Chabrias is there also. —
Death and character of Agesilaus. — State of Egypt and Persia. —
Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal family. — Athenian
maritime operations — Timotheus makes war against Amphipolis and
against Kotys. — Ergophilus succeeds Timotheus at the Chersonese —
Kallisthenes succeeds him against Amphipolis — war at sea against
Alexander of Pheræ. — Ergophilus and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful
— both tried. — Autokles in the Hellespont and Bosphorus — convoy
for the corn-ships out of the Euxine. — Miltokythes revolts from
Kotys in Thrace — ill-success of the Athenians. — Menon — Timomachus
— as commanders in the Chersonese. The Athenians lose Sestos. —
Kephisodotus in the Chersonese. Charidemus crosses thither from
Abydos. — Assassination of Kotys. — Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys.
Berisades and Amadokus, his rivals — ill-success of Athens —
Kephisodotus. — Improved prospects of Athens in the Chersonese —
Athenodorus — Charidemus. — Charidemus is forced to accept the
convention of Athenodorus — his evasions — the Chersonese with Sestos
is restored to Athens. — The transmarine empire of Athens now at its
maximum. Mischievous effects of her conquests<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_xiv">[p. xiv]</span> made against Olynthus. — Maximum of
second Athenian empire — accession of Philip of Macedon.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_80">311-383</a></p>

<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXXI.</p>
<p class="small center">SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
BEFORE SYRACUSE.</p>

<p class="p1">Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian
armament. — Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens — revolution
at Thurii. — Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to act against
Athens in the Ægean. — Disappointed hopes — defeat at Kynossema —
second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus. — Sufferings of the Syracusan
seamen — disappointment and displeasure at Syracuse. — Banishment of
Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Hermokrates
to the armament. — Internal state of Syracuse — constitution of
Diokles. — Difficulty of determining what that constitution was. —
Invasion from Carthage. — State of the Carthaginians. — Extent of
Carthaginian empire — power, and population — Liby-Phœnicians. —
Harsh dealing of Carthage towards her subjects. Colonies sent out
from Carthage. — Military force of Carthage. — Political constitution
of Carthage. — Oligarchical system and sentiment at Carthage. —
Powerful families at Carthage — Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal. — Quarrel
between Egesta and Selinus in Sicily. — Application of Egesta to
Carthage for aid — application granted — eagerness of Hannibal. —
Carthaginian envoys sent to Sicily. — Hannibal crosses over to Sicily
with a very large armament. He lays siege to Selinus. — Vigorous
assault on Selinus — gallant resistance — the town is at length
stormed. — Selinus is sacked and plundered — merciless slaughter. —
Delay of the Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal
to their embassy. — Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it. Aid
from Syracuse under Diokles — sally from Himera. Hannibal destroys
Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an expiation
to the memory of his grandfather. — Alarm throughout the Greeks of
Sicily — Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns to Carthage. —
New intestine discord in Syracuse — Hermokrates comes to Sicily. —
He levies troops to effect his return by force. — He is obliged to
retire — he establishes himself in the ruins of Selinus, and acts
against the Carthaginians. — His father attempts to reënter Syracuse,
with the bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of
Diokles. — Hermokrates tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with
an armed force. — He is defeated and slain. — First appearance of
Dionysius at Syracuse. — Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this
political discord — party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage. —
Fresh invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under
Hannibal and Imilkon. — Great alarm in Sicily — active preparations
for defence at Agrigentum. — Grandeur, wealth, and population of
Agrigentum. — The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish
the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
terrors — sacrifice. — Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under
Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to pursue them.
— Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the Agrigentine
generals, for having been backward in attack. They are put to death.
— Privations in both armies — Hamilkar captures the provision-ships
of the Syracusans — Agrigentum is evacuated. — Agrigentum taken and
plundered by the Carthagians. — Terror throughout Sicily. — Bitter
complaints against the Syracusan generals. — The Hermokratean party
at Syracuse comes forward to subvert the government and elevate
Dionysius. — Harangue of Diony<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xv">[p.
xv]</span>sius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals,
who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others
appointed in their room. — Ambitious arts of Dionysius — he intrigues
against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He
procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles. — Dionysius
is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the
execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy. — He returns to
Syracuse with an increased force — he accuses his colleagues of
gross treason. — Dionysius is named general, single-handed, with
full powers. — Apparent repentance of the people after the vote.
Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a body
of paid guards. — March of Dionysius to Leontini. — Dionysius
establishes himself at Syracuse as despot. — Dionysius as despot —
the means whereby he attained the power.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_81">383-446</a></p>

<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXXII.</p>
<p class="small center">SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.</p>

<p class="p1">Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from
Agrigentum to attack Gela. — Brave defence of the Geloans —
Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them. — Plan of Dionysius
for a general attack on the Carthaginian army. — He is defeated
and obliged to retreat. — He evacuates Gela and Kamarina — flight
of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by
the Carthaginians. — Indignation and charges of treachery against
Dionysius. — Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen — they ride off
to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius. — Their imprudence.
Dionysius master of Syracuse. — Propositions of peace come from
Imilkon. Terms of peace. — Collusion of Dionysius with the
Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in
the Carthaginian army. — Near coincidence, in time, of this peace,
with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami — sympathy of Sparta with
Dionysius. — Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily,
from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum. — Strong position of Dionysius. —
Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in
and about Ortygia. — He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and
partisans — he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew. — Exorbitant
exactions of Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Dionysius marches
out of Syracuse against the Sikels — mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers
at Herbesa — Dorikus the commander is slain. — The Syracusan
insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege
Dionysius in Ortygia. — Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body
of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid. — He amuses the
assailants with feigned submission — arrival of the Campanians —
victory of Dionysius. — Dionysius strengthens his despotism more than
before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikoteles
the Corinthian is put to death. — He disarms the Syracusan citizens
— strengthens the fortifications of Ortygia — augments his mercenary
force. — Dionysius conquers Naxus, Katana, and Leontini. — Great
power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides. — Resolution
of Dionysius to make war upon Carthage. — Locality of Syracuse —
danger to which the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege.
— Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern
ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus. — Popularity of the
work — efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius
himself. — Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the
Carthaginians. — Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius towards
the Syracusans. — His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in
Sicily. Hostile sentiment of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvi">[p.
xvi]</span> the Rhegines towards him. Their application to Messênê.
— He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. — He desires to marry a
Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly
incensed. — He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri — his
wish is granted — he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris. — Immense
warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse — arms, engines, etc. —
Naval preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk
of ships of war — quadriremes and quinqueremes. — General sympathy of
the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage. — He hires soldiers
from all quarters. — He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the
same day — Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse
towards him. — He convokes the Syracusan assembly, and exhorts them
to war against Carthage. — He desires to arrest the emigration of
those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his.
— He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and
ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage — suffering in Africa from the
pestilence. — Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious
army against the Carthaginians in Sicily. — Insurrection against
Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures
inflicted on the Carthaginians. — Dionysius besieges the Carthaginian
seaport Motyê. — Situation of Motyê — operations of the siege —
vigorous defence. — Dionysius overruns the neighboring dependencies
of Carthage — doubtful result of the siege of Motyê — appearance
of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet — he is obliged to return. —
Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length taken by a nocturnal
attack. — Plunder of Motyê — the inhabitants either slaughtered or
sold for slaves. — Farther operations of Dionysius. — Arrival of
Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament — his successful operations — he
retakes Motyê. — Dionysius retires to Syracuse. — Imilkon captures
Messênê. — Revolt of the Sikels from Dionysius. Commencement of
Tauromenium. — Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of Syracuse —
he strengthens Leontini — he advances to Katana with his land-army
as well as his fleet. — Naval battle off Katana — great victory
of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon. — Arrival of Imilkon to
join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the
Campanians of Ætna. — Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of
his army. — Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse — the Carthaginian
fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbor — their imposing entry.
Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbor. — Imilkon plunders
the suburb of Achradina — blockades Syracuse by sea. — Naval victory
gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius. —
Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans. —
Public meeting convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him —
vehement speech by Thedorus. — Sympathy excited by the speech in the
Syracusan assembly. — The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius — who
finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement. —
Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy
at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas.
— Dionysius tries to gain popularity. — Terrific pestilence among
the Carthaginian army before Syracuse. — Dionysius attacks the
Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his
mercenaries. — Success of Dionysius, both by sea and by land,
against the Syracusan position. — Conflagration of the Carthaginian
camp — exultation at Syracuse. — Imilkon concludes a secret treaty
with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians,
on condition of abandoning his remaining army. Destruction of the
remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians. — Distress
at Carthage — miserable end of Imilkon. — Danger of Carthage — anger
and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down.</p>
<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_82">446-512</a></p>

</div>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_76">
  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[p. 1]</a></span></p>
  <p class="falseh1">HISTORY OF GREECE.</p>
  <hr class="sep2" />
  <p class="xl center">PART II.<br />
  <small>CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</small></p>
  <hr class="sep2" />
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVI.<br />
  FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.</h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span>
peace or convention<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1"
class="fnanchor">[1]</a> which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians <i>medising</i>!”—“Nay (replied
the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) <i>laconising</i>.”<a
id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>

<p>These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were
perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership
between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the
Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[p. 2]</span> on the express ground,
that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s purposes
and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.<a
id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> While
Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state
gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after
the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating
Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos,
Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.<a id="FNanchor_4"
href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> This addition seems
to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form
the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by
Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s
name from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate
the adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and
Persia had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had
the means of standing out, even if the supplementary article had
been omitted. Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to
Athens a certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger
shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true,
that Athens, as well as Thebes,<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5"
class="fnanchor">[5]</a> assented to the peace only under fear and
compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
degradation.</p>

<p>That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece.
Its authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction
from his concluding threat, that he would make war against all
recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[p. 3]</span> with Antalkidas), read by
him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled Grecian envoys,
after he had called their special attention to the regal seal.<a
id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Such was
the convention which Sparta, the ancient president of the Grecian
world had been the first to solicit at the hands of the Persian
king, and which she now not only set the example of sanctioning by
her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as guarantee and
champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the point
of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or
not. Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and
placed as a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;<a
id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> nay, even
in the common sanctuaries,—the Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the
great <i>foci</i> and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though
called by the name of a convention, it was on the very face of it
a peremptory mandate proceeding from the ancient enemy of Greece,
an acceptance of which was nothing less than an act of obedience.
While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_4">[p. 4]</span> Pan-hellenic patriots it was the
deepest disgrace and insult.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8"
class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Effacing altogether the idea of an
independent Hellenic world, bound together and regulated by the
self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own members,—even the
words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign
power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of
Grecian differences; a guardian<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9"
class="fnanchor">[9]</a> who cared for the peace of Greece more
than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it
was tantamount to that symbol of submission—the cession of earth
and water—which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor
of Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians;
a demand, which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated,
but resented so cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it
was brought,—stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to
Hellas for complying with it.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10"
class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Yet nothing more would have been implied
in such cession than what stood embodied in the inscription on
that “colonna infame,” which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[p.
5]</span> placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the
Pan-hellenic glories and ornaments at Olympia.<a id="FNanchor_11"
href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p>

<p>Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her own
estimation even more than in that of others,<a id="FNanchor_12"
href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>—had so lost all
Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious
minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political
objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation have
appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.</p>

<p>Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates
from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[p. 6]</span> the commencement
of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology, little
less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not unconscious
of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta,
when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be
blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for
her own preservation.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13"
class="fnanchor">[13]</a> From the earliest commencement to the
seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized
in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest
reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and
contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to
understand what they meant,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14"
class="fnanchor">[14]</a> sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta
(in the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and
asking for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
to reach Susa.</p>

<p>Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_7">[p. 7]</span> Greeks, and that too without any
stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my last volume.<a
id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> She
had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an excuse and not as a
justification—of self-defence against aggression from Athens, which
Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the war. Even then it was
only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the reality of the case;
but now, the avowed as well as the real object was something quite
different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to accomplish that
object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition, Sparta
sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a
price which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly
never have endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then
formidable power of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the
example; and consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the
like sacrifice, though the bargain was never consummated. It is true
that she was then contending for her existence. Nevertheless, the
facts afford melancholy proof how much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic
independence became enfeebled in both the leaders, amidst the
fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of Ægospotami.<a
id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[p. 8]</span></p>

<p>After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,<a id="FNanchor_17"
href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and Athenian aid was
still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse
of self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.</p> <p><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[p. 9]</span></p> <p>But never on any
occasion did that excuse find less real place than in regard to
the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful,
even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the
Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only
by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive against her,
and would probably have been disunited by reasonable offers on her
part; nor would she have needed even to recall Agesilaus from Asia.
Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated in great measure by
a groundless panic, arising from the sight of the revived Long Walls
and refortified Piræus, and springing at once to the fancy, that a
new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before, was
about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since
the very peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian
empire were now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire
herself, the first object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from
the like; the next, to put down all partial federations or political
combinations, and to enforce universal autonomy, or the maximum of
political isolation; in order that there might nowhere exist a power
capable of resisting herself, the strongest of all individual states.
As a means to this end, which was no less in the interest of Persia
than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King,
betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen,
but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant
manner,—and volunteered to <i>medise</i> in order that the Persians might
repay her by <i>laconising</i>.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18"
class="fnanchor">[18]</a> To ensure fully the obedience of all the
satraps, who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their
own, Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and
sealed at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to
enforce the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon
all her countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and
herself into a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an
act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and
destructive than that alleged confederacy with the Persian king,
for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and
that, too, by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[p. 10]</span>
the Spartans themselves.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19"
class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Unhappily it formed a precedent for
the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;<a
id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a>
foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political
independence had to run.</p>

<p>That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous
answer sent by the Athenians<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21"
class="fnanchor">[21]</a> to the offers of Mardonius in 479
<small>B.C.</small>, refusing in the midst of ruin present and
prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic
fellowship,—that sentiment which had been during the two following
generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been
powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the
former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter
completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that
Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic
independence; from the smaller states nothing more could be required
than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld.<a
id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> But so
soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept
(even under constraint), the proclamation under the king’s hand and
seal brought down by Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part
of the public emblems of Gre<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[p.
11]</span>cian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
bosoms of individual patriots.</p>

<p>If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
the present of a friend or of an enemy.</p>

<p>The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry.
The Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the
peace, sent down by the king,”<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23"
class="fnanchor">[23]</a> undertook the duty of execution; and we
shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They
did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
interests and purposes. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[p.
12]</span> promise made by the convention, except in so far as it
enabled them to increase their own power by dismemberment or party
intervention, proved altogether false and hollow. For if we look
back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when they sent to
Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece, we shall find
that the word had then a distinct and serious import; demanding that
the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free, which
freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of
the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher
empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were
no large body of subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of
Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means intended to apply. So
that in fact, what was promised, as well as what was realized, even
by the most specious item of this disgraceful convention, was—“that
cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their own comfort and in
their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;” a significant
phrase (employed by Perikles,<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24"
class="fnanchor">[24]</a> in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian
war) which forms a sort of running text for Grecian history during
the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas and the battle of
Leuktra.</p>

<p>I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to
extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian
auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency
of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an object which
they had long had at heart;<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25"
class="fnanchor">[25]</a> and by both, their ascendency in Greece
was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by the new development
of Persian force as well as partially bribed by the restoration of
her three islands, into an acceptance of the peace,—was thus robbed
of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and disabled from opposing the
Spartan projects. But before we enter upon these projects, it will
be convenient to turn for a short time to the proceedings of the
Persians.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[p. 13]</span></p>

<p>Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
aid in reconquering Egypt.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26"
class="fnanchor">[26]</a> It was not merely these Greeks who were
exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos
with all his children.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27"
class="fnanchor">[27]</a> About 395 <small>B.C.</small>, we
find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian
fleet against Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28"
class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Two years afterwards (392-390
<small>B.C.</small>), during the years immediately succeeding the
victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to
Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and
Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.<a
id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>
Having thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[p. 14]</span>
repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between
390-380 <small>B.C.</small>,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30"
class="fnanchor">[30]</a> sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against
the same enemy. And in spite of farther efforts made afterwards by
Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native kings in that country
maintained their independence for about sixty years in all, until the
reign of his successor Ochus.</p>

<p>But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities
much superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief
attention of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas:
Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we
possess a discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy,
composed after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid
for with the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the
contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration
and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are
sufficiently interesting.</p>

<p>Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the
Teukridæ, which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary
names of Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through
them, from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the
archer Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the
Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father
Telamon, and given commencement to the city of that name on the
eastern coast of Cyprus.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31"
class="fnanchor">[31]</a> As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek
and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
being all dependent upon one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[p.
15]</span> or other of them,—seven pass for Hellenic, the two most
considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician,—Paphos,
Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture
of Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.<a
id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> Each
was ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician.
The Greek immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned)
appear to have been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time
of the Ionic revolt (<small>B.C.</small> 496), the preponderance
was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable intermixture
of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly crushed by
the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished through
the aid of the Phœnicians<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33"
class="fnanchor">[33]</a> on the opposite continent. And though
doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
<small>B.C.</small>) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in
his pacification with the Persians, had prudently relinquished
Cyprus as well as Egypt;<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34"
class="fnanchor">[34]</a> so that the Grecian element in the
former,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[p. 16]</span> receiving
little extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to
the Phœnician.</p>

<p>It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes
of Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks
of the Teukrid Gens,<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35"
class="fnanchor">[35]</a> were supplanted and dethroned by a
Phœnician exile who gained their confidence and made himself
despot in their place.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36"
class="fnanchor">[36]</a> To insure his own sceptre, this usurper
did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician
population, as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The
same policy was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but
seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns;
insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus
became sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly
oppressed; new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the
most repulsive treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel
mutilations of the body which were habitually employed as penalties
by the Orientals; while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry,
and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.<a id="FNanchor_37"
href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[p. 17]</span></p>

<p>Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth
of the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at
an early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much
power of winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man
both among Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the
Phœnician despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian
or Tyrian named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.<a
id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The
usurper, mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon
all conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.<a
id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p>

<p>The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed
to princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was
still farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.<a id="FNanchor_40"
href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> His conduct fully
justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_18">[p. 18]</span> the gratification of personal appetite;
abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his
reign with letters of gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras,
since he had the susceptible temperament of a Greek, though his great
mental force always kept it under due control.<a id="FNanchor_41"
href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> But he was also careful
in inquiring into, and strict in punishing crime, yet without
those demonstrations of cruel infliction by which an Oriental
prince displayed his energy.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42"
class="fnanchor">[42]</a> His government was at the same time
highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the multitude as
towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal supervision,
he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of
policy, and kept watch over its execution.<a id="FNanchor_43"
href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> He was foremost in
all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security,
he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and military
force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went on
increasing.</p>

<p>Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis
and in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of
the last fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt.
For aid in this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to
Athens, with which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile
and legendary sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing
to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot
exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign,
we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[p. 19]</span> may conclude
it to have been about 411 or 410 <small>B.C.</small> It seems
to have been shortly after that period that he was visited by
Andokides the Athenian;<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44"
class="fnanchor">[44]</a> moreover, he must have been a prince
not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbor
Konon in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, after the battle of Ægospotami.
He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other
parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under
the auspices of Solon,<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45"
class="fnanchor">[45]</a> a century and a half before. He took
especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching,
music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was so
successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
of the island.</p>

<p>Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
of Ægospotami (<small>B.C.</small> 405), all such out-settlers as
then remained were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at
Athens (at that moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in
some other locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian
admiral Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out
of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would
present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly,
we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[p. 20]</span> different parts of
Greece, crowded to Salamis.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46"
class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Many Athenian women, during the years
of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
husbands in that city;<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47"
class="fnanchor">[47]</a> while throughout the wide range of the
Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.</p>

<p>During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid
his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the
Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased
also. We find him towards the year 390 <small>B.C.</small>,
engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with
Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician
cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period,
this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle
of Knidus (394 <small>B.C.</small>) Evagoras had not only paid
his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
fleet placed under Konon to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[p.
21]</span> act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard.<a
id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> It
was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the extraordinary
energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion in the
service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the
latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and
at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of
Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against
him, and forced him into the war in self-defence.<a id="FNanchor_49"
href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Evagoras accepted the
challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage
and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded
by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus,
Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to
Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians
on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take the great city
of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian towns to
declare against the Persians.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50"
class="fnanchor">[50]</a> He received powerful aid from Akoris,
the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias
and the force sent out by the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_51"
href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Beginning apparently
about 390 <small>B.C.</small>, the war against Evagoras lasted
something more than ten years, costing the Persians great efforts and
an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to
his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to Konon and
his energetic efforts before and in the battle of Knidus,—though she
thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.</p>

<p>The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[p. 22]</span> a war in Greece, it was
impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of
Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort
made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the
peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as
should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of
the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;<a
id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>
the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the
Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no
other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras
was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by Hekatomnus
prince of Karia with a secret present of money.<a id="FNanchor_53"
href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> But the peace of
Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were
completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic sea-board,
and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only
their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from
these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian force
acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
constraint, neither well paid nor well used,<a id="FNanchor_54"
href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> and therefore not very
efficient.</p>

<p>The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a
large portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral
Gaos was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium
in the south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having
previously gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary
efforts he had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes,
nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[p. 23]</span> contest, in which he at
first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled
the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.<a
id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a>
Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras
defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid
from Akoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also
continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the
Persians were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten
years after its commencement.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56"
class="fnanchor">[56]</a> It cost them on the whole (if we
may believe Isokrates)<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57"
class="fnanchor">[57]</a> fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
as paid by “one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[p. 24]</span>
king to another.” Rather than concede this point of honor, he even
broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself
to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had been yet
farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between the two
commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus of
projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and
thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already
wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented
to grant the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and
exchanging the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the
amendment of the other side.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58"
class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p>

<p>It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.<a
id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>
His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing
as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of
the Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies,
and conflict, often with actual bloodshed.<a id="FNanchor_60"
href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> But he omits to notice
the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the
hero throughout his life.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61"
class="fnanchor">[61]</a> It was seemingly not very long after
the peace, that a Sa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[p.
25]</span>laminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against his
life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before
the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He
left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of
an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty
of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the
most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence
of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each
unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being
conducted to her chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there
assassinated by his hand.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62"
class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p>

<p>Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
form<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[p. 26]</span>ing a strong
contrast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose
military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklês,
the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed
much regard, accompanied by munificent presents, to the Athenian
Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince,
attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study
with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just
dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property, which had so
much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.<a
id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a></p>

<p>We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting
not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the
glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in
Cyprus,—to the general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in
Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in
479 <small>B.C.</small>, the Persians were now really masters of
all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no time in
confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected,
they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some
cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to
raze the town altogether.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64"
class="fnanchor">[64]</a> And thus these cities, having already once
changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy
subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harmosts
and native decemvirs,—were now transferred to masters yet more
oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy.
Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards individuals,
the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap maintained, were
probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even
the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required
beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women
as inmates of their harems.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65"
class="fnanchor">[65]</a> What was taken for their convenience
admitted neither<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[p. 27]</span>
of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful
than many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent,
lively, and seductive,—as we may read in the history of that
<span class="replace" id="tn_1" title="In the printed book:
Phokæn">Phokæan</span> lady, the companion of Cyrus, who was taken
captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic Greeks, when passing into
the hands of Oriental masters, came under the maxims and sentiment
of Orientals, respecting the infliction of pain or torture,—maxims
not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but also making
little distinction between freemen and slaves.<a id="FNanchor_66"
href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> The difference between
the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just
noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians
was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made
over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to
a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time
thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the hands of the
Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in Cyprus,—and
above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia,—Chios,
Samos, Rhodes, etc.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67"
class="fnanchor">[67]</a> These islands were now exposed to the same
hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that from which
they had been rescued nearly a century before by the Confederacy
of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that Confederacy
was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the
energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized,
and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom
its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[p. 28]</span> extinction was
owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security
even of the islanders.</p>

<p>It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
like Antalkidas, warned him<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68"
class="fnanchor">[68]</a> that his persevering hostility would
ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
was too fully realized in the development of the great military
genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.</p>

<p>I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging
oaths to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at
first to recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon
which Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them
from the treaty, and attack them single-handed.<a id="FNanchor_69"
href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> Their timely accession
balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a
series of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to
the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed
autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and
interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to
have, the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual
or contingent, from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For
this purpose she availed herself of this<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_29">[p. 29]</span> moment of change to organize in each
of them a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes
as well as devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a
Spartan harmost and garrison.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70"
class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Such an internal revolution grew almost
naturally out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and
the predominant sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been
favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of
Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves hampered,
intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those who
had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a bold
and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the
surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would
rather invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in
their town, as a security to themselves against resistance from their
own citizens as well as against attacks from<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_30">[p. 30]</span> Thebes, and as a means of placing them
under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears
to have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable
to the Spartan alliance.<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71"
class="fnanchor">[71]</a> These two cities were strongly garrisoned
by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_72"
href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p>

<p>The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.</p>

<p>A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this
town, as one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its
brave and faithful population, victims of an exposed position
combined with numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a
sort of repugnance the capricious turns of policy which dictated
the Spartan behavior towards them. One hundred and twenty years
before, the Platæans had thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat
her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then
declined the obligation as too distant, and had recommended them to
ally themselves with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73"
class="fnanchor">[73]</a> This recommendation, though dictated
chiefly by a wish to raise contention between Athens and Thebes,
was complied with; and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether
from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both advantageous and
honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and
strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian
cities; it was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the
power of Thebes was reës<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[p.
31]</span>tablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace
which she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the
service of Mardonius.<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74"
class="fnanchor">[74]</a> Athens, on the other hand, was at that
time doing her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol
its various cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless
suggested by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time
(460-445 <small>B.C.</small>) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic
grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently
enlisted them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to
do the same again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted.
Though for a time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by
the defeat of Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, the whole Bœotian federation (except Platæa, was united under
Thebes, in bitter hostility against her. The first blow of the war,
even prior to any declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive
nocturnal attempt to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war,
king Archidamus, at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid
siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic defence and a long
blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine;
yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced their way
out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the
Platæan old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before
the siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities
of Grecian warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the
Platæan captives, two hundred in number, who fell into their hands;
the town of Platæa had been razed, and its whole territory, joined
to Thebes, had remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.<a
id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> The
surviving Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the
Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at
Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420 <small>B.C.</small>,
that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was
handed over to the Platæans as a residence.<a id="FNanchor_76"
href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> Compelled to evacuate
Skionê, they were obliged at the close of the Peloponnesian war,<a
id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a>
to return to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[p. 32]</span>
Athens, where the remainder of them were residing at the time
of the peace of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had
destroyed their town and their fathers forty years before, would now
turn round and restore it.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78"
class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p>

<p>Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on
which the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken
either to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed
only the autonomy of <i>existing</i> towns,—or to repair previous
injustice, since the prior destruction had been the deliberate act
of themselves, and of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but
simply as a step conducive to the present political views of Sparta.
And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the
Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for about
forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by
establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of
their bitter enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished
an additional station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full
consent of the newly-established inhabitants. And more than all,
it introduced a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes,
calculated to prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards
against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no
less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we
may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an act
acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw
the use made of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy
in reference to Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during
their residence at Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,<a
id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> who
now, probably, accompanied their husbands to the restored little
town on the north of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river
Asôpus.</p>

<p>Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy,
such as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
of Spartan operations against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[p.
33]</span> Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80"
class="fnanchor">[80]</a> They were a part of the great revolution
which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes
was degraded from the president of a federation into an isolated
autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had been
before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth<a
id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> in
place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in as
dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted to
her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
the reunion of Bœotia;<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82"
class="fnanchor">[82]</a> an object in which she was for a
time completely successful, and was even<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_34">[p. 34]</span> enabled, beyond her hopes, to become
possessed of Thebes itself,<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83"
class="fnanchor">[83]</a> through a party of traitors within,—as will
presently appear.</p>

<p>In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous
hand, and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time
the great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his
more just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,<a id="FNanchor_84"
href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> as well as by a
section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with
his project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local
despots or oligarchies in the various cities,<a id="FNanchor_85"
href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> and who contended
that the autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be
left to develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention
on the part of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86"
class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[p. 35]</span></p>

<p>Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early
moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth,
to strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous
limits. Passing in review<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87"
class="fnanchor">[87]</a> the conduct of each during the war,
they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea. Some
acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity, were
imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been slack
in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even to the
length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence of
a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to
the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected
feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success which she
obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.<a
id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a>
The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all
such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that the walls of
the city should be demolished, as the only security for future
penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they despatched
an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for the purpose
of enforcing the sentence.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[p.
36]</span> They intrusted the command to king Agesipolis, since
Agesilaus excused himself from the duty, on the ground that the
Mantineans had rendered material service to his father Archidamus
in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta during the
early part of his reign.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89"
class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p>

<p>Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging
their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging
a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard,
while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he
prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that
the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock
of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it
out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more
rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of
considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the
middle of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;<a
id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> thus
causing it to inundate the interior of the<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_37">[p. 37]</span> city and threaten the stability of the
walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of
sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for
aid,<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a>
and unable to provide extraneous support for their tottering towers,
the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a capitulation. But
Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except on condition
that not only the fortifications of their city, but the city itself,
should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants
should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been
brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of
Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the
capitulation was ratified.</p>

<p>Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of
the Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious
that they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition
and by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put
to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not
Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose
good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor
from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in
number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis
had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His
Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the gate
by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as a
signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their
spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their
reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most
murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.<a
id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> As at
Peiræus before, so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[p. 38]</span>
here at Mantinea again,—the liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias
is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the
ferocity of political antipathies.</p>

<p>The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants
were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of
four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in
the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property
lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village.
Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left
unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved
troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves
resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt
themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation
became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still
better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct
Arcadian villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies.
They assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined
to the command of each allied contingent), and the military service
of all was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.<a
id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p>

<p>Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient
city Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after the
trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves deci<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[p. 39]</span>dedly bettered by the
change. Such an assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that,
being captives under the Grecian laws of war, they may have been
thankful to escape the more terrible liabilities of death or personal
slavery, at the price of forfeiting their civic community. That their
feelings towards the change were those of genuine aversion, is shown
by their subsequent conduct after the battle of Leuktra. As soon as
the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together, with unanimous
impulse, to reconstitute and refortify their dismantled city.<a
id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> It
would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for
attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct
of the Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse—often most
unhappily averse—to compromise the separate and autonomous working of
his community by joining in any larger political combination, however
equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an
increase of Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink
from the idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and
exchanging the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which
was nothing less than great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[p.
40]</span> social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
Spartans not excepted.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95"
class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p>

<p>In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea
was in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the
severest which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive
glory and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic
manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy,
or of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life
of the people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of
her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending
not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated
towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into
villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively
dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had
exercised no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we
shall hereafter find coming forward actively to found the new and
great cities of Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of
Sparta are worse than those of either Athens or Thebes; including
less of improving or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most
systematically upon subservient factions in each subordinate city. In
the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the
attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by
the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the power
into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In
the first object they completely succeeded, and their government
probably was more assured in the five villages than it would have
been in the entire town. In the second, nothing prevented them
from succeeding except the accidental intervention of the exile
Pausanias; an accident, which alone rescued the Spartan name from
the additional disgrace of a political massacre, over and above the
lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient
autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt enmity, and which
was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to receive
the fa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[p. 41]</span>vorable
criticism of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.<a
id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a>
Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring
Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to
preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than the
reduction of the city to its original district;<a id="FNanchor_97"
href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> now they are satisfied
with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified
villages, though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had
Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed
during this interval.</p>

<p>The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,<a
id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a>
indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most
stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians
through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its
members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During
the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been lords of
the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never before
possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus, and
the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded by
Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered it on
land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on their
side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled
them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general
autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant
nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,<a
id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> and
of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply to the relation
between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the
Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their ascendency on land to
the point where it had stood before the battle of Knidus, and even to
regain as much as possible of their empire at sea. To bring back a
dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts and dekarchies, and
to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most devoted partisans,
in each of those cities where the government had been somewhat
liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their systematic
policy.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[p. 42]</span></p>

<p>Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their
fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season
convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their
return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political
leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when
under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but
had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring
that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished
without just cause.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100"
class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p>

<p>While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace
of Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land,
efforts were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the
Cyclades and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In
this latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the
peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined
with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce
and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps.
Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike
marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine,
which latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen
except constrained Helots or paid foreigners;<a id="FNanchor_101"
href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> while the commerce
of Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population
of this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect
of accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia
had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.<a
id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a>
Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the
shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with
Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was
enabled to compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies
among the smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had
no marine of their own, and who (like Athens herself) required
habitual supplies of imported corn, it was important to<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[p. 43]</span> obtain both access to
Peiræus and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm
of pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when
there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market
of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea,
through the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens,
at a time when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.<a
id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a>
A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary
island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least
equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these
islanders was farther aided by the fact, that she administered the
festivals, and lent out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos.
We know by inscriptions remaining, that large sums were borrowed
at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely by individual
islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros,
Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed
these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians
named annually at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104"
class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Moreover, these islanders rendered
religious homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were
thus brought within the range of a central Athenian influence,
capable, under favorable circumstances, of being strengthened and
rendered even politically important.</p>

<p>By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of
considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her
former empire; so that in the year 380 <small>B.C.</small>, when
Isokrates published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the
peace of Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender
compared with the overruling might of Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_105"
href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> yet her navy had
already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[p. 44]</span> made such
progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command
by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens
and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against
the Asiatic barbarians.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106"
class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p>

<p>It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas,
Sparta became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic
Greeks to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading
Spartans encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition
against Asia, in compliance with propositions from some disaffected
subjects of Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107"
class="fnanchor">[107]</a> Upon some such project, currently
discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably built his
Panegyrical Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic
eloquence (380 <small>B.C.</small>) to stimulate both Sparta and
Athens in the cause, and calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece,
to suspend dissensions at home for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation
against the common enemy abroad. But whatever ideas of this kind the
Spartan leaders may have entertained, their attention was taken off,
about 382 <small>B.C.</small> by movements in a more remote region
of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.</p>

<p>Since the year 414 <small>B.C.</small> (when the Athenians were
engaged in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[p. 45]</span> the
siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of
Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of
Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained
a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans were
still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê) which she
had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded
by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of Macedonia,
undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on the Strymon.<a
id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a>
But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled Athens from
maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to her along with
her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we do not know how.
At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war,
the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may
conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens,—but still more
from the abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of
Perdikkas.</p>

<p>The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not
to have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at
the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes
of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of
the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately
subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The
reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first
instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,<a
id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> who
appears (so far as we can make out) to have had<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_46">[p. 46]</span> the better right to it; next he had
also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his subordinate
principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one of
the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition
undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of
the Peloponnesian war.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110"
class="fnanchor">[110]</a> On the death of Perdikkas (about 413
<small>B.C.</small>), his eldest or only legitimate son was a
child of seven years old; but his natural son<a id="FNanchor_111"
href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> Archelaus was
of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas
was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of reëstablishing
himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son under
pretence that he would himself bring about their reëstablishment,
slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next
despatched the boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a
well; and through these crimes made himself king. His government,
however, was so energetic and able, that Macedonia reached a
degree of military power such as none of his predecessors had ever
possessed. His troops, military equipments, and fortified places,
were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight roads
of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a
novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.<a id="FNanchor_112"
href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> Besides such improved
organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in
detail), Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival,
in honor of the Olympian Zeus and the Muses,<a id="FNanchor_113"
href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> and maintained
correspondence with the poets and philosophers of Athens. He
prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides and Agathon, as well as
the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in Macedonia, where Euripides
especially was treated with distinguished favor and munificence,<a
id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a>
remaining<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[p. 47]</span> there
until his death in 406 or 405 <small>B.C.</small> Archelaus also
invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears to have
shown some favor to Plato.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115"
class="fnanchor">[115]</a> He perished in the same year as Sokrates
(399 <small>B.C.</small>), by a violent death; two Thessalian
youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian
named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a hunting-party. The
first two were youths to whom he was strongly attached, but whose
dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and non-performance
of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for having made an
offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had been given
up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might
be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be
inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that
Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront,
found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding
the assassins of Archelaus.<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116"
class="fnanchor">[116]</a></p>

<p>These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and
relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian
citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast
between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one
wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and
capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his
crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization
of the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for
the poets and philosophers of Athens makes<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_48">[p. 48]</span> him sympathize warmly with Euripides,
and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an offensive
remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by drawing
upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. <i>L’Etat,
c’est moi</i>—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the
personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens,
no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of
bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the
military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was
afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and
in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand,
neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual
Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs,
which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced
sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might
have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to
require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might
be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated
by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained
of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without
the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who
had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and
other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the
crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have
the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal,
by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that
he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the
punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could
never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life,
upon any free Athenian citizen.</p>

<p>Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days,
after which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the
throne, under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however,
after about four years, made away with his ward, and reigned
in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[p. 49]</span> his stead for
two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son
Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated
and succeeded by Amyntas.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117"
class="fnanchor">[117]</a> This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as
the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great),
though akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an
attendant of Æropus,<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118"
class="fnanchor">[118]</a> until he made himself king by putting
to death Pausanias.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119"
class="fnanchor">[119]</a> He reigned, though with interruptions,
twenty-four years (393-369 <small>B.C.</small>); years, for the most
part, of trouble and humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional
exile for himself. The vigorous military organization introduced by
Archelaus appears to have declined; while the frequent dethronements
and assassinations of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father
of Archelaus, and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central
authority and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name;
which naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together
by a firm hand.</p>

<p>The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north,
north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian
and Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often
formidable. Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the
government, the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first
year of his reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other
princes of the interior,<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120"
class="fnanchor">[120]</a> and at all events their coming would
operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves.
Amyntas,—having only acquired the sceptre a few months before
by assassinating his predecessor, and having little hold on the
people,—was not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged
to evacuate Pella, and even to retire from Macedonia altogether.
Despairing of his position, he made over to the Olynthians a
large<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[p. 50]</span> portion of
the neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities
round the Thermaic Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121"
class="fnanchor">[121]</a> As this cession is represented to have
been made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may
fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or
valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a
moment of so much exigency.</p>

<p>It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the
Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually
aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to
have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to
speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what
he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall
see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength.
The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower
or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the
interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw
themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in
conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among
all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering
(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against
Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were
the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves
forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the
smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and
soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger
towns in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable
city of the country.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122"
class="fnanchor">[122]</a> As they began<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_51">[p. 51]</span> this enterprise at a time when the
Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to
despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them
serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may
also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not
to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks
clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos.
The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less
considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against
the will of the inhabitants.</p>

<p>How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps
the confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know.
Our information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian
envoy Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards
(<small>B.C.</small> 383), and describing in a few words the
confederacy as it then stood. But there is one circumstance which
this witness,—himself hostile to Olynthus and coming to solicit
Spartan aid against her,—attests emphatically; the equal, generous,
and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their
scheme from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an
imperial city enrolling a body of dependent allies, but invited each
separate city to adopt common laws and reciprocal citizenship with
Olynthus, with full liberty of intermarriage, commercial dealing,
and landed proprietorship. That the Macedonian cities near the sea
should welcome so liberal a proposition as this, coming from the
most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at all surprise
us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian
invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto
always been subjects;<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123"
class="fnanchor">[123]</a> their cities had not<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_52">[p. 52]</span> (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its
own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to
them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past
subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate
to protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also
these various cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus,
Pydna, etc.,—may have contained, among the indigenous population, a
certain proportion of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the
proposition of the Olynthians would be especially acceptable.</p>

<p>We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the
Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge
farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities
in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily;
others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came
to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa,
situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of
communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent.
The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed
principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But
in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian
neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the
Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own
town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and
customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political
life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the
Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on
consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous
promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and
there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration,
refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the
sword.</p>

<p>Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities
(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore,
the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[p. 53]</span> did not make application,
until they had already attracted within their confederacy a
considerable number of other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities.
They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come in, upon the same
terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The proposition being
declined, they sent a second message intimating that, unless it were
accepted within a certain time, they would enforce it by compulsory
measures. So powerful already was the military force of the Olynthian
confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia, incompetent to resist
without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set forth the
position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit
intervention against Olynthus.</p>

<p>Their embassy reached Sparta about <small>B.C.</small> 383,
when the Spartans, having broken up the city of Mantinea into
villages, and coërced Phlius, were in the full swing of power
over Peloponnesus,—and when they had also dissolved the Bœotian
federation, placing harmosts in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon
any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself
to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming
picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus,
invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian
confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great,
Greek as well as Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its
military power, even at present great, was growing every day.<a
id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> The
territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could
sustain a numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at
hand, while the numerous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[p.
54]</span> harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade
as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring
Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and
would thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold
mines of Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach.
“All that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is
matter of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of
hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious
pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,<a id="FNanchor_125"
href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> permit the
aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land and
by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither
from Athens and Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an
embassy in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence,
your enemies will derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and
Apollonia, having declined the proposition to join the confederacy
voluntarily, have received notice that, if we persist, they will
constrain us. Now we are anxious to retain our paternal laws and
customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.<a id="FNanchor_126"
href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> But if we cannot
obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of joining
them,—as several other cities have already done, from not daring
to refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had
they not been afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if
you interfere forthwith, and with a powerful force, will now revolt
from the new confederacy. But if you postpone your interference,
and allow time for the confederacy to work, their sentiments will
soon alter. They will come to be knit together in attached unity,
by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity of
landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively.
All of them will become convinced that they have a common interest
both in belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy,—just as
the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not
only enabled to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[p. 55]</span>
preserve their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by your
delay, the attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come
into real operation, you will presently find it not so much within
your power to dissolve.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127"
class="fnanchor">[127]</a>”</p>

<p>This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all
testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the
Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of
selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally,
of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too
seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking
down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties
of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them
all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would
enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The
advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to
all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of
his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses
upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may
never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you
will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also
admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the
cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share
along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political
instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is
the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus
should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like
Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a
larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make
union<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[p. 56]</span> secure,
profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly
the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though at the moment
preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory, and would give
place to attachment when the union came to be felt as a reality;
and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in clenching
the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for any
beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own
dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were
pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so that
each city, or each village, while protected against subjection to
any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union
or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and
dependent in reference to Sparta.</p>

<p>It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from
the dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached
Sparta to ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas,
after having abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the
Olynthians, had obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to
reinstate himself by force. In this scheme he had failed, being
defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named
Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and
possessing it for two years.<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128"
class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p>

<p>After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first
declared their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put
down Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of
the assembled allies.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129"
class="fnanchor">[129]</a> Among these latter, there was no genuine
antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed
against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then
held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now
far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were
under oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over
their fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and
at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[p. 57]</span> Mantinea had
operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of
Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as
well as most of the votes, declared for war,<a id="FNanchor_130"
href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> and a combined
army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make up such
total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each confederate;
combined with the proviso now added for the first time, that each
might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of three Æginæan
oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A cavalry-soldier,
to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as equivalent
to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or
pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default
were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day,
for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.<a
id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a>
Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for personal
service, is the same as I have already described to have taken
place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos under
the presidency of Athens.<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132"
class="fnanchor">[132]</a> It was a system not likely to be
extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once
poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it
was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency
becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public
resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already
grown up in practice.</p>

<p>The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with
the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous
contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the
necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before
the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work
or appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian
force (they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[p. 58]</span> keep those who had
refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also induce
others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the
ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand
hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ
or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the
whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with
such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind
to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the
Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after
a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians
in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was
able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which
resolutely stood aloof.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133"
class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Amyntas brought a force to coöperate with
him.</p>

<p>The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of
consequences no less momentous than unexpected. The direct line
from Peloponnesus to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a
passage which the Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes,
were not powerful enough to refuse, though they had contracted an
alliance with Olynthus,<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134"
class="fnanchor">[134]</a> and though proclamation was made that no
Theban citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having
departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt,
in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was
presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in
Thebes organized a conspiracy.</p>

<p>They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban
feelings of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should
coöperate with them in any party movement which they might find
opportunity of executing;<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135"
class="fnanchor">[135]</a> and when he halted with his<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[p. 59]</span> detachment near the
gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as
well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias,
were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party
decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so
strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that
Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the
anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most
of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into
office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_136"
href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a>—the leaders were
Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as
well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in
office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.</p>

<p>While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the
day of the Thesmophoria,<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137"
class="fnanchor">[137]</a> a religious festival<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_60">[p. 60]</span> celebrated by the women apart from the
men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to their
exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt,
put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly
rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate
was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat
of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the streets, when
Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback
to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the
Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as
well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch.
There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the
Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine
Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of
the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they
became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the
persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages
for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the citizens in the
town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates,
and then descended into the town, giving orders that no man should
go up without his order.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138"
class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p>

<p>The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of
the acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken
among the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The
lochages and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously
given orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not
intimidated by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia;
for they assure us that they have no hostile purpose against any
one who does not court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am
empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and
capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the
great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay
hold of him, and carry him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias
was accordingly seized and hurried off<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_61">[p. 61]</span> as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while
the senators, thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance.
Such of them as were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and
many even of the more neutral members, left the Senate and went
home, thankful to escape with their lives. Three hundred of them,
including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety
by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the remainder of the
Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-Spartan partisans,
passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new
polemarch in his place.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139"
class="fnanchor">[139]</a></p>

<p>This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a
worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,<a
id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a>
twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty.
Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar
deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion
and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive
Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the
presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in
the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading
partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of
resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably
was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of
the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer,
Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would
probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new <i>régime</i>,
the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis.
Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he
proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order
reigned” at Thebes.</p>

<p>The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at
Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as
well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere
throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than
any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized
public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta
had not the shadow of a pretence. It was even<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_62">[p. 62]</span> worse than the surprise of Platæa by the
Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial
excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas in this case, the
Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything to violate the peace
of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all
Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon<a
id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a>
himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan
power. It had been achieved with preëminent skill and success;
and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most
important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two
really formidable enemies.<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142"
class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p>

<p>Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became
the object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the
citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium
of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without
orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand
to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless
never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed
him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending
that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had
been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited
punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service,
even <i>impromptu</i> and without previous orders.</p>

<p>Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For
every man at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself;
and felt it still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble
in solicitation as well as profuse in promise. In his speech
addressed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[p. 63]</span> to the
assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile
Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just
put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest
Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now
(added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to
uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For
the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short
despatch, to get every service which you require.<a id="FNanchor_143"
href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a>” It was resolved by
the Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their
garrison now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues
in the government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial.
Yet they at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of
Greece, passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from
his command, and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however,
most probably was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of
Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at
first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.</p>

<p>That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas
and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction.
Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the
Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised
itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have
been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be,
cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom
they put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of
three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city.
He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies,
of having entered into friendship and con<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_64">[p. 64]</span>spiracy with the Persian king to the
detriment of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144"
class="fnanchor">[144]</a>—of having partaken in the Persian
funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being
the real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395
<small>B.C.</small> down to the peace of Antalkidas. After an
unavailing defence, he was condemned and executed. Had this doom been
inflicted upon him by his political antagonists as a consequence of
their intestine victory, it would have been too much in the analogy
of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special remark. But there
is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of judicial
solemnity and Pan-hellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here
committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a
criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge
of confederacy with the Persian king,—when they had themselves,
only five years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as
instruments, of that monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas.
If Ismenias had received money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan
Antalkidas had profited in like manner by another,—and for the like
purpose too of carrying on Grecian war. The real motive of the
Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves upon this distinguished
Theban for having raised against them the war which began in 395
<small>B.C.</small> But the mockery of justice by which that revenge
was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that
same foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified
themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.</p>

<p>Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in
Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them
and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as
a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to
prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas
and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian
confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a
larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men,
which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition,
to be commanded by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[p. 65]</span>
Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very
popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of this large
army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as horsemen,
furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion to Sparta.
He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging upon him the
most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering the Macedonian
cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to Derdas, prince
of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia, inviting his
coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily extend
her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the interior,
unless she were put down.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145"
class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p>

<p>Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had
their hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with
powerful forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred
excellent Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found
no easy enterprise.<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146"
class="fnanchor">[146]</a> The Olynthian cavalry, in particular,
was numerous and efficient. Unable as they were to make head
against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless
in a desultory engagement which took place near the city gates,
they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the
infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete
victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a
diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the
city. Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage
the Olynthian territory during the summer, for which, however, the
Olynthians retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the
cities in alliance with him.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147"
class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p>

<p>In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial
defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were
more and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias
became confident and began to despise them. Under these dispo<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[p. 66]</span>sitions on his part, a
body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed
the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards the
Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring,
Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them;
upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts
rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the
river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had
crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously,
and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas
and a hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who
completely lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to
cover the fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to
all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also.
But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city,
with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers
ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed
close up to the walls.<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148"
class="fnanchor">[148]</a> Here, however, they were received by a
shower of missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon
which the Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more
than one gate at once, and charged them first with cavalry and
peltasts, next with hoplites. The Lacedæmonians and their allies,
disturbed and distressed by the first, were unable to stand against
the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself, fighting in
the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the
flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled
in different directions,—to Akanthus, to Spartôlus, to Potidæa,
to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the
Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was immense. The whole
army was in fact ruined;<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149"
class="fnanchor">[149]</a> for probably many of the allies who
escaped became discouraged and went home.</p>

<p>At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have
deterred the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved
Olynthus. But now, they were so completely masters everywhere
else, that they thought only of repairing the dishonor by a
still<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[p. 67]</span> more
imposing demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the
head of an expedition on the largest scale; and his name called
forth eager coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies.
He marched with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone
to Asia; besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers,
from the Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from
strangers or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty,
introduced as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the
arduous Lykurgean training.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150"
class="fnanchor">[150]</a> Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to
greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after
receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to
present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to
confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage
of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took
Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently
brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s time;
although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady
grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis.
His body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where
it was buried with the customary solemnities.<a id="FNanchor_151"
href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p>

<p>Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted
the war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred
from their home produce as well as from importation, were<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[p. 68]</span> speedily reduced to
such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged
to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn
members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations
of service to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152"
class="fnanchor">[152]</a> The Olynthian union being dissolved,
the component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of
Sparta, while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their
neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of
Amyntas.</p>

<p>Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the
reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to
the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously
or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy
should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region
where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of
signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have
served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians
and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any,
would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian
neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most
equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater
compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct
of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct
would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the
benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these
are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians,
when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy
to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta
could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing
but the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379
<small>B.C.</small>, she was at the maximum of her power and had her
hands quite free, with Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison.
Such prosperity did not long continue unabated. Only a few months
after the submission of Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the
Theban exiles, who raised so vigorous a war against Sparta, that
she would have been disabled from meddling with Olynthus,—as we
shall find illustrated by the fact (hereafter to be recounted), that
she declined interfering in Thessaly to pro<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_69">[p. 69]</span>tect the Thessalian cities against Jason
of Pheræ. Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural
working, it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it
in harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of
a confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining
the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her
extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat
these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from
fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal
autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to
bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the
indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to
reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part
of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of
those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free
communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent
were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian
neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude
which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By
the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually
surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never
again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm,
consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the
Thermaic Gulf.</p>

<p>While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians
were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within
Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been
mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been
recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party
in Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the
confiscated property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public
treasury, to those who had purchased it, the price which they had
paid,—and reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.<a
id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> The
returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that
they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the
tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[p. 70]</span> many of them directly
interested as purchasers, who refused them the right of appealing
to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that there were even
in the city itself many who thought them wronged. Such allegations
were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At the same time, the
appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence of Phlius, so incensed
the ruling Phliasians that they passed a sentence of fine against
all the appellants. The latter insisted on this sentence as a fresh
count for strengthening their complaints at Sparta; and as a farther
proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well as of high-handed injustice,
in the Phliasian rulers.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154"
class="fnanchor">[154]</a> Their cause was warmly espoused by
Agesilaus, who had personal relations of hospitality with some of the
exiles; while it appears that his colleague, King Agesipolis, was on
good terms with the ruling party at Phlius,—had received from them
zealous aid, both in men and money, for his Olynthian expedition,—and
had publicly thanked them for their devotion to Sparta.<a
id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> The
Phliasian government, emboldened by the proclaimed testimonial of
Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity, had fancied that they stood
upon firm ground, and that no Spartan coërcion would be enforced
against them. But the marked favor of Agesipolis, now absent in
Thrace, told rather against them in the mind of Agesilaus; pursuant
to that jealousy which usually prevailed between the two Spartan
kings. In spite of much remonstrance at Sparta, from many who
deprecated hostilities against a city of five thousand citizens,
for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only seconded the
proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but also took
the command of the army.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156"
class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p>

<p>The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable,
Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius;
dismissing those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and
bribed or entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the
government had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be
satisfied with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis.
This being refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by
a wall of circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[p. 71]</span> with resolute bravery
and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a select
troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every point, and
even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public decree,
every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that the
siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the
information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had
supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt;
desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable,
or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus
took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment
as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after
about a year’s blockade,<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157"
class="fnanchor">[157]</a> the provisions within were exhausted, so
that the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to
despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their
request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted
to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the
terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his
watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his
most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour.
Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus,
who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from
those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death
over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for
the future government of the city. Until this should be done, he
left a garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.<a
id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p>

<p>Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have
obtained better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named
by the partisan feelings of Agesilaus,<a id="FNanchor_159"
href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> conducted themselves,
we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[p. 72]</span> do not know. But
the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation as
well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens and
the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.</p>

<p>The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to
Agesilaus, seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.</p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_77">
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVII.<br />
  FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS
  DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL
  PEACE, IN 371&nbsp;<small>B.C.</small></h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">At</span>
the beginning of 379 <small>B.C.</small>, the empire of the
Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled.
On the sea, their fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem
to have held divided empire with Athens over the smaller islands;
while the larger islands (so far as we can make out) were independent
of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both within and without
Peloponnesus,—except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the more powerful
Thessalian cities,—was now enrolled in the confederacy dependent
on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an
oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond
all chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the
war against Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her
far-reaching power. Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many
cases by Spartan harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on
Sparta,—were much more dependent upon her than they had been during
the time of the Peloponnesian war.</p>

<p>Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same
mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt
towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated
as the “despot city.<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160"
class="fnanchor">[160]</a>” And this sentiment was farther<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[p. 73]</span> aggravated by the recent
peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had
first procured, and afterwards carried into execution. That peace
was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by the king of Persia,
enforced in his name, and surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks.
But it became yet more disgraceful when the universal autonomy which
it promised was seen to be so executed, as to mean nothing better
than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts yet committed by Sparta,
not only in perversion of the autonomy promised to every city,
but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of right dealing
between city and city,—the most flagrant was, her recent seizure and
occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in alliance
with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia)
of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to
every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism. She appeared as
the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the
Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius on a
third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner, and
seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which
stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.</p>

<p>Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably
as the head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her
headship, or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic
and free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent
residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors,
the former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia
during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, <small>B.C.</small>
384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration
(of which unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by
Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to
Greece, partly from the Persian king, partly from the despot
Dionysius of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161"
class="fnanchor">[161]</a> He calls upon all Greeks to lay aside
hos<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[p. 74]</span>tility and
jealousies one with the other, and to unite in making head against
these two really formidable enemies, as their ancestors had
previously done, with equal zeal for putting down despots and for
repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in Asia)
handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable
him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose
naval force was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster;
while the strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan
Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias
expresses his astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire
to extend itself from one city to another. They ought to look upon
the misfortunes of those cities which had been destroyed, both by
the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home to themselves; not to
wait patiently, until the two hostile powers had united their forces
to attack the centre of Greece, which yet remained independent.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[p. 75]</span></p> <p>Of
the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias
thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival
a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his
name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and
some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The
Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were
clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary
magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had
not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades<a
id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> in
the ninetieth Olympiad (<small>B.C.</small> 420). While instigating
the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the
liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias
exhorted them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against
the latter, by plundering the splendid tent before them, which
insulted the sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth
extorted from Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation
was partially, but only partially, acted upon.<a id="FNanchor_163"
href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Some persons
assailed the tents, but were, probably, re<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_76">[p. 76]</span>strained by the Eleian superintendents
without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with
the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and
sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in <small>B.C.</small>
384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of
Antalkidas; a festival memorable, not only because it again brought
thither Athenians, Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must
have been prevented by the preceding war from coming either in
<small>B.C.</small> 388 or in <small>B.C.</small> 392,—but also as
it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the Asiatic Greeks, for
the first time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the
Persians,—and the like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian
Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these sufferers, especially
the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of complaints respecting the
hardships of their new lot, and against Sparta as having betrayed
them; complaints, which would call forth genuine sympathy in the
Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted reluctantly to
the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of sentiment
prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a
Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan
tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator’s
remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire<a id="FNanchor_164"
href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> at both sides; that
Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already passed into the hands
of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these two formidable
enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central Greece would
be in great danger.</p>

<p>It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame
would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[p. 77]</span> tend to
raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his
speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under
the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous
discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read
at the next Olympic festival of <small>B.C.</small> 380), speaks
out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the
general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign
kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the
cost of autonomous Grecian cities,—all in the interest of their own
selfish ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting
Hellenic world was every day becoming contracted into a narrower
space, when the presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas,
and Dionysius to absorb it,—and herself undertook unjust aggressions
against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea.<a id="FNanchor_165"
href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p>

<p>The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be
sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries
took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta,
during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379
<small>B.C.</small>). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still
more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having described her
triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the subjugation
of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,<a id="FNanchor_166"
href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a>—“I could produce
numerous oth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[p. 78]</span>er
incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take
careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which
I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians,
who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their
oaths by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very
men whom they had wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before
triumphed over them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them
into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that their city should
be enslaved to Sparta in order that they might rule despotically
themselves,—were put down by no more than seven assailants, among the
exiles whom they had banished.”</p>

<p>What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when
Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his
dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering
in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a
well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just
translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic
Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past
glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening
misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides
by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian<a
id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a>
council; or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,<a
id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> by
the warnings of the prophet Teiresias.</p>

<p>The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since
the blow struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his
oligarchical partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the
Kadmeia. Respecting the details of its proceedings we have scarce
any information. We can only (as above remarked) judge of it by
the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian
Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin, position,
and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel,
oppressive, and rapacious,—we cannot doubt; though in what degree
we have no means of knowing. The appetites<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_79">[p. 79]</span> of uncontrolled rulers, as well as
those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result;
besides which, those rulers must have been in constant fear of
risings or conspiracies amidst a body of high-spirited citizens
who saw their city degraded, from being the chief of the Bœotian
federation, into nothing better than a captive dependency of Sparta.
Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a numerous body of
Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan party;
three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first
seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined
subsequently by others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend
mischief from these exiles, that they hired assassins to take them
off by private murder at Athens; and actually succeeded in thus
killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief successor of the
deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at the rest.<a
id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a>
And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes subservient
to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not only
that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
government was put down,<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170"
class="fnanchor">[170]</a> but also that in the fervor of that
revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such
fierce antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a
crowd of Theban women.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171"
class="fnanchor">[171]</a> In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the
women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even
showed themselves in public;<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172"
class="fnanchor">[172]</a> so that this furious demonstration
of vin<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[p. 80]</span>dictive
sentiment must have been generated by the loss or maltreatment of
sons, husbands, and brothers.</p>

<p>The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter,
but genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian
injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the
Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other
Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was now
gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both cities;<a
id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> and
requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta, who demanded that
the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the earlier occasion
demanded that the Athenian refugees should be dismissed from Thebes.
To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all that Athens could
do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power,—and seemingly
yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of Thebes
was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control.
Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and
Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs,
though the last was the most energetic and resolute)—it was at
the same time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred
Lacedæmonians and allies,<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174"
class="fnanchor">[174]</a> under Lysanoridas and two other harmosts,
in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other
Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, Tanagra, etc.
Though the general body of Theban senti<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_81">[p. 81]</span>ment in the city was decidedly adverse
to the government, and though the young men while exercising
in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being more strenuously
prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at Sparta) kept up
by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but compressed,
patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly kept
down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the
citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.<a
id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></p>

<p>For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes
of some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians.
At length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to
despair of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take
the initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several
men of the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of
chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at
the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus,
Pherenikus, and others.<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176"
class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p>

<p>Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures,
though almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and
self-devotion, in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon
communicated itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping
up constant private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt
assured of the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could
once strike a blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the
destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor
would any one within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger.
It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten
other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as
seven, by others, twelve<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177"
class="fnanchor">[177]</a>) un<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[p.
82]</span>dertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes came
in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the design
as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next
to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having
been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret
conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for
their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access
to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them
concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates
until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but
also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless,
in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared
desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas,
for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident
at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded
others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He
announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil
bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose
violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the
sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would
avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against
other political enemies.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178"
class="fnanchor">[178]</a></p>

<p>The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the
secretary, who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and
Philippus, in celebration of the period when they were going out of
office as polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring
into their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of
the best families in Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179"
class="fnanchor">[179]</a> In concert with the general body of
Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders
of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to
Thebes the instant that they should receive<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_83">[p. 83]</span> intimation,—and in concert also with two
out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took on themselves privately
to countenance the enterprise, without any public vote,—Pelopidas
and Mellon, and their five companions,<a id="FNanchor_180"
href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> crossed Kithæron
from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about December
<small>B.C.</small> 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters,
with no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the
gates of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming
men were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at
the house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.</p>

<p>It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been
turned back, and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named
Hipposthenidas, friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who
had been let into the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so
frightened as the moment of execution approached, that he took upon
himself, without the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a
faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from
Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to desire that he and his
comrades would go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to
render the project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home
to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his
wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at
last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became
so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation
with his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey.
He at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His
departure was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended
message of countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.<a
id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p>

<p>In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing
day, on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus
was to take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them
at that banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become
full of wine, in female attire, as being the<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_84">[p. 84]</span> women whose visit was expected. The
hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their
parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning
Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within
were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the
plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was
agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he
himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most
of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should
suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before
departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen,
and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the
hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas
and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon
to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all
were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on
to comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the
rest. He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he
found already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from
Athens, that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They
had sent for him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles;
but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas,
in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to
resume their conviviality.<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182"
class="fnanchor">[182]</a> He was allowed to retire and rejoin
his friends. Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were
the favorable chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh
message was delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake
Archias the Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the
names and scheme of the conspirators, which had become known<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[p. 85]</span> to the philo-Laconian
party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered
it to Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious
matters. “Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he
put the despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch
on which he was reclining.<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183"
class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p>

<p>Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently
called upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his
promise. Upon this the secretary retired, and brought the
conspirators, clothed in female attire, into an adjoining chamber;
then going back to the polemarchs, he informed them that the women
would not come in unless all the domestics were first dismissed.
An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart,
while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with
wine at the lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were
thus left only with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated
as well as themselves; among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the
year, who always throughout his term kept the consecrated spear of
office in actual possession, and had it at that moment close to
his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended women into the
banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of distinction, the
four others following as female attendants. Their long veils, and
ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise,—even
had the guests at table been sober,—until they sat down by the side
of the polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the
signal for using their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain
at once and with little resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear
tried to defend himself, and thus perished with the others, though
the conspirators had not originally intended to take his life.<a
id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[p. 86]</span></p> <p>Having
been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing
himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was
reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his
side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man,
he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus
in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and
Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third
to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him,
after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain
silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands
that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house of
Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the roof.<a
id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[p. 87]</span></p> <p>The
four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been
now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the
prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of
the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a
sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all.
To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred
politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken
from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and
to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the
next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance
of safety and triumph.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186"
class="fnanchor">[186]</a> Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of
what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes
was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in
arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many
trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching
festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow
their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to
excite the citizens to arms.<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187"
class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p>

<p>Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent
feeling, and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned,
and the truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy
and patriotic enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.<a
id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a>
Both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[p. 88]</span> horsemen and
hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time
since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly
of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his
fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city
crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the
local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of
delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon,
and Charon, as the first renewed Bœotarchs.<a id="FNanchor_189"
href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> The revival of this
title, which had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was
in itself an event of no mean significance; implying not merely
that Thebes had waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian
confederacy also had been, or would be, restored.</p>

<p>Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to
Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining
exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a
body of Athenian volunteers, or <i>corps francs</i>, all of whom were
ready on the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to
complete the work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent
to Platæa and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had
been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights
showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts
for the recent success.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190"
class="fnanchor">[190]</a> Apprised speedily of the slaughter of
the polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive
orders, they knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were
doubtless beset by affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party,
who would hurry up the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on
a diversion in their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ.
But these forces were not permitted even to approach the city gate;
being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the
newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The
Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without support,
but saw their enemies in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[p.
89]</span> the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the
auxiliary volunteers.<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191"
class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p>

<p>Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves
at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism
and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed
themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming
the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling
all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up
to the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to
those who should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian
commander sent proposals for a capitulation.<a id="FNanchor_192"
href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> Undisturbed egress
from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to
him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were
marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came
forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors
was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as
they passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children
along with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched,
had not the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted
every effort to get them out of sight and put them into safety.<a
id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a>
We are not told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were
protected under the capitulation. Even had they been so, however,
the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against them. Of
the three harmosts who thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow,
two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by
the authorities at Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194"
class="fnanchor">[194]</a> We do not know what the fortifi<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[p. 90]</span>cations of the Kadmeia
were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that
these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that
hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure
adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the
Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the
Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return
of Alexander from Illyria.<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195"
class="fnanchor">[195]</a> The first messenger who brought news
to Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to
have communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated
the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles
from the defeated party.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196"
class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[p. 91]</span></p>

<p>This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the
Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[p. 92]</span> four leaders, in their
houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which
withdraws his attention from the other fea<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_93">[p. 93]</span>tures of this memorable deed. Now an
ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized
with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the
death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary
personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the skilful forecast of
the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force so contemptibly
small, of a government which the day before seemed unassailable.<a
id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> It
deserves note that we here see the richest men in Thebes undertaking
a risk, single-handed and with their own persons, which must have
appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than desperate.
From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free
Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,<a id="FNanchor_198"
href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> and exposes his
person in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being
generally superior to them in strength and bodily efficiency.</p>

<p>As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian
mind from the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its
positive effects it altered forthwith the balance of power in
Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly
universal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[p. 94]</span> over
Greece, is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort,
until at length it is completely overthrown.<a id="FNanchor_199"
href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p>

<p>The exiles from Thebes, arriving <span class="replace" id="tn_4"
title="In the printed book: from">at</span> Sparta, inflamed
both the ephors, and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest
pitch. Though it was then the depth of winter,<a id="FNanchor_200"
href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> an expedition was
decreed forthwith against Thebes, and the allied contingents were
summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the command of it, on the
ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer
liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says Xenophon<a
id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a>)
was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta
would say,—“Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order
that he may uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and
had been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the
reproaches against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from
Lysias and Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well
as with foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in
Sparta herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta,
took the command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis,
and had never commanded before.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[p. 95]</span></p>

<p>Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth
through Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of
Thebans, composed chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent
revolution, who had been placed for the defence of the intervening
mountain-pass. From Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from
thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban territory, where he lay encamped
for sixteen days; after which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears
that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the subject of much
wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted whether he was
really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with
customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could
provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate
the bad weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since
in his march back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ
the wind blew a hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed
without leaving their shields and coming back afterwards to fetch
them. Kleombrotus did not quit Bœotia, however, without leaving
Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with one third of the entire army,
and with a considerable sum of money to employ in hiring mercenaries
and acting vigorously against the Thebans.<a id="FNanchor_202"
href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a></p>

<p>The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa,
had passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the
Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to
guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ into
Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had touched
Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as in the war
between 394 and 388 <small>B.C.</small>) since the retirement of
king Pausanias in 404 <small>B.C.</small>; furnishing a proof of
the exposure of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind
all the terrible recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian
war. It was during the first prevalence of this alarm,—and
seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with his army at Thespiæ or
Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian
envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens to demand
satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the
Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aid<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_96">[p. 96]</span>ing the enterprise of Pelopidas and his
comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid
giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them
accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and
executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant
to the psephism of <span class="replace" id="tn_2" title="In the
printed book: Kannônes">Kannônus</span>,<a id="FNanchor_203"
href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a> the two would be
put on trial separately), escaped, and a sentence of banishment
was passed against him.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204"
class="fnanchor">[204]</a> These two generals had been unquestionably
guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions. They had brought
the state into public hazard, not merely without consulting the
senate or assembly, but even without taking the sense of their own
board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence pronounced
indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general body
of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in
form, of all political connection with Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_205"
href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[p. 97]</span></p>

<p>Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens,
however, an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[p. 98]</span> altered the Athenian
temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had left
at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that
Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch,—since
there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of surprising
it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one
stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of Athens.
Putting his troops under march one evening after an early supper, he
calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before daylight.
But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook him when he
had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near Eleusis; from
whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back and
retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts
of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.</p>

<p>This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived.
Had Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements
as rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might
not have succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would
have been changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of
Peiræus, both could and would have maintained the place. But it
was one of those injustices, which no one ever commends until it
has been successfully consummated,—“consilium quod non potest
laudari nisi peractum.<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206"
class="fnanchor">[206]</a>” As it<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_99">[p. 99]</span> failed, it has been considered, by
critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as
a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly
weak and hot-headed.<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207"
class="fnanchor">[207]</a> Without admitting the full extent of
this censure, we may see that his present aggression grew out of
an untoward emulation of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the
simulated or transient displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired
by seizing the Kadmeia. That Sphodrias received private instructions
from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved;
while the suspicion, intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he
was wrought upon by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the
Thebans, for the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta,
is altogether improbable;<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208"
class="fnanchor">[208]</a> and seems merely an hypothesis suggested
by the consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies
had bribed him, he could not have served them better.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[p. 100]</span></p>

<p>The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain
was communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited
no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself
under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had
retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to
indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house
of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest
and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less
astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than
the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had
they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they
would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city,
and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where
of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by
assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly
disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was
deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of
the offending general.<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209"
class="fnanchor">[209]</a></p>

<p>The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of
his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general
impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly
be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he
was acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his
general character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that
all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter
of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his
friends dreaded that the latter would declare<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_101">[p. 101]</span> against him, and bring about his
condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside
his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner:
“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two
opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who,
as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor.
Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.<a id="FNanchor_210"
href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a>” The friends of
Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of
Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable,
that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as
a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and
friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.<a id="FNanchor_211"
href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a></p>

<p>This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not
merely philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus)
shows how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by
private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings.
It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter
respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the
dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here
was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed,
but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war
with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for
redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance
was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or
an injured individual,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[p.
102]</span> against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan and
Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days before,
the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two
generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles.
In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear
official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies
went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was
stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at
Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence,
capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous
and independent dikastery.</p>

