diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/51182-h')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/51182-h/51182-h.htm | 21223 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/51182-h/images/cover.jpg | bin | 16067 -> 0 bytes |
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 21223 deletions
diff --git a/old/51182-h/51182-h.htm b/old/51182-h/51182-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 8159d24..0000000 --- a/old/51182-h/51182-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21223 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> - <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - History of Greece - Vol. 9/12, by George Grote — A Project Gutenberg eBook - </title> - <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> - <style type="text/css"> - - body { margin: 0 auto; max-width: 40em; } - p { margin: 0.75em 0 0 0; text-align: justify; text-indent: 1.5em; } - - h1, h2, h3 { text-align: center; clear: both; font-weight: normal; } - h1 { line-height: 1.5em; } - h2 { margin: 0.75em 0 1em 0; font-size: 120%; line-height: 130%; } - h3 { margin: 1.5em 5% 1em 5%; font-size: 130%; } - - h2:first-line { line-height: 2em; font-size: 1.3em; } - h2.nobreak { page-break-before: avoid; } - - .falseh1 { margin: 0 0 1em 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center; - font-weight: normal; font-size: 175%; clear: both; } - - .xs { font-size: x-small; } - .small { font-size: small; } - .medium { font-size: medium; } - .large { font-size: large; } - .xl { font-size: x-large; } - - .p1 { margin-top: 1em; } - .p2 { margin-top: 2em; } - .p4 { margin-top: 4em; } - - .front { margin: 3em 0; page-break-before: always; } - .front p { margin: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: left; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 90%; } - .tit { margin: 3em auto 0 auto; page-break-before: always; } - .tit p { text-indent: 0; text-align: center; } - .chapter { page-break-before: always; margin-top: 2em; } - - hr { clear: both; width: 33%; text-align: center; margin: 3em auto; } - hr.chap { width: 20%; } - hr.sep2 { width: 6%; margin: 1.5em auto; } - - .smcap { font-variant: small-caps; } - .gesperrt { letter-spacing: 0.15em; margin-right: -0.15em; } - .noindent { text-indent: 0; } - .center { text-align: center; text-indent: 0; } - - .contents { font-size: 90%; } - .contents p { clear: both; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1em; } - .contents p.chap { padding-top: 1em; padding-left: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: center; } - .contents p.toright { margin: 0; padding: 0; text-indent: 0; text-align: right; } - - table { margin: 0.5em auto; padding-right: 2em; } - .tdr { text-align: right; white-space: nowrap; } - - .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - right: 90%; - font-size: small; - font-variant: normal; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal; - letter-spacing: normal; - text-align: right; - color: #B0B0B0; - text-indent: 0; - } - - /* Images */ - .figcenter { margin: 2em auto; text-align: center; } - - /* Footnotes */ - .footnotes { margin: 3em 0; border: medium solid #C0C0C0; background-color: white; - page-break-before: always; } - .footnote { margin: 1em 2em; font-size: 90%; } - .footnote a { text-decoration: none; } - .footnote p { margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0; text-indent: 1.5em; } - .footnote .label { padding-right: .5em; } - .fnanchor { vertical-align: top; text-decoration: none; font-size: 0.75em; - font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; } - - - /* Poetry */ - .poetry-container { text-align: center; } - .poetry { display: inline-block; margin: 0.75em 0; text-align: left; } - .poetry p { margin: 0; padding-left: 2em; text-indent: -2em; } - .poetry p.i1 { padding-left: 3em; } - .poetry p.i2 { padding-left: 4em; } - - /* Transcriber's notes */ - .transnote { border: thin solid gray; background-color: #f8f8f8; font-family: sans-serif; - font-size: smaller; margin: 3em 0; padding: 1em 2em 1em 0; - page-break-before: always; } - #tnote li { margin-top: 0.5em; text-align: justify; } - .tnotetit { font-weight: bold; text-align: center; text-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; } - .replace { text-decoration: none; border-bottom: thin dotted gray; } - - @media handheld, print - { - p { margin: 0; } - - hr { clear: both; width: 34%; margin-left: 33%; } - hr.chap { width: 20%; margin-left: 40%; } - hr.sep2 { width: 6%; margin-left: 47%; } - - .screenonly { display: none; } - .poetry { font-size: 90%; } - - .footnotes { border: none; } - .footnote { margin: 1em 0; } - .replace { border-bottom: none; } - } - - - </style> - </head> - <body> - - -<pre> - -Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12), by George Grote - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51182] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 9 OF 12 *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Mark C. Orton, Ramon Pajares -Box and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/American -Libraries.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="front"> - <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p> - <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p> -</div> - -<div class="screenonly"> - <div class="figcenter"> - <img src="images/cover.jpg" - alt="Book cover" /> - </div> -</div> - -<div class="tit"> - <hr class="chap" /> - - <h1>HISTORY OF GREECE</h1> - - <p class="xl p2"><small>BY</small><br /> - GEORGE GROTE, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span></p> - - <p class="large p2">VOL. IX.</p> - - <p class="xs p4">REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.</p> - - <p class="medium p2">NEW YORK:<br /> - HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br /> - <span class="small">329 <small>AND</small> 331 <small>PEARL STREET.</small></span><br /> - 1880.</p> - - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - -<div class="chapter" id="ToC"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</a></span></p> - <h2>CONTENTS.<br /> - <span class="large">VOL. IX.</span></h2> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <p class="xl center">PART II.</p> - <p class="large center">CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> -</div> - -<div class="contents"> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXIX.</p> -<p class="small center">CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</p> - -<p class="p1">Spartan empire. — March of the Ten Thousand Greeks. -— Persian kings — Xerxes — Artaxerxes Longimanus. — Darius Nothus. -— Cyrus the younger in Ionia — his vigorous operations against -Athens. — Youth and education of Cyrus. — His esteem for the Greeks -— his hopes of the crown. — Death of Darius Nothus — succession of -Artaxerxes Mnemon. — Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking -his brother. — Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of Cyrus. -— Strict administration, and prudent behavior, of Cyrus. — Cyrus -collects his army at Sardis. — The Ten Thousand Greeks — their -position and circumstances. — Xenophon. — How Xenophon came to join -the Cyreian army. — Cyrus marches from Sardis — Kolossæ — Kelænæ. -— Peltæ — Keramôn-Agora, Käystru-Pedion. — Distress of Cyrus for -money — Epyaxa supplies him. — Thymbrium. — Tyriæum — Review of the -Greeks by Cyrus. — Ikonium — Lykaonia — Tyana. — Pass over Taurus -into Kilikia. — Syennesis of Kilikia — his duplicity — he assists -Cyrus with money. — Cyrus at Tarsus — mutiny of the Greeks — their -refusal to go farther. — Klearchus tries to suppress the mutiny -by severity — he fails. — He tries persuasion — his discourse to -the soldiers. — His refusal to march farther — well received. — -Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the soldiers round to -Cyrus. — The soldiers agree to accompany Cyrus farther — increase of -pay. — March onward — from Tarsus to Issus. — Flight of Abrokomas — -abandonment of the passes. — Gates of Kilikia and Syria. — Desertion -of Xenias and Pasion — prudence of Cyrus. — Cyrus marches from the -sea to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. — Partial reluctance of the -army — they ford the Euphrates. — Separate manœuvre of Menon. — -Abrokomas abandons the defence of the river — his double dealing. -— Cyrus marches along the left bank of the Euphrates — the Desert -— privations of the army. — Pylæ — Charmandê — dangerous dispute -between the soldiers of Klearchus and those of Menon. — Entry into -Babylonia — treason of Orontes — preparation for battle. — Discourse -of Cyrus to his officers and soldiers. — Conception formed by -Cyrus of Grecian superiority. — Present<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_iv">[p. iv]</a></span> of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus. — -Cyrus passes the undefended trench — Kunaxa — sudden appearance of -the king’s army — preparation of Cyrus for battle. — Last orders -of Cyrus. — Battle of Kunaxa — easy victory of the Greeks on their -side. — Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother — Cyrus is slain. -— Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus. — Plunder of the -Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the Greeks. — -Character of Cyrus. — If Cyrus had succeeded, he would have been -the most formidable enemy to Greece.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_69">1-51</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXX.</p> -<p class="small center">RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</p> - -<p class="p1">Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. -Klearchus offers the throne to Ariæus. — Artaxerxes summons the -Greeks to surrender — their reply — language of Phalinus. — Ariæus -refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him for retreat. -— The Greeks rejoin Ariæus — interchange of oaths — resolution to -retreat together. — Position of the Greeks — to all appearance -hopeless. — Commencement of the retreat, along with Ariæus — -disorder of the army. — Heralds from the Persians to treat about a -truce. — The heralds conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with -provisions. March over the canals. — Abundant supplies obtained in -the villages. — Visit of Tissaphernes — negotiations. — Convention -concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the Greeks home. -— Motives of the Persians — favorable dispositions of Parysatis -towards Cyrus. — Long halt of the Greeks — their quarrel with -Ariæus. — Secret despair of Klearchus. — Retreating march begun, -under Tissaphernes — they enter within the Wall of Media — march -to Sittakê. — Alarm and suspicions of the Greeks — they cross the -Tigris. — Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris — to -the Great Zab. — Suspicions between the Greeks and Tissaphernes. -— Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes — and is talked over. — -Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals, visits Tissaphernes in -his tent. — Tissaphernes seizes the Greek generals. They are sent -prisoners to the Persian court, and there put to death. — Menon -is reserved to perish in torture — sentiments of queen Parysatis. -— How Klearchus came to be imposed upon. — Plans of Tissaphernes -— impotence and timidity of the Persians. — The Persians summon -the Grecian army to surrender. — Indignant refusal of the Greeks — -distress and despair prevalent among them. — First appearance of -Xenophon — his dream. — He stimulates the other captains to take -the lead and appoint new officers. — Address of Xenophon to the -officers. New generals are named, Xenophon being one. — The army -is convened in general assembly — speech of Xenophon. — Favorable -augury from a man sneezing. — Encouraging topics insisted on by -Xenophon. — Great impression produced by his speech — the army -confirm the new generals proposed. — Great ascendency acquired -over the army at once by Xenophon — qualities whereby he obtained -it. — Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like -resource and bravery. — Approach of the Persian Mithridates — the -Greeks refuse all parley. — The Greeks cross the Zab and resume -their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry. — Sufferings of the -Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful -precautions taken. — Tissaphernes renews the attack, with<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">[p. v]</a></span> some effect. — -Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry, -and then march fast onward. — Victory of the Greeks — prowess of -Xenophon. — The Greeks embarrassed as to their route — impossibility -either of following the Tigris farther, or of crossing it. — The -strike into the mountains of the Karduchians. — They burn much of -their baggage — their sufferings from the activity and energy of the -Karduchians. — Extreme danger of their situation. — Xenophon finds -out another road to turn the enemy’s position. — The Karduchians -are defeated and the road cleared. — Danger of Xenophon with the -rear division and baggage. — Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the -bodies of the slain. — They reach the river Kentritês, the northern -boundary of Karduchia. — Difficulties of passing the Kentritês — -dream of Xenophon. — They discover a ford and pass the river. — -Xenophon with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his -passage. — March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe cold. — They -ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad. — Distressing marches — extreme -misery from cold and hunger. — Rest in good quarters — subterranean -villages well stocked with provisions. — After a week’s rest, they -march onward — their guide runs away. — They reach a difficult pass -occupied by the Chalybes — raillery exchanged between Xenophon and -Cheirisophus about stealing. — They turn the pass by a flank-march, -and force their way over the mountain. — March through the country -of the Taochi — exhaustion of provisions — capture of a hill-fort. — -Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom they had yet seen — -the Skythini. — They reach the flourishing city of Gymnias. — First -sight of the sea from the mountain-top Thêchê — extreme delight -of the soldiers. — Passage through the Makrônes. — Through the -Kolchians — who oppose them and are defeated. — Kolchian villages — -unwholesome honey. — Arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond). -— Joy of the Greeks — their discharge of vows to their gods — -their festivals and games. — Appendix.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_70">52-120</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXI.</p> -<p class="small center">PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT -THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN -ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.</p> - -<p class="p1">Greek cities on the Euxine — Sinôpê with her colonies -Kerasus, Kotyôra, and Trapezus. — Indigenous inhabitants — their -relations with the Greek colonists. — Feelings of the Greeks on the -Euxine when the Ten Thousand descended among them. — Uncertainty and -danger of what they might do. — Plans of the army — Cheirisophus -is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them. — -Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during his absence. -— Adopted by the army — their intense repugnance to farther -marching. — Measures for procuring transports. Marauding expeditions -for supplies, against the Colchians and the Drilæ. — The army -leave Trapezus, and march westward along the coast to Kerasus. — -Acts of disorder and outrage committed by various soldiers near -Kerasus. — March to Kotyôra — hostilities with the Mosynœki. — Long -halt at Kotyôra — remonstrance from the Sinopians. — Speech of -Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army — reply of Xenophon. — Success of -the reply — good understanding established with Sinôpê. — <span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi">[p. vi]</a></span>Consultation -of the army with Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea. — -Envoys sent by the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels. — Poverty -and increasing disorganization or the army. — Ideas of Xenophon -about founding a new city in the Euxine, with the army. — Sacrifice -of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods — treachery of the -prophet Silanus. — Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies -against Xenophon. General assembly of the army. — Accusations against -Xenophon — his speech in defence. — He carries the soldiers with him -— discontent and flight of Silanus. — Fresh manœuvres of Timasion -— fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon — renewed discontent -of the army. — Xenophon convenes the assembly again. — his address -in defence of himself. — His remonstrance against the disorders in -the army. — Vote of the army unanimously favorable to Xenophon — -disapproving the disorders, and directing trial. — Xenophon’s appeal -to universal suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success -of his appeal. — Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before -a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of the -army with Xenophon. — Manner in which discipline was upheld by the -officers. — Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the -army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory. — -Improved feeling of the army — peace with the Paphlagonian Korylas. -— The army pass by sea to Sinôpê. — Return of Cheirisophus — -resolution of the army to elect a single general — they wish to elect -Xenophon, who declines — Cheirisophus is chosen. — The army pass by -sea to Herakleia — they wish to extort money from the Herakleots -— opposition of Cheirisophus and Xenophon. — Dissatisfaction of -the army — they divide into three <span class="replace" id="tn_1" -title="In the printed book: fractions">factions</span>. 1. The -Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division under Cheirisophus. 3. A -division under Xenophon. — Arcadian division start first and act for -themselves — they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon -— the army reünited at Kalpê — old board of generals reëlected, with -Neon in place of Cheirisophus. — Distress for provisions at Kalpê -— unwillingness to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices — -ultimate victory over the troops of the country. — Halt at Kalpê — -comfortable quarters — idea that they were about to settle there as a -colony. — Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium, -together with Dexippus. — Disorder in the army: mutiny against -Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus. — Indignation -and threats of Kleander — Xenophon persuades the army to submit — -fear of Sparta. — Satisfaction given to Kleander, by the voluntary -surrender of Agasias with the mutinous soldier. — Appeal to the mercy -of Kleander, who is completely soothed. — Kleander takes the command, -expressing the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards -Xenophon. — Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the command -and sail away. — March of the army across the country from Kalpê to -Chalkêdon. — Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across -the Bosphorus into Europe — false promises of Anaxibius to the army. -— Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home — -first proposition addressed to him by Seuthes of Thrace. — The army -cross over to Byzantium — fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who -sends the army at once out of the town. — Last orders of Anaxibius -as the soldiers were going out of the gates. — Wrath and mutiny of -the soldiers, in going away — they rush again into the gates, and -muster within the town. — Terror of Anaxibius and all within the -town. — The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium — danger of -all within it — conduct of Xenophon. — Xenophon musters the soldiers -in military order and harangues them. — Xenophon calms the army, and -persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town — message sent by -them to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</a></span> -Anaxibius — they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Kœratadas -as their commander. — Remarkable effect produced by Xenophon — -evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind -to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into -Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Kœratadas is dismissed from -the command. — Dissension among the commanders left. — Distress of -the army — Aristarchus arrives from Sparta to supersede Kleander -— Polus on his way to supersede Anaxibius. — Pharnabazus defrauds -Anaxibius, who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across -back to Asia. — Aristarchus hinders the crossing — his cruel dealing -towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzantium. — His treacherous scheme -for entrapping Xenophon. — Xenophon is again implicated in the -conduct of the army — he opens negotiations with Seuthes. — Position -of Seuthes — his liberal offers to the army. — Xenophon introduces -him to the army, who accept the offers. — Service of the army with -Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay. — The army suspect -the probity of Xenophon — unjust calumnies against him — he exposes -it in a public harangue, and regains their confidence. — Change of -interest in the Lacedæmonians, who become anxious to convey the -Cyreians across into Asia, in order to make war against the satraps. -— Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia — his poverty — he is -advised to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios — beneficial effects. — He -conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus. — His unsuccessful -attempt to surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates. — In a -second attempt he captures Asidates — valuable booty secured. — -General sympathy expressed for Xenophon — large share personally -allotted to him. — The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the -Lacedæmonian general Thimbron — Xenophon leaves the army, depositing -his money in the temple at Ephesus. — His subsequent return to Asia, -to take command of Cyreians as a part of the Lacedæmonian army. — -Xenophon in the Spartan service, with Agesilaus against Athens — -he is banished. — He settles at Skillus near Olympia, on an estate -consecrated to Artemis. — Charms of the residence — good hunting — -annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon. — Later life of Xenophon -— expelled from Skillus after the battle of Leuktra — afterwards -restored at Athens. — Great impression produced by the retreat of -the Ten Thousand upon the Greek mind.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_71">121-180</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXII.</p> -<p class="small center">GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.</p> - -<p class="p1">Sequel of Grecian affairs generally — resumed. — -Spartan empire — how and when it commenced. — Oppression and -suffering of Athens under the Thirty. — Alteration of Grecian -feeling towards Athens — the Thirty are put down and the democracy -restored. — The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors at -Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their tyranny. -— The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of that -which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities, at the -commencement of the Spartan empire. — Great power of Lysander — he -establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along with a Spartan -harmost. — Intimidation exercised everywhere by Lysander in favor -of his own partisans. — Oppressive action of these Dekarchies. — In -some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii">[p. viii]</a></span> -points, probably worse than the Thirty at Athens. — Bad conduct of -the Spartan harmosts — harsh as well as corrupt. No justice to be -obtained against them at Sparta. — Contrast of the actual empire of -Sparta, with the promises of freedom which she had previously held -out. — Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta — by -the Spartan general Brasidas, especially. — Gradual change in the -language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the Peloponnesian -war. — Language of Brasidas contrasted with the acts of Lysander. — -Extreme suddenness and completeness of the victory of Ægospotami left -Lysander almost omnipotent. — The dekarchies became partly modified -by the jealousy at Sparta against Lysander. The harmosts lasted -much longer. — The Thirty at Athens were put down by the Athenians -themselves, not by any reformatory interference of Sparta. — The -empire of Sparta much worse and more oppressive than that of Athens. -— Imperial Athens deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but -was guilty of little or no oppression. — Imperial Sparta did this, -and much worse — her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of -than the fact of her empire. — This more to be regretted, as Sparta -had now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable -confederacy throughout Greece. — Sparta might have reörganized the -confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work well. — -Insupportable arrogance of Lysander — bitter complaints against him, -as well as against the dekarchies. — Lysander offends Pharnabazus, -who procures his recall. His disgust and temporary expatriation. — -Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, according to the treaty -concluded with Sparta. — Their condition is affected by the position -and ambitious schemes of Cyrus, whose protection they seek against -Tissaphernes. — After the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as -victor and satrap to the coast of Asia Minor. — Alarm of the Asiatic -Greeks, who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron -with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall — he is superseded -by Derkyllidas. — Conduct of the Cyreians loose as to pillage. — -Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and attacks Pharnabazus -in the Troad and Æolis. — Distribution of the Persian empire; -relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap. — Mania, widow of Zênis, holds -the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus. Her regular payment and -vigorous government. — Military force, personal conquests, and large -treasures, of Mania. — Assassination of Mania, and of her son, by her -son-in-law Meidias, who solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is -indignantly refused. — Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas, -who gets possession of the person of Meidias. — Derkyllidas acquires -and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing -the treasures of Mania. — Derkyllidas concludes a truce with -Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia. — Command of -Derkyllidas — satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of -the Cyreians. — Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his -troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians. — He -captures and garrisons Atarneus. — He makes war upon Tissaphernes -and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander. — Timidity of Tissaphernes — he -concludes a truce with Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas is superseded -by Agesilaus. — Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her -allies in Central Greece. — Great energy imparted to Spartan action -by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami; an energy -very unusual with Sparta. — The Spartans had kept all the advantages -of victory to themselves — their allies were allowed nothing. — -Great power of the Spartans — they take revenge upon those who -had displeased them — their invasion of Elis. — The Spartan king -Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires from it immediately -in consequence of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix">[p. -ix]</a></span> an earthquake. — Second invasion of Elis by Agis — he -marches through Triphylia and Olympia; victorious march, with much -booty. — Insurrection of the oligarchical party in Elis — they are -put down. — The Eleians are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace. -— Sparta refuses to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency. -— Triumphant position of Sparta — she expels the Messenians from -Peloponnesus and its neighborhood.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_72">181-229</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIII.</p> -<p class="small center">AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.</p> - -<p class="p1">Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the war — -introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by Lysander — opposed -by some of the Ephors. — The introduction of money was only one among -a large train of corrupting circumstances which then became operative -on Sparta. — Contrast between Sparta in 432 <small>B.C.</small>, -and Sparta after 404 <small>B.C.</small> — Increase of peculation, -inequality, and discontent at Sparta. — Testimonies of Isokrates -and Xenophon to the change of character and habits at Sparta. — -Power of Lysander — his arrogance and ambitious projects — flattery -lavished upon him by sophists and poets. — Real position of the -kings at Sparta. — His intrigues to make himself king at Sparta — -he tries in vain to move the oracles in his favor — scheme laid -for the production of sacred documents, as yet lying hidden, by -a son of Apollo. — His aim at the kingship fails — nevertheless -he still retains prodigious influence at Sparta. — Death of Agis, -king of Sparta — doubt as to the legitimacy of his son Leotychides. -Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander, aspires to the throne. — Character -of Agesilaus. — Conflicting pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides. -— Objection taken against Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness, -— oracle produced by Diopeithes — eluded by the interpretation of -Lysander. — Agesilaus is preferred as king — suspicions which always -remained attached to Lysander’s interpretation. — Popular conduct of -Agesilaus — he conciliates the ephors — his great influence at Sparta -— his energy, combined with unscrupulous partisanship. — Dangerous -conspiracy at Sparta — terror-striking sacrifices. — Character and -position of the chief conspirator Kinadon — state of parties at -Sparta — increasing number of malcontents. — Police of the ephors — -information laid before them. — Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon -by the conspirators. — Alarm of the ephors — their manœuvres for -apprehending Kinadon privately. — Kinadon is seized, interrogated, -and executed — his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy -broken up. — Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta. — Proceedings -of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia. — Persian preparations for -reviving the maritime war against Sparta — renewed activity of -Konon. — Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia, accompanied by -Lysander. — Large plans of Agesilaus, for conquest in the interior -of Asia. — General willingness of the Spartan allies to serve in the -expedition, but refusal from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens. — Agesilaus -compares himself with Agamemnon — goes to sacrifice at Aulis — is -contemptuously hindered by the Thebans. — Arrival of Agesilaus -at Ephesus — he concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes. -— Arrogant behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander — -offensive to the army and to Agesilaus. — Agesilaus hum<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x">[p. x]</a></span>bles and degrades -Lysander, who asks to be sent away. — Lysander is sent to command at -the Hellespont — his valuable service there. — Tissaphernes breaks -the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and Pharnabazus — he -retires for the purpose of organizing a force of cavalry. — Agesilaus -indifferent to money for himself, but eager in enriching his friends. -— His humanity towards captives and deserted children. — Spartan side -of his character — exposure of naked prisoners — different practice -of Asiatics and Greeks. — Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and -to procure cavalry. — Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, -and gains a victory near Sardis. — Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to -be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes. — Negotiations between -the new satrap and Agesilaus — the satraps in Asia Minor hostile to -each other. — Commencement of action at sea against Sparta — the -Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money, commands a fleet -of eighty sail on the coast of Karia. — Rhodes revolts from the -Spartan empire — Konon captures an Egyptian corn-fleet at Rhodes. — -Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians — Agesilaus is appointed to command at -sea as well as on land. — Severity of the Lacedæmonians towards the -Rhodian Dorieus — contrast of the former treatment of the same man by -Athens. — Sentiment of a multitude compared with that of individuals. -— Efforts of Agesilaus to augment the fleet — he names Peisander -admiral. — Operations of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus. — He lays -waste the residence of the satrap, and surprises his camp — offence -given to Spithridates. — Personal conference between Agesilaus and -Pharnabazus. — Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son -of Pharnabazus — character of Agesilaus. — Promising position and -large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus — he is -recalled with his army to Peloponnesus. — Efforts and proceedings -of Konon in command of the Persian fleet — his personal visit to -the Persian court. — Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with -Konon. — Battle of Knidus — complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian -fleet — death of Peisander the admiral.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_73">230-283</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIV.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.</p> - -<p class="p1">War in Central Greece against Sparta — called the -Corinthian war. — Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states -and with her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent -among the allies. — Great power of Sparta, stretching even to -Northern Greece — state of Herakleia. — Growing disposition in -Greece to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the -war against Persia. — The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy with -money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta — his success -at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. — The Persian money did not create -hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out hostile tendencies -pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment of Xenophon. — War between -Sparta and Thebes — the Bœotian war. — Active operations of Sparta -against Bœotia — Lysander is sent to act from Herakleia on the -northward — Pausanias conducts an army from Peloponnesus. — The -Thebans apply to Athens for aid — remarkable proof of the altered -sentiment in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</a></span> -Greece. — Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens. — Political feeling -at Athens — good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of the -Thirty. — Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes against -Sparta. — State of the Bœotian confederacy — Orchomenus revolts -and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army and attacks -Haliartus. — Lysander is repulsed and slain before Haliartus. — -Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of Lysander — Thrasybulus -and an Athenian army come to the aid of the Thebans. — Pausanias -evacuates Bœotia, on receiving the dead bodies of Lysander and the -rest for burial. — Anger against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes -into voluntary exile; he is condemned in his absence. — Condemnation -of Pausanias not deserved. — Sparta not less unjust in condemning -unsuccessful generals than Athens. — Character of Lysander — his -mischievous influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally. — -His plans to make himself king at Sparta — discourse of the sophist -Kleon. — Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from the death of -Lysander — alliance against her between Thebes, Athens, Corinth, -and Argos — the Eubœans and others join the alliance. — Increased -importance of Thebes — she now rises to the rank of a primary power -— the Theban leader Ismenias. — Successful operations of Ismenias -to the north of Bœotia — capture of Herakleia from Sparta. — Synod -of anti-Spartan allies at Corinth — their confident hopes — the -Lacedæmonians send to recall Agesilaus from Asia. — Large muster near -Corinth of Spartans and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan -allies on the other. — Boldness of the language against Sparta — -speech of the Corinthian Timolaus. — The anti-Spartan allies take -up a defensive position near Corinth — advance of the Lacedæmonians -to attack them. — Battle of Corinth — victory of the Lacedæmonians -in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts being -worsted. — Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus is secured, -but no farther result gained. — Agesilaus — his vexation on being -recalled from Asia — his large plans of Asiatic conquest. — Regret -of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia — he leaves Euxenus in -Asia with four thousand men. — Agesilaus crosses the Hellespont and -marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. — Agesilaus -and his army on the northern frontier of Bœotia — eclipse of the sun -— news of the naval defeat at Knidus. — Bœotians and their allies -mustered at Korôneia. — Battle of Korôneia — Agesilaus with most of -his army is victorious; while the Thebans on their side are also -victorious. — Terrible combat between the Thebans and Spartans; on -the whole, the result is favorable to the Thebans. — Victory of -Agesilaus, not without severe wounds — yet not very decisive — his -conduct after the battle. — Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia — -he goes to the Pythian games — sails homeward across the Corinthian -Gulf — his honorable reception at Sparta. — Results of the battles -of Corinth and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, -and had rather lost by the latter. — Reverses of Sparta after the -defeat of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all -her maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon. — Abydos -holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas holds -both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of Pharnabazus -— anger of the latter. — Pharnabazus and Konon sail with their -fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth. — Assistance and encouragement -given by Pharnabazus to the allies at Corinth — Remarkable fact -of the Persian satrap and fleet at Corinth. — Pharnabazus leaves -the fleet with Konon in the Saronic Gulf, and aids him, with -money, to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens. — Konon rebuilds the -Long Walls — hearty coöperation of the allies. — Great<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii">[p. xii]</a></span> importance of -this restoration — how much it depended upon accident — Maintenance -of the lines of Corinth against Sparta, was one essential condition -to the power of rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not -maintained longer than the ensuing year.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_74">284-324</a></p> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXV.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.</p> - -<p class="p1">Large plans of Konon — organization of a mercenary -force at Corinth. — Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and -Lacedæmonians, in the Corinthian Gulf. — Land-warfare — the -Lacedæmonians established at Sikyon — the anti-Spartan allies -occupying the lines of Corinth from sea to sea. — Sufferings of -the Corinthians from the war being carried on in their territory. -Many Corinthian proprietors become averse to the war. — Growth and -manifestation of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical -form of the government left open nothing but an appeal to force. -— The Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a <i>coup -d’état</i>. — Numerous persons of the philo-Laconian party are banished; -nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and remains at Corinth. -— Intimate political union and consolidation between Corinth and -Argos. — Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians within the Long Walls -of Corinth. Battle within those walls. — The Lacedæmonians are -victorious — severe loss of the Argeians. — The Lacedæmonians pull -down a portion of the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum, so as -to open a free passage across. They capture Krommyon and Sidus. — -Effective warfare carried on by the light troops under Iphikrates -at Corinth — Military genius and improvements of Iphikrates. — -The Athenians restore the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum -— expedition of the Spartan king Agesilaus, who, in concert with -Teleutias, retakes the Long Walls and captures Lechæum. — Alarm -of Athens and Thebes at the capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. -Propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. The discussions come to -no result. — Advantages derived by the Corinthians from possession of -Peiræum. At the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth -with an army to attack it. — Isthmian festival — Agesilaus disturbs -the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection, -celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the city -perform the ceremony over again. — Agesilaus attacks Peiræum, which -he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and much -booty. — Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth. The -Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace — contemptuously treated -by Agesilaus. — Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils the triumph. -— Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light troops under -Iphikrates. — Daring and well-planned manœuvres of Iphikrates. — Few -of the mora escape to Lechæum. — The Lacedæmonians bury the bodies -of the slain, under truce asked and obtained. Trophy erected by -Iphikrates. — Great effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this -event. Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the -slain. — Mortification of Agesilaus — he marches up to the walls -of Corinth and defies Iphikrates — he then goes back humiliated to -Sparta. — Success of Iphikrates — he retakes<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_xiii">[p. xiii]</a></span> Krommyon, Sidus, and Peiræum — -Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed by enemies. The Athenians -recall Iphikrates. — Expedition of Agesilaus against Akarnania — -successful, after some delay — the Akarnanians submit, and enrol -themselves in the Lacedæmonian confederacy. — The Lacedæmonians under -Agesipolis invade Argos. — Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the -season of the holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia -and Delphi. — Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis — -he disregards it. — He marches up near to Argos — much plunder taken -— he retires. — Transactions in Asia — efforts of Sparta to detach -the Great King from Athens. — The Spartan Antalkidas is sent as envoy -to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also, from Athens and the -anti-Spartan allies. — Antalkidas offers to surrender the Asiatic -Greeks, and demands universal autonomy throughout the Grecian world — -the anti-Spartan allies refuse to accede to those terms. — Hostility -of Sparta to all the partial confederacies of Greece, now first -proclaimed under the name of universal autonomy. — Antalkidas gains -the favor of Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta, -though the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon — -Konon’s career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment. -— Tiribazus cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still -continues hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the -Lacedæmonians in Ionia. — Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and the -Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain. — Diphridas is sent to succeed -Thimbron. — Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes — intestine disputes in the -island. — The Athenians send aid to Evagoras at Cyprus. Fidelity -with which they adhered to him, though his alliance had now become -inconvenient. — Thrasybulus is sent with a fleet from Athens to the -Asiatic coast — his acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. -— Victory of Thrasybulus in Lesbos — he levies contributions along -the Asiatic coast — he is slain near Aspendus. — Character of -Thrasybulus. — Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus — Rhodes still holds -out against the Lacedæmonians. — Anaxibius is sent to command at -the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas — his vigorous proceedings -— he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait. — The Athenians -send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the Hellespont. His -stratagem to surprise Anaxibius. — Defeat and death of Anaxibius. -— The Athenians are again masters of the Hellespont and the strait -dues. — The island of Ægina — its past history. — The Æginetans are -constrained by Sparta into war with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral -Teleutias at Ægina. He is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable -popularity among the seamen. — Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving -Gorgôpas at Ægina. Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia. — -Gorgôpas is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian -Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus. — The Lacedæmonian -seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented. Teleutias is sent thither to -conciliate them. — Sudden and successful attack of Teleutias upon the -Peiræus. — Unprepared and unguarded condition of Peiræus — Teleutias -gains rich plunder, and sails away in safety. — He is enabled to -pay his seamen — activity of the fleet — great loss inflicted upon -Athenian commerce. — Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon. — -Direct property-taxes. — Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa — -his success at the Persian court — he brings down the terms of peace -asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced by -Sparta in his name. — Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian and -Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His successes -against the Athenians. — Distress and discouragement of Athens — -anxiety of the anti<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv">[p. -xiv]</a></span>-Spartan allies for peace. — Tiribazus summons them -all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had been sent down by -the Great King. — Terms of the convention, called the peace of -Antalkidas. — Congress at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. All -parties accept. The Thebans at first accept under reserve for the -Bœotian cities. — Agesilaus refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and -requires unconditional acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of -Thebes, to get into a war with them single-handed. The Thebans are -obliged to accept unconditionally. — Agesilaus forces the Corinthians -to send away their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians -go into exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_75">326-388</a></p> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_69"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[p. 1]</a></span></p> - <p class="falseh1">HISTORY OF GREECE.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <p class="xl center">PART II.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXIX.<br /> - CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span> my last volume, -I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to the close of the -Peloponnesian war, including a description of the permanent loss of -imperial power, the severe temporary oppression, the enfranchisement -and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of defeated Athens. -The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished by the Spartan -confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian -prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left -Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her -victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose -of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils -of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost -and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed, -however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected -calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual -consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the -narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the -heart of the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. -This incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, -would form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather -than in Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the -future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important;<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">[p. 2]</a></span> while as an -illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against -that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of -instruction.</p> - -<p>This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, -conducted by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of -placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother -Artaxerxes Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the -year 401 <small>B.C.</small> It was about six months afterwards, in -the month of September or October of the same year, that the battle -of Kunaxa was fought, in which, though the Greeks were victorious, -Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to commence their -retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought them -across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November, -400 <small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p>The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and -Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 <small>B.C.</small>, -a short time after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at -Ægospotami. His reign of nineteen years, with that of his father -Artaxerxes Longimanus which lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost -all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 <small>B.C.</small> -The close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had -indeed been marked by those phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, -fratricide, and family tragedy, so common in the transmission of -an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer -of the palace, named Artabanus,—who had received from him at a -banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but had not -fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination -upon Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying -the latter; he then attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but -failed, and was himself killed, after carrying on the government -a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after reigning about forty -years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who was -slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus; who again was -put to death after seven months, by a third brother Darius Nothus -mentioned above.<a id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" -class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_3">[p. 3]</a></span></p> <p>The wars between the Persian -empire, and Athens as the head of the confederacy of Delos (477-449 -<small>B.C.</small>), have been already related in one of my -earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian empire -during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a -formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the -Fragments of Ktesias.<a id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" -class="fnanchor">[2]</a> About 414 <small>B.C.</small> the -Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his -independence,—though probably in a part only, and not the whole, -of that country,<a id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" -class="fnanchor">[3]</a>—and was succeeded by a native Egyptian -dynasty for the space of sixty years. A revolt of the Medes, which -took place in 408 <small>B.C.</small>, was put down by Darius, and -subsequently a like revolt of the Kadusians.<a id="FNanchor_4"></a><a -href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The peace concluded in -449 <small>B.C.</small>, between Athens and the Persian empire, -continued without open violation, until the ruinous catastrophe -which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413 <small>B.C.</small> -Yet there had been various communications and envoys from Sparta -to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the Great -King during the early years of the war; communications so confused -and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed to -the Spartans, in 425 <small>B.C.</small>, and carried by his -envoy Artaphernes who was captured by the Athenians), complained -of being unable to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans -telling the same story.<a id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" -class="fnanchor">[5]</a> It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of -Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after this period, -and that Tissaphernes was sent by the Great King to suppress this -revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander -of the satrap’s mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession -of the satrapy.<a id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" -class="fnanchor">[6]</a> We find <span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_4">[p. 4]</a></span>Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 -<small>B.C.</small>, commencing operations jointly with the -Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her -reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans successfully against -Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who occupied the strong -maritime town of Iasus.<a id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" -class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, -after Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the -Ionic coast in 407 <small>B.C.</small>, has been recounted in my -preceding volume; together with the complete prostration of Athenian -power, accomplished during the ensuing three years. Residing at -Sardis and placed in active coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious -and energetic young prince soon became penetrated with their -superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the -native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of Lysander, the -Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that, when -summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius -in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, he even confided to that officer -the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in -furtherance of the war;<a id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" -class="fnanchor">[8]</a> which during his absence was brought to a -victorious close.</p> - -<p>Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was -not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis -(in 407 <small>B.C.</small>) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and -Kappadokia, and as commander of that Persian military division which -mustered at the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic -Greeks on the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.<a -id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> -We cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives -of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother -and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under -the strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, -with the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of -them, and upon him with peculiar success.<a id="FNanchor_10"></a><a -href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> It is contradicted -by all the realities which we read about the Persian court, and -is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better -suited to the romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the -Anabasis. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">[p. 5]</a></span> mastery of the bow -and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance -in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without -being intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially -so when compared with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at -least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.<a id="FNanchor_11"></a><a -href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> And although the -peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen,—competence for -alternate command and obedience,—formed no part of the -character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas -became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that on first coming -down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him strong interest -for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to that -ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled -and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and the -Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last -preceding volume.<a id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" -class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt -from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow -in divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power -to himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary -that he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and -conciliate the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came -to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian -prince, with something of the regularity and system belonging to -a Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems -to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian -crown at the death of his father. So undetermined was the law of -succession in the Persian royal family, and so constant the dispute -and fratricide on each vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious -schemes would appear feasible to a young man of much less ardor -than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,<a -id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> -who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was -born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes -had been born prior to that event; and, as this latter consideration -had been employed seventy years earlier by<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_6">[p. 6]</a></span> queen Atossa<a id="FNanchor_14"></a><a -href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> in determining her -husband Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) -her son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an -elder son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so -Cyrus, perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself -from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther -inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of -the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely -he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about -the early part of 405 <small>B.C.</small> It was required as a part -of Persian etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the -king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, -which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but -such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins -of Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high -Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared -in his presence without thus concealing their hands;<a -id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> -upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and -mother preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who -was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, -not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.</p> - -<p>If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important -that he should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly -went up from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three -hundred Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly -remunerated for this distant march, that the rate of pay was -long celebrated.<a id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" -class="fnanchor">[16]</a> He also took with him Tissaphernes as an -ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity -between them. Not long after his arrival, Darius died; but without -complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare -in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">[p. 7]</a></span> favor of -Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed -king, went to Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to -perform the customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was -farther accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his -brother; who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of -putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis -saved his life.<a id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" -class="fnanchor">[17]</a> He was sent down to his former satrapy -at Sardis, whither he returned with insupportable feelings of -anger and wounded pride, and with a determined resolution to leave -nothing untried for the purpose of dethroning his brother. This -statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story -of Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we -look at the probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect -that the charge of Tissaphernes may well have been true, and the -conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus against his brother, a reality -instead of a fiction.<a id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" -class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to -his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded -by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many -Greeks, after having acquired military tastes and habits, were now -thrown out of employment; many others were driven into exile, by -the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the -cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service -like that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a -certain number of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the -various garrisons in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command -to strengthen their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian -soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was,—first, -defence against Tissaphernes, with whom, since the denunciation -by the latter, he was at open war,—next, protection of the -Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had been hitherto comprised under -the government of Tissaphernes, but had now revolted of their own -accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been declared. -Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution, -for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had -adopted violent measures of repression, killing or banishing several -of the leading men.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">[p. -8]</a></span> Cyrus, receiving these exiled Milesians with every -demonstration of sympathy, immediately got together both an army -and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,<a id="FNanchor_19"></a><a -href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> to besiege Miletus -by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted to court the -regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and attempted, -through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that they -should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence the -Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus -were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes; -an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it -displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus -occupied at a distance.<a id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" -class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means -to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and -unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable -military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at -Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge -amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and -extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for -having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had -formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike -appetite of Klearchus,<a id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" -class="fnanchor">[21]</a> procured for him the confidence of Cyrus, -who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600), -which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the -defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian -tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">[p. 9]</a></span> they were required -by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians of -the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained -their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family -ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection -with Cyrus,<a id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" -class="fnanchor">[22]</a>—received from him funds to maintain -a force of two thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in -Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other -Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality -with Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a -Bœotian; Agias and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, -etc.,—were also empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. -His pretended objects were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly -an ostensible expedition against the Pisidians,—warlike and -predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in -the south-east of Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys -to the Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the -strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations against -Athens,—and received a favorable answer. He farther got -together a considerable native force, taking great pains to -conciliate friends as well as to inspire confidence. “He was -straightforward and just, like a candidate for command,”—to -use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Dëiokês;<a -id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> -maintaining order and security throughout his satrapy, and punishing -evil doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity of rigor; -of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony, -in the persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet, -or eyesight.<a id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" -class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But he was also exact in rewarding faithful -service,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">[p. 10]</a></span> -both civil and military. He not only made various expeditions -against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in -exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding the zeal of all -soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached men to his person -both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts. As it was the -uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East), for every -one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand,<a -id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> -so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of distinction -to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of all in his -own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes sent down on -various pretences for the purpose of observing his motions. Of these -emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to obstruct and enfeeble -him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor -of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus; who twice -subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn assurance of fidelity -for the future.<a id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" -class="fnanchor">[26]</a> In all agreements, even with avowed -enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was trusted by -every one.</p> - -<p>Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient -or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">[p. 11]</a></span> -modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the -fruits at the beginning of 401 <small>B.C.</small> Xenias, his -general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a -bare sufficiency for defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and -the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus -was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a -body of seven thousand seven hundred Grecian hoplites, with five -hundred light armed.<a id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" -class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Others afterwards joined on the march, -and there was, besides, a native army of about one hundred -thousand men. With such means Cyrus set forth, (March or April, -401 <small>B.C.</small>), from Sardis. His real purpose was kept -secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood -by every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and -root out the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and -Persian fleet, under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the -same time coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to -lend coöperation from the sea-side.<a id="FNanchor_28"></a><a -href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> This Lacedæmonian -coöperation passed for a private levy effected by Cyrus himself; -for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the -Great King.<a id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" -class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<p>The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten -Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected -perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were -by no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for -the most part persons of established position, and not a few even -opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.</p> - -<p>Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent -dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from -their fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted -to leave their wives and children; and there were even some who -had embarked their own money in advance of outfit for other -poorer men, as well as for themselves.<a id="FNanchor_30"></a><a -href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> All calculated on a -year’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">[p. 12]</a></span> -campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but would -certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with -a well-furnished purse. So the Greek commanders at Sardis all -confidently assured them; extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence -suitable to recruiting officers, both the liberality of Cyrus<a -id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> -and the abundant promise of all men of enterprise.</p> - -<p>Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, -at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering -to present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a -better friend to him than his own country;<a id="FNanchor_32"></a><a -href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>” a striking evidence of -the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian -patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance -forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to -respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from -the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally,—was -one of the class of Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served -in that capacity at the battle of Delium.<a id="FNanchor_33"></a><a -href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Of his previous life -we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and -diligent hearer of Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we -chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the -Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made -ample use of the Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw -from his Anabasis (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) -the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are -fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">[p. 13]</a></span></p> - -<p>On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much -inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which -three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the -Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) -it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not -peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, -apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, -might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an -application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in -truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead -of asking, “whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put -the question, “To which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to -obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?” -The reply of the oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god -to whom sacrifice was proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; -upon which Sokrates, though displeased that the question had not -been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless advised, since -an answer had now been given, that it should be literally obeyed. -Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took -his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found -the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who -entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him -as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.<a -id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> -He was thus induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of -Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as -officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service -under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of -rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards -banished, this sentence was not passed against him until after the -battle of Korôneia in 394 <small>B.C.</small>, where he was in arms -as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen -and their Theban allies,—nor need we look farther back for the -grounds of the sentence.</p> - -<p>Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his -brother’s ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch -him, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, -and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">[p. 14]</a></span> -had masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation -was conveyed to Susa until the march was about to commence. It -was only then that Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus -relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined -that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian -freebooters, and went up in person to warn the king; who began his -preparations forthwith.<a id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" -class="fnanchor">[35]</a> That which Tissaphernes had divined was -yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the -rest,—when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management -of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the -Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly direction -from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.<a id="FNanchor_36"></a><a -href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Three days’ march, a -distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,<a id="FNanchor_37"></a><a -href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> brought him to<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">[p. 15]</a></span> the Mæander; one -additional march of eight parasangs, after crossing that river, -forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing city<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_16">[p. 16]</a></span> in Phrygia, where Menon overtook -him with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, and five hundred -peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes, and Olynthians. He then marched -three days onward to Kelænæ, another Phrygian city, “great and -flourishing,” with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. -Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the -arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one thousand hoplites, -eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred Kretan bowmen; at -the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand farther hoplites, -and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks was reviewed -by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">[p. 17]</a></span> Cyrus -in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand hoplites and two -thousand peltasts.<a id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" -class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> - -<p>As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards -Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated. -So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up. -But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in -a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs, -to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, -to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. -At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias -celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with -its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From -Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of -thirty parasangs,<a id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" -class="fnanchor">[39]</a> to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the -plain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">[p. 18]</a></span> -of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was -disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no -pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were -mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked -around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was -Cyrus by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of -tribute for the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was -utterly without money, and was obliged to put them off again with -promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been -rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the -Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, -and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at -once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received -little beyond their maintenance.</p> - -<p>Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the -army to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called -five parasangs<a id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" -class="fnanchor">[40]</a>. It was here that Cyrus, halting three -days, passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess -Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops -were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry -in their separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, -and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered -with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along -the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were -marshalled four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple -tunics, greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just -taken out of the wrappers in which they were<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_19">[p. 19]</a></span> carried during a mere march.<a -id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> -Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other -generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review -along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess -at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to -the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly, -the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets -sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with -the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and -they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic -encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all -the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa -herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had -among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never -before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; -much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of -his coming success.<a id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" -class="fnanchor">[42]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">[p. 20]</a></span></p> - -<p>Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) -brought the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of -Phrygia; where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five -days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being -out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks -to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, -its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they -were of the like predatory character:<a id="FNanchor_43"></a><a -href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> so that Cyrus would -be partially realizing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He -thus, too, approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him -from Kilikia; and he here sent the Kilikian princess, together with -Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and -more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult -for the whole army; in order that they might thus get straight -into Kilikia,<a id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" -class="fnanchor">[44]</a> in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying -the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his -main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through -Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana or -Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where he halted three days, -and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of -conspiring against him.<a id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" -class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<p>This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or -Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for -vehicles, it was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level -of the sea, narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and -crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever -so moderately defended.<a id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" -class="fnanchor">[46]</a> But the Kilikian prince,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">[p. 21]</a></span> alarmed at the -news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less -frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing -along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell -back to Tarsus; from whence he again retired, accompanied by most -of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. -Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus -abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining -Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, -having dispersed on their march for pillage, had been cut off by the -natives; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, -plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, -though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, -but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to -return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, -to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money -towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in -return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther -plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever -they were found.<a id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" -class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p> - -<p>It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, -that the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title -of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a -mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus, -and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were -manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be -successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the -same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in -case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.<a id="FNanchor_48"></a><a -href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">[p. 22]</a></span></p> <p>At -first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined -to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. -The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of -the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not -one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the -contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw -that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to -be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at -such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any -fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three -months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, -which had so powerfully affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,<a -name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" -class="fnanchor">[49]</a> a century before; most of them being (as -I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their -respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination -to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against -the Great King.<a id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" -class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> - -<p>Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, -Xenias, etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any -generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized -more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the -soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was -doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it -might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated -as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof -of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military -discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, -resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for -the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and -hardship,—yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments -were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to -conciliate his soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were -remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders -required them,—but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">[p. -23]</a></span> preferred service under other commanders, when they -could obtain it.<a id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" -class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Finding his orders to march forward -disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce -and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the -cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move -forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his -attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a -regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.</p> - -<p>On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and -imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping; a -remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive -to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At -length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me -deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was -he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics, -which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, -and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against -Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along -with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for -his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along -with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of -breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot -say; but I shall stand by you, and share your fate. No one shall say -of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I -betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, -friends, allies; while you are with me, I can help a friend, and -repel an enemy. Understand me well; I shall go wherever you go, and -partake your fortune.”<a id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" -class="fnanchor">[52]</a></p> - -<p>This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he -would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers -with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions -sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had -yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among -the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_24">[p. 24]</a></span> thousand of them left their -commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the -encampment of Klearchus.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered, -sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing -well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He, -however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage -Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at -last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be -sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. -He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those -who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we -must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer -his soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks -we have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go -near him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has -a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This -is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether -to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as -to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to -suggest.”</p> - -<p>Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops -found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from -his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the -assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but -their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately -instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either -of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the -commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be -impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to -conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other -generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask -Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our -return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must -put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending -forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus -here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for -him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other -commander<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">[p. 25]</a></span> -who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who -demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for a -guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating -his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting -away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other -hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. -The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting -of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really -wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should -be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their -resolution accordingly.</p> - -<p>To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain -that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the -question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack -his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’ -march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he -deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again -consult what step was fit to be taken.</p> - -<p>The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, -but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They -required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about -the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted -increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead -of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a -daric and a half.<a id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" -class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> - -<p>This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the -Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal -made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more -or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and -attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding -afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the -fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves -to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look -at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best -to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they -stood, against the wish of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">[p. -26]</a></span> Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and -danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the -best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous -course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.</p> - -<p>As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example -of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from -Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days’ -march,—crossing the rivers Sarus<a id="FNanchor_54"></a><a -href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> and Pyramus. At Issus, -a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, -Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five -Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a -reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the -Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the -Spartan Ephors.<a id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" -class="fnanchor">[55]</a> He also received a farther reinforcement -of four hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in -his army fourteen thousand, from which<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_27">[p. 27]</a></span> are to be deducted the one hundred -soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.</p> - -<p>The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of -some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas -(the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three -hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom -they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of -their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen -marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning -amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement, -that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior; -abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The -Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. -3. The passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been -alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, -and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis -with the invader.<a id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" -class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> - -<p>Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria -stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing -up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport -a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at -one day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of -near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs -terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side -of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls -and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from -the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass -against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled -an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.<a -id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> -And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought -of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had -looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, -beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas, -on the king’s side, all the numerous means and opportunities of -defence are successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">[p. -28]</a></span> abandoned; the Persians have no confidence, except in -vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in treachery.</p> - -<p>Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached -the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great -commerce, with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested -here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; -privately engaging a merchant vessel to carry them away with their -property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them -in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers -who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played -off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted -may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, -after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account -for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could -not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army -sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus -would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring -back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining -generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and -Pasion were gone, added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake -their merchantmen if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will -do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man -while he is with me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use -him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children -under guard as hostages, at Tralles;<a id="FNanchor_58"></a><a -href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> but even these shall -be given up to them, in consideration of their good behavior down -to the present day. Let them go if they choose, with the full -knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them.” -This behavior, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally -admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits -of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to -outweigh the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">[p. 29]</a></span> -prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they -were entering.<a id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" -class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> - -<p>At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back -his fleet,<a id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" -class="fnanchor">[60]</a> and striking with his land-force eastward -into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross -mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, -which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might -easily have defended it, if he had chosen.<a id="FNanchor_61"></a><a -href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Four days’ march -brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), -full of fish held sacred by the neighboring inhabitants; five -more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace -and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to -Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town, -a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of -the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40′ N.<a -id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> -The river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">[p. 30]</a></span> -when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than -half an English mile, in breadth.</p> - -<p>Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled -formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the -march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent -for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly -the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his -brother,—which to themselves, probably, had been for some time -well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement -excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, -of having betrayed them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst -was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before -manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made -up their minds to, the real truth; so that their complaint was soon -converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they -should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his -Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly -promised them five minæ per head (about £19 5<i>s.</i>), equal to more -than a year’s pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a -half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of -pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such -ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at -least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which -they were about to tread.</p> - -<p>But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced -their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was -already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to -decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, -before the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) -you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding -reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">[p. 31]</a></span> that they do so -because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others -should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will -never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you -could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate -gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to -act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish -and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, -completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually -crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his -warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the -obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents -to Menon separately.<a id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" -class="fnanchor">[63]</a> He passed with his whole army immediately -afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.</p> - -<p>What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not -defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? -We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had -thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the -belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And -Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to -have been never before fordable,—always passed by means of -boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water -as a providential interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; -“the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre.” When -we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of -Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in -Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, -and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed -the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without -taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable -without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was -not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any -other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river -crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were -regular ferry-boats.<a id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" -class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_32">[p. 32]</a></span></p> <p>After crossing the Euphrates, -Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’ march,<a id="FNanchor_65"></a><a -href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> southward along its -left bank, until he came to its affluent, the river Araxes or -Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and -well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a -large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through -Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of -the Euphrates still further southward. It was now that he entered -on what may be called the Desert,—an endless breadth or -succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any cultivation or -even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.<a -id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> -Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, -antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and -occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing -them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich -altogether unapproachable. Five days’ march brought them to Korsôtê, -a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants,—probably, -however, leaving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">[p. -33]</a></span> the provision dealers behind, as had before happened -at Tarsus, in Kilikia;<a id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" -class="fnanchor">[67]</a> since the army here increased their -supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was -required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which -awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed -parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates, -without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few -places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for -some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished -of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full -of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every -man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures; efforts in -which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took -zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.<a -id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> -After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ; near -the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where -they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.<a -id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> -There<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">[p. 34]</a></span> -was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a -flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">[p. 35]</a></span> crossed over (by -means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies, -especially of date-wine and millet.<a id="FNanchor_70"></a><a -href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p> - -<p>It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred -among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have -already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the -Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division, -subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the -soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of -Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of -Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. -The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to -such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of -the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through -the encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to -be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and -began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from -this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to -take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at -the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile -attitude against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, -with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of -defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable -disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment -with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array -between the two disputing parties,<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_36">[p. 36]</a></span> and entreated Klearchus to desist -from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that -his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so -lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, -until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came -galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins -in hand. “Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you -know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to -blows, it will be the hour of my destruction,—and of your own -also, shortly after me. For if <i>your</i> force be ruined, all these -natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even -than the men now serving with the King.” On hearing this (says -Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed -without any encounter.<a id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" -class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p> - -<p>After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The -hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto -been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.<a -id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> -Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, -of a hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country -and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the -treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined -in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his -intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of -three<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">[p. 37]</a></span> -thousand hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately -put to death.<a id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" -class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> - -<p>After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve -parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by -the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was -close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the -middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well -as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. -His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there -were, of Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand -five hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, -one hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers -of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from -sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters -described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand -men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses, -and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas, -Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, -that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts -represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.</p> - -<p>In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as -well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult -about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause. -Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language -addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on -other occasions.</p> - -<p>“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have -brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than -any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom -which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would -choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand -times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you -will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but -if you despise these, I am<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">[p. -38]</a></span> ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find -in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men, and trust me -for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at -home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my -service to your own homes.”</p> - -<p>“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named -Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but -will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when -danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire -reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to -that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in -satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious, -will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having -enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to -receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present -a wreath of gold.”</p> - -<p>Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek -soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them -with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of -force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do -you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, -by Zeus, (was the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and -Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a -battle.” All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to -expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body.<a -id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> -We shall see presently how this advice was followed.</p> - -<p>The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions -employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers -of Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and -authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus -in the Persæ, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed -to Xerxes in Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences -respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the -superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus -attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also -their fidelity and sense of obligation which he contrasts with the -time-serving treachery of the latter;<a id="FNanchor_75"></a><a -href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> connecting<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">[p. 39]</a></span> these superior -qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear -this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for -Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above -all the splendor of his own position,—was doubtless the most -flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening -citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable -of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental -elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The -natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between -Xerxes and Demaratus<a id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" -class="fnanchor">[76]</a> in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception -of free citizenship,—and of orderly, self-sufficing -courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as well as -equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He -understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and -stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant -Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to -enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks -around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed -themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his -own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that -in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else -but for themselves.<a id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" -class="fnanchor">[77]</a> Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment -of Hellenic honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost -their political freedom by the hands<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_40">[p. 40]</a></span> of the Macedonians, and exchanged for -that intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which -Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these -once high-toned communities.</p> - -<p>Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus -marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating -the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen, -however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were -evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been -concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic -prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or -ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day -preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time; -upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, -I will give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at -all, if he does not fight within ten days.”<a id="FNanchor_78"></a><a -href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> - -<p>In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply -to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle -would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course -of this last day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench -(thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near -to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only twenty feet for -passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across -the plain, for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about -forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty -stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called -the walls of Media.<a id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" -class="fnanchor">[79]</a> It had been dug as a special measure<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">[p. 41]</a></span> of defence -against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and -the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man -was on the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and -baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of -twenty feet. This is the first notice of any defensive measures taken -to repel the invasion,—except the precaution of Abrokomas in -burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse -all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible -positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes, -after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much -labor,—provided a valuable means of resistance, especially -against Grecian heavy-armed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">[p. -42]</a></span> soldiers,—and occupied it seemingly until the -very last moment,—throws it up from some unaccountable panic, -and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow -gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus -as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never think -of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful -array which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch -that he himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, -while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons -or beasts of burden.<a id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" -class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> - -<p>On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they -were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,<a id="FNanchor_81"></a><a -href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> just when they were -about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">[p. 43]</a></span> intimation that -the king’s army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. -Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and -to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on their side halted and -formed their line with all possible speed.<a id="FNanchor_82"></a><a -href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> They were on the right -wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphrates; Ariæus with the -Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a -body-guard of six hundred well-armed Persian horsemen, in the centre. -Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites, -with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme -right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next; -Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus -had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins -in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both -over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the -rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the -helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the -Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for -the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First, -was seen dust, like a white cloud,—next, an undefined dark -spot, gradually nearing, until the armor began to shine, and the -component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became -discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the Greeks, -at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his -right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_44">[p. 44]</a></span> gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so -as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind -them; next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering -the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with -scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against -the Grecian phalanx.<a id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" -class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p> - -<p>As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the -front, and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks -upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in -person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory -was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, -that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly -Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest -he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his -position on the right,—and merely replied to Cyrus, that he -would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked<a -id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> -how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on -the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with -military expediency; and it will be seen presently that Klearchus, -blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to -commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary -to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.<a id="FNanchor_85"></a><a -href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> The latter continued -for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking -alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of the small total -of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus, rode -forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to -give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the sacrifices -were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he -inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the -watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, -with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon -replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver, and Victory.”—“I -accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;” and immediately -rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">[p. 45]</a></span></p> - -<p>The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without -noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when -the Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to -move forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, -the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.<a -id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> -This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other -than Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the -charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly -within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the -scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with -the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all -directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming -against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass. -The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow, -and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only -being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way -of one of the chariots.<a id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" -class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the -body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian -left, close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal -flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who -stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These -peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks -to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without -losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of -the Greeks, who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying -Persians before them.<a id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" -class="fnanchor">[88]</a></p> - -<p>Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field. -Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his -superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left -of the Cyreians.<a id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" -class="fnanchor">[89]</a> Finding no one directly opposed to him, -he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; -not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other -hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was -overjoyed; and received from every one around him salutations, as -if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">[p. 46]</a></span> enough not -yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,<a -id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> -but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around -him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the -latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the -Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge -upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the -body-guard of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous -was the attack of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke -and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own -hand. His own six hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the -fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select -few, called his “Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these -circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person -had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight -filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,<a -id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> -that he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, -“I see the man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful -of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host -behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin -with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him -through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the -Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since -Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged -in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful -of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being -severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, -was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful -companions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">[p. 47]</a></span> -around him all perished in his defence. Artasyras, who stood first -among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally -wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his -arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by -order of the king.<a id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" -class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> - -<p>The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were -immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited -conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the -entire contest was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, -who, together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the -field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend -themselves, when the king and his forces pursued them; but fled -yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The -troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp and began to plunder it -without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. -It included two Grecian women,—of free condition, good family, -and education,—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus, -brought to him, by force, from their parents to Sardis. The elder -of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">[p. 48]</a></span> for beauty and -accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner and transferred to the -harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger person, found means to save -herself, though without her upper garments,<a id="FNanchor_93"></a><a -href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> and sought shelter -among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the -Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with -considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as -the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic -camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those -reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that -his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, -of a supply.<a id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" -class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> - -<p>While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he -was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had -charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At -this time, there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or -three and a half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian -division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of -the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s -troops had been victorious on the left and centre, and were -masters of the camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of -Cyrus,—Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s -forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded -by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon -the river. In this position, Artaxerxes<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_49">[p. 49]</a></span> again marshalled his troops in -front, as if to attack him, but the Greeks, anticipating his -movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced -the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. -Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes -of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was -found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled -to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had -no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.<a -id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> -It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês -(descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of -Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain; -news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into -sorrow and dismay.<a id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" -class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> - -<p>Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the -ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His -character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in -the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years -of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed -qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in -any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any -other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. -We observe a large and long-sighted combination,—a power -of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for -overcoming them,—a dexterity in meeting variable exigencies, -and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers -or soldiers,—a conviction of the necessity, not merely of -purchasing men’s service by lavish presents, but of acquiring -their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good -faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy -commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first -conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which -he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the -merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt -when we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description -of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.<a id="FNanchor_97"></a><a -href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> That many<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">[p. 50]</a></span> persons deserted -from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus -to Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely -throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at -Kunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. -The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take -care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of -Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault -of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; -and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant -on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears -that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress -that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman, -against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous -fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put -to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence, an -act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this -same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, -and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in -regal families,<a id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" -class="fnanchor">[98]</a> blinded him, for the moment, to all -rational calculation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">[p. 51]</a></span></p> - -<p>We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to -regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother -and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his -hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to -forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and -to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. -He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian -independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would -have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers -and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as -recorded by Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" -class="fnanchor">[99]</a>) have thought him a better friend to -them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to -take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each -Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he -strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none -of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius -Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of -them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to -employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference -to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, -competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his -hands,—and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, -in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of -Kallias.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_70"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">[p. 52]</a></span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXX.<br /> - RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> -first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged, -as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow; -accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which -he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too -repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of -fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either -to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still -maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions -of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklês and Glus -to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side -were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about -to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariæus would join -them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for -Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular -friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal -as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the -baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from -the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away -on the field, and the baggage carts.<a id="FNanchor_100"></a><a -href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> - -<p>Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds -appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek -from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was -in the service of the Persian king.<a id="FNanchor_101"></a><a -href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> Phalinus, an -officer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">[p. 53]</a></span> -of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, -addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the -part of the king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to -surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, -painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it -was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. -Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going -on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the -summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. “If the king thinks -himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him -come and try to seize them.” “The king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks -that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, -hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable -subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor are all that remain to us -(replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand -over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still -to have a fight for your treasure.”<a id="FNanchor_102"></a><a -href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> But though several -spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed -to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to -Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, -if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst -of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus -to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the -advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of -Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment, -that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. “If -(replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your -favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you -to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance -of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to -look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.” -Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, -Klearchus rejoined,—“That is <i>your</i> opinion; now report our -answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we -are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are -to be his enemies,—with our arms, than without them.<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">[p. 54]</a></span>” Phalinus, in -retiring, said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they -remained in their present position,—but war, if they moved, -either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without -declaring which he intended to do.<a id="FNanchor_103"></a><a -href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> - -<p>Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to -Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees -would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and -that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if -the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the -night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the -lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning -sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the -king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason, -from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of the -Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was -favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a -night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had -passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian -generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly -acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and -experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The -night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus -at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming -symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king, -at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly -horse, partly foot.</p> - -<p>The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange -solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. -According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a -wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood -allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek -generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions, -a spear.<a id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" -class="fnanchor">[104]</a> The latter, besides the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">[p. 55]</a></span> promise of -alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith, down to -the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he -proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had -come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road -along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the -utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that -he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be -sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, -however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’ -marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get -out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to -overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.</p> - -<p>They had now come ninety-three days’ march<a -id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" -class="fnanchor">[105]</a> from Ephesus, or ninety from -Sardis.<a id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" -class="fnanchor">[106]</a> The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, -according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five -geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English -miles. There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed -at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have -at least been one hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more -than half a year;<a id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" -class="fnanchor">[107]</a> but it was probably greater, since some -intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.</p> - -<p>How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently -insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field, -indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more -the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no -serious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">[p. 56]</a></span> -apprehensions.