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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51181]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 7 OF 12 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the
-Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
-(This file was produced from images generously made
-available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
-
-  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
-  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
-  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
-    λοιπά~.
-  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
-    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
-    also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
-    with Perseus, when the reference was found.
-  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
-    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
-    usage was found.
-  * Some inconsistencies in the use of accents over proper nouns
-    (like “Alkibiades” and “Alkibiadês”) have been retained.
-  * The following changes were also made, after checking with
-    Perseus and other editions:
-
-    note 337: “Thucyd. vi, 69” → “Thucyd, i, 69”
-    note 573:        “vii, 73” → “viii, 73”
-
-
-
-
-  HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-  BY
-  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
-
-  VOL. VII.
-
-  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION
-
-  NEW YORK:
-  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
-  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-VOL. VII.
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-  CHAPTER LV.
-
-  FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF
-  OLYMPIAD 90.
-
-  Negotiations for peace during the winter after the battle
-  of Amphipolis.—Peace called the Peace of Nikias—concluded
-  in March 421 B.C. Conditions of peace.—Peace accepted at
-  Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian
-  alliance.—The most powerful members of the alliance refuse
-  to accept the truce—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and
-  Eleians.—Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians—their
-  great anxiety for peace—their uncertain relations with
-  Argos.—Steps taken by the Lacedæmonians to execute the
-  peace—Amphipolis is not restored to Athens—the great
-  allies of Sparta do not accept the peace.—Separate
-  alliance for mutual defence concluded between Sparta and
-  Athens.—Terms of the alliance.—Athens restores the Spartan
-  captives.—Mismanagement of the political interests of
-  Athens by Nikias and the peace party.—By the terms of
-  the alliance Athens renounced all the advantages of her
-  position in reference to the Lacedæmonians—she gained none
-  of those concessions upon which she calculated, while
-  they gained materially.—Discontent and remonstrances
-  of the Athenians against Sparta in consequence of the
-  non-performance of the conditions—they repent of having
-  given up the captives—excuses of Sparta.—New combinations
-  in Peloponnesus—suspicion entertained of concert between
-  Sparta and Athens—Argos stands prominently forward—state
-  of Argos—aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed
-  in that city.—The Corinthians prevail upon Argos to stand
-  forward as head of a new Peloponnesian alliance.—Congress
-  of recusant Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—the Mantineians
-  join Argos—state of Arcadia—rivalship of Tegea and
-  Mantineia.—Remonstrances of Lacedæmonian envoys at the
-  congress at Corinth—redefence of the Corinthians—pretence
-  of religious scruple.—The Bœotians and Megarians refuse
-  to break with Sparta, or to ally themselves with Argos—the
-  Corinthians hesitate in actually joining Argos.—The
-  Eleians become allies of Argos—their reasons for doing
-  so—relations with Lepreum—the Corinthians now join Argos
-  also.—Refusal of Tegea to separate from Sparta.—The
-  Corinthians are disheartened—their application through
-  the Bœotians to Athens.—The Lacedæmonians emancipate the
-  Arcadian subjects of Mantineia—they plant the Brasidean
-  Helots at Lepreum.—Treatment of the Spartan captives after
-  their liberation from Athens and return to Sparta—they are
-  disfranchised for a time and in a qualified manner.—The
-  Athenians recapture Skiônê—put to death all the adult
-  males.—Political relations in Peloponnesus—change of ephors
-  at Sparta—the new ephors are hostile to Athens.—Congress
-  at Sparta—Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian deputies,
-  present—long debates, but no settlement attained of any
-  one of the disputed points—intrigues of the anti-Athenian
-  ephors—Kleobulus and Xenarês.—These ephors try to bring
-  about underhand an alliance between Sparta and Argos,
-  through the Bœotians—the project fails.—The Lacedæmonians
-  conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, thereby
-  violating their alliance with Athens—the Bœotians raze
-  Panaktum to the ground.—Application from the Argeians
-  to Sparta to renew the expiring treaty. Project of
-  renewed treaty agreed upon. Curious stipulation about
-  combat by champions, to keep the question open about
-  the title to Thyrea.—Lacedæmonian envoys go first to
-  Bœotia, next to Athens—they find Panaktum demolished—they
-  ask for the cession of Pylos from Athens.—The envoys
-  are badly received at Athens—angry feeling against
-  the Lacedæmonians.—Alkibiadês stands forward as a
-  party-leader. His education and character.—Great energy
-  and capacity of Alkibiadês in public affairs—his
-  reckless expenditure—lawless demeanor—unprincipled
-  character, inspiring suspicion and alarm—military
-  service.—Alkibiadês—Sokratês—the Sophists.—Conflicting
-  sentiments entertained towards Alkibiadês—his great energy
-  and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, and jealousy, which
-  he inspires.—Alkibiadês tries to renew the ancient but
-  interrupted connection of his ancestors with Lacedæmon,
-  as proxeni.—The Spartans reject his advances—he turns
-  against them—alters his politics, and becomes their enemy
-  at Athens.—He tries to bring Athens into alliance with
-  Argos.—He induces the Argeians to send envoys to Athens—the
-  Argeians eagerly embrace this opening, and drop their
-  negotiations with Sparta.—Embassy of the Lacedæmonians
-  to Athens, to press the Athenians not to throw up the
-  alliance. The envoys are favorably received.—Trick by which
-  Alkibiadês cheats and disgraces the envoys, and baffles
-  the Lacedæmonian project. Indignation of the Athenians
-  against Sparta.—Nikias prevails with the assembly to
-  send himself and others as envoys to Sparta, in order to
-  clear up the embarrassment.—Failure of the embassy of
-  Nikias at Sparta—Athens concludes the alliance with Argos,
-  Elis, and Mantineia.—Conditions of this convention and
-  alliance.—Complicated relations among the Grecian states
-  as to treaty and alliance.—Olympic festival of the 90th
-  Olympiad, July 420 B.C., its memorable character.—First
-  appearance of Athens at the Olympic festival since the
-  beginning of the war. Immense display of Alkibiadês in
-  the chariot-race.—The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred
-  legation from this Olympic festival, in consequence of
-  alleged violation of the Olympic truce.—Alarm felt at the
-  festival lest the Spartans should come in arms.—Depressed
-  estimation of Sparta throughout Greece—Herakleia.             1-61
-
-
-  CHAPTER LVI.
-
-  FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF
-  MANTINEIA.
-
-  New policy of Athens, attempted by Alkibiadês.—Expedition
-  of Alkibiadês into the interior of Peloponnesus.—Attack
-  upon Epidaurus by Argos and Athens.—Movements of the
-  Spartans and Argeians.—The sacred month Karneius—trick
-  played by the Argeians with their calendar—Congress
-  at Mantineia for peace—the discussions prove
-  abortive.—Athenian lordship of the sea—the alliance between
-  Athens and Sparta continues in name, but is indirectly
-  violated by both.—Invasion of Argos by Agis and the
-  Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, and Corinthians.—Approach of the
-  invaders to Argos by different lines of march.—Superior
-  forces and advantageous position of the invaders—danger
-  of Argos—Agis takes upon him to grant an armistice to
-  the Argeians, and withdraws the army—dissatisfaction of
-  the allies.—Severe censure against Agis on his return
-  to Sparta.—Tardy arrival of Alkibiadês, Lachês, etc.,
-  with the Athenian contingent at Argos—expedition of
-  Athenians, Eleians, Mantineians, and Argeians, against
-  the Arcadian town of Orchomenus.—Plans against Tegea—the
-  Eleians return home.—Danger of Tegea—Agis and the
-  Lacedæmonians march to its relief.—Manœuvres of Agis
-  to bring on a battle on fair ground.—Forward march
-  and new position of the Argeians.—The Lacedæmonians
-  are surprised: their sudden and ready formation into
-  battle order.—Gradation of command and responsibility
-  peculiar to the Lacedæmonian army.—Lacedæmonian line:
-  privileged post of the Skiritæ on the left.—Uncertain
-  numbers of both armies.—Preliminary harangues to the
-  soldiers.—Battle of Mantineia.—Movement ordered by Agis,
-  on the instant before the battle; his order disobeyed.
-  His left wing is defeated.—Complete ultimate victory
-  of the Lacedæmonians.—Great effects of the victory in
-  reëstablishing the reputation of Sparta.—Operations
-  of Argeians, Eleians, etc., near Epidaurus.—Political
-  change at Argos, arising out of the battle of
-  Mantineia.—Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand-regiment
-  at Argos, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Treaty of
-  peace between Sparta and Argos.—Treaty of alliance between
-  Sparta and Argos—dissolution of the alliance of Argos with
-  Athens, Mantineia, and Elis.—Submission of Mantineia to
-  Sparta.—Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos by the
-  Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Oligarchy in
-  Sikyôn and the towns in Achaia.—Violences of the Thousand
-  at Argos: counter-revolution in that town: restoration of
-  the democracy.—Proceedings of the restored Argeian Demos:
-  tardiness of Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Argos: measures for the
-  protection of the democracy.—Nominal peace, but precarious
-  relations, between Athens and Sparta.—Relations of Athens
-  with Perdikkas of Macedonia.—Negligence of Athens about
-  Amphipolis: improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party:
-  adventurous speculations of Alkibiadês.—Projected
-  contention of ostracism between Nikias and Alkibiadês.
-  Proposition supported by Hyperbolus.—Gradual desuetude of
-  the ostracism, as the democracy became assured.—Siege of
-  Mêlos by the Athenians.—Dialogue set forth by Thucydidês,
-  between the Athenian envoys and the Executive Council
-  of Mêlos.—Language represented by Thucydidês as having
-  been held by the Athenian envoys—with the replies of
-  the Melians.—Refusal of the Melians to submit.—Siege and
-  capture of Mêlos.—Remarks upon the event.—View taken by
-  Thucydidês of this incident.—Place which it occupies in the
-  general historical conception of Thucydidês.                61-118
-
-
-  CHAPTER LVII.
-
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN
-  DYNASTY.
-
-  Expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty from Syracuse, and
-  of other despots from the other Sicilian towns.—Large
-  changes of resident inhabitants—effects of this
-  fact.—Relative power and condition of the Sicilian
-  cities. Political dissensions at Syracuse. Ostracism
-  tried and abandoned.—Power and foreign exploits
-  of Syracuse.—Sikels in the interior of Sicily—the
-  Sikel prince Duketius—he founds the new Sikel town
-  of Palikê.—Exploits of Duketius—he is defeated and
-  becomes the prisoner of the Syracusans, who spare him,
-  and send him to Corinth.—Duketius breaks his parole
-  and returns to Sicily.—Conquests of Syracuse in the
-  interior of Sicily—death of Duketius.—Prosperity
-  and power of Agrigentum.—Intellectual movement in
-  Sicily—Empedoklês—Tisias—Korax—Gorgias.—Sicilian
-  cities—their condition and proceedings at the first
-  breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, 431 B.C.—Relations
-  of Sicily to Athens and Sparta—altered by the quarrel
-  between Corinth and Korkyra and the intervention of
-  Athens.—Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the
-  Sicilian Dorians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-  war. Expectations not realized.—The Dorian cities in
-  Sicily attack the Ionian cities in Sicily.—The Ionic
-  cities in Sicily solicit aid from Athens—first Athenian
-  expedition to Sicily under Lachês.—Second expedition
-  under Pythodôrus.—Indecisive operations near Messênê and
-  Rhegium.—Defeat of the Messenians by the Naxians and
-  Sikels, near Naxos.—Eurymedon and Sophoklês, with a larger
-  Athenian fleet, arrive in Sicily.—Congress of the Sicilian
-  cities at Gela. Speech of Hermokratês.—General peace made
-  between the Sicilian cities. Eurymedon accedes to the
-  peace, and withdraws the Athenian fleet.—Displeasure of the
-  Athenians against Eurymedon and his colleagues.—Intestine
-  dissension in Leontini—expulsion of the Leontine Demos,
-  by the aid of Syracuse.—Application of the Leontine
-  Demos for help to Athens. The Athenians send Phæax
-  to make observations.—Leontini depopulated—the Demos
-  expelled—Leontine exiles at Athens.—War between Selinus and
-  Egesta—the latter applies to Athens for aid.—Promises of
-  the Egestæans: motives offered to Athens for intervention
-  in Sicily.—Alkibiadês warmly espouses their cause, and
-  advises intervention.—Inspecting commissioners despatched
-  by the Athenians to Egesta—frauds practised by the
-  Egestæans to delude them.—Return of the commissioners to
-  Athens—impression produced by their report. Resolution
-  taken to send an expedition to Sicily.—Embarrassment of
-  Nikias as opposer of the expedition.—Speech of Nikias
-  at the second assembly held by the Athenians.—Reply
-  of Alkibiadês.—The assembly favorable to the views
-  of Alkibiadês—adheres to the resolution of sailing
-  to Sicily.—Second speech of Nikias—exaggerating the
-  difficulties and dangers of the expedition, and demanding a
-  force on the largest scale.—Effect of this speech—increased
-  eagerness of the assembly for the expedition—order and
-  unanimity in reference to the plan.—Excitement in the city
-  among all classes—great increase in the scale on which the
-  expedition was planned.—Large preparations made for the
-  expedition.—Review of these preliminary proceedings to the
-  Sicilian expedition.—Advice and influence of Nikias.—Advice
-  and influence of Alkibiadês.—Athens believed herself
-  entitled to be mistress of the islands as well as of the
-  sea.                                                       118-162
-
-
-  CHAPTER LVIII.
-
-  FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE,
-  DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.
-
-  Preparations for the expedition against Sicily—general
-  enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens.—Abundance in
-  the Athenian treasury—display of wealth as well as of
-  force in the armament.—Mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.
-  Numbers and sanctity of the Hermæ.—Violent excitement
-  and religious alarm produced by the act at Athens.—The
-  authors of the act unknown—but it was certainly done by
-  design and conspiracy.—Various parties suspected—great
-  probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians
-  to abandon or postpone the expedition.—The political
-  enemies of Alkibiadês take advantage of the reigning
-  excitement to try and ruin him.—Anxiety of the Athenians
-  to detect and punish the conspirators—rewards offered for
-  information.—Informations given in—commissioners of inquiry
-  appointed.—First accusation of Alkibiadês, of having
-  profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries.—Violent
-  speeches in the assembly against Alkibiadês unfavorably
-  received.—He denies the charge and demands immediate
-  trial—his demand is eluded by his enemies.—Departure of
-  the armament from Peiræus—splendor and exciting character
-  of the spectacle.—Solemnities of parting, on shipboard
-  and on the water’s edge.—Full muster of the armament
-  at Korkyra.—Progress to Rhegium—cold reception by the
-  Italian cities.—Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching
-  armament—disposition to undervalue its magnitude,
-  and even to question its intended coming.—Strenuous
-  exhortations of Hermokratês, to be prepared.—Temper and
-  parties in the Syracusan assembly.—Reply of Athenagoras,
-  the popular orator.—Interposition of the stratêgi to
-  moderate the violence of the debate.—Relative position
-  of Athenagoras and other parties at Syracuse.—Pacific
-  dispositions of Athenagoras.—His general denunciations
-  against the oligarchical youth were well founded.—Active
-  preparations at Syracuse on the approach of the
-  Athenian armament.—Discouragement of the Athenians at
-  Rhegium on learning the truth respecting the poverty
-  of Egesta.—The Athenian generals discuss their plan of
-  action—opinion of Nikias.—Opinion of Alkibiadês.—Opinion
-  of Lamachus.—Superior discernment of Lamachus—plan of
-  Alkibiadês preferred.—Alkibiadês at Messênê—Naxos joins
-  the Athenians. Empty display of the armament.—Alkibiadês
-  at Katana—the Athenians masters of Katana—they establish
-  their station there. Refusal of Kamarina.—Alkibiadês is
-  summoned home to take his trial.—Feelings and proceedings
-  at Athens since the departure of the armament.—Number of
-  citizens imprisoned on suspicion—increased agony of the
-  public mind.—Peisander and Chariklês the commissioners
-  of inquiry.—Information of Diokleidês.—More prisoners
-  arrested—increased terror in the city—Andokidês
-  among the persons imprisoned.—Andokidês is solicited
-  by his fellow-prisoners to stand forward and give
-  information—he complies.—Andokidês designates the
-  authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ—consequence of
-  his revelations.—Questionable authority of Andokidês, as
-  to what he himself really stated in information.—Belief
-  of the Athenians in his information—its tranquillizing
-  effects.—Anxiety and alarm revived, respecting
-  the persons concerned in the profanation of the
-  Eleusinian mysteries.—Revival of the accusation against
-  Alkibiadês.—Indictment presented by Thessalus, son
-  of Kimon, against Alkibiadês.—Resolution to send for
-  Alkibiadês home from Sicily to be tried.—Alkibiadês quits
-  the army, as if to come home: makes his escape at Thurii,
-  and retires to Peloponnesus.—Conduct of the Athenian public
-  in reference to Alkibiadês—how far blamable. Conduct of
-  his enemies.—Mischief to Athens from the banishment of
-  Alkibiadês. Languid operations of the Sicilian armament
-  under Nikias.—Increase of confidence and preparations at
-  Syracuse, arising from the delays of Nikias.—Manœuvre of
-  Nikias from Katana—he lands his forces in the Great Harbor
-  of Syracuse.—Return of the Syracusan army from Katana to
-  the Great Harbor—preparations for fighting Nikias.—Feelings
-  of the ancient soldier.—Harangue of Nikias.—Battle near the
-  Olympieion—victory of the Athenians.—Unabated confidence
-  of the Syracusans—they garrison the Olympieion—Nikias
-  reembarks his army, and returns to Katana.—He determines
-  to take up his winter quarters at Katana, and sends
-  to Athens for reinforcements of horse.—His failure at
-  Messênê, through the betrayal by Alkibiadês.—Salutary
-  lesson to the Syracusans, arising out of the recent
-  defeat—mischiefs to the Athenians from the delay of
-  Nikias.—Confidence of the Athenians at home in Nikias—their
-  good temper—they send to him the reinforcements
-  demanded.—Determined feeling at Syracuse—improved measures
-  of defence—recommendations of Hermokratês.—Enlargement
-  of the fortifications of Syracuse. Improvement of
-  their situation. Increase of the difficulties of
-  Nikias.—Hermokratês and Euphêmus—counter-envoys at
-  Kamarina.—Speech of Euphêmus.—The Kamarinæans maintain
-  practical neutrality.—Winter proceedings of Nikias from
-  his quarters at Katana.—Syracusan envoys sent to solicit
-  aid from Corinth and Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Sparta—his
-  intense hostility to Athens.—Speech of Alkibiadês in the
-  Lacedæmonian assembly.—Great effect of his speech on
-  the Peloponnesians.—Misrepresentations contained in the
-  speech.—Resolutions of the Spartans.—The Lacedæmonians send
-  Gylippus to Syracuse.                                      163-243
-
-
-  CHAPTER LIX.
-
-  FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS,
-  DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES,
-  AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.
-
-  Movements of Nikias in the early spring.—Local condition
-  and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nikias
-  arrived.—Inner and Outer City.—Localities without the wall
-  of the outer city—Epipolæ.—Possibilities of the siege when
-  Nikias first arrived in Sicily—increase of difficulties
-  through his delay.—Increased importance of the upper
-  ground of Epipolæ. Intention of the Syracusans to occupy
-  the summit of Epipolæ.—The summit is surprised by the
-  Athenians.—The success of this surprise was essential
-  to the effective future prosecution of the siege.—First
-  operations of the siege.—Central work of the Athenians
-  on Epipolæ, called The Circle.—First counter-wall of
-  the Syracusans.—Its direction, south of the Athenian
-  circle—its completion.—It is stormed, taken, and destroyed
-  by the Athenians.—Nikias occupies the southern cliff—and
-  prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle.—Second
-  counter-work of the Syracusans—reaching across the marsh,
-  south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus.—This counter-work
-  attacked and taken by Lamachus—general battle—death
-  of Lamachus.—Danger of the Athenian circle and of
-  Nikias—victory of the Athenians.—Entrance of the Athenian
-  fleet into the Great Harbor.—The southern portion of the
-  wall of blockade, across the marsh to the Great Harbor,
-  is prosecuted and nearly finished.—The Syracusans offer
-  no farther obstruction—despondency at Syracuse—increasing
-  closeness of the siege.—Order of the besieging operations
-  successively undertaken by the Athenians.—Triumphant
-  prospects of the Athenians. Disposition among the Sikels
-  and Italian Greeks to favor them.—Conduct of Nikias—his
-  correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.—Confidence of
-  Nikias—comparative languor of his operations.—Approach
-  of Gylippus—he despairs of relieving Syracuse.—Progress
-  of Gylippus, in spite of discouraging reports.—Approach
-  of Gylippus is made known to Nikias. Facility of
-  preventing his farther advance—Nikias despises him, and
-  leaves him to come unobstructed. He lands at Himera in
-  Sicily.—Blindness of Nikias—egregious mistake of letting
-  in Gylippus.—Gylippus levies an army and marches across
-  Sicily from Himera to Syracuse.—The Corinthian Goggylus
-  reaches Syracuse before Gylippus—just in time to hinder
-  the town from capitulating.—Gylippus with his new-levied
-  force enters Syracuse unopposed.—Unaccountable inaction
-  of Nikias.—Vigorous and aggressive measures of Gylippus,
-  immediately on arriving.—Gylippus surprises and captures
-  the Athenian fort of Labdalum.—He begins the construction
-  of a third counter-wall, on the north side of the Athenian
-  circle.—Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium.—Inconveniences
-  of Plemmyrium as a maritime station—mischief which ensues
-  to the Athenian naval strength.—Operations of Gylippus in
-  the field—his defeat.—His decisive victory—the Athenians
-  are shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall
-  is carried on so far as to cut the Athenian line of
-  blockade.—Farther defences provided by Gylippus, joining
-  the higher part of Epipolæ with the city wall.—Confidence
-  of Gylippus and the Syracusans—aggressive plans against
-  the Athenians, even on the sea.—Discouragement of Nikias
-  and the Athenians.—Nikias sends home a despatch to
-  Athens, soliciting reinforcements.—Despatch of Nikias
-  to the Athenian people.—Resolution of the Athenians to
-  send Demosthenês with a second armament.—Remarks upon the
-  despatch of Nikias.—Former despatches of Nikias.—Effect
-  of his despatch upon the Athenians.—Treatment of
-  Nikias by the Athenians.—Capital mistake committed by
-  the Athenians.—Hostilities from Sparta certain and
-  impending.—Resolution of Sparta to invade Attica forthwith,
-  and to send farther reinforcements to Sicily.              243-286
-
-
-  CHAPTER LX.
-
-  FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS
-  AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
-  ARMAMENT IN SICILY.