<p>The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of
Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.<a id="FNanchor_212"
href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> But the Athenians,
who had so recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances
of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by it to the
quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the extraordinary
compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was made to turn.
They immediately contracted hearty alliance with Thebes, and made
vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by land and sea.
After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it
beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to
the building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their
naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_213"
href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p>

<p>From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction
of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed
a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable
Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards
such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had
already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates
(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been
familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise
was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting
under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon;
since,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[p. 103]</span> while the
discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was widely spread, the
late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen that sentiment
of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To Thebes, the
junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her leaders gladly
enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new confederacy.<a
id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a>
They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens,—reserving,
however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of the
Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which
reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing
that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under
harmosts and oligarchies.</p>

<p>The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance
on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the
same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed
against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that
a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city,
small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be
president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund
should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment
imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same
authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be,
maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each
confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as
much as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which
rendered the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.<a
id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a>
And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times
of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers
in various dependencies, but had been deprived of their
properties at the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to
pass a formal decree,<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216"
class="fnanchor">[216]</a> re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[p.
104]</span>nouncing and barring all revival of these suspended
rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should
on any<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[p. 105]</span> pretence
hold property, either in house or land, in the territory of any
one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as security for
money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any Athenian
infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against
before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of
the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the general
purposes of the confederacy.</p>

<p>Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just,
like the Herodotean Deiokês,<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217"
class="fnanchor">[217]</a>—and formally ratified, as well by the
Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies
assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact of
alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side
of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of
enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to
be maintained against Persia and other enemies.<a id="FNanchor_218"
href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> Periodical meetings
of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how often, we
do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as competent
judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with treason
against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates
generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any
Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to the
vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that
document,—he should be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[p.
106]</span> tried before the synod for treason; and that, if found
guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest punishment.</p>

<p>Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the
first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with
those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable
inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.<a
id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a></p>

<p>The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and
Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered
among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since
the peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small>, she had had no
need of their services; hence both of them had been absent from the
city during much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still
to have been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded,
Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with
Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the
head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their
troops, and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less
agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive
to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands,
and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued
in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king
Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so
inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall
him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the
same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps
in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied
on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for
the Athenian service,<a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220"
class="fnanchor">[220]</a> and despatched Iphikrates to take command
along with the Persians.</p>

<p>Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his
peltasts in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes,
near the shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of
certain lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired,
and whose daughter he presently married.<a id="FNanchor_221"
href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> Not only did
he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and plunder,
among the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[p. 107]</span>
“butter-eating Thracians,”<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222"
class="fnanchor">[222]</a>—but he also acquired, as dowry, a
large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their
disposal, together with a boon even more important,—a seaport
village not far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where
he established a fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony
dependent on himself.<a id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223"
class="fnanchor">[223]</a> Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other
eminent Athenians had done the same thing before him; though
Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made to him by
the earlier Seuthes.<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224"
class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Iphikrates thus became a great man in
Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens,
but making his position in each subservient to his importance in
the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of
Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the
Chersonese and other parts<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[p.
108]</span> of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval
and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even
beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia
became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt him for his son.<a
id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a>
When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus
(about 378 <small>B.C.</small> apparently), Iphikrates had fair
ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was
opening before him.<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226"
class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[p. 109]</span></p>

<p>Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias,
in the mission and measures for organizing their new confed<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[p. 110]</span>eracy, two other
colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus son of
Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.<a
id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a>
The abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all; while
Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit.
But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies to her proposed
congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive appeal, conciliatory
dealing, and substantial fairness in all her propositions, not less
than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus, doubtless as son
of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle of
Knidus—was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and
probably Kallistratus,<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228"
class="fnanchor">[228]</a> going round with him to the different
islands, contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same
result. On their invitation, many cities entered as con<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[p. 111]</span>federates.<a
id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a>
At this time (as in the earlier confederacy of Delos) all who
joined must have been unconstrained members. And we may understand
the motives of their junction, when we read the picture drawn by
Isokrates (in 380 <small>B.C.</small>) of the tyranny of the
Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the
neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing
force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also
a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her
perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace
of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the
Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the
cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as
well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former
of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the
peace of Antalkidas,<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230"
class="fnanchor">[230]</a>—all entered into the confederacy. An
Athenian fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and
the other islands of the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the
Lacedæmonian harmosts,<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231"
class="fnanchor">[231]</a> together with their devoted local
oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted; and all the cities
thus liberated became equal members of the newly-constituted
congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be
not less than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[p. 112]</span>
seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent
deputies to it;<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232"
class="fnanchor">[232]</a> an aggregate sufficient to intimidate
Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to
something like her former lustre.</p>

<p>The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was
passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen,
and two hundred triremes.<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233"
class="fnanchor">[233]</a> Probably the insular and Ionic deputies
promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond.
We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements,
large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to
enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act
upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in
this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that
Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of
Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against
evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at
first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by
constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 <small>B.C.</small>,
we may presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of
promises on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not
exact, and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet
that Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising,
the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the
majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process;
to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round
for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
difficult.</p>

<p>It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[p. 113]</span> came together from
a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A few
years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and
the confederates reluctant.<a id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234"
class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Inflamed, as well by their position
of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the
Athenians made important efforts of their own, both financial and
military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time was superior in the
Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of Histiæa in Eubœa, and
annexed to their confederacy the islands of Peparêthus and Skiathus.
They imposed upon themselves also a direct property-tax; to what
amount, however, we do not know.</p>

<p>It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great
change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the
city; a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus,
(<small>B.C.</small> 378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian
citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for purposes of
taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of Solon<a
id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a>
the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four
classes,—Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished
from each other by the amount of their respective properties. Of
these Solonian classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct
taxes; while the three former were taxed according to assessments
representing a certain proportion of their actual property. The
taxable property of the richest (or Pentakosiomedimni, including all
at or above the minimum income of five hundred medimni of corn per
annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum equal to twelve times
their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who possessed
between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual income) at
ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an
annual income between two hundred and three<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_114">[p. 114]</span> hundred medimni) at five times their
income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma;
which permitted the application of this same class-system to movable
property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax
(or <i>eisphora</i>) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional
tax, so far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as
a graduated or progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer
class as compared with those of the poorer.</p>

<p>The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have
lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the close
of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved,
after the renovation of the democracy in <small>B.C.</small>
403, during the archonship of Eukleides.<a id="FNanchor_236"
href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> Though eligibility
to the great offices of state had before that time ceased to be
dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to
possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not
merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the
liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent
on a man’s enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of
property. It seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main
principles of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s
property being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes
according to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion
of taxable capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was
entered in the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the
sum of taxable capital corresponding to his property, according to
the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable
capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less
rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of
all these items of taxable capital, in all the different classes,
set opposite to each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the
aggregate census of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was
imposed, in equal proportion upon every man.</p>

<p>Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes,
which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[p. 115]</span> had
been introduced in 403 <small>B.C.</small> at the archonship of
Eukleides, we have no information. Nor can we make out how large or
how numerous were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed
at Athens between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus
in 378 <small>B.C.</small> But at this latter epoch the register
was again considerably modified, at the moment when Athens was
bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was
made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount
of twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards.
Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule
for a sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he
possessed. But this fraction was different in each of the different
classes. How many classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor
can we tell, except in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum
was taken as the minimum for any one of them. There could hardly
have been less, however, than three classes, and there may probably
have been four. But respecting the first or richest class, we know
that each man was entered in the schedule for a taxable capital
equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that possessors
of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes
died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his
guardians to the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon
which his name was entered on the schedule with a taxable capital
of three talents set against him; being one-fifth of his actual
property. The taxable capital of the second class was entered at
a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property (probably
enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of
the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was
a fourth), even smaller than the third. This last class descended
down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred
drachmæ; below which no account was taken.<a id="FNanchor_237"
href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a></p> <p><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[p. 116]</span></p> <p>Besides the
taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule also
included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each
enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller property,
above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth
of his actual property;<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238"
class="fnanchor">[238]</a> being a proportion less than the richest
class of citizens, and probably equal to the second class in order
of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to five thousand seven
hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,<a id="FNanchor_239"
href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a> forming the aggregate
schedule of taxable property; that is, something near about six
thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways and
means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and
whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule,—every
man, rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable
capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would
thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred and twenty
talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of Athens
during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule was first
prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then imposed, but we
do not know to what amount.<a id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240"
class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[p. 117]</span></p>

<p>Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new
distribution of the citizens now took place into certain bodies
called Symmories. As far as we can make out, on a very obscure
subject, it seems that these Symmories were twenty in number, two
to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens, thus making one
thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two hundred
were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule,—containing, perhaps,
the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one
thousand two hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood
out as a separate body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred
were the wealthiest men in the city, and were called “the leaders
or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three hundred and the twelve
hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to the old Solonian classes
of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_118">[p. 118]</span> latter class there had also been
twelve hundred, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.<a
id="FNanchor_241" href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a>
The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices, were discharged
principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the Twelve
Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially
fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time,
discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals
suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted
one of the latter body to take his place in the Three Hundred. As
between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted the process
called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen who believed
himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies, and that
another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not borne his
fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the other
to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender
to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would
undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were made over
to him.</p>

<p>It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest
citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable
number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still
liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from
the minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not
know, at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded,
speaking loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian
census. The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred
and twenty richest members) superintended the property-register
of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less
wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required
immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making
up altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax
chargeable upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement
against the other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable
upon each. The richest citizens were thus both armed with rights
and charged with duties,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[p.
119]</span> such as had not belonged to them before the archonship
of Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule
would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each
individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately
forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of
its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the
trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each
Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the
general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we
also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a
still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that
men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might
thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct
Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component
persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process,
but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will
rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories
came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never
anticipated.</p>

<p>At present, however, I only notice this new financial and
political classification introduced in 378 <small>B.C.</small>,
as one evidence of the ardor with which Athens embarked in her
projected war against Sparta. The feeling among her allies, the
Thebans, was no less determined. The government of Leontiades and
the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an antipathy, that
the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the revolution
against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and
his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to
repel the common enemy. The Theban government now became probably
democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from
the unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force
was put under the best training; the most fertile portion of the
plain north of Thebes, from which the chief subsistence of the city
came, was surrounded by a ditch and a palisade,<a id="FNanchor_242"
href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> to repel the expected
Spartan invasion; and the memorable Sacred Band was now for the first
time organized. This was a brigade of three<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_120">[p. 120]</span> hundred hoplites, called the Lochus,
or regiment of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the
Kadmeia, or acropolis.<a id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243"
class="fnanchor">[243]</a> It was put under constant arms and
training, at the public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of
whom mention was made in my seventh volume.<a id="FNanchor_244"
href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> It consisted of
youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their
strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the palæstra
in Thebes, and was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of
neighboring soldiers were at the same time intimate friends; so
that the whole band were thus kept together by ties which no
dangers could sever. At first its destination, under Gorgidas its
commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who fought in 424
<small>B.C.</small> at the battle of Delium),<a id="FNanchor_245"
href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> was to serve as front
rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a
circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by
Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge
was then found irresistible.<a id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246"
class="fnanchor">[246]</a></p>

<p>We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers,
both as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore,
with the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much
better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as
had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of
the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas,
the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of
Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient
in Thebes, belonging to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[p.
121]</span> those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors
were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown by Kadmus.<a
id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> He
seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was younger, and of
a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were those of
equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the
two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had
saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds,
and the greatest possible danger, to himself.<a id="FNanchor_248"
href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a></p>

<p>Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military
and gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen.
But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the
maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements
of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased
in part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.<a
id="FNanchor_249" href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> He
also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_122">[p. 122]</span> dancing; by which, in those days,
was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or blowing
the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive, and
emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body; rhythmical
pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and disciplined
movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming
consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic
and musical training, the combination of which constituted an
accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes,
the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training
was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which,
excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon
the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player.
The Athenian Alkibiades<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250"
class="fnanchor">[250]</a> was heard to remark, when he threw away
his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to
the countrymen of Pindar<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251"
class="fnanchor">[251]</a> generally, the remark was hardly
less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas
formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre<a
id="FNanchor_252" href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a>
as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting
from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested
from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would
have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness
the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom
were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of
them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence
of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at
second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between
Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war,
had become more and more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[p.
123]</span> friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war
against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he profited
by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But the
person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not only
heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close of
an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the
Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out,
had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.<a
id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a>
With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed
all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable
positive instruction, but also became practised in new and
enlarged intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,<a
id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a>
emancipated from that timorous interpretation of nature, which
rendered so many Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens.
His patience as a listener, and his indifference to showy talk on
his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of
Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed that
he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.<a
id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[p. 124]</span></p>

<p>Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when
he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely
preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best
Athenian opponents.<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256"
class="fnanchor">[256]</a> But his disposition was essentially
modest and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual
curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race
usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little
moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by
unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score
of money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life,
not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating
not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also
the solicitous tenders of personal friends;<a id="FNanchor_257"
href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> though we are
told that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he
permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.<a
id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a>
As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which
most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character;
the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to
harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in
intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed
to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his
fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the
Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias.
Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other
exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it; partly
on prudential grounds, but partly, also,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_125">[p. 125]</span> on conscientious scruples.<a
id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a>
None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his
subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and
vindictive passions.<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260"
class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p>

<p>Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues,
however, it was necessary that he should give proof of the
extraordinary capacities for action with which they were combined,
and that he should achieve something to earn that exclamation
of praise which we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards
pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the invading Theban army
near Sparta,—“Oh! thou man of great deeds!”<a id="FNanchor_261"
href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> In the year
<small>B.C.</small> 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was
as yet undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas
with his other friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and
inquisitive disposition was a subject of complaint as keeping him
unduly in the background.<a id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262"
class="fnanchor">[262]</a> But the unparalleled phenomena of that
year supplied a spur which overruled all backwardness, and smothered
all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having just recovered their
city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves exposed
single-handed to the full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[p.
126]</span> attack of Sparta and her extensive confederacy. Not
even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a single
other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by
the energy of all her citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical
as well as the rest. As the necessities of the case required such
simultaneous devotion, so the electric shock of the recent revolution
was sufficient to awaken enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than
that of Epaminondas. He was among the first to join the victorious
exiles in arms, after the contest had been transferred from the
houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open market-place; and he
would probably have been among the first to mount the walls of the
Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas
being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally placed
among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary
military resistance against the common enemy; in which employment
his capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment
almost an unknown man, he had acquired, in <small>B.C.</small>
371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation both as speaker and
as general, that he was chosen as the expositor of Theban policy
at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the battle of Leuktra,
upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may fairly conclude,
that the well-planned and successful system of defence, together
with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the
intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.<a
id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a></p>

<p>The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal
of Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in
second<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[p. 127]</span>ing as
well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved
at the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias,
thought it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They
organized on a more systematic scale the military force of their
confederacy, and even took some conciliatory steps with the view
of effacing the odium of their past misrule.<a id="FNanchor_264"
href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> The full force
of their confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present
Spartan power, even the distant Olynthians,<a id="FNanchor_265"
href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a>—was placed in motion
against Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who
contrived, by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries
acting in the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its
neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the
passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have
notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.<a id="FNanchor_266"
href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> Then crossing
Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ,
a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced
his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended
partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the
main force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and
mercenaries, sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own
side of the palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry,
and attacked Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such
sallies were frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break
of day, he forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into
their inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.<a
id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a>
The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal
terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold
positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not
feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one
occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to
the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent
array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await
his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until
signal should be given; with their shields resting on the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[p. 128]</span> knee, and their
spears protended. So imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus
called off his troops without daring to complete the charge.<a
id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a>
After a month or more of devastations on the lands of Thebes, and a
string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to have lost rather
than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the fortifications of
which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a considerable force in
occupation, and then leading back his army to Peloponnesus.</p>

<p>Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with
his own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who
promised him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on
reprisals from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed
by Phœbidas with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit,
however, hurrying incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden
turn of the Theban cavalry;<a id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269"
class="fnanchor">[269]</a> upon which all his troops fled, chased by
the Thebans to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in
consequence of this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and
division to replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly
strengthened by their recent victory. They pushed their success not
only against Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still
held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time,
these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their
own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable
numbers as exiles to Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270"
class="fnanchor">[270]</a></p>

<p>A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus
in the ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was
neither more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though
he contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[p. 129]</span> Theban palisade, and
lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed,
more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage except upon
perfectly equal terms.<a id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271"
class="fnanchor">[271]</a> It became evident that the Thebans
were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia, but also
acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the Spartans;
insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions remonstrated with
Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give improving
lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and called upon him
to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after
the summer’s campaign, without any such step.<a id="FNanchor_272"
href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> In his way he
appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break out in
Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or
hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has been mentioned
already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his surgeon to open
a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation. When this was done,
however, the blood could not be stopped until he swooned. Having been
conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he was confined to his
couch for several months; and he remained during a much longer time
unfit for active command.<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273"
class="fnanchor">[273]</a></p>

<p>The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the
confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the
Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so
that he was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to
dismiss his troops without achieving anything.<a id="FNanchor_274"
href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p>

<p>His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when
they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval
force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn to
Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes, to
the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former object
was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty triremes,
fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_130">[p. 130]</span> was cruising in the Ægean; especially
round the coast of Attica, near Ægina, Keos, and Andros. The
Athenians, who, since their recently renewed confederacy, had been
undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves thus threatened,
not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade and
even famine; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely
reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented
from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they
fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,<a id="FNanchor_275"
href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> with crews
mainly composed of citizens; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in
a sharply contested action near Naxos, completely defeated the
fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the mastery of the sea.
Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or captured, eight
with their entire crews.<a id="FNanchor_276" href="#Footnote_276"
class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Moreover, Chabrias might have destroyed
all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having
eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living
men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians
who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are told<a
id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a>),
from distinct<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[p. 131]</span>
recollection of the fierce displeasure of the people against the
victorious generals after the battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus
see, that though the proceedings on that memorable occasion were
stained both by illegality and by violence, they produced a salutary
effect upon the public conduct of subsequent commanders. Many a brave
Athenian (the crews consisting principally of citizens) owed his
life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered
by the people to their generals in 406 <small>B.C.</small>, thirty
years before.</p>

<p>This was the first great victory (in September, 376
<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278"
class="fnanchor">[278]</a>) which the Athenians had gained at sea
since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus filled them with
joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their
maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias,—of which a squadron
was detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now
distinguishing himself for the first time and often hereafter to
be mentioned,—sailed victorious round the Ægean, made prize of
twenty other triremes in single ships, brought in three thousand
prisoners with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed
seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending deputies to the
synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and conciliatory
behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among the
islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.<a
id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> To
the inhabitants<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[p. 132]</span>
of Abdêra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by
aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting
their abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating
the Abderites and plundering their territory. The citizens,
grateful for a force left to defend their town, willingly allied
themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus extended itself
to the coast of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280"
class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p>

<p>Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new
allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently
served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the
son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast
of Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager
to keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her
from conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the
Bœotian port of Kreusis.<a id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281"
class="fnanchor">[281]</a> This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first
which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at
Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered
by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not
only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra,
voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid
all violence or interference with the political constitution,
his popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince
of the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and
the Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.<a
id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a>
While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the
Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to
his fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced
by other triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those
waters, that the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having
received only thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that
he had great difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an
advance of money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet,
of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective ships;<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[p. 133]</span> and that he also sent
home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;<a
id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a>
measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the
plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion
of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.<a
id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a>
This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on
both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased
employment of mercenary bands.</p>

<p>The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not
favorably received. Though her naval position was now more
brilliant and commanding than it had been since the battle of
Ægospotami,—though no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb
her in the Ægean,<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285"
class="fnanchor">[285]</a>—yet the cost of the war began to be
seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina
annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while
the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were
not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct
property tax at home.<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286"
class="fnanchor">[286]</a></p>

<p>In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy,
were represented.<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287"
class="fnanchor">[287]</a> Application was made to them to
contribute towards the cost of the naval war; the rather, as
it was partly at their instance that the fleet had been sent
round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined compliance,<a
id="FNanchor_288" href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a>
nor were they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[p. 134]</span>
probably in any condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal
occasioned much displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at
the strides which they had been making during the two last years,
partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens.
At the end of the year 377 <small>B.C.</small>, after the two
successive invasions of Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had
so straitened the Thebans, that they were forced to import corn
from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise their ships and seamen
were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in
Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon led not only to an
outbreak of their seamen who had been taken prisoners, but also to
the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the communication of
Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the two succeeding
years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since, in 376
<small>B.C.</small>, Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights
of Kithæron,—while in 375 <small>B.C.</small>, the attention of
Sparta had been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in
the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted
themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in
most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the population,
was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands of the
philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.<a
id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a>
We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa,
under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the
Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.<a id="FNanchor_290"
href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a></p>

<p>But the most important of all their successes was that of
Pelopidas near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan
harmost, with his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus,
had gone away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a
dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise
the place. It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs
were at the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit
to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between
Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_135">[p. 135]</span> near Orchomenus, he ascertained that
there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no surprise
could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But on reaching
Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders, Gorgoleon and
Theopompus, returning with their troops from the Lokrian excursion.
As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they rejoiced in the
encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first dismayed, and
required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the fight
that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass,
the strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved
irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain;
their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat;
but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the combat
until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of
Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only
erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.<a
id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a></p>

<p>This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time
beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced
a strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties.
The confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was
redoubled; so that by the year 374 <small>B.C.</small>, they
had cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local
oligarchies which sustained them; persuading or constraining the
cities again to come into union with Thebes, and reviving the
Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus, Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra,
Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus became again Bœotian;<a
id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a>
leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency Chæroneia,)
which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under
Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly
to Thebes was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[p. 136]</span>
numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular; though in some the
prevailing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained by
intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these
cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative
system of Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on
surprising Platæa in 431 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_293"
href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> While resuming her
own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian federation,
she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by convention,
probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient rights, their
security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the system which
had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.</p>

<p>The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this
reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis,
the port of Thespiæ,<a id="FNanchor_294" href="#Footnote_294"
class="fnanchor">[294]</a> they fortified it, and built some triremes
to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan
Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate
upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta,
and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from
ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_295"
href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">[295]</a> So hard pressed
were the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly
was at the same time their bitter enemy,<a id="FNanchor_296"
href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a>—that unless
assisted, they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans,
and along with them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison
then occupying it; while the treasures of the Delphian Temple
would also have been laid open, in case the Thebans should think
fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_137">[p. 137]</span> the Phokians to Sparta, King
Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four
Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.<a
id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">[297]</a>
This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both
Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus sustained
them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy.
When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to
the offensive,—partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to
contribute to the cost of her navy,—her ancient jealousy of them
became again so powerful, that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose
terms of peace. What these terms were, we are not told; nor does it
appear that the Thebans even received notice of the proceeding. But
the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of the Athenian envoys were
despatched at once from thence, without even going home, to Korkyra,
for the purpose of notifying the peace to Timotheus, and ordering him
forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_298"
href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a></p>

<p>This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[p. 138]</span> and served somewhat to
countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the Spartans a
little before from a different quarter.</p>

<p>Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to
Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality
with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been
in alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one
of their garrisons.<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299"
class="fnanchor">[299]</a> In the usual state of Thessaly, the great
cities Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some
smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement
with each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they
could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a
supreme chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was
now in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family
factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree,
indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the
entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements.
Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian
fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury
whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came in.<a
id="FNanchor_300" href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a></p>

<p>But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in
Thessaly,—Jason, despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening
the independence of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce.
Though the force of Jason can hardly have been very considerable when
the Spartans passed through Thessaly, six years before, in their
repeated expeditions against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of
Pheræ, but master of nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron
of Pheræ had partially succeeded in becoming thirty years before),<a
id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">[301]</a> as
well as of a large area of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[p.
139]</span> tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument
of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six
thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed
all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with
the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to
temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the
drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military
merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them,
but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his
person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas,
prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing
of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the
Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once
been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to
carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects.
He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting
for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as
Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with
its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first
power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and
at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes
of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to
overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians,
and afterwards by Agesilaus.</p>

<p>Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which
the energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who
replied, that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that
he could take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[p. 140]</span> Sparta, then (rejoined
Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and
that it is for them to afford you protection. If they cannot comply
with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the interests of your
city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on this mission that
Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that unless aid could
be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to sever himself
from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against whom you
will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from personal
qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate
force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can
do.”</p>

<p>The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in
the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus
as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were
now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no
active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be
provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly.
Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable
to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that
he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly,
he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial
compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the
dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had
been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time
to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and
tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this
was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were
gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the
rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_302"
href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a></p>

<p>The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of
weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in
the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance
of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had
sent three powerful armies in succession to<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_141">[p. 141]</span> crush the liberal and promising
confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on
the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to which her
armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas. The parties
in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a claim, as
friends or allies; while those <i>against</i> whom she acted, had neither
done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the main ground on
which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free and equal
confederation of Grecian cities. <i>Now</i>, a claim, and a strong claim,
is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally.
It comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political
interest would naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of
an aggressive power already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so
seriously has the position of Sparta altered in the last eight years
(382-374 <small>B.C.</small>), that she is now compelled to decline
a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy alike prompted
her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian confederacy,
that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly
during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power!
So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus,
but for Greece generally:—since nothing but Spartan interference
restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian
confederacy, had it been allowed to expand, might probably have
confined them to the interior, and averted the death-blow which came
upon Grecian freedom in the next generation from their hands.</p>

<p>The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant
abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens
which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace
thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus,
being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet.
He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as
he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked
these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post.
Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints at
Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having been
in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off, and
war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail was
despatched to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[p. 142]</span>
assist the Zakynthians,<a id="FNanchor_303" href="#Footnote_303"
class="fnanchor">[303]</a> while plans were formed for the
acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra. The fleet of
Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent Korkyræan party
formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians as friends,
and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of twenty-two
triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a voyage to
Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the plot,
refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent
envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.</p>

<p>The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with
the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts
of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia,
Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[p. 143]</span> pecuniary payments
from other confederates, who preferred commuting their obligation
to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body of one
thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled; besides some
Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.<a id="FNanchor_304"
href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a> At the same time,
application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan despot, for his
coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the connection of
that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove again,
dangerous to his city.</p>

<p>It was in the spring of 373 <small>B.C.</small> that this force
proceeded against Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian
Mnasippus; who, having driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss
of four triremes, landed on the island, gained a victory, and
confined the inhabitants within the walls of the city. He next
carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were found in
the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce;
fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in surpassing condition,—with
splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance
of cattle as well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers,
while enriching themselves by depredations on cattle and slaves,
became so pampered with the plentiful stock around, that they
refused to drink any wine that was not of the first quality.<a
id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a>
Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, of
the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the
time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable
than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus),
of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical Athens,
at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[p. 144]</span> the moment
when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there
in 431 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306"
class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p>

<p>With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped
on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies
out of the country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor
with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in want. Yet they
seemed to have no chance of safety except through aid from the
Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing entreaties,<a
id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">[307]</a> and
who had now reason to regret their hasty consent (in the preceding
year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from the island.
However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new fleet to
be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts, under
Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest route,
to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during the
delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its
circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by
land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon
which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of
Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to
get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large
Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much
to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans
would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased
daily; and at length became so severe, that<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_145">[p. 145]</span> many of the citizens deserted, and
numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to receive them,
making public proclamation that every one who deserted should be sold
into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless continued to come,
he caused them to be scourged back to the city-gates. As for the
unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor re-admitted
within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.<a
id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a></p>

<p>Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching
hour of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and
the general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled,
through the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from
allies in commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed
several of his mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them
unpaid for the last two months. His present temper made him not
only more harsh towards his own soldiers,<a id="FNanchor_309"
href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> but also less
vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged,
detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose
a favorable opportunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on
seeing his outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward
with the Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to
the officers of the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But
these officers replied, that they could not answer for the obedience
of soldiers without pay; upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that
he struck them with his stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such
an insult inflamed still farther the existing discontent. Both
officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and heartless,
while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing
out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate
energy. Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at
length slain, and all his troops, being completely routed, fled back
to the fortified camp in which their stores were preserved. Even
this too might have been taken, and the whole armament destroyed,
had the besieged attacked it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[p.
146]</span> at once. But they were astonished at their own success.
Mistaking the numerous camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they
retired back to the city.</p>

<p>Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy
communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary
supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until
reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed,
was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to
Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now
succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail
round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to
block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the
slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent
them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers
and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these
latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the
island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so
great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much
corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers,
were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions
were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued
them from capture, slavery, or starvation.<a id="FNanchor_310"
href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a></p>

<p>The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as
to incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when
it did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the
orator Kallistratus,<a id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311"
class="fnanchor">[311]</a>—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote
of the people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in
April 373 <small>B.C.</small>), when the Athenians first learned
that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra,
had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty
triremes,—found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and
therefore undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and
contributory funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to
transport the six hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly,
where he entered into relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded
the latter to become the ally of Athens, and to further<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[p. 147]</span> the march of Stesiklês
with his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus,
to Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the
dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from
Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the
powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable
service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his
fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he
also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal
marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring
islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and
supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the
Athenian confederacy.</p>

<p>This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the
general purpose of collecting means for the expedition to
Korkyra, began in the month of April or commencement of May 373
<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312"
class="fnanchor">[312]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[p.
148]</span> On departing, it appears, he had given orders to such
of the allies as were intended to form part of the expedition,
to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to
Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to proceed
onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at
this island,—among them the Bœotians, who sent several triremes,
though in the preceding year it had been alleged against them
that they contributed nothing to sustain the naval exertions of
Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a long time. Reliance was placed
upon him, and upon the money which he was to bring home, for the
pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes accordingly fell into
distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his return.<a
id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" class="fnanchor">[313]</a> In
the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[p. 149]</span> mean time
fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was much pressed; so that
great indignation was felt against the absent admiral, for employing
in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable him to
reach the island in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from
serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt
for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially
loud in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation
of Korkyra required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the
appointment of Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates,
Kallistratus, and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to
Korkyra without delay.<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314"
class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p>

<p>Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several
new adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account
of general success.<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315"
class="fnanchor">[315]</a> He went down to Kalauria to supply the
deficiencies of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his
absence had occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs
without borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for
though the sum brought home from his voyage was considerable, it
would appear that the demands upon him had been greater still. At
first an accusation, called for in consequence of the pronounced
displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and
Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for
the expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial
was postponed until the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the
accused, and doubtless seconded by his friends.<a id="FNanchor_316"
href="#Footnote_316" class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[p. 150]</span></p>

<p>Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for
accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the
public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though
perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed)
not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to coërce the
trierarchs with severity,<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317"
class="fnanchor">[317]</a> and to employ all the triremes reserved
for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two sacred triremes
called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a fleet of seventy
sail, promising to send back a large portion of it directly, if
matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on
the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he
arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with
training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat.
The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out
of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard:
Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller
sails sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which
greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the
men in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and
rest, on an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such
extreme dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible
time was consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get
together. On reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first
time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the
correctness of his information, he still persevered both in his
celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he
first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past.
The excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is
spoken of in terms of admiration by Xenophon.<a id="FNanchor_318"
href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a></p>

<p>Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian
commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which
he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from
the defence of the coast.<a id="FNanchor_319" href="#Footnote_319"
class="fnanchor">[319]</a> After making himself master of some of
the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_151">[p. 151]</span> onward to Korkyra; where the squadron
of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent
by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their
flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the hills to give notice of
their approach, set apart twenty triremes to be ready for moving at
the first signal. So excellent was his discipline, (says Xenophon,)
that “the moment the signal was made, the ardor of all the crews was
a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did not hasten at a run
to take his place aboard.”<a id="FNanchor_320" href="#Footnote_320"
class="fnanchor">[320]</a> The ten Syracusan triremes, after their
voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest their men
on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found
by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral
Anippus; one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her
captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph,
towing his nine prizes into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being
sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral
Anippus was retained in expectation of a higher ransom, but slew
himself shortly afterwards from mortification.<a id="FNanchor_321"
href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a></p>

<p>Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time
to pay his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary
disappointment to him, and he soon began to need money. This
consideration induced him to consent to the return of his colleague
Kallistratus; who,—an orator by profession, and not on friendly
terms with Iphikrates,—had come out against his own consent.
Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus and Chabrias
as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their
advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what
they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[p. 152]</span> really saw
in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous
circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus,
and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached
to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could
succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion
which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had
Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe
crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus
and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among his
assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of them
with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability
of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.<a
id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" class="fnanchor">[322]</a> As
the result of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all
such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part
with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted
to go home, he would employ all his efforts to keep the fleet well
paid from the public treasury; or if this were impracticable,
that he would labor to procure peace.<a id="FNanchor_323"
href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> So terrible are the
difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring
money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are
acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same
embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year before,—and
which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in
the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen by find<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[p. 153]</span>ing work for them on the
farms of the Korkyræans, where there must doubtless have been ample
necessity for repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he
crossed over to Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there
obtained service with the townships friendly to Athens against such
others as were friendly to Sparta; especially against the warlike
inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.<a id="FNanchor_324"
href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a></p>

<p>The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal
satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than
to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 <small>B.C.</small>, that
the former, as well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus,
underwent each his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home,
pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as
one of the accusers;<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325"
class="fnanchor">[325]</a> though probably in a spirit of greater
gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent joint success
and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while
the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the
defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends
speaking in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the
unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the
request of Timotheus, both Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ,
came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses
in his favor. They were received and lodged by him in his house in
the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Peiræus. And as
he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it
necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them
honor,—clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion,
a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would
depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus;
who had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of
bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they
had sealed at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across
Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would
be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason
of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece;
and we are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[p. 154]</span> not
surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer
Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so
powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death,
and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on
what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in
dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a
most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was
held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the
money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.</p>

<p>As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be
personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested
with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged
Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time
to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was
in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really
been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the
misfortune to his delay.<a id="FNanchor_326" href="#Footnote_326"
class="fnanchor">[326]</a> And although<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_155">[p. 155]</span> he was now acquitted, his reputation
suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring
he was glad to accept an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[p.
156]</span> invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the
command of the Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian
war;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[p. 157]</span> the same
command from which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.<a
id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a></p>

<p>That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a
large number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without
opposition incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast
of Peloponnesus; insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in
their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive
hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupaktus, which they had
occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian war.<a
id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" class="fnanchor">[328]</a>
And while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and
west of Peloponnesus,<a id="FNanchor_329" href="#Footnote_329"
class="fnanchor">[329]</a> Sparta and her confederates, discouraged
by the ruinous failure of their expedition against Korkyra in the
preceding year, appear to have remained inactive. With such mental
predispositions, they were powerfully affected by religious alarm
arising from certain frightful earthquakes and inundations with
which Peloponnesus was visited during this year, and which were
regarded as marks of the wrath of the god Poseidon. More of these
formidable visitations occurred this year in Peloponnesus than had
ever before been known; especially one, the worst of all, whereby
the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia were destroyed, together
with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes,
which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the
calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.<a
id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a></p>

<p>Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had
recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose
fifteen years before, in 388-387 <small>B.C.</small> They sent
Antal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[p. 158]</span>kidas
again as envoy to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,<a
id="FNanchor_331" href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> and
a fresh Persian intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his
name; which peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian
construction) by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy
under Thebes as president. And it appears that in the course of
the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece,
requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind
up their dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.<a
id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" class="fnanchor">[332]</a> The
Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt,
were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means
of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops
Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.</p>

<p>Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which
doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more
and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the
Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in
378 <small>B.C.</small>, was now no longer predominant. She was
actually at the head of a considerable maritime confederacy; and
this she could hardly hope to increase by continuing the war, since
the Lacedæmonian naval power had already been humbled. Moreover,
she found the expense of warlike operations very burdensome,
nowise defrayed either by the contributions of her allies or by
the results of victory. The orator Kallistratus,—who had promised
either to procure remittances from Athens to<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_159">[p. 159]</span> Iphikrates, or to recommend the
conclusion of peace,—was obliged to confine himself to the latter
alternative, and contributed much to promote the pacific dispositions
of his countrymen.<a id="FNanchor_333" href="#Footnote_333"
class="fnanchor">[333]</a></p>

<p>Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from
Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for a
time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes
had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens
again began to arise. In 374 <small>B.C.</small>, she had concluded
a peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which
peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves,
in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The
Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in
her invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been
ancient friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.<a
id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" class="fnanchor">[334]</a>
Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and
destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus
at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in
the preceding year;<a id="FNanchor_335" href="#Footnote_335"
class="fnanchor">[335]</a> an expedition of which Athens alone reaped
both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of
the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the
unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was
farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the
first half of 372 <small>B.C.</small></p>

<p>During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns
of Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.
Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called
autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against
Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the
Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 <small>B.C.</small>
While other Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated
from their philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation
under Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union
only by constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking
off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of
the growing coldness<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[p.
160]</span> between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were
secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town,
annexing Platæa to Attica;<a id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336"
class="fnanchor">[336]</a> a project hazardous both to Thebes and
Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while
neither was yet at peace with Sparta.</p>

<p>This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined
them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one
of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to
the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they
not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished
town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting
from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by
prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender
of Platæa in 427 <small>B.C.</small> As it would have been to
them a loss as well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to
close with the tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency
by seizing the town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia
by Thebes, the Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under
the ancient constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with
Thebes, acknowledging her rights as president of the federation,
and having their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her,
probably under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their
territory, and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal
restrictions and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,<a
id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a> the
Platæans knew<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[p. 161]</span>
well what was her real sentiment towards them, and their own towards
her. If we are to believe, what seems very probable, that they were
secretly negotiating with Athens to help them in breaking off from
the federation,—the consciousness of such an intrigue tended still
farther to keep them in anxiety and suspicion. Accordingly, being
apprehensive of some aggression from Thebes, they kept themselves
habitually on their guard. But their vigilance was somewhat
relaxed and most of them went out of the city to their farms in
the country, on the days, well known beforehand, when the public
assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation the Bœotarch
Neokles took advantage.<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338"
class="fnanchor">[338]</a> He conducted a Theban armed force,
immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through
Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male
adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in
the fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families,
all in possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of
accepting the terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart
in safety, and to carry away all their mov<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_162">[p. 162]</span>able property; but their town was
destroyed, and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy
fugitives were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at
Athens, where they were again kindly received, and restored to the
same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to
the peace of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339"
class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p>

<p>It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes
was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she
constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;<a
id="FNanchor_340" href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a>
as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the
victory of Delium,<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341"
class="fnanchor">[341]</a> on suspicion of leanings favorable to
Athens.</p>

<p>Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited
strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[p. 163]</span> as suppliants, with
the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their
case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain
their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a question
at once so touching and so full of political consequences, many
speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has
fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually
delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard
fate of this interesting little community is here impressively
set forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a
little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs
done by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much
of his invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when
the orator repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous
existence, under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the
peace of Antalkidas,<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342"
class="fnanchor">[342]</a>—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at
the time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had
been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by
the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator
intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their
proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;
moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers
espoused the same side.<a id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343"
class="fnanchor">[343]</a> That the Platæans had coöperated with
Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens
and Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can
only extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a
present Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as
a proof of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness
again to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.<a
id="FNanchor_344" href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a>
The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[p. 164]</span> confederacy; and
they even seem to have contended, that they had rendered a
positive service to the general Athenian confederacy of which
they were members,<a id="FNanchor_345" href="#Footnote_345"
class="fnanchor">[345]</a> by expelling the inhabitants of Platæa and
dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted to Sparta,
but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby a Spartan
army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of Athens, and
in the general congress of the confederates at that city, animated
discussions were raised upon the whole subject;<a id="FNanchor_346"
href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a> discussions, wherein,
as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and representative of
Thebes, was found a competent advocate against Kallistratus, the
most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining the Theban cause
with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing reputation.<a
id="FNanchor_347" href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a></p>

<p>But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all
the prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no
step was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration
made against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general
result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan
sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen
the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself by an
increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly advocated
by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by the
announced Persian inter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[p.
165]</span>vention, but by the heavy cost of war, and the absence
of all prospective gain from its continuance. The resolution was at
length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority
of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make propositions of
peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions
prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was given to the
Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also, if they chose
to become parties. In the spring of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, at the
time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled
at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the
various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among
the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch
or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were
men of great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by
Kallistratus the orator.<a id="FNanchor_348" href="#Footnote_348"
class="fnanchor">[348]</a> From the Thebans, the only man of note was
Epaminondas, then one of the Bœotarchs.</p>

<p>Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we
have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic
conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no
knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three
Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces
himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and
empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;<a id="FNanchor_349"
href="#Footnote_349" class="fnanchor">[349]</a> that of Autoklês is
in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past conduct of
Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other two,—while
the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both
parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autoklês,<a
id="FNanchor_350" href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a>—is
framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting faults on both sides,
but deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and
showing how much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.<a
id="FNanchor_351" href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[p. 166]</span></p>

<p>This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time,
recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which
Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well
as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian
king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was
on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians
in the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he
urged),—as the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.<a
id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" class="fnanchor">[352]</a>
Her affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as
to prove that she only did so on consideration of the general
evils of prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash
confidence which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,<a
id="FNanchor_353" href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a>
like a gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both
Sparta and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had
the strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that
each could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two
would produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each
separate city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on
Athens, the other on Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_354" href="#Footnote_354"
class="fnanchor">[354]</a> But it was indispensably necessary that
Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly
denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since
the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped
bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended
by throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities,
whose separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.<a
id="FNanchor_355" href="#Footnote_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p>

<p>Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a
judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy
to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed
and enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[p. 167]</span> had been at the
peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or
headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between
Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the
means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted
to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before
the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which
had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of
Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta
were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship
of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them
interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and
her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by
mutual consent.</p>

<p>It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments
on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons
everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full
autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions,
and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at
liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no
one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last
stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most
vexatious chains.</p>

<p>To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on
the ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for
herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her
allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such
difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the
principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.</p>

<p>Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal
hitch was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on
taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as
president of the Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian
cities. The Spartan authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as
the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him. They required that he
should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the
oath each for itself.</p>

<p>Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas
had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta.<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[p. 168]</span> While most of
the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the
energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian Autoklês,
and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies present, had
proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her unjust
pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such
pretensions were put aside.<a id="FNanchor_356" href="#Footnote_356"
class="fnanchor">[356]</a> Accepting the conditions of peace as
finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the
name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each
of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to
those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just
invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as
good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied
by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for
her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He
contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good
a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_357"
href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> He would remind the
assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled by its
present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out from
Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of
all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes
as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country;
that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established
institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at
Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.
All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six
years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to
determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa;
when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of
treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;<a id="FNanchor_358"
href="#Footnote_358" class="fnanchor">[358]</a> and the Spartan
commis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[p. 169]</span>sioners
had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions by a sweeping
sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover, at a time
when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been
greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with the invading
Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their
power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force against Athens.<a
id="FNanchor_359" href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a>
Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of Thebes over the
Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation; a right not only
of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized and strenuously
vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show farther that
it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern the
Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of
the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)<a
id="FNanchor_360" href="#Footnote_360" class="fnanchor">[360]</a> by
nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.</p>

<p>An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies
assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their
supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it
were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question
such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty
startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus
and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably
poignant and insulting.<a id="FNanchor_361" href="#Footnote_361"
class="fnanchor">[361]</a> They had already a long<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[p. 170]</span> account of antipathy
to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing the
Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being unable
to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in the last
seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To aggravate
this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now
wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus,
full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of
a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to the quick.
Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his wrath would
have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was
anxious only to close these offensive discussions with scornful
abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no middle ground
between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility. Indignantly
starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak plainly,—will
you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian cities its
separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will <i>you</i> leave
each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying another word,
Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans to be struck
out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the treaty.<a
id="FNanchor_362" href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[p. 171]</span></p>

<p>Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta
in June, 371 <small>B.C.</small> Between the Spartans and
Athenians, and their respective allies, peace was sworn. But the
Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned home (if we
may believe Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_363" href="#Footnote_363"
class="fnanchor">[363]</a>) discouraged and mournful. Yet such a man
as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his claims
nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If therefore he was
disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted
upon, but did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.</p>

<p>The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than
favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined,
from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential
claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest
of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_172">[p. 172]</span> maintained, as a bulwark to herself
against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the
congress as before it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather
than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes
was at war, without a single ally attached to her. On the whole,
Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the interests of Athens
in this congress with great prudence and success. They had disengaged
her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been dictated seven
years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but which had no
longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of continuing
the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been accomplished
without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven years
of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval
power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the
Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens
was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular Greece,—while
Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land, but only
on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between the
two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of
the Hellenic hegemony.<a id="FNanchor_364" href="#Footnote_364"
class="fnanchor">[364]</a> Moreover, Athens had the prudence to
draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her
acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.</p>

<p>On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable
confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been
once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but
treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new
engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an
organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions
permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with
more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding
voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere
uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking
counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as
all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of
the others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him
even to performance of what he had specially<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_173">[p. 173]</span> promised, if it became irksome. By
such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were losers in power;
yet the latter to a much greater extent than the former, inasmuch as
her reach of power over her allies had been more comprehensive and
stringent.</p>

<p>We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed
by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and
Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation
between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what
subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when
Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of
her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as
a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand
that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.
Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel.
He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was
the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to
the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns
under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the
most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states,
Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized
whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other
Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution
of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than
to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of
Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes
over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as
that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her
presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part,
were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any
Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of
Sparta in Laconia.</p>

<p>Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and
Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the
superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter.
The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and
enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which
the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question
stood for decision, with keener antipathy<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_174">[p. 174]</span> on both sides,—with diminished power
in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased confidence, and a
new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet but half-known,—in
Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet allies of
neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without interfering.
How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.</p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_78">
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXVIII.<br />
  BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.</h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Immediately</span>
after the congress at Sparta in June 371 <small>B.C.</small>,
the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the
covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies
generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who
was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions
against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should
forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any
captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they
should all be restored;<a id="FNanchor_365" href="#Footnote_365"
class="fnanchor">[365]</a> so as to prevent the misunderstanding
which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,<a
id="FNanchor_366" href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a>
in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent
to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city
still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise
once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed
it,—commissioners,<a id="FNanchor_367" href="#Footnote_367"
class="fnanchor">[367]</a> not Spartans, were now named from the
general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[p. 175]</span></p>

<p>No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this
part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the
Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban
impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other
thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered
it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent
insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked
back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to
be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,<a id="FNanchor_368"
href="#Footnote_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a>—like that of the
Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other
allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able
to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of
Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other
Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was
anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into
villages (as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon
her the fate which she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate
her citizens and her property to the profit of the Delphian god,
pursuant to the vow that had been taken more than a century before,
in consequence of the assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.<a
id="FNanchor_369" href="#Footnote_369" class="fnanchor">[369]</a> Few
persons out of Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.</p>

<p>To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta,
by the peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial
ascendency over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or
withhold assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy
task; for the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed
with the Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left
to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at
the moment when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was
actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in
Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on
hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions
as to his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan
authorities and assembly, with Agesilaus as<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_176">[p. 176]</span> the most vehement of all,<a
id="FNanchor_370" href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a> he
was directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch
at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas),
and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities.
One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He
protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths,
which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the
voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies,
who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never
serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus
was treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,<a id="FNanchor_371"
href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> and the peremptory
order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a
reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in
the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be
imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.</p>

<p>Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.<a
id="FNanchor_372" href="#Footnote_372" class="fnanchor">[372]</a>
Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the
resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian
federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude
of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented
from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly
occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying
between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on
the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and
forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three
years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side)
of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian
garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of
Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in
the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead
of march<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[p. 177]</span>ing by
the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by
a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban
division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of
Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming
upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban
triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy
the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous ground
into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity of Helikon;
where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of ever-memorable
name, called Leuktra.<a id="FNanchor_373" href="#Footnote_373"
class="fnanchor">[373]</a></p>

<p>Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing
Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure
communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and
thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king
and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence;
while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as
surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the
daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen,
and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents,
which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the
road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans
with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra,
where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp.
They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas
was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle
with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the
ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for
fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege,
sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was
vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch,
Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been
on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder
course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the
feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair
than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish
in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[p. 178]</span> masters of the
Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to
the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of
Trophonius at Lebadeia:<a id="FNanchor_374" href="#Footnote_374"
class="fnanchor">[374]</a> and a Spartan exile named Leandrias,
serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were
now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian
named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had
afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted
to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back,
imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of
these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on
Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own
tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune
encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its
inmates against the common enemy now present.<a id="FNanchor_375"
href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a></p>

<p>While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman
aid, Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been
confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting.
His task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited,
while those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were
inferior, and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[p. 179]</span> trustworthy. What
the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to
know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans;
Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.<a
id="FNanchor_376" href="#Footnote_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a>
Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for
believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such
inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and
by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all
former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in
line, and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had
been the intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the
cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness
or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing
from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring
his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right,
and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively out of action.
Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official
persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that,
if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find
little resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his
own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of
fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order
of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep
column on the left should join battle first, while the centre and
right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive
attitude.</p>

<p>In 371 <small>B.C.</small>, such a combination was absolutely
new, and betokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace
to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered
to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along
the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among
the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar
precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp
on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an
opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low
ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry
on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping.
Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleom<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_180">[p. 180]</span>brotus united in provoking the order
for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him, since
he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a
blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor
instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be
understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions
would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.<a
id="FNanchor_377" href="#Footnote_377" class="fnanchor">[377]</a>
Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager to fight, and
so would any other Spartan general have been, under the same
circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had he been
otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian portion
of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided resolution
to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the final orders
issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious
libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper
of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on
the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and
most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve
deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the
order of the other parts of the line, we have no information. The
cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.</p>

<p>Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his
own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward,
and strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack.
His cavalry too were posted in front of his line. But before he
commenced his march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home
to Thebes; while at the same time he made proclamation that any of
his Bœotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also
retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately
availed themselves;<a id="FNanchor_378" href="#Footnote_378"
class="fnanchor">[378]</a> so many were there, in the Theban camp,
who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory.
But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen
retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus,
either with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape,
and forced them to return for safety to the<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_181">[p. 181]</span> main Theban army. The most zealous
among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and
the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this
movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main
battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.</p>

<p>The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the
superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian
cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad,
composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by
the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose
ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle,
Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself
personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably
hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and
prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas
and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention
to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was
terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately
disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields
and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the
Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front,
composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,<a id="FNanchor_379"
href="#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> and the deep column
of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans, with
all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand
up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the front,
was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and it was
only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his comrades
around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve him from
falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most
eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch,
Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an
obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the
Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the
higher ground.</p>

<p>It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was
irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[p. 182]</span> Epaminondas had
intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there
appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through his
deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or
his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban
cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of
the enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence,
or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the
command of Kleombrotus.<a id="FNanchor_380" href="#Footnote_380"
class="fnanchor">[380]</a> The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in
the cause from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a
blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining
allies, after mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired
to the camp as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and
driven back to it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left
wing, probably astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them,
and by the unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in
the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying
king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the entrenchment
on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not
attempt to molest them.<a id="FNanchor_381" href="#Footnote_381"
class="fnanchor">[381]</a></p>

<p>But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed
in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they
had quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss
when it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had
marched forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.<a
id="FNanchor_382" href="#Footnote_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> One
thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even
by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[p. 183]</span> even larger. Apart from
this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an event impressive to
every one, the like of which had never occurred since the fatal day
of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies who stood alongside
of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick of their cause,
and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a positive
satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now
commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps
proper in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans
who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force
their slain brethren in the field, or perishing in the attempt.
All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the polemarchs, giving
effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to solicit the regular
truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted, after
erecting their own trophy.<a id="FNanchor_383" href="#Footnote_383"
class="fnanchor">[383]</a> But Epaminondas, aware that the Spartans
would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their
losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should
bury their dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce
any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain warrior on the
field was a Lacedæmonian.<a id="FNanchor_384" href="#Footnote_384"
class="fnanchor">[384]</a> And thus the Theban general, while he
placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment, proclaimed
at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage, as to
rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the score
of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell
us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,<a id="FNanchor_385"
href="#Footnote_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a> Diodorus at three
hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the
latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight,
over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased.
Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms
were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by
the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.<a
id="FNanchor_386" href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a></p>

<p>Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas
quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general
peace, to the day when he stood victorious on the field of<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[p. 184]</span> Leuktra.<a
id="FNanchor_387" href="#Footnote_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a>
The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon
victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near
and distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes
would be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not
only she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the
military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose
account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that
chagrin which the event occasioned to him,<a id="FNanchor_388"
href="#Footnote_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a>—ascribes the defeat
to untoward accidents,<a id="FNanchor_389" href="#Footnote_389"
class="fnanchor">[389]</a> or to the rashness and convivial
carelessness of Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and
his party at Sparta did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,<a
id="FNanchor_390" href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a>
while others faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought
contrary to his better judgment, under<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_185">[p. 185]</span> fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms,
coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for
the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will
not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the
feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march
against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all
the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him.
To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every
other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of
Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he
seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with
Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure
his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what
no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary,
then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of
Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle,
though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by
the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of
the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus<a
id="FNanchor_391" href="#Footnote_391" class="fnanchor">[391]</a>
expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations
of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans,
cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had
received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry
his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally,
was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which
followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had
arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of
Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field,
with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for
the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood
without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war,
against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without
the like training.<a id="FNanchor_392" href="#Footnote_392"
class="fnanchor">[392]</a> Essentially stationary and old-fashioned,
the Lykurgean discipline was now<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_186">[p. 186]</span> overborne by the progressive military
improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician;
a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians<a id="FNanchor_393"
href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> at Sparta sixty years
before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the
field of Leuktra.</p>

<p>But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its
privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching
wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of
enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the
manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at
Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may
turn to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when
the trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings
of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress
(says the historian)<a id="FNanchor_394" href="#Footnote_394"
class="fnanchor">[394]</a> reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus
to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that
night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens
and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,
when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there
was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only
was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel,
but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon
as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted
Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt
of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived
with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated,
with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than
a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having
solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when
he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_187">[p. 187]</span> was actually being celebrated, on
its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going through its
usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of
the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be
either interrupted or abridged. “<i>Of necessity, I suppose, they were
grieved</i>,—but they went through the whole as if nothing had happened,
only communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and
issuing a general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing,
but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That such an order should
be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it should be issued and
obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it should not only be
issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man could believe, if
it were not expressly attested by the contemporary historian. “On
the morrow (says he) you might see those whose relations had been
slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances;
but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself;
and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and humbled.”<a
id="FNanchor_395" href="#Footnote_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a></p>

<p>In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to
orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the
sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of
feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric
type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference
to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past
calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians
were decidedly the better of the two. I have al<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_188">[p. 188]</span>ready recounted the prodigious and
unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after the ruinous loss of
her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one expected that she
could have held out for six months: I am now about to recount the
proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra,—a calamity
great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what
had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that,
looking to the intensity of active effort in both cases, the
comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at least,
if not justifying, the boast of Perikles<a id="FNanchor_396"
href="#Footnote_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a> in his memorable
funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill
of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring
exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.</p>

<p>It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the
safety of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they
put in march nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the
Lacedæmonian moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the
aggregate), two or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the
remainder were now despatched, even including elderly citizens up
to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left behind in
consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the command
(Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself
in getting together the aid promised from Tegea,—from the villages
representing the disintegrated Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon,
Phlius, and Achaia; all these places being still under the same
oligarchies which had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and
still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as
a means of transporting the new army across to Kreusis, and thus
joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port of Kreusis, the
recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found inestimable,
as the only means of access into Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_397"
href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a></p>

<p>Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp
at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb
it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the
recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans
themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at
a moment when they were animated more by <span class="pagenum"
id="Page_189">[p. 189]</span>despair than by hope. They were
doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation of
the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families
in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like
the Syracusans after their last great victory<a id="FNanchor_398"
href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> over the Athenian
fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give
loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action.
Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban
alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from
without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they
sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their
recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present
opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands
with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now
rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn
peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled
in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident
chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while
the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in
expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy
reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to
indefinite exile.</p>

<p>To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for
the same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back
word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be
equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the
same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near
to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements,
that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the
territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter
enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_399"
href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> But when the Theban
leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp in
flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight up
the hill and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[p. 190]</span>
attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the enterprise as too
perilous; recommending that they should permit the enemy’s departure
under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the great victory
which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting
something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven to despair
in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, <i>you</i> yourselves were
in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very
feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these
sudden changes of fortune.”<a id="FNanchor_400" href="#Footnote_400"
class="fnanchor">[400]</a> Having by such representations convinced
the Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians,
reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little
trust to be reposed in their allies,—and offering himself as mediator
to negotiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily
given; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties,
assuring to the Lacedæmonians the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In
spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedæmonian commander placed
little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud
for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him
on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for
every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to
march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain
on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he
directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way,
first to Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.<a
id="FNanchor_401" href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a>
The Thebans offered no opposition; nor is<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_191">[p. 191]</span> it at all probable that they intended
any fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he
had at least no motive to break his word.</p>

<p>It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met
Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian
forces, and was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies.
The purpose of his march being now completed, he advanced no
farther. The armament was disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as
allies returned home.<a id="FNanchor_402" href="#Footnote_402"
class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"
id="Page_192">[p. 192]</span></p> <p>In all communities, the return
of so many defeated soldiers, liberated under a capitulation by the
enemy, would have been a scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was
pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So terrible was the
scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a
defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact
sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying
or extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him,
or be seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other
family would intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with
an air of cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by,
until he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become
his degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from
the panegyrist Xenophon)<a id="FNanchor_403" href="#Footnote_403"
class="fnanchor">[403]</a> helps to explain the satisfaction of the
Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son was among
the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had
hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners at Sphakteria,
when released from captivity and brought back to a degraded existence
at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some precautions deemed
necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous malcontents.<a
id="FNanchor_404" href="#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a>
Here was another<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[p. 193]</span>
case yet more formidable. The vanquished returning from Leuktra
were numerous, while the severe loss sustained in the battle amply
attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of enforcing against them
the established custom, the ephors referred the case to Agesilaus;
who proposed that for that time and case the customary penalties
should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and
come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;<a
id="FNanchor_405" href="#Footnote_405" class="fnanchor">[405]</a>
so that the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to
mingle with the remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation.
The step was indeed doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate
number of fully qualified citizens; which number always tended to
decline,—from the nature of the Spartan political franchise combined
with the exigencies of Spartan training,<a id="FNanchor_406"
href="#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a>—and could not bear
even so great a diminution as that of the four hundred slain at
Leuktra. “Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up against a single
defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her citizens.”<a
id="FNanchor_407" href="#Footnote_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a></p>

<p>The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter
loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power
and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick
upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still
more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere
in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle
of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with
her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and
fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto
reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open
manifestation.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[p. 194]</span></p>

<p>The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of
the Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her,
and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of
Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in
cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent
success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to
the full exigencies of military training; while under a leader
like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account,
that they became better soldiers every month.<a id="FNanchor_408"
href="#Footnote_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a> The Phokians, unable
to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the
protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than
the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual
defence and alliance.<a id="FNanchor_409" href="#Footnote_409"
class="fnanchor">[409]</a> The cities of Eubœa, together with the
Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the
town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now
defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly,
had assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its
important site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be
held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.<a
id="FNanchor_410" href="#Footnote_410" class="fnanchor">[410]</a> The
Bœotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians
even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the
Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed
to destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe
as this proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary
rigors of war, nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself,
had Kleombrotus been victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous
remonstrance of Epaminondas prevented it from being carried into
execution. Alike distinguished for mild temper and for long-sighted
views, he reminded his countrymen that in their present aspiring
hopes towards ascendency in Greece, it was essential to establish
a character for moderation of dealing<a id="FNanchor_411"
href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> not inferior to their
military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly,
the Orchomenians were par<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[p.
195]</span>doned upon submission, and re-admitted as members of the
Bœotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same lenity was
not extended. They were expelled from Bœotia, and their territory
annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before
the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be
made that such of the Bœotians as were disaffected to the Theban
cause might march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the
permission and departed.<a id="FNanchor_412" href="#Footnote_412"
class="fnanchor">[412]</a> The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like
the Platæans, at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_413" href="#Footnote_413"
class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p>

<p>While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection
of a treasury chamber,<a id="FNanchor_414" href="#Footnote_414"
class="fnanchor">[414]</a> and the dedication of pious offerings at
Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving such
marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached
to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of
Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every
day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors
under complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on
him,—and with a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater
than had ever been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea,
in his return home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of
Thermopylæ, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever
he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great
power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would
direct his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he
was fond of boasting,<a id="FNanchor_415" href="#Footnote_415"
class="fnanchor">[415]</a>—or northward against the cities in
Chalkidikê—or southward against Greece.</p>

<p>The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the
beginning of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, half a year after the
battle of Leuktra: for Jason proclaimed distinctly his intention
of being present at the Pythian festival (the season for which
was about August 1, 370 <small>B.C.</small>, near Delphi), not
only with splendid presents and sacrifices to Apollo, but also
at the head of a numerous army. Orders had<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_196">[p. 196]</span> been given that his troops should
hold themselves ready for military service,<a id="FNanchor_416"
href="#Footnote_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a>—about the time when
the festival was to be celebrated; and requisitions had been sent
round, demanding from all his tributaries victims for the Pythian
sacrifice, to a total of not less than one thousand bulls, and ten
thousand sheep, goats, and swine; besides a prize-bull to take
the lead in the procession, for which a wreath of gold was to be
given. Never before had such honor been done to the god; for those
who came to offer sacrifice were usually content with one or more
beasts bred on the neighboring plain of Kirrha.<a id="FNanchor_417"
href="#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> We must recollect,
however, that this Pythian festival of 370 <small>B.C.</small>
occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the two previous festivals
in 374 <small>B.C.</small> and 378 <small>B.C.</small> must have been
comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta
and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and
also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival
of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, following immediately after the peace,
appeared to justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to
make up for the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former;
while the hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an
excuse for the military force intended to accompany Jason.</p>

<p>But there were other intentions, generally believed though not
formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness.
It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the
presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[p. 197]</span> of right to the
Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that he would lay
hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a scheme said
to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius fifteen
years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who was now
dependent upon Jason.<a id="FNanchor_418" href="#Footnote_418"
class="fnanchor">[418]</a> As there were no visible means of warding
off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know what they
were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which the god
replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept his
word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at
the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day
of the festival arrived.<a id="FNanchor_419" href="#Footnote_419"
class="fnanchor">[419]</a> He had been reviewing his cavalry near
Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven
young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and
appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they
set upon him and slew him.<a id="FNanchor_420" href="#Footnote_420"
class="fnanchor">[420]</a> One was killed on the spot by the guards,
and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining
five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop
away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities
which these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished
honor, as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired
universal alarm,<a id="FNanchor_421" href="#Footnote_421"
class="fnanchor">[421]</a> now that Sparta was unable to resist him,
while no other power had as yet taken her place.</p>

<p>Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his
power,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[p. 198]</span> nor
ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived
longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent
destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but
he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban
power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly
innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch
that his widow went to reside there for security.<a id="FNanchor_422"
href="#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> Epaminondas was
relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban
allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would
have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason
in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years
longer, to be rifled by another hand.</p>

<p>While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during
the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events
not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The
treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the
Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts and
garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty of
action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the orders
sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in executing
the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for the express
purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the cities was
really carried into effect.<a id="FNanchor_423" href="#Footnote_423"
class="fnanchor">[423]</a> But it probably was not accomplished in
twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more than nominally
accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in Bœotia. But
after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence of the
fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of Sparta
was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance of
foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they had
disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three years
before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,<a id="FNanchor_424"
href="#Footnote_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a>) and returned home.
Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had been maintained
everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies, which had been for
the most part violent and oppressive. Against these governments, now
deprived<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[p. 199]</span> of their
foreign support, the long-accumulated flood of internal discontent
burst with irresistible force, stimulated probably by returning
exiles. Their past misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences
and proscription, to the length of great reactionary injustice;
and the parties banished by this anti-Spartan revolution became so
numerous, as to harass and alarm seriously the newly-established
governments. Such were the commotions which, during the latter half
of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, disturbed many of the Peloponnesian
towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, etc., though
with great local difference, both of detail and of result.<a
id="FNanchor_425" href="#Footnote_425" class="fnanchor">[425]</a></p>

<p>But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most
violent form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was con<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[p. 200]</span>nected with the general
state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had not been in any
way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan confederacy, nor
(so far as we know) concerned in the recent war, since the peace
of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small> The Argeian government
was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their
denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men
of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced,
formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government.
But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of
the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to
make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one
of them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people,
after a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated
their property, while others slew themselves to escape the same
fate. So furious did the fear and wrath of the people become,
exasperated by the popular leaders, that they continued their
executions until they had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some
say, fifteen hundred) of the principal citizens. At length the
popular leaders became themselves tired and afraid of what they had
done; upon which the people were animated to fury against them, and
put them to death also.<a id="FNanchor_426" href="#Footnote_426"
class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p>

<p>This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or
Cudgelling, from the instrument (as we are told) by which these
multiplied executions were consummated; though the name seems more
to indicate an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate
executions. We know the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer
anything more than the brutal working of angry political passion
amidst a population like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there
was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit
of being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every
question fully discussed. Cicero remarks that he had never heard
of an Argeian orator. The acrimony of Demosthenes and Æschines
was discharged by mutual eloquence of vituperation, while the
assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided between them. We are
told that the assembled Athenian people, when they heard the news
of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it, that they<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[p. 201]</span> caused the solemnity of
purification to be performed round the assembly.<a id="FNanchor_427"
href="#Footnote_427" class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p>

<p>Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed,
expelled, or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian
cities,—and though as yet there was no Theban interference within
the isthmus, either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly
discouraged, and incapable of any effort either to afford protection
or to uphold ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the
necessity of contending for home and family;<a id="FNanchor_428"
href="#Footnote_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a> probably too the
dispositions of her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such
as to require all her force as well as all her watchfulness. At
any rate, her empire and her influence over the sentiments of
Greeks out of Laconia, became suddenly extinct, to a degree which
astonishes us, when we recollect that it had become a sort of
tradition in the Greek mind, and that, only nine years before,
it had reached as far as Olynthus. How completely her ascendency
had passed away, is shown in a remarkable step taken by Athens,
seemingly towards the close of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, about
four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of the Peloponnesian
cities, though they had lost both their fear and their reverence
for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members of a voluntary
alliance under the presidency of some considerable city. Of this
feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys and invite
them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the basis of the
peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn at Sparta.<a
id="FNanchor_429" href="#Footnote_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a>
Many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[p. 202]</span> of them,
obeying the summons, entered into an engagement to the following
effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent down by the Persian king,
and to the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies generally.
If any of the cities who have sworn this oath shall be attacked,
I will assist her with all my might.” What cities, or how many,
swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out indirectly
that Corinth was one;<a id="FNanchor_430" href="#Footnote_430"
class="fnanchor">[430]</a> but the Eleians refused it, on the ground
that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis, the Triphylians,
and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The formation of the league
itself, however, with Athens as president, is a striking fact, as
evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta, and as a warning
that she would henceforward have to move in her own separate orbit,
like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens stepped into the
place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and
guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities which entered into
this new compact were not for that reason understood to break with
their ancient president.<a id="FNanchor_431" href="#Footnote_431"
class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p>

<p>Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present
time, though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the
altered position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of
Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of
their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and
for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in
detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found
the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred
talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain
interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted
as well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.<a
id="FNanchor_432" href="#Footnote_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a>
Probably neither those who<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[p.
203]</span> preferred the charge, nor those who passed the vote,
expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit to pay the
fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment for such
contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games, which
were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we may
perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.</p>

<p>The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than
one point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of
Sparta. Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes
had become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the
majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly
were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes,
that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the
incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther
developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly
beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it
the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of
the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an
entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the
Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither
Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy
years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly.
The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the
Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history.
We know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately
merely as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary
details. During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of
Leuktra, Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy
and synod of allies convened by herself: her political ascendency
was exercised over them, <i>eo nomine</i>, by a method more direct
and easy than that of perverting the religious authority of the
Amphiktyonic assembly, even if such a proceeding were open to her.<a
id="FNanchor_433" href="#Footnote_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> But
when Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful
state individually, she had no such established confederacy and
synod of allies, to sanction her propositions, and to share or abet
her antipathies. The Amphiktyonic assembly,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_204">[p. 204]</span> meeting alternately at Delphi and
at Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally
belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable
in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her
purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the
seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it
was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself
a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations
recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations,
were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though
probably, if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar
complaint to the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust
attempt to surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431
<small>B.C.</small>,—both Spartans and Thebans would have resisted
it. In the present case, however, the Thebans had a case against
Sparta sufficiently plausible, when combined with their overruling
ascendency, to carry a majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and
to procure the imposition of this enormous fine. In itself the
sentence produced no direct effect,—which will explain the silence of
Xenophon. But it is the first of a series of proceedings, connected
with the Amphiktyons, which will be found hereafter pregnant with
serious results for Grecian stability and independence.</p>

<p>Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more
powerfully affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra,
than the Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on
the border of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the
interest of Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea
had been broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years
before) by the Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed
injustice committed at the zenith of their power after the peace
of Antalkidas. The remaining Arcadian population were in great
proportion villagers; rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always
ready to follow the Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and
military deference, as from the love of plunder.<a id="FNanchor_434"
href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a></p>

<p>The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The
Arcadians not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in
the service of Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military
prow<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[p. 205]</span>ess was not
inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the
harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by
the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of
Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each
under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound
animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of
deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution
was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and
resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by
the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to
become foremost in the work.<a id="FNanchor_435" href="#Footnote_435"
class="fnanchor">[435]</a> As the breaking up of Mantinea had been
one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there
was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many
Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while
the Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost.
Deeply mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by
force, the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance.
Having been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality,
he had declined the command of the army of coërcion previously
employed against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean
leaders refused to convene their public assembly to hear his
communication, desiring that he would make known his purpose to them.
Accordingly, he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering
the re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they
would defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given;
which (he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a
handsome subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders
answered, that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution
had already been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged
at such a rebuff, yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was
compelled to return home.<a id="FNanchor_436" href="#Footnote_436"
class="fnanchor">[436]</a> The Mantineans persevered and com<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[p. 206]</span>pleted the rebuilding of
their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded
with elaborate walls and towers.</p>

<p>The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by
Mantinean leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or
sympathized with the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of
others (presently to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable.
But it was doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by
Agesilaus, as a public symptom of that prostration into which they
had so suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment,
we must recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity,
individual as well as collective, founded upon military excellence
and earned by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental
result imbibed by every pupil of Lykurgus, and<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_207">[p. 207]</span> hitherto ratified as legitimate by
the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense
for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow,
monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died. As
an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger of
admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;<a id="FNanchor_437"
href="#Footnote_437" class="fnanchor">[437]</a> while he saw his
city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece, and obeyed
almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic president.
On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events, he
now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its
former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus,
especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not
only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of
having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of
having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the
maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied
her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present
degradation.</p>