<a id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" -class="fnanchor">[108]</a> In spite of this great extent, -population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through -the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad -Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending -the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the -protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between -them and their homes were of a very different character. How were -they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of -a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even -in a pitched battle would be most formidable in opposing their -retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with -supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even under such advantages, -supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the -march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think -and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or -distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any -one to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a -territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means -of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of -any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his -heart, seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the -consent of the king.<a id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" -class="fnanchor">[109]</a> The reader who casts his eye on a map -of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the -left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° -30′—will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the -part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had -not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, -to enable him to shape his course.</p> - -<p>In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to -consult Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with -good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and -promised to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, -yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began -their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night -they should reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as -in fact they did;<a id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" -class="fnanchor">[110]</a> yet not before they had been alarmed -in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">[p. 57]</a></span> -afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and -by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to -slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence -they did not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had -been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that -only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, -while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they -could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, -dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be -obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_58">[p. 58]</a></span> ordered them under arms; and desiring -to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to -proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the -ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a -talent of silver.<a id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" -class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p> - -<p>What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot -ascertain;<a id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" -class="fnanchor">[112]</a> since it was not farther pursued. For the -effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the -enemy,—and even the clamor and shouting of the camp during -the night—so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they -sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast -between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day -to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, -and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was -by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of -the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the -outposts until he was at leisure; then, having put his troops into -the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the -eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds -to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and -best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed -him that they had come from the king with instructions to propose a -truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, -Klearchus replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the -king, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing -to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, -without first providing dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds -rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the -king, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word -that the king thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to -conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the -truce should be concluded.</p> - -<p>After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon -the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that -the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">[p. 59]</a></span> guides -would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could -be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during -the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides -led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut -for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they -could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put together -bridges for the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, -or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which -Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried -his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right; employing the -latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even -plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever -it was necessary.<a id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" -class="fnanchor">[113]</a> As it was not the usual season of -irrigation for crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on -this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them -with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious -to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more -than Grecian energy could easily surmount.</p> - -<p>At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides -for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a -sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, -which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large -quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of -such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen -or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece, -was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both -also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon -is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare -and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches -which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon -himself and others.<a id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" -class="fnanchor">[114]</a></p> - -<p>After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they -were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees -and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation -with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an -interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">[p. 60]</a></span> to Greece -impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks, -and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate -situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them, -as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to -forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only -Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King -had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime -to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack -him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory -answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty -in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, -after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, -that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, -without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought -them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been -ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always -treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had -no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious -to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from -all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or -assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on -the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King’s -permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without great -opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was -unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed -him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and -exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into -Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you -to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to -pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do -not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to -take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to -enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon -it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their -side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on -the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">[p. 61]</a></span> go back to -the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks -home; going himself to his own satrapy.<a id="FNanchor_115"></a><a -href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> - -<p>The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly -and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing -that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in -his contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed -to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, -filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when -she was informed of his death,—that she caused to be slain -with horrible tortures all those, who though acting in the Persian -army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation -in the death of Cyrus—and that she showed favorable -dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.<a id="FNanchor_116"></a><a -href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> It seems probable, -farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them -an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made -by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention. -And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in -facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered -retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in -their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian -empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only -teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible; especially -against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus -observed respecting Lower Egypt.<a id="FNanchor_117"></a><a -href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> And Klearchus might -say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards -preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what -Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted -away from Syracuse<a id="FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118" -class="fnanchor">[118]</a>—that wherever they sat down, -they were sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at -once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and -would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off -the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious -tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">[p. 62]</a></span> the advisers of -Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the -Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. -This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was -the more necessary to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because -there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge -could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably -farther into the interior of Babylonia.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time -when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. -For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him -any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped -near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few -days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as -Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian -kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for -his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were -painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his -Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the -Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king -had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, -until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more -effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus -replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike -our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of -war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides; -Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops -as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for -us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can -never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any -cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of -our enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes -to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all -these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in -the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”<a id="FNanchor_119"></a><a -href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">[p. 63]</a></span></p> <p>Such -words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own -complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural -despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and -also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. -This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in -Tissaphernes.</p> - -<p>That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with -his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter -whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another -grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, -providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and -his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, -and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the -Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the -rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and -mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting -wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three -days’ march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the -moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the -Wall of Media, and passed through it,<a id="FNanchor_120"></a><a -href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> prosecuting their -march onward through the country on its other or interior side. It -was of bricks cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and -twenty feet broad; it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs -(or about seventy miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), -and to be not far distant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">[p. -64]</a></span> from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as -eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days -they crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent -bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. -Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four -stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a -parasang distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, -and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by -means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of -the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, -perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from -the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal -at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the -Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the -Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick -grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the -Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.</p> - -<p>As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp -after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at -the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions -from Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there -were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of -attacking them during the night,—and also to send and occupy -the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it -down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility -of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this -information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young -Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant -contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to -attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the -bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from -crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat -if they were beaten,—while, if the Greeks were beaten, there -was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. -This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the -extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger -replied, that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large -cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek -officers came to the con<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">[p. -65]</a></span>clusion that the message was a stratagem on the part -of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across -the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan -of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position -in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one -side by the Tigris,—on the other sides, by intersecting canals -between the Euphrates and the Tigris.<a id="FNanchor_121"></a><a -href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> Such an island -was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">[p. 66]</a></span> a -defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous -cultivators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all -the king’s enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that the message<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">[p. 67]</a></span> now delivered -would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual -position and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. -At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put -upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since, -in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged -to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting -for them to hold,—and since he knew that his own purposes -were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">[p. 68]</a></span> as soldiers, were -animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not -without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; -and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this -fertile island. They did not, however, neglect the precaution of -sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which -no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a -body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the -eastern bank of the Tigris,—not only without attack, but even -without sight of a single Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and -a few others watching their motions.</p> - -<p>After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons, -the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern -side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to be -twenty parasangs.<a id="FNanchor_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122" -class="fnanchor">[122]</a> The Physkus was one hundred feet wide, -with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the -frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to -Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching. -An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a -numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as -a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see -the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of -two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent -array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long -a time in passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared -greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon -the Persian spectators was very imposing.<a id="FNanchor_123"></a><a -href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> Here Assyria ended -and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for -six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came -to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain -of queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an -exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">[p. 69]</a></span> situated on the -Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have -crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order -of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter -only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but -on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages, -which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet -without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an -insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,<a id="FNanchor_124"></a><a -href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> through Parysatis, -thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five -more days’ march, called twenty parasangs, brought them to the -banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows -into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first -of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris -a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of -provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported -by inflated skins.<a id="FNanchor_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125" -class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p> - -<p>On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days -of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of -mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they -had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides -of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining -their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many -various manifestations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">[p. -70]</a></span> occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities -seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate -this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, -represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted -on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed -upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been -interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable -motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his -friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance -of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could -gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, -the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement -and for conquering the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus -had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his -protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had -been filling the mind of Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions -against the Greeks.<a id="FNanchor_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126" -class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p> - -<p>“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent -sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate -evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove -to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the -king or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be -easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are -wide plains in which you would be starved,—besides mountains -and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help. -Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having -nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall -not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should -draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my -peculiar affection for my neighbors, the Greeks,—and my -wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek -soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me eager to conduct you -to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, -though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara erect -<i>upon his head</i>, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon <i>my -heart</i>, in full pride and confidence.”<a id="FNanchor_127"></a><a -href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">[p. 71]</a></span></p> <p>So powerful -was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that -he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the severest -punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good -friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes -(replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with -the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I -will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined -Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at -the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against -you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus -to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential -manner.</p> - -<p>On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed -to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals -should go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order -to reëstablish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had -shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. -So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and -philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the -opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to -entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against -the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into -the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed. -Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and -Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went to visit -the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers going -along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the -Persian camp-market.<a id="FNanchor_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128" -class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> - -<p>On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly -three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five -generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained -at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent, -betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to -come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them -were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were -detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian -court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_72">[p. 72]</a></span> Sokrates were beheaded after a short -imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not -only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison, by the hands -of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all her influence with her son -Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted, -on this occasion, by the superior influence of queen Stateira, his -wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising -out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus, -became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira -to be poisoned.<a id="FNanchor_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129" -class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> - -<p>Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He -appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason -of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But -his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace -and torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, -who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had -always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always -to avert them.<a id="FNanchor_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130" -class="fnanchor">[130]</a> She had already brought to a miserable end -every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the -death of her son Cyrus.</p> - -<p>Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to -boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were -entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as -matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe -differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark -and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such -imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_73">[p. 73]</a></span> aside.<a id="FNanchor_131"></a><a -href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> Unfortunately for -the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be -offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his -colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink -of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army, -taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed -to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system -Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might -have been especially present to <i>his</i> mind, since he had served -with the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 <small>B.C.</small>, -and had, therefore, had fuller experience than other men in the -army, of the satrap’s real character.<a id="FNanchor_132"></a><a -href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> On a sudden he -now turns round, and on the faith of a few verbal declarations, -puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless posture and -the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for -confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is -justified by large experience,—that from the short-sightedness -of men and their obedience to present impulse, the most notorious -deceiver will always find new persons to trust him,—still -such misjudgment on the part of an officer of age and experience is -difficult to explain.<a id="FNanchor_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133" -class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Polyænus intimates that beautiful -women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to Klearchus -alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to -the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a -jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,<a id="FNanchor_134"></a><a -href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> it appears, having -always been intimate with Ariæus, had been<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_74">[p. 74]</a></span> thus brought into previous -communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had been well received, -and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the -whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his -(Menon’s) command, into the service of the satrap. Such at least -was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the extreme of -his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding -still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining -that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap -against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name -and dismiss him.<a id="FNanchor_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135" -class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Such jealousy seems to have robbed -Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another -impression deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army -was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, -since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might -have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could -not be hostile.<a id="FNanchor_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136" -class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p> - -<p>Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present -occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the -Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both -committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a -great misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of -Menon was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate -safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts -Menon, would probably have ended by really committing towards the -army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian -court in reference to the seizure of the generals.</p> - -<p>The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless -position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after -the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who -could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the -enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable -in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown -away,—the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole -line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates, -left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">[p. 75]</a></span> frontier of -Babylonia, with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the -Euphrates, abandoned without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall -of Media and the canals which offered such favorable positions for -keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, -neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded, whereby the -Persians engaged to escort the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, -beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst -canals affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to -take up a position among them. The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as -we can understand it, seems to have been, to draw the Greeks to some -considerable distance from the heart of the Persian empire, and then -to open his schemes of treasonable hostility, which the imprudence -of Klearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with -chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have -here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We -should have expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act -of perfidy, Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to -account; that he would have poured, with all his forces and all his -vigor, on the Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, -disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of which, when the -generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had -been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small -detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in -the plain. One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named -Nikarchus, ran wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers -were looking from afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without -knowing what they were about,—exclaiming that the Persians -were massacring all the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. -Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in defence, -expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no -more Persians came near than a body of about three hundred horse, -under Ariæus and Mithridates (the confidential companions of the -deceased Cyrus), accompanied by the brother of Tissaphernes. These -men, approaching the Greek lines as friends, called for the Greek -officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver from the -king. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, -came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to hear -news about Proxenus. Ariæus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">[p. -76]</a></span> then acquainted them that Klearchus, having been -detected in a breach of the convention to which he had sworn, had -been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his -treason, were in high honor at the Persian quarters. He concluded -by saying,—the king calls upon you to surrender your arms, -which now (he says) belong to him, since they formerly belonged to -his slave Cyrus.<a id="FNanchor_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137" -class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p> - -<p>The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of -these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the -Grecian soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to -surrender their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the -most deadly fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such -an expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor -and Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he -soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.</p> - -<p>While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was -a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending -and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it -would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten -thousand stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by -impassable mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, -without cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give -orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon -all. Few came to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook -their suppers; every man lay down to rest where he was; yet no -man could sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives -whom he was never again to behold.<a id="FNanchor_138"></a><a -href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p> - -<p>Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this -forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact, that -not a single man among them had now either authority to command, -or obligation to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious -candidate likely to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when -the post promised nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as -of hazard. A new, self-kindled, light—and self-originated -stimulus—was required, to vivify the embers of suspended -hope and action, in a mass paralyzed for the moment, but every way -capable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">[p. 77]</a></span> of -effort. And the inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one -in whom a full measure of soldierly strength and courage was combined -with the education of an Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.</p> - -<p>It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric -language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative -of the expedition) describes his dream, or the intervention -of Oneirus, sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse -took its rise.<a id="FNanchor_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139" -class="fnanchor">[139]</a> Lying mournful and restless, like his -comrades, he caught a short repose; when he dreamt that he heard -thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt fall upon his paternal -house, which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking, -full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which the dream -began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and -with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited -fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was -sent by Zeus<a id="FNanchor_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140" -class="fnanchor">[140]</a> the King, since it was from him that -thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was -auspicious,—that a great light had appeared to him from -Zeus, in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand, -it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely -encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed -to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the -Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties -which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was -still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a -stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the -initiative movement.<a id="FNanchor_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141" -class="fnanchor">[141]</a> “Why am I lying here? Night is -advancing;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">[p. 78]</a></span> -at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death -with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence. -Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a -different city, to begin?”</p> - -<p>With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given -with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or -captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed -upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the -army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I -presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon -us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his -worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury -has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce -under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the -rich possessions of the king, without touching anything except what -we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands -free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for -the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly -be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong -temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more -enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier -to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of -the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.</p> - -<p>“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not -wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the -lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show -yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of -being generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">[p. 79]</a></span> and I desire -only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I -shall obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting -myself of complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself -from ruin.”<a id="FNanchor_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142" -class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> - -<p>All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in his -suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it. -One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian -dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their -desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the -only chance of safety. “How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten -the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in -Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our -arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which -has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their -hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations -to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My -friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city, -but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier -him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage.”—“Nay (observed -Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I -myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was -degraded accordingly.<a id="FNanchor_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143" -class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p> - -<p>Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to -bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were -presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">[p. 80]</a></span> senior captain -of the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger -body the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. -Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, -perilous, yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be -taken,—and especially on the necessity that they, the chief -officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently, -first fix upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the -names to be confirmed by the army, accompanied with suitable -exhortations and encouragement. His speech was applauded and -welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian general Cheirisophus, who -had joined Cyrus with a body of seven hundred hoplites at Issus in -Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and -agree upon other commanders instead of the four who had been seized; -after which the herald must be summoned, and the entire body of -soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly Timasion of Dardanus -was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in place of Sokrates; -Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon -instead of Proxenus.<a id="FNanchor_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144" -class="fnanchor">[144]</a> The captains, who had served under each of -the departed generals, separately chose a successor to the captain -thus promoted. It is to be recollected that the five now chosen were -not the only generals in the camp; thus for example, Cheirisophus had -the command of his own separate division, and there may have been one -or two others similarly placed. But it was now necessary for all the -generals to form a Board and act in concert.</p> - -<p>At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed -proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general -assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted -and confirmed. As soon as this had been done, probably on the -proposition of Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that -general addressed a few words of exhortation and encouragement to -the soldiers. He was followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the -like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes -and Ariæus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important -and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case -at length,—working up the feelings of the soldiers to that -pitch of resolution which the emergency required,—and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">[p. 81]</a></span> above all, -extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous -proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be -likely to suggest.</p> - -<p>Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at -this his first official appearance before the army, when the scales -seemed to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of -Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that -any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars, -would be utter ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were -taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish -their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favor of the gods and -of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of -the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole -army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation -to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, -continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver -has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation, -let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at -the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can, -in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who -agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their hands; all then -joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.</p> - -<p>This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical -skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out -of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to -listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the -gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he -recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and -Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully -repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy -of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder, -knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for -Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion -was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen; -but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in -the fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing -against infantry firm on the ground,—and only better able -to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with -provisions to buy, they on their side were<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_82">[p. 82]</a></span> released from their covenant, and -would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those -were indeed difficult to be crossed in the middle of their course; -but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass -them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce -the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the -king’s own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and -Pisidians. “If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease -in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median -and Persian women for our companions,<a id="FNanchor_145"></a><a -href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a>—we shall be -only too ready, like the Lotophagi, to forget our way home. We ought -first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they -remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements -in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage -to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry -with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all -things,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">[p. 83]</a></span> -let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders, -upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise -to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient -individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten -thousand persons like Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have -so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, -however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward -and state it; for we have all but one object,—the common -safety.”</p> - -<p>It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that -the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for -when Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should -sanction his recommendations, and finally elect the new generals -proposed,—every man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that -the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored -villages, rather more than two miles distant; that the march -should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that -Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian, should lead the van; while Kleanor, -and the other senior officers, would command on each flank,—and -himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would -lead the rear-guard.</p> - -<p>This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up, -proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, -every man’s superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning -meal previous to the march.</p> - -<p>The scene just described is interesting and illustrative -in more than one point of view.<a id="FNanchor_146"></a><a -href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> It exhibits that -susceptibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed -so marked a feature in the Grecian character,—a resurrection -of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the -exhortation of one who had no established ascendency, nor anything -to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and -his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still -more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared -with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been -before in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">[p. 84]</a></span> -office as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, -whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor -had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the -second rank of officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he -was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army -consisted of Arcadians and Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, -and various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or -established starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference -to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, -with little military experience;—he was not an officer at -all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer, -companion of Proxenus;—he was, moreover, a native of Athens, -a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and -especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had -been carried on. Not only, therefore, he had no advantages compared -with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had -nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous -training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, -but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In -him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not -less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of -her own citizens,<a id="FNanchor_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147" -class="fnanchor">[147]</a>—spontaneous and forward impulse, -as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under -circumstances which made others despair,—persuasive<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">[p. 85]</a></span> discourse and -publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business, -so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the -active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more -remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in -Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, -secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and -Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood -nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.</p> - -<p>If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately -upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia -of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the -vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it -necessary under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded -the unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found -as the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably, -except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to -stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every -motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him. -But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus -forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would -enable him to work on the minds of others<a id="FNanchor_148"></a><a -href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a>—of that -flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and movements -of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and -touching the opportune chords, which Athenian democratical<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">[p. 86]</a></span> training imparted. -Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid -merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, -would not have combined with it that political and rhetorical -accomplishment which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious -as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of them is left -to him not only to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus -and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him -the duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch. -How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the -army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance -to that of Perikles addressed to the Athenian public in the -second year of the war, at the moment when the miseries of the -epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had driven them almost -to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated confidence, and an -undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable for the occasion, -but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would have employed at -any other moment.<a id="FNanchor_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149" -class="fnanchor">[149]</a> Throughout the whole of his speech, and -especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at hand which -interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that skill and -practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given situation, -which characterized more or less every educated Athenian. Other -Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in -concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think, -speak, and act, with equal efficiency.<a id="FNanchor_150"></a><a -href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> It was this -tripartite accomplishment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">[p. -87]</a></span> which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before -himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which the -sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them so -hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was -this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which, -in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and -comrades of Proxenus,<a id="FNanchor_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151" -class="fnanchor">[151]</a> elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent -person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time -when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.</p> - -<p>I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that -the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such -extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to his -army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the -Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself -has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the -attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive -antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the -perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government -proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and -deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of -Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it -is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute -so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own -reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.</p> - -<p>While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of -Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced their -march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus, -appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. -But it was soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and -that he came merely to seduce individual<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_88">[p. 88]</a></span> soldiers to desertion,—with a -few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to -admit no more heralds or envoys.</p> - -<p>Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army -now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the -other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, -and Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three -hundred hoplites.<a id="FNanchor_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152" -class="fnanchor">[152]</a> As no mention is made of a bridge, we -are to presume that they forded the river,—which furnishes a -ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place -between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. -When they had got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared -with a few hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a -friend; but as soon as he was near enough, suddenly began to harass -the rear with a shower of missiles. What surprises us most, is, -that the Persians, with their very numerous force, made no attempt -to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a river; for -Xenophon estimates the Zab at four hundred feet broad,—and -this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who inform -us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and -though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any -fordable place.<a id="FNanchor_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153" -class="fnanchor">[153]</a> It is to be recollected that the Persians, -habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the -river first, and were, therefore, in possession of the crossing, -whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity -of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist the Greeks even -in the most advantageous position, and ventured only upon sending -Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with considerable -effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number, were -at the same time inferior to those of the Persians; and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">[p. 89]</a></span> when Xenophon -employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts, to charge and repel -them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in -getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the -Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind -him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards -still more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present -day parallel with their carbines. This was the first experience which -the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry. -Even the small detachment of Mithridates greatly delayed their -progress; so that they accomplished little more than two miles, -reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded, and much -discouragement.<a id="FNanchor_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154" -class="fnanchor">[154]</a></p> - -<p>“Thank Heaven,” (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus -reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge -cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) “Thank Heaven, that our -enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their -great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing -us any serious harm.” Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders -organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a -small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers, -whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther -and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones. -On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there -lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine -undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings), -but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared -in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters. -Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised, -with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of -the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon as -he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith -the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the -Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was -the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding -their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their -flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners -made. The Greek soldiers of their own<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_90">[p. 90]</a></span> accord mutilated the dead bodies, in -order to strike terror into the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_155"></a><a -href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> At the end of -the day’s march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city -of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which -(twenty-five feet in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles -in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was -a stone pyramid, one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet -high; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the -neighboring villages. Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris -brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly -opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, -which seem to have formed the continuation or the substitute of the -once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet -the country around them was so well furnished with villages and -population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also -strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used -for the slingers.<a id="FNanchor_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156" -class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> - -<p>During the next day’s march, in a course generally parallel -with the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming -up along with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, -enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his -advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge, -but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, -so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the -Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the -superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and -effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night -in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order -to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march -for four successive days along a level country, until, on the -fifth day, they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still -higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting -annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the -Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">[p. 91]</a></span> men were wounded. -Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole army -to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square; and they -accordingly constituted six lochi or regiments of one hundred men -each, subdivided into companies of fifty, and enômoties or smaller -companies of twenty-five, each with a special officer (conformably -to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and -either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of -the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces -of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157" -class="fnanchor">[157]</a> On reaching the hills, in sight of an -elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the -Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after -having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the -second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigor -by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were -seen flogging on the men to the attack.<a id="FNanchor_158"></a><a -href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> This charge was so -efficacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss, -and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After -a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach -their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of -some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double -attack.</p> - -<p>The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth -to have been in the fertile country under the modern town -called Zakhu),<a id="FNanchor_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159" -class="fnanchor">[159]</a> were unusually rich in provisions; -magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for -the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order -to tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the -most competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the -fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But -experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue -in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes -appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village, -and when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon -advanced, the Persian assailants began<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_92">[p. 92]</a></span> to retire; for they were always -in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near -seven miles from the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of -nocturnal attack in their camp, when their horses were tied by the -leg and without either saddle or bridle.<a id="FNanchor_160"></a><a -href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> As soon as they had -departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance -during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on -the next day or the day after.</p> - -<p>On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced -march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but -in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging -immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the -plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent -was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore -halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring -forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed -the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not -think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw -Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so -that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by -the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground -in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, -that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible -mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a -flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to -Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops -in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a -detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the -choice either of going, or staying with the army. “Choose yourself,” -said Cheirisophus. “Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since -I am the younger of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">[p. -93]</a></span> two.” Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment -from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his -flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as -the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side, -hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were seen -mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts -to get before the other,—each being encouraged by shouts and -clamor from the two armies respectively.</p> - -<p>As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them -on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country -and their families all depended upon success in the effort before -them, a Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to -him,—“You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are -on horseback; I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield -to carry.” Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, -pushed Sotêridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as -well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the -rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to -an hoplite, and by the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no -shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance, under -such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. -But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of -Sotêridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they -compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks. -Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as -the ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in -consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic -efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. -As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, -and dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to -the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted -safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on -descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable -quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the -Tigris. They acquired moreover an additional booty of large droves -of cattle, intercepted when on the point<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_94">[p. 94]</a></span> of being transported across the -river; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on -the opposite bank.<a id="FNanchor_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161" -class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p> - -<p>Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part -of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in -their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed -whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the -Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on -their right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the -lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a -proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank -of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished -in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious -scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view -of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in -their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return -back one day’s march to those in which they had before halted. Here -the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as -to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south -was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media; -that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them -by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way -to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable -mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the -Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once -destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand -men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian -satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could -be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their -farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other -mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded -on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned -only in the cities and on the plains.<a id="FNanchor_162"></a><a -href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">[p. 95]</a></span></p> <p>Determining -to fight their way across these difficult mountains into Armenia, -but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that the -passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed -forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a -moment’s notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, -so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian -mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with -his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend -the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the -other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while -Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower -pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was -both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise, -abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge -on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions, -comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. -At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite -the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would -come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what -was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the -rear guard were coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first -set upon them; by surprise and with considerable success,—so -that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief might -have ensued.<a id="FNanchor_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163" -class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> - -<p>Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an -earnest of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the -Greek generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure -greater expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands -during the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all -the baggage except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the -prisoners; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which -the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were -executed. The women, however, of whom there<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_96">[p. 96]</a></span> were many with the army, could not be -abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage -was still retained;<a id="FNanchor_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164" -class="fnanchor">[164]</a> nor could the army make more than slow -advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack -of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers. -Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when -the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward -their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both -Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed -by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate -skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than -two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart -them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow -paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising -force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek -warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet -into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads; -among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named -Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.<a id="FNanchor_165"></a><a -href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> The rear division, -more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt -to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which -made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one -occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an -ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate) -two of their number were made prisoners.</p> - -<p>Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating -Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but -instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, -urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became -little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached -the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which Xenophon -proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely -hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the -other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, -and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of -march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended -himself by saying that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">[p. -97]</a></span> he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to -reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had -not succeeded.<a id="FNanchor_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166" -class="fnanchor">[166]</a></p> - -<p>To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides -declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought -him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed -that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly -interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted -in denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road -except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of -the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave -more comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different -road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts -of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy -might be turned; but that there was one particular high position -commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand -by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two -thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were -accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post -by a night-march; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention -of the Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about -to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine -which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately -began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed -down the roadway, in such manner as to render it unapproachable. -They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise -of the descending masses long after they had returned to their camp -for supper and rest.<a id="FNanchor_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167" -class="fnanchor">[167]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the -circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, -(though there was another above yet more commanding), held by the -Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by -their fires. At daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole -silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in -front of the main Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded -their trumpets, shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which -proved completely successful. The defenders, taken unprepared,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">[p. 98]</a></span> fled with little -resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge -of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on -hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the -signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along -the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each -other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus -joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for -farther advance.</p> - -<p>Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the -circuitous road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable -for the baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his -division,—the whole array covering a great length of ground, -since the road was very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed -Karduchians had rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, -commanding the road,—from whence it was necessary to drive -them. Xenophon’s troops stormed successively these three positions, -the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making -destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the -hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should -have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed -movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the -three leaders, with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump -down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the -road. Encouraged by such success, the assailants pressed nearer to -the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit -on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance, -he endeavored to open a negotiation with them in order to get -back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians -at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be -burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they -resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his -descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to -occupy it; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew -their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here -in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he -was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to -give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both -in the retreat.<a id="FNanchor_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168" -class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_99">[p. 99]</a></span></p> <p>After a march thus painful -and perilous, the rear division at length found themselves in -safety among their comrades in villages with well-stocked houses -and abundance of corn and wine. So eager, however, were Xenophon -and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, -that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, -and to march onward without any guide;—a heavy sacrifice -in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about -the burial.<a id="FNanchor_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169" -class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p> - -<p>For three more days did they struggle and fight their way -through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, -beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom -they had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom -their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still -highly useful. Their seven days’ march through this country, with -its free and warlike inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, -suffering and peril; far more intolerable than anything which they -had experienced from Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad -were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near -the banks of the river Kentritês, which divided these mountains -from the hillocks and plains of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable -quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over -past miseries.<a id="FNanchor_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170" -class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p> - -<p>Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the -Armenian side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was -unpeopled and destitute of villages.<a id="FNanchor_171"></a><a -href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> But the approach -of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, -the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to -oppose their passage; a precaution, which if Tissaphernes had<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">[p. 100]</a></span> taken at the -Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his -colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of -that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, -attempted the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the -other side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half -the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely -rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they -could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force -of the stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, -they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s troops. -After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they -were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their -great alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their -rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared -nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the -first, which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night -after the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of -augury more unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in -chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; -on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had -good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, -the victims were at once favorable. As the army were taking their -morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious -news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile -up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and -where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy’s -horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal -in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had -revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected -ford afterwards to these youths; two revelations which he ascribed -to the same gods.<a id="FNanchor_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172" -class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> - -<p>Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus -commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the -newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on -the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded -arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off -again,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">[p. 101]</a></span> -and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow -his example.<a id="FNanchor_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173" -class="fnanchor">[173]</a> Each lochus (company of one hundred men) -was then arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself -in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the -river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all -the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus -with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army, -entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large -portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the -original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This -distracted the attention of the enemy’s horse; who became afraid of -being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at -the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus. -As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his -division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry, -who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry, -deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The -handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus, -pursued and took some valuable spoils.<a id="FNanchor_174"></a><a -href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">[p. 102]</a></span></p> - -<p>As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on -the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over -which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded -to take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who -were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping -his rear division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, -quitted their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their -baggage in the crossing of the water.<a id="FNanchor_175"></a><a -href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> The peltasts and -bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general -now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared -on both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way -into the water, in the attitude of men just about to recross. When -Xenophon was left with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest -having got over,—the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began -to shoot and sling. But on a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged -with their accustomed pæan, upon which the Karduchians took to -flight,—having no arms for close combat on the plain. The -trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the faster; -while this was the signal, according to orders before given by -Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back, -and to cross the river as speedily as possible. By favor of this -able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the whole army, -with little or no loss, about mid-day.<a id="FNanchor_176"></a><a -href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p> - -<p>They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, -undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and -extremely cold at the season when they entered it,—December. -Though the strip of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no -supplies, one long march brought them to a village, containing -abundance of provisions, together with a residence of the satrap -Tiribazus; after which, in two farther marches, they reached the -river Teleboas, with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus -himself, appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his -interpreter to request a conference with the leaders; which being -held, it was agreed that the Greeks should proceed unmolested through -his territory, taking such supplies as they required,—but -should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly -advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs, -or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">[p. 103]</a></span> three -pretty full days’ march; without any hostility from the satrap, -though he was hovering within less than two miles of them. They then -found themselves amidst several villages, wherein were regal or -satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, -and all sorts of vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they -were overtaken by so heavy a fall of snow, that the generals, on the -next day, distributed the troops into separate quarters among the -villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any -rapid surprise. Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires -were discernible, together with traces of military movements around; -insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on -their guard, and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, -in the night, they were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still -heavier than the preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men -and their arms, and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm -under the snow and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself -set the example of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, -in cutting wood and kindling a fire.<a id="FNanchor_177"></a><a -href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> Others followed -his example, and great comfort was found in rubbing themselves -with pork-fat, oil of almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having -sent out a clever scout named Demokrates, who captured a native -prisoner, they learned that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept -them in a lofty mountain-pass lying farther on in their route; upon -which they immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march, -surprising in their way the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult -pass in safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the -Euphrates river,<a id="FNanchor_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178" -class="fnanchor">[178]</a>—that is, to the eastern branch, now -called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it, without having the -water higher than the navel; and they were informed that its sources -were not far off.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">[p. 104]</a></span></p> - -<p>Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates, -were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered -with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the -face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at -length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices -to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_179"></a><a -href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a>) the severity of the -wind abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many -of the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers, -perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by -the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these -unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish, -near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity -of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon -the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard, -employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce -them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless, -answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was -the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in -which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the -order, and was about to bury him alive.<a id="FNanchor_180"></a><a -href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> Xenophon made a -sally, with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which -even the exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He -was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take -shelter in a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying -down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next -day,—and went forward, seeing all along the line of march the -exhausted soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of -a watch. He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged -thus to pass the night without either food or fire, distributing -scouts in the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus -with the van division had got into a village, which they reached so -unexpectedly, that they found the women<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_105">[p. 105]</a></span> fetching water from a fountain -outside the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. -This division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak -some of their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with -delight that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring -up in their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted -soldiers who had been left behind.<a id="FNanchor_181"></a><a -href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p> - -<p>Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There -were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it -no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different -divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one -of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission -to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him, -before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running -at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the -village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married -daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the -king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of -houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at -the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a -well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug -for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply -stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as -with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer, -in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws, -without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they -sucked the liquid.<a id="FNanchor_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182" -class="fnanchor">[182]</a> Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the -headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through -the Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army),<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_106">[p. 106]</a></span> promising him that not one of -his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully -remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country, -into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent. -By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and -even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the -wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly -under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care -of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention -and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in -these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining -strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom -they communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which -all of them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted -in the lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own -exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and -the other officers.<a id="FNanchor_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183" -class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p> - -<p>After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through -the snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as -they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was -not put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage -with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at -home. As they marched for three days without reaching a village, -Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so -out of humor, though the man affirmed that there were no villages -in the track, as to beat him,—yet without the precaution of -putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly, -this headman made his escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, -who severely reproached Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, -and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference -between the two (says Xenophon), during the whole march; a fact -very honorable to both, considering the numberless difficulties -against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the -headman’s youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much -attached to him.<a id="FNanchor_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184" -class="fnanchor">[184]</a></p> - -<p>Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better -than march up the course of a river; and thus, from the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">[p. 107]</a></span> villages -which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded -seven days’ march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river -not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known -under that name by Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet -in breadth.<a id="FNanchor_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185" -class="fnanchor">[185]</a> Two more days’ march brought them from -this river to the foot of a range of mountains; near a pass occupied -by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.</p> - -<p>Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, -Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up; in order that the -generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they -should storm the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to -refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better -to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse -the enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by -stealth, at night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn -the position. “However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), -stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I -understand that you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise -stealing from your boyhood upward;<a id="FNanchor_186"></a><a -href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> and that it is held -no way base, but even honorable, to steal such things as the law does -not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the -greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, -to flog you if you are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent -opportunity for displaying your training. Take good care that we be -not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before -us; for if we <i>are</i> found out, we shall be well beaten.</p> - -<p>“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, -as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and -that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most -powerful men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most -powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that -this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">[p. 108]</a></span> -is a time for <i>you</i> to exhibit <i>your</i> training as well as for me -to exhibit mine.”<a id="FNanchor_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187" -class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> - -<p>We have here an interchange of raillery between the two -Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the -history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially -illustrates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of -Sparta and Athens<a id="FNanchor_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188" -class="fnanchor">[188]</a>,—the readiness to take bribes, -so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the -readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in -spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment -proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called -demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The -joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent -to suppress it. But according to the pictures commonly drawn of -Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil -was,—too great a license of accusation, and too much judicial -trial. Assuredly, such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor -shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general -evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious -in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door -had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the numerous popular -dikasts had been exchanged for a few select judges of the same stamp -and class as the official men themselves?</p> - -<p>Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues -that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for -certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides -acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured -by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of -the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus, -some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and -Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After -refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near -to the foot of the pass,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">[p. -109]</a></span> and there took up their night-station, making -demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as -soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and -ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance -a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw -them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak -these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the -Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching -up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged -by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge -faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so -dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little -or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away -their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey -of the conquerors.<a id="FNanchor_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189" -class="fnanchor">[189]</a></p> - -<p>Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level -ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some -villages well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in -the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; -for they had seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, -during the last nine days’ march, since leaving those Armenian -villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative, -and which apparently had furnished them with a stock of provisions -for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry -up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so -that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days’ march through -the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when -they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which -were seen the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without -houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as -to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast -rocks which the defenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an -ingenious combination of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the -captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this -difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was -awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the -precipice, and then cast<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">[p. -110]</a></span> themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost -every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. -An Arcadian captain named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress -about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view -to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged -him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction -of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the -Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully -supplied their wants.<a id="FNanchor_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190" -class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p> - -<p>They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which -they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest -warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear -of fifteen cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet, -greaves, stuffed corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a -short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a slain -enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies -with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield; perhaps -because the excessive length of the spear required the constant -employment of both hands,—yet they did not shrink from -meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As -they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the -Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the -cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of -march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their -rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet -broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It -rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that -of the Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they -remained three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves -with provisions.<a id="FNanchor_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191" -class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p> - -<p>Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like -of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris -in Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; -an earnest of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of -civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly -manner, and furnished them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, -after five days’ march, to a hill from whence they would<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">[p. 111]</a></span> have a view -of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for -the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of -some neighbors to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon -as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. -However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still -apparently through the territory of the Skythini, they reached -the summit of a mountain called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine -Sea was visible.<a id="FNanchor_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192" -class="fnanchor">[192]</a></p> - -<p>An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard -testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle, -assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. -To Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the -attack of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of -their territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first -imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well -as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But -every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the -summit and gave vent to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew -anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to -see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed -crowd was heard distinctly crying out, <i>Thalatta, Thalatta</i> (The -sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main -body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses -and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and -hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and -soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions -by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With -spontaneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by -a monument and commemorative trophy; putting on the stones such -homely offerings as their means afforded,—sticks, hides, -and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To -the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in -five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded. -They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume, -and ten darics in money; besides several<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_112">[p. 112]</a></span> of the soldiers’ rings, which he -especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having -first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters,—as -well as the road which they were to take through the territory -of the Makrônes.<a id="FNanchor_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193" -class="fnanchor">[193]</a></p> - -<p>When they reached the river which divided the land of the -Makrônes from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former -assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The -river not being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to -provide the means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting -and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army -came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he -believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, -exported from home during his boyhood,—he had then made his -escape (probably during the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of -Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate -accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the -Makrônes, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm, -desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy -provisions. The Makrônes, on receiving such assurance in their -own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship -with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished -the best market in their power during the three days’ march across -their territory.<a id="FNanchor_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194" -class="fnanchor">[194]</a></p> - -<p>The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found -in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain -which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the -soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men) -in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or -continuous front with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them -the following pithy encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these -enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from -reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even -eat them raw, if in any way we can do so.”</p> - -<p>Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in -single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen -being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. -Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">[p. 113]</a></span> their peltasts -in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened -their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian -peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and -disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians -presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as -well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these -villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It -was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which -this region still continues to produce,—unaware of its peculiar -properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly -intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most -violent vomiting and diarrhœa, lying down like madmen in a state of -delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing -day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any -one actually died.<a id="FNanchor_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195" -class="fnanchor">[195]</a></p> - -<p>Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the Greek -maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of -Sinôpê on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines -received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents -of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some -Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first -time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during -thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the -severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines -brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the -means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians -on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the -plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the -Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">[p. 114]</a></span> Greeks to leave -them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.</p> - -<p>These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they -had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, -during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately -on the massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the -Preserver, to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they -offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the -sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were -given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and -the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully -accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, -was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny -recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he -had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another -boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, -however, were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony -hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the -numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest -to the bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted -to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have -been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the -ardor of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their -mistresses present.<a id="FNanchor_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196" -class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_70app"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">[p. 115]</a></span></p> - <h3>APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.</h3> - <p class="center">ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND - AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN - MOUNTAINS.</p> -</div> - -<p class="noindent p1"><span class="smcap">It</span> -would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not -to present the reader with a minute description of the full length -of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter -Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which, -though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes -us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that -moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with -nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course, -and a few negative conditions.</p> - -<p>Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of -the Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment -on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the -Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have -been their probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most -important point which he has established here, seems to be the -identity of the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern -affluent of the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of -Bitlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both -of which it had been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai -falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at -the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p. -166). In this identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, -Professor Koch agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).</p> - -<p>If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the -Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation -near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon -takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must -have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction -nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond -the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the -eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”</p> - -<p>Three days of additional march brought them to the river -Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (iv. 4, 4). There -appear sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or -Black River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into -the Murad or Eastern<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">[p. -116]</a></span> Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part -x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and -Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of -Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it -with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, -“is only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river -of the plain and district.”</p> - -<p>Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia -give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in -identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that -the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the -Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort. -From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the -modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near -the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern -affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and -which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther, -in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which -separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is -the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those -to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is -one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).</p> - -<p>After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march -which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor -have we any means even of determining the general line of route, -apart from specific places, which they followed from the river -Teleboas to Trebizond.</p> - -<p>Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates. -They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could -find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to -be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor -Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that -the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the -Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it -would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus -(Khinnis). Koch’s authority, as the most recent and systematic -investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it -puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to -Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open -throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter, -Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army -passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates -(Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified -this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south -of the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district -called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">[p. 117]</a></span></p> - -<p>To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks -followed from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether -impossible. I cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who -conducts the army across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries -them up northward to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings -them back again across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the -Araxes, which he identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) -and the Araxes itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of -Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason -from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) -a line of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same -objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to -the northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the -place where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified -by any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home -they must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).</p> - -<p>Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the -westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road -from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would -thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They -had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it -without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less -circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which -the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a -possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to -complete the reader’s idea of the entire ground travelled over by the -Ten Thousand.</p> - -<p>Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships -with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that -if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was -practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond -in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year. -Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold -country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no -advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled -men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger; -that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they -had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the -prophet Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand -darics in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there -was much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to -take provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a -small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out -of their course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable -accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any -degree of slowness in their progress. It<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_118">[p. 118]</a></span> rarely happens that modern -travellers go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what -travelling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. -Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the -month of March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir -says (Travels, p. 353)—“The winters are so severe that all -communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut -off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the -snow.”</p> - -<p>Now if we measure on Kiepert’s map the rectilinear -distance,—the air-line—from Trebizond to the place -where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern -Euphrates,—we shall find it one hundred and seventy English -miles. The number of days’ journey-marches which Xenophon mentions -are fifty-four; even if we include the five days of march undertaken -from Gymnias (Anab. iv. 7, 20), which, properly speaking, were -directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than -for the promotion of their retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, -therefore, they must have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. -This surely is not an unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under -all the disadvantages of their situation; nor does it imply any -very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable. -Indeed Koch himself (in his Introduction, p. 4) suggests various -embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which -Xenophon has not distinctly stated.</p> - -<p>The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably -the Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least -it is difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can -be identified.</p> - -<p>I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls -<i>Gymnias</i> (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as -that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh -(Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). “Gumisch-Khana (says Mr. -Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p. -234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable -silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions.” Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr. -Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to -Erzerum.</p> - -<p>Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of -situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a -plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange; -the existence of this “great, flourishing, inhabited, city,” inland, -in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini, -the Makrônes, etc.</p> - -<p>Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day -after quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long -and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana, -reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers -repre<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">[p. 119]</a></span>sent -the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr. Ainsworth, -who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of -some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the <i>winter-road</i> -from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 394). -“The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and -takes the longer portion of valley; all the others cross over the -mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But -whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go -indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and at other times -turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah Bunar, where they -take to the mountains.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana -eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about -forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. -389).</p> - -<p>Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct -road from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days’ -march which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted -by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of -people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the -lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches, -towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on -the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could -view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top -of the sacred mountain Thêchê.</p> - -<p>Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But -unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit -on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place. -Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from -whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned. -D’Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge -called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea -than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for -the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern -travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to -the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It -stands on Kiepert’s map at a distance of full thirty-five English -miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted -by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion -of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It -is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of -Xenophon’s visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered -with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.</p> - -<p>There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain -called Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet -high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of -Trebizond,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">[p. 120]</a></span> -and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From -the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out -three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive -slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow -valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill -immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on -the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley, -partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But -throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the -hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea -until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him -to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland, -who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this -view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed -for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then -again lost.</p> - -<p>Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive, -and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the -Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of -Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point -from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in -his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be -reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian. -Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after -quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with -the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban. -It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that -Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide -may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of -showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards. -This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the -whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is -not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on -Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening -mountains, the sea might become visible.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_71"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">[p. 121]</a></span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXI.<br /> - PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME - THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH - THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">We</span> now commence a -third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having -followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the -throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious -only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, -endurance, and organization, we shall now track their proceedings -among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of -Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the -Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and -arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and -Aristarchus.</p> - -<p>Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, -was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther -westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the -mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three -cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine -from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its -southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a -defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of -adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even -before the year 600 <small>B.C.</small>, to plant a colony there, -and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther -westward, not more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from -Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the -territory of the Mariandyni.</p> - -<p>The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek -settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were -the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the -Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as -elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in -giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great -men<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">[p. 122]</a></span> -with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had -no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence -a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held -them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia -and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the -Kolchian villages were also subject, in the same manner, to the -Trapezuntines;<a id="FNanchor_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197" -class="fnanchor">[197]</a> and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar -inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth -of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; -from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the -olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not -indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; -from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds -of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper in the neighboring -mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house furniture, -and native slaves.<a id="FNanchor_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198" -class="fnanchor">[198]</a> The case was similar with the three -colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra, Kerasus, -and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the -Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, -left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. -For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered -and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus -and the cities on the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The -Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in -those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under -a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half -independent,—since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes -to come up and help in repelling Cyrus<a id="FNanchor_199"></a><a -href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a>—and now on -terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without -secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against -that city.<a id="FNanchor_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200" -class="fnanchor">[200]</a> The other native tribes to the eastward -were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own -heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.</p> - -<p>Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment -of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,<a id="FNanchor_201"></a><a -href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> and had expelled -from thence the despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor -any of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">[p. 123]</a></span> -their neighbors appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian -war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of -tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward -march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not -ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it -was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that -they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only -recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous -tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.</p> - -<p>Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of -the retreat, the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at -Kerasus,<a id="FNanchor_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202" -class="fnanchor">[202]</a> eight thousand six hundred hoplites, -with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, etc., making a total -of above ten thousand military persons. Such a force had never -before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and -the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians, -even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting -them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor -receive orders from any established government. They were like -those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the -fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking -service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one -could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner -they might deal with the established communities on the shores of -the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared -in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against -Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and -Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of -Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê,—or -if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating war against that -city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. -Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation -of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original -Greek settlers, would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">[p. -124]</a></span> probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was -no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic -sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not -less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by -permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in -Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens -who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full -intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their -homes and families.<a id="FNanchor_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203" -class="fnanchor">[203]</a> We shall find such gravitation towards -home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the -army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, -no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for -uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose -supremacy had never before been endangered.</p> - -<p>An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to -recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and -to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled -achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged -their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held -an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian -soldier, named Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already -tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into -line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here -before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail -the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">[p. 125]</a></span> asleep, -like Odysseus.” This pithy address being received with vehement -acclamations, and warmly responded to by all,—Cheirisophus -offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to -Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the -Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport. -His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the -project.</p> - -<p>Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and -measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence -of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by -marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. -Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither -individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go -out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, -the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the -event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also -to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; -since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing -an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from -the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they -saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and -maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be -required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were -often sailing by;<a id="FNanchor_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204" -class="fnanchor">[204]</a> so that they would thus acquire the means -of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from -Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to -repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; -since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible -to get together a sufficient stock of transports.