-
-  Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during
-  the winter of 414-413 B.C.—Invasion of Attica by
-  Agis and the Peloponnesian force—fortification of
-  Dekeleia.—Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse,
-  under Demosthenês.—Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He
-  determines to attack the Athenians at sea.—Naval combat in
-  the harbor of Syracuse—the Athenians victorious.—Gylippus
-  surprises and takes Plemmyrium.—Important consequences
-  of the capture.—Increased spirits and confidence of the
-  Syracusans, even for sea-fight.—Efforts of the Syracusans
-  to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian
-  towns.—Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans
-  in the Great Harbor.—Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement
-  marching to aid Syracuse—Renewed attack by Gylippus
-  on the Athenians.—Disadvantages of the Athenian fleet
-  in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in the
-  narrow space.—Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to
-  the narrow space.—The Syracusans threaten attack upon
-  the Athenian naval station.—Additional preparations
-  of Nikias—battle renewed.—Complete defeat of the
-  Athenians.—Danger of the Athenian armament—arrival of
-  Demosthenês with the second armament.—Voyage of Demosthenês
-  from Korkyra.—Imposing effect of his entry into the Great
-  Harbor.—Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious
-  and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês.—Position and
-  plans of Demosthenês.—Nocturnal march of Demosthenês
-  to surprise Epipolæ, and turn the Syracusan line of
-  defence.—Partial success at first—complete and ruinous
-  defeat finally.—Disorder of the Athenians—great loss
-  in the flight.—Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive
-  plans, of the Syracusans.—Deliberation and different
-  opinions of the Athenian generals.—Demosthenês insists
-  on departing from Sicily—Nikias opposes him.—Demosthenês
-  insists at least on removing out of the Great
-  Harbor.—Nikias refuses to consent to such removal.—The
-  armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither acting nor
-  retiring.—Infatuation of Nikias.—Increase of force and
-  confidence in Syracuse.—Nikias at length consents to
-  retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated.—Eclipse
-  of the moon—Athenian retreat postponed.—Eclipses
-  considered as signs—differently interpreted—opinion of
-  Philochorus.—Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of
-  the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor.—Partial success
-  ashore against Gylippus.—The Syracusans determine to block
-  up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the
-  whole Athenian armament.—Large views of the Syracusans
-  against the power of Athens—new hazards now opened to
-  endanger that power.—Vast numbers, and miscellaneous
-  origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for
-  or against Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the mouth
-  of the harbor.—The Athenians resolve to force their way
-  out—preparations made by the generals.—Exhortations of
-  Nikias on putting the crews aboard.—Agony of Nikias—his
-  efforts to encourage the officers.—Bold and animated
-  language of Gylippus to the Syracusan fleet.—Syracusan
-  arrangements. Condition of the Great Harbor—sympathizing
-  population surrounding it.—Attempt of the Athenian fleet
-  to break out—battle in the Great Harbor.—Long-continued
-  and desperate struggle—intense emotion—total defeat of the
-  Athenians.—Military operations of ancient times—strong
-  emotions which accompanied them.—Causes of the defeat of
-  the Athenians.—Feelings of the victors and vanquished after
-  the battle.—Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make
-  a second attempt—the armament are too much discouraged
-  to obey.—The Athenians determine to retreat by land—they
-  postpone their retreat, under false communications from
-  Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept
-  their retreat.—Retreat of the Athenians—miserable condition
-  of the army.—Wretchedness arising from abandoning the
-  sick and wounded.—Attempt of the generals to maintain
-  some order—energy of Nikias.—Exhortations of Nikias to
-  the suffering army.—Commencement of the retreat—harassed
-  and impeded by the Syracusans.—Continued conflict—no
-  progress made by the retreating army.—Violent storm—effect
-  produced on both parties—change of feeling in the last
-  two years.—Night march of the Athenians, in an altered
-  direction, towards the southern sea.—Separation of
-  the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The
-  first division under Nikias gets across the river
-  Erineus.—The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued,
-  overtaken, and forced to surrender.—Gylippus overtakes
-  and attacks the division of Nikias.—Nikias gets to the
-  river Asinarus—intolerable thirst and suffering of the
-  soldiers—he and his division become prisoners.—Total
-  numbers captured.—Hard treatment and sufferings of
-  the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse.—Treatment of
-  Nikias and Demosthenês—difference of opinion among the
-  conquerors.—Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of
-  Gylippus—both the generals are slain.—Disgrace of Nikias
-  after his death, at Athens—continued respect for the memory
-  of Demosthenês.—Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias.—How
-  far that opinion is just.—Opinion of the Athenians about
-  Nikias—their steady over-confidence and over-esteem
-  for him, arising from his respectable and religious
-  character.—Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest
-  personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed. 287-352
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXI.
-
-  FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY,
-  DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT
-  ATHENS.
-
-  Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in
-  Sicily.—Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its
-  ruinous effects upon Athens.—Athens becomes a
-  military post—heavy duty in arms imposed upon the
-  citizens.—Financial pressure.—Athens dismisses her
-  Thracian mercenaries—massacre at Mykalêssus.—The Thracians
-  driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.—Athenian
-  station at Naupaktus—decline of the naval superiority of
-  Athens.—Naval battle near Naupaktus—indecisive result.—Last
-  news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army
-  there not officially made known to them.—Reluctance of
-  the Athenians to believe the full truth.—Terror and
-  affliction at Athens.—Energetic resolutions adopted by
-  the Athenians—Board of Probûli.—Prodigious effect of the
-  catastrophe upon all Greeks—enemies and allies of Athens
-  as well as neutrals—and even on the Persians.—Motions
-  of king Agis.—The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in
-  revolting from Athens—the Lesbians also apply, and
-  are preferred.—The Chians, with the same view, make
-  application to Sparta.—Envoys from Tissaphernês and
-  Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time.—Alkibiadês
-  at Sparta—his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians
-  to send aid to Chios.—Synod of the Peloponnesian allies
-  at Corinth—measures resolved.—Isthmian festival—scruples
-  of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspicions of
-  Athens.—Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios—it
-  is defeated by the Athenians.—Small squadron starts
-  from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to
-  Chios.—Energetic advice of Alkibiadês—his great usefulness
-  to Sparta.—Arrival of Alkibiadês at Chios—revolt of the
-  island from Athens.—General population of Chios was
-  disinclined to revolt from Athens.—Dismay occasioned at
-  Athens by the revolt of Chios—the Athenians set free
-  and appropriate their reserved fund.—Athenian force
-  despatched to Chios under Strombichidês.—Activity of
-  the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian
-  allies—Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt.—First
-  alliance between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernês,
-  concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus.—Dishonorable and
-  disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.—Energetic efforts
-  of Athens—democratical revolution at Samos.—Peloponnesian
-  fleet at Kenchreæ—Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral
-  to Ionia.—Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos.—Ill
-  success of the Chians—Lesbos is maintained by the
-  Athenians.—Harassing operations of the Athenians against
-  Chios.—Hardships suffered by the Chians—prosperity
-  of the island up to this time.—Fresh forces from
-  Athens—victory of the Athenians near Milêtus.—Fresh
-  Peloponnesian forces arrive—the Athenians retire, pursuant
-  to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus.—Capture of
-  Iasus by the Peloponnesians—rich plunder—Amorgês made
-  prisoner.—Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the
-  Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the
-  future.—Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos—unexpected
-  renovation of the navy of Athens.—Astyochus at Chios and
-  on the opposite coast.—Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at
-  Chios—disagreement between him and Astyochus.—Astyochus
-  abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus—accident whereby
-  he escaped the Athenian fleet.—The Athenians establish a
-  fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island.—Dorieus
-  arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii,
-  to join Astyochus—maritime contests near Knidus.—Second
-  Peloponnesian treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by
-  Astyochus and Theramenês.—Comparison of the second
-  treaty with the first.—Arrival of a fresh Peloponnesian
-  squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus—Lichas comes out as
-  Spartan commissioner.—Astyochus goes with the fleet from
-  Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats
-  the Athenian squadron under Charmînus.—Peloponnesian
-  fleet at Knidus—double dealing of Tissaphernês—breach
-  between him and Lichas.—Peloponnesian fleet masters
-  Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island.—Long
-  inaction of the fleet at Rhodes—paralyzing intrigues of
-  Tissaphernês—corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers.      353-402
-
-
-
-
-HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LV.
-
-FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.
-
-
-My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the
-Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the
-Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.
-
-This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the
-defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and
-Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety
-of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at
-Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading
-them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general
-principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties
-of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had
-been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the
-Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold
-Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore
-Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the
-revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus,
-Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however,
-were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose
-voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the
-tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense
-for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy.
-Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave
-them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property.
-Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens,
-together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to
-Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to
-take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all
-captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore
-Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all
-the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.
-
-Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should
-have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by
-land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be
-guaranteed.
-
-The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury
-to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which
-might arise.[1]
-
-  [1] Thucyd. v, 17-29.
-
-Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur
-as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by
-mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the
-oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as
-many principal Lacedæmonians.
-
-Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as
-it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still,
-there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent
-but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians
-were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and
-Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the
-Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians
-also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of
-them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided
-that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without
-consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought
-proper.[2] Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful
-members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.
-
-  [2] Thucyd. v, 18.
-
-So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however,
-that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they
-resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking
-up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their
-captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact
-that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now
-expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it,
-through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians
-had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border
-territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to
-fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into
-the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.[3]
-
-  [3] Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76.
-
-Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans
-proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine
-whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions
-required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very
-great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to
-have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing
-such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias
-gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot
-conferred.[4]
-
-  [4] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
-
-The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all
-the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras
-with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These
-envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce
-its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command
-Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should
-surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these
-envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic
-were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out
-of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government,
-pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place
-against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled,
-the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent
-to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes
-of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found
-this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory
-orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly
-be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away,
-and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps
-the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater
-than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the
-population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to
-be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians
-still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of
-the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor
-was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and
-others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back
-to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice
-of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them
-to compliance were fruitless.[5]
-
-  [5] Thucyd. v, 21, 22.
-
-The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed
-their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should
-execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of
-forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one
-of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to
-enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens,
-at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos,
-if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the
-moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided
-pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the
-known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês.
-The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing
-of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias
-or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they
-saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty
-seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and
-perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance
-between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the
-deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives
-should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the
-two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance.
-Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of
-the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to
-conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was
-the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however,
-of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians
-engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any
-rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision
-indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians
-respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of
-peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if
-not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by
-themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.
-
-An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time
-to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the
-envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or two after
-the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both
-sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually
-renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might
-by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without
-violating the oath.[6] Moreover, the treaty was directed to be
-inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at
-Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens.
-
-  [6] Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been
-  drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian
-  envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people;
-  then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second
-  treaty and the first (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, v, 24), may have been
-  more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian
-  envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the
-  manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of
-  Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.
-
-The most important result of this new alliance was something
-not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well
-assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it
-was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith
-restored.[7]
-
-  [7] Thucyd. v, 24.
-
-Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent
-feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian
-inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadês was
-competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated
-presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to
-assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important
-after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus
-parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her
-second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what
-was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last
-three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the
-possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided
-advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which
-had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses.
-This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of
-peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the
-commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal
-and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had
-been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for
-the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before
-she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized
-any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do
-so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as
-made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity
-would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked
-indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second
-treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to
-the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with
-little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta
-could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance
-was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos, not
-less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little
-doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence,
-she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives:
-for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we
-grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might
-have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta
-with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that
-which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original
-proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years
-before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but
-before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but
-merely said, through their envoys, “Give us the men in the island,
-and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance.”[8] At that
-moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the
-proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also
-plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled
-to make a better bargain. But _now_, there were no reasons in its
-favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with
-the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material
-importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides,
-after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into
-execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the
-best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had
-procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before
-she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position,
-accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the
-obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit,
-and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved
-unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace
-from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydidês himself[9] admits, no
-peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.
-
-  [8] Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς
-  σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν
-  καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν,
-  ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.
-
-  [9] Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc.
-
-Thucydidês states on more than one occasion, and it was the
-sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the
-peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of
-disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;[10] alluding
-chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other
-matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious
-losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions
-of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and
-short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the
-men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away
-this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes
-which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and
-nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which
-she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation
-of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as
-this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein
-both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors
-amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious
-assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory
-orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser,
-with his criminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an
-inferior successor, the lamp-maker[11] Hyperbolus, and leaving the
-Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for
-birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained
-no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to
-enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: “Wait, as you are
-entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part
-of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or,
-if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which
-they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of
-all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in
-exchange for the captives.”
-
-  [10] Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων
-  μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς.—(Νικίας)
-  λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ
-  (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46)—Οἷς πρῶτον
-  μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις, etc.
-
-  [11] Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.
-
-The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had
-forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of
-enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom
-of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first
-blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors
-Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which
-could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas
-to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and
-bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not
-surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered
-that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was
-concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained
-unperformed.[12] The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her
-persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So
-also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the
-Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with
-Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice
-with Athens, terminable at ten days’ notice on either side.[13]
-
-  [12] Thucyd. v, 21-35.
-
-  [13] Thucyd. v, 32.
-
-In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and
-free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were
-established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances
-of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians
-had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful
-among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important
-to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the
-Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had
-the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the
-remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed
-that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in
-their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which
-was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were
-not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian
-cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the
-Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms
-along with Athens,[14] for the purpose of constraining them to
-accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which
-these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both
-by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined
-to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any
-written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their
-confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the
-facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the
-surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian
-garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none
-but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made
-in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously
-altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None
-of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been
-performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that
-they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply
-regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.[15] Their
-remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the
-summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered
-themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from
-Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.[16]
-
-  [14] Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ’ Ἀθηναίων τούτους,
-  ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· ~χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἄνευ
-  ξυγγραφῆς~, ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους
-  εἶναι.
-
-  [15] Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ
-  γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον
-  διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ
-  ~καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες~, etc.
-
-  [16] Thucyd. v, 35. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ
-  θέρει τούτῳ, etc.
-
-The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But
-the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were
-Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted
-from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though
-favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus
-acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her
-promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta
-almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The
-many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the
-demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel
-with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater
-forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens.
-Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidês
-and Euklês: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of
-Nikias.
-
-So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of
-states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency
-of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now
-springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that
-the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos
-therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of
-Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power,
-and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting
-war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both
-sides;[17] while her military force was just now farther strengthened
-by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart
-a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth
-and station, to receive constant military training at the public
-expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves,
-apart from the other citizens.[18] To a democratical government like
-Argos, such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant
-with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present
-moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only
-of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with
-Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan
-confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something
-like headship in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [17] Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians,
-  δίχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα.
-
-  He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to
-  prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well
-  as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that
-  the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding
-  the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle
-  of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years
-  later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date
-  in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress.
-
-  [18] Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ~ἐκ
-  πολλοῦ~ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε.
-
-  Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this
-  Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this
-  time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not
-  regard the expression of Thucydidês ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a
-  time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For
-  Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would
-  be a _long_ time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian
-  democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping
-  up this select regiment during all the period of their long
-  peace, just now coming to an end.
-
-The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing
-them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had
-mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had
-separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get
-back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and
-Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies,
-especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that
-article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens
-and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that
-they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as
-if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens
-against the confederacy.[19] And the alarm, once roused, was still
-farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta
-and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the
-restoration of the Spartan captives.
-
-  [19] Thucyd. v, 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι
-  δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.
-
-Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the
-unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened
-in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own,
-first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring
-from the conferences at Sparta,—where the recent alliance between
-the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the
-latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept
-the peace,—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate
-what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the
-leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step
-forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were
-openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose,
-into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state
-which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in
-all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred
-of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a
-board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers
-to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection,
-there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the
-Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians,
-who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both
-by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their
-long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were
-accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they
-might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those
-two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the
-public assembly.[20]
-
-  [20] Thucyd. v, 28.
-
-Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the
-Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling
-themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of
-Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made
-the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And
-here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the
-secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea,
-being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in
-Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a
-year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.[21] Tegea,
-situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed,
-was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as
-well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia
-was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member
-of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for
-herself[22] a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of
-village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and
-comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest
-had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a
-period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even
-subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under
-the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to
-render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she
-was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and
-for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near
-to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have
-been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing
-embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the
-confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But
-now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as
-motive for interference.
-
-  [21] Thucyd. iv, 134.
-
-  [22] Thucyd. v, 29. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας
-  κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ
-  ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ
-  καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.
-
-  As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the
-  confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and
-  imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of
-  Elis and Lepreum.
-
-To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any
-of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the
-ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta;
-especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by
-insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of
-the confederacy.[23] Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably
-operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such
-apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and
-protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy
-of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta[24] (for so it was
-considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together
-with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent,
-to follow the example.
-
-  [23] Thucyd. i, 125.
-
-  [24] Thucyd. v, 29. ~Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων~, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη
-  Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο,
-  νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς
-  Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι’ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, etc.
-
-In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of
-the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it
-necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going
-on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous
-remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they
-had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and
-organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They
-(the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and
-perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal
-vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the
-peace,—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy,
-that the decision of the majority should be binding on all,
-except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes.”
-Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian,
-Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,[25] etc., the Corinthians replied
-with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim
-their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not
-procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium:
-since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had
-no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their
-resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their
-stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that
-reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had
-himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each
-member with reference to his own pious feeling. “It _was_ a religious
-impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from
-acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the
-majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from
-the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they
-revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate
-oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians
-were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves
-free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after
-consultation with our friends here present.” With this unsatisfactory
-answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet
-some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the
-purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of
-alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their
-side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again
-at the next conference.[26]
-
-  [25] Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων,
-  ὅσοι οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ
-  πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ~ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο, οὐ
-  δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς~, etc.
-
-  [26] Thucyd. v, 30.
-
-Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new
-Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation,
-yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme.
-They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of
-Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt,
-apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very
-old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends,
-who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused
-all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this
-category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left
-to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did
-not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the
-Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from
-aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the
-oligarchy at Sparta:[27] they were linked together by communion of
-interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of
-Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might
-perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of
-these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting
-Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse,
-the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new
-project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians,
-and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident
-so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they
-speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join
-the new confederacy.
-
-  [27] Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες
-  ἡσύχαζον, ~περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων~, καὶ νομίζοντες
-  σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον
-  ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.
-
-  These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear,
-  and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators,
-  as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would
-  undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted
-  (with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as
-  a gloss, and thus to construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb,
-  “waiting to see the event,” or literally, “keeping a look-out
-  about them.” But taking the text as it now stands, the sense
-  which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.
-
-  Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι “slighted or despised
-  by the Lacedæmonians.” But in the first place, this is not true
-  as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we
-  ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before
-  νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would
-  then be in opposite directions. “The Bœotians, though despised
-  by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian
-  democracy dangerous.” And this is the sense which Haack actually
-  proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι “feeling
-  themselves slighted;” and the latter says, “The Bœotians and
-  Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt
-  that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for
-  they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than
-  the constitution of Sparta.” But this again puts an inadmissible
-  meaning on ἡσύχαζον, which means “stood as they were.” The
-  Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two
-  positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves
-  with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to _remain
-  as they are_, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties
-  to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we
-  should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ.
-
-  I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean “to
-  slight or despise,” but sometimes “to leave alone, to take
-  no notice of, to abstain from interfering.” Thus, Thucyd. i,
-  24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δεόμενοι μὴ
-  σφᾶς ~περιορᾶν~ φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοὺς
-  Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς ὄντας ~περιορᾶτε~, etc. The same
-  is the sense of περιϊδεῖν and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these
-  passages there is no idea of _contempt_ implied in the word: the
-  “leaving alone” or “abstaining from interference,” proceeds from
-  feelings quite different from contempt.
-
-  So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the
-  _passive_ participle in this sense. Thucydidês, having just
-  described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to
-  prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the
-  words here in discussion) that _no_ similar _interference_ was
-  resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from
-  joining her: “The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were,
-  _left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians_, and thinking the
-  Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of
-  Sparta.”
-
-The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting from
-Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising
-out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates
-had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the
-Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to
-extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies.
-To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half
-their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it,
-under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the
-Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When
-the Peloponnesian war began,[28] and the Lacedæmonians began to call
-for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small
-as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing
-agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing
-to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at
-the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement,
-to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the
-payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and
-when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection
-of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed
-to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly
-in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more
-disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy
-of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of
-the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust
-bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military
-force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in
-their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a
-body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The
-latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the
-Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies,
-contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general
-confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city
-should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which
-it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to
-tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted.
-After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly
-embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of
-joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.[29]
-
-  [28] Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον·
-  ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἠλεῖοι
-  ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ’ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.
-
-  For the _agreement_ here alluded to, see a few lines forward.
-
-  [29] Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ
-  ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας
-  καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc.
-
-  Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the
-  Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage.
-  It was extremely important to such of the confederates as
-  were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or
-  subject-allies.
-
-  Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal
-  to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of
-  Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the
-  agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war
-  by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to
-  enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should
-  lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would
-  be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could
-  bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a
-  covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own
-  imperial _immediate_ members, and the _mediate_ or subordinate
-  dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego
-  the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter
-  was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the
-  confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the
-  same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should
-  reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should
-  be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in
-  the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of
-  Mantineia, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had
-  violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified
-  in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the
-  autonomy of the latter.
-
-That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, had
-now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and
-Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the
-junction of that city, seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus
-next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success
-we are not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos,
-seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing
-the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the
-proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand
-by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened
-by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been
-so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta
-as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of
-confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther
-extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position
-as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace,
-while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta
-and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this
-embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again
-entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already
-once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher
-in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were
-entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them
-from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice, such
-as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal,
-they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to
-conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far
-the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and
-back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined
-to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the
-general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this
-answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter
-of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause
-as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The
-Bœotians maintained their ten days’ armistice; and the Corinthians
-were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace _de
-facto_, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.[30]
-
-  [30] Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς
-  Ἀθηναίους.
-
-  Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “By ἄσπονδος is meant a mere
-  agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion.
-  And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their
-  word very different from the breach of their oath.”
-
-  Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes.
-  There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There
-  was a simple absence of hostilities, _de facto_, not arising out
-  of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, i, 66;
-  iii, 25, 26.
-
-  The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of
-  Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better
-  reason, have declined to conclude the ten day’s armistice with
-  the _Bœotians_, because these latter still remained allies of
-  Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas
-  the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be
-  considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find
-  them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of
-  the latter.
-
-Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which
-they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the
-request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of
-Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory,
-and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had
-erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though
-they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and
-were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened
-spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia,
-the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and
-Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on
-the frontiers of Elis.[31] These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom
-Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had
-been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose.
-But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished
-commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the
-serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to
-plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they
-had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly
-assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims
-personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course
-greater fear of the bravest.[32]
-
-  [31] Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously
-  enfranchised, or the sons of such.
-
-  [32] Thucyd. iv, 80.
-
-It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots
-that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger—real
-or supposed—from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens
-at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of
-Sphakteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these
-men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes
-of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so
-looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already
-in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted
-suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary
-disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their
-property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors,
-from every act either of purchase or sale.[33] This species of
-disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers
-were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be
-over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly
-from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and
-wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended
-that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and
-organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable
-us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the
-regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a
-long imprisonment—justly pointed out by modern historians—would not
-weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.
-
-  [33] Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε
-  μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.
-
-Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear
-nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to
-them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death
-the male population of military age, selling the women and children
-into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two
-years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it,
-nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him,
-and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be
-sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised
-at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê
-and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native
-population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred
-spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were
-too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were
-now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis
-had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the
-gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle,
-the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian
-exiles.[34] They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula
-of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by
-the Chalkidians of Thrace.[35]
-
-  [34] Thucyd. v, 32.
-
-  [35] Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold
-  in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this place.
-
-Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian
-states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still
-subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on
-the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled.
-The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had
-seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos,
-ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head
-of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success.
-Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well
-as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain
-the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice,
-and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which
-they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover,
-the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the
-prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach
-them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the
-summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October,
-B.C. 421—the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were
-nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things
-this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors,
-two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile to peace with
-Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.[36] And we
-may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public
-policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute
-of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional
-monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in
-principle and detail.
-
-  [36] Thucyd. v, 36.
-
-The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the
-settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest
-Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But,
-after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that
-the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and
-Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,[37] originated, in
-concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private
-underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance.
-This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between
-Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would
-grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost
-them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were
-urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring
-Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that
-they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered
-to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily
-go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.[38]
-
-  [37] Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ
-  Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.
-
-  [38] Thucyd. v, 36.
-
-Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the
-Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home
-prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for
-on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators
-in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about
-alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly
-encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes
-as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on
-their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and
-the wishes of these Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily
-into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked
-favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the
-requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance
-with Argos.
-
-That sanction was to be obtained from “the Four Senates of the
-Bœotians;” bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known.
-But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the
-bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course,
-even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans
-accordingly.[39] They proposed to these four Senates a resolution
-in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian
-federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which
-might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their
-particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with
-the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual
-defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common
-consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on
-the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth
-had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties
-named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But
-the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive
-terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther
-afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and
-Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the
-present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which
-might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully
-contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures
-which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an
-oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control
-its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found
-themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even
-hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta
-by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her.
-Nor did the bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications
-with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole
-plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly,
-under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther
-proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left
-Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained
-unexecuted.[40]
-
-  [39] Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα
-  ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν ... ταῖς τέσσαρσι
-  βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσι.
-
-  [40] Thucyd. v, 38.
-
-But the anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their
-schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency
-of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon
-Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range
-between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê,
-and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led
-through Phylê[41]—had been an Athenian possession, until six months
-before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the
-Bœotians.[42] A special provision of the treaty between Athens
-and Sparta, prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and
-Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia,
-to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as
-of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to
-Athens she might be induced to surrender Pylos. The Bœotians refused
-compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should
-enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the
-Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the
-latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter
-into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly
-bent upon getting possession of Panaktum; while the prospect of
-breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly
-that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings,
-the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with
-Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for
-surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to
-the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been
-exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect
-that the district round it should always remain without resident
-inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common
-pasture.
-
-  [41] See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch.