<p>Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans
themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and
uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been from
childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted on by
his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides in 398
<small>B.C.</small> for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for
the regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an
ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious
interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit
in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides,
had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always
been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought
that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when the
humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested to him
readily the cause of it,<a id="FNanchor_438" href="#Footnote_438"
class="fnanchor">[438]</a>—“See what comes of having set at nought
the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves a lame
reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the real
energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[p. 208]</span> even an infirm body
and an age of seventy years, was more than ever indispensable to his
country. He was still the chief leader of her affairs, condemned to
the sad necessity of submitting to this Mantinean affront, and much
worse that followed it, without the least power of hindrance.</p>

<p>The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the
autumn and winter of <small>B.C.</small> 371-370. Such coalescence
of villages into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings
hostile to Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger
political union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no
such union had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had
nothing in common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary
and religious sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage
and indigenous antiquity.<a id="FNanchor_439" href="#Footnote_439"
class="fnanchor">[439]</a> But now the idea and aspiration, espoused
with peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread
itself rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or
central Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out
of all the sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory
power of determining by the vote of its majority. Such central
power, however, was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate
governments, but only to be exercised for certain definite purposes;
in maintaining unanimity at home, together with concurrent,
independent action, as to foreign states.<a id="FNanchor_440"
href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> This plan of
Pan-Arcadian federation was warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who
looked to it as a protec<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[p.
209]</span>tion to themselves in case the Spartan power should
revive; as well as by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was
expected in case of need. It found great favor in most parts of
Arcadia, especially in the small districts bordering on Laconia,
which stood most in need of union to protect themselves against
the Spartans,—the Mænalians, Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,<a
id="FNanchor_441" href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a>
etc. But the jealousies among the more considerable cities made some
of them adverse to any scheme emanating from Mantinea. Among these
unfriendly opponents were Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering
on Elis,—Orchomenus,<a id="FNanchor_442" href="#Footnote_442"
class="fnanchor">[442]</a> conterminous with Mantinea to the
north—and Tegea, conterminous to the south. The hold of the Spartans
on Arcadia had been always maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and
Tegea. The former was the place where they deposited their hostages
taken from other suspected towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus
and an oligarchy devoted to their interests.<a id="FNanchor_443"
href="#Footnote_443" class="fnanchor">[443]</a></p>

<p>Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were
ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous
of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of
this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his
friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans,
vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus
and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom
accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with
free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution of
the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers also;
and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other with
bad faith and with striking the first blow.<a id="FNanchor_444"
href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> At first Stasippus
had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_210">[p. 210]</span> opposite party were slain, while
Kallibius with the remainder maintained himself near the town-wall,
and in possession of the gate on the side towards Mantinea. To that
city he had before despatched an express, entreating aid, while he
opened a parley with the opponents. Presently the Mantinean force
arrived, and was admitted within the gates; upon which Stasippus,
seeing that he could no longer maintain himself, escaped by another
gate towards Pallantium. He took sanctuary with a few friends in
a neighboring temple of Artemis, whither he was pursued by his
adversaries, who removed the roof, and began to cast the tiles
down upon them. The unfortunate men were obliged to surrender.
Fettered and placed on a cart, they were carried back to Tegea, and
put on their trial before the united Tegeans and Mantineans, who
condemned them and put them to death. Eight hundred Tegeans, of
the defeated party, fled as exiles to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_445"
href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a></p>

<p>Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea;
a struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in
the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any
serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without
violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which
now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were
cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous
in opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own
defence, a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full
assembly of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called
Asea, in the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have
been numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the
district of Mount Mænalus,<a id="FNanchor_446" href="#Footnote_446"
class="fnanchor">[446]</a> and near the borders of Laconia), from
whence every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here
that the consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally
determined; though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.<a
id="FNanchor_447" href="#Footnote_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p>

<p>There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss
to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most powerful
of her remaining allies.<a id="FNanchor_448" href="#Footnote_448"
class="fnanchor">[448]</a> To assist the exiles and avenge
Stasip<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[p. 211]</span>pus, as
well as to arrest the Arcadian movement, she resolved on a march
into the country, in spite of her present dispirited condition;
while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places, sent contingents to
her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other hand, reinforcements
came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that the Mantineans had
violated the recent peace by their entry into Tegea, Agesilaus
marched across the border against them. The first Arcadian town
which he reached was Eutæa,<a id="FNanchor_449" href="#Footnote_449"
class="fnanchor">[449]</a> where he found that all the male adults
had gone to the great Arcadian assembly. Though the feebler
population, remaining behind, were completely in his power, he took
scrupulous care to respect both person and property, and even lent
aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the wall. At Eutæa he halted
a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait for the junction of
the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under Polytropus, now
at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however, the Mantineans
had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming forth from
the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and slain.<a
id="FNanchor_450" href="#Footnote_450" class="fnanchor">[450]</a>
Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with his own
unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the
neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea
to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up,
and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they
proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the
Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united.
Agesilaus on his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[p. 212]</span>
side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within little more
than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably surprised
by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had eluded by a
night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side and on the
other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found himself
on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a recess of
the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered on the
high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the next
morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from this
inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained
three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth,
in order that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his
departure through fear.”<a id="FNanchor_451" href="#Footnote_451"
class="fnanchor">[451]</a> As the enemy kept within their walls,
he marched homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the
Tegean territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on
his march, though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing
(says Xenophon) to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires
could be seen, in order that no one might say that his return was a
flight. He thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the
previous discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country
without any enemy coming forth to fight him.”<a id="FNanchor_452"
href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> The army was then
brought back to Sparta and disbanded.</p>

<p>It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to
his own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days,
without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan
pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before)
when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out
of Phokis straight against Thebes!</p>

<p>Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise
discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[p. 213]</span> walls of Mantinea.
Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching to their aid,
and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the
Eleians to defray the cost.<a id="FNanchor_453" href="#Footnote_453"
class="fnanchor">[453]</a> He had been invited by them and by others
of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of
some external protector against Sparta,—and who even before they
applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like interference from
Athens (probably under the general presidency accepted by Athens,
and the oaths interchanged by her with various inferior cities,
since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a refusal.<a
id="FNanchor_454" href="#Footnote_454" class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p>

<p>Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since
the battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to
establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant
Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc.
After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied (during
the early part of 370 <small>B.C.</small>) in anxiously watching the
movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design
of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration
of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the
ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards
the headship of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_455" href="#Footnote_455"
class="fnanchor">[455]</a> were well known, no Theban general, even
of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of
such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus,
leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes
from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his
successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability.
Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 <small>B.C.</small> Epaminondas
had his attention free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both
of maintaining the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in
Tegea, and of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians
towards federative coalition.</p>

<p>But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still;
embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should
forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent sta<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[p. 214]</span>tion in the Grecian
world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the other he
took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their ancient
territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess the
Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under
its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best
portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors
at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as
their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite
back all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in
various portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by
loss of territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly
hostile. It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian
war, the exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies
of Athens and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in
Kephallenia, and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by
the triumphant Spartans,<a id="FNanchor_456" href="#Footnote_456"
class="fnanchor">[456]</a> not only from Peloponnesus, but also from
Naupaktus and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed
among various Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in
Sicily, at Hesperides in Libya. From 404 <small>B.C.</small> (the
close of the war) to 373 <small>B.C.</small>, they had remained thus
without a home. At length, about the latter year (when the Athenian
confederate navy again became equal or superior to the Lacedæmonian
on the west coast of Peloponnesus), they began to indulge the hope of
being restored to Naupaktus.<a id="FNanchor_457" href="#Footnote_457"
class="fnanchor">[457]</a> Probably their request may have been
preferred and discussed in the synod of Athenian allies, where the
Thebans sat as members. Nothing however had been done towards it by
the Athenians,—who soon became fatigued with the war, and at length
made peace with Sparta,—when the momentous battle of Leuktra altered,
both completely and suddenly, the balance of power in Greece. A
chance of protection was now opened to the Messenians from Thebes,
far more promising than they had ever had from Athens. Epaminondas,
well aware of the loss as well as humiliation that he should
inflict upon Sparta by restoring them to their ancient territory,
entered into communication with them, and caused them to be invited
to Peloponnesus from all their distant places of emigration.<a
id="FNanchor_458" href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> By
the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[p. 215]</span> time of his
march into Arcadia, in the late autumn of 370 <small>B.C.</small>,
many of them had already joined him, burning with all their ancient
hatred of Sparta, and contributing to aggravate the same sentiment
among Thebans and allies.</p>

<p>With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in
the mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation
of the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and
self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of
course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had
not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among
the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection,
the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local
jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid
from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had
been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the
satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would
have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of
intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians.
It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy
between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one
common cause, would never have permitted that either should be
preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.<a id="FNanchor_459"
href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a> Besides fixing upon
the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose between
conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a way such
as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely Arcadian.
The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by Epaminondas;
who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid personal name,
combined with impartiality as to the local politics of Arcadia, and
single-minded hostility to Sparta.</p>

<p>It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as
to expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army
into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by
Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after
the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadi<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_216">[p. 216]</span>ans and Eleians were ravaging the lands
of the recusant town of Heræa. As they speedily came back to greet
his arrival, the aggregate confederate body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and
Eleians, united with the Thebans and their accompanying allies,—is
said to have amounted to forty thousand, or according to some, even
to seventy thousand men.<a id="FNanchor_460" href="#Footnote_460"
class="fnanchor">[460]</a> Not merely had Epaminondas brought with
him a choice body of auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans,
Akarnanians, Herakleots, Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and
peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands themselves were so brilliant
and imposing, as to excite universal admiration. The victory of
Leuktra had awakened among them an enthusiastic military ardor,
turned to account by the genius of Epaminondas, and made to produce
a finished discipline which even the unwilling Xenophon cannot
refuse to acknowledge.<a id="FNanchor_461" href="#Footnote_461"
class="fnanchor">[461]</a> Conscious of the might of their assembled
force, within a day’s march of Laconia, the Arcadians, Argeians,
and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade that country, now that
no allies could approach the frontier to its aid. At first he was
unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared for the enterprise;
being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta (when the
peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of Leuktra), of
the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so easy to
be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops like
the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all the
passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances of his
allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the frontier,
that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by invitations from
some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These Periœki engaged
to revolt openly, if he would only show himself in the country. They
told him that there was a general slackness throughout Laconia in
obeying the military requisitions from Sparta; and tendered their
lives as atonement if they should be found to speak falsely. By
such encouragements, as well as by the general impatience of all
around him to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[p. 217]</span>
revenge upon Sparta her long career of pride and abused ascendency,
Epaminondas was at length induced to give the order of invasion.<a
id="FNanchor_462" href="#Footnote_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a></p>

<p>That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility,
will not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the
real difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was
an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most
imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he
left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his
colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian
allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his
countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance
turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them
to apprehend.</p>

<p>The invading army was distributed into four portions, all
penetrating by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost
and easiest road, the Argeians the easternmost;<a id="FNanchor_463"
href="#Footnote_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> while the Thebans
themselves and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The
latter alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even
than the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or
Oeum in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village,
and overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers,
and seemingly also by some favor or collusion<a id="FNanchor_464"
href="#Footnote_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> on the part of the
inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with
nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found
and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians
over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four
divisions reached Sellasia<a id="FNanchor_465" href="#Footnote_465"
class="fnanchor">[465]</a> and were again<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_218">[p. 218]</span> united in safety. Undefended and
deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was now burnt and
destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march along the
plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred grove of
Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the foot of the
bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of Sparta.</p>

<p>Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing
it; a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on
the other side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore
marched down the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the
houses in his way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles
below Sparta. Here he found a ford, though the river was full, from
the winter season; and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a
severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now
on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and
cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops
always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped,
by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies
dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.<a
id="FNanchor_466" href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a></p>

<p>Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute
of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable
even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no
auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come
back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that even these
troops would remain with them, if the invasion became formidable.<a
id="FNanchor_467" href="#Footnote_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> On
the first assemblage of the irresistible army on their frontier, they
had despatched one of their commanders of foreign contingents (called
Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such Peloponnesian allies as
remained faithful to them; and also envoys to Athens, entreating
assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and rapidly put
under march, from Pellênê,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[p.
219]</span> Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen,
Hermionê, and Halieis.<a id="FNanchor_468" href="#Footnote_468"
class="fnanchor">[468]</a> But the ordinary line of march into
Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being
barred by Argeians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to
proceed first to the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by
sea (embarking probably at Halieis on the south-western coast of the
peninsula) to Prasiæ on the eastern coast of Laconia; from whence
they made their way over the Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being
poorly provided with vessels, they were forced to cross in separate
detachments, and to draw lots for priority.<a id="FNanchor_469"
href="#Footnote_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a> By this chance the
Phliasian contingent did not come over until the last; while the
xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and conducted the
rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies
debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ,
found neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to
hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely
and in time, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, who were then near
Amyklæ.</p>

<p>These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than
creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which
habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one
side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour
of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness.
Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but
even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction
called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the
remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under
the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading
exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a
previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed
the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many
disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_220">[p. 220]</span> in Laconia, inferior citizens at
Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain
feeling of common interest arose, since even the disaffected might
reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if not repelled at
the point of the sword, would make their condition worse instead of
better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public proclamation,
that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve in the ranks as
an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six thousand Helots
gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous, when seen
in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so
that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ was welcomed as a
security, not less against the armed Helots within the city, than
against the Thebans without.<a id="FNanchor_470" href="#Footnote_470"
class="fnanchor">[470]</a> Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A
considerable number both of Periœki and Helots actually took arms on
behalf of the Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the
urgent summons from the ephors, which could not now be enforced.<a
id="FNanchor_471" href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[p. 221]</span></p>

<p>Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even
of Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring
all the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder
the Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon
Amyklæ and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards
which they immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on
the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the
projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were
marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis)
called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them,
but Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band,
addressed them in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them
that they had mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not
at the Issorium, but in another part of the city. They obeyed his
orders, and moved to the spot indicated; upon which he immediately
occupied the Issorium with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing
night, he seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the
two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on the point
of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the
house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried;
the first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was
ever put to death untried,<a id="FNanchor_472" href="#Footnote_472"
class="fnanchor">[472]</a>—a statement which I hesitate to believe
without knowing from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves
that the Spartan kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens
the same measure as to Periœki and Helots.</p>

<p>By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while
the strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the
wider approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.<a
id="FNanchor_473" href="#Footnote_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a>
Though destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by
position. Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the
Arcadians and others in his army spreading themselves to burn and
plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry
occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near
the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan
cavalry, though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[p. 222]</span> an advantage over
them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom
Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the
Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet
Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with
having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field
even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas.
To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation
and even of boasting,<a id="FNanchor_474" href="#Footnote_474"
class="fnanchor">[474]</a> that he had not dared to assail them
in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,
resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out
and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same
firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians
first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy,
are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing,
as to increase much the difficulty of defence.<a id="FNanchor_475"
href="#Footnote_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> We are even told
that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children
for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas
knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be
if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a
hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.<a
id="FNanchor_476" href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[p. 223]</span></p>

<p>On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos
and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country,
and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the
Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined
and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium
did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to
the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of
quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and
others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they
had acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.<a
id="FNanchor_477" href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a></p>

<p>Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected
when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian
opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his
own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon,
unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to
the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his
troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the
enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for
plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still
greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had
indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but
had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable
territory and an unapproachable city.</p>

<p>The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as
regards their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies
expected;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[p. 224]</span> the
belief in their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now
remained for Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing
those two enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his
expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of
the Arcadians.</p>

<p>The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative,
had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy
against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas.
When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a
strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when
he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the
restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the
small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of
coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments
of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves.
Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,<a
id="FNanchor_478" href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a>
that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition
to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those
numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had
consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just
such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the
like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or
Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian
assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian
city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from
Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two
from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon
the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in
two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the
marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of
the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with
Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,<a id="FNanchor_479"
href="#Footnote_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> from all sides of
this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from
the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[p. 225]</span> three great sections
of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little
townships, occupying a portion of the area intended for the new
territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were constrained to
join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was so strong,
that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and went to
join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who received
them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even slain by
the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of the new
city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than
five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also
gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles
from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea,
Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,<a id="FNanchor_480"
href="#Footnote_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> Phigalia, and
Heræa.</p>

<p>The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices
of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês
being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.<a
id="FNanchor_481" href="#Footnote_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a>
The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of
regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new
city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of
their calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of
Mount Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon,
in a dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances
of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the
revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the
Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications
of dreams, prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the
deliberate choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this
hill Ithômê (then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together
with the Akrocorinthus, were marked out by De<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_226">[p. 226]</span>metrius of Pharus as the two horns of
Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.<a
id="FNanchor_482" href="#Footnote_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a>
Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above the level of
the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of water, called
Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis of the new
town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was situated lower
down on the slope, though connected by a continuous wall with its
acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by Epaminondas,
who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,<a id="FNanchor_483"
href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> to Dionysius and
Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus
Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri.
Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the
Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes,
that they would now come back and again take up their residence as
inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground was marked
out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian and
Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas. The best
masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to lay out the
streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper distribution
and construction of the sacred edifices.<a id="FNanchor_484"
href="#Footnote_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a> In respect of the
fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such
was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for
admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.<a
id="FNanchor_485" href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a></p>

<p>From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the
Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward
down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the
richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward,
their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the
contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated
space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much
was cut off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the
north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say.
But it would appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that
neighborhood, were converted into an independent community<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[p. 227]</span> and protected by
the vicinity of Messênê.<a id="FNanchor_486" href="#Footnote_486"
class="fnanchor">[486]</a> What is of more importance to
notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward
and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of
Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now
also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê<a
id="FNanchor_487" href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a>
(not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes
erected his hostile fort, near which the important capture at
Sphakteria was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to
Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;<a id="FNanchor_488"
href="#Footnote_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> Aulon (rather farther
north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of
Kinadon a township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.<a
id="FNanchor_489" href="#Footnote_489" class="fnanchor">[489]</a> Now
all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian
Gulf westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed
from Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted
into freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as
before, but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their
tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to
pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,<a id="FNanchor_490"
href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> killing the Spartan
polemarch Geranor; and probably about the same time the other
Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been
expelled. Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new
Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides
confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted
some other towns,<a id="FNanchor_491" href="#Footnote_491"
class="fnanchor">[491]</a> which under Lacedæmonian dominion had
probably been kept unfortified and had dwindled away.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[p. 228]</span></p>

<p>In the spring of 425 <small>B.C.</small>, when Demosthenes landed
at Pylus, Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens,
and a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of
Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan
territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,<a id="FNanchor_492"
href="#Footnote_492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a>—especially as
their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans
themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout
Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others
on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta
in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the
western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it!
We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times
applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed
upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the
Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of
Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount
Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all
comprised in the domain of the new city.</p>

<p>They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine
Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own
emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.<a
id="FNanchor_493" href="#Footnote_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a>
Herein were included, not only such of these two classes<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[p. 229]</span> as, having before
dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now
remained there in a state of freedom—but also doubtless a number of
others who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that
such desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no
better shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may
be sure that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring
city of Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when
there was a chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf,
free lands with a new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as
had actually joined the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia,
would be forced from simple insecurity to quit the country when
he retired, and would be supplied with fresh residences in the
newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would pass at once,
out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of
free and equal Hellens,<a id="FNanchor_494" href="#Footnote_494"
class="fnanchor">[494]</a> sending again a solemn Messenian
legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of
more than three centuries,<a id="FNanchor_495" href="#Footnote_495"
class="fnanchor">[495]</a>—outdoing their former masters in the
magnitude of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[p. 230]</span>
their offerings from the same soil,—and requiting them for previous
ill-usage by words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal
deference and admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed
to look upon as his due.</p>

<p>The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia,
the renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two
new cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and
sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted
in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that
Greece had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification
of the historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare
facts, with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant.
Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly
omits to notice them;<a id="FNanchor_496" href="#Footnote_496"
class="fnanchor">[496]</a> Pausanias, whom we<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_231">[p. 231]</span> have to thank for most of what we know,
is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine signs
and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details are
altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was
occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the
cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable.
Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many
small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are
unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein
social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In
describing societies already established and ancient, we find the
force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence
both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good
is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past
stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even
for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which
coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers
who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in
a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate
satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any
resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by
those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the
problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine
and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of
the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting
views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of
houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both
together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious
and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for
the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many
other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided
for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily
the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare
fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of
cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the
same presiding genius, Epami<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[p.
232]</span>nondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly
sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the attacks of
Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards, remained
engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.<a
id="FNanchor_497" href="#Footnote_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p>

<p>Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but
as the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised
all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod
or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name,
and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent
communities had the right of attending, should be periodically
convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the
Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined
to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was
also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their
support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers)
was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received
foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried
all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations
of public misconduct.<a id="FNanchor_498" href="#Footnote_498"
class="fnanchor">[498]</a> The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus,
Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.<a
id="FNanchor_499" href="#Footnote_499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a>
What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed
seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion
of action and sentiment which had never before existed;<a
id="FNanchor_500" href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a> and
to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency
to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic
enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,
gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence
or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused
the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population
actually inhabiting it.<a id="FNanchor_501" href="#Footnote_501"
class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[p. 233]</span></p>

<p>Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf
now rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory
which lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the
Skiritæ (hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent
upon Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),<a
id="FNanchor_502" href="#Footnote_502" class="fnanchor">[502]</a>
with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia
towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and
hostile to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_503" href="#Footnote_503"
class="fnanchor">[503]</a> The same is the case even with a place
much nearer to Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by
the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_504"
href="#Footnote_504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p>

<p>Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration
of his command in Arcadia and Laconia.<a id="FNanchor_505"
href="#Footnote_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> The sufferings
of a severe mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by
the Arcadians, who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them
an excess of hospitality which he could not permit consistently
with his military duties.<a id="FNanchor_506" href="#Footnote_506"
class="fnanchor">[506]</a> He stayed long enough to settle all the
preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious
execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the
completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face
and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary.
Accordingly, a Theban division under Pamenes was left to repel all
obstruction from Sparta;<a id="FNanchor_507" href="#Footnote_507"
class="fnanchor">[507]</a> while Tegea also, from this time for<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[p. 234]</span>ward, for some
years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.<a
id="FNanchor_508" href="#Footnote_508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a></p>

<p>Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these
proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of
force against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like
him, it seemed sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians
were now neutral in the contest, such a prospect was not at all
agreeable to them,<a id="FNanchor_509" href="#Footnote_509"
class="fnanchor">[509]</a> involving the aggrandizement of Thebes
to a point inconsistent with their security. It was in the midst of
the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens from Sparta,
Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one not
merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously
sent the like request to any Grecian city,—but also difficult to
handle in reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of
jealousy and hostility, little either of good feeling or consentient
interest, on the part of the Lacedæmonians towards her. What little
was to be found, the envoys dexterously brought forward; going back
to the dethronement of the Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help,
the glorious expulsion of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of
both cities,—and the auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465
<small>B.C.</small>, to assist the Spartans against the revolted
Messenians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[p. 235]</span> on
Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian assembly)
Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had
been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime
forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy
of Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta;
while the headship of the latter by land had in like manner been
accepted by the Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of
these former glories, to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the
deplorable hostilities which had since intervened, and to afford
to her a generous relief against the old common enemy. The Thebans
might even now be decimated (according to the vow said to have
been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of their present
menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta could be brought heartily
to coöperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished to
deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to
concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.<a id="FNanchor_510"
href="#Footnote_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a></p>

<p>This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys
from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that
Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth
and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus,
had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in
371 <small>B.C.</small>, first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens,
guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy
from Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which
she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the
meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously
interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries
and remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too,
she would act in accordance with her own true interests; since,
should Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads
of Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_511"
href="#Footnote_511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a></p>

<p>It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta,
that she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and
to entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past.
The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language
against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through
the Peloponnesian war.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[p. 236]</span></p>

<p>At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the
sentiment of the assembly being apparently rather against than for
them. “Such language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled
citizens) is intelligible enough during their present distress; but
so long as they were in good circumstances, we received nothing
but ill-usage from them.”<a id="FNanchor_512" href="#Footnote_512"
class="fnanchor">[512]</a> Nor was the complaint of the Spartans,
that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace
guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some
said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves,
by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that
the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable,
since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been
the first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal
made by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held
in 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after the surrender of Athens,—when
the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be totally
destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against
so cruel a sentence—made a powerful impression on the assembly,
and contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor
of the proposition.<a id="FNanchor_513" href="#Footnote_513"
class="fnanchor">[513]</a> “As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on
the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then
rescued by Sparta, and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?”
Such was the broad and simple issue which told upon the feelings of
the assembled Athenians, disposing them to listen with increasing
favor both to the envoys from Corinth and Phlius, and to their own
speakers on the same side.</p>

<p>To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous.
A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive
aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused
serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after
the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally
suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of
the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the
assembly. Kallistratus<a id="FNanchor_514" href="#Footnote_514"
class="fnanchor">[514]</a> the orator spoke eloquently in
support of the Lace<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[p.
237]</span>dæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened
to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize
farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting
the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of
Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen<a id="FNanchor_515"
href="#Footnote_515" class="fnanchor">[515]</a> at Athens, since the
peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from
Korkyra.</p>

<p>As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this
enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made
proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip
themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside
the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the
next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many
citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates
himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have
been twelve thousand men,—not named under conscription by the
general, but volunteers.<a id="FNanchor_516" href="#Footnote_516"
class="fnanchor">[516]</a> He first marched to Corinth, where he
halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were
impatient to accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta.
But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile
ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After
having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information
regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war
without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted
Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with
the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of
danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,<a
id="FNanchor_517" href="#Footnote_517" class="fnanchor">[517]</a>
the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into
Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of
Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed
of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the
passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its
two extremities, did not attempt directly to<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_238">[p. 238]</span> bar the passage of the Thebans. He
contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry,
both Athenian and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But
Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the
gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body
within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle.
Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go
forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.<a
id="FNanchor_518" href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[p. 239]</span></p>

<p>On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the
other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[p. 240]</span> retained it for four
months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although,
by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his
functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy
of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects
for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her
border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading
all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all
of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited
every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the
present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed
an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent.
Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well
as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies,
likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is
not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present
occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that
the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because
this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate
with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of
danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because
Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case
to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed
was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation
of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall
accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the
proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just
finished; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[p. 241]</span>
invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any
enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their walls,—the
liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê
as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming,
with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence
on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of
the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece generally, from
Spartan ascendency, now consummated.</p>

<p>Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive
accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by
Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant.
He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without
even going through the formality of collecting the votes.<a
id="FNanchor_519" href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a>
And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately
re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.<a id="FNanchor_520"
href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a></p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_79">
  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[p. 242]</span></p>
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIX.<br />
  FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO
  THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.</h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Prodigious</span>
was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the
eighteen months between June 371 <small>B.C.</small> (when the
general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta,
twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369
<small>B.C.</small>, when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition
into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.</p>

<p>How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding
chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent
allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence
had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent
reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans
were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth
and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia
had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free
city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and
Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile
to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from
their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in
the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The
once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta;
and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians
and Thebans against her.</p>

<p>Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been
considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia,
partly in the position and policy of Athens.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[p. 243]</span></p>

<p>At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371
<small>B.C.</small>) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas
king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to,
Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with
extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly
the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known to
be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere,
especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout
a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas
had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,<a
id="FNanchor_521" href="#Footnote_521" class="fnanchor">[521]</a>
especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been
enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would
otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta
aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was
at the maximum of her power (382-379 <small>B.C.</small>), holding
even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the
revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378
<small>B.C.</small> downward) had sensibly diminished her power on
land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy
of the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the
great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with
the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication
of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374
<small>B.C.</small>) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian
Polydamas, against him.<a id="FNanchor_522" href="#Footnote_522"
class="fnanchor">[522]</a> To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship
of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece,
had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he
tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and
Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;<a id="FNanchor_523"
href="#Footnote_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a> at what exact
period, cannot be discovered; but I have<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_244">[p. 244]</span> already stated that Iphikrates had
married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a
maritime settlement called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years
373-372 <small>B.C.</small>, we find Timotheus also in great favor
with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens;
a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.<a id="FNanchor_524"
href="#Footnote_524" class="fnanchor">[524]</a> Amyntas was at this
period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a
confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated
with considerable favor.<a id="FNanchor_525" href="#Footnote_525"
class="fnanchor">[525]</a></p>

<p>The battle of Leuktra (July 371 <small>B.C.</small>) tended to
knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians,
who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the
ascendency of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important
effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction.
Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven
from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her,
and even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans,
were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled
jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration
such as had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404
<small>B.C.</small> Such enlargement of her views was manifested
conspicuously by the step taken two or three months after the
battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter),—of causing
the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding
month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee
of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as
defensive allies of Athens;<a id="FNanchor_526" href="#Footnote_526"
class="fnanchor">[526]</a> thus silently disenthroning Sparta and
taking her place.</p>

<p>On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect
to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark
against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the
first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was
to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[p. 245]</span> farther
maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her
past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now
find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy,
in 378 <small>B.C.</small>, she had distinctly renounced all idea
of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private,
which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the
close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that
no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate
land out of Attica—a guarantee against renovation of the previous
kleruchies or out-possessions. This prudent self-restraint, which
had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her
again into naval preëminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under
the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian
maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions
as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The
prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be
forgotten. Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime
confederacy; so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into
fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to
repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in
the Macedonian prince Philip, son of Amyntas.</p>

<p>Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards
Athens, in 371 <small>B.C.</small> He was an unpretending ally,
looking for help in case of need against Jason, and sending his
envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371
<small>B.C.</small>, when the general peace was resworn under
Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have
first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing
to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy,
she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to
herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the
towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which we find,
a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_527"
href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> How much of their
lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim,
we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations
grasped<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[p. 246]</span> much
more than Amphipolis;<a id="FNanchor_528" href="#Footnote_528"
class="fnanchor">[528]</a> and the moment was probably thought
propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his
envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys, recognized
without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.<a
id="FNanchor_529" href="#Footnote_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a></p>

<p>Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to
Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering
on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of
transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,<a id="FNanchor_530"
href="#Footnote_530" class="fnanchor">[530]</a> next taken from<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[p. 247]</span> Athens in 424-423
<small>B.C.</small> by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the
Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under
Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent
city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of
Nikias (421 <small>B.C.</small>), but had never performed her
covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and
mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within
reach of the mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting
prize; and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as
original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal
treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right.
But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old.
The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of
a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their
second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable
admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such
pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic
unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men
and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had done
(under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 <small>B.C.</small>,
and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated
pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on
the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and
inertness in military action,—will be found henceforward among the
greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and
among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of
Philip of Macedon.</p> <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[p.
248]</span></p> <p>Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of
a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced
and recognized in the congress of autumn 371 <small>B.C.</small>,
she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps
for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of northern
Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the
same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.<a
id="FNanchor_531" href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a> The
former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter)
by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his
great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two
brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus
of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the
dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third
brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross
enormities by killing and banishing many of the most eminent citizens
of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas.<a
id="FNanchor_532" href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a>
The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the
Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in
370 <small>B.C.</small>) had been succeeded in the throne by his
youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade
Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting
possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under
his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron
and Alexander of Pheræ.<a id="FNanchor_533" href="#Footnote_533"
class="fnanchor">[533]</a></p>

<p>This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and
to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless
unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and
its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian
cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander
of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas
into the country, seemingly in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, soon
after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious
progress<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[p. 249]</span> in
Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of
an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban
protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of
Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance.<a id="FNanchor_534"
href="#Footnote_534" class="fnanchor">[534]</a> A large portion of
Thessaly thus came under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the
dynasty of Pheræ, and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in
that city.</p>

<p>Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian
towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions,
and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368
<small>B.C.</small>) by some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna,
two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western
coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is
mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanês of Pydna
as one of the agents.<a id="FNanchor_535" href="#Footnote_535"
class="fnanchor">[535]</a> But besides these conspirators, there
was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a man of the royal lineage and a
pretender to the throne;<a id="FNanchor_536" href="#Footnote_536"
class="fnanchor">[536]</a> who, having been hitherto in banishment,
was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks,
supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia,—and was already
master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa, and other places in or<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[p. 250]</span> near the Thermaic Gulf.
He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining
family of Amyntas. Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now
left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and
Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the
successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was
even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed.
Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs and those of her minor
children, against Pausanias.<a id="FNanchor_537" href="#Footnote_537"
class="fnanchor">[537]</a></p>

<p>Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and
Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias,
had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand.
The Athenian admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force,
was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by
his countrymen (369 <small>B.C.</small>) (soon after his partial
conflict near Corinth with the retreating army of Epaminondas, on
its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally
surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening
negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for
future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain,
and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened
to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê
with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about
thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She
urgently implored him<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[p.
251]</span> to assist the family in their present emergency,
reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a
faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his
son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes.
Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his
knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid
as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the
family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in
her favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from
Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under
Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.</p>

<p>This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines<a
id="FNanchor_538" href="#Footnote_538" class="fnanchor">[538]</a> in
an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who
then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow
the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The
Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of
succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the
circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised
beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to
blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to
occasion.</p>

<p>Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not
procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the
power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time
a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly
Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.<a id="FNanchor_539"
href="#Footnote_539" class="fnanchor">[539]</a> Iphikrates prosecuted
his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a
period of three years (368-365 <small>B.C.</small>). We make out
very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general
named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eu<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_252">[p. 252]</span>bœa; one of those Condottieri (to use an
Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band
of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the best bidder
and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under
Iphikrates for three years,<a id="FNanchor_540" href="#Footnote_540"
class="fnanchor">[540]</a> until he was dismissed by the Athenians
from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they
enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain
that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have
directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers,
which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan
prisoners or hostages,<a id="FNanchor_541" href="#Footnote_541"
class="fnanchor">[541]</a> which opened a prospect of accomplishing
the surrender of the town.</p>

<p>It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of
information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365
<small>B.C.</small> did not satisfy the expectations of his
countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as
testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and
Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with
the Persians in 372-371 <small>B.C.</small>) to Ionia and the
Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia.<a
id="FNanchor_542" href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a>
That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other
towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which Athenian ambition
now tended, according to that new turn, towards more special and
separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle
of Leuktra. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[p. 253]</span>
before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366-365
<small>B.C.</small>) in these regions, we must notice the main
course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial
pacification of 366 <small>B.C.</small></p>

<p>Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of
370-369 <small>B.C.</small>) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of
Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been
settled between them; envoys from Sparta and her allies visited
Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose.<a id="FNanchor_543"
href="#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a> All pretensions
to exclusive headship<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[p.
254]</span> on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant
discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and
others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship
must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only
point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably
carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command
on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing,
found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian
named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians
had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the
land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the
choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now
pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality,
would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and
those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would
be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both
on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and
Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.<a
id="FNanchor_544" href="#Footnote_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a></p>

<p>Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between
the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated
for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas.
The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to
guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,<a
id="FNanchor_545" href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a> so
as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus.
It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that
this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban
invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from
394-387 <small>B.C.</small>, by the Athenians and Thebans against
herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into
Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there
been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an
extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from
Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea,
either across the Argolic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[p.
255]</span> Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to
the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by
land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted,
and a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according
to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries
under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.</p>

<p>It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the
Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer
in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His
numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose
position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and
Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having
vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain,
Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his
camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when
the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet
risen and got under arms,<a id="FNanchor_546" href="#Footnote_546"
class="fnanchor">[546]</a>—he directed an assault along the whole
line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban
troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were
posted in the most assailable part of the line.<a id="FNanchor_547"
href="#Footnote_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> So skilfully was his
movement conducted, that he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[p.
256]</span> completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian
polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and
forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently
sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon
the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other
parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor
were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention,
while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of
the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as
faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his
own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might
have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans,
in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend
on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to
retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable
judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which
we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian
commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and
victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already
high military renown.<a id="FNanchor_548" href="#Footnote_548"
class="fnanchor">[548]</a></p>

<p>Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian
force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum,
and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and
Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.<a
id="FNanchor_549" href="#Footnote_549" class="fnanchor">[549]</a>
At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to
desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban
harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto
preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her
interest, now altered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[p.
257]</span> his politics and went along with the stronger tide.<a
id="FNanchor_550" href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a> We
cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and
regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the foundation
of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on
such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been
commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished,
and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious
army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon and west
of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta,
was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles.
When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join
Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show
themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration
would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then
stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders,
and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the
neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in
sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged
on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders,
overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the
acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until
the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but
in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts
of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without;
thus preserving their town.<a id="FNanchor_551" href="#Footnote_551"
class="fnanchor">[551]</a> The fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta
entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of
their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their
territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for
it was only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[p. 258]</span> on
the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbor to
afford them the means of purchasing provisions.<a id="FNanchor_552"
href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a></p>

<p>Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses.
Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had
the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of
the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it,
disposed his troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance,
that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of
asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying
very near to the walls.<a id="FNanchor_553" href="#Footnote_553"
class="fnanchor">[553]</a> This advantage over the victorious
Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were
still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron
from Syracuse, bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and
Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius.
Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their
bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the
advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the
Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to
hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home
after no very long stay,<a id="FNanchor_554" href="#Footnote_554"
class="fnanchor">[554]</a> while the Thebans also went back to
Bœotia.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[p. 259]</span></p>

<p>One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits
especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to
death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners,
while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the
capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory,
Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With
the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing
to regard them as belonging to other cities.<a id="FNanchor_555"
href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> We find him always
trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards
political opponents.</p>

<p>Throughout this campaign of 369 <small>B.C.</small>, all the
Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under
Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit
of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new
Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis,
and the conspicuous depression of Sparta,—that they fancied
themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by
themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as
Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy,
energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new
aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded
the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod),—that while all other
residents in Peloponnesus were originally immigrants, they alone were
the indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most
numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardiest men, who bore
the Hellenic name,—of which proof was afforded by the fact, that
Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the
Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to
invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s
lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we
built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if
we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate
headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans
under another name.”<a id="FNanchor_556" href="#Footnote_556"
class="fnanchor">[556]</a></p>

<p>Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of
collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for
Ly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[p. 260]</span>komedes,
they chose as officers every man whom he recommended calling upon
him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new
pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now
under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest
danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body
of troops from Corinth under Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians.
Lykomêdês with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies
as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of
Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded
the territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the
Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons.
He penetrated as far as Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor,
drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and
slain, while the suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.<a id="FNanchor_557"
href="#Footnote_557" class="fnanchor">[557]</a> Probably the
Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was
terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these
Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all
enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over
the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the
winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without
considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.<a
id="FNanchor_558" href="#Footnote_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a></p>

<p>While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the
Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to
disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy
over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had
been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.<a
id="FNanchor_559" href="#Footnote_559" class="fnanchor">[559]</a>
Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate
communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now
that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[p. 261]</span> resumption of their
lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at
Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The
Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin,
and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,<a
id="FNanchor_560" href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a>
solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently
shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as
political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.<a
id="FNanchor_561" href="#Footnote_561" class="fnanchor">[561]</a> The
Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which
they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly
alienated from the Arcadians.</p>

<p>Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians
had just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps
at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over
a citizen of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large
sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked
thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the
belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet
him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of
attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among
themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards
peace; since the Spartans<a id="FNanchor_562" href="#Footnote_562"
class="fnanchor">[562]</a> peremptorily insisted that Messênê should
again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm
in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of
Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in
vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up;
while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens,
employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose
of aiding them in the war.<a id="FNanchor_563" href="#Footnote_563"
class="fnanchor">[563]</a> We do not find,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_262">[p. 262]</span> however, that he really lent them any
aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the
service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt
from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close
the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate
result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them
to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they
learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the
Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_564"
href="#Footnote_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a></p>

<p>How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in
reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other
evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this
formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an
article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the
Thebans (whom Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_565" href="#Footnote_565"
class="fnanchor">[565]</a> specifies as if there were no others
of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty
sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised
residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the
allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them,
if not positively inclined in their favor.<a id="FNanchor_566"
href="#Footnote_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a> A new phenomenon
soon presented itself, which served as a sort of recognition of the
new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice
of Greece. At the one hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer
368 <small>B.C.</small>),—which occurred within less than two
years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messênê,—a
Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the
foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation
became subject to Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_567" href="#Footnote_567"
class="fnanchor">[567]</a> no Messenian victor had ever been
enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of
recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the
register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except
as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[p. 263]</span> a free Greek
from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had
been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed
to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger
was the impression produced, when, in 368 <small>B.C.</small>, after
an interval of more than three centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was
proclaimed victor. No Theôry (or public legation for sacrifice) could
have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both
with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians
were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks
unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as
being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with
the long and severe oppression of the Messenians.<a id="FNanchor_568"
href="#Footnote_568" class="fnanchor">[568]</a> This Olympic
festival,—the first after the great revolution occasioned by the
battle of Leuktra,—was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan
emotion.</p>

<p>During this year 368 <small>B.C.</small>, the Thebans undertook
no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably
occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor
needed their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban
force into Thessaly, in order to protect Larissa and the other
cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious
projects of that despot, who was soliciting reinforcement from
Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled
to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however,
alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his
cruelty,—and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards,
menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think himself in safety, and
fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against
him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into
Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist,
entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty
hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a
guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the
youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who remained in this character
at Thebes for some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[p.
264]</span> years, under the care of Pammenês.<a id="FNanchor_569"
href="#Footnote_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a> It was thus that
Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in
Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians
not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by
alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the
Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the
superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban
and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of
the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.<a id="FNanchor_570"
href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a> And Pelopidas
returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendency of Thebes not only
over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of
the thirty hostages.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[p. 265]</span></p>

<p>Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece,
disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of
Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an
alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus
opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement
arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the
despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth,
debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the
Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in
Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to
have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order
that they might coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.<a
id="FNanchor_571" href="#Footnote_571" class="fnanchor">[571]</a>
Reinforced by these Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus
led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ
by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the
place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the
district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and
Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to
an eminence near Midea.<a id="FNanchor_572" href="#Footnote_572"
class="fnanchor">[572]</a> Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander,
gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders
reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but
midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops
arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to
send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the
main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus
resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his
soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta
from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge,
that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled
with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially
by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[p. 266]</span> thousand men (if we
are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single
Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or, as it came to
be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith transmitted by
the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced
by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears;
Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting the example;<a
id="FNanchor_573" href="#Footnote_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a>—a
striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory,
their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we
compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their
reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more
irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on
these minds of iron temper!</p>

<p>So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that
the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies
the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not
independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show
himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the
Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still
under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their
head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the
preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the
general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas,
was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a
force of two thousand men and seven days’ provision. The Theban
commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open
near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after
which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against
the cities in Achaia.<a id="FNanchor_574" href="#Footnote_574"
class="fnanchor">[574]</a> Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities
had been among<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[p. 267]</span>
the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in
her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but
were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the
same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in
connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.<a id="FNanchor_575"
href="#Footnote_575" class="fnanchor">[575]</a> Not being in a
condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened
negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies
of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do
their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which
Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise.
Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to
accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment
of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in
place of the oligarchical.<a id="FNanchor_576" href="#Footnote_576"
class="fnanchor">[576]</a> Such a proceeding was not only suitable
to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also
calculated to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[p. 268]</span>
strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present
jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching
to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter
being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas
farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,<a id="FNanchor_577"
href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a> which were held by
Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes;
whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as
we are informed) in Peloponnesus.</p>

<p>But the generous calculations of this eminent man found
little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the
opposition-party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against
him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real
friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join
Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed
by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse
to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the
displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend
the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas
in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch
during the ensuing year.<a id="FNanchor_578" href="#Footnote_578"
class="fnanchor">[578]</a> They sent harmosts of their own to each
of the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the
chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
combining their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[p. 269]</span>
united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to
overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban
harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and
active part with Sparta;<a id="FNanchor_579" href="#Footnote_579"
class="fnanchor">[579]</a> vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one
side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless
Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.</p>

<p>The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time
in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its
acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical,
still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan
cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed
the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the
example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron,
took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in
power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth,
and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he
said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He
then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution,
seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the
intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra,
carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her
purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into
the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose
presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the
market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed
an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he
next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen
were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.
The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force
in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were
overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded
to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas
instead of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[p. 270]</span>
Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting
from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and
being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief
of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious
and sanguinary tyranny.<a id="FNanchor_580" href="#Footnote_580"
class="fnanchor">[580]</a> He caused several of his colleagues to
be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale
the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging
the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich
stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured
for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to
the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.<a
id="FNanchor_581" href="#Footnote_581" class="fnanchor">[581]</a>
The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized
enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries,
but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they
connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in
the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still
held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of
the town and harbor.</p>

<p>During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring
city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained
steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes;
notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê,
and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them
serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369
<small>B.C.</small>, a little before the line of Oneium was forced
by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its
own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been
saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.<a
id="FNanchor_582" href="#Footnote_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a>
In the ensuing year, 368 <small>B.C.</small>, the Argeian
and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing
great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their
departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and
of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_583"
href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> In the ensuing year
367 <small>B.C.</small>, a second invasion of the Phliasian territory
was attempted by Euphron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[p.
271]</span> with his own mercenaries to the number of two
thousand,—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban
harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near
Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of
the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally
from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round,
over an elevated line of ground called the <i>Trikaranum</i> (which had
been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to
approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry
and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from
spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day
they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these
last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which
forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing
by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in
reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked
and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban
division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they
made no effort to repair.<a id="FNanchor_584" href="#Footnote_584"
class="fnanchor">[584]</a></p>

<p>An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here
made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings,
released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with
the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as
well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had
disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics
of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.<a
id="FNanchor_585" href="#Footnote_585" class="fnanchor">[585]</a>
Such an accession afforded sensible<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_272">[p. 272]</span> relief,—it might almost be said,
salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment;
since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by
marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from
Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult
to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population
to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The
military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to
Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their
way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort
of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive
post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for
Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also
great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.<a
id="FNanchor_586" href="#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a></p>

<p>Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to
the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in
Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the
Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of
Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a
body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis,
and there summoned the Sikyonian <i>notables</i> to an assembly. Under
his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely
manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom
he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading
the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought
it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he
invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the
garrison of Corinth, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[p.
273]</span> immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta.
The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance
from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and
for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians.
In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still
remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably
bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of
losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated
slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent
revolution had conferred upon them.</p>

<p>Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having
procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was
enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as
master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But
as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter
along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly
tried to take by assault,<a id="FNanchor_587" href="#Footnote_587"
class="fnanchor">[587]</a>—his possession even of the town was
altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be
removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of
obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents
and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds,
after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes
of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large
sum of money for the purpose of bribery.<a id="FNanchor_588"
href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> His Sikyonian
opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed
him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther increased by
seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first
impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad
daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban
Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.</p>

<p>For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized
forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The
magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death,
insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage,
committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon
the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even
the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon of<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[p. 274]</span>fenders who had despised
its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not
know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that
one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban
Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the
language of the accusing magistrates:—</p>

<p>“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of
my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that
I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly;
next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that <i>you</i> did
not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,<a
id="FNanchor_589" href="#Footnote_589" class="fnanchor">[589]</a>
whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but
punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the
conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism,
were already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron,
too, guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of
gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How
can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and
upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after
having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to
her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he
a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into
freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew,
not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief
citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction
with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from
Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to
turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you,
you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish
me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt
you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your
own disgrace as well as mis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[p.
275]</span>chief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should
undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is
a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I
shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the
laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him
anywhere out of Thebes; why not <i>in</i> Thebes also, when he has come
hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the
past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors,
deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that
exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws
in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to
come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies.
How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I
tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put me to death, you
will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy,—if
you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves
publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of
your whole body of allies.”<a id="FNanchor_590" href="#Footnote_590"
class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p>

<p>This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce
that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the
principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies
as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a
characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore
upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means
of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others,
and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection
themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach
them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as
diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive
assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like
assent, if set<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[p. 276]</span>
forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or assemblies
elsewhere.</p>

<p>Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body
of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished
preëminence of being buried in the market-place.<a id="FNanchor_591"
href="#Footnote_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a> There, along
with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped
as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city.
He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at
Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had
conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of
a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as
their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he
had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive
Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy
who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges.
A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic
citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus
to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit
of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or
crushes the previously monopolizing few.</p>

<p>We may presume from these statements that the government of
Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon
does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the
Theban harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions,
between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel,
were composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron.
We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which
Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians,
was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens;
and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town,
aided by the Arcadians.<a id="FNanchor_592" href="#Footnote_592"
class="fnanchor">[592]</a></p>

<p>It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first
proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of
despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the
harbor) took place throughout the year 367 <small>B.C.</small>
and the earlier half of 366 <small>B.C.</small> No such enemy,
probably, would have arisen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[p.
277]</span> to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by
Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had
fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too
was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the
worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was
then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey
and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have
occupied the greater part of the year 367 <small>B.C.</small>, being
terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of
366 <small>B.C.</small></p>

<p>The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of
Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the
satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money
in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his
threats seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence
of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas<a
id="FNanchor_593" href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a>)
at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now
pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as
either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by
Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387
<small>B.C.</small>, and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra
in 371 <small>B.C.</small>,—it had become a sort of recognized
fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title
from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim
itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of
borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in
her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set
upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her
policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê.
The vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of
the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to
contend with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state
of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under
a Persian rescript. To attain this object,<a id="FNanchor_594"
href="#Footnote_594" class="fnanchor">[594]</a> Pelopidas and
Isme<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[p. 278]</span>nias now
proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the
allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast,
the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them.
Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and
Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile
envoys all went up thither in the same company.<a id="FNanchor_595"
href="#Footnote_595" class="fnanchor">[595]</a></p>

<p>Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony
of prostration,<a id="FNanchor_596" href="#Footnote_596"
class="fnanchor">[596]</a> was favorably received by the Persian
court. Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner
unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now
only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms
that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the
ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta,
at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes
had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced,
the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt,
whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence
of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,<a id="FNanchor_597"
href="#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> which could only
reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for
the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious
at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther
the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and
emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they
were no longer in Pelopon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[p.
279]</span>nesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been
shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle).
Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact
even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers
that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through
Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked
by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own
terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta:
Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city:
the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of
war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against
them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head
city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was
menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.<a id="FNanchor_598"
href="#Footnote_598" class="fnanchor">[598]</a> In reference to the
points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming
sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had
been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced
in favor of the Eleians;<a id="FNanchor_599" href="#Footnote_599"
class="fnanchor">[599]</a> probably at the instance of<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[p. 280]</span> Pelopidas, since there
now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.</p>

<p>Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript,
observing aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think
it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great
King.” This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted
to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the
Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the
King and inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little
to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their
two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of
having not only declined to associate with him during the journey,
but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of
being implicated in treasonable promises, and of receiving large
bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was
condemned and executed.<a id="FNanchor_600" href="#Footnote_600"
class="fnanchor">[600]</a> The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally
indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of
formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas
himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct
of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the
large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.<a id="FNanchor_601"
href="#Footnote_601" class="fnanchor">[601]</a> Antiochus, on
returning to Arcadia,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[p.
281]</span> made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod,
called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most
contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court.
There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers,
porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks,
though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and
even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not large enough to furnish
shade for a grasshopper.<a id="FNanchor_602" href="#Footnote_602"
class="fnanchor">[602]</a></p>

<p>On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of
satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of
their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian
rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official
companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes
since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who,
after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document
aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the
peace of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_603" href="#Footnote_603"
class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p>

<p>But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of
Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the
like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present
to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes.
All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them
to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection
must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst.
Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of
Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their
envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest
against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not
to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever
that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused
Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy;
upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went
home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other
deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had
refused to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[p. 282]</span> take
the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was
defeated.</p>

<p>Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies
collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of
applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with
the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively,
calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each
city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under
peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So
confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that
they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance
with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys
first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at
variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for
the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium,
and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But
the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining
formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian
king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they
passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at
least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely
frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such
pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming
or enforcing her headship;<a id="FNanchor_604" href="#Footnote_604"
class="fnanchor">[604]</a> though doubtless the mere fact, that it
comprised and recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the
vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born city.</p>

<p>In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards
the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans
would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well
as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves
undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were
seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot
seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at
Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as
the other Thessalians to accept the Persian<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_283">[p. 283]</span> rescript; for we see by the example
of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on
enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the
application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held
sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys
(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not
so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were
unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and
carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.</p>

<p>Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable
to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that
his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in
Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of
Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture,
and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes.
Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander
as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of
their neighbor and rival.<a id="FNanchor_605" href="#Footnote_605"
class="fnanchor">[605]</a> They immediately despatched to his aid
thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who,
unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were
both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter
island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed
beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without
delay eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover
or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been
rechosen commander since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He
was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with
other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were
joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alex<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[p. 284]</span>ander, aided by the
Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found
exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies
of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the
hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was
rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable
to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced
to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and
the enemy’s cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent
danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the
presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant
as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals,
and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their
perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in
consummate order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard,
beating off all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army
safely back to Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_606" href="#Footnote_606"
class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p>

<p>This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful
Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their
office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among
his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a
fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander
now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in
his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual
to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former
parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he
is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens
of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such
hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with
that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of
unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy
was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of
Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful
of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare
his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too,
appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged
by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second
expedition.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[p. 285]</span></p>

<p>At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed,
on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of
his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence,
no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in
defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to
such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at
length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence,
offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace
and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more
than a temporary truce,<a id="FNanchor_607" href="#Footnote_607"
class="fnanchor">[607]</a> coupled with the engagement of evacuating
Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas
and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight
of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this
primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did
not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had
enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.<a id="FNanchor_608"
href="#Footnote_608" class="fnanchor">[608]</a> That event with its
consequences<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[p. 286]</span>
still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who
again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with
the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations
dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and
connection at Athens.<a id="FNanchor_609" href="#Footnote_609"
class="fnanchor">[609]</a></p>

<p>While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an
important point was gained in their favor on the other side of
Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining
Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles
who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison,
despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost
and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin
Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member
of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency
of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its
inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, de<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_287">[p. 287]</span>mots of the neighboring Deme Græa.<a
id="FNanchor_610" href="#Footnote_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> So
recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of
Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and
Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time,
it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans
in Oropus were banished.<a id="FNanchor_611" href="#Footnote_611"
class="fnanchor">[611]</a> It was these partisans who, through
the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return,
so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish
the principal citizens friendly to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_612"
href="#Footnote_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> So great was the
sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched
with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their
general, Chares, with that mercenary force which he commanded in
the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid
from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These
allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone
would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied
it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to
acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and
with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred
to impartial arbitration.<a id="FNanchor_613" href="#Footnote_613"
class="fnanchor">[613]</a></p>

<p>This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material
consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor
of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians
in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it,
so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[p. 288]</span> that both
town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians.
Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies,
for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although
Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of
Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions
at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and
most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the
predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with
them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.<a
id="FNanchor_614" href="#Footnote_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a>
Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from
Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to
open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the
Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was
difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition,
from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were
reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less
in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was
then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his
return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the
spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled,
and these men put him to death at once.<a id="FNanchor_615"
href="#Footnote_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a> In spite of his
death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still
brought to pass, though not without opposition.</p>

<p>Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign
in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which
disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as
that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and
her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer,
in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to
the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus,
the most distinguished orator at Athens,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_289">[p. 289]</span> who had been sent by his countrymen to
plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among
other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic
legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both
murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos?
Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native
of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply) they were. But
Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while
they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As soon as
their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then
it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt.”<a
id="FNanchor_616" href="#Footnote_616" class="fnanchor">[616]</a>
This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill
of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The
Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally
renouncing friendship with Thebes.</p>

<p>As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became
important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into
Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the
Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her
mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the
Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to
seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian
garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to
be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet
and land-force under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on
reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut
out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the
resolution of the Athenians had become known to the Corinthians;
who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to
relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called
upon these latter to give in any complaints for<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_290">[p. 290]</span> which they might have ground, as their
services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that
Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were
dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.<a
id="FNanchor_617" href="#Footnote_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a></p>

<p>The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the
Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was
precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos,
were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted
from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a
sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;<a id="FNanchor_618"
href="#Footnote_618" class="fnanchor">[618]</a> but while thus
providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open
negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans
to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction
with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly
the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full
synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point
of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall
rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent;
but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased
if we make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians,
reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness
and impatience for peace.<a id="FNanchor_619" href="#Footnote_619"
class="fnanchor">[619]</a></p>

<p>It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace
could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition
of the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other
allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly
en<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[p. 291]</span>deavored to
prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The
Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited
from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription.
They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as
free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their
slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing
the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain
what they had lost;<a id="FNanchor_620" href="#Footnote_620"
class="fnanchor">[620]</a> and although they could not directly
prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the
war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for
themselves,—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus
son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous
selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her
hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice
ruinous to her honor.<a id="FNanchor_621" href="#Footnote_621"
class="fnanchor">[621]</a> The Spartan prince conjured his
country<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[p. 292]</span>men,
in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates
of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the
reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all
Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent
camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly
foreign cities.</p>

<p>Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate
suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended
by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians,
Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded
peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the
independence of each separate city within its own territory, without
either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet
when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined,
saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;
whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly
sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as
regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially
that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect,
of Theban headship.<a id="FNanchor_622" href="#Footnote_622"
class="fnanchor">[622]</a></p>

<p>This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position
of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly
those near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen
and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the
contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and
Argos,—Sparta and Athens,<a id="FNanchor_623" href="#Footnote_623"
class="fnanchor">[623]</a>—still at war; as well as Arcadia,
Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however,
were now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta,
and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[p. 293]</span> with the Arcadians;
while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta
as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes
and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly
terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it
would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians
themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one
with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were
forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea
and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held
strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus
constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.</p>

<p>As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for
urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they
were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still
calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition
in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.<a id="FNanchor_624"
href="#Footnote_624" class="fnanchor">[624]</a> The Athenians also
were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already
stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had
accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed
themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the
rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and
solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the
fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished
for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing
Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city.<a
id="FNanchor_625" href="#Footnote_625" class="fnanchor">[625]</a>
Whether that other article also in the<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_294">[p. 294]</span> former rescript, which commanded Athens
to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but
it seems probable.</p>

<p>At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy,
they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of
Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace
with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same
scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of
his long-established military reputation to promote the interests
of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention
was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the
satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over
to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view
either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to
Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.<a id="FNanchor_626"
href="#Footnote_626" class="fnanchor">[626]</a> Ariobarzanes was then
preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt
from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in
fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct
breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet
with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great
King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three
sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.<a
id="FNanchor_627" href="#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">[627]</a>
That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to
have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as
of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer,
exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and
brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.</p>

<p>Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted
Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of
Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a
military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[p. 295]</span> on the opposite
mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but
the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet
possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to
push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on
his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and
thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of
it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay
and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies;
without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting
contributions from allies.<a id="FNanchor_628" href="#Footnote_628"
class="fnanchor">[628]</a> An important possession was thus acquired
for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite
party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties.
Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of
Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him
and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and
the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for
some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his revenues in these
regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and Mausôlus, native
prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked Ariobarzanes, with
the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege
to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to
desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.<a id="FNanchor_629"
href="#Footnote_629" class="fnanchor">[629]</a> As the latter had
no army, nor any means of allurement (except perhaps some money
derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two
besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find
both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[p. 296]</span> of them,
a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself
against the Persian king.<a id="FNanchor_630" href="#Footnote_630"
class="fnanchor">[630]</a> Agesilaus obtained, from all three,
pecuniary aid for Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_631" href="#Footnote_631"
class="fnanchor">[631]</a></p>

<p>The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of
Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens.
It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia
Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian
cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded
both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a
sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining
pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of
readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him
Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious,
as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of
the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.<a
id="FNanchor_632" href="#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">[632]</a></p>

<p>Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary
confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large
proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied
by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the
Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the
time of the first Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction
of the Athenian empire in 405 <small>B.C.</small> Though all
these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they
had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[p. 297]</span> eventual reëntry.<a
id="FNanchor_633" href="#Footnote_633" class="fnanchor">[633]</a>
That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private
appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at
the formation of her second confederacy in 378 <small>B.C.</small>,
as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now
that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of
kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was
again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent
out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men
were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even
in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of
the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important
measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been
new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before.<a
id="FNanchor_634" href="#Footnote_634" class="fnanchor">[634]</a>
But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been
expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless
now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain
their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[p. 298]</span> previous
lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus,
having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his
acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened
publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it,
as her own ancient possession,—from its extreme northern boundary
at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus
at its southern extremity.<a id="FNanchor_635" href="#Footnote_635"
class="fnanchor">[635]</a></p>

<p>This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined
with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited
a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious
tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from
those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378
<small>B.C.</small> Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named
Kydias pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of
the kleruchs to Samos.<a id="FNanchor_636" href="#Footnote_636"
class="fnanchor">[636]</a> However, obnoxious as the measure was
to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and
the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have
involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of
her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into
conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,<a id="FNanchor_637"
href="#Footnote_637" class="fnanchor">[637]</a> which resisted her
pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her
citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of
Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory,
was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or
Ariobarzanes drove him away,<a id="FNanchor_638" href="#Footnote_638"
class="fnanchor">[638]</a> to make room for Timotheus and the
Athenians.</p>

<p>It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,<a id="FNanchor_639"
href="#Footnote_639" class="fnanchor">[639]</a>—the new Thracian
enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was
father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had
enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called
Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the
Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia
and Chalkidikê, and especially against Am<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_299">[p. 299]</span>phipolis; but he had neither taken the
latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success;
though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary
general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable
a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to be
explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the
eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus,
who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason
for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact, that
Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now
resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus<a
id="FNanchor_640" href="#Footnote_640" class="fnanchor">[640]</a> to
an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the
Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs,
with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change.
As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before,
so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.<a
id="FNanchor_641" href="#Footnote_641" class="fnanchor">[641]</a>
At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such
a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking
part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually
fighting against Athens.<a id="FNanchor_642" href="#Footnote_642"
class="fnanchor">[642]</a> He had got into his possession some
hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus; which gave
great hopes of extorting the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[p.
300]</span> surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned
to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a
vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should
be sent to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_643" href="#Footnote_643"
class="fnanchor">[643]</a> As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates
was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to
the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material
advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three
years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates,
yet when the new general Timotheus wished to reëngage him, he
declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian
transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys;
and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself.<a id="FNanchor_644"
href="#Footnote_644" class="fnanchor">[644]</a> He was subsequently
coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies,
Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet.
Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve
Athens.</p>

<p>It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of
Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first
attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese.
In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of
Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates.
Ptolemy of Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the
preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated
(365 <small>B.C.</small>) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.<a
id="FNanchor_645" href="#Footnote_645" class="fnanchor">[645]</a>
Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to
have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to
Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns
both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.<a
id="FNanchor_646" href="#Footnote_646" class="fnanchor">[646]</a>
Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquir<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[p. 301]</span>ing strength during
the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now
found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it,
just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose.
Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful
in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna,
Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the
Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still
retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus
is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.<a id="FNanchor_647"
href="#Footnote_647" class="fnanchor">[647]</a> Here, as at Samos,
he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also
(as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from
the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens,
assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.<a
id="FNanchor_648" href="#Footnote_648" class="fnanchor">[648]</a>
Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic
Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt
to achieve that which Athens had most at heart,—the capture of
Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at
sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose
services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.<a
id="FNanchor_649" href="#Footnote_649" class="fnanchor">[649]</a>
Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed,—then landed
himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the
neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian
Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire
with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried
across to assail the city from the wide part of<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_302">[p. 302]</span> the river Strymon above, could not
be brought off in the face of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_650"
href="#Footnote_650" class="fnanchor">[650]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[p. 303]</span></p>

<p>Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in
Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions
in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and
unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a
Theban fleet.</p>

<p>I have already mentioned that in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, Thebes
had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been
fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ;
a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably
repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the
genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by
the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself
had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive
friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing
Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain
time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled
and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant
Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of
complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas,
burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on
the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose
of invading Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_651" href="#Footnote_651"
class="fnanchor">[651]</a></p>

<p>At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the
Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had
excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of
the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen
that they should grapple with Athens on her own element,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[p. 304]</span> and compete for
the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the
rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned
this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of
war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;<a
id="FNanchor_652" href="#Footnote_652" class="fnanchor">[652]</a>
a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her
maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas
employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that,
Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent
enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had been used by
Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by
Hermokrates at Syracuse,<a id="FNanchor_653" href="#Footnote_653"
class="fnanchor">[653]</a>—that men such as the Thebans, brave and
trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities
on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been
mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced
them to take to the sea.<a id="FNanchor_654" href="#Footnote_654"
class="fnanchor">[654]</a> “We must put down this haughty rival (he
exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the
Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of
the acropolis at Athens.”<a id="FNanchor_655" href="#Footnote_655"
class="fnanchor">[655]</a></p>

<p>Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile
recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme
ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and
equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses
fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas
himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as
soon as it should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands
near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched
to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for
breaking with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_656" href="#Footnote_656"
class="fnanchor">[656]</a> Some opposition however was made in
the assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas,
an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his
criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminon<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[p. 305]</span>das, has been handed
down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him,
whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented
as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into
war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against
the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the
picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the
Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,<a
id="FNanchor_657" href="#Footnote_657" class="fnanchor">[657]</a>
that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of
the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes.
Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in
order that he might denounce the generals when they came back,
advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas
of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a
view to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in
Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the
Hellespont. “By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have
already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta
and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city;
while <i>I</i>, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day
of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta.”<a
id="FNanchor_658" href="#Footnote_658" class="fnanchor">[658]</a>
While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended
that peace would be equivalent to an abnegation of the headship
of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant
station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and
action.</p>

<p>To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as
better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of
this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the
general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_306">[p. 306]</span> resemble but too closely those
feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to
wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.<a
id="FNanchor_659" href="#Footnote_659" class="fnanchor">[659]</a>
If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference
to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling
Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had
neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency on land
alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard
for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once would be
still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would probably
keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting,
that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine
dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound
appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy
of Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.<a
id="FNanchor_660" href="#Footnote_660" class="fnanchor">[660]</a></p>

<p>The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet
under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 <small>B.C.</small> In
the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the
head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the
fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that
Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the
Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of
the allies of Athens to declare in his favor.<a id="FNanchor_661"
href="#Footnote_661" class="fnanchor">[661]</a> Both he<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[p. 307]</span> and Timotheus appear
to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with
no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the
oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both
declined to furnish aid.<a id="FNanchor_662" href="#Footnote_662"
class="fnanchor">[662]</a> Timotheus is said to have liberated
the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not
certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.<a id="FNanchor_663"
href="#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">[663]</a> Epaminondas brought
back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any
splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes;
yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her
dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on
by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and
Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 <small>B.C.</small> than they
had been in 364 <small>B.C.</small> Probably Epaminondas intended to
return with his fleet in the next year (362 <small>B.C.</small>), and
to push his maritime enterprises still farther;<a id="FNanchor_664"
href="#Footnote_664" class="fnanchor">[664]</a> but we shall find him
imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field.
And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the
last.</p>

<p>Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into
Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height
of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly
together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens
as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties,
and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid
from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him.
Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said
to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the
gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this
event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force
was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving
at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his
Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the
head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number.
The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called
Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s Heads. Pelopidas<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_308">[p. 308]</span> arrived there first with his cavalry,
beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but
he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry
of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed
with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising
did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit.
Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in
flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself
at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up
the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh
ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded
in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill.
Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army
of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten;
while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself
to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were
within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and
dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every
one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness,
like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his
brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or
even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously
forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth
and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his
guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who
followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met
his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that
his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently
hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the
troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.<a
id="FNanchor_665" href="#Footnote_665" class="fnanchor">[665]</a></p>

<p>Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more
important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all
its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations
of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The
soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet
untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[p. 309]</span> trophy the arms of the
slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch
their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their
own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities
vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and obtained
from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral,
as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no
less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the
head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to
rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas had been reëlected
without interruption to the annual office of Bœotarch during all the
years that had since elapsed<a id="FNanchor_666" href="#Footnote_666"
class="fnanchor">[666]</a> (378-364 <small>B.C.</small>). He had
taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories;
he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he
had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of
a friend, to second the guiding ascendency of Epaminondas, and his
moderation of dealing towards conquered enemies.<a id="FNanchor_667"
href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">[667]</a></p>

<p>All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas.
The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,<a id="FNanchor_668"
href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">[668]</a> conducted a pow<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[p. 310]</span>erful force of seven
thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of
their partisans in that country. With this united army, they pressed
Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to
their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies
in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its territory near the
Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All
Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnêtes, became
annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater
ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before.<a
id="FNanchor_669" href="#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">[669]</a> The
power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still
continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the
ensuing year.</p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_80">
  <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[p. 311]</span></p>
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXX.<br />
  FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.</h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">It</span>
was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet,
and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from
whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus.
That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been
disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders,
as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been
regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and
richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable
moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with
a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed
for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large
number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the
day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the
Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought
before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. But
besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill
the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery.<a
id="FNanchor_670" href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">[670]</a>
This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain
fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population
which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban
hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to
those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to
Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of
autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of
so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout
the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;<a
id="FNanchor_671" href="#Footnote_671" class="fnanchor">[671]</a>
a sentiment probably aggra<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[p.
312]</span>vated by the fact, which we must presume to have been
concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their
own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of Koroneia
shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of
together in such manner as to make us suppose so.<a id="FNanchor_672"
href="#Footnote_672" class="fnanchor">[672]</a> Thebes thus absorbed
into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own
city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.</p>

<p>We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the
period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of
Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause.
Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under
their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had
been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.<a
id="FNanchor_673" href="#Footnote_673" class="fnanchor">[673]</a>
All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the
Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would
never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas,
who was deeply chagrined on his return.<a id="FNanchor_674"
href="#Footnote_674" class="fnanchor">[674]</a> He well knew the
bitter censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing
the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in
a manner even more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the
inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out
of Bœotia, while the Orchome<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[p.
313]</span>nian male adults were slain, and the women and children
sold into slavery.</p>

<p>On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363
<small>B.C.</small>, Epaminondas was reëlected one of the
Bœotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the
coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his
grief for the death of Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as
a political colleague whom he could trust,—might deter him from a
second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now
becoming so complicated, as to render the necessity of renewed Theban
interference again probable.</p>