</p> - -<p>All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, -except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited -such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put -that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send -messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging -them to repair the roads, in order that the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_126">[p. 126]</a></span> departure of the army might be -facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his -wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.<a id="FNanchor_205"></a><a -href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p> - -<p>The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon -appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was -compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or -armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and -committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus, -for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This -man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own -escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an -Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant -vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes -under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. -It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the -camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable -detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and -seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did -not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or -companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were -destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased -and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary -for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted -stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the -natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the -detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. -It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, -attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the -most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the -Euxine; well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. -After a difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in -interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small -hazard of ruinous defeat,—they returned in the end completely -successful, and with a plentiful booty.<a id="FNanchor_206"></a><a -href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a></p> - -<p>At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of -Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them -to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">[p. 127]</a></span> leave -Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to -serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and -of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under -the command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; -while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had -been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In -three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the -Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they -halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the -money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six -hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven -thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various -light troops.<a id="FNanchor_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207" -class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> - -<p>During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the -army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of -outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues -of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his -company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, -which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which -rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to -make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his -attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers -despatched three elders, as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian -authorities; but these heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the -repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in -which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only -escaped the pursuing soldiers by running<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_128">[p. 128]</a></span> into the sea. This enormity, though -it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their -departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from -the numbers concerned in it.</p> - -<p>Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now) -any regular road.<a id="FNanchor_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208" -class="fnanchor">[208]</a> This march cost the Cyreian army -not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the -sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous -tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their -iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki -refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the -army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with -the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance -was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was -proxenus of the Mosynœki, and understood their language. The -Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered -the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar -fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have -not space to copy.<a id="FNanchor_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209" -class="fnanchor">[209]</a> The territory of the Tibarêni was more -easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and -tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined -the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">[p. 129]</a></span> and plunder -them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been -deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.<a id="FNanchor_210"></a><a -href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a></p> - -<p>Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet -on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still -awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry -them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit -them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market -was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. -But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to -resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen -in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their -way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation -of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, -but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their -victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the -neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived -from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.</p> - -<p>These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers -in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent -among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant -exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra -and Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their -hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings -were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in -her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince -Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid -against the Greeks.<a id="FNanchor_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211" -class="fnanchor">[211]</a> Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites -had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to -the Sinopian harmost in the place; that the generals were under the -necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room -for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men -were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other -soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial -friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good -offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being -anxious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">[p. 130]</a></span> -only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting -Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become -master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt -some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his -auxiliaries.<a id="FNanchor_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212" -class="fnanchor">[212]</a></p> - -<p>This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, -that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, -and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy -and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them -an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town -on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the -inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.</p> - -<p>Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê -was an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential -condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their -march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation -that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while -for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient -number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been -received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a -strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus -removing formidable neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there -could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the -Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and -entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the -best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, -after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former -speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except -to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, -began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through -Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved -through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible -to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to -be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein -the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, -would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four -great rivers, which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">[p. -131]</a></span> army would be unable to pass,—the Thermodon -and the Iris, each three hundred feet in breadth,—the Halys, -two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth,—the -Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he -affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia -impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê, -and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from -the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across -Thrace, yet easier.<a id="FNanchor_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213" -class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p> - -<p>Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than -sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of -marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there -were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But -Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, -distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit -themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain -all in a body, and that vessels must be provided sufficient for -the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys -of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements. -Three envoys were accordingly sent,—Ariston, an Athenian, -Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian, -probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian -senate or assembly.<a id="FNanchor_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214" -class="fnanchor">[214]</a></p> - -<p>During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued -near Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with -traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as -had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the -neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia.<a id="FNanchor_215"></a><a -href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> But they were -receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; -and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as -each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, -there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when -they left home.<a id="FNanchor_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216" -class="fnanchor">[216]</a> Moreover, the army was now moving onward -without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction -and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the -difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they -should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the -Grecian world.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">[p. 132]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the -idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and -colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to -his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled -efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever -be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a -Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new -autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, -possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many -indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and -conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas -of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had -contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though -he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing -wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.<a id="FNanchor_217"></a><a -href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> He contemplated the -employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other -native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely -effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as -settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and -probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in -the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and -chiefs,—perhaps even the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at -Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to -become rich, powerful, and important,—was a tempting prospect -for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the -sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort -of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain -employment.</p> - -<p>It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master -Sokrates,<a id="FNanchor_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218" -class="fnanchor">[218]</a> in grave and doubtful cases, where the -most careful reflection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">[p. -133]</a></span> was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of -an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence -that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation -to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to -any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was -anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; -for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, -the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already -mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that -Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came -to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded -him with the prodigious present of three thousand darics or ten -Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having -contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of -the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home -with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the -project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it -by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which -he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the -indications of the victims were favorable;<a id="FNanchor_219"></a><a -href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> Xenophon<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">[p. 134]</a></span> himself being -too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the -same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection -disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which -latter indications he himself began to realize, by spreading -reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying -clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their -own concurrence.<a id="FNanchor_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220" -class="fnanchor">[220]</a></p> - -<p>Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found -some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially -among those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of -Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming -the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them -that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for -the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the -Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived, not -for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition -This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that -large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on -condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon -as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these -officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against -the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without -any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, -not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as -to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia -and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the -first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable -reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from -whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy -of Pharnabazus.<a id="FNanchor_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221" -class="fnanchor">[221]</a></p> - -<p>It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from -more than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon -had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">[p. 135]</a></span> loudly -accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into -remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel -the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult -the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the -army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the -gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus -himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, -(he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by -his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to -be visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as -destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still -have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which -would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the -rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any -necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and -Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be -better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for -going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who -were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together -until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or -runs off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”<a id="FNanchor_222"></a><a -href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a></p> - -<p>Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every -hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted -with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against -the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the -soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that -they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His -intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. -But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took -his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to -Greece with the three thousand darics.<a id="FNanchor_223"></a><a -href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a></p> - -<p>If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his -partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that -the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and -that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">[p. 136]</a></span> and the -Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, -but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and -Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; -for, having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were -now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, -that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered -their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the -newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but -against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity -of the Euxine.<a id="FNanchor_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224" -class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Xenophon replied, that they might convene -the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that -he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition -themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, -was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began -individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by -them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of -the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which -Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to -throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had -converted the other officers to his original project, and that he -intended as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them -fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something -so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon -as the author of the renewed project, once his own,—and -something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should -spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up -his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence -which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their exasperation -against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce -groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into -mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of -Kerasus.</p> - -<p>Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal -assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of -convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or -legitimate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">[p. 137]</a></span> -defence,<a id="FNanchor_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225" -class="fnanchor">[225]</a>—Xenophon immediately sent round the -herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary -method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, -and Xenophon then addressed them,—refraining, with equal -generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last -proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he -mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death -between him and those other officers.</p> - -<p>“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here -calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you -to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to -be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the -contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal -with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises -and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, -he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must -go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and -persuade you that the sun rises on <i>this</i> side, and sets on<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">[p. 138]</a></span> <i>that</i>? Can -any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows -you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there -is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against -your own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred -and more? Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding -you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that -we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a -detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in -their hands? No,—these stories all proceed from foolish men, -who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without -reason,—for I neither hinder <i>them</i> from outstripping me -in your favor, if they can render you greater service,—nor -<i>you</i> from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of -this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is -possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid -to my charge.”<a id="FNanchor_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226" -class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p> - -<p>Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, -and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction -in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce -the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such -that, if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must -fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the -soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which -he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the -outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus,—the -unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his -company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce -with the army,—the murder of the three elders of the village, -who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such -wrong,—the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even -upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were -remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these -magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves -to ignominy.<a id="FNanchor_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227" -class="fnanchor">[227]</a> “If such are to be our proceedings, -(continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army -will fall. You, the aggregate body,<a id="FNanchor_228"></a><a -href="#Footnote_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> will no longer -be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">[p. 139]</a></span> the -sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each -individual among you will conduct the army against any point which -he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either -for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single -enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications -whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen -commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general -who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i. e. darts or stones), -may put to death, without trial, either officer or soldier, as it -suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened -near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected leaders have done -for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of -wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if -he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the -only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who -stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such a pass, -that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus -in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even -send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were -slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though -at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to -give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as -herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to -death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury -the bodies for us.”<a id="FNanchor_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229" -class="fnanchor">[229]</a></p> - -<p>Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders -and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own -sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">[p. 140]</a></span> passed a vote -that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished; -that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should -be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or -captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that -trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong -committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony -was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon -and the prophets, to purify the army.<a id="FNanchor_230"></a><a -href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a></p> - -<p>This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political -morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and -more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous -aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon -insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the -legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual -will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, -as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority; -the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons -entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he -appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of -each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all -safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for -punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up -their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity -either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech -proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. -No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, -though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. -And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of -Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, -seems to have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way -diminished.</p> - -<p>The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well -calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition -of Xenophon himself<a id="FNanchor_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231" -class="fnanchor">[231]</a> that the generals themselves should -be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">[p. 141]</a></span> tried -before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains, -in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters; -agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to -a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course -of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty -minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the -cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus -for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general -superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that -duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when -various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and -ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far -the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold -and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards -and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially -was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as -to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out -that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted -with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the -duty by burying the dying man alive.<a id="FNanchor_232"></a><a -href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> This interesting -debate (given in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, -on the part of the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with -regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.</p> - -<p>The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the -internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and -well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) -to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were -content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and -constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and -enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we -should have perished to a man. Sometimes, too, I struck<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">[p. 142]</a></span> men who -were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the -way so as to hinder others from getting forward; I struck them -with my fist,<a id="FNanchor_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233" -class="fnanchor">[233]</a> in order to save them from the spear -of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me; you had arms -in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it -for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of -disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering -from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively -well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and yet I strike -no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times -of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. -There is Boïskus,<a id="FNanchor_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234" -class="fnanchor">[234]</a> the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended -sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying -his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several -citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows -which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now -brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to -whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify -in my favor.”<a id="FNanchor_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235" -class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p> - -<p>Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon -was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the -opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding -officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty, -was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as -those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, -the extraordinary influence which Xenophon’s powers of speaking -gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from -the other generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc.,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">[p. 143]</a></span> by having -the power of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; -and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, -not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite -of such frankness—or rather, partly by means of such -frankness,—his ascendency as commander not only remained -unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on -increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators -as a means of influence over the people,—it will be found that -though particular points may be gained in this way, yet wherever -the influence of an orator has been steady and long-continued (like -that of Perikles<a id="FNanchor_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236" -class="fnanchor">[236]</a> or Demosthenes) it is owing in part to -the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is not willing to -accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions of his hearers. -Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have existed no engine -for kindling or sustaining the <i>sensus communis</i> of the ten thousand -Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping up the moral authority -of the aggregate over the individual members and fractions. The -other officers could doubtless speak well enough to address short -encouragements, or give simple explanations, to the soldiers; -without this faculty, no man was fit for military command over -Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of a higher order. -Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him at Kotyôra, will -perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled multitudes,—a -discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and most direct appeal, -sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous transitions to work -round the minds of the hearers,—a command of those fundamental -political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian mind, but -were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of each -successive situation, as to require some positive friction to draw -them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion -and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted -both by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, -but would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and -judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not -less essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in -these points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly -his equals.</p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">[p. -144]</a></span></p> <p>The important public proceedings above -described not only restored the influence of Xenophon, but also -cleared off a great amount of bad feeling, and sensibly abated -the bad habits, which had grown up in the army. A scene which -speedily followed was not without effect in promoting cheerful and -amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian prince Korylas, weary of the -desultory warfare carried on between the Greeks and the border -inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp with presents of horses -and fine robes,<a id="FNanchor_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237" -class="fnanchor">[237]</a> and with expressions of a wish to conclude -peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents, and promised to -submit the proposition to the army. But first they entertained the -envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time games and dances, -with other recreations amusing not only to them but also to the -soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and pantomimic, -of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are described by -Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were followed on -the next day by an amicable convention concluded between the army and -the Paphlagonians.<a id="FNanchor_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238" -class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> - -<p>Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient -for the whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and -Sinôpê,—all the soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter -place, passing by the mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, -which they would have found impracticable to cross in a land-march -through Paphlagonia. Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of -sailing with a fair wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged -in the neighboring seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to -them a large present of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained -for five days.</p> - -<p>It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose -absence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">[p. 145]</a></span> -had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single -trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the -Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army, -and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they -were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on -seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent -on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached -Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such -project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly, -they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of -six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the -ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at -once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating -to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious -hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering -a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But -at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies -of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which -he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As -in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to -Zeus Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to -determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with -predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate -him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground -that Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; -adding that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might -name. His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially -by the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of -them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if -that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his -command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon -acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought -to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden -him to do so.<a id="FNanchor_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239" -class="fnanchor">[239]</a></p> - -<p>Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">[p. 146]</a></span> the duty; saying -that he would have willingly served under Xenophon, if the latter -had accepted the office, but that it was a good thing for Xenophon -himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had already poisoned -the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he (Cheirisophus) had -emphatically contradicted the calumnies.<a id="FNanchor_240"></a><a -href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p> - -<p>On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of -Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably -entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and -bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now -appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole -command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet -having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance -in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia, -the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit -of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no -measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that -they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand -staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten -talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the -inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this -proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand -staters—a full month’s pay for the army. It was moved that -Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with -this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in -so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received -the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon -with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated -the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to -the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into -consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys, -and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and -brought in their outlying property.</p> - -<p>The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their -displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of -having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">[p. 147]</a></span> exclaim, that it -was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more than -one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to -obey as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; -especially a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the -army. Here again it is remarkable that the personal importance of -Xenophon caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the -sole command had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So -vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan -soldiers in the army, more than four thousand and five hundred -hoplites in number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed -themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from -out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into -three portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, -one thousand and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, -who adhered to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred -hoplites, three hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the -horsemen in the army) attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however -was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and -quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been -restrained by unfavorable sacrifices.<a id="FNanchor_241"></a><a -href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p> - -<p>The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia, -landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the -Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium. -From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, -with the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. -But through rashness and bad management, they first sustained -several partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an -eminence, by a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all -the territory around. They were only rescued from destruction by -the unexpected appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had -left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their -march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became -re-assembled at Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted -at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established -the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of -Cheirisophus, who,—afflicted by<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_148">[p. 148]</a></span> the humiliation put upon him, in -having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a -week,—had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian -captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward -should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be -put to death.<a id="FNanchor_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242" -class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p> - -<p>The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a -colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, -though he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the -soldiers were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest -Xenophon should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned -the encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some -days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions, -because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to lead -them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the -army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of -detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two -thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want -of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with -the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was -defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune -which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of -the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the -remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon -which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near -at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim -was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater -part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was -brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become, -that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on -the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves -with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from -Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal, -cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling -them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive -against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops -were completely defeated and dispersed,<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_149">[p. 149]</a></span> so that the Greeks returned -to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of -the country.<a id="FNanchor_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243" -class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p> - -<p>At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander -from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their -transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not -merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, -but also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed -the impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of -Xenophon, to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that -several of the neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on -what terms alliance would be granted to them. At length Kleander -came, but with two triremes only.<a id="FNanchor_244"></a><a -href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></p> - -<p>Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. -His appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of -this gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the -Grecian world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by -Dexippus, who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at -Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for -the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but -had abused the confidence reposed in him by running away with the -ship to Byzantium.</p> - -<p>It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the -whole army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already -promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the -whole army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public -property; though on days when the army was collectively at rest, -any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever -he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the -whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of -sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have -been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to -appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and -promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. -Accordingly the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the -sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; -who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of -them, a soldier belonging<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">[p. -150]</a></span> to the lochus or company of one of the best friends -of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man -under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less -at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into -violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with -stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew -of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in -spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who -on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established -army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on -the other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost -was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of -Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the -Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be -interdicted from giving them reception.<a id="FNanchor_245"></a><a -href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> It was in vain -that the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of -such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only -on condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as -well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered -up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by -Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice -Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by -his order.<a id="FNanchor_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246" -class="fnanchor">[246]</a></p> - -<p>The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers -would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who -had a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by -undue violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. -When the army was convened in assembly, several of them went so -far as to treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon -took pains to set them right upon this point. “Soldiers (said he), -it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he -threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close -upon the cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial -power in Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but -even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he -pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting -us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">[p. 151]</a></span> harmosts -in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and -disobedient to Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation -should be conveyed to the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, -Anaxibius,—we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to -sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are at present masters, both on -land and at sea.<a id="FNanchor_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247" -class="fnanchor">[247]</a> We must not, for the sake of any one or -two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must -obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command, especially as our cities, -to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns -myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias -would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if -Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and -all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment. -I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander arraigns, ought -in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you -collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard -indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be -debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but should -be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the -Grecian cities.”<a id="FNanchor_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248" -class="fnanchor">[248]</a></p> - -<p>After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so -significant a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference -of the Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and -proclaimed, that what he had done was neither under the orders, -nor with the privity, of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal -impulse of wrath, at seeing his own honest and innocent soldier -dragged away by the traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave -himself up as a victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of -the Lacedæmonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">[p. 152]</a></span> moment promised -nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the -army; and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he -had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the -responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander -the infamous behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards -no one else would he have acted in the same manner; while the -soldier whom he had rescued and who was given up at the same time, -also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus -and some others from overruling, for their own individual benefit, -a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed -that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last -to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without -trial,—desired that the persons surrendered might be left for -his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of -displeasure as regarded all the others.<a id="FNanchor_249"></a><a -href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a></p> - -<p>The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the -prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired -with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army -to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to -implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially -adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius, -the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest -appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied -with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that -the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated -him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him -in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the -command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance -of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of -Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over -by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals -belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by -Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the -Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but -also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them -back into Greece.<a id="FNanchor_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250" -class="fnanchor">[250]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_153">[p. 153]</a></span></p> <p>The prospects of the -army appeared thus greatly improved; the more so, as Kleander, on -entering upon his new functions as commander, found the soldiers so -cheerful and orderly, that he was highly gratified, and exchanged -personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xenophon. But when -sacrifices came to be offered, for beginning the march homeward, -the signs were so unpropitious, for three successive days, that -Kleander could not bring himself to brave such auguries at the outset -of his career. Accordingly, he told the generals, that the gods -plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army -into Greece; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and -would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached -the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers, -he then departed with his two triremes.<a id="FNanchor_251"></a><a -href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a></p> - -<p>The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander -will be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at -Byzantium; but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious -sacrifices which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at -Kalpê. In the request preferred to him by them that he would march -as their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and -a very well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired -to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the -difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station -and influence, would increase with every step of their approach -to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would -have been better treated, while Xenophon himself might either have -remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would -have chosen the latter course.</p> - -<p>Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched -from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,<a id="FNanchor_252"></a><a -href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> (in the territory -of Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately -opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where -they remained seven days, turning into money the slaves<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">[p. 154]</a></span> and plunder -which they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian -admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander -was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap -of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed -lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message -to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents, -to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of -the Bosphorus.<a id="FNanchor_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253" -class="fnanchor">[253]</a> Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the -generals and the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to -cross, and gave them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers -should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other -officers told him that they would return with this message and take -the sense of the army; but Xenophon, on his own account, said that -he should not return; that he should now retire from the army, and -sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance -of Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and -conduct the army across; on the understanding that he should depart -immediately afterwards.</p> - -<p>Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the -Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward -if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army -would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about -that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the -command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed -with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the -walls of Byzantium.<a id="FNanchor_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254" -class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Xenophon, who had come along with them, -paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, -and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander -told him that he must not think of departing until the army was -out of the city, and that he would be held responsible if they -stayed. In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers -were within the walls, and was well aware that it might be no -easy matter to induce them to go away.<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_155">[p. 155]</a></span> For Anaxibius had practised a gross -fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor -the inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or -even means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go -forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there -to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind -being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and -offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and -were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with -Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army -outside of the walls, added—“Go forth as if you were about to -march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as -soon as you please.”<a id="FNanchor_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255" -class="fnanchor">[255]</a> Xenophon replied that this matter must be -settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and -who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory. -Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a -sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon -the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well -as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who -followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside -of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration, -noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at -the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the -Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten -it with the bar.<a id="FNanchor_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256" -class="fnanchor">[256]</a></p> - -<p>Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that -the communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak -among the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were -outside. But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in -the inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he -thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and -captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending -the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that -he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of -the generals, but remained outside among<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_156">[p. 156]</a></span> the soldiers. “Take what supplies -you want (said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, -which are well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries. -After thus providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, -and there Kyniskus will give you pay.”<a id="FNanchor_257"></a><a -href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a></p> - -<p>This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that -he did not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the -soldiers. Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known -to the Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred -and fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not -indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether -they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by -the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), -or by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also -whether they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a -friend or an enemy.<a id="FNanchor_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258" -class="fnanchor">[258]</a></p> - -<p>Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by -Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the -Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long -march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies -to be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of -it a lot unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, -they would have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus -within their reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal -ejectment from Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations -of hospitality; contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the -army had recently experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; -where they had been welcomed not only by compliments on their past -achievements, but also by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. -Such behavior could not fail to provoke the most violent indignation -in the bosoms of the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed -giving the order until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking -that the army would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of -the gates to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the -walls manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations -were not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him -give the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">[p. 157]</a></span> -order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away from -the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the -outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable -way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to -inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the -generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or -at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent -or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their -position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the -march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous -movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to -get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement, -closed it without a moment’s delay, and fastened the bar. The -soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly -to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to -knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made -their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the -city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost -soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and -fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate -from the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide -open to the army.<a id="FNanchor_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259" -class="fnanchor">[259]</a> All the soldiers then rushed up, and were -soon again in Byzantium.</p> - -<p>Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well -as of the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians -again within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the -point of being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the -smallest means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the -soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved. -Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the -sea-shore, and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He -even thought the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and -sent over to Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were -the citizens of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly -fled; some to their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the -harbor, others to the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled -down to the water, and thus put to sea.<a id="FNanchor_260"></a><a -href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">[p. 158]</a></span></p> <p>To the -deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was thus added -a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which threatened -to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but too probable -that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of recent injury, -would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves for the want -of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing the Lacedæmonian -garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that too from mere -impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of prohibitions, -from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case, when they -became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and such would -probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed his design of -retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals acting without -him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers, Xenophon felt -at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and the army -again within the town, the terrific emergency which was impending; -first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy, -throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers -indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon -all by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he -rushed into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to -pacify them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted -to see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were -eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail -on him to second and methodize their present triumph. “Now is your -time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have -here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you -have plenty of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich -us; and we in return can make you powerful.”—“You speak -well (replied he); I shall do as you propose; but if you want to -accomplish anything, you must fall into military array forthwith.” -He knew that this was the first condition of returning to anything -like tranquillity; and by great good fortune, the space called -the Thrakion, immediately adjoining the gate inside, was level, -open, and clear of houses; presenting an excellent place of arms -or locality for a review. The whole army,—partly from their -long military practice,—partly under the impression that -Xenophon was really about to second their wishes and direct some -aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of their own -accord into regular array on the Thrakion;<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_159">[p. 159]</a></span> the hoplites eight deep, the -peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that Xenophon -addressed them as follows:—</p> - -<p>“Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you -think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give -way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us -for their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect -what will be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith -as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort -of a war that will be, those who have witnessed and who still -recollect recent matters of history may easily fancy. We Athenians -entered into the war against Sparta with a powerful army and -fleet, an abundant revenue, and numerous tributary cities in Asia -as well as Europe,—among them this very Byzantium in which -we now stand. We have been vanquished in the way that all of you -know. And what then will be the fate of us soldiers, when we -shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all her old allies and -Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric forces on the -coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched up -to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to -think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined -enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur -the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities -which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly, -if we, who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when -we were in force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the -first Grecian city into which we have been admitted. As far as I -am concerned, may I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the -earth, rather than see you do such things; and I exhort <i>you</i>, -too, as Greeks, to obey the leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while -thus obedient, to obtain your just rights; but if you should fail -in this, rather submit to injustice than cut yourselves off from -the Grecian world. Send to inform Anaxibius that we have entered -the city, not with a view to commit any violence, but in the -hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the advantages which he -promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove to him that we -quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but under our -own sense of the duty of obedience.”<a id="FNanchor_261"></a><a -href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">[p. 160]</a></span></p> <p>This -speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army, -brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to -adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their -position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to -communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban -named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under -the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort -of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to -command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any -city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians, -and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct -them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the -north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the -Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great -opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with -ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned, -bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably, -promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their -obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the -authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote -their comfort.<a id="FNanchor_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262" -class="fnanchor">[262]</a> He said nothing farther about taking -them into pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The -soldiers, on hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to -accept Kœratadas as their future commander, and then marched out of -the town. As soon as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content -with closing the gates against them, made public proclamation that if -any one of them were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith -into slavery.</p> - -<p>There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able -discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was -averted by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor -did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render -to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which -would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive -impulse,—first, to the citizens of the town, ultimately -to themselves, while Anaxibius, the only guilty person,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">[p. 161]</a></span> had the means -of escaping by sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are -stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality. At the same -time no orator ever undertook a more difficult case, or achieved -a fuller triumph over unpromising conditions. If we consider the -feelings and position of the army at the instant of their breaking -into the town, we shall be astonished that any commander could have -arrested their movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their -retreat, they had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, -next roughly ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said -truly that the citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the -one or the other, yet little heed is commonly taken, in military -operations, to the distinction between garrison and citizens in an -assailed town. Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of -force arising out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at -the same time inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross -recent injury, and enriching themselves in the process of execution; -to which we may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had -obtained the reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates -they had nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in -Thrace. With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse -of this nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on -the point of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to -induce them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to -invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation, -chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable -reality and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant -future, and therefore of little comparative force, except when set -forth in magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he -worked upon the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these -far-removed dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which -they were overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration -the example of his own native city,—will be seen by all who -study his speech. Never did his Athenian accomplishments,—his -talent for giving words to important thoughts,—his promptitude -in seizing a present situation and managing the sentiments of an -impetuous multitude,—appear to greater advantage than when he -was thus suddenly called forth to meet a terrible emergency. His -pre-established reputation and the habit of obeying his orders, -were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">[p. 162]</a></span> -doubtless essential conditions of success. But none of his colleagues -in command would have been able to accomplish the like memorable -change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure obedience for any -simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon -had not been at hand, the other generals would have followed the -passionate movement, even though they had been reluctant,—from -simple inability to repress it.<a id="FNanchor_263"></a><a -href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> Again,—whatever -might have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain -that even <i>he</i> would not have been able to work upon the minds of -these excited soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as -well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed -to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part through voice -and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and instruments -of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion at Byzantium -illustrates the working of that persuasive agency which formed one of -the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches -us that if the orator could sometimes accuse innocent defendants and -pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part of the case which -historians of Greece often present as if it were the whole,—he -could also, and that in the most trying emergencies, combat the -strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid presence the -half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.</p> - -<p>After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through -Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might -be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure -by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty; -upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions -of affection and gratitude on their part,<a id="FNanchor_264"></a><a -href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> and went into -Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came -to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him -a prophet, and beasts to be offered in<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_163">[p. 163]</a></span> sacrifice. There followed in his -train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with -jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of -garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas -proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution -of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being -unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas -was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with -the victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when -Timasion and the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, -and dismissed him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable -sacrifices may have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But -the main reason was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one -day’s subsistence for the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and -the obvious insufficiency of his means.<a id="FNanchor_265"></a><a -href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a></p> - -<p>On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its -quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under -its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future -order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents -from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of -that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese -under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had -projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there -obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view -of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed -returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.</p> - -<p>Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it -could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little -or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place, -during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress. -Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get -subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the -neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was -thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius, -who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished. -By degrees, it would probably have<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_164">[p. 164]</a></span> been dissolved altogether, had -not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to -promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic -coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer -cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems -moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same -opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian -Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of -Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that -Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral. -Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius -impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves -all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and -then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis -to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of -the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was -no longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he -at the same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with -Aristarchus against the Cyreian army.<a id="FNanchor_266"></a><a -href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a></p> - -<p>Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of -disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he -resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted -and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from -Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any -might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for -the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed -himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment’s delay to -rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling -the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across -into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to -cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory -order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that -he might reach the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">[p. -165]</a></span> with the greatest speed.<a id="FNanchor_267"></a><a -href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> Perhaps it would -not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under -any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia -against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very -acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his -return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to -Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute -condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped -under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria, -a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the -army.</p> - -<p>While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the -passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived -there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only -Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in -his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede -Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians, -chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will -of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had -billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did -his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come -into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately -on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented -with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized -them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and -sold them all into slavery.<a id="FNanchor_268"></a><a -href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">[p. 166]</a></span> Apprised of -the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus -to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the -transports in the harbor, and presenting himself personally before -the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When -Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, -and had sent him expressly to conduct them,—Aristarchus -replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am -harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you.” -On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains -(lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about -to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a -private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, -and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. -Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself -with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behavior -of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, -sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in -the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as -to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this -accidental warning.<a id="FNanchor_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269" -class="fnanchor">[269]</a> It need hardly be added that Xenophon -disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a -third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded -by all.</p> - -<p>We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a -snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had -practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his -colleagues,—and that too against a Greek, and an officer of -the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from -pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">[p. 167]</a></span> from the -Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been -withheld, Xenophon would assuredly have fallen into this snare, -nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence,—so -fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under -the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who -undoubtedly manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the -fraud to which he fell a victim.</p> - -<p>At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, -while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to -force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy -mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) -they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight -hundred hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated -this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the -proposition of Seuthes to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was -inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the -narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of -the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and -as to provisions.<a id="FNanchor_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270" -class="fnanchor">[270]</a> Moreover it was imperiously necessary -for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement; for -they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing -immediately on shipboard; it was mid-winter,—they were encamped -in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace,—they had -neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market -had been near.<a id="FNanchor_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271" -class="fnanchor">[271]</a> Xenophon, who had brought them to the -neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating -them from this untenable situation, and began to offer sacrifices, -according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage -him to recommend a covenant with Seuthes. The sacrifices were so -favorable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from -each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for -the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.</p> - -<p>Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent -prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians;<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">[p. 168]</a></span> so formidable in -the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions -had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes; -which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by the aid of -the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus -(about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they -originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to -each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the -generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians -by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement -and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, -over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, -with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to -Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, -his best point on the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing -Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any -daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the -custom of Thrace.”<a id="FNanchor_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272" -class="fnanchor">[272]</a> Seuthes farther engaged never on any -occasion to lead them more than seven days’ journey from the sea, at -farthest.</p> - -<p>These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect; -and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as -mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition -of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades, -Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) -as a valuable refuge in case of need.<a id="FNanchor_273"></a><a -href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> But even if the -promise had been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; -for they had not even present supplies,—still less any means -of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was -rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes -was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who -accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.</p> - -<p>They remained for two months in his service, engaged in -warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to -conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in -possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and -a considerable tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from -cold were extreme, during these two months of full winter and -amidst<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">[p. 169]</a></span> -the snowy mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled -by their expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful -subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner. -But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, -in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only -for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from -obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had -made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as -one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy; -since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand -and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the -soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the -non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from -him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous -intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named -Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.</p> - -<p>Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon, -both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare -carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting -as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It -seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute -personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies -against himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace -in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the -soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the -army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes -while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent -sentiments and falsehoods against him.<a id="FNanchor_274"></a><a -href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> Until such suspicions -were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but -they were perfectly willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon -triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their -feelings towards him were those of esteem and favor, stands confessed -in his own words,<a id="FNanchor_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275" -class="fnanchor">[275]</a> proving that the ingratitude of which he -complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.</p> - -<p>It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this -gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">[p. 170]</a></span> two months all -that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without -pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest and -policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just -declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending -Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became -extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which -their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to -take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, -Charmînus and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer -to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid, -by Seuthes; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes -and Herakleides, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers, -endeavored to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting -their views.<a id="FNanchor_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276" -class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Joyfully did the army accept this -offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them -by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly -pressed the Thracian prince to redress.<a id="FNanchor_277"></a><a -href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> He even sent Xenophon -to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which -afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe -lecture to Seuthes.<a id="FNanchor_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278" -class="fnanchor">[278]</a> But the latter was found less accessible -to the workings of eloquence than the Cyreian assembled soldiers; -nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon -the sum due;—together with civil expressions towards himself -personally,—an invitation to remain in his service with one -thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army,—and -renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and -grant of lands.</p> - -<p>When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six -thousand men,<a id="FNanchor_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279" -class="fnanchor">[279]</a> was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon -was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain -with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time -so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home, -that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic -town<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">[p. 171]</a></span> -where the army landed. Here he found Eukleides, a Phliasian -prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer -sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he -had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he -affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice -together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present -to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the entrails of -the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the -statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its -way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even -if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios -(the Gracious)<a id="FNanchor_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280" -class="fnanchor">[280]</a> is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed -to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at -Athens?” “Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do -so now, then (said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.” -The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; -sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom -at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very -same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton -and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay -to the army, and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they -bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus -for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one -year’s pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general -being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a -time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore -would not stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now -made<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">[p. 172]</a></span> up -with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any -man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the -present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to -him a favorite horse.</p> - -<p>Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious -respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, -had been admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon -was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself -throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by -the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming -events,—but also, according as it is rendered to the right -god and at the right season, determines his will, and therefore the -course of events, for dispensations favorable or unfavorable.</p> - -<p>But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet -ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across -mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia, -through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving -Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town -overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied -by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been -banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded -Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with -this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant, -another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and -his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great -hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named -Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a -tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with -three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable -booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having -sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon -communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who -had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to -make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many -volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed -to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more -than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler -dividend to each partner.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">[p. 173]</a></span></p> - -<p>Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment -of three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was -large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison. -It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around, -like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants -neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking -the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than -was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak, -yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance -could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by -Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood; -numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his -company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only -accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of -them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and -of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little -farther off seaward.<a id="FNanchor_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281" -class="fnanchor">[281]</a></p> - -<p>Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid -plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in -bringing Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, -horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above -all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous -sacrifices (those which had promised favorably before the first -unsuccessful attempt) now came true.”<a id="FNanchor_282"></a><a -href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> The persons of -this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for -a large ransom;<a id="FNanchor_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283" -class="fnanchor">[283]</a> which, together with the booty brought in, -made up a prodigious total to be divided.</p> - -<p>In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy -and admiration was paid to Xenophon, to which all the -army,—generals, captains, and soldiers,—and the -Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon -at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of -horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he -became possessor of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">[p. -174]</a></span> share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in -addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. “Here -then Xenophon (to use his own language<a id="FNanchor_284"></a><a -href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a>) had no reason to -complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may add,—what he -ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before -put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain of the -ingratitude of the army.</p> - -<p>As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and -the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his -leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus -that portion which had been confided to him as general, of -the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian -Artemis,<a id="FNanchor_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285" -class="fnanchor">[285]</a> he seems to have executed his intention of -returning to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286" -class="fnanchor">[286]</a> He must have arrived there, after an -absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at -farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates, -whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume. -That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence -from Athens;<a id="FNanchor_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287" -class="fnanchor">[287]</a> but whether it had come to his knowledge -before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and -indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of -memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by -the name of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his -arrival.</p> - -<p>That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military -service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by -himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second -visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that -he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again -in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became -again their commander,—and served for two years under the -Spartan general Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus.<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">[p. 175]</a></span> Such military -service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence -at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful -to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted -during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the -death of Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would -be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy -Tissaphernes; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to -take the command.<a id="FNanchor_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288" -class="fnanchor">[288]</a></p> - -<p>But during the two years after this latter event, Athens -became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into -conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans -and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander -of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into -Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their -Bœotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these -circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence -of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken -part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor because -his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has -been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was -now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his -own country.<a id="FNanchor_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289" -class="fnanchor">[289]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">[p. -176]</a></span> Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed -by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of -Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently -emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic -festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis -at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money -which Xenophon had dedicated therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This -money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillus, to be -consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted -her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated, -which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain -points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of -them a river called by the same name Selinus, having in it fish and a -shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue -of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced -scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them -was inscribed with the following words,—“This spot is sacred -to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits, -must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">[p. 177]</a></span> in repair -out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty the goddess -herself will take the omission in hand.”<a id="FNanchor_290"></a><a -href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a></p> - -<p>Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description -of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range -of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier -mountain called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture -for horses, oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for -deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision -at Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to -him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as -steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her -name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed -with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian<a id="FNanchor_291"></a><a -href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> settlers at Skillus, -and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens -after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognized that place, -along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he -made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the -property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also -all the neighboring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for -the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language -of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, -game, and sweetmeats;<a id="FNanchor_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292" -class="fnanchor">[292]</a> the game being provided by a general hunt, -which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbors -took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe -and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, -was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both -hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as -we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses -and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.</p> - -<p>Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">[p. 178]</a></span> by the army -at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the -same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber -of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and -that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of -twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to -enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious -information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian -informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant -in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition -of his various works. The interesting description which he -himself gives of his residence at Skillus, implies a state of -things not present and continuing,<a id="FNanchor_293"></a><a -href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> but past and gone; -other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to -show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillus lasted no longer -than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During -the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra -(371 <small>B.C.</small>), Xenophon, with his family and his -fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to -have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not -only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta,—the sentence -of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part -of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright -as an Athenian citizen and Knight.<a id="FNanchor_294"></a><a -href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> Two of his sons, -Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the -cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where the -former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while -his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject -of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the -orator Deinarchus.<a id="FNanchor_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295" -class="fnanchor">[295]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">[p. 179]</a></span></p> - -<p>On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close -of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, -I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future, -in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile -(in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we -probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our -knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary -world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted, -afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary -compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of -the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in -the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any -systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages, -against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on -resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct -the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It -more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by -Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that -he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the -worthlessness of his own countrymen.<a id="FNanchor_296"></a><a -href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> Against such -perfect weakness and disorganization,<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_180">[p. 180]</a></span> nothing prevented the success of -the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal -antipathy.<a id="FNanchor_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297" -class="fnanchor">[297]</a> And we shall perceive hereafter the -military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, -Jason of Pheræ,<a id="FNanchor_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298" -class="fnanchor">[298]</a> and others down to Philip and -Alexander<a id="FNanchor_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299" -class="fnanchor">[299]</a>—firmly persuaded that with a -tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian force, combined with -exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing -or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important in -the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the retreat -of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an -important influence, for two generations to come,—and at the -peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever,—over -the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from the -treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the -Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and the force -of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion to herself. -Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength -against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side -of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially -strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her -real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time -exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action -and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and -discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens -with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer such -immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of -this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic -qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been -devoted to it in this History.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_72"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">[p. 181]</a></span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXII.<br /> - GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> three preceding -Chapters have been devoted exclusively to the narrative of the -Expedition and Retreat, immortalized by Xenophon, occupying the two -years intervening between about April 401 <small>B.C.</small> and -June 399 <small>B.C.</small> That event, replete as it is with -interest and pregnant with important consequences, stands apart from -the general sequence of Grecian affairs,—which sequence I now -resume.</p> - -<p>It will be recollected that as soon as Xenophon with his Ten -Thousand warriors descended from the rugged mountains between -Armenia and the Euxine to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus, and -began to lay their plans for returning to Central Greece,—they -found themselves within the Lacedæmonian empire, unable to advance -a step without consulting Lacedæmonian dictation, and obliged, -when they reached the Bosphorus, to endure without redress the -harsh and treacherous usage of the Spartan officers, Anaxibius and -Aristarchus.</p> - -<p>Of that empire the first origin has been set forth in my last -preceding volume. It began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami -in the Hellespont (September or October 405 <small>B.C.</small>), -where the Lacedæmonian Lysander, without the loss of a man, got -possession of the entire Athenian fleet and a large portion of their -crews,—with the exception of eight or nine triremes with which -the Athenian admiral Konon effected his escape to Euagoras at Cyprus. -The whole power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained -for the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Peiræus; a -consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in April -404 <small>B.C.</small>, when Lysander entered Athens in triumph, -dismantled Peiræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls. -With the exception of Athens herself,—whose citizens deferred -the moment of subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle -against the horrors of famine,—and<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_182">[p. 182]</a></span> of Samos,—no other Grecian -city offered any resistance to Lysander after the battle of -Ægospotami; which in fact not only took away from Athens her whole -naval force, but transferred it all over to him, and rendered him -admiral of a larger Grecian fleet than had ever been seen together -since the battle of Salamis.</p> - -<p>I have recounted in my sixty-fifth chapter, the sixteen months -of bitter suffering undergone by Athens immediately after her -surrender. The loss of her fleet and power was aggravated by an -extremity of internal oppression. Her oligarchical party and her -exiles, returning after having served with the enemy against her, -extorted from the public assembly, under the dictation of Lysander -who attended it in person, the appointment of an omnipotent council -of thirty for the ostensible purpose of framing a new constitution. -These thirty rulers,—among whom Kritias was the most violent, -and Theramenes (seemingly) the most moderate, or at least the soonest -satiated,—perpetrated cruelty and spoliation on the largest -scale, being protected against all resistance by a Lacedæmonian -harmost and garrison established in the acropolis. Besides numbers of -citizens put to death, so many others were driven into exile with the -loss of their property, that Thebes and the neighboring cities became -crowded with them. After about eight months of unopposed tyranny, the -Thirty found themselves for the first time attacked by Thrasybulus -at the head of a small party of these exiles coming out of Bœotia. -His bravery and good conduct,—combined with the enormities of -the Thirty, which became continually more nefarious, and to which -even numerous oligarchical citizens, as well as Theramenes himself, -successively became victims,—enabled him soon to strengthen -himself, to seize the Peiræus, and to carry on a civil war which -ultimately put down the tyrants.</p> - -<p>These latter were obliged to invoke the aid of a new Lacedæmonian -force. And had that force still continued at the disposal of -Lysander, all resistance on the part of Athens would have been -unavailing. But fortunately for the Athenians, the last few months -had wrought material change in the dispositions both of the -allies of Sparta and of many among her leading men. The allies, -especially Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred -and fear of Athens, now that she had lost her power,—but -even sympathized<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">[p. -183]</a></span> with her suffering exiles, and became disgusted -with the self-willed encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan -king Pausanias, together with some of the ephors, were also jealous -of the arbitrary and oppressive conduct of Lysander. Instead of -conducting the Lacedæmonian force to uphold at all price the -Lysandrian oligarchy, Pausanias appeared rather as an equitable -mediator to terminate the civil war. He refused to concur in any -measure for obstructing the natural tendency towards a revival of -the democracy. It was in this manner that Athens, rescued from that -sanguinary and rapacious <i>regime</i> which has passed into history under -the name of the Thirty Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble -and dependent member of the Spartan alliance,—with nothing but -the recollection of her former power, yet with her democracy again -in vigorous and tutelary action for internal government. The just -and gentle bearing of her democratical citizens, and the absence of -reactionary antipathies, after such cruel ill-treatment,—are -among the most honorable features in her history.</p> - -<p>The reader will find in my last volume, what I can only rapidly -glance at here, the details of that system of bloodshed, spoliation, -extinction of free speech and even of intellectual teaching, efforts -to implicate innocent citizens as agents in judicial assassination, -etc.,—which stained the year of Anarchy (as it was termed in -Athenian annals<a id="FNanchor_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300" -class="fnanchor">[300]</a>) immediately following the surrender of -the city. These details depend on evidence perfectly satisfactory; -for they are conveyed to us chiefly by Xenophon, whose sympathies are -decidedly oligarchical. From him too we learn another fact, not less -pregnant with instruction; that the knights or horsemen, the body of -richest proprietors at Athens, were the mainstay of the Thirty from -first to last, notwithstanding all the enormities of their career.</p> - -<p>We learn from these dark, but well-attested details, to -appreciate the auspices under which that period of history called -the Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by -no means confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, -the year of Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was -employed by the Athenians) arising out of the same combination<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">[p. 184]</a></span> of causes -and agents, was common to a very large proportion of the cities -throughout Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his -first year of naval command, had organized in most of the allied -cities factious combinations of some of the principal citizens, -corresponding with himself personally; by whose efforts in their -respective cities he was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously, -and whom he repaid, partly by seconding as much as he could their -injustices in their respective cities,—partly by promising -to strengthen their hands still farther as soon as victory should -be made sure.<a id="FNanchor_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301" -class="fnanchor">[301]</a> This policy, while it served as a stimulus -against the common enemy, contributed still more directly to -aggrandize Lysander himself; creating for him an ascendency of his -own, and imposing upon him personal obligations towards adherents, -apart from what was required by the interests of Sparta.</p> - -<p>The victory of Ægospotami, complete and decisive beyond all -expectations either of friend or foe, enabled him to discharge these -obligations with interest. All Greece at once made submission to -the Lacedæmonians,<a id="FNanchor_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302" -class="fnanchor">[302]</a> except Athens and Samos,—and these -two only held out a few months. It was now the first business -of the victorious commander to remunerate his adherents, and to -take permanent security for Spartan dominion as well as for his -own. In the greater number of cities, he established an oligarchy -of ten citizens, or a dekarchy,<a id="FNanchor_303"></a><a -href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> composed of his own -partisans; while he at the same time planted in each a Lacedæmonian -harmost or governor, with a garrison to uphold the new oligarchy. The -dekarchy of ten Lysandrian partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost -to sustain them, became the general scheme of Hellenic government -throughout the Ægean, from Eubœa to the Thracian coast-towns, and -from Myletus to Byzantium. Lysander sailed round in person, with -his victorious fleet, to Byzantium and Chalkêdon, to the cities of -Lesbos, to Thasos, and other places,—while he sent Eteonikus -to Thrace, for the purpose of thus recasting the governments -everywhere. Not merely those cities which had hitherto been on -the Athenian side, but also those which had acted as allies<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">[p. 185]</a></span> of Sparta, -were subjected to the same intestine revolution and the same -foreign constraint.<a id="FNanchor_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304" -class="fnanchor">[304]</a> Everywhere the new Lysandrian dekarchy -superseded the previous governments, whether oligarchical or -democratical.</p> - -<p>At Thasus, as well as in other places, this revolution was -not accomplished without much bloodshed as well as treacherous -stratagem, nor did Lysander himself scruple to enforce, personally -and by his own presence, the execution and expulsion of suspected -citizens.<a id="FNanchor_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305" -class="fnanchor">[305]</a> In many places, however, simple terrorism -probably sufficed. The new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and -procured recognition of their usurpation by the menace of inviting -the victorious admiral with his fleet of two hundred sail, and by -the simple arrival of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Not only was each -town obliged to provide a fortified citadel and maintenance for this -governor with his garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to one -thousand talents annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed -ratably upon each city by Lysander.<a id="FNanchor_306"></a><a -href="#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p> - -<p>In what spirit these new dekarchies would govern, consisting as -they did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity -and ambition,<a id="FNanchor_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307" -class="fnanchor">[307]</a>—who, to all the unscrupulous lust -of power which characterized Lysander himself, added a thirst for -personal gain, from which he was exempt, and were now about to -reimburse<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">[p. 186]</a></span> -themselves for services already rendered to him,—the general -analogy of Grecian history would sufficiently teach us, though we -are without special details. But in reference to this point, we -have not merely general analogy to guide us; we have farther the -parallel case of the Thirty at Athens, the particulars of whose -rule are well known and have already been alluded to. These Thirty, -with the exception of the difference of number, were to all intents -and purposes a Lysandrian dekarchy; created by the same originating -force, placed under the like circumstances, and animated by the like -spirit and interests. Every subject town would produce its Kritias -and Theramenes, and its body of wealthy citizens like the knights -or horsemen at Athens to abet their oppressions, under Lacedæmonian -patronage and the covering guard of the Lacedæmonian harmost. -Moreover, Kritias, with all his vices, was likely to be better -rather than worse, as compared with his oligarchical parallel in any -other less cultivated city. He was a man of letters and philosophy, -accustomed to the conversation of Sokrates, and to the discussion of -ethical and social questions. We may say the same of the knights or -horsemen at Athens. Undoubtedly they had been better educated, and -had been exposed to more liberalizing and improving influences, than -the corresponding class elsewhere. If, then, these knights at Athens -had no shame in serving as accomplices to the Thirty throughout all -their enormities, we need not fear to presume that other cities -would furnish a body of wealthy men yet more unscrupulous, and a -leader at least as sanguinary, rapacious, and full of antipathies, -as Kritias. As at Athens, so elsewhere; the dekarchs would begin by -putting to death notorious political opponents, under the name of -“the wicked men;”<a id="FNanchor_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308" -class="fnanchor">[308]</a> they would next proceed to deal in -the same manner with men of known probity and courage, likely to -take a lead in resisting oppression.<a id="FNanchor_309"></a><a -href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> Their career of -blood would continue,—in spite of remonstrances from more -moderate persons among their own number,<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_187">[p. 187]</a></span> like Theramenes,—until -they contrived some stratagem for disarming the citizens, -which would enable them to gratify both their antipathies and -their rapacity by victims still more numerous,—many of -such victims being wealthy men, selected for purposes of pure -spoliation.<a id="FNanchor_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310" -class="fnanchor">[310]</a> They would next despatch by force -any obtrusive monitor from their own number, like Theramenes; -probably with far less ceremony than accompanied the perpetration -of this crime at Athens, where we may trace the effect of -those judicial forms and habits to which the Athenian public -had been habituated,—overruled indeed, yet still not -forgotten. There would hardly remain any fresh enormity still -to commit, over and above the multiplied executions, except to -banish from the city all but their own immediate partisans, and -to reward these latter with choice estates confiscated from -the victims.<a id="FNanchor_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311" -class="fnanchor">[311]</a> If called upon to excuse such tyranny, -the leader of a dekarchy would have sufficient invention to employ -the plea of Kritias,—that all changes of government were -unavoidably death-dealing, and that nothing less than such stringent -measures would suffice to maintain his city in suitable dependence -upon Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_312" -class="fnanchor">[312]</a></p> - -<p>Of course, it is not my purpose to affirm that in any other -city, precisely the same phenomena took place as those which -occurred in Athens. But we are nevertheless perfectly warranted -in regarding the history of the Athenian Thirty as a fair sample, -from whence to derive our idea of those Lysandrian dekarchies -which now overspread the Grecian world. Doubtless, each had its -own peculiar march; some were less tyrannical; but, perhaps, some -even more tyrannical, regard being had to the size of the city. -And in point of fact, Isokrates, who speaks with indignant horror -of these dekarchies, while he denounces those features which they -had in common with the triakontarchy at Athens,—extrajudicial -murders, spoliations, and banishments,—notices one enormity -besides, which we do not find in the latter, violent outrages upon -boys and women.<a id="FNanchor_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313" -class="fnanchor">[313]</a> Nothing of this kind is ascribed -to Kritias and his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">[p. -188]</a></span> companions;<a id="FNanchor_314"></a><a -href="#Footnote_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a> and it is a -considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian manners, -that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of other -violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs -named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would -find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as -their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to -the former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening -insolence of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans -with an exaltation comprising every sort of license and tyranny, -stained the dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on -private as well as on public grounds.<a id="FNanchor_315"></a><a -href="#Footnote_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> No individual -Greek had ever before wielded so prodigious a power of enriching -friends or destroying enemies, in this universal reorganization -of Greece;<a id="FNanchor_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316" -class="fnanchor">[316]</a> nor was there ever any power more -deplorably abused.</p> - -<p>It was thus that the Lacedæmonian empire imposed upon each of -the subject cities a double oppression;<a id="FNanchor_317"></a><a -href="#Footnote_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> the native decemvirs, -and the foreign harmost; each abetting the other, and forming -together an aggravated pressure upon the citizens, from which -scarce any escape was left. The Thirty at Athens paid the greatest -possible court to the harmost Kallibius,<a id="FNanchor_318"></a><a -href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> and put to -death<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">[p. 189]</a></span> -individual Athenians offensive to him, in order to purchase his -coöperation in their own violences. The few details which we possess -respecting these harmosts (who continued throughout the insular and -maritime cities for about ten years, until the battle of Knidus, or -as long as the maritime empire of Sparta lasted,—but in various -continental dependencies considerably longer, that is, until the -defeat of Leuktra in 371 <small>B.C.</small>), are all for the most -part discreditable. We have seen in the last chapter the description -given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, of the harsh and treacherous -manner in which they acted towards the returning Cyreian soldiers, -combined with their corrupt subservience to Pharnabazus. We learn -from him that it depended upon the fiat of a Lacedæmonian harmost -whether these soldiers should be proclaimed enemies and excluded -forever from their native cities; and Kleander, the harmost of -Byzantium, who at first threatened them with this treatment, was only -induced by the most unlimited submission, combined with very delicate -management, to withdraw his menace. The cruel proceeding of Anaxibius -and Aristarchus, who went so far as to sell four hundred of these -soldiers into slavery, has been recounted a few pages above. Nothing -can be more arbitrary or reckless than their proceedings. If they -could behave thus towards a body of Greek soldiers full of acquired -glory, effective either as friends or as enemies, and having generals -capable of prosecuting their collective interests and making their -complaints heard,—what protection would a private citizen of -any subject city, Byzantium or Perinthus, be likely to enjoy against -their oppression?</p> - -<p>The story of Aristodemus, the harmost of Oreus in Eubœa, evinces -that no justice could be obtained against any of their enor<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">[p. 190]</a></span>mities from the -ephors of Sparta. That harmost, among many other acts of brutal -violence, seized a beautiful youth, son of a free citizen at Oreus, -out of the palæstra,—carried him off,—and after vainly -endeavoring to overcome his resistance, put him to death. The father -of the youth went to Sparta, made known the atrocities, and appealed -to the ephors and Senate for redress. But a deaf ear was turned to -his complaints, and in anguish of mind he slew himself. Indeed, we -know that these Spartan authorities would grant no redress, not -merely against harmosts, but even against private Spartan citizens, -who had been guilty of gross crime out of their own country. A -Bœotian near Leuktra, named Skedasus, preferred complaint that two -Spartans, on their way from Delphi, after having been hospitably -entertained in his house, had first violated, and afterwards -killed, his two daughters; but even for so flagitious an outrage -as this, no redress could be obtained.<a id="FNanchor_319"></a><a -href="#Footnote_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> Doubtless, -when a powerful foreign ally, like the Persian satrap -Pharnabazus,<a id="FNanchor_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_320" -class="fnanchor">[320]</a> complained to the ephors of the conduct -of a Lacedæmonian harmost or admiral, his representations would -receive attention; and we learn that the ephors were thus induced -not merely to recall Lysander from the Hellespont, but to put to -death another officer, Thorax, for corrupt appropriation of money. -But for a private citizen in any subject city, the superintending -authority of Sparta would be not merely remote but deaf and -immovable, so as to afford him no protection whatever, and to leave -him altogether at the mercy of the harmost. It seems, too, that -the rigor of Spartan training, and peculiarity of habits, rendered -individual Lacedæmonians on foreign service more self-willed, more -incapable of entering into the customs or feelings of others, and -more liable to degenerate when set free from the strict watch of -home,—than other Greeks generally.<a id="FNanchor_321"></a><a -href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">[p. 191]</a></span></p> - -<p>Taking all these causes of evil together,—the -dekarchies, the harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of -Lysander,—and construing other parts of the Grecian world by -the analogy of Athens under the Thirty,—we shall be warranted -in affirming that the first years of the Spartan Empire, which -followed upon the victory of Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading -tyranny and multifarious intestine calamity, such as Greece had -never before endured. The hardships of war, severe in many ways, -were now at an end, but they were replaced by a state of suffering -not the less difficult to bear because it was called peace. And what -made the suffering yet more intolerable was, that it was a bitter -disappointment, and a flagrant violation of promises proclaimed, -repeatedly and explicitly, by the Lacedæmonians themselves.</p> - -<p>For more than thirty years preceding,—from times earlier -than the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,—the Spartans -had professed to interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece, -and of putting down the usurped ascendency of Athens. All the allies -of Sparta had been invited into strenuous action,—all those -of Athens had been urged to revolt,—under the soul-stirring -cry of “Freedom to Greece.” The earliest incitements addressed by -the Corinthians to Sparta in 432 <small>B.C.</small>, immediately -after the Korkyræan dispute, called upon her to stand forward in -fulfilment of her recognized function as “Liberator of Greece,” -and denounced her as guilty of connivance with Athens if she -held back.<a id="FNanchor_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322" -class="fnanchor">[322]</a> Athens was branded as the “despot city;” -which had already absorbed the independence of many Greeks, and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">[p. 192]</a></span> menaced that of -all the rest. The last formal requisition borne by the Lacedæmonian -envoys to Athens in the winter immediately preceding the war, ran -thus,—“If you desire the continuance of peace with Sparta, -restore to the Greeks their autonomy.”<a id="FNanchor_323"></a><a -href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> When Archidamus, -king of Sparta, approached at the head of his army to besiege -Platæa, the Platæans laid claim to autonomy as having been solemnly -guaranteed to them by King Pausanias after the great victory near -their town. Upon which Archidamus replied,—“Your demand is -just; we are prepared to confirm <i>your</i> autonomy,—but we call -upon you to aid us in securing the like for those other Greeks who -have been enslaved by Athens. This is the sole purpose of our great -present effort.”<a id="FNanchor_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324" -class="fnanchor">[324]</a> And the banner of general enfranchisement, -which the Lacedæmonians thus held up at the outset of the war, -enlisted in their cause encouraging sympathy and good wishes -throughout Greece.<a id="FNanchor_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325" -class="fnanchor">[325]</a></p> - -<p>But the most striking illustration by far, of the seductive -promises held out by the Lacedæmonians, was afforded by the conduct -of Brasidas in Thrace, when he first came into the neighborhood -of the Athenian allies during the eighth year of the war (424 -<small>B.C.</small>). In his memorable discourse addressed to -the public assembly at Akanthus, he takes the greatest pains to -satisfy them that he came only for the purpose of realizing the -promise of enfranchisement proclaimed by the Lacedæmonians at the -beginning of the war.<a id="FNanchor_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326" -class="fnanchor">[326]</a> Having expected, when acting in such -a cause, nothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">[p. -193]</a></span> less than a hearty welcome, he is astonished to -find their gates closed against him. “I am come (said he) not to -injure, but to liberate the Greeks; after binding the Lacedæmonian -authorities by the most solemn oaths, that all whom I may bring -over shall be dealt with as autonomous allies. We do not wish to -obtain you as allies either by force or fraud, but to act as your -allies at a time when you are enslaved by the Athenians. You ought -not to suspect my purposes, in the face of these solemn assurances; -least of all ought any man to hold back through apprehension of -private enmities, and through fear lest I should put the city into -the hands of a few chosen partisans. I am not come to identify -myself with local faction: I am not the man to offer you an unreal -liberty by breaking down your established constitution, for the -purpose of enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the Few to the -Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign dominion; -and we Lacedæmonians should incur nothing but reproach, instead -of reaping thanks and honor for our trouble. We should draw upon -ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we are -trying to put down Athens; and that, too, in aggravated measure, -worse than those who have never made honorable professions; since -to men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than -open violence.