-  xvii, p. 370.
-
-  [42] Thucyd. v, 3.
-
-These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout
-the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the
-destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the
-middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to
-be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably
-surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another
-quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal
-of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no
-progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while
-their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of
-realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But
-when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate
-alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their
-disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future.
-Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been
-concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole
-proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians
-to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being
-conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession.
-Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two
-contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished
-no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw
-themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta,
-and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto
-regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without
-a moment’s delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians
-much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press
-for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to
-obtain the best terms they could.
-
-To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently acceptable,
-the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring
-about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys
-at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should
-be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a
-peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such
-a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at
-an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the
-question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon
-the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement.
-Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but
-if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods
-of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either
-party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for
-the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full
-liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of
-Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the
-vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will
-be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this
-date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions
-on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the
-victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined.
-The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old
-practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration
-which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now
-appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians,
-the most old-fashioned people in Greece.[43] Yet since they hazarded
-nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely
-anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation
-of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew
-up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back
-to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public
-assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted,
-the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the
-Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.
-
-Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan
-ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with
-Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means—through the possession
-of Panaktum—of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they
-were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês
-and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on
-to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the
-time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at
-Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead
-of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to
-the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at
-Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him
-all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens,
-at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact:
-Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus _restored_, he pretended;
-for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and
-he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.[44]
-
-  [43] Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει
-  μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον
-  ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.
-
-  By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that
-  the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by
-  the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on
-  a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but
-  seemingly no official signature.
-
-  [44] Thucyd. v. 42.
-
-But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been
-reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance
-concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at
-Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical
-governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for
-keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum
-and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the
-demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest
-marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened
-by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being
-tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the
-enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated
-still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed
-items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent
-notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of the
-conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the
-restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she
-on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost
-everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought
-to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the
-harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.[45]
-
-  [45] Thucyd. v. 42.
-
-Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident
-facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing,
-were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation
-against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from
-their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of
-Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of
-the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia,
-and giving to it a substantive aim.
-
-The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable
-man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about
-thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered
-an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was
-the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage
-through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that
-lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,[46] that he stepped
-speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also
-through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he
-was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left
-an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother
-Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at
-the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme
-of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A
-Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and
-a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch
-over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens
-was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of
-Periklês and his brother Ariphron.[47] His violent passions, love of
-enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,[48]
-were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout
-his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and
-mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,[49] and even
-by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the
-age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his
-earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training,
-procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations
-of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public
-palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were
-even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them.
-Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting
-influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an
-age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was
-not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of
-others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The
-anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both
-these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the
-particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal
-and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly
-marked and sufficiently established in all.
-
-  [46] Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης ... ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε
-  νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.
-
-  The expression cf Plutarch, however, ἔτι μειράκιον, seems an
-  exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).
-
-  Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom
-  they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a
-  _young man_ to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial
-  age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35).
-
-  [47] Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c.
-  2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34;
-  Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.
-
-  [48] Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ~ὃ οὐκ ἄν
-  τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν~.
-
-  This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth
-  of Alkibiadês, in the Symposion, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato,
-  Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3.
-
-  Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25.
-
-  Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον
-  ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς
-  ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).
-
-  [49] I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words,
-  the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i,
-  2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ’ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν
-  γυναικῶν ~θηρώμενος~, etc.
-
-A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its
-forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so
-circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were
-indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort
-of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the
-battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents:
-when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês
-violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of
-the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the
-presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion,
-and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one,
-which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes
-the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a
-copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,[50] a rival chorêgus, in the
-public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes
-Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager
-of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology;
-he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmon, against whom an indictment
-had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with
-his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called
-Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on
-for trial.[51] Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared
-to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read
-with amazement the tissue of lawlessness[52] which marked his private
-life; a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional
-mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal,
-judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the
-citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities
-between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding
-the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions
-limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or
-discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the
-current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom
-they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech
-which Thucydidês[53] ascribes to Alkibiadês before the Athenian
-public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social
-position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just
-morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts
-in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least
-tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints
-of the democracy.
-
-  [50] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi, 16; Antipho
-  apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.
-
-  [51] Athenæus, ix, p. 407.
-
-  [52] Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidês,
-  which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ
-  πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ~παρανομίας~ ἐς τὴν
-  δίαιταν, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28.
-  τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν ~παρανομίαν~.
-
-  The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the
-  λοιδορία of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525).
-
-  The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the
-  Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p.
-  1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical
-  compositions. Τοῦτο δ’, Ἀλκιβιάδην εὑρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
-  πολλῷ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς,
-  τὰ δ’ ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προῃρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας
-  πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν
-  ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυψάμενον.
-
-  Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad
-  tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his
-  proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence
-  here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out.
-
-  [53] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2;
-  Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.
-
-  I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to
-  Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217)
-  can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as
-  Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the
-  general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon,
-  Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2.
-
-  Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures
-  of the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic
-  teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and
-  the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement
-  and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the
-  Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rivales, where the scene is
-  laid in the house of a γραμματιστὴς, or schoolmaster. In the
-  Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with
-  these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting
-  flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will.
-  Οὕτω χρὴ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα
-  καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα
-  (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).
-
-  See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as
-  a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the
-  beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69.
-
-  There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek
-  youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this
-  society and conversation of their boyish years; though the
-  subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be
-  produced and discussed.
-
-Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês stood
-distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the
-army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then
-hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers
-in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger;
-owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in
-the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also
-served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and
-had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês, by
-protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man,
-also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive
-duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with
-sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort,
-though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so
-fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape
-of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went
-beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves
-off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to
-have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when
-various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud
-applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel
-and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried
-in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy
-among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him
-by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in
-after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.[54]
-
-  [54] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.
-
-To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and preëminence,
-a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was
-indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the
-society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,[55] Prodikus,
-Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. His
-intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and
-is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately
-with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe
-Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês—like the oligarchical
-Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter—was attracted
-to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his
-suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting
-new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely
-illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long
-cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby
-the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete,
-when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out
-of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in
-themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental
-activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar
-value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate;
-with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the
-knack from Sokratês,[56] and to copy his formidable string of
-interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the
-poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom
-this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed
-his life to the generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa, but had also
-learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the
-philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.[57]
-But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with
-the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty,
-or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify
-an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and
-ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their
-after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and
-intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes
-of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and
-Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense of
-the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and to the
-rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society
-was highly useful.[58] It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition,
-including mental accomplishments as well as political success:
-it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them
-as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded:
-it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and
-obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even
-suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which
-their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would
-hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they
-intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to
-learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference
-between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to
-enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics.
-Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had
-thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely
-their purpose in the pursuit.[59]
-
-  [55] See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.
-
-  [56] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47.
-
-  Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους
-  ὡμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
-  ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες
-  οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα
-  πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά.... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων
-  ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσῄεσαν, οὐδὲ
-  γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον
-  ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πóλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ
-  Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23;
-  c. 22, p. 33.
-
-  Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the
-  society of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same
-  objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the
-  Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.
-
-  “Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt
-  comici, docere cum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et
-  contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato.”
-
-  The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired
-  by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission
-  of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if
-  we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon.
-  Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by
-  any one as teacher of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the
-  other direction. Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222.
-
-  [57] Plato, Symposium, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.
-
-  [58] See the representation, given in the Protagoras of Plato,
-  of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes
-  to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which
-  Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction.
-  Plato, Protagoras, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p.
-  318, etc.: compare also Plato, Meno. p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4. p.
-  449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between
-  teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc.
-
-  It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the
-  polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as
-  we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But
-  modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more
-  than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their
-  favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.
-
-  This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.
-
-  [59] I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who
-  repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the
-  Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as “ensnared by the Sophists,”
-  while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from
-  their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp.
-  312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes
-  so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists; when he describes
-  the Sophists as “pretenders to wisdom;” as “a new school;” as
-  “teaching that there was no real difference between truth and
-  falsehood, right and wrong,” etc.
-
-  All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises
-  from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense
-  of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the
-  word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation
-  of the word at Athens, it meant not a _school_ of persons
-  professing common doctrines, but a _class_ of men bearing the
-  same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous
-  objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists
-  were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative,
-  partly professional; but they differed widely from each other,
-  both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont.
-  Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made
-  himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his
-  opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was
-  called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he
-  sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money,
-  and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so
-  fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no
-  essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds
-  the dikasts, “Recollect that you Athenians put to death _the
-  Sophist Sokratês_, because he was shown to have been the teacher
-  of Kritias,” (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the
-  word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to
-  make against Sokratês, who had then been dead more than forty
-  years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just
-  as he would have said, _Hippokratês the physician_, _Pheidias
-  the sculptor_, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and
-  Isokratês sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.).
-  The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put forth by Plato
-  and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called by the name
-  Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which
-  Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls “the new School of
-  the Sophists;” as “a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or
-  falsehood, right or wrong,” etc. See a striking passage in the
-  Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think,
-  that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês,
-  will be careful how he advances them against the general
-  profession to which Sokratês belonged.
-
-  That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of
-  Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters,
-  professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not
-  doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme
-  hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body
-  of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively
-  Sokratês and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that
-  the well-known Apologue, called the _Choice of Hercules_, was the
-  work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture
-  (Xenophon, Memor. ii, 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue
-  remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with
-  which it presents one of the most important points of view of
-  moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of
-  books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratês, Plato,
-  or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the
-  class to which he belonged, as teaching “that there was no real
-  difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood,” etc.,
-  is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of
-  Dr. Thirlwall’s history.
-
-  I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of
-  the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492-493), refutes the imputation
-  against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth.
-  He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that
-  morality which was received as true and just in their age and
-  society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he
-  says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice
-  and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far
-  Plato or Sokratês were right in condemning the received morality
-  of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the
-  great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what
-  was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there
-  were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who
-  taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the
-  great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.
-
-  Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the
-  corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal
-  beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among
-  them (Memorab. i, 2. 24, 25).
-
-Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed
-the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be
-found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently.
-The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost
-no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as
-could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled
-youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life.
-But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and
-ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life
-of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation,
-public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends
-which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of
-aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out
-to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of
-Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of
-the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should
-certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.
-
-At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it
-was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public
-life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by private
-enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent
-demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that
-position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded
-him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary
-energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to
-the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination
-of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in
-execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and
-what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility
-of character[60] and consummate power of adapting himself to new
-habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances
-required. Like Themistoklês, whom he resembled as well in ability and
-vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means,
-Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a
-secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed
-enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished
-only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at
-least according to the high standard of Athens.[61] But his career
-affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action
-and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by
-the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of
-individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling
-citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous
-ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in
-the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private
-fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself
-by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by
-overthrowing[62] the constitution to make himself master of the
-persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired
-confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public
-like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure
-to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration
-for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting
-sentiments: “The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still
-wished to have him,” was said in the latter years of his life by a
-contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered
-in regard to him: “You ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city
-at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to
-his behavior.”[63] Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an
-exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his
-capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for
-showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated
-his own personal actions.
-
-  [60] Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii,
-  p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.
-
-  Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ’ ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the
-  Philoktêtês of Sophoklês.
-
-  [61] I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from
-  Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much
-  more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of
-  Demosthenês (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the
-  eloquence of Alkibiadês (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch,
-  Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.
-
-  Antisthenês, companion and pupil of Sokratês, and originator of
-  what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally
-  acquainted with Alkibiadês, was full of admiration for his
-  extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly,
-  and audacious, but unschooled, ~ἀπαίδευτον~. His scandals about
-  the lawless life of Alkibiadês, however, exceed what we can
-  reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenês ap.
-  Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, p. 534). Antisthenês had composed a
-  dialogue called Alkibiadês (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15).
-
-  See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G.
-  Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19).
-
-  The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanês, Pherekratês,
-  and others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels
-  against the excesses of Alkibiadês, real or supposed. There was
-  a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadês,
-  who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity,
-  had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the
-  Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græ. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες
-  (vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanês Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166:
-  also Meineke’s first volume, Historia Critica Comic. Græc. pp.
-  124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann’s _Mythologus_, on
-  the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.
-
-  [62] Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p.
-  800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of
-  the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself
-  into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the
-  character of Alkibiadês. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp.
-  491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of
-  the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadês the first.
-
-  [63] Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16;
-  Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.
-
-Mentioning Alkibiadês now for the first time, I have somewhat
-anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea
-of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment
-which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion’s whelp was yet
-young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his
-full-grown claws.
-
-He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long
-before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in
-his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical:
-his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his opposition
-to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced
-an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian
-government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But
-Alkibiadês himself, in commencing political life, departed from this
-family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical
-and philo-Laconian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his
-natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same
-general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards
-became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put
-himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to
-revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his
-grandfather had broken off.[64]
-
-  [64] Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 352,
-  sect. 27-30.
-
-  Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as
-  being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.
-
-To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good
-treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens.
-Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated
-upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of
-their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated
-both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration
-of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but
-tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent
-of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish
-hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of
-acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of
-Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadês thus became a partisan of the blind
-and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives
-on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point
-which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his
-advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding
-important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known
-for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans
-should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme
-reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally
-preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did
-not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had
-Alkibiadês yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable.
-But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the
-quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,[65]
-he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an
-energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.
-
-  [65] Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν
-  ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς
-  σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν
-  προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος
-  αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο
-  ἀνανεώσασθαι. ~Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι~ τό τε πρῶτον
-  ἀντεῖπεν, etc.
-
-The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new
-political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more
-favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month
-passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one
-of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had
-yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for
-altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them
-as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous
-confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention
-naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful
-friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by
-the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of
-connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended
-by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the
-Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had
-attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had
-less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful
-allies, Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such
-acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to
-the Athenians.
-
-It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the
-growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans
-of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived
-at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of
-Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that
-the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the
-Bœotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of
-displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time
-was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent
-his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at
-the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents
-at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of
-his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens
-in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be
-admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation
-at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were
-negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent
-thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without
-allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no
-sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with
-Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial
-state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in
-Peloponnesus,—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and
-despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint
-embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian:[66] the alliance between
-these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a
-second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a
-party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.[67]
-
-  [66] Thucyd. v, 43.
-
-  [67] Thucyd. v, 48.
-
-But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of
-their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias
-and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting
-alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without
-a moment’s delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,[68]
-Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all
-matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all
-alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta
-with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of
-evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos
-should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum.
-Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength
-of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining
-an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition: and when
-the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had
-their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an
-audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made,
-on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly
-favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed
-lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding
-out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian
-party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus
-preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.
-
-  [68] Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ~κατὰ
-  τάχος~, etc.
-
-To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular
-manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private
-guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their
-two families.[69] This probably assisted in procuring for him a
-secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them
-with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public
-assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in
-the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should
-succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly
-turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of
-the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with
-full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to
-act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions.
-He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come,
-not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain,
-discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain
-nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed
-points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak
-emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident
-that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which
-his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing.
-He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to
-Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his
-counsel.[70] The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity
-of these suggestions,[71] and still more delighted to find that the
-man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was
-prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them,
-probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he
-had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta
-only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming
-that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party,
-under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of
-Alkibiadês, they could gain _his_ strenuous advocacy and influence
-also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly,
-they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting
-but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês
-desired, and had probably required them to promise.
-
-  [69] Thucyd. viii, 6. Ἐνδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα
-  φίλος—ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν
-  ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο.
-
-  I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of
-  Endius was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was
-  nevertheless named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the
-  peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in
-  which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really
-  named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to
-  general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be
-  nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark
-  of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and
-  most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to explain here is,
-  how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês.
-  Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the
-  terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then
-  have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself,
-  nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family,
-  that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his
-  Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but)
-  from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian
-  family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to
-  his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of
-  the genitive of his real father’s name. Doubtless this was an
-  anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are
-  to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, Thucydidês
-  would not have stepped aside to particularize it.
-
-  [70] Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ
-  Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, ~πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς~,
-  ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε
-  αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (~πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους~, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν
-  ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἄλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε
-  ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ~ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς
-  οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς
-  Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ~.
-
-  [71] Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν ~ὅρκους ἔδωκεν
-  αὐτοῖς~, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας
-  αὐτῷ, καὶ ~θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν~, ὡς οὐ τοῦ
-  τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
-
-Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced;
-upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put
-the question to them, upon what footing they came?[72] what powers
-they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had
-brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came
-to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with
-which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom
-these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct
-contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous
-affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from
-their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential
-agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced
-them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management
-of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and
-none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation
-of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous
-burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity
-of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together.
-To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the
-surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in
-invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and
-evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed
-before. Nor was this all:[73] he took advantage of the vehement
-acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the
-Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos
-concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a
-remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it;
-causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a
-religious scruple then recognized as paramount.
-
-  [72] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου
-  ~πάνυ φιλανθρώπως~, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν
-  ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες.
-
-  [73] Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ
-  τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ~πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν
-  Λακεδαιμονίων~, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν
-  τοὺς Ἀργείους, etc.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
-
-This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from
-Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which
-will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents
-indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we
-cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein
-of Fielding’s Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus,
-historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the
-impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic.
-Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount
-of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently
-credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of
-the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of
-leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon
-whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if
-they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and
-Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian
-envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of
-public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what
-they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their
-own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to
-justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged
-against the Lacedæmonian character.[74]
-
-  [74] Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.
-
-The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but
-this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from
-his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still
-contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of
-Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation
-of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta,
-now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He
-contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and
-alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position
-of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater
-interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he
-at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation
-must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested
-the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it.
-The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already
-present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might
-already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted
-themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But
-the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it
-forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2.
-By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance
-with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become
-parties to the peace with Athens.[75]
-
-  [75] Thucyd. v, 46.
-
-The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias,
-invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable
-proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong
-was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their
-desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance
-granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all
-that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters
-to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His
-mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and
-Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that
-not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally
-announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the
-Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens,
-the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the
-menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a
-personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be
-formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the
-humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened
-to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and
-with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and
-voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted
-to introduce the envoys—already at hand in the city—from Argos,
-Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.[76]
-
-  [76] Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
-
-The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the
-record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace,
-another for alliance.
-
-The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a
-treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each
-for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.[77]
-[The express terms in which these states announce themselves as
-imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No
-such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have
-already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of
-Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial
-power.]
-
-  [77] Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν
-  ἑκάτεροι.
-
-Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of
-damage.
-
-The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies
-with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade
-Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid
-in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the
-invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim
-that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in
-that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.
-
-Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia,
-or Elis, shall be attacked.
-
-Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops
-through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom
-they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea,
-unless upon joint resolution.[78]
-
-  [78] Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ~ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν~ ἕκαστοι.
-  The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the
-  phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ~ἄρχουσιν~
-  ἑκάτεροι.
-
-  The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of
-  troops, required to be left open for application to the actual
-  time.
-
-In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this
-treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the
-space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the
-territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for
-a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance,
-at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or
-archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman,
-per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the
-service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition
-shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be
-shared equally between all.
-
-Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision
-was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what words?
-how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of
-herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their
-respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were
-to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before
-each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three
-cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater
-Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the
-oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the
-temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to
-be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.”
-
-“The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please
-in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”[79]
-
-  [79] Thucyd. v, 47.
-
-The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of
-complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities
-than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy,
-and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace had been concluded
-between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the
-confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not
-merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between
-Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia.
-Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a
-defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three
-states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other
-(without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and
-Sparta still retained the alliance[80] concluded between themselves,
-without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained
-that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever
-subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there
-was an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. Lastly, Corinth
-could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from
-the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so
-that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the
-Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies
-towards Sparta.[81]
-
-  [80] Thucyd. v, 48.
-
-  [81] Thucyd. v, 48-50.
-
-The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have
-just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival
-of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the
-beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.[82] That festival
-was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had
-been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading
-clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all
-Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty
-of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches.
-For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens
-herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been
-excluded from sending their solemn legation, or theôry, and from
-attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.[83] Now that such
-exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to
-announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with
-them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt
-both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was
-entertained to see what figure the theôry of Athens would make as
-to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that
-Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented
-from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the
-presence of Olympic Zeus.
-
-  [82] Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ ~Ὀλυμπίοις
-  τοῖς νυνί~ (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.
-
-  [83] Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in
-  Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the
-  tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend
-  were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never
-  molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose
-  to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never
-  disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch,
-  Aratus, c. 28).
-
-  But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a
-  Rhodian theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in
-  safety.
-
-  From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little
-  can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of
-  420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though
-  all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the
-  Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).
-
-Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in
-glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than
-had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself
-in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation
-surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing
-forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had
-discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to
-the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to
-commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the
-Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first
-appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders.
-The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with
-first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers,
-censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.[84] But when
-the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor
-at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four,
-which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary
-personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct
-chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their
-quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another
-a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of
-the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of
-his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation,
-it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must
-recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend
-against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments.
-Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for
-their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned;
-but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public
-banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself,
-was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich
-allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him
-their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they
-would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of
-the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must
-farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded
-from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first
-returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this
-imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of
-Hellas.
-
-  [84] Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were
-  usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city
-  in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil.
-  iii, 3, 12.
-
-Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be
-hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the
-Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced
-an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;[85]
-dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the
-war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He
-was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient
-to repel the charge from himself, which it was his purpose to do,
-both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure
-which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation
-or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions
-suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated
-by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and
-hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less
-real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public
-favor.
-
-  [85] Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν
-  τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας,
-  ~πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι~· διότι ἅρματα
-  μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε,
-  καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἄλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης
-  παρεσκευασάμην.
-
-  The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless
-  we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and
-  the Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself
-  towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half
-  of the year 420 B.C.
-
-  Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian
-  ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few
-  lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious
-  that the poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and
-  _third_, in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest
-  and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and
-  _fourth_. Euripidês informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice
-  and proclaimed twice—δὶς στεφθέντ’ ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι.
-  Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this
-  word δὶς to τρὶς, without any authority, which completely alters
-  the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has
-  properly restored the word δὶς.
-
-  How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival
-  remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the
-  Oratio de Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son
-  of Alkibiadês at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps
-  more. Isokratês repeats the loose assertion of Euripidês,
-  πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The
-  spurious Oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês
-  also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I
-  have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in
-  themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be
-  believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century
-  B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a
-  very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story
-  of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine
-  chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about
-  Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid.
-  cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of
-  the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians,
-  Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be
-  substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ.
-  i, p. 3.
-
-  Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at
-  Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the
-  seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the
-  seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same
-  race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging
-  to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever
-  a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since
-  the course involved going _twelve_ times round the goal (Pindar,
-  Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race
-  described by Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to
-  construe strictly the expression of the poet,—~δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν~
-  ὄχον,—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to
-  run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to
-  the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description
-  in Sophoklês (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers
-  indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main
-  circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the
-  twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον δωδεκάδρομον) _were_ common to both
-  (Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).
-
-  Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory
-  at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also
-  gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be
-  entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted
-  from attendance.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316)
-  says: “We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these
-  chariot-victories of Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly
-  fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424.”
-
-  In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C.
-  424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that
-  the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in
-  the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an
-  Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send
-  thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition,
-  and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary
-  to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur
-  just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying
-  troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued
-  Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet
-  time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display
-  of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass
-  by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans
-  occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the
-  Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from
-  Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.
-
-  Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce
-  for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate
-  for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals.
-  The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is
-  general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians
-  had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C. without impediment, these
-  stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning.
-  But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves
-  that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.
-
-  I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended
-  with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but
-  immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all
-  suitable.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there
-  was only _one_ chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all
-  the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that
-  in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained _the_ prize: thus
-  implying that Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the
-  same festival.
-
-  I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of
-  these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and
-  unfounded.
-
-  We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the
-  stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were
-  not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or
-  batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat,
-  and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh
-  heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was
-  sure to have won two heats.
-
-  Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much
-  more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in
-  case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger
-  would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory
-  of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five
-  days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of
-  spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained
-  chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of
-  them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two
-  that was it is impossible to say.