<p>Since the peace concluded in 366 <small>B.C.</small> with Corinth,
Phlius, etc., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her
harmost and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis
and Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited
among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance
with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the
Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and
the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 <small>B.C.</small>)
came into alliance again with Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_675"
href="#Footnote_675" class="fnanchor">[675]</a> relinquishing their
alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous
coöperation with Sparta<a id="FNanchor_676" href="#Footnote_676"
class="fnanchor">[676]</a> ever since 367 <small>B.C.</small>
(by reaction against the Thebans, who, reserving the judicious
and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan
governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365
<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_677" href="#Footnote_677"
class="fnanchor">[677]</a> And thus Sparta, though robbed by the
pacification of 366 <small>B.C.</small> of the aid of Corinth,
Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and
Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.</p>

<p>Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of
Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid
(including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain
of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between
Messenia and Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held
by the Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in
the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_314">[p. 314]</span> found it politic to vindicate their
independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two
or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.<a
id="FNanchor_678" href="#Footnote_678" class="fnanchor">[678]</a>
No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than
the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;<a id="FNanchor_679"
href="#Footnote_679" class="fnanchor">[679]</a> while the
subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians,
and were even admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the
Pan-Arcadian confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_680" href="#Footnote_680"
class="fnanchor">[680]</a> The Persian rescript brought down by
Pelopidas (367-366 <small>B.C.</small>) seems to have reversed
this arrangement, recognizing the imperial rights of the Eleians.<a
id="FNanchor_681" href="#Footnote_681" class="fnanchor">[681]</a>
But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for
the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could.
They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only
equally hostile to the Arcadians, but also complaining that she had
been robbed of Messênê, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia.
Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in
the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan
reinforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger
Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.<a id="FNanchor_682"
href="#Footnote_682" class="fnanchor">[682]</a></p>

<p>Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid,
which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with
Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius
(on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount
Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia),
which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii,
and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment,
it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;<a
id="FNanchor_683" href="#Footnote_683" class="fnanchor">[683]</a>
but the Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in
along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion
as well as some of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were
not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian
militia called the epariti, collected from the various cities and
districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with
considerable loss both of men and arms, and<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_315">[p. 315]</span> drove them out of the district. The
victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus;
after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and
took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a
regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made
good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself,
which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that
they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they
reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and
the chosen hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis
was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now
manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis
in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen
and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered
the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of four
hundred, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and
established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine
miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border<a id="FNanchor_684"
href="#Footnote_684" class="fnanchor">[684]</a>), where they were
reinforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their
partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified
post, planted in the country like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried
on harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them
after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling
the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was
invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued
by a reinforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large
force and placed the city in safety; so that the Arcadians could do
nothing more than lay waste the territory around.<a id="FNanchor_685"
href="#Footnote_685" class="fnanchor">[685]</a></p>

<p>Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion
not long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the
exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country,
even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea.
Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them,
but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who
had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress
of the Eleians became greater<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[p.
316]</span> than ever. In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders,
they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians
would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly, the
Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus), invading the
south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called
Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off
the communication between that city and Messênê), which he fortified
and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and Periœki. The
effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian
army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had
leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an
abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were
overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and
two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these
latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the
remainder sold for slaves.<a id="FNanchor_686" href="#Footnote_686"
class="fnanchor">[686]</a></p>

<p>Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from
Elis, was joined by allies,—Thebans,<a id="FNanchor_687"
href="#Footnote_687" class="fnanchor">[687]</a> Argeians, and
Messenians,—and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up
the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all around,
which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus
attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the
Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former
days dependents of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents
of the Lacedæmonian armies,<a id="FNanchor_688" href="#Footnote_688"
class="fnanchor">[688]</a> had now become independent Arcadians. The
blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next
tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian
position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the
enemy in great force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being
thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas
and Chilon slain.<a id="FNanchor_689" href="#Footnote_689"
class="fnanchor">[689]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[p.
317]</span> The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into
a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle
order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the
communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most
distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were
advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan,
stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice “What
need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and
separate?” Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce
was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the
Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their
advantage, and there erected their trophy.<a id="FNanchor_690"
href="#Footnote_690" class="fnanchor">[690]</a></p>

<p>Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to
be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he
likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point,
by continuing the blockade without interruption. One more attempt
was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen.
Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering
the portion of it guarded by the Argeians.<a id="FNanchor_691"
href="#Footnote_691" class="fnanchor">[691]</a> They broke down
an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the
relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at
hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to
the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and reënclosed
the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of
provisions. More than a hundred prisoners, Spartans and Periœki
together, were distributed among the captors,—Argeians, Thebans,
Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to each.<a id="FNanchor_692"
href="#Footnote_692" class="fnanchor">[692]</a> Sixty years before,
the capture of two hundred and twenty Spartans and Lacedæmonians
in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes, had excited the extreme
of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece; emphatically noted by
the impartial Thucydides.<a id="FNanchor_693" href="#Footnote_693"
class="fnanchor">[693]</a> Now, not a trace of such sentiment
appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan
glory declined!</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[p. 318]</span></p>

<p>Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians
resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new
project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately
preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic
festival, which came about midsummer. The presidency over this
sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the
Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans—the
inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the
first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These
Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the
conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of
right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right,
thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of
peace upon the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_694" href="#Footnote_694"
class="fnanchor">[694]</a> Their request had been then declined,
on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy
honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the
Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian
garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia for more
than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was made for
celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection.<a
id="FNanchor_695" href="#Footnote_695" class="fnanchor">[695]</a>
The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion,
two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the
commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day
when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the Eleians, though
expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent
round their notices as usual.</p>

<p>It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it
was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present
occasion be dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the
Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength,
a considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos,
and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being
considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of
asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the
festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having
gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon,
or quintuple contest, wherein the running<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_319">[p. 319]</span> match and the wrestling-match came
first in order. The running-match had already been completed, and
those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for
the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the
space between the stadium and the great altar,<a id="FNanchor_696"
href="#Footnote_696" class="fnanchor">[696]</a>—when suddenly the
Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by
their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of
the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to the
westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus, falling
afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in
armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the farther
approach of the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_697" href="#Footnote_697"
class="fnanchor">[697]</a> The latter, with a boldness for which
no one gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[p. 320]</span>
them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his
chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously charged first the
Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven
back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and
pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of
their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by
numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various
porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent
positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas
was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground,
were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed
and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid
of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied
the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but
passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down
for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully
put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors.<a id="FNanchor_698"
href="#Footnote_698" class="fnanchor">[698]</a> Such precautions
rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged
to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration
among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they
had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th
Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in
their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the
names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in
the lists like the rest.<a id="FNanchor_699" href="#Footnote_699"
class="fnanchor">[699]</a></p>

<p>Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of
Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its
enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first
time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the
Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the
competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of
the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought
on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed
to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presi<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_321">[p. 321]</span>dency, in the permanent mastery of
Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event
which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot
doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely
annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition
of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage to the
sacred ground,—“imminentium templorum religio.”<a id="FNanchor_700"
href="#Footnote_700" class="fnanchor">[700]</a> Most of them probably
believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never
either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could
hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of
these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon
(himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special
inspiration of the gods.<a id="FNanchor_701" href="#Footnote_701"
class="fnanchor">[701]</a></p>

<p>If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans
as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that
spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders
rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for
plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with
both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the
stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally,
more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;<a id="FNanchor_702"
href="#Footnote_702" class="fnanchor">[702]</a> the other from
the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings,
distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now
installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate
these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they
doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus.
Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better
paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted
numerous volunteers of the poorer class.<a id="FNanchor_703"
href="#Footnote_703" class="fnanchor">[703]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[p. 322]</span></p>

<p>At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and
Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money
from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.<a id="FNanchor_704"
href="#Footnote_704" class="fnanchor">[704]</a> How far the project
had ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had
not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the
large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which
appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity
and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among
many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover
some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions
for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among
their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together
and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any
strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which
had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each
other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed
their ancient rivalry.<a id="FNanchor_705" href="#Footnote_705"
class="fnanchor">[705]</a> The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea
and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity
and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with
Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the
reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into
villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds,
offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with
a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean
assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation
in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum
was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of
the Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to
the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive
it; but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their
trial before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at
Megalopolis,—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.<a
id="FNanchor_706" href="#Footnote_706" class="fnanchor">[706]</a> The
Mantinean leaders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[p. 323]</span>
thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their
absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment of the epariti was sent to
Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and
the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in
Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many other towns copied their
protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved
by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods,
were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and
interdicting all farther participation in the Olympian treasures.</p>

<p>Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained,
in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which
had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as
the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans
speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of
oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from
Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of
paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members
of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually
relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy
and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each
other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of
getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party
and into their own.<a id="FNanchor_707" href="#Footnote_707"
class="fnanchor">[707]</a> The leaders of that opposite party saw
plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them
to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but
would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly
they sent intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of
policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition
into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding,<a id="FNanchor_708"
href="#Footnote_708" class="fnanchor">[708]</a> the opposite leaders
brought it before the Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a
resolution, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[p. 324]</span>
envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army
might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the
preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly
determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to
them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The
Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.<a
id="FNanchor_709" href="#Footnote_709" class="fnanchor">[709]</a></p>

<p>The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine
or ten months, from Midsummer 364 <small>B.C.</small> (the time
of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 <small>B.C.</small>
The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly
even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been
concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the centre
of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the
mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans
had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first
probably sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at
Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost,
who occupied the town with a garrison of three hundred Bœotians, were
present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished,
most of the Mantineans went home; their city being both unfriendly
to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the
evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pæans,
and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the
most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat
at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of
the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable
number, as to fill both the prison and the government-house; though
there were few Mantineans among them, since most of these last had
gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let
themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the
gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following
morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither.
The authorities,—while they sent round the intelligence to the
remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms,—despatched
heralds to Tegea, demanding all the Mantinean<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_325">[p. 325]</span> prisoners there detained. They at the
same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution
of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian
community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea,
to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges
might be preferred.<a id="FNanchor_710" href="#Footnote_710"
class="fnanchor">[710]</a></p>

<p>Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost
forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together
an assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from
feelings of mistrust,<a id="FNanchor_711" href="#Footnote_711"
class="fnanchor">[711]</a>—wherein he explained that he had been
misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that
a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city
in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed
accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one
believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably
from the Mantineans and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his
conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.</p>

<p>On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing
that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under
which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the
first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with
any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get
possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few of the
latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention
of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have
set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done
it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of waiting
until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act
offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was
done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On
the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that
the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed in the existence
of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the
Theban with a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[p. 326]</span>
persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in
Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party,
and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation
of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed
not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been
conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood
of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.<a
id="FNanchor_712" href="#Footnote_712" class="fnanchor">[712]</a></p>

<p>The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his
order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him
indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached
Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not
only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied
to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—“The arrest (he
said) was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested.
You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on
your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into
Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be
assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make
war to support our partisans in the country.”<a id="FNanchor_713"
href="#Footnote_713" class="fnanchor">[713]</a></p>

<p>Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought
back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must
prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for
resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to
the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling
any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating
Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state
should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they
farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken
by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in
the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon)
“were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”<a id="FNanchor_714"
href="#Footnote_714" class="fnanchor">[714]</a> “Why do these Thebans
(said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[p. 327]</span> they)
march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what
other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief
to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of
<i>them</i>? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that
they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”<a id="FNanchor_715"
href="#Footnote_715" class="fnanchor">[715]</a> Such is the language
which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his
philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself
narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the
reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas
had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 <small>B.C.</small>)
at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of
protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give
strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a
political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them
against Sparta, in Messênê and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the
Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence
to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the
gentle and politic measures adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan
cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta.
They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the
mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans
had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 <small>B.C.</small>—an
interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the
Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea
of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt
to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair
right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and
Achaia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation
with Thebes. He probably believed that there had been a real plot to
betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous
peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line
against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê,—could no longer be
assured without a new Theban invasion.</p>

<p>This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in
Peloponnesus, in June 362 <small>B.C.</small>—immediately before
the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable
judg<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[p. 328]</span>ment of
Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans.
It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by
himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from
an impartial witness.</p>

<p>I have already recounted as much as can be made out
of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of
Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366
<small>B.C.</small>) to the close of 363 <small>B.C.</small> In
366-365 <small>B.C.</small>, they had experienced great loss and
humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas,
whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In
364-363 <small>B.C.</small>, Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh
command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had
been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the
country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having
persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the
summer of 363 <small>B.C.</small> as admiral of a powerful Theban
fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363
<small>B.C.</small>, he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the
relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were
becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention
on land, without admitting farther aspirations towards maritime
empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual
change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363-362
<small>B.C.</small>), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party,
profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at
Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly
and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the
prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This
political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the
Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being
communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the
reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest
which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban
intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained
the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon
the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into
Peloponnesus.</p>

<p>The army with which he began his march was numerous and
imposing. It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[p. 329]</span> large number of
Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now
become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes,
and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though
the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with
Thebes was for alliance purely defensive.<a id="FNanchor_716"
href="#Footnote_716" class="fnanchor">[716]</a> Having passed
the line of Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it
had been at his former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was
probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent,<a id="FNanchor_717"
href="#Footnote_717" class="fnanchor">[717]</a> and where he
halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their
way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced
him to expect them;<a id="FNanchor_718" href="#Footnote_718"
class="fnanchor">[718]</a> but the information turned out false.
The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were
preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a
fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian
allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium,
Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of
frontier against Laconia)—and the Argeians.</p>

<p>The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose,
was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his
Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction
might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without
delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting
of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the
Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans;
and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with
the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian
contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its
cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description
of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.</p>

<p>Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the
walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his
troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less ob<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[p. 330]</span>servable by the enemy.<a
id="FNanchor_719" href="#Footnote_719" class="fnanchor">[719]</a>
He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action
before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on
their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced.<a
id="FNanchor_720" href="#Footnote_720" class="fnanchor">[720]</a> On
returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with
the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea,
had already made some progress and reached Pellênê. Upon this he
resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march
from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea,
while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue
a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the
evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed towards
Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, “like a nest of
unprotected young birds,” at a moment when no resistance could have
been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring
and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed
the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta except the providential
interposition of the gods,<a id="FNanchor_721" href="#Footnote_721"
class="fnanchor">[721]</a> signified by the accident that a Kretan
runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were
in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time
his farther progress towards Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned
back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a
sufficient posture of defence before the Thebans arrived. Though
sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous;
for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent,
having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main
army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.<a
id="FNanchor_722" href="#Footnote_722" class="fnanchor">[722]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[p. 331]</span></p>

<p>The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the
probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was
in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still
less to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from
Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he
did not choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable
to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at
his former invasion of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>; when he had
most part of Peloponnesus in active coöperation with him, and when
the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field. Accordingly, though he
crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta<a
id="FNanchor_723" href="#Footnote_723" class="fnanchor">[723]</a>
(which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the
roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance,
he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets
and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession
of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence
it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with
advantage. But even here, though inferior in number they prevented
him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus,
sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_332">[p. 332]</span> of defence, with a small company of
one hundred hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his
front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry,
that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for
a space, until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat.<a
id="FNanchor_724" href="#Footnote_724" class="fnanchor">[724]</a> The
bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of
the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor to Sparta, in this day of her
comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth
sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the
palæstra. Wielding in his right hand a spear and in his left a sword,
he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite
of which he was suffered to come back unwounded: so great was the
awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The
ephors decorated him afterwards with a wreath of honor, but at the
same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armor.<a
id="FNanchor_725" href="#Footnote_725" class="fnanchor">[725]</a></p>

<p>Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry,
yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into
importance only by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact
was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get
back to Sparta and put it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As
soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was
no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try the city round,
to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving
himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he
applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of
motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army
from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward
off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea
to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through
Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be
forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea
and Pallantion; so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than
they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were
on their march towards Sparta, and before<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_333">[p. 333]</span> they could be apprised of his change of
purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest,
he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable
to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he
sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea,
which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with
its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining
population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields
upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary
ascendency of Epaminondas,—coupled with his earnestness in setting
forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable
plunder,—could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to
such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment
and repose at Tegea.<a id="FNanchor_726" href="#Footnote_726"
class="fnanchor">[726]</a></p>

<p>Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas
anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme
defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans
doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods,—as Xenophon
regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian
cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted
from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed
from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no
longer occupied Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested
at the isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced
some loss or annoyance.<a id="FNanchor_727" href="#Footnote_727"
class="fnanchor">[727]</a> They then passed forward through Kleonæ
to Mantinea, arriving thither without having broken fast, either
themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they
reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment,—that
the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_334">[p. 334]</span> made their appearance, having
advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a
mile of the gates.<a id="FNanchor_728" href="#Footnote_728"
class="fnanchor">[728]</a></p>

<p>The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military
citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder
were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they
implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though
hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged
to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants
were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous
than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the
latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they
gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had
the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and
property. Xenophon extols<a id="FNanchor_729" href="#Footnote_729"
class="fnanchor">[729]</a> (and doubtless with good reason) the
generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued.
But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet
more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have
sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious
resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for
the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields
through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when
the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander
Kephisodôrus,<a id="FNanchor_730" href="#Footnote_730"
class="fnanchor">[730]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[p.
335]</span> together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon),
then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse,
were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the
contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the
personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans also
paid distinguished honors.</p>

<p>Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both
well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any
omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while
his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united
camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians,
Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all,
of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust
the assertion of Diodorus;<a id="FNanchor_731" href="#Footnote_731"
class="fnanchor">[731]</a> who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas
as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value
can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain
which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw
that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through
a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair of the result.<a
id="FNanchor_732" href="#Footnote_732" class="fnanchor">[732]</a>
He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which
time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of
harvest was now approaching. Moreover, his stock of provisions
was barely sufficient;<a id="FNanchor_733" href="#Footnote_733"
class="fnanchor">[733]</a> the new crop being not yet gathered in,
while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He
took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[p. 336]</span></p>

<p>But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution
was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate
position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without
fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his
own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity
of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and
at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.<a id="FNanchor_734"
href="#Footnote_734" class="fnanchor">[734]</a> This is an estimate
of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts
narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the
Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle.
With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what
other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting
that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually
found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence,
without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as
well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent
defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were
checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea,
Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known
beforehand) to attempt a <i>coup de main</i>, first against Sparta,
next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which
his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near
to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;<a
id="FNanchor_735" href="#Footnote_735" class="fnanchor">[735]</a>
but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was
before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the
field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by
side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must
have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as
the only probable way of deciding the contest.</p>

<p>The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of
disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to
their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[p. 337]</span> full of enthusiastic
alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them
within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving them better quarters
and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the
enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinean
territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the
horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their
best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets,—the hoplites
burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords.
Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing
but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers
of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing
but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign.<a id="FNanchor_736"
href="#Footnote_736" class="fnanchor">[736]</a> The best spirit and
confidence animated all the allies, as they quitted the gates of
Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by
Epaminondas.</p>

<p>The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the
level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the
greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus,
each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains
that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the
moun<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[p. 338]</span>tains
themselves.”<a id="FNanchor_737" href="#Footnote_737"
class="fnanchor">[737]</a> Its length stretches from north to
south, bordered by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and
of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of
about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the
narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea
near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities,
in a line not much different from north and south, being about
ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains
was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low
ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and
another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and
make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea;<a
id="FNanchor_738" href="#Footnote_738" class="fnanchor">[738]</a>
thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position,
covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army opposed to
Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well
as the rest having now returned from Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_739"
href="#Footnote_739" class="fnanchor">[739]</a></p>

<p>Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern
gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the
enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array
being completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction
straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course,
turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which
forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached
somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he
pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain
on the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;<a
id="FNanchor_740" href="#Footnote_740" class="fnanchor">[740]</a>
until at length he neared the enemy’s po<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_339">[p. 339]</span>sition, upon their right flank. He here
halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming
a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the enemy.
During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single file
with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier
in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages
marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the
phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was of
course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the
Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line.
In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.<a
id="FNanchor_741" href="#Footnote_741" class="fnanchor">[741]</a></p>

<p>The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and
formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming
straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy
battle. But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that
for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position,
they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day.
Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though,
by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived
very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the
same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they
construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot
where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly
simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march
from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of
raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon
their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in
his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that
there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks
to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[p. 340]</span> fall into
disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horsemen even
took off their breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was
of hardly less consequence,—that mental preparation of the soldier,
whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident
commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special
harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken and run down.<a
id="FNanchor_742" href="#Footnote_742" class="fnanchor">[742]</a> So
strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas
to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but
even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions
preparatory to immediate attack.</p>

<p>Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the
ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close
upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained,
probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an
end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the whole body
of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings
of Sparta was present,—a point not distinctly ascertainable,—he
would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the
entire allied army, the Mantineans occupied the extreme right (as
on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory,<a
id="FNanchor_743" href="#Footnote_743" class="fnanchor">[743]</a>
and because the Lacedæmonians had lost their once-recognized
privilege), together with the other Arcadians. On the right-centre
and centre were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the
extreme left, the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_744" href="#Footnote_744"
class="fnanchor">[744]</a> There was cavalry on both the wings;
Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the right; spread out with no
more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of
light infantry along with the horsemen.<a id="FNanchor_745"
href="#Footnote_745" class="fnanchor">[745]</a></p>

<p>In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and
Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[p. 341]</span> Arcadians,
Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.<a
id="FNanchor_746" href="#Footnote_746" class="fnanchor">[746]</a> It
was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had
succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge himself with
his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right or right-centre,
and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force,
both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and
centre, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should
have been thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused
the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of his line in lochi or
companies, with the lochage or captain at the left extremity of
each,—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy,
in advance of his remaining line. The Theban lochages thus became
placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of
extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each lochus, and perhaps
of more than one lochus, being ranged in file behind them.<a
id="FNanchor_747" href="#Footnote_747" class="fnanchor">[747]</a>
What the actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the
lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas had attacked with
fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was
probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were
at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy’s
phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would
hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so
overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the
enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the
midships of her antagonist.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[p. 342]</span></p>

<p>It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed
in column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining
allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.<a
id="FNanchor_748" href="#Footnote_748" class="fnanchor">[748]</a>
Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through
the enemy’s phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take
flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx
could easily deal with them.</p>

<p>Against the cavalry on the enemy’s right, which was marshaled
only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six,
or perhaps eight deep),<a id="FNanchor_749" href="#Footnote_749"
class="fnanchor">[749]</a> and without any light infantry
intermingled with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his
left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in
strong and deep column, so as to ensure to them also a superior
weight of attack. He farther mingled in their ranks some active
footmen, darters and slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly
and the Maliac Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_750" href="#Footnote_750"
class="fnanchor">[750]</a></p>

<p>There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and
Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its
right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially
the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy’s left. To guard against any
such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right,
a special body of reserve, both horse and<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_343">[p. 343]</span> foot, in order to take the Athenians in
the rear if they should attempt it.</p>

<p>All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must
have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute
both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack
on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground
at his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy
from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they
either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.<a
id="FNanchor_751" href="#Footnote_751" class="fnanchor">[751]</a>
Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed,
actually gave the word of command to “take up arms,” that they had
any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in
full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous
movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their
places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular
array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume
their breast-plates.<a id="FNanchor_752" href="#Footnote_752"
class="fnanchor">[752]</a> And though the space dividing the two
armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially
corrected,—yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled,
were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban
hoplites in deep column.</p>

<p>The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which
Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its
portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters
and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy’s cavalry
opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit,
turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his
part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the
Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate
struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force
and weight. He broke through the enemy’s line of infantry at this
point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave
and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight.
The remaining troops of the enemy’s line, seeing the best portion
of their army defeated and in flight, turned<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_344">[p. 344]</span> and fled also. The centre and right
of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into
conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been
felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering
and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that
side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would appear,
from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The
Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their
own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the
cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten,
after a gallant fight,<a id="FNanchor_753" href="#Footnote_753"
class="fnanchor">[753]</a> until the Eleian cavalry from the right
came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to
reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the
stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right
and centre,—and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered,
that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their own right, may have been
aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement
of Diodorus.</p>

<p>In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp
with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature
and the ultimate result.<a id="FNanchor_754" href="#Footnote_754"
class="fnanchor">[754]</a> The calculations of Epaminondas were<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[p. 345]</span> completely realized.
The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by
himself with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immediately
opposed, but caused the enemy’s whole army to take flight. It was
under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on
the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry,
that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was
by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this
day probably exposed himself preëminently, as a means of encouraging
those around him, and ensuring the success of his own charge, on
which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot
in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, etc.) as a
private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry
were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself
at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that
he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian
commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated
others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing
him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him
with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his
shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and
wounded him, he plucked out and employed them in repelling the enemy.
At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear.<a
id="FNanchor_755" href="#Footnote_755" class="fnanchor">[755]</a> I
cannot altogether admit to notice these details; which once passed as
a portion of Grecian history, though they seem rather the offspring
of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the Iliad than a recital
of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent
for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield.<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[p. 346]</span> The mortal wound of
Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case
which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point
was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the
enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own
comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as
there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.</p>

<p>The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his
army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary
phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words
of the contemporary historian. “It was thus (says Xenophon) that
Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed
in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where
he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take
flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer
any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx
of the enemy’s infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites
neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the
actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy’s cavalry was also in
full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their
pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but
fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten
men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the
Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over
towards the enemy’s left with the security of conquerors; but there
(being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to
pieces by the Athenians.”<a id="FNanchor_756" href="#Footnote_756"
class="fnanchor">[756]</a></p>

<p>Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is
literally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[p. 347]</span> true,
since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing
but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained
Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army
beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the
untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave
no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas
was no more,—that the army which he commanded should be incapable of
executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign,—we
can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle-field, when the
moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone
through, and when the soldier’s blood is up, to reap his reward
in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him—that at
this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been
unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers
from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralyzed
and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this is what we could not
have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once
contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been
rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their general, of devoted
and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such
diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence
of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the
idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking
down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were
withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with
commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to
complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty,
and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph,—whatever may be
our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most
chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered
if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at
the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendency established
by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly
paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense
grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thessaly over
the dead body of Pelopidas<a id="FNanchor_757" href="#Footnote_757"
class="fnanchor">[757]</a> on the<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_348">[p. 348]</span> hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct
and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief
(and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall
short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of
victory.</p>

<p>That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to
Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of
Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued,
were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea,
and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian
cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they
too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both
sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle;
so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send
a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant
for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.<a
id="FNanchor_758" href="#Footnote_758" class="fnanchor">[758]</a>
This was the understood confession of defeat.</p>

<p>The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the
spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as
soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield
was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative,
produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of
the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious.<a
id="FNanchor_759" href="#Footnote_759" class="fnanchor">[759]</a>
He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to
succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both
of them had been slain.<a id="FNanchor_760" href="#Footnote_760"
class="fnanchor">[760]</a> “Then (said he) you must make<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[p. 349]</span> peace with the enemy.”
He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood
speedily terminated his life.</p>

<p>Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third
is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other
citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust,
shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed
as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but
the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished
in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year.
Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when
we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity,
after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the
extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as
well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.</p>

<p>The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp
proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior
was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans
gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus
son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.<a
id="FNanchor_761" href="#Footnote_761" class="fnanchor">[761]</a> At
Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch,
to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the
city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious
testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of
Epaminondas.</p>

<p>How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no
positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[p. 350]</span> so paralysing
to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt
with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing,
in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the
citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the
mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must
be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was
concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus.
The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than
the recognition of the <i>statu quo;</i> to leave everything exactly as
it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting
Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and
admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last
article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her
allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly
against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of
independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as an
admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.<a id="FNanchor_762"
href="#Footnote_762" class="fnanchor">[762]</a> Neither Athenians,
nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta strengthened. None
had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to
every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia
dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to on these conditions,
and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all, except the Spartans;
who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or
auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than submit to what
they considered as an intolerable degradation.<a id="FNanchor_763"
href="#Footnote_763" class="fnanchor">[763]</a></p>

<p>Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired.
Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything,
either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle,
considering<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[p. 351]</span>
the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected
that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and
the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that “there was more
disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle
than before it,”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of
a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by
Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance,
that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state.
Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of
suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of
Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity,
and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither
of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and
to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would
not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas
into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was
disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely
death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea,
Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the
Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an
indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted
in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain
themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the
frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the
affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle
either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add,
that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her
anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.</p>

<p>This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed,
was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field
of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only
from his verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.<a id="FNanchor_764"
href="#Footnote_764" class="fnanchor">[764]</a> He was buried on the
field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.</p>

<p>Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged
with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed
of admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[p. 352]</span> enthusiastic. Cicero
pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.<a id="FNanchor_765"
href="#Footnote_765" class="fnanchor">[765]</a> The judgment of
Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet,
is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor
was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The
best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as
Timoleon and Philopœmen,<a id="FNanchor_766" href="#Footnote_766"
class="fnanchor">[766]</a> set before them Epaminondas as their
model to copy. The remark has been often made, and suggests itself
whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt
only when we come to follow the subsequent history,—that with him
the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended.
His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from
the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion
of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the subversion
of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea (379-362
<small>B.C.</small>). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency
belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371
<small>B.C.</small>). Throughout this whole period, both all that
we know and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the
judgment of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much
more. And this too,—let it be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried
by a severe canon: for the chief contemporary witness remaining
is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds
neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of
Sparta,—mentions him only to record what is honorable,—and manifests
the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his
triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress
immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra,<a id="FNanchor_767"
href="#Footnote_767" class="fnanchor">[767]</a>—who in that
battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath
to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the
virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for
the restitution of independent Messênê, and erected the hostile
Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier,—the author of
these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolera<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[p. 353]</span>ble chagrin and
antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in
the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign,
preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no
positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every
predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon
the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter
of Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’ contains a panegyric,<a id="FNanchor_768"
href="#Footnote_768" class="fnanchor">[768]</a> ample and
unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon
his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to
avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline,
his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in
striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with
following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes<a
id="FNanchor_769" href="#Footnote_769" class="fnanchor">[769]</a>)
like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal
aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the
first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of
attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of
his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus
decided,—is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant
effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination
on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it
were so commonplace as not to require any mention of the chief with
whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is
the superiority of the first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the
earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see
that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him
from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and
from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!</p>

<p>The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely
belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing
praiseworthy in other ways,—would have stamped him as a man of
high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or
contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man
that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character
in order to compensate deficiencies in another.<a id="FNanchor_770"
href="#Footnote_770" class="fnanchor">[770]</a> His splendid
mili<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[p. 354]</span>tary capacity
was never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor
ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life,
he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses;
having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his
position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners.<a
id="FNanchor_771" href="#Footnote_771" class="fnanchor">[771]</a>
Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his
friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous
exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her
defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that
captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of
glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his
personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious
success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private
hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior
street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious
specimen of that capacity and goodwill, both to command and to be
commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination
the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen.<a id="FNanchor_772"
href="#Footnote_772" class="fnanchor">[772]</a> He once incurred
the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate
policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse.
We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political
censors and enemies,—the condition of eminence in every free state;
but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his
political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so
he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without angry renunciation
of patriotic duty.<a id="FNanchor_773" href="#Footnote_773"
class="fnanchor">[773]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[p. 355]</span></p>

<p>The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at
home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the
precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against
foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was
uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have
been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes
in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely
as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities
of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards
partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His
friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen
years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal
and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the
richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to
the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived
splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other,
we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and
conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence,
which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as
his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to
the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor
would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport
of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent
battle.</p>

<p>In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors
at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor,
nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the
expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was
second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while
the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy,
the counsellor, the debater, of his country,<a id="FNanchor_774"
href="#Footnote_774" class="fnanchor">[774]</a><span class="pagenum"
id="Page_356">[p. 356]</span> as well as her minister at war and
commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading
state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Bœotian
stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative
in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of
the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried
bluster of Menelaus.<a id="FNanchor_775" href="#Footnote_775"
class="fnanchor">[775]</a> The possession of such eloquence,
amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater
mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at
Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and
action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting,
which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists<a id="FNanchor_776"
href="#Footnote_776" class="fnanchor">[776]</a> set before their
hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To
the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans,
Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of
discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself.
He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or
wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even
determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own.
But the great revolution of 379 <small>B.C.</small>, which expelled
from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy
who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations
both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence
could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It
was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first
French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and
capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not.
As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also
disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever
he was to be found; and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[p.
357]</span> no other living man could they obtain the same union
of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking
through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the
like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas
as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman.
But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much to illustrate
the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang exclusively
from the school of practice and experience. They both brought
to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most
instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained to
varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects
than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with
reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which
the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.</p>

<p>On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended
by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his
advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power.
One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of
permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of
strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the
foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once
founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even
her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound
reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas
would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally
prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of
Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would
have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a
plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But
all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he
would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this
great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future
not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to
Greece generally.</p>

<p>Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely
anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief
allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he
is said<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[p. 358]</span>
to have indulged.<a id="FNanchor_777" href="#Footnote_777"
class="fnanchor">[777]</a> Among the countrymen of Pindar,<a
id="FNanchor_778" href="#Footnote_778" class="fnanchor">[778]</a>
devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was
more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed
by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was
reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour
of battle. Asopichus and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom
Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate
bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an
image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which
he dedicated at Delphi;<a id="FNanchor_779" href="#Footnote_779"
class="fnanchor">[779]</a> the second perished along with his
illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was
buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.<a id="FNanchor_780"
href="#Footnote_780" class="fnanchor">[780]</a></p>

<p>It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their
allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to
turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia
and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased
even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded
only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships,
all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The
vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately
succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree
the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves
to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community
in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place.
The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan
party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been
merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the
Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_359">[p. 359]</span> their original autonomy. But for
foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty.
A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into
Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled
the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable
rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory
members in communion.<a id="FNanchor_781" href="#Footnote_781"
class="fnanchor">[781]</a> And it appears that the interference thus
obtained was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[p. 360]</span>
permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent
Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.</p>

<p>The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty,
to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her
influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally
sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of
his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only
ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and
sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute
the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or
three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians
would send away their wives and families, and convert their military
population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until
they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.<a
id="FNanchor_782" href="#Footnote_782" class="fnanchor">[782]</a> Yet
he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet
abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money
for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and
the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have
been for some time in a sort of correspondence.<a id="FNanchor_783"
href="#Footnote_783" class="fnanchor">[783]</a></p>

<p>About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem,
for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of
the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious
obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and
under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to
subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals
Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 <small>B.C.</small>
Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near the Propontis and the
Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367-366
<small>B.C.</small> In other parts of Asia Minor, too,—Paphlagonia,
Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or governors became
disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain
time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian
named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who
gained several important victories over them by rapidity of movement
and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became
so distinguished as to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[p.
361]</span> excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees;
who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to
raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia,
under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that
Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a
powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open
force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous
conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted
by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father
Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted
the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.<a
id="FNanchor_784" href="#Footnote_784" class="fnanchor">[784]</a></p>

<p>Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in
Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia;
Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the
last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had
before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems
too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all
the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was
at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt,
was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination
of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief;
confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to
Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force
of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who
betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail.
Of the particulars we know little or nothing.<a id="FNanchor_785"
href="#Footnote_785" class="fnanchor">[785]</a></p> <p><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[p. 362]</span></p> <p>Both the Spartan
king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian
hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were invited to Egypt
to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter
at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public
sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was
undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities
at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out
as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian
king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as
the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared
at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large
reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in
return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But
dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the
Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,<a id="FNanchor_786"
href="#Footnote_786" class="fnanchor">[786]</a> was received with
little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom
they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed
old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops,
careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment
in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the
supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as
general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded
in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts
were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great
King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems
for obtaining money from the Egyptians.<a id="FNanchor_787"
href="#Footnote_787" class="fnanchor">[787]</a> The army having been
thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant,
nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian
forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the
revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[p. 363]</span> to be proclaimed king
of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to
sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while
Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for the favor of
the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in
spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of
Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,<a
id="FNanchor_788" href="#Footnote_788" class="fnanchor">[788]</a>
who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home
to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had
come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in
consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor
for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt.
Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated
all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against
the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as
the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of
Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay
longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and
with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents.
Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain
from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died
on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home
by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey
was not to be obtained.<a id="FNanchor_789" href="#Footnote_789"
class="fnanchor">[789]</a></p>

<p>Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and
most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage,
denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and
exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a
friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality
in this picture, there will still remain a really great and
distinguished character. We find the virtues of<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_364">[p. 364]</span> a soldier, and the abilities of a
commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in
such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant ascendency over
the minds of others far beyond what was naturally incident to his
station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity,
amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits
which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a
Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference
to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form.
But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary
corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attached to
him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal to himself.
We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally
above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or
Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with a disputed
title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander;
whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in
Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as instruments
of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of Sparta, for
himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second
to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been
constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without
following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up
the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition
was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and
for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his
measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of
Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign
coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which had been
introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality,
and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by
Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with
the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.</p>

<p>The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent
in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian
impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.<a
id="FNanchor_790" href="#Footnote_790" class="fnanchor">[790]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">[p. 365]</span></p> <p>He
was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic
Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had
imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid
against Athens.</p>

<p>The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta
against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her
near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the
truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled
to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is
greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little
reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back
an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had
been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired
the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between
394-387 <small>B.C.</small>, he displayed that vigor and ability
which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found
that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by
making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript,
he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the
still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the
time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387-379 <small>B.C.</small>
(that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by
Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendency of Sparta on land,
in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and
oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and
this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its
maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering
Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a
war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war
his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with
a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out
unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 <small>B.C.</small>, she is obliged
to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her
position in 387 <small>B.C.</small>; and the only compensation
which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans
out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed
against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban
impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing
disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_366">[p. 366]</span> out as the prominent spokesman. In
the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct
creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in
which Sparta then found herself, allowed; and though Plutarch
seems displeased with him<a id="FNanchor_791" href="#Footnote_791"
class="fnanchor">[791]</a> for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge
the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of
Mantinea), when acknowledged by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot
be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and
circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been
a gain.</p>

<p>On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of
Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem.
We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state
in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left
her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing
but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something
yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are
considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to
recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had
ever before encountered.</p>

<p>The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last
expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the
dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that
country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event
that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of
the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one
time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as
Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes
and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters,
that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the
exception of Egypt), unimpaired.</p>

<p>He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently
about a year after it, in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>), having
reigned forty-five or forty-six years.<a id="FNanchor_792"
href="#Footnote_792" class="fnanchor">[792]</a> His death was
preceded by one of those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[p.
367]</span> bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the
transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of
Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne.
According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was
entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being
held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege
to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father’s harem,
for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased
Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to
the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son
Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well
as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was
persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a
plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and
the king caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By
this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition
yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older
than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to
put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him
to take poison,—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next
as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him,—for
Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down by the fatal
consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not survive the
additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_368">[p. 368]</span> afterwards.<a
id="FNanchor_793" href="#Footnote_793" class="fnanchor">[793]</a>
He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes,
succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same
sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on
the throne.</p>

<p>During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens,
though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to
have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties.
She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the
Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of
Alexander of Pheræ to Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363
<small>B.C.</small> It was in 363-362 <small>B.C.</small> that the
Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent success
against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but
with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his forces to
the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese.
The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted
the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys;
who was moreover aided by the Athenian gen<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_369">[p. 369]</span>eral Iphikrates, on this occasion
serving his father-in-law against his country.<a id="FNanchor_794"
href="#Footnote_794" class="fnanchor">[794]</a> Timotheus is
said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to
have acquired for Athens a large plunder.<a id="FNanchor_795"
href="#Footnote_795" class="fnanchor">[795]</a> It would appear that
his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his
command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese
were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to
Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when
he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.<a
id="FNanchor_796" href="#Footnote_796" class="fnanchor">[796]</a></p>

<p>We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal
or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year,
we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and
Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.<a
id="FNanchor_797" href="#Footnote_797" class="fnanchor">[797]</a>
The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving.
Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing
strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new
maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time previously, he had
been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans
during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he
now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the
expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,<a id="FNanchor_798"
href="#Footnote_798" class="fnanchor">[798]</a> and equipping a
fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured
the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid
siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about
the end of August (362 <small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_799"
href="#Footnote_799" class="fnanchor">[799]</a> two months after
the battle of Mantinea,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[p.
370]</span> a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the
purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the
Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs,
and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this
fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the
Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with
a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes
and six hundred prisoners.<a id="FNanchor_800" href="#Footnote_800"
class="fnanchor">[800]</a> We are even told that soon after this
naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the
Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before),
where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay,
before there was any force ready to repel them.<a id="FNanchor_801"
href="#Footnote_801" class="fnanchor">[801]</a> The Thessalian
marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet
not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some
disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned
to death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in
person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and
by contract, were censured or put upon trial.<a id="FNanchor_802"
href="#Footnote_802" class="fnanchor">[802]</a></p>

<p>Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become
worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also,
who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis,
achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans,
to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the
Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That
prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force
under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_371">[p. 371]</span> joint invasion had so much weakened
the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis.
At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the
first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from
Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a
possession of Macedonia.<a id="FNanchor_803" href="#Footnote_803"
class="fnanchor">[803]</a> Kallisthenes thus found himself at war
under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his
enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear,
he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the
necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the
Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained time
during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of
performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as
obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which
never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious
truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled,
on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending
operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have
been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon
trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen;
and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home
from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of
the war against Kotys.<a id="FNanchor_804" href="#Footnote_804"
class="fnanchor">[804]</a> The people were much incensed against
both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that
Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next
day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day
had discharged the wrath of the dikasts, and rendered them so
much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.<a id="FNanchor_805"
href="#Footnote_805" class="fnanchor">[805]</a></p>

<p>Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for
Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against
Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokon<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[p. 372]</span>nesians, allies of
Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides
which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of
corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens,
but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other
places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen
competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine.
The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to
detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets;
and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the
safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.<a id="FNanchor_806"
href="#Footnote_806" class="fnanchor">[806]</a> The Athenian fleet,
guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near
the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy
for the autumnal exports of this essential article.</p>

<p>In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored
with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful
Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so
alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive
tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions.
At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in
person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was
however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed
on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the
friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable,<a id="FNanchor_807"
href="#Footnote_807" class="fnanchor">[807]</a> as to send him away
not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all
his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain
with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite
of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain
Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after
a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put
down this enemy unassisted.<a id="FNanchor_808" href="#Footnote_808"
class="fnanchor">[808]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[p.
373]</span> How the trial ended or how the justice of the case
stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of
Demosthenes.</p>

<p>Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede
Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by
Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became
necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a
second time during the autumn of 361 <small>B.C.</small> by the
Athenian ships of war;<a id="FNanchor_809" href="#Footnote_809"
class="fnanchor">[809]</a> not merely for provisions under transport
to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and
other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese
became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361-360
<small>B.C.</small>, Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of
Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont
from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;<a id="FNanchor_810"
href="#Footnote_810" class="fnanchor">[810]</a> the most important
place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont
on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The
whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made
preparations for attacking Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief
possessions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[p. 374]</span> of
Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in
his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in
defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason
involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted
Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.<a
id="FNanchor_811" href="#Footnote_811" class="fnanchor">[811]</a> In
spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens
in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed
the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers
at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.<a
id="FNanchor_812" href="#Footnote_812" class="fnanchor">[812]</a></p>

<p>The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious.
All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus,
had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity,
and had undergone accusation at home.<a id="FNanchor_813"
href="#Footnote_813" class="fnanchor">[813]</a> Timomachus was now
superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both
Iphikrates and Kotys.<a id="FNanchor_814" href="#Footnote_814"
class="fnanchor">[814]</a> But Kephisodotus achieved no more than
his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who
crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with
the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his
service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had
been for some time in Asia, especially in the <span class="replace"
id="tn_5" title="In the printed book: troad">Troad.</span> He hired
himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took
advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium;
intending to hold them as a little principality.<a id="FNanchor_815"
href="#Footnote_815" class="fnanchor">[815]</a> Finding his position,
however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the
satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian
commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport
his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he
engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This
proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[p. 375]</span> Charidemus was enabled,
through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross
over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon
as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to
recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against
her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in
greater peril than ever.<a id="FNanchor_816" href="#Footnote_816"
class="fnanchor">[816]</a></p>

<p>The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly
arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by
two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in
Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed
the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys
had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent
and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic
military character.<a id="FNanchor_817" href="#Footnote_817"
class="fnanchor">[817]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[p.
376]</span> Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired
to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of
honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden
wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the
Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.<a id="FNanchor_818"
href="#Footnote_818" class="fnanchor">[818]</a> Disclaiming the
warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly,
Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did the deed; we
only lent our hands:”<a id="FNanchor_819" href="#Footnote_819"
class="fnanchor">[819]</a> an anecdote, which, whether it be
truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of
tyrannicide.</p>

<p>The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in
the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes,
was only a youth:<a id="FNanchor_820" href="#Footnote_820"
class="fnanchor">[820]</a> moreover two other Thracian chiefs,
Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in
the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and
minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already
married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been
formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and
Bianor—and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus,
who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed
a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.<a
id="FNanchor_821" href="#Footnote_821" class="fnanchor">[821]</a>
These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial
ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to
Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century
ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for
example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian
competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first,
it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest.
He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the
Propontis, where the Athenian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[p.
377]</span> commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small
squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those
fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But
Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise
the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then
pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched
even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the
Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western
coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable
warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus
to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable,
that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.<a
id="FNanchor_822" href="#Footnote_822" class="fnanchor">[822]</a>
Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial,
and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as
one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.<a
id="FNanchor_823" href="#Footnote_823" class="fnanchor">[823]</a></p>

<p>Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was
that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[p. 378]</span> the Greek
city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus himself.
That city—eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus
connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the Athenians
as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile
to Athens—became his principal station.<a id="FNanchor_824"
href="#Footnote_824" class="fnanchor">[824]</a> He was fortunate
enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian
Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had
coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this
important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes
would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians,
in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.<a
id="FNanchor_825" href="#Footnote_825" class="fnanchor">[825]</a>
We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece,
amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than
the Greeks. Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the
Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took
them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the
father, and then drowned the father himself.<a id="FNanchor_826"
href="#Footnote_826" class="fnanchor">[826]</a> It is not improbable
that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning
intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes,
and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable
subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled
violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to
the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had
been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any
successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their
forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions
of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general
of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians
together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and
Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated
by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace
should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors;
that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to
Athens;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[p. 379]</span> and
that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held by
Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be
surrendered to Athens also.<a id="FNanchor_827" href="#Footnote_827"
class="fnanchor">[827]</a></p>

<p>This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens
the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as
done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to
receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by
Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for
want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up
their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and
constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to
the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and
indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite
of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese,
insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all
the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes;
if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures
for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of
the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing
from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while
Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting
the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the
triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa
(358 <small>B.C.</small>)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the
Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then
at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the
convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as
of Berisades and Amadokus.<a id="FNanchor_828" href="#Footnote_828"
class="fnanchor">[828]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">[p.
380]</span> And it would appear that before long, its conditions
were realized. Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course
including its principal town Sestos, to Athens;<a id="FNanchor_829"
href="#Footnote_829" class="fnanchor">[829]</a> yet he retained
for himself Kardia,<a id="FNanchor_830" href="#Footnote_830"
class="fnanchor">[830]</a> which was affirmed (though the
Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of
that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between
Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadokus; which triple division,
diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great
additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonese.<a
id="FNanchor_831" href="#Footnote_831" class="fnanchor">[831]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[p. 381]</span></p>

<p>It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of
the Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it
would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and
confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached
since the terrible reverses of 405 <small>B.C.</small> Among them
were numbered not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the
largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental
possessions of Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia<a id="FNanchor_832"
href="#Footnote_832" class="fnanchor">[832]</a> with other places on
the southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with
most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_833"
href="#Footnote_833" class="fnanchor">[833]</a> This last portion
of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal
alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as
Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of
Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king
Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of
his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling
that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a
strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally
attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more
effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens,
even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of
Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 <small>B.C.</small>,
was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta
had been between 382-380 <small>B.C.</small> Sparta had crushed the
Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented
it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most
effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were
found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its
room.</p>

<p>The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked
that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,<a
id="FNanchor_834" href="#Footnote_834" class="fnanchor">[834]</a>
lasted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[p. 382]</span> but for a
moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among
her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave
to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear
for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip
of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a
hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in
a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 <small>B.C.</small>).
At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost
hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized,
in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against
rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the
future conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence.
How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the
faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his
inauspicious eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.</p>

<hr class="tb" />

<p>At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens,
Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent
city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than
they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered
among the followers of Sparta.</p>

<p>But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an
interval of forty-four years—404-403 <small>B.C.</small> to 360-359
<small>B.C.</small>) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving
Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic
authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion.
Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, had all been engaged in weakening each
other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than
in strengthening<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">[p. 383]</span>
herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and
may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation
to which she had been brought in 403 <small>B.C.</small> But it
will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her
authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial
feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of
Perikles.</p>

<p>It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the
aggressor from Macedonia arises.</p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_81">
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXXI.<br />
  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
  ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.</h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span>
the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of
the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian
siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their
entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from
that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so
distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is
inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.</p>

<p>If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September
413 <small>B.C.</small>) excited the strongest sensation throughout
every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication
of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had
been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the
united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island,—for
all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became
decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied
with the Athenians,—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral.<a
id="FNanchor_835" href="#Footnote_835" class="fnanchor">[835]</a>
Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[p. 384]</span> of the Syracusans,
immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement
and interest. They appear to have carried on war against
Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army
contributed to the resistance against them.<a id="FNanchor_836"
href="#Footnote_836" class="fnanchor">[836]</a> But both this city
and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies
of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss
of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not
eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther;
while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great
exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone
their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which
they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last
months of the siege,<a id="FNanchor_837" href="#Footnote_837"
class="fnanchor">[837]</a> and fatally misleading his judgment,—were
so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After
paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous
auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire,—after celebrating
the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner
satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens<a id="FNanchor_838"
href="#Footnote_838" class="fnanchor">[838]</a>—there would probably
be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare.
There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their
territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the
siege.</p>

<p>In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of
exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude
towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident
persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens<a id="FNanchor_839"
href="#Footnote_839" class="fnanchor">[839]</a> could not hold out
for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion,
founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act
against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy.
In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more
numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,<a id="FNanchor_840"
href="#Footnote_840" class="fnanchor">[840]</a> which had been
friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his
expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred
of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor
Lysias), and espoused<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[p.
385]</span> the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of
reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the
citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to
be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire.
And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian
satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in
invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.</p>

<p>Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 <small>B.C.</small>
(the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a
Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from
Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and
joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean
to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under
the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum,
and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly
instigated his countrymen to this effort.<a id="FNanchor_841"
href="#Footnote_841" class="fnanchor">[841]</a> Throughout the trying
months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence
of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and
discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet
now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in
my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished.
He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior towards
those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as
well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While
the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of
Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and
breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to
the privations of their own unpaid seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus
were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon
themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral
Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.<a id="FNanchor_842"
href="#Footnote_842" class="fnanchor">[842]</a> They were the
more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and
Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than
the remaining fleet.<a id="FNanchor_843" href="#Footnote_843"
class="fnanchor">[843]</a></p>

<p>The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates
and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[p. 386]</span> single effort would
gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens
resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack
and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity
presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred.
Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting
the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried
to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.<a
id="FNanchor_844" href="#Footnote_844" class="fnanchor">[844]</a>
Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even
renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at
home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid
anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received
news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous.
They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed;
while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to
assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of
the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the
Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont<a
id="FNanchor_845" href="#Footnote_845" class="fnanchor">[845]</a>
(one at Kynossema,—411 <small>B.C.</small>,—a second between Abydos
and Dardanus,—410 <small>B.C.</small>); and at length of a third,
more decisive and calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of
Kyzikus (409 <small>B.C.</small>), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral
Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed.
In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their
seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception,
in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy;
and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the
shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.<a
id="FNanchor_846" href="#Footnote_846" class="fnanchor">[846]</a>
That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay,
advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished
them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At
Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for
Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans
made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a
vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them
who chose to accept it.<a id="FNanchor_847" href="#Footnote_847"
class="fnanchor">[847]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[p. 387]</span></p>

<p>In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch,
addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second
officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition
of the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain.
The men are hungry. We know not what to do.”<a id="FNanchor_848"
href="#Footnote_848" class="fnanchor">[848]</a> This curious
despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the
Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the
calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew
rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus
and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made
by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention
of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would
hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At
Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful
sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against
Hermokrates and his colleagues; who, having instigated their
countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to
commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down
Athens, had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of
reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom
they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.</p>

<p>It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the
defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at
Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was
transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the
armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting
against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the
armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to
choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated
at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by
the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines;
who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant
openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their
opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor
serve under, any other lead<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[p.
388]</span>ers.<a id="FNanchor_849" href="#Footnote_849"
class="fnanchor">[849]</a> But the admirals repressed this
disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city.
They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them
to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers
of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea,
which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship.
No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the
continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their
three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then
retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding
themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure
their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.<a
id="FNanchor_850" href="#Footnote_850" class="fnanchor">[850]</a></p>

<p>Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would
doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past
victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a
Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament
since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian
fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a
complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens
had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample
cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand,
as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the
sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved
and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to
any misconduct or omission on his part; while in regard to personal
incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of
Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body
of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates
had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own,
pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been
refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.<a
id="FNanchor_851" href="#Footnote_851" class="fnanchor">[851]</a>
But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit
with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause
of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even
unsolicited. This money<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">[p.
389]</span> Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together
triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration
to Syracuse by force.<a id="FNanchor_852" href="#Footnote_852"
class="fnanchor">[852]</a> We shall presently see how he fared
in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of
banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in
the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile
measures against them.</p>

<p>The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in
Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him
was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of
Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as
to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately
succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment
and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the
Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor,
young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common
enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens
after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the
destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the
plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful
defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated
democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality
of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government
had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the
causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous
in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting
intestine discontent.<a id="FNanchor_853" href="#Footnote_853"
class="fnanchor">[853]</a> But in the period immediately after
the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered
it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential
citizen named Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he
was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and
the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted,
one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the
principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore,
a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was
drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we
are told that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">[p. 390]</span>
its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences
minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief.
It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the
Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did
not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism
of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down
the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the
extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than
sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among
whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also
said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to
have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the
dominion of the Romans.<a id="FNanchor_854" href="#Footnote_854"
class="fnanchor">[854]</a></p>

<p>We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by
a story (of more than dubious credit,<a id="FNanchor_855"
href="#Footnote_855" class="fnanchor">[855]</a> and of which the
like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having
inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the
duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we
are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have
thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian
Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political
constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells
us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates,
yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates,
or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those
adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people,
after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial
democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five
or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism,
by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused,
disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of
the functions of government.<a id="FNanchor_856" href="#Footnote_856"
class="fnanchor">[856]</a> If the constitutional forms were rendered
more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have
materially changed, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[p.
391]</span> that the persons actually in leading function still
continued to be rich men.</p>

<p>The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana,
after continuing more than three years,<a id="FNanchor_857"
href="#Footnote_857" class="fnanchor">[857]</a> was brought to a
close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens.
This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient
foe of Hellas, Carthage.</p>

<p>It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year
(480 <small>B.C.</small>) which transported Xerxes across the
Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had
poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the
purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been
expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been
slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon,
in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression
left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened
between 480-410 <small>B.C.</small>, the Carthaginians had never
again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly
after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which
same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in
restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to
act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic
Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve
but even alarm to Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_858" href="#Footnote_858"
class="fnanchor">[858]</a> had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world
both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that
safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner
began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast
of the Ægean.</p>

<p>From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion
of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in
their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[p. 392]</span> scale, so as to act
powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any
internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention
during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history
of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out
a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical
government and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which
leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions
were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and
westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic
isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She
had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling
in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was
rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early
treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even
interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa
(except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of
intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they
consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities
of Latium stood in to Rome.<a id="FNanchor_859" href="#Footnote_859"
class="fnanchor">[859]</a> While the connection of Carthage
with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other
dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own
harsh and extortionate dominion.</p>

<p>All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage
and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second
centuries <small>B.C.</small>, yet it may be held to justify
presumptive conclusions as to the fifth<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_393">[p. 393]</span> century <small>B.C.</small>,
especially in reference to the general system pursued. The
maximum of her power was attained before her first war with
Rome, which began in 264 <small>B.C.</small>; the first and
second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and
dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150
<small>B.C.</small>, shortly before the third Punic war, which ended
in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than seven
hundred thousand souls<a id="FNanchor_860" href="#Footnote_860"
class="fnanchor">[860]</a> were computed in it, as occupants
of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a
peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa
was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned
at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous
population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable
city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage
itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in
the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within
the distance of seven miles from Carthage<a id="FNanchor_861"
href="#Footnote_861" class="fnanchor">[861]</a> on the one side,
and Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that
time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred
tributary cities in Libya.<a id="FNanchor_862" href="#Footnote_862"
class="fnanchor">[862]</a> Yet this was but a small fraction of the
prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth
century <small>B.C.</small>, and in all probability also between
480-410 <small>B.C.</small> That empire extended eastward as far
as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all
along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of
Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay
called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium
and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were
distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a
mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and
coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre
and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to
the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.<a
id="FNanchor_863" href="#Footnote_863" class="fnanchor">[863]</a>
These Liby-Phœnicians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[p.
394]</span> dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and
unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile,
yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but
generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient
theory to the extreme richness of their soil.<a id="FNanchor_864"
href="#Footnote_864" class="fnanchor">[864]</a> Of the Liby-Phœnician
towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been
prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and
Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two
hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as
having fifty towns.<a id="FNanchor_865" href="#Footnote_865"
class="fnanchor">[865]</a></p>

<p>A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum,
Thapsus, Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage
herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a
different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime
or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to
render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus
derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region,
Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount
which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time,
immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural
cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,<a id="FNanchor_866"
href="#Footnote_866" class="fnanchor">[866]</a> and doubled at one
stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of
Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred
and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected
without extreme harshness of enforcement,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_395">[p. 395]</span> sometimes stripping the tax-payer of
all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his family to be
sold in person for a slave.<a id="FNanchor_867" href="#Footnote_867"
class="fnanchor">[867]</a> Accordingly the general sentiment among
the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred,
which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign
invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against
such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a
species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out
from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the
cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants
(mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in
the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of
obviating discontent among their own town population at home, and of
keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.<a id="FNanchor_868"
href="#Footnote_868" class="fnanchor">[868]</a></p>

<p>In the fifth century <small>B.C.</small>, the Carthaginians had
no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward;
an enterprise first attempted in 316 <small>B.C.</small>, to the
surprise of every one, by the boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles.
Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors,
though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and
other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished
for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the
individ<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">[p. 396]</span>ual
cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of
ditch to keep them off.<a id="FNanchor_869" href="#Footnote_869"
class="fnanchor">[869]</a> But these barbarians did not acquire
sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the
reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During
the fifth and fourth centuries <small>B.C.</small>, therefore
(prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by
the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts.
For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries,
hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands
of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their
Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,<a id="FNanchor_870"
href="#Footnote_870" class="fnanchor">[870]</a> though encouraged by
honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally
averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though
not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable
force when called upon. No less then forty thousand hoplites went
forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together
with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.<a
id="FNanchor_871" href="#Footnote_871" class="fnanchor">[871]</a>
An immense public magazine,—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds,
and provisions,—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa,
the citadel of Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_872" href="#Footnote_872"
class="fnanchor">[872]</a> A chosen division of two thousand five
hundred citi<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[p. 397]</span>zens,
men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred
Band of Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_873" href="#Footnote_873"
class="fnanchor">[873]</a> distinguished for their bravery in the
field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and
silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these
citizen-troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most
part of the Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans,
etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in
language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment
to the cause in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under
whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad
faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.<a id="FNanchor_874"
href="#Footnote_874" class="fnanchor">[874]</a> A military system
such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers
got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when
the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in
Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at
the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own
citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied,
like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill;
until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar
Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.</p>

<p>Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known
are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real
working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence
were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the Senate.<a
id="FNanchor_875" href="#Footnote_875" class="fnanchor">[875]</a>
They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same
persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do not<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_398">[p. 398]</span> know, but they were
always selected out of some few principal families or Gentes. There
is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were
distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred
gentes—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these
gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again
was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty <i>principes</i>
representing the curiæ;<a id="FNanchor_876" href="#Footnote_876"
class="fnanchor">[876]</a> sometimes a still smaller, of only ten
<i>principes</i>. These little councils are both frequently mentioned
in the political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty
may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia, or Council of
Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.<a
id="FNanchor_877" href="#Footnote_877" class="fnanchor">[877]</a>
Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of Carthage to the two
kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta;<a
id="FNanchor_878" href="#Footnote_878" class="fnanchor">[878]</a>
which latter consisted of thirty members, including the kings
who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at
Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions
two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred
and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He compares
the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors; yet again
he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive functions,
and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the
state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly
of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate
as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of which
Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its
members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other
assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence
of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of
this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year,
instead of being perpetual.<a id="FNanchor_879" href="#Footnote_879"
class="fnanchor">[879]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[p. 399]</span></p>

<p>These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so
little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that
both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage
may be said to be unknown.<a id="FNanchor_880" href="#Footnote_880"
class="fnanchor">[880]</a> But it seems clear that the general spirit
of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and
powerful families, divided among themselves the great offices and
influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed
and even insolent distinction from the multitude;<a id="FNanchor_881"
href="#Footnote_881" class="fnanchor">[881]</a> that they stood
opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross
perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through
these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited,
was cruel in the extreme.<a id="FNanchor_882" href="#Footnote_882"
class="fnanchor">[882]</a> It appears that wealth was one
indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals
procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of
such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling
the citizens in collective banquets of the <i>curiæ</i> or the political
associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of
citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the <i>phiditia</i>
or public mess of Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_883" href="#Footnote_883"
class="fnanchor">[883]</a> There was a demos or people at Carthage,
who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom
propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and
the small Council were not all of one mind.<a id="FNanchor_884"
href="#Footnote_884" class="fnanchor">[884]</a> How numerous<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[p. 400]</span> this demos was, or what
proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of
knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable,
its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families
by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments
with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of
government were determined, its powers wielded and the great offices
held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by the members of a
small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which
they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the
main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well
for internal tranquillity as for systematic foreign and commercial
aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had
never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any
violent intestine commotion.<a id="FNanchor_885" href="#Footnote_885"
class="fnanchor">[885]</a></p>

<p>The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is
Mago (seemingly about 530-500 <small>B.C.</small>), who is said
to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the
dominion, of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished
after a victorious career in Sardinia;<a id="FNanchor_886"
href="#Footnote_886" class="fnanchor">[886]</a> the other, Hamilkar,
commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated
and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death
of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile,
and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.<a
id="FNanchor_887" href="#Footnote_887" class="fnanchor">[887]</a>
But the sons of Hasdrubal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">[p.
401]</span> still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens
in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other
indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute
which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon
the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so
powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be
necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators
sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.<a
id="FNanchor_888" href="#Footnote_888" class="fnanchor">[888]</a>
Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians
from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between
480-410 <small>B.C.</small> There were probably other causes also,
not known to us,—and down to the year 413 <small>B.C.</small>, the
formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept
them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great
Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter
were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as
inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.</p>

<p>It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same
quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent
invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters
to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war
with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting
parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success,<a
id="FNanchor_889" href="#Footnote_889" class="fnanchor">[889]</a>
before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war
indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger
Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that
catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The
Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred
aggravated hostility from their neighbors, for having brought upon
Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel
with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory.
This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[p. 402]</span> their present
disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident
as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their
original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands
indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity
as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could
the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and
power to protect them, except to Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_890"
href="#Footnote_890" class="fnanchor">[890]</a></p>

<p>The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic)
was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not
far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate
neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now
Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western
cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory
conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the
Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage
for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated
and become a dependency of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not
unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be
endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus
to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid
solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were
uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily,—which
had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such
disastrous recollections<a id="FNanchor_891" href="#Footnote_891"
class="fnanchor">[891]</a>—at a moment when Syracusan courage
stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian
armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera,
while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of
revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of
that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was
at this moment king, or rather first of the two suffetes, chief
executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather had been
seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon
the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished
Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal,
and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen
the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also had spent
his youth, though restored<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">[p.
403]</span> since to his country and to his family consequence,—and
from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name,
as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor
both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with
warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate
authority to take effective measures for their protection.<a
id="FNanchor_892" href="#Footnote_892" class="fnanchor">[892]</a></p>

<p>His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus,
to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with
farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to
proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole
dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the
Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse
to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully
invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside
from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected.
The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the
representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer
their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote
that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without
impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving
the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately
sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_404">[p. 404]</span> thousand Libyans or
Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been
formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse,
but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.<a
id="FNanchor_893" href="#Footnote_893" class="fnanchor">[893]</a></p>

<p>In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance
of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and
prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta.
Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full
force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order
and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to
oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for
disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans
and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines
by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and
recaptured the whole booty.<a id="FNanchor_894" href="#Footnote_894"
class="fnanchor">[894]</a></p>

<p>The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of
the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their
ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of
the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an
interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of
their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve
any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now,
had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by
a citizen named Empedion,<a id="FNanchor_895" href="#Footnote_895"
class="fnanchor">[895]</a> urgently recommended: for Selinus appears
always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any
other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the
Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually
fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;<a id="FNanchor_896"
href="#Footnote_896" class="fnanchor">[896]</a> a plea, which, had
it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal.
But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have
rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force
and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid,
which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send
them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears
by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_405">[p. 405]</span> the neutrality which
they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to
be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little
interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans
nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and
energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at once altered the
character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the
ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary
troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were
willing to take service.<a id="FNanchor_897" href="#Footnote_897"
class="fnanchor">[897]</a></p>

<p>In the spring of the memorable year 409 <small>B.C.</small>,
through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition
to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen
hundred transports or vessels of burthen;<a id="FNanchor_898"
href="#Footnote_898" class="fnanchor">[898]</a> conveying an army,
which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus,
amounted to more than one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus
extended the number to two hundred thousand infantry, and four
thousand cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering
machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western
Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops
and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay
near Motyê,—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should
alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute
his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their
city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the
period of Syracusan inaction. The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the
advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected,
sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help.
They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a
really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to
hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the
long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many
places out of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">[p. 406]</span>
repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies.
Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias
had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real
inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from
Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then
marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing
the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near
its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He
distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering
machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls
on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most
accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers
were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and
chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such
discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the
wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that
the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the
defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall,
battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength
of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially
where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods
of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared
Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries,
by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the
largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been
defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western
Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms,
in language,—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for
blood as well as plunder.<a id="FNanchor_899" href="#Footnote_899"
class="fnanchor">[899]</a></p>

<p>The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found
themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to
be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose
conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of
their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to
hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive
aid from their Hellenic brethren on the south<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_407">[p. 407]</span>ern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela, and
especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to
supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a
resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the
females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to
menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under
the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants
approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance.
They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh
troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at
length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their
way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary
advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again
or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being
accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed
with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic
population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies
were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though
their own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single
friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after
terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the
weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the
city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were
carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend
their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing
down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All
these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted
numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the
defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most
of them closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small
minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they
received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.<a
id="FNanchor_900" href="#Footnote_900" class="fnanchor">[900]</a></p>

<p>Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves
through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous,
lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscrimi<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_408">[p. 408]</span>nately elders and
children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad
details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same
in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus
manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the
pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies
of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together
in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished
heads on the points of their spears and javelins.<a id="FNanchor_901"
href="#Footnote_901" class="fnanchor">[901]</a> The Greeks (seemingly
not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these
ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the
deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines
are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken
captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.<a
id="FNanchor_902" href="#Footnote_902" class="fnanchor">[902]</a>
These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet
they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any
account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and
young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We
can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All
exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.</p>

<p>It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence
of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city
should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger
after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more
critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force
of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march
until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account
given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not
ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which
they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a
large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries
were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour
of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the
Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval
of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such
as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case
of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_409">[p. 409]</span> the like elaborate siege,—and not
reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous
foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford
to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other
Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but
thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls
recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine
days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The Syracusan soldiers,
a select body of three thousand, who at length joined the Geloans
and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in
the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by
three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the
captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went
at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive
fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian
returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic,—“The
Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must
now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended
with them, and have taken their departure from the town.”<a
id="FNanchor_903" href="#Footnote_903" class="fnanchor">[903]</a>
To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the
Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of
Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up;
moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to
return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as
tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted
such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to
be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.<a
id="FNanchor_904" href="#Footnote_904" class="fnanchor">[904]</a>
What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">[p. 410]</span></p>

<p>Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now
quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across
the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the
enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was
against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here
it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing
inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it
was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital
from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot.
Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success,
but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder
as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the
Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses
sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed
his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to
instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and
towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at
the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves
with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not
unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed
by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement.
For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults.
No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so
confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the
Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out
at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field.
Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian
allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements
were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their
exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew
the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken
by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in
spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were
incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the
Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring
hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to
cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and
slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_411">[p. 411]</span> but not less than
twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad statement of Ephorus),
exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the
haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their
ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found
themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by
Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own
defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely
turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time
against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven
back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors,
however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus,
disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate
conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.<a
id="FNanchor_905" href="#Footnote_905" class="fnanchor">[905]</a></p>

<p>Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of
her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half
their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port
a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other
Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the
Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now
got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city.
So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of
the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march
across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief
of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the
statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in
the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and
along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless
through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan
fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of
Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and
picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more
than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês
and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now
reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to
sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the
apprehended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">[p. 412]</span>
surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by
land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence
of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on
their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the
Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It
plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was
no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklês
to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off
the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the
besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight
to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the
population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely
at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who
would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.</p>