<a id="FNanchor_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_327" -class="fnanchor">[327]</a>—If (continued Brasidas) in spite -of my assurances, you still withhold from me your coöperation, I -shall think myself authorized to constrain you by force. We should -not be warranted in forcing freedom on any<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_194">[p. 194]</a></span> unwilling parties, except -with a view to some common good. But as we seek not empire for -ourselves,—as we struggle only to put down the empire of -others,—as we offer autonomy to each and all,—so we -should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to persist in -your opposition.”<a id="FNanchor_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328" -class="fnanchor">[328]</a></p> - -<p>Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the -most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against -the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions and granted -nothing after the victory had been assured,—the Lacedæmonians -thus held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general -autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even -ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that -after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens -appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps -against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedæmonians began to -think more of empire,<a id="FNanchor_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329" -class="fnanchor">[329]</a> and less of Grecian freedom; which, -indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia, -was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watchword still -continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously -professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at -as a means to the liberation of Greece.<a id="FNanchor_330"></a><a -href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a></p> - -<p>The victory of Ægospotami with its consequences cruelly -undeceived every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned -by the solemn oaths of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424 -<small>B.C.</small>—and the proceedings of the Lacedæmonian Lysander -in 405-404 <small>B.C.</small>, the commencing hour of Spartan -omnipotence,—stand in such literal and flagrant contradiction, that -we might almost imagine the former to have foreseen the possibility -of such a successor, and to have tried to disgrace and disarm him -beforehand. The dekarchies of Lysander<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_195">[p. 195]</a></span> realized that precise ascendency of -a few chosen partisans which Brasidas repudiates as an abomination -worse than foreign dominion; while the harmosts and garrison, -installed in the dependent cities along with the native decemvirs, -planted the second variety of mischief as well as the first, each -aggravating the other. Had the noble-minded Kallikratidas gained a -victory at Arginusæ, and lived to close the war, he would probably -have tried, with more or less of success, to make some approach to -the promises of Brasidas. But it was the double misfortune of Greece, -first that the closing victory was gained by such an admiral as -Lysander, the most unscrupulous of all power-seekers, partly for his -country, and still more for himself,—next, that the victory was so -decisive, sudden and imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or in -a position to insist upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, acting in the -name of Sparta, became omnipotent, not merely over enemies, but over -allies; and to a certain degree even over the Spartan authorities -themselves. There was no present necessity for conciliating -allies,—still less for acting up to former engagements; so that -nothing remained to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations -of the Spartan ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the -details in his own way. But former assurances, though Sparta was -in a condition to disregard them, were not forgotten by others; -and the recollection of them imparted additional bitterness to the -oppressions of the decemvirs and harmosts.<a id="FNanchor_331"></a><a -href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> In perfect -consistency<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">[p. -196]</a></span> with her misrule throughout Eastern -Greece,<a id="FNanchor_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332" -class="fnanchor">[332]</a> too, Sparta identified herself with the -energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to erect -and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of action -which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.</p> - -<p>The empire of Sparta thus constituted at the end of 405 -<small>B.C.</small>, maintained itself in full grandeur -for somewhat above ten years, until the naval battle of -Knidus,<a id="FNanchor_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333" -class="fnanchor">[333]</a> in 394 <small>B.C.</small> That defeat -de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">[p. 197]</a></span>stroyed -her fleet and maritime ascendency, yet left her in undiminished -power on land, which she still maintained until her defeat by -the Thebans<a id="FNanchor_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334" -class="fnanchor">[334]</a> at Leuktra in 371 <small>B.C.</small> -Throughout all this time, it was her established system to keep -up Spartan harmosts and garrisons in the dependent cities on the -continent as well as in the islands. Even the Chians, who had -been her most active allies during the last eight years of the -war, were compelled to submit to this hardship; besides having -all their fleet taken away from them.<a id="FNanchor_335"></a><a -href="#Footnote_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> But the native -dekarchies, though at first established by Lysander universally -throughout the maritime dependencies, did not last as a system so -long as the harmosts. Composed as they were to a great degree of -the personal nominees and confederates of Lysander, they suffered -in part by the reactionary jealousy which in time made itself -felt against his overweening ascendency. After continuing for -some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan ephors, who -proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely know when) -to resume their preëxisting governments.<a id="FNanchor_336"></a><a -href="#Footnote_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> Some of the -dekarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but -several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough -to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever -systematically put them down, as Lysander had systematically set them -up.</p> - -<p>The government of the Thirty at Athens would never have been -overthrown if the oppressed Athenians had been obliged to rely -on a tutelary interference of the Spartan ephors to help them in -overthrowing it. My last volume has shown that this nefarious<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">[p. 198]</a></span> oligarchy came -to its end by the unassisted efforts of Thrasybulus and the Athenian -democrats themselves. It is true, indeed, that the arrogance and -selfishness of Sparta and of Lysander had alienated the Thebans, -Corinthians, Megarians, and other neighboring allies, and induced -them to sympathize with the Athenian exiles against the atrocities -of the Thirty,—but they never rendered any positive assistance -of moment. The inordinate personal ambition of Lysander had also -offended King Pausanias and the Spartan ephors, so that they too -became indifferent to the Thirty, who were his creatures. But this -merely deprived the Thirty of that foreign support which Lysander, -had he still continued in the ascendent, would have extended to them -in full measure. It was not the positive cause of their downfall. -That crisis was brought about altogether by the energy of Thrasybulus -and his companions, who manifested such force and determination -as could not have been put down without an extraordinary display -of Spartan military power; a display not entirely safe when the -sympathies of the chief allies were with the other side,—and -at any rate adverse to the inclinations of Pausanias. As it was -with the Thirty at Athens, so it probably was also with the -dekarchies in the dependent cities. The Spartan ephors took no -steps to put them down; but where the resistance of the citizens -was strenuous enough to overthrow them, no Spartan intervention -came to prop them up, and the harmost perhaps received orders not -to consider his authority as indissolubly linked with theirs. The -native forces of each dependent city being thus left to find their -own level, the decemvirs, once installed, would doubtless maintain -themselves in a great number; while in other cases they would be -overthrown,—or, perhaps, would contrive to perpetuate their -dominion by compromise and alliance with other oligarchical sections. -This confused and unsettled state of the dekarchies,—some still -existing, others half-existing, others again defunct,—prevailed -in 396 <small>B.C.</small>, when Lysander accompanied Agesilaus -into Asia, in the full hope that he should have influence enough to -reorganize them all.<a id="FNanchor_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337" -class="fnanchor">[337]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">[p. -199]</a></span> We must recollect that no other dependent city would -possess the same means of offering energetic resistance to its local -decemvirs, as Athens offered to the Thirty; and that the insular -Grecian cities were not only feeble individually, but naturally -helpless against the lords of the sea.<a id="FNanchor_338"></a><a -href="#Footnote_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a></p> - -<p>Such then was the result throughout Greece, when that long war, -which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was -terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens -was substituted, not the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial -Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, in -399 <small>B.C.</small>, of the ascendency exercised throughout all -the Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers, -but even by the private citizens, of Sparta. “The Lacedæmonians -(says he in addressing the Cyreian army) are now the presidents of -Greece; and even any single private Lacedæmonian can accomplish -what he pleases.”<a id="FNanchor_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339" -class="fnanchor">[339]</a> “All the cities (he says in another place) -then obeyed whatever order they might receive from a Lacedæmonian -citizen.”<a id="FNanchor_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340" -class="fnanchor">[340]</a> Not merely was the general ascendency thus -omnipresent and irresistible, but it was enforced with a stringency -of detail, and darkened by a thousand accompaniments of tyranny and -individual abuse, such as had never been known under the much-decried -empire of Athens.</p> - -<p>We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire, in speeches -made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest -antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the -addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the -Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian war,<a id="FNanchor_341"></a><a -href="#Footnote_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a>—that<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200">[p. 200]</a></span> of the envoys -from Mitylênê delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates, -when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing -need of support,—the discourse of Brasidas in the public -assembly at Akanthus,—and more than one speech also from -Hermokrates, impressing upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well -as fear of Athens.<a id="FNanchor_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342" -class="fnanchor">[342]</a> Whoever reads these discourses, will see -that they dwell almost exclusively on the great political wrong -inherent in the very fact of her empire, robbing so many Grecian -communities of their legitimate autonomy, over and above the tribute -imposed. That Athens had thus already enslaved many cities, and was -only watching for opportunities to enslave many more, is the theme -upon which they expatiate. But of practical grievances,—of -cruelty, oppression, spoliation, multiplied exiles, etc., of -high-handed wrong committed by individual Athenians,—not one -word is spoken. Had there been the smallest pretext for introducing -such inflammatory topics, how much more impressive would have -been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies of the Akanthians! -How vehement would have been the denunciations of the Mitylenæan -envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic language which -we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the autonomy of her -subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity, sometimes -even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the silence -of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful -exculpation.</p> - -<p>The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the -battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire -complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast -with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which -Sparta had not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only -ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance,—other -topics stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the -harmosts (some of the latter being Helots), the standing instruments -of Spartan empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire -itself; as the language held by Brasidas at Akanthus admits them -to be beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject-city under -Sparta, governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian -harmost in the acropolis,—the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_201">[p. 201]</a></span> sense of indignity arising from -the fact of subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible -suffering arising from the enormities of those individual rulers -whom the imperial state had set up. Now Athens set up no local -rulers,—no native Ten or native Thirty,—no resident -Athenian harmosts or garrisons. This was of itself an unspeakable -exemption, when compared with the condition of cities subject, not -only to the Spartan empire, but also under that empire to native -decemvirs like Kritias, and Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or -Aristodemus. A city subject to Athens had to bear definite burdens -enforced by its own government, which was liable in case of default -or delinquency to be tried before the popular Athenian Dikastery. -But this same dikastery (as I have shown in a former volume, and -as is distinctly stated by Thucydides)<a id="FNanchor_343"></a><a -href="#Footnote_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> was the harbor of -refuge to each subject-city; not less against individual Athenian -wrong-doers than against misconduct from other cities. Those -who complained of the hardship suffered by a subject-city, from -the obligation of bringing causes to be tried in the dikastery -of Athens,—even if we take the case as they state it, and -overlook the unfairness of omitting those numerous instances -wherein the city was thus enabled to avert or redress wrong -done to its own citizens,—would have complained both more -loudly and with greater justice of an ever-present Athenian -harmost; especially if there were coexistent a native government -of Ten oligarchs, exchanging with him guilty connivances, like -the partnership of the Thirty at Athens with the Lacedæmonian -harmost Kallibius.<a id="FNanchor_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344" -class="fnanchor">[344]</a></p> - -<p>In no one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan -empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject-cities -or for Greece generally; while in many points, it was a great and -serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the -more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of -Ægospotami a precious opportunity,—such as Athens had never -had, and such as never again recurred,—of reorganizing the -Grecian world on wise principles, and with a view to Pan-hellenic -stability and harmony. It is not her greatest sin to have -refused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202">[p. 202]</a></span> to -grant universal autonomy. She had indeed promised it; but we might -pardon a departure from specific performance, had she exchanged the -boon for one far greater, which it was within her reasonable power, -at the end of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, to confer. That universal -town autonomy, towards which the Grecian instinct tended, though -immeasurably better than universal subjection, was yet accompanied -by much internal discord, and by the still more formidable evil of -helplessness against any efficient foreign enemy. To ensure to the -Hellenic world external safety as well as internal concord, it was -not a new empire which was wanted, but a new political combination -on equitable and comprehensive principles; divesting each town of a -portion of its autonomy, and creating a common authority, responsible -to all, for certain definite controlling purposes. If ever a -tolerable federative system would have been practicable in Greece, it -was after the battle of Ægospotami. The Athenian empire,—which, -with all its defects, I believe to have been much better for the -subject-cities than universal autonomy would have been,—had -already removed many difficulties, and shown that combined and -systematic action of the maritime Grecian world was no impossibility. -Sparta might now have substituted herself for Athens, not as heir -to the imperial power, but as president and executive agent of a -new Confederacy of Delos,—reviving the equal, comprehensive, -and liberal principles, on which that confederacy had first been -organized.</p> - -<p>It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of -the original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible to -its value. As soon as the pressing alarm from Persia had passed -over, some had discontinued sending deputies, others had disobeyed -requisitions, others again had bought off their obligations, -and forfeited their rights as autonomous and voting members, by -pecuniary bargain with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties -of her presidency to enforce obedience to the Synod against all -reluctant members, made successively many enemies, and was gradually -converted, almost without her own seeking, from President into -Emperor, as the only means of obviating the total dissolution -of the Confederacy. But though such untoward circumstances had -happened before, it does not follow that they would now have -happened again, assuming the same experiment to have been retried -by Sparta, with manifest sincerity of purpose and tolerable<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203">[p. 203]</a></span> wisdom. The -Grecian world, especially the maritime portion of it, had passed -through trials not less painful than instructive, during this -important interval. Nor does it seem rash to suppose, that the -bulk of its members might now have been disposed to perform steady -confederate duties, at the call and under the presidency of Sparta, -had she really attempted to reorganize a liberal confederacy, -treating every city as autonomous and equal, except in so far -as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the general synod. -However impracticable such a scheme may appear, we must recollect -that even Utopian schemes have their transient moments, if not of -certain success, at least of commencement not merely possible but -promising. And my belief is, that had Kallikratidas, with his ardent -Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of resolution, been the final -victor over imperial Athens, he would not have let the moment of -pride and omnipotence pass over without essaying some noble project -like that sketched above. It is to be remembered that Athens had -never had the power of organizing any such generous Pan-hellenic -combination. She had become depopularized in the legitimate execution -of her trust, as president of the Confederacy of Delos, against -refractory members;<a id="FNanchor_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345" -class="fnanchor">[345]</a> and had been obliged to choose between -breaking up the Confederacy, and keeping it together under the -strong compression of an imperial chief. But Sparta had not yet -become depopularized. She now stood without competitor as leader -of the Grecian world, and might at that moment have reasonably -hoped to carry the members of it along with her to any liberal -and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with proper -earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under the -influence of Lysander; founding a new empire far more oppressive and -odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none -of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even -more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent -Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also,—never to return.</p> - -<p>Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her -empire, with a tribute of more than one thousand talents -imposed upon them,—and continuing to be chief of her -landed alliance in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204">[p. -204]</a></span> Central Greece, which now included Athens as a -simple unit,—Sparta was the all-pervading imperial power -in Greece.<a id="FNanchor_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346" -class="fnanchor">[346]</a> Her new empire was organized by the -victorious Lysander; but with so much arrogance, and so much -personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees of his -own, decemvirs and harmosts,—that he raised numerous rivals -and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy -entertained by king Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and -Corinth, and the manner in which these new phenomena brought about -(in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as a -revived democracy into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,—has been -already related.</p> - -<p>In the early months of 403 <small>B.C.</small>, Lysander was -partly at home, partly in Attica, exerting himself to sustain -the falling oligarchy of Athens against the increasing force of -Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. In this purpose -he was directly thwarted by the opposing views of king Pausanias, -and three out of the five ephors.<a id="FNanchor_347"></a><a -href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> But though the -ephors thus checked Lysander in regard to Athens, they softened the -humiliation by sending him abroad to a fresh command on the Asiatic -coast and the Hellespont; a step which had the farther advantage -of putting asunder two such marked rivals as he and Pausanias had -now become. That which Lysander had tried in vain to do at Athens, -he was doubtless better able to do in Asia, where he had neither -Pausanias nor the ephors along with him. He could lend effective -aid to the dekarchies and harmosts in the Asiatic cities, against -any internal opposition with which they might be threatened. Bitter -were the complaints which reached Sparta, both against him and -against his ruling partisans. At length the ephors were prevailed -upon to disavow the dekarchies; and to proclaim that they would -not hinder the cities from resuming their former governments -at pleasure.<a id="FNanchor_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_348" -class="fnanchor">[348]</a></p> - -<p>But all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the -maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall -of Lysander from his command in the Hellespont, had not Pharnabazus -joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations -so strengthened the enemies of Lysander at Sparta, that a<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205">[p. 205]</a></span> peremptory -order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to -Sparta; but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless -power which he had enjoyed on his command was so insupportable -to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the -temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow -to discharge.<a id="FNanchor_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349" -class="fnanchor">[349]</a> He appears also to have visited -the temples of Delphi and Dodona,<a id="FNanchor_350"></a><a -href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> with secret ambitious -projects which will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal -softened the jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after -a year or two, reëstablished in great influence and ascendency. He -was sent as Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know, -to Syracuse, where he lent countenance and aid to the recently -established despotism of Dionysius.<a id="FNanchor_351"></a><a -href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a></p> - -<p>The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, -Æolis,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206">[p. 206]</a></span> -and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta -at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after -the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king -had renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous -hand of Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years; -how Sparta, bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal -conventions to surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas -even reproved the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain; -how Athens also, in the days of her weakness, competing for the -same advantage, had expressed her willingness to pay the same -price for it.<a id="FNanchor_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352" -class="fnanchor">[352]</a> After the battle of Ægospotami, -this convention was carried into effect; though seemingly not -without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus on one side, and -Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.<a id="FNanchor_353"></a><a -href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> The latter was -Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important as a -station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have -retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more -complete command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad, -than ever they had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in -the interior.<a id="FNanchor_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354" -class="fnanchor">[354]</a></p> - -<p>Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition -of the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to -Persian regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, -was now materially determined,—first, by the competing claims -of Cyrus, who wished to take them away from him, and tried to get -such transfer ordered at court,—next, by the aspirations -of that young prince to the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his -hope of success on Grecian coöperation, it was highly important -to him to render himself popular among the Greeks, especially on -his own side of the Ægean. Partly his own manifestations of just -and conciliatory temper, partly the bad name and known perfidy of -Tissaphernes, induced the Grecian cities with one accord to revolt -from the latter. All threw themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except -Miletus, where Tissaphernes interposed in time, slew the leaders -of the intended revolt, and banished many of their partisans. -Cyrus, receiving the exiles with distinguished favor, levied an -army to besiege Miletus and procure their restoration; while<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207">[p. 207]</a></span> he at the same -time threw strong Grecian garrisons into the other cities to protect -them against attack.<a id="FNanchor_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355" -class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p> - -<p>This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more -comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both -parties were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek -soldiers and Milesian exiles on one side,—Tissaphernes on -the other. How that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the -future history both of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have -already recounted. Probably the impression brought back by the -Lacedæmonian fleet which left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he -had surmounted the most difficult country without any resistance, -was highly favorable to his success. So much the more painful would -be the disappointment among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his -death was afterwards brought; so much the greater their alarm, -when Tissaphernes, having relinquished the pursuit of the Ten -Thousand Greeks at the moment when they entered the mountains of -Karduchia, came down as victor to the seaboard; more powerful than -ever,—rewarded<a id="FNanchor_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356" -class="fnanchor">[356]</a> by the Great King, for the services -which he had rendered against Cyrus, with all the territory which -had been governed by the latter, as well as with the title of -commander-in-chief over all the neighboring satraps,—and -prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the revolted maritime -cities. He began by attacking Kymê;<a id="FNanchor_357"></a><a -href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> ravaging the -territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from them a -still larger contribution, when the approach of winter rendered it -inconvenient to besiege their city.</p> - -<p>In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to -Sparta, as the great imperial power of Greece, to entreat -her protection against the aggravated slavery impending -over them.<a id="FNanchor_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358" -class="fnanchor">[358]</a> The Lacedæmonians had nothing farther to -expect from the king of Persia, with whom they had already broken -the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover, the fame of the Ten -Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along the Euxine towards -Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece, inspiring signal -contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes of enrichment by -war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the Spartan ephors were -induced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208">[p. 208]</a></span> -to comply with the petition of their Asiatic countrymen, and to -send over to Asia Thimbron at the head of a considerable force: -two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had been enfranchised) and -four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed, accompanied by three -hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of those who had been -adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an aid granted by Athens -at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving in Asia during the -winter of 400-399 <small>B.C.</small>, Thimbron was reinforced in -the spring of 399 <small>B.C.</small> by the Cyreian army, who -were brought across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, -and taken into Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became -more than a match for the satraps, even on the plains where they -could employ their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes -of Pergamus and Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient -grants from Xerxes to their ancestors, joined their troops to his, -contributing much to enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure -from the Cyreians. Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large -an army. He not only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was -even unable to maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged -indiscriminately both friends and foes.<a id="FNanchor_359"></a><a -href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> Such loud complaints -were transmitted to Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, -that the ephors first sent him order to march into Karia, where -Tissaphernes resided,—and next, before that order was executed, -despatched Derkyllidas to supersede him; seemingly in the winter -399-398 <small>B.C.</small> Thimbron on returning to Sparta was -fined and banished.<a id="FNanchor_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360" -class="fnanchor">[360]</a></p> - -<p>It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent -in the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the -prodigious toils which they had gone through in their long march, -and having been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as -cheated by Seuthes,—were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to -be restrained, in the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon, -their most influential general, had now left them. Their conduct -greatly improved under Derkyllidas. And though such improvement -was doubtless owing partly to the superiority of the latter over -Thimbron, yet it seems also partly ascribable to the fact that<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209">[p. 209]</a></span> Xenophon, after -a few months of residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and -resumed the command of his old comrades.<a id="FNanchor_361"></a><a -href="#Footnote_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a></p> - -<p>Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to -have acquired the surname of Sisyphus.<a id="FNanchor_362"></a><a -href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> He had served -throughout all the concluding years of the war, and had been harmost -at Abydus during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned -him, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public -exposure with his shield on his arm;<a id="FNanchor_363"></a><a -href="#Footnote_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> this was (I presume) -a disgrace, because an officer of rank always had his shield -carried for him by an attendant, except in the actual encounter -of battle. Having never forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring -him, Derkyllidas now took advantage of a misunderstanding between -that satrap and Tissaphernes, to make a truce with the latter, -and conduct his army, eight thousand strong, into the territory -of the former.<a id="FNanchor_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364" -class="fnanchor">[364]</a> The mountainous region of Ida generally -known as the Troad,—inhabited by a population of Æolic Greeks -(who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous inhabitants), and -therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus,—was laid open to -him by a recent event, important in itself as well as instructive to -read.</p> - -<p>The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies; -each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute, -and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court -at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations, -little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the -rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In -like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies -or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the -satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military -force,—having liberty to govern in other respects as he<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210">[p. 210]</a></span> pleased. Besides -the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of constant -occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the deputy -to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the people -(we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one -and to the other.<a id="FNanchor_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365" -class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p> - -<p>This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to -a native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for -some time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a -widow with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the -point of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow -of Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to -be allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money -in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain -over his mistresses and his ministers,<a id="FNanchor_366"></a><a -href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a>—she said -to him,—“My husband was faithful to you, and paid his -tribute so regularly as to obtain your thanks. If I serve you no -worse than he, why should you name any other deputy? If I fail -in giving you satisfaction, you can always remove me, and give -the place to another.” Pharnabazus granted her petition, and -had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in her payment of -tribute,—frequent in bringing him presents,—and splendid, -beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of receiving him -whenever he visited the district.</p> - -<p>Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and -Kebrên,—inland towns, strong both by position and by -fortification, amidst the mountainous region once belonging to the -Teukri Gergithes. It was here too that she kept her treasures, -which, partly left by her husband, partly accumulated by herself, -had gradually reached an enormous sum. But her district also reached -down to the coast, comprising among other towns the classical name -of Ilium, and probably<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211">[p. -211]</a></span> her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She -maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries -in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both -as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for -conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime -towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of -the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot -to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished -himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against -the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her -military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he -paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to -ask her advice.<a id="FNanchor_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367" -class="fnanchor">[367]</a> So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia, -queen of Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best -appointed in his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when -he chose to call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound -opinions contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately -for the Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, -not to follow.<a id="FNanchor_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368" -class="fnanchor">[368]</a></p> - -<p>Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and -well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy -of Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had -not a domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law, -Meidias, a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms -of intimate confidence—“though she was scrupulously -mistrustful of every one else, as it is proper for a despot -to be,”<a id="FNanchor_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369" -class="fnanchor">[369]</a>—was so inflamed by his own -ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who told -him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212">[p. 212]</a></span> he was only -a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber. Following up -his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a beautiful -youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of the three -strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, -together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the commanders -in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until they -should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias -instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that -the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed -by Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant -reply to Meidias,—“Keep them until I come to seize them, and -seize you, too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I -were not to avenge the death of Mania.”<a id="FNanchor_370"></a><a -href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a></p> - -<p>At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap, -Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis almost -defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa, -Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared; -while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken -special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now -that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian -dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their -cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district, -with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was -anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving -before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, -he remained inactive for four days,<a id="FNanchor_371"></a><a -href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> because the -sacrifices were unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer, -hazarding an unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed -and wounded. The sacrifices at length became favorable, and -Derkyllidas was rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by -the example of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213">[p. 213]</a></span> their -commander, who tried to earn the satrap’s favor by holding out -and assuring to him this very strong place. Sending out heralds -to proclaim that they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, -they admitted the Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having -thus fortunately captured, and duly secured this important town, -Derkyllidas marched against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of -which was held by Meidias himself; who, dreading the arrival of -Pharnabazus, and mistrusting the citizens within, thought it best to -open negotiations with Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference, -demanding hostages for his safety. When he came forth from the -town, and demanded from the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms -alliance would be granted to him, the latter replied,—“On -condition that the citizens shall be left free and autonomous;” at -the same time marching on, without waiting either for acquiescence -or refusal, straight up to the gates of the town. Meidias, taken -by surprise, in the power of the assailants, and aware that the -citizens were unfriendly to him, was obliged to give orders that -the gates should be opened; so that Derkyllidas found himself by -this manœuvre in possession of the strongest place in the district -without either loss or delay,—to the great delight of the -Skepsians themselves.<a id="FNanchor_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372" -class="fnanchor">[372]</a></p> - -<p>Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer -a sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium -and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias -to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens -themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as -became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of -Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than -generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland -town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments -of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still -conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be -allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses. -Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his side, -and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in double -file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot of the -lofty towers of Gergis. The garrison on the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_214">[p. 214]</a></span> walls, seeing Meidias along with -him, allowed him to approach without discharging a single missile. -“Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be opened, and show -me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order that I may there -offer sacrifice.” Again Meidias was forced, from fear of being at -once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and the Lacedæmonian -forces found themselves in possession of the town. Derkyllidas, -distributing his troops around the walls, in order to make sure -of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his intended -sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate of Meidias, -whom he divested of his character of prince and of his military -force,—incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army. He -then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property, and -restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the -bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant -exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the -treasures of Mania,—and caused her house, which Meidias had -taken for himself, to be put under seal,—as lawful prey; -since Mania had belonged to Pharnabazus,<a id="FNanchor_373"></a><a -href="#Footnote_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> against whom the -Lacedæmonians were making war. On coming out after examining and -verifying the contents of the house, he said to his officers, “Now, -my friends, we have here already worked out pay for the whole -army, eight thousand men, for nearly a year. Whatever we acquire -besides, shall come to you also.” He well knew the favorable effect -which this intelligence would produce upon the temper, as well as -upon the discipline,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215">[p. -215]</a></span> of the army—especially upon the Cyreians, who -had tasted the discomfort of irregular pay and poverty.</p> - -<p>“And where am I to live?” asked Meidias, who found himself turned -out of the house of Mania. “In your rightful place of abode, to be -sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in your -paternal house.<a id="FNanchor_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374" -class="fnanchor">[374]</a>” What became of the assassin afterwards, -we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap -the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an -important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army,—and a still -more important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed -by Mania,—enfranchisement and autonomy.</p> - -<p>This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit,—the capture -of nine towns in eight days,—is all which Xenophon mentions -as achieved by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay -for so many months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed -to rest until it was spent. But as winter approached, it became -necessary to find winter quarters, without incurring the reproach -which had fallen upon Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. -Fearing, however, that if he changed his position, Pharnabazus -would employ the numerous Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian -cities, he tendered a truce, which the latter willingly accepted. -For the occupation of Æolis by the Lacedæmonian general was a sort -of watch-post (like Dekeleia to Athens,) exposing the whole of -Phrygia near the Propontis (in which was Daskylium the residence -of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.<a id="FNanchor_375"></a><a -href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> Derkyllidas -accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his winter -quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor, -between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same territory through -which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road -from Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_216">[p. 216]</a></span> abundant provisions and booty, -slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not -without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of -marauding parties.<a id="FNanchor_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376" -class="fnanchor">[376]</a></p> - -<p>One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas -had obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of -whom Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of -three hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts,—Odrysian -Thracians. These Odrysians established themselves in a separate -camp, nearly two miles and a half from Derkyllidas, which they -surrounded with a palisade about man’s height. Being indefatigable -plunderers, they prevailed upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of -two hundred hoplites, for the purpose of guarding their separate -camp with the booty accumulated within it. Presently the camp became -richly stocked, especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile -Bithynians, however, watching their opportunity when the Odrysians -were out marauding, suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred -Grecian hoplites in the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade -with darts and arrows, they killed and wounded some, while the -Greeks with their spears were utterly helpless, and could only reach -their enemies by pulling up the palisade and charging out upon -them; but the light-armed assailants, easily evading the charge of -warriors with shield and spear, turned round upon them when they -began to retire, and slew several before they could get back. In -each successive sally the same phenomena recurred, until at length -all the Greeks were overpowered and slain, except fifteen of them, -who charged through the <span class="replace" id="tn_2" title="In -the printed book: Odrysians">Bithynians</span> in the first sally, -and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead of returning with -their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no time in sending -a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and found only the -naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians carried away all -their own captives.<a id="FNanchor_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377" -class="fnanchor">[377]</a></p> - -<p>At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to -Lampsakus, where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just -arrived out as commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with -instructions to prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another -year; as well as to communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with -the Cyreian army, in consequence of the great improvement<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217">[p. 217]</a></span> in their -conduct, compared with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled -the soldiers, and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise -and admonition; expressing his hope that they would continue the -forbearance which they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic -allies. The commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself), -in his reply, availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment -to Derkyllidas. “We (said he) are the same men now as we were in -the previous year; but we are under a different general; you need -not look farther for the explanation.<a id="FNanchor_378"></a><a -href="#Footnote_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a>” Without denying -the superiority of Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark -that the abundant wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident -(though he showed great ability in turning the accident to account), -was an auxiliary circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for -ensuring the good behavior of the soldiers.</p> - -<p>It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the -principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta; -and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey -at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace -and tranquillity.<a id="FNanchor_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379" -class="fnanchor">[379]</a> So long as the truce continued both -with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from -aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas -affording to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218">[p. -218]</a></span> them a protection<a id="FNanchor_380"></a><a -href="#Footnote_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> analogous to that -which had been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the -interval between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the -Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, -the army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together -and near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the -problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas -noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys -(the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus -(the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont), -soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That -fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by -the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian -citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval -power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove home -these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula of its -protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven distinct -cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its inhabitants -combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors to send -out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the isthmus -from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said) there was -fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to come, with -coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on first going -out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a cross-wall on -the same spot, which had since become neglected during the period of -Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh colonists, and -caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have been unnecessary -while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since the Thracian -princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept off, by -Athens, even without any such bulwark.<a id="FNanchor_381"></a><a -href="#Footnote_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> Informed that the -request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at -Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own -army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the -Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole -summer in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219">[p. 219]</a></span> quarter miles in -length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of -the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and -workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide -pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided -security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to -their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in, -under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were again disturbed, wholly -or partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a -few years afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382" -class="fnanchor">[382]</a></p> - -<p>On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this -work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided -during six months, Derkyllidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a -strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied -by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas -had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few -years before.<a id="FNanchor_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383" -class="fnanchor">[383]</a> These men, living by predatory expeditions -against Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that -it cost Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could -reduce it. He placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it -might serve him as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan -named Drako, whose name remained long terrible from his ravages -on the neighboring plain of Mysia.<a id="FNanchor_384"></a><a -href="#Footnote_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a></p> - -<p>Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently -reached him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia -and attack Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto -provisionally kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from -the Asiatic Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks -had sent envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes -would be constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of -Persia, and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia -were vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward -across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under -Pharax coöperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes, -on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with -the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in -Asia Minor; upon which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220">[p. -220]</a></span> Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the -interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but -had now returned)<a id="FNanchor_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385" -class="fnanchor">[385]</a> joined him in Karia, prepared to commence -vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army. -Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps -crossed the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian -force, with numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. -As soon as he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his -army from Karia, to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the -Mæander, he was marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting -the enemy to be near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, -planted on some sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some -scouts up to the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised -him that the two satraps, with their joint force in good order, -were planted here to intercept him. He immediately gave orders -for his hoplites to form in battle array of eight deep, with the -peltasts, and his handful of horsemen, on each flank. But such -was the alarm caused among his troops by this surprise, that none -could be relied upon except the Cyreians and the Peloponnesians. -Of the insular and Ionian hoplites, from Priênê and other cities, -some actually hid their arms in the thick standing corn, and fled; -others, who took their places in the line, manifested dispositions -which left little hope that they would stand a charge; so that the -Persians had the opportunity of fighting a battle not merely with -superiority of number, but also with advantage of position and -circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious to attack without delay. -But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the valor of the Cyreian -troops, and concluded that all the remaining Greeks were like them, -forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand a conference. As they -approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself with a body-guard of -the finest and best-equipped soldiers,<a id="FNanchor_386"></a><a -href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> advanced to the -front of the line to meet them; saying that he, for his part, was -prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221">[p. 221]</a></span> -to fight,—but since a conference was demanded, he had no -objection to grant it, provided hostages were exchanged. This having -been assented to, and a place named for conference on the ensuing -day, both armies were simultaneously withdrawn; the Persians to -Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys, celebrated for its temple of -Artemis Leukophryne.<a id="FNanchor_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387" -class="fnanchor">[387]</a></p> - -<p>This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when -he was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned -to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the -Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain -to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were -allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground -without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to -confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility -as that escape so forcibly suggested.</p> - -<p>The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing. -Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete -autonomy,—exemption from Persian interference and tribute; -while the two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian -army should be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts -from all the Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to -allow time for reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing -matters in the condition in which they had been at the beginning -of the year.<a id="FNanchor_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388" -class="fnanchor">[388]</a></p> - -<p>Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of -Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects -began to assume larger proportions,—of which more in the next -chapter.</p> - -<p>But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. -The prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of -hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her -subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited -against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which -had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated -to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with -a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How -far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during -each successive year, we are not in a<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_222">[p. 222]</a></span> condition to say; but such was -the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for her -maritime dependencies,—enforced too by omnipresent instruments -of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens -had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire -the prodigious ascendency on land which Sparta had enjoyed before, -we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which -Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to -the truce of 445 <small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p>This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading -Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever -put forth. Her habitual short-comings at the moment of action are -keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and -forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle -of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs -was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the -inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity -and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under -his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her -new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest -account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had -it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the -Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen -that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her -most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition. -Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did -not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose -arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at -home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting -Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans -of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such -impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself -had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and -others.</p> - -<p>While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close -of the war, not one of her allies had received the smallest -remuneration or compensation, except such as might be considered -to be involved in the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even -the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223">[p. 223]</a></span> -pecuniary result or residue which Lysander had brought home -with him (four hundred and seventy talents remaining out of the -advances made by Cyrus), together with the booty acquired at -Dekeleia, was all detained by the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes -and Corinth indeed presented demands, in which the other allies -did not (probably durst not) join, to be allowed to share. But -though all the efforts and sufferings of the war had fallen upon -these allies no less than upon Sparta, the demands were refused, -and almost resented as insults.<a id="FNanchor_389"></a><a -href="#Footnote_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> Hence there -arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping -dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta. -Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and -important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they -refused to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and -the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,<a id="FNanchor_390"></a><a -href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a>—less than -a year after the surrender of Athens, the enemy whom these two -cities had hated with such extreme bitterness down to the very -moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and Achæans too, habitually -obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly felt the different way -in which she treated them, as compared with the previous years of -war, when she had been forced to keep alive their zeal against -the common enemy.<a id="FNanchor_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391" -class="fnanchor">[391]</a></p> - -<p>The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise -this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge -upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure. -Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government -called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus,—a -man who had lent considerable aid in 404 <small>B.C.</small> to -Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the -year 420 <small>B.C.</small>, had been engaged in a controversy with -Sparta,—had employed their privileges as administrators<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224">[p. 224]</a></span> of the Olympic -festival to exclude her from attendance on that occasion,—and -had subsequently been in arms against her along with Argos and -Mantineia. To these grounds of quarrel, now of rather ancient -date, had been added afterwards, a refusal to furnish aid in the -war against Athens since the resumption of hostilities in 414 -<small>B.C.</small>, and a recent exclusion of king Agis, who had -come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle of Zeus -Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that he was -about to pray for victory in the war then pending against Athens, -contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which admitted -no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek -against Greek.<a id="FNanchor_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392" -class="fnanchor">[392]</a> These were considered by Sparta as -affronts; and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as -well as for chastising and humbling Elis.<a id="FNanchor_393"></a><a -href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> Accordingly -Sparta sent an embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the -unpaid arrears of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of -the war against Athens; and farther,—to relinquish their -authority over their dependent townships or Periœki, leaving the -latter autonomous.<a id="FNanchor_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394" -class="fnanchor">[394]</a> Of these dependencies there were several, -no one very considerable individually, in the region called -Triphylia, south of the river Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One -of them was Lepreum, the autonomy of which the Lacedæmonians had -vindicated against Elis in 420 <small>B.C.</small>, though during -the subsequent period it had again become subject.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225">[p. 225]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent, -alleging that their dependent cities were held by the right of -conquest. They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of -enslaving Greeks;<a id="FNanchor_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395" -class="fnanchor">[395]</a> upon which Agis marched with an army to -invade their territory, entering it from the north side where it -joined Achaia. Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus -and begun his ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event, -usually construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this -occasion so strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that -he not only withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his -army. His retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians, -that they sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those -cities which they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes -and Corinth, however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they -obtain any other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.</p> - -<p>In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied -on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians, -now enrolled upon the list. Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On -this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that -of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and -crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river -Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he -consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded -him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum, -Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their -subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards -the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing -agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring -Olympic temple, and for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226">[p. -226]</a></span> a long period unassailed. After attacking, not very -vigorously, the half-fortified city,—and being repelled by the -Ætolian auxiliaries,—he marched onward to the harbor called -Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of -slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only -acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by -many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of -the golden harvest.<a id="FNanchor_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396" -class="fnanchor">[396]</a></p> - -<p>The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed -themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government; -hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in -power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense -wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed -the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his -colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and -among them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook -for Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated, -and asleep in a separate chamber.<a id="FNanchor_397"></a><a -href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> They then assembled -in arms in the market-place, believing themselves to be masters of -the city; while the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus -was dead, were too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently -it became known that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the -government-house “like a swarm of bees,”<a id="FNanchor_398"></a><a -href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> and arrayed -themselves for his protection as well as under his guidance. -Leading them forth at once to battle, he completely defeated the -oligarchical insurgents, and forced them to flee for protection to -the Lacedæmonian army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227">[p. 227]</a></span></p> - -<p>Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without -planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias -and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of -the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in -Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn -and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus -and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and -solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of -their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered -their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished -all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion, -which was claimed as an Arcadian town.<a id="FNanchor_399"></a><a -href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> Though they pressed -strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between -the Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of Makistus), -on the plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants -at the price of thirty talents paid down,—the Lacedæmonians, -pronouncing this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker -parties by force, refused to recognize it. The town was taken away -from them, seemingly without any reimbursement of the purchase money -either in part or in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted -to peace, and enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian -confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400" -class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228">[p. 228]</a></span></p> - -<p>The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now -approaching, and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain -peace from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege -as superintendents. The Pisatans,—inhabitants of the district -immediately around Olympia,—availed themselves of the Spartan -invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original -privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with -its great periodical solemnity,—by the dispossession of the -Eleians as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with -no success. It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the -Pisatans in early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its -actual Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians -had only appropriated it to themselves after conquering<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229">[p. 229]</a></span> the territory -of Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, -mere villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do -justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all -Greece.</p> - -<p>Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the -claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games -still in the hands of the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_401"></a><a -href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a></p> - -<p>This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the -Lacedæmonians in a condition of overruling ascendency throughout -Peloponnesus, such as they had never attained before. To -complete their victory, they rooted out all the remnants of -their ancient enemies the Messenians, some of whom had been -planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others in the island of -Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were now expelled, in -the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the neighborhood of -Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in Sicily, others -at Kyrênê.<a id="FNanchor_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402" -class="fnanchor">[402]</a> We shall in a future chapter have to -commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_73"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230">[p. 230]</a></span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIII.<br /> - AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> close of -the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization of the -Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as a -period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which had -formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what they -had endured under Athens,—and harder dependence, unaccompanied -by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and -inland cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To -complete the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these -years, we may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that -calamities of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian -Greeks; first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked -Himera, Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina,—next from the -overruling despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.</p> - -<p>Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious -extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from -the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated -the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly -to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting -gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly -prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron, -not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the -ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in -his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to -punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in -practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors -strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home -by Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards -the prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of -so much gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant -transgression of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was -unavailing and the new ac<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231">[p. -231]</a></span>quisitions were received; though it still continued to -be a penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may -trust Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver -in his possession.<a id="FNanchor_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403" -class="fnanchor">[403]</a> To enforce such a prohibition, however, -even if practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these -metals were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the -purposes of the government.</p> - -<p>There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of -coined gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and -important phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar -customs and discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong -antipathies in the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably -king Archidamus, had he been alive, would have taken part with the -opposing ephors. But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much -as a phenomenon by itself; whereas, it was really one characteristic -mark and portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which -Sparta had been gradually arriving during the last years of the -war, and which were brought into the most effective action by the -decisive success at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, -though excluding all Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and -public mess, from trade and industry, from ostentation, and from -luxury,—did not by any means extinguish in their bosoms the -love of money;<a id="FNanchor_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404" -class="fnanchor">[404]</a> while it had a positive tendency to -exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love of power. The Spartan -kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_232">[p. 232]</a></span> both been guilty of receiving -bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during the twentieth year of -the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely the Spartan admiral -Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of the Peloponnesian -fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus, as well as his -father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like fraud; and -Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander, enslaved only -by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable instance -of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the first to -engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though he found -it already diffused among them, he did much to impart to it a still -more decided predominance, by the immense increase of opportunities, -and enlarged booty for peculation, which his newly-organized Spartan -empire furnished. Not merely did he bring home a large residue in -gold and silver, but there was a much larger annual tribute imposed -by him on the dependent cities, combined with numerous appointments -of harmosts to govern these cities. Such appointments presented -abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and even difficult to -avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager thus to purchase -forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds. So many new sources -of corruption were sufficient to operate most unfavorably on the -Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh vices, at least by -stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.</p> - -<p>To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have -only to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the -Corinthians, made in 432 <small>B.C.</small> at the beginning of -the Peloponnesian war, with the state of facts at the end of the -war,—during the eleven years between the victory of Ægospotami -and the defeat of Knidus (405-394 <small>B.C.</small>). At the -former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary subjects, nor -any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were very reluctant -to pay imposts.<a id="FNanchor_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405" -class="fnanchor">[405]</a> About 334 <small>B.C.</small>, -thirty-seven years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of -Messenia, Aristotle remarks the like fact, which had then again -become true;<a id="FNanchor_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_406" -class="fnanchor">[406]</a> but during the continuance of her -empire<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233">[p. 233]</a></span> -between 405 and 394 <small>B.C.</small>, she possessed a large -public revenue, derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. -In 432 <small>B.C.</small>, Sparta is not merely cautious -but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance -from home.<a id="FNanchor_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407" -class="fnanchor">[407]</a> In 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after -the close of the war, she becomes aggressive, intermeddling, and -ready for dealing with enemies, or making acquisitions remote as -well as near.<a id="FNanchor_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408" -class="fnanchor">[408]</a> In 432 <small>B.C.</small>, her unsocial -and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with her constant -expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand prominent among -her attributes;<a id="FNanchor_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409" -class="fnanchor">[409]</a> while at the end of the war, her foreign -relations had acquired such great development as to become the -principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well as for -her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta, and -the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant -and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgean discipline -gave way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially -struggled by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these -leading men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich -themselves at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public -treasury, and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of -wealth among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices -in his time;<a id="FNanchor_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410" -class="fnanchor">[410]</a> since the smaller citizens had no similar -opportunities opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to -guard their properties against gradual subdivision and absorption, -and to keep them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that -contribution to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which -formed the groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the -spectacle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234">[p. 234]</a></span> -of such newly-opened lucrative prizes,—accessible only to that -particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually -became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals or -Peers,—embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens -beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace -the tranquillity of the state,—as will presently be seen. -That sameness of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments, -fatigues, and restraints, which the Lykurgean regulations had so -long enforced, and still continued to prescribe,—divesting -wealth of its principal advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment -of personal equality among the poorer citizens,—became more -and more eluded by the richer, through the venality as well as -the example of ephors and senators;<a id="FNanchor_411"></a><a -href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> while for those who -had no means of corruption, it continued unrelaxed, except in so far -as many of them fell into a still more degraded condition by the loss -of their citizenship.</p> - -<p>It is not merely Isokrates,<a id="FNanchor_412"></a><a -href="#Footnote_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> who attests -the corruption wrought in the character of the Spartans by -the possession of that foreign empire which followed the -victory of Ægospotami,—but also their earnest panegyrist -Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws of Lykurgus or -the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit that his -eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably -inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. “Formerly -(says he,<a id="FNanchor_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413" -class="fnanchor">[413]</a>) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer -their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235">[p. 235]</a></span> -own society and moderate way of life at home, to appointments -as harmosts in foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the -corruption attending them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen -with gold in their possession; now, there are some who make even an -ostentatious display of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy -or) expulsion of strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that -their citizens might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from -contact with foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point -of influence among them, study above all things to be in perpetual -employment as harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains -to be worthy of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and -keep the command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly, -the Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans -would act as their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are -exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from -renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into -this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to -the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!”</p> - -<p>This criticism (written at some period between 394-371 -<small>B.C.</small>) from the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is -highly instructive. We know from other evidences how badly the -Spartan empire worked for the subject cities; we here learn how -badly it worked for the character of the Spartans themselves, -and for those internal institutions which even an enemy of -Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt constrained -to admire.<a id="FNanchor_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414" -class="fnanchor">[414]</a> All the vices, here insisted upon by -Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire. The -moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition,—of -which the Corinthians complain,<a id="FNanchor_415"></a><a -href="#Footnote_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a> but<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236">[p. 236]</a></span> for which king -Archidamus takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian -war,—is found exchanged, at the close of the war, for -a spirit of aggression and conquest, for ambition public as -well as private, and for emancipation of the great men from -the subduing<a id="FNanchor_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416" -class="fnanchor">[416]</a> equality of the discipline enacted by -Lykurgus.</p> - -<p>Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 <small>B.C.</small>), -and Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (408-394 <small>B.C.</small>), -were the two kings of Sparta at the end of the war. But -Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was for -the time<a id="FNanchor_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_417" -class="fnanchor">[417]</a> greater than either of the two kings, -who had the right of commanding only the troops on land. I have -already mentioned how his overweening dictation and insolence -offended not only Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and -leading men at Sparta, as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap; -thus indirectly bringing about the emancipation of Athens from the -Thirty, the partial discouragement of the dekarchies throughout -Greece, and the recall of Lysander himself from his command. It was -not without reluctance that the conqueror of Athens submitted to -descend again to a private station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers -who heaped incense on him at the moment of his omnipotence, there -were not wanting those who suggested that he was much more worthy -to reign than either Agis or Pausanias; that the kings ought to be -taken, not from the first-born of the lineage of Eurysthenês and -Proklês, but by selection out of all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander -himself was one;<a id="FNanchor_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_418" -class="fnanchor">[418]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237">[p. -237]</a></span> and that the person elected ought to be not -merely a descendant of Hêraklês, but a worthy parallel of -Hêraklês himself, while pæans were sung to the honor of Lysander -at Samos,<a id="FNanchor_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419" -class="fnanchor">[419]</a>—while Chœrilus and Antilochus -composed poems in his praise,—while Antimachus (a poet highly -esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic -verses called <i>Lysandria</i>, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there -was another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus, -named Kleon,<a id="FNanchor_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420" -class="fnanchor">[420]</a> who wrote a discourse proving that -Lysander had well earned the regal dignity,—that personal -excellence ought to prevail over legitimate descent, and that the -crown ought to be laid open to election from the most worthy among -the Herakleids. Considering that rhetoric was neither employed nor -esteemed at Sparta, we cannot reasonably believe that Lysander -really ordered the composition of this discourse as an instrument of -execution for projects preconceived by himself, in the same manner as -an Athenian prosecutor or defendant before the dikastery used to arm -himself with a speech from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make -his court professionally through such a prose composition, whether -the project were first recommended by himself, or currently discussed -among a circle of admirers; while Lysander would probably requite -the compliment by a reward not less munificent than that which he -gave to the indifferent poet Antilochus.<a id="FNanchor_421"></a><a -href="#Footnote_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a> And the composition -would be put into the form of an harangue from the admiral to -his countrymen, without any definite purpose that it should be -ever so delivered. Such hypothesis of a speaker and an audience -was frequent with the rhetors in their writings, as we may see -in Isokrates,—especially in his sixth discourse, called -Archidamus.</p> - -<p>Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others, -Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession of -the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach the -crown. His projects have been characterized as revolutionary;<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238">[p. 238]</a></span> but there -seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation, in the -sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately what the -Spartan kings were in the year 400 <small>B.C.</small> In this view -the associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern -reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any -modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they -were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor -was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a -free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he -reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and -by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the -ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional, -though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan -king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was, -arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge -of his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer -of state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising -certain military and judicial functions, which passed as an -<i>universitas</i> by hereditary transmission in his family; but subject -to the control of the ephors as to the way in which he performed -these duties.<a id="FNanchor_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_422" -class="fnanchor">[422]</a> Thus, for example, it was his privilege to -command the army when sent on foreign service; yet a law was made, -requiring him to take deputies along with him, as a council of war, -without whom nothing was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus -when they thought fit; and they brought Pausanias to trial<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239">[p. 239]</a></span> and punishment, -for alleged misconduct in his command.<a id="FNanchor_423"></a><a -href="#Footnote_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> The only way in which -the Spartan kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state, -or shared in the exercise of government properly so called, was that -they had votes <i>ex officio</i> in the Senate, and could vote there by -proxy when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly -known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the -government having then been really carried on by them, or by their -orders. But in the year 400 <small>B.C.</small>, Agis and Pausanias -had become nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers -of state, still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw -open these hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid -Gens, by election from their number, might be a change better or -worse; it was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to -propose, that any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary -in particular families, should be made elective), because of the -extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but -it cannot properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate, -and the public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal -form, without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against -it, but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been -made, the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as -in principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and -Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant -here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in -the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their -official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less -true, that the associations, connected with the title of <i>king</i> in -the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.</p> - -<p>To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that -agencies of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta -soon after his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and -Zeus Ammon in Libya,<a id="FNanchor_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424" -class="fnanchor">[424]</a> in order to procure, by persuasion -or corruption, injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his -projects. So great was the general effect of oracular injunctions -on the Spartan mind, that Kleomenes had thus obtained the -deposition of king Demaratus, and the exiled Pleistoanax, his -own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240">[p. 240]</a></span> -return;<a id="FNanchor_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425" -class="fnanchor">[425]</a> bribery having been in both cases the -moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate. None of these -oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture upon so grave a -sentence as that of repealing the established law of succession to -the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of Ammon, not -content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to denounce -his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on his trial, -but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and acquitted, -I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried,—and he was -compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing to the -religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been born -some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth named -Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo; an -assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various -difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new -birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread -abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired -records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody -of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some -genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the -connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated -agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that -Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his -divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden -records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny, -were prepared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the -presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them, -recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the -best citizens.<a id="FNanchor_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426" -class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p> - -<p>So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus -actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But -one of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke -down, at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still -remained hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon -his plan, nothing was made public about it until after his<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241">[p. 241]</a></span> death. It -might probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of -proper courage and cunning,—when we consider the profound and -habitual deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction -of which oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly -understood to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which -the proposed change might have been tried with unusual facility -and pertinence; though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, -renounced his enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued -unabated, in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring -it for himself,<a id="FNanchor_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427" -class="fnanchor">[427]</a>—like Mucian in reference to the -emperor Vespasian.</p> - -<p>It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that -king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and -carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His -wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242">[p. 242]</a></span> a youth about -fifteen years of age.<a id="FNanchor_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428" -class="fnanchor">[428]</a> But the legitimacy of this youth had -always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the birth -of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be his. -He had been frightened out of his wife’s bed by the shock of an -earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was -held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during -which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was, -that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the -absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it -was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy -of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully -recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during -his last illness.<a id="FNanchor_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429" -class="fnanchor">[429]</a> As in the case of Demaratus about a -century earlier,<a id="FNanchor_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430" -class="fnanchor">[430]</a>—advantage was taken of these doubts -by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by -Lysander, to exclude Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.</p> - -<p>Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito -the mother of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was -now at the mature age of forty,<a id="FNanchor_431"></a><a -href="#Footnote_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a> and having been -brought up without any prospect of becoming king,—at least -until very recent times,—had passed through the unmitigated -rigor of Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for -all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience to authority, in -the performance of his trying exercises, military as well as -civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every -competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as -well as facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and -frugality in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to -the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends -or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243">[p. 243]</a></span> -adherents, he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even -for unscrupulous partisanship, with a readiness to use all his -influence in screening their injustices or short-comings; while -he was comparatively placable and generous in dealing with rivals -at home, notwithstanding his eagerness to be first in every sort -of competition.<a id="FNanchor_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432" -class="fnanchor">[432]</a> His manners were cheerful and popular, -and his physiognomy pleasing; though in stature he was not only -small but mean, and though he labored under the additional defect of -lameness on one leg,<a id="FNanchor_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433" -class="fnanchor">[433]</a> which accounts for his constant refusal -to suffer his statue to be taken.<a id="FNanchor_434"></a><a -href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a> He was indifferent -to money, and exempt from excess of selfish feeling, except in his -passion for superiority and power.</p> - -<p>In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never -yet been tried in any military command, though he had probably -served in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his -character, therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity -may perhaps have been the greater at the moment when the throne -became vacant, inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to -excite jealousy, he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, -efforts, endurances, and punctual obedience, wherein even the -poorest citizens were his competitors on equal terms. Nay, so -complete was the self-constraint, and the habit of smothering -emotions, generated by a Spartan training, that even the cunning -Lysander himself did not at this time know him. He and Agesilaus -had been early and intimate friends,<a id="FNanchor_435"></a><a -href="#Footnote_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> both having been -placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of -discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing character of -this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of poor parents -and condition.<a id="FNanchor_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436" -class="fnanchor">[436]</a> He made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus -to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable; and this -was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the latter -to the throne, after the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244">[p. -244]</a></span> decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned, if by his means -Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own influence, -and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as ostensible -general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship of the new -king.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which -always marked the funeral of a king of Sparta were -terminated,<a id="FNanchor_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437" -class="fnanchor">[437]</a> and the day arrived for installation -of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of Lysander, stood -forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of Leotychides, and -to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid, brother -of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took place not -merely before the ephors and the senate but before the assembled -citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions. Of this -debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much. We cannot -doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of Agesilaus would -count as a great recommendation, when set against an untried youth; -and this was probably the real point (since the relationship of both -was so near) upon which decision turned;<a id="FNanchor_438"></a><a -href="#Footnote_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> for the -legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his -mother Timæa,<a id="FNanchor_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439" -class="fnanchor">[439]</a> and we do not find that the question of -paternity was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of -Demaratus.</p> - -<p>There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the -way of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king -of Sparta had never yet been known. And if we turn back more -than a century to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one -of the Battiad princes at Kyrênê,<a id="FNanchor_440"></a><a -href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> we see the -Kyrenians taking it so deeply to heart, that they sent to ask -advice from Delphi, and invited over the Mantineian reformer -Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of repugnance, too, the -gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware of “a lame reign.” -Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_245">[p. 245]</a></span> adviser of high reputation, -advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an ancient oracle, -telling Sparta, that “with all her pride she must not suffer a lame -reign to impair her stable footing;<a id="FNanchor_441"></a><a -href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> for if she did -so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset -her.” This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty -years earlier,<a id="FNanchor_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442" -class="fnanchor">[442]</a> but with a very different -interpretation. To Grecian leaders, like Themistokles or -Lysander, it was an accomplishment of no small value to be able -to elude inconvenient texts or intractable religious feelings, -by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised his voice (as -Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before the battle -of Salamis),<a id="FNanchor_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443" -class="fnanchor">[443]</a> to combat the professional expositors; -contending that by “a lame reign,” the god meant, not a bodily -defect in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but -might arise from some positive hurt,<a id="FNanchor_444"></a><a -href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a>—but the reign -of any king who was not a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.</p> - -<p>The influence of Lysander,<a id="FNanchor_445"></a><a -href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a> combined doubtless -with a preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, -caused this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as -convincing, and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as -king. There was, however, a considerable minority, to whom this -decision appeared a sin against the gods and a mockery of the -oracle. And though the murmurs of such dissentients were kept -down by the ability and success of Agesilaus during the first -years of his reign; yet when, in his ten last years, calamity and -humiliation were poured thickly upon this proud city, the public -sentiment came decidedly round to their view. Many a pious Spartan -then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246">[p. 246]</a></span> -exclaimed, with feelings of bitter repentance, that the divine -word never failed to come true at last,<a id="FNanchor_446"></a><a -href="#Footnote_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a> and that Sparta was -justly punished for having wilfully shut her eyes to the distinct -and merciful warning vouchsafed to her, about the mischiefs of -a “lame reign.”<a id="FNanchor_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447" -class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p> - -<p>Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the -large property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which -enabled him to display his generosity by transferring half of -it at once to his maternal relatives,—for the most part -poor persons.<a id="FNanchor_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448" -class="fnanchor">[448]</a> The popularity acquired by this step -was still farther increased by his manner of conducting himself -towards the ephors and senate. Between these magistrates and the -kings, there was generally a bad understanding. The kings, not -having lost the tradition of the plenary power once enjoyed by -their ancestors, displayed as much haughty reserve as they dared, -towards an authority now become essentially superior to their -own. But Agesilaus,—not less from his own preëstablished -habits, than from anxiety to make up for the defects of his -title,—adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite. He not -only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed -marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He -rose from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both -ephors and senators by timely presents.<a id="FNanchor_449"></a><a -href="#Footnote_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a> By such judicious -proceeding, as well as by his exact observance of the laws -and customs,<a id="FNanchor_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450" -class="fnanchor">[450]</a> he was himself the greatest gainer. -Combined with that ability and energy in which he was never -deficient, it ensured to him more real power than had ever fallen to -the lot of any king of Sparta; power not merely over the military -operations abroad<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247">[p. -247]</a></span> which usually fell to the kings,—but also over -the policy of the state at home. On the increase and maintenance -of that real power, his chief thoughts were concentrated; new -dispositions generated by kingship, which had never shown themselves -in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money, luxury, and -all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king, -an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in -diet, clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he -delighted in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots -or factions of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to -uphold in all their career of injustice and oppression. Though an -amiable man, with no disposition to tyranny, and still less to -plunder, for his own benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself -the willing instrument of both, for the benefit of his various -coadjutors and friends, whose power and consequence he identified -with his own.<a id="FNanchor_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_451" -class="fnanchor">[451]</a></p> - -<p>At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the -maximum of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject -allies, with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has -already been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against -the Persian satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting -portion of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with -which he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted, -this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his -very promising career was intercepted<a id="FNanchor_452"></a><a -href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> by his bad, factious -subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his -unmeasured thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference -or aversion to any generous scheme of combination with the cities -dependent on Sparta.</p> - -<p>His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal -conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The “lame reign” was as -yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged in -sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was apprised -by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited menacing -symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248">[p. 248]</a></span> character. -A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the third, the -terrified prophet exclaimed, “Agesilaus, the revelation before -us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies.” -They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered -to the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these -latter, by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending -peril. At length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, -favorable victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made -clear. Five days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, -communicating the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, -organized by a citizen named Kinadon.<a id="FNanchor_453"></a><a -href="#Footnote_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a></p> - -<p>The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of -that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already -been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up -among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart -a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the -rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this, -since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as -the citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and -his sons to the public mess-table, and since industry of every -kind was inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed -upon all of them,—the natural consequence was, that in each -generation a certain number of citizens became disfranchised and -dropped off. But these disfranchised men did not become Periœki -or Helots. They were still citizens, whose qualification, though -in abeyance, might be at any time renewed by the munificence -of a rich man;<a id="FNanchor_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454" -class="fnanchor">[454]</a> so that they too, along with the lesser -citizens, were known under the denomination of The Inferiors. It -was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was a young man of -remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged with honor his -duties in the Lykurgean discipline,<a id="FNanchor_455"></a><a -href="#Footnote_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a> and had imbibed from -it that sense of personal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249">[p. -249]</a></span> equality, and that contempt of privilege, which -its theory as well as its practice suggested. Notwithstanding all -exactness of duty performed, he found that the constitution, as -practically worked, excluded him from the honors and distinctions -of the state; reserving them for the select citizens known under -the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more marked and -galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after the victory -of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts (harmosties and -others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so much multiplied. -Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon was still employed -by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit and military -sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept for maintaining -order at home.<a id="FNanchor_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456" -class="fnanchor">[456]</a> He had been the agent ordered on -several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to -employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this -was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him -into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to -lessen his respect for them. He desired “to be inferior to no -man in Sparta,”<a id="FNanchor_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457" -class="fnanchor">[457]</a> and his conspiracy was undertaken to -realize this object by breaking up the constitution.</p> - -<p>It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity -which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors -maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its -height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia. -Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes -in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the -number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the -Periœki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common -antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the -Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and -the man who now came to the ephors either<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_250">[p. 250]</a></span> was really an intimate friend -of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the -secret. “Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity -of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were -therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors -and the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count -them, he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men, -whom you have to look upon as enemies;<a id="FNanchor_458"></a><a -href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> all others in the -market-place, more than four thousand in number, are friends and -comrades. Kinadon also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom -we met in the roads, or who were lords in the country districts, -as our only enemies; every one else around them being friendly -to our purpose.” “How many did he tell you were the accomplices -actually privy to the scheme?”—asked the ephors. “Only a -few (was the reply); but those thoroughly trustworthy; these -confidants themselves, however, said that all around them were -accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki, Neodamodes, and Helots, -all alike; for whenever any one among the classes talked about a -Spartan, he could not disguise his intense antipathy,—he talked -as if he could eat the Spartans raw.”<a id="FNanchor_459"></a><a -href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a></p> - -<p>“But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting -arms?” “His language was (replied the witness)—We of the -standing force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of -knives, swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in -this market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man -who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which -will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with -enemies themselves unarmed.” On being asked what was the moment fixed -for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed -only to remain on the spot, and be ready.<a id="FNanchor_460"></a><a -href="#Footnote_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251">[p. 251]</a></span></p> <p>It does -not appear that this man knew the name of any person concerned, -except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed, that they -refrained from any formal convocation even of what was called the -Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the kings were -members <i>ex officio</i>, and, perhaps, a few other principal persons -besides. But the members of this assembly were privately brought -together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably, among -them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent; -since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus -admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make -their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting -him out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The -ephors, calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as -they had done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a -Laconian town on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and -there to seize some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê -or warrant; including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some -Helots,—and one other person by name, a woman of peculiar -beauty, resident at the place, whose influence was understood to -spread disaffection among all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old -as well as young.<a id="FNanchor_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461" -class="fnanchor">[461]</a> When Kinadon inquired what force he -was to take with him on the mission, the ephors, to obviate all -suspicion that they were picking out companions with views hostile -to him, desired him to go to the Hippagretês (or commander of -the three hundred youthful guards called horsemen, though they -were not really mounted) and ask for the first six or seven men -of the guard<a id="FNanchor_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462" -class="fnanchor">[462]</a> who might happen to be in the way. But -they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the -Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be -sent, and what the persons sent were to<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_252">[p. 252]</a></span> do. They then despatched Kinadon -on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his -disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home -the prisoners.</p> - -<p>Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest -suspicion of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make -their purpose sure, sent an additional body of the guards after -him, to quell any resistance which might possibly arise. But -their stratagem succeeded as completely as they could desire. He -was seized on the road, by those who accompanied him ostensibly -for his pretended mission. These men interrogated him, put him -to the torture,<a id="FNanchor_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463" -class="fnanchor">[463]</a> and heard from his lips the names -of his accomplices;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253">[p. -253]</a></span> the list of whom they wrote down, and forwarded -by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors, on receiving it, -immediately arrested the parties principally concerned, especially -the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along with Kinadon, as -soon as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254">[p. 254]</a></span> -he was brought prisoner. They asked the latter, among other -questions, what was his purpose in setting on foot the conspiracy; -to which he replied,—“I wanted to be inferior to no man -at Sparta.” His punishment was not long deferred. Having been -manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were made -fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city, -with men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His -accomplices were treated in like manner, and at length all of them -were put to death.<a id="FNanchor_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_464" -class="fnanchor">[464]</a></p> - -<p>Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this -unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from -Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have -otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the -ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of -Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient -and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We -were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing -among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Periœki. But -the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation -of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents -formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the -prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the -provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by -the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active -in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate -expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer -himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that -the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power -and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among the -citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time -when the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the -way for that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of -Leuktra.</p> - -<p>It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent -came to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially -indicated in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been -one of the motives (as had happened in 424 <small>B.C.</small> on -occasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255">[p. 255]</a></span> -of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring -about the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave -malcontents on distant and lucrative military service.</p> - -<p>Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near -three years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much -efficiency and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on -the coast, and to intercept all the revenues which those satraps -either transmitted to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had -already gone up to Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 -<small>B.C.</small>), and besides obtaining a reinforcement which -acted under himself and Tissaphernes in 396 <small>B.C.</small> -against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for renewing -the maritime war against Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_465"></a><a -href="#Footnote_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></p> - -<p>It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, -who, having saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat -of Ægospotami, had remained for the last seven years under the -protection of Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus. Konon, having -married at Salamis, and having a son<a id="FNanchor_466"></a><a -href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> born to him there, -indulged but faint hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, -fortunately for him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became -eager for an efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. -Through representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras -in Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the -Greek physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in -the negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence -with queen Parysatis,<a id="FNanchor_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467" -class="fnanchor">[467]</a>—orders were obtained, and funds -provided, to equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under -the command of Konon. While that officer began to show himself, -and to act with such triremes as he<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_256">[p. 256]</a></span> found in readiness (about forty -in number) along the southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia -to Kaunus,<a id="FNanchor_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468" -class="fnanchor">[468]</a>—further preparations were vigorously -prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in order to make up the fleet to -three hundred sail.<a id="FNanchor_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469" -class="fnanchor">[469]</a></p> - -<p>It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached -Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were -as yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited -the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta -intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to -excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among -themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, -when Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a -volunteer to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose -of attacking the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him -only thirty full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or -Council of Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, -whom the ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be -selected from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand -hoplites from the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich -service against Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty -Spartans, Lysander intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on -his preëstablished influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real -command himself, without the name. He had no serious fear of the -Persian arms, either by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement -of the Phœnician fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often -proved in the mouth of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the -Cyreian expedition had inspired him further with ardent hopes of -another successful Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from -the sea-coast inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ -his newly-acquired ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the -dekarchies, which had excited such intolerable hatred and exercised -so much oppression, that even the ephors had refused to lend positive -aid in upholding them, so that they had been in several places broken -up or modified.<a id="FNanchor_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470" -class="fnanchor">[470]</a> If the ambition of Agesilaus was -comparatively less stained by personal and factious antipathies, -and more Pan-hellenic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257">[p. -257]</a></span> in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was -at the same time yet more unmeasured in respect to victory over -the Great King, whom he dreamed of dethroning, or at least of -expelling from Asia Minor and the coast.<a id="FNanchor_471"></a><a -href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a> So powerful was -the influence exercised by the Cyreian expedition over the schemes -and imagination of energetic Greeks: so sudden was the outburst of -ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for which no one before had given -him credit.</p> - -<p>Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it -turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of -the Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have -been made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts -were made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for -purposes of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements -in Asia Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force -competent to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the -Lacedæmonians embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys -were sent from many of the subject cities, by the partisans of -Lysander and in concert with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might -be placed at the head of the expedition, with as large a force -as he required.<a id="FNanchor_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472" -class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p> - -<p>No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number -of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder -for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with -respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of -Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The -refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground -of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the -city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not -yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive -some hope from the projects of Konon.<a id="FNanchor_473"></a><a -href="#Footnote_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a></p> - -<p>The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the -command and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the -enterprise. The Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of -Greece, conceived themselves to have inherited the sceptre of -Agamemnon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258">[p. 258]</a></span> -and Orestes;<a id="FNanchor_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474" -class="fnanchor">[474]</a> and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated -his expedition to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united -Greece, for the purpose of taking vengeance on the common Asiatic -enemy of the Hellenic name. The sacrifices having been found -favorable, Agesilaus took measures for the transit of the troops -from various ports to Ephesus. But he himself, with one division, -touched in his way at Geræstus, the southern point of Eubœa; -wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice at Aulis, (the port of -Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the other side of the strait) -where Agamemnon had offered his memorable sacrifice immediately -previous to departure for Troy. It appears that he both went to -the spot, and began the sacrifice, without asking permission from -the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied by his own prophet, who -conducted the solemnities in a manner not consistent with the -habitual practice of the temple or chapel of Artemis at Aulis. On -both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the proceeding as an -insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled him to desist from -the sacrifice.<a id="FNanchor_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475" -class="fnanchor">[475]</a> Not taking part themselves in the -expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king was -presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character of -a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which -Agesilaus never forgave.</p> - -<p>Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when -Derkyllidas had recently concluded his last armistice with -Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time -for mutual communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. -On being asked by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, -Agesilaus merely renewed the demand which had before been made by -Derkyllidas—of autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes -replied by proposing a continuation of the same armistice, until -he could communicate with the Persian court,—adding that he -hoped to be empowered to grant the demand. A fresh armistice was -accordingly sworn to on both sides, for three months; Derkyllidas -(who with his army came now under the command of Agesilaus) -and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to receive his oath, -and take oaths to him in return.<a id="FNanchor_476"></a><a -href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259">[p. 259]</a></span></p> -<p>While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at -Ephesus, the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite -intolerable jealousy in the superior officers; and most of -all Agesilaus. So great and established was the reputation -of Lysander,—whose statue had been erected at Ephesus -itself in the temple of Artemis,<a id="FNanchor_477"></a><a -href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a> as well as in many -other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked upon him as -the real chief of the expedition. That he should be real chief, -under the nominal command of another, was nothing more than what had -happened before, in the year wherein he gained the great victory of -Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having then also sent him out -in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral Arakus, in -order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that the same -man should not serve twice as admiral.<a id="FNanchor_478"></a><a -href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> It was through the -instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence, that -the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had sent -to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried and -unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for -having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important -appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others, -to exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town -the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans -came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners -were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself -appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all -that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former -commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, -since the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a -peculiar degree.<a id="FNanchor_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479" -class="fnanchor">[479]</a></p> - -<p>The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been -named to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor -solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260">[p. 260]</a></span> helped to -encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded in his -own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious -strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess. -He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by -or through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never -formally announced,<a id="FNanchor_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480" -class="fnanchor">[480]</a> was presently discerned by the -petitioners, by the Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter -thus found himself not merely disappointed in all his calculations, -but humiliated to excess, though without any tangible ground of -complaint. He was forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention -was an injury and not a benefit to them; that they must desist -from obsequious attentions to him, and must address themselves -directly to Agesilaus. With that prince he also remonstrated on -his own account,—“Truly, Agesilaus, you know how to degrade -your friends.”—“Ay, to be sure (was the reply), those among -them who want to appear greater than I am; but such as seek to -uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not know how to repay with -due honor.”—Lysander was constrained to admit the force -of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape from -present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some -mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he -might be employed.<a id="FNanchor_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_481" -class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p> - -<p>This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus -than to himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a -mission to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting -past offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over -a Persian grandee named Spithridates, who had received some -offence from Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying -a regiment of two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus -enabled to inform himself fully about the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_261">[p. 261]</a></span> satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising -the territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis -and the Hellespont.<a id="FNanchor_482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482" -class="fnanchor">[482]</a></p> - -<p>The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the -moment when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice -with Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the -conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him to -such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated three -months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate departure of -Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith, if such departure -were delayed. While this message, accompanied by formidable reports -of the satrap’s force, filled the army at Ephesus with mingled alarm -and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge with cheerful -readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap for perjuring -himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods against him and -ensure their favor to the Greek side.<a id="FNanchor_483"></a><a -href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> Orders were -forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic Greeks, -for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and attack -Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on the -route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes, -fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to -cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while -he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a -view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over -that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But -the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent, -suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy -of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap, -who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly -Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and -villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves. -Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching -as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative -and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium, -the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the -satrapic residence, however, his small<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_262">[p. 262]</a></span> body of cavalry, ascending an -eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry, -under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove -them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus -himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and -there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does -not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On -the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther -advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He -reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the -winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved -to be indispensable.