-
-If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished
-by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it
-was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of
-the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new
-political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased
-consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos,
-Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the
-peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the
-case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency,
-had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to
-defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks
-upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for
-the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand
-hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the
-mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The
-Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating
-the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by
-heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all
-violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against
-the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the
-Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and
-had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after
-the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta
-the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man,
-two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the
-Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of
-the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians
-sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have
-been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed
-the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians
-replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among
-themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before
-their heralds crossed the borders), so that _they_ were interdicted
-from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites
-had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the
-Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves
-contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian
-heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the
-sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the
-truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that
-after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military
-measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no
-means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though
-offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to
-forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to
-pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the
-portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike
-refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they
-would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine
-at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the
-assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the
-Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment
-or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic
-law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the
-privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition
-at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred
-legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at
-the solemnity.[86]
-
-  [86] Thucyd. v, 49, 50.
-
-As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception of
-Lepreum—were present by their theôries[87] as well as by individual
-spectators, so the Spartan theôry “shone by its absence” in a
-manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed,
-was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were
-with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so
-pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which
-they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back
-of the Sphakterian disaster,[88] that they were supposed likely
-to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into
-the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an
-armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their
-younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand
-hoplites from Mantineia as well as the same number from Argos, for
-the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment
-of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival,
-to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the
-spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably
-aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing.
-Lichas,[89] a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a
-chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in
-his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence
-of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did
-not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw
-his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his
-impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped
-into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of
-the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a
-flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival:
-accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at
-once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to
-his place with blows.[90] Hence arose an increased apprehension of
-armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the
-Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered
-their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without
-any interruption.[91] The boldness of the Eleians in putting this
-affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing,
-that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have
-been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the
-allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating
-Sparta than in showing off Athens.
-
-  [87] Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας
-  καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν
-  Λεπρεατῶν.
-
-  [88] Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων
-  μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε
-  Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.
-
-  [89] See a previous note, p. 56.
-
-  [90] Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι
-  ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους,
-  καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς
-  ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος
-  δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.
-
-  We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and
-  harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more
-  serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the
-  Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder
-  or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him
-  in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered
-  and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out,
-  and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to
-  strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the
-  dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).
-
-  [91] It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered
-  and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve
-  years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph.
-  Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).
-
-Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther
-proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian
-Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the
-war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of
-settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power,
-and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had
-never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by
-the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well
-as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had
-been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially
-the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their
-hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the
-Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of
-violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous
-battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the
-place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without
-foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies
-and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her
-inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would
-be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia
-with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor
-Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians
-prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant
-remonstrance.[92]
-
-  [92] Thucyd. v, 51, 52.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LVI.
-
-FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.
-
-
-Shortly after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described
-in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh
-embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a
-promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to
-prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were
-present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new
-resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not
-real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress.
-The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was
-united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling
-to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the
-other.[93]
-
-  [93] Thucyd. v, 48-50.
-
-In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and
-Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under
-the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the
-new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers
-and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime,
-defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês.
-After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage
-to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before
-been compelled to abandon by the thirty years’ truce, at the
-recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year
-of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that
-period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of
-many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became,
-to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and
-his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while
-Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved
-except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against
-Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also:
-Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining
-Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative
-except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this
-perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her projecting to do in
-the course of about four years forward, if it had not been, first,
-that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about
-Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently
-undergone there; next, that Alkibiadês, the new chief adviser or
-prime minister of Athens—if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate
-expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case—was prompted
-by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardor into
-a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the
-interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in
-the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover,
-his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre
-of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and
-barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort
-the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron
-frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of
-Potidæa twelve years before,[94] and which any armament destined
-to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under
-these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian
-operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a
-counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and
-at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the
-Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the
-peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in
-conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.
-
-  [94] Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 220. δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες,
-  πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου, etc.
-
-Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen,
-and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadês exhibited the
-spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the
-peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, a
-spectacle at that moment new and striking.[95] He first turned his
-attention to the Achæan towns in the northwest, where he persuaded
-the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to
-undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of
-long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens
-from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the
-formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just
-at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians,
-who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would
-have become masters of the commerce of the gulf. But the Corinthians
-and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief,
-despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme,
-and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.[96]
-Yet the march of Alkibiadês doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian
-interest throughout the Achæan coast.
-
-  [95] Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratês (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349)
-  speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadês in his usual loose and
-  exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it
-  as something very memorable at the time.
-
-  [96] Thucyd. v, 52.
-
-He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against
-Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate
-the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not
-only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by
-the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land,
-dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum, the
-southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever
-they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus
-bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession
-of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the
-Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for
-which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering
-state of the temple of Apollo Pythäeus (situated within the walls
-of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over
-Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of
-that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in
-early times had been theirs.[97] The Epidaurians owed to this temple
-certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which,
-arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now
-due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default
-imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to
-attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.
-
-  [97] Thucyd. v, 53, with Dr. Arnold’s note.
-
-Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news
-that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies had
-advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on
-the northwest, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What
-this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even
-explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies.[98]
-But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was
-found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present
-and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as
-religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he
-directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as
-soon as that month had expired.
-
-  [98] Thucyd. v, 54. ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ
-  πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν.
-
-  This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force
-  of her allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as
-  decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too
-  powerful to be thus treated.
-
-On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians
-prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which
-they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month preceding
-the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before
-the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding
-upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which
-Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made
-use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted
-likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by
-playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those
-arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks
-occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of
-their lunar system. Having begun their march on the twenty-sixth
-of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding
-day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of time,
-and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This
-proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their
-allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, not being Dorians, were
-under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, the
-army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent
-seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this
-time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian
-states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting
-their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be
-violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the
-field, invoked the aid of their allies: who, however, had already
-been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose,
-any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself.
-Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the
-Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend
-aid by entering the territory alone.[99]
-
-  [99] Thucyd. v, 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the
-  Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι
-  φθίνοντος, ~καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον~,
-  ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ~ἐδῄουν~· Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς
-  ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν οἱ μὲν ~τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο~, οἱ δὲ
-  καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.
-
-  In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views
-  of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems
-  to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and
-  unsatisfactory.
-
-  The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and
-  literal possible: “The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of
-  the month before Karneius, and _keeping that day during the whole
-  time_, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging
-  it.” By “during the whole time” is meant, during the whole time
-  that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they
-  kept the twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole
-  fortnight or so; they called each successive day by the same
-  name; they stopped the computed march of time; the twenty-seventh
-  was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates
-  it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 331): “They began their
-  march on a day which they had _always_ been used to keep holy.”
-  But surely the words πάντα τὸν χρόνον must denote some definite
-  interval of time, and can hardly be construed as equivalent
-  to ἀεί. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes them,
-  introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main
-  affirmation of the sentence.
-
-  The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the
-  ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and
-  childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd
-  than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who
-  being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that
-  month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, that it should be
-  the month Boêdromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorkêtês might
-  be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêtêr,
-  both at once and at the same time. Demetrius arrived at Athens in
-  the month Munychion, and went through both ceremonies with little
-  or no delay; the religious scruple, and the dignity of the Two
-  Goddesses being saved by altering the name of the month twice
-  (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26).
-
-  Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at
-  a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 2, 5; v,
-  1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the
-  calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When
-  the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds
-  with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on
-  the ground of its being the period of the holy truce,—though it
-  _really was not so_,—~οὐχ ὅποτε κάθηκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ ὅποτε
-  ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~—Οἱ
-  δ’ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ὥσπερ
-  εἰώθεσαν, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας ~ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς~.
-  On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the
-  Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of
-  the heralds, who affirmed that it _was_ the time of the truce,
-  though in reality it was not so. At last, the Spartan king
-  Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put
-  the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to
-  accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might
-  suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a
-  sham plea (ὑποφέρειν). The oracles both told him that he was
-  under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, he
-  sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and
-  invaded the Argeian territory.
-
-  Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that
-  the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the
-  calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really
-  ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they
-  commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce
-  where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore,
-  that such an analogous incident completely justifies the
-  interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in
-  Thucydidês.
-
-  But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel,
-  I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state
-  of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the
-  Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd
-  for adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now.
-
-  With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the
-  calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the
-  months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed
-  in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient
-  divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each
-  different city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not,
-  except by accident, either begin or end at the same time as the
-  lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i,
-  p. 734): “Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos
-  annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi
-  cyclus intercalationum utrique populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt
-  cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat
-  alter, eorum qui non intercalarunt mensis certus cedit jam in eum
-  mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus
-  iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi.” Compare
-  also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die
-  Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, pp. 21-27, where all that
-  is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is
-  well brought together.
-
-  The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F.
-  Hermann, pp. 84-124): indeed, the only single name resting on
-  positive proof, is that of a month _Hermæus_. How far the months
-  of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta we do not
-  know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor
-  is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may
-  properly be called a _system_ of intercalation, so correct as to
-  keep the calendar right without frequent arbitrary interferences.
-  Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the
-  Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use.
-  Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks about
-  reckoning of time, characterizes their interferences for the
-  purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than
-  systematic. Verres took occasion from these interferences to make
-  a still more violent change, by declaring the Ides of January to
-  be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii, 52, 129).
-
-  Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar,
-  and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority
-  to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians
-  to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear
-  absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the
-  real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet
-  arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views
-  of other Dorian states, since there does not seem to have been
-  any recognized authority for proclaiming the commencement of the
-  Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic and the
-  Corinthians the Isthmiac truce. In saying, therefore, that the
-  twenty-sixth of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated,
-  and that the twenty-seventh should not be recognized as arriving
-  for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would
-  only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before
-  resorted to; though, in the case before us, it was employed for a
-  fraudulent purpose.
-
-  The Spartan month _Hekatombeus_ appears to have corresponded
-  with the Attic month Hekatombæon; the Spartan month following
-  it, _Karneius_, with the Attic month Metageitnion (Hermann, p.
-  112), our months July and August; such correspondence being by
-  no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Göller speak of
-  Hekatombeus as if it were the _Argeian_ month preceding Karneius:
-  but we only know it as a _Spartan_ month. Its name does not
-  appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among
-  whom nevertheless Karneius seems universal. See Franz, Comm. ad
-  Corp. Inscript. Græc. No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxxii, p. 640.
-
-  The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political
-  authorities for party purposes, are well known to every one. And
-  even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so
-  uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable
-  confusion. See Hesychius—~Ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡμέρα~; Ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ
-  εὐγνώστον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡ ἡμέρα, ὅτι οὐκ ἑστᾶσιν
-  αἱ ἡμέραι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἕκαστοι θέλουσιν ἄγουσι. See also Aristoph.
-  Nubes, 605.
-
-Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies
-at Mantineia, for the purpose of discussing propositions of peace:
-perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in
-spite of Alkibiadês. What other deputies attended we are not told;
-but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted even at
-the opening of the debates upon the inconsistency of assembling
-a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian
-territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this
-observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire
-from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still,
-however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable,
-and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned
-to renew their devastation in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians,
-immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out
-again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested
-and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation
-of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which
-Alkibiadês, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, was sent
-to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army
-had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer
-required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of
-the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.[100]
-
-  [100] Thucyd. v, 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν
-  ὁπλῖται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγὸς: πυθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
-  ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the
-  reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Göller, either adopt
-  or recommend; leaving out the particle δὲ which stands in the
-  common text after πυθόμενοι.
-
-  If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι,
-  as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it, in the sense of “had already
-  completed their expedition and returned home.” But no authority
-  is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἐκστρατεύω:
-  and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning
-  exclusively belongs to the preterite or pluperfect tense, is
-  powerfully contradicted by the use of the word ἐξεστρατευμένων
-  (ii, 7), the same verb and the same tense, yet in a meaning
-  contrary to that which he assigns.
-
-  It appears to me the least objectionable proceeding of the two,
-  to dispense with the particle δέ.
-
-The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a
-detachment of three hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas,
-sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this, the
-Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens; and they had good
-reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not
-having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina,
-and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus.
-But they took another ground of complaint, somewhat remarkable. In
-the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, it had been
-stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of
-troops through its territory, without the joint consent of all. Now
-the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the
-Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the
-Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians
-now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back
-the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylos, and allow them
-to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadês,
-complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the
-pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the
-Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless, they still
-abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or
-breaking it in any other way.[101] The relations between Athens and
-Sparta thus remained in name, peace and alliance, so far as concerns
-direct operations against each other’s territory; in reality, hostile
-action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies
-respectively of third parties.
-
-  [101] Thucyd. v, 56.
-
-The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the
-Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter
-an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there
-was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory
-attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage,
-yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case
-forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as
-well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they
-now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined
-during the course of the ensuing summer to put forth their strength
-vigorously, and win back their lost ground.[102]
-
-  [102] Thucyd. v, 37.
-
-Towards the month of June (B.C. 418) they marched with their full
-force, freemen as well as Helots, under king Agis, against Argos.
-The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march,
-while their other allies near the Isthmus,—Bœotians, Megarians,
-Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, etc., were directed to
-assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies were very
-considerable, for we hear of five thousand Bœotian hoplites, and two
-thousand Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also five thousand
-light-armed, five hundred horsemen, and five hundred foot-soldiers,
-who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of
-Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydidês
-himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable
-concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference
-to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantineia. Such muster of
-the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching
-first to Mantineia, and there taking up the force of that city as
-well as three thousand Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the
-Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies
-being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack
-Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at
-Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the
-night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not
-hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus,
-who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the
-battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the
-enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact, that
-no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the
-Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of
-actual warfare.
-
-As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the
-Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies,
-first to Argos itself; next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road from
-Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the
-invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing
-his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians
-and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road,
-crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the
-plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians, were
-directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same
-plain upon a different point; while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and
-Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route,
-by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient,
-led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine, called the
-Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis
-was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched
-in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus,
-their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst
-the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their
-defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his
-own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the
-Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw
-him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith
-quit the advantageous ground near Nemea, to come and attack him in
-the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea
-and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance
-into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with
-effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple
-march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with
-theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the
-night; while the Argeians,[103] hearing at daybreak that he was near
-their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position
-at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march
-they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which had
-reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, and which
-lay nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon
-found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who
-lay between them and their city.
-
-  [103] Thucyd. v, 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν ~ἡμέρας ἤδη~
-  ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, etc.
-
-On both sides, the armies were marshalled, and order taken for
-battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little
-less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in
-their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take
-them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road
-through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian
-cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since
-neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantineia, seemed to have possessed any
-horsemen; a description of force which ought to have been sent from
-Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian
-contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of this very
-critical position, both the Argeians and their allies were elate
-with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the
-division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be
-inclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other
-formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals
-were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just
-as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the
-Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five
-generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without
-the least consultation or privity on the part of their own army.
-They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the
-Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction,
-in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge
-against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis,
-at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four
-months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also
-took this step without consulting either his army or his allies,
-simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the
-official Spartans near him. Immediately, he gave the order for
-retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted
-out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the
-Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual
-discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order
-of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.[104] For the
-army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their
-position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force,
-so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of
-Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful
-a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at
-Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home,—so as to have before
-their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one
-of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled,—the
-Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared
-contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer
-and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed
-their cause.
-
-  [104] Thucyd. v, 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἵποντο
-  μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ εἶχον κατ’ ἀλλήλους
-  πολλῇ τὸν Ἆγιν, etc.
-
-On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan
-authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so
-admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly
-no more than he deserved: but we read with no small astonishment
-that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more
-exasperated against Thrasyllus,[105] whom they accused of having
-traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good
-ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded
-a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom
-on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before
-entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus, or winter torrent
-near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and
-faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion
-against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even
-to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to
-seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried
-him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.[106]
-
-  [105] Thucyd. v, 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι
-  αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ~τοὺς σπεισαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους~, etc.
-
-  [106] Thucyd. v, 60.
-
-Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived,
-which probably ought to have come earlier: one thousand hoplites,
-with three hundred horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês
-came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the
-horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against
-Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce
-which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the
-newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted
-to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and
-Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused.
-An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part,
-along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the
-recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had
-been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at
-variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon
-them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with
-the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded
-the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to
-join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus;
-the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed
-them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely
-because its territory joined that of Mantineia on the northward, but
-because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which
-they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee
-for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its
-inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to
-become allies of Mantineia, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion
-to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them
-by Sparta.[107]
-
-  [107] Thucyd. v, 62.
-
-Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should
-next undertake; the Eleians contending strenuously for a march
-against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their
-enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred
-the latter, incomparably the more important enterprise of the two:
-but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their
-proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home.
-Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies
-continued together at Mantineia, organizing their attack upon Tegea,
-in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually
-laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt
-of the city from Sparta,[108] when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just
-saved themselves by despatching the most urgent message to Sparta,
-and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with
-indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew
-all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with
-the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in
-the sum of one hundred thousand drachmæ, or about twenty-seven and
-two-thirds Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity
-might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name
-which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might
-inflict on him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly
-withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was
-now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part
-of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his
-own authority; but a council of ten was now named, without whose
-concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.[109]
-
-  [108] Thucyd. v, 64. ὅσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν, etc.
-
-  [109] Thucyd. v, 63.
-
-To the great good fortune of Agis, a pressing message now arrived
-announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of
-Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by
-this news that the whole military population instantly started off
-to relieve the place, Agis at their head, the most rapid movement
-ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.[110] When they
-arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia, in their way, perhaps hearing that
-the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta
-one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence, the oldest as well
-as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where
-they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent
-messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phocians
-and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents
-in the territory of Mantineia. The arrival of such reinforcements,
-however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities
-contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the
-rather, as it appears, that they could not get into the territory
-of Mantineia except by passing through that of Argos,[111] which
-could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction.
-Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once
-with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present, into the
-territory of Mantineia, and took up a position near the Herakleion,
-or temple of Hêraklês,[112] from whence he began to ravage the
-neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth
-from Mantineia, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and
-impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted
-by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led
-it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might
-have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to
-Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him
-that he was now merely proceeding “to heal mischief by mischief.” So
-forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by
-the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault,
-that he suddenly halted the army and gave orders for retreat, though
-actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from
-the enemy.[113]
-
-  [110] Thucyd. v, 64. ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων
-  γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἵα οὔπω
-  πρότερον. The out-march of the Spartans just before the battle of
-  Platæa (described in Herodot. vii, 10) seems, however, to have
-  been quite as rapid and instantaneous.
-
-  [111] Thucyd. v, 64. ξυνέκλῃε γὰρ διὰ μέσου.
-
-  [112] The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of
-  protection in encamping near a temple of Hêraklês, their heroic
-  progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 31).
-
-  [113] Thucyd. v, 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan
-  mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment
-  when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 4,
-  25.
-
-His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the
-difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between
-Mantineia and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain,
-drained only by katabothra, or natural subterranean channels in the
-mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which
-seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for
-their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the
-purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantineia, where
-it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians
-and their allies would certainly descend from their position to
-hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter
-to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians,
-after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next
-retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great: and
-this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and
-impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals not sharing such
-confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon
-which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for
-treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time,
-as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably
-not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before,
-so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the
-murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove
-them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders
-for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain
-so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in
-arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight
-at a moment’s notice.
-
-Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his
-operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or
-not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly
-desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position
-at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained
-their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he
-came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in
-the least prepared to see them: they were not only in the plain,
-but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians
-occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in
-their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies:
-then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and
-family, trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them,
-the remaining Argeian hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleônæ
-and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their
-hoplites as well as their horsemen.
-
-It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this
-unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the
-sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a
-feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to
-recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent
-a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.[114]
-But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training
-and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination
-of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other
-Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice
-by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each
-_taxis_, or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter
-did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems
-to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by
-his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not
-recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a
-regular gradation of military and responsible authority, “commanders
-of commanders,” each of whom had his special duty in insuring the
-execution of orders.[115] Every order emanated from the Spartan king
-when he was present, and was given to the polemarchs (each commanding
-a mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the
-lochagi, or colonels, of the respective lochi. These again gave
-command to each pentekontêr, or captain of a pentekosty; lastly,
-he to the enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision, called
-an enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except
-from the enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for
-his enômoty; but the pentekontêr and the lochage were responsible
-also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four
-enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties, at least so the numbers
-stood on this occasion. All the various military manœuvres were
-familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so
-that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along
-with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by
-surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives, to
-form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater
-promptitude[116] and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis,
-transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array
-was attained with regularity as well as with speed.
-
-  [114] Thucyd. v, 66. μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ ἐμέμνηντο,
-  ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἡ
-  παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, etc.
-
-  [115] Thucyd. v, 66. Σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν ὀλίγου, τὸ
-  στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸ
-  ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.
-
-  Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi, 5. Αἱ παραγωγαὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκος
-  ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνωμοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: compare xi, 8, τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ
-  παρεγγυᾶται εἰς μέτωπον παρ’ ἄσπιδα καθίστασθαι, etc.
-
-  [116] Thucyd. v, 66. εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ~ἐς κόσμον τὸν
-  ἑαυτῶν~, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον,
-  etc.
-
-The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient
-privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of
-Laconia, skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the
-Eurotas, near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally
-Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Periœki, with
-peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the
-bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed
-the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused
-of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming
-recklessness.[117] Next to the Skiritæ, who were six hundred in
-number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving
-with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned
-home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been
-planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the
-Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent
-allies, Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing,
-stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying
-the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were
-some Lacedæmonian horsemen.[118]
-
-  [117] Xenophon, Cyrop. iv, 2. 1: see Diodor. xv, c. 32; Xenophon,
-  Rep. Laced. xiii, 6.
-
-  [118] Thucyd. v, 67.
-
-Thucydidês, with a frankness which enhances the value of his
-testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot
-pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that
-this silence is not for want of having inquired; but none of the
-answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme
-secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about
-_their_ numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks
-were not less misleading. In the absence of assured information about
-aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information
-accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator.
-From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr.
-Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle,
-though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile
-from his country. First, he states that the Lacedæmonian army
-_appeared_ more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us,
-that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were six hundred in
-number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their
-right wing, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, each
-enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different
-enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were
-eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ);
-each lochus comprised four pentekosties, each pentekosty contained
-four enômoties.[119] Multiplying four hundred and forty-four by
-eight, and adding the six hundred Skiritæ, this would make a total
-of four thousand one hundred and eighty-four hoplites, besides a few
-horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said.
-I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller
-than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians
-had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing
-emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total,
-their oldest and youngest soldiers.
-
-  [119] Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the
-  Lacedæmonian army. We know that the enômoty was the elementary
-  division, the military unit: that the pentekosty was composed
-  of a definite (not always the same) number of enômoties: that
-  the lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same)
-  number of pentekosties. The mora appears to have been a still
-  larger division, consisting of so many lochi (according to
-  Xenophon, of four lochi): but Thucydidês speaks as if he knew no
-  division larger than the lochus.
-
-  Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other
-  fact certainly established about the Lacedæmonian military
-  distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that
-  these words _enômoty_, _pentekosty_, lochus, etc., indicate
-  any fixed number of men: our own names _regiment_, _company_,
-  _troop_, _brigade_, _division_, etc., are all more or less
-  indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion to each other.
-
-  That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the
-  teaching a small number of men like an enômoty (twenty-five,
-  thirty-two, thirty-six men, as we sometimes find it), to perform
-  its evolutions under the command of its enômotarch. When this
-  was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these
-  elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by
-  circumstances.
-
-  Thucydidês states two distinct facts. 1. Each enômoty had _four
-  men in front_. 2. Each enômoty _varied in depth_, according as
-  every lochagus chose. Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how
-  these two assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of
-  men in front, the depth of the enômoty is of course determined,
-  without any reference to the discretion of any one. These two
-  assertions appear distinctly contradictory; unless we suppose
-  (what seems very difficult to believe) that the lochage might
-  make one or two of the four files of the same enômoty deeper
-  than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this
-  difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have
-  confidence, however, in the conjecture.
-
-It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any
-attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet
-incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice,
-to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation
-and encouragement: and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians
-may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers
-reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether
-Mantineia should continue to be a free and imperial city, with
-Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again
-be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders
-dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her
-lost ascendency in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her
-worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show
-themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now
-associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by
-vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.
-
-It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character,
-that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either
-by Agis or any of the officers. “They knew (says the historian[120])
-that long practice beforehand in the business of war, was a better
-preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment.” As among
-professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course,
-without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard
-among them with a view to get their order of battle and position
-perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and
-hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover,
-various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the
-ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers
-in attendance—an hereditary caste at Sparta—began to play, while the
-slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the
-time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the
-line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by
-the enemy: who having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed
-forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,[121]
-fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.