<p>Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these
unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the
feebler part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding
on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the
northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched
out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get
home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan
soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally.
Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their
departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since
it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all.
The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still
remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After
keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed
on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph
of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet
notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering
machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so
that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the
triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo
in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders
could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them
might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_413">[p. 413]</span> physical force, of
these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera,
as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes
were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down
a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured
in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by
their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls,
and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of
wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of
Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense
to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being
anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the
number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples.
A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach
the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into
the hands of the victor.<a id="FNanchor_906" href="#Footnote_906"
class="fnanchor">[906]</a></p>

<p>It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood
as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty,
and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather.
Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose.
Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the
houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having
been first stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt.
The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes
among the soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in
number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been
slain, and there put to death with indignity,<a id="FNanchor_907"
href="#Footnote_907" class="fnanchor">[907]</a> as an expiatory
satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated
name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma
(so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards
founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.<a id="FNanchor_908"
href="#Footnote_908" class="fnanchor">[908]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">[p. 414]</span></p>

<p>No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without
horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts
of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried;
that it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his
concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation,
and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded
as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the
prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been
equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the
more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human
sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest
manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to
in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods
was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were
cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the
army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the
tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and
nations.</p>

<p>In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have
been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no
examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the
more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the
events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of
ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them
been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within
the space of three months.<a id="FNanchor_909" href="#Footnote_909"
class="fnanchor">[909]</a> No event at all parallel had occurred
since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt
(495 <small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_910" href="#Footnote_910"
class="fnanchor">[910]</a> which raised such powerful sympathy and
mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens
and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to
deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities
sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within
that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and
aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general
had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer
throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering
machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities.<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_415">[p. 415]</span> The mercenaries whom
he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and
ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late
rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island.
No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having
completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian
dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on
the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern),
dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were
satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who
had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves
unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.<a id="FNanchor_911"
href="#Footnote_911" class="fnanchor">[911]</a> Hannibal carried
back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was
greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.<a id="FNanchor_912"
href="#Footnote_912" class="fnanchor">[912]</a></p>

<p>Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and
Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in
the event of a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives
for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence.
Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of
intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her
strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her
liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently
arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at
the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been
mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan
contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia.
After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was
slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence
of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals.
Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the
officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had
conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy
and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior,
was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for
the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held
out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were
now in the ascendant at Sy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">[p.
416]</span>racuse. When the banished general, in making it known
to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he
obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the
command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to
think of raising sedition against their common city and country;<a
id="FNanchor_913" href="#Footnote_913" class="fnanchor">[913]</a>
upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate
leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should
return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his
restoration.</p>

<p>The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness
of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism,
had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst
enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the
new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he
stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money,
which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building
ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure
his own restoration.<a id="FNanchor_914" href="#Footnote_914"
class="fnanchor">[914]</a> Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia
to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture
of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh
triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of
the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted
to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in
the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some
of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him
their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior
partisans.</p>

<p>The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster
at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so
we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against
Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus
unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree
of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we
are not in a condition to judge. But such<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_417">[p. 417]</span> reverses in themselves were sure to
discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and
stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless
that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in
his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon
which he marched his little army across the interior of the island,
and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established
himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as
he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had
already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh
colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the
demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened
by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six
thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers
of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the
Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.<a
id="FNanchor_915" href="#Footnote_915" class="fnanchor">[915]</a>
Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his
ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions
of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily;
for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of
mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.</p>

<p>These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The
valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the
Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently
in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding
of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this
topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been
banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing
some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing
his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was
turning towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his
return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing
the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera,
informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone
their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his
slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must
have lain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">[p. 418]</span> upon
the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on
cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them
across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an
exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the
law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates
of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some
friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens
for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their
arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an
outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left
the bodies unburied on the field of battle. “It was to Hermokrates
(so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the
Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and
the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was
now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies,
testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and
their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”<a
id="FNanchor_916" href="#Footnote_916" class="fnanchor">[916]</a>
Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage.
In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary
also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the
bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went
vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst
the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary
sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their
proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other
hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of
Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably
manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the
city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier
with an armed force under his command,—that his readmission would
have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom
of the city to a despot.<a id="FNanchor_917" href="#Footnote_917"
class="fnanchor">[917]</a></p>

<p>Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote
of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">[p. 419]</span> consent,
Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be
consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan
frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his
friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity.
We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened,
and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof
is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not
succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain
interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they
thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night.
Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of three
thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,<a id="FNanchor_918"
href="#Footnote_918" class="fnanchor">[918]</a> and reached the
concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the
rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the
main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however,
he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession
of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth<a
id="FNanchor_919" href="#Footnote_919" class="fnanchor">[919]</a>)
awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels.
Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans
within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack
until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the
Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened,
mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time
in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested
combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates
himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers.
The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon
them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their
relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised
in such a condemnation.<a id="FNanchor_920" href="#Footnote_920"
class="fnanchor">[920]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">[p. 420]</span></p>

<p>Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens;
a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign
enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal
liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt
to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and
might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support
arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign
relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years
afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.</p>

<p>Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable
name in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in
history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family
or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation;
as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate,
though essential, function.<a id="FNanchor_921" href="#Footnote_921"
class="fnanchor">[921]</a> He was the son of Hermokrates,—not
that eminent person whose death has been just described, but
another person of the same name, whether related or<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_421">[p. 421]</span> not, we do not know.<a
id="FNanchor_922" href="#Footnote_922" class="fnanchor">[922]</a>
It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and
instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of
odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished
in all the talents for military action,—bravery, force of will,
and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused
strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took
arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the
battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out
for dead by his relations.<a id="FNanchor_923" href="#Footnote_923"
class="fnanchor">[923]</a> In this manner he escaped the sentence of
banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of
a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced
as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the
leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth
while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already
passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his
daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit
to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their
late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party
lent their aid to exalt him.</p>

<p>Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled
by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to
penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they
had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents
also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially
reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This
magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know
nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing
the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but
little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness
of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate
with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued
by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies
at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion
of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_422">[p. 422]</span> projects, the Syracusan
leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to
make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be
obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.<a id="FNanchor_924"
href="#Footnote_924" class="fnanchor">[924]</a></p>

<p>In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with
destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had
been got together during the winter, greater than that which had
sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to
Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and
Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant
impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great
sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age,
and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative
Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense
host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and
Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed
across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less
than one thousand five hundred transports.<a id="FNanchor_925"
href="#Footnote_925" class="fnanchor">[925]</a> To protect the
landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to
the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and
watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes
to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival
of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of
the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet
their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth
immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans
to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared,
disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western
cape of Sicily.</p>

<p>Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All
the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with
a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to
have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The
Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks
and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be
expected, since her whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">[p.
423]</span> efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war
against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded,
and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.</p>

<p>Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most
frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were
with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first
shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began
to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as
to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending
for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body
of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in
their service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced
by eight hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal
at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.<a id="FNanchor_926"
href="#Footnote_926" class="fnanchor">[926]</a></p>

<p>Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity
and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population
was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty
thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand
males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account,
an aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;<a
id="FNanchor_927" href="#Footnote_927" class="fnanchor">[927]</a>
numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as
indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two
miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly
cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a
lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time
no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially
the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its
abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its
artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked
with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities
of the Hellenic world.<a id="FNanchor_928" href="#Footnote_928"
class="fnanchor">[928]</a> Of the numerous prisoners taken at the
defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very
large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had
been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage
or ornament of the city.<a id="FNanchor_929" href="#Footnote_929"
class="fnanchor">[929]</a> The hospitality of the wealthy
citizens,—Gellias,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">[p.
424]</span> Antisthenes, and others,—was carried even to profusion.
The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,<a
id="FNanchor_930" href="#Footnote_930" class="fnanchor">[930]</a>
which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and
equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately
preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd
Olympiad,—408 <small>B.C.</small>), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained
the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his
victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him
home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair
of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the
festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of
his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this
wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties
of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences,
not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the
citizens on guard.</p>

<p>Such was Agrigentum in May 406 <small>B.C.</small>, when Hannibal
and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first
propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited
the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this
were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both
propositions were declined.<a id="FNanchor_931" href="#Footnote_931"
class="fnanchor">[931]</a></p>

<p>Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the
Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the
strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its
citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately
above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north;
the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city,
and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills,
separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half
is the loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of
the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except
on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side
towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus
presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The
whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous
wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of
the solid rock. The town<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">[p.
425]</span> of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the
walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and
accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern
hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called
the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus
Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood
the Agrigentine sepulchres.<a id="FNanchor_932" href="#Footnote_932"
class="fnanchor">[932]</a>—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian
mercenaries, with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by
Dexippus from Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack
upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than
those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or
movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was
here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began
his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day,
he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering
train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.<a
id="FNanchor_933" href="#Footnote_933" class="fnanchor">[933]</a>
Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered
his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower
or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of
the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he
calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense
mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently
close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made
considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged
in breaking down the monument of Theron,<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_426">[p. 426]</span> when their progress was arrested by a
thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious
terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that
the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every
night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested
themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the
judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential
distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among
them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from
active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to
appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn
supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed
a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings,
to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as
offerings to Poseidon.<a id="FNanchor_934" href="#Footnote_934"
class="fnanchor">[934]</a></p>

<p>These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and
mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so
that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the
tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against
the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed
up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the
wall; but this manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were
presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which
marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum.
Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela,
it amounted to thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, on
reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine
territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along
the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town,
Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;<a
id="FNanchor_935" href="#Footnote_935" class="fnanchor">[935]</a> who
however, after a strenuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">[p.
427]</span> combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the
Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under
the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory
and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his
troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the
apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage
of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in
the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed
Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time
the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement,
the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead
them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction
of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were
inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself
would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize
the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not
sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped
to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as
they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.</p>

<p>Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum,
and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the
Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of
meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory,
were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested
escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than
remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the
part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the
Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much
was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter,
the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly
and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the
Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation.
Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the
most violent of all was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">[p.
428]</span> the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders,
seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The
concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of
their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the
generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy
nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were
stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared
only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus
was severely censured.<a id="FNanchor_936" href="#Footnote_936"
class="fnanchor">[936]</a></p>

<p>How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really
guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would
have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not
enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the
victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative
position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls,
Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however,
was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this
time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and
privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or
eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus,
with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to
harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the
greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian
mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous
demands for provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent
of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold
and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,<a
id="FNanchor_937" href="#Footnote_937" class="fnanchor">[937]</a>
coupled with entreaties that they<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_429">[p. 429]</span> would wait yet a few days. During
that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of
relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea
from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was
now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of
their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian
triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the
Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan
triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the
whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance
and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians,
while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to
Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he
had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the
Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself
also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was
even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from
the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no
longer tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately
retired, and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time
stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck
every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately
instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision
still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that
there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing
the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.<a
id="FNanchor_938" href="#Footnote_938" class="fnanchor">[938]</a></p>

<p>A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than
that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants
of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more
deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry
out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of
escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to
Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age
and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No
thought could be bestowed on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">[p.
430]</span> the preservation of property or cherished possessions.
Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through
personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind.
Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength
with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with
the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old,
the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender
or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity
abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to
survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city;
others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves
to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it
would procure them safety. The morning’s dawn exhibited to Imilkon
unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of
exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.</p>

<p>For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine
soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated
torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to
occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes.
They rushed upon the town with the fury of men who had been
struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked
the houses, slew every living person that was left, and found
plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as
well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who
had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest: a fate
which Gellius only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which
he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments
and trophies of the city,—the bull of Phalaris, together with the
most precious statues and pictures,—were preserved by Imilkon
and sent home as decorations to Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_939"
href="#Footnote_939" class="fnanchor">[939]</a> While he gave up the
houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing,
and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his
soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’ siege. The unhappy
Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality
at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission of the
Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.</p> <p><span class="pagenum"
id="Page_431">[p. 431]</span></p> <p>I have described, as far as
the narrative of Diodorus permits us to know, this momentous and
tragical portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface to the long
despotism of Dionysius. It is evident that the seven or eight months
(the former of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while
the latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must have
contained matters of the greatest importance which are not mentioned,
and that even of the main circumstances which brought about the
capture, we are most imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully
comprehend its causes, its effects are easy to understand. They
were terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm
which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have
extended its desolation to a city so much more conspicuous, among the
wealthiest and most populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving
Agrigentine population, including women and children, and the great
proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at
Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless
flight and nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders
took up their quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread
their conquests farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly
a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property.<a
id="FNanchor_940" href="#Footnote_940" class="fnanchor">[940]</a>
Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted
the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.</p>

<p>Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were
loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals
under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which
had been cast upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued
the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by
the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of
Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial
cause; for the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and
could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments
adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of
provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan
store-ships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon
which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_432">[p. 432]</span> the Carthaginian camp
and famine in Agrigentum.<a id="FNanchor_941" href="#Footnote_941"
class="fnanchor">[941]</a> The efficiency of Dexippus and the other
generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands
sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before
Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that
by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme
alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or
treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.</p>

<p>Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would
have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination
of others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver
import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in
Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the
preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now
re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more
aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as well
as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations
have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government.
Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokrates in
the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now overhung the city
in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was
convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned;<a
id="FNanchor_942" href="#Footnote_942" class="fnanchor">[942]</a>
as in the memorable description given by Demosthenes of the
Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia.<a
id="FNanchor_943" href="#Footnote_943" class="fnanchor">[943]</a>
The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet
no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume
their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of
the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their
train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both
young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of
that audacity and bravery<span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">[p.
433]</span> which even already he had displayed, both in the fight
along with Hermokrates and in the battles against the Carthaginians.
Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family, who had ruined himself by
dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding
the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism;<a id="FNanchor_944"
href="#Footnote_944" class="fnanchor">[944]</a> Philistus (the
subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw
himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading
persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans
in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily
became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the sceptre
into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several
among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as
satellites and auxiliaries.</p>

<p>Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan
assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He
enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors
and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having
betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the
persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending
peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds,
real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with
a ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible
debate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the
death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit,
the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay
hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”<a
id="FNanchor_945" href="#Footnote_945" class="fnanchor">[945]</a>
Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_434">[p. 434]</span> the Athenian Kritias, when he caused
the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was an
offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The
presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order,
and fined him, as they were empowered by law.<a id="FNanchor_946"
href="#Footnote_946" class="fnanchor">[946]</a> But his partisans
were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for
him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for
the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and
incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper.
That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open
defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the
magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual
position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or
to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone
yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having
corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous
and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical
sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit
out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could
never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were
invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station,
but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind
in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.<a
id="FNanchor_947" href="#Footnote_947" class="fnanchor">[947]</a>
His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together
with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people
against the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states
that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow
literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius,
and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot,
without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a
vote was passed to cashier<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">[p.
435]</span> the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius,
Hipparinus, and others.<a id="FNanchor_948" href="#Footnote_948"
class="fnanchor">[948]</a> This latter statement is, in my opinion,
the more probable.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">[p. 436]</span></p>

<p>Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s
progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dio<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_437">[p. 437]</span>nysius outdoes, in
fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we
read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse,
or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new
Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and
energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put
the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It
suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy
himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and
to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately
began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He
refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with
them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of
the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable
correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues,
men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet
have committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians.
But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus;<a id="FNanchor_949"
href="#Footnote_949" class="fnanchor">[949]</a> while probably
the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally,
were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going
partisans,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">[p. 438]</span> or
worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any
rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the
leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of
the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the
situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus
discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His
first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be
passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their
country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers
of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous
political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would
manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse
far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus.
His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the
proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his
party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly
returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms
with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with
party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others
the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking
to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.<a
id="FNanchor_950" href="#Footnote_950" class="fnanchor">[950]</a></p>

<p>The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished.
Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and
obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests
were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived
from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be
about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither a
body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned the
occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the
Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government
of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the
rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On
reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter;
originating the most violent propositions against the governing
rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the
public assembly, he obtained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">[p.
439]</span> a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death
and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid
the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of
his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense
popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the
Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy
oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote testifying their
gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they despatched
envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to
Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time,
with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to
accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went
thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly
entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily
expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently
return with a larger force.<a id="FNanchor_951" href="#Footnote_951"
class="fnanchor">[951]</a></p>

<p>A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to
Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from
Gela,—with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers,
on account of the double pay,—and with the means of coining and
circulating a new delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival
that he reached the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds
out of the theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as
of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to
inquire, What news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your
foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse
enemies within among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose
watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the
traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers
unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when
the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I
knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it.
For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the
prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he
tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would
consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced
to take<span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">[p. 440]</span> part in
their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up
my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their
country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common
risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their
treachery.”</p>

<p>Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd
pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in
the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual
resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke
with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed,
but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed
by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of
the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood,
was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as
by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by
the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or
tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor
did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so
powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were
incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by
the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous
guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his
partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get
rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be
tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at
once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing
emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually
assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only
one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious
victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was
achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric
was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the
partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when
his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without
any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already
overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on
Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_441">[p. 441]</span> passed, appointing Dionysius general
of the city, alone, and with full powers;<a id="FNanchor_952"
href="#Footnote_952" class="fnanchor">[952]</a> by what majority we
do not know.</p>

<p>The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his
dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the
soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the
best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense,
there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.</p>

<p>Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the
despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed
in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power
unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he
was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no
intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant
only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger
of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom
against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained
by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would
speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms
of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one
assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.<a
id="FNanchor_953" href="#Footnote_953" class="fnanchor">[953]</a> It
therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his
power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of
which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself
in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military
force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to
the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as
well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their
pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his
behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_442">[p. 442]</span> important basis, but
not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body
of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as
controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express
mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther vote of the
people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.</p>

<p>But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his
partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly
held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming
that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full
military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along
with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’
provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent
city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the
Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the
captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such
men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were
likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the
purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there,
besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general
body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to
him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.<a
id="FNanchor_954" href="#Footnote_954" class="fnanchor">[954]</a>
For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view,
than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to
Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to
be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was
most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.</p>

<p>Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported,
ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military
manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly
his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini,
he caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during
the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">[p. 443]</span> darkness,
around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned on a
sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under their
escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of
the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan
assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia
Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman
republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself
upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed
during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand
by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding
for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly
and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous
partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or
quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree,
granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected
by himself and responsible to him alone.<a id="FNanchor_955"
href="#Footnote_955" class="fnanchor">[955]</a> One speaker indeed
proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient
to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but
not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.<a
id="FNanchor_956" href="#Footnote_956" class="fnanchor">[956]</a> But
such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered,
when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the
destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words
of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance
in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned,
Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He
immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well
for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He
provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most
munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized,
regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing
army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than
the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries
already around<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">[p. 444]</span>
him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers;
choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating
slaves for the purpose.<a id="FNanchor_957" href="#Footnote_957"
class="fnanchor">[957]</a> Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the
Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer
away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and
likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then
consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering
them anew with men devoted to himself.</p>

<p>This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished
during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would
probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter
place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than
when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his
chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired
by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet
of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding
the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and
stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the
general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet
his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope
of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked
under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but
his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute,
upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both
wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and
were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people
to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the
previous public assemblies.<a id="FNanchor_958" href="#Footnote_958"
class="fnanchor">[958]</a> One step alone remained to decorate
the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the
Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought
about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates;
giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of
that deceased chief.<a id="FNanchor_959" href="#Footnote_959"
class="fnanchor">[959]</a></p>

<p>Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s
progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes
of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">[p. 445]</span> his
fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed
from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is
our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than
usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but
also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at
least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the
political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was
adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly
struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation
of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often
unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation
of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as
the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired
the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than
an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious
purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the
public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor
both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation
of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt
traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in
406 <small>B.C.</small>, must have been strongly democratical,
yet Dionysius in his ardor for popular rights, treats it as an
anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favor of the people
by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the
rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokrates and
Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or
at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich;
while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of
conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 <small>B.C.</small>,
the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy,
assuming a pretended democratical fervor much more violent than that
of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the trade of what is called a
demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring
one single vote in his own favor, and then shutting the door by force
against all future voting and all correction,—might resort to grosser
falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always
before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting,
was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">[p. 446]</span></p>

<p>In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really
available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be
preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from
time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from
time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by
particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for
amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and
never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to
the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the
case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing
protector.</p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="chapter" id="Chap_82">
  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXXII.<br />
  SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT
  SYRACUSE.</h2>
</div>

<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span>
proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby
Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less
than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405
<small>B.C.</small>, inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the
winter solstice of 406 <small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_960"
href="#Footnote_960" class="fnanchor">[960]</a> He was not molested
during this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">[p. 447]</span>
period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters
at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade;
employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for
transmission to Carthage, and in burning or defacing, with barbarous
antipathy, such as could not be carried away.<a id="FNanchor_961"
href="#Footnote_961" class="fnanchor">[961]</a> In the spring
Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with
fresh siege-machines, and ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian
territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his
troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much
plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned
to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some
plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city
and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue
of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a
present to Tyre.</p>

<p>Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for
Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed
at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered
Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing
entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to
send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the
women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated
so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their
fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In
expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave
and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the
country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against
the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the
assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and
storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once;
the walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor
placed upon so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">[p. 448]</span>
unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave way on more
than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valor,
frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing
during the night the breaches which had been made during the day.
The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in
their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was
thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected
reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the
Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the
Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according
to Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as
Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round
Cape Pachynus to coöperate with them off Gela.<a id="FNanchor_962"
href="#Footnote_962" class="fnanchor">[962]</a></p>

<p>Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to
that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his
fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he
became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his
fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The
contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place
before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks.
At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius,
finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct
attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no
danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there,
accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack
with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks,
sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously
from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from
two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies,
was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of
Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he
himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around
him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the
advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where
their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_449">[p. 449]</span> to hold themselves
in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful; or
for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.<a
id="FNanchor_963" href="#Footnote_963" class="fnanchor">[963]</a></p>

<p>Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side
of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet
in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be
successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way
into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts
on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but
reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet
unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right
did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre
never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over
the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had
been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him,
intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed
and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet
longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably
the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow,
and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions
recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right,
not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been
already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle,
by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and
his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for
attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without
fighting at all.</p>

<p>Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the
one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will
appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a
repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for
abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called
together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done.
All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard
for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in
the same position as Diokles after the defeat<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_450">[p. 450]</span> near Himera, and as Daphnæus and the
other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of
their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to
abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the
escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of
flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce
for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light
troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout
the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so
as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.<a
id="FNanchor_964" href="#Footnote_964" class="fnanchor">[964]</a>
Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to
evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he
himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All
hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account
the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina
the immovable,<a id="FNanchor_965" href="#Footnote_965"
class="fnanchor">[965]</a> as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle
or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet.
Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced
all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of
the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been
recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road
from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both
sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying
they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy.
The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any
pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment
of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very
little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich
plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous
hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind:
old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden
and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious
instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.<a
id="FNanchor_966" href="#Footnote_966" class="fnanchor">[966]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">[p. 451]</span></p>

<p>Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and
the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were
powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so
effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now
himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath
and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army.
He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only
the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans,
intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders,
might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked
that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of
the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained
in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even
to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially,
the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss,
but had never been brought into action; that while his measures
taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they
on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his
flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between
them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own
mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot
allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during
the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them
thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the
centre of the island home to Italy.</p>

<p>But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the
principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against
Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in
this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he
had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having
been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now
deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since
Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the
Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and
superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_452">[p. 452]</span> hated at once as a
despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched for an
opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing
him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries
who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and
rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of
reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius.
As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat
and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into
the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the
docks and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence
and power. They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of
Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and
valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so
that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems
ascertained that his own private property was by no means large.
The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior
wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards
died of the outrage.<a id="FNanchor_967" href="#Footnote_967"
class="fnanchor">[967]</a> Against this unfortunate woman they
probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of
Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the
same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to
return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had
witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce wrath which they
had heard universally expressed against him.<a id="FNanchor_968"
href="#Footnote_968" class="fnanchor">[968]</a> After having betrayed
his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a
flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had
been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the
just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was
now free; and might, on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular
government.</p>

<p>Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against
adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved
correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while
they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal
outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his
supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular
portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_453">[p. 453]</span> Achradina (the outer
city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius
proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the army,
and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their
projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and
suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his
best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred horsemen and six hundred
foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to Syracuse;
a distance of about four hundred stadia, or about forty-five English
miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not
at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in
possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina; which latter
(as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification
from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them.<a id="FNanchor_969"
href="#Footnote_969" class="fnanchor">[969]</a> Though the gate was
shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled
to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so
as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity
of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part
only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while
the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body,
into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the
streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion
of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its
chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming
news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy
the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius; and
being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get
together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain
by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all
his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties,
without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded
to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his
dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to
seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen,—who
but the evening before were masters of the city, and might with
common prudence have maintained themselves in it, were thus either
destroyed or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">[p. 454]</span>
driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves
in the town of Ætna.<a id="FNanchor_970" href="#Footnote_970"
class="fnanchor">[970]</a></p>

<p>Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing
day by the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian
allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers
from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their
betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the
original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated
at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius.
Leontini thus became again an independent city.<a id="FNanchor_971"
href="#Footnote_971" class="fnanchor">[971]</a></p>

<p>Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius,
yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse
than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The
horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the
most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put
down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to
any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of
all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There
was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to
render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before
which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned
his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All
such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The
superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his
rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.</p>

<p>Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius
might still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched
on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and
Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_455">[p. 455]</span> hazard and alarm of
this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which
came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was
concluded between them, on the following terms:—</p>

<p>1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions,
and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep,
besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina
may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on
condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls
and fortifications.</p>

<p>2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the
Sikel inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.</p>

<p>3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.<a
id="FNanchor_972" href="#Footnote_972" class="fnanchor">[972]</a></p>

<p>4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall
be mutually restored.</p>

<p>Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded.
Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to
her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern
shore of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to
be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security
of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push
forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It
appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina,
the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper,
which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to
have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event
however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a
way somewhat confused.<a id="FNanchor_973" href="#Footnote_973"
class="fnanchor">[973]</a> And when we read, as one of the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_456">[p. 456]</span> articles in the
treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans
shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was
also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to
his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints
against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and
Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion
at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to
Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in
dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize
by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may
fairly conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some
underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas
and Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many
points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed
themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the
despotism of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_974" href="#Footnote_974"
class="fnanchor">[974]</a></p>

<p>The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to
have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers.
The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already
there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around
Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_975"
href="#Footnote_975" class="fnanchor">[975]</a></p> <p><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_457">[p. 457]</span></p> <p>It was in the
summer of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, that this treaty was concluded,
which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to
the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to
that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year
that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at
Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens,
and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the
actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies
and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central
Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same
time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be
borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position
and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a
sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would
not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way,
to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of
Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of
effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.<a
id="FNanchor_976" href="#Footnote_976" class="fnanchor">[976]</a></p>

<p>The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress,
depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According
to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by
their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces
of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and
under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition
of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of
Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled
at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence.
No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape
Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.</p>

<p>Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the
withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_458">[p. 458]</span> would be felt as a
relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.<a id="FNanchor_977"
href="#Footnote_977" class="fnanchor">[977]</a> It had been brought
about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for
his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely
unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered
no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a
plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered
strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a
formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had
destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his
dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all
his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He
now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions
for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or
obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.</p>

<p>His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the
islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held
separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed
a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of
every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this
islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided
convenient places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough
to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong
fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.<a id="FNanchor_978"
href="#Footnote_978" class="fnanchor">[978]</a> It suited his purpose
that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons
of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his
peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_459">[p. 459]</span> erected a distinct
citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The
citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls
were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing
it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though
there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an
almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack
from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling
him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master, at the
same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign
enemies.</p>

<p>To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step
towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted
adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion
were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from
their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and
consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of
liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent
support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the
islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and
permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans
and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in
the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person
against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept
Syracuse in subjection.<a id="FNanchor_979" href="#Footnote_979"
class="fnanchor">[979]</a> Having provided houses for his soldiers,
by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them
a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of
proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed
anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and
the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command
of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal
shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By
this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well
as the former; so far at least, as any man<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_460">[p. 460]</span> could be properly called a citizen
under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new
citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.<a id="FNanchor_980"
href="#Footnote_980" class="fnanchor">[980]</a></p>

<p>Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to
have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief
sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands,
Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property
of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put
down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be
confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment.
It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen
were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius
enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general
spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans
and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not
know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries
under him are mentioned as amounting to about ten thousand.<a
id="FNanchor_981" href="#Footnote_981" class="fnanchor">[981]</a>
To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with
the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping
confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth
in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot
say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends
and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance
for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul
Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards,
prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and
of excluding all native Syracusan residents.<a id="FNanchor_982"
href="#Footnote_982" class="fnanchor">[982]</a></p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">[p. 461]</span></p>

<p>Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive
a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been
accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking
considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that
the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very
heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know.
Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from
the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five
years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property;
that is, twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.<a
id="FNanchor_983" href="#Footnote_983" class="fnanchor">[983]</a> To
what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the
amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us.
But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to
lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying
the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen
of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful
spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable
mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the
heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised
to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and
that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the
favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen
were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly
came back from Gela.<a id="FNanchor_984" href="#Footnote_984"
class="fnanchor">[984]</a></p>

<p>Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt,
there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a
watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia.
But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his
fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of
the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the
autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom
had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out
with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops,
part<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">[p. 462]</span>ly of armed
Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus. While he was
laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding
themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment,
began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The
commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations,
lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;<a
id="FNanchor_985" href="#Footnote_985" class="fnanchor">[985]</a>
upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They
slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again, with loud shouts,
free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp
to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to
the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan
Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius.
Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers
in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the
despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.</p>

<p>So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and
unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt
to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by
the lesson which he had received, after the return march from
Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned
to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his
Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus
left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp,
chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and
found themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning
exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating
Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to
Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their
force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is
not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they
were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess
themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its
appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from
all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his
impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his
chosen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">[p. 463]</span> partisans
and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must
have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants
extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to
the Greater as well as the Lesser Harbor.<a id="FNanchor_986"
href="#Footnote_986" class="fnanchor">[986]</a> A considerable
naval force was sent to their aid from Messênê and Rhegium, giving
to them the means of blocking him up on the seaside; while the
Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified
their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser.<a id="FNanchor_987"
href="#Footnote_987" class="fnanchor">[987]</a> The leaders of the
movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards
for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the
mercenaries who should desert him.</p>

<p>Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well
as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which
characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came
over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to
the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade,
brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls
of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate
fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack.
And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so
desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He
himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion;
discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death
under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by
a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to
purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary
Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed
probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus
advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the
Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this
counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris
and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was
the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting
his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was
dragged away by the leg.<a id="FNanchor_988" href="#Footnote_988"
class="fnanchor">[988]</a> Accordingly, Dionysius determined to
hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private en<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_464">[p. 464]</span>voys to the Campanians,
with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his
defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to
oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty
the possession of Syracuse.</p>

<p>To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the
assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged
defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with
his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted
to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence
of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned
themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius
as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all
farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure
broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust
and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed
about the country to their various lands and properties. The same
difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military
operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians
besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,<a
id="FNanchor_989" href="#Footnote_989" class="fnanchor">[989]</a> was
now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the
length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to
the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to
maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised
departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared
and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival
of the Campanians,<a id="FNanchor_990" href="#Footnote_990"
class="fnanchor">[990]</a> who, attacking and defeating them with
considerable loss, forced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">[p.
465]</span> their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the
same time, a reinforcement of three hundred fresh mercenaries reached
him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The
recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement,
but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still
prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends
of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it
up altogether and joining the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which
they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus
enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked
them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west
of Achradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But
he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding
up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried
the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings
to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his
opponents had retired to Ætna, where no less than seven thousand
hoplites were now assembled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent
thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the
largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys
expatiated upon his recent forbearance towards the fugitives and
decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back,
except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his
power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all
submission to his command, remained in exile at Ætna. Such as did
return were well treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually
to follow their example.<a id="FNanchor_991" href="#Footnote_991"
class="fnanchor">[991]</a></p>

<p>Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate,
and reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash
presumption (as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela),
the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding
leader, on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was
to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">[p. 466]</span> dismiss the
newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly
for his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly
faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely
to turn against him.<a id="FNanchor_992" href="#Footnote_992"
class="fnanchor">[992]</a> But he adopted more efficient means for
strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a
repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped.
He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named
Aristus, recently despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible
purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at
Syracuse. While Nikoteles, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused
the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head
to obtain for them more or less of free government,—Aristus, on
the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced
the people away from Nikoteles, whom he impeached and caused to be
slain. Next, pretending himself to act along with the people, and to
employ the great ascendency of Sparta in defence of their freedom,<a
id="FNanchor_993" href="#Footnote_993" class="fnanchor">[993]</a>
he gained their confidence and then betrayed them. The despot was
thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and
probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to
him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by
finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.</p>

<p>Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to
strike another important blow. During the season of harvest,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_467">[p. 467]</span> while the citizens
were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be searched, and
seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing
his opponents of the means of attack, he farther proceeded to
construct additional fortifications around the islet of Ortygia,
to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh
ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to
the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded
himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian
despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by
the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of
her imperial ascendency;<a id="FNanchor_994" href="#Footnote_994"
class="fnanchor">[994]</a> and by the presence of the mighty Lysander
at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.<a
id="FNanchor_995" href="#Footnote_995" class="fnanchor">[995]</a>
The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling
among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians,
the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus
and Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms<a
id="FNanchor_996" href="#Footnote_996" class="fnanchor">[996]</a>—and
whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years
afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.</p>

<p>So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were
prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted
Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not
choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms
to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian
(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the
Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities
were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by
the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as
a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians,
when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived
to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin
of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful
force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of
Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to
his dominion.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">[p. 468]</span>
Though the place was strong by situation,<a id="FNanchor_997"
href="#Footnote_997" class="fnanchor">[997]</a> yet these men,
too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he
proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to
surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation
made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do nothing more than
plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the
interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita. But his march
in this direction was little more than a feint, for the purpose of
masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both which cities
he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and
Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations
for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities.
Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear
as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against
Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennæan citizen named
Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the sceptre of his native
town,—by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself
admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt and succeeded,
but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who resented this
proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans in putting
down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then
retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther meddling. He
next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with
little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus and Katana
had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius
was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city,
disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison.
Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the
part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the
privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to
be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the
houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The
dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian
mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in
his possession hostages for their fidelity;<a id="FNanchor_998"
href="#Footnote_998" class="fnanchor">[998]</a> the site of Naxus
to the indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck
so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">[p. 469]</span> much terror
into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon
them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to
surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside
for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time,
as subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition,
and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.<a
id="FNanchor_999" href="#Footnote_999" class="fnanchor">[999]</a></p>

<p>These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the
generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread
so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides,
the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town
and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains,
on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of
Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large
portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded
the town of Alæsa.<a id="FNanchor_1000" href="#Footnote_1000"
class="fnanchor">[1000]</a></p>

<p>Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine
despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises.
He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians.
But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were
indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design
could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to ensure the
defensibility of Syracuse against all contingencies. Five Grecian
cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily,
had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a
Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for
Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the
most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade
impossible.</p>

<p>Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable
lessons on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been
well-nigh blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea
to sea; which was actually more than half completed, and would have
been entirely completed, had the original com<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_470">[p. 470]</span>mander been Demosthenes instead of
Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the
safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal
evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described the site
of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city called
Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina. It was
bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by lines of
descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet deep
in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the
summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or road
between elevated banks, which communicated with the country both
north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon an
inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of
Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed,
the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs.
This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the
narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or
summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on
the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep,
though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.<a
id="FNanchor_1001" href="#Footnote_1001" class="fnanchor">[1001]</a>
Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could
never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great
Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near
accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the
position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope
of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how
the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field,
at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half
finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward
down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same
point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how
he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from
the outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended
line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he
finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which
he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">[p. 471]</span> connected with
the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried
down the slope of Epipolæ.<a id="FNanchor_1002" href="#Footnote_1002"
class="fnanchor">[1002]</a></p>

<p>Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means
whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of
Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps
have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but
they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the
outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias
in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred
precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus
left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or
excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide
for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived
by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He
carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea near
the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê (which
adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward,
along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of
that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected
together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,<a id="FNanchor_1003"
href="#Footnote_1003" class="fnanchor">[1003]</a> by a single
cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff,
and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the
slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line
bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line,
instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice
of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed
throughout its length, to serve both as means of defence and as
permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia
(about three and a half English miles); it was constructed of
large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length.<a
id="FNanchor_1004" href="#Footnote_1004" class="fnanchor">[1004]</a>
The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labor
necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city
and its neighborhood, out of whom he selected sixty thousand of the
most<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">[p. 472]</span> effective
hands, to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones
in the quarry, while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness
to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by
smaller spaces of one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable
number, each under the direction of an overseer.<a id="FNanchor_1005"
href="#Footnote_1005" class="fnanchor">[1005]</a></p>

<p>As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud,
violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own
dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests
on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different
import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia,
a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself
against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the
people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers.
It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had
so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly,
it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between
them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had
not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with
good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed
unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in
all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst
the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve,
in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,<a
id="FNanchor_1006" href="#Footnote_1006" class="fnanchor">[1006]</a>
proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also
provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way.
Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled,
often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall
in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the
termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably
not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of
execution; at least in its complete consummation. For the defences
provided at this fort (either now or at a later<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_473">[p. 473]</span> period) were prodigious in extent as
well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit,
even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us
of ancient fortification.<a id="FNanchor_1007" href="#Footnote_1007"
class="fnanchor">[1007]</a> To bring them into such a condition
must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the
wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating
the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving
towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.</p>

<p>To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however,
was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he
meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which
purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind
on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both
towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.</p>

<p>Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change.
The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion
was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into
banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of
such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance,
and conciliation.<a id="FNanchor_1008" href="#Footnote_1008"
class="fnanchor">[1008]</a> Where the system had before been so
fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the
mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately
felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of
Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by
his express order by no means represented the whole amount of evil
which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia,
with the entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The
numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great
part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves,
probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city
and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert
and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">[p. 474]</span> organization,
but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to
be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from
their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius
had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and house-property
by wholesale.<a id="FNanchor_1009" href="#Footnote_1009"
class="fnanchor">[1009]</a> Now, while the despot himself was
inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure
that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would
neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity of
the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not,
therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the
Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly
appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly
gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians,
thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since
his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the
license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made
it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the
Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become
embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in
this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful
and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage,
the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of
Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the
tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a
restoration of the arms snatched from them.<a id="FNanchor_1010"
href="#Footnote_1010" class="fnanchor">[1010]</a></p>

<p>Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was
mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him
eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war
in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side
of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to
attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and
Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and
enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament
visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic
cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship
of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias<a id="FNanchor_1011"
href="#Footnote_1011" class="fnanchor">[1011]</a> to lend assistance,
being then afraid of Athens.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">[p.
475]</span> But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that
to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable
enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with the great
extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with
apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage,
inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum
and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines
projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become
yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were greatly
confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven
from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium), confident
in their assurances that insurrection would break out against
Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should be
announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to
Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent
plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over,
either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of
the strait. These representations made so much impression on the
generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly,
they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched
along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand
Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine
and four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes.
But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory,
a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals
farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending
that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public
vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius
unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the
Messenian soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines,
believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single
handed, went home also.<a id="FNanchor_1012" href="#Footnote_1012"
class="fnanchor">[1012]</a></p>

<p>Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his
troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them
back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace
which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_476">[p. 476]</span> Messênê.<a id="FNanchor_1013"
href="#Footnote_1013" class="fnanchor">[1013]</a> He was anxious
to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that
the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find
no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired
an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions
of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how
acquired, we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate
connection with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which
view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission
to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer
upon them important benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement
and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined
his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile
to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and
it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with
contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public
executioner was the only fit wife for him.<a id="FNanchor_1014"
href="#Footnote_1014" class="fnanchor">[1014]</a> Taken by itself,
the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when
coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate
in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible
that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or
resolution of the assembly<a id="FNanchor_1015" href="#Footnote_1015"
class="fnanchor">[1015]</a>), it left the bitterest animosity; a
feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.</p>

<p>Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request,
with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where
it was favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle
comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave
imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal
citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement
to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have
been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a
well-regulated aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted
by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a
citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate
conse<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">[p. 477]</span>quence
the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri.<a id="FNanchor_1016"
href="#Footnote_1016" class="fnanchor">[1016]</a> And even among
the Lokrians, the request was not granted without opposition. A
citizen named Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose
daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer
that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge
for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides
to be put to death.<a id="FNanchor_1017" href="#Footnote_1017"
class="fnanchor">[1017]</a></p>

<p>But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains
to establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê,
were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against
Carthage; which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale.
Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but
with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto
come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with
which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against
Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the
like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever
before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint,
partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers,
artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them
upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and
upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with
the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great
variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy
or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric
tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc.,
from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every
different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort
of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a
bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos,
palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-cham<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_478">[p. 478]</span>bers and back-chambers
of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude
into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as
superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing
their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table,
those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he
farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of
ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties;
especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called
Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that
the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation
were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and
the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled
in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers.
Helmets, spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in
indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.<a
id="FNanchor_1018" href="#Footnote_1018" class="fnanchor">[1018]</a>
The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war
in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in
amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the
downfall of his son.<a id="FNanchor_1019" href="#Footnote_1019"
class="fnanchor">[1019]</a></p>

<p>If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those
for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of
Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and
artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on
the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams
of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it
was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment
of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing
docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips
for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this
was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith
undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses,
each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building
of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the
same time put all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">[p. 479]</span>
the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair.
Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his
architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As
yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or
Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks
or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme
had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of
the Corinthian Ameinokles:<a id="FNanchor_1020" href="#Footnote_1020"
class="fnanchor">[1020]</a> it was not until the period succeeding
the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively
employed; nor had any larger vessels ever been thought of. The
Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion
and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood preëminent and set
the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to
build above the size of the trireme. As their style of manœuvring
consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s direction,
for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s ship with
the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had been
increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would
have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy
the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when
fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,<a
id="FNanchor_1021" href="#Footnote_1021" class="fnanchor">[1021]</a>
they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and
straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the
larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius
or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck
out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of
oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes,
instead of triremes.<a id="FNanchor_1022" href="#Footnote_1022"
class="fnanchor">[1022]</a> Not only did the Syracusan despot thus
equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best
days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever
possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.</p>

<p>In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in
the previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of
the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.<a
id="FNanchor_1023" href="#Footnote_1023" class="fnanchor">[1023]</a>
Their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">[p. 480]</span> sympathy
and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for
this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this
sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all
informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.</p>

<p>After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an
operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three
years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius
were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force, he
enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well
as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses,
and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks
throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was manned with
Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen
enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to
Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal
pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his
alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such
warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable
numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers
from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also.<a
id="FNanchor_1024" href="#Footnote_1024" class="fnanchor">[1024]</a>
He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an
aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery,
than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and
well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each
newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native
and appropriate weapons.<a id="FNanchor_1025" href="#Footnote_1025"
class="fnanchor">[1025]</a></p>

<p>When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step
was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active
commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time,
two wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan
woman named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus
(and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter).
The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme
vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments
of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_481">[p. 481]</span> in state to Ortygia.
Aristomachê was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot
with four white horses.<a id="FNanchor_1026" href="#Footnote_1026"
class="fnanchor">[1026]</a> He celebrated his nuptials with both
of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber
he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live
with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years.
He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius
the Younger; and four by Aristomachê; but the latter was for a
considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius.
Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death
the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these
mischievous influences.<a id="FNanchor_1027" href="#Footnote_1027"
class="fnanchor">[1027]</a> It was the rumor at Syracuse that
Aristomachê was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated
both of them well, and both of them equally; moreover his son by
Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His
nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations,
wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook.
The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius, as he seems
at this moment, when every man’s mind was full of vindictive impulse
and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real
short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among
the people; without that fear of assassination which habitually
tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bedchamber—and
that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives
or his daughters.<a id="FNanchor_1028" href="#Footnote_1028"
class="fnanchor">[1028]</a></p>

<p>After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity,
Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally
announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the
Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most
of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly
testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of
the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which
had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of
Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented
Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the
rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself
been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_482">[p. 482]</span> this ought to be an imperative
stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic
brethren, before she had time to recover.<a id="FNanchor_1029"
href="#Footnote_1029" class="fnanchor">[1029]</a></p>

<p>These motives were really popular and impressive. There was
besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten
the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public
address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks
were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory
of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was,
at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than
his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at
once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce
such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off
her yoke and join him.<a id="FNanchor_1030" href="#Footnote_1030"
class="fnanchor">[1030]</a></p>

<p>Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the
proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only
converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation
of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the
permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the
Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse
or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not
only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many
loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the
plunder was lucrative.<a id="FNanchor_1031" href="#Footnote_1031"
class="fnanchor">[1031]</a> But though such may have been the case
in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual
circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can have
been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_483">[p. 483]</span> had been long
announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal
language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand
how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less
provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)<a
id="FNanchor_1032" href="#Footnote_1032" class="fnanchor">[1032]</a>
can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last
moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring
war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private
plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required
the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek
cities in Sicily,<a id="FNanchor_1033" href="#Footnote_1033"
class="fnanchor">[1033]</a> as the only means of avoiding war. To
such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected.
But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in
the second or third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation,
suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence
which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious
effort, and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There
was, however, no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some
of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their
Sicilian possessions.<a id="FNanchor_1034" href="#Footnote_1034"
class="fnanchor">[1034]</a></p>

<p>The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius
had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as
foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the
like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than
that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the
contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe<a id="FNanchor_1035"
href="#Footnote_1035" class="fnanchor">[1035]</a> at the superiority
of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much
or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded
Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the
mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in
setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy,
and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily
subject to Carthage;<a id="FNanchor_1036" href="#Footnote_1036"
class="fnanchor">[1036]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">[p.
484]</span> cities, whose number and importance had since fearfully
augmented.</p>

<p>These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island
to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain
number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective
standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage;
whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special
occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as
soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan
border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern
coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most
intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at
Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did
not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all
Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and
put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A
frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently
committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus,
Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.<a id="FNanchor_1037"
href="#Footnote_1037" class="fnanchor">[1037]</a> The Hellenic
war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated
into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which
had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western
mercenaries. These “Sicilian vespers,” which burst out throughout
all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents,
surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the
thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were
indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the
Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of
forbearance. It will not appear however, from their future conduct,
that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily
cer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">[p. 485]</span>tain, that
such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors,
contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of
comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its
own home.</p>

<p>Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela,
Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the
coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated
arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable
that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened
by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand
men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war
which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and
the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than
five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto
assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian
settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately
north of Cape Lilybæum.<a id="FNanchor_1038" href="#Footnote_1038"
class="fnanchor">[1038]</a></p>

<p>Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in
Sicily,—Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at
once the nearest to the mother-city,<a id="FNanchor_1039"
href="#Footnote_1039" class="fnanchor">[1039]</a> the most important,
and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse
in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow
strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens
had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular,
though narrow, footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and
distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and
its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not
intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the
Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force,—the
Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They
broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves from Sicily, in
the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage.
Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and
Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with
his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among
the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of
a pro<span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">[p. 486]</span>fessed
engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the
best mode of proceeding.<a id="FNanchor_1040" href="#Footnote_1040"
class="fnanchor">[1040]</a></p>

<p>Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a
portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself
with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on
or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but
Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though
the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness,
without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.<a
id="FNanchor_1041" href="#Footnote_1041" class="fnanchor">[1041]</a>
Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with
the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers
could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and
hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the
laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth)
which divided Motyê from the main island;<a id="FNanchor_1042"
href="#Footnote_1042" class="fnanchor">[1042]</a>—or at least as much
of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both
with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close
against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled
him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period
of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to
interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending
in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general
Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of
ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in
hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to
detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however,
was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor,
yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious
impression, or creating the diversion intended.<a id="FNanchor_1043"
href="#Footnote_1043" class="fnanchor">[1043]</a> Imilkon next
made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius,<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_487">[p. 487]</span> as they lay hauled
ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by
night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he
sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His
appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight
the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared for attack
while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat.
As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his
great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his
fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his
numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles,
from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of the Syracusan
ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with
effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which
the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially
effective; projecting large masses to a great distance, it filled
them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus
arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from
the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were
directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward,
across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which
separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were
laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the
great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes,
the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort
of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet,
double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got
afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned
at once back to Africa.<a id="FNanchor_1044" href="#Footnote_1044"
class="fnanchor">[1044]</a></p>

<p>Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful
spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise
abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the
general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory,
and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê
itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in
a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length
completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_488">[p. 488]</span> assault. While the
catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing
themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to
shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on
wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above
the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means
of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the
walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men
protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding
burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down
upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the
woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration
was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however,
the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the
besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But
the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses
behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that
a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be
undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could
not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence
of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach.
Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden
platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march
along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage,
and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately,
prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of
them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground,
by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this
desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers,
yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted,
while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every
evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night’s repose,
renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy
into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he on one
fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus
with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences.
This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the
half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position
within the town before re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">[p.
489]</span>sistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes,
discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The
main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial
earth-way to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried,
in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after
it had become hopeless.<a id="FNanchor_1045" href="#Footnote_1045"
class="fnanchor">[1045]</a></p>

<p>The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not
merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by
antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere,
gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They
butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children,
without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the
slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired
to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and
thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from
slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite
the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step,
which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained
from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors
now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments,
and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of
active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to
them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils
of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those
who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to
Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the
surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more
cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among
them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;<a id="FNanchor_1046"
href="#Footnote_1046" class="fnanchor">[1046]</a> a specimen of
the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic
neighbors and enemies.</p>

<p>The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer,
Dionysius now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a
Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a
large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the
command of his brother Leptines; who was in<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_490">[p. 490]</span>structed to watch for the arrival of
any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the
neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against
these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended
themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through
a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp, with
many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the
two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius
himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced
the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other
permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the
neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.<a id="FNanchor_1047"
href="#Footnote_1047" class="fnanchor">[1047]</a></p>

<p>Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of
Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy
of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force,
collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and
the Western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate
of Timæus, to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in
Sicily by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations
of Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse,
four hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six
hundred transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his
spies at Carthage,<a id="FNanchor_1048" href="#Footnote_1048"
class="fnanchor">[1048]</a> even among men of rank and politicians,
to apprise him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to
obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended
to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only
when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the
place of rendezvous.<a id="FNanchor_1049" href="#Footnote_1049"
class="fnanchor">[1049]</a> The transports made directly for that
port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the
ships of war approached the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">[p.
491]</span> harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the coast
to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting
some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was
found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate
enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost
vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus.
He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men,
and two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached
the port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the
ships of war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian
general led them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany
him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at
heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to
Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which
he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out
obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in
the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families
and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less
motive for stout defence.<a id="FNanchor_1050" href="#Footnote_1050"
class="fnanchor">[1050]</a></p>

<p>Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so
much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised
to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he
was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers,
elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a
general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous,
resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and
he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have
been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with
him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their
abode in the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them
with better homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his
offers; some (among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume
their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing
now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but
Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from
Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with
him;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">[p. 492]</span> a result
of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike
preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a
wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not
sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been
dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak
against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_1051"
href="#Footnote_1051" class="fnanchor">[1051]</a></p>

<p>Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to
reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished
by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê
in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and
untouched,—so little prepared for attack that its walls were not
in good repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther
enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.<a
id="FNanchor_1052" href="#Footnote_1052" class="fnanchor">[1052]</a>
Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his
fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made
terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and
at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid
march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many
of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a
host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium
or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence
prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among
the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should
one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to
carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians,
persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent
out their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose
his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops
on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor
of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the
defenders. A north wind so fa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">[p.
493]</span>vored the advance of the ships, that they entered the
harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost unguarded.
The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened back,
but were too late;<a id="FNanchor_1053" href="#Footnote_1053"
class="fnanchor">[1053]</a> while Imilkon himself also, pushing
forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected
parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population
fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the
neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian
territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels;
while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into
the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the
Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.<a id="FNanchor_1054"
href="#Footnote_1054" class="fnanchor">[1054]</a></p>

<p>Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the
Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly
defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both
imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally,
and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But
most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic
general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the
preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing
but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He
ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly
burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to
have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything
but ruins, without a trace of human residence.<a id="FNanchor_1055"
href="#Footnote_1055" class="fnanchor">[1055]</a><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_494">[p. 494]</span> He received adhesion
and reinforcements from most of the Sikels<a id="FNanchor_1056"
href="#Footnote_1056" class="fnanchor">[1056]</a> of the interior,
who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before,
but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan
despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with
their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape
from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to
the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated
among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek
colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration
was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of
Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong
eminence of Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning
of the city afterwards known as Tauromenium.<a id="FNanchor_1057"
href="#Footnote_1057" class="fnanchor">[1057]</a> Magon was sent with
the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.</p>

<p>Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê,
exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence
on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he
was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had
planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called
Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his
chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications
of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts,
wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile
plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more
than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and
eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding,
he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior
to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he
could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had
become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and
eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary
proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes
in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible
among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part
of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_495">[p. 495]</span> for special occasions,
and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched envoys to Sparta,
soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary auxiliaries.
Having thus provided the best defence that he could through the
territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana,
having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately off
shore.</p>

<p>Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now
moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast
along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while
Imilkon intended himself to march with the land force on shore,
keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support.
But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden
eruption took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the
mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the
shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit
with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated
his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was
unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon
was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of
this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching
northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately.
The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of
five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not
strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished
with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars.
But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to
coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval warfare
counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships,
and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy’s
means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian
land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to
attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the
battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though ordered by Dionysius
to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his
inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and even with temerity;
advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and
being apparently farther out to sea than the enemy. His bravery
at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the headmost
ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_496">[p. 496]</span> presently closed around him, and after
a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and
hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward.
His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat,
were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either
landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the
Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than a hundred of the
Syracusan ships, with twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or
destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on
spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But
the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or
drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore
who could render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed,
both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors,
the Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen,
either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet
their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it
proved, was dearly purchased.</p>

<p>Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged,
yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate
orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to
Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining
shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up
on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as
visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to
his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced
to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for
several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather
would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead
of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired
land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been
in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to
run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their
landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for
the arrival of Imilkon.<a id="FNanchor_1058" href="#Footnote_1058"
class="fnanchor">[1058]</a> The latter, after no very long interval,
came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians
were now<span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">[p. 497]</span> again
in coöperation. While allowing his troops some days of repose and
enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna,
inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and
join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Entella were living
in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently
testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them
an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war,
to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less
than of Carthaginians.<a id="FNanchor_1059" href="#Footnote_1059"
class="fnanchor">[1059]</a> The Campanians of Ætna would gladly have
complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining
him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of
Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.</p>

<p>Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his
army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action
without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing
better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation.
Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him
to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either
assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join
battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first,
Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently
reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the
victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess
himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently
succeeded at Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his
original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of
his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them
quitted him at once. Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have
no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not
to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messênê;
for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the
fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the
stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_498">[p. 498]</span> very act of landing,
if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can
judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the
hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He
nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only
much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies.
He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and
to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent
supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_1060"
href="#Footnote_1060" class="fnanchor">[1060]</a> Polyxenus, his
brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with
such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space
of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the
Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.<a id="FNanchor_1061" href="#Footnote_1061"
class="fnanchor">[1061]</a></p>

<p>Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops
after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse
both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet
into the Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above
even that of the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first
exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force.<a id="FNanchor_1062"
href="#Footnote_1062" class="fnanchor">[1062]</a> Two hundred and
eight ships of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and
adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were
followed by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and
one thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The
total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand,
covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.<a id="FNanchor_1063"
href="#Footnote_1063" class="fnanchor">[1063]</a> The numerous
land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his
head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile
and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order
of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of
war also, being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">[p. 499]</span>
divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each, showed themselves
in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on each side of the
connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land) wherein the
Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans
to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.</p>

<p>Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his
own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and
allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited
plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as
essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would
be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he
constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern
entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where
Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor,
midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at
the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp,
near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which
were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs
around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating
Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was
able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his
transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for
the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.</p>

<p>It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city
by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of
Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that
city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis,
wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê,
which he stripped of their rich treasures.<a id="FNanchor_1064"
href="#Footnote_1064" class="fnanchor">[1064]</a> But if such<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_500">[p. 500]</span> was his plan, he soon
abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing
the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however,
was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not,
like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to
stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left
arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make
out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of
Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall
along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the
northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor
and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ;
so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around
remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus
at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus
and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new
fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of
Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification,
which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding
the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations
of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two
sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were
found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much
stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle,
yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude
their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and
Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons
to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while
several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of
shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly
raised their spirits.</p>

<p>One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was
absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to
Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans
suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into
their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from
their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans
equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with
numbers decidedly superior, and completely<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_501">[p. 501]</span> defeated them. They captured the
admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to
the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the
enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to
their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.</p>

<p>This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion,
that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still
farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan
public with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our
enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under
him any longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which
largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened
by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to
extort freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually
appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two
hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously
taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself
returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was
forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the
recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous
confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a
close.</p>

<p>It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have
occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we
may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters
of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was
ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like
passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless
much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the
assembly, when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was
a Horseman or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city,
of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering
boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to
proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom,
which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to
utter privately and were well known to feel.<a id="FNanchor_1065"
href="#Footnote_1065" class="fnanchor">[1065]</a></p> <p><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_502">[p. 502]</span></p> <p>Diodorus in
his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself,
or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodôrus.
The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and
are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an
emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding
with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his
dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a
worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be
satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties
and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has
pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or
banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by
wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given
the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He
has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to
keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel
against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other
mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise
his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused
our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate
him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and
rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice.
He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has
compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now
employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”<a id="FNanchor_1066"
href="#Footnote_1066" class="fnanchor">[1066]</a></p> <p><span
class="pagenum" id="Page_503">[p. 503]</span></p> <p>“If the conduct
of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no
better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and
Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered
Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced
to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors
of Naxus and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic
Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked
the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at
Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage.
He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana,
instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our
fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep
his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious
Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on
shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them, if they
tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war,
altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely,
indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors
of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection
to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly
unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent
experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with
inferior numbers.</p>

<p>“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus),
in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now
abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion,
let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he
will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms,
and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The
assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own
citizens,—or from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the
presidents of all Greece.”</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">[p. 504]</span></p>

<p>Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to
Theodôrus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice
of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the
charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner
of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several
which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient
knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his
dealing with the Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and
bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his
dominion over them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which
coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and
which we have no ground for contesting.</p>

<p>Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this
harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words,
Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta,
against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus
ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were
now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas.
That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus.
Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards
Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was
adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier
period of her history.<a id="FNanchor_1067" href="#Footnote_1067"
class="fnanchor">[1067]</a> Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even
expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus,
and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian
city in Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_1068" href="#Footnote_1068"
class="fnanchor">[1068]</a> Bitterly indeed were they disappointed.
Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly
as those of the Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the
Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.<a id="FNanchor_1069"
href="#Footnote_1069" class="fnanchor">[1069]</a> Accordingly
Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition
just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot;
intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius
against the Carthaginians,—not to put down<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_505">[p. 505]</span> the dominion of Dionysius. To the
Syracusans this declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw
plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would
have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also
the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented
on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous
year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence,
not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius,
thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous
and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his
person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a
free spokesman was heard.<a id="FNanchor_1070" href="#Footnote_1070"
class="fnanchor">[1070]</a> And he was thus enabled to dismiss
an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten
the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for
Syracuse.</p>

<p>During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse
had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware
that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be
left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander,
with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own
hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can
be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been
so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians
without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within.
Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the
people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened
Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril.
The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his
instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing
policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between
the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued
throughout the Grecian world.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">[p. 506]</span></p>

<p>Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been
assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove
to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and
demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to
his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the
lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of
all aids for building up his full power anew.</p>

<p>It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter
and Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon
had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the
piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which
now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The
divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us<a
id="FNanchor_1071" href="#Footnote_1071" class="fnanchor">[1071]</a>)
by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of
the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of
autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer
had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the
Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning
sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence. These
unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the
troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans,
who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily
sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with which it spread
from man to man,—and the countless victims which it speedily
accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed, the worst
days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 <small>B.C.</small> Care
and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became
impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable
agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and fifty
thousand unburied bodies.<a id="FNanchor_1072" href="#Footnote_1072"
class="fnanchor">[1072]</a> The military strength of the
Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visita<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_507">[p. 507]</span>tion. Far from being
able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend
themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans;
who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens)
were themselves untouched by the distemper.<a id="FNanchor_1073"
href="#Footnote_1073" class="fnanchor">[1073]</a></p>

<p>Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly
visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous
attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the
opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he
made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the
city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a
simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and
land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines,
with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body
of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing
forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when
he surprised Plemmyrium<a id="FNanchor_1074" href="#Footnote_1074"
class="fnanchor">[1074]</a>), and making a circuit until he came, on
the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on
the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first
despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand
mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops
had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged
in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them
up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same
time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades
and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been
made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving
their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.<a
id="FNanchor_1075" href="#Footnote_1075" class="fnanchor">[1075]</a>
We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising<span
class="pagenum" id="Page_508">[p. 508]</span> to Dionysius from his
mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are
here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying
it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a
fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of
deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed
to keep them under his command.</p>

<p>In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could
afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own
attack, first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the
naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success.
While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were
striving to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came
forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the
ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and
moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get
aboard to put them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and
quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed,
drove against them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the
line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off,
and the best ships were thus speedily disabled.<a id="FNanchor_1076"
href="#Footnote_1076" class="fnanchor">[1076]</a> Following up their
success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or
forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted
Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land,
the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through
the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled
up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and
triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the
flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently
to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this
terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard;
while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the
cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval
station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.</p>

<p>Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval
resources<span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">[p. 509]</span> of the
Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing
Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land.
But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across
the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and
stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen
towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen.
The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children,
and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and
stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near
twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the
same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much
excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they
could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where
they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and
towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire.
The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans
victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of
Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though
they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at
Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive
defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected
and deplorable condition.</p>

<p>On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen
the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum
and near Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon,
copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence
of Demosthenes, had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great
Harbor, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and
while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily
accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him
that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable;
yet nowise impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others,
in his army, and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had
he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias,
or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which
ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best
measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret
envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to
him the sum of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">[p. 510]</span>
three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition
of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested.
Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed
any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit
the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The
sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to
Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of
Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius.
During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians,
put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy
flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the
Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but
also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They
overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the
rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.</p>

<p>Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of
the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and
unavailing,—applied himself with earnest activity to act against
the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his
troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight
of Imilkon speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with
astonishment and consternation. No command,—no common cause,—no
bond of union,—now remained among this miscellaneous host, already
prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being
near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at
once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they
passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred
the like escape to others. Amidst the general dispersion of the
abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the
passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The
Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken
resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to him their
service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among
his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being
stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were
probably sold as slaves.<a id="FNanchor_1077" href="#Footnote_1077"
class="fnanchor">[1077]</a></p>

<p>The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat
in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">[p. 511]</span> the face of
desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at
Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners
of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he insured a safe
retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for
him only a short prolongation of life amidst the extreme of ignominy
and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his
army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless
family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to
the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known.
Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was
suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and the
citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated
commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of
a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a
slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his
impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans,
who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the
temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the
inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and
then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved
himself to death.</p>

<p>But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his
decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh
and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any
moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been
in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection;
but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate
betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom
lived to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on
this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in
congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which
is said to have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They
established their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a
short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so
much stronger in the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged
to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the
star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever.
The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency,
believing themselves to be under the wrath<span class="pagenum"
id="Page_512">[p. 512]</span> of the goddesses Demeter and her
daughter Persephonê; who, not content with the terrible revenge
already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon,
were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious
terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the
offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods
had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice
of human victims,—and those too the most precious, such as beautiful
captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion,
the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be
made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians
had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Demeter or
Persephonê; they now established temples in honor of these goddesses,
appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and
consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship
most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared
their own consciences, they devoted themselves to the preparation of
ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon
found that Demeter and Persephonê were not implacable, and that the
fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first
irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about
the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of
provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia.
From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted
away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where
they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission,
between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as
they had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her
disastrous reverses.<a id="FNanchor_1078" href="#Footnote_1078"
class="fnanchor">[1078]</a></p>

<p>But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored,
in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she
could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left
at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the
Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful
against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be
recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.</p>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="footnotes">