<a id="FNanchor_484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484" -class="fnanchor">[484]</a></p> - -<p>This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than -glorious. Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits -of his hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient -warfare and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both -with Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan -commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money -for himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, -and would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition -for their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of -rich prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had -chosen, he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a -practice to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some -favorite officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that -Xenophon himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and -enjoy a large portion of his ransom.<a id="FNanchor_485"></a><a -href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a> Again, when the army -in the course of its march was at a considerable distance from the -sea, and appeared to be advancing farther inland, the authorized -auctioneers, whose province it was to sell the booty, found the -buyers extremely slack. It was difficult to keep or carry what was -bought, and opportunity for resale did not<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_263">[p. 263]</a></span> seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he -instructed the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting -on ready money,—at the same time gave private hints to a -few friends that he was very shortly about to return to the sea. -The friends thus warned, bidding for the plunder on credit and -purchasing at low prices, were speedily enabled to dispose of it -again at a seaport, with large profits.<a id="FNanchor_486"></a><a -href="#Footnote_486" class="fnanchor">[486]</a></p> - -<p>We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured -for Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon -ought to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to -be mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder -of the country over which he carried his victorious arms, took -great pains to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. -When any town surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were -neither ruinous nor grossly humiliating.<a id="FNanchor_487"></a><a -href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a> Amidst all -the plunder realized, too, the most valuable portion was the -adult natives of both sexes, hunted down and brought in by -the predatory light troops of the army, to be sold as slaves. -Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor victims from -ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not of -punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under -guard as men.<a id="FNanchor_488"></a><a href="#Footnote_488" -class="fnanchor">[488]</a>” It was the practice of the poorer -part of the native population often to sell their little children -for exportation to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to -maintain them. The children thus purchased, if they promised to be -handsome, were often mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, -to supply the large demand for the harems and religious worship of -many Asiatic towns. But in their haste to get out of the way of a -plundering army, these slave-merchants were forced often to leave by -the way-side the little children whom they had purchased, exposed -to the wolves, the dogs, or starvation. In this wretched condition, -they were found by Agesilaus on his march. His humane disposition -prompted him to see them carried to a place of safety, where he -gave them in charge of those old natives whom age and feebleness -had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264">[p. 264]</a></span> -caused to be left behind as not worth carrying off. By such active -kindness, rare, indeed, in a Grecian general, towards the conquered, -he earned the gratitude of the captives, and the sympathies of -every one around.<a id="FNanchor_489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489" -class="fnanchor">[489]</a></p> - -<p>This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient -world in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely -condescend to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition -of Agesilaus. We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, -illustrating the Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who -had been captured during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, -and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265">[p. 265]</a></span> -sold during the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. -Agesilaus,—being then busily employed in training his troops -to military efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during -the ensuing campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them -with contempt for the bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. -He therefore directed the heralds who conducted the auction, to put -the prisoners up to sale in a state of perfect nudity. To have the -body thus exposed, was a thing never done, and even held disgraceful -by the native Asiatics; while among the Greeks the practice was -universal for purposes of exercise,—or at least, had become -universal during the last two or three centuries,—for we -are told that originally the Asiatic feeling on this point had -prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the obvious differences -between Grecian and Asiatic customs,<a id="FNanchor_490"></a><a -href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a>—that in -the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the -matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank -to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually; -Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the -Olympic stadium,<a id="FNanchor_491"></a><a href="#Footnote_491" -class="fnanchor">[491]</a>—also the combatants out of the great -family of the Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories -in the Olympic pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists, -wrestlers, and runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom -Pindar pours forth his complimentary odes.</p> - -<p>On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders -to put up the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by -way of insult, but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek -soldier, as he contemplated them, how much he gained by his own -bodily training and frequent exposure, and how inferior was the -condition of men whose bodies never felt the sun or wind. They -displayed a white skin, plump and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped -muscles, like men accustomed to be borne in carriages instead of -walking or running; from whence we indirectly learn that many -of them were men in wealthy circumstances. And the purpose of -Agesilaus was completely answered; since his soldiers, when they -witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence, thought that -“the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266">[p. 266]</a></span> -enemies against whom they had to contend were not more formidable -than women.”<a id="FNanchor_492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492" -class="fnanchor">[492]</a> Such a method of illustrating the -difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have -occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean -rules.</p> - -<p>While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers -the inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout -the winter under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as -in arms. A force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he -enrolled all the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as -conscripts to serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to -exempt himself, however, by providing a competent substitute and -equipment,—man, horse, and arms.<a id="FNanchor_493"></a><a -href="#Footnote_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a> Before the -commencement of spring, an adequate force of cavalry was thus -assembled at Ephesus, and put into tolerable exercise. Throughout -the whole winter, that city became a place of arms, consecrated -to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On parade as well as in the -palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in setting the example -of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given to the diligent and -improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light troops; while the -armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all the various -artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in the fullest -employment. “It was a sight full of encouragement (says Xenophon, -who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see Agesilaus -and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on their -heads,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267">[p. 267]</a></span> -and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their wreaths -to the goddess.”<a id="FNanchor_494"></a><a href="#Footnote_494" -class="fnanchor">[494]</a></p> - -<p>Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations -for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over. -Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding -the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The -army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more -systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus -distributed the various divisions under the command of different -members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês, -the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the -Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march -straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in -that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing -that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his -cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding -campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within -the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched -as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he -plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the -fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to -oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching -the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek -light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them -by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently, -however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge, -anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive -in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a -full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But -when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger -hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory -soon declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and -many of them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, -with a valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus -afterwards took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him -the unopposed mastery of all the ter<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_268">[p. 268]</a></span>ritory around Sardis. He carried his -ravages to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and -ornamented ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying -Tissaphernes to come out and fight.<a id="FNanchor_495"></a><a -href="#Footnote_495" class="fnanchor">[495]</a></p> - -<p>The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached -its close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him -as leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own -residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that -the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year, -intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve -absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was -added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person -yet more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a -victim. The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for -having been one of the principal agents in the defeat and death -of her son Cyrus. Her influence being now reëstablished over the -mind of Artaxerxes, she took advantage of the existing discredit of -the satrap to get an order sent down for his deposition and death. -Tithraustes, the bearer of this order, seized him by stratagem -at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while he was in the bath, and caused him -to be beheaded.<a id="FNanchor_496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496" -class="fnanchor">[496]</a></p> - -<p>The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by -increased efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war -against Sparta with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also -for fomenting the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into -hostilities this year in Greece. At first, however, immediately -after the death of Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open -negotiations with Agesilaus, who was in military possession of -the country around Sardis, while that city itself appears to -have been occupied by Ariæus, probably the same Persian who -had formerly been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269">[p. -269]</a></span> general under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted -from Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_497"></a><a href="#Footnote_497" -class="fnanchor">[497]</a> Tithraustes took credit to the justice -of the king for having punished the late satrap; out of whose -perfidy (he affirmed) the war had arisen. He then summoned -Agesilaus, in the king’s name, to evacuate Asia, leaving the -Asiatic Greeks to pay their original tribute to Persia, but to -enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that one condition. Had -this proposition been accepted and executed, it would have -secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or governors; a -much milder fate for them than that to which the Lacedæmonians -had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes sixteen -years before,<a id="FNanchor_498"></a><a href="#Footnote_498" -class="fnanchor">[498]</a> and analogous to the position in which the -Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens, under -the peace of Nikias;<a id="FNanchor_499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499" -class="fnanchor">[499]</a> subject to a fixed tribute, yet -autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus -replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without -the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But -in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an -armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that -of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards -the temporary maintenance of the army.<a id="FNanchor_500"></a><a -href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a> These satraps -generally acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than -coöperating colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the -Persian empire.</p> - -<p>When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march -northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from -home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under -his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name -whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.<a id="FNanchor_501"></a><a -href="#Footnote_501" class="fnanchor">[501]</a> For the first -time since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of -Sparta was beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on -her part were becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person -to the court of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations -obtained a large subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and -Phœnicia, to act under the Athenian admiral Konon against the -Lacedæmonians.<a id="FNanchor_502"></a><a href="#Footnote_502" -class="fnanchor">[502]</a> That officer,—with a fleet of -forty triremes, before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270">[p. -270]</a></span> the equipment of the remainder was yet -complete,—had advanced along the southern coast of Asia Minor -to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the peninsula, on the -frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was besieged by the -Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes under Pharax. -But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet of Konon to eighty -sail, and put the place out of danger; so that Pharax, desisting from -the siege, retired to Rhodes.</p> - -<p>The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his -fleet of eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened -the Rhodians to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the -general detestation of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so -many different cities by the local dekarchies and by the Spartan -harmosts, first manifested itself. And such was the ardor of the -Rhodian population, that their revolt took place while the fleet -of Pharax was (in part at least) actually in the harbor, and they -drove him out of it.<a id="FNanchor_503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503" -class="fnanchor">[503]</a> Konon, whose secret encouragements had -helped to excite this insurrection, presently sailed to Rhodes -with his fleet, and made the island his main station. It threw -into his hands an unexpected advantage; for a numerous fleet of -vessels arrived there shortly afterwards, sent by Nephareus, the -native king of Egypt (which was in revolt against the Persians), -with marine stores and grain to the aid of the Lacedæmonians. -Not having been apprized of the recent revolt, these vessels -entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a Lacedæmonian -island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by Konon and -the Rhodians.<a id="FNanchor_504"></a><a href="#Footnote_504" -class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p> - -<p>In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens -which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to -point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in -the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271">[p. 271]</a></span> (in most -cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of -a local party,—and without privity or previous consent of -the bulk of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming -a remarkable contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost -surprise and indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves -about to enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which -they had reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated -uncertainty in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was -under this prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating -Agesilaus to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in -order to ensure unity of operations;<a id="FNanchor_505"></a><a -href="#Footnote_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> though a -distinction of functions, which they had hitherto set great -value upon maintaining, was thus broken down,—and, though -the two commands had never been united in any king before -Agesilaus.<a id="FNanchor_506"></a><a href="#Footnote_506" -class="fnanchor">[506]</a> Pharax, the previous admiral, was -recalled.<a id="FNanchor_507"></a><a href="#Footnote_507" -class="fnanchor">[507]</a></p> - -<p>But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the -revolted Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. -Among all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished -than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high -political functionaries in their native island, but had attained -even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories -at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of -this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia -on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in -the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the -prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring -to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration. -As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the -Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to -Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he -had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens -after the Syracusan<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272">[p. -272]</a></span> catastrophe. Serving against her in ships fitted out -at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 <small>B.C.</small> by -the Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received -practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and -above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the -Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive -enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty -and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and -admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed -him unconditionally.<a id="FNanchor_508"></a><a href="#Footnote_508" -class="fnanchor">[508]</a></p> - -<p>This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in -my eighth volume,<a id="FNanchor_509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509" -class="fnanchor">[509]</a> is here again noticed as a contrast -to the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the -Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but -at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only -absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus. -Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians -generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to -Sparta, and there condemned and executed.<a id="FNanchor_510"></a><a -href="#Footnote_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a> It seems hardly -possible that he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. -Had such been the fact, he would have been in the island,—or -would at least have taken care not to be within the reach of the -Lacedæmonians when the revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other -members of the Diagoridæ, his family, once so much attached to -Sparta, may have taken part in it; for we know, by the example of -the Thirty at Athens, that the Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan -harmosts made themselves quite as formidable to oligarchical as -to democratical politicians, and it is very conceivable that the -Diagoridæ may have become less philo-Laconian in their politics.</p> - -<p>This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by -Athens and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits -the difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and -between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273">[p. 273]</a></span> grand and -sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to the -senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in -chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on -so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks -ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon -their emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished -antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail a -just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day. But the -same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan ephors and -senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting Dorieus to -death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy or revenge, -simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the island. Now -this difference depended partly upon the difference between the -sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also upon the -difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. -Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal at Athens, -instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had the -case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he -would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the -circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon -the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course -intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens -to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were -susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction; -whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that -they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another, -and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or -sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of -multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened -to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to -mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate -would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did -not, as seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it -in rigor.</p> - -<p>While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities -against Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news -of his nomination to the double command, immediately despatched -orders to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring -the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274">[p. 274]</a></span> -construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence -of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its -continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. -Many leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to -acquire his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new -triremes was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his -brother-in-law, Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend -the preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill -and experience.<a id="FNanchor_511"></a><a href="#Footnote_511" -class="fnanchor">[511]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of -autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south -and south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his -new auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing -some towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable -advantage to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army -to hazard a battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his -force near his own residence at Daskylium, offering no opposition -to the march of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to -traverse Phrygia and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an -alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal -dependence on Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian -empire. But he had recently refused to obey an invitation from -the court at Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance -of Agesilaus, but concluded an alliance with him, strengthening -him with an auxiliary body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to -requite Spithridates for his services, and vehemently attached to -his son, the beautiful youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded -Otys to marry the daughter of Spithridates. He even caused her to -be conveyed by sea in a Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from -Abydos to Sinôpê.<a id="FNanchor_512"></a><a href="#Footnote_512" -class="fnanchor">[512]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_275">[p. 275]</a></span></p> <p>Reinforced by the -Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted the war with augmented -vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He now approached the -neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the satrap himself, -inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been satrap before -him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich villages, -embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap’s hunting and -gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to -remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers -full of fish.<a id="FNanchor_513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513" -class="fnanchor">[513]</a> In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed -the winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became -so careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that -Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed -chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by -surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus -came up to protect them with the hoplites.</p> - -<p>This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of -being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying -any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his -valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment -as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless, -having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in -the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one -of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment -to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number -of light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian -horse, were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these -soldiers took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the -enterprise proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus -was surprised at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put -to the sword, and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to -take flight with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, -and personal furniture, together with a large baggage-train and -abundance of prisoners, fell into the hands<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_276">[p. 276]</a></span> of the victors. As the -Paphlagonians under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious -detachment, they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than -the infantry. They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, -when Herippidas interfered and took everything away from them; -placing the entire spoil of every description, under the charge of -Grecian officers, to be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; -after which the proceeds were to be distributed or applied by public -authority. The orders of Herippidas were conformable to the regular -and systematic proceeding of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and -the Paphlagonians were probably justified by Asiatic practice in -appropriating that which they had themselves captured. Moreover, -the order, disagreeable in itself, was enforced against them with -Lacedæmonian harshness of manner,<a id="FNanchor_514"></a><a -href="#Footnote_514" class="fnanchor">[514]</a> unaccompanied by -any guarantee that they would be allowed, even at last, a fair -share of the proceeds. Resenting the conduct of Herippidas as -combining injury with insult, they deserted in the night and fled -to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in actual revolt against -the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and still more serious -chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of valuable -auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant; but -the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies of -their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from -joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure -of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates -to Sardis.<a id="FNanchor_515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515" -class="fnanchor">[515]</a></p> - -<p>It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference -took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the -intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was -connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as -guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon, -himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview. -Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277">[p. 277]</a></span> being the first -to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down upon the -grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid clothing -and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine carpets -for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were seated, -felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down on the grass -by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes, they next shook -hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older of the two had been -the first to tender his right hand, was also the first to open the -conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well enough to dispense with the -necessity of an interpreter, we are not informed. “Agesilaus (said -he), I was the friend and ally of you Lacedæmonians while you were -at war with Athens; I furnished you with money to strengthen your -fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on horseback, chasing your -enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me with having ever played -you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word or deed. Yet, after this -behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a condition, that I have -not a dinner in my own territory, except by picking up your leavings, -like the beasts of the field. I see the fine residences, parks, and -hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my father, which formed the -charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by you. Is this the conduct -of men mindful of favors received, and eager to requite them? Pray -answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have yet to learn what is -holy and just.”</p> - -<p>The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this -emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after -a long pause, at length replied,—“You are aware, Pharnabazus, -that in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests -of each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to -war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each -other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we, -being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions -as enemy’s land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to -become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters, in -place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and to -enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and -acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the -highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a -freeman, and yet poor.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278">[p. -278]</a></span> We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh -territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those -who are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell -me,—if you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can -you want farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?”</p> - -<p>“I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the -king shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall -willingly become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty -of command on me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall -continue to make war upon you to the best of my power. Expect -nothing else.”<a id="FNanchor_516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516" -class="fnanchor">[516]</a></p> - -<p>Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and -said,—“Would that with such high-minded sentiments you -<i>could</i> become our friend! At any rate, let me assure you of -this,—that I will immediately quit your territory; and for the -future, even should the war continue, I will respect both you and -all your property, as long as I can turn my arms against any other -Persians.”</p> - -<p>Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, -and rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time -still a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, -and exclaimed,—“Agesilaus, I make you my guest.”—“I -accept it with all my heart,”—was the answer. “Remember me -by this,”—rejoined the young Persian,—putting into -the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin which he carried. The -latter immediately took off the ornamental trappings from the -horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a return present; -upon which the young man rode away with them, and rejoined -his father.<a id="FNanchor_517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517" -class="fnanchor">[517]</a></p> - -<p>There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as -described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic -chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The -pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus were -not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days -impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279">[p. 279]</a></span> absence of -Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in Greece; -where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home, and even -went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian youth, to -whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian youth had -outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic stadium; -nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference, overruled -the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon them to admit -him as a competitor with the other boys.<a id="FNanchor_518"></a><a -href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a> The stress laid by -Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of Grecian sentiment, -and shows us the variety of objects which personal ascendency was -used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself, Agesilaus was -unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and screening -the injustices, of his friends.<a id="FNanchor_519"></a><a -href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a> The unfair privilege -which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself, -could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the -established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to -severe censure.</p> - -<p>Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty -well exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must -have expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of -Artemis, at Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly -known as Æolis), near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself -in bringing together an increased number of troops, with a view to -penetrate farther into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. -Recent events had greatly increased the belief entertained by the -Asiatics in his superior strength; so that he received propositions -from various districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and -expressing anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also -to compose the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the -Lysandrian dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much -as possible sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved -in this direction, we cannot tell,<a id="FNanchor_520"></a><a -href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a> nor can it have -been possible, indeed, to achieve<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_280">[p. 280]</a></span> much, without dismissing the -Spartan harmosts and lessening the political power of his own -partisans; neither of which he did.</p> - -<p>His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into -the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western -portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished -towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march -was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in -the next chapter.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and -take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of -Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes -from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year, 395 -<small>B.C.</small>) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. -The burst of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus -at the Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the -Persian commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by -peculation of officers who embezzled the pay destined for the -troops,—by mutiny in the fleet from absence of pay,—and -by the many delays arising while the satraps, unwilling to spend -their own revenues in the war, waited for orders and remittances -from court.<a id="FNanchor_521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521" -class="fnanchor">[521]</a> Hence Konon had been unable to make -any efficient use of his fleet, during those months when the -Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its former number. -At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation of his -countrymen at home<a id="FNanchor_522"></a><a href="#Footnote_522" -class="fnanchor">[522]</a> as well as of Euagoras prince of Salamis -in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one of the -Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going -himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes. -Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on the -Eu<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281">[p. 281]</a></span>phrates -(as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he sailed down -the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did not see -Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration which was -required from all who approached the royal person. But his messages, -transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident -engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract -the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were -put into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the -mind of the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the -formidable position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the -Lacedæmonians as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. -Artaxerxes not only approved his views, but made to him a large grant -of money, and transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his -officers should be active in prosecuting the maritime war.</p> - -<p>What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to -name any person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. -It was by his choice that Pharnabazus was called from his -satrapy, and ordered to act jointly as commander of the fleet. -This satrap, the bravest and most straightforward among all -the Persian grandees, and just now smarting with resentment -at the devastation of his satrapy<a id="FNanchor_523"></a><a -href="#Footnote_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a> by Agesilaus, -coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly Phœnician, -partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior in -number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under -Peisander.<a id="FNanchor_524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524" -class="fnanchor">[524]</a> Euagoras, prince of Sa<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282">[p. 282]</a></span>lamis -in Cyprus,<a id="FNanchor_525"></a><a href="#Footnote_525" -class="fnanchor">[525]</a> not only provided many triremes, but -served himself, personally, on board.</p> - -<p>It was about the month of July, 394 <small>B.C.</small>, -that Pharnabazus and Konon brought their united fleet to the -south-western corner of Asia Minor; first, probably, to the friendly -island of Rhodes, next, off Loryma<a id="FNanchor_526"></a><a -href="#Footnote_526" class="fnanchor">[526]</a> and the mountain -called Dorion on the peninsula of Knidus.<a id="FNanchor_527"></a><a -href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> Peisander, with -the fleet of Sparta and her allies, sailed out from Knidus to meet -them, and both parties prepared for a battle. The numbers of the -Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus at eighty-five triremes; -those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above ninety. But Xenophon, -without particularizing the number on either side, seems to -intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that the entire -fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the Grecian -division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships under -Pharnabazus.<a id="FNanchor_528"></a><a href="#Footnote_528" -class="fnanchor">[528]</a> In spite of such inferiority, Peisander -did not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without -military skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage -and pride; moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was -only maintained by the assumed superior<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_283">[p. 283]</a></span>ity of his fleet,—had he -confessed himself too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone -unopposed around the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he -sailed forth from the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets -were ranged opposite to each other, and the battle was about to -commence,—so manifest and alarming was the superiority of the -Athenians and Persians, that his Asiatic allies on the left division, -noway hearty in the cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under -such discouraging circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into -action with the greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by -numbers, broken in various places by the beaks of the enemy’s ships, -and forced back upon the land, together with a large portion of his -fleet. Many of the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their -triremes to the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in -the same way; but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit -his ship, fell gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and -Pharnabazus was complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were -either captured or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land -enabled a large proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that -no great number of prisoners were taken.<a id="FNanchor_529"></a><a -href="#Footnote_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a> Among the allies -of Sparta, the chief loss of course fell upon those who were most -attached to her cause; the disaffected or lukewarm were those who -escaped by flight at the beginning.</p> - -<p>Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal -of that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important -effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_74"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284">[p. 284]</a></span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIV.<br /> - FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Having</span> in my last -chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down to the battle of -Knidus, in the beginning of August, <small>B.C.</small> 394, at -which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean, -in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period -somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly -called the Corinthian war, began.</p> - -<p>At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 -<small>B.C.</small>, the power of Sparta throughout all Greece from -Laconia to Thessaly, was greater than it had ever been, and greater -than any Grecian state had ever enjoyed before. The burden of the -long war against Athens she had borne in far less proportion than -her allies; its fruits she had reaped exclusively for herself. There -prevailed consequently among her allies a general discontent, which -Thebes as well as Corinth manifested by refusing to take part in -the recent expeditions; either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and -the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or -of Agesilaus against the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were -completely humbled by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities -in Peloponnesus, from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from -being governed by oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, -were obedient to her authority,—with the single exception of Argos, -which remained, as before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment -unfriendly. Athens was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan -allies, furnishing her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by -the xenâgus,—or officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of -commanding such foreign contingents.</p> - -<p>In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power is -yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 <small>B.C.</small> -(about two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so -unable to protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac -Gulf, near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285">[p. 285]</a></span> obliged to -send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling into -the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the -Lacedæmonian harmost.<a id="FNanchor_530"></a><a href="#Footnote_530" -class="fnanchor">[530]</a> In the winter of 409-408 -<small>B.C.</small>, another disaster had happened at Herakleia, in -which the Lacedæmonian harmost was slain.<a id="FNanchor_531"></a><a -href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a> But about 399 -<small>B.C.</small>, we find Sparta exercising an energetic -ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a central -post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount -Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was -sent thither to repress some factious movements, with a force -sufficient to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize -the obnoxious party in the place, and to put them to death, five -hundred in number, outside of the gates.<a id="FNanchor_532"></a><a -href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a> Carrying his arms -farther against the Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who -had been long at variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, -he expelled them from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with -their wives and children into Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_533"></a><a -href="#Footnote_533" class="fnanchor">[533]</a> Hence, the -Lacedæmonians were enabled to extend their influence into parts -of Thessaly, and to place a harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, -resting upon Herakleia as a basis,—which thus became a position -of extraordinary importance for their dominion over the northern -regions.</p> - -<p>With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, -in addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx -of tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized -her as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required -an unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination -against her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and -antipathy. The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the -means had been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing -Athens. The news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, -which had prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of -396 <small>B.C.</small>, was doubtless circulated and heard with -satisfaction among the Grecian cities unfriendly to Sparta; and -the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, to take service under -that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286">[p. 286]</a></span> -prince,—aggravated in the case of the Thebans by a positive offence -given to him on the occasion of his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to -warn Sparta of the dangerous sentiments and tendencies by which she -was surrounded near home.</p> - -<p>It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation -and promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of -the following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary -supplies, with news of revived naval warfare threatening the -insular dominion of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had -put to death and succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded -the armistice mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to -remove his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed -active measures for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in -order to create a necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of -Asia. He sent a Rhodian named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to -the cities most unfriendly to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of -fifty talents;<a id="FNanchor_534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534" -class="fnanchor">[534]</a> directing him to employ this money in -gaining over the leading men in these cities, and to exchange -solemn oaths of alliance and aid with Persia, for common hostility -against Sparta. The island of Rhodes having just revolted from the -Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon with the Persian fleet (as I -have mentioned in the last chapter), so that probably the Rhodian -envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes on behalf of his countrymen. -He was an appropriate envoy on this occasion, as having an animated -interest in raising up new enemies to Sparta, and as being hearty -in stirring up among the Thebans and Corinthians the same spirit -which had led to the revolt of Rhodes. The effect which that revolt -produced in alarming and exasperating the Spartans, has been<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287">[p. 287]</a></span> already noticed; -and we may fairly presume that its effect on the other side, in -encouraging their Grecian enemies, was considerable. Timokrates -visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, distributing his funds. He -concluded engagements on behalf of the satrap, with various leading -men in each, putting them into communication with each other; -Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes -at Corinth,—Kylon and others at Argos. It appears that he did not -visit Athens; at least, Xenophon expressly says that none of his -money went there. The working of this mission,—coupled, we must -recollect, with the renewed naval warfare on the coast of Asia, and -the promise of a Persian fleet against that of Sparta,—was soon felt -in the more pronounced manifestation of anti-Laconian sentiments -in these various cities, and in the commencement of attempts -to establish alliance between them.<a id="FNanchor_535"></a><a -href="#Footnote_535" class="fnanchor">[535]</a></p> - -<p>With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon -represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought -about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in -these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that -the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in -Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal -corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when -such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher -than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long -life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore -surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the -circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that -the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is, -given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was -furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could -not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous -to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us) -Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry -away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present -for the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution -to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288">[p. 288]</a></span> -wants of the army),<a id="FNanchor_536"></a><a href="#Footnote_536" -class="fnanchor">[536]</a> or to that which the satrap Tiribazus -gave to Antalkidas afterwards,<a id="FNanchor_537"></a><a -href="#Footnote_537" class="fnanchor">[537]</a> also for -public objects. Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, -having received these presents from Timokrates, accused the -Lacedæmonians and rendered them odious,—each in his respective -city.<a id="FNanchor_538"></a><a href="#Footnote_538" -class="fnanchor">[538]</a> But it is certain, from his own showing, -that the hatred towards them existed in these cities, before the -arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was of old standing; -in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the close of -the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon -himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none -of the money,<a id="FNanchor_539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539" -class="fnanchor">[539]</a> were quite as ready for war as the other -cities. If we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that -Timokrates gave private presents to various leading politicians, -which is by no means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory -use which he makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the -cause of the war. What these leading men would find it difficult -to raise was, not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to -brave the power of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of -Timokrates would be a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of -Persian coöperation and support against Sparta. He must have been -produced publicly either before the people, the senate, or at least -the great body of the anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money -which he brought with him, though a portion of it may have gone in -private presents, would serve to this party as the best warrant for -the sincerity of the satrap.</p> - -<p>Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the -cities visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about -between them when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out -as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289">[p. 289]</a></span> a -“Bœotian war,”<a id="FNanchor_540"></a><a href="#Footnote_540" -class="fnanchor">[540]</a> between Thebes and Sparta separately. -Between the Opuntian Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia, -there was a strip of disputed border land; respecting which the -Phokians, imputing wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded -their territory. The Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her -protection; upon which a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while -the Phokians on their side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, -invoking her aid against Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_541"></a><a -href="#Footnote_541" class="fnanchor">[541]</a> “The Lacedæmonians -(says Xenophon) were delighted to get a pretence for making war -against the Thebans,—having been long angry with them on several -different grounds. They thought that the present was an excellent -time for marching against them, and putting down their insolence; -since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia, and there was no -other war to embarrass them in Greece.”<a id="FNanchor_542"></a><a -href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a> The various<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290">[p. 290]</a></span> grounds on which -the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure against Thebes, begin from -a time immediately succeeding the close of the war against Athens, -and the sentiment was now both established and vehement. It was -they who now began the Bœotian war; not the Thebans, nor the bribes -brought by Timokrates.</p> - -<p>The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated -the expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated -the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now -decreed by the ephors against Thebes,<a id="FNanchor_543"></a><a -href="#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a> as well as the -chief commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was -despatched with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He -was directed to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian -influence in those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together -with the various dependent populations in the neighborhood of -Œta, Œtæans, Malians, Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia, -taking up the Phokians in his way,—and to attack Haliartus. -Under the walls of this town king Pausanias engaged to meet -him on a given day, with the native Lacedæmonian force and -the Peloponnesian allies. For this purpose, having obtained -favorable border sacrifices, he marched forth to Tegea, and -there employed himself in collecting the allied contingents from -Peloponnesus.<a id="FNanchor_544"></a><a href="#Footnote_544" -class="fnanchor">[544]</a> But the allies generally were tardy -and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld -all concurrence and support,<a id="FNanchor_545"></a><a -href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a>—though neither did -they make any manifestation in favor of Thebes.</p> - -<p>Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two -sides, from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan -officer of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without -a single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. -A Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this -purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution -which had taken place in Grecian politics.<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_291">[p. 291]</a></span> The antipathy between the two -cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the -close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the -Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable -and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the -Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating -statues in the Theban Herakleion.<a id="FNanchor_546"></a><a -href="#Footnote_546" class="fnanchor">[546]</a> But it was by no -means clear that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by -policy or by sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a -moment when she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no -ships, nor any protection against the Spartan maritime power.</p> - -<p>It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually -engaged in mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to -address the Athenian assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy -sets forth strikingly the case against Sparta as it then stood. -Disclaiming all concurrence with that former Theban deputy, who, -without any instructions, had taken on himself to propose, in the -Spartan assembly of allies, extreme severity towards the conquered -Athenians,—he reminded the Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous -voice declined obeying the summons of the Spartans, to aid in the -march against Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; and that this was the -first cause of the anger of the Spartans against her. On that -ground, then, he appealed to the gratitude of democratical Athens -against the Lacedæmonians. But he likewise invoked against them, -with yet greater confidence, the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of -those who at that time had stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the -Peiræus; for it was Sparta who, having first set up the oligarchy -at Athens, had afterwards refused to sustain it, and left its -partisans to the generosity of their democratical opponents, by -whom alone they were saved harmless.<a id="FNanchor_547"></a><a -href="#Footnote_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> Of course Athens -was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain her lost -empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial aid<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292">[p. 292]</a></span> of Thebes as -an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means an impracticable -enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which Sparta had now -drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient allies than of -prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that Thebes could be -formidable as a foe; she would now show that she could be yet more -effective as a friend, if the Athenians would interfere to rescue -her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not for Syracusans or -Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity. “We hesitate not -to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban speaker), that what -we are now invoking at your hands is a greater benefit to you than -it is to ourselves.”<a id="FNanchor_548"></a><a href="#Footnote_548" -class="fnanchor">[548]</a></p> - -<p>Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides -and the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation -of the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned -allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the -assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure -distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she -had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic -vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the -temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived -likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance. -But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the -democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance -with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing -recollections,—were now found to have produced their fruits. Majority -and minority,—democrats and oligarchs,—were seen confounded in one -unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to Thebes, in spite -of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot indeed doubt -that this vote was considerably influenced also by the revolt of -Rhodes, by the reappearance of Konon with a fleet in the Asiatic -seas, and by private communications from that commander intimating -his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power of -Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a -double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony -between democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common -resolution to break the chain by which they were held as mere -satellites<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293">[p. 293]</a></span> -and units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew -the old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power, -at least,—if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed -a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing -weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by -Demosthenes.<a id="FNanchor_549"></a><a href="#Footnote_549" -class="fnanchor">[549]</a></p> - -<p>After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even -by the philo-Laconian Xenophon),<a id="FNanchor_550"></a><a -href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a> “very many Athenian -citizens rose and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole -assembly with one accord voted to grant it.” Thrasybulus proposed the -resolution, and communicated it to the Theban envoys.</p> - -<p>He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was -incurring while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was -prepared to show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she -had received; for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive -aid, in case they were attacked—while the Thebans had done nothing -more for <i>her</i> than to refuse to join in an aggressive march -against her.<a id="FNanchor_551"></a><a href="#Footnote_551" -class="fnanchor">[551]</a></p> - -<p>Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly -probable that the Thebans might have been afraid to face, -single-handed, Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now -prepared for a strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander -with his army of Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north, -was truly menacing; the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next -to Thebes in the Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and -joined him. The supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the -Bœotian confederacy appears to have been often harsh and oppressive, -though probably not equally oppressive towards all, and certainly -not equally odious to all. To Platæa on the extreme south of -Bœotia, it had been long<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294">[p. -294]</a></span> intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town -has saddened many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on -the extreme north, it was also unpalatable,—partly because that town -stood next in power and importance to Thebes,—partly because it had -an imposing legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the -ascendant city receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now -joined Lysander, threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted -him with his army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into -the district belonging to Haliartus.<a id="FNanchor_552"></a><a -href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a></p> - -<p>Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted -between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given -day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan -Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far -as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet -arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine -with certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a -mistake on this point would be very conceivable,—as had happened -between the Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in -those measures which preceded the battle of Delium in 424 -<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_553"></a><a href="#Footnote_553" -class="fnanchor">[553]</a> But the engagement must have been taken -by both parties, subject to obstructions in the way,—since each -would have to march through a hostile country to reach the place of -meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather indicate that the -day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander resolved at once -to act against Haliartus, without waiting for Pausanias. There were -as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he, probably, had good -reasons for judging that he would better succeed by rapid measures, -before any more Thebans could arrive, than by delaying until the -other Spartan army should join him; not to mention anxiety that -the conquest should belong to himself exclusively, and confidence -arising from his previous success at Orchomenus. Accordingly, he -sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow the example of -the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand upon their -autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may have been -a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority, encouraged -too by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295">[p. 295]</a></span> the -Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon which Lysander marched -up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was here engaged, close by -the gates, in examining where he could best effect an entrance, when -a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of his proceedings, was seen -approaching from Thebes, at their fastest pace,—cavalry, as well as -hoplites. They were probably seen from the watch-towers in the city -earlier than they became visible to the assailants without; so that -the Haliartians, encouraged by the sight, threw open their gates, -and made a sudden sally. Lysander, seemingly taken by surprise, was -himself slain among the first, with his prophet by his side, by a -Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His troops stood some time, -against both the Haliartians from the town, and the fresh Thebans who -now came up. But they were at length driven back with considerable -loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and difficult ground at -some distance in their rear. Here, however, they made good their -position, repelling their assailants with the loss of more than two -hundred hoplites.<a id="FNanchor_554"></a><a href="#Footnote_554" -class="fnanchor">[554]</a></p> - -<p>The success here gained, though highly valuable as an -encouragement to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the -speedy arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the -slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to -Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both collected -and held together by his personal ascendency, lost confidence -and dispersed in the ensuing night.<a id="FNanchor_555"></a><a -href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> When Pausanias -arrived soon afterwards, he found no second army to join with him. -Yet his own force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the -Thebans, had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived -with an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry -under Orthobulus<a id="FNanchor_556"></a><a href="#Footnote_556" -class="fnanchor">[556]</a>—and imparted fresh courage as well as -adequate strength to the Theban cause.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296">[p. 296]</a></span></p> - -<p>Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to -recover the bodies of the slain,—that of Lysander among them; whether -he would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master -of the field,—or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which -always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point -to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well -as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant -protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the -whole original plan of operations was broken up, since not only -the great name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole -army had spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies -were generally lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for -energetic behavior in case of pressing danger; that he had little -or no cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557" -class="fnanchor">[557]</a> while the Theban cavalry was numerous -and excellent; lastly, that the dead body of Lysander himself lay -so close to the walls of Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians -were victorious, they could not carry it off without serious loss -from the armed defenders in their towers.<a id="FNanchor_558"></a><a -href="#Footnote_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a> Such were the -reasons which determined Pausanias and the major part of the -council to send and solicit a truce. But the Thebans refused to -grant it except on condition that they should immediately evacuate -Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary to the received -practice of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_559"></a><a href="#Footnote_559" -class="fnanchor">[559]</a> which imposed on the victor the duty -of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it was -asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed,—nevertheless, -such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not -merely with acquiescence, but with joy,<a id="FNanchor_560"></a><a -href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a> the proposition -of departing. The bodies were duly buried,—that of Lysander in -the territory of Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border, -but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297">[p. 297]</a></span> not -far from Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed, -than the Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their -dejection forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence -of the Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not -without occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the -cultivated fields.<a id="FNanchor_561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561" -class="fnanchor">[561]</a></p> - -<p>The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and -resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself -the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent -to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea, -at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on -two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in -meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a -truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose -of obtaining the bodies of the slain.</p> - -<p>As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not -appear that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts. -The first is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that -Lysander was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time, -in arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first, -would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without -delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though -the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to -the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies,—it does not appear -that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of -a battle. The facts of the case,—even as summed up by Xenophon, -who always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans,—lead -us to this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless -prefer perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of -sending in the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of -fighting a battle under the influence of such a point of honor, -to the exclusion of a rational estimate of consequences, will be -seen when we come to the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus, -son of Pausanias was thus piqued into an imprudence (at least -this is alleged as one of the motives) to which his own life and -the dominion of Sparta became forfeit.<a id="FNanchor_562"></a><a -href="#Footnote_562" class="fnanchor">[562]</a> Moreover, the army of -Pausanias, comprising very few Spartans, con<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_298">[p. 298]</a></span>sisted chiefly of allies who had no -heart in the cause, and who were glad to be required by the Thebans -to depart. If he had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment -to Sparta would have been most serious in every way; whereas, if -he had gained a victory, no result would have followed except the -acquisition of the bodies for burial; since the execution of the -original plan had become impracticable through the dispersion of the -army of Lysander.</p> - -<p>Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also -to have led Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_563"></a><a href="#Footnote_563" -class="fnanchor">[563]</a>) to the conclusion that Pausanias was -innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was -in great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss -of Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry, -and for whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old -accusation was now revived against him,<a id="FNanchor_564"></a><a -href="#Footnote_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a>—for which he had been -tried, and barely acquitted, eight years before,—of having tolerated -the reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might -have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously -against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just -now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced -their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in -their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that -he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of -his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegea. His son, Agesipolis, was -invested with the sceptre in his place.</p> - -<p>A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have -Grecian historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon -the violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere, -in condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many -cases in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299">[p. 299]</a></span> wherein it has -been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against Athens -and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that the ephors -and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of the like -unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian condemnation -occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved, as this of a -Spartan king.</p> - -<p>Turning from the banished king to Lysander,—the Spartans had -indeed valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had -procured for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and -the time was coming when they needed his services to procure them -more; for he left behind him no man of equal warlike resource, -cunning, and power of command. But if he possessed those abilities -which powerfully helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the -same time did more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor, -and to render its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or -dekarchies, diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained -by a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local -tyranny such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And -though the Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the -imperial name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement -of his own, and partially withdrew their countenance from his -dekarchies,—yet the general character of their empire still continued -to retain the impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had -originally stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had -so repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered. -Such an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to -Sparta herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault -which the historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far -deeper sin consists in his having thrown away an opportunity,—such -as never occurred either before or afterwards,—for organizing some -permanent, honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination -under the headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked) -what a man like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with -far-sighted wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an -appeal to the best veins of political sentiment in the chief -city as well as in the subordinates. It is possible that with -the best intentions even he might have failed; so strong was the -centrifugal instinct in the Grecian political mind. But what<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300">[p. 300]</a></span> we have to -reproach in Lysander is, that he never tried; that he abused the -critical moment of cure for the purpose of infusing new poison into -the system; that he not only sacrificed the interests of Greece -to the narrow gains of Sparta, but even the interests of Sparta -to the still narrower monopoly of dominion in his own hands. That -his measures worked mischievously not merely for Greece, but for -Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad tendencies,—has been already -remarked in the preceding pages.</p> - -<p>That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived -and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character. -Yet his personal indifference to money seems only to have left -the greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which -made him unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in -upholding the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens -and the decemvirs in other cities. In spite of his great success -and ability in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree -with Pausanias<a id="FNanchor_565"></a><a href="#Footnote_565" -class="fnanchor">[565]</a> that he was more mischievous than -profitable even to Sparta,—even if we take no thought of Greece -generally. What would have been the effect produced by his projects -in regard to the regal succession, had he been able to bring them to -bear, we have no means of measuring. We are told that the discourse -composed and addressed to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon, -was found after his death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first -learnt from it, with astonishment and alarm, the point to which the -ambition of Lysander had tended, and was desirous of exposing his -real character by making the discourse public,—but was deterred -by dissuasive counsel of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story -(attested by Ephorus<a id="FNanchor_566"></a><a href="#Footnote_566" -class="fnanchor">[566]</a>) looks more like an anecdote of the -rhetorical schools than like a reality. Agesilaus was not the man to -set much value on sophists or their compositions; nor is it easy to -believe that he remained so long ignorant of those projects which -Lysander had once entertained but subsequently dropped. Moreover the -probability is, that Kleon himself would make the discourse public -as a sample of his own talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander; -not only without shame, but as representing the feelings of a -considerable section of readers throughout the Grecian world.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301">[p. 301]</a></span></p> - -<p>Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death -of Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope -and spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance -was immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, -and Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at -Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of -fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now -acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it -lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately -strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans,—the Akarnanians,—the -Ozolian Lokrians,—Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to -Corinth),—and the Chalkidians of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_567"></a><a -href="#Footnote_567" class="fnanchor">[567]</a></p> - -<p>We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes -begins to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually -raises herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian -politics. Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown -themselves excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as -auxiliaries to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of -its own, and individual citizens of ability become conspicuous. -While waiting for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall -presently become acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias; -a wealthy Theban, a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian -exiles eight years before, and one of the great organizers of -the present anti-Spartan movement; a man, too, honored by his -political enemies,<a id="FNanchor_568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568" -class="fnanchor">[568]</a> when they put him to death fourteen -years afterwards, with the title of “a great wicked man,”—the -same combination of epithets which Clarendon applies to Oliver -Cromwell.</p> - -<p>It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and -Argeians, undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence -in the regions north of Bœotia. At Pharsalus in Thessaly, the -Lacedæmonians had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302">[p. 302]</a></span> Lykophron the -despot was their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was -their principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now -enabled to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa, -was received into the Theban alliance,<a id="FNanchor_569"></a><a -href="#Footnote_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a> and Ismenias obtained -also the more important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from -Herakleia. Some malcontents, left after the violent interference -of the Spartan Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of -Herakleia by night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians -in the town were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian -colonists were permitted to retire in safety; while the old -Trachinian inhabitants, whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make -room for their new settlers, together with the Œtæans, whom they had -driven out of the districts in the neighborhood,—were now called -back to repossess their original homes.<a id="FNanchor_570"></a><a -href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a> The loss of Herakleia -was a serious blow to the Spartans in those regions,—protecting -Eubœa in its recent revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to -draw into his alliance the neighboring Malians, Ænianes, and -Athamanes,—tribes stretching along the valley of the Spercheius -westward to the vicinity of Pindus. Assembling additional troops -from these districts (which, only a few months before, had supplied -an army to Lysander<a id="FNanchor_571"></a><a href="#Footnote_571" -class="fnanchor">[571]</a>), Ismenias marched against the Phokians, -among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had been left as harmost in -command. After a severe battle, this officer with his Phokians was -defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and Ismenias came back -victorious to the synod at Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_572"></a><a -href="#Footnote_572" class="fnanchor">[572]</a></p> - -<p>By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter -of 395-394 <small>B.C.</small>, the prospects of Grecian -affairs as they stood in the ensuing spring became materially -altered. The allies assembled at Corinth, full of hope, and -resolved to levy a large combined force to act against Sparta; -who on her side seemed to be threatened with the loss of all -her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly, the ephors -determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his army from -Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect. But even -before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it expe<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303">[p. 303]</a></span>dient to -muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act with vigor -against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling in -considerable numbers. Aristodemus,—guardian of the youthful king -Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid -race,—marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian -hoplites;<a id="FNanchor_573"></a><a href="#Footnote_573" -class="fnanchor">[573]</a> the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent -on purpose to conduct the contingents from the outlying allies), -successively brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, -Akroreia, and Lasion,—fifteen hundred from Sikyon,—three thousand -from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from -Phlias, on the plea (true or false<a id="FNanchor_574"></a><a -href="#Footnote_574" class="fnanchor">[574]</a>) that in that city -the moment was one of solemnity and holy truce. There were also -hoplites from Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns, but their -number is not given; so that we do not know the full muster-roll -on the Lacedæmonian side. The cavalry, six hundred in number, -were all Lacedæmonian; there were, moreover, three hundred Kretan -bowmen,—and four hundred slingers from different rural districts -of Triphylia.<a id="FNanchor_575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575" -class="fnanchor">[575]</a></p> - -<p>The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near -Corinth;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304">[p. 304]</a></span> -six thousand Athenian hoplites,—seven thousand Argeian,—five -thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent,—three -thousand Corinthian,—three thousand from the different towns of -Eubœa; making twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry -was fifteen hundred and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian, -six hundred Athenian, one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty -from the Lokrians. The light troops also were numerous,—partly -Corinthian, drawn probably from the serf-population which tilled -the fields,<a id="FNanchor_576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576" -class="fnanchor">[576]</a>—partly Lokrians, Malians, and -Akarnanians.</p> - -<p>The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their -plans, came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn -up in deeper files than sixteen men,<a id="FNanchor_577"></a><a -href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a> in order that there -might be no chance of their being surrounded; and that the right -wing, carrying with it command for the time, should be alternated -from day to day between the different cities. The confidence which -the events of the last few months had infused into these leaders, -now for the first time acting against their old leader Sparta, is -surprising. “There is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the -Corinthian Timolaus) and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near -their own home. We must burn out the wasps in their nest, without -letting them come forth to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like -that of a river; small at its source, and becoming formidable only -by the affluents which it receives, in proportion to the length -of its course.”<a id="FNanchor_578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578" -class="fnanchor">[578]</a> The wisdom of this advice was remarkable; -but its boldness was yet more remarkable, when viewed in conjunction -with the established feeling of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted -by the general council of the allies; but unfortunately the time -for executing it had already passed; for the Lacedæmonians were -already in march and had crossed their own border. They took the -line of road by Tegea and Mantineia (whose troops joined the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305">[p. 305]</a></span> march), and -advanced as far as Sikyon, where probably all the Arcadian and Achæan -contingents were ordered to rendezvous.</p> - -<p>The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when -they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then -altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The -Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called -Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy’s light troops, -who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they -had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore -of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents -from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—the whole army thus -reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging -the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and -at length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough -ground with a ravine in their front.<a id="FNanchor_579"></a><a -href="#Footnote_579" class="fnanchor">[579]</a> The Lacedæmonians -advanced forward until they were little more than a mile distant from -this position, and there encamped.</p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_306">[p. 306]</a></span></p> <p>After an interval -seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day when their turn -came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead, gave the -signal for battle.<a id="FNanchor_580"></a><a href="#Footnote_580" -class="fnanchor">[580]</a> The Lacedæmonians, prevented by the -wooded ground from seeing clearly, were only made aware of the -coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle -immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when -within a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division -took the lead,—slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder -forward, according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites, -through anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307">[p. 307]</a></span> being exposed to -the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield of a -right-hand neighbor.<a id="FNanchor_581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581" -class="fnanchor">[581]</a> The Lacedæmonians in the one army, and -the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused -their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting -to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably -outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes -of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who -came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four -contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on -their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely -beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in -front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four -Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and -generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and -Corinthians were victorious,—except where the troops of the Achæan -Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the -battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious -confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as -to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks; -while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in -this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans, -Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to -their camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter -within the walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the -philo-Laconian Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates -against them, and opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians -however came so near that it was at last thought impossible to keep -the gates open longer. Many of the remaining confederates were -therefore obliged to be satisfied with the protection of their -ancient camp;<a id="FNanchor_582"></a><a href="#Footnote_582" -class="fnanchor">[582]</a> which seems, however, to have been -situated in such defensible ground,<a id="FNanchor_583"></a><a -href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> that the -Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308">[p. 308]</a></span></p> - -<p>So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the -battle of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they -affirmed) with the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy -loss upon the Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the -remaining confederates in their return from pursuit. Though -the Athenian hoplites suffered thus severely, yet Thrasybulus -their commander,<a id="FNanchor_584"></a><a href="#Footnote_584" -class="fnanchor">[584]</a> who kept the field until the last, -with strenuous efforts to rally them, was not satisfied with -their behavior. But on the other hand, all the allies of -Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them slain. -According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side -was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight -hundred.<a id="FNanchor_585"></a><a href="#Footnote_585" -class="fnanchor">[585]</a> On the whole, the victory of the -Lacedæmonians was not sufficiently decisive to lead to important -results, though it completely secured their ascendency within -Peloponnesus. We observe here, as we shall have occasion to observe -elsewhere, that the Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in -the cause of Sparta. They seem bound to her more by fear than by -affection.</p> - -<p>The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 -<small>B.C.</small>, seemingly about the same time as the naval -battle near Knidus (or perhaps a little earlier), and while Agesilaus -was on his homeward march after being recalled from Asia. Had the -Lacedæmonians been able to defer the battle until Agesilaus had come -up so as to threaten Bœotia on the northern side, their campaign -would probably have been much more successful. As it is, their -defeated allies doubtless went home in disgust from the field of -Corinth, so that the confederates were now enabled to turn their -whole attention to Agesilaus.</p> - -<p>That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the -ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same -time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309">[p. 309]</a></span> and was -contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the -Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation -for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him -from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be -emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to -their aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian -cities on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of -partisan oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater -practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked -the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled -a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch -of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of -farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of -his aspirations,—all the conquests were to be made at the expense, -not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps -of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.</p> - -<p>All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his -sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin -and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but the -panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his ready -obedience is altogether unreasonable.<a id="FNanchor_586"></a><a -href="#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a> There was no merit -in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors; -because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, -none of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of -place to remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the -extinction of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of -Knidus, would have rendered all large plans of inland conquest -impracticable. On receiving his orders of recall, he convened an -assembly both of his allies and of his army, to make known the -painful necessity of his departure; which was heard with open and -sincere manifestations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310">[p. -310]</a></span> of sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had -dissipated the clouds which hung over Sparta at home, he should -come back to Asia without delay, and resume his efforts against the -Persian satraps; in the interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four -thousand men for their protection. Such was the sympathy excited -by his communication, combined with esteem for his character, that -the cities passed a general vote to furnish him with contingents -of troops for his march to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal -abated, when they came to reflect that it was a service against -Greeks; not merely unpopular in itself, but presenting a certainty -of hard fighting with little plunder. Agesilaus tried every means -to keep up their spirits, by proclaiming prizes both to the civic -soldiers and to the mercenaries, to be distributed at Sestus in the -Chersonesus, as soon as they should have crossed into Europe,—prizes -for the best equipment, and best disciplined soldiers in every -different arm.<a id="FNanchor_587"></a><a href="#Footnote_587" -class="fnanchor">[587]</a> By these means he prevailed upon the -bravest and most effective soldiers in his army to undertake the -march along with him; among them many of the Cyreians, with Xenophon -himself at their head.</p> - -<p>Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on -hoisting the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his -will to tread in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his -march from the Thracian Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, -and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ and Bœotia. Never, since the time of -Xerxes, had any army undertaken this march; which now bore an -Oriental impress, from the fact that Agesilaus brought with him some -camels, taken in the battle of Sardis.<a id="FNanchor_588"></a><a -href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> Overawing or -defeating the various Thracian tribes, he reached Amphipolis on -the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas, who had come fresh -from the battle of Corinth and informed him of the victory. Full -as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against Persia, he burst -into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death of so many -Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united, to emancipate -Asia Minor.<a id="FNanchor_589"></a><a href="#Footnote_589" -class="fnanchor">[589]</a> Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia to -make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance, he -pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter -coun<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311">[p. 311]</a></span>try, -Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes, raised -opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition of -this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against -him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he -beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As -the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took -great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by -himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful -and effective support from his hoplites.<a id="FNanchor_590"></a><a -href="#Footnote_590" class="fnanchor">[590]</a> After having passed -the Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest -of the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to -the frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.</p> - -<p>In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the -ephor Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march -as much as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further -joined by two Lacedæmonian regiments<a id="FNanchor_591"></a><a -href="#Footnote_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a> from Corinth, and -by fifty young Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed -by sea from Sikyon. He was reinforced also by the Phokians and -the Orchomenians,—in addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had -accompanied him to Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the -peltasts, and the cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the -Hellespont, and some fresh troops collected in the march. His -army was thus in imposing force when he reached the neighborhood -of Chæroneia on the Bœotian border. It was here that they were -alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394 -<small>B.C.</small>; a fatal presage, the meaning of which was -soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a messenger bearing -news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death of Peisander, -brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter affected by this -irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it would spread dismay -and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom would remain attached -to him only so long as they believed the cause of Sparta<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312">[p. 312]</a></span> to be ascendant -and profitable.<a id="FNanchor_592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592" -class="fnanchor">[592]</a> Accordingly, he resolved, being now within -a day’s march of his enemies, to hasten on a battle without making -known the bad news. Proclaiming that intelligence had been received -of a sea-fight having taken place, in which the Lacedæmonians -had been victorious, though Peisander himself was slain,—he -offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round presents of -congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect, and made the -skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.</p> - -<p>To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Korôneia, -the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known, -spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are -not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse. The -army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who had -recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænianes in -place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less numerous, -since there was still a necessity for occupying and defending the -camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had just been so -roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were now drafted -off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general and an army -of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension and some -reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who stood -forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes just -boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.<a id="FNanchor_593"></a><a -href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a> The Thebans and -Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at -Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended. -The camp was established in the territory of Korôneia, not far from -the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313">[p. 313]</a></span> -temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general Bœotian -assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy erected -for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about fifty -years before.<a id="FNanchor_594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594" -class="fnanchor">[594]</a> Between the two armies there was no great -difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more -numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have -taken much part in the battle.</p> - -<p>Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain -of Korôneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him -from the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing -of his army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians -with the Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the -Thebans were on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies -approached slowly and in silence until they were separated only by -an interval of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right -began the war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest -of the line following their example. When they got within half a -furlong of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter, -under the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with -Xenophon himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their -side, and advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond -their own line,<a id="FNanchor_595"></a><a href="#Footnote_595" -class="fnanchor">[595]</a> and coming first to cross spears with the -enemy’s centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas -was here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his -right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him, -fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety -on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the -Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians, -and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the -army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him -as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by -attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and -prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their -comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and -assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he -pre<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314">[p. 314]</a></span>ferred -the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face. Such is the -coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,<a id="FNanchor_596"></a><a -href="#Footnote_596" class="fnanchor">[596]</a> puts upon his -manœuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass, -he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades -were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought -against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of -their prowess.</p> - -<p>The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond -all Grecian military experience,<a id="FNanchor_597"></a><a -href="#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> leaving an -indelible impression upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in -it. The hoplites on both sides came to the fiercest and closest -bodily struggle, pushing shields against each other, with all the -weight of the incumbent mass behind impelling forward the foremost -ranks,—especially in the deep order of the Thebans. The shields of -the foremost combatants were thus stove in, their spears broken, -and each man was engaged in such close embrace with his enemy, that -the dagger was the only weapon which he could use. There was no -systematic shout, such as usually marked the charge of a Grecian -army; the silence was only broken by a medley of furious exclamations -and murmurs.<a id="FNanchor_598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598" -class="fnanchor">[598]</a> Agesilaus himself, who was among the -front ranks, and whose size and strength were by no means on a level -with his personal courage, had his body covered with wounds from -different weapons,<a id="FNanchor_599"></a><a href="#Footnote_599" -class="fnanchor">[599]</a>—was trodden down,—and only escaped -by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers who -formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the -irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the -Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford -a free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315">[p. 315]</a></span> march onward and -rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by attacks -on their rear.<a id="FNanchor_600"></a><a href="#Footnote_600" -class="fnanchor">[600]</a></p> - -<p>Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having -gained a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so -far as concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no -victory, but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress, -and had had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed, -he was brought back on men’s shoulders to give his final orders, -and was then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites, -left behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian -Athênê as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the -sanctity of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed -unhurt, and then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch, -as it was already late. The field of battle presented a terrible -spectacle; Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet -grasping their naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of -their enemies; around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen -broken spears, smashed shields, swords and daggers scattered apart -from their owners.<a id="FNanchor_601"></a><a href="#Footnote_601" -class="fnanchor">[601]</a> He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to -be collected in separate heaps, and placed in safe custody for the -night, in the interior of his phalanx; the troops then took their -supper, and rested for the night. On the next morning, Gylis the -Polemarch was ordered to draw up the army in battle-array, to erect -a trophy, and to offer sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving, -with the pipers solemnly playing, according to Spartan fashion. -Agesilaus was anxious to make these demonstrations of victory as -ostentatious as possible, because he really doubted whether he -had gained a victory. It was very possible that the Thebans might -feel confidence enough to renew the attack, and try to recover -the field of battle, with their own dead upon it; which Agesilaus -had, for that reason, caused to be collected in a sepa<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316">[p. 316]</a></span>rate heap and -placed within the Lacedæmonian line.<a id="FNanchor_602"></a><a -href="#Footnote_602" class="fnanchor">[602]</a> He was, however, soon -relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the Thebans to solicit -the customary truce for the burial of their dead; the understood -confession of defeat. The request was immediately granted; each -party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and the Spartan -force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not state the -loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred on the -side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of the -Lacedæmonians.<a id="FNanchor_603"></a><a href="#Footnote_603" -class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p> - -<p>Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, -Agesilaus caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian -games were at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the -tithe of the booty acquired during his two years’ campaigns in Asia; -a tithe equal to one hundred talents.<a id="FNanchor_604"></a><a -href="#Footnote_604" class="fnanchor">[604]</a> Meanwhile the -polemarch Gylis conducted the army first into Phokis, next on -a predatory excursion into the Lokrian territory, where the -nimble attack of the Lokrian light troops, amidst hilly ground, -inflicted upon his troops a severe check, and cost him his life. -After this the contingents in the army were dismissed to their -respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when tolerably recovered, -sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from Delphi across the -Corinthian Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_605"></a><a href="#Footnote_605" -class="fnanchor">[605]</a> He was received at Sparta with every -demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still farther -strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance of -the public discipline; an exactness not diminished either by long -absence or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317">[p. 317]</a></span> -enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time forward he -was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an influence -greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before. His -colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was won -over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most -respectful deference.<a id="FNanchor_606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606" -class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p> - -<p>Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little -more than a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Knidus, -and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as -described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the -Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the -field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce. -But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, -the answer must be that both were totally barren. The position -of Sparta in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no -improvement. In the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed -manifested signal superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the -field of Korôneia, the honor of the day was rather on the side -of the Thebans, who broke through the most strenuous opposition, -and carried their point of joining their allies. And the purpose -of Agesilaus (ordered by the ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia, -completely failed.<a id="FNanchor_607"></a><a href="#Footnote_607" -class="fnanchor">[607]</a> Instead of advancing, he withdrew from -Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus across the gulf from Delphi; -which he might have done just as well without fighting this murderous -and hardly contested battle. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply -colored as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies, -indicates to us that the predominant impression carried off by every -one from the field of Korôneia was that of the tremendous force and -obstinacy of the Theban hoplites,—a foretaste of what was to come at -Leuktra!</p> - -<p>If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, -the case was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. -That defeat was pregnant with consequences following in rapid -succession, and of the most disastrous character. As with Athens at -Ægospotami,—the loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318">[p. 318]</a></span> only as the -signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon, -with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and -from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel -the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So -universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was -found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, -the harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the -Hellespont, deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the -battle of Knidus.<a id="FNanchor_608"></a><a href="#Footnote_608" -class="fnanchor">[608]</a> Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found -themselves received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of -hospitality. They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign -force or governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to -guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was -adopted by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, -who warned him that if he manifested any design of reducing the -cities to subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that -each of them severally would cost him a long siege; and that a -combination would ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal -and judicious ideas, when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced -a strong feeling of friendship and even of gratitude, so that the -Lacedæmonian maritime empire was dissolved without a blow, by the -almost spontaneous movements of the cities themselves. Though the -victorious fleet presented itself in many different places, it was -nowhere called upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single -siege. Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos, -all declared themselves independent, under the protection of the -new conquerors.<a id="FNanchor_609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609" -class="fnanchor">[609]</a> Pharnabazus presently disembarked at -Ephesus and marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a -fleet of forty triremes under the command of Konon.</p> - -<p>To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the -Asiatic side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That -town, steady in hostility to Athens,<a id="FNanchor_610"></a><a -href="#Footnote_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> had been the great -military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319">[p. 319]</a></span> -station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last -twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been -made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for their -warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the strait. -Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to acquire -possession of Abydos,—there was nothing which the Abydenes dreaded so -much as to become subject to him. In this view they were decidedly -disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and it happened by -a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and experienced -Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of the battle of -Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he had been sent -to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on his march at -Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to communicate -the victory to the allied cities;<a id="FNanchor_611"></a><a -href="#Footnote_611" class="fnanchor">[611]</a> neither of them at -that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending. -The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired -a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity -with Pharnabazus,—combined with the standing apprehensions of the -Abydenes,—was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime -ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the -battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight, -and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal -revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were -spreading from city to city,—Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes, -heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them -to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while -others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found -capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened -to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a -good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the -fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.</p> - -<p>Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the -strait to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the -Eu<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320">[p. 320]</a></span>ropean -side, in the Thracian Chersonese.<a id="FNanchor_612"></a><a -href="#Footnote_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> In that fertile -peninsula there had been many new settlers, who had come in and -acquired land under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since -the building of the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus -against Thracian invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on -Sparta for the security of their tenures,—and of the refugees from -various cities all concentrated under his protection,—Derkyllidas -maintained his position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; -defying the requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith -evacuate them. The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the -lands around Abydos,—but without any result. His wrath against -the Lacedæmonians, already considerable, was so aggravated by -disappointment when he found that he could not yet expel them from -his satrapy, that he resolved to act against them with increased -energy, and even to strike a blow at them near their own home. For -this purpose he transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding -naval force for the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep -both Abydos and Sestos under blockade.<a id="FNanchor_613"></a><a -href="#Footnote_613" class="fnanchor">[613]</a></p> - -<p>As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a -powerful fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos, -to various islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of -Peloponnesus. They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and -Messenia, disembarking at several points to ravage the country. -They next landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured, -granting safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving -in the island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting -then the harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, -they sailed up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here -they found the confederates,—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc., -carrying on war with Corinth as their central post, against the -Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. The line across the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_321">[p. 321]</a></span> isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ -(the two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of -operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus; -just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 <small>B.C.</small>, -while possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain -the inland road midway between them, where it crosses the high and -difficult crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three -roads by which a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus -of Corinth into Attica or Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_614"></a><a -href="#Footnote_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a> Pharnabazus -communicated in the most friendly manner with the allies, assured -them of his strenuous support against Sparta, and left with -them a considerable sum of money.<a id="FNanchor_615"></a><a -href="#Footnote_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a></p> - -<p>The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master -of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon -astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to -Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the -degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the -Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been -seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could -anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against -the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage -inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far -away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which -Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important -boon.</p> - -<p>Since 404 <small>B.C.</small>, a space of eleven years, Athens -had continued without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus, -and without any Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To -this state she had been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, -in the full knowledge that she could have little trade,—few ships -either armed or mercantile,—poor defence even against pirates, -and no defence at all against aggression from the mistress of the -sea. Konon now entreated Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to -leave the fleet under his command, and to permit him to use it in -rebuilding the fortifications of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls -of Athens. While he engaged to maintain the fleet by contributions -from the islands, he assured the satrap that no blow could be<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322">[p. 322]</a></span> inflicted -upon Sparta so destructive or so mortifying, as the renovation of -Athens and Peiræus with their complete and connected fortifications. -Sparta would thus be deprived of the most important harvest which -she had reaped from the long struggle of the Peloponnesian war. -Indignant as he now was against the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus -sympathized cordially with these plans, and on departing not only -left the fleet under the command of Konon, but also furnished -him with a considerable sum of money towards the expense of the -fortifications.<a id="FNanchor_616"></a><a href="#Footnote_616" -class="fnanchor">[616]</a></p> - -<p>Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay. -He had quitted Athens in 407 <small>B.C.</small>, as one of the -joint admirals nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had -parted with his countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami -in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, preserving the miserable fraction of -eight or nine ships out of that noble fleet which otherwise would -have passed entire into the hands of Lysander. He now returned, in -393 <small>B.C.</small>, as a second Themistokles, the deliverer of -his country, and the restorer of her lost strength and independence. -All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons being hired with -the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete the fortifications -as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other neighbors lent -their aid zealously as volunteers,<a id="FNanchor_617"></a><a -href="#Footnote_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a>—the same who eleven -years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when the former -walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings of Greece -altered since that period. By such hearty coöperation the work was -finished during the course of the present summer and autumn without -any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified Peiræus and -harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel, joining -it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a single wall -stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed down to -the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor was it -indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the city -or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323">[p. 323]</a></span> to Peiræus, -Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden wreath in the -acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in Peiræus to the -honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped at Knidus with -peculiar devotion by the local population.<a id="FNanchor_618"></a><a -href="#Footnote_618" class="fnanchor">[618]</a> He farther celebrated -the completion of the walls by a splendid sacrifice and festival -banquet. And the Athenian people not only inscribed on a pillar -a public vote gratefully recording the exploits of Konon, but -also erected a statue to his honor.<a id="FNanchor_619"></a><a -href="#Footnote_619" class="fnanchor">[619]</a></p> - -<p>The importance of this event in reference to the future history -of Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either -her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a -city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It -reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into -that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second -fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the -half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed -by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect -the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived -(eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of -Athens, in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and -her Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation -of the Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, -Konon in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such -as no one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive -the idea of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the -largest force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced -neither by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations -of policy, though the proceeding was one really conducive to the -interests of Persian power,—but simply by his own violent personal -wrath against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would -have been satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have -cleared his own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement -impatience, when he found himself unable to expel his old enemy, -Derkyllidas, from the important position of<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_324">[p. 324]</a></span> Abydos, which chiefly spurred him -on to take revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than -the satrap’s personal presence would have placed at the disposal -of Konon either a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for -the erection of the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment -from Sparta. So strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by -which Derkyllidas preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, -the greater mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been -better for Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered -Abydos as well as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would -have had no wrongs remaining unavenged to incense him, and would -have kept on his own side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest -squadron sufficient to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming -formidable on the Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if -we may borrow an expression of Plato) “to continue asleep in the -bosom of the earth.”<a id="FNanchor_620"></a><a href="#Footnote_620" -class="fnanchor">[620]</a></p> - -<p>But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the -only condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. -It was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should -be kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during -all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the -barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the -confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum -to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.<a id="FNanchor_621"></a><a -href="#Footnote_621" class="fnanchor">[621]</a> But they were unable -to sustain this line even through the ensuing year,—during which -Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will -appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it -while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would -have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and -interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded. -Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during the -summer and autumn of 393 <small>B.C.</small>, but which did not -continue to be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens, -that the two conditions were fulfilled both together during this -particular year!</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_75"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325">[p. 325]</a></span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXV.<br /> - FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> presence of -Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in the Saronic -Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished pecuniary -aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications of -Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the -war,—seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over -Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon<a id="FNanchor_622"></a><a -href="#Footnote_622" class="fnanchor">[622]</a> were extensive. -He was the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a -mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted with -greater efficiency by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the -fortifications of Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself -in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying -the foundations of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear -that he caused an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius -at Syracuse, with the view of detaching that despot from Sparta, -and bringing him into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot -of Salamis in Cyprus, the steady friend of Konon, was a party -to this proposition, which he sought to strengthen by offering -to Dionysius his sister in marriage.<a id="FNanchor_623"></a><a -href="#Footnote_623" class="fnanchor">[623]</a> There was a basis -of sympathy between them arising from the fact that Evagoras was -at variance with the Phœnicians both in Phœnicia and Cyprus, while -Dionysius was in active hostilities with the Carthaginians (their -kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily. Nevertheless, the proposition -met with little or no success. We find Dionysius afterwards still -continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.</p> - -<p>Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians -strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian -Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326">[p. 326]</a></span> to occupy Rhium, -one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow entrance. To -oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were driven to greater -maritime effort. More than one naval action seems to have taken -place, in those waters where the prowess and skill of the Athenian -admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at the beginning of -the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian admiral Herippidas, -who succeeded to the command of the fleet after his predecessor -Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the Corinthians -to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency in the -Corinthian Gulf; <span class="replace" id="tn_3" title="In the -printed book: with">which</span> his successor Teleutias, brother -of Agesilaus, still farther completed.<a id="FNanchor_624"></a><a -href="#Footnote_624" class="fnanchor">[624]</a></p> - -<p>While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the -last half of 393 <small>B.C.</small> and the full year of 392 -<small>B.C.</small>), so as to put an end to the temporary naval -preponderance of the Corinthians,—the latter were at the same time -bearing the brunt of a desultory, but continued, land-warfare against -the garrison of Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians established at -Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were partly defended by the presence -of confederate troops, Bœotians, Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries -paid by Athens. But this did not protect the Corinthians against -suffering great damage, in their lands and outlying properties, from -the incursions of the enemy.</p> - -<p>The plain between Corinth and Sikyon,—fertile and extensive -(speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and -constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities, -was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 <small>B.C.</small>; -so that the Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw -their servants and cattle to Peiræum<a id="FNanchor_625"></a><a -href="#Footnote_625" class="fnanchor">[625]</a> (a portion of -the Corinthian territory without the Isthmus properly so called, -north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a line between that eminence -and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the Sikyonian assailants -could not reach them, because of the Long Walls of Corinth, which -connected that city by a continuous fortification of twelve -stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its harbor -of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of the -deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons -of it were quite enough to inspire them<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_327">[p. 327]</a></span> with a strong aversion to -the war;<a id="FNanchor_626"></a><a href="#Footnote_626" -class="fnanchor">[626]</a> the more so, as the damage fell -exclusively upon them—their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328">[p. 328]</a></span> Argos, having -as yet suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with -the conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated -their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless -not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had -been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to -diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to -rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as -well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back -a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the -Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some -of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the -disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater -security of Peiræus.</p> - -<p>Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented -philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth, -presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with -sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The -Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical. -In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or -how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But -of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions -and authoritative resolves, there was<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_329">[p. 329]</a></span> nothing.<a id="FNanchor_627"></a><a -href="#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">[627]</a> Now the oligarchical -persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting -of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliance -with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like -Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations of hostile sentiment -towards Sparta. These men found themselves menaced by a powerful -opposition party, which had no constitutional means for making its -sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing peaceably either -a change of administrators or a change of public policy. It was -only by an appeal to arms and violence that such a consummation -could be brought about; a fact notorious to both parties,—so that -the oligarchical administrators, informed of the meetings and -conversations going on, knew well that they had to expect nothing -less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such anticipations -were well-founded, we gather even from the partial recital of -Xenophon; who states that Pasimêlus, the philo-Laconian leader, -was on his guard and in preparation,<a id="FNanchor_628"></a><a -href="#Footnote_628" class="fnanchor">[628]</a>—and counts it to -him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the -Lacedæmonians.