-
-  [120] Thucyd. v, 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστους τε καὶ
-  μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίσταντο τὴν
-  παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ
-  πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σώζουσαν ἢ λόγων δι’ ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθέντων
-  παραίνεσιν.
-
-  [121] Thucyd. v, 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ἐντόνως καὶ
-  ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν
-  νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ
-  ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις,
-  ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.
-
-It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into
-conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat
-aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of
-both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid
-exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every
-man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his
-right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers,
-the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative
-safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian
-discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though
-the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more
-extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not
-think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right,
-and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left
-wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the
-right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder
-forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and
-Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with
-the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed,
-his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the
-rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions
-even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to
-accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and
-slow march, of his soldiers.
-
-The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to
-bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be
-spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But
-the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves
-on the extreme left, forbade such an order.[122] Accordingly, Agis
-gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement
-on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while
-in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent
-orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, who had
-their lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear
-and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close
-up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most
-victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his
-express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move,
-was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement
-of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back
-into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute
-this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ
-and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from
-their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition,
-defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos,
-breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the
-Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their
-discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian
-baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the
-wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether
-dispersed.
-
-  [122] Thucyd. v, 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς
-  καθίσταντο, ~ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν
-  αὐτῶν ἔχοντες~, etc.
-
-  The strong and precise language, which Thucydidês here
-  uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and
-  much esteemed: among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient
-  routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to
-  take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the
-  generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticized.
-
-But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only
-of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time
-when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very
-differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with
-his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippeis, and
-with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with the
-centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argeians, their elderly troops
-and the so-called Five Lochi, with the Kleonæans and Orneates,
-dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these
-troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance,
-indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was
-the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops
-gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so headlong,
-that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.[123] While
-thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans
-and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis’s army, and the Athenians
-here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they
-not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand.
-Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back was
-less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own
-defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed
-both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in
-safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious
-on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army
-in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat
-against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to
-effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe
-loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and which Agis
-might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system,
-enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named
-Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated
-enemy.[124]
-
-  [123] Thucyd. v, 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργείους) Ἔτρεψαν
-  οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπῇσαν οἱ
-  Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας,
-  τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.
-
-  The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has
-  perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet
-  satisfactorily cleared up.
-
-  They all admit that the expressions, ~τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ~, preceding the
-  infinitive mood as here, signify _design_ or _purpose_; ἕνεκα
-  being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence
-  satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe
-  to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes
-  of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of
-  other critics are cited and discussed.
-
-  Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή:
-  others affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ
-  μή. “Formula ~τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ~ (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque
-  _consilium_ significat: interdum _effectum_ (_i. e._ ὥστε μή);
-  hic _causam_ indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μή).” But I agree
-  with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged
-  meanings is wholly unauthorized; while the second, which is
-  adopted by Dr. Arnold himself, is sustained only by feeble and
-  dubious evidence; for the passage of Thucydidês (ii, 4. τοῦ μὴ
-  ἐκφεύγειν) may be as well construed, as Poppo’s note thereupon
-  suggests, without any such supposed exceptional sense of the
-  words.
-
-  Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ
-  φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of ~ἕνεκα τοῦ~,
-  or _consilium_. But first an error must be cleared up which
-  pervades the view of most of the commentators. They suppose that
-  those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been “_trodden
-  under foot_,” were so trodden down by _the Lacedæmonians_
-  in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The
-  Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular
-  in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, qualities which are
-  dwelt upon by Thucydidês in regard to this very battle. They were
-  not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only
-  anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they
-  would spear them, not trample them under foot.
-
-  To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the
-  numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii, 173; Xenoph. Hellen.
-  iii, 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet
-  with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially
-  Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which
-  they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their
-  own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy
-  closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of
-  course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized
-  with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their
-  own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them
-  down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it
-  was the Argeians in front—not the Lacedæmonians—who trod down
-  their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight
-  men in every file), in order to escape themselves before the
-  Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv, 4,
-  11; Œconomic. viii, 5.
-
-  There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydidês
-  describes, three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2.
-  The Argeians soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian
-  soldiers, who trod them down in order to get away themselves. Out
-  of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third
-  is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative, just
-  as much as if he had written καταπατηθέντας ~ὑπ’ ἄλλων~, or ὑπ’
-  ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 11.
-
-  Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but
-  not formally specified (_i. e._ those Argeians who trod down
-  their comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the
-  second and third conjointly and confusedly, that the _design_ or
-  _purpose_ (_consilium_) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers.
-
-  Farther, the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν
-  ἐγκατάληψιν, as if the last word were an accusative case coming
-  _after_ φθῆναι and governed by it. But there is also another
-  construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense.
-  In my judgment, τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case
-  coming _before_ φθῆναι and forming the _subject_ of it. The words
-  will thus read (ἕνεκα) τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν
-  αὐτοῖς): “in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians
-  might not be beforehand in coming upon them;” “might not come
-  upon them too soon,” _i. e._ “sooner than they could get away.”
-  And since the word ἐγκατάληψις is an abstract active substantive,
-  so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute
-  the concrete words with which it correlates, _i. e._ τοὺς
-  Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαβόντας, subject as well as attribute, for
-  the active participle is here essentially involved.
-
-  The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up
-  and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—ἔστιν οὓς
-  καὶ καταπατηθέντας ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων φευγόντων (or βιαζομένων), ἕνεκα
-  τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαβόντας αὐτοὺς (τοὺς
-  φεύγοντας): “As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the
-  Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat:
-  and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own
-  comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not
-  be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape.”
-
-  Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have τοῦ
-  μὴ φθῆναι used in its regular and legitimate sense of _purpose_,
-  or _consilium_. We have moreover a plain and natural state of
-  facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there
-  any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to
-  expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire
-  sentence which was present to the writer’s own mind. To do this
-  properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of
-  an expositor of Thucydidês.
-
-  [124] Thucyd. v, 73; Diodor. xii, 79.
-
-There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians,
-Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both
-the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians.
-The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from
-the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at
-about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy’s dead, spreading
-out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy;
-then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at
-Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy.
-Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea
-with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but
-on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.[125]
-
-  [125] Thucyd. v, 73.
-
-Such was the important battle of Mantineia, fought in the month
-of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The
-numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian
-army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle
-of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states
-whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But
-what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at
-once the preëxisting stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster
-in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn
-upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were
-other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be
-stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia
-silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her
-old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. It
-worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit
-of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and
-tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present
-case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in
-itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing,
-had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs:
-but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all
-parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered
-to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude
-which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled “artists in warlike
-affairs.” So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage
-stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the
-Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the
-left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank,
-and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in
-the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would
-have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front,
-and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were
-thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians,
-and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of
-Peloponnesus.[126]
-
-  [126] Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην
-  αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν
-  ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἑνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχῃ
-  μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες.
-
-We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and
-Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the
-army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their
-return to Sparta.[127]
-
-  [127] Thucyd. v, 72.
-
-Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we
-may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish
-caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men
-immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead
-of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more
-important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark
-of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal
-allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.[128] Shortly
-after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the
-aid of Mantineia,—probably regretting their previous untoward
-departure,—together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians.
-Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians
-kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their
-extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late
-battle,[129] and remaining themselves within their own territory,
-so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations
-of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they
-had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence
-of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had
-gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun
-by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold
-enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of
-Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to
-be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the
-Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the
-portion of work committed to them—the fortification of the cape on
-which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated—was indefatigably
-prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both
-Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted
-to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being
-for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new
-fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian
-territory.[130]
-
-  [128] Thucyd. i, 141.
-
-  [129] Thucyd. v, 75.
-
-  [130] Thucyd. v, 75.
-
-So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive
-benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon
-manifested in the very centre of their enemy’s force, at Argos. A
-material change had taken place since the battle in the political
-tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an
-opposition party, philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the
-effect of the defeat of Mantineia had been to strengthen this party
-as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders,
-who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to
-maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not
-superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and
-exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a
-victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence
-by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary
-democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field
-of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian
-arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very
-different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies,
-they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the
-Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,[131] and
-doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has
-been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families,
-and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to
-receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time
-when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the
-Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue
-the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would
-probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her
-as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But
-when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and
-threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance
-their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided
-opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The
-oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered
-into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into
-alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.[132]
-
-  [131] Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the credit
-  gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of
-  Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution,
-  notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: ~Οἱ
-  γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες~ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc.
-
-  An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over
-  defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the
-  Athenian army under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the
-  later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2,
-  15-17.
-
-  [132] Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80.
-
-As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the
-Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their
-full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and
-inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy
-Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative
-propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and
-prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case
-they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the
-oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with
-Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they
-attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas
-was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously
-pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had
-to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in
-Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing
-but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general
-despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their
-point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being
-already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to
-Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were
-substantially as follows:—
-
-“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as
-hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii.
-They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia,
-whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in
-Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away
-from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort
-recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith
-evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as
-well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall
-restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever
-place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged
-to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent
-to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear
-themselves.[133] Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be
-autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution.
-If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with
-mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel
-against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the
-Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta
-shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the
-allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their
-own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their
-allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit.
-But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send
-them home about their business.”[134]
-
-  [133] Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydidês is incurably corrupt,
-  in regard to several words of this clause; though the general
-  sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to
-  be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an
-  oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been
-  essential that the oath should be _tendered_ by one litigant
-  party and _taken_ by the other: perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν
-  λῇν (Valckenaer’s conjecture) might be preferable to εἶμεν λῇν.
-
-  To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr.
-  Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this
-  practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous
-  practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny,
-  in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, sects. 309-313,
-  vol. vii, pp. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant
-  party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to
-  take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of
-  the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and
-  formalities, with respect to this _jusjurandum delatum_, which
-  Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.
-
-  [134] Thucyd. v, 77. Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι,
-  αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, ~οἴκαδ’
-  ἀπιάλλειν~. See Dr. Arnold’s note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.
-  ch. xxiv. vol. iii, p. 342.
-
-  One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words,
-  but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and
-  almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text.
-  The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantineia; all
-  hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well
-  decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it
-  stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even
-  with rudeness, if they desired any change.
-
-  I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδείξαντας)
-  has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the
-  Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a
-  resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to
-  Argos.
-
-Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to
-Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity
-little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance
-upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by
-substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three
-confederates.
-
-But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only
-as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was
-concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and
-was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the
-Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time
-retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians
-at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever.
-They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly
-formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia,
-and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following
-terms:—
-
-“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the
-Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable
-satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all
-complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the
-other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance,
-holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All
-extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same
-footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall
-also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their
-own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military
-operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take
-counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can
-for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto
-belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes
-either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound
-to enter upon amicable adjustment.[135] If any allied city shall
-quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to
-some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice
-to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.”
-
-  [135] Thucyd. v, 79. Αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τᾶν
-  ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσου, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου
-  τινὸς, διακριθῆμεν.
-
-  The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the
-  joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to
-  interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a
-  foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were
-  at this time standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens, and
-  between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose
-  to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the
-  alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard
-  themselves against such necessity in this clause.
-
-  M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat.
-  Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle,
-  1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of
-  this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.
-
-It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed
-question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and
-Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking
-joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are
-to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding
-themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy
-of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy
-to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the
-empire of Elis, Mantineia, or any other larger state which might
-have dependencies.[136] And accordingly the Mantineians, finding
-themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their
-submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies,
-renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering
-up the hostages of these latter, according to the stipulation in
-the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.[137] The Lacedæmonians do
-not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed
-of Lepreum,—through the Brasideian settlers planted there,—they
-perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being
-excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.
-
-  [136] All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced
-  by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed
-  with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of
-  Nikias) αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους, Thucyd. v, 19.
-  The last clause of this treaty guarantees αὐτοδικíαν to all,
-  though in language somewhat different, τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ
-  πάτρια δικάζεσθαι. The expression in this treaty αὐτοπόλιες is
-  substantially equivalent to αὐτοτελεῖς in the former.
-
-  It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydidês the very
-  convenient Herodotean word δωσίδικοι (Herodot. vi, 42), though
-  there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it
-  would be useful to his meaning.
-
-  [137] Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii, 81.
-
-Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon—about
-November or December, 418 B.C.—had still farther depressed the
-popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen
-regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as
-bound together by their common military training, now saw their way
-clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the
-accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views,
-and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta,
-they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and
-began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens.
-Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and
-Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects
-of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements
-concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce
-his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that
-quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian
-princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which
-constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly,
-Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty;
-insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step
-should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.[138] In farther
-pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys
-were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit
-Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort
-recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly
-by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter
-were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged
-it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not
-only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which
-gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in
-the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for
-the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the
-Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily
-shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.[139] Having no
-intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the
-Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they
-had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before,
-two years before the Peace of Nikias.[140]
-
-  [138] Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.
-
-  [139] The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian
-  towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the
-  gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious
-  festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the
-  precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his
-  treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.
-
-  [140] Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ~ἀνανεωσάμενοι~ τὰς
-  σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told
-  that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but
-  I know no truce previously between them except the general truce
-  for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with
-  Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.
-
-The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to
-the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire
-to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly
-what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most
-desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their
-plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy.
-They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one
-thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under
-the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more
-thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian
-government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical
-opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city
-seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy,
-and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint
-enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to cover
-the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos,
-whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business
-at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical
-leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the
-democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical
-leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the
-government.[141]
-
-  [141] Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι
-  ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ’ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον
-  κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνα
-  ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία
-  ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80.
-
-This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of
-the victory of Mantineia and the consummation of a train of policy
-laid by Sparta, raised her ascendency in Peloponnesus to a higher and
-more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in
-Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose,
-perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before;
-accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with
-her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not
-merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep
-down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither
-enemy, nor even neutral, to counter-work her or to favor Athens,
-throughout the whole peninsula.
-
-But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last.
-Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long
-maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional
-routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to
-govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a
-democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of
-the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived,
-and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them
-suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault:
-they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too
-tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity.
-With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all
-ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens, such abuse was pretty
-sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment
-of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their
-military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed
-the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a
-period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of
-their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop.
-After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one
-day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of
-the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn
-from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself
-of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited
-woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the
-ravisher while he was fast asleep:[142] a terrible revenge, which
-the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled
-women[143] to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to
-make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as
-protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts
-of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.
-
-  [142] Pausanias, ii, 20, 1.
-
-  [143] See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note of
-  Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.
-
-From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults
-which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not
-surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost
-courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical
-oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the
-Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta,—a festival at
-which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with
-Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians
-would make no military movement until they were finished. At this
-critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after
-a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom
-were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the
-first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta
-for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move
-during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after
-messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their
-friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march
-towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already
-passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends
-were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people.
-Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them
-success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians
-refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted
-festival.[144]
-
-  [144] Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80.
-
-Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of
-about four months,[145] from February to June, 417 B.C., and the
-chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement
-excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,[146] who
-were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta.
-Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city,
-felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they
-sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable
-treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been
-spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled
-oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after
-a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of
-wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down.
-Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any
-immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned,
-none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this
-moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three
-months intervened before any actual force was brought together.
-
-  [145] Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight months:
-  but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from
-  the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first
-  establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidês does
-  not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.
-
-  [146] Thucyd. v, 82. ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν
-  Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων.
-
-This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos,
-who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as
-an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding
-her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls
-to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might
-always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case
-they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force.
-The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about
-the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiadês brought assistance
-from Athens,[147] especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom
-they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested
-by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had
-urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls
-adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half
-between Argos and the sea,[148] required a long time. Moreover,
-the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles
-without,—a party defeated but not annihilated,—strenuously urged
-the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them
-a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew
-near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the
-oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down
-to Peiræus were in course of erection.[149] Accordingly about the end
-of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians
-and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and
-destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised.
-But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their
-engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after
-merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where
-he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his
-departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring
-territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.[150]
-
-  [147] Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ
-  γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.
-
-  [148] Pausanias, ii, 36, 3.
-
-  [149] Thucyd. i, 107.
-
-  [150] Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the
-  Argeians _had already_ built their long walls down to the
-  sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους ~ᾠκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι
-  τῆς θαλάσσης~ (xii, 81). Thucydidês uses the participle of the
-  present tense—~τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα~ τείχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες,
-  etc.
-
-The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared
-countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical
-party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual
-uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent
-victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand.
-To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched
-thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty
-triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the
-ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert
-with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons,
-whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as
-hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging
-march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of
-Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And
-again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word
-for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as
-the borders, they found the sacrifices—always offered previous to
-leaving their own territory—so unfavorable, that they returned back
-and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite
-of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for
-this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least
-were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were
-seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their
-escape.[151] Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians
-became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the
-Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the
-Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian
-oligarchical exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were
-again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian
-army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian
-reinforcement.[152]
-
-  [151] Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~μελλήσαντες~ ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν
-  στρατεύειν ... ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ~μέλλησιν~
-  τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ’
-  αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.
-
-  I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of
-  _loitering delay_, but is to be construed by the previous verb
-  μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126—“prospect of
-  action immediately impending:” compare Diodor. xii, 81.
-
-  [152] Thucyd. vi, 7.
-
-To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against
-enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to
-Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended,
-of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time
-the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a
-source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes
-which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia, hopes of
-supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is
-remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling
-between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in
-an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third
-party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally
-renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed
-on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real
-truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in
-fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the
-Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever
-in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon
-which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance,
-publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call
-letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian
-commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel,
-commenced hostilities against the Athenians.[153] Yet still Sparta
-and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the
-Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians
-to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit
-devastation.[154] Nor was the license of free intercourse for
-individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were
-invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and
-sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and
-other Dorian Greeks.
-
-  [153] Thucyd. v, 115.
-
-  [154] Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate
-  Oratio de Pace, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the war
-  was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the
-  Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This
-  assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was
-  one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among
-  others, some of them more powerful. Thucydidês tells us that the
-  _persuasions_ of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance
-  with Sparta were repeated and unavailing.
-
-Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians
-probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the
-intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the
-Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had
-made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who,
-having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian
-expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417
-B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew
-his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated
-the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the
-ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an
-enemy.[155]
-
-  [155] Thucyd. v, 83.
-
-Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without
-any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded
-to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians
-with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want
-of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades,
-and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens,
-which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among
-all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as
-Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region,
-situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could
-readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since
-it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman,
-Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on
-the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected
-to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it;
-the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure
-and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man
-who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it
-never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his
-countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon
-them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly
-through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking
-of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through
-the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a
-portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force
-not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês,
-all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with
-express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis.
-But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much
-silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result
-becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore
-to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The
-fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness
-of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When
-he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian
-diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making
-important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might
-have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for
-this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well
-as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her
-empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of
-which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to
-display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous
-than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless,
-and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after
-the defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations
-of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects
-an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected
-only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious
-perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place
-could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved.
-We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign
-politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of
-Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be
-developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought near to ruin
-by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular
-misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of
-either.
-
-It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do
-not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising
-out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês.[156] The
-political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great
-violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken,
-and this proposition—probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since
-Alkibiadês was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous—was
-adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cheremês, a
-speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously
-supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is
-named by Aristophanês as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership
-of the rostrum in the Pnyx:[157] if this were true, his supposed
-demagogic preëminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the
-period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he
-had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe
-to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in
-accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language
-which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be
-doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as
-had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidês does not
-name him in any of the important debates which took place at and
-after the Peace of Nikias. Thucydidês only mentions him once, in 411
-B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and
-resident at Samos. He terms him, “one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body,
-who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity
-and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a
-disgrace to the city.”[158] This sentence of Thucydidês is really the
-only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his
-case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as
-if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was
-at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators
-who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no
-particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general
-character given by Thucydidês.
-
-  [156] Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p.
-  360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring
-  of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.
-
-  His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called
-  Andokidês against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems
-  to accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p.
-  494, _seq._).
-
-  The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I
-  feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two
-  generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My
-  reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous
-  notes, nor do I think that Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix is successful
-  in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech.
-  See my preceding vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6, note.
-
-  [157] Aristophan. Pac. 680.
-
-  [158] Thucyd. viii, 73. ~Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν~ Ἀθηναίων,
-  μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος
-  φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to
-  Androtion (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot.)—ὠστρακισμένον διὰ φαυλότητα.
-
-  Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch,
-  Alkibiadês, c. 13; Ælian. V. H. xii, 43; Theopompus, Fragm. 102,
-  103, ed. Didot.
-
-At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a
-vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between
-Nikias and Alkibiadês, about twenty-four years had elapsed since
-a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been
-that of Periklês and Thucydidês son of Melêsius, the latter of whom
-was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had
-become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for
-ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover, there
-was now full confidence in the numerous dikasteries as competent to
-deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus abating the necessity
-as conceived in men’s minds, not less than the real necessity, for
-such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things,
-altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised
-to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not
-know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an
-abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At
-a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the friends of Alkibiadês
-probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting
-a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The
-vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place,
-the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred to let
-the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating
-the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally
-pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was
-always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any
-citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, the
-two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs, or
-hetæries, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax also,
-united to turn the vote against some one else: and they fixed upon
-a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.[159] By thus
-concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him
-to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary banishment. But
-such a result was in no one’s contemplation when the vote was decreed
-to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping
-their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by
-every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross
-abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidês himself
-distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully
-deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could
-treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the
-ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was,
-even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and
-this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of
-it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier
-days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual
-usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry
-between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough
-to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês
-had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that
-the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary
-antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.
-
-  [159] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11.
-  Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the
-  coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but
-  between Phæax and Alkibiadês.
-
-  The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all
-  three.
-
-It was in the beginning of summer (416 B.C.) that the Athenians
-undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos,
-one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not
-already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient
-colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of
-lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been
-in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had
-they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her
-any ground of complaint,[160] until she landed and attacked them
-in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt,
-sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and
-Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian,
-twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from
-the allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These
-officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent
-envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to
-become a subject-ally of Athens.
-
-  [160] Thucyd. iii, 91.
-
-It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in
-governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for
-peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present
-occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted
-the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive
-council. Of this conversation Thucydidês professes to give a detailed
-and elaborate account, at surprising length, considering his general
-brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many
-replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no
-one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue
-carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every
-reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far
-larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report,
-than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For
-this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have
-had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different
-persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four
-Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part.
-Now as all the Melian population were slain immediately after the
-capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through
-whose report Thucydidês could possibly have heard what really passed.
-That he did hear either from or through them the general character of
-what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing
-that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of
-debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we
-must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.
-
-The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the
-mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in
-which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians
-to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of
-justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will
-not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian
-empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth
-injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he
-listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though
-colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done
-Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable
-under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that
-justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal
-compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows,
-and the weak submitting to it.[161] To this the Melians reply,
-that—omitting all appeal to justice, and speaking only of what was
-expedient—they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break
-down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity
-and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with
-some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a
-case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of
-Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be
-awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others.—“We
-are not afraid of _that_ (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire
-should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who
-deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is
-not undertaken against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether
-subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This
-is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you
-that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we
-are now speaking with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under
-our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the
-mutual benefit of both of us.”—“Cannot you leave us alone, and let
-us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor
-of Sparta?” said the Melians.—“No (is the reply); your friendship
-does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of
-our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will
-give a demonstration of our power.”—“But do your subjects really
-take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of
-connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of
-whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted
-from you and been reconquered?”—“They do: for they think that both
-one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and
-that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power
-and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not
-only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the
-whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too,
-while we are lords of the sea.”—“But surely that very circumstance is
-in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for
-if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert
-them into enemies.”—“We are in little fear of continental cities,
-who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but
-only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you,
-or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which
-it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy
-are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves
-into peril.”—“We know well (said the Melians, after some other
-observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend
-against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we
-trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from
-the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice;
-and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be
-made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from
-very shame to aid us.”—“We too (replied the Athenians) think that we
-shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For
-we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which
-men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves.