<h2>FOOTNOTES</h2>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1"><a href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span>
It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ εἰρήνη—Isokrates,
of αἱ συνθῆκαι.
</p>
<p>
Though we say, the peace <i>of</i> Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου
εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it with the genitive
case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_2"><a href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span>
Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23; and his
Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!... Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_3"><a href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_4"><a href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span>
The restoration of these three islands forms the basis of historical truth
in the assertion of Isokrates, that the Lacedæmonians were so subdued by
the defeat of Knidus, as to come and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν
δώσοντας) Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.);
s. 83. But the assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been enfeebled
and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before (Xenoph.
Hellen. vii. 1, 3).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_5"><a href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 111.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_6"><a href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος παρεῖναι
<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι</em>, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες
παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα</em>,
ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·
</p>
<p>
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς <em class="gesperrt">νομίζει δίκαιον</em>, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι,
καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ
μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ
ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, <em class="gesperrt">τούτοις ἐγὼ
πολεμήσω</em>, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ
χρήμασιν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_7"><a href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν (the
Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι,
πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.
</p>
<p>
The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380 <small>B.C.</small>, seven
years afterwards) from which I here copy, is the best evidence of the feelings
with which an intelligent and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty
at the time; when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time to
see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other orations, though
valuable and instructive, were published later, and represent the feelings of
after-time.
</p>
<p>
Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245 D), stigmatizes
severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering
Greeks to the foreigner,” and asserts that the Athenians resolutely
refused to sanction it. This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting
the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_8"><a href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μηδεμίαν
ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, <em class="gesperrt">προστάγματα καὶ οὐ συνθήκας</em> εἶναι, etc. (s.
213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς <em class="gesperrt">ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης</em>, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι
κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.
</p>
<p>
The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of Xenophon
(put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at Sparta), respecting
the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν <em class="gesperrt">Βασιλεὺς
προσέταττεν</em> αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_9"><a href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ διαλύειν ταύτας
τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος
καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν, ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες
αὐτήν;
</p>
<p>
The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus (whether
it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot be certain—see
Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position taken by Artaxerxes in
reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which
implies the peremptory decision of an official judge, analogous to
another passage (139) of the Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός
(Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου κύριος
ἐγένετο, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε</em>, καὶ τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης
καθέστηκεν;</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_10"><a href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span>
Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες
τὴν Ἑλλάδα.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_11"><a href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span>
Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses himself in terms
of bitter and well-merited indignation of this peace,—“if indeed (says he)
we are to call this ignominy and betrayal of Greece by the name of <i>peace</i>,
which brought with it as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta
(he says) lost her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.
</p>
<p>
It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate Agesilaus from
any share in the peace. From the narrative (in Xenophon’s Hellenica,
v. i, 33) of his conduct at the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused
it most warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7) takes
credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was true, from the year <small>B.C.</small>
396 to <small>B.C.</small> 394. But in <small>B.C.</small> 387, at the time of the peace of Antalkidas,
he had become μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
of Thebes.
</p>
<p>
See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing the disgraceful
position of the Greek cities at a later time in calling in Philip of Macedon
as arbiter; a passage not less applicable to the peace of Antalkidas;
and perhaps borrowed from Theopompus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_12"><a href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span>
Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt from Darius
king of Persia about 500 <small>B.C.</small>, had implored the aid of Sparta (Herodot. v,
49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος
μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, <em class="gesperrt">ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος</em>.
</p>
<p>
How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of Antalkidas!
and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus himself if he
could have heard of the latter event!</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_13"><a href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων
τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων <em class="gesperrt">καὶ βαρβάρων</em>, εἴ ποθέν τινα <em class="gesperrt">ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων</em>
δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (<em class="gesperrt">ἀνεπίφθονον</em> δὲ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων
ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον <em class="gesperrt">ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους</em> προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι),
etc. Compare also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_14"><a href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_15"><a href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span>
See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.
</p>
<p>
Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33, p. 666)
attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians of his time, about
this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior.
Libertate, c. 13, p. 199, where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by
Athens with Persia in 449 <small>B.C.</small>, in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas,
contracted under the auspices of Sparta.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_16"><a href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span>
This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 167-173.
In this passage, however, he distributes his blame too equally between
Sparta and Athens, whereas the blame belongs of right to the former, in
far greater proportion. Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the
Great King, and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point of selfishness
and subservience. Athens is guilty of following the bad example of
her rival, but to a less extent, and under greater excuse on the plea of necessity.
</p>
<p>
Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting the various
acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν
ἡμετέρους <em class="gesperrt">ὀψιμαθεῖς</em> αὐτῶν γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ <em class="gesperrt">τὰ μὲν πρώτους,
τὰ δὲ μόνους</em>, ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which
is much nearer the truth than the passage before referred to.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_17"><a href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span>
Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_18"><a href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span>
Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἕξουσιν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_19"><a href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_20"><a href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_21"><a href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span>
Herodot. viii, 143.
</p>
<p>
The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys, of the
reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of refusal to Alexander
(viii, 144), are not less impressive than the answer itself.
</p>
<p>
But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the Spartans
in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read in contrast with it
that speech which their envoys address to the Athenians, in order to induce
the latter to stand out against the temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_22"><a href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span>
The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets forth emphatically
the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive principles, on which
it becomes Sparta to model her public conduct,—as altogether different
from the simple considerations of prudence and security which are suitable
to humbler states like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105,
106, 110).
</p>
<p>
Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities of the
convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by superior force, but
both originally sued out, and finally enforced by her, for her own political
ends.
</p>
<p>
Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about the dissension
of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful effects.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_23"><a href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.
</p>
<p>
Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες οἱ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, <em class="gesperrt">πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο</em> ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· <em class="gesperrt">προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς
ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης</em> καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν
ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_24"><a href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ
καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι
πόλεσι <em class="gesperrt">μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ
αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται</em>.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_25"><a href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_26"><a href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span>
Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.
</p>
<p>
It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date between
414-411 <small>B.C.</small>; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh, Manetho und die
Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and Ley, Fata et Conditio
Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.</p>
<p>
M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places the
revolt rather earlier, about 414 <small>B.C.</small>; and Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen.
Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same date.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_27"><a href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 35.
</p>
<p>
This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above cited,
p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the list of Manetho,
under a different name. It is also possible, however, that he may have
been king over a part of Egypt, contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_28"><a href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_29"><a href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span>
This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ Iphicratis,
Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on very probable grounds,
principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_30"><a href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 2, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_31"><a href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 21; Pausanias,
ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.
</p>
<p>
The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of Evagoras,
seems to have related many legendary tales respecting the Greek Gentes in
Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon himself as ultimately migrating
to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed. Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap.
Photium).
</p>
<p>
The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus. See
the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_32"><a href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span>
Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the Phœnicians
(vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 <i>seq.</i>), attempts to establish the existence of an
ancient population in Cyprus, called Kitians; once extended over the
island, and of which the town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes
them to have been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus he
reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these natives. He
supposes the Kilikian population to have been in early times Canaanitish
also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166) inclines to admit the same hypothesis
as highly probable.
</p>
<p>
The sixth century <small>B.C.</small> (from 600 downwards) appears to have been very
unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe pressure from
the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the Jews. During the same
period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was greatly extended, especially
by the reign of the Phil-hellenic Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus.
Much of the Grecian immigration into Cyprus probably took place
at this time; we know of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to
Soli, under the assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 <i>seq.</i>).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_33"><a href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span>
Herodot. v, 109.
</p>
<p>
Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and arms
of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental (vii, 90). The
Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v, 113); as the Carthaginians
did, before they learnt the art of training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch,
Timoleon, c. 27).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_34"><a href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span>
See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_35"><a href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span>
One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the Phœnician
name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_36"><a href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span>
We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v, 104-114,
with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_37"><a href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.
</p>
<p>
Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) <em class="gesperrt">τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην</em>, καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων
ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ
χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.
</p>
<p>
Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε
καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι βελτίστους οἵ <em class="gesperrt">τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς
τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι</em> τυγχάνοιεν, etc.
</p>
<p>
This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the oration of
Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the visit of the latter to
Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς
ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν
αἰκίσματα, <em class="gesperrt">οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος</em> ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).
</p>
<p>
Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of this
narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor do I myself
see any, for this contradiction.
</p>
<p>
Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and family
at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis,
Or. xix, s. 38).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_38"><a href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span>
Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus (xiv, 98)
calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both are correct, and that
he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had migrated from Salamis during the
Athenian preponderance there. There were Kitians, not natives of the
town of Kition, but belonging to the ancient population of the island, living
in the various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_39"><a href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 33;
Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot. Diodor. xiv, 98.
</p>
<p>
The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which Isokrates
does not specify.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_40"><a href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_41"><a href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγόμενος
ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_42"><a href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span>
Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν,
καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, <em class="gesperrt">νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας</em> κολάζων
(s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν
τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα τὴν νῆσον, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα</em>
προήγαγεν, etc.; compare s. 81.
</p>
<p>
These epithets, <i>lawful</i> punishment, <i>mild</i> dealing, etc., cannot be fully understood
except in contrast with the mutilations alluded to by Lysias, in
the passage cited in a note on page 16, above; also with exactly similar
mutilations, mentioned by Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders
by Cyrus the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν
(says Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι
τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_43"><a href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.
</p>
<p>
The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless be
founded in truth, as the result shows.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_44"><a href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span>
Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_45"><a href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span>
Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_46"><a href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or. xix, (De Aristoph.
Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_47"><a href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span>
Isokrates, <i>l. c.</i> παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.
</p>
<p>
For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying times
consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.
</p>
<p>
The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young woman
of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an Athenian
named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold her to the despot of
Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being threatened with prosecution for
this act before the Athenian Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought
her back to Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince,
and punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune to
escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261; Tzetzes, Chiliad.
vi, 367).
</p>
<p>
How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no means
of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the Athenian maidens,
who had no dowry at home, were provided for by their relatives elsewhere.
Probably Andokides took this young woman out, under the engagement to find
a Grecian husband for her in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for
his own profit to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having
so sold her.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_48"><a href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span>
This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias, given by
Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).
</p>
<p>
Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot) recounted
the causes which brought about the war between the Persian king
and Evagoras.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_49"><a href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον (Evagoras) οὕτως
ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), <em class="gesperrt">ὥστε μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ</em>, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν
ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ <em class="gesperrt">ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν</em> (<i>i. e.</i> Evagoras).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_50"><a href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span>
Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus, Frag. 134,
ed. Didot.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_51"><a href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span>
Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 479,
s. 84.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_52"><a href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.
</p>
<p>
We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the king of
Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to Athens, concluded by
Perikles about 449 <small>B.C.</small>, and called the peace of Kallias. It was, therefore,
neither a new demand on the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on
the part of the Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_53"><a href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 2.
</p>
<p>
It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of Hekatomnus
for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).
</p>
<p>
About 380 <small>B.C.</small>, Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely dependent
in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the first opportunity
(Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_54"><a href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_55"><a href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_56"><a href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span>
Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with Isokrates, Or.
ix, (Evag.) s. 77.
</p>
<p>
The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of Kilikia was
still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the Panegyrical Oration. At
that time, Evagoras had maintained the contest six years, counting either
from the peace of Antalkidas (387 <small>B.C.</small>) or from his naval defeat about a
year or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite clear from
what point of commencement he reckons the six years.
</p>
<p>
We know that the war between the king of Persia and Evagoras had
begun as early as 390 <small>B.C.</small>, in which year an Athenian fleet was sent to
assist the latter (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus
state that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the conclusion of it in
380 or 379 <small>B.C.</small>, soon after the date of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates.
I dissent on this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad annos 387-376
<small>B.C.</small>, and his Appendix, No. 12—where the point is discussed). He
supposes the war to have begun after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have
ended in 376 <small>B.C.</small> I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority of Xenophon,—or
at least only to evade the necessity of contradicting him by resorting to
an inconvenient hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian expeditions
sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390 <small>B.C.</small>, next in 388 <small>B.C.</small>,
as relating to “<i>hostile measures before the war began</i>” (p. 280). To me it appears
more natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the war.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_57"><a href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_58"><a href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span>
Diodor. xv. 8, 9.
</p>
<p>
This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the part of
Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit on the authority
of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice a morsel for a panegyrical
discourse such as that of Isokrates, that one cannot but think he would
have inserted it had it come to his knowledge. His silence causes great
surprise—not without some suspicion as to the truth of the story.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_59"><a href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must be more true
of Evagoras than of Nikokles.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_60"><a href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 138.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_61"><a href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span>
Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_62"><a href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span>
I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the fragment of
Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract of that author by Photius
(Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot).
</p>
<p>
Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude to the assassination
of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these authors conceive the
story differently from Theopompus. Thus Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the
eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and became “despot of Salamis.” This
appears to be a confusion of Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the
son of Evagoras, and the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords
the surest proof that <i>he</i> had no hand in the death of his father.
</p>
<p>
The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ·
διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος.
So perplexing is the passage in its literal sense, that M. Barthélemy
St. Hilaire, in the note to his translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname
or <i>sobriquet</i> given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês.
But this supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that Theopompus
marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch, by another
word—Θρασυδαίου <em class="gesperrt">τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος</em>, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ γένος, etc.
</p>
<p>
It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently from Theopompus,
and we have to choose between the two. I prefer the version of
the latter; which is more marked as well as more intelligible, and which
furnishes the explanation why Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the
most advanced of the sons, being left in command of the besieged Salamis
when Evagoras quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his
father, but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man of much energy.
The position of this eunuch in the family of Nikokreon seems to mark
the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_63"><a href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 100; Or.
xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the assassination of Evagoras
in 374 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_64"><a href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span>
Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας
οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_65"><a href="#FNanchor_65">[65]</a></span>
See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_66"><a href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.
</p>
<p>
Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ
δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους
κολάζουσιν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_67"><a href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190.
How immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also, is seen in
Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered without resisting, to
the first Cyrus, when he was master of the continental towns, though he had
no naval force (Herod. i, 143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the
Spartans deemed it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the energy
and organization of the Athenians proved that it was possible to do so.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_68"><a href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_69"><a href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_70"><a href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city of Tanagra,
he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες
τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).
</p>
<p>
Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages, explains the
word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis
favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ Laconico.” This is perfectly
just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation.
These words allude to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades
was the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 <small>B.C.</small>; and who remained
masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by a standing Lacedæmonian
garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were overthrown by the
memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon in 379 <small>B.C.</small> It is to this
oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes, devoted to Spartan interests and
resting on Spartan support,—that Xenophon compares the governments
planted by Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities.
What he says, of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at
Thebes, is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into
the acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might themselves
exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς,
καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1:
compare v, 2, 36). This character—conveying a
strong censure in the mouth of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to
all the governments planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace
of Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she established
throughout her empire.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_71"><a href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span>
Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_72"><a href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.)
s. 14. 15.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_73"><a href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span>
Herodot. vi, 108.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_74"><a href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span>
See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_75"><a href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span>
Thucyd. iii, 68.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_76"><a href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span>
Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or. xii, (Panathen.)
s. 101.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_77"><a href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span>
Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_78"><a href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span>
Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_79"><a href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_80"><a href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span>
See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which is a pleading
probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by the Platæans (after the
second destruction of their city), and, doubtless, founded upon their own
statements. The painful dependence and compulsion under which they
were held by Sparta, is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31,
33, 48); together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
their town (s. 14).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_81"><a href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span>
Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian cities
αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long desired to do.
Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from Thebes, was insured to them,—but
in no other sense.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_82"><a href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span>
To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian cities, and
Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia by
Sparta (387-382 <small>B.C.</small>)—compare the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and
that of the Theban Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34).
Ὑμᾶς (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη,
etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους
αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται,
οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_83"><a href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span>
In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it stated among
the accusations against the Thebans, that during this period (<i>i. e.</i> between
the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia) they became
sworn in as members of the Spartan alliance and as ready to act with
Sparta conjointly against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might
also admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the Spartan
army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not see how it can be
even partially true. If it had been true, I think Xenophon could not have
failed to mention it: all that he does say, tends to contradict it.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_84"><a href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span>
Diodor. xv. 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_85"><a href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span>
How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus, may be
seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica of Xenophon; whose narrative
is both so partial, and so ill-constructed, that the most instructive
information is dropped only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where
we should not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων
ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius) ἀπεχθάνοιτο
(Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again, v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος)
εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις,
πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 24-26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_86"><a href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span>
Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for a short time;
that the cities which had before been dependent allies of Sparta were now
emancipated and left to themselves; that a reaction immediately ensued
against those dekarchies or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the
cities in the interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as everywhere
to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal partisans of Spartan supremacy;
and that the accumulated complaints and sufferings of these
exiles drove the Spartans, after having “endured the peace like a heavy
burthen” (ὥσπερ βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the government of
their friends in all the various cities. In this statement there is nothing
intrinsically improbable. After what we have heard of the dekarchies under
Sparta, no extent of violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor
can we doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian citizens
were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both after the
Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I believe that Diodorus
is here mistaken, and that he has assigned to the period immediately succeeding
the peace of Antalkidas, those reactionary violences which took
place in many cities about sixteen years subsequently, <i>after the battle of
Leuktra</i>. For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by Sparta
to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked; which he would
never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been so, because it would have
supplied a plausible apology for the high-handed injustice of the Spartans,
and would have thus lent aid to the current of partiality which manifests
itself in his history.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_87"><a href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισκοποῦντας
τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_88"><a href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the Mantineans had
really shown themselves pleased, when the Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed
near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv, 5, 18).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_89"><a href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_90"><a href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span>
In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of Wolfenbüttel
was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by damming up the
river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance of General Count Pappenheim,
the Austrian besieging commander. See Colonel Mitchell’s Life
of Wallenstein, p. 107.
</p>
<p>
The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in 385 <small>B.C.</small>,
with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing through the middle of
it, is perfectly clear. When the city, after having been now broken up, was
rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, the site was so far changed that the river no longer ran
through it. But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is at a
very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>; the situation
of which is accurately known, since the circuit of its walls still remains
distinctly marked. The Mantinea of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, therefore, as compared
with the Mantinea in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, must have been removed to a considerable
distance—or else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted from its course,
in order that it might be brought through the town of Mantinea; a supposition,
which he founds on the words of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
τὸ μὴ διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2,
7). But it is very difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look
at his own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and Tegeatis,
and observe the great distance between the river Ophis and Mantinea;
nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to imply any artificial
diversion of the river. It appears easier to believe that the river has
changed its course. See Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71;
and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380; and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who
still, however, leaves the point obscure.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_91"><a href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_92"><a href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν ἀργολιζόντων,
καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ
Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα
οὖσι. Καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ δόρατα
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως
ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων</em>· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω
μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.
</p>
<p>
I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe a new
example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied to the
wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its equivalent is in other languages,
by writers who sympathize with them—is divested of all genuine
ethical import as to character.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_93"><a href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.
</p>
<p>
He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ,
καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138, ed. Didot)
states that it was distributed into the five original villages; and Strabo affirms
that there were <i>five</i> original constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence
it is probable that Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus, Strabo, and
Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_94"><a href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span>
This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5, 3). The Lacedæmonians,
though they remonstrated against it, were at that time too
much humiliated to interfere by force and prevent it. The reason why
they did not interfere by force (according to Xenophon) was that a general
peace had just then been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct
town, so that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what they
did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ
τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of this second peace, Athens was the
originator and the voucher; but the autonomy which it guaranteed was
only the same as had been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas,
of which Sparta had been the voucher.
</p>
<p>
General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing from
general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta. The Spartans,
when they had in their own hands both the power of interpretation and
the power of enforcement, did not scruple to falsify autonomy so completely
as to lay siege to Mantinea and break up the city by force; while, when
interpretation and enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized
that the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
interference.
</p>
<p>
We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is the account
given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea; how completely he keeps
out of view the odious side of that proceeding.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_95"><a href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span>
See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they reject the
claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer the Olympic festival
(which had been their ancient privilege) because they were χωρίται and not fit
for the task (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv.
5, 54).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_96"><a href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span>
Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_97"><a href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span>
Thucyd. v, 81.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_98"><a href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or. viii, (De Pace) s.
123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5, 9-19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_99"><a href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_100"><a href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.
</p>
<p>
The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee; they will
appear in a subsequent page.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_101"><a href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_102"><a href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span>
Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_103"><a href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span>
Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_104"><a href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span>
See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense, which contains
the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at Delos, from
377-373 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1; vol. ii, p.
78 <i>seq.</i>, ed. 2nd.
</p>
<p>
The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the temple is
given in these accounts, together with the amount of interest either paid by
them, or remaining in arrear.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_105"><a href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span>
This is the description which Isokrates himself gives (Orat. xv, (Permutat.)
s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world when he published his Panegyrical
Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_106"><a href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span>
The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it being pretty exactly
known, is of great value for enabling us to understand the period immediately
succeeding the peace of Antalkidas.
</p>
<p>
He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the competition
between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the islands in the Ægean
(s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ
μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.
</p>
<p>
... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις
ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν</em>, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν
ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους,
τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν
περιορῶντας, etc. (s. 151).
</p>
<p>
... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα πρόνοιαν,
ἀλλὰ <em class="gesperrt">περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν</em>, τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος
καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.
</p>
<p>
Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_107"><a href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 9, 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_108"><a href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_109"><a href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span>
This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.
</p>
<p>
... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην
καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, <em class="gesperrt">ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας
αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο</em>, etc.
</p>
<p>
This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother Alketas from
the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the commentators. Perhaps it
may help to explain the chronological embarrassments connected with the
reign of Perdikkas, the years of which are assigned by different authors, as
23, 28, 35, 40, 41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs, Lection. Diodoreæ,
p. 159.
</p>
<p>
There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas began—nor
exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he was king
in 432, and in 414 <small>B.C.</small> But the fact of his acquiring the crown by the expulsion
of an elder brother, renders it less wonderful that the beginning of
his reign should be differently stated by different authors; though these authors
seem mostly to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of
Alexander, without any notice of Alketas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_110"><a href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_111"><a href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span>
The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging to Alketas; it is
for this reason that Plato calls Alketas <em class="gesperrt">δεσπότην</em> καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus
(Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.)</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_112"><a href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in Ch. lxix, p.
17 of Vol. IX.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_113"><a href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span>
Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_114"><a href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_115"><a href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span>
Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6; Ælian, V. H.
xiv, 17.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_116"><a href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span>
See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle (Politic. v, 8,
10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D), while mentioning the assassination
of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ represents the motive of the latter differently
from Aristotle, as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself
of the throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.
</p>
<p>
Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους
πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ
Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. <i>l. c.</i>).
</p>
<p>
Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of persons
actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed himself of the privilege
accorded by Archelaus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_117"><a href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv. 84-89.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_118"><a href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span>
Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin, vii, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_119"><a href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων
βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν· τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν
κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_120"><a href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span>
See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince of the
Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with the Illyrian invaders—<small>B.C.</small>
423.
</p>
<p>
Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person (Aristot.
Polit. v, 8, 11).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_121"><a href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων δωρησαμένου
πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυναστείας, etc.
</p>
<p>
The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by Dexippus ap.
Syncell. p. 263.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_122"><a href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μεγίστη
πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν
ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν
μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας
πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν
αἱ ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο· καὶ
κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν, ἥπερ μεγίστη
τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν
πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ πάσης Μακεδονίας.
</p>
<p>
We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair, and
ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the Olynthians.
Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and Amyntas (here alluded
to), must have taken place when he came back and tried to resume his dominion.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_123"><a href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_124"><a href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.
</p>
<p>
The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight hundred
hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one thousand horsemen,
assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined the confederacy. It has
been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others, that these numbers, as they here
stand, must be decidedly smaller than the reality. But we have no means
of correction open to us. Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites
in place of eight hundred, rests upon no authority.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had brought
all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De
Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed four hundred horsemen,
and a citizen population of 5000; no more than this (he says) at the time
when the Lacedæmonians attacked them. The historical statements of the
great orator, for a time which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to
be received with caution.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_125"><a href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.
</p>
<p>
I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_126"><a href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι·
εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_127"><a href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις ἐστίν·
αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων <em class="gesperrt">τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι</em>, αὗται,
ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· <em class="gesperrt">εἰ μέντοι
συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἕπεσθαι
κερδαλέον ἐστὶν</em>, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά τε αὐτῶν
σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—<em class="gesperrt">ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως εὔλυτα
ἔσται</em>.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_128"><a href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his kingdom
by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657). If this be historically
correct, it must be referred to some subsequent war in which he was
engaged with the Thessalians, perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ
acquired dominion over Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_129"><a href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span>
See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_130"><a href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι Λακεδαιμονίοις
χαρίζεσθαι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_131"><a href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned equivalent
to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian muster-roll of a few
years afterwards; but it must have been equally necessary to fix the proportion
on the present occasion.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_132"><a href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span>
See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_133"><a href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_134"><a href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_135"><a href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span>
This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and substantially that of Plutarch
(Agesil. c. 24), who intimates that it was the general belief of the time.
And it appears to me much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that
the first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act on his own
responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the ephors after the fact
is like that of persons who had previously contemplated the possibility of it.
But the original suggestion must have come from the Theban faction themselves.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_136"><a href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span>
Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that most of these generals
of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were afterwards in exile with
Pelopidas at Athens.
</p>
<p>
We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes.
It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized oligarchy. There
was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the Polemarchs may have
been more than two in all, though the words of Xenophon rather lead us to
suppose <i>only</i> two)—and there seems also to have been a civil magistrate,
chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was
marked by his constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state
(τὸ ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p. 597—B.—C.).
</p>
<p>
At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such officers as Bœotarchs;
since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the peace of Antalkidas, had
put an end to the Bœotian federation.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_137"><a href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span>
The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.; p. 419 Dind.)
states that the Kadmeia was seized during the Pythian festival. This festival
would take place, July or August 382 <small>B.C.</small>; near the beginning of the
third year of the (99th) Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI.
Ch. liv, p. 455, note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian
festival was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators. I
agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the third Olympic year.
And the date of the march of Phœbidas would perfectly harmonize with this
supposition.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for it
had no particular reference to Thebes.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_138"><a href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_139"><a href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_140"><a href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII. Ch. lxv. p. 252.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_141"><a href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_142"><a href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span>
It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man more warm-hearted
than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered no real service to
Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2, 28). The explanation of this
is, that Xenophon wrote his history at a later period, after the defeat at
Leuktra and the downfall of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by
the reaction against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially
after the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon) by
the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down upon her (v, 4,
1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that Phœbidas had not acted
with true wisdom, and that he had done his country more harm than good;
a criticism, which we may be sure that no man advanced, at the time of the
capture itself, or during the three years after it.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_143"><a href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.
</p>
<p>
Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε μὲν ἀεὶ
προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’
αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους
φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη, ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα
πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς
ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans generally
against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not the fine, which
is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio
Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_144"><a href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A. Plutarch
in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias as having been conveyed
to Sparta and tried there.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_145"><a href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_146"><a href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span>
Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with proper commendation
of the brave resistance made by the Olynthians against the great
force of Sparta. But his expressions are altogether misleading as to the
tenor and result of the war. If we had no other information than his, we
should be led to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the
Lacedæmonians baffled.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_147"><a href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_148"><a href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_149"><a href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους
καὶ ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_150"><a href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων
ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων,
καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν
οὐκ ἄπειροι.
</p>
<p>
The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from Phylarchus
in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider in his note here).
I have already stated that the political franchise of a Spartan citizen depended
upon his being able to furnish constantly his quota to the public
mess-table. Many of the poor families became unable to do this, and thus
lost their qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes paid
their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to continue their training
as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc. as companions of their own sons.
The two sons of Xenophon were educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54),
and would thus be ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was
now old enough, he might probably have been one among the volunteers to
accompany Agesipolis.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_151"><a href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_152"><a href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_153"><a href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_154"><a href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_155"><a href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα
μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς
τὴν στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_156"><a href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor. xv, 20.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_157"><a href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.
</p>
<p>
Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ.
</p>
<p>
This general expression “the matters relative to Phlius,” comprises not
merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment and complaints of the
Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will be as much as we can allow for
the blockade,—perhaps more than we ought to allow.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_158"><a href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_159"><a href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a></span>
The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend in these Phliasian
proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or partisan-attachment of his hero
(Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_160"><a href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_161"><a href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a></span>
Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap. Dionys. Hal. Judic.
de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.
</p>
<p>
... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα
ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.
</p>
<p>
... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν περιεστηκότας.
Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων
βασιλεὺς ταμίας· <em class="gesperrt">τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων</em>·
ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....
</p>
<p>
... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἐποίησαν,
τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους
ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους
πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, <em class="gesperrt">καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν</em>,
ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
</p>
<p>
... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς
τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας· οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’
αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις <em class="gesperrt">ἀμφοτέρων</em> (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius)
ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.
</p>
<p>
Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted between
the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in concert and
dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141, ed. Didot). The assertion
is made by the rhetor Aristeides, and the allusion to Ephorus is here
preserved by the Scholiast on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring
it to Dionysius <i>the younger</i>). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates, and Timotheus;
the former of whom captured the fleet of Dionysius, while the latter
defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at Leukas. But these events happened
in 373-372 <small>B.C.</small>, when the power of Dionysius was not so formidable or
aggressive as it had been between 387-382 <small>B.C.</small>: moreover, the ships of
Dionysius taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which the assertion
of Ephorus really referred.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_162"><a href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a></span>
See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII. of this History,
Ch. lv, p. 53.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_163"><a href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a></span>
Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109. ὥστε τινας
τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.
</p>
<p>
Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias; but Diodorus
places it at Olympiad 98—<small>B.C.</small> 388—the year before the peace of Antalkidas.
On this point I venture to depart from him, and assign it to
Olympiad 99, or 384 <small>B.C.</small>, three years after the peace; the rather as his
Olympic chronology appears not clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7
with xiv, 109.
</p>
<p>
1. The year 388 <small>B.C.</small> was a year of war, in which Sparta with her allies
on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos on the other,—were
carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war would hinder the four last-mentioned
states from sending any public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic
festival. Lysias, as an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at
all; but he certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
oratorical demonstration.
</p>
<p>
2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered after the
cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα
ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent after the peace of Antalkidas;
but not at all admissible before that peace. The same may be
said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς
νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας; which must be referred to the recent subjection
of the Asiatic Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
Dionysius.
</p>
<p>
3. In 388 <small>B.C.</small>—when Athens and so large a portion of the greater cities
of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore contesting her headship,—Lysias
would hardly have publicly talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην. This
remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich.
Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed
so ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.
</p>
<p>
On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when I recount
the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this oration of Lysias is
unsuitable to <small>B.C.</small> 388—but perfectly suitable to 384 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_164"><a href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a></span>
Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_165"><a href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his Orat. viii, (De
Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.
</p>
<p>
Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the Lacedæmonians
at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of Antalkidas (Xenophon,
Hellen. v, 1, 26).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_166"><a href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν,
καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων
ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες
αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
μόνον τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων
κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ
βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν
τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.
</p>
<p>
This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his Commentatio
Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82) as the turning-point in
the history:—
</p>
<p>
“Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit, atque
uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis fastigium ascendere videt,
et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in
hac Spartanorum fortunâ conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id
solet facere, suppresserit.”</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_167"><a href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a></span>
See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_168"><a href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a></span>
Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_169"><a href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 29, p.
596 B.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_170"><a href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_171"><a href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν
ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.
</p>
<p>
Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic party,
named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed, and the
conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have accelerated the hour
of their plot partly to preserve his life (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D,
p. 586 F.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_172"><a href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a></span>
The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598 C.) is illustrated
by the description given in the harangue of Lykurgus cont. Leokrat.
(c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm prevalent in Athens after the battle
of Chæroneia, such that even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως
αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of
Makaria, in the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_173"><a href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.
</p>
<p>
See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian democrats, towards
those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes during the exile
along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out in an oration of Lysias,
of which unfortunately only a fragment remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47,
Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration
had been received at Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the
latter was now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but also delivered
this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery; Pherenikus having rightful
claims on the property left behind by the assassinated Androkleidas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_174"><a href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c.
17, p. 586 E.
</p>
<p>
In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one) he sets
down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the smaller number
is most likely to be true.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_175"><a href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c. 25, p. 594 C;
c. 27, p. 595 A.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_176"><a href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα
λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα πέρυσιν;</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_177"><a href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a></span>
Xenophon says <i>seven</i> (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos
say <i>twelve</i> (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p. 576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c.
8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 2).
</p>
<p>
It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of Pelopidas in
this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception) throughout his Hellenica.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_178"><a href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_179"><a href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch,
De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 9.
</p>
<p>
The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and beauty
(Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_180"><a href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a></span>
Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.) mentions
Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them. Compare Cornel.
Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_181"><a href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17, p. 586 B.; c.
18, p. 587 D-E.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_182"><a href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a></span>
Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit of Charon
to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene with his son. He only
notices Charon as having harbored the conspirators in his house, and seems
even to speak of him as a person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι,
etc. (v, 4, 3).
</p>
<p>
The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch (De Gen.
Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too interesting to be omitted,
being perfectly consistent with what we read in Xenophon; though it has
perhaps somewhat of a theatrical air.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_183"><a href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30, p. 596 F. Εἰς
αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.
</p>
<p>
This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon. Cornelius
Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31) makes a general
reference to the omission of immediate opening of letters arrived, as having
caused the capture of the Kadmeia; which was, however, only its remote
consequence.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_184"><a href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a></span>
The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination of the polemarchs
at Thebes, differs materially from that of Plutarch. I follow Xenophon
in the main; introducing, however, several of the details found in
Plutarch, which are interesting, and which have the air of being authentic.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the story given
in the text, there was also another story told by some,—that Mellon and
his companions had got access to the polemarchs in the guise of drunken
revellers. It is this latter story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries
him into many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in female
attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by the exact analogy
of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander son of Amyntas,
prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).
</p>
<p>
Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 31,
p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many different circumstances,
yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas in female attire killed the Spartan
general. The story alluded to by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names
both Thebes and Archias, can hardly refer to this event.
</p>
<p>
It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus the
archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that the archon during
his year of office never left out of his hand the consecrated spear. As a
Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless familiar with these old customs.
</p>
<p>
From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of this revolution
at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of Pelopidas and in the
treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not know. Some critics suppose
him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus and Anaxis—Bœotian historians
whose work comprised this period, but of whom not a single fragment is
preserved (see Fragm. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_185"><a href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a></span>
Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen. Socr. p. 597
D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the latter represents
that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades <i>without</i> Phyllidas,—which
appears to me altogether improbable. On the other hand, Xenophon mentions
nothing about the defence of Leontiades and his personal conflict with
Pelopidas, which I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake
and sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death of Leontiades
as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious enterprise, and the
most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non posse suaviter vivi secundum
Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_186"><a href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen. Socr. p. 598 B.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_187"><a href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a></span>
This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from Plutarch (De
Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).
</p>
<p>
The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the prizes
given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 1584,
1585, etc.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_188"><a href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a></span>
The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the revolution was
welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the citizens turned out to
support it by armed force,—is attested by Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen.
v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται
καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_189"><a href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_190"><a href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_191"><a href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a></span>
Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were invited to
come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the two generals and the
volunteers; all of whom were before privy to the plot, and were in readiness
on the borders of Attica—τοὺς <em class="gesperrt">πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις</em> Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο
τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων</em> ἤδη παρῆσαν
(Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_192"><a href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν
προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρακαλέσαντες
(the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas, etc.) <em class="gesperrt">συνέργους ἔσχον
ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους</em>.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_193"><a href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_194"><a href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by saying that the
Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually met at Megara the reinforcements
under king Kleombrotus, which had advanced thus far, on their
march to relieve the Kadmeia. But this is highly improbable. The account
of Xenophon intimates clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on
the next morning after the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated
in the first moment of distraction and despair, without even standing
an assault.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_195"><a href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a></span>
Arrian, i, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_196"><a href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a></span>
In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the proceedings of the
Athenians in regard to it, I have followed Xenophon almost entirely.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the Theban
exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly through the concurrence
of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called
the citizens to freedom next morning, finding all hearty in the
cause—and then proceeded to besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians
and Peloponnesians in the Kadmeia.
</p>
<p>
But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed, in a
manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—
</p>
<p>
The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta of
what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The Thebans at
once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed with great loss,
both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they might not be able to take
the fort before reinforcement should come from Sparta, they sent envoys to
Athens to ask for aid, reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans)
had helped to emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
(ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ <em class="gesperrt">συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον</em> τῶν Ἀθηναίων
καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from a wish to
secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a public vote to assist
them forthwith. Demophon the general got together five thousand hoplites
and five hundred horsemen, with whom he hastened to Thebes on the next
day; and all the remaining population were prepared to follow, if necessary
(πανδημεί). All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand hoplites
and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the Athenians being among
them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night, relieving each other; but were
repelled with great loss of killed and wounded. At length the garrison
found themselves without provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending
reinforcement; and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who
formed the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians, refusing
to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the Lacedæmonian governor
was obliged perforce to do, though both he and the Spartans along
with him desired to hold out to the death. The Kadmeia was accordingly
surrendered, and the garrison went back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian
reinforcement from Sparta arrived only a little too late.
</p>
<p>
All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only completely different
from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his conception of the event.
We must reject either the one or the other.
</p>
<p>
Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is in this
case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the case.
</p>
<p>
1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by public
vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the assistance which the Thebans
had before sent to restore the Athenian democracy against the Thirty.
Now this is incorrect in point of fact. The Thebans had <i>never sent any assistance</i>,
positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand, and without
any public government-act; and they had refused to serve along with
the Spartans against him. But they never sent any force to help him
against the Thirty. Consequently, the Athenians <i>could not</i> now have sent
any public force to Thebes, <i>in requital</i> for a similar favor done before by the
Thebans to them.
</p>
<p>
2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public army,
and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on the Lacedæmonian
garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been the most flagrant and unequivocal
commencement of hostilities against Sparta. No Spartan envoys
could, after that, have gone to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of
the Proxenus,—as we know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the
story of Sphodrias (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that
Athens was at peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility
against her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at Thebes.
It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about the public vote of the
Athenians, and the public Athenian force under Demophon, aiding in the
attack of the Kadmeia. Strange to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters
afterwards (xv, 29), relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same
manner (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with a
declaration, that <i>the Athenians were still at peace with Sparta</i>, and forgetting
that he had himself recounted a distinct rupture of that peace on the part
of the Athenians.
</p>
<p>
3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have taken the
Athenian public completely by surprise (though some few Athenians were
privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme which had no chance of succeeding
except by profound secrecy. Now, that the Athenian public, hearing
the news for the first time,—having no positive act to complain of on
the part of Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no
previous circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes, and provoke
war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated by Diodorus,—this is, in
my judgment, eminently improbable, requiring good evidence to induce us
to believe it.
</p>
<p>
4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable explanation
can be given of the erroneous version which we read in Xenophon?
The facts as he recounts them conflict most pointedly with his
philo-Laconian partialities; first, the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
power at Thebes, by a handful of exiles; still more, the whole story of
Sphodrias and his acquittal.
</p>
<p>
But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can give a
very plausible explanation how the erroneous version in Diodorus arose.
A few months later, after the acquittal of Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians
did enter heartily into the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public
force (indeed five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling Agesilaus with
the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural that their public vote and
expedition undertaken about July 378 <small>B.C.</small>,—should have been erroneously
thrown back to December 379 <small>B.C.</small> The Athenian orators were fond of
boasting that Athens had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might
be said with some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in general terms;
but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more distinct, and gives in a
few words a version the same as that which we find in Diodorus; so also
does Aristeides, in two very brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or.
xxxviii, Socialis, p. 486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may
have copied from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
the mistake out of which their version grew.
</p>
<p>
5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of the Athenians,
and the regular division of troops under Demophon which Diodorus
asserts to have aided in the storming of the Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De
Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23; Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as
Xenophon does, that there were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the
exiles.
</p>
<p>
M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses this discrepancy
at considerable length, and cites the opinion of various German
authors in respect to it, with none of whom I altogether concur.
</p>
<p>
In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as belonging
to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting the public vote at
Athens, and the army said to have been sent to Thebes under Demophon;
and to accept the more credible narrative of Xenophon; which ascribes to
Athens a reasonable prudence, and great fear of Sparta,—qualities such
as Athenian orators would not be disposed to boast of. According to that
narrative, the question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since that citadel
was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_197"><a href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a></span>
The daring <i>coup de main</i> of Pelopidas and Mellon, against the government
of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by which Evagoras got
into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor.
s. 34).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_198"><a href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a></span>
See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point, Xenophon, Hellen.
iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_199"><a href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a></span>
If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through the mouth of a
Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans, immediately after their revolution,
sent an humble embassy to Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to
be admitted as allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had rendered;
an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by desiring them to
receive back their exiles, and to cast out the assassins Pelopidas and his
comrades. It is possible that the Thebans may have sent to try the possibility
of escaping Spartan enmity; but it is highly improbable that they
made any such promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that
they speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which they saw
to be approaching.
</p>
<p>
See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.
</p>
<p>
This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be an assemblage
of nearly all the topics which could possibly be enforced, truly or
falsely, against Thebes.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_200"><a href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_201"><a href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει
παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_202"><a href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_203"><a href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a></span>
See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the psephism
of Kannônus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_204"><a href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does not
expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for the conduct of
these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot doubt, however, that the
fact was so; for in those times, there were no resident envoys,—none but
envoys sent on special missions.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_205"><a href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a></span>
The trial and condemnation of these two generals has served as the
groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian democracy. Wachsmuth
(Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein
Greul-gericht.” Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p.
44, 45) says,—“Quid? quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in
Bœotiam factam esse, non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta
suis decretis comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc <i>illius facinoris excusationem</i>
habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (<i>i. e.</i> by the propositions
of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying to get enrolled
as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I have noticed above as being,
in my judgment, very inaccurately recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo
<i>enixius subvenerant, eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi</i> sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit
ut sibimet irascerentur, ut, <i>e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui perfecerant
id quod tum populus exoptaverat</i>.”
</p>
<p>
The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of fact,—1.
That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the public assembly to
send assistance to Thebes, under two generals, who accordingly went out in
command of the army and performed their instructions. 2. That the Athenians,
becoming afterwards repentant or terrified, tried and condemned
these two generals for having executed the commission entrusted to them.
</p>
<p>
I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing that the
first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as dependent on it, will
therefore be incorrect also.
</p>
<p>
These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each of the
two <i>inconsistent</i> narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus, and blend them together
in a way which contradicts both.
</p>
<p>
Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians sent to
Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along with the Thebans
against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not only is not to be found in
Xenophon, but which his narrative plainly, though indirectly, excludes.
</p>
<p>
Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians tried
and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the conspiracy
of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ, οἳ συνηπιστάσθην
τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now
the mention of these two generals follows naturally and consistently in
<i>Xenophon</i>. He had before told us that there were <i>two</i> out of the Athenian
generals, who both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted on to
the narrative of <i>Diodorus, who never says a word about this condemnation by
the Athenians</i>—nor even mentions <i>any two Athenian generals</i>, at all. He
tells us that the Athenian army which went to Thebes was commanded by
Demophon; he notices no colleague whatever. He says in general words,
that the conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
(συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any <i>two generals</i> as
especially active.
</p>
<p>
Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously, that
these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not by Diodorus)
are identical with Demophon and another colleague, commanders of
an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by Diodorus and not
by Xenophon).
</p>
<p>
The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before observed)
are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have to make our option
between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon, for reasons previously given.
But if any one prefers that of Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether
the story of the condemnation of the two Athenian generals (<i>who nowhere
appear in Diodorus</i>), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
that point, as upon the other facts of the case.
</p>
<p>
That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic narrative as
true) should be tried and punished, when the consequences of their unauthorized
proceeding were threatening to come with severity upon Athens,—appears
to me neither improbable nor unreasonable. Those who are
shocked by the very severity of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks
which the Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on
the conduct of Sphodrias.
</p>
<p>
To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the narrative
of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought to regard the
execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders who surrendered the
Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to Diodorus, these officers had
done everything which brave men could do; they had resisted a long time,
repelled many attacks, and were only prevented from farther holding out
by a mutiny among their garrison.
</p>
<p>
Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of Xenophon over
that of Diodorus. According to the former, these Lacedæmonian commanders
surrendered the Kadmeia without any resistance at all. Their
condemnation, like that of the Athenian two generals, becomes a matter
easy to understand and explain.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_206"><a href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a></span>
Tacit. Histor. i, 38.
</p>
<p>
Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey to his
captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to cut the cables of
the ship, while Octavius and Antony were dining on board, and to seize
their persons,—“I cannot permit any such thing; but you ought to have
done it without asking my permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of
Shakspeare’s Antony and Cleopatra.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_207"><a href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a></span>
Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v. Σφοδρίας; Diodor.
xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation
of Sphodrias as to the time necessary for his march to Peiræus
is not worse than other mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse,
ix, 12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on Tactics)
recounts as having been committed by various other able commanders.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_208"><a href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a></span>
Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες,
ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopid.
c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.
</p>
<p>
In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was the
Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may remark—1.
That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and its success
would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they been the instigators,
they would not have failed to give notice of it at Athens at the same time;
which they certainly did not do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished
Sphodrias, no war would have ensued. Now every man would have
predicted, that assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish
him. 3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the fate of
Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the general character
of the latter,—are quite consistent with a belief on his part that Sphodrias
(like Phœbidas) may have done wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition
in the service of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the
Thebans beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under
the influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been disposed
to let justice take its course, but would have approved and promoted the
condemnation.
</p>
<p>
On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed to the
Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with just as little
cause.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_209"><a href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_210"><a href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι·
ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν
διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι· τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην
τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very interesting
manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and Archidamus, and the
appeal of Archidamus to his father. The statement has all the air of being
derived from personal knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders
me from giving it in full.
</p>
<p>
Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_211"><a href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_212"><a href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_213"><a href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_214"><a href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.)
s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_215"><a href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a></span>
The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος; see Isokrates, De
Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατέστησαν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_216"><a href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τῶν μὲν κτημάτων τῶν
ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε</em>, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.
</p>
<p>
Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας ἀποκαταστῆσαι
τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι</em>, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν
ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
εὔνοιαν, ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.
</p>
<p>
Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language which
might make us imagine that it was one of distinct restitution, giving back
property <i>actually enjoyed</i>. But the Athenians had never actually regained
the outlying private property lost at the close of the war, though they had
much desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of circumstances
might enable them to effect the recovery. As the recovery, if
effected, would be at the cost of those whom they were now soliciting as
allies, the public and formal renunciation of such rights was a measure of
much policy, and contributed greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands;
though in point of fact nothing was given up except rights to property not
really enjoyed.
</p>
<p>
An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording the
original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions are mentioned in my
text. It bears date in the archonship of Nausinikus. It stands, with the
restorations of M. Boeckh (fortunately a portion of it has been found in
tolerably good preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,” p. xx.
</p>
<p>
Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ
ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ,
μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται
τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ
ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις [ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους
τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις
καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ,
ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα, ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι
εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν.
Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ
τιμήθῃ, μὴ ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.
</p>
<p>
Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of Five Hundred
shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone, and place it by the side
of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius; with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess
to disburse sixty drachmas for the cost of so doing.
</p>
<p>
It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of such cities as
had already joined the confederacy, together with certain other names
added afterwards, of cities which joined subsequently. The Inscription itself
directs such list to be recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε
οὐσῶν πόλεων συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.
</p>
<p>
Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which, moreover, he
states to have been preserved only in a very partial and fragmentary condition.
He notices only, as contained in it, the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus
in the island of Keos,—and Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as
autonomous communities.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_217"><a href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a></span>
Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_218"><a href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a></span>
This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias
the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving
immediately after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii,
71). So the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii, 142).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_219"><a href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_220"><a href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_221"><a href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a></span>
Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_222"><a href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a></span>
See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv, p. 131) of the
comedy called <i>Protesilaus</i>—by the Athenian poet Anaxandrides (Meineke,
Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It contains a curious description of the
wedding of Iphikrates with the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by
an abundant banquet and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of
Thracians in the market-place:—
</p>
<div class="poetry-container">
  <div class="poetry">
    <p>δειπνεῖν&nbsp;δ’&nbsp;<em class="gesperrt">ἄνδρας&nbsp;βουτυροφάγας</em></p>
    <p>αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,</p>
  </div>
</div>
<p class="ni">brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys himself girt
round, and serving the broth in a golden basin, then going about to taste
all the bowls of wine and water ready mixed, until he was himself the first
man intoxicated. Iphikrates brought from Athens several of the best
players on the harp and flute.
</p>
<p>
The distinction between the <i>butter</i> eaten, or rubbed on the skin, by the
Thracians, and the <i>olive-oil</i> habitually consumed in Greece, deserves notice.
The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to indicate the absence of those scented unguents
which, at the banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the
hair of the guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed themselves
with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1109 B.
</p>
<p>
The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to Iphikrates by
Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that his exploits there were
renowned as well as long-continued.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_223"><a href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a></span>
Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_224"><a href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a></span>
Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 17;
Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.
</p>
<p>
See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. s. 5)
about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a discontented fellow-citizen, to
seize Byzantium, marry the daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_225"><a href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a></span>
Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.
</p>
<p>
At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly make out;
Amyntas died in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, while from 378-371 <small>B.C.</small>, Iphikrates seems to
have been partly on service with the Persian satraps, partly in command of
the Athenian fleet in the Ionian Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch.
4). Therefore, the adoption took place at some time between 387-378 <small>B.C.</small>;
perhaps after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by the
Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 <small>B.C.</small> Amyntas
was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and other land-neighbors
(see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 112), that it was much to his advantage
to cultivate the favor of a warlike Athenian established on the
Thracian coast, like Iphikrates.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_226"><a href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a></span>
From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias, a conclusion
has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian people. They were so
envious and ill-tempered (it has been said), that none of their generals
could live with comfort at Athens; all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius
Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3) makes the remark, borrowed originally from
Theopompus (Fr. 117, ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators
as if it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i.
e. on being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam fuit necesse.
Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum, quod et vivebat
laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere.
Est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia
gloriæ comes sit, et libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius;
neque animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus ille
aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod
tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a conspectu suorum
recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraciâ,
Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”
</p>
<p>
That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their fair
share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that these attributes
belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner, cannot (in my judgment)
be shown by any evidence extant,—and most assuredly is not shown
by the evidence here alluded to.
</p>
<p>
“Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious indulgence.”
If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a Spartan, he would undoubtedly
have been compelled to expatriate in order to gratify this taste; for it
was the express drift and purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize
property, but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils, of the
rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of Lykurgus,—Xenophon
and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle,
and others. If then it were considered a proof of envy and ill-temper,
to debar rich men from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we
might fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece where the
means of luxurious and comfortable living were more abundantly exhibited
for sale, nor where a rich man was more perfectly at liberty to purchase
them. Of this the proofs are everywhere to be found. Even the son of this
very Chabrias, Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without
the greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted his whole substance
in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Athenæus, iv, p. 165).
And Chares was even better liked at Athens in consequence of his love of
enjoyment and license,—if we are to believe another Fragment (238) of
the same Theopompus.
</p>
<p>
The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither true as
matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to sustain the hypothesis
of a malignant Athenian public, with which they connect it. Iphikrates
and Chabrias did not stay away from Athens because they loved enjoyments
or feared the envy of their countrymen; but because both of them were
large gainers by doing so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of
them were men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1); both
of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities quite compatible
with strong appetite for enjoyment; while neither of them had either
taste or talent for the civil routine and debate of Athens when at peace.
Besides, each of them was commander of a body of peltasts, through whose
means he could obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so
that we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to be absent
from Athens during most part of the nine years that the peace of Antalkidas
continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was abroad three or four years,
in service with the Persian satraps, by order of the Athenians; Chabrias
also went a long time afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the
same time when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens to the
Chersonese in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. 677, s. 204); but
neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape the mischief of envious
countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of Iphikrates as being uncomfortable
in Athens, or anxious to get out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p.
535, s. 83.
</p>
<p>
Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it is truly
surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of Athenian jealousy or
ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately after the disaster of Ægospotami,
and remained there, or remained away from Athens, for eleven years
(405-393 <small>B.C.</small>) until the year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected
that he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the
fleet at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable ruin upon
Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with well-merited infamy the
generals commanding. Konon was so far less guilty than his colleagues, as
he was in a condition to escape with eight ships when the rest were captured.
But he could not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to
show his face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country, by the victory
of Knidus in 394 <small>B.C.</small>; and then came back the year afterwards, to a grateful
and honorable welcome at Athens. About a year or more after this, he
went out again as envoy to Persia in the service of his country. He was
there seized and imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make
his escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 <small>B.C.</small> Nothing
therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of Theopompus,
“that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was afraid of undeserved
ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For what time Timotheus
may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of saying. But from the year
370 <small>B.C.</small> down to his death, we hear of him so frequently elsewhere, in the
service of his country, that his residence cannot have been long.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_227"><a href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a></span>
Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_228"><a href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a></span>
The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead of the unpopular
term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_229"><a href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a></span>
Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv, Permut. s. 120). So
also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15; cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement
of Æschines, that Timotheus brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy,
appears large, and must probably include all that that general either acquired
or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think the
number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult to identify what
towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he particularizes, includes Samos,
Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were not acquired until many years afterwards,—in
366-365 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which Timotheus
brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when it was first formed
(among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most part of it—Plutarch, De
Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others which he afterwards took by
siege, like Samos.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_230"><a href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_231"><a href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν δὲ τοῦ
συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.
</p>
<p>
The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 <small>B.C.</small>, about a year before
the battle of Leuktra.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_232"><a href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_233"><a href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 29.
</p>
<p>
Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians <i>sent out</i> (not merely, <i>voted</i> to
send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned one hundred triremes.
</p>
<p>
Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by the Athenians
alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with the newly-assembled
synod of allies.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_234"><a href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a></span>
Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα,
πάλιν <em class="gesperrt">ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται</em> τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;
</p>
<p>
In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of wreaths or
crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed by the Eubœans, as
well as by the general body of allies. These crowns were still to be seen
thirty years afterwards at Athens, with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen.
cont. Androtion. c. 21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_235"><a href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a></span>
For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III, Ch. xi, p. 117,
of this History.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_236"><a href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a></span>
This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far as can be made
out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public Economy of Athens, B,
iv, ch. 5).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_237"><a href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p. 836; cont.
Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7.
</p>
<p>
In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new property-schedule
introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus, he inclines to the hypothesis
of four distinct Classes, thus distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of
his Staats-haushaltung der Athener):—
</p>
<p>
1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to the value
of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the schedule, each
for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.
</p>
<p>
2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to the amount
of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was enrolled in the
schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent. upon his property.
</p>
<p>
3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the value
of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was entered in the
schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon his property.
</p>
<p>
4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of twenty-five minæ,
but below the maximum of two talents. Each was entered in the schedule
for the amount of eight per cent. upon his property.
</p>
<p>
This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to illustrate the
principle of distribution, and of graduation, then adopted.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_238"><a href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_239"><a href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a></span>
Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the latter (De
Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown, that Polybius did
not correctly conceive what the sum which he stated really meant.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_240"><a href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a></span>
I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from M. Boeckh, who
sets it down as positive matter of fact that a property-tax of five per cent.,
amounting to three hundred talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship
of Nausinikus (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of Demosthenes cont.
Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν <em class="gesperrt">παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου</em>, παρ’ ἴσως
τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ οὗτος
(Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these
words imply,—not that a property-tax of about three hundred talents had
been levied or called for <i>during</i> the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that a
total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been levied (or called
for) by all the various property-taxes imposed <i>from the archonship of Nausinikus
down to the date of the speech</i>. The oration was spoken about 355 <small>B.C.</small>;
the archonship of Nausinikus was in 378 <small>B.C.</small> What the speaker affirms,
therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been levied or called for
by all the various property-taxes imposed between these two dates; and
that the aggregate sum of arrears due upon all of them, at the time when
Androtion entered upon his office, was fourteen talents.
</p>
<p>
Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three hundred talents
is very small, as the aggregate of all property-taxes imposed for twenty-three
years, suggests that it might be proper to read <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ</em> Ναυσινίκου
instead of <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ</em> Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that
reading. But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon such
a change of text, even if the existing text were more indefensible than it
actually is. And surely the plural number τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator
has in view, not the single property-tax imposed in the archonship of
Nausinikus, but two or more property-taxes, imposed at different times.
Besides, Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding arrears
generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He would have no
motive to single out those which had accrued in the year 378 <small>B.C.</small>; moreover,
those arrears would probably have become confounded with others,
long before 355 <small>B.C.</small> Demosthenes selects the year of Nausinikus as his
initial period, because it was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning,
began.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_241"><a href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a></span>
Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der
Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt,
De Symmoriis, p. 18 <i>seq.</i></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_242"><a href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_243"><a href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a></span>
Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_244"><a href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a></span>
Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_245"><a href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a></span>
Diodor. xii, 70.
</p>
<p>
These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were called
Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a name borrowed
from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described in the Iliad and
probably in many of the lost epic poems; the charioteer being himself an
excellent warrior, though occupied for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes
and Sthenelus, Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon,
etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_246"><a href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.
</p>
<p>
Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud Athenæum,
xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military division which
bore the same title, composed of chosen and wealthy citizens, two thousand
five hundred in number (Diodor. xvi, 80).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_247"><a href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a></span>
Pausan. viii, 11, 5.
</p>
<p>
Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that he could
not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil.
c. 19).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_248"><a href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to Plutarch, Epaminondas
had attained the age of forty years, before he became publicly known
(De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).
</p>
<p>
Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was desperately
wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place at Mantinea, when they
were fighting on the side of the Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis,
against the Arcadians; the Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta,
and having sent a contingent to her aid.
</p>
<p>
I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The Thebans
were never so united with Sparta as to send any contingent to her aid, after
the capture of Athens (in 404 <small>B.C.</small>). Most critics think that the war referred
to by Plutarch, is, the expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea,
whereby the city was broken up into villages—in 385 <small>B.C.</small>; see Mr.
Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici ad 385 <small>B.C.</small> But, in the first place, there cannot
have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for Thebes
was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not her ally. In
the next place, there does not seem to have been any battle, according to
Xenophon’s account.
</p>
<p>
I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to this alleged
battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that Epaminondas may have
saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_249"><a href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a></span>
Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192 D.; Aristophan.
Acharn. 872.
</p>
<p>
Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of form
required in the runner was also different from that required in the wrestler
(Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_250"><a href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a></span>
Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_251"><a href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a></span>
Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.</p>
<div class="poetry-container">
  <div class="poetry">
    <p>ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.</p>
  </div>
</div>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_252"><a href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a></span>
Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos the lyre
(Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i,
2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_253"><a href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a></span>
Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 583,
Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian, V. H. iii, 17.
</p>
<p>
The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied by
Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught Epaminondas,
had been one of the persons actually present in the synod of Pythagoreans
at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the house, and that he with another had
been the only persons who escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_254"><a href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a></span>
Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and Plutarch, Demosthenes,
c. 20.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_255"><a href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας διαφόρου
καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος
ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου
λέγει, μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα γιγνώσκοντι
μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel.
Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.
</p>
<p>
We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was communicated
by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch copied it; and
we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned other particulars
respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p. 184). We see thus that Plutarch
had access to good sources of information respecting the latter. And as he
had composed a life of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials would naturally
be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio Socratis.” This
strengthens our confidence in the interesting statements which that dialogue
furnishes respecting the character of Epaminondas; as well as in the
incidental allusions interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_256"><a href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a></span>
Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Gerend. p.
819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any pretensions to oratorical
talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos had ever produced (Brutus,
c. 13, 50).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_257"><a href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a></span>
Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab. Max. c. 27.
Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_258"><a href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a></span>
Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_259"><a href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ πείθων
ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ
πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.
</p>
<p>
... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν
αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ
τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.
</p>
<p>
Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas,
c. 4.
</p>
<p>
Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may be well
applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means, without which the
former could not have got possession of the sceptre, were performed by
others and not by him; while all the meritorious and admirable functions
of command were reserved for Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_260"><a href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a></span>
See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς, τὸ
δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ
πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ
δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς
ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch,
Pelopidas, c. 25: Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in
modum.”</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_261"><a href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_262"><a href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν ἁπάντων
τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_263"><a href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a></span>
Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas (Epaminondas,
und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834, p. 26), seems to
conceive that Epaminondas was never employed in any public official post
by his countrymen, until the period immediately preceding the battle of
Leuktra. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me that he must
have been previously employed in such posts as enabled him to show his
military worth. For all the proceedings of 371 <small>B.C.</small> prove that in that year
he actually possessed a great and established reputation, which must have
been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous position; and as he had no
great family position to start from, his reputation was probably acquired
only by slow degrees.
</p>
<p>
The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this supposition;
for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_264"><a href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_265"><a href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_266"><a href="#FNanchor_266">[266]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_267"><a href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_268"><a href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 1,—“obnixo
genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.
</p>
<p>
The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor of
Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design (Diodor. xv, 33).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_269"><a href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_270"><a href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο,
καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος
ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας
ἐδέοντο.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_271"><a href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.
</p>
<p>
The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning faint-heartedness
and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are likely to apply (certainly in
part) to this campaign.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_272"><a href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_273"><a href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_274"><a href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_275"><a href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc. Boeckh (followed
by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p. 58) connects with this
maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp. Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a
vote of gratitude, passed by the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus,
a native of Parium in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can
hardly belong to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to
be informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile fleet
near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus must have
related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the transit of hostile
ships along the Hellespont, which a native of Parium would be the likely
person first to discover and communicate.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_276"><a href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.
</p>
<p>
I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated by Demosthenes;
in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller number. The
orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in this oration, not only
speaks from a written memorandum in his hand, which he afterwards causes
to be read by the clerk,—but also seems exact and special as to numbers,
so as to inspire greater confidence than usual.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_277"><a href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ, ἀναμνησθεὶς
τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης
εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, <em class="gesperrt">αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν
ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν</em>· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note) μή ποτε
τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ <em class="gesperrt">ἀποστὰς
τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας
διέσωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν</em>. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν,
ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.
</p>
<p>
This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume (Vol.
VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ and the proceedings
at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus incorrectly represented
the excitement at Athens against the generals as arising from their having
neglected to pick up the bodies of the <i>slain</i> warriors for burial,—and that
he omitted the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
warriors to perish.
</p>
<p>
It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above cited, Diodorus
repeats his erroneous affirmation about the battle of Arginusæ; while in the
second sentence he corrects the error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by
the warning, took care to pick up the <i>living</i> men on the wrecks and in the
water, as well as the dead bodies.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_278"><a href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a></span>
Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_279"><a href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_280"><a href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was afterwards
assassinated at Abdera.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_281"><a href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_282"><a href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_283"><a href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116; Cornelius Nepos,
Timotheus, c. 2.
</p>
<p>
The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus from
the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by Demosthenes
cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M. Boeckh (Public Economy
of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring this advance to his expedition to Korkyra
and other places in the Ionian Sea in 375-374 <small>B.C.</small>; not to his subsequent
expedition of 373 <small>B.C.</small>, to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser,
and others would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second expedition,
it does not appear that he ever had really sixty triremes, or sixty
trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent
with Timotheus to Korkyra consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact
number of trierarchs named by Demosthenes.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_284"><a href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a></span>
Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_285"><a href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a></span>
Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_286"><a href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_287"><a href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a></span>
See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_288"><a href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς
τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι
καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_289"><a href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_290"><a href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_291"><a href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus mentions,
what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he does not name Tegyra.
</p>
<p>
Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to have
given various particulars respecting the religious legends connected with
that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_292"><a href="#FNanchor_292">[292]</a></span>
That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all Bœotia, and revived
the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by Xenophon, Hellen. v,
4, 63; vi, 1, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_293"><a href="#FNanchor_293">[293]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the Theban
troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa εἴ τις βούλεται <em class="gesperrt">κατὰ
τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν</em> ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα,
νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.
</p>
<p>
Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν (iii,
61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of their own professions
and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431 <small>B.C.</small>, may be taken as fair
analogy to judge of their professions and views towards the recovered Bœotian
towns in 376-375 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_294"><a href="#FNanchor_294">[294]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_295"><a href="#FNanchor_295">[295]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_296"><a href="#FNanchor_296">[296]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_297"><a href="#FNanchor_297">[297]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.
</p>
<p>
This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton
in 375 <small>B.C.</small> (Fast. Hel. ad 375 <small>B.C.</small>). To me it seems to belong rather
to 374 <small>B.C.</small> It was not undertaken until the Thebans had reconquered all
the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1, 1); and this operation seems to have
occupied them all the two years,—376 and 375 <small>B.C.</small> See v, 4, 63, where
the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include,
not simply the time which Timotheus took in <i>actually circumnavigating</i> Peloponnesus,
but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian Sea, and
the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas,
and the neighborhood generally. The “Periplus” for which Timotheus
was afterwards honored at Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c.
90, p. 458) meant the exploits performed by him during the year and with
the fleet of the “Periplus.”
</p>
<p>
It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this year
374 <small>B.C.</small>,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first quarter of that
archon, or the third Olympic year; about the beginning of August, Chabrias
won a prize at these games with a chariot and four; in celebration of
which, he afterwards gave a splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called
Kôlias, near Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_298"><a href="#FNanchor_298">[298]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.
</p>
<p>
Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen. Hellen. vi,
3, 4).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_299"><a href="#FNanchor_299">[299]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 82.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_300"><a href="#FNanchor_300">[300]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη, παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ
προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου, ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως
φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.
</p>
<p>
Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues helps us
to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into his hands the
management of their harbors and customs-duties (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p.
15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking contrast with the exactness of the Athenian
people about their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
inscriptions yet remaining.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_301"><a href="#FNanchor_301">[301]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.
</p>
<p>
The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason sending
a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior to the recapture
of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting Epaminondas,—appears
not entitled to credit. Before that time, Epaminondas was too little known
to be worth corrupting; moreover, Jason did not become <i>tagus</i> of Thessaly
until long after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_302"><a href="#FNanchor_302">[302]</a></span>
See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech of Polydamas,
which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in Xen. Hellen. vi, 1,
4-18).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_303"><a href="#FNanchor_303">[303]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.
</p>
<p>
The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides that on
some points, though not in the main, they contradict Xenophon. Diodorus
states that those exiles whom Timotheus brought back to Zakynthus, were
the philo-Spartan leaders, who had been recently expelled for their misrule
under the empire of Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect.
The exiles whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan
party in the island.
</p>
<p>
But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by representing
that universal and turbulent reaction against the philo-Spartan oligarchies,
which really did not take place until after the battle of Leuktra—as if it
had taken place some three years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor.
xv, 40, seem to me to belong to a period <i>after</i> the battle of Leuktra.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the Athenians
sent <i>Ktesikles</i> as auxiliary commander to <i>Zakynthus</i> (xv, 46); whereas
this very commander is announced by himself in the next chapter (as well
as by Xenophon, who calls him <i>Stesikles</i>) as sent to <i>Korkyra</i> (Hellen. v,
2, 10).
</p>
<p>
I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian expedition
under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent to Zakynthus—then
again, as sent to <i>Korkyra</i>. The latter is the truth. No Athenian
expedition at all appears on this occasion to have gone to Zakynthus;
for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians among those who helped to fit
out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2, 3).
</p>
<p>
On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the reality of
the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of 374 <small>B.C.</small>—one under
Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under Alkidas to Korkyra—which
Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It is true that Xenophon does not
notice either of them; but they are noway inconsistent with the facts which
he does state.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_304"><a href="#FNanchor_304">[304]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the commutation
of personal service for money.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the expedition
of Mnasippus, though differing on several other contemporary points.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_305"><a href="#FNanchor_305">[305]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus landed),
ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν,
μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’
ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ
ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.
</p>
<p>
Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood after πίνειν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_306"><a href="#FNanchor_306">[306]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε
τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.
</p>
<p>
Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the second
speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).
</p>
<p>
To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties of the
wealthy men established throughout the area of Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ
τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες
(<i>i. e.</i> by the invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_307"><a href="#FNanchor_307">[307]</a></span>
The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon, v, 2, 9)
would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the aid of Alketas.
This would be a much quicker way for them than the circumnavigation of
Peloponnesus: and it would suggest the same way for the detachment of
Stesiklês presently to be mentioned.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_308"><a href="#FNanchor_308">[308]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_309"><a href="#FNanchor_309">[309]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.
</p>
<p>
Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν πόλιν,
καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους
ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν,
ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_310"><a href="#FNanchor_310">[310]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_311"><a href="#FNanchor_311">[311]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_312"><a href="#FNanchor_312">[312]</a></span>
The manner in which I have described the preliminary cruise of Timotheus,
will be found (I think) the only way of uniting into one consistent
narrative the scattered fragments of information which we possess respecting
his proceedings in this year.
</p>
<p>
The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by Demosthenes,
adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the archonship
of Sokratidês—April 373 <small>B.C.</small> Diodorus says that he proceeded to Thrace,
and that he acquired several new members for the confederacy (xv, 47);
Xenophon states that he sailed towards the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two
statements not directly the same, yet not incompatible with each other. In
his way to Thrace, he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along
the coast of Thessaly.
</p>
<p>
We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra, not
by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across Thessaly and
Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that the Athenians
“asked Alketas to help them to cross over from the mainland of Epirus to
the opposite island of Korkyra: and that they were in consequence carried
across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου δὲ ἐδεήθησαν <em class="gesperrt">συνδιαβιβάσαι</em> τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι
μὲν <em class="gesperrt">νυκτὸς διακομισθέντες</em> που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
</p>
<p>
Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing Thessaly;
nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the permission and
escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the dependent of Jason,
whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).
</p>
<p>
We farther know that in the year preceding (374 <small>B.C.</small>), Jason was not
yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to become so, though the
Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November
373 <small>B.C.</small>, Jason (as well as Alketas) appears as the established ally
of Athens; not as then becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely
an established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose
of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his favor—Ἀφικομένου
γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus) ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου
ἄρχοντος, <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ</em> καὶ καταγομένων εἰς
τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc.
(Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p. 1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus)
<em class="gesperrt">ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν</em> τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ <em class="gesperrt">Ἀλκέτου
καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν</em>, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι
(Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence,
therefore, that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been contracted
in the early part of 373 <small>B.C.</small>; we see farther that it had been contracted
by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which is the only reasonable
way of explaining the strong interest felt by Jason as well as by
Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing them to take the remarkable
step of coming to Athens to promote his acquittal. It was Timotheus who
had first made the alliance of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel.
Nepos, Timoth. c. 2), a year or two before.
</p>
<p>
Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with confidence,
that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited Jason, contracted alliance
between him and Athens, and prevailed upon him to forward the division
of Stesikles across Thessaly to Epirus and Korkyra.
</p>
<p>
In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact dates mentioned,
which are a great aid to the understanding of the historical events
of the time. That oration is spoken by Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus
the repayment of money lent to him by Pasion the banker, father of
Apollodorus; and the dates specified are copied from entries made by Pasion
at the time in his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_313"><a href="#FNanchor_313">[313]</a></span>
Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ στράτευμα
καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199. προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν
Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ
παραλαμβάνειν· <em class="gesperrt">ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι·
τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ</em> (Timotheus) <em class="gesperrt">ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων</em>· καὶ
σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_314"><a href="#FNanchor_314">[314]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_315"><a href="#FNanchor_315">[315]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 47.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_316"><a href="#FNanchor_316">[316]</a></span>
I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p.
1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus was about to sail
home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it is certain that his trial did not
take place until the month Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the
trial must have been postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates
and Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_317"><a href="#FNanchor_317">[317]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη
στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_318"><a href="#FNanchor_318">[318]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_319"><a href="#FNanchor_319">[319]</a></span>
Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_320"><a href="#FNanchor_320">[320]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_321"><a href="#FNanchor_321">[321]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.
</p>
<p>
We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the Athenians under
Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes of Dionysius, carrying
sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia. They detained and appropriated
the valuable cargo, of which Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.
</p>
<p>
This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to any other
triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would probably have
mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since it presents the enemies of
Sparta as committing sacrilege. And whether the triremes were carrying
sacred ornaments or not, it is certain that they were coming to take part
in the war, and were therefore legitimate prizes.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_322"><a href="#FNanchor_322">[322]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not very
clear, nor is even the text perfect.
</p>
<p>
Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ
τὸ <em class="gesperrt">προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ</em> (this shows that Iphikrates
himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον
ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς
ἡγούμενος εἶναι, συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι·
<em class="gesperrt">εἴτε ἀντιπάλους νομίζων</em>, οὕτω θρασέως (some words
in the text seem to be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν
φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν, μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.
</p>
<p>
I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which appears
to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3) shows that Kallistratus
was an unwilling colleague.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_323"><a href="#FNanchor_323">[323]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει (Kallistratus)
<em class="gesperrt">εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει</em>, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_324"><a href="#FNanchor_324">[324]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_325"><a href="#FNanchor_325">[325]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_326"><a href="#FNanchor_326">[326]</a></span>
The narrative here given of the events of 373 <small>B.C.</small>, so far as they concern
Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only way of satisfying
the exigencies of the case, and following the statements of Xenophon and
Demosthenes.
</p>
<p>
Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis,
etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take command of the fleet, nor
depart from Athens, until <i>after</i> the trial of Timotheus. There are some
expressions in the oration of Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance
this supposition; but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively
study the series of facts.
</p>
<p>
1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the
siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373 <small>B.C.</small> For his
arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet, was known at Athens <i>before</i>
Timotheus received his appointment as admiral of the fleet for the
relief of the island (Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).
</p>
<p>
2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in April
373 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 <small>B.C.</small>; Alketas and
Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses in his favor.
</p>
<p>
Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from Athens with
his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in November, we must suppose
that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus lasted seven months, and the cruise
of Timotheus nearly five months. Both the one and the other are altogether
improbable. The Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra
to incur so terrible a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial
of Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of
Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of Mnasippus
(that already pay was owing to them for <i>as much as two months</i>,—καὶ
δυοῖν <em class="gesperrt">ἤδη</em> μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that it could hardly have
lasted more than three months in all. Let us say, that it lasted four
months; the siege would then be over in August, and we know that the
fleet of Iphikrates arrived just after the siege was concluded.
</p>
<p>
Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the express
purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus was
already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would have spent so
long a time as <i>five</i> months in his preliminary cruise?
</p>
<p>
I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about <i>two</i> months;
and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to raise strong displeasure
against him at Athens, when the danger and privations of Korkyra
were made known as hourly increasing. At the time when Timotheus
came back to Athens, he found all this displeasure actually afloat against
him, excited in part by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus
(Dem. cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public
assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against him, caused
a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to Korkyra, and nominating
in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias and Kallistratus. Probably
those who proposed this vote would at the same time give notice that they
intended to prefer a judicial accusation against Timotheus for breach or
neglect of duty. But it would be the interest of all parties to postpone
<i>actual trial</i> until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which purpose
the saving of time would be precious. Already too much time had
been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole chance of success
depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his friends would look upon
postponement as an additional chance of softening the public displeasure,
besides enabling them to obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still,
though trial was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.
The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered
by Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though speaking
loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches against Timotheus <i>in
the public assembly</i> (in June 373 <small>B.C.</small>, or thereabouts, whereby his deposition
was obtained), from the accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in
November 373 <small>B.C.</small>, <i>before the dikastery</i>—is nevertheless not incorrect in
saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι
Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ <em class="gesperrt">κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο εἰς τὸν δῆμον</em>, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης
τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and again respecting his coming
from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ
δανείζεται, etc. (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed
over to the people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria <i>for
his trial</i>—might well be asserted respecting his position in the month of
June, though his trial did not actually take place until November. I think
it cannot be doubted that the triremes at Kalauria would form a part of that
fleet which actually went to Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go
thither until after the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as
soon as Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in July, he
must have returned to Athens in November to the trial of Timotheus, which
is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that he remained in the Ionian sea
until 371 <small>B.C.</small> But if we look attentively at the oration of Demosthenes,
we shall see that there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have
been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of Timotheus.
The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ
διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc.,
may be well explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned,
by supposing them to allude to those pronounced censures in the
public assembly whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was
obtained, and whereby the general indignation against him was first excited.
I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates was actually present
at the trial of Timotheus in November. But Kallistratus was really present
at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197, 1198); which consists well enough with
the statement of Xenophon, that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates
to leave him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus
directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer of
Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances of the
case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding Timotheus in the
command and gaining an important success at Korkyra—might be well-pleased
to be dispensed from the obligation of formally accusing him before
the dikastery, in opposition to Jason and Alketas, as well as to a
powerful body of Athenian friends.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from Xenophon.
He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from his command, but afterwards
forgiven and re-appointed by the people (jointly with Iphikrates) in
consequence of the great accession of force which he had procured in his
preliminary cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes
in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command of Iphikrates
and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the trial of Timotheus.
This account is evidently quite distinct from that of Xenophon,
which latter is on all grounds to be preferred, especially as its main points
are in conformity with the Demosthenic oration.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_327"><a href="#FNanchor_327">[327]</a></span>
Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.
</p>
<p>
We see from another passage of the same oration, that the creditors of
Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum of money in the Persian
service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther illustrates what I have said in a previous
note, about the motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take
service in foreign parts away from Athens.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_328"><a href="#FNanchor_328">[328]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_329"><a href="#FNanchor_329">[329]</a></span>
See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont. Neæram, c. 12,
p. 1357.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_330"><a href="#FNanchor_330">[330]</a></span>
Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal. xi, 19.
</p>
<p>
Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate religious
comments, numerous physical portents which occurred about this time (see
Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_331"><a href="#FNanchor_331">[331]</a></span>
This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified by an indirect
allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known philo-Laconian sentiments
sufficiently explain why he avoids directly mentioning it.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_332"><a href="#FNanchor_332">[332]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 50.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian envoys
had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, and had
been the originators of that previous peace. But this appears to me one of
the cases (not a few altogether in his history) in which he repeats himself,
or gives the same event twice over under analogous circumstances. The
intervention of the Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period
immediately preceding the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, than upon that which preceded
the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, when, in point of fact, no peace was ever fully
executed.
</p>
<p>
Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479) represents the
king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by Athens and Sparta in 371
<small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_333"><a href="#FNanchor_333">[333]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_334"><a href="#FNanchor_334">[334]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_335"><a href="#FNanchor_335">[335]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_336"><a href="#FNanchor_336">[336]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied this statement;
but it seems extremely reasonable.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_337"><a href="#FNanchor_337">[337]</a></span>
This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in Isokrates,
when he complains more than once that Platæa had been taken by the
Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The speaker, in protesting
against the injustice of the Thebans, appeals to two guarantees which they
have violated; for the purpose of his argument, however, the two are not
clearly distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee was,
the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been restored, and to
which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all parties. The second guarantee,
was that given by Thebes when she conquered the Bœotian cities in
377-370 <small>B.C.</small>, and reconstituted the federation; whereby she ensured to the
Platæans existence as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent
with the obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the
Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths and
the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of the peace of
Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed by the submission of
Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He calls for the tutelary interference
of Athens, as a party to the peace of Antalkidas.
</p>
<p>
Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that the Thebans
were parties to the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small> between Sparta and Athens; that they
accepted it, intending deliberately to break it; and that under that peace,
the Lacedæmonian harmosts and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ
and other places in Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which
appears to me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in
the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were no Lacedæmonian
harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the north) in 374
B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1) that the Thebans “were
recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued the Bœotian cities”—in or
before 375 <small>B.C.</small>, so that they were able to march out of Bœotia and invade
Phokis; which implies the expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian
forces from the southern part of Bœotia.
</p>
<p>
The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very clear or
discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it should be, in the
pleading of a suffering and passionate man. But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης
and εἰρήνη may always (in my judgment) be explained, without referring
it, as Dr. Thirlwall does, to the peace of 374 <small>B.C.</small>, or supposing
Thebes to have been a party to that peace.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_338"><a href="#FNanchor_338">[338]</a></span>
Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_339"><a href="#FNanchor_339">[339]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 47.
</p>
<p>
Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third year (counting
the years from midsummer to midsummer) before the battle of Leuktra;
or in the year of the archon Asteius at Athens; which seems to me the
true date, though Mr. Clinton supposes it (without ground, I think) to be
contradicted by Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from
midsummer 373 to 372 <small>B.C.</small> It is in the latter half of the year that I suppose
Platæa to have been taken.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_340"><a href="#FNanchor_340">[340]</a></span>
I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38; compare also
sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having destroyed
the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and above what they had done to
Platæa,) and I venture to apply this to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states
that the Thespians were at this very period treated exactly like the Platæans;
that is, driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except
that they had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας γενομένους:
compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46) speaks of the
Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against this, I gather, from
the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the Thespians were not in the same
plight with the Platæans when that oration was delivered; that is, they
were not expelled collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also
expressly says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of
the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly afterwards.
Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story, about the conduct of the
Thespians, which it would not be reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1).
I believe therefore that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that
the Thespians were ἀπόλιδες <i>before</i> the battle of Leuktra. It is quite possible
that they might have sent supplications to Athens (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen.
Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe mandate to demolish their
walls.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_341"><a href="#FNanchor_341">[341]</a></span>
Thucyd. iv, 133.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_342"><a href="#FNanchor_342">[342]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47, 68.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_343"><a href="#FNanchor_343">[343]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους
ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς
ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους· ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’
ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι
παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.
</p>
<p>
Compare sect. 36.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_344"><a href="#FNanchor_344">[344]</a></span>
Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_345"><a href="#FNanchor_345">[345]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ
τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν
ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_346"><a href="#FNanchor_346">[346]</a></span>
Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_347"><a href="#FNanchor_347">[347]</a></span>
Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict between Epaminondas
and <i>Kallistratus</i>, assigning it to the period immediately antecedent
to the abortive peace concluded between Athens and Sparta three years
before. I agree with Wesseling (see his note <i>ad loc.</i>) in thinking that these
debates more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace
of 371 <small>B.C.</small> Diodorus has made great confusion between the two; sometimes
repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena, as if they belonged
to both,—sometimes assigning to one what properly belongs to the
other.
</p>
<p>
The altercation between Epaminondas and <i>Kallistratus</i> (ἐν τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ)
seems to me more properly appertaining to debates in the assembly
of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to debates at Sparta, in the
preliminary discussions for peace, where the altercations between Epaminondas
and <i>Agesilaus</i> occurred.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_348"><a href="#FNanchor_348">[348]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.
</p>
<p>
It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether Kallistratus
was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_349"><a href="#FNanchor_349">[349]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_350"><a href="#FNanchor_350">[350]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ πάντων ἐποίησεν
(Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_351"><a href="#FNanchor_351">[351]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_352"><a href="#FNanchor_352">[352]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_353"><a href="#FNanchor_353">[353]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_354"><a href="#FNanchor_354">[354]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν,
ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε μὴν
τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_355"><a href="#FNanchor_355">[355]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ
ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ
ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε
αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν
οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_356"><a href="#FNanchor_356">[356]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_357"><a href="#FNanchor_357">[357]</a></span>
Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_358"><a href="#FNanchor_358">[358]</a></span>
Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον
τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες
ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the Platæans), <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον</em>,
ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, <em class="gesperrt">ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια</em>,
ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.
</p>
<p>
Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who admitted
the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες
ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι,
<em class="gesperrt">ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι</em>, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc.
</p>
<p>
Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_359"><a href="#FNanchor_359">[359]</a></span>
Diodor. xi, 81.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_360"><a href="#FNanchor_360">[360]</a></span>
Thucyd. iv, 126.
</p>
<p>
Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on the approach
of the Illyrians:—
</p>
<p>
Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν
ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων·
οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν,
ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους· <em class="gesperrt">οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν
ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν</em>.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_361"><a href="#FNanchor_361">[361]</a></span>
One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such a proposition,
before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the language which Isokrates
puts into the mouth of the Spartan prince Archidamus, five or six years
after that battle, protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather
than consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν
ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’ ἡ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok.
Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 <small>B.C.</small>, what had once been Messenia, was
only a portion of Laconia, which no one thought of distinguishing from
the other portions (see Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_362"><a href="#FNanchor_362">[362]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare Diodor. xv, 51.
Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the congress preceding the
peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small>; at which time Epaminondas was an unknown
man.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between Agesilaus and
Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that given by Pausanias,
and has every appearance of being the truth. But he introduces it in a
very bold and abrupt way, such as cannot be conformable to the reality.
To raise a question about the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most
daring novelty. A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon
it as a retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes to
her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without assigning his
reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a large portion of his hearers.
The reasons which I here ascribe to Epaminondas are such as we know to
have formed the Theban creed, in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as
were actually urged by the Theban orator in 427 <small>B.C.</small>, when the fate of the
Platæan captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid
out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if the same brief
question were angrily put to him a second time, meet it with another equally
brief counter-question or retort. It is this final interchange of thrusts
which Plutarch has given, omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas,
and necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances.
We must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that
Thebes was entitled to <i>as much power</i> in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He
only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as much
an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in reference to
the Grecian world.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of the
Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor any envoy
by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered their name among
the cities which had taken the oaths, came on the next day and requested,
that the entry might be altered, and that ‘<i>the Bœotians</i>’ might be substituted
in place of <i>the Thebans</i>, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them
that he could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they
chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It seems to me
that this account is far less probable than that of Plutarch, and bears every
mark of being incorrect. Why should such a man as Epaminondas (who
doubtless was the envoy) consent at first to waive the presidential pretensions
of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should
he retract the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to
be as much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his proceedings
manifested themselves but too soon.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_363"><a href="#FNanchor_363">[363]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_364"><a href="#FNanchor_364">[364]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 38-82.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_365"><a href="#FNanchor_365">[365]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_366"><a href="#FNanchor_366">[366]</a></span>
Thucyd. iv.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_367"><a href="#FNanchor_367">[367]</a></span>
Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i>
</p>
<p>
Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace between Athens
and Sparta in 374 <small>B.C.</small> I have already remarked that they belong
properly to the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small>; as Wesseling suspects in his note.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_368"><a href="#FNanchor_368">[368]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_369"><a href="#FNanchor_369">[369]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor. xv, 51.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_370"><a href="#FNanchor_370">[370]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_371"><a href="#FNanchor_371">[371]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_372"><a href="#FNanchor_372">[372]</a></span>
It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta, or Kleombrotus
from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to Thebes, that the Bœotian
cities should be left autonomous; and the requisition was repudiated (Diodor.
xv, 51; Aristeides, Or. (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But
such mission seems very doubtful.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_373"><a href="#FNanchor_373">[373]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_374"><a href="#FNanchor_374">[374]</a></span>
Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9, ed. Didot.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_375"><a href="#FNanchor_375">[375]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3; Plutarch, Pelopid.
c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.
</p>
<p>
The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus, who directed
him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to the deceased females. Pelopidas
and his friends were greatly perplexed about the fulfilment of this
command; many urged that it was necessary for some maiden to devote
herself, or to be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the
country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others denounced
the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the debate, a
mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped not far off; upon which
the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here comes the victim required,
sent by the special providence of the gods.” The chestnut filly was caught
and offered as a sacrifice on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from
a conviction that the mandate of the gods had been executed.
</p>
<p>
The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De Genio Socratis
(c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of Pelopidas in the conspiracy
whereby the Theban oligarchy was put down and the Lacedæmonians
expelled from the Kadmeia.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_376"><a href="#FNanchor_376">[376]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_377"><a href="#FNanchor_377">[377]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_378"><a href="#FNanchor_378">[378]</a></span>
Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_379"><a href="#FNanchor_379">[379]</a></span>
Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_380"><a href="#FNanchor_380">[380]</a></span>
Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress upon this indifference
or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon says quite enough to authenticate
the reality of the fact (Hellen. vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De
Offic. ii, 7, 26.
</p>
<p>
Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of Agesilaus
in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on the part of the allies
of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_381"><a href="#FNanchor_381">[381]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_382"><a href="#FNanchor_382">[382]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a thousand Lacedæmonians
to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4) gives the number as more
than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless
above the truth, though the number given by Xenophon may be fairly
presumed as somewhat below it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman.
ii, 17) states that seventeen hundred Spartans perished.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_383"><a href="#FNanchor_383">[383]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_384"><a href="#FNanchor_384">[384]</a></span>
Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.; Cicero, de officiis,
ii, 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_385"><a href="#FNanchor_385">[385]</a></span>
Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_386"><a href="#FNanchor_386">[386]</a></span>
Pausan. ix, 16, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_387"><a href="#FNanchor_387">[387]</a></span>
This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28). The
congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of the Attic month Skirrophorion
(June), the last month of the year of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes;
the battle was fought on the fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon,
the first month of the next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês;
about the beginning of July.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_388"><a href="#FNanchor_388">[388]</a></span>
Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter connected
with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of Agesilaus was present
and fought, together with various other circumstances, which I shall discuss
presently, in a future note. I follow Xenophon.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_389"><a href="#FNanchor_389">[389]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία
ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans) πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_390"><a href="#FNanchor_390">[390]</a></span>
Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called <i>Archidamus</i> (composed about five years
after the battle, as if to be spoken by Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts
this statement distinctly into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σώμασι κρατηθῆναι
<em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον</em>, etc. (s. 9).
</p>
<p>
I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion entertained both
by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the more natural, since the
two contemporary kings of Sparta were almost always at variance, and at
the head of opposing parties; especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus,
during the life of the latter.
</p>
<p>
Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de Officiis, i, 24,
84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera, quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam
timens temere cum Epaminondâ conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes
corruerunt.” Polybius remarks (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed)
that all the proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta,
were marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings of the allies;
while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the opposite character.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_391"><a href="#FNanchor_391">[391]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει
χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον
νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους
ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch, Pelop. c. 23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_392"><a href="#FNanchor_392">[392]</a></span>
See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.
</p>
<p>
Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι
τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph.
Memorab. iii, 5, 13, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_393"><a href="#FNanchor_393">[393]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα
πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. <em class="gesperrt">Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν</em>·
καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις
ἰέναι, <em class="gesperrt">πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ</em>, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_394"><a href="#FNanchor_394">[394]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_395"><a href="#FNanchor_395">[395]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν
Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν τῆς τελευταίας,
καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος,
ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ
διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν
τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν· προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ
σιγῇ τὸ πάθος φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ
προσήκοντες, λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ
ζῶντες ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ
ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.
</p>
<p>
See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the cutting
in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about the satisfaction
and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians who had lost relations in
the battle; while every one else was mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10).
Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_396"><a href="#FNanchor_396">[396]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 39.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_397"><a href="#FNanchor_397">[397]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_398"><a href="#FNanchor_398">[398]</a></span>
See Thucyd. vii, 73.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_399"><a href="#FNanchor_399">[399]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.
</p>
<p>
However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at Leuktra,
it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from them at this moment,
than at any other.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_400"><a href="#FNanchor_400">[400]</a></span>
Pausanias states that immediately after the battle, Epaminondas gave
permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and go home, by which permission
they profited, so that the Spartans now stood alone in the camp (Paus.
ix, 14, 1). This however is inconsistent with the account of Xenophon
(vi, 4, 26), and I think improbable.
</p>
<p>
Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved the Spartans
by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it appears to me that the
storming of the Spartan camp was an arduous enterprise, wherein more
Thebans than Spartans would have been slain: moreover, the Spartans
were masters of the port of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving
out the camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted
by Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_401"><a href="#FNanchor_401">[401]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.
</p>
<p>
The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by
which Kleombrotus arrived.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_402"><a href="#FNanchor_402">[402]</a></span>
This is the most convenient place for noticing the discrepancy, as to
the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and Xenophon. I have followed
Xenophon.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and the
out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place, <i>not after</i> the
battle of Leuktra, but <i>before</i> it. Jason (he says) came with a considerable
force to the aid of the Thebans. He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who
doubted the sufficiency of his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate
Bœotia. But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus
with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by
order of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly Kleombrotus,
finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened, openly broke
the truce just concluded, and marched back with Archidamus to Leuktra.
Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus commanding the right wing, and
Archidamus the left. They sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus
was slain; the result being the same on both statements.
</p>
<p>
We must here make our election between the narrative of Xenophon and
that of Diodorus. That the authority of the former is greater, speaking generally,
I need hardly remark; nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities
become so glaring and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica
(where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting the humiliation
of Sparta), as to afford some color for the suspicions of Palmerius,
Morus, and Schneider, who think that Xenophon has concealed the direct
violation of truce on the part of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred
as Diodorus has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen.
vi, 4, 5, 6.
</p>
<p>
It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such suspicion
ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds for preferring the
narrative of Xenophon.
</p>
<p>
1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the Spartan
army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia. Jason arrives
after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans to allow them to retreat
under a truce; Archidamus also arrives after the battle to take them up.
If the defeat had taken place under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus
and the survivors would have found it scarcely possible
to escape out of Bœotia.
</p>
<p>
2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been a violation of truce
on the part of Kleombrotus and the Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that
occurs in Grecian history. But such violation is never afterwards alluded
to by any one, among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.
</p>
<p>
3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus, is, that Archidamus
was present and fought at Leuktra. But we have independent evidence
rendering it almost certain that he was not there. Whoever reads
the Discourse of Isokrates called <i>Archidamus</i> (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will
see that such observations could not have been put into the mouth of Archidamus,
if he had been present there, and (of course) in joint command
with Kleombrotus.
</p>
<p>
4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army from her
allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace exonerated her allies
from everything like obligation to follow her headship; and a new army,
not for the purpose of extricating defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for
pure aggression against Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.
</p>
<p>
On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_403"><a href="#FNanchor_403">[403]</a></span>
Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_404"><a href="#FNanchor_404">[404]</a></span>
Thucyd. v, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_405"><a href="#FNanchor_405">[405]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214 B.; Apophtheg.
Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.
</p>
<p>
A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was enacted
after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by Antipater, <small>B.C.</small>
330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the only person at Sparta
who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix, 70). He incurred the strongest
unpopularity for such opposition. Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing
the public feeling at Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_406"><a href="#FNanchor_406">[406]</a></span>
The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an earlier part
of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_407"><a href="#FNanchor_407">[407]</a></span>
Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις,
ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_408"><a href="#FNanchor_408">[408]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ
πάντες ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.
</p>
<p>
These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon: compare
vii, 5, 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_409"><a href="#FNanchor_409">[409]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_410"><a href="#FNanchor_410">[410]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_411"><a href="#FNanchor_411">[411]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 57.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_412"><a href="#FNanchor_412">[412]</a></span>
Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_413"><a href="#FNanchor_413">[413]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.
</p>
<p>
I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding chapter) for
believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες <i>before</i> the battle of Leuktra.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_414"><a href="#FNanchor_414">[414]</a></span>
Pausanias, x, 11, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_415"><a href="#FNanchor_415">[415]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_416"><a href="#FNanchor_416">[416]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς στρατευσομένοις
εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς παρασκευάζεσθαι.
</p>
<p>
I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his Appendix
ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his edition of Thucydides)
as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton. At the same time, I do
not think that the passage proves much either in favor of his view, or
against the view of Mr. Clinton, about the month of the Pythian festival;
which I incline to conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than
Dr. Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking to the
lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the festival would not
always coincide with the same month or week of our year.
</p>
<p>
I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of Plutarch
respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with the battle of
Koroneia.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_417"><a href="#FNanchor_417">[417]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_418"><a href="#FNanchor_418">[418]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 13.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_419"><a href="#FNanchor_419">[419]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ
μελήσει. <em class="gesperrt">Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα
διανοούμενος</em>, etc.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a consequence
of the previous intention expressed by the god to take care of his
own treasure.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_420"><a href="#FNanchor_420">[420]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.
</p>
<p>
The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated: compare
Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_421"><a href="#FNanchor_421">[421]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.
</p>
<p>
The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 <small>B.C.</small>, refutes
the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays to Timotheus;
who can never have made war upon Jason after 373 <small>B.C.</small>, when he received
the latter at Athens in his house.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_422"><a href="#FNanchor_422">[422]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_423"><a href="#FNanchor_423">[423]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_424"><a href="#FNanchor_424">[424]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_425"><a href="#FNanchor_425">[425]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 39, 40.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place after the
peace concluded in 374 <small>B.C.</small>, and not after the peace of 371 <small>B.C.</small> But it is
impossible that they can have taken place after the former, which in point
of fact, was broken off almost as soon as sworn,—was never carried into
effect,—and comprised no one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked
that Diodorus seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in
his history, these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the
former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he mentions
come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after the battle of
Leuktra.
</p>
<p>
He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and its
local representatives in the various cities, to have taken place even after
the peace of Antalkidas in 387 <small>B.C.</small> (xv, 5). But if such reaction began at
that time, it must have been promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished
and even advancing power.
</p>
<p>
Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of Leuktra,
may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and Strabo seemingly
copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both Sparta and Thebes agreed to
leave their disputed questions of power to the arbitration of the Achæans,
and to abide by their decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of
Polybius, I am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts
which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If any such
arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to nothing; for the
war went on without interruption. But I cannot bring myself to believe
that it was even consented to, either by Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant
confidence of the former, the sense of dignity on the part of the latter,
must have indisposed both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment
of umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation
in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, though they acquired a good deal a century and a half afterwards.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_426"><a href="#FNanchor_426">[426]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 57, 58.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_427"><a href="#FNanchor_427">[427]</a></span>
Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.)
s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii, 66.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_428"><a href="#FNanchor_428">[428]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.
</p>
<p>
The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling, though
indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by their actual conduct—Hellen.
vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_429"><a href="#FNanchor_429">[429]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.
</p>
<p>
Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν,
καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται
τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.
</p>
<p>
In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that we ought to
read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any MSS.), in place of
οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the new reading into the text;
yet they doubt the propriety of the change, and I confess that I share their
doubts. The word οὕτω will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different
sense from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by
Xenophon.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_430"><a href="#FNanchor_430">[430]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_431"><a href="#FNanchor_431">[431]</a></span>
Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vii,
4, 8).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_432"><a href="#FNanchor_432">[432]</a></span>
Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.
</p>
<p>
We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus, who
treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the Phokians, which
began in 355 <small>B.C.</small>, and in which the conduct of Sparta was partly determined
by this previous sentence of the Amphiktyons. See Theopompi
Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_433"><a href="#FNanchor_433">[433]</a></span>
See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197 (Berlin,
1812).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_434"><a href="#FNanchor_434">[434]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_435"><a href="#FNanchor_435">[435]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_436"><a href="#FNanchor_436">[436]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.
</p>
<p>
Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans reëstablished the
city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the spontaneous impulse of the
Mantineans and other Arcadians, before the Thebans had yet begun to interfere
actively in Peloponnesus, which we shall presently find them doing.
But it was doubtless done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all
probability made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed
the first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia, which I
shall presently relate.
</p>
<p>
Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the same situation
as the one dismantled in 385 <small>B.C.</small>, since the river Ophis did not run
through it, as it had run through the former,—or else the course of
the Ophis has altered. If the former, there would be three successive
sites, the oldest of them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of
Gurzuli. Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent villages.
Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill Gurzuli to be the same
as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake distinguishes the two, and places
Ptolis on his map northward of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The
summit of Gurzuli is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea
(Leake, Peloponnes. p. 383).
</p>
<p>
The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 <small>B.C.</small>, form an ellipse of about
eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in circumference. The
greater axis of the ellipse points north and south. It was surrounded with
a wet ditch, whose waters join into one course at the west of the town, and
form a brook which Sir William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea,
p. 142). The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square
stones; it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall, two feet
for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four feet filled up with rubbish.
There were eight principal double gates, each with a narrow winding approach,
defended by a round tower on each side. There were quadrangular
towers, eighty feet apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst
Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).
</p>
<p>
These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks respecting
fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears that Mantinea
was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius assigns a circumference
of more than three miles (p. 253).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_437"><a href="#FNanchor_437">[437]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_438"><a href="#FNanchor_438">[438]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_439"><a href="#FNanchor_439">[439]</a></span>
It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some common Arcadian
coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.
</p>
<p>
Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as well as
by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a later date subsequent
to the foundation of Megalopolis.
</p>
<p>
On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde, p.
85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference in the style
and execution of these coins, and that several in all probability belong to a
date earlier than the battle of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins
were struck in connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of
Zeus Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of that
god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection with the temple of
Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between Mantinea and Orchomenus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_440"><a href="#FNanchor_440">[440]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν,
καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων, etc.
</p>
<p>
Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_441"><a href="#FNanchor_441">[441]</a></span>
See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_442"><a href="#FNanchor_442">[442]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_443"><a href="#FNanchor_443">[443]</a></span>
For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and with each
other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_444"><a href="#FNanchor_444">[444]</a></span>
Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his friends as being
quite in the right, and as having behaved not only with justice but with
clemency. But we learn from an indirect admission, in another place, that
there was also another story, totally different, which represented Stasippus
as having begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5,
36.
</p>
<p>
The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books, greatly diminishes
the value of his own belief on such a matter.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_445"><a href="#FNanchor_445">[445]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_446"><a href="#FNanchor_446">[446]</a></span>
Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_447"><a href="#FNanchor_447">[447]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_448"><a href="#FNanchor_448">[448]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.
</p>
<p>
See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians respecting
the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_449"><a href="#FNanchor_449">[449]</a></span>
I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps of Kiepert
at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and so situated in reference
to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed very near Asea in order to get to
it; which is difficult to suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was
assembled at Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to
Laconia (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position marked
by Kiepert.
</p>
<p>
The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward than
Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which was on the
straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64; Herodot. ix, 11).
Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map agreeably to what seems the meaning
of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3. But it rather appears that the place mentioned
by Pausanias must have been <i>Oresthasion</i>, and that <i>Oresteion</i> must have been
a different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See the geographical
Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p. 442—Germ. edit.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_450"><a href="#FNanchor_450">[450]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_451"><a href="#FNanchor_451">[451]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν τὴν ἔφοδον.
</p>
<p>
See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75. The exact
spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς Μαντινικῆς, seems
hardly to be identified.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_452"><a href="#FNanchor_452">[452]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρὶν καὶ
τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν
ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ
δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_453"><a href="#FNanchor_453">[453]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_454"><a href="#FNanchor_454">[454]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_455"><a href="#FNanchor_455">[455]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 60.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_456"><a href="#FNanchor_456">[456]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_457"><a href="#FNanchor_457">[457]</a></span>
Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_458"><a href="#FNanchor_458">[458]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_459"><a href="#FNanchor_459">[459]</a></span>
To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation of the
Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the rival pretensions
of New York and Philadelphia were among the principal motives for creating
the new federal city of Washington.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_460"><a href="#FNanchor_460">[460]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4; Diodor.
xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_461"><a href="#FNanchor_461">[461]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι
ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ
ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν
Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ,
etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_462"><a href="#FNanchor_462">[462]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_463"><a href="#FNanchor_463">[463]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 64.
</p>
<p>
See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_464"><a href="#FNanchor_464">[464]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got on the
roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems to imply that they
were admitted into the houses by the villagers.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_465"><a href="#FNanchor_465">[465]</a></span>
Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and advances
various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the road from Sparta
to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and that Karyæ was on the road
from Sparta northward, towards Tegea. The French investigators of the
Morea, as well as Professor Ross and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and
place Sellasia on the road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake,
Peloponnesiaca, p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin,
1841).
</p>
<p>
Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high; yet the
opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to me preferable.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_466"><a href="#FNanchor_466">[466]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_467"><a href="#FNanchor_467">[467]</a></span>
This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ μέντοι
ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_468"><a href="#FNanchor_468">[468]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_469"><a href="#FNanchor_469">[469]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ <em class="gesperrt">διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι λαχόντες</em>
(the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων ... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν,
ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς προδιαβεβῶτας</em> λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς
ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν, ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων
τῶν πολεμίων περὶ Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_470"><a href="#FNanchor_470">[470]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον
συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_471"><a href="#FNanchor_471">[471]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.
</p>
<p>
It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the number of
Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very considerable; and that
the contrast between the second and third passages evinces the different
feelings with which the two seem to have been composed by Xenophon.
</p>
<p>
In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas, with a wish