</p> - -<p>Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent -it by a <i>coup d’état</i>. They threw themselves upon the assistance -of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their -blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival -called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding, -though dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of -brutal ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different -from the deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan -ephors when they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of -Kinadon,—and more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra -(in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into -the assembled Senate, and massacred Peithias, with sixty<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330">[p. 330]</a></span> others in -the senate-house.<a id="FNanchor_629"></a><a href="#Footnote_629" -class="fnanchor">[629]</a> While the choice performers at Corinth -were contending for the prize in the theatre, with judges formally -named to decide,—and while the market-place around was crowded -with festive spectators,—a number of armed men were introduced, -probably Argeians, with leaders designating the victims whom they -were to strike. Some of these select victims were massacred in the -market-place, others in the theatre, and one even while sitting as -a judge in the theatre. Others again fled in terror to embrace the -altars or statues in the market-place,—which sanctuary, nevertheless, -did not save their lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested,—repugnant -as it was to the feelings of the assembled spectators and to -Grecian feelings generally,—until one hundred and twenty persons -had perished.<a id="FNanchor_630"></a><a href="#Footnote_630" -class="fnanchor">[630]</a> But the persons slain were chiefly -elderly men; for the younger portion of the philo-Laconian party, -suspecting some mischief, had declined attending the festival, and -kept themselves separately assembled under their leader Pasimêlus -in the gymnasium and cyprus-grove called Kranium, just without -the city-gates. We find, too, that they were not only assembled, -but actually in arms. For the moment that they heard the clamor -in the market-place, and learned from some fugitives what was -going on, they rushed up at once to the Akrokorinthus (or eminence -and acropolis overhanging the city) and got possession of the -citadel,—which they maintained with such force and courage that the -Argeians and the Corinthians, who took part with the government, -were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge them. This circumstance, -indirectly revealed in the one-sided narrative of Xenophon, lets -us into the real state of the city, and affords good ground for -believing that Pasimêlus and his friends were prepared beforehand -for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it, until the festival -was over,—a scruple which the government, in their eagerness to -forestall the plot, disregarded,—employing the hands and weapons -of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by solemnities -peculiar to Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_631"></a><a href="#Footnote_631" -class="fnanchor">[631]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331">[p. 331]</a></span></p> - -<p>Though Pasimêlus and his friends were masters of the citadel, -and had repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the <i>coup -d’état</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332">[p. 332]</a></span> -had been completely successful in overawing their party in the -city, and depriving them of all means of communicating with the -Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they -were besides frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer -sacrifice, in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged -them to fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive -them to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of -them (according to Diodorus five hundred)<a id="FNanchor_632"></a><a -href="#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">[632]</a> actually went -into exile; while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were -restrained by the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined -with solemn assurances of peace and security from the government; -who now, probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to -mitigate the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. -These pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther -mischief was done to any citizen.</p> - -<p>But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by -an extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos; -perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of intermarriage, and of -purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the -two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled <i>Argos</i> -instead of <i>Corinth</i> (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious -phrase in which the opposition party described the very close -political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong -Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian -mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Bœotians as a garrison in -the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still -Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon -Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though -partly also upon the other two allies.</p> - -<p>To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things -was intol<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333">[p. -333]</a></span>erable. Though personally they had no ill-usage -to complain of, yet the complete predominance of their political -enemies was quite sufficient to excite their most vehement -antipathies. They entered into secret correspondence with Praxitas, -the Lacedæmonian commander at Sikyon, engaging to betray to him -one of the gates in the western Long Wall between Corinth and -Lechæum. The scheme being concerted, Pasimêlus and his partisans got -themselves placed,<a id="FNanchor_633"></a><a href="#Footnote_633" -class="fnanchor">[633]</a> partly by contrivance and partly by -accident, on the night-watch at this gate; an imprudence, which shows -that the government not only did not maltreat them, but even admitted -them to trust. At the moment fixed, Praxitas,—presenting himself -with a Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> or regiment, a Sikyonian force, and the -Corinthian exiles,—found the treacherous sentinels prepared to open -the gates. Having first sent in a trusty soldier to satisfy him that -there was no deceit,<a id="FNanchor_634"></a><a href="#Footnote_634" -class="fnanchor">[634]</a> he then conducted all his force within the -gates, into the mid-space between the two Long Walls. So broad was -this space, and so inadequate did his numbers appear to maintain it, -that he took the precaution of digging a cross-ditch with a palisade -to defend himself on the side towards the city; which he was enabled -to do undisturbed, since the enemy (we are not told why) did not -attack him all the next day. On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, -Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came -down from the city in full force; the latter stood on the right of -the line, along the eastern wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles -on the Lacedæmonian left; while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on -their own right, opposed to the Corinthians from the city; and the -Argeians, opposed to the Sikyonians, in the centre.</p> - -<p>It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold -from superior numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, -tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea -with much slaugh<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334">[p. -334]</a></span>ter;<a id="FNanchor_635"></a><a href="#Footnote_635" -class="fnanchor">[635]</a> upon which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian -commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body -of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then -armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians, inscribed on the -outside with the letter Sigma (Σ). With these he approached on foot -to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed -to the charge with alacrity; upon which Pasimachus exclaimed,—“By -the two gods, Argeians, these Sigmas which you see here will -deceive you;” he then closed with them resolutely, but his number -was so inferior that he was soon overpowered and slain. Meanwhile, -the Corinthian exiles on the left had driven back Iphikrates with -his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly light troops) and pursued them -even to the city gates; while the Lacedæmonians, easily repelling -the Corinthians opposed to them, came out of their palisade, and -planted themselves with their faces towards the eastern wall, but -at a little distance from it, to intercept the Argeians on their -return. The latter were forced to run back as they could, huddling -close along the eastern wall, with their right or unshielded side -exposed, as they passed, to the spears of the Lacedæmonians. Before -they could get to the walls of Corinth, they were met and roughly -handled by the victorious Corinthian exiles. And even when they came -to the walls, those within, unwilling to throw open the gates for -fear of admitting the enemy, contented themselves with handing down -ladders, over which the defeated Argeians clambered with distress -and difficulty. Altogether, their loss in this disastrous retreat -was frightful. Their dead (says Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps -of stones or wood.<a id="FNanchor_636"></a><a href="#Footnote_636" -class="fnanchor">[636]</a></p> - -<p>This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did -not yet make them masters of Lechæum,<a id="FNanchor_637"></a><a -href="#Footnote_637" class="fnanchor">[637]</a> was, nevertheless, -of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335">[p. 335]</a></span> -considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received -reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account. -The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth -of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for -any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He -then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to -Megara, capturing the two Corinthian dependencies of Krommyon and -Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning -back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the -frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter -against incursions from Corinth,—and then disbanded his army.</p> - -<p>A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter -and spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. -It was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place, -began to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts -whom, after their first organization by Konon, he had trained -to effective tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose -movements he conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced -improvements both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened -by one half both the light javelin and the short sword, which -the Thracian peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species -of leggings, known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and -he thus combined, better than had ever been done before, rapid -motion,—power of acting in difficult ground and open order,—effective -attack, either by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat -in case of need.<a id="FNanchor_638"></a><a href="#Footnote_638" -class="fnanchor">[638]</a> As yet, he was but a young officer, -in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337">[p. 337]</a></span> -the beginning of his military career.<a id="FNanchor_639"></a><a -href="#Footnote_639" class="fnanchor">[639]</a> We must therefore -presume that these improvements were chiefly of later date, -the suggestions of his personal experience; but even now, the -successes of his light troops were remarkable. Attacking Phlius, -he entrapped the Phliasians into an ambuscade, and inflicted on -them a defeat so destructive that they were obliged to invoke the -aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for the protection of their city. -He gained a victory near Sikyon, and carried his incursions over -all Arcadia, to the very gates of the cities; damaging the Arcadian -hoplites so severely, that they became afraid to meet him in the -field. His own peltasts, however, though full of confidence against -these Peloponnesian hoplites, still retained their awe and their -reluctance to fight against Lacedæmonians;<a id="FNanchor_640"></a><a -href="#Footnote_640" class="fnanchor">[640]</a> who, on their side, -despised them, but despised their own allies still more. “Our -friends fear these peltasts, as children fear hobgoblins,”—said -the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically, endeavoring to set the example -of courage by ostentatious demonstrations of their own around the -walls of Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_641"></a><a href="#Footnote_641" -class="fnanchor">[641]</a></p> - -<p>The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had -laid open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into -Attica or Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_642"></a><a href="#Footnote_642" -class="fnanchor">[642]</a> Fortunately for the Athenians, they -had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338">[p. 338]</a></span> -already completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls; -but they were so much alarmed by the new danger, that they -marched with their full force, and with masons and carpenters -accompanying,<a id="FNanchor_643"></a><a href="#Footnote_643" -class="fnanchor">[643]</a> to Corinth. Here, with that celerity of -work for which they were distinguished,<a id="FNanchor_644"></a><a -href="#Footnote_644" class="fnanchor">[644]</a> they in a few days -reëstablished completely the western wall; the more important of -the two, since it formed the barrier against the incursions of the -Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They had then a secure position, and could -finish the eastern wall at their leisure; which they accordingly did, -and then retired, leaving it to the confederate troops in Corinth to -defend.</p> - -<p>This advantage, however,—a very material one,—was again overthrown -by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the -same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian -force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there -spent some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he -passed over the mountain-road, by Tenea,<a id="FNanchor_645"></a><a -href="#Footnote_645" class="fnanchor">[645]</a><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339">[p. 339]</a></span> into -the plain of Corinth, to the foot of the newly-repaired Long -Walls. Here his brother Teleutias, who had recently superseded -Herippidas as admiral in the Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate -with him in a joint attack, by sea and land, on the new walls -and on Lechæum.<a id="FNanchor_646"></a><a href="#Footnote_646" -class="fnanchor">[646]</a> The presence of this naval force -rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since troops could -be disembarked in the interval between them, where the Sikyonians -in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down to the sea. -Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the joint force -of the four confederated armies, and to master not only the Long -Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,<a id="FNanchor_647"></a><a -href="#Footnote_647" class="fnanchor">[647]</a> with its docks, and -the ships<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340">[p. 340]</a></span> -within them; thus breaking up the naval power of Corinth in the -Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of hostility -against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and -occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of -the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After -this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he -nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever -willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now -disdain to take his station in the chorus,<a id="FNanchor_648"></a><a -href="#Footnote_648" class="fnanchor">[648]</a> under the orders of -the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.</p> - -<p>It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians -in the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the -road for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more -laid open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at -this new success, that both appear to have<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_341">[p. 341]</a></span> become desirous of peace, and to -have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered -to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian -garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation; -while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received -at Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make -peace on better terms than those which had been proposed during -the late discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;) -recognizing the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos, -Imbros, and Skyros to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each -separate city in the Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta -having provisionally accepted these terms, forty days were allowed -for reference to the people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian -envoys were sent as formal bearers of the propositions. The Argeians -and Corinthians, however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of -peace, urging the Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it -appears that many Athenian citizens thought that large restitution -ought to have been made of Athenian property forfeited at the end -of the late war, and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have -been given back as well as the three islands. On these and other -grounds, the Athenian people refused to sanction the recommendation -of their envoys; though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a -discourse still extant, earnestly advised that they should accept -the peace.<a id="FNanchor_649"></a><a href="#Footnote_649" -class="fnanchor">[649]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_342">[p. 342]</a></span></p> <p>The war being thus -continued, Corinth, though defended by a considerable confederate -force, including Athenian hoplites under<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_343">[p. 343]</a></span> Kallias, and peltasts under -Iphikrates, became much pressed by the hostile posts at Lechæum as -well as at Krommyon and Sidus,—and by its own exiles as the most -active of all enemies. Still, however, there remained the peninsula -and the fortification of Peiræum as an undisturbed shelter for the -Corinthian servants and cattle, and a source of subsistence for -the city. Peiræum was an inland post north-east of Corinth, in the -centre of that peninsula which separates the two innermost recesses -of the Krissæan Gulf,—the bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay -called Alkyonis, between Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its -north-east. Across this latter bay Corinth communicated easily, -through Peiræum and the fortified port of Œnoê, with Kreusis the port -of Thespiæ in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_650"></a><a href="#Footnote_650" -class="fnanchor">[650]</a> The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon -Agesilaus to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order -that they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived -from Peiræum,—partly in order that they might also appropriate to -themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were -just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the -head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian -allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so -called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schœnus on the -Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the -biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.</p> - -<p>It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival -had actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from -the city who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being -present as guards.<a id="FNanchor_651"></a><a href="#Footnote_651" -class="fnanchor">[651]</a> But on the approach of Agesilaus,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344">[p. 344]</a></span> they immediately -retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices -half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus -proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position -close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian -exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the -parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus -marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the -Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and -distributed the wreaths a second time.</p> - -<p>Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising -Iphikrates and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly -attacking it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden -retrograde march directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the -citizens were at that moment absent for the second celebration of -the festival; so that those remaining within, on hearing of the -approach of Agesilaus, apprehended a plot to betray the city to -him, and sent in haste to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with -his peltasts. Having learned that these troops had passed by in -the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345">[p. 345]</a></span> -night, Agesilaus forthwith again turned his course and marched -back to Peiræum, which he himself approached by the ordinary road, -coasting round along the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm -springs, which are still discernible;<a id="FNanchor_652"></a><a -href="#Footnote_652" class="fnanchor">[652]</a> while he sent a mora -or division of troops to get round the place by a mountain-road more -in the interior, ascending some woody heights commanding the town, -and crowned by a temple of Poseidon.<a id="FNanchor_653"></a><a -href="#Footnote_653" class="fnanchor">[653]</a> The movement was -quite effectual. The garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing -that the place had become indefensible, abandoned it the next day -with all their cattle and property, to take refuge in the Heræum, -or sacred ground of Hêrê Akræa near the western cape of the -peninsula. While Agesilaus marched thither towards the coast in -pursuit of them, the troops descending from the heights attacked -and captured Œnoê,<a id="FNanchor_654"></a><a href="#Footnote_654" -class="fnanchor">[654]</a>—the Corinthian town of that name situated -near the Alkyonian bay over against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty -here fell into their hands, which was still farther augmented by -the speedy surrender of all in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without -conditions. Called upon to determine the fate of the prisoners, among -whom were included men,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346">[p. -346]</a></span> women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with -cattle and other property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who -had taken part in the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place, -should be handed over to the vengeance of the exiles; and that -all the rest should be sold as slaves.<a id="FNanchor_655"></a><a -href="#Footnote_655" class="fnanchor">[655]</a> Though he did not -here inflict any harder measure than was usual in Grecian warfare, -the reader who reflects that this sentence, pronounced by one -on the whole more generous than most contemporary commanders, -condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and women to a life of -degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by contrast the -encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the magnanimity -of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he refused, in -spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either the Methymnæan -or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the exalted -principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by any -permission of his.<a id="FNanchor_656"></a><a href="#Footnote_656" -class="fnanchor">[656]</a></p> - -<p>As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum, -Krommyon, and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its -other side, and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city -not being in condition to hold out much longer, the exiles -already began to lay their plans for surprising it by aid of -friends within.<a id="FNanchor_657"></a><a href="#Footnote_657" -class="fnanchor">[657]</a> So triumphant was the position of -Agesilaus, that his enemies were all in alarm, and the Thebans, -as well as others, sent fresh envoys to him to solicit peace. His -antipathy towards the Thebans was so vehement, that it was a great -personal satisfaction to him to see them thus humiliated. He even -treated their envoys with marked contempt, affecting not to notice -them when they stood close by, though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes -at Sparta, was preparing to introduce them.</p> - -<p>Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over -conquered enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on -the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347">[p. 347]</a></span> -banks of the lake adjoining the Heræum,<a id="FNanchor_658"></a><a -href="#Footnote_658" class="fnanchor">[658]</a>—with his eyes fixed -on the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed -Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a -crowd of spectators,<a id="FNanchor_659"></a><a href="#Footnote_659" -class="fnanchor">[659]</a>—when news arrived, as if under the special -intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the -prospect of affairs.<a id="FNanchor_660"></a><a href="#Footnote_660" -class="fnanchor">[660]</a> A horseman was seen galloping up, his -horse foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he -returned no answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse -at the feet of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, -he made his communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized -his spear, and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. -On their coming near, he directed them, together with the guards -around, to accompany him without a moment’s delay; leaving orders -with the general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should -have snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself -in march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and -informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had -already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned -to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news, -he sold all his captives by auction.<a id="FNanchor_661"></a><a -href="#Footnote_661" class="fnanchor">[661]</a></p> - -<p>This bad news,—the arrival of which has been so graphically<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348">[p. 348]</a></span> described by -Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and companions of -Agesilaus,—was nothing less than the defeat and destruction of a -Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> or military division by the light troops under -Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of the Amyklæan -hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home, even when on -actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia, Agesilaus had left -all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being now at hand, they set -off to return. But the road from Lechæum to Sikyon lay immediately -under the walls of Corinth, so that their march was not safe without -an escort. Accordingly the polemarch commanding at Lechæum, leaving -that place for the time under watch by the Peloponnesian allies, -put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> which formed the -habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred hoplites, and of a -<i>mora</i> of cavalry (number unknown)—to protect the Amyklæans until -they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having passed -by Corinth, and reached a point within about three miles of the -friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and turned back -with his <i>mora</i> of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however, leaving -the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans as -much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on -the return march.<a id="FNanchor_662"></a><a href="#Footnote_662" -class="fnanchor">[662]</a></p> - -<p>Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to -be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the -force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred -to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for -his own <i>mora</i> of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his -estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which -these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But -Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he -now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning -separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the -idea,—perhaps, in the existing state of men’s minds, no one else -would have conceived it,—of attacking them with his peltasts as -they repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian -hoplites in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his -troops, and arrayed them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349">[p. -349]</a></span> in battle order not far from the gates; while -Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian -<i>mora</i> in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance, -he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or -wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the -polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off -the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants -to be carried forward to Lechæum.<a id="FNanchor_663"></a><a -href="#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">[663]</a> But even the youngest -soldiers, encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their -nimbler enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, -after an unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in -the ranks, the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were -slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders -to march forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing -him to halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all -those between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the -former occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) -to rush out and drive them off.<a id="FNanchor_664"></a><a -href="#Footnote_664" class="fnanchor">[664]</a> But the result -was just the same: the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only -suffered increased loss of their bravest and most forward<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350">[p. 350]</a></span> soldiers, when -they tried to rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians -attempted to make progress, these circumstances were again repeated, -to their great loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became -every moment more confident and vigorous.</p> - -<p>Some relief was now afforded to the distressed <i>mora</i> by the -coming up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the -Amyklæans. Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the -result might have been different; but it was now insufficient -to repress the animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the -Lacedæmonian horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on -this occasion venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than -the younger hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after -much loss in killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the -polemarch contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence -about a quarter of a mile from the sea and about two miles from -Lechæum. Here, while Iphikrates still continued to harass them -with his peltasts, Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites -to charge them hand to hand,—when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in -numbers, exhausted in strength, and too much dispirited for close -fight with a new enemy, broke and fled in all directions. Some took -the road to Lechæum, which place a few of them reached, along with -the cavalry; the rest ran towards the sea at the nearest point, -and observing that some of their friends were rowing in boats from -Lechæum along the shore to rescue them, threw themselves into -the sea, to wade or swim towards this new succor. But the active -peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit of broken hoplites, put the -last hand to the destruction of the unfortunate <i>mora</i>. Out of its -full muster of six hundred, a very small proportion survived to -reënter Lechæum.<a id="FNanchor_665"></a><a href="#Footnote_665" -class="fnanchor">[665]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_351">[p. 351]</a></span></p> <p>The horseman who first -communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had started off express -immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies of the slain had -been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of Agesilaus had been -dictated by the desire of reaching the field in time to contend for -the possession of the bodies, and to escape the shame of soliciting -the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who met him afterwards, -arrested his course by informing him that the bodies had already been -buried, under truce asked and obtained; which authorized Iphikrates -to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot where he had first -made the attack.<a id="FNanchor_666"></a><a href="#Footnote_666" -class="fnanchor">[666]</a></p> - -<p>Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites, -by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised, -was an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but -striking in respect of military effect and impression upon the -Grecian mind. Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable -capture of Sphakteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less -considerable in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was -inferior by one-third,—but far more important in another respect, -that half the division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the -battle near Corinth, though the whole mora (except a few fugitives) -perished, it does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon -the Corinthians, Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event -operated as a joyous encouragement, reviving them out of all their -previous despondency. Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her -superiority and bound to her by fear more than by attachment, it -was welcomed with ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of -Agesilaus (and doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell -like a sudden thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of -sorrow and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352">[p. 352]</a></span> -sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception,—the -fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed -no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant -countenances, like victorious athletes.<a id="FNanchor_667"></a><a -href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">[667]</a> We shall find -the like phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after -the far more terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the -slain were joyous and elate,—those of the survivors, downcast -and mortified;<a id="FNanchor_668"></a><a href="#Footnote_668" -class="fnanchor">[668]</a> a fact strikingly characteristic both -of the intense mental effect of the Spartan training, and of the -peculiar associations which it generated. We may understand how -terrible was the contempt which awaited a Spartan who survived -defeat, when we find fathers positively rejoicing that their sons had -escaped such treatment by death.</p> - -<p>Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards -the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the -news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said not -a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through and -communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. “I understand your -purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling),—you want to witness the triumph -of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with me, and -I will teach you.” Accordingly, on the next day, he caused them to -accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates of -Corinth,—defying those within to come out and fight. The lands had -been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But wherever -there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians now cut -them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his recent -advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had only -the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field, and -then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the -Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or -division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353">[p. 353]</a></span> he marched -back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed his -real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching -up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian -troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he -was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the -Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat. -Accordingly, he commenced his day’s march before dawn, and did -not halt for the night till after dark; at Mantineia, he not only -did not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before -day had broken.<a id="FNanchor_669"></a><a href="#Footnote_669" -class="fnanchor">[669]</a> There cannot be a more convincing proof -of the real dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the -sentiment of compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a -fact which we shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the -stream of the history.</p> - -<p>The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise -on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had -been garrisoned by Praxitas,—as well as Peiræum and Œnoê, which had -been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared -of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the -Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum, -yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their -mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march -by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth,—but -communicated with Lechæum only by sea.<a id="FNanchor_670"></a><a -href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">[670]</a> In truth, we hear -of no farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta -against Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place -became so secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian -allies were glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That -officer had gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the -Athenian orators<a id="FNanchor_671"></a><a href="#Footnote_671" -class="fnanchor">[671]</a> even in the next generation never ceased -to extol, that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering; -and he tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the -mastery of Corinth,—putting to death some of the philo-Argeian -leaders. We know these circumstances only by brief and meagre -allusion; but they caused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354">[p. -354]</a></span> the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large -portion of his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in -his place.<a id="FNanchor_672"></a><a href="#Footnote_672" -class="fnanchor">[672]</a></p> - -<p>It was either in the ensuing summer,—or perhaps immediately -afterwards during the same summer,—390 <small>B.C.</small>, that -Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of -the Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the -Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian -district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a -city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achæan -confederacy. But the Akarnanians,—allies of Athens as well as Thebes, -and aided by an Athenian squadron at Œniadæ,—attacked them there, -probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants, and -pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent instances -to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at Rhium with -a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full muster of -the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge in their -cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands, to -the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to -require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans, -but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to -become allies of Sparta,—found his demands resisted, and began to -lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly -slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after -which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the -remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited -for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants, -probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty -in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains -through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and -well-combined hill-movements,—which, probably, reminded Xenophon of -his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the -Ten-Thousand,—he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though not -without suffering considerably from the excellence of their light -troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355">[p. 355]</a></span> one of their -cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until seed-time, -notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans, whom he -pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was, indeed, -in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat been -facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated (though -vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus, then held -(as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.<a id="FNanchor_673"></a><a -href="#Footnote_673" class="fnanchor">[673]</a> Partial as the -success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted -sufficient damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On -learning that it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, -they sent envoys to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain -from hostilities against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as -members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_674"></a><a -href="#Footnote_674" class="fnanchor">[674]</a></p> - -<p>It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on -an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king, -took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and -crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the -Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first -turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.</p> - -<p>It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on -more than one previous occasion,<a id="FNanchor_675"></a><a -href="#Footnote_675" class="fnanchor">[675]</a> when an invading -Lacedæmonian army was approaching their territory, to meet them by -a solemn message, intimating that it was the time of some festival -(the Karneian, or other) held sacred by both parties, and warning -them not to violate the frontier during the holy truce. This was -in point of fact nothing better than a fraud; for the notice was -sent, not at the moment when the Karneian festival (or other, as -the case might be) ought to come on according to the due course -of seasons, but at any time when it might serve the purpose of -arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But though the duplicity of the -Argeians was thus manifest, so strong were the pious scruples of the -Spartan king, that he could hardly make up his mind to disregard -the warning. Moreover, in the existing confusion of the calendar, -there was always room for some uncertainty as to the question,<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356">[p. 356]</a></span> which was the -true Karneian moon; no Dorian state having any right to fix it -imperatively for the others, as the Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, -and the Corinthians the Isthmian. It was with a view to satisfy his -conscience on this subject that Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and -put the question to the oracle of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe -religious conscience refuse to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians -should now tender it. The oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a -specific question with a general reply, informed him, that he might -with a safe conscience decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for -underhand purposes.<a id="FNanchor_676"></a><a href="#Footnote_676" -class="fnanchor">[676]</a> This<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_357">[p. 357]</a></span> was accepted by Agesipolis as a -satisfactory affirmative. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly -sure, he went directly forward to Delphi, to put the same question -to Apollo. As it would have been truly embarrassing, however, if the -two holy replies had turned out such as to contradict each other, he -availed himself of the <i>præjudicium</i> which he had already received at -Olympia, and submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: -“Is thine opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that -of thy father (Zeus)?” “Most decidedly the same,” replied the god. -Such double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely -to leave to Apollo freedom of speech,<a id="FNanchor_677"></a><a -href="#Footnote_677" class="fnanchor">[677]</a> enabled Agesipolis -to return with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already -mustered; and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the -road of Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths -and in solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy -truce, he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to -their summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.</p> - -<p>It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the -border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just -concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase, -“the god (Poseidon) shook.” To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians -especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of -Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon; -the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give -orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted -in the invasion of Elis a few years be<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_358">[p. 358]</a></span>fore. Perhaps Agesipolis would have -done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that -he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had -he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that -if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he -should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his -crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.</p> - -<p>So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning -transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation -for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their -property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so -that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He -carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on -advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion -two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror -of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons. -And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on -the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable -sacrifices.<a id="FNanchor_678"></a><a href="#Footnote_678" -class="fnanchor">[678]</a></p> - -<p>Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of -Corinth, the war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted -during the same years both in the islands and on the coast of -Asia Minor; though our information is so imperfect that we can -scarcely trace the thread of events. The defeat near Knidus (394 -<small>B.C.</small>),—the triumphant maritime force of Pharnabazus -and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the ensuing year (393 -<small>B.C.</small>),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls -and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among -the islands,<a id="FNanchor_679"></a><a href="#Footnote_679" -class="fnanchor">[679]</a>—so alarmed the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_359">[p. 359]</a></span> Spartans with the idea of a second -Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the -Persian force from the side of their enemies.</p> - -<p>The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful -man,<a id="FNanchor_680"></a><a href="#Footnote_680" -class="fnanchor">[680]</a> not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy -to Tiribazus (392 <small>B.C.</small>); whom we now find as satrap -of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes, after having been satrap of -Armenia during the retreat of the Ten Thousand. As Tiribazus was -newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not acquired that personal enmity -against the Spartans, which the active hostilities of Derkyllidas and -Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus and other Persians. Moreover, -jealousy between neighboring satraps was an ordinary feeling, -which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the advantage of Sparta. To -counteract his projects, envoys were also sent to Tiribazus, by the -confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; -and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was incautiously despatched -among the number. On the part of Sparta, Antalkidas offered, first, -to abandon to the king of Persia all the Greeks on the continent -of Asia; next, as to all the other Greeks, insular as well as -continental, he required nothing more than absolute autonomy for -each separate city, great and small.<a id="FNanchor_681"></a><a -href="#Footnote_681" class="fnanchor">[681]</a> The Persian king -(he said) could neither desire anything more for himself, nor have -any motive for continuing the war against Sparta, when he should -once be placed in possession of all the towns on the Asiatic -coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens rendered -incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion of -the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of -Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first, -they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the -Asiatic Greeks;<a id="FNanchor_682"></a><a href="#Footnote_682" -class="fnanchor">[682]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360">[p. -360]</a></span> as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy -to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under -special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas -to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was -framed with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the -presidency of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; -while it also deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, -Imbros, and Skyros,<a id="FNanchor_683"></a><a href="#Footnote_683" -class="fnanchor">[683]</a>—islands which had been possessed and -recognized by her since the first commencement of the confederacy of -Delos; indeed the two former, even from the time of Miltiades the -conqueror of Marathon.</p> - -<p>Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she -should abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway -difficult to understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably -overthrown by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she -should abandon the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian -sway; since this was nothing more than she had already consented -to do in her conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the -latter years of the Peloponnesian war,<a id="FNanchor_684"></a><a -href="#Footnote_684" class="fnanchor">[684]</a>—and consented, let -us add, not under any of that stringent necessity which at the same -time pressed upon Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of -victory over an enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed -the close of that war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed -induced her to alter her determination, and again to espouse -their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361">[p. 361]</a></span> -cause. But the real novelty now first exhibited in her policy, -is, the full development of what had before existed in manifest -tendency,—hostility against all the partial land-confederacies of -Greece, disguised under the plausible demand of universal autonomy -for every town, great or small. How this autonomy was construed and -carried into act, we shall see hereafter; at present, we have only -to note the first proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of -Sparta.</p> - -<p>On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from -the peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was -fortunate enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; -who saw so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote -the interests and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in -person to court, and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with -Sparta. Though not daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus -secretly gave him money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the -same time rendered to Sparta the more signal service of arresting -and detaining Konon, pretending that the latter was acting -contrary to the interests of the king.<a id="FNanchor_685"></a><a -href="#Footnote_685" class="fnanchor">[685]</a> This arrest was a -gross act of perfidy, since Konon not only commanded respect in his -character of envoy,—but had been acting with the full confidence, -and almost under the orders, of Pharnabazus. But the removal of -an officer of so much ability,—the only man who possessed the -confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most fatal of all impediments -to the naval renovation of Athens. It was fortunate that Konon had -had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before his means of action were -thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his subsequent fate, there -exist contradictory stories. According to one, he was put to death -by the Persians in prison; according to another, he found means -to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, in which -island he afterwards died of sickness.<a id="FNanchor_686"></a><a -href="#Footnote_686" class="fnanchor">[686]</a> The latter story -appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is certain that he -never afterwards had the means of performing any public service, and -that his career was cut short by this treacherous detention, just at -the moment when its promise was the most splendid for his country.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362">[p. 362]</a></span></p> - -<p>Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been -detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against -Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was -now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not -yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions -of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent -down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety -to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility -against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions -towards Athens.</p> - -<p>Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command -of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace) -received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in -Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated -by Diodorus at eight thousand men,<a id="FNanchor_687"></a><a -href="#Footnote_687" class="fnanchor">[687]</a> marched from Ephesus -into the interior, and began his devastation of the territory -dependent on Persia. But his previous command, though he was -personally amiable,<a id="FNanchor_688"></a><a href="#Footnote_688" -class="fnanchor">[688]</a> had been irregular and disorderly, and it -was soon observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent, -aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures. -Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack, -Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry -to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning -meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not -merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of -Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron, with -Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately at -hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and hastened -to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced him into -a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a numerous -and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the disorderly -detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander, bravely -fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived of their -commander<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363">[p. 363]</a></span> -as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but an ineffective -resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and the greater number -slain. A few who contrived to escape the active Persian cavalry, -found shelter in the neighboring cities.<a id="FNanchor_689"></a><a -href="#Footnote_689" class="fnanchor">[689]</a></p> - -<p>This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays -a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks, -was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does -not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out -soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as -successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated -army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it. -Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor, -but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to -some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take -captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had -captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable -him to pay his troops for some time.<a id="FNanchor_690"></a><a -href="#Footnote_690" class="fnanchor">[690]</a> But it is evident -that his achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian -Greeks on the continent are now left to make good their position, as -they can, against the satrap at Sardis.</p> - -<p>The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which -island (as has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta -about five years before (a few months anterior to the battle of -Knidus), dispossessed the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a -democratical government. But since that period, an opposition-party -in the island had gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come -into correspondence with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side -warmly solicited aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would -otherwise become thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the -Lacedæmonians sent eight triremes across the Ægean under the command -of Ekdikus; the first of their ships of war which had crossed since -the defeat of Knidus.<a id="FNanchor_691"></a><a href="#Footnote_691" -class="fnanchor">[691]</a> Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in -the Ægean had been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure -of Konon, yet the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about -twenty triremes, besides considerable force of other kinds; so -that Ekdikus could not even land on the<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_364">[p. 364]</a></span> island, but was compelled to halt -at Knidus. Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the -Corinthian Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer -required there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few -months before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians -in those waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out -of the Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and -take the command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On -passing by Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause -of Sparta, and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went -onward to Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself -at the head of twenty-seven triremes.<a id="FNanchor_692"></a><a -href="#Footnote_692" class="fnanchor">[692]</a> In his way from -Knidus to Rhodes, he accidentally fell in with the Athenian -admiral Philokrates, conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the -aid of Evagoras in his struggle against the Persians. He was -fortunate enough to carry them all as prisoners into Knidus, where -he sold the whole booty, and then proceeded with his fleet, thus -augmented to thirty-seven sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a -fortified post, enabling the oligarchical party to carry on an -active civil war. But he was defeated in a battle,—his enemies -being decidedly the stronger force in the island, and masters of -all the cities.<a id="FNanchor_693"></a><a href="#Footnote_693" -class="fnanchor">[693]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365">[p. 365]</a></span></p> - -<p>The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against -Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing -circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid -against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for -it. But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw -off. For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant -of the Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but -had earned a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at -Athens, as a strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid -which gained the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant -in that battle, before the commencement of his dissension with -Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_694"></a><a href="#Footnote_694" -class="fnanchor">[694]</a> It would have been every way advantageous -to Athens at this moment to decline assisting Evagoras, since (not -to mention the probability of offending the Persian court) she had -more than enough to employ all her maritime force nearer home and -for purposes more essential to herself. Yet in spite of these very -serious considerations of prudence, the paramount feelings of prior -obligation and gratitude, enforced by influential citizens who had -formed connections in Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify -themselves with his gallant struggles<a id="FNanchor_695"></a><a -href="#Footnote_695" class="fnanchor">[695]</a> (of which I -shall speak more fully presently). So little was fickleness, or -instability, or the easy oblivion of past feelings, a part of their -real nature,—though historians have commonly denounced it as among -their prominent qualities.</p> - -<p>The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and -the consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes, -compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and -to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no -inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before -there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a -wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the -assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366">[p. 366]</a></span> first to -the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his -men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there -was no Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was -enabled to extend the alliances of Athens both on the European -and the Asiatic side,—the latter being under the friendly satrap, -Pharnabazus. Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and -Amadokus, whom he found at war, he brought both of them into -amicable relations with Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. -That city was already in alliance with Athens; but on the arrival -of Thrasybulus, the alliance was still further cemented by the -change of its government into a democracy. Having established -friendship with the opposite city of Chalkêdon, and being thus -master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe of the commercial -ships sailing out of the Euxine;<a id="FNanchor_696"></a><a -href="#Footnote_696" class="fnanchor">[696]</a> leaving doubtless -an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence of -revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been -now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast -of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_697"></a><a href="#Footnote_697" -class="fnanchor">[697]</a></p> - -<p>From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already -in friendship with Athens,—though Methymna and the other cities in -the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian -harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the -exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders -of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought -together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain. -The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they -were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder -the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in -spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself -not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was not -sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367">[p. 367]</a></span> exhausted island -might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed from Lesbos along -the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, levying contributions -at Halikarnassus<a id="FNanchor_698"></a><a href="#Footnote_698" -class="fnanchor">[698]</a> and other places, until he came to -Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and was about -to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his soldiers -so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by night -unprepared in his tent, and slew him.<a id="FNanchor_699"></a><a -href="#Footnote_699" class="fnanchor">[699]</a></p> - -<p>Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, -Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, -and harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian -and oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected -eulogy.<a id="FNanchor_700"></a><a href="#Footnote_700" -class="fnanchor">[700]</a> His devoted patriotism in commencing -and prosecuting the struggle against the Thirty, at a time when -they not only were at the height of their power, but had plausible -ground for calculating on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, -deserves high admiration. But the feature which stands yet more -eminent in his character,—a feature infinitely rare in the Grecian -character, generally,—is, that the energy of a successful leader -was combined with complete absence both of vindictive antipathies -for the past, and of overbearing ambition for himself. Content to -live himself as a simple citizen under the restored democracy, he -taught his countrymen to forgive an oligarchical party from whom -they had suffered atrocious wrongs, and set the example himself of -acquiescing, in the loss of his own large property. The generosity -of such a proceeding ought not to count for less, because it was at -the same time dictated by the highest political prudence. We find -in an oration of Lysias against Ergokles (a citizen who served in -the Athenian fleet on this last expedition), in which the latter is -accused of gross peculation,—insinuations against Thrasybulus, of -having countenanced the delinquency, though coupled with praise of -his general character. Even the words as they now stand are so vague -as to carry little evidence; but when we<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_368">[p. 368]</a></span> reflect that the oration was -spoken after the death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no -weight at all.<a id="FNanchor_701"></a><a href="#Footnote_701" -class="fnanchor">[701]</a></p> - -<p>The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After -the death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went -to Rhodes, its original destination,—though Xenophon does not -expressly say so,—the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any -subsequent Lacedæmonian commander appears to have become master -of the island, in spite of the considerable force which they had -there assembled.<a id="FNanchor_702"></a><a href="#Footnote_702" -class="fnanchor">[702]</a> The Lacedæmonians, however, on their -side, being also much in want of money, Teleutias was obliged (in -the same manner as the Athenians), to move from island to island, -levying contributions as he could.<a id="FNanchor_703"></a><a -href="#Footnote_703" class="fnanchor">[703]</a></p> - -<p>When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at -Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the -profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, -that Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the -time, prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, -in the room of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for -several years. Having been the officer originally employed -to procure the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369">[p. -369]</a></span> revolt of the place from Athens (in 411 -<small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_704"></a><a href="#Footnote_704" -class="fnanchor">[704]</a> Derkyllidas had since rendered service -not less essential in preserving it to Sparta, during the extensive -desertion which followed the battle of Knidus. But it was supposed -that he ought to have checked the aggressive plans of Thrasybulus; -moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force were entrusted to -him, to put down effectually the newly-revived Athenian influence. -He was supposed to know well, those regions in which he had once -already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon and the Cyreian -army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and corruption, which -he displayed in his dealing with that gallant body of men, have been -already recounted in a former chapter.<a id="FNanchor_705"></a><a -href="#Footnote_705" class="fnanchor">[705]</a> With three -triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary troops, -Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations with -considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While -he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on -the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap,—he at the -same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of -the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize -the merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or -to her allies.<a id="FNanchor_706"></a><a href="#Footnote_706" -class="fnanchor">[706]</a> The force which Thrasybulus had left at -Byzantium to secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its -object without farther addition.</p> - -<p>Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens, -having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, -for whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent -with twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius -in the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict, -as it had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the -Athenians from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic. -At first the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and -money-levying excursions, on both sides.<a id="FNanchor_707"></a><a -href="#Footnote_707" class="fnanchor">[707]</a> But at length, -the watchful genius of Iphikrates discov<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_370">[p. 370]</a></span>ered opportunity for a successful -stratagem. Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus -into his alliance, had marched thither for the purpose of leaving -a garrison in it, with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as -well as two hundred hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across -the mountainous region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf -of Adramyttium. Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would -speedily return, crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and -planted himself in ambush on the line of return march; at a point -where it traversed the desert and mountainous extremities of the -Abydene territory, near the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes -which carried him across were ordered to sail up the strait on the -next day, in order that Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might -suppose Iphikrates to be employed on his ordinary money-levying -excursion.</p> - -<p>The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on -the next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand, -marching in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well -from the narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance -that he was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to -fight, he had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, -or taken no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so -Xenophon informs us,<a id="FNanchor_708"></a><a href="#Footnote_708" -class="fnanchor">[708]</a> with that constant regard to the divine -judgments and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica -and the Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who -were in the van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to -assault Anaxibius with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries, -as they descended the mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê. -His appearance struck terror and confusion into the whole army; -unprepared in its disorderly array for stedfast resistance,—even -if the minds of the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against -well-trained peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not -in steady rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at -once. Defeat was inevitable, and there remained no other resource -for him except to die like a brave man.<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_371">[p. 371]</a></span> Accordingly, desiring his -shield-bearer to hand to him his shield, he said to those around -him,—“Friends, my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten -away, and save yourselves, before the enemy close with us.” Such -order was hardly required to determine his panic-stricken troops, -who fled with one accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself -awaited firmly the approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting -on the spot. No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had -been expelled from their various governments by the defeat of -Knidus, and who had remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, -stood with the like courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of -life hardly surprises us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom -preservation by flight was “no true preservation” (in the language -of Xenophon),<a id="FNanchor_709"></a><a href="#Footnote_709" -class="fnanchor">[709]</a> but simply prolongation of life under -intolerable disgrace at home. But what deserves greater remark -is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius was tenderly attached -and who was his constant companion, could not endure to leave -him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the same -honorable death.<a id="FNanchor_710"></a><a href="#Footnote_710" -class="fnanchor">[710]</a> So strong was the mutual devotion which -this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient -Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to -stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates -of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene -hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.</p> - -<p>This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the -reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the -Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and -the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were -thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began -to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.</p> - -<p>That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles -was wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a -population eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered -and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372">[p. 372]</a></span> -expelled by her,—at last again captured in the new abode which they -had obtained in Laconia,—and put to death by her order. During the -Peloponnesian war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as -outsettlers or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the -battle of Ægospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to -the remnant of the former population,—as many of them at least as he -could find.</p> - -<p>These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations -highly unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only -at peace, but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a -considerable time after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding -of her Long Walls. And so they would have continued, of their own -accord,—since they could gain but little, and were likely to lose all -the security of their traffic, by her hostility,—had they not been -forced to commence the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost -in the island;<a id="FNanchor_711"></a><a href="#Footnote_711" -class="fnanchor">[711]</a> one amidst many examples of the manner in -which the smaller Grecian states were dragged into war, without any -motive of their own, by the ambition of the greater,—by Sparta as -well as by Athens.<a id="FNanchor_712"></a><a href="#Footnote_712" -class="fnanchor">[712]</a> With the concurrence of the ephors, -Eteonikus authorized and encouraged all Æginetans to fit out -privateers for depredation on Attica; which aggression the<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373">[p. 373]</a></span> Athenians -resented, after suffering considerable inconvenience by sending a -force of ten triremes to block up Ægina from the sea, with a body -of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct and occupy a permanent -fort in the island. This squadron, however, was soon driven off -(though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the fort) by Teleutias, -who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade; having been engaged, -with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes, in an expedition among -the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying contributions. He seems to -have been now at the term of his year of command, and while he was -at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived from Sparta, on his way to -Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was, accordingly, handed over -to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went directly home to Sparta. -So remarkable was his popularity among the seamen, that numbers -of them accompanied him down to the water-edge, testifying their -regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths, or pressing -his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was already under -weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers for his health -and happiness.<a id="FNanchor_713"></a><a href="#Footnote_713" -class="fnanchor">[713]</a></p> - -<p>Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which -Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas -as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected -the island completely, and caused the fortified post occu<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374">[p. 374]</a></span>pied by the -Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch that -after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed at -Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison. As -the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now -recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian -triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron -against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time -withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent -to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus. -On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas -fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at -Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching for a -short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels -and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to -prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men -to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping -on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray -himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês. -Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he -had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in -the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack. -After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons -were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus -escaped to Peiræus.<a id="FNanchor_714"></a><a href="#Footnote_714" -class="fnanchor">[714]</a></p> - -<p>This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident, -laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian -Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth -as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force -of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras; -to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude, -though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias, -passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived in -a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in ambush -with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the Herakleion or -temple of Hêraklês, amidst hollow ground suitable for concealment. He -had before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375">[p. 375]</a></span> -made agreement with another squadron and a body of hoplites under -Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and landed at Ægina at a point -called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant from the Herakleion, but -farther removed from the city. As soon as their arrival became known, -Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to repel them, with all the troops -he could collect, Æginetans as well as marines out of the ships -of war,—and eight Spartans who happened to be his companions in -the island. In their march from the city to attack the new comers, -they had to pass near the Herakleion, and therefore near the troops -in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and those about him had gone -by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in the rear. The stratagem -succeeded not less completely than that of Iphikrates at Abydos -against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans near him were slain, -the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee with considerable loss -back to the city.<a id="FNanchor_715"></a><a href="#Footnote_715" -class="fnanchor">[715]</a></p> - -<p>After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to -Cyprus, and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina, -that Demænetus also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce -Iphikrates. For some time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at -Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus, who was sent as successor to -Gorgôpas,<a id="FNanchor_716"></a><a href="#Footnote_716" -class="fnanchor">[716]</a> could neither persuade nor constrain the -seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds, while their pay was -in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and her trading-vessels -remained altogether unmolested. At length the Lacedæmonians were -obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most popular and -best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen welcomed with -the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence of this -first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice, he -told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that -he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should -himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should -require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went -through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all been -purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the cause -of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376">[p. 376]</a></span> cringing to any -one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies. And he engaged -to find them the means of doing this, provided they would now again -manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them by experience -to possess.<a id="FNanchor_717"></a><a href="#Footnote_717" -class="fnanchor">[717]</a></p> - -<p>This address completely won over the seamen, who received it -with shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders -forthwith, and promising ready obedience. “Well, (said he), now go -and get your suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come -immediately on shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day. -Advance me thus much out of your own means, that we may, by the will -of the gods, make an opportune voyage.”<a id="FNanchor_718"></a><a -href="#Footnote_718" class="fnanchor">[718]</a></p> - -<p>In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would -probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand -his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the -harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane, -for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm -him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen -as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not -only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour’s -plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was -the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of -Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as -it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year -of the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the -port of Megara.<a id="FNanchor_719"></a><a href="#Footnote_719" -class="fnanchor">[719]</a> Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian -naval power, it was an enterprise possible, simply because every -one considered it to be impossible; and it only failed because the -assailants became terrified, and flinched in the execution.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377">[p. 377]</a></span></p> - -<p>A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina, -without telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and -allowing his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself -before morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until -day was just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the -harbor. Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least -idea of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not -a single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several -were moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels, -loaded as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his -squadron to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no -means to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable -the merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were -abroad, and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one -with surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries transmitted -the news through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where -it was believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man -having run home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed -impetuously down thither, with one accord,—hoplites as well as -horsemen. But before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full -time to do considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger -merchant-ships, seizing both the men and the portable goods which -they found aboard. Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the -Deigma), laid hands on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, -whom they saw near, and carried them away captive. Various smaller -vessels with their entire cargoes were also towed away; and even -three or four triremes. With all these Teleutias sailed safely out -of Peiræus, sending some of his squadron to escort the prizes to -Ægina, while he himself with the remainder sailed southward along -the coast. As he was seen to come out of Peiræus, his triremes -were mistaken for Athenian, and excited no alarm; so that he thus -captured several fishing-boats, and passage-boats coming with -passengers from the islands to Athens,—together with some merchantmen -carrying corn and other goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely -into Ægina.<a id="FNanchor_720"></a><a href="#Footnote_720" -class="fnanchor">[720]</a></p> - -<p>The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378">[p. 378]</a></span> executed -without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty, -of which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in -the men seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so -large a return that he was enabled to pay down at once a month’s -pay to his seamen; who became more attached to him than ever, -and kept the triremes in animated and active service under -his orders.<a id="FNanchor_721"></a><a href="#Footnote_721" -class="fnanchor">[721]</a> Admonished by painful experience, -indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless, careful both in guarding -and in closing Peiræus; as they had become forty years before -after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in spite of the -utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from the -indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite -sufficient to make them weary of the war.<a id="FNanchor_722"></a><a -href="#Footnote_722" class="fnanchor">[722]</a></p> - -<p>We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must -have been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395 -<small>B.C.</small> downward to 387 <small>B.C.</small> How -they made good the cost, without any contributory allies, or any -foreign support, except what Konon obtained during one year from -Pharnabazus,—we are not informed. On the revival of the democracy -in 403 <small>B.C.</small>, the poverty of the city, both public -and private, had been very great, owing to the long previous war, -ending with the loss of all Athenian property abroad. At a period -about three years afterwards, it seems that the Athenians were in -arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which they then owed to -Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts due to the Bœotians -on account of damage done; that they were too poor to perform in full -the religious sacrifices prescribed for the year, and were obliged -to omit some even of the more ancient; that the docks as well as -the walls were in sad want of repair.<a id="FNanchor_723"></a><a -href="#Footnote_723" class="fnanchor">[723]</a> Even the pay to -those citizens who attended the pub<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_379">[p. 379]</a></span>lic assemblies and sat as dikasts in -the dikasteries,—pay essential to the working of the democracy,—was -restored only by degrees; beginning first at one obolus, and not -restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before the capture, -until after an interval of some years.<a id="FNanchor_724"></a><a -href="#Footnote_724" class="fnanchor">[724]</a> It was at this -time too that the Theôric Board, or Paymasters for the general -expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established; -and when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for -the means of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was, -probably, great necessity for the formation of some such office. -The disbursements connected with this object had been effected, -before 403 <small>B.C.</small>, not by any special Board, but by -the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the tribute collected from the -allies, who were not renewed after 403 <small>B.C.</small> as the -Athenian empire had ceased to exist.<a id="FNanchor_725"></a><a -href="#Footnote_725" class="fnanchor">[725]</a> A portion of -the money disbursed by the Theôric Board for the religious -festivals, was employed in the distribution of two oboli per -head, called the diobely, to all present citizens, and actually -received by all,—not merely by the poor, but by persons in easy -circumstances also.<a id="FNanchor_726"></a><a href="#Footnote_726" -class="fnanchor">[726]</a> This distribution was made at several -festivals, having originally begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose -of enabling the citizens to obtain places at the theatrical -representations in honor of Dionysus; but we do not know either the -number of the festivals, or the amount of the total sum. It was, -in principle, a natural corollary of the religious idea connected -with the festival; not simply because the comfort and recreation -of each citizen, individually taken, was promoted by his being -enabled to attend the festival,—but because the collective effect -of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the god, was believed -to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance and lively -manifestations.<a id="FNanchor_727"></a><a href="#Footnote_727" -class="fnanchor">[727]</a> Gradually, however, this distribution -of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380">[p. 380]</a></span> Theôric -or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and mischievous -excess, which is brought before our notice forty years afterwards, -during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that time, we have -no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice is simply the -first creation of the Theôric Board.</p> - -<p>The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying -her troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been -derived mainly from direct assessments on property, called -eisphoræ. And some such assessments we find alluded to generally as -having taken place during these years; though we know no details -either as to frequency or amount.<a id="FNanchor_728"></a><a -href="#Footnote_728" class="fnanchor">[728]</a> But the restitution -of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381">[p. 381]</a></span> the -Long Walls and of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an -assistance not less valuable to the finances of Athens than<span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382">[p. 382]</a></span> to her political -power. That excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and -now again safe for the residence of metics<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_383">[p. 383]</a></span> and the importations of merchants, -became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it -when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident -non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time -of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic -persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.<a id="FNanchor_729"></a><a -href="#Footnote_729" class="fnanchor">[729]</a> Both the port-duties, -and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as -in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs, -continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by -Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose -the Athenians to peace.</p> - -<p>In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the -decline, but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina -to Ephesus in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpas with -the Æginetan squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his -fleet under his secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to -the Hellespont for the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and -repaired to Tiribazus, by whom he was conducted up to the court -of Susa. Here he renewed the propositions for the pacification of -Greece,—on principles of universal autonomy, abandoning all the -Asiatic Greeks as subject absolutely to the Persian king,—which he -had tried in vain to carry through two years before. Though the -Spartans generally were odious to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with -so much dexterity<a id="FNanchor_730"></a><a href="#Footnote_730" -class="fnanchor">[730]</a> as to gain the royal favor personally, -while all the influence of Tiribazus was employed to second his -political views. At length they succeeded in prevailing upon the king -formally to adopt the peace, and to proclaim war against any Greeks -who should refuse to accede to it, empowering the Spartans to enforce -it everywhere as his allies and under his sanction. In order to -remove one who would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384">[p. -384]</a></span> proved a great impediment to this measure, the king -was farther induced to invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court, -and to honor him with his daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy -of Daskylium under the temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a -personal friend and guest of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_731"></a><a -href="#Footnote_731" class="fnanchor">[731]</a> Thus armed against -all contingencies, Antalkidas and Tiribazus returned from Susa to -the coast of Asia Minor in the spring of 387 <small>B.C.</small>, -not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by the king’s seal, but -commanding ample means to carry it into effect; since, in addition to -the full forces of Persia, twenty additional triremes were on their -way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns, sent by the despot -Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.<a id="FNanchor_732"></a><a -href="#Footnote_732" class="fnanchor">[732]</a></p> - -<p>On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet -of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under -Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European -side of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, -and took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his -fleet up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that -he was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the -town. But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he -saw the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the -false scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being -now clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan -and Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a -view to which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him -more than a match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune -to capture a detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which -Thrasybulus (a second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting -from Thrace to join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. -Lastly, additional reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the -zealous aid of Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found -himself at the head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a -still greater number which were under preparation in the various -ports of Ionia.<a id="FNanchor_733"></a><a href="#Footnote_733" -class="fnanchor">[733]</a></p> - -<p>Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the -Hellespont<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385">[p. 385]</a></span> -since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything -which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the -full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the -Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering -which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such -hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship -reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by -Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus -cut off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, -the Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the -coasting trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship -with prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to -terminate the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no -chance of success through their own forces; while the Argeians -also, hitherto the most obstinate, had become on their own account -desirous of peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions -of their territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when -the terms of it were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. -Even to her, triumphant as her position now seemed, the war was -a heavy burden.<a id="FNanchor_734"></a><a href="#Footnote_734" -class="fnanchor">[734]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when -Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably -at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come -down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first -publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows:—</p> - -<p>“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the -islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks -it just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, -both small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which -are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any -parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, -along with those who are of the same mind, by land as well as -by sea, with ships and with money.”<a id="FNanchor_735"></a><a -href="#Footnote_735" class="fnanchor">[735]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386">[p. 386]</a></span></p> -<p>Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the -terms of this edict to their respective cities, and to meet -again at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. When the time of -meeting arrived,<a id="FNanchor_736"></a><a href="#Footnote_736" -class="fnanchor">[736]</a> all the cities, in spite of their -repugnance to the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also -to the second condition, nevertheless felt themselves overruled by -superior force, and gave a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths, -however, the Thebans tried indirectly to make good an exception in -their own case, by claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of -themselves, but on behalf of the Bœotian cities generally; a demand -which Agesilaus in the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually -cancelling that item in the pacification whereby the small cities -were pronounced to be autonomous as well as the great. When the -Theban deputy replied that he could not relinquish his claim without -fresh instructions from home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and -consult his countrymen. “You may tell them (said he) that if they do -not comply, they will be shut out from the treaty.”</p> - -<p>It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory -sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy -towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he -exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so -that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to -crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected -triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies, -and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he -procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice, -and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not -only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival -of the Periœki, but also sent forth the officers called xenâgi to -the cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together -the respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to -despatch, his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from -Tegea, the Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they -were prepared to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the -other Bœotian cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were -thus obliged to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very -serious and considerable, of having degraded<span class="pagenum"><a -id="Page_387">[p. 387]</a></span> Thebes from her federal headship, -and isolated her from the Bœotian cities.<a id="FNanchor_737"></a><a -href="#Footnote_737" class="fnanchor">[737]</a></p> - -<p>The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus, -attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice; -for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and -her officers during the ensuing years.</p> - -<p>There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The -Argeian auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the -Corinthian government might probably think that the terms of the -peace, leaving their city autonomous, permitted them to retain -or dismiss these auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was -not so that Agesilaus construed the peace; and his construction, -right or wrong, was backed by the power of enforcement. He sent -to inform both Argeians and Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries -were not withdrawn, he would march his army forthwith into both -territories. No resistance could be offered to his peremptory -mandate. The Argeians retired from Corinth; and the vehement -philo-Argeian Corinthians,—especially those who had been concerned -in the massacre at the festival of the Eukleia,—retired at the -same time into voluntary exile, thinking themselves no longer -safe in the town. They found a home partly at Argos, partly -at Athens,<a id="FNanchor_738"></a><a href="#Footnote_738" -class="fnanchor">[738]</a> where they were most hospitably -received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who, -in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon, -had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in -Corinth,—were immediately readmitted into the city. According to -Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous -voice of the Corinthian citizens.<a id="FNanchor_739"></a><a -href="#Footnote_739" class="fnanchor">[739]</a> But we shall -be more correct in affirming, that it was procured by the same -intimidating summons from Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal -of the Argeians.<a id="FNanchor_740"></a><a href="#Footnote_740" -class="fnanchor">[740]</a> The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum -on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388">[p. 388]</a></span> -present occasion was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian -exiles had been eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian -war,—or than that of the Phliasian exiles was, two or three years -afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_741"></a><a href="#Footnote_741" -class="fnanchor">[741]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<h2 class="nobreak">FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_1"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span> See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71; -Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45; Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last -passage of Aristotle is not very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1. </p> - -<p>For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable Appendix in -Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol. ii, p. 313-316.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_2"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span> Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_3"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span> See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes -Clinton, mentioned in the preceding note, p. 317.</p> - -<p>There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at the -battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other Egyptians in -a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages of Xenophon’s -Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and the Dissertation -of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio Persarum, p. 20-56 -(Cologne, 1830).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_4"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1, -13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_5"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων -πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν.</p> - -<p>This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan -envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped -them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol. VII. -ch. lv, p. 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_6"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span> Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_7"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. -lxi, p. 389 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_8"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare -Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_9"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. -Hellen. i, 4, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_10"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare -Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1, 16, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_11"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. -Anab. <i>ut sup.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_12"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span> See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. -135.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_13"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span> Darius had had thirteen children -by Parysatis; but all except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias -asserts that he heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, -Persica, c. 49).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_14"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span> Herodot. vii, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_15"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. -viii, 58.</p> - -<p>Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota, -c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note.</p> - -<p>It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either -Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes -(instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors, -without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from Ξέρξου -to Ἀρταξέρξου.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_16"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_17"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_18"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span> So it is presented by Justin, v, -11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_19"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_20"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν -ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν πολεμοῦντων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_21"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The -statements here contained do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while -both of them differ from Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. -xii, Panath. s. 111), and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.</p> - -<p>I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to suppose -that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by Klearchus as -Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a Lacedæmonian Harmost -in that town, named as soon as the town was taken, by Lysander, -after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2). This was -towards the end of 405 <small>B.C.</small> We know farther, from the -Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 <small>B.C.</small> -Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_22"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. -vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon, c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_23"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span> Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês) -οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.</p> - -<p>Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_24"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span> Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽ -ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν -στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.</p> - -<p>For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not merely -on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see Quintus Curtius, -v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching near to Persepolis, -“quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi -occurrit. Captivi erant Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ -vario suppliciorum modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus -auribusque, amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in -longum sui ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; -and the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112; -Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.</p> - -<p>It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing -in which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in -exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at -Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the -execution took place within the prison by administering a cup of -hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of pain, as -well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who reads the -account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the end of the -Phædon.</p> - -<p>It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in England -is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens. Yet an Athenian -public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged -or beheaded in the market-place. Much less could they have borne the -sight of the prolonged tortures inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 -(a fair parallel to the Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch, -Artaxerx. c. 16), in the presence of an immense crowd of spectators, -when every window commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at -a high price, and filled by the best company in Paris.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_25"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_26"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_27"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_28"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_29"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_30"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ -στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην -τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας -ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι -ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς -χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους -τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν -εἰς τὴν <span class="replace" id="tn_4" title="In the printed book: -Ἑγγαδα">Ἑλλάδα</span> σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_31"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span> Compare similar praises of -Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to attract Greek mercenaries from -Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv, 50-59).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_32"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο -δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν -αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_33"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span> Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story -that Sokrates carried off Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his -horse, on his shoulders, and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful -to enter into the narrative.</p> - -<p>Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς of -Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and great -skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its -commander, and in all that relates to horses, as manifested in his -published works,—but also the fact, that his son Gryllus served -afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the combat of cavalry which -preceded the great battle of Mantineia (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_34"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9, -22-24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_35"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.</p> - -<p>Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first -revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it -from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the latter -should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorus -on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_36"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_37"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span> The parasang was a Persian -measurement of length, but according to Strabo, not of uniform value -in all parts of Asia; in some parts, held equivalent to thirty -stadia, in others to forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. -518; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This -variability of meaning is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the -difference between English, Irish, and German miles, etc.</p> - -<p>Herodotus tells us distinctly what <i>he</i> meant by a parasang, and -what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in their -measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in -their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute (Herod. v, -53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three and a half -English miles, or nearly three geographical miles. The distance -between every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to -Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,” διὰ οἰκεομένης τε -ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been measured and marked in -parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It seems probable, from the -account which Herodotus gives of the march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that -this road passed from Kappadokia and across the river Halys, through -Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis; and therefore that the road which Cyrus -took for his march, from Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have -been so measured and marked.</p> - -<p>Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii, 8, -26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia, while he -gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured in parasangs. -Now even at the outset of the march, we have no reason to believe -that there was any official measurer of road-progress accompanying -the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander’s -invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. -Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as -far as Trebizond, states the day’s march of the army in parasangs; -not merely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the -Arabian desert between Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of -Armenia,—and through the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He -tells us that in the desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs -in thirteen days, or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that -too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that -in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they -marched fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory -(also covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs -in seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches, at -thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon -measure the distance marched over?</p> - -<p>The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major -Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor -Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major -Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr. miles; Mr. -Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels in Asia Minor, -c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a half geogr. miles; -Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8, p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. -miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at 1.98 geogr. miles, between -Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something less than this, without specifying -how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain -basis to proceed upon, even for the earlier portion of the route; -much more, for the retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana -(or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests -his calculation; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the -direct route of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his -way, partly to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian -princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, -is the distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of -which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps, -fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance -twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been -the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of -Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that the -road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and numbered -according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the number of -parasangs between these two places, would be speaking upon official -authority.</p> - -<p>Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes -found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of the -country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)</p> - -<p>Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds of -Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and sixty-five -geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles for each of the -five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by Xenophon between -those two places.”</p> - -<p>As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently -untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description -of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are -measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ, -he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is -probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for four -days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that the -road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through -these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued even as far -as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xenophon had -the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time -(measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to -march one, two, or three parasangs; and when he came to the ulterior -portions of the road, he called <i>that length of time</i> by the name of -one, two, or three parasangs. Five parasangs seem to have meant with -him a full day’s march; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or -eight, a long, or very long day.</p> - -<p>We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had -no portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually -divide the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. -The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were -the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der -Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)</p> - -<p>This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he talks -about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of -Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this meaning uniformly -or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must -have used the word in its usual meaning of distance.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_38"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About -Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29, 2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_39"></a><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span> These three marches, each of ten -parasangs, from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest -recorded in the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; -for there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When -he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der Zehn -Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days’ march, -which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon’s calculation, comparing -the items with the total, might conveniently be let in here; so that -these thirty parasangs should have occupied six days’ march instead -of three; five parasangs per day. The whole march which Cyrus had -hitherto made from Sardis, including the road from Keramôn-Agora to -Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great road from Sardis to the river Halys, -Kappadokia, and Susa. That road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, -Herodot. vii, 26; v, 52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; -though this is a prodigious departure from the straight line. At -Käystru-Pedion, Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a -different route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. -About the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads -crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.</p> - -<p>I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s -accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium; -though the names of several of the places which he mentions are not -known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is -a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the -present day assign more weight to that circumstance than is suited to -the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over -a large region of country, are not of that age; the communications -were probably all originally made, between one neighboring town and -another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no -reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places.</p> - -<p>It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut -straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as a -remarkable thing (ii, 100).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_40"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span> Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it seems -that both must have been situated on the line of road now followed by the -caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which line of road follows a -direction between the mountains called Emir Dagh on the north-east, and -those called Sultan Dagh on the south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn -Tausend, p. 21, 22).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_41"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span> Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ κνημῖδας, καὶ -<em class="gesperrt">τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας</em>. -</p> -<p> -When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy, the -shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his blanket attached to -it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149); it was slung by the strap round -his neck and shoulder. Sometimes indeed he had an opportunity of relieving -himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon -(Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers, -could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2, 20; Aristoph. -1, c.). -</p> -<p> -On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened, -as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then fastened round the neck -or shoulders, and held out upon the left arm, which was passed through the -rings or straps attached to its concave or interior side. -</p> -<p> -Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious stratagem -of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman soldiers also -carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, Lucull. -c. 27). -</p> -<p> -It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cyreians, -does not mention <i>breastplates</i>; which (though sometimes worn, see -Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy -shields. It is quite possible that <i>some</i> of the Cyreian infantry may have -had breastplates as well as shields, since every soldier provided his own -arms; but Xenophon states only what was common to all. -</p> -<p> -Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no shield.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_42"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_43"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_44"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span> This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by Kizil-Chesmeh, -Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the Kilikian seaport-town -Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It is laid down in the Peutinger -Tables as the road from Iconium to Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 <i>seq.</i>; -Chesney, Euph. and Tigr. ii, p. 209).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_45"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_46"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir, Travels in -Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; -and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 <i>seq.</i>; -also his other work, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and -Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this memorable -pass. -</p> -<p> -Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to find this -impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through sheer stupidity or recklessness -of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even -the same excuse for abandoning it as Syennesis had on the approach of -Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii. 4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_47"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_48"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double game, -though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of Epyaxa. -</p> -<p> -So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard -to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two sons of Philip II. of -Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, -Demetrius summâ ope adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum -incauti a fraude fraternâ juvenis—<i>adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati, fovendamque -spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt</i>,” <i>etc.</i> (Livy, xl, 5).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_49"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span> See Herodot. v. 49.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_50"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_51"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_52"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I translate the -sense rather than the words.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_53"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_54"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span> The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon at three -hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of modern travellers -(Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34). -</p> -<p> -Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey through -Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, ii, p. 211; Mr. -Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 54. -</p> -<p> -Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus is fordable. -There must have been bridges; which, in the then flourishing state -of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Ainsworth, however, -differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between -Tarsus and Issus. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which afterwards -appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The -various data of ancient history and geography about this region are by no -means easy to reconcile; see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, -iii, 17, 7. An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s -or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal description. -We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates into two branches, -one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on its western, the other on its eastern -side. There are thus two different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides -or Amanian Gates; one having reference to the Western Amanus, the -other to the Eastern. The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by -Darius, before the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct -in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates; though -both did not pass the same gates.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_55"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span> Diodor. xiv. 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_56"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ -ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_57"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span> Diodor. xiv.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_58"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of generals in -service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have been not unfrequent with -Persian kings. On the other hand, it was remarked as a piece of gross -obsequiousness in the Argeian Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent -of his countrymen serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered -to bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded -(Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_59"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_60"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_61"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span> See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten -Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the difficult road -through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable notes on Quintus Curtius, -iii, 20, 13, p. 101.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_62"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span> Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the road followed by -Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the Euphrates, can be satisfactorily -made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 36, 37). -</p> -<p> -Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by Rennell -lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed -to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and by Reichard higher -up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde, part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. -14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also -the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus -is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr. p. -213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though I dissent -from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus. -</p> -<p> -Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known -passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings, -down to 100 <small>B.C.</small> It was selected as a noted point, to which observations -and calculations might be conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other -geographers (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman -empire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the -river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more -used and better known, at least to the Roman writers. -</p> -<p> -The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to -Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the Tigris -below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus -Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, -Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc. -</p> -<p> -The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is celebrated to -this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the -Euphrates there are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very -banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_63"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_64"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17) analogous expressions -of flattery—from the historians of Alexander, affirming that the sea near -Pamphylia providentially made way for him—from the inhabitants on the -banks of the Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and -the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor Tiberius (Tacitus, -Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24). -</p> -<p> -The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have been -about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period of greatest -height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this part of its course, is from -the 21st to the 28th of May; the period when they are lowest, is about the -middle of November (see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). -Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September -(Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a sort of -mean height, when Cyrus passed. -</p> -<p> -Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the -ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the steamers -Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphrates -and Tigris had passed over it without difficulty in the month of -May.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty parasangs -(Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance is not half so great -as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five -parasangs. There is here some confusion; together with the usual difficulty -in assigning any given distance as the equivalent of the parasang -(Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 38).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_66"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span> See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal observation, -to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the country, even at -the present day.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_67"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_68"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_69"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span> I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from the story afterwards -told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the prophet of the army; -who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his brother would not fight for ten -days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice must have been offered, I imagine, during -the halt—not during the distressing march which preceded. The ten days -named by Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ. -</p> -<p> -It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphrates, from the -Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by -Herodotus, and still celebrated from its unexhausted supply of bitumen), -between latitude 35½° and 34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the -Navigation of the Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:— -</p> -<p> -“The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly heightened, -as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short -intervals, of ancient irrigating aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art -and durability are attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, -meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers, -and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove -that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly inhabited by a people -far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic purposes, -of the first and greatest utility—the transport of water. The greater portion -is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up -for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly -cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty inches at top, placed at -right angles to the current, and carried various distances towards the interior, -from two hundred to one thousand two hundred yards. -</p> -<p> -“But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the existence of -a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts. -In general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter. -And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of -them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage -left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous -walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently -at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the -wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of -the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water -rushes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably -from four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a bank -of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient -passage for large boats at low seasons.” -</p> -<p> -The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population -and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this part of its course, are -extremely interesting and curious, when contrasted with the desolation -depicted by Xenophon; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants -than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and -sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population, -of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already -long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to construct their dams and -aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began -during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 <small>B.C.</small> For this -line of road along the Euphrates began then to acquire great importance -as the means of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on -the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator -and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia Minor—Seleukeia in -Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc. This route coincides mainly -with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at -Thapsakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphrates -was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (<small>B.C.</small> -300-100, speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when -that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians. -Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion, however, Ammianus -Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphrates, north of Babylonia, -as being in several parts well cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, -(Ammian. Marc. xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was -nothing to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of -Babylonia. -</p> -<p> -Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphrates, -before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same condition as it was when -Xenophon and his comrades marched through it,—“full of hills and narrow -valleys, and presenting many difficulties to the movement of an army. -The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on -this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek -army, and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions; -so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks -had to encounter.” (Travels in the Track, etc. p. 81.