-What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see
-to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of
-necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This
-is the principle on which we now proceed,—not having been the first
-either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established
-and likely to continue for ever,—and knowing well too that you or
-others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations
-from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining
-deaf to your call, we congratulate you indeed on your innocent
-simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness.
-For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in
-regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at
-their behavior towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by
-many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most
-conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable,
-and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state
-of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations
-of safety.”
-
-  [161] In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy,
-  I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by
-  the English government in 1807, together with the language used
-  by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject.
-  We read as follows in M. Thiers’s Histoire du Consulat et de
-  l’Empire:—
-
-  “L’agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C’étoit M. Jackson
-  qui avait été autrefois chargé d’affaires en France, avant
-  l’arrivée de Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu’on n’avoit pas pû
-  y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu’il manifestoit en toute
-  occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il allégua de prétendues
-  stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit,
-  (disoit on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d’une coalition
-  contre l’Angleterre: il donna comme raison d’agir la necessité
-  où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions
-  pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund
-  ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François: et en conséquence
-  il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu’on livrât à l’armée
-  Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande de Sund, le
-  port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même—promettant de
-  garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit
-  remis en possession de ce qu’on alloit lui enlever, dès que
-  le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne
-  perdroit rien, que l’on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires
-  et en amis—que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce
-  qu’elles consommeroient.—Et avec quoi, répondit le prince
-  indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérions
-  à cette infame proposition?—Le prince continuant, et opposant
-  à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui
-  n’avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit
-  toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le
-  surprendre—_M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par
-  une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre,
-  qu’il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus
-  fort quand on étoit le plus foible_. Le prince congédia l’agent
-  Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu’il alloit
-  se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince
-  et de citoyen Danois.” (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de
-  l’Empire, tome viii, livre xxviii, p. 190.)
-
-After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the
-Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider
-the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a
-certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the
-following words: “We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of
-Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which
-has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an
-effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which
-the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from
-men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may
-be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and
-that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may
-be mutually acceptable.”—“Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone
-seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts
-before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your
-own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all
-upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with
-your all, you will come to ruin.”
-
-The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation,
-distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was
-constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both
-by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The
-town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of
-that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded
-them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an
-additional detachment, under Philokratês. At length the provisions
-within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the
-Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at
-discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of
-military age and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the
-proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydidês does not say;
-but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadês[162] was strenuous
-in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently
-sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as kleruchs, or
-out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.[163]
-
-  [162] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the
-  statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokidês against
-  Alkibiadês found current in respect to the conduct of the latter
-  (sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of
-  it.
-
-  [163] Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον
-  πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the
-  island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9):
-  some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared.
-
-Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mêlos from the
-beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most
-inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian
-history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such
-wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war
-placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror,
-and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in
-Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the
-same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange.
-But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws
-of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they
-done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the
-island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the
-expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain
-was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the
-whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens.
-Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this
-small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless,
-it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in
-after times as among the first of her misdeeds.
-
-To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest—easy to effect,
-though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also
-strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a
-thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate
-Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition,
-superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions
-of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with
-still more fatal predominance.
-
-Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked
-in the dialogue set forth by Thucydidês. I have already stated that
-this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except
-as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out
-into deductions and illustrations,[164] thus dramatizing the given
-situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put
-into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers,
-as Dionysius of Halikarnassus[165] long ago remarked; intimating his
-suspicion that Thucydidês had so set out the case for the purpose
-of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever
-may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the
-arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even
-with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are
-more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false
-pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an
-amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called
-_sophistry_, where their purpose needs it.[166] Now the language of
-the envoy at Mêlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating
-the immorality of the class or profession—falsely called a
-school—named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for
-a sort of audacious frankness; a disdain not merely of sophistry,
-in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse
-as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if
-“_The good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and
-they should keep who can_,” had been first discovered and openly
-promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value
-of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word—putting
-aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called
-sophists at Athens—is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive
-justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon
-this “good old plan” as much as he pleases, but without avowing
-it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some
-imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb)
-speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mêlos speaks in a manner
-totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the
-modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as
-Dionysius has observed.
-
-  [164] Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol.
-  iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348.
-
-  [165] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucydid. c. 37-42, pp. 906-920,
-  Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de
-  Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk.
-
-  [166] Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πραότατα τῶν
-  ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδιὰς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας. To
-  the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.
-
-As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in
-Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they
-have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day,
-to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory
-in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors
-who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas
-reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which
-had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves,
-as matter of pride and glory:[167] and when we come to the times of
-Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest
-reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus
-founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples
-to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mêlos: but
-that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy
-of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification,
-looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous
-invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a
-civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to
-furnish some justification,—a good plea, if he can,—a false plea, or
-sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies
-the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the
-civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in
-Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of
-barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy
-more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra.
-He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect
-truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency
-as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty
-years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her
-allies, without any payment of their own.
-
-  [167] Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the
-  Akanthians, v, 86 ~ἴσχυος δικαιώσει~, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, etc.
-
-So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic
-fragment,—Μήλου Ἅλωσις (The Capture of Melos),—if we may parody the
-title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus “The Capture of Miletus.”
-And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydidês will
-suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and
-tragical effect. The capture of Mêlos comes immediately before the
-great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon
-three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course
-of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort
-of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to
-ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to
-recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its
-effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main,
-declining,—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration,—until
-her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidês,
-just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress,
-makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in
-its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this
-dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mêlos. It will be recollected that
-Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxês into
-Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses
-his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and
-superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the
-courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the
-overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral
-contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse
-following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to
-the Greek mind. And Thucydidês—having before him an act of great
-injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at
-this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for
-once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and
-confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his
-own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of
-the Athenian envoy,—still less, those of the Athenian public,—least
-of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian
-sophists.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LVII.
-
-SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.
-
-
-In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of
-the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable
-Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face
-of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history
-of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of
-the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has
-been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect: so that I
-have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two
-streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in
-Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill
-up this blank: to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian
-events during the interval between 461-416 B.C., and to assign the
-successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in
-ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to
-stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.
-
-The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,[168] followed by
-the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the
-island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in
-free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately, our memorials
-respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is
-enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change
-from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther,
-transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property.
-The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile,
-transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided
-settlements for numerous emigrants and mercenaries devoted to their
-interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties
-were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution
-was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a
-period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby
-the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the
-territory of Messêne, partly in the reëstablished city of Kamarina in
-the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.[169]
-
-  [168] See above, vol. v, ch. xliii, pp. 204-239, for the history
-  of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter.
-
-  [169] Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while
-  enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive
-  revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily,
-  takes no notice of the cause in which it originated, namely,
-  the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had
-  brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having
-  brought in ten thousand, Diodor. xi, 72), and the number of
-  exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed.
-
-  I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting
-  the events of this period, because it is definite as well as
-  important (vol. iv, p. 9, chap. xviii, sect. 1).
-
-  “But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to
-  become public property, or to be assigned to new individual
-  owners. _Everywhere, then, that favorite measure of democracy,
-  the equal division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon_:
-  a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be
-  maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it
-  could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained.”
-
-  Again, sect. iii, p. 23, he speaks of “that incomplete and
-  iniquitous partition of lands,” etc.
-
-  Now, upon this we may remark:—
-
-  1. The _equal division of the lands_ of the state, here affirmed
-  by Mr. Mitford, is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority
-  for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi, 76) κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν
-  χώραν, etc.; and again (xi, 86) he speaks of τὸν ἀναδασμὸν
-  τῆς χώρας: the _redivision_ of the territory; but respecting
-  _equality of division_, not one word does he say. Nor can
-  any principle of division in this case be less probable than
-  equality; for one of the great motives of the redivision was
-  to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the
-  Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or
-  less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as
-  it might have been. Besides, immediately after the redivision, we
-  find rich and poor mentioned, just as before (xi, 86).
-
-  2. Next, Mr. Mitford calls “the equal division of all the lands
-  of the state” the _favorite measure of democracy_. This is an
-  assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece,
-  so far as my knowledge extends, can be produced, in which such
-  equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect.
-  In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed
-  constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath
-  annually taken by the popular heliastic judges had a special
-  clause, protesting emphatically against _redivision of the land
-  or extinction of debts_.
-
-But though peace was thus reëstablished, these large mutations
-of inhabitants first begun by the despots,—and the incoherent
-mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which
-was brought about unavoidably during the process,—left throughout
-Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long
-traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by
-foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.[170] The wonder
-indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were
-soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the
-half century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and
-undisturbed period in the history of the island.
-
-  [170] Thucyd. vi, 17.
-
-The southern coast of Sicily was occupied, beginning from the
-westward by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came
-Syracuse, possessing the southeastern cape, and the southern portion
-of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana,
-and Naxos: Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the
-island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the
-non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans: on this coast, Himera was the only
-Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner
-of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and
-Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo)
-was the principal.
-
-Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the
-first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed,
-disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of
-them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know
-the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there
-established, but its stability was threatened by more than one
-ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero.
-The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed
-a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring
-partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so
-openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put
-to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans
-to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried, and failed
-in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law
-similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of
-temporary preventive banishment.[171] Under this law several powerful
-citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse
-of the new engine, by the political parties in the city, that men
-of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling
-with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said
-to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent
-than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found
-themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction.
-We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this
-political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus,
-and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the
-application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse.
-Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities
-provided by Kleisthenês at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the
-institution, though tutelary, if reserved for its proper emergencies,
-was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder
-that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and
-discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.
-
-  [171] Diodor. xi, 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called
-  the _petalism_; because, in taking the votes, the name of the
-  citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive,
-  instead of a shell or potsherd.
-
-Although the ostracism, or petalism, at Syracuse was speedily
-discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind,
-as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism
-are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth, and
-manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan
-admiral Phaӱllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the
-piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the
-island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been
-bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried
-and banished, a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellês being
-sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many
-parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the
-island of Corsica, at that time a Tyrrhenian possession, and reduced
-the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large
-number of captives and a rich booty.[172]
-
-  [172] Diodor. xi. 87, 88.
-
-Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities
-in Sicily had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior,
-and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability,
-with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having
-probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion,
-or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement,
-that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities
-into something like city life and collective coöperation. Having
-acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he
-induced all the Sikel communities, with the exception of Hybla, to
-enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a
-central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little
-town from the hill-top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the
-neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called
-Paliki.[173] As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in
-part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood,
-rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels
-generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city
-of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of
-adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population,
-probably with some Greeks intermingled.
-
-  [173] Diodor. xi, 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is
-  illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad, xx, 216:—
-
-  Κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
-  Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,
-  Ἀλλ’ ἔθ’ ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης.
-
-  Compare Plato, de Legg. iii, pp. 681, 682.
-
-The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested
-by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually
-to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had
-appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel
-town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from
-Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna:[174] Duketius
-now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the
-leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory
-of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons
-called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power, when
-we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place,
-thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to
-them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a
-victory, in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as
-the Syracusans believed, insomuch that they condemned him to death.
-In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel
-prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised
-the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and
-dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades
-and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate
-resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He
-rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown,
-and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering
-himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected
-brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them
-the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the
-assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy
-was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of
-some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder
-citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus
-fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring
-upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the
-generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of
-“Save the suppliant.”[175] Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was
-sent off to Corinth, under his engagement to live there quietly for
-the future; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.
-
-  [174] Diodor. xi, 76.
-
-  [175] Diodor. xi, 91, 92. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὥσπερ τινὶ μιᾷ φωνῇ σώζειν
-  ἅπαντες ἐβόων τὸν ἱκέτην.
-
-Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable
-incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the
-lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius
-actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead
-of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence,—just as
-the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of
-the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion
-which will be hereafter recounted.[176] If in some instances the
-assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous
-sentiment, carried severities to excess,—so, in other cases, as well
-as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have
-triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the
-fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after
-residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending
-to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of
-colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê
-on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that
-when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited,
-the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great
-credit on the score of superior foresight.[177]
-
-  [176] Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.
-
-  [177] Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius
-  to Sicily: “The Syracusan chiefs brought back Duketius from
-  Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to their own views
-  for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted,
-  or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people,
-  Greeks and Sicels, at Calé Acté, on the northern coast of the
-  island,” (ch. xviii, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 13.)
-
-  The statement that “the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or
-  encouraged him to come back, or to found the colony of Kalê
-  Aktê,” is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of
-  Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of
-  the Sikel _prince_ into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of
-  Syracusan _democracy_. The words of Diodorus, the only authority
-  in the case, are as follows (xii, 8): Οὗτος δὲ (Duketius)
-  ὀλίγον χρόνον μείνας ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ, ~τὰς ὁμολογίας ἔλυσε~, καὶ
-  προσποιησάμενος χρησμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτῷ δεδόσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν
-  Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν
-  οἰκητόρων· συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν
-  καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ τῶν Ἑρβιταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ
-  τὸν οἰκισμὸν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐγίνετο· Ἀκραγαντῖνοι δὲ, ἅμα μὲν
-  φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἅμα δ’ ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι
-  Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πολέμιον ~διέσωσαν ἄνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων
-  γνώμης~, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις.
-
-But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief
-which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius
-had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who
-had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again
-in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they
-declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between
-these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War
-actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took
-part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and
-especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera,
-these latter solicited and obtained peace.[178] The discord between
-the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the
-city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in reëstablishing his
-ascendency over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by
-death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that
-the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of
-the Sikel townships in the island, regaining his former conquest,
-Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and town called
-Trinakia,[179] after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of
-the inhabitants.
-
-  [178] Diodor. xii, 8.
-
-  [179] Diodor. xii, 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see
-  Thucyd. iv, 65.
-
-  Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage
-  of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling’s note), as
-  well as Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer, b. x, ch.
-  xv, p. 446), intimate some skepticism; which I share so far as
-  to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and
-  importance.
-
-  Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was _the
-  only_ Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and
-  that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all.
-  We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent
-  Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd.
-  vi, 88; vii, 2).
-
-By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined
-with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to
-the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending
-her ascendency throughout the island: with which view her horsemen
-were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were
-constructed.[180] Whether any, or what, steps were taken to realize
-her designs our historian does not tell us. But the position of
-Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war:
-Syracuse, the first city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams,
-if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and
-almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their
-independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.
-
-  [180] Diodor. xii, 30.
-
-Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not
-come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of
-great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public
-monuments of Agrigentum, especially appear to have even surpassed
-those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African
-coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither
-the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the
-Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory
-of Sicily,[181] particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the
-city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the
-grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind
-in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was
-very great: the number of rich men keeping chariots and competing
-for the prize at the Olympic games was renowned, not less than the
-accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures,[182] with
-manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly
-brought to our notice because of the frightful catastrophe which
-desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians.
-It was in the interval which we are now describing that this
-prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but
-more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.
-
-  [181] Diodor. xiii, 81.
-
-  [182] Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90.
-
-Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished.
-At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and
-Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea
-in the gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative
-philosophers in Greece, Parmenidês and Zeno. Empedoklês of Agrigentum
-was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with
-it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of
-the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical
-studies, wherein not only Empedoklês and Pôlus at Agrigentum, but
-Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini,
-acquired great reputation.[183] The constitution established at
-Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at
-first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing
-in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an
-ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the reëstablishment of
-a despotism, when Empedoklês, availing himself of wealth and high
-position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only
-to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One
-Thousand, and render the government completely democratical. His
-influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and
-pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his
-philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.[184]
-The same combination of rhetoric with physical speculation appears
-also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout
-Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It
-was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the
-judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers
-Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.
-
-  [183] See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato,
-  Phædr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate,
-  p. 534 R. and Epist. ii, ad Ammæum, p. 792; also Quintilian,
-  iii, 1, 125. According to Cicero (de Inventione, ii, 2), the
-  treatises of these ancient rhetoricians, “usque a principe illo
-  et inventore Tisiâ,” had been superseded by Aristotle, who had
-  collected them carefully, “nominatim,” and had improved upon
-  their expositions. Dionysius laments that they had been so
-  superseded (Epist. ad Ammæ. p. 722).
-
-  [184] Diogen. Laërt. viii, 64-71; Seyfert, Akragas und
-  sein Gebiet, sect. ii, p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der Alten
-  Philosophie, vol. i. ch. vi, p. 533, _seqq._
-
-In this state of material prosperity, popular politics, and
-intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking
-out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian
-confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian
-Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition
-of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears
-to have never aimed at any political ascendency even over that town,
-much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though
-forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the
-dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference,[185]
-were yet connected, by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances,
-with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies
-of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of
-Sicily,—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps
-Himera and Messênê,—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among
-the allies of Athens, perhaps the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in
-Italy.[186] Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and
-Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty,
-is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to
-the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of
-the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one
-of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action.
-The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the
-Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any
-coöperation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned
-to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor
-Syracuse.
-
-  [185] Thucyd. iv. 61-64. This is the tenor of the speech
-  delivered by Hermokratês at the congress of Gela in the eighth
-  year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he
-  calls all non-Sicilian Greeks ἀλλοφύλους.
-
-  [186] The inscription in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. (No. 74,
-  part i, p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and
-  Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it
-  to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudês at Athens
-  (Olymp. 86, 4, B.C. 433-432, the year before the Peloponnesian
-  war), renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But
-  it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his
-  own conjecture; and even the name of the archon, _Apseudês_,
-  which he has restored by a plausible conjecture, can hardly be
-  considered as certain.
-
-  If we could believe the story in Justin iv, 3, Rhegium must have
-  ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states,
-  that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in
-  auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeræan exiles having first
-  destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next
-  massacred the friends who had invoked them: “ausi facinus nulli
-  tyranno comparandum.” They married the Rhegine women, and seized
-  the city for themselves.
-
-  I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears
-  noticed in Thucydidês, nor seems to consist with what he does
-  tell us.
-
-It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and
-the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433-432), which
-brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to coöperation in the
-Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting
-the most violent anti-Athenian war spirit in Corinth, with whom
-the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy,—next,
-by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in
-Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an
-established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch—whom most historians
-have followed—is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydidês, when
-he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in
-Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven
-or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years
-before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely
-conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown
-in a former chapter. At that moment, Sparta and Corinth anticipated
-large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in
-money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally
-of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such
-reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.[187]
-
-  [187] Thucyd. i, 36.
-
-In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first
-invasion of Attica, and full of hope that Athens would be crushed
-in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet
-of five hundred ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable
-portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian
-Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to
-refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their
-fleet should be ready.[188] Of such expected succor, indeed, little
-was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the
-expectations and orders of Sparta, show that here as elsewhere
-she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive.
-Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample
-reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns, a hope which
-must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they
-began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from
-being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermokratês
-the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards,
-immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse,
-with their antecedent apathy.[189] But it is easy to see, that as the
-Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest,—neither wrongs
-to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens,—nor any habit of
-obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content
-themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case
-of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it
-pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely
-Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment
-to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar
-motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or
-Selinus.
-
-  [188] Thucyd. ii, 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ
-  ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τἀκείνων ἑλομένοις,
-  ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν
-  πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσόμενον, etc.
-
-  Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the
-  notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd.
-  vol. i, ch. xv, p. 181.
-
-  I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction
-  of αὐτοῦ with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of “those
-  ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily.” This
-  would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no
-  Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus.
-
-  Nevertheless I think, differing from them, that αὐτοῦ is not
-  a pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used
-  in contrast with those words, and really means, “in or about
-  Peloponnesus.” It was contemplated that new ships should be built
-  in Sicily and Italy, of sufficient number to make the total
-  fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, including the triremes
-  already in Peloponnesus, equal to five hundred sail. But it
-  was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily
-  _alone_ should amount to five hundred sail, as Dr. Arnold, in my
-  judgment, erroneously imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire
-  confederacy would be a prodigious total: five hundred sail for
-  Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible.
-
-  To construe the sentence as it stands now, putting aside the
-  conjecture of νῆες instead of ναῦς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of
-  ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly, we must admit the
-  supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes
-  occurs in Thucydidês. The sentence begins with one form of
-  construction and concludes with another. We must suppose, with
-  Göller, that αἱ πόλεις understood as the nominative case to
-  ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονίοις—ἑλομένοις) are to
-  be considered, I apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that
-  is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction,
-  which Thucydidês has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if
-  νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow.
-
-  [189] Thucyd. vi, 34: compare iii, 86.
-
-Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little
-doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming
-known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that
-it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to
-assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of
-despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing
-to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities
-in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable
-hopes of conquering and appropriating,—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini.
-These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle
-against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her
-or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend
-themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian
-city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city
-Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter
-enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth
-summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined
-to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor, as
-allies[190] and Ionians, and to represent that, if Syracuse succeeded
-in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith
-send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been
-invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar
-style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly,
-and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this
-embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous
-pupils and large gains, not merely in Athens but in many other towns
-of Central Greece,[191] though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his
-pleading the success of the present application.
-
-  [190] Thucyd. vi, 86.
-
-  [191] Thucyd. iii, 86; Diodor. xii, 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282,
-  B. It is remarkable that Thucydidês, though he is said, with much
-  probability, to have been among the pupils of Gorgias, makes no
-  mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus
-  probably copied from Ephorus, the pupil of Isokratês. Among the
-  writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished
-  rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for
-  much more than in the estimation of Thucydidês. Pausanias (vi,
-  17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in
-  this celebrated legation.
-
-Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these
-Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island,
-as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus:
-and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charœadês, with
-instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the
-possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests.
-Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing
-the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even
-undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which
-were in alliance with Syracuse.[192] Throughout the ensuing year,
-he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his
-colleague Charœadês being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian
-territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage
-over the troops of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him,
-gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic
-cities.[193] He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic
-city of Egesta, in the northwest portion of Sicily, and he invaded
-the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the
-river Halex:[194] after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated
-a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an
-expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inêssus. This was a
-native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in
-the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being
-repulsed with loss.[195] Lachês concluded his operations in the
-autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on
-the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the
-ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from
-Athens to supersede him.[196]
-
-  [192] Thucyd. iii, 88; Diodor. xii, 54.
-
-  [193] Thucyd. iii, 90; vi, 6.
-
-  [194] Thucyd. iii, 99.
-
-  [195] Thucyd. iii, 103.
-
-  [196] Thucyd. iii, 115.
-
-That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable
-expedition, intended to arrive in the spring, under Eurymedon and
-Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic
-cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to
-render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened
-to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther
-reinforcements, at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge
-their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians
-had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they
-desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to
-send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing
-the contest to a speedy close.[197]
-
-  [197] Thucyd. iii, 115.
-
-Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from
-Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to
-afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board
-to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in
-conjunction with the land-forces under the command of Kleon, making a
-descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylos, achieved
-for Athens the most signal success of the whole war, the capture
-of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.[198] But the fleet was
-so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in
-operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the
-month of September.[199]
-
-  [198] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. lii.
-
-  [199] Thucyd. iv, 48.
-
-Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal
-to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For
-Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês
-at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but
-experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which
-had surrendered to Lachês a few months before; and which, together
-with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait.
-Apprized of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to
-deprive them of this important base of operations against the island;
-and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled
-by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. It would
-appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was
-at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land-force
-of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were
-even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable
-party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the
-diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messênê. The latter
-town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens,[200]
-which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began
-maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians
-and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the
-Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight
-others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought
-on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through
-the strait. They put the enemy’s ships to flight, and drove them
-to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force
-at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near
-Rhegium, each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.[201]
-This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against
-the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine
-territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the
-opposite coast under Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close
-on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians
-and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even
-with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to
-seize and detain by a grappling-iron; her crew escaping by swimming
-to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the
-Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by
-tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messênê, in which transit they were again
-attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the
-loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in
-this along-shore fighting.[202]
-
-  [200] Thucyd. iii, 115; iv, 1.
-
-  [201] Thucyd. iv, 24. Καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους
-  ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν
-  τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες, etc.
-
-  I concur in Dr. Arnold’s explanation of this passage, yet
-  conceiving that the words ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον designate the flight
-  as disorderly, insomuch that _all_ the Lokrian ships did not get
-  back to the Lokrian station, nor _all_ the Syracusan ships to the
-  Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or
-  the other, as it best could.
-
-  [202] Thucyd. iv, 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων.
-
-  I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which
-  is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the
-  commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr.
-  Arnold’s explanation, when he says “The Syracusans, on a sudden,
-  threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by
-  a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants,” etc. The
-  open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the
-  benefit of their superior seamanship.