to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and calamity as much as
he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more than this,—“there were some
among the Periœki, who even took active service in the attack of Gythium,
and fought along with the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ
ἐπέθεντο καὶ συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.
</p>
<p>
But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called Agesilaus,
ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta
under adverse circumstances of the latter. Hence it then suits his argument,
to magnify these adverse circumstances, in order to enhance the merit
of the Phliasians; and he therefore tells us,—“<i>Many</i> of the Periœki, all
the Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from Sparta,”—σφαλέντων
δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ
πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς,
ὡς εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).
</p>
<p>
I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though in opposite
directions. I have adopted in the text something between the two.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_472"><a href="#FNanchor_472">[472]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H. xiv, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_473"><a href="#FNanchor_473">[473]</a></span>
Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_474"><a href="#FNanchor_474">[474]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν
προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.
</p>
<p>
This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators unanimous
either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit μὴ, construe ἐδόκει
as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively
rash.”
</p>
<p>
I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and construction.
I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_475"><a href="#FNanchor_475">[475]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8; Plutarch, Agesil. c.
32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_476"><a href="#FNanchor_476">[476]</a></span>
Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the opinion of those political
philosophers who maintained that a city ought to have no walls, but
to be defended only by the bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons
against such opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers;
that the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal courage,
have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι,
καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.
</p>
<p>
The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that Aristotle
has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban invasion. I do
not see what else he can mean; yet at the same time, if such be his meaning,
the remark is surely difficult to admit. Epaminondas came close up
to Sparta, but did not dare to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city
had had walls like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her
any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show (contrary
to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so strong by position, combined
with the military character of her citizens, that she could dispense
with walls.
</p>
<p>
Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom borrowed, to
the effect that Epaminondas might have taken Sparta, but designedly refrained
from doing so, on the ground that the Arcadians and others would
then no longer stand in need of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of
fact, nor the reason, appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv,
8) has the same story, but with a different reason assigned.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_477"><a href="#FNanchor_477">[477]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_478"><a href="#FNanchor_478">[478]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος
μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_479"><a href="#FNanchor_479">[479]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 72.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_480"><a href="#FNanchor_480">[480]</a></span>
Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.
</p>
<p>
See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where the facts
respecting Megalopolis are brought together and discussed.
</p>
<p>
It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes that the
capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the Mantineans see the folly
of having a river run through their town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis,
this same feature was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice
the Mantineans were parties concerned.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_481"><a href="#FNanchor_481">[481]</a></span>
Pausan. iv, 26, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_482"><a href="#FNanchor_482">[482]</a></span>
Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_483"><a href="#FNanchor_483">[483]</a></span>
Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of Epaminondas
(ix, 15, 4).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_484"><a href="#FNanchor_484">[484]</a></span>
Pausan. iv, 27, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_485"><a href="#FNanchor_485">[485]</a></span>
Pausan. iv, 31, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_486"><a href="#FNanchor_486">[486]</a></span>
Pausan. iv, 31, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_487"><a href="#FNanchor_487">[487]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_488"><a href="#FNanchor_488">[488]</a></span>
Thucyd. iv, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_489"><a href="#FNanchor_489">[489]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_490"><a href="#FNanchor_490">[490]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_491"><a href="#FNanchor_491">[491]</a></span>
Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc. Pausanias, following
the line of coast from the mouth of the river Pamisus in the Messenian
Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the mouth of the Neda in the Western
Sea,—enumerates the following towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides,
Asinê, the Cape Akritas, the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus,
Aulon (Pausan. iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus,
c. 46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused and
unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of Laconia; but
he seems to have conceived these cities as being in the <i>central southern</i> projection
of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape Tænarus forms the extremity); and
not to have conceived at all the <i>south-western</i> projection, whereof Cape Akritas
forms the extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus
of the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast
of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then after
that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and Psamathus, with
Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces in Messenia two different
cities,—one called Messênê, the other called Ithômê; whereas there
was only one Messênê situated on Mount Ithome.
</p>
<p>
I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this account of
Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of Peloponnesus remained
a portion of Laconia and belonging to Sparta, long after the establishment
of the city of Messênê. See the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax
of Karyanda,—in his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_492"><a href="#FNanchor_492">[492]</a></span>
Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_493"><a href="#FNanchor_493">[493]</a></span>
The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits powerfully
the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this abstraction of territory, and
emancipation of serfs, for the purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς
ὡς ἀληθῶς Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’ εὐλογωτέρως ἂν
εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ
τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς
δούλους ἡμετέρους ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.
</p>
<p>
Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν
αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν
ὄντες; compare also sections 8 and 102.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_494"><a href="#FNanchor_494">[494]</a></span>
Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος
ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς
τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
<em class="gesperrt">τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας</em> ἧς οἱ πατέρες ἡμῖν κατέλιπον
ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους, ἀκουσόμενος δ’ <em class="gesperrt">αὐτῶν τοιαύταις
βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας</em>,
ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.
</p>
<p>
This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of Leuktra,
is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan feeling under such
severe humiliations.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_495"><a href="#FNanchor_495">[495]</a></span>
The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the first Messenian
war, after which they became subjects of Sparta. The second Messenian
war arose from their revolt.
</p>
<p>
No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia since
the termination of the first war; which is placed by Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in
723 <small>B.C.</small>; though the date is not to be trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives
two hundred and eighty-seven years between the end of the second Messenian
war and the foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the
note of Siebelis on this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot
be made out.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_496"><a href="#FNanchor_496">[496]</a></span>
The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the beginning of Xenophon’s
history, becomes more and more exaggerated throughout the two latter
books wherein he recounts her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by
spite against the Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is
hardly any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable, as the case
now before us. In describing the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
in the winter of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>, he totally omits the foundation both of
Messênê and Megalopolis; though in the after part of his history, he alludes
(briefly) both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents
the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent army, for the
simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the Spartans, and to have been
desirous of returning to Bœotia, as soon as it was ascertained that the latter
had already returned to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention
the name of Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any
more than he mentions him at Leuktra.
</p>
<p>
Considering the momentous and striking character of these facts, and the
eminence of the Theban general by whom they were achieved, such silence
on the part of an historian, who professes to recount the events of
the time, is an inexcusable dereliction of his duty to state the <i>whole truth</i>.
It is plain that Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan
sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of
the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had withdrawn
from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet he can find
space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity, the two applications of
the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the favorable reception which they obtained,—also
the exploits of the Phliasians in their devoted attachment to
Sparta.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_497"><a href="#FNanchor_497">[497]</a></span>
See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also Pausan. v,
29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_498"><a href="#FNanchor_498">[498]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_499"><a href="#FNanchor_499">[499]</a></span>
Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220, Æschines, Fals.
Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_500"><a href="#FNanchor_500">[500]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59; Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων
Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106, ed. Neumann.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_501"><a href="#FNanchor_501">[501]</a></span>
Polybius, ii, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_502"><a href="#FNanchor_502">[502]</a></span>
Thucyd. v, 66.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_503"><a href="#FNanchor_503">[503]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_504"><a href="#FNanchor_504">[504]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_505"><a href="#FNanchor_505">[505]</a></span>
The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus (xv. 67),
seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus or some other
older author.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire months,”
which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses himself as if Epaminondas
spent all this time in ravaging Laconia. Yet again, in the
Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of
Pelopidas (c. 25), Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held
the command four whole months over and above the legal time, being engaged
in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems to me the
more probable interpretation of the case; for the operations seem too large
to have been accomplished in either three or four months.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_506"><a href="#FNanchor_506">[506]</a></span>
See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda Respublica
(c. 8, p. 788 A.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_507"><a href="#FNanchor_507">[507]</a></span>
Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an earnest friend
of Epaminondas, but of older political standing; to whom Epaminondas
partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcep. p. 805 F.).
</p>
<p>
Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same Olympic
year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after that battle, during the
archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 371
and Midsummer 370 <small>B.C.</small> (Pausan. viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation
of Messênê in the next Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus
at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 <small>B.C.</small> (iv,
27, 5).
</p>
<p>
The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to date
from the initial determination taken by the assembled Arcadians, soon after
the revolution at Tegea, to found a Pan-Arcadian city and federative league.
This was probably taken before Midsummer 370 <small>B.C.</small>, and the date of Pausanias
would thus be correct.
</p>
<p>
The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the expedition
of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>
which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens, as Pausanias
affirms.
</p>
<p>
What length of time was required to complete the erection and establishment
of either city, we are not informed.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 <small>B.C.</small> (xv, 72).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_508"><a href="#FNanchor_508">[508]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_509"><a href="#FNanchor_509">[509]</a></span>
Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_510"><a href="#FNanchor_510">[510]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_511"><a href="#FNanchor_511">[511]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_512"><a href="#FNanchor_512">[512]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ ἐδέξαντο,
ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ
ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_513"><a href="#FNanchor_513">[513]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων
παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_514"><a href="#FNanchor_514">[514]</a></span>
Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.
</p>
<p>
Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for supporting Sparta (ib.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_515"><a href="#FNanchor_515">[515]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_516"><a href="#FNanchor_516">[516]</a></span>
This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_517"><a href="#FNanchor_517">[517]</a></span>
To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius Nepos (Iphicrates,
c. 2).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_518"><a href="#FNanchor_518">[518]</a></span>
The account here given in the text coincides as to the matter of fact
with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also (in my belief) with
Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).
</p>
<p>
But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either his
suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the conduct, of Iphikrates.
Other modern critics appear to me not to have sufficiently distinguished
Xenophon’s <i>facts</i> from his <i>suppositions</i>.
</p>
<p>
Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line of Mount
Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able to reach Bœotia,—left
the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ unguarded. Then,—wishing
to inform himself, whether the Thebans had as yet passed the Mount
Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry.
Now (observes Xenophon) a few scouts can see and report as well as
a great number; while the great number find it more difficult to get back
in safety. By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a
body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not have
happened if he had only sent out a few.
</p>
<p>
The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is plain,
from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates never intended to
bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he sent out his whole body of
cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to harass the enemy on ground which he
thought advantageous for the purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates
should have been guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon
here reproaches him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more
probable that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed
should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a murderous
conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward march of the Thebans?
His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but Sparta was now no longer in danger;
and it was for the advantage of Athens that the Thebans should go
back to Bœotia, rather than remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content
himself with harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat
directly, is a policy which we should expect from him.
</p>
<p>
There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited discussion
among the commentators, and on which I dissent from their views. It is
connected with the statement of Pausanias, who says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ
(Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο, καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα
ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ
τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, <em class="gesperrt">καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος
Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ</em>, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης,
ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας ἀπήλαυνε.
</p>
<p>
In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling Iphikrates
“son of Timotheus;” and speaking of <i>Lechæum</i>, where Pausanias
ought to have named <i>Kenchreæ</i>. For Epaminondas could not have passed
Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long Walls, reaching from one
to the other, would prevent him; moreover, the “rugged ground” was between
Corinth and Kenchreæ, not between Corinth and Lechæum.
</p>
<p>
But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which follow:
“Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and <i>having come to the city itself of
the Athenians</i>, when Iphikrates forbade the Athenians to come out and fight,
he (Epaminondas) again marched away to Thebes.”
</p>
<p>
What are we to understand <i>by the city of the Athenians</i>? The natural
sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of the commentators
relate. But when the battle was fought between Corinth and Kenchreæ,
can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas pursued the fugitives to Athens—through
the city of Megara, which lay in the way, and which seems
then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have been allied with Athens? The station of
Iphikrates was <i>Corinth</i>; from thence he had marched out,—and thither his
cavalry, when repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.
</p>
<p>
Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands Pausanias
to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated cavalry to Corinth,—that
Epaminondas then marched straight on to Athens,—and that Iphikrates
followed him. “Possibly (he says) the only mistake in this statement
is, that it represents the <i>presence</i> of Iphikrates, instead of his <i>absence</i>,
as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to
Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”
</p>
<p>
I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon. Neither
he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas marched to the
walls of Athens, which supposition is derived solely from the words of
Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch intimate only that Iphikrates interposed
some opposition, and not very effective opposition, near Corinth, to
the retreating march of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.
</p>
<p>
That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under the circumstances
of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia, appears to me
in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more improbable by the silence
of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable to put this construction even upon
Pausanias; who may surely have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not
Athens, but <i>the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged</i>,—that
is, <i>Corinth</i>. <i>The city of the Athenians</i>, in reference to this battle, was
Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of Iphikrates had just
marched, and to which, on being defeated, they naturally retired for safety,
pursued by Epaminondas to the gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that
Iphikrates would not let the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out
to fight,—then follows naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would
not come out, drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.
</p>
<p>
The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29), can hardly
be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias. It purports to be a
nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans against Athens; which certainly
must be quite different (if it be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas.
And the stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a
strange and highly improbable character.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_519"><a href="#FNanchor_519">[519]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194 B.; Pausan.
ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.
</p>
<p>
Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others, especially Nepos
and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact, surround it with colors
exaggerated and false. They represent Epaminondas as in danger of being
put to death by ungrateful and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos
puts into his mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare
Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520 Dindorf.);
which, had it been really made, would have tended more than anything else
to set the public against him,—and which is moreover quite foreign to the
character of Epaminondas. To carry the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch
(De Vitioso Pudore, p. 540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and
begging for his life.
</p>
<p>
Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be
passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But he had a
good justification. It was necessary that he should put in the justification;
when put in, it passed triumphantly. What more could be required? The
facts, when fairly stated, will not serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude
of the people towards great men.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_520"><a href="#FNanchor_520">[520]</a></span>
Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch without interruption,
annually re-appointed, from the revolution of Thebes down to his decease.
Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34) affirms that when Pelopidas died, he
was in the thirteenth year of his appointment; which may be understood
as the same assertion in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen,
does not appear.
</p>
<p>
Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of Epaminondas.
But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my judgment, Epaminondas
appears again as commander in Peloponnesus during this same year
(369 <small>B.C.</small>) Sievers holds Epaminondas to have commanded without being
Bœotarch; but no reason is produced for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech.
bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 277).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_521"><a href="#FNanchor_521">[521]</a></span>
Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s.
124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta,
Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.
</p>
<p>
The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been considerable;
that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary and ancestral
sentiment rather than on common political grounds; with Athens, it
was both political and serious; with Sparta, it was attested by the most essential
military aid and coöperation.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_522"><a href="#FNanchor_522">[522]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_523"><a href="#FNanchor_523">[523]</a></span>
Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_524"><a href="#FNanchor_524">[524]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_525"><a href="#FNanchor_525">[525]</a></span>
Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς
εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου πατρὶ, etc.
</p>
<p>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνανεοῦθαι
(Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_526"><a href="#FNanchor_526">[526]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_527"><a href="#FNanchor_527">[527]</a></span>
Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3, p. 79; De
Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosthen. c. 6,
p. 163.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_528"><a href="#FNanchor_528">[528]</a></span>
Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 <small>B.C.</small>, when the
propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were under consideration,
aspirations, which were then regarded as beyond all hope of attainment,
and imprudent even to talk about (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον
καὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὔτε
οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_529"><a href="#FNanchor_529">[529]</a></span>
Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.
</p>
<p>
Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, εἷς ὢν τούτων
Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον, καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος
ὢν, <em class="gesperrt">ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις</em>.
Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, <em class="gesperrt">ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων
γραμμάτων</em> μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.
</p>
<p>
The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must have
taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the month preceding
the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace was sworn, with universal
autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only Thebes; or else, at the subsequent
congress held three or four months afterwards at Athens, where a
peace, on similar conditions generally, was again sworn under the auspices
of Athens as president.
</p>
<p>
My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at Athens.
First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα leads us to conclude
that the affair was transacted in that city; secondly, I do not think
that the Athenians would have been in any situation to exact such a reserve
in their favor, prior to the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta
was held, not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of terminating
the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent congress at
Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to which, either then or
soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_530"><a href="#FNanchor_530">[530]</a></span>
The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in his Epistola ad
Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that Amphipolis or its locality originally
belonged to his ancestor Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled
the Persians from it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides.
At least, if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the
spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by the Edonian
Thracians, both in 465 <small>B.C.</small>, when Athens made her first unsuccessful
attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437 <small>B.C.</small>, when she tried again
with better success under Agnon, and established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv,
102).
</p>
<p>
The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 <small>B.C.</small> “gave up or receded
from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1 c.) can
at most only be construed as referring to rights which he may have claimed,
since he was never in actual possession of it; though we cannot wonder
that the orator should use such language in addressing Philip son of Amyntas,
who was really master of the town.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_531"><a href="#FNanchor_531">[531]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 60.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_532"><a href="#FNanchor_532">[532]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus; Plutarch
(Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not expressly say
which; but his narrative seems to countenance the statement of Diodorus
rather than that of Plutarch.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_533"><a href="#FNanchor_533">[533]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 61.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_534"><a href="#FNanchor_534">[534]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 67.
</p>
<p>
The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are difficult
to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes from Diodorus;
who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas marched into Macedonia,
and brought back as a hostage to Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of
Alexander. This latter affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was
in Macedonia, and free, <i>after</i> the death of Alexander. And I believe that
the march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of Philip
as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of Macedon gave
his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the Illyrians, next to the Thebans.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_535"><a href="#FNanchor_535">[535]</a></span>
Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas
and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes him as
Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be applied to one of
the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14,
p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap.
Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the fact.
</p>
<p>
See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix,
c. 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_536"><a href="#FNanchor_536">[536]</a></span>
Diodor. xvi, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_537"><a href="#FNanchor_537">[537]</a></span>
Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii, 6.
</p>
<p>
Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and her
younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having recently died,
but says nothing about his assassination. Nevertheless there is no reason
to doubt that he was assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes
and Diodorus; and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch
(Pelop. c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus.
Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband Amyntas,
and against her children, in concert with a paramour. The statements of
Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of her having been concerned
in the death of Amyntas, but to support that of her having been accomplice
with Ptolemy in the murder of Alexander.
</p>
<p>
Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian kings.
When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of Alexander the
Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were capable of greater
crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_538"><a href="#FNanchor_538">[538]</a></span>
Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates,
c. 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_539"><a href="#FNanchor_539">[539]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.
</p>
<p>
μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐχθροῖς
καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus superseded
Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 <small>B.C.</small> But we are fairly
entitled to presume that the same is true of 369 or 368 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_540"><a href="#FNanchor_540">[540]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_541"><a href="#FNanchor_541">[541]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
</p>
<p>
The passage in which the orator alludes to these <i>hostages</i> of the Amphipolitans
in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately not fully intelligible
without farther information.
</p>
<p>
(Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς <em class="gesperrt">Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’ Ἁρπάλου
λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν</em> ὡς ὑμᾶς
κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’
ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.
</p>
<p>
Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining (or
capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot determine.
Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a body of Macedonians
or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the Amphipolitans, and in this character
exacting hostages from them as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards
when acting for Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants
of Sestos (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_542"><a href="#FNanchor_542">[542]</a></span>
Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_543"><a href="#FNanchor_543">[543]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.
</p>
<p>
The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the spring
of 369 <small>B.C.</small> On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch.
40, p. 145 note); differing from him however (p. 146 note), as well as from
Mr. Clinton, in this,—that I place the second expedition of Epaminondas
into Peloponnesus (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 <small>B.C.</small>; not in 368
<small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this is
what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει
Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι
καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.
</p>
<p>
Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion at Athens,
respecting the terms of alliance. This description occupies, from vii, 1, 1
to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and agreement is announced.
</p>
<p>
Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων
αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies)
εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι
καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.
</p>
<p>
I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the march of
the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of Oneion,—and
the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are here placed by
Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no long interval of time
between them. I see no ground to admit the interval of a year between
the vote of the assembly and the march of the Thebans; the more so, as
Epaminondas might reasonably presume that the building of Megalopolis
and Messene, recently begun, would need to be supported by another Theban
army in Peloponnesus during 369 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that Epaminondas
could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 <small>B.C.</small> But in this point I
do not concur. It appears to me that the issue of the trial at Thebes was
triumphant for him; thus making it more probable,—not less probable,—that
he and Pelopidas were reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_544"><a href="#FNanchor_544">[544]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_545"><a href="#FNanchor_545">[545]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_546"><a href="#FNanchor_546">[546]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.
</p>
<p>
This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants, affording
a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their guard. It was at
the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus surprised the troops of the
Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 6).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_547"><a href="#FNanchor_547">[547]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
</p>
<p>
Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ Λέχαιον; not
very exact, topographically, since it was on the other side of Corinth, between
Corinth and Kenchreæ.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from Kenchreæ on
one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and palisaded by the Athenians
and Spartans. But this cannot be true, because the Long Walls
were a sufficient defence between Corinth and Lechæum; and even between
Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not probable that any such continuous line of
defence was drawn, though the assailable points were probably thus guarded.
Xenophon does not mention either trench or palisade.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_548"><a href="#FNanchor_548">[548]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_549"><a href="#FNanchor_549">[549]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.
</p>
<p>
This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3, 1); the
Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the enemy’s commander
with his own hand.
</p>
<p>
The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor of
Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this undertaking.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_550"><a href="#FNanchor_550">[550]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_551"><a href="#FNanchor_551">[551]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.
</p>
<p>
This incident may have happened in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, just about the time when
Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive lines of Mount
Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book, Xenophon takes up
the history of Phlius, and carries it on from the winter of 370-369 <small>B.C.</small>,
when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, through 369, 368, 367 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_552"><a href="#FNanchor_552">[552]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_553"><a href="#FNanchor_553">[553]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_554"><a href="#FNanchor_554">[554]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with pay for
five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must understand it as
comprehending the time of their voyage from Sicily and back to Sicily.
Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon would not lead us to suppose that
they remained in Peloponnesus even so long as three months.
</p>
<p>
I think it certain however that much more must have passed in this campaign
than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would hardly have
forced the passage of the Oneium for such small objects as we find mentioned
in the Hellenica.
</p>
<p>
An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially restored and
published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a. Addenda to vol. i, p. 897),
records a vote of the Athenian people and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising
Dionysius of Syracuse,—and recording him with his
two sons as benefactors of Athens. It was probably passed somewhere
near this time; and we know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted
the freedom of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes
ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on which this
is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to warrant any other inferences.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_555"><a href="#FNanchor_555">[555]</a></span>
Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_556"><a href="#FNanchor_556">[556]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_557"><a href="#FNanchor_557">[557]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
</p>
<p>
Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην
γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê, which
is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the same expedition (xv,
67).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_558"><a href="#FNanchor_558">[558]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_559"><a href="#FNanchor_559">[559]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_560"><a href="#FNanchor_560">[560]</a></span>
Polyb. iv, 77.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_561"><a href="#FNanchor_561">[561]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_562"><a href="#FNanchor_562">[562]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ
οὐδὲν ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_563"><a href="#FNanchor_563">[563]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which seems not
exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name of Artaxerxes. Diodorus
also says that Philiskus left two thousand mercenaries with pay provided,
for the service of the Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards
mentioned.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_564"><a href="#FNanchor_564">[564]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_565"><a href="#FNanchor_565">[565]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_566"><a href="#FNanchor_566">[566]</a></span>
See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,) s. 2-11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_567"><a href="#FNanchor_567">[567]</a></span>
Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.
</p>
<p>
Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval; but
they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two were ancient
citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian Messênê bore before Anaxilaus
the despot chose to give to it this last-mentioned name.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_568"><a href="#FNanchor_568">[568]</a></span>
See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea of persons
who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves as spectators and
competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus)
s. 111, 112.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_569"><a href="#FNanchor_569">[569]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_570"><a href="#FNanchor_570">[570]</a></span>
Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.
</p>
<p>
... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy)
τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.
</p>
<p>
Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying and
distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. I cannot
but think that he made four different expeditions; two before his embassy
to the Persian court (which embassy took place in 367 <small>B.C.</small>; see Mr.
Clinton, Fast. Hellen. on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy),
and two after it.
</p>
<p>
1. The first was, in 369 <small>B.C.</small>, after the death of Amyntas, but during the
short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander of Macedon.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is erroneous, that
Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as a hostage.
</p>
<p>
2. The second was in 368 <small>B.C.</small>; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv, 71)
and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with the seizure
and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But it was really
on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the hostages.
</p>
<p>
3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was in 366
<small>B.C.</small>, after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian court, which happened
seemingly in the beginning of 366 <small>B.C.</small> In this third march, Pelopidas was
seized and made prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by
Epaminondas. Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing
it from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.); but with
this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before the journey of Pelopidas
to the Persian court; whereas it really occurred after and in consequence
of that journey, which dates in 367 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 <small>B.C.</small>; wherein he was slain (Diodor.
xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_571"><a href="#FNanchor_571">[571]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_572"><a href="#FNanchor_572">[572]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot be identified.
The only place of that name known, is in the territory of Argos,
quite different from what is here mentioned. O. Müller proposes to substitute
Malæa for Midea; a conjecture, which there are no means of verifying.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_573"><a href="#FNanchor_573">[573]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 33.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_574"><a href="#FNanchor_574">[574]</a></span>
I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
belongs to 367 <small>B.C.</small>; being simultaneous with the embassy of Pelopidas to
the Persian court. Many chronologers place it in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after the conclusion
of that embassy; because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon
after he has brought the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that
this proves the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the embassy
lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made while
Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the year 366
<small>B.C.</small> Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, there will hardly be
time left for the whole career of Euphron at Sikyon, which intervened before
the peace of 366 <small>B.C.</small> between Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen.
vii, 1, 44 <i>seq.</i>).
</p>
<p>
The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of Pelopidas
to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems indicated when we
compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα,
etc. Then Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy,
together with its unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up
the entire space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, βουληθεὶς
τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι
προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.
</p>
<p>
This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted by
the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in the former
words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_575"><a href="#FNanchor_575">[575]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.
</p>
<p>
The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby Xenophon
describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες <em class="gesperrt">οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον</em>, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_576"><a href="#FNanchor_576">[576]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.
</p>
<p>
His expression marks how completely these terms were granted by the
personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling opposition,—<em class="gesperrt">ἐνδυναστεύει</em>
ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_577"><a href="#FNanchor_577">[577]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 75.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_578"><a href="#FNanchor_578">[578]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against Epaminondas
to the events of the preceding year. They believed (according to
Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared the Spartans, and not
pushed his victory so far as might have been done, when he forced the lines
of Mount Oneium in 369 <small>B.C.</small> But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans
should have been displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines
was a capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed to be possible.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with Epaminondas,
on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his conduct in Achaia two
years after the action at Oneium; that is, in 367 <small>B.C.</small> This is much more
probable in itself, and much more consistent with the general series of
facts, than the cause assigned by Diodorus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_579"><a href="#FNanchor_579">[579]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
</p>
<p>
For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities, congregating
in a body, became strong enough to carry their restoration in each city
successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_580"><a href="#FNanchor_580">[580]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_581"><a href="#FNanchor_581">[581]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_582"><a href="#FNanchor_582">[582]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_583"><a href="#FNanchor_583">[583]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_584"><a href="#FNanchor_584">[584]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_585"><a href="#FNanchor_585">[585]</a></span>
This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by Xenophon, at
the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii, 4, 17) as a fact accomplished;
but we must suppose it to have occurred now, in order to reconcile sections
11-14 with sections 18-20 of vii, 2.
</p>
<p>
The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot not
only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared with other
parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave little Phliasian community.
Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere, he is obscure in the description of particular
events, and still more perplexing when we try to draw from him a
clear idea of the general series.
</p>
<p>
With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative, however, we
must recollect that it is a description of real events by a contemporary author
who had reasonable means of information. This is a precious ingredient,
which gives value to all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly
obliged to borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from
authors who write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators
whose purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence I
have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as described by
Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise influence on the main
course of the war.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_586"><a href="#FNanchor_586">[586]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_587"><a href="#FNanchor_587">[587]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_588"><a href="#FNanchor_588">[588]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_589"><a href="#FNanchor_589">[589]</a></span>
This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the six other
Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time when the Lacedæmonians
were masters of that town and garrisoned the Kadmeia. The
conspirators, through the contrivance of the secretary Phyllidas, got access
in disguise to the oligarchical leaders of Thebes, who were governing under
Lacedæmonian ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described
in a former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 <i>seq.</i></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_590"><a href="#FNanchor_590">[590]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.
</p>
<p>
To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so characteristic and
emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider and others refer, with great
probability, the allusion in the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ
τοῦ Θήβῃσιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_591"><a href="#FNanchor_591">[591]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_592"><a href="#FNanchor_592">[592]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_593"><a href="#FNanchor_593">[593]</a></span>
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_594"><a href="#FNanchor_594">[594]</a></span>
It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with Pelopidas in his
mission to the Persian court; we see this not only from Cornelius Nepos
(Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81), but also even from Xenophon, Hellen.
vii, 1, 36.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_595"><a href="#FNanchor_595">[595]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30; Plutarch, Artaxerx.
c. 22.
</p>
<p>
The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to some
Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must probably
have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon may not have
heard the name.
</p>
<p>
It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted up to
the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408 <small>B.C.</small>, envoys
from hostile Greek cities were included in the same company (Xen. Hellen.
i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_596"><a href="#FNanchor_596">[596]</a></span>
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
</p>
<p>
His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his ring, and
then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before the king; thus going
through the prostration.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_597"><a href="#FNanchor_597">[597]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_598"><a href="#FNanchor_598">[598]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας
τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων,
καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’ αὐτούς·
<em class="gesperrt">εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν</em>, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον ἰέναι.
</p>
<p>
It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of 367 <small>B.C.</small>,
though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas (387 <small>B.C.</small>) Xenophon
seems to have given the rescript in its exact words (v, 1, 31).
</p>
<p>
What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia proves that
other matters were included. Accordingly I do not hesitate to believe that
Amphipolis also was recognized as autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes,
Fals. Leg. p. 383, c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν
δούλην κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), <em class="gesperrt">ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ φίλην</em>
ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect
produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in his proceedings,
when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to death on returning
to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to the rescript given when
Timagoras was present.
</p>
<p>
In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι <em class="gesperrt">ἀκολουθεῖν</em>,—the
headship of Thebes is declared or implied. Compare the convention
imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_599"><a href="#FNanchor_599">[599]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος Ἀρχίδαμος,
ὅτι <em class="gesperrt">προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων</em>, ἐπήνει τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος,
ὅτι <em class="gesperrt">ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν</em>, οὔτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_600"><a href="#FNanchor_600">[600]</a></span>
Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.
</p>
<p>
In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400), Demosthenes says
that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras <i>for four years</i>. Certainly
this mission of Pelopidas to the Persian court cannot have lasted four years;
and Xenophon states that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they
heard that Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras
may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the battle of
Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the former rescript of the
Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens as head into the place of Sparta
(Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2). This was exactly four years before (371-367 <small>B.C.</small>).
Leon and Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently
returned from their first embassy, were now sent <i>jointly</i> on a second. Demosthenes
has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_601"><a href="#FNanchor_601">[601]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras
from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται (Fals. Leg.
p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences. Compare also Plutarch,
Artaxerxes, c. 22.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_602"><a href="#FNanchor_602">[602]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_603"><a href="#FNanchor_603">[603]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_604"><a href="#FNanchor_604">[604]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ
τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_605"><a href="#FNanchor_605">[605]</a></span>
The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a remarkable effect
was produced by the news at Athens (cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).
</p>
<p>
Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δήσας Πελοπίδαν,
ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν
στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.
</p>
<p>
Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a supply
of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at Athens (Plutarch,
Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_606"><a href="#FNanchor_606">[606]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_607"><a href="#FNanchor_607">[607]</a></span>
Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days; but it is difficult
to believe that Alexander would have been satisfied with a term so very
short.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_608"><a href="#FNanchor_608">[608]</a></span>
The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander, with its consequences,
is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv, 71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas,
c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5; Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does
not mention it.
</p>
<p>
I have placed the seizure in the year 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after the return of Pelopidas
from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree with Mr. Fynes
Clinton in referring to the year 367 <small>B.C.</small> Plutarch places the seizure before
the embassy; Diodorus places it in the year between Midsummer 368 and
Midsummer 367 <small>B.C.</small>; but he does not mention the embassy at all, in its
regular chronological order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits
at the close of the career of Pelopidas.
</p>
<p>
Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367 <small>B.C.</small>,
the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.
</p>
<p>
The year 368 <small>B.C.</small> seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas made his
second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned victorious, bringing
back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.
</p>
<p>
The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when Epaminondas
was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army. Now it seems to
have been not until the close of 367 <small>B.C.</small>, after the accusations arising out
of his proceedings in Achaia, that Epaminondas missed being rechosen as
general.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, mentions
his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and the matters which he
had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if Pelopidas, immediately before,
had been seized and detained for some months in prison by Alexander of
Pheræ, surely Xenophon would have alluded to it as an item on the other
side. I know that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always
to be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes both
the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where he is enumerating
the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly have failed to mention a
signal disgrace, if there had been one, immediately preceding.
</p>
<p>
Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but when in
pacific mission, and under circumstances in which no man less infamous
than Alexander would have seized him (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph.
p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1; “legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur”
Corn. Nep.). His imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances
to such a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.
But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or explained
by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation of the Persian rescript
appears to me to present the most reasonable explanation of his proceeding.
</p>
<p>
On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any probabilities on
the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of Pelopidas in 366 <small>B.C.</small>, after
the embassy to Persia; not without feeling, however, that the chronology
of this period cannot be rendered absolutely certain.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_609"><a href="#FNanchor_609">[609]</a></span>
Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_610"><a href="#FNanchor_610">[610]</a></span>
See the instructive Inscription and comments published by Professor
Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first distinctly made
known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle, 1846).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_611"><a href="#FNanchor_611">[611]</a></span>
Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_612"><a href="#FNanchor_612">[612]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
</p>
<p>
The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 <small>B.C.</small>, was
accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd. viii, 60).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_613"><a href="#FNanchor_613">[613]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
</p>
<p>
Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont.
p. 397, s. 85.
</p>
<p>
It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the trial of Chabrias
and Kallistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of
the latter which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such strong admiration.
But our information is so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing
certainly on the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei,
p. 109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an instructive
chapter.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_614"><a href="#FNanchor_614">[614]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_615"><a href="#FNanchor_615">[615]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were plenty of
vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his choice, and to determine
where he would disembark. He fixed upon the exact spot where the
exiles were assembled, not knowing that they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_616"><a href="#FNanchor_616">[616]</a></span>
Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger. Præc. p.
810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.
</p>
<p>
Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes embodied
in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).
</p>
<p>
Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus, that
Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly at Mêssenê, to
which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17, 3); possibly enough,
against Epaminondas also.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_617"><a href="#FNanchor_617">[617]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.
</p>
<p>
The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to the
success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was
indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in like manner, in Thucydides,
iii, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_618"><a href="#FNanchor_618">[618]</a></span>
It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by the Corinthians
under the command of Timophanes, and employed by him afterwards
as instruments for establishing a despotism.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries equipped about
this time (as far as we can verify his chronology) and to the Corinthian
mercenaries now assembled, in connection with Timoleon and Timophanes,
of whom I shall have to say much in a future chapter.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_619"><a href="#FNanchor_619">[619]</a></span>
Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus),
s. 106.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_620"><a href="#FNanchor_620">[620]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_621"><a href="#FNanchor_621">[621]</a></span>
This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is strongly and repeatedly
set forth in the oration of Isokrates called Archidamus, composed
as if to be spoken in this synod,—and good evidence (whether actually
spoken or not) of the feelings animating the prince and a large party at
Sparta. Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to
surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had broken off
altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians, and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο
δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας, καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀξιώσαντες
ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν
αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι,
καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ
σφᾶς αὐτούς. Compare sect. 67, 87,
99, 105, 106, 123.
</p>
<p>
We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the displeasure of
the Spartans against their allies, because the latter advised them to relinquish
Messênê,—was much greater than the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen.
vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to believe.
</p>
<p>
In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among various
other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes to ask for peace,
and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ
αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι. Now the Spartans had never sent
to Thebes for this purpose; the Corinthians went to Thebes, and there
learnt the peremptory condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized.
Next, the Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute
(ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans
themselves.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_622"><a href="#FNanchor_622">[622]</a></span>
Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys to Greece
who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems no ground for believing
that any Persian envoys had visited Greece since the return of Pelopidas,
whose return with the rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention.
The peace now concluded was upon the general basis of that
rescript; so far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus
about Persian intervention is exact.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_623"><a href="#FNanchor_623">[623]</a></span>
Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the peace as universally
accepted, and as being a conclusion of the Bœotian and Lacedæmonian
war, which had begun with the battle of Leuktra.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_624"><a href="#FNanchor_624">[624]</a></span>
Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην ἐπιθήσειν
καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων, ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_625"><a href="#FNanchor_625">[625]</a></span>
This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court (pursuant
to the invitation contained in the rescript given to Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen.
vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150,
p. 420, s. 283; Or. De Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.
</p>
<p>
If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put to death
by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he sent down (κατέπεμψεν)
a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this information can only
have been communicated, and the new rescript only obtained, by a second
embassy sent to him from Athens.
</p>
<p>
Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second
Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with a
friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon, Enc. Ages.
viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.), brought by a Persian messenger.
But the statement is too vague to enable us to verify this as the
actual occasion.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_626"><a href="#FNanchor_626">[626]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_627"><a href="#FNanchor_627">[627]</a></span>
Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont. Aristokrat. p. 666, s.
165; p. 687, s. 242.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_628"><a href="#FNanchor_628">[628]</a></span>
Demosth. <i>ut sup.</i>; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118; Cornel.
Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.
</p>
<p>
The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops at Samos,
are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic. ii, 23; and in
Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand them, they appear to be only
contributions, levied under a thin disguise, upon the inhabitants.
</p>
<p>
Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have given
some to Timotheus during this siege.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_629"><a href="#FNanchor_629">[629]</a></span>
Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.
</p>
<p>
I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer the
siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to relinquish
by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the place (Aristot. Politic.
ii, 4, 10).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_630"><a href="#FNanchor_630">[630]</a></span>
It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out anything like a thread
of events at this period; so miserably scanty and indistinct are our authorities.
</p>
<p>
Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap, v. p. 118-130) is
an instructive auxiliary in putting together the scraps of information; compare
also Weissenborn, Hellen. p. 192-194 (Jena, 1844).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_631"><a href="#FNanchor_631">[631]</a></span>
Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_632"><a href="#FNanchor_632">[632]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus,
c. 1.
</p>
<p>
Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests of Timotheus
secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων
οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).
</p>
<p>
From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular supply
of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes called “the flour-board
of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_633"><a href="#FNanchor_633">[633]</a></span>
See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_634"><a href="#FNanchor_634">[634]</a></span>
That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in part) by
kleruchs, <i>began</i> in 366 or 365 <small>B.C.</small>,—is established by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18,
when he mentions the restoration of the Samians forty-three years afterwards
by the Macedonian Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the
fact that additional detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in
352 <small>B.C.</small>, as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31
c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of Wesseling,
who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I dissent from his
criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh (Public Econ. of Athens,
b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly
improbable that so long an interval should have elapsed between the capture
of the island and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,
offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been <i>first</i> resorted
to by Athens in 352 <small>B.C.</small>, when she had been so much weakened
both by the Social War, and by the Progress of Philip. Strabo mentions
two thousand kleruchs as having been sent to Samos. But whether he
means the first batch alone, or altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p.
638). The father of the philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs;
compare Diogen. Laert. x, 1.
</p>
<p>
Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to me
to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this period.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general review
of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in Olym. 106, before
352 <small>B.C.</small> (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_635"><a href="#FNanchor_635">[635]</a></span>
See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De Fals.
Legat. 264, s. 74.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_636"><a href="#FNanchor_636">[636]</a></span>
Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_637"><a href="#FNanchor_637">[637]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_638"><a href="#FNanchor_638">[638]</a></span>
Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_639"><a href="#FNanchor_639">[639]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_640"><a href="#FNanchor_640">[640]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην
ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε
στρατηγὸν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_641"><a href="#FNanchor_641">[641]</a></span>
See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.
</p>
<p>
Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian assembly,
on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν ξενίας; but he never
realized this engagement, and he even afterwards became so far reconciled
with Iphikrates, as to give his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter
(ibid. p. 1204, s. 78).
</p>
<p>
To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is to be
referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας may refer to the
connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which might entail in some manner
the forfeiture of his right of citizenship; for it is difficult to understand
how γραφὴ ξενίας, in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original
right of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against Iphikrates;
who not only performed all the active duties of a citizen, but served in the
highest post, and received from the people distinguished honors.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_642"><a href="#FNanchor_642">[642]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν
Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_643"><a href="#FNanchor_643">[643]</a></span>
Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting these hostages,
I can do nothing more than repeat the brief and obscure notice of Demosthenes.
Of the various conjectures proposed to illustrate it, none appear
to me at all satisfactory. Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_644"><a href="#FNanchor_644">[644]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.
</p>
<p>
The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus to the
Athenian people, in support of these allegations. Unfortunately these letters
are not cited in substance.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_645"><a href="#FNanchor_645">[645]</a></span>
Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_646"><a href="#FNanchor_646">[646]</a></span>
Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the assistance of the
Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus. Compare also his oration
ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9). This can hardly allude to anything
else than the war carried on by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 <small>B.C.</small> See
also Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_647"><a href="#FNanchor_647">[647]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De
Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14. cont. Philokl. s. 19.
</p>
<p>
I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth contained in the
large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119).
The orator states that Timotheus acquired twenty-four cities in all; but
this total probably comprises his conquests in other times as well as in
other places. The expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is
vague.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_648"><a href="#FNanchor_648">[648]</a></span>
Isokrates, <i>l. c.</i>; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_649"><a href="#FNanchor_649">[649]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_650"><a href="#FNanchor_650">[650]</a></span>
Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is explained by comparing
(in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of the attack made by the Athenian
Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive, in
that catalogue of <i>nine</i> defeats, which the Scholiast on Æschines (De Fals.
Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been undergone by Athens at the
territory called <i>Nine Ways</i> (Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot
where Amphipolis was built. They form the eighth and ninth items of the
catalogue.
</p>
<p>
The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The fourth
is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—
</p>
<p>
5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way in
which I can make historical fact out of these words, is, by supposing that
they allude to the driving in of all the out-resident Athenians to Athens,
after the defeat of Ægospotami. We know from Thucydides that when
Amphipolis was taken by Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there
settled retired to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the
Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should then
have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the Athenians residing
at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense of the preposition ἐπὶ with
an accusative case, seems the only definite meaning which can be made out
here.
</p>
<p>
6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.
</p>
<p>
7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί,
these last words are inserted by Bekker from a MS.). These
two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether unknown. We may perhaps
suppose them to refer to the period when Iphikrates was commanding the
forces of Athens in these regions, from 368-365 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν
ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.
</p>
<p>
The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place of
Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.
</p>
<p>
9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.
</p>
<p>
Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the archonship of
Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the command of Timotheus in
these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small>). But the other
archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti of Athens. Winiewski (Comment.
in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39), Böhnecke, and other commentators
follow Corsini in representing Kalamion to be a corruption of <i>Kallimedes</i>,
who was archon from Midsummer 360-359 <small>B.C.</small>; and Mr. Clinton
even inserts the fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with
Rehdantz (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after
Midsummer 360 <small>B.C.</small>, can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings in the
Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by Demosthenes in the
Oration against Aristokrates. Without being able to explain the mistake
about the name of the archon, and without determining whether the real
mistake may not consist in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot
but think that Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant,
and another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in 364
or the early part of 363 <small>B.C.</small> During great part of 363 <small>B.C.</small>, the attention
of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the Chersonese, Byzantium,
Kotys, etc.
</p>
<p>
My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with that of
Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_651"><a href="#FNanchor_651">[651]</a></span>
Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_652"><a href="#FNanchor_652">[652]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_653"><a href="#FNanchor_653">[653]</a></span>
Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_654"><a href="#FNanchor_654">[654]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 78.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_655"><a href="#FNanchor_655">[655]</a></span>
Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,
οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν
Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετενεγκεῖν εἰς
τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_656"><a href="#FNanchor_656">[656]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 78, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_657"><a href="#FNanchor_657">[657]</a></span>
See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_658"><a href="#FNanchor_658">[658]</a></span>
Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch,
De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.
</p>
<p>
Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly either the
attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon is here brought forward.
As I have given it in the text, there is a real foundation for the
attack, and a real point in the reply; as it appears in Cornelius Nepos,
there is neither one nor the other.
</p>
<p>
That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the leadership
of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus, vii, 159.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_659"><a href="#FNanchor_659">[659]</a></span>
Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_660"><a href="#FNanchor_660">[660]</a></span>
Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors represented
Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this maritime expedition.
He explains such reluctance by reference to the disparaging opinion expressed
by Plato about maritime service. But this opinion of Plato is
founded upon reasons foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it
seems to me evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced
the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a general
on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea, when he took
command of a fleet; putting himself in a function for which he had little
capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch, Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).
</p>
<p>
Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie,
Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas was constrained
against his own better judgment to undertake this maritime enterprise.
I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle which Bauch cites
from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little as the above extract from Plutarch.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_661"><a href="#FNanchor_661">[661]</a></span>
Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις
τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that these general words apply
to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which had before been mentioned.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_662"><a href="#FNanchor_662">[662]</a></span>
Justin, xvi, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_663"><a href="#FNanchor_663">[663]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_664"><a href="#FNanchor_664">[664]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_665"><a href="#FNanchor_665">[665]</a></span>
For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch, Pelopidas,
c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid. c. 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_666"><a href="#FNanchor_666">[666]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states substantially the same.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_667"><a href="#FNanchor_667">[667]</a></span>
Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_668"><a href="#FNanchor_668">[668]</a></span>
Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1. The maritime
project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation of it, the
equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2. The expedition of
Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate consequences.—He mentions
the former of the two first, but he places both in the first year of Olympiad
104, the year in which Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is,
from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small> He passes immediately
from the maritime expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea,
which (he says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following
up his ideas of maritime activity.
</p>
<p>
The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 <small>B.C.</small> The maritime
expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would therefore naturally
take place in the summer of 363 <small>B.C.</small>; the year 364 <small>B.C.</small> having been
occupied in the requisite naval equipments.
</p>
<p>
I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also took place
during 363 <small>B.C.</small>, and that his death thus occurred while Epaminondas was
absent on shipboard. A probable reason is thus supplied why the second
Theban army which went to avenge Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his
friend and colleague Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas
been then at home, this would hardly have been.
</p>
<p>
The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention to
have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does not seem to
have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on the authority of an astronomical
friend, places it on the 13th of June, 364 <small>B.C.</small>, at five o’clock in
the morning. On the other hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in
the same Julian year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see
L’Art de Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day
named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the Olympic
year 364-363 <small>B.C.</small>, but during the months preceding the commencement
of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there were no other months
in the year, except June, July, and August, fit for military expeditions; an
hypothesis not reasonable to admit.
</p>
<p>
Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by Dodwell,
as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas commenced—June
364 <small>B.C.</small> But against this, Mr. Clinton takes no notice of it in his tables;
which seems to show that he was not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s
statement or the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on
farther astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of the sun
in the year 363 <small>B.C.</small>, visible at Thebes,—I should then fix upon the eclipse
mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 <small>B.C.</small>) as identifying the time of the
expedition of Pelopidas; which would, on that supposition, precede by
eight or nine months the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas.
The eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned
by Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by
Diodorus.
</p>
<p>
But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is here required.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_669"><a href="#FNanchor_669">[669]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_670"><a href="#FNanchor_670">[670]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_671"><a href="#FNanchor_671">[671]</a></span>
See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem, p. 489, s.
121,—an oration delivered in 355 <small>B.C.</small>; eight years after the destruction of
Orchomenus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_672"><a href="#FNanchor_672">[672]</a></span>
Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s. 13; s. 15; Fals.
Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s. 373.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_673"><a href="#FNanchor_673">[673]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 57.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_674"><a href="#FNanchor_674">[674]</a></span>
Pausan. ix, 15, 2.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The maritime
expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly,
his death, and the following Theban victories over Alexander of Pheræ.
3. The conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.
</p>
<p>
The year in which he places them is, the archonship of Timokrates,—from
Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence of Epaminondas,
and that he was greatly distressed at it on his return,—is distinctly
stated by Pausanias; who however is (in my judgment) so far mistaken,
that he refers the absence of Epaminondas to that previous occasion
when he had gone into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of
Alexander, 366 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus; nor do
the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me exact.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_675"><a href="#FNanchor_675">[675]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_676"><a href="#FNanchor_676">[676]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_677"><a href="#FNanchor_677">[677]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_678"><a href="#FNanchor_678">[678]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_679"><a href="#FNanchor_679">[679]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_680"><a href="#FNanchor_680">[680]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_681"><a href="#FNanchor_681">[681]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_682"><a href="#FNanchor_682">[682]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_683"><a href="#FNanchor_683">[683]</a></span>
It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399 <small>B.C.</small> after his
victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_684"><a href="#FNanchor_684">[684]</a></span>
Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_685"><a href="#FNanchor_685">[685]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_686"><a href="#FNanchor_686">[686]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_687"><a href="#FNanchor_687">[687]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.
</p>
<p>
The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in garrison
at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban troops had come
into Peloponnesus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_688"><a href="#FNanchor_688">[688]</a></span>
Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_689"><a href="#FNanchor_689">[689]</a></span>
The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound received
by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_690"><a href="#FNanchor_690">[690]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας
τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ σπεισαμένους
διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες, ἐσπείσαντο.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_691"><a href="#FNanchor_691">[691]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ κατὰ
τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_692"><a href="#FNanchor_692">[692]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_693"><a href="#FNanchor_693">[693]</a></span>
Thucyd. iv, 40.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_694"><a href="#FNanchor_694">[694]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_695"><a href="#FNanchor_695">[695]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_696"><a href="#FNanchor_696">[696]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη ἐπεποιήκεσαν,
καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ’ εἰς πάλην ἀφικόμενοι <em class="gesperrt">οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ</em>,
ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι</em> παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the Eleians
had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if the Pisatans and
Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while doing so. The Eleians
were really the assailants.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_697"><a href="#FNanchor_697">[697]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i> Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις <em class="gesperrt">εἰς τὸ
τέμενος</em>. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποτάμου
παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν <em class="gesperrt">οἱ Ἠλεῖοι
τἀπὶ θάτερα τοῦ ποτάμου παρετάξαντο</em>, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.
</p>
<p>
The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning the
entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed
a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into
the τέμενος before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed <i>through</i> the
τέμενος, but <i>alongside</i> of the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was
doubtless included in the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus
(Pausan. vi, 21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.
</p>
<p>
Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a copious and
instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia, as well as of the notices
left by Pausanias respecting it. Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly,
except the position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither
the positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or the
Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert in the
plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in the Plan annexed
to his recent Dissertation called <i>Olympia</i> (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very
sufficient evidence. Perhaps future excavations may hereafter reveal much
that is now unknown.
</p>
<p>
I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa was
at any time a <i>city</i>, and afterwards deserted.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_698"><a href="#FNanchor_698">[698]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ’ ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς
ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_699"><a href="#FNanchor_699">[699]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_700"><a href="#FNanchor_700">[700]</a></span>
Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba in the Forum
at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—
</p>
<p>
“Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito Arsacidarum
solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et senem, trucidare
pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu, truces armis, rapidis
equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii aspectus, et imminentium templorum
religio, et priores et futuri Principes, terruere, quominus facerent
scelus, cujus ultor est quisquis successit.”</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_701"><a href="#FNanchor_701">[701]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_702"><a href="#FNanchor_702">[702]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_703"><a href="#FNanchor_703">[703]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_704"><a href="#FNanchor_704">[704]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 121.
</p>
<p>
Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood purpose of
the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_705"><a href="#FNanchor_705">[705]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias, vii, 8, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_706"><a href="#FNanchor_706">[706]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν,
ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_707"><a href="#FNanchor_707">[707]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_708"><a href="#FNanchor_708">[708]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
βουλευόμενοι</em> ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις εἰπεῖν
τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc.
</p>
<p>
The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical party,
marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς
Πελοποννήσου, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_709"><a href="#FNanchor_709">[709]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. <i>l. c.</i></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_710"><a href="#FNanchor_710">[710]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_711"><a href="#FNanchor_711">[711]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen.
<span class="replace" id="tn_3" title="In the printed book: vii, 39">vii, 4, 39</span>.
συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι
γε δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_712"><a href="#FNanchor_712">[712]</a></span>
The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose and vague,
gives us to understand that the two opposing parties at Tegea came to an
actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the peace.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_713"><a href="#FNanchor_713">[713]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_714"><a href="#FNanchor_714">[714]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_715"><a href="#FNanchor_715">[715]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_716"><a href="#FNanchor_716">[716]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_717"><a href="#FNanchor_717">[717]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 85.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_718"><a href="#FNanchor_718">[718]</a></span>
The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at Nemea,—as if
Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar hatred of Athens (Hellen.
vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and ill-tempered.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_719"><a href="#FNanchor_719">[719]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_720"><a href="#FNanchor_720">[720]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_721"><a href="#FNanchor_721">[721]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθὼν,
ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν,
παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with many inaccuracies
of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea of this narrow escape
of Sparta, which is fully attested by Xenophon, even against his own partialities.
</p>
<p>
Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been conveyed to
Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_722"><a href="#FNanchor_722">[722]</a></span>
Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts in a manner different
on several points from Polybius (ix, 8), and from Diodorus (xv, 83).
Xenophon’s authority appears to me better in itself, while his narrative is
also more probable. He states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news
of the Theban march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea,
to which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already gone forward),—that
he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta before Epaminondas,
with a division not numerous, yet sufficient to put the town in a
state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms, that Agesilaus heard the news
when he was at Mantinea,—that he marched from thence with the whole
army to Sparta, but that Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had
already attacked the town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus
arrived and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never
left Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the army
to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by some swift
Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.
</p>
<p>
Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a mistake;
that the second king of Sparta at that time was named Kleomenes.
</p>
<p>
Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached Sparta before
Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which are too uncertain
to copy.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_723"><a href="#FNanchor_723">[723]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας
<em class="gesperrt">ἐν τῇ πόλει</em> τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_724"><a href="#FNanchor_724">[724]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.
</p>
<p>
Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of the
contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not reach Sparta
till after Epaminondas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_725"><a href="#FNanchor_725">[725]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_726"><a href="#FNanchor_726">[726]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο τάχιστα
εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν,
δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων
βοσκήματα, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_727"><a href="#FNanchor_727">[727]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.
</p>
<p>
The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν—allude
to something which we have no means of making out. It is possible
that the Corinthians, who were at peace with Thebes and had been ill-used
by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have seen with displeasure, and even molested,
the Athenian horsemen while resting on their territory.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_728"><a href="#FNanchor_728">[728]</a></span>
Polybius, ix, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_729"><a href="#FNanchor_729">[729]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general fact of
this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several inaccuracies which
we refute by means of Xenophon.
</p>
<p>
Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the unexpected arrival
of the Athenians; but he states them as being six thousand soldiers,
that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and he says nothing about the cavalry
battle. Hegesilaus is named by Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare
Xenoph. De Vectigal. iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out
by Athens on this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The
infantry must have come up somewhat later.
</p>
<p>
Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with Xenophon, differs
in several details. I follow the narrative of Xenophon.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_730"><a href="#FNanchor_730">[730]</a></span>
Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii, 53; Pausan.
1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.
</p>
<p>
There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry battle near
Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which speedily followed it,
wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is sometimes said to have been
slain in the battle of Mantinea, and even to have killed Epaminondas with
his own hand. It would seem as if the picture of Euphranor represented
Gryllus in the act of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter
tradition of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that
Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.
</p>
<p>
See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article on the Battle
of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the Rheinisches Museum
für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes Heft).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_731"><a href="#FNanchor_731">[731]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 84.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_732"><a href="#FNanchor_732">[732]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρείττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων εἶναι,
etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_733"><a href="#FNanchor_733">[733]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας ὅμως πείθεσθαι
ἐθέλειν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_734"><a href="#FNanchor_734">[734]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι
τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ ὁπλιτικῷ
ὑπ’ ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος δὲ γεγενημένος
διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ
Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀμαχεὶ
παρελθεῖν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_735"><a href="#FNanchor_735">[735]</a></span>
Polybius, ix. 8, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_736"><a href="#FNanchor_736">[736]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς τὰ κράνη,
κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες,
ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο
τὰς ἀσπίδας.
</p>
<p>
There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the Arcadians
and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλῖται; and are represented
as passing themselves off to be as good as Thebans.
</p>
<p>
Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40, p. 200) follow
Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that “the Arcadian hoplites
inscribed upon their shields the figure of a club, that being the ensign of
the Thebans.” I cannot think this interpretation is the best,—at least
until some evidence is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was
a club. Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly
of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας,
immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, immediately
before, means “men armed with clubs”; the natural sense of the
words.
</p>
<p>
The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or head-pieces).”
Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not made of metal, but of
wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_737"><a href="#FNanchor_737">[737]</a></span>
See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 45.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_738"><a href="#FNanchor_738">[738]</a></span>
Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) “a low ridge of rocks,
which, advancing into the plain from a projecting part of the Mænalium,
formed a natural division between the districts of Tegea and Mantineia.”
</p>
<p>
Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the recent valuable
work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha, 1851), pp. 232-247.
Gell says that a wall has once been carried across the plain at this boundary
(Itinerary of the Morea, p. 141-143).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_739"><a href="#FNanchor_739">[739]</a></span>
See the indications of the locality of the battle in Pausanias, viii, 11, 4,
5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_740"><a href="#FNanchor_740">[740]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21.
</p>
<p>
Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and a half
from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about four miles, and
Gell’s Itinerary of the Morea much the same.
</p>
<p>
Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to Mantinea.
Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell as two hours and five
minutes,—or seven miles.
</p>
<p>
Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell’s Itinerary, p.
141; Dodwell’s Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422.
</p>
<p>
It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march, must
have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium. Pallantium
was situated west by south from Tegea.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_741"><a href="#FNanchor_741">[741]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_742"><a href="#FNanchor_742">[742]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἐγένετο,
ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη
στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν
ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_743"><a href="#FNanchor_743">[743]</a></span>
Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_744"><a href="#FNanchor_744">[744]</a></span>
Diodor. xv. 85.
</p>
<p>
That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon (Hell.
vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of
the allies on either side.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_745"><a href="#FNanchor_745">[745]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_746"><a href="#FNanchor_746">[746]</a></span>
Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on the
left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we obtain only
from Diodorus (xv, 85).
</p>
<p>
The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas formed
his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at Mantinea, of all
the Bœotians.
</p>
<p>
About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle of Leuktra,
to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch. Quæst. Roman. p.
282 D.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_747"><a href="#FNanchor_747">[747]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως
πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον,
τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο· οἱ δ’ ἠκολούθουν ... Ὁ δὲ τὸ
στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε,
διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_748"><a href="#FNanchor_748">[748]</a></span>
I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi, prefixed to the
translation of Polybius) in considering ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather
than a wedge tapering towards the front. And I dissent from Schneider’s
explanation, who says,—“Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit
in frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ igitur
ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.”
It appears to me that the troops which Epaminondas caused to
wheel into the front and to form the advancing column, consisted only of
the left or Theban division, the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο
ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover,
the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made the
attack from his own left against the enemy’s right, or right-centre. He was
afraid that the Athenians would take him in flank from their own left.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_749"><a href="#FNanchor_749">[749]</a></span>
Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where the Grecian
cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ
τεσσάρων, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_750"><a href="#FNanchor_750">[750]</a></span>
These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with the
ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item in the military
establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon (Herodot. vii. 158).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_751"><a href="#FNanchor_751">[751]</a></span>
Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was
going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the
kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_752"><a href="#FNanchor_752">[752]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_753"><a href="#FNanchor_753">[753]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 85.
</p>
<p>
The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this occasion
(Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_754"><a href="#FNanchor_754">[754]</a></span>
The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves notice. He
states that the description given of the battle by Ephorus was extremely
incorrect and absurd, arguing great ignorance both of the ground where it
was fought and of the possible movements of the armies. He says that
Ephorus had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the battle
of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was less misleading,
because that battle was simple and easily intelligible, involving movements
only of one wing of each army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea
(he says), the misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect;
because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship, which
Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any one who measured
the ground and studied the movements reported in his narrative (Polybius,
xii, 25).
</p>
<p>
Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be trusted
in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether this remark has
special application to the battle of Mantinea, I do not clearly make out.
He gives credit however to Ephorus for greater judgment and accuracy,
in the description of naval battles.
</p>
<p>
Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of this battle
of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how imperfectly we
know its details. There is too much reason to fear that the account which
we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in large proportion from that
very narrative of Ephorus here so much disparaged.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_755"><a href="#FNanchor_755">[755]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy the same
authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details. He does not seem
to have read Xenophon.
</p>
<p>
I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on Thucydides,
iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and embellishments
of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_756"><a href="#FNanchor_756">[756]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως ἐποιήσατο,
καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· <em class="gesperrt">κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε</em>
φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ
ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας
φάλαγγος, οὐδένα ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα
ἡ συμβολὴ ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ
οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι πεφοβημένως
διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ,
συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες·
ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_757"><a href="#FNanchor_757">[757]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_758"><a href="#FNanchor_758">[758]</a></span>
The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to me more
probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).
</p>
<p>
The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their cavalry,
enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their allies had been defeated
around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 350 A.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_759"><a href="#FNanchor_759">[759]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad Familiares,
v, 12, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_760"><a href="#FNanchor_760">[760]</a></span>
Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3.
</p>
<p>
Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back to
the <i>camp</i>. But it seems that there could hardly have been any camp.
Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from Tegea. A
tent may have been erected on the field to receive him. Five centuries
afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller Pausanias a spot called
Skiopê near the field of battle, to which (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas
had been carried off, in great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from
whence he had looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan.
viii, 11, 4).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_761"><a href="#FNanchor_761">[761]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9, 2-5; viii, 11, 4;
ix, 15, 3.
</p>
<p>
The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of Machærion
which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are confused, and are
hardly to be reconciled with the story of Plutarch.
</p>
<p>
Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not clearly
distinguish between the first battle fought by the Athenian cavalry, immediately
after their arrival at Mantinea, when they rescued that town from
being surprised by the Thebans and Thessalians—and the general action
which followed a few days afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_762"><a href="#FNanchor_762">[762]</a></span>
See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the Megalopolitans
(Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_763"><a href="#FNanchor_763">[763]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv, 33.
</p>
<p>
Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. <small>B.C.</small> 361) assigns the conclusion of
peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however what ground there
is for assuming such an interval between the battle and the peace. Diodorus
appears to place the latter immediately after the former. This would
not count for much, indeed, against any considerable counter-probability;
but the probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate
sequence between the two events.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_764"><a href="#FNanchor_764">[764]</a></span>
Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_765"><a href="#FNanchor_765">[765]</a></span>
Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139. “Epaminondas,
princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ,” etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_766"><a href="#FNanchor_766">[766]</a></span>
Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_767"><a href="#FNanchor_767">[767]</a></span>
See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from the statue of
Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):—
</p>
<div class="poetry-container">
  <div class="poetry">
    <p>Ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.</p>
  </div>
</div>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_768"><a href="#FNanchor_768">[768]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_769"><a href="#FNanchor_769">[769]</a></span>
Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_770"><a href="#FNanchor_770">[770]</a></span>
The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more emphatic
than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι
προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_771"><a href="#FNanchor_771">[771]</a></span>
Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c. 4) gives one
anecdote, among several which he affirms to have found on record, of large
pecuniary presents tendered to, and repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote
recounted with so much precision of detail, that it appears to deserve
credit, though we cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber
Diomedon of Kyzicus, came to Thebes.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about Jason
of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which cannot well
have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia (the period to which
Plutarch’s dialogue assigns it), but may have happened afterwards.
</p>
<p>
Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch’s Life of
Fabius Maximus, c. 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_772"><a href="#FNanchor_772">[772]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_773"><a href="#FNanchor_773">[773]</a></span>
Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό γε
μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε καὶ Ἀριστείδης
καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι
καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ
καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν,
ἀλλ’ ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_774"><a href="#FNanchor_774">[774]</a></span>
See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and negotiator
on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος, etc. Athenæus,
xiv, p. 650 E.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_775"><a href="#FNanchor_775">[775]</a></span>
Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—
</p>
<div class="poetry-container">
  <div class="poetry">
    <p>Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,</p>
    <p>Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,</p>
    <p>Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.</p>
    <p>... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),</p>
    <p>Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,</p>
    <p>Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.</p>
  </div>
</div>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_776"><a href="#FNanchor_776">[776]</a></span>
See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p. 357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_777"><a href="#FNanchor_777">[777]</a></span>
Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_778"><a href="#FNanchor_778">[778]</a></span>
Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18;
Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.
</p>
<p>
See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by him
when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the Skolia, in
Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol. iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum,
xiii, p. 605 C.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_779"><a href="#FNanchor_779">[779]</a></span>
See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 605 A.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_780"><a href="#FNanchor_780">[780]</a></span>
Plutarch, Pelopid. <i>ut sup.</i>; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761 D.; compare
Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_781"><a href="#FNanchor_781">[781]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 94.
</p>
<p>
I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these three thousand
men were <i>Athenians</i>, not <i>Thebans</i>; that the Megalopolitans sent to ask
aid from <i>Athens</i>, and that the <i>Athenians</i> sent these three thousand men under
Pammenes.
</p>
<p>
That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for Athenians,
appears to me, on the following grounds:—
</p>
<p>
1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes in
the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period) respecting the
propriety of sending an armed force to defend Megalopolis against the
threats of Sparta—will see, I think, that Athens can never before have
sent any military assistance to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which
Demosthenes urges, and those which he combats as having been urged by
opponents, exclude the reality of any such previous proceeding.
</p>
<p>
2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was delivered, the
Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus, xvi, 39) under special alliance
with, and guardianship of, Thebes—though the latter had then been
so much weakened by the Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed
doubtful whether she could give them complete protection against Sparta.
But in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance between
Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between Megalopolis and
Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The Thebans (then in unimpaired
power), who had fought for them in the preceding year,—not the
Athenians, who had fought against them,—would be the persons invoked
for aid to Megalopolis; nor had any positive reverses as yet occurred to
disable the Thebans from furnishing aid.
</p>
<p>
3. Lastly, Pammenes is a <i>Theban</i> general, friend of Epaminondas. He is
mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another place (xvi, 34),
but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as the general who had been sent to
watch over the building of Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas,
c. 26; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v,
16, 3). We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith,
mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31. p. 521);
but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so named.
</p>
<p>
Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and his
troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.
</p>
<p>
I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on this
point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_782"><a href="#FNanchor_782">[782]</a></span>
See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_783"><a href="#FNanchor_783">[783]</a></span>
Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_784"><a href="#FNanchor_784">[784]</a></span>
Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some length,
recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datames, in
point of military talent, above all <i>barbari</i>, except Hamilcar Barca and
Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii, 29) recounts several memorable proceedings
of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen.
Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
</p>
<p>
We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology,
of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of
Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before
the death of that prince; which last event is to be assigned to 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>
See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_785"><a href="#FNanchor_785">[785]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
</p>
<p>
Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian
empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the facts can be said to be
certainly known. Diodorus has evidently introduced into the year 362-361
<small>B.C.</small> a series of events, many of them belonging to years before and after.
Rehdantz (Vit. Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all
the statements; but unfortunately with little result.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_786"><a href="#FNanchor_786">[786]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.; Cornelius Nepos,
Agesil. c. 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_787"><a href="#FNanchor_787">[787]</a></span>
See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_788"><a href="#FNanchor_788">[788]</a></span>
Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom I follow) in
respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis with Agesilaus; affirming
that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and supported him with success,
against Nektanebis.
</p>
<p>
Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
</p>
<p>
We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 <small>B.C.</small>
(Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_789"><a href="#FNanchor_789">[789]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_790"><a href="#FNanchor_790">[790]</a></span>
Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_791"><a href="#FNanchor_791">[791]</a></span>
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_792"><a href="#FNanchor_792">[792]</a></span>
Diodor. xv, 93.
</p>
<p>
There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical Canon, in
the statements about the length of reign, and date of death, of Artaxerxes
Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 <small>B.C.</small> See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti
Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where the statements are brought
together and discussed. Plutarch states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon
to have lasted sixty-two years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be
correct, though in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot
determine.
</p>
<p>
An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year of the
reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in the Astronomical
Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of reign. See Boeckh, Corp.
Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p. 470.
</p>
<p>
This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the duration
of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus recognized himself as
satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in the year beginning November
359 <small>B.C.</small>, which corresponds with the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon.
The revolt therefore must have been suppressed before that period:
see Sievers, Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia,
p. 373, note.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_793"><a href="#FNanchor_793">[793]</a></span>
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.
</p>
<p>
Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for, was,
Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger, who had
fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of Kunaxa, and had
acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections.
</p>
<p>
But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear hardly possible
that the lady who inspired so strong a passion to Darius, in or about
361 <small>B.C.</small>, as to induce him to risk the displeasure of his father—and so
decided a reluctance on the part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have
been the person who accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa <i>forty years</i> before; for
the battle of Kunaxa was fought in 401 <small>B.C.</small> The chronological improbability
would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that Artaxerxes
reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the battle of Kunaxa
occurred very near the beginning of his reign, and the death of his son
Darius near the end of it.
</p>
<p>
Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of Artaxerxes
Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that the plot against
the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius in conjunction with several
of his brothers; and that, on the plot being discovered, all these brothers,
together with their wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming
to the throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the
principal persons about the court, together with their wives and children—fearing
a like conspiracy against himself.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_794"><a href="#FNanchor_794">[794]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_795"><a href="#FNanchor_795">[795]</a></span>
The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that Timotheus
made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into the Athenian treasury
twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant as to amount; even if
we accept it as generally true.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_796"><a href="#FNanchor_796">[796]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_797"><a href="#FNanchor_797">[797]</a></span>
See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 151, and the
preceding page.
</p>
<p>
M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all the fragments
of evidence respecting this obscure period; and has elicited, as it
seems to me, the most probable conclusions deducible from such scanty
premises.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_798"><a href="#FNanchor_798">[798]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_799"><a href="#FNanchor_799">[799]</a></span>
We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the twenty third
of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of Molon,—mentioned by
Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_800"><a href="#FNanchor_800">[800]</a></span>
Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_801"><a href="#FNanchor_801">[801]</a></span>
Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.
</p>
<p>
It must have been about this time (362-361 <small>B.C.</small>) that Alexander of Pheræ
sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of Charidemus and his mercenary
band, then in or near the troad. His application was not accepted
(Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675, s. 192).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_802"><a href="#FNanchor_802">[802]</a></span>
Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in command
of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this admiral took himself
off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder the allies (Diodor. xvi,
95).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_803"><a href="#FNanchor_803">[803]</a></span>
Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176; and Æschines,
Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_804"><a href="#FNanchor_804">[804]</a></span>
The facts as stated in the text are the most probable result, as it seems
to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_805"><a href="#FNanchor_805">[805]</a></span>
Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.
</p>
<p>
Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398, s.
200).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_806"><a href="#FNanchor_806">[806]</a></span>
Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_807"><a href="#FNanchor_807">[807]</a></span>
Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont. Polyklem. p. 1207.
</p>
<p>
ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ
Μιλτοκύθης μὲν <em class="gesperrt">ἀπῆλθε</em> φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ,
Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.
</p>
<p>
The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.
</p>
<p>
The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the revolt of
Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s. 136, 137.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_808"><a href="#FNanchor_808">[808]</a></span>
Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont. Aristok.
p. 655, s. 123.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_809"><a href="#FNanchor_809">[809]</a></span>
Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s. 27; p. 1225, s.
71.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_810"><a href="#FNanchor_810">[810]</a></span>
Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου,
τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες,
εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is speaking of Charidemus.)
</p>
<p>
The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains distinct
intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians <i>until after November
361</i> <small>B.C.</small> Apollodorus the Athenian trierarch was in the town at that
time, as well as various friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must
have been still an Athenian possession in November 361 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that the purpose
of this oration against Polykles (composed by Demosthenes, but spoken by
Apollodorus) requires great precision and specification of dates, even to
months and days. Apollodorus complains that he has been constrained to
bear the expense of a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which
it was incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person
whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of the year,
but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy of Apollodorus
began in August 362 <small>B.C.</small>, and lasted (not merely to Aug. 361 <small>B.C.</small>, its legal
term, but) to November 361 <small>B.C.</small>
</p>
<p>
Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the valuable
chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of the period, has overlooked
this exact indication of the time <i>after which</i> the Athenians lost Sestos.
He supposes the loss to have taken place two or three years earlier.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_811"><a href="#FNanchor_811">[811]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_812"><a href="#FNanchor_812">[812]</a></span>
Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s. 211.
</p>
<p>
What is said in the latter passage about the youthful Kersobleptes, is
doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_813"><a href="#FNanchor_813">[813]</a></span>
Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 398,
s. 200.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_814"><a href="#FNanchor_814">[814]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_815"><a href="#FNanchor_815">[815]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare Pseudo-Aristot.
Œconomic. ii, 30.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_816"><a href="#FNanchor_816">[816]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.
</p>
<p>
The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor of Krithôtê,
announcing the formidable increase of force which threatened the
place since the arrival of Charidemus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_817"><a href="#FNanchor_817">[817]</a></span>
Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states that the two
young men did it to avenge their father. He does not expressly say what
Kotys had done to the father; but he notices the event in illustration of the
general category,—Πολλαὶ δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι
τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about <i>mos regius</i>—Annal.
vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of cruel
mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ
παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.
</p>
<p>
Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ.
xii, p. 531, 532.
</p>
<p>
Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725, 726)
places the death of Kotys in 359 <small>B.C.</small>; and seems to infer from Athenæus
(vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual communication with Philip of
Macedon as king, whose accession took place between Midsummer 360 and
Midsummer 359 <small>B.C.</small> But the evidence does not appear to me to bear out
such a conclusion.
</p>
<p>
The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters reaching
Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys; because it seems impossible
that Philip, in the first year of his reign, can have had any such
flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip being at that time in the greatest political
embarrassments, out of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable
energy and ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned
by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal communication
with Kotys.
</p>
<p>
My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more probably in
360 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_818"><a href="#FNanchor_818">[818]</a></span>
Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s. 150; p. 675, s.
193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_819"><a href="#FNanchor_819">[819]</a></span>
Plutarch, De Sui Laude, <i>ut sup.</i></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_820"><a href="#FNanchor_820">[820]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_821"><a href="#FNanchor_821">[821]</a></span>
Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s. 153 (in which
passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any near connection by marriage).
</p>
<p>
About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_822"><a href="#FNanchor_822">[822]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.
</p>
<p>
In sect. 194, are the words, <em class="gesperrt">ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν</em>,
πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ αἱ
τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦντος
Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.
</p>
<p>
The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the <i>first coming out</i> of Kephisodotus
from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment. ad
Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators think, but—to
the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes <i>to Perinthus</i>, near which
place Charidemus was, for the purpose of demanding fulfilment of what
the latter had promised; see s. 196. When Kephisodotus came to him at
Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s.
195) to make this demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly,
acted like a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter
from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have been on
the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot refer to his first coming
out.
</p>
<p>
The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of Kotys.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_823"><a href="#FNanchor_823">[823]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont.
p. 384, c. 20.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs called
before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place at Perinthus
and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 200); Euthykles,
the speaker of the discourse against Aristokrates, had been himself also
among the officers serving (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_824"><a href="#FNanchor_824">[824]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s. 216. Demosthen.
de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_825"><a href="#FNanchor_825">[825]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος νομίμου
τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_826"><a href="#FNanchor_826">[826]</a></span>
Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_827"><a href="#FNanchor_827">[827]</a></span>
Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.
</p>
<p>
Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction of Iphiades
as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there may have been an
Abydene association now exercising influence at Sestos; at least we are
told, that the revolution which deprived the Athenians of Sestos, was
accomplished in part by exiles who crossed from Abydos; something like
the relation between Argos and Corinth in the years immediately preceding
the peace of Antalkidas.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_828"><a href="#FNanchor_828">[828]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680. s. 211, 212.
The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by Demosthenes as
immediately following the expedition of Athens to drive the Thebans out
of Eubœa, which took place about the middle of 358 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_829"><a href="#FNanchor_829">[829]</a></span>
We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this occasion,
although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered by Chares five
years afterwards, in the year 353 <small>B.C.</small> (Diod. xvi, 34). It is evident from
the whole tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually
surrender the Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender
Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact emphatically
against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing the conduct of
Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις
Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ τηνικαῦτ’ ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ’ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ’ οἷός τ’ ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης
Χεῤῥόνησον (p. 656. s. 128).
This distinctly announces that the Chersonese was <i>given back</i> to Athens,
though reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been
given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post upon all
accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that Chares in 353 <small>B.C.</small> took
Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants of military age and reduced the rest
to slavery—we must suppose the town again to have revolted between 358
and 353 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly
probable. But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot
distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 <small>B.C.</small>, on account
of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens all the cities in the
Chersonese except Kardia. That had already been done in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, and
without any reference to Philip; and if after surrendering the Chersonese
in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, Kersobleptes had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it
again in his possession in the beginning of 353 <small>B.C.</small>—it seems unaccountable
that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his oration
against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all points possible
against Kersobleptes.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_830"><a href="#FNanchor_830">[830]</a></span>
Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_831"><a href="#FNanchor_831">[831]</a></span>
Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121. The chronology
of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p.
147) appears to me nearly correct, in spite of the strong objection expressed
against it by Weber (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and
more exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727,
who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the Chersonese
in 358 <small>B.C.</small>, which is, I think, a full year too late. Rehdantz does not allow,
as I think he ought to do, for a certain interval between Kephisodotus and
the Ten Envoys, during which Athenodorus acted for Athens.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_832"><a href="#FNanchor_832">[832]</a></span>
Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_833"><a href="#FNanchor_833">[833]</a></span>
Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην <em class="gesperrt">καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ</em>, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_834"><a href="#FNanchor_834">[834]</a></span>
I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa (whereby
Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island), though it occurred
just about the same time as the recovery of the Chersonese.
</p>
<p>
That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my next
volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing event of a
series of proceedings which had been going on for four years; so that I
could hardly leave that series unfinished.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_835"><a href="#FNanchor_835">[835]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 50-58.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_836"><a href="#FNanchor_836">[836]</a></span>
Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_837"><a href="#FNanchor_837">[837]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_838"><a href="#FNanchor_838">[838]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_839"><a href="#FNanchor_839">[839]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_840"><a href="#FNanchor_840">[840]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 453.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_841"><a href="#FNanchor_841">[841]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_842"><a href="#FNanchor_842">[842]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_843"><a href="#FNanchor_843">[843]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 84.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_844"><a href="#FNanchor_844">[844]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 85.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_845"><a href="#FNanchor_845">[845]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_846"><a href="#FNanchor_846">[846]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_847"><a href="#FNanchor_847">[847]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_848"><a href="#FNanchor_848">[848]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα· πεινῶντι
τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_849"><a href="#FNanchor_849">[849]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_850"><a href="#FNanchor_850">[850]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_851"><a href="#FNanchor_851">[851]</a></span>
Thucyd. viii, 85.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_852"><a href="#FNanchor_852">[852]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_853"><a href="#FNanchor_853">[853]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_854"><a href="#FNanchor_854">[854]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 33-35.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_855"><a href="#FNanchor_855">[855]</a></span>
Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_856"><a href="#FNanchor_856">[856]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος, αἴτιος γενόμενος
τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.
</p>
<p>
v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος,
διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_857"><a href="#FNanchor_857">[857]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 56.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_858"><a href="#FNanchor_858">[858]</a></span>
Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at Syracuse—δοκεῖ
δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ
φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_859"><a href="#FNanchor_859">[859]</a></span>
Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.
</p>
<p>
He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part) between the
Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three belongs to the days
of Pyrrhus, about 278 <small>B.C.</small>; the earliest to 508 <small>B.C.</small> The intermediate
treaty is not marked as to date by any specific evidence, but I see no ground
for supposing that it is so late as 345 <small>B.C.</small>, which is the date assigned to it
by Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii, 27. I
cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier date, somewhere
between 480-410 <small>B.C.</small> This second treaty is far more restrictive than the
first, against the Romans; for it interdicts them from all traffic either with
Sardinia or Africa, except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted
such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second
treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome, which would
rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth century <small>B.C.</small>, than to
the latter half of the fourth.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_860"><a href="#FNanchor_860">[860]</a></span>
Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.
</p>
<p>
Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia, and the
breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is noticed by Barth as
much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste des Mittelmeers, p. 85).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_861"><a href="#FNanchor_861">[861]</a></span>
Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_862"><a href="#FNanchor_862">[862]</a></span>
Strabo, <i>ut sup.</i></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_863"><a href="#FNanchor_863">[863]</a></span>
This is the view of Movers, sustained with much plausibility, in his
learned and instructive work—Geschichte der Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p.
435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_864"><a href="#FNanchor_864">[864]</a></span>
Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_865"><a href="#FNanchor_865">[865]</a></span>
Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_866"><a href="#FNanchor_866">[866]</a></span>
Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks, who work
on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of Turkish proprietors—“The
Helots seem to have resembled the Greeks, who labor on the Turkish
farms <i>in the plains</i> of Turkey, and who are bound to account to their
masters for one-half of the produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the
Messenians of his time—
</p>
<div class="poetry-container">
  <div class="poetry">
    <p class="i1">Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι</p>
    <p>Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,</p>
    <p class="i1">Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.</p>
    <p class="rt">(Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)</p>
  </div>
</div>
<p>
The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so hard”
(Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_867"><a href="#FNanchor_867">[867]</a></span>
Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.
</p>
<p>
Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this large assessment
to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can relate only to Leptis
Parva, in the region called Emporia.
</p>
<p>
Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near the
Great Syrtis.
</p>
<p>
Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mittelländischen
Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and valuable examination of the site
of Carthage and of the neighboring regions. On his map, however, the
territory called Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred
miles from Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the
name Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and
approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his expedition
from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia. He intended to land
very near Carthage; and he actually did land on the White Cape, near
to that city, but on the north side, and still nearer to Utica. This region
north of Carthage was probably not included in the name Emporia (Livy,
xxix, 25-27).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_868"><a href="#FNanchor_868">[868]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_869"><a href="#FNanchor_869">[869]</a></span>
Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus, c. 18. Εὔμαχος
δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας
δύο σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.
</p>
<p>
The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage of the
Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards, as they grew
more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the trench; as we see by
the passages of Appian above referred to.
</p>
<p>
Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench with the
one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis, as having been dug
by order of the second Africanus—to form a boundary between the Roman
province of Africa, and the dominion of the native kings (Pliny, H.
N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such identity. It appears to me that this
last is distinct from the Carthaginian trench.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_870"><a href="#FNanchor_870">[870]</a></span>
A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served campaigns
(Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_871"><a href="#FNanchor_871">[871]</a></span>
Diodor. xx, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_872"><a href="#FNanchor_872">[872]</a></span>
Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with an immense
stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered up to the
perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the last siege of Carthage.
</p>
<p>
See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_873"><a href="#FNanchor_873">[873]</a></span>
Diodor. xvi, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_874"><a href="#FNanchor_874">[874]</a></span>
See the striking description in Livy, of the motley composition of the
Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he bestows just admiration on the
genius of Hannibal, for having always maintained his ascendency over
them, and kept them in obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare
Polybius, i, 65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his
mercenaries to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_875"><a href="#FNanchor_875">[875]</a></span>
There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each of the other
Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7)
talks of Hannibal as having been made <i>king</i> (rex) when he was invested
with his great foreign military command, at twenty-two years of age. So
Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about
Hamilkar.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_876"><a href="#FNanchor_876">[876]</a></span>
See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_877"><a href="#FNanchor_877">[877]</a></span>
Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.
</p>
<p>
Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at Carthage
as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed to the πλῆθος or
people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον he must mean the same
as the assembly called in another passage (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_878"><a href="#FNanchor_878">[878]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_879"><a href="#FNanchor_879">[879]</a></span>
Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred select Senators
set apart as judges.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_880"><a href="#FNanchor_880">[880]</a></span>
Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p. 138, 3rd
edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de Politiâ Carthaginiensium,
Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these passages with ability. But
their materials do not enable them to reach any certainty.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_881"><a href="#FNanchor_881">[881]</a></span>
Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum
senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à plebe balneo lavabatur,
hic diverso foro utebatur.”</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_882"><a href="#FNanchor_882">[882]</a></span>
Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_883"><a href="#FNanchor_883">[883]</a></span>
Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.
</p>
<p>
These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as well as
multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant for the comparison
which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public mess. But even granting
the analogy on these external points,—the intrinsic difference of
character and purpose between the two must have been so great, that the
comparison seems not happy.
</p>
<p>
Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the <i>circuli et convivia</i> at Carthage; but this is
probably a general expression, without particular reference to the public
banquets mentioned by Aristotle.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_884"><a href="#FNanchor_884">[884]</a></span>
Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_885"><a href="#FNanchor_885">[885]</a></span>
Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of
Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said
to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself
despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures;
all his family being put to death along with him.
</p>
<p>
Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements about the
Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even contradictory.
One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire,
who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another
place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a
state democratically governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he
says in ii, 8, respecting its government.
</p>
<p>
Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at Carthage
to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so numerous a body
could have transacted the infinite diversity of administrative and other business
performed by the five ephors.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_886"><a href="#FNanchor_886">[886]</a></span>
Justin. xix, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_887"><a href="#FNanchor_887">[887]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_888"><a href="#FNanchor_888">[888]</a></span>
Justin, xix, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_889"><a href="#FNanchor_889">[889]</a></span>
Diodor. xii, 82.
</p>
<p>
It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have taken
place in 452 <small>B.C.</small>, between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was really a war
between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with Wesseling’s note).
Lilybæum as a town attained no importance until after the capture of Motyê
by the older Dionysius in 393 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_890"><a href="#FNanchor_890">[890]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 43.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_891"><a href="#FNanchor_891">[891]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 43.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_892"><a href="#FNanchor_892">[892]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ νόμους
τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου,
καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν
ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ
<em class="gesperrt">φύσει μισέλλην</em>, ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.
</p>
<p>
The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his life, deserves
notice, as a point of comparison between the Greek republics and Carthage.
A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently
banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability
that he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But
I do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus apparently
innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the battle, his son was
banished for life, as Giskon was banished by the Carthaginians. In appreciating
the manner in which the Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical,
dealt with their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage
is one important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks,
will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the
proceedings of the Carthaginians.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_893"><a href="#FNanchor_893">[893]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_894"><a href="#FNanchor_894">[894]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 44.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_895"><a href="#FNanchor_895">[895]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 59.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_896"><a href="#FNanchor_896">[896]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_897"><a href="#FNanchor_897">[897]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.
</p>
<p>
It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms, Timoleon, c.
30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks in their service,
at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—<small>B.C.</small> 340.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_898"><a href="#FNanchor_898">[898]</a></span>
Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα τῶν νῦν,
βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ
τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_899"><a href="#FNanchor_899">[899]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_900"><a href="#FNanchor_900">[900]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_901"><a href="#FNanchor_901">[901]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 57.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_902"><a href="#FNanchor_902">[902]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_903"><a href="#FNanchor_903">[903]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν Σελινουντίους
μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ
θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι, προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_904"><a href="#FNanchor_904">[904]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient temples of
Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as specimens of Doric art,
during the fifth and sixth centuries <small>B.C.</small> From the great magnitude of the
fallen columns, it has been supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake.
But the ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have
been first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.
</p>
<p>
This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the Carthaginian destroyers,
is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_905"><a href="#FNanchor_905">[905]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 60.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_906"><a href="#FNanchor_906">[906]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_907"><a href="#FNanchor_907">[907]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας διαδοὺς
εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας,
παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη,
καὶ πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.
</p>
<p>
The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307 <small>B.C.</small>, sacrificed
their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to the gods (Diodor. xx,
65.)</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_908"><a href="#FNanchor_908">[908]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_909"><a href="#FNanchor_909">[909]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_910"><a href="#FNanchor_910">[910]</a></span>
Herodot. vi, 28.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_911"><a href="#FNanchor_911">[911]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 62-80.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_912"><a href="#FNanchor_912">[912]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 62.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_913"><a href="#FNanchor_913">[913]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_914"><a href="#FNanchor_914">[914]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_915"><a href="#FNanchor_915">[915]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 63.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_916"><a href="#FNanchor_916">[916]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_917"><a href="#FNanchor_917">[917]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν
δὲ Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς τόλμαν,
μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_918"><a href="#FNanchor_918">[918]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ ὁρῶν
εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα. Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον,
τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς
διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_919"><a href="#FNanchor_919">[919]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_920"><a href="#FNanchor_920">[920]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 75.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν,
was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along with the
envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far as Gordium in
Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the requisition of Cyrus)
for three years. This must have been in the year 407 <small>B.C.</small> Now I cannot
reconcile this with the proceedings of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus;
his coming to the Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his
various attempts to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which
must have occurred in 408-407 <small>B.C.</small>, ending with the death of Hermokrates.
</p>
<p>
It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon as
accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the eminent
Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same name,—or
whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not take upon me
to determine. There were really two contemporary Syracusans bearing
that name, for the father of Dionysius the despot was named Hermokrates.
</p>
<p>
Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the Lacedæmonians
at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so called; who
however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer or autumn of
405 <small>B.C.</small> There is some mistake in the assertion of Polybius, but I do not
know how to explain it.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_921"><a href="#FNanchor_921">[921]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.
</p>
<p>
Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συρακοσίων
καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.
</p>
<p>
Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι, etc.
Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare
Polyænus, v, 2, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_922"><a href="#FNanchor_922">[922]</a></span>
Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_923"><a href="#FNanchor_923">[923]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 75.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_924"><a href="#FNanchor_924">[924]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 79.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_925"><a href="#FNanchor_925">[925]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_926"><a href="#FNanchor_926">[926]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 81-84.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_927"><a href="#FNanchor_927">[927]</a></span>
Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_928"><a href="#FNanchor_928">[928]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_929"><a href="#FNanchor_929">[929]</a></span>
Diodor. xi, 25.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_930"><a href="#FNanchor_930">[930]</a></span>
Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_931"><a href="#FNanchor_931">[931]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 85.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_932"><a href="#FNanchor_932">[932]</a></span>
See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas, p. 21,
23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).
</p>
<p>
The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this vast
aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and around which the
traces of the old walls may be distinctly made out, with considerable remains
of them in some particular parts.
</p>
<p>
Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.
</p>
<p>
Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν οἴκημα
ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_933"><a href="#FNanchor_933">[933]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 85.
</p>
<p>
We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is said
to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies, into incautious
pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have inflicted upon them a serious
defeat.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_934"><a href="#FNanchor_934">[934]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 86.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_935"><a href="#FNanchor_935">[935]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 87.
</p>
<p>
It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum still
bears the name of <i>Il Campo Cartaginese</i>, raising some presumption that it
was once occupied by the Carthaginians. Evidently, the troops sent out
by Imilkon to meet and repel Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward
of Agrigentum, from which side the Syracusan army of relief was
approaching. Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes
that they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy of the
Roman siege in 262 <small>B.C.</small>, when the Carthaginian relieving army under
Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei (Polyb. i, 19).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_936"><a href="#FNanchor_936">[936]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 87.
</p>
<p>
The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high command,
makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth: compare Thucydid.
vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_937"><a href="#FNanchor_937">[937]</a></span>
Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the description
of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of the abundance of
gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal ornaments, carried by the
native Carthaginians on military service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon,
c. 28, 29).
</p>
<p>
There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred Band,—mentioned
in these later times, consisting of two thousand five hundred men of distinguished
bravery as well as of conspicuous position in the city (Diodor.
xvi, 80; xx, 10).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_938"><a href="#FNanchor_938">[938]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 88.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_939"><a href="#FNanchor_939">[939]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_940"><a href="#FNanchor_940">[940]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_941"><a href="#FNanchor_941">[941]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 88.
</p>
<p>
Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was
taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_942"><a href="#FNanchor_942">[942]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_943"><a href="#FNanchor_943">[943]</a></span>
Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.
</p>
<p>
This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable historical
work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en Sicile, Part ii, s.
39, p. 219).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_944"><a href="#FNanchor_944">[944]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας,
καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι,
καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον
ἐν Συρακούσαις.
</p>
<p>
Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.
</p>
<p>
Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more of an
equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius, than the subsequent
facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 A.; p. 355 F.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_945"><a href="#FNanchor_945">[945]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους,
τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη
παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον,
ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_946"><a href="#FNanchor_946">[946]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον κατὰ
τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον συγγράψας,
οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.
</p>
<p>
In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate in the
Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian expedition) in
which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find the magistrates interfering
to prevent the continuance of a debate which had become very personal
and acrimonious; though there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor
any exhortation to personal violence or infringement of the law.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_947"><a href="#FNanchor_947">[947]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 91.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_948"><a href="#FNanchor_948">[948]</a></span>
Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων
Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων, τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ
τοῦς δέκα στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες,
ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως·
ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.
</p>
<p>
Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς,
ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time afterwards, Diodorus
farther mentions that Dionysius accused before the public assembly, and
caused to be put to death, Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now
Daphnæus was one of the generals (xiii, 86-88).
</p>
<p>
If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it, we cannot
easily explain how something so impressive and terror-striking came to be
transformed into the more commonplace statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus,
Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus, or Philistus, from one of whom probably
his narrative is borrowed.
</p>
<p>
But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account for the
erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short time before this scene
at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance had really occurred at Agrigentum.
The assembled Agrigentines, being inflamed against their generals for
what they believed to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the
Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only spared the
fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).
</p>
<p>
I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene and
proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently antecedent, at
Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above citation is made) was written
in his old age,—fifty years after the event.
</p>
<p>
This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be produced in
support of the views of those who reject the letters of Plato as spurious,
though Ast does not notice it, while going through the letters <i>seriatim</i>, and
condemning them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions.
After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his reasoning, I
dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first letter, that which purports
to come not from Plato, but from Dion, is the only one against which
he seems to me to have made out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben
und Schriften, p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that
he has shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious
and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following the opinion of
Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that their authenticity was not
suspected in antiquity, as far as our knowledge extends. Without considering
the presumption hence arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be
countervailed by stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has
urged.
</p>
<p>
Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating to Dion and
Dionysius (always setting aside the first letter)—that is the second, third,
fourth, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to
fact and details. Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they
been the work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly avoid
laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done, on the score
of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed situation. I have
already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take to be a <i>fault</i> of memory,
both conceivable and pardonable. Ast mentions another, to disprove the
authenticity of the eighth letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in
this eighth letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends
the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a tripartite
kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder Dionysius) and the
younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523) cannot be correct, because
Dion’s son died before his father. To make the argument of Ast
complete, we ought to be sure that Dion had only <i>one</i> son; for which there
is doubtless the evidence of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son
of Dion, a youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the
house and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political enemy of
Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων
<em class="gesperrt">ἄπαις γεγονὼς</em> ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι
διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c. 55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου).
But since the rumor was altogether false, we may surely imagine
that Kallippus, taking advantage of a notorious accident which had
just proved fatal to the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false
statement about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy
at home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was familiarly
known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion himself in
the situation of an assured king, able to transfer his succession at once to
a boy not yet adult. And when we find in another chapter of Plutarch’s
Life of Dion (c. 31), that the son of Dion was called by Timæus, <i>Aretæus</i>,—and
by Timonides, <i>Hipparinus</i>,—this surely affords some presumption
that there were <i>two</i> sons, and not one son called by two different names.
</p>
<p>
I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic letter
to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add that the letter does
not mention the <i>name</i> of Dion’s son (though Ast says that it calls him <i>Hipparinus</i>);
and that it does specify the <i>three</i> partners in the tripartite kingship
suggested (though Ast says that it only mentioned <i>two</i>).
</p>
<p>
Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters, however,
are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact, but upon what he maintains
to be impropriety and meanness of thought, childish intrusion of
philosophy, unseasonable mysticism and pedantry, etc. In some of his
criticisms I coincide, though by no means in all. But I cannot accept
them as evidence to prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness
of the letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to
me to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons about
letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste. Dionysius of
Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth. p. 1025-1044), while emphatically
extolling the admirable composition of Plato’s dialogues, does
not scruple to pass an unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer;
referring to the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral
harangue in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that
Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.
</p>
<p>
That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally involved,
in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot be doubted. That
he would write letters to Dionysius on the subject,—that he would anxiously
seek to maintain influence over him, on all grounds,—that he would
manifest a lofty opinion of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly
natural and credible. And when we consider both the character and the
station of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured
canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most suitable to
address him.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_949"><a href="#FNanchor_949">[949]</a></span>
Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_950"><a href="#FNanchor_950">[950]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 93.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_951"><a href="#FNanchor_951">[951]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 93.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_952"><a href="#FNanchor_952">[952]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 94.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_953"><a href="#FNanchor_953">[953]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι
τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες·
τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν.
Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην
τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, <em class="gesperrt">τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι
βουλόμενος</em>, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος·
τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν τῆς τυραννίδος.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_954"><a href="#FNanchor_954">[954]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον ἦν
τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων. Ἤλπιζε γὰρ
τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ
Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς Λεοντίνους.
</p>
<p>
Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by permission of
the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_955"><a href="#FNanchor_955">[955]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 95.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_956"><a href="#FNanchor_956">[956]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει τοὺς
φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας—i. e.
τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ
δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_957"><a href="#FNanchor_957">[957]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_958"><a href="#FNanchor_958">[958]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 96.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_959"><a href="#FNanchor_959">[959]</a></span>
Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_960"><a href="#FNanchor_960">[960]</a></span>
Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε,
etc.
</p>
<p>
The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to Midsummer;
so that the middle months of it would fall in the first quarter of the
Julian year.
</p>
<p>
If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we shall see
that the indications of time cannot both be correct; for the acquisition of
the despotism by Dionysius followed immediately, and as a consequence
directly brought about, upon the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.
</p>
<p>
It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in either one
passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took place at the close
of <small>B.C.</small> 406; the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius, in the early
months of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, as Diodorus places them. Both events are in the same
Olympic year, between Midsummer 406 <small>B.C.</small> and Midsummer 405 <small>B.C.</small>
But this year is exactly the year which falls between the two passages above
referred to in Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the
other. Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 <small>B.C.</small></p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_961"><a href="#FNanchor_961">[961]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως
εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_962"><a href="#FNanchor_962">[962]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 109.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_963"><a href="#FNanchor_963">[963]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 109.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_964"><a href="#FNanchor_964">[964]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 111.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_965"><a href="#FNanchor_965">[965]</a></span>
Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν,
<span
  class="replace"
  id="tn_6"
  title="In the original English edition: ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων">ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν</span>—
</p>
<div class="poetry-container">
  <div class="poetry">
    <p class="i5">“fatis nunquam concessa moveri</p>
    <p>Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.</p>
  </div>
</div>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_966"><a href="#FNanchor_966">[966]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν
ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν, οἷς
δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_967"><a href="#FNanchor_967">[967]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_968"><a href="#FNanchor_968">[968]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 112.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_969"><a href="#FNanchor_969">[969]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην
τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_970"><a href="#FNanchor_970">[970]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_971"><a href="#FNanchor_971">[971]</a></span>
Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines, co-residents at
Syracuse, revolted to their own city from Dionysius and the Syracusans.”
</p>
<p>
This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction as what
Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as independent by the
peace which speedily followed, is mentioned again shortly afterwards as independent
(xiv, 14). It had been annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian
siege.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_972"><a href="#FNanchor_972">[972]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_973"><a href="#FNanchor_973">[973]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 114.
</p>
<p>
Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—<em class="gesperrt">Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων
ἀναγκαζόμενος</em> Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλῶν τοὺς
ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην
ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.
</p>
<p>
Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned or indicated
before, to which the word διόπερ can have reference. Nothing is mentioned
but success on the part of the Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of
the Greeks; the repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian
camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the
occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny, and partial
dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its retreat,—the struggle within
the walls of Syracuse. There is nothing in all this to which διόπερ can
refer. But a few lines farther on, after the conditions of peace have been
specified, Diodorus alludes to <i>the</i> terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which laid
waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it before.
</p>
<p>
I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p. 212, 213) the
opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus “intentionally disguised in
the MSS., and not yet noticed by any editor.” Some such conclusion seems
to me unavoidable. Niebuhr thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it
was stated that Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the
place, and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which allusion is
made in the remaining portion of the text. This also is nowise improbable;
yet I do not venture to assert it,—since the pestilence may possibly have
broken out while Imilkon was still at Gela.
</p>
<p>
Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of Gela through
miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design, as suitable to his political
projects,—and that by the terms of the subsequent treaty, he held the territory
around Syracuse only under Carthaginian supremacy.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_974"><a href="#FNanchor_974">[974]</a></span>
Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_975"><a href="#FNanchor_975">[975]</a></span>
Diodor. xiii, 114.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_976"><a href="#FNanchor_976">[976]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 10.
</p>
<p>
The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is emphatically
denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 145; Orat. viii, (De Pace)
s. 122.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_977"><a href="#FNanchor_977">[977]</a></span>
Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on this occasion as
the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon extraordinary valor and ability
on their parts, but assigns the result mainly to fortune and the favor of
the gods (Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).
</p>
<p>
His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at Syracuse,
between the party of freedom, and the descendants of Dionysius and
Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case as he can, in favor of
the title of both the two latter to the gratitude of the Syracusans.
</p>
<p>
He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards abused
the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_978"><a href="#FNanchor_978">[978]</a></span>
That this was the situation of the fortified <i>horrea publica</i> at Syracuse,
we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may presume that they were begun
at this time by Dionysius, as they form a natural part of his scheme.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_979"><a href="#FNanchor_979">[979]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 7.
</p>
<p>
The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters of his mercenaries
without the acropolis, but still within Ortygia,—are noticed in
Plato’s account of his visit to the younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p.
350; Epist. iii, p. 315).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_980"><a href="#FNanchor_980">[980]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδωρήσατο
τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις· <em class="gesperrt">τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν
ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ</em>, συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς
ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς
ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις
ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_981"><a href="#FNanchor_981">[981]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 78.
</p>
<p>
So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks of his
military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν (Plutarch,
Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little pretence to numerical
accuracy.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_982"><a href="#FNanchor_982">[982]</a></span>
Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_983"><a href="#FNanchor_983">[983]</a></span>
Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν
(τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν
εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_984"><a href="#FNanchor_984">[984]</a></span>
Diodorus, xiv, 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_985"><a href="#FNanchor_985">[985]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at Mendê in
Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_986"><a href="#FNanchor_986">[986]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 8.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_987"><a href="#FNanchor_987">[987]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 10.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_988"><a href="#FNanchor_988">[988]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) sect. 49.
</p>
<p>
It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last observation to
Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of the passages above referred
to, though not in the other. But Philistus himself in his history
asserted that the observation had been made by another person (Plutarch,
Dion. c. 35).
</p>
<p>
The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long afterwards in
Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by Dionysius himself, not as
addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).
</p>
<p>
Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having been delivered
when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse hardly by siege; having
in mind doubtless the siege or blockade undertaken by Imilkon seven
years afterwards. But I apprehend this to be a misconception. The story
seems to suit better to the earlier occasion named by Diodorus.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_989"><a href="#FNanchor_989">[989]</a></span>
Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_990"><a href="#FNanchor_990">[990]</a></span>
It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse, passed by
Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of Agyris the despot of
that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we look at the position of Agyrium on
the map, it seems difficult to understand how mercenaries coming from the
Carthaginian territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have
passed anywhere near to it.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_991"><a href="#FNanchor_991">[991]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 9.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_992"><a href="#FNanchor_992">[992]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the Campanians justified
his wisdom in dismissing them. They went to Entella (a town among
the dependencies of Carthage, in the south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod.
xiv, 48), where they were welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants.
In the night, they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise,
put them all to death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession
of the town for themselves.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_993"><a href="#FNanchor_993">[993]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον, ἄνδρα τῶν
ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν,
τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες
τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος
καταπλεύσας εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς,
τούς τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν, ἀφηγούμενον
τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε,
διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα.
Compare xiv, 70.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_994"><a href="#FNanchor_994">[994]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν
ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι πᾶν
ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_995"><a href="#FNanchor_995">[995]</a></span>
Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_996"><a href="#FNanchor_996">[996]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 34.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_997"><a href="#FNanchor_997">[997]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 58.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_998"><a href="#FNanchor_998">[998]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 61.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_999"><a href="#FNanchor_999">[999]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 15.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1000"><a href="#FNanchor_1000">[1000]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been son of the
Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part as an ally of Nikias
and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse, died just before Gylippus
reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1001"><a href="#FNanchor_1001">[1001]</a></span>
See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie von
Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1002"><a href="#FNanchor_1002">[1002]</a></span>
See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account of the siege
of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1003"><a href="#FNanchor_1003">[1003]</a></span>
Thucyd. vi, 75.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1004"><a href="#FNanchor_1004">[1004]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have been cubes
of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1005"><a href="#FNanchor_1005">[1005]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 18.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1006"><a href="#FNanchor_1006">[1006]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος,
ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.
</p>
<p>
Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων ἐπικρατείας,
etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1007"><a href="#FNanchor_1007">[1007]</a></span>
According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the architect under
whose directions the excavations were made in 1839, whereby these remains
were first fully disclosed (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1008"><a href="#FNanchor_1008">[1008]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος,
καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων,
οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν, <em class="gesperrt">καθάπερ εἰώθει</em>.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1009"><a href="#FNanchor_1009">[1009]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 7.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1010"><a href="#FNanchor_1010">[1010]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 45.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1011"><a href="#FNanchor_1011">[1011]</a></span>
Thucyd. vi, 46.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1012"><a href="#FNanchor_1012">[1012]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 40.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1013"><a href="#FNanchor_1013">[1013]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 40.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1014"><a href="#FNanchor_1014">[1014]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1015"><a href="#FNanchor_1015">[1015]</a></span>
Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give this remark
as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to it as having been <i>said</i>
to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1016"><a href="#FNanchor_1016">[1016]</a></span>
Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς
πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι
τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία
ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’
ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1017"><a href="#FNanchor_1017">[1017]</a></span>
Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1018"><a href="#FNanchor_1018">[1018]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.
</p>
<p>
The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these warlike
preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged from him
(Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1019"><a href="#FNanchor_1019">[1019]</a></span>
Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1020"><a href="#FNanchor_1020">[1020]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 13.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1021"><a href="#FNanchor_1021">[1021]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 36-62.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1022"><a href="#FNanchor_1022">[1022]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 42.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1023"><a href="#FNanchor_1023">[1023]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων
τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν
περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1024"><a href="#FNanchor_1024">[1024]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1025"><a href="#FNanchor_1025">[1025]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 41.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1026"><a href="#FNanchor_1026">[1026]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1027"><a href="#FNanchor_1027">[1027]</a></span>
Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1028"><a href="#FNanchor_1028">[1028]</a></span>
Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13; Diodor. xiv, 2.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1029"><a href="#FNanchor_1029">[1029]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 45.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1030"><a href="#FNanchor_1030">[1030]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 41.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1031"><a href="#FNanchor_1031">[1031]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 46.
</p>
<p>
There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some consideration,
who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have continued resident there
throughout the war between the Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv,
77). We should infer, from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians
did not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius
against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it affords
additional probability that the number of Carthaginians actually plundered
at Syracuse was not considerable.
</p>
<p>
For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between Carthage
and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.
</p>
<p>
Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician inscription
signifying <i>The Island</i>,—which was the usual denomination of Ortygia
(Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1032"><a href="#FNanchor_1032">[1032]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ
μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1033"><a href="#FNanchor_1033">[1033]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1034"><a href="#FNanchor_1034">[1034]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 47.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1035"><a href="#FNanchor_1035">[1035]</a></span>
Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο
εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1036"><a href="#FNanchor_1036">[1036]</a></span>
Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who come to
solicit his aid against Xerxes.
</p>
<p>
Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι,
ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ... <em class="gesperrt">ὑποτείνοντός τε
τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν</em>, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1037"><a href="#FNanchor_1037">[1037]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς τὰ σώματα
αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον.
Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ
κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι
παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1038"><a href="#FNanchor_1038">[1038]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 47.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1039"><a href="#FNanchor_1039">[1039]</a></span>
Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1040"><a href="#FNanchor_1040">[1040]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων
κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.
</p>
<p>
Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of Samos
(Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1041"><a href="#FNanchor_1041">[1041]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1042"><a href="#FNanchor_1042">[1042]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς
ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς τείχεσι.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1043"><a href="#FNanchor_1043">[1043]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 50.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1044"><a href="#FNanchor_1044">[1044]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1045"><a href="#FNanchor_1045">[1045]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1046"><a href="#FNanchor_1046">[1046]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 53.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1047"><a href="#FNanchor_1047">[1047]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 54.
</p>
<p>
Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he afterwards
married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not condemned by
Grecian sentiment.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1048"><a href="#FNanchor_1048">[1048]</a></span>
Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who, from political
enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to communicate information to
Dionysius, was detected and punished as a traitor. On this occasion, the
Carthaginian senate is said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to
learn Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1049"><a href="#FNanchor_1049">[1049]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1050"><a href="#FNanchor_1050">[1050]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1051"><a href="#FNanchor_1051">[1051]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 55.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1052"><a href="#FNanchor_1052">[1052]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὄντων, etc.
διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ τείχη καταπεπτωκότα,
etc.
</p>
<p>
Compare another example of inattention to the state of their walls, on
the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1053"><a href="#FNanchor_1053">[1053]</a></span>
Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre (Thucyd.
v, 2).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1054"><a href="#FNanchor_1054">[1054]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 57.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1055"><a href="#FNanchor_1055">[1055]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη κατασκάψας,
προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον,
μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι.
Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις
ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν τόπον
πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον, εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ
Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ
καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.
</p>
<p>
Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.
</p>
<p>
It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can hardly
have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended; since the city reappears
shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1056"><a href="#FNanchor_1056">[1056]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 59-76.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1057"><a href="#FNanchor_1057">[1057]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 59.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1058"><a href="#FNanchor_1058">[1058]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at Syracuse
afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete idea of what
passed after the battle.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1059"><a href="#FNanchor_1059">[1059]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος
ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.
</p>
<p>
These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the various
neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to notice, though they are
not often brought before us.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1060"><a href="#FNanchor_1060">[1060]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 61.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1061"><a href="#FNanchor_1061">[1061]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 63.
</p>
<p>
Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of <i>Leptines</i>, practised in bringing
back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to Sicily on his voyage
along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may be the Lacedæmonian
division intended.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1062"><a href="#FNanchor_1062">[1062]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1063"><a href="#FNanchor_1063">[1063]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 62.
</p>
<p>
The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require conjectural alteration,
which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not so as to remove all
that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still remains to be explained or corrected.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1064"><a href="#FNanchor_1064">[1064]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον,
καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.
</p>
<p>
Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples of Demeter
and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites, among the characteristic
features of Neapolis; which proves the identity of Neapolis with
what Diodorus calls the suburb of Achradina. This identity, recognized
by Serra di Falco, Colonel Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio
Cavallari, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.
</p>
<p>
See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur Topographie
von Syrakus, p. 20.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1065"><a href="#FNanchor_1065">[1065]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων, Διονύσιος
κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς Συρακουσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει
θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος
διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν
εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας
τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1066"><a href="#FNanchor_1066">[1066]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος, τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ
ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....
</p>
<p>
c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς πόλεως
ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῶν Συρακοσίων
ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ
μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ
μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας· Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν
τυραννίδα συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....
</p>
<p>
... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις ἥττηται·
παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως ἀφείλετο τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων
δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις
καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ
ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....
</p>
<p>
c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν
ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;
</p>
<p>
c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα τοὺς τῶν θεῶν
ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1067"><a href="#FNanchor_1067">[1067]</a></span>
Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1068"><a href="#FNanchor_1068">[1068]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις,
οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους
ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ
παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1069"><a href="#FNanchor_1069">[1069]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως, etc.; compare
Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1070"><a href="#FNanchor_1070">[1070]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς ἀποφάσεως,
οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες
τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον
Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously <i>Aristus</i>, xiv, 10),
ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας
ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1071"><a href="#FNanchor_1071">[1071]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου συμφορᾷ
τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους
ἐνεργότατον, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1072"><a href="#FNanchor_1072">[1072]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους
διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.
</p>
<p>
I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as anything
more than an indication of a great number.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1073"><a href="#FNanchor_1073">[1073]</a></span>
Thucyd. ii, 54.
</p>
<p>
When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212 <small>B.C.</small>,
a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to that of this year, broke
out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, suffered from it
considerably; but the Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all
perished (Livy, xxv, 26).</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1074"><a href="#FNanchor_1074">[1074]</a></span>
Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1075"><a href="#FNanchor_1075">[1075]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρὰ
πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ
ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς, ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων,
φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν,
οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες κατεκόπησαν.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1076"><a href="#FNanchor_1076">[1076]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων,
αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο ψόφον, etc.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1077"><a href="#FNanchor_1077">[1077]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 75.</p>
</div>