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_70"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span> I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly opposite -Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107) and Mr. Ainsworth -(p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place as the modern Hit -(the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known town with which we can -identify it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_71"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_72"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span> The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand by Pylæ -a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert country north of -Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and its steep banks along the -river—was exchanged for the flat and fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia -proper. Perhaps there was a town near the pass, and named after it. -</p> -<p> -Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration in the -nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes—(Euphrates -and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles below Hit, the remains -of aqueducts disappear, and the windings become shorter and more frequent, -as the river flows through a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts -it is that I am inclined to place Pylæ. -</p> -<p> -Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit. Professor -Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth -places it as much as seventy geographical miles lower than Hit -(Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81); compare Ritter, Erdkunde, -West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_73"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span> The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks through the -communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is extremely interesting -(Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to space.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_74"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_75"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_76"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span> See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of the Persian -Achæmenês, c. 236.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_77"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span> Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the -Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ -σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.</p> - -<p>Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their extraordinary -increase of prowess after having shaken off the despotism of Hippias -(v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα -σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων -ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ -ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων -δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.</p> - -<p>Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm. -Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·</p> - <p>Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_78"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_79"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span> From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three entire -days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in the fourth day’s -march. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all. This -argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not seem that the -space of ground traversed during any one of them can have been considerable. -For they were all undertaken with visible evidences of an enemy -immediately in front of them; which circumstance was the occasion of the -treason of Orontes, who asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence -of attacking the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter -to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his division. The -letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered the treason. -</p> -<p> -Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must have -kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore must have -moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of Orontes must -itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated to render both Cyrus and -Klearchus doubly cautious for the time. And the very trial of Orontes -appears to have been conducted under such solemnities as must have occasioned -a halt of the army. -</p> -<p> -Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks to have -got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in the three entire days -of march. The fourth day they must have got over very little ground indeed; -not merely because Cyrus was in momentary expectation of the -King’s main army, and of a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the -great delay necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than -one hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass -through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench and the Euphrates. -He can hardly have made more than five miles in this whole -day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp two or three miles beyond -the trench. We may therefore reckon the distance marched over between -Pylæ and the trench as about thirty-two miles in all; and two or three -miles farther to the encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would -keep near the river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so -that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the straight -line and the full windings of the river. -</p> -<p> -I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much wider -angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the triangular space -included between the trench, the Wall, and the river, was much more extensive. -The reason, we may presume, why the trench was cut, was, to -defend that portion of the well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia -which lay outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see -hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very considerable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_80"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this long line -of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then left useless and undefended, -differs from the narrative of Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be -borrowed from Ephorus. Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench -to be dug, and lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage; -and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with -his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This is a -statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this point of view, that -it makes out the king to have acted upon a rational scheme; whereas in -Xenophon he appears at first to have adopted a plan of defence, and then -to have renounced it, after immense labor and cost, without any reason, so -far as we can see. Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is -the true one. The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both -facts of the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_81"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span> Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to us from -Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five hundred stadia (about -fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while Xenophon was informed that the -field of battle was distant from Babylon only three hundred and sixty -stadia. Now, according to Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, -p. 57), Hillah (Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one -and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the distance -given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we should place -Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah. This seems the most -probable supposition. -</p> -<p> -Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and Assyria, p. -186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the latter remarks, what most -of the commentators overlook, that the Greeks did not pass through the -Wall of Media until long after the battle. See a note a little below, near -the beginning of my next chapter, in reference to that Wall.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_82"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span> The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field of Kunaxa -would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles beyond the trench, to -the first night-station; next, a full day’s march, say twelve miles; thirdly, -a half day’s march, to the time of the mid-day halt, say seven miles. -</p> -<p> -The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at thirty-two -miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be about fifty-four -miles. -</p> -<p> -Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah Castle -(two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line, and seventy-seven -miles, if following the line of the river. Deduct four miles for the distance -from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall then have between Pylæ and Felujah, -a rectilinear distance of forty-four miles. The marching route of the -Greeks (as explained in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, -but not exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from Pylæ -to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to Kunaxa.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_83"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_84"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span> Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_85"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span> Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon Klearchus; and it -seems quite just.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_86"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_87"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_88"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span> Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_89"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_90"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21. -</p> -<p> -Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ διώκοντας, -ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, -<em class="gesperrt">οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν</em>, etc. -</p> -<p> -The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus except -that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to -overthrow the self-command of Cyrus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_91"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span> Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized the Theban -Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ in the opposite -army; which led to the same fatal consequences (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. -32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See also the reflections of Xenophon on -the conduct of Teleutas before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_92"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of the death of -Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from the brief abstract in -Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed. Bähr) does not differ materially -from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions the Karian soldier (not noticed by -Xenophon) who hurled the javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards -tortured and put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for -the death of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who -by order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was destroyed -by her in the same way. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between -Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, partly direct -and partly implied, from Xenophon. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and -of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have derived from Ktesias, but -which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare -also the few words of Justin, v, 11. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of the king’s -army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks under Klearchus, -who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic -army at three thousand men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so -they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any -cavalry, and no great number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have -overtaken the flying Persians.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_93"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations of this -Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was held first by Cyrus -and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been exaggerated into a romantic story, -in which we cannot tell what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, -V. H. xii, 1; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch -and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes and his -son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter against his father, and -to his destruction when the conspiracy was discovered, arose out of the -passion of Darius for her. But as that transaction certainly happened at -the close of the long life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six -years—and as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we -may fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have been -something different. -</p> -<p> -Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and Monimê -of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes -of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_94"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been made -during the recent halt at Pylæ.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_95"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_96"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_97"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span> Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking passage, as describing -the way in which political institutions work themselves into the -individual character and habits.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_98"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile brothers, Eteokles -and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox -Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem potentiæ, et <i>solita fratribus odia</i>, accendebatur -invidia, quod mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin, -xlii, 4. -</p> -<p> -Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in his -life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the name of -Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict, -by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Transtamare. -</p> -<p> -At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre, qui, -pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée, s’acharna long temps -à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait galoper dans la plaine, monté sur -un cheval noir, sa bannière armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son -frère partout où l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où -est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don -Pèdre, p. 504.) -</p> -<p> -Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle -of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into the power of his -enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother -Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed likely to prevail, if -Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander. -</p> -<p> -This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is graphically -described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_99"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, -φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· <em class="gesperrt">ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_100"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_101"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span> We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias distinctly asserted -himself to have been present at this interview, and I see no reason -why we should not believe him. Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as -false, affirming that Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had -he been there; but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it -necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος <em class="gesperrt">εἶς Ἕλλην,</em> -(ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence of one or two other -Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he was the spokesman of the -party—a military man.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_102"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα -ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μαχούμεθα.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_103"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat copious in -his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he certainly followed -other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it be true that he had Xenophon -before him. The allusion to the past heroism of Leonidas seems rather in -the style of Ephorus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_104"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good reason, that -it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in Babylonia, for the sacrifice -(Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_105"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span> Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab. ii, 1, 6). It -is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which we should obtain by -adding together the separate days’ march specified by Xenophon from Sardis. -But the distance from Sardis to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was -three days’ journey (Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really -only to the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556; -Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_106"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span> Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208) calculates twelve -hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from Sardis to Kunaxa or the -Mounds of Mohammed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_107"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span> For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ, or opposite -to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the preceding chapter) for -believing that it cannot have been less than five days. The army must -have been in the utmost need of repose, as well as of provisions.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_108"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_109"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_110"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, -<em class="gesperrt">ἐπορεύοντο ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον</em>, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα -ἡλίῳ δύνοντι εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν. -</p> -<p> -Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter, (Erdkunde, part. -x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel -Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenophon -in a sense from which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded -onward on their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these -words they understand as meaning that the army marched <i>northward</i>; -whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched <i>eastward</i>. -<i>To have the sun on the right hand</i>, does not so much refer either to the -precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises,—but to -his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direction of the -day’s march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in -Herodotus, iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa, -from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Gibraltar, -by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These Phœnicians said, “that -in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right -hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες <em class="gesperrt">τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ</em>. Herodotus -rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of -a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine -that men in sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their -right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar -must, in his judgment, have the sun on the <i>left</i> hand, as he himself had -always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African -coast. See Vol. III. of this History, ch. xviii, p. 282. -</p> -<p> -In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the Greeks, -starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates (the place where -they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and -marching <i>northward</i>, could not expect to arrive, and could not really arrive, -at villages of the Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to -do so, if they marched <i>eastward</i>, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have -hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been -something near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would -moreover have been stopped by the undefended Trench, which could only -be passed at the narrow opening close to the Euphrates.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_111"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing military jest, -to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic. See the references in Krüger -and Schneider’s notes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_112"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span> Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide them towards -Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_113"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_114"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_115"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_116"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span> Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the remarkable -Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius Phalêreus: see also -Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_117"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span> Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_118"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_119"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_120"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ <em class="gesperrt">τρεῖς σταθμοὺς</em>, ἀφίκοντο -πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ εἴσω</em>. It appears -to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ can hardly be computed -from the moment when they commenced their march under the conduct of -Tissaphernes. On the other hand, if we begin from the moment when the -Greeks started under conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct -<i>resting places</i> (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media. First, at -the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii, 13-21). Secondly, at -the villages of abundant supply, where they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, -and waited twenty days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, -one night’s halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached -the Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting places, -between the station (the first station after passing the undefended trench) -from whence they started to begin their retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and -the point where they traversed the Wall of Media.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_121"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span> I reserve for this place the consideration of that which Xenophon states, -in two or three passages, about the Wall of Media and about different canals -in connection with the Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can -make it out, stands in my text. -</p> -<p> -I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the march of the -day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep -and broad trench dug for defence across their line of way, with the exception -of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphrates; through -which gut the whole army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been -carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed, -the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four canals, one hundred -feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail -along them. They strike into the Euphrates, they are distant each from the -other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω -διὰ τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους, ἔνθα δὴ (the books -print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα, which -appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption) -εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος -πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ εἰς -τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽ ἔπεισιν. The present -tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media, -and not to the actual march of the army. -</p> -<p> -Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp. 79-87, etc.), -Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and -Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider -Xenophon to state that the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but -one before the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four -distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They all, indeed, -contest the accuracy of this latter statement; Rennell remarking that the -level of the Tigris, in this part of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; -and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so -near to each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed -through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa. -</p> -<p> -It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words -of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either the Wall of -Media, or these four canals <i>before</i> the battle of Kunaxa, but who says (as -Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, -rightly explains him), that these four canals flowing from the Tigris -are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through -until long <i>after</i> the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them towards -the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached Sittakê (Anab. ii, 4, 12). -</p> -<p> -It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the -Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot. -Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see journal of the Geographical Society, vol. -ix. pp. 447-473, with Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of -embankment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on -the western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches towards the -Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W. “It is a solitary straight -single mound, twenty-five long paces thick, with a bastion on its western -face at every fifty-five paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, -twenty-seven paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of -the country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from thirty-five -to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line as far as the eye can -trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes in the same straight line to two -mounds called Ramelah on the Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that -it is, in places far inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a -level with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446). -</p> -<p> -Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now called Sidd -Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall of Media reaching -from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best recent maps, especially that of -Colonel Chesney; and accepted as such by recent inquirers. -</p> -<p> -Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by Colonel -Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted the views of -Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall of Media, in the line -here assigned to it, has no evidence to rest upon. Captain Jones, commander -of the steamer at Bagdad, undertook, at the request of Colonel -Rawlinson a minute examination of the locality, and ascertained that what -had been laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds; no -wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or eight miles from -the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter torrents and drain off the rain -water of the desert into a large reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive -valley between the rivers. -</p> -<p> -From this important communication it results, that there is as yet no -evidence now remaining for determining what was the line or position of the -Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be a datum positively established, -serving as premises from whence to deduce other positions mentioned -by Xenophon. As our knowledge now stands, there is not a single point -mentioned by Xenophon in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except -Babylon itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot -where Babylonia proper commences. -</p> -<p> -The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very plain -and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually saw it, passed through -it, and correctly describes it in height as well as breadth. Its entire length -he of course only gives from what he was told. His statement appears to -me good evidence that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the -Tigris to the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates, -though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality and direction -of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in the expedition -of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on the left bank of the Euphrates, -the ruins of a wall, “which in ancient times had stretched to a -great distance for the defence of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is -fair to presume that this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta -cannot be assigned. -</p> -<p> -It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already stated in -this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not cross either the Wall -of Media, or the two canals here mentioned, until many days after the battle -of Kunaxa. -</p> -<p> -We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was intersected -by canals, and that there was one canal greater than the rest and -navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to the Tigris, in a direction to -the south of east. This coincides pretty well with the direction assigned -in Colonel Chesney’s map to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into -which the four great canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris -to the Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be -said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as it were a -branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust itself, when the space -between them was covered with a network of canals great and small, and -when a vast quantity of the water of both was exhausted in fertilizing the -earth, is difficult to say. -</p> -<p> -The <i>island</i> wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near Sittakê, before -crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram formed by the Tigris, the -Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel canals joining them. It might well be -called a large island, containing many cities and villages, with a large -population.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_122"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span> There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the Tigris, above -Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and less winding, than it -does now. The situation of Opis cannot be verified. The ruins of a large -city were seen by Captain Lynch near the confluence of the river Adhem -with the Tigris, which he supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_123"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_124"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span> Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_125"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28. -</p> -<p> -Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators, identify -this town of Καιναὶ or Kænæ with the modern town Senn; which latter -place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and Rennell (Illustrations -p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser Zab instead of the Greater Zab. -</p> -<p> -To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to Καιναὶ, does -not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is there much real similarity -of name between the two; although our erroneous way of pronouncing the -Latin name <i>Caenae</i>, creates a delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth -shows that some modern writers have been misled in the same manner -by identifying the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-<i>certa</i>. -</p> -<p> -It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s work, -that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he must have -crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on the fact that though -distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v, 52). Perhaps in drawing up -his narrative after the expedition, Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as -to fancy that two synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, -were only one.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_126"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_127"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious, and in all -probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν -βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων -καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_128"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_129"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, -Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_130"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span> Tacit. Histor. i, 45. “Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad <i>prohibendum</i> -scelus; <i>jubere</i> jam poterat. Ita, simulatione iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium -Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum, affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit.” -</p> -<p> -Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as referred to in -the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon, which he probably derived -from the story of Menon himself. Xenophon mentions the ignominious -death of Menon, and he probably derived his information from Ktesias (see -Anabasis, ii, 6, 29). -</p> -<p> -The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death of Menon, -in itself highly probable, renders all the different statements consistent and -harmonious.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_131"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span> Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories current, -which he does not credit, to the disparagement of Menon,—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ -ἔξεστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc. (Anab. ii, 6, 28). -</p> -<p> -Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed Menon -to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by Tissaphernes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_132"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span> Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange explanation of -the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in the assurance of the -Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the high reputation for good faith -which the Persians had acquired by the undeviating and scrupulous honor -of the first Cyrus (or Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to -deserve, though the corruption of their character had not before publicly -manifested itself. -</p> -<p> -This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of his romance.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_133"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span> Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_134"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span> Polyæn. vii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_135"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_136"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span> Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_137"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_138"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_139"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ -Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς, etc. -</p> -<p> -Homer, Iliad, v, 9— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἀφνεῖος, ἀμύμων,</p> - <p>Ἱρεὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, etc.</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon, -at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_140"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span> Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the necessity -of conciliating him, compare various passages in the Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19; -iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_141"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ τὸ ὄναρ -τῆ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὢν καὶ κινδύνοις φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν -ἔδοξε, etc. ... Ὁποῖον τι μὲν δή ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν -συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ ὄναρ. Γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν -ἔννοια αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τί κατάκειμαι; ἡ δὲ νὺξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰκὸς -τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν, etc. -</p> -<p> -The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the Iliad and -Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into language and expanded,—such -as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other passages cited or referred to in -Colonel Mure’s History of the Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, -vol. ii, p. 25 <i>seq.</i> -</p> -<p> -A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house, counts for a -favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587 C.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_142"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25. -</p> -<p> -“Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini.” (Sallust, Bellum Catilinar. -c. 20).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_143"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words of Xenophon, -that Apollonides had been one of those who had held faint-hearted -language (ὑπομαλακιζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the conversation with Phalinus -shortly after the death of Cyrus. Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is -the second time of his offering such advice—Ἃ σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι -κελεύοντας φλυαρεῖν φῂς, <em class="gesperrt">πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις ἰόντας</em>; -</p> -<p> -This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon here -treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under the actual -circumstances, than for a man “to show his acuteness by summing up the -perils around.” See the remarkable speech of Demosthenes at Pylos -(Thucyd. iv, 10).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_144"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_145"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25. -</p> -<p> -Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιοτεύειν, -καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν <em class="gesperrt">καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ παρθένοις -ὁμιλεῖν</em>, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ. -</p> -<p> -Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical -characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown, -rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of the first,—as contrasted with -the more compact, muscular, and vigorous type of the second, trained for -movement, action, and endurance. -</p> -<p> -Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian preference -for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males an -approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their eyes and tastes being -under the influence only of aphrodisiac ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed -to the constant training and naked exercises of the palæstra, -boys competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations -of the male beauty attracted towards active power and graceful motion. -</p> -<p> -Οὐ γὰρ φανερὸν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως αὐτοῖς -ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν ᾤοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ θῆλυ· σχεδὸν καὶ -πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἐννοεῖν. Κἀκεῖνοι γυναικός -εἰδος περιτιθέασι τοῖς ἄῤῥεσιν, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐρᾷν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ -ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις, τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπό τε γυναικῶν καὶ -εὐνούχων τῶν πρεσβυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων -μὴ πάνυ συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίοις, etc. -(Orat. xxi, p. 270). -</p> -<p> -Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 <i>seq.</i>; and the Epigram of Strato in the -Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_146"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span> A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which passed -after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does not mention the name -of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed throughout all his account of the -march.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_147"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span> Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at Sparta, prior -to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic funeral oration of Perikles, -in the second year of that war (Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40). -</p> -<p> -Οἱ μέν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by the Corinthian -speaker) <em class="gesperrt">καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν</em>· ὑμεῖς δὲ -(Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ -τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὖθις δὲ, οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ -γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς -τεδυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, -τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς -ὑμᾶς μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc. -</p> -<p> -Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα -ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ -προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως -μὲν δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, <em class="gesperrt">ὥστε τολμᾷν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν -ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι</em>· ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς -δὲ ὄκνον, φέρει.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_148"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span> Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech to the Athenians -about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if a man had not the -power of setting them forth in an impressive manner (Thucyd. ii, 60). -Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι -<em class="gesperrt">γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα</em>, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ -χρημάτων κρείττων· ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἵσῳ καὶ -εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη, etc. -</p> -<p> -The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same language. -It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνους ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς -εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους</em> (Xenoph. Mem. -i, 2, 52). -</p> -<p> -A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii, Epitaph. -s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian democracy—authoritative -law, with persuasive and instructive speech, as superseding mutual violence -(νόμος and λόγος, as the antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment -in Isokrates (Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_149"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span> See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies the boastful -tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which he had to contend on -the part of his hearers—Δελώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ -πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ -ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, <em class="gesperrt">οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι -τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων</em>. -</p> -<p> -This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon’s tone.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_150"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span> In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets forth in a -striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ πρακτικός—Ὥσπερ καὶ -ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι, -οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πεῖσαι δέῃ, ὁ πλέιστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος -δικαίως ἂν <em class="gesperrt">λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος</em> κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι. -Μὴ μέντοι ὡς <em class="gesperrt">λόγον ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἴποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον -αὐτῶν, τοῦτο μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοὺς πεπεισμένους ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου δήλους -ἐσομένους οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, ὅυτω παρασκευάζεσθε</em>. -</p> -<p> -In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the cavalry, -Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive speech, as a means -of keeping up the active obedience of the soldiers—Εἴς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς -εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν -τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen. Mag. Eq. i, 24).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_151"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span> See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_152"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_153"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth. Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, -etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, -p. 119-134. -</p> -<p> -Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of Armenia -and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly that the Great Zab is -the only point (east of the Tigris) which Xenophon assigns in such a manner -as to be capable of distinct local identification. He also observes, here -as elsewhere, that the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially -delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_154"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_155"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_156"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the ancient Nineveh, -that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard have brought to light so many -curious and valuable Assyrian remains. The legend which Xenophon -heard on the spot, respecting the way in which these cities were captured -and ruined, is of a truly Oriental character.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_157"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23. -</p> -<p> -I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon <i>each</i> flank—that -is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon are not quite clear.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_158"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_159"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a></span> Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 68) is of the same opinion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_160"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37. -</p> -<p> -The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack, that -he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii, -2, 21.) -</p> -<p> -Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the horses -of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in Hindostan, are still -kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to -have been practised by the Persians.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_161"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36-49; iii, 5, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_162"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where the Greeks quitted -the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian mountains, was the neighborhood -of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient Bezabde. It is here that farther -march, up the eastern side of the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the -mountains closing in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, -from the eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, -p. 72).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_163"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_164"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 19-30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_165"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 18; iv, 2, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_166"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_167"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 2, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_168"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_169"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_170"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis which -marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had suffered in Karduchia. -</p> -<p> -Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίον· ἀπεῖχε δὲ -τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδούχων. Τότε μὲν οὖν -ηὐλίσθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ τῶν -παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἕπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσασπερ ἐπορεύθησαν -διὰ τῶν Καρδούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ ἔπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ -τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνους. Ὡς οὖν ἀπηλλαγμένοι τούτων -ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_171"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_172"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_173"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17. -</p> -<p> -... ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανωσάμενος καὶ -ἀποδὺς, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε. -</p> -<p> -I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood after -ἀποδὺς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems to imagine. -It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation of the Grecian army, the -soldiers should be ordered first to disarm, and then to resume their arms. -I conceive the matter thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so -that the shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the left -hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear, also resting on the -ground, is sustained by the shield and by the same left hand. The right -hand of the soldier being thus free, he is ordered first to wreath himself -(the costume usual in offering sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, -to resume his arms. -</p> -<p> -Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must here have -been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by gesture, raising the -hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it seems impossible that they -could have been provided generally with actual wreaths, on the banks of -the Kentritês, and just after their painful march through the Karduchian -mountains. Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, -which he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain -select officiating persons.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_174"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_175"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_176"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_177"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_178"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2. -</p> -<p> -The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of various -MSS., read here ἐπορεύθησαν—<em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ</em> τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν. The old -reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson’s edition, <em class="gesperrt">παρὰ</em> τὸν -Εὐφράτην ποταμόν. -</p> -<p> -This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too vague -to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this chapter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_179"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4. -</p> -<p> -Ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μάντέων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ· καὶ πᾶσι δὴ -περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος. -</p> -<p> -The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of Armenia -are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_180"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_181"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_182"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες. -</p> -<p> -This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to which -the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies (see Krüger’s note), -illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No. 28, ed. Schneidewin, Poetæ -Græc. Minor). -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρύτον ἢ Θρῆιξ ἀνὴρ</p> - <p>ἢ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and -Phrygians, is not surprising.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_183"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_184"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 1-3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_185"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_186"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14. -</p> -<p> -Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ <em class="gesperrt">καλὸν</em> κλέπτειν, etc. The reading <em class="gesperrt">καλὸν</em> -is preferred by Schneider to <em class="gesperrt">ἀναγκαῖον</em>, which has been the vulgar -reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are sanctioned by -authority of MSS., and either would be admissible; on the whole, I incline -to side with Schneider.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_187"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16. -</p> -<p> -Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω -δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ -κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα, -εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ σοὶ -ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παίδειαν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_188"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a></span> See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 401 <i>seq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_189"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_190"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_191"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_192"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain Χήνοιν—Chenium. He seems -to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of this interesting -scene.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_193"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_194"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4-7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_195"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the existence, -in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous, such as Xenophon -describes. They point out the <i>Azalea Pontica</i>, as the flower from which -the bees imbibe this peculiar quality. Professor Koch, however, calls in -question the existence of any honey thus naturally unwholesome near the -Black Sea. He states (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful -inquiries he could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, -he thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale or -tainted.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_196"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23-27. -</p> -<p> -A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, (c. -41) attests how much these Hetæræ accompanying the soldiers (women for -the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander -himself among the rest. A Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus, -had got himself improperly put on a list of veterans and invalids, who -were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition -was detected, and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had -practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named Telesippa, -who was about to accompany the departing division. “I sympathize with -your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander); let us see whether we -cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by persuasion or by presents, since -she is of free condition, to stay behind” (Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας -ἔχεις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδήπερ -ἐξ ἐλευθέρας ἐστί).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_197"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a></span> Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_198"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a></span> Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_199"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_200"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_201"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a></span> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_202"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian force, when -mustered at Issus after the junction of those three hundred men who deserted -from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand nine hundred men. At the -review in Babylonia, three days before the battle of Kunaxa, there were -mustered, however, only twelve thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_203"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8. -</p> -<p> -Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ὁι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ -ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ -ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι -ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς -χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους -τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν -εἶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι. -</p> -<p> -This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more -authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. -s. 170). -</p> -<p> -In another oration, composed about fifty years after the Cyreian expedition, -Isokrates notices the large premiums which it had been formerly -necessary to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over -and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. -s. 112); as contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries -during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 <i>seq.</i>)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_204"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13. -</p> -<p> -Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible proof -how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and region of Phasis, -at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_205"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a></span> Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_206"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_207"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 327) and -many other authors, have naturally presumed from the analogy of name -that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38° 40′) corresponds to the -Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in his Periplus conceives to be identical -with what was afterwards called Pharnakia. -</p> -<p> -But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p. 281) and -by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250), that Kerasoun is -too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon having marched with the -army from the one place to the other in three days; or even in less than -ten days, in the judgment of Mr. Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton -places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond -(about long. 39° 20′, as it stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a -river now called the Kerasoun Dere Sú.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_208"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a></span> It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir obtained horses to -travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land. The aga of the place told him -that it was madness to think of travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for -him; but was at last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, -to have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach close to -the sea, and Mr. Kinneir “travelled the whole of the way along the shore -alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded bank. The hills at intervals -jutting out into the sea, form capes and numerous little bays along -the coast; but the nature of the country was still the same, that is to say, -studded with fine timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees” (Travels in -Asia Minor, p. 324). -</p> -<p> -Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the origin of -its name. -</p> -<p> -Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by Xenophon -(ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than consists with -the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes. -If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have -halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn Tausend. p. 115. 116).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_209"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_210"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_211"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_212"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_213"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_214"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_215"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_216"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_217"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29. -</p> -<p> -Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they ascribe -to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_218"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a></span> Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν -μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις -ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, -οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν. -</p> -<p> -Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr. Equit. -ix, 9. -</p> -<p> -“The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom -to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary comforts of life; -in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are enabled to inform ourselves by looking -at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting prophets who understand the -livers of sacrificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus -furnished so excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be -discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of self-conceit, -will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume itself to be -wiser, than the gods.” -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν</p> - <p>Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας</p> - <p>Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.</p> - <p>Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου</p> - <p>Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;</p> - <p>Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν</p> - <p>Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι</p> - <p>Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special revelations, -through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of these Sokratic thinkers) -an essential part of the divine government; indispensable to satisfy their -ideas of the benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific prediction -was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the phenomena of the future.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_219"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_220"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a></span> Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential preliminary to -any action of dubious result, and placed great faith in the indications which -the victims offered, as signs of the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless -had very little confidence in the professional prophets. He thought -them quite capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare Sophokles, -Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_221"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_222"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_223"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_224"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36. -</p> -<p> -I may here note that this <i>Phasis</i> in the Euxine means the town of that -name, not the river.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_225"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3. -</p> -<p> -Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾐσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν, -καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν. -</p> -<p> -The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is incontestable. -He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting -together, and exciting one another to action, without any formal summons. -</p> -<p> -The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in -Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p. 133 of this History) during -the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and the first invasion of Attica -by the Peloponnesians; when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight -of the walls of Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of -the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest -impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call an assembly, -for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And -what was much more remarkable—the people even in that state of excitement -though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal -assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which -the Cyreians would certainly have done, had they not been convened in a -regular assembly. -</p> -<p> -The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the extraordinary -empire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian -citizens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_226"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_227"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_228"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται, -θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ -πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε, -οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν -ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ -ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς -τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν -ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἔλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽ -ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος -ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ -ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_229"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_230"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_231"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35. -</p> -<p> -Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε -καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς -στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου. -</p> -<p> -In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter the eighth -is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to me not convenient for -comprehending the full sense. I think that the second ἔδοξε, as well as the -first, is connected with the words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to -be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same -sentence, without an intervening full stop.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_232"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_233"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ -τῶν πολεμίων παίοιτο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_234"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a></span> The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in battle, is as old -among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled pugilist of the Homeric -Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii -667). -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἆσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·</p> - <p>Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,</p> - <p>Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.</p> - <p><em class="gesperrt">Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,ττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι</em>; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν</p> - <p>Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_235"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_236"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a></span> See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon Perikles.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_237"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρέσβεις, -ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλάς, etc. -</p> -<p> -The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes sent were -probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and Kotyôra; just as the -Thracian princes used to receive fine woven and metallic fabrics from Abdêra -and the other Grecian colonies on their coast—ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεῖα, -καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, etc. (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably -proceeded the splendid “regia textilia” and abundance of gold and silver -vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with Perseus -the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_238"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 10-14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_239"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_240"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_241"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_242"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a></span> Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi, 4, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_243"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_244"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 1-5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_245"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 5-9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_246"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32; vi, 4, 11-15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_247"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12, 13. -</p> -<p> -Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι -προεστήκασιν· <em class="gesperrt">ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἶς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς -πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι</em>. Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς -Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς -πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι, ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι -δὲ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει—χαλεπὸν ἔσται -καὶ μένειν καὶ αποπλεῖν· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν -τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_248"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12-16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_249"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_250"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_251"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_252"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a></span> Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian general Lamachus, -in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, after he had lost his -triremes by a sudden rise of the water at the mouth of the river Kalex, in -the territory of Herakleia (Thucyd. iv, 75).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_253"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν -ναύαρχον, ἐδεῖτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ -ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι. -</p> -<p> -Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of -this promise.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_254"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_255"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγώ σοι -συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευσόμενον· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἔξω γένηται τὸ -στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_256"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_257"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_258"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_259"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_260"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_261"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_262"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a></span> Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32-35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_263"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a></span> So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurinna (governor of Placentia -for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army who marched out -to fight the Vitellian generals against his strenuous remonstrance—“Fit -<i>temeritatis alienæ comes</i> Spurinna, primo coactus, mox <i>velle simulans</i>, quo -plus auctoritatis inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret” (Tacitus, Hist. ii, -18).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_264"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_265"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34-40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_266"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_266">[266]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο -Ἀρίσταρχόν τε ἥκοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστὴν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον οὐκέτι -ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξιβίου μὲν ἠμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον δὲ διεπράττετο -τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_267"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25. -</p> -<p> -Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, <em class="gesperrt">κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ -καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα</em>, καὶ συνέχειν -τε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους -δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν -<em class="gesperrt">ὅτι τάχιστα</em>· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ -ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους <em class="gesperrt">ὡς τάχιστα</em> -Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα. -</p> -<p> -The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is marked -by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity is enjoined three -several times.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_268"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ -ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν -ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει, ἀλλὰ -καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. -Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_269"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16. -</p> -<p> -Ἥδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, -εἰ εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ, -παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς δ᾽ -εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο.... Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ -ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν ἀπιέναι σφᾶς -κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον ἐδόκει [εἶναι] -ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_270"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_271"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably the month -of December.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_272"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_273"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_274"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_275"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_276"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_277"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_278"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47. -</p> -<p> -The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the person to -whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to have been spoken.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_279"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_280"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a></span> It appears that the epithet <i>Meilichios</i> (the Gracious) is here applied to -Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the denomination <i>Eumenides</i> to the -avenging goddesses. Zeus is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being -in a disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this surname represents -a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement, expiation or purification, -destined to avert his displeasure; but the surname itself is to be -interpreted <i>proleptice</i>, to use the word of the critics—it designates, not the -actual disposition of Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which -the sacrifice is intended to bring about in him. -</p> -<p> -See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl. Alterthümer -der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus Festis, p. -5 (Utrecht, 1849).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_281"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_282"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα -συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ -γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ -οὕτω τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_283"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a></span> Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_284"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23. -</p> -<p> -Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ -Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, -ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν -εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_285"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must have been -first made on the present occasion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_286"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a></span> Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_287"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a></span> Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence of the -work.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_288"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a></span> See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus refers, I think -with much probability, to Xenophon himself. -</p> -<p> -The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1, 11-28) -about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in the Troad, seem -also to indicate that he was serving there in person.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_289"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a></span> That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed by the -Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears plainly from Anabasis, -v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August 394 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as to the -time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα -τῶν Περσῶν, <em class="gesperrt">σφίσιν εὔνουν ὄντα</em>, στρατείας μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ -τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not until 396 or 395 <small>B.C.</small>, -that the Persian king began to manifest the least symptoms of good-will -towards Athens; and not until the battle of Knidus (a little before the -battle of Korôneia in the same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous -and effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians -to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of the king -of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have taken place before -395 <small>B.C.</small>, and is not likely to have taken place until after 394 <small>B.C.</small>; which -is the intimation of Xenophon himself as above. -</p> -<p> -Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to be the main -truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed against Xenophon by the -Athenians on the ground of his attachment to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ -Λακωνισμῷ. -</p> -<p> -Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished because -he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter enemy of Athens. It -is true that Sokrates, when first consulted, was apprehensive beforehand that -this might bring upon him the displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). -But it is to be remembered that <i>at this time</i>, the king of Persia was just as -much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact had made -war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king. Artaxerxes and -Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of Athens, it was of little consequence -to the Athenians whether Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. -But when Artaxerxes, six years afterwards, became their friend, -their feelings towards his enemies were altered. -</p> -<p> -The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as asserting the -main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my judgment inaccurate. -Xenophon was banished <i>for Laconism</i>, or attachment to Sparta against his -country; the fact of his having served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes -counted at best only as a secondary motive.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_290"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἔστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν, -γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Αρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ -καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ -περίττου τόν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ -θεῷ μελήσει.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_291"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_292"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_292">[292]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν -ἄλφιτα ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_293"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_293">[293]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_294"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_294">[294]</a></span> Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests the reconquest -of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ -or show guides) that they permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination -before the Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point -I apprehend to be incorrect. -</p> -<p> -The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio Magistri -Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been restored to citizenship, -and had come again to take cognizance of politics at Athens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_295"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_295">[295]</a></span> Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664, ed. Reiska. -Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου -πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς -Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου. -</p> -<p> -Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573), respecting -the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against whom the oration -of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon himself, the Cyreian commander -and author. But this, I think, is chronologically all but impossible; -for Deinarchus was not born till 361 <small>B.C.</small>, and composed his first oration in -336 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly mentioned -several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which implies that the latter -was a relative of the person against whom the oration was directed. I -venture to set him down as grandson, on that evidence, combined with the -identity of name and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be -the son of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in -362 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration against -Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and character of Xenophon -the grandfather; see for analogy, the oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; -among others.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_296"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_296">[296]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and Isokrates, -Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 <i>seq.</i> -</p> -<p> -The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26) expresses -strenuously the like conviction, of the military feebleness and disorganization -of the Persian empire, not defensible without Grecian aid.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_297"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_297">[297]</a></span> Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽ ἐγκρατεῖς -δοκοῦντας εἶναι (<i>i. e.</i> the Greeks under Klearchus) διὰ τὴν Κύρου -<em class="gesperrt">προπέτειαν</em> ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_298"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_298">[298]</a></span> Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_299"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_299">[299]</a></span> See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the adventures of the -Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his soldiers before the battle of -Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_300"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_300">[300]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_301"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_301">[301]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_302"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_302">[302]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_303"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_303">[303]</a></span> These Councils of Ten, organized by Lysander, are sometimes called -<i>Dekarchies</i>—sometimes <i>Dekadarchies</i>. I use the former word by preference; -since the word <i>Dekadarch</i> is also employed by Xenophon in another and -very different sense—as meaning an officer who commands a <i>dekad</i>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_304"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_304">[304]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. -</p> -<p> -Καταλυών δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστὴν -ἑκάστῃ Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ -συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἑταιρειῶν. Καὶ ταῦτα πράττων <em class="gesperrt">ὁμοίως -ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι</em>, -παρέπλει σχολαίως τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῆς -Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii, -3, 10, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_305"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_305">[305]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς -σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς ἐδίδου -τοῖς Ἕλλησι δεῖγμα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, etc. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ὁμαλῶς ἁπασῶν -κατέλυε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστη δεκαδαρχίας· πολλῶν μὲν ἐν -ἑκάστῃ σφαττομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων, etc. -</p> -<p> -About the massacre at Thasus, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. -i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol. VIII, Ch. -lxv, p. 220 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_306"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_306">[306]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 10. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 151; Xen. -Hellen. iv, 8, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_307"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_307">[307]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τῶν ὀλίγων -τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρίζοντος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_308"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_308">[308]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13. -</p> -<p> -... ἔπεισαν Λύσανδρον φρουροὺς σφίσι ξυμπρᾶξαι ἐλθεῖν, ἕως δὴ -<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς πονηροὺς</em> ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν -πολιτείαν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_309"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_309">[309]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν τούτου (the harmost) -συμπέμποντος αὐτοῖς οὓς ἐβούλοντο συνελάμβανον οὐκέτι τοὺς πονηροὺς -καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη οὓς ἐνόμιζον ἥκιστα μὲν παρωθουμένους -ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀντιπράττειν δέ τι ἐπιχειροῦντας πλείστους τοὺς -συνεθέλοντας λαμβάνειν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_310"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_310">[310]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_311"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_311">[311]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_312"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_312">[312]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 24-32. Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δήπου πᾶσαι -μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν θανατήφοροι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_313"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_313">[313]</a></span> Isokrates Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 127-132 (c. 32). -</p> -<p> -He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic denunciation, -against the enormities of the dekarchies. He concludes by saying—Φυγὰς -δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς, -<em class="gesperrt">ἔτι δὲ παιδῶν ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας καὶ χρημάτων ἁρπαγὰς</em>, -τίς ἂν δύναιτο διεξελθεῖν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ᾽ ἁπάντων, ὅτι -τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν δεινὰ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τις ἑνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε, τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς -καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο. -</p> -<p> -See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 110; Orat. -viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58, 60, 106.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_314"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_314">[314]</a></span> We may infer that if Xenophon had heard anything of the sort respecting -Kritias, he would hardly have been averse to mention it; when we -read what he says (Memorab. i, 2, 29.) Compare a curious passage about -Kritias in Dion. Chrysostom. Or. xxi, p. 270.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_315"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_315">[315]</a></span> Plutarch Lysand. c. 19. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι -δημοτικῶν φόνος οὐκ ἀριθμητὸς, ἅτε δὴ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰδίας μόνον αἰτίας αὐτοῦ -κτείνοντος, ἀλλὰ πολλαῖς μὲν ἔχθραις, πολλαῖς δὲ πλεονεξίαις, τῶν -ἑκασταχόθι φίλων χαριζομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ συνεργοῦντος; also -Pausanias, vii, 10, 1; ix, 32, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_316"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_316">[316]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_317"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_317">[317]</a></span> See the speech of the Theban envoys at Athens, about eight years after -the surrender of Athens (Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 13). -</p> -<p> -... Οὐδὲ γὰρ φυγεῖν ἐξῆν (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_318"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_318">[318]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13. -</p> -<p> -τὸν μὲν Καλλίβιον ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ, ὡς πάντα ἐπαινοίῃ, ἃ πράττοιεν, -etc. (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). -</p> -<p> -The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young Athenian -of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratium, Autolykus,—having -been insulted by Kallibius, resented it, tripped him up, and threw him down. -Lysander, on being appealed to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius, -telling him that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty, -however, afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of courting Kallibius -(Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanius mentions Eteonikus (not Kallibius) -as the person who struck Autolykus; but he ascribes the same decision to -Lysander (ix, 32, 3).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_319"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_319">[319]</a></span> Plutarch, Amator. Narration, p. 773; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20. In -Diodorus (xv, 54) and Pausanias, (ix, 13, 2), the damsels thus outraged -are stated to have slain themselves. Compare another story in Xenoph. -Hellen. v, 4, 56, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_320"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_320">[320]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_321"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_321">[321]</a></span> This seems to have been the impression not merely of the enemies of -Sparta, but even of the Spartan authorities themselves. Compare two -remarkable passages of Thucydides, i, 77, and i, 95. Ἄμικτα γὰρ (says the -Athenian envoy at Sparta) τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, -καὶ προσέτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται, οὐθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει. -</p> -<p> -After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the Hellespont -(in 477 <small>B.C.</small>), the Lacedæmonians refuse to send out any successor, -φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ -ἐνεῖδον, etc. (i, 95.) -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_322"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_322">[322]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 69. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος -μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν -τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται. -</p> -<p> -To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys at -Sparta, c. 122-124—μὴ μέλλετε Ποτιδαιάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι -τιμωρίαν. ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_323"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_323">[323]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 139. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, Panegyr. c. 34, s. 140; Or. -v, (Philipp.) s. 121; Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_324"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_324">[324]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 72. Παρασκευὴ δὲ τόσηδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται -αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως. -</p> -<p> -Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the Platæan, after -the capture of the town by the Lacedæmonians (iii, 63).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_325"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_325">[325]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 8. ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων -μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν -Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. -</p> -<p> -See also iii, 13, 14—the speech of the envoys from the revolted Mitylênê, -to the Lacedæmonians. -</p> -<p> -The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as crossing -over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of “liberating Greece;” accordingly, -the Samian exiles remonstrate with him for killing his prisoners, -as in contradiction with that object (iii, 32)—ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς -τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_326"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_326">[326]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 85. Ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς -ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα -ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, <em class="gesperrt">Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες -τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_327"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_327">[327]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 85. Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει -δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη -τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι -αὐτονόμους.... Καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι προσθῶ -τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, <em class="gesperrt">πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. Οὐ γὰρ -συστασιάσων ἥκω</em>, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ, -<em class="gesperrt">τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς, τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις</em>, ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς -πᾶσι, δουλώσαιμι. <em class="gesperrt">Χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη</em>, -καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο, -ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· <em class="gesperrt">οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους -ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ -ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_328"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_328">[328]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 87. Οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ -<em class="gesperrt">κοινοῦ τινος αγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ -ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα</em>, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους -ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, <em class="gesperrt">εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες</em> ὑμᾶς τοὺς -ἐναντιουμένους περιΐδοιμεν. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 140, 141.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_329"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_329">[329]</a></span> Feelings of the Lacedæmonians during the winter immediately succeeding -the great Syracusan catastrophe (Thuc. viii. 2)—καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους -(the Athenians) αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_330"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_330">[330]</a></span> Compare Thucyd. viii, 43, 3; viii, 46, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_331"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_331">[331]</a></span> This is emphatically set forth in a fragment of Theopompus the historian, -preserved by Theodorus Metochita, and printed at the end of the -collection of the Fragments of Theopompus the historian, both by Wichers -and by M. Didot. Both these editors, however, insert it only as Fragmentum -Spurium, on the authority of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who -quotes the same sentiment from the comic writer Theopompus. But the -passage of Theodorus Metochita presents the express words Θεόπομπος -ὁ ἱστορικός. We have, therefore, his distinct affirmation against that of Plutarch; -and the question is, which of the two we are to believe. -</p> -<p> -Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum Spurium -as it stands at the end of the collections above referred to, he will see (I -think) that it belongs much more naturally to the historian than to the -comic writer. It is a strictly historical statement, illustrated by a telling, -though coarse, comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus -Metochita (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot). -</p> -<p> -Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικὸς ἀποσκώπτων εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴκαζεν αὐτοὺς -ταῖς φαύλαις καπηλίσιν, αἳ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐγχέουσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶνον ἡδύν -τε καὶ εὔχρηστον σοφιστικῶς ἐπὶ τῇ λήψει τοῦ ἀργυρίου, μεθύστερον φαυλόν -τινα καὶ ἐκτροπίαν καὶ ὀξίνην κατακρινῶσι καὶ παρέχονται· καὶ τοὺς -Λακεδαιμονίους τοίνυν ἔλεγε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείναις τρόπον, ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν -Ἀθηναίων πολέμῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡδίστῳ πόματι τῆς ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίας καὶ -προγράμματι καὶ κηρύγματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας δελεάσαντας, ὕστερον πικρότατα -σφίσιν ἐγχέαι καὶ ἀηδέστατα κράματα βιοτῆς ἐπωδύνου καὶ χρήσεως πραγμάτων -ἀλγεινῶν, πάνυ τοι κατατυραννοῦντας τὰς πόλεις δεκαρχίαις καὶ ἁρμοσταῖς -βαρυτάτοις, καὶ πραττομένους, ἃ δυσχερὲς εἶναι σφόδρα καὶ ἀνύποιστον -φέρειν, καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus, affirms him -to be silly (ἔοικε ληρεῖν) in saying that the Lacedæmonian empire began by -being sweet and pleasant, and afterwards was corrupted and turned into -bitterness and oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and -oppression from the very first. -</p> -<p> -Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see that -Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which Plutarch contradicts -as silly and untrue. -</p> -<p> -What Theopompus stated was, that the first Lacedæmonians, <i>during the -war against Athens</i>, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious draught and -<i>programme</i> and <i>proclamation</i> of freedom from the rule of Athens,—and that -they afterwards poured in the most bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard -oppression and tyranny, etc. -</p> -<p> -The sweet draught is asserted to consist—not, as Plutarch supposes, in -the first taste of the actual Lacedæmonian empire after the war, but—in -the seductive promises of freedom held out by them to the allies <i>during the -war</i>. Plutarch’s charge of ἔοικε ληρεῖν has thus no foundation. I have -written δελεάσαντας instead of δελεάσοντας which stands in Didot’s Fragment, -because it struck me that this correction was required to construe -the passage.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_332"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_332">[332]</a></span> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 145; Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 122; Diodor. -xiv, 10-44; xv, 23. Compare Herodot. v, 92; Thucyd. i, 18; Isokrates, -Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 144.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_333"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_333">[333]</a></span> Isokrates, Panathen. s. 61. Σπαρτιᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δέκα -μόλις ἐπεστάτησαν αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα συνεχῶς κατέσχομεν -τὴν ἀρχήν. I do not hold myself bound to make out the exactness of the chronology -of Isokrates. But here we may remark that his “hardly ten years” is a -term, though less than the truth by some months, if we may take the battle -of Ægospotami as the beginning, is very near the truth if we take the -surrender of Athens as the beginning, down to the battle of Knidus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_334"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_334">[334]</a></span> Pausanias, viii, 52, 2; ix, 6, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_335"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_335">[335]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 84; Isokrates, Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 121.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_336"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_336">[336]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2. -</p> -<p> -Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going to his -Asiatic command in 396 <small>B.C.</small>). His purpose was—ὅπως τὰς -δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας -δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν -καταστήσειε μετ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου. -</p> -<p> -It shows the careless construction of Xenophon’s Hellenica, or perhaps -his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of the Lacedæmonian -rule, that this is the first mention which he makes (and that too, indirectly) -of the dekarchies, nine years after they had been first set up by Lysander.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_337"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_337">[337]</a></span> Compare the two passages of Xenophon’s Hellenica, iii, 4, 7; iii, -5, 13. -</p> -<p> -Ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε δημοκρατίας -ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου. -</p> -<p> -But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from the -subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public assembly at -Athens, respecting the Spartans:— -</p> -<p> -Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὓς ὑμῶν ἀπέστησαν φανεροί εἰσιν ἐξηπατηκότες· ὑπό τε -γὰρ τῶν ἁρμοστῶν <em class="gesperrt">τυραννοῦνται</em>, καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς -Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει—where the decemvirs are noted as still subsisting, -in 395 <small>B.C.</small> See also Xen. Agesilaus, i, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_338"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_338">[338]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_339"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_339">[339]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες -πόλεις· (this was spoken at Kalpê in Bithynia) τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος -Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· <em class="gesperrt">ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος -Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_340"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_340">[340]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5. Πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις -ἐπείθοντο, ὅ,τι Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ ἐπιτάττοι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_341"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_341">[341]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 68-120.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_342"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_342">[342]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 9; iv, 59-85; vi, 76.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_343"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_343">[343]</a></span> See the remarkable speech of Phrynichus in Thucyd. viii, 48, 5, which -I have before referred to.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_344"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_344">[344]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Compare the analogous case of Thebes, after -the Lacedæmonians had got possession of the Kadmeia (v. 2, 34-36).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_345"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_345">[345]</a></span> Such is the justification offered by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately -before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 75, 76). And it is -borne out in the main by the narrative of Thucydides himself (i, 99).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_346"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_346">[346]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3. πάσης τὴς Ἑλλάδος προστάται, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_347"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_347">[347]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 28-30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_348"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_348">[348]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_349"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_349">[349]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21. -</p> -<p> -The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be reconciled -with the chronology which he adopts. He represents the recall of -Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all the facts which preceded -it, as having occurred prior to the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, -which event we know to have taken place in the summer of 403 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after the surrender -of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in triumph, in -the autumn of 404 <small>B.C.</small> (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He was at home, or serving -in Attica, in the beginning of 403 <small>B.C.</small> (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30). -</p> -<p> -Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 <small>B.C.</small>, it was his triumphant -return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of Pharnabazus. -Yet there can have been no other return before the restoration of the -democracy at Athens. -</p> -<p> -The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of this command, -but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems to me necessary, -in order to make room for the facts stated respecting Lysander as well as -about the dekarchies, that we should suppose him to have been again sent -out (after his quarrel with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 <small>B.C.</small>, to command -in Asia. This is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict -it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated about Lysander. -</p> -<p> -It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology as to -the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He places it in -401 <small>B.C.</small> (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its real date, which is 403 <small>B.C.</small>; -thus lengthening by two years the interval between the surrender of -Athens and the reëstablishment of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to -have conceived that interval as much longer than it really was.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_350"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_350">[350]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_351"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_351">[351]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_352"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_352">[352]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 5, 18-37, 56-58, 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_353"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_353">[353]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_354"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_354">[354]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_355"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_355">[355]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_356"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_356">[356]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19; ii, 4, 8; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3; iii, 3, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_357"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_357">[357]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_358"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_358">[358]</a></span> Diodor. <i>ut sup.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_359"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_359">[359]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_360"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_360">[360]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Diodor. xiv, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_361"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_361">[361]</a></span> There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my belief, as I have -stated at the close of the last chapter. It is certain that Xenophon was -serving under Agesilaus in Asia three years after this time; the only matter -left for conjecture is, at what precise moment he went out the second -time. The marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for -the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail with which -the military operations of Derkyllidas are described, rendering it probable -that the narrative is from an eye-witness.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_362"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_362">[362]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 500.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_363"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_363">[363]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. ἐστάθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_364"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_364">[364]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10; iii, 2, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_365"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_365">[365]</a></span> See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab. i, 9, 19, -21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of the entire empire -into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee responsible for payment of -the rent or tribute, to the government or to some higher officer of the government—is -the system prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to -the present day.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_366"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_366">[366]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύξασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ -χρήματα λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς -παλλακίσιν αὐτοῦ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις μάλιστα παρὰ -Φαρναβάζῳ, ἐπορεύετο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_367"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_367">[367]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_368"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_368">[368]</a></span> Herod. viii, 69.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_369"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_369">[369]</a></span> Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii, -1, 14)—Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς ὢν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων, ὡς -αἰσχρὸν εἴη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἰδιώτην εἶναι, <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς -μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει</em>, -ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν -ἀσπάζοιτο,—εἰσελθὼν ἀποπνῖξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται. -</p> -<p> -For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the Grecian despot -lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii, -10). He particularly dwells upon the multitude of family crimes which -stained the houses of the Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers, -wives, etc. (iii, 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_370"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_370">[370]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_371"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_371">[371]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38. -</p> -<p> -The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such -a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings -furnished by the sacrifice,—either for action or for inaction. I have -already noticed (in my preceding chapters) how often he does this in the -Anabasis. -</p> -<p> -Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_372"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_372">[372]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 20-23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_373"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_373">[373]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν; -Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη, -Φαρναβάζου; Μάλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμέτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν· -πολέμιος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρνάβαζος. -</p> -<p> -Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania, the -administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious treasure and a large -army in pay, is treated as <i>belonging</i> to Pharnabazus—as the servant or -slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The distinction here taken between public property -and private property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights -of the conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to -Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but <i>not</i> to that which had belonged to Meidias. -</p> -<p> -According to the modern rules of international law, this distinction is -one allowed and respected, everywhere except at sea. But in the ancient -world, it by no means stood out so clearly or prominently; and the observance -of it here deserves notice.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_374"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_374">[374]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28. -</p> -<p> -Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and Derkyllidas. -The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in which -Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that he was actually -present at the scene.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_375"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_375">[375]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα -ἐπιτετειχίσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκήσει Φρυγίᾳ. -</p> -<p> -The word ἐπιτειχίζειν is capital and significant, in Grecian warfare.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_376"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_376">[376]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_377"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_377">[377]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_378"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_378">[378]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7. -</p> -<p> -Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν Κυρείων -προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself. -</p> -<p> -<i>He</i> could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself had not -been with the army during the year of Thimbron.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_379"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_379">[379]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἔπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ <em class="gesperrt">Ἐφέσου</em> -διὰ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἔμελλον ὄψεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν -εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought here -to read ἐπ᾽ Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ᾽ Ἐφέσου; or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου. -</p> -<p> -It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between Derkyllidas -and the commissioners took place. The commissioners were to -be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian cities. -</p> -<p> -The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to the -foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from annoyance by -Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom or good condition. -There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of them, and dekarchies half -broken up or modified in many; see the subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, -4, 7; iv, 8, 1)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_380"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_380">[380]</a></span> Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_381"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_381">[381]</a></span> Herodot. vi, 36; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) -s. 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_382"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_382">[382]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10; iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_383"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_383">[383]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 65.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_384"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_384">[384]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_385"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_385">[385]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_386"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_386">[386]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18. -</p> -<p> -In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care on the part -of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most imposing soldiers around -him, when he went to his interview with Tissaphernes. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an indirect -compliment to the Cyreian army.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_387"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_387">[387]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19; Diodor. xiv, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_388"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_388">[388]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_389"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_389">[389]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin, v, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_390"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_390">[390]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_391"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_391">[391]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἄρκαδας -καὶ Ἀχαίους τί φῶμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban -envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ -<em class="gesperrt">μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων</em> (the Lacedæmonians), πάντων -καὶ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετεῖχον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔπραξαν -ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων -χρημάτων μεταδεδώκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἱλώτας ἁρμοστὰς -καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχησαν, -δεσπόται ἀναπεφῄνασιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_392"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_392">[392]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22. -</p> -<p> -Τούτων δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ Ἄγιδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διῒ κατὰ μαντείαν -τινὰ, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου, λέγοντες, -ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἴη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας -ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ· ὥστε ἄθυτος ἀπῆλθεν. -</p> -<p> -This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest Pan-hellenic -temples and establishments. Yet it was not constantly observed at Olympia -(compare another example—Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, -which was not less Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We -are therefore led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked -only when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_393"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_393">[393]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν πάντων ὀργιζομένοις, -ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, <em class="gesperrt">σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_394"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_394">[394]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears; which appears -very probable. It is not directly noticed by Xenophon, who however -mentions (see the passage cited in the note of page preceding) the general -assessment levied by Sparta upon all her Peloponnesian allies during the -war.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_395"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_395">[395]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 17. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not King Agis, -as the acting person. -</p> -<p> -Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a negative answer -to the requisition of Sparta, added that they would enfranchise their Periœki, -when they saw Sparta enfranchise her own. This answer appears to -me highly improbable, under the existing circumstances of Sparta and her -relations to the other Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between -Sparta and her Periœki was a novelty, even in 371 <small>B.C.</small>, at the congress -which preceded the battle of Leuktra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_396"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_396">[396]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_397"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_397">[397]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5. -</p> -<p> -The words of Xenophon are not very clear—Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ -Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς -ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι᾽ αὐτῶν προσχωρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, -ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους -τέ τινας κτείνουσι, καὶ ὅμοιόν τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες, -τῷ τοῦ δήμου προστάτῃ, ᾤοντο Θρασυδαῖον ἀπεκτονέναι.... Ὁ δὲ -Θρασυδαῖος ἔτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὗπερ ἐμεθύσθη. -</p> -<p> -Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems as if a -sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the mention of -the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before been told of any -circumstance either leading to or implying this condition.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_398"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_398">[398]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_399"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_399">[399]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in Xenophon’s -description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered. -First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus, both of which nevertheless -had joined Agis on his invasion, and were the most important places in -Triphylia (iii, 2, 25). Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis, -as Triphylian; which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are -elsewhere distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the -words in his text, καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι, must be taken to mean -Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other places which we do not -know; but that a καὶ after ἀφεῖναι, has fallen out of the text, and that the -cities, whose names follow, are to be taken as <i>not</i> Triphylian. Phrixa and -Epitalium were both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were -not on the borders of Triphylia,—and it seems doubtful whether they were -properly Triphylian.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_400"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_400">[400]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2. -</p> -<p> -This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different years; it -began in the first, occupied the whole of the second, and was finished in -the third. Which years these three were (out of the seven which separate -<small>B.C.</small> 403-396), critics have not been unanimous. -</p> -<p> -Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of the -war in 402 <small>B.C.</small>, I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in 401 <small>B.C.</small> (Fasti -Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur -Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who places it in 398 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -According to Mr. Clinton’s view, the principal year of the war would -have been 400 <small>B.C.</small>, the year of the Olympic festival. But surely, had such -been the fact, the coincidence of war in the country with the Olympic festival, -must have raised so many complications, and acted so powerfully on -the sentiments of all parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, -the war was brought to a close in the early part of 400 <small>B.C.</small>, before -the time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were anxious, -on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the festival did arrive. -</p> -<p> -Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date assigned by -Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the date which Diodorus -gives for the death of Agis, and with that which Plutarch states about the -duration of the reign of Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he -himself (Sievers) prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. -iii, 2, 21. Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι -κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἠλείοις, etc. -</p> -<p> -This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the present case -it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to date. The whole third -Book down to these very words, has been occupied entirely with the course -of Asiatic affairs. Not a single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, -since the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command -of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic exploits, -and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it comprehended the -whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole Eleian war into one year -and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I think, than that which is implied in -the statements of Xenophon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_401"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_401">[401]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_402"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_402">[402]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iv, 26, 2. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_403"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_403">[403]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6. -</p> -<p> -Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the introduction -of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the name of one of -the ephors as taking the lead in it. -</p> -<p> -There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too among -high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and silver as a cause -of mischief and corruption, and of which the stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3) -is an echo:— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm</p> - <p>Cum terra celat, spernere fortior</p> - <p class="i1">Quam cogere humanos in usus,</p> - <p class="i2">Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.</p> - </div> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_404"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_404">[404]</a></span> Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23. -</p> -<p> -Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοὐνάντιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ -πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_405"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_405">[405]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων) -ἐλλείπομεν, καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν, οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_406"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_406">[406]</a></span> Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ -τὰ κοινὰ κρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεώς -ἐστιν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσί -τε κακῶς, etc. -</p> -<p> -Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c. 39, p. 122 E. -about the great quantity of gold and silver then at Sparta. The dialogue -must bear date at some period between 400-371 <small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_407"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_407">[407]</a></span> See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King Archidamus -at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70-84; compare also viii, 24-96).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_408"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_408">[408]</a></span> See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 <small>B.C.</small> and 372 <small>B.C.</small> (Xenoph. -Hellen. iii, 5, 11-15; vi, 3, 8-11).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_409"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_409">[409]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 77. Ἄμικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς -νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the -Spartans—see the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i, 138.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_410"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_410">[410]</a></span> Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_411"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_411">[411]</a></span> Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_412"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_412">[412]</a></span> Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_413"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_413">[413]</a></span> Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14. -</p> -<p> -Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἱρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ μέτρια -ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἁρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ -κολακευομένους διαφθείρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα αὐτοὺς -φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς καὶ -καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν τούτου -ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένας, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν, ὅπως μὴ -ῥᾳδιουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίμπλαιντο· νῦν δ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι -τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπουδακότας ὡς μηδεπότε παύωνται -ἁρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως ἄξιοι εἶεν -ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως -ἄξιοι τούτου ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρότερον μὲν ἰόντες εἰς -Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν -δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ τὸ διακωλύειν ἄρξαι πάλιν -αὐτούς</em>. Οὐδὲν μέντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν τούτων τῶν ἐπιψόγων αὐτοῖς -γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροί εἰσιν οὔτε τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὔτε τοῖς -Λυκούργου νόμοις. -</p> -<p> -The expression, “taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians from -again exercising empire,”—marks this treatise as probably composed some -time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and their land-defeat at Leuktra. -The former put an end to their maritime empire,—the latter excluded -them from all possibility of recovering it; but during the interval between -the two, such recovery was by no means impossible.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_414"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_414">[414]</a></span> The Athenian envoy at Melos says,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς -μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς δὲ -τοὺς ἀλλους—ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ -ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment almost exactly the -same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_415"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_415">[415]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 84. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ -ἐπιτηδεύματα—ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς -ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_416"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_416">[416]</a></span> Σπάρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum, c. 1).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_417"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_417">[417]</a></span> See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about the function of -admiral among the Lacedæmonians,—ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι -στρατηγοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδόν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκε. -</p> -<p> -This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed from -some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in all probability -have been founded upon the case of Lysander; for never after Lysander, -was there any Lacedæmonian admiral enjoying a power which could by -possibility be termed exorbitant or dangerous. We know that during the -later years of the Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian -practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4). -</p> -<p> -The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these criticisms, -for in the year 395 <small>B.C.</small> (the year before the battle of Knidus) they conferred -upon King Agesilaus, who was then commanding the land army in Asia -Minor, the command of the fleet also—in order to secure unity of operations. -This had never been done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_418"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_418">[418]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply a member -of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called themselves Herakleids. -Some affirmed that Lysander wished to cause the kings to be elected out -of all the Spartans, not simply out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_419"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_419">[419]</a></span> Duris ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 696.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_420"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_420">[420]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_421"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_421">[421]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_422"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_422">[422]</a></span> Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes of Lysander as -going πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας· οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν. -The Spartan kingship is here regarded as ἀρχή τις—one office -of state, among others. But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended -to destroy the kingship—καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν—which does not appear -to have been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship, -but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to place the -Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as that on which the -office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage stood; who were not hereditary, -nor confined to members of the same family or Gens, but chosen out of the -principal families or Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the βασιλεῖς at -Sparta with those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in -favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan hereditary -transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_423"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_423">[423]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_424"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_424">[424]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_425"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_425">[425]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi, 66; -Thucyd. v, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_426"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_426">[426]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_427"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_427">[427]</a></span> Tacit. Histor. i, 10. “Cui expeditius fuerit tradere imperium, quam -obtinere.” -</p> -<p> -The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for himself a -way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient testimony,—that of -Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words φασί τινες in Aristotle may allude, -where he mentions this conspiracy as having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). -But Plutarch, as well as K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, -erroneously represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to after -Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia; which is certainly -impossible, since Lysander accompanied Agesilaus out, in the spring -of 396 <small>B.C.</small>—did not return to Greece until the spring of 395 <small>B.C.</small>—and -was then employed, with an interval not greater than four or five months, -on that expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain. -</p> -<p> -The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have -taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403 <small>B.C.</small> -and 399 <small>B.C.</small> The humiliation which he received in 396 <small>B.C.</small> from Agesilaus -might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind the renewal of his -former plans; but he can have had no time to do anything towards them. -Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes to the humiliation of Lysander by the -kings as an example of incidents <i>tending</i> to raise disturbance in an aristocratical -government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner -in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 <small>B.C.</small>—which proceeding -is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to their jealousy of -Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to the treatment of Lysander -by Agesilaus in 396 <small>B.C.</small> The mission of Lysander to the despot Dionysius -at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) must also have taken place prior -to the death of Agis in 399 <small>B.C.</small>; whether before or after the failure of the -stratagem at Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_428"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_428">[428]</a></span> The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the date of the -presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 <small>B.C.</small> The mere rumor, true or -false, that this young man was the son of Alkibiades, may be held sufficient -as chronological evidence to certify his age.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_429"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_429">[429]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_430"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_430">[430]</a></span> Herodot. v, 66.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_431"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_431">[431]</a></span> I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in his Agesilaus, -i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself -says (ii, 28), and it seems well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of -above 80 (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360 -<small>B.C.</small></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_432"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_432">[432]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. -Laconic. p. 212 D.