-
-The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an
-intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under
-Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free,
-invaded the territory of their neighbor, the Chalkidic city of Naxos,
-sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that
-city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the
-town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels were seen
-descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians: upon which
-the latter, elate with the sight, and mistaking the new comers for
-their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and
-made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared.
-The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less
-than one thousand men, and with a still greater loss sustained in
-their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet
-went back also to Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were
-not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its
-recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection
-under Demomelês, while the Leontines and Naxians, together with
-the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by
-land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the
-Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force;
-but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the
-assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back
-within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now
-become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to
-Rhegium.[203]
-
-  [203] Thucyd. iv, 25.
-
-Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the
-first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it
-appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the
-autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined
-Pythodôrus.[204] Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet
-at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind,
-the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing
-humiliation of Sparta during the months immediately following the
-capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring
-of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession
-of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Kythêra, so that a
-rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the
-full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on
-the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of
-affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three
-years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their
-island.[205] The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted
-along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a
-separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which
-latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in
-the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.[206]
-
-  [204] Thucyd. iv, 48.
-
-  [205] Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratês,
-  nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian expedition against
-  Syracuse was on its way, respecting the increased disposition
-  to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of
-  Athens (Thucyd. vi, 33).
-
-  [206] Thucyd. iv, 58.
-
-This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most
-powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest
-which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês,
-chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to
-vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave,
-and able man, clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his
-country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments,
-mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to
-their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydidês places
-in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically
-the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign
-intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might
-arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impressed upon
-his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest
-power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened
-all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled
-one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians
-as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The
-Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without
-invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation,
-under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided
-them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The
-Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security
-against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a
-paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If
-possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were
-impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily,
-apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged,
-and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance;
-of which Syracuse—the first city in the island, and best able to
-sustain the brunt of war—was prepared to set the example, without
-that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to
-first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the
-future. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of
-the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and
-let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their
-affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.[207]
-
-  [207] See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv, 59-64. One
-  expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by
-  Thucydidês many years after its proper date, subsequently to the
-  great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.;
-  though I doubt not that Thucydidês collected the memoranda for it
-  at the time.
-
-  Hermokratês says: “The Athenians are now near us with _a few
-  ships_, lying in wait for our blunders,”—οἱ δύναμιν ἔχοντες
-  μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, ~ὀλίγαις
-  ναυσὶ παρόντες~, etc. (iv, 60).
-
-  Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues
-  at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted
-  at Sphakteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been
-  previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodôrus. It could
-  not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been
-  sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in
-  the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a
-  _small_ fleet: assuredly, Hermokratês would not thus allude to
-  it, since it was for the interest of his argument to exaggerate
-  rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens.
-
-  But Thucydidês, composing the speech after the great Athenian
-  expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding
-  in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet
-  of Eurymedon as “a few ships,” when he tacitly compared the
-  two. This is the only way that I know, of explaining such an
-  expression.
-
-  The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time
-  omitted the words ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ: probably they noticed the
-  contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage _may_
-  certainly be construed without those words.
-
-This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions of
-Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities,
-Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war,
-and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the
-Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident
-uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor
-for the future. Accordingly, the peace was accepted by all the
-belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that
-the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina, on receipt of
-a fixed sum of money.[208] The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens
-should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all,
-except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.[209] They then acquainted Eurymedon
-and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the
-pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet
-from Sicily. Nor had these generals any choice but to close with the
-proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the
-Sicilian cities, with liberty of access reciprocally to any single
-ship of war, but no armed force to cross the sea between Sicily and
-Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.[210]
-
-  [208] Thucyd. iv, 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii, 22,
-  23, one of the Excerpta recently published by Maii, from the
-  Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus had in his twenty-first book described
-  the congress of Gela at considerable length, and had composed an
-  elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns,
-  as a piece of empty declamation.
-
-  [209] Thucyd. v, 5.
-
-  [210] Thucyd. vi, 13-52.
-
-On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received
-by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his
-colleagues Sophoklês and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having
-been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet—so the Athenians
-believed—was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the
-three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.[211]
-This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that
-Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from
-concluding peace, while it is certain that without them he could have
-achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained in his conduct,
-as recounted by Thucydidês, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with
-the entire fleet in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been
-attended with any increased vigor or success, in the prosecution
-of the war. But the Athenians—besides an undue depreciation of
-the Sicilian cities, which we shall find fatally misleading them
-hereafter—were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes,
-counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment,
-and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the
-objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence
-was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle
-of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment,
-it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three
-generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.
-
-  [211] Thucyd. iv, 65.
-
-The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been
-premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini
-and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation
-of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the
-pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came
-to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of
-many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of
-the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these
-new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town upon whom the necessity
-would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands,
-forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally
-decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse,
-bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.[212] While
-these exiles found shelter as they could in other cities, the rich
-Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their
-residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To
-them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became
-masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their
-own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their
-residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up
-a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong
-post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable
-number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some
-time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their
-fortifications.
-
-  [212] Thucyd. v, 4. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ
-  Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, καὶ
-  ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι
-  Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν
-  ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, etc.
-
-  Upon this Dr. Arnold observes: “The principle on which this
-  ἀναδασμὸς γῆς was redemanded, was this; that every citizen was
-  entitled to his portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and
-  that the admission of new citizens rendered a redivision of
-  the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of
-  justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual κλῆροι
-  (properties) of the old citizens were required to be shared
-  with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the
-  ager publicus, or land still remaining to the state itself,
-  and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however,
-  being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens,
-  either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different
-  individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among
-  the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking,
-  a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to
-  a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always
-  regarded as a revolutionary measure.”
-
-  I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic
-  worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations
-  existed between Rome and Leontini. The ager publicus at Rome was
-  the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the
-  city: there may, indeed, have been originally a similar ager
-  publicus in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all
-  conquests; but this must at any rate have been very small, and
-  had probably been all absorbed and assigned in private property
-  before the agrarian disputes began.
-
-  We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any ager publicus
-  acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they
-  had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots
-  for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property.
-  But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and
-  conditions. Of what class of men were the new emigrants? Were
-  they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands
-  to work with; or did they bring with them any amount of funds,
-  to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of
-  Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i, 27, and Plato de Legib. v, p. 744,
-  A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would
-  be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing
-  proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not
-  to yield their properties without compensation. I have already
-  noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no
-  slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the
-  city; and provided this were insured, it might be a good bargain
-  for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to
-  come in and buy.
-
-  We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words
-  of Thucydidês do not present this measure as revolutionary, or
-  as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor.
-  It was proposed, on public grounds, to strengthen the city by
-  the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy,
-  in the close neighborhood of a doubtful and superior city,
-  like Syracuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the
-  measure without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford’s
-  representation can be noway justified from Thucydidês: “Time and
-  circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all
-  the Sicilian commonwealths, since _that incomplete and iniquitous
-  partition of lands_, which had been made, on the general
-  establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of
-  the family of Gelon. In other cities, the poor rested under their
-  lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project _for a fresh and
-  equal partition_; and to strengthen themselves against the party
-  of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree
-  for associating a number of new citizens.” (Mitford, H. G. ch.
-  xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 23.)
-
-  I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford
-  has misrepresented the redivision of lands which took place
-  after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That redivision had
-  not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore
-  correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present
-  movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and
-  circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to
-  say, that the poor at Leontini now desired “a fresh and equal
-  partition.” Thucydidês says _not one word about equal partition_.
-  He puts forward the enrolment of new citizens as the substantive
-  and primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines; the
-  redivision of the lands, as a measure consequent and subsidiary
-  to this, and as yet existing only in project (ἐπενόει). Mr.
-  Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real
-  object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been
-  proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly
-  at variance with that of Thucydidês.
-
-The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy,
-seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela,
-and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible
-position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse, thus compensating
-for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos,
-in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had
-concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with
-complaints, and renewed prayers for help.[213]
-
-  [213] Justin (iv, 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens with
-  all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the
-  Athenian assembly: “Sordidâ veste, capillo barbâque promissis, et
-  omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito,
-  concionem deformes adeunt.”
-
-But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call; her
-defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by
-the truce for one year; and even during that truce, she had been
-called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress
-of Brasidas. After the expiration of that truce, she sent Phæax and
-two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two
-triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan
-party in the island, for the purpose of reëstablishing the Leontine
-Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable
-relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri,
-which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first addresses
-in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger
-from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and
-Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens,
-which had dictated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared;
-while on the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in regard
-to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that
-proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was
-not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine
-aristocracy to expel the Demos, just as the despot Gelon had combined
-with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and
-had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of
-the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited
-cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become
-a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully
-affecting Grecian imagination, that the Kamarinæans, neighbors of
-Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust
-conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them.
-Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed from
-policy, and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But
-when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion
-of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by
-so resolute an opposition that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor
-did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera.
-In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the
-territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies,
-where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious
-existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid,
-he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina, he
-struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from
-Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messênê after
-the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but
-after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second
-revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these
-vessels without any act of hostility.[214]
-
-  [214] Thucyd. v, 4, 5.
-
-The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from
-his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely
-expelled. Nevertheless, Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable
-time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of
-Phæax to that island, came the Peace of Nikias: the consequences
-of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while
-the ambition of Alkibiadês carried her on for three years in
-intra-Peloponnesian projects and coöperation with Argos against
-Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects
-had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention
-elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition
-against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion
-frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mêlos was
-besieged and taken.
-
-Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the
-territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk
-and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have
-continued at Athens, pressing their entreaties for aid, which began
-to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another
-incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel
-broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and
-Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about
-a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories,
-partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection.
-The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained
-assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced
-Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.[215] Now
-the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before,
-during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon
-the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her
-intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both
-to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage
-did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference,
-considering that, ten years afterwards, she interfered with such
-destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear
-of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at
-Carthage,[216] thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most
-dangerous of their neighbors.
-
-  [215] Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 82. The statement of
-  Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum
-  but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he
-  mentions as having taken place some years before between Egesta
-  and Lilybæum (xi, 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war
-  between Egesta and Selinus.
-
-  [216] Thucyd. vi, 34.
-
-The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C.,
-at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy
-their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mêlos, which could
-not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth
-the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not
-appear, like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing
-themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly
-on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished
-one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second
-(Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as
-this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an
-omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race
-and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens
-herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this
-coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies
-against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval
-expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves
-engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.[217]
-
-  [217] Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 83.
-
-Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan
-aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along
-with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of
-Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon
-the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a
-still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly
-heard in the public assembly,[218] together with those citizens who
-supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadês,
-who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike
-to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is
-plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of
-the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a
-considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even
-at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but
-a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special
-envoys were despatched to Egesta, partly to ascertain the means of
-the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war,
-partly to make investigations on the spot and report upon the general
-state of affairs.
-
-  [218] Thucyd. vi, 6. ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις
-  τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων ~πολλάκις λεγόντων~ καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων
-  αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο, etc.
-
-  Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when
-  he imputes to the Athenians hurry and passion in the ultimate
-  decision (ch. xviii. sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 30.)
-
-Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves friendly
-to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may
-have been individually bribed by the Egestæans; at least such a
-supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public
-morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly
-be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude
-them, on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich
-temple of Aphroditê on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives
-were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking
-to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which,
-though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little
-pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in
-their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and
-to the crews of the triremes.[219] They collected together all the
-gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egesta, which they
-farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind
-from the neighboring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At
-each successive entertainment, every Egestæan host exhibited all
-this large stock of plate as his own property, the same stock being
-transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance
-was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and
-the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses,
-saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and
-were thoroughly duped by the fraud.[220] To complete the illusion, by
-resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents
-of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations
-of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after
-finishing their examination, and the Egestæan envoys also, returned
-to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,[221] about
-three months after the capture of Mêlos.
-
-  [219] Thucyd. vi, 46. ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν, τά
-  τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες,
-  καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων
-  αἰτησάμενοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἑστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. Καὶ
-  πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν
-  φαινομένων, μεγάλην τὴν ἔκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις
-  παρεῖχον, etc.
-
-  Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree
-  of intimacy among the different cities.
-
-  [220] Thucyd. vi, 46; Diodor. xii, 83.
-
-  [221] To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the
-  representation of the lost comedy Τριφάλης of Aristophanês.
-  Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus;
-  seemingly, Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries
-  talked of at this time by Alkibiadês and the other prominent
-  advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily
-  (Thucyd. vi, 90). The word Τριφάλης was a nickname (not difficult
-  to understand) applied to Alkibiadês, who was just now at the
-  height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be
-  chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining
-  of the Τριφάλης, in Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii, pp.
-  1162-1167.
-
-The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report,
-the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth,
-public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at
-Egesta, and presented the sixty talents—one month’s pay for a fleet
-of sixty triremes—as a small instalment out of the vast stock
-remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity
-of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost
-of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly
-in their character of citizens,—beyond all suspicion of being
-bribed,—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had
-just been so cordially welcomed, and full of wonder at the display
-of wealth which they had witnessed, would probably contribute still
-more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen.
-Accordingly, when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions
-and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which
-they had undergone,—when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was
-again depicted,—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a
-final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to
-Sicily, under three generals with full powers,—Nikias, Alkibiadês,
-and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next,
-as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of
-reëstablishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the
-views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find
-practicable.[222] Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was
-appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.
-
-  [222] Thucyd. vi, 8; Diodor. xii, 83.
-
-We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta
-were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês
-and those who had from the first advocated the expedition, as well as
-of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He
-was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of
-the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point
-which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict
-eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith, and as the assembly
-went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty
-in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened
-in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitating
-and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing
-to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward
-in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of
-his own declared repugnance.[223] But when the assembly broke up,
-he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which
-it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not
-done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to
-avail himself of the next assembly, four days afterwards, for the
-purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended
-expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to
-hear him on this subject; indeed, the question which he raised could
-not be put without illegality: the principle of the measure had been
-already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for
-which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he
-was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable
-sample, both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by
-Thucydidês. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself
-to the exact expressions.
-
-  [223] Thucyd. vi, 8. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾑρημένος ἄρχειν,
-  etc. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS.,
-  and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter
-  word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was
-  surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech
-  which properly belonged to the first, and who explained this by
-  supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly.
-  That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The
-  matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have
-  endeavored to supply one in the text.
-
-“Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars
-of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think
-we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that
-expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the
-instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To
-myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable
-appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any
-man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before
-prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest
-opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell
-you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many
-enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new
-enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce
-with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only
-in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there),
-that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but
-on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the
-opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies
-have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force
-as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along
-with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure
-as coöperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that
-your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have
-never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not
-much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered
-to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now
-your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but
-Sicily is so distant, and the people so powerful, that you will
-never be able to maintain permanent ascendency; and it is absurd
-to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent,
-while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the
-prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the
-Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be
-less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand
-now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the
-part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse
-would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of
-putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have
-come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust
-the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation
-of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to
-repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against
-you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of
-these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat
-from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this
-newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it
-upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily.”
-
-Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadês: “If any
-man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young
-for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests,
-looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to
-profit from his command, as a means of making good his extravagances,
-do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the
-entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in
-regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own, and that
-this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble
-when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close
-to their leader in the assembly; and I in my turn exhort the elderly
-men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by
-the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the
-ruinous appetite for what is not within reach, in the conviction that
-few plans ever succeed from passionate desire; many, from deliberate
-foresight. Let them vote against the expedition; maintaining
-undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and
-desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they
-have begun it, without the aid of Athens.[224] Nor be thou afraid,
-prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to
-the decision of the assembly, seeing that breach of the law, in the
-presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment,
-while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous
-misjudgment.”
-
-  [224] Thucyd. vi, 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ
-  σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι
-  πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε, καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις,
-  νομίσας, εἰ ὀῤῥωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους
-  μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ’ ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς
-  βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, etc.
-
-  I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold, either on this
-  passage or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in
-  the Athenian assembly, on the subject of the punishment to be
-  inflicted on the Mitylenæans (see above, vol. vi, ch. 1, p. 338,
-  and Thucyd. iii, 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here
-  asking the prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose
-  him to accusation and punishment. Probably he _would_ have been
-  accused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly
-  had been different from what it actually turned out; if they had
-  reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small
-  majority.
-
-  The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold between what was _illegal_
-  and what was merely _irregular_, was little marked at Athens:
-  both were called _illegal_, τοὺς νόμους λύειν. The rules which
-  the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its
-  own debates and decisions, were just as much _laws_ as those
-  which it passed for the guidance of private citizens. The English
-  House of Commons is not a sovereign assembly, but only a portion
-  of the sovereign power: accordingly, the rules which it lays down
-  for its debates are not _laws_, but orders of the House: a breach
-  of these orders, therefore, in debating any particular subject,
-  would not be illegal, but merely irregular or informal. The same
-  was the case with the French Chamber of Deputies, prior to the
-  revolution of February, 1848: the rules which it laid down for
-  its own proceedings were not laws, but simply _le réglement de la
-  Chambre_. It is remarkable that the present National Assembly now
-  sitting (March, 1849) has retained this expression, and adopted
-  a _réglement_ for its own business; though it is in point of
-  fact a sovereign assembly, and the rules which it sanctions are,
-  properly speaking, _laws_.
-
-  Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the
-  Athenian prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case,
-  every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the
-  salvation of so many Mitylenæan lives. In the second case,
-  the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences,
-  inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension
-  of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there
-  will occur in a few years a third incident, the condemnation
-  of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, in which the
-  prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear
-  painfully and conspicuously manifest.
-
-Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this
-memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made
-some impression, since it completely reopened the entire debate, in
-spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while
-his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadês rose
-to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into
-question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary
-acquisition; for his dreams went farther than those of any man in
-Athens; not merely to the conquest of all Sicily, but also to that
-of Carthage and the Carthaginian empire. Opposed to Nikias, both in
-personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his
-rivalry to such a degree of bitterness that at one moment a vote
-of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That
-vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged
-upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both
-sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack
-of the most galling character; all the more galling because it was
-strictly accurate and well deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed,
-Alkibiadês started up forthwith, his impatience breaking loose from
-the formalities of an exordium.
-
-“Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of
-commander,—for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here,—and I
-count myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters with which he
-reproaches me are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and
-myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks,
-on witnessing my splendid theôry at Olympia, were induced to rate
-the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded
-it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven
-chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent
-before, winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth,
-and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic
-victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of
-the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of
-spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are
-naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes
-of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is
-by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as
-well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion
-of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if
-he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear
-a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to
-speak to us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the
-insolence of the prosperous, or else let him give equal dealing to
-the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well
-that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained
-eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in
-society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others
-also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation
-as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce
-their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or
-wrongdoers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It
-is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such
-reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct,
-and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other
-citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus
-without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians
-peril their all at Mantineia on the fortune of one day: a peril so
-great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their
-steady belief in their own strength.”
-
-“Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable
-words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give
-them confidence and obtain their coöperation. Be not now, therefore,
-afraid of this youth of mine: but so long an I possess it in full
-vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune,
-turn us each to account in our own way.”[225]
-
-  [225] Thucyd. vi, 16, 17.
-
-Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to
-deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The
-Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented.
-Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent,
-often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there
-considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the
-city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such
-a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly
-lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful
-as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had
-been in former days:[226] they might invade Attica by land whether
-the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief
-by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient
-to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade
-performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies?
-To be sure, _they_ could bring no help to Attica in return; but
-Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted
-them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to
-attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness
-to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any
-progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such
-invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her
-imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her
-present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of
-falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let
-her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into
-the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would
-probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in
-case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from
-her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive
-policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the
-temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to
-her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her
-energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of
-that steady activity and acquisition which had become engrafted upon
-her laws and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in
-itself, without speedy destruction.[227]
-
-  [226] Thucyd. vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον
-  Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πάνυ ἔῤῥωνται, etc.
-
-  The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot
-  think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it
-  is the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii,
-  4, and vii, 47: “enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal
-  with.”
-
-  [227] Thucyd. vi, 16-19.
-
-Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadês to Nikias. The debate
-was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the
-assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly in favor of the
-expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines
-renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the
-city: probably also those Athenians who had visited Egesta, again
-stood forward to protest against what they would call the ungenerous
-doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after
-considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that
-their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever;
-and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless,
-altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly
-to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its
-dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as
-indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they
-might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships,
-to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted,
-he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with
-completeness and confidence.
-
-Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the
-people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to
-attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous,
-free: well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed
-troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and
-abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other
-allies in Sicily except Naxus and Katana, from their kindred with
-the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope
-with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must
-be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime
-combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the
-importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force
-of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, a large stock of provisions in
-transports, and, above all an abundant amount of money: for the funds
-promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The
-army must be not simply a match for the enemy’s regular hoplites and
-powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first
-day of their landing.[228] If not, in case of the least reverse, they
-would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single
-friend. “I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against
-which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust
-to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose
-to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have
-in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave
-Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is
-the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it
-is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I
-resign to him the command.”[229]
-
-  [228] Thucyd. vi, 22.
-
-  [229] Thucyd. vi, 23. ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ
-  μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι (~χαλεπὸν
-  δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας~), ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν
-  βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι.
-  Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς
-  στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια· εἰ δέ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν
-  ἀρχήν.
-
-The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming
-as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater
-than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an
-effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated
-and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the
-expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified,
-the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy.
-The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served
-but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor
-and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not
-only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which
-Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled
-his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making
-success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything
-which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely
-seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of
-Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into
-a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected.
-While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the
-popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiadês, the Egestæans, and the
-Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than
-they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to
-propose. If Alkibiadês had demanded an armament on so vast a scale,
-the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect
-for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety,
-and favor with the gods—that his opposition to their favorite scheme
-had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they
-were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such
-conditions as he imposed.[230]
-
-  [230] Plutarch. Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.
-
-It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only
-imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors
-had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens,
-and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former example. Every man
-present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and
-professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service.
-Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of
-seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed
-safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering
-was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme,
-that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid
-to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want
-of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator
-named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment,
-urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force
-he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being
-left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal;
-saying, that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues,
-but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes
-required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less
-than five thousand, Athenians and allies together. There must farther
-be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments,
-especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition
-was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but
-even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to
-fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating
-to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of
-Athens.
-
-Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation
-of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon
-sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite
-hoplites from Argos and Mantineia, and to hire bowmen and slingers
-elsewhere. For three months, the generals were busily engaged in this
-proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle,
-fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in
-the next chapter.
-
-Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the
-expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow
-a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian
-people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of
-Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not
-find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just
-considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded
-to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and
-repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with
-considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle
-both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however,
-no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information
-from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for
-the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly
-certifying all that the Egestæans had promised: nor can we at all
-wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby
-their commissioners had been duped.
-
-Upon the result of that mission to Egesta, the two parties for and
-against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and
-when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in
-favor of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself
-warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the
-previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the
-renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally
-ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often
-repeated but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and
-deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into
-hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that
-tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the
-expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either
-from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in
-Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or
-more deliberately and unanimously resolved.
-
-The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As
-a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but
-in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet
-such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance
-to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced
-any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions
-which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into
-such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated;
-thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of
-Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the
-commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when,
-after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted
-to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people
-would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a
-sad series of other mistakes, fatal to his country as well as to
-himself.
-
-Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the
-wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the
-reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in
-Alkibiadês. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence,
-as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous
-instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The
-arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are
-indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition
-itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held
-responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had
-it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the
-remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at
-an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether
-impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political
-wisdom with which Periklês had advised his countrymen to maintain
-strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any
-new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus,
-we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending
-aggression inculcated by Alkibiadês, and the destructive principles
-which he lays down, that Athens must forever be engaged in new
-conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing
-herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity
-for Athens to employ her military and naval force, as Nikias had
-truly observed, Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were
-still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought
-to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant
-hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position
-in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel
-which Alkibiadês draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby
-the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined
-speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether
-fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian
-enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity
-on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean sea.
-Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and
-preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in
-before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and
-had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation
-of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of
-her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily, was
-in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find
-Alkibiadês asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that
-distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force
-to watch them, would impart new stability to the preëxisting Athenian
-empire; to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in
-Peloponnesus and in Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise
-hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian,[231] and
-to notice the credit which he claims to himself for his operations
-in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantineia,[232] although it had
-ended in complete failure; restoring the ascendency of Sparta to the
-maximum at which it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There
-is in fact no speech in Thucydidês so replete with rash misguiding,
-and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alkibiadês.