<div class="footnote">
<p><span class="label" id="Footnote_1078"><a href="#FNanchor_1078">[1078]</a></span>
Diodor. xiv, 77.</p>
</div>

</div>

<hr class="chap" />


<div class="transnote" id="tnote">
  <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p>
  <ul>
    <li>Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, but variant spellings were made
    consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li>
    <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li>
    <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li>
    <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after comparison with a later edition of
    this work. Greek text has also been corrected after checking with this later edition and with Perseus,
    when the reference was found.</li>
    <li>Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize” and “reörganize”) and in the use
    of accents over proper nouns (like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.</li>
    <li>Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when referring to Franz Karl Movers,
    as it is the spelling used in the title pages of his main works in German.</li>
    <li>The following changes were also made, after checking with other editions:
      <table summary="changes made">
        <tr>
          <td>page</td>
          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_27">27</a>:</td>
          <td class="tdr">“Phokæn”</td>
          <td>→</td>
          <td>“<a href="#tn_1">Phokæan</a>”</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>page</td>
          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_94">94</a>:</td>
          <td class="tdr">“from”</td>
          <td>→</td>
          <td>“<a href="#tn_4">at</a>”</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>page</td>
          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_96">96</a>:</td>
          <td class="tdr">“Kannônes”</td>
          <td>→</td>
          <td>“<a href="#tn_2">Kannônus</a>”</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>page</td>
          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_374">374</a>:</td>
          <td class="tdr">“troad”</td>
          <td>→</td>
          <td>“<a href="#tn_5">Troad</a>”</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>note</td>
          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Footnote_711">711</a>:</td>
          <td class="tdr">“vii, 39”</td>
          <td>→</td>
          <td>“<a href="#tn_3">vii, 4, 39</a>”</td>
        </tr>
      </table>
    </li>
    <li>In note <a href="#Footnote_965">965</a>, the printed book version has been retained:
    “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, <a href="#tn_6">ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν</a>”, but the original English
    edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.</li>
    <li>The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</li>
  </ul>
</div>

<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51183 ***</div>
</body>
</html>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2026-04-25 06:07:11 +0000