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_433"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_433">[433]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1. -</p> -<p> -It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman, and -that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on that especial -ground, for marrying her.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_434"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_434">[434]</a></span> Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_435"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_435">[435]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_436"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_436">[436]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_437"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_437">[437]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_438"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_438">[438]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; -Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_439"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_439">[439]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk imputed to -Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_440"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_440">[440]</a></span> Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ Ἀρκεσίλεω -ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖοι <em class="gesperrt">πρὸς -τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν</em> ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς, ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα -τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_441"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_441">[441]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias, iii, 8, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_442"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_442">[442]</a></span> Diodor. xi, 50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_443"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_443">[443]</a></span> Herodot. vii, 143.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_444"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_444">[444]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο κελεύειν -φυλάξασθαι, <em class="gesperrt">μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ</em>, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ -γένους βασιλεύσῃ. -</p> -<p> -Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine displeasure, -and therefore a disqualification from the throne, as in the case of Battus -of Kyrênê above noticed. But the words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general -enough to cover both the cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. -It is upon this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god -did not mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_445"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_445">[445]</a></span> Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; -Justin, vi, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_446"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_446">[446]</a></span></p> -<div class="poetry-container" style="margin-top: -2em;"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ</p> - <p>Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν</p> - <p>Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,</p> - <p>Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822) proclaiming -their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in the tunic of Nessus, -which has just been announced as about to happen.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_447"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_447">[447]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 1. -Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος, -οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν -ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος. -Again, ib. c. 2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_448"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_448">[448]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_449"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_449">[449]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_450"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_450">[450]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_451"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_451">[451]</a></span> Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3, 13-23; -Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D. -</p> -<p> -See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. -609.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_452"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_452">[452]</a></span> Isokrates (Orat. v, <i>ut sup.</i>) makes a remark in substance the same.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_453"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_453">[453]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_454"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_454">[454]</a></span> See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_455"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_455">[455]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος -καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων. -</p> -<p> -The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon; it sometimes, -as here, is used to signify the privileged Peers—again De Repub. -Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14. Sometimes again it is used agreeably -to the Lykurgean theory; whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged -his duty in the public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7). -</p> -<p> -There was a variance between the theory and the practice.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_456"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_456">[456]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη -ὁ Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν -(Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_457"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_457">[457]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι—was -the declaration of Kinadon when seized and questioned by the ephors concerning -his purposes. Substantially it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, -2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου -συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_458"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_458">[458]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_459"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_459">[459]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν συνειδέναι -καὶ εἵλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου -γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν -τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν <em class="gesperrt">καὶ ὠμῶν ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν</em>. -</p> -<p> -The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad. iv, 35). -The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain the full expression -of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis wishes, “that he may one day -come to drink the blood of those who had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_460"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_460">[460]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_461"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_461">[461]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, -ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἐῴκει τοὺς -ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_462"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_462">[462]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10. -</p> -<p> -The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were a -select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either on home -police or on foreign service. -</p> -<p> -See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. Müller, History of the -Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_463"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_463">[463]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. -</p> -<p> -Ἔμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας <em class="gesperrt">πυθόμενοι -αὐτοῦ γράψαντες ἀποπέμπειν</em> τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις. Οὕτω δ᾽ εἶχον οἱ -ἔφοροι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μορὰν ἱππέων ἔπεμψαν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ Αὐλῶνος. Ἐπεὶ -δ᾽ εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, <em class="gesperrt">φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων -ἀπέγραψε</em>, παραχρῆμα τόν τε μάντιν Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους -ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ᾽ ἀνήχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὡμολόγει πάντα, -καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε</em>, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο, τί καὶ βουλόμενος -ταῦτα πράττοι; -</p> -<p> -Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction, expressly mentions -that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied Kinadon, put him to the torture -(στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized him, in order to extort the names of -his accomplices. Even without express testimony, we might pretty confidently -have assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were -not likely to obtain such betrayal without torture. -</p> -<p> -I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given by Xenophon, -it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write or not. My -assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his Reply to my Appendix), -who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων <em class="gesperrt">ἀπέγραψε</em>, as containing -an affirmation from Xenophon that Kinadon could write. -</p> -<p> -In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what precedes, -and with the probabilities of the fact described, do not contain such an affirmation. -</p> -<p> -The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after <i>having heard from -Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names down and send them to the -ephors</i>. It is to be presumed that they executed these instructions as given; -the more so, as what they were commanded to do, was at once the safest -and the most natural proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished -for personal <i>stature and courage</i> (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, iii, 3, 5) -so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable precaution to -pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could write,—yet, if he -were to write, he must have his right arm free. And why should the guards -take this risk, when all which the ephors required was, that Kinadon should -<i>pronounce</i> the names, to be written down by others? With a man of the -qualities of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to force -him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would probably be -more difficult still, to force him to betray them by the more deliberate act -of writing. -</p> -<p> -I conceive that ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε is -to be construed with reference to the preceding sentence, and announces -the carrying into effect of the instructions then reported as given by the -ephors. “A guard came, bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had -given in.” It is not necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down -these names with his own hand. -</p> -<p> -In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis), Pythonikus -gives information of a mock celebration of the mysteries, committed -by Alkibiades and others; citing as his witness the slave Andromachus; -who is accordingly produced, and states to the assembly <i>vivâ voce</i> what he -had seen and who were the persons present—Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus) -ταῦτα εμήνυσε, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">ἀπέγραψε τούτους</em> (s. 13). It is not here -meant to affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these -persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the assembly. -It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator describes the public -oral announcement made by Andromachus, which was formally taken -note of by a secretary, and which led to legal consequences against the -persons whose names were given in. -</p> -<p> -So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p. 1068), -Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιοῦντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα; and -in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἃ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ -ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι: compare also Lysias, De Bonis -Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was -required to perform his process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. -A citizen who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He -<i>informed against</i> a certain person as delinquent; he <i>informed of</i> certain articles -of property, as belonging to the estate of one whose property had been -confiscated to the city. The information, as well as the name of the informer, -was taken down by the official person,—whether the informer -could himself write or not. -</p> -<p> -It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated, <i>told</i> to the -guards who first seized him, the names of his accomplices,—just as he -<i>told</i> these names afterwards to the ephors (καὶ τοῦς ξυνειδότας <em class="gesperrt">ἔλεγε</em>); -and this, whether he was, or was not, able to write; a point, which the -passage of Xenophon noway determines.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_464"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_464">[464]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_465"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_465">[465]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_466"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_466">[466]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_467"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_467">[467]</a></span> See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artax. c. 21. -</p> -<p> -We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness; but the -general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very probable. Another Grecian -surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned as concerned,—Polykritus of -Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named Zeno,—both established at the Persian -court. -</p> -<p> -There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which is so -much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in which he was himself -concerned, and seemingly giving original letters.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_468"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_468">[468]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39-79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_469"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_469">[469]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_470"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_470">[470]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_471"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_471">[471]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν βασιλέα, etc. -Compare iv, 2, 3. -</p> -<p> -Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα -στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_472"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_472">[472]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_473"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_473">[473]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_474"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_474">[474]</a></span> Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_475"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_475">[475]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_476"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_476">[476]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10. -</p> -<p> -The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage. The -former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when Agesilaus -first arrived.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_477"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_477">[477]</a></span> Pausan. vi, 3, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_478"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_478">[478]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been adhered to -afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander in 403 <small>B.C.</small> It is -possible, indeed, that he may have been again sent out as nominal secretary -to some other person named as commander.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_479"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_479">[479]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_480"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_480">[480]</a></span> The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus, calling -Lysander “my meat-distributor” (κρεοδαίτην), are not warranted by Xenophon, -and seem not to be probable under the circumstances (Plutarch, -Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_481"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_481">[481]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8; Plutarch, Lysand. -c. 23. -</p> -<p> -It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special Panegyric -called <i>Agesilaus</i>, not a word is said about this highly characteristic -proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander at Ephesus; nor indeed is the -name of Lysander once mentioned.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_482"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_482">[482]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_483"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_483">[483]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14; Plutarch, Agesil. -c. 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_484"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_484">[484]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ -μέντοι οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ -τὴν Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9. -</p> -<p> -These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in the -early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_485"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_485">[485]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. -Præcept. p 809, B. See above, <a href="#Chap_72">Chapter lxxii</a>, of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_486"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_486">[486]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_487"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_487">[487]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_488"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_488">[488]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν -ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους. -</p> -<p> -So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the commander -of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 30).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_489"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_489">[489]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς στρατιώταις -<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας -φυλάσσειν</em>. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, <em class="gesperrt">εἰ αἴσθοιτο -καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν -μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)</em> ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως -συγκομίζοιτό ποι· τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις -προσέταττεν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων, -διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ -ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο. -</p> -<p> -Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for exportation,—πωλεῦσι -τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare Philostratus, -Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol. III, p. 216 of this -History. -</p> -<p> -Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the “<i>Mitylenæus -mango</i>” in Martial,—“Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis ephebus” Martial, -vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale the trade of purchasing -boys, looking out for such as were handsome, to supply the great demand -in the East for eunuchs, who were supposed to make better and more attached -servants. Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος ἐπαμμένους, -ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι -βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων. -Boys were necessary, as the operation -was performed in childhood or youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: -compare iii, 48). The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary -tribute, had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας -ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the preference of -the Persians both for the persons and the services of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio -Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph. Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus -(Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed that the Persians had derived both the -persons so employed, and the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians. -</p> -<p> -When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the Kalmucks, -little children of two or three vears of age, were often tendered to -him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_490"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_490">[490]</a></span> Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ -παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς -αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic, -v, 3, p. 452, D.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_491"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_491">[491]</a></span> Herodot. v, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_492"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_492">[492]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν -τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι, -τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν -οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, <em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι</em>, μαλακοὺς -δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν -τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι. -</p> -<p> -Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ -ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9). -</p> -<p> -Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the part of -Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo -Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus Pœnos suscepto, cum multos -cepisset, infirmissimum quemque præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi -erant, nudatum in conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_493"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_493">[493]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what is related -about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_494"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_494">[494]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_495"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_495">[495]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his description -is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon, which is better authority. -Among other points of difference, Diodorus affirms that the Persians had -fifty thousand infantry; and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number -of Persian infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got -together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon expressly -states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and took no part -in the battle.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_496"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_496">[496]</a></span> Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_497"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_497">[497]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_498"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_498">[498]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_499"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_499">[499]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 18, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_500"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_500">[500]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους ἀνοχάς.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_501"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_501">[501]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_502"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_502">[502]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_503"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_503">[503]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων -στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο μετὰ -τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν. -</p> -<p> -Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_504"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_504">[504]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian king <i>Hercynion</i>. -</p> -<p> -It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships coming -from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont. Dionysodor -p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_505"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_505">[505]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_506"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_506">[506]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_507"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_507">[507]</a></span> The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus -(Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a profligate -and extravagant person, is more probably an officer who served under Dionysius -in Sicily and Italy, about forty years after the revolt of Rhodes. -The difference of time appears so great, that we must probably suppose -two different men bearing the same name.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_508"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_508">[508]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19. -</p> -<p> -Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part of the Syracusan -assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius (Diodor. xi, 92).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_509"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_509">[509]</a></span> Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_510"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_510">[510]</a></span> Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_511"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_511">[511]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_512"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_512">[512]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15. -</p> -<p> -The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a curious -and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation with Otys took -place in the presence of the thirty Spartan counsellors, and probably in -the presence of Xenophon himself. -</p> -<p> -The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates, is -marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly brought out -in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. -</p> -<p> -In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before) along the -southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince named Korylas is -mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8). Whether there was more than -one Paphlagonian prince—or whether Otys was successor of Korylas—we -cannot tell.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_513"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_513">[513]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_514"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_514">[514]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_515"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_515">[515]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. -</p> -<p> -Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night, the scene -which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between Agesilaus and Megabazus -cannot have occurred on the departure of the latter, but must belong -to some other occasion; as, indeed, it seems to be represented by Xenophon -(Agesil. v, 4).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_516"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_516">[516]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ, -τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πολεμήσω ὑμῖν -ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα. -</p> -<p> -Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_517"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_517">[517]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14; Xen. Agesil. -iii, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_518"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_518">[518]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν -δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_519"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_519">[519]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_520"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_520">[520]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 14, 15; -Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_521"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_521">[521]</a></span> Compare Diodor. xv, 41 <i>ad fin.</i>; and Thucyd. viii, 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_522"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_522">[522]</a></span> Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to “many embassies” as having -been sent by Athens to the king of Persia, to protest against the Lacedæmonian -dominion. But this mission of Konon is the only one which -we can verify, prior to the battle of Knidus. -</p> -<p> -Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and trierarch -of Athens, must have been one of the companions of Konon in this -mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias as having received from -the Great King a present of a golden drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do -not know on what other occasion he can have received it, except in this -embassy (Lysias, Or. xix, De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_523"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_523">[523]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_524"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_524">[524]</a></span> The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the battle of -Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may gather them generally -from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. -c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63, ed. Bähr. -</p> -<p> -Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix, (Euagor.) s. 77) -speaks loosely as to the duration of time that the Persian fleet remained -blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before Konon obtained his final and -vigorous orders from Artaxerxes, unless we are to understand his <i>three -years</i> as referring to the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, -brought to Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even -then the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον for all -this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for exaggeration, however, -Isokrates coincides generally with the authorities above noticed. -</p> -<p> -It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this time permission -to quit the court of Persia and come back to Greece. Perhaps he -may have been induced (like Demokêdes of Kroton, one hundred and -twenty years before) to promote the views of Konon in order to get for -himself this permission. -</p> -<p> -In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63) mention is -made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up to the Persian -court, and were watched or detained on the way. This mission can hardly -have taken place before the battle of Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the -full tide of success, and contemplating the largest plans of aggression -against Persia. It must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_525"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_525">[525]</a></span> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ -<em class="gesperrt">αὑτόν τε παρασχόντος</em>, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην -παρασκευάσαντος. Compare s. -83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_526"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_526">[526]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου. -</p> -<p> -It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word <i>Chersonesus</i> here (and in -xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace commonly known by that -name, forming the European side of the Hellespont,—but the peninsula -on which Knidus is situated.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_527"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_527">[527]</a></span> Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον ὀνομαζόμενον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_528"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_528">[528]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον, -ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. -Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">πολὺ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν -φανεισῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος Ἑλληνικοῦ</em>, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_529"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_529">[529]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. -4; Justin, vi, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_530"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_530">[530]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 52.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_531"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_531">[531]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_532"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_532">[532]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_533"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_533">[533]</a></span> Diodorus, <i>ut sup.</i>; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς -Τραχινίους φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_534"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_534">[534]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς -τὴν Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει -πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν -ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. -</p> -<p> -Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but only -on a certain condition, in case he should find that such condition could be -realized; that is, if by giving it he could procure from various leading -Greeks sufficient assurances and guarantees that they would raise war -against Sparta. As this was a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is -ordered to <i>try to give the money for this purpose</i>. Though the construction -of πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more properly -belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be accomplished.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_535"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_535">[535]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_536"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_536">[536]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_537"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_537">[537]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_538"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_538">[538]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι -τὰ χρήματα ἐς τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· -ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας -πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_539"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_539">[539]</a></span> Xenophon, <i>ut sup.</i> -</p> -<p> -Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received part of the -money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c. 15). -</p> -<p> -Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the presents -of Timokrates.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_540"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_540">[540]</a></span> Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_541"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_541">[541]</a></span> Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) follows -him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about a war with Sparta, -and knowing that Sparta would not begin it, purposely incited the Lokrians -to encroach upon this disputed border, in order that the Phokians might -resent it, and that thus a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation -in rejecting this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon’s -philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that the fight -between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that between the Phokians -and Thebans, arose without any design on the part of the latter to provoke -Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in reference to the war between the Phokians -and the Thebans; for about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81). -</p> -<p> -The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show that the -Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but eager in regard to will, -to go to war with the Thebans; while the latter were not at all ready to go -to war with Sparta. They had not a single ally; for their application to -Athens, in itself doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared -war against them.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_542"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_542">[542]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι <em class="gesperrt">ἄσμενοι -ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι</em> αὐτοῖς, -τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ, καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν -Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι -μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον -οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς -τὴν Ἀσίαν συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν -στρατιὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ -καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον -πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1, 34. -</p> -<p> -The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the past dealing -and established sentiment between Sparta and Thebes,—refutes his allegation, -that it was the bribes brought by Timokrates to the leading Thebans -which first blew up the hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that -Sparta did not need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish -her with a pretext for going to war.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_543"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_543">[543]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_544"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_544">[544]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_545"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_545">[545]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. -</p> -<p> -The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute the assertion -of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of Timokrates.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_546"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_546">[546]</a></span> Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_547"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_547">[547]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9. -</p> -<p> -Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως -ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς -ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς ὑμῖν -σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, -ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_548"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_548">[548]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_549"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_549">[549]</a></span> Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7, p. 44. Compare -also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_550"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_550">[550]</a></span> -Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ -μὲν ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_551"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_551">[551]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. <i>ut sup.</i></p> -<p>Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the Spartans -to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes, but to submit their -complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems to me improbable. Diodorus -(xiv, 81) briefly states the general fact in conformity with Xenophon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_552"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_552">[552]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_553"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_553">[553]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_554"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_554">[554]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28, 29; Pausan. iii, -5, 4. -</p> -<p> -The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose account, -however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the preference.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_555"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_555">[555]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τούς -τε Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἑκάστους, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_556"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_556">[556]</a></span> Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_557"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_557">[557]</a></span> Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the service of the -Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were commanded by Orthobulus, -was judged to be extremely safe and easy; while that of the hoplites -was dangerous (Lysias, Orat. xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_558"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_558">[558]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ -ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοιντο, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_559"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_559">[559]</a></span> See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of giving up the -slain at the solicitation of the conquered Athenians for burial) after the -battle of Delium, and the discussion thereupon,—in this History, Vol. VI, -ch. liii, p. 393 <i>seq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_560"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_560">[560]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῦτα ἤκουσαν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_561"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_561">[561]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_562"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_562">[562]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_563"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_563">[563]</a></span> The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal namesake in -avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians were in his rear, and the -Thebans in his front; and that he was afraid of being assailed on both sides -at once, like Leonidas at Thermopylæ and like the troops enclosed in -Sphakteria (Paus. iii, 5, 5). -</p> -<p> -But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests, is contradicted by -Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had actually joined the Thebans, -and were in the same ranks—ἐλθόντες ξυμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_564"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_564">[564]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων -λαβὼν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_565"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_565">[565]</a></span> Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_566"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_566">[566]</a></span> Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_567"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_567">[567]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_568"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_568">[568]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. Ὁ δ᾽ (Ismenias) ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν -πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ -κακοπράγμων εἶναι. -</p> -<p> -It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions in Plato, except -that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B; -Republ. i. p. 336 A.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_569"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_569">[569]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_570"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_570">[570]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 38-82.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_571"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_571">[571]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_572"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_572">[572]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 82.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_573"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_573">[573]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six thousand as if -it were of Lacedæmonians <i>alone</i>. But if we follow his narrative, we shall -see that there were unquestionably in the army troops of Tegea, Mantineia, -and the Achæan towns (probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present -in the battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant -to include <i>these</i> allies in the total of six thousand, along with the Lacedæmonians,—which -is doubtless a large total for Lacedæmonians alone? -Unless this supposition be admitted, there is no resource except to assume -an omission, either of Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission -in fact Gail and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right; -for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be prodigiously -unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that the Lacedæmonian -victory was gained in spite of great inferiority of number, and something -which even implies that it must have been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13),—though -he is always disposed to compliment Sparta wherever he can.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_574"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_574">[574]</a></span> From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15), we may suspect -that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians were not very well -affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of excuse ascribed to the Mantineians -(v, 2, 2).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_575"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_575">[575]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand foot and five -hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but without enumerating items. -On the side of the confederacy he states a total of more than fifteen -thousand foot and five hundred horse (c. 82).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_576"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_576">[576]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων, -πλέον ἦν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v, Κυνόφαλοι; Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theognidem, -p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_577"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_577">[577]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says of the -Thebans—<em class="gesperrt">ἀμελήσαντες</em> τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν -φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the resolution previously -taken.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_578"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_578">[578]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_579"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_579">[579]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15. -</p> -<p> -In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι <em class="gesperrt">ἐλθόντες</em> κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, -ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I apprehend that ἀπελθόντες -(which is sanctioned by four MSS., and preferred by Leunclavius) is the -proper reading, in place of <em class="gesperrt">ἐλθόντες</em>. For it seems certain that the -march of the confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought -very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops sought shelter -within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers were so close upon them, -that the Corinthians within were afraid to keep open the gates. Hence we -must reject the statement of Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the -banks of the river Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous. -</p> -<p> -There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description which Xenophon -gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ -δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες καὶ Μαντινέας, <em class="gesperrt">ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον</em>. -These last three words are not satisfactorily explained. -Weiske and Schneider construe τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating -the region lying immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of -Corinth and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf -on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would not be -correct to say, that “the Lacedæmonians had gone out by the bimarine -way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they had gone out into the bimarine -road or region,—which meaning however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν -<em class="gesperrt">εἰς</em> τὴν ἀμφίαλον. Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders -τὴν ἀμφίαλον—<i>viam ad mare</i>—which seems an extraordinary sense of -the word, unless instances were produced to support it; and even if instances -were produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon -should be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the -road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos. -</p> -<p> -Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or district -called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But it is certain from -the map, that when the confederates were at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians -at Sikyon,—the former must have been exactly placed so as to intercept -the junction of the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê, -with the Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians -were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region which -lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line pointing from Sikyon -down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached the other side of these mountains -near the sea, they would be in communication with Epidaurus and the -other towns of the Argolic peninsula. -</p> -<p> -The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally take from -Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, etc., is -described two years afterwards in the case of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_580"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_580">[580]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts upon this -step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly the case throughout -his history. He says that “they were in no hurry to fight” (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον -τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so long as they were on the left, opposed to the -Lacedæmonians on the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the -right (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith gave -the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had any greater privilege -on the day when they were on the right, than the Argeians or Athenians -had when each were on the right respectively. The command had -been determined to reside in the right division, which post alternated from -one to the other; why the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this -post to order the attack, we cannot explain. -</p> -<p> -So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by the -Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the Thebans -made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his own account, that -no mischievous consequences turned upon this greater depth.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_581"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_581">[581]</a></span> See the instructive description of the battle of Mantineia—in Thucyd. -v, 71.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_582"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_582">[582]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23. -</p> -<p> -The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c. 13, p. -472) is interesting, though indistinct.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_583"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_583">[583]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον—which illustrates -the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων -ἰσχυρῶν κατειλημμένων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_584"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_584">[584]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19. -</p> -<p> -Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245 E.) ascribes -the defeat and loss of the Athenians to “bad ground”—χρησαμένων δυσχωρίᾳ.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_585"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_585">[585]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 83. -</p> -<p> -The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand men -were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest exaggeration; if -indeed the reading be correct.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_586"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_586">[586]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius Nepos (Agesilaus, -c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of Xenophon; but we can better -feel the force of <i>his</i> panegyric, when we recollect that he had had personal -cognizance of the disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders -of the Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their -provinces were then matter of recent history. “Cujus exemplum (says -Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent!”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_587"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_587">[587]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_588"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_588">[588]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_589"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_589">[589]</a></span> Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_590"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_590">[590]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_591"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_591">[591]</a></span> Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth. p. 795, as -corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states two moræ or regiments -as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth; Xenophon alludes only to one, -besides that mora which was in garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15; -Agesil. ii, 6).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_592"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_592">[592]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13. -</p> -<p> -Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγησίλαος πυθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς ἔφερεν· -ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνεθυμήθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον εἴη αὐτῷ, -οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδέως μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι χαλεπὸν ὁρῷεν, -οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc. -</p> -<p> -These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the philo-Spartan -allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming from Xenophon, as -they contradict all his partialities, and are dropped here almost reluctantly, -from the necessity of justifying the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a -false proclamation to his army.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_593"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_593">[593]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων ἁπάντων εἰκότως, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_594"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_594">[594]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_595"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_595">[595]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου φάλαγγος, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_596"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_596">[596]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_597"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_597">[597]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 16; Xen. Agesil. ii, 9. -</p> -<p> -Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_598"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_598">[598]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12. -</p> -<p> -Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον. -Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρῆν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ σιγή· φωνὴ δέ τις ἦν τοιαύτη, -οἵαν ὀργή τε καὶ μάχη παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_599"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_599">[599]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 13. Ὁ δὲ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων πάντοσε -καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_600"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_600">[600]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_601"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_601">[601]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 14. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, -παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι -πεφυρμένην, νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων, -ἀσπίδας δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ -κουλεῶν τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι μετὰ χειρός.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_602"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_602">[602]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη ὀψέ) -συνελκύσαντες <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς</em> εἴσω φάλαγγος, -ἐδειπνοποιήσαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν. -</p> -<p> -Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, -21—condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as spurious and unintelligible. -But in my judgment, these words hear a plain and appropriate meaning, -which I have endeavored to give in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. -c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_603"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_603">[603]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_604"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_604">[604]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter says—εἰς -Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη <em class="gesperrt">Πυθίων ἀγομένων</em>, etc. Manso, Dr. Arnold, and -others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this assertion respecting the time -of year at which the Pythian games were celebrated, upon grounds which -seem to me very insufficient.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_605"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_605">[605]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv. 4, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_606"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_606">[606]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_607"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_607">[607]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4. “Obsistere ei -conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti,” etc. They <i>succeeded</i> in barring his way, -and compelling him to retreat.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_608"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_608">[608]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_609"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_609">[609]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv, 97. -</p> -<p> -Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen. Hellen. -iv, 8, 4)—Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ξὺν τῇ τύχῃ ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν, -τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη ἄν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_610"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_610">[610]</a></span> Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἔχθρας—says Demosthenes -in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p. 672; compare -c. 52, p. 688).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_611"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_611">[611]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_612"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_612">[612]</a></span> Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion of the -Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district as a settlement -for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But the ephors are said to -have reversed the assignment, and restored the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, -Lysand. c. 14). Probably, however, the new settlers would remain -in part upon the lands vacated by the expelled Athenians.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_613"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_613">[613]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_614"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_614">[614]</a></span> See Sir William Gell’s Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst Curtius—Peloponnesos—p. -25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_615"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_615">[615]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_616"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_616">[616]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_617"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_617">[617]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diodor. xiv. 85. -</p> -<p> -Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum received -by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by him to this public -work. This is not improbable; but the total sum contributed by the satrap -towards the fortifications must, probably, have been much greater.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_618"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_618">[618]</a></span> Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1, 3) still saw -this temple in Peiræus—very near to the sea; five hundred and fifty years -afterwards.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_619"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_619">[619]</a></span> Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 16. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i, 3; Cornelius -Nepos, Conon, c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_620"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_620">[620]</a></span> Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; καθεύδειν ἐᾷν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_621"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_621">[621]</a></span> The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection to Athens -against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19, and -Andokides, Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_622"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_622">[622]</a></span> Harpokration, v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Philochorus, Fragm. 150, ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_623"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_623">[623]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_624"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_624">[624]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_625"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_625">[625]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_626"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_626">[626]</a></span> I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M. Rehdantz (Vitæ -Iphicratis, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees with Dodwell’s Annales Xenophontei) -in their chronological arrangement of these events. -</p> -<p> -They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls of Corinth -in 393 <small>B.C.</small>, and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> or division -by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is marked by its having immediately -succeeded the Isthmian games), in 392 <small>B.C.</small> I place the former event -in 392 <small>B.C.</small>; the latter in 390 <small>B.C.</small>, immediately after the Isthmian games -of 390 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after describing -(iv, 3) the battle of Korôneia (August 394 <small>B.C.</small>) with its immediate consequences, -and the return of Agesilaus home,—he goes on in the next chapter -to narrate the land-war about or near Corinth, which he carries down -without interruption (through Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up the -naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug. 394 <small>B.C.</small>). He -recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the Ægean with a powerful -fleet in the spring of 393 <small>B.C.</small>, and how after various proceedings, they -brought the fleet to the Saronic Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where -they must have arrived at or near midsummer 393 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of Pharnabazus with -the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter, come, in point of date, <i>before</i> the -seditious movements and the <i>coup d’état</i> at Corinth, which are recounted -in the fourth chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in -midsummer 393 <small>B.C.</small>, the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to -believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously, and without -discontent: the money and encouragement which Pharnabazus gave them -was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It was by aid of this money that -the Corinthians fitted out their fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a -time the maritime command of the Gulf. -</p> -<p> -The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 <i>seq.</i>) could not -have commenced until a considerable time after the departure of Pharnabazus. -They arose out of causes which only took effect after a long continuance,—the -hardships of the land-war, the losses of property and slaves, -the jealousy towards Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The -Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly -have been established before the autumn of -<span class="replace" id="tn_5" title="In the printed book: 494 B.C.">394 <small>B.C.</small></span>, -and was most -probably placed there early in the spring of 393 <small>B.C.</small> Its effects were brought -about, not by one great blow, but by repetition of ravages and destructive -annoyance; and all the effects which it produced previous to midsummer -393 <small>B.C.</small> would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts, and -the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet. Moreover, after -his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first successful at sea, and -acquired the command of the Gulf, which, however, they did not retain for -more than a year, if so much. Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent -against the war began before the early part of 392 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to believe that -the <i>coup d’état</i> and massacre at Corinth took place (not in 393 <small>B.C.</small>, as Mr. -Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but) in 392 <small>B.C.</small>; and the battle within -the Long Walls rather later in the same year. -</p> -<p> -Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of Dodwell,—that -the destruction of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> by Iphicrates took place in the -spring of 392 <small>B.C.</small>,—is also, in my view, erroneous. If this were true, it -would be necessary to pack all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4, -into the year 393 <small>B.C.</small>; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction -of the mora did not occur in the spring of 393 <small>B.C.</small>, we know that it could -not have occurred until the spring of 390 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, the next ensuing -Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this last will be found to be -its true date; thus leaving full time, but not too much time, for the antecedent -occurrences.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_627"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_627">[627]</a></span> Plutarch, Dion. c. 53.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_628"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_628">[628]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ -καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετεσχηκότες, -καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὼν ποιήσαιντο -τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους, κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις -λακωνίσαι—οὕτω δὴ καὶ σφαγὰς ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι. -</p> -<p> -iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντος Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, -ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὡς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο, καὶ φεύγοντές -τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐκ τούτου ἀναδραμόντες -κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους -ἀπεκρούσαντο, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_629"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_629">[629]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 70.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_630"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_630">[630]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very credible. Xenophon -(iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_631"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_631">[631]</a></span> In recounting this alternation of violence projected, violence perpetrated, -recourse on the one side to a foreign ally, treason on the other by admitting -an avowed enemy,—which formed the <i>modus operandi</i> of opposing -parties in the oligarchical Corinth,—I invite the reader to contrast it with -the democratical Athens. -</p> -<p> -At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were precisely -the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked antithesis of -parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth. There was first, a considerable -Athenian minority who opposed the war with Sparta from the first; -next, when the war began, the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, -and were compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and cattle, -so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent, the angry -complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which these circumstances raised -among the Athenian citizens,—not to mention the aggravation of all these -symptoms by the terrible epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and -have been recorded in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive -loss and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a higher -pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, than at Corinth -in 392 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority resort -to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a <i>coup d’état</i>—or either of them to -invitation of foreign aid against the other? Nothing of the kind. The -minority had always open to them the road of pacific opposition, and the -chance of obtaining a majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, -which was practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their opposition, -though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated and violent in -words and propositions, to serve as a real discharge for imprisoned angry -passion. If they could not carry the adoption of their general policy, they -had the opportunity of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of -a fierce discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd. ii, 65) -in the year before his death, which both gratified and mollified the antipathy -against him, and brought about shortly afterwards a strong reaction in -his favor. The majority, on the other hand, knew that the predominance -of its policy depended upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public -assembly, against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain -forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to the -latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in both parties. It -was this system which excluded on both sides the thought of armed violence. -It produced among the democratical citizens of Athens that characteristic -insisted upon by Kleon in Thucydides,—“constant and fearless -security and absence of treacherous hostility among one another” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ -καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους -τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands so -prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the oligarchical -Corinth. Pasimêlus and his Corinthian minority had no assemblies, dikasteries, -annual Senate, or constant habit of free debate and accusation, to -appeal to; their only available weapon was armed violence, or treacherous -correspondence with a foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, -superior or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, -was the only weapon of defence, in like manner. -</p> -<p> -I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter more at -large into the character of the Athenians.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_632"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_632">[632]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_633"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_633">[633]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_634"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_634">[634]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the Laconian -bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to Pasimêlus for his good -faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he was letting in; overlooking or -approving his treacherous betrayal towards his own countrymen, in thus -opening a gate which he had been trusted to watch. τὼ δ᾽ εἰσηγαγέτην, -καὶ <em class="gesperrt">οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἀπεδειξάτην</em>, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα -εἶναι ἀδόλως, οἷάπερ ἐλεγέτην.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_635"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_635">[635]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4. 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικυωνίους ἐκράτησαν -καὶ διασπάσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς -αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν. -</p> -<p> -It would appear from hence that there must have been an open portion -of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the wall which encircled -Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls. Otherwise the fugitive -Sikyonians could hardly have got down to the sea.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_636"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_636">[636]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε -εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾷν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθου, τότε ἐθεάσαντο -σωροὺς νεκρῶν. -</p> -<p> -A singular form of speech.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_637"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_637">[637]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on this -occasion surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general body of -the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it. But his -narrative of all these circumstances differs materially from that -of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making allowance for -great partiality, and for much confusion and obscurity. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was <i>not</i> -captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by Agesilaus -and Teleutias. -</p> -<p> -It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of knowing -what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit on that -head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not mention -Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_638"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_638">[638]</a></span> Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c. 2; Polyæn. iii, 9, 10. -Compare Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, c. 2, 7 (Berlin, -1845)—a very useful and instructive publication. -</p> -<p> -In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature of -his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or Diodorus, who both -appear to me confused in their statements. You would imagine, in reading -their account (and so it has been stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth. -cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.), that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates; -that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into light-armed -peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light shield or <i>pelta</i>, not -only smaller in size than the round ἀσπὶς carried by the hoplite, but also -without the ἴτυς (or surrounding metallic rim of the ἀσπὶς) seemingly connected -by outside bars or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob -or projection (<i>umbo</i>) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. -The <i>pelta</i>, smaller and lighter than the ἀσπὶς, was seemingly square or oblong -and not round; though it had no ἴτυς, it often had thin plates of brass, -as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so that the explanation of it -given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg. vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve. -</p> -<p> -But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen. Hellen. -i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them; he found them already -there, and improved their armature. Both Diodorus and Nepos affirm -that he lengthened the <i>spears</i> of the peltasts to a measure half as long again -as those of the hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the -swords in proportion—“ηὔξησε μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει—hastæ -modum duplicavit.” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is it true -(as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried “short spears”—“brevibus -hastis.” The spear of the Grecian hoplite was long (though not -so long as that of the heavy and compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards -became), and it appears to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given -to his light and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again, -as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken by making -their comparison with the arms <i>of the hoplite</i>, to which the changes of Iphikrates -had no reference. The peltast both before and after Iphikrates did -not carry a <i>spear</i>, but a <i>javelin</i>, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not -to thrust; he was essentially an ἀκοντιστὴς or javelin-shooter (See Xenoph. -Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin might, in case of need, -serve to thrust, but this was not its appropriate employment; <i>e converso</i>, the -spear might be hurled (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher -ground against an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its -proper employment was, to be held and thrust forward. -</p> -<p> -What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two offensive -weapons which the peltast carried, before his time,—the javelin, and the -sword. He made the javelin a longer and heavier weapon, requiring a -more practised hand to throw—but also competent to inflict more serious -wounds, and capable of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts -saw an opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms. Possibly -Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also improved its -point and efficacy in other ways; making it more analogous to the formidable -Roman <i>pilum</i>. Whether he made any alteration in the <i>pelta</i> itself, -we do not know. -</p> -<p> -The name <i>Iphikratides</i>, given to these new-fashioned leggings or boots, -proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first eminent generals -who have lent an honorable denomination to boots and shoes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_639"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_639">[639]</a></span> Justin, vi, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_640"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_640">[640]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 16; Diodor. xiv, 91. -</p> -<p> -Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὖ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδέδισαν, ὡς ἐντὸς -ἀκοντίσματος οὐ προσῄεσαν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of Sphakteria, -when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to approach the Lacedæmonian -hoplites—τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (Thucyd. iv, -34).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_641"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_641">[641]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ -ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς, ὥσπερ -μορμῶνας παιδάρια, etc. -</p> -<p> -This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon for -preserving.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_642"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_642">[642]</a></span> Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς πύλας, etc. -</p> -<p> -Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line of defence -which barred ingress to, or egress from, Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—“The -narrative of Xenophon shows the great importance of the -Corinthian Long Walls in time of war. They completed a line of fortification -from the summit of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted -the most direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into -Peloponnesus. For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side -of the Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the -eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass under the -eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended by a particular kind -of fortification, as some remains of walls still testify,—the other, along -the shore at Cenchreiæ, which was also a fortified place in the hands of the -Corinthians. Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreiæ, in all operations -between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus.” -(Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254). -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of Epaminondas as -described by Diodorus, xv, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_643"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_643">[643]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες <em class="gesperrt">πανδημεὶ</em> μετὰ λιθολόγων καὶ τεκτόνων, -etc. The word πανδημεὶ shows how much they were alarmed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_644"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_644">[644]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 98.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_645"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_645">[645]</a></span> The words stand in the text of Xenophon,—εὐθὺς ἐκεῖθεν ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ -<em class="gesperrt">Τεγέαν</em> εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the Argeian territory -to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus by <i>Tegea</i>; Kœppen proposes -<em class="gesperrt">Τενέαν</em>, which I accept, as geographically suitable. I am not certain, -however, that it is right; the <i>Agesilaus</i> of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά. -</p> -<p> -About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels in -Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_646"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_646">[646]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11. -</p> -<p> -It was rather late in the autumn of 393 <small>B.C.</small> that the Lacedæmonian -maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began, against the fleet recently -equipped by the Corinthians out of the funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, -the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus was named admiral; he was slain,—and -his secretary Pollis, who succeeded to his command, retired afterwards -wounded. Next came Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by -Teleutias. Now if we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary -duration of a Lacedæmonian admiral’s appointment), and to the other -two something less than a year, since their time was brought to an end by -accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of Teleutias will fall in the -spring or early summer of 391 <small>B.C.</small>, the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_647"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_647">[647]</a></span> Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19. Παρεγένετο δὲ -αὐτῷ (Ἀγησιλάῳ) καὶ ὁ ἁδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ -δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν <em class="gesperrt">ἔτεκεν -ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ -τὰ νεώρια ᾕρηκε</em>. -</p> -<p> -This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not taken until -this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And the authority of Xenophon -on the point is superior, in my judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, -86), who represents Lechæum to have been taken in the year before, on the -occasion when the Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within -the Long Walls. -</p> -<p> -The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling, Mr. -Clinton, and others, only mentions the <i>battle</i> at Lechæum—<i>not the capture</i> -of the port. Xenophon also mentions a <i>battle</i> as having taken place close -to Lechæum, between the two long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus -talks of the <i>capture</i> of Lechæum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony -with Xenophon than with Diodorus. -</p> -<p> -A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and Teleutias, the -Athenians had come with an army, and with masons and carpenters, for the -express purpose of rebuilding the Long Walls which Praxitas had in part -broken down. This step would have been both impracticable and useless, -if the Lacedæmonians had stood then in possession of Lechæum. -</p> -<p> -There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the Lacedæmonians -had been in possession of Lechæum <i>before</i> this expedition of the -Athenians to reëstablish the Long Walls,—Αὐτοὶ (the Lacedæmonians) -<em class="gesperrt">δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι</em> σὺν μόρᾳ καὶ τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων φυγάσι, -κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων ἐστρατεύοντο (iv, 4, 17). But -whoever reads attentively the sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I -think) that this affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before, -the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the general -contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts of Iphikrates, as -contrasted with the terror displayed by the Mantineians and others, of these -same peltasts. Even if this were otherwise, however, I should still say -that the passages which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly -that <i>he</i> represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and -Teleutias; and that the other words, ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι, if they -really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be regarded as an inaccuracy. -</p> -<p> -I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one year events -which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in that same year. -</p> -<p> -Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the Lacedæmonians -in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias, Xenophon -would surely have mentioned it in iv, 4, 14; for it was a more important -post than Sikyon, for acting against Corinth.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_648"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_648">[648]</a></span> Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_649"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_649">[649]</a></span> Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in the text, is -derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides called de Pace,—partly -from a statement contained in the Argument of that Oration, and -purporting to be borrowed from Philochorus—Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ελθεῖν -τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος -τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου. -</p> -<p> -Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon, other -than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at any rate, this -important fragment (which I do not see noticed among the fragments of -Philochorus in M. Didot’s collection) counts for some farther evidence as -to the reality of the peace proposed and discussed, but not concluded. -</p> -<p> -Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to -Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject of the Andokidean -oration. But on the other hand, neither of them says anything -which goes to contradict the reality of the event; nor can we in this case -found any strong negative inference on the mere silence of Xenophon, in -the case of a pacific proposition which ultimately came to nothing. -</p> -<p> -If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was genuine -it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality of the mission to -which it relates. It would be sufficient evidence, not only without corroboration -from Xenophon, but even against any contradictory statement proceeding -from Xenophon. But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced -this oration to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws -us upon the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a -decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another out of the -four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the fourth oration, entitled -against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I was inclined to the same suspicion -with respect to this present oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed -in a former volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again -with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my suspicion, -and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has plenty of erroneous -allegations as to matter of fact, especially in reference to times prior to the -battle of Ægospotami; but not one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts -with <i>the situation</i> to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires -us to pronounce it spurious. -</p> -<p> -Indeed, in considering <i>this situation</i> (which is the most important point -to be studied when we are examining the genuineness of an oration), we -find a partial coincidence in Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative -confidence. One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that -the Bœotians were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to -relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions, three or -four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious for peace, and as -sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what terms it would be granted to -them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This coincidence is of some value in reference -to the authenticity of the oration. -</p> -<p> -Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly marked, -and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 <small>B.C.</small> It was in the autumn -or winter of that year, four years after the commencement of the war -in Bœotia which began in 395 <small>B.C.</small> (s. 20). It was <i>after</i> the capture of -Lechæum, which took place in the summer of 391 <small>B.C.</small>—and <i>before</i> the destruction -of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> by Iphikrates, which took place in the -spring of 390 <i>B.C.</i> For Andokides emphatically intimates, that at the moment -when he spoke, <i>not one military success</i> had yet been obtained against -the Lacedæmonians—καίτοι ποίας τινος ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον, -<em class="gesperrt">εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην ἡττήθησαν</em>; (s. 19). This could never have -been said <i>after</i> the destruction of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i>, which made so -profound a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the temper -of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof (among others) -that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly the events subsequent to -the battle of Corinth, when I observe that he assigns the destruction of the -<i>mora</i> to the year 392 <small>B.C.</small>, a year <i>before</i> the date which he rightly allots to -the Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds) the -destruction of the <i>mora</i> in the spring of 390 <i>B.C.</i>, which receives additional -confirmation from this passage of Andokides. -</p> -<p> -Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the oration -of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics hold the contrary -opinion.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_650"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_650">[650]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_651"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_651">[651]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of a partisan, -says that “<i>the Argeians</i> celebrated the festival, Corinth having now become -Argos.” But it seems plain that the truth was as I have stated in the text,—and -that the Argeians stood by (with others of the confederates probably -also) to protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their usual -privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood by to protect -the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the same thing. -</p> -<p> -The Isthmian games were <i>trietêric</i>, that is, celebrated in every alternate -year; in one of the spring months, about April or perhaps the beginning of -May (the Greek months being lunar, no one of them would coincide regularly -with any one of our calendar months, year after year); and in the -<i>second</i> and <i>fourth</i> Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know -that this festival was celebrated in April 412 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, towards the end -of the <i>fourth</i> year of Olympiad 91, about two or three months before the -festival of Olympiad 92. -</p> -<p> -Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss. Agonistic. iv, -3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of Xenophon,—all state the -Isthmian games to have been celebrated in the <i>first</i> and <i>third</i> Olympic -years; which is, in my judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states -the Isthmian games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated -at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter of the fourth -year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by Krüger (<i>ad loc.</i>) as well as -by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although the argumentation of the latter, founded -upon the time of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely -uncertain. It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian -games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games (Annal. -Xenoph. ad ann. 392).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_652"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_652">[652]</a></span> See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, chap. i, p. 3. -The modern village and port of Lutráki derives its name from these warm -springs, which are quite close to it and close to the sea, at the foot of the -mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on the side of the bay opposite to -Lechæum, but near the point where the level ground constituting the Isthmus -(properly so-called), ends,—and where the rocky or mountainous -region, forming the westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of -Peiræum), begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes -to describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate,—ἤδη δ᾽ -ἐκπεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαίου, etc. (iv, 5, 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_653"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_653">[653]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire in -pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm themselves; -the night being very cold and rainy, the situation very high, and the troops -not having come out with blankets or warm covering to protect them. They -kindled large fires, and the neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally -burnt.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_654"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_654">[654]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5. -</p> -<p> -This Œnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that -name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia. -</p> -<p> -So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded with -another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory, but on the -Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus (Thucyd. viii, 10).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_655"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_655">[655]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_656"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_656">[656]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of this History. -</p> -<p> -The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the encomiums of -his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep. Agesil. c. 5).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_657"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_657">[657]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5. -</p> -<p> -The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this point of time. -But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or those of the other Tactic -writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to find proper places for the sixty-three -different stratagems which Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_658"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_658">[658]</a></span> This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable ruins were -noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey, near its western extremity; -on which side it adjoins the temple of Hêrê Akræa, or the Heræum. -See M. Boblaye, Recherches Géographiques sur les Ruines de la -Morée, p. 36; and Colonel Leake’s Peloponnesiaca, p. 399.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_659"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_659">[659]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6. -</p> -<p> -Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν φύλακες -τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ -κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Ἔτι δὲ καθημένου τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, -καὶ ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἱππεύς τις προσήλαυνε, καὶ μάλα -ἰσχυρῶς ἱδρῶντι τῷ ἵππῳ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὅ,τι ἀγγέλλοι, οὐδενὶ -ἀπεκρίνατο, etc. -</p> -<p> -It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of Philo-Laconian -complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and of that care in bringing -out the contrast of good fortune, with sudden reverse instantly following -upon it, which forms so constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and -historians.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_660"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_660">[660]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 22. ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_661"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_661">[661]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_662"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_662">[662]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_663"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_663">[663]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκέλευον τοὺς -ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμένους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· <em class="gesperrt">οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι -τῆς μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν</em>. -</p> -<p> -We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—“These were the -only men in the mora who were <i>really and truly saved</i>.” He means, I presume, -that they were the only men who were saved without the smallest -loss of honor; being carried off wounded from the field of battle, and not -having fled or deserted their posts. The others who survived, preserved -themselves by flight; and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians -who ran away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta, -was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4; Plutarch, -Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of Xenophon, that a distinction -was really made at Sparta between the treatment of these wounded -men here carried off, and that of the other survivors of the beaten mora. -</p> -<p> -The ὑπασπισταὶ, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain number of -attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the officers (compare Xen. -Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20), persons of importance, and rich hoplites. -It seems hardly to be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστὴς, in -spite of what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa -(Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_664"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_664">[664]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5,15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης—τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_665"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_665">[665]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two hundred -and fifty—ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον περὶ πεντήκοντα -καὶ διακοσίους. But he had before distinctly stated that the whole <i>mora</i> -marching back to Lechæum under the polemarch, was six hundred in number—ὁ μὲν -πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, οὖσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπῄει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ -Λέχαιον (iv, 5, 12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, -that all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors. -</p> -<p> -I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two numbers is erroneous; -either the original aggregate of six hundred is <i>above</i> the truth,—or -the total of slain, two hundred and fifty, is <i>below</i> the truth. Now the -latter supposition appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The -Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns of their -own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose to admit publicly -a greater total of slain than two hundred and fifty. Xenophon has inserted -this in his history, forgetting that his own details of the battle refuted the -numerical statement. The total of six hundred is more probable, than any -smaller number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any reasons -why Xenophon should overstate it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_666"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_666">[666]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8-10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_667"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_667">[667]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις -γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ Λακωνικὸν -στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες ἢ ἀδελφοί· -<em class="gesperrt">οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει -περιῄεσαν</em>. -</p> -<p> -If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text I request -him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_668"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_668">[668]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_669"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_669">[669]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_670"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_670">[670]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_671"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_671">[671]</a></span> Demosthenes—περὶ Συντάξεως—c. 8, p. 172.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_672"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_672">[672]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 92; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 34. -</p> -<p> -Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were masters of -the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as their own, but that -they generously refused to do so.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_673"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_673">[673]</a></span> Diodor. xv, 73.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_674"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_674">[674]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 6, 1-14; iv, 7, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_675"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_675">[675]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ -δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν</em>, ἐστεφανωμένους -δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_676"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_676">[676]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν -καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ, μὴ δεχομένῳ -τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· <em class="gesperrt">ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε -ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας</em>. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς -ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. -Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ -δοκοίῃ περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, <em class="gesperrt">καὶ μάλα -κατὰ ταὐτά</em>. -</p> -<p> -I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of the words -ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a long and not very instructive -note, adopting an untenable hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians -on this occasion appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; -which is not countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged -to the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural τοὺς μῆνας -indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that the Argeians sometimes -put forward the name of one festival, sometimes of another. We -may be pretty sure that the Karneian festival was one of them; but what -the others were, we cannot tell. It is very probable that there were several -festivals of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between -Sparta and Argos—πατρῴους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας τοῖς Δωριεῦσι -πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias (iii, 5, 6). -The language of Xenophon implies that the demand made by the Argeians, -for observance of the Holy Truce, was in itself rightful, or rather, that it -would have been rightful at a different season; but that they put themselves -in the wrong by making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political -purpose. -</p> -<p> -For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians, respecting -the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of this History, -Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb <em class="gesperrt">ὑποφέρειν</em> τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply -the <i>underhand purpose</i> with which the Argeians preferred their demand -of the truce. What were the previous occasions on which they had preferred -a similar demand, we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus -had invaded and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without -success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud. -</p> -<p> -It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or. iii, De Pace, -s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though strenuous in insisting that -Athens should help them to carry on the war for the possession of Corinth -against the Lacedæmonians, had nevertheless made a separate peace with -the latter, covering their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ -εἰρήνην ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure -passage I can give no better explanation.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_677"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_677">[677]</a></span> Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεόν, -κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιᾶσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ, ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, <em class="gesperrt">ὡς αἰσχρὸν -ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν</em>. -</p> -<p> -A similar story about the manner of putting the question to Apollo at -Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at Dodona, is told about Agesilaus -on another occasion (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_678"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_678">[678]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6. -</p> -<p> -It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they look upon -the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced to depart, as marks -of some displeasure of the gods against his expedition.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_679"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_679">[679]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii, (Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης -γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ -τὴν Τιμοθέου στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, -was composed a long while after the events (about <small>B.C.</small> 353—see Mr. Clinton’s -Fast. H., in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the -break-up of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian. -Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the same two ideas, -and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon, perpetuated on a commemorative -column, countenanced the same impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς -Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_680"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_680">[680]</a></span> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_681"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_681">[681]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_682"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_682">[682]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly objected to this -concession, five years afterwards, when the peace of Antalkidas was actually -concluded; but that they were forced to give up their scruples and accept -the peace including the concession, because they had not force to resist -Persia and Sparta acting in hearty alliance. -</p> -<p> -Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to it during -the earlier discussions, when it was first broached by Antalkidas; and that -their objections to it were in part the cause why the discussions reported in -the text broke off without result. -</p> -<p> -It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the last years of -the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this concession, and even to -greater, without doing herself any good (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was -not now placed in circumstances so imperious as to force her to be equally -yielding. -</p> -<p> -Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the allies of Athens—Bœotians, -Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were willing to surrender the Asiatic -Greeks at the requisition of Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone -resolutely stood out, and were in consequence left without any allies. The -latter part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her allies, is -certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies took essentially different -views from Athens on the point. The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary -to Athens, must be followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato -goes the length of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of -Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were forced to -subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_683"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_683">[683]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_684"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_684">[684]</a></span> See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of Isokrates, s. 110.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_685"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_685">[685]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_686"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_686">[686]</a></span> Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44; Cornelius Nepos, -Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 180.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_687"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_687">[687]</a></span> Diodor. xiv. 99.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_688"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_688">[688]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἁνὴρ (Diphridas) -<em class="gesperrt">εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος</em>, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος, -καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ -σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_689"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_689">[689]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_690"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_690">[690]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_691"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_691">[691]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_692"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_692">[692]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven triremes, and -in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos, which island was persuaded -to detach itself from Athens. But he recounts the circumstances -in a very different manner. He represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes -as having risen in insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does -not name Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), -and Philodikus, as commanders. -</p> -<p> -The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my judgment. -His means of information, as well as his interest, about Teleutias -(the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_693"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_693">[693]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26. -</p> -<p> -Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus) -had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years before into the great -city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and celebrated,—yet they still continued -to exist, and apparently as fortified places. For Xenophon speaks -of the democrats in Rhodes as <em class="gesperrt">τάς τε πόλεις</em> ἔχοντας, etc. -</p> -<p> -Whether the Philokrates here named as <i>Philokrates son of Ephialtes</i>, is -the same person as the Philokrates accused in the Thirtieth oration of -Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is possible enough that there -might be two contemporary Athenians bearing this name, which would explain -the circumstance that Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a -practice occasional with him, but not common.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_694"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_694">[694]</a></span> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. -Orat. p. 161, c. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_695"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_695">[695]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_696"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_696">[696]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25-27. -</p> -<p> -Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information about the -importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position, in the ancient -world,—as well as about the dues charged on the merchant vessels going -into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and the manner in which these dues -pressed upon general trade.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_697"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_697">[697]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_698"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_698">[698]</a></span> Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1-20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_699"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_699">[699]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv, 94. -</p> -<p> -The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by a storm -near Lesbos,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which seems improbable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_700"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_700">[700]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν -ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_701"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_701">[701]</a></span> Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9. -</p> -<p> -Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power, oppression -towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation for his own profit, -during the course of the expedition of Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused -of conniving at such misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as -soon as they were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the -Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home of all -moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the colleagues of Thrasybulus -should come home to go through the audit (s. 5); implying (so far as -we can understand what is thus briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself -should <i>not</i> be obliged to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or -Asiatic command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues, -resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzantium, -to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter of the Thracian prince -Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the oration that the fleet had come home -in very bad condition (s. 2-4), and that the money, levied with so much -criminal abuse, had been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated. -</p> -<p> -We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to death. -His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to thirty talents, -though he had been poor before the expedition; but nothing like that -amount was discovered after the sentence of confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, -cont. Philokrat. s. 3).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_702"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_702">[702]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_703"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_703">[703]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_704"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_704">[704]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_705"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_705">[705]</a></span> See above, <a href="#Chap_71">Chapter lxxi</a>, p. 156 of the present volume.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_706"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_706">[706]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_707"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_707">[707]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῃστὰς -διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλοις ... Ὅπως δοκοίη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, -ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπαναπεπλευκέναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_708"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_708">[708]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. Ὁ Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο, -ὡς μὲν ἐλέγετο, <em class="gesperrt">οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ -ἡμέρᾳ</em>, ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπορεύετο καὶ -ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἤκουε τῶν ἀπαντώντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην -ἀναπεπλευκέναι τῆς ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέστερον ἐπορεύετο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_709"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_709">[709]</a></span> See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and destruction of -the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum, <a href="#Page_350">page 350</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_710"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_710">[710]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ παρέμεινε, -καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἁρμοστήρων -ὡς δώδεκα μαχόμενοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι φεύγοντες ἔπιπτον.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_711"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_711">[711]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὢν δὲ <em class="gesperrt">πάλιν</em> ὁ Ἐτεόνικος -ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμιξίᾳ χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν -πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερῶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο ὁ πόλεμος, -ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἐφίησι ληΐζεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς. -</p> -<p> -The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since (as -Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the presence of -Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by supposing that Eteonikus -found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in the war, and that he did -not like to involve them in it without first going to Sparta to consult the -ephors. It was on <i>coming back</i> to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having -obtained the consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued -the letters of marque. -</p> -<p> -Schneider’s note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my judgment.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_712"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_712">[712]</a></span> Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old Æginetan -antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated, continued for a considerable -time. A year or two afterwards, when the philosopher Plato was -taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave, it was death to any Athenian to land -in the island (Aristides, Or. xlvi, p. 384; p. 306 Dindorf; Diogenes Laërt. -iii, 19; Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_713"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_713">[713]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὴ ἀπέπλευσεν οἴκαδε, -etc. -</p> -<p> -This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for whom, -as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always manifests a marked -sympathy) is extremely interesting. The reflection, too, with which Xenophon -follows it up, deserves notice,—“I know well that in these incidents -I am not recounting any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable -stratagem. But by Zeus, it <i>does</i> seem to me worth a man’s while to reflect, -by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in his soldiers. -This is a true man’s achievement, more precious than any outlay or any -danger.” -</p> -<p> -What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the scheme -worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν—the -exercising command in such manner as to have willing and obedient -subjects)—and touched upon indirectly in various of his other compositions,—the -Hiero, the Œconomicus, and portions of the Memorabilia. -The <i>idéal</i> of government, as it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal -despotism, or something like it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_714"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_714">[714]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_715"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_715">[715]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_716"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_716">[716]</a></span> So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is found -at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_717"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_717">[717]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_718"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_718">[718]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. Ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν, -ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾶς ἡμέρας σῖτον· ἔπειτα -δὲ ἥκετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὔτικα μάλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἔνθα θεὸς ἐθέλει, -ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιξόμενοι. -</p> -<p> -Schneider doubts whether the words προπαράσχετε δέ μοι are correct. -But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning. Teleutias had no -money; yet it was necessary for his purpose that the seamen should come -furnished with one day’s provision beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged -to ask <i>them</i> to get provision for themselves, or to <i>lend it</i>, as it were, <i>to him</i>; -though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received their -pay.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_719"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_719">[719]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 94.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_720"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_720">[720]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_721"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_721">[721]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_722"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_722">[722]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29. -</p> -<p> -Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost -Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it was without -gates on the land-side—ἀπύλωτος—or at least without any such gates -as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_723"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_723">[723]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21-30. -</p> -<p> -I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the preceding -year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from state-poverty; but the -manner in which the speaker makes this fact tell against Nikomachus, may -or may not be just.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_724"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_724">[724]</a></span> Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_725"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_725">[725]</a></span> See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. Græcor.—Boeckh, -Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180, Eng. transl.—and -Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_726"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_726">[726]</a></span> Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat. xliv, cont. -Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_727"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_727">[727]</a></span> It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as if they were so -many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at the public expense. But the -primitive idea and sentiment of the Grecian religious festival—the satisfaction -to the god dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing -and enjoying themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας)—is much anterior to -the development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in Demosthen. -cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin. 147; K. F. Herrmann, -Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_728"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_728">[728]</a></span> See such direct assessments on property alluded to in various speeches -of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31, 45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem, -s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont. Philokrat. s. 14. -</p> -<p> -Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl. transl., which -passage stands unaltered in the second edition of the German original recently -published, p. 642) affirms that a proposition for the assessment of a -direct property-tax of one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made -about this time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended -to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at first enthusiastically -welcomed by the Athenians, and procured for its author unbounded -popularity; but that he was presently cried down and disgraced, because on -farther examination the measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk. -</p> -<p> -Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, -pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that this was a real proposition -of a property tax of two and a half per cent., made by Euripides. After -having alleged that the Athenians in these times supplied their treasury -by the most unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich citizens,—referring -as proof to passages in the orators, none of which establishes -his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—“But that these violences -did not suffice, is shown by the fact that the people caught with greedy impatience -at other measures. Thus a new scheme of finance, which however -was presently discovered to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first -the most extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded -from Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See -Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.” -</p> -<p> -In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers rests -upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does not warrant -us in concluding anything at all about a proposition for a property-tax. It -is as follows:— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Τὸ δ᾽ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν</p> - <p>Τάλαντ᾽ ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει</p> - <p>Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ᾽ Εὐριπίδης;</p> - <p>Κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην·</p> - <p>Ὅτε δὴ δ᾽ ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο</p> - <p>Ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,</p> - <p>Πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls it) was, which -the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of determining. But I venture -to express my decided conviction that it cannot have been a property-tax. -The terms in which it is described forbid that supposition. It was a -scheme which seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to -the city, and procured for its author very great popularity; but which, on -farther examination, proved to be mere empty boasting (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος) -How can this be said about any motion for a property-tax? That any financier -should ever have gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a -property-tax, is altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the -immense sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the -probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of Athens, -Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by an assessment upon -property! It would be as much as any financier could do to bear up against -the tremendous <i>unpopularity</i> of such a proposition; and to induce the assembly -even to listen to him, were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious -are propositions for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the -specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such specific -evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. -On one occasion (De Symmoriis, Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that -orator alludes to a proposition for raising five hundred talents by direct -property-tax as something extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure -to hear mentioned. -</p> -<p> -Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax could -scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of all ideas the most -simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a scheme. But to pass for -an acceptable financier, you must propose some measure which promises -gain to the state without such undisguised pressure upon individuals. -</p> -<p> -Lastly, there is nothing <i>delusive</i> in a property-tax,—nothing which looks -gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther examination (ἀνασκοπουμένοις) -to be false or uncertain. It may, indeed, be more or less evaded; -but this can only be known after it has been assessed, and when payment is -actually called for. -</p> -<p> -Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by Euripides -was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ -may have many other meanings; it might mean a duty of two -and a half per cent. upon imports or exports, or upon the produce of the -mines of Laureion; or it might mean a cheap coinage or base money, something -in the nature of the Chian τεσσαρακοσταί (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that -the passage really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made -by Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would not stand -an attentive examination. It is not even certain that Euripides promised a -receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is only given to us as a comic -exaggeration of that which foolish men at first fancied. Boeckh in more -than one place reasons (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred -talents was a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half -per cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv, 8, p. 520, -Engl. transl.) that “Euripides assumed as the basis of his proposal for levying -a property-tax, a taxable capital of twenty thousand talents,”—and -that “his proposition of one-fortieth was <i>calculated</i> to produce five hundred -talents.” No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes. -</p> -<p> -Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play of the same -author, that a small direct property-tax of one five-hundredth part had been -recently imposed. After a speech from one of the old women, calling upon -a young man to follow her, he replies (v. 1006):— -</p> -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοὔστίν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν</p> - <p>Τὴν πεντακοσιόστην κατέθηκας τῇ πόλει.</p> - </div> -</div> -<p> -Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is very obscure, and -so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt was so perplexed by it that he -altered ἐμῶν into ἐτῶν. Without presuming to assign the meaning of the -passage, I merely contend that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, -as a matter of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth had -been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of Ekklesiazusæ. -</p> -<p> -I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by Sievers -from a third passage in this same play,—the Ekklesiazusæ (Geschichte -Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, -p. 101.) He says,—“How melancholy is the picture of Athenian popular -life, which is presented to us by the Ekklesiazusæ and the second Plutus, -ten or twelve years after the restoration of the democracy! What an <i>impressive -seriousness</i> (welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech -of Praxagora!” (v. 174 <i>seqq.</i>). -</p> -<p> -I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and trustworthy -coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a comic case made out for the -purpose of showing that the women were more fit to govern Athens than -the men, and setting forth the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad -and general disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce -and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous to treat what -is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading feminine character, as if it -were historical evidence as to the actual condition or management of Athens. -Let any one follow the speech of Praxagora into the proposition of -reform which she is made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of -citing her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History is -indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into serious matter -of evidence; and no history has suffered so much from the proceeding as -that of Athens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_729"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_729">[729]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24: compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph. De Vectigalibus, -chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub. Athen. i, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_730"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_730">[730]</a></span> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_731"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_731">[731]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_732"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_732">[732]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_733"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_733">[733]</a></span> Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing year for -the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_734"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_734">[734]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_735"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_735">[735]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31. -</p> -<p> -In this document there is the same introduction of the first person immediately -following the third, as in the correspondence between Pausanias -and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_736"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_736">[736]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 110.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_737"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_737">[737]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_738"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_738">[738]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p. 473.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_739"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_739">[739]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πολῖται ἕκοντες κατεδέχοντο -τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_740"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_740">[740]</a></span> Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon’s Encomium upon -Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of honor to the latter, that he -would not consent to peace, except with a compulsory clause (ἠνάγκασε) -that the Corinthian and Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian -exiles had been actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of -Theban exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there -were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain that he -would insist upon their restoration.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a id="Footnote_741"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_741">[741]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.</p> -</div> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="transnote" id="tnote"> - <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p> - <ul> - <li>Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li> - <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li> - <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li> - <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after comparison with a later edition of - this work. Greek text has also been corrected after checking with this later edition and with Perseus, - when the reference was found.</li> - <li>The following changes were also made, after checking with other editions: - <table summary="changes made"> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"> <a href="#Page_vi">vi</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“fractions”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_1">factions</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_216">216</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“Odrysians”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_2">Bithynians</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>page</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“with”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_3">which</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>note</td> - <td class="tdr"> <a href="#Footnote_30">30</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“Ἑγγαδα”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_4">Ἑλλάδα</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>note</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Footnote_626">626</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“494 <small>B.C.</small>”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_5">394 <small>B.C.</small></a>”</td> - </tr> - </table> - </li> - <li>Both “Euagoras” and “Evagoras” are used to refer to the same ruler.</li> - <li>The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</li> - </ul> -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12), by -George Grote - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 9 OF 12 *** - -***** This file should be named 51182-h.htm or 51182-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/1/8/51182/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Mark C. Orton, Ramon Pajares -Box and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/American -Libraries.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - - - -</pre> - -</body> -</html> diff --git a/old/51182-h/images/cover.jpg b/old/51182-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index a42479b..0000000 --- a/old/51182-h/images/cover.jpg +++ /dev/null |