-
-  [231] Thucyd. vi, 1. οὐ πολλῷ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, etc.:
-  compare vii, 28.
-
-  [232] Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804.
-
-As a man of action, Alkibiadês was always brave, vigorous, and
-full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially
-mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to
-their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising
-temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation.
-The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of
-the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all
-islands; a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly
-professed, in their attack upon Mêlos during the preceding autumn.
-As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this
-category of subjects; nor ought we to wonder, amidst the inaccurate
-geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how
-much larger Sicily was[233] than the largest island in the Ægean.
-Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest
-to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was
-one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to
-all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.[234] Moreover, we
-shall see presently, that even the armament which was despatched had
-conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something
-great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash
-and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more
-extravagant were the views of Alkibiadês, who looked even beyond
-Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. Nor was it merely
-ambition which he desired to gratify; he was not less eager for the
-immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in
-order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure
-had occasioned.[235]
-
-  [233] Thucyd. v, 99; vi, 1-6.
-
-  [234] Thucyd. vi, 6. ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς
-  πάσης (Σικελίας) ἄρξειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς
-  ἑαυτῶν ξυγγένεσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις.
-
-  Even in the speech of Alkibiadês, the conquest of Sicily is only
-  once alluded to, and that indirectly; rather as a favorable
-  possibility, than as a result to be counted upon.
-
-  [235] Thucyd. vi, 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ
-  ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια
-  ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. Ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι
-  ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν
-  οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, etc.
-
-  Compare vi, 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch
-  sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in
-  conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally,
-  set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as
-  Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his
-  banishment (Thucyd. vi, 90), he does indeed state this as the
-  general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he
-  is here describing, to his countrymen generally, plans which
-  were only fermenting in his own brain, as we may discern from a
-  careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of
-  Thucydidês.
-
-  In the inaccurate Oratio de Pace ascribed to Andokidês (sect.
-  30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens,
-  a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as
-  allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be
-  a more valuable ally to Athens than Egesta or Katana. This
-  statement is wholly untrue.
-
-When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against
-Kleon, of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in
-reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and
-to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct
-of Alkibiadês as here described, we shall see how much more forcibly
-such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen
-before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadês, and the
-defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than
-either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the
-eyes of their worst enemies.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LVIII.
-
-FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE
-FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.
-
-
-For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final
-resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the
-last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation.
-I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by
-Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted—chiefly
-through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a
-counter-manœuvre—with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon
-an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its
-promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited
-religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions of
-the gods, and promised a triumphant result.[236] All classes in the
-city, rich and poor,—cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young,
-all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet
-promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and
-individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for
-personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and
-Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites,
-instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will,
-as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose
-the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided
-himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as
-well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a
-varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens,
-who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war,
-the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor
-to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the
-most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed, furnished both
-the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay
-for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually
-incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete
-and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither
-exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion,
-was different in every individual case, according to temper and
-circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness
-were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the
-best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to
-the thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:[237] and
-it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship,
-but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship
-they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known
-before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his
-vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish,
-picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid
-for in the same way by the trierarchs.[238]
-
-  [236] Thucyd. viii, 1.
-
-  [237] Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ
-  διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ~ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις~, καὶ
-  τἄλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc.
-
-  Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean _the petty
-  officers_, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστὴς, etc. Göller and Poppo
-  construe it to mean “_the servants of the sailors_.” Neither
-  of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means
-  “to the crews generally;” the word ὑπερησία being a perfectly
-  general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the
-  examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this
-  meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before.
-  To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning “the crews generally, or
-  the remaining crews, along with the thranitæ,” is doubtless more
-  or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction
-  than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.
-
-  [238] Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, etc.
-
-Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had
-now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable
-warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with
-fresh accumulations,[239] and the triremes increased in number, the
-military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had
-forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic
-disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in
-number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the
-second year of the previous war under Periklês, was incomparably
-superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest,
-in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in
-picked men, universal ardor, ships as well as arms in the best
-condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was
-the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for
-trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added
-to the public outfit, and to the sums placed in the hands of the
-generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of
-this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general
-excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city
-while the preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of
-private sympathy and patriotism,—a dash of uneasiness from reflection
-on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act,—yet
-an elate confidence in Athenian force, such as had never before been
-entertained.[240] We hear of Sokratês the philosopher, and Meton the
-astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine
-anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the
-philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is
-it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though
-the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general
-predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies,
-there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of
-risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite
-ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were
-at once forgotten, or never long remembered.[241]
-
-  [239] Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in
-  Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De
-  Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an
-  accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias,
-  and that four hundred triremes, or three hundred triremes, were
-  newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those
-  orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to
-  deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed
-  by other testimony; even if we admitted the oration ascribed to
-  Andokidês as genuine, which in all probability it is not.
-
-  But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that
-  the sum of three thousand talents at least must have been laid
-  by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of
-  Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that
-  over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition
-  to discharge, out of the current receipts, various sums which it
-  had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various
-  temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and
-  fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote
-  passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so
-  paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for
-  account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See
-  Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. 117; also
-  the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii,
-  p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the
-  years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.
-
-  [240] Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3.
-
-  [241] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately
-  after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry
-  with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii,
-  1).
-
-After between two and three months of active preparations, the
-expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which
-fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the
-mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all
-Grecian history.
-
-These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble
-about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a
-head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular
-pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the
-significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in
-great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous
-situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well
-as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection
-of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the
-eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either
-for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious
-feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or
-domiciliated where his statue stood,[242] so that the companionship,
-sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of
-the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens,—political, social,
-commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of
-these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês,
-was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness
-of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as
-peculiarly frequent in Athens.[243]
-
-  [242] Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. “Melius Græci atque nostri; qui,
-  ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos,
-  _incolere_ voluerunt.”
-
-  How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the
-  god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated
-  in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare
-  Herodotus, v, 67; a striking story, as illustrated in this
-  History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7;
-  Livy, xxxviii, 43.
-
-  In an Inscription in Boeckh’s Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p.
-  320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of
-  which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.
-
-  [243] Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48,
-  4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad
-  finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller,
-  Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl.
-  Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum.
-  Berlin, 1845.
-
-About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same
-night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city,
-were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were
-knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of
-stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt
-with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês
-affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but _one_ which
-escaped unharmed.[244]
-
-  [244] Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ
-  Ἀθηναίων ... ~μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι~ περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.
-
-  Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single
-  one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὁρᾶτε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν
-  πατρῷαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, ~μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν
-  Ἀθήνῃσι~.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13)
-  copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses
-  the expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is
-  noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his
-  affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the
-  Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to
-  this point.
-
-  Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that _all_ the Hermæ were mutilated, not
-  recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular
-  inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all _thrown
-  down_ (dejicerentur).
-
-It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the
-feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with
-which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards
-the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other,
-is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can
-occasion any serious distress or excitement.[245] But if we take
-that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the
-history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and
-political associations of the Athenians,[246] noted in ancient
-times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and
-magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we
-shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror,
-and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this
-nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all
-the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian
-invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt
-or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and
-temples of the gods.[247] If we could imagine the excitement of
-a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the
-Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a
-parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt
-at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more
-intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings
-of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more
-forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and
-keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the
-following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway
-dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that
-the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become
-as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos,
-were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still,
-that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away
-with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of
-tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that
-all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil
-life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually
-invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as
-well as others:[248] an extension and generalization of the feeling
-still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the
-people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a
-form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues,
-without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences
-and determining practical measures. Accordingly, they drew from
-the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than
-terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city,
-and that the political constitution to which they were attached was
-in imminent danger of being subverted.[249]
-
-  [245] It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this
-  mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth,
-  Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191-196. While he
-  denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the
-  subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would
-  suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental
-  distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was
-  a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking
-  the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the
-  religious feeling of Athens.
-
-  Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. p. 65),
-  though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.
-
-  [246] Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, Ἑρμαῖ. See
-  Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideæ, cap. 2.
-
-  Especially the ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted
-  at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who
-  protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo
-  Aguieus, as well as by Hermes.
-
-  [247] Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, Pers. 810; Æschyl. Agam.
-  339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a
-  god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is
-  manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus:
-  see the argument of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker,
-  Griechische Tragödien, _Sophoklês_, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162.
-  Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to
-  the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition
-  than that of stark madness, ἐμάνη μεγάλως; Herod. iii, 37-38.
-
-  Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.)
-  represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine
-  punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by
-  the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the
-  god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim.
-  iv, 3).
-
-  The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and
-  Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to
-  remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring
-  after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people
-  were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the
-  divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian
-  Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly
-  was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.
-
-  [248] Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 _b_, 881 _d_.
-  ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p.
-  404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24.
-
-  [249] Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at
-  Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:—
-
-  “We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring
-  impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly
-  understand how they could have been associated together as
-  they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the
-  difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the
-  contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who were rather disposed by their
-  views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch.
-  xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.)
-
-  This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history,
-  indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast
-  with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have
-  undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however,
-  have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen
-  would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our
-  _disjunction_ of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his
-  _association_ of the two.
-
-Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager
-and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian
-expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that
-expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.[250]
-It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere
-undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object,
-just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the
-occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the
-Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of
-Adonis.[251] The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something
-much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as
-the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in
-number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who
-had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard
-of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where
-the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we
-know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one
-band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the
-parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially
-made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.
-
-  [250] Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε
-  γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων
-  πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine
-  magnimultorum consensione esse factam,” etc.
-
-  [251] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratês, Fr. Inc. 84, ed.
-  Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164;
-  Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.
-
-It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the
-conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the
-other: to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How
-they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the
-latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus,
-and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were
-influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,[252] prompting
-them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great
-triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies
-of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately
-connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise,
-while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant
-with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances
-would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at
-all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of
-religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might
-throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely
-sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his
-wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,[253] would
-hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected
-to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or
-at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been
-appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of
-his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two
-years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually
-sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined
-Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition
-to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we
-reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public
-designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.[254]
-
-  [252] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, Orator.
-  p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly
-  contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot
-  be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan
-  agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were
-  exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the
-  Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the
-  Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that
-  no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great
-  familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of
-  Athens.
-
-  The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.)
-  ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we
-  may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês; who, however, is not
-  very careful, since he tells us that _Thucydidês_ ascribed that
-  act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (Philochor.
-  Frag. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094).
-
-  [253] Thucyd. vi, 34.
-
-  [254] See Thucyd. v, 45; v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7,
-  4.
-
-But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether
-might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a
-likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious
-mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not
-realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for
-Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies;
-forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the
-Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So
-much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part
-of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they
-had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadês.
-
-Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of
-enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them
-being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence,
-and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by
-his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much
-increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the
-Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in
-compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to
-have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to
-profit.
-
-Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled
-a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people,—as it would
-have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every
-oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their paramount and
-imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these
-latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were
-defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under
-the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public
-misfortunes.[255] Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself
-comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of
-private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be
-discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large
-rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give
-information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession
-might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under
-this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians
-became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent
-acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew,
-and more than he knew, about such incidents; while to exercise
-any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue
-weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic
-himself a suspected man, “metuunt dubitasse videri.” To rake out
-and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an
-earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary
-means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage.
-Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and
-inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even
-slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have
-come within their cognizance,[256] but at the same time providing
-that informers who gave false depositions should be punished
-capitally.[257]
-
-  [255] See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of
-  Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. 1, 10).
-
-  Ἀσύμφορόν θ’ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ
-  τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπί τε
-  τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα ~συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ
-  γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θ’ αἱ πράξεις
-  καθίστανται~. ~Οἰκείαν~ οὖν χρὴ τὴν ~τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους~, αὐτῷ
-  τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν
-  καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.
-
-  Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklês, Œdip.
-  Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country,
-  so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute
-  the soil and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon,
-  Hiero. iv, 4, and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning
-  and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ὕβρις) outrage
-  against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species
-  of ὕβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that
-  the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or
-  banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole
-  population.
-
-  [256] Thucyd. vi, 27.
-
-  [257] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20.
-
-The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action;
-while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named
-commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public
-assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.[258] The
-first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave
-and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of
-older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in
-drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated
-in various houses,[259] by parties of revellers caricaturing and
-divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head
-that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadês.
-
-  [258] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch,
-  Alkibiad. c. 18.
-
-  [259] Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings
-  and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were
-  the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded
-  of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet
-  separated by a century.
-
-  In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen
-  of good family—the Chevalier d’Etallonde and Chevalier de la
-  Barre—were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured
-  a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in
-  aggravation of this offence they were charged with having
-  sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was
-  exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to
-  have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right
-  hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post
-  in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow
-  fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to
-  the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually
-  executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre—d’Etallonde having
-  escaped—in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed
-  to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time
-  with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary
-  and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices
-  (Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres,
-  vol. xlii, pp. 361-379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du
-  Sang Innocent, vol. xii, p. 133).
-
-  I extract from this treatise a passage showing how—as in this
-  mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens—the occurrence of one act of
-  sacrilege turns men’s imagination, belief, and talk, to others,
-  real or imaginary:—
-
-  “Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit sécrètement cette trame, il
-  arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont
-  d’Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l’on soupçonna que des soldats
-  ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.
-
-  “Malheureusement l’evêque d’Amiens, étant aussi evêque
-  d’Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une
-  importance qu’elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires:
-  il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; _et
-  on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année
-  entière_. On disoit qu’il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui
-  brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties,
-  et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu’ils avoient
-  répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en
-  avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux
-  répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l’Europe. Vous
-  connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu’à quel point la populace porte la
-  credulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.
-
-  “La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de
-  délations. Chacun disoit ce qu’il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu’il
-  avoit entendu ou cru entendre.”
-
-  It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de
-  la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular
-  judicature, but by a limited court of professional judges sitting
-  at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris,
-  the first tribunal of professional judges in France.
-
-So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that
-the trireme of Lamachus—who was doubtless more diligent about the
-military details than either of his two colleagues—was already moored
-in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held for the
-departing officers,[260] who probably laid before their countrymen
-an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to
-impeach Alkibiadês. “Athenians,” said he, “you are going to despatch
-this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am
-prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the
-profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of
-impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here
-present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall
-repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose,
-if my statement prove untrue.” While Alkibiadês strenuously denied
-the allegation, the prytanes—senators presiding over the assembly,
-according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten
-tribes—at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to
-depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave—Andromachus by
-name—whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus
-deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the
-house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went
-through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons
-being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We
-must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what
-the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had
-offered.[261]
-
-  [260] Andokidês (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely—Ἦν
-  μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ
-  Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριήρης ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμει ἡ
-  Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, etc.
-
-  [261] Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.
-
-Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies.
-Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having
-put in evidence this irreverent proceeding,—probably in substance
-true,—enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him
-many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as
-cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done,
-they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the
-democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested
-by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular
-demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the
-mutilation of the Hermæ,—for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done,
-of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person
-who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,—they
-calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and
-probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory
-to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from
-the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The
-strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar position
-as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that
-the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects in
-Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve,
-manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos
-and Mantineia were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his
-instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as
-the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this
-project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding little
-disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were
-compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.[262]
-
-  [262] Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. 7,
-  8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily,
-  in a very inaccurate manner.
-
-But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges
-hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived
-from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people
-to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to
-stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting
-the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting
-above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on
-such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the
-hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence,
-without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in
-themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that
-the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were
-very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the
-trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility
-to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the
-delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition,
-if he were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the
-trial until a certain number of days after his return.[263] Such was
-the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês
-probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving
-that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for
-his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus
-his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his
-immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure
-for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing
-their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther
-accusation until he and the armament had departed.[264]
-
-  [263] Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ’ ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα,
-  μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται,
-  θεραπεύων ὅτι δι’ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ’ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν
-  Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ~ἄλλους ῥήτορας
-  ἐνιέντες~, οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν
-  ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι
-  ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν,
-  μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.
-
-  [264] The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation
-  against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to
-  the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being
-  substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It
-  is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês.
-  But when Andokidês goes on to say, that “in consequence of this
-  information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the
-  rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death
-  in their absence,” (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês
-  most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at _that
-  time_. If Alkibiadês was not then tried, neither could the other
-  persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in
-  the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been
-  first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadês before the sailing
-  of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against
-  him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when
-  the information of Andokidês himself had satisfied the Athenians
-  on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented
-  by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, was founded, in
-  part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.
-
-  If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been
-  on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when
-  Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may
-  well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that
-  ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês
-  is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He
-  mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that
-  information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius
-  appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as _not_ having
-  fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v.
-  Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias,
-  that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been
-  concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different
-  from the statement of Andokidês, and would lead us to suppose
-  that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês himself
-  informed.
-
-The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment
-so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection
-of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at
-Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied
-contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force
-alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes,
-sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while
-the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers.
-There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from
-the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too
-poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on
-shipboard,—epibatæ, or marines,—each with a panoply furnished by the
-state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred
-and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on
-board Athenian ships.[265] The number of horsemen was so small, that
-all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But the condition,
-the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the
-armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak
-on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus,
-for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from
-the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole
-population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the
-appearance was that of a collective emigration, like the flight to
-Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners,
-brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the
-spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more
-stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends,
-were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens
-had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful,
-known to none of them accurately, and into a sea of undefined
-possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of
-unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas
-of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had
-been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all
-the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the
-relatives now separating at the water’s edge could not banish the
-dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the
-last time.
-
-  [265] Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.
-
-The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers
-were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point of
-beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn
-and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of
-trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore
-followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success,
-and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine
-prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made libations,
-with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was
-given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file, displaying
-the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as
-far as Ægina.[266] Never in Grecian history was an invocation more
-unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was
-the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details,
-given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from
-Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad
-issue which will hereafter be unfolded.
-
-  [266] Thucyd. vi, 32; Diodor. xiii, 3.
-
-The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the
-maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found
-assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found
-to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian
-pentekonters; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and
-eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers;
-and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops.
-Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of
-war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less
-than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable number
-of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes
-of profit.[267] Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in
-advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would
-welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice
-at Egesta, that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring
-at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be
-produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three
-divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and
-Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian
-promontory.
-
-  [267] Thucyd. vi, 44.
-
-In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they
-met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None
-would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions
-without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of
-taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to
-them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium,
-immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate was still
-kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market
-of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed to encamp
-in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They
-here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of
-the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into
-negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring
-to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed
-Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But
-the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise
-nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy
-which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they,
-as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated
-by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave
-themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without
-mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration
-of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative
-from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been
-the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the
-operation of Chalkidic sympathies.[268]
-
-  [268] Thucyd. vi, 44-46.
-
-It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, about
-July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both
-of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against
-Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several
-quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding
-March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going
-on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition
-to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any
-encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid,
-the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of
-the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to
-cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided
-the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most,
-nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years
-before.[269] No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy
-with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian
-conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start.
-Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make
-preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.[270]
-
-  [269] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: “It is not
-  specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes
-  it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government
-  of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration,
-  since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of
-  Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The
-  democratical party now bore the sway,” etc.
-
-  I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford
-  founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had
-  spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues
-  to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered
-  vituperative strain.
-
-  [270] Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, etc.
-
-Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged
-these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public
-assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were
-starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen,
-as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit
-that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but
-even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on
-their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs
-of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city
-should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable
-invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the
-firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the
-approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive
-them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed
-did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as
-might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by
-which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations,
-however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely
-at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and
-Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for
-some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of
-Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable,
-and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in
-Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he
-(Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized,
-that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian[271]
-allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two
-months’ provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of
-Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet
-and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They
-would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but
-even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the
-presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan
-lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she
-solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would
-probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition
-until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the
-three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme
-against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext
-to return.[272]
-
-  [271] Thucyd. vi, 34. Ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον,
-  ~ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε~, ὅμως
-  εἰρήσεται.
-
-  That “habitual quiescence” which Hermokratês here predicates of
-  his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless
-  activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which
-  Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144;
-  vi, 7). Both of the governments, however, were democratical. This
-  serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications
-  about _all_ democracies; for it is certain that one democracy
-  differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted,
-  however, whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to
-  his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his
-  language implies.
-
-  [272] Thucyd. vi, 33-36.
-
-Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by
-various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of
-speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his
-warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as
-envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then,
-as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in
-Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and
-of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution;
-but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and
-even angry debate arose upon his present speech.[273] Though there
-was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging
-either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it
-would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken
-up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which
-he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans,
-into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those
-administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the
-democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to
-Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations
-and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the
-most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical
-politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.[274]
-
-  [273] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς
-  ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, etc.
-
-  [274] Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ’ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε
-  προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε
-  τοιάδε, etc.
-
-  The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same
-  as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’
-  ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. (iv, 21).
-
-  Neither δήμου προστάτης nor δημαγωγὸς, denotes any express
-  functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at
-  least in these places. It is possible that there may have been
-  some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office
-  bearing that title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed.
-  Nor would the words δήμου προστάτης always imply an equal degree
-  of power: the person so designated might have more power in one
-  town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv, 67) it seems that the
-  oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the
-  popular party had become the most influential men in the city.
-  See also iii, 70, Peithias at Korkyra.
-
-“Every one[275] (said he), except only cowards and bad citizens, must
-wish that the Athenians _would_ be fools enough to come here and put
-themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are
-nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder
-at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations
-are not seen through.[276] You will be too wise to take measure of
-the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able
-men, such as the Athenians, are likely to do. Be assured that they
-will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude,
-to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed,
-I think they account themselves lucky that we, with our powerful
-cities, have never come across to attack them. And if they _should_
-come, as it is pretended, they will find Sicily a more formidable foe
-than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice
-the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all
-this well enough, will mind their own business, in spite of all the
-fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which
-they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on
-the present occasion, in order to terrify you, and get themselves
-nominated to the chief posts.[277] One of these days, I fear they
-may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such
-intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city; they
-condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have
-sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you
-will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort
-at present; by simple persuasion to you, by chastisement to these
-conspirators, and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party
-generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles
-covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you,
-because you are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under
-equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of
-the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell
-me[278] that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that
-the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm,
-first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely
-a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the
-aggregate wealth existing in the community,—intelligent men, the
-best counsellors,—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing
-and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one
-and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on
-the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content
-even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps
-and monopolizes the whole for itself.[279] This is just what you
-young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able
-to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me,
-or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public
-advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such
-as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped.
-If even there be any truth in what you say, and if the Athenians _do_
-come, our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation.
-She will not take you at your word, and choose _you_ commanders, in
-order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself,
-construe your communications for what they really mean, and, instead
-of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take
-effective precautions for maintaining it against you.”
-
-  [275] Thucyd. vi, 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed
-  to Athenagoras by Thucydidês, without binding myself to the words.
-
-  [276] Thucyd. vi, 36. τοὺς δ’ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
-  περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ
-  ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι.
-
-  [277] Thucyd. vi, 38. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι
-  γιγνώσκοντες, τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι, σῴζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε
-  ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα, οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα, λογοποιοῦσιν. Οὓς ἐγὼ οὐ
-  νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ
-  ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας
-  τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι
-  μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν, etc.
-
-  [278] Thucyd. vi, 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ’
-  ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ’ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα
-  βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι,
-  ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος· ἔπειτα, ~φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων
-  τοὺς πλουσίους~, βουλεῦσαι δ’ ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετοὺς, κρῖναι
-  δ’ ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς· καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ
-  μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν.
-
-  Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων, “having the care of the
-  public purse,” as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But
-  it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to
-  the private property of these rich men, not to their functions
-  as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute.
-  Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is
-  guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state
-  require that he should spend more or less of it for the public
-  defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases,
-  but he will for his own interest take care that the property
-  does not perish (compare vi, 9). This is the service which he
-  renders, _quatenus_, _rich man_, to the state; he may also serve
-  it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal
-  qualities; thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as
-  rich (ξυνετὸς as well as πλούσιος), and then he may serve the
-  state as _counsellor_, the second of the two categories named by
-  Athenagoras. What that orator is here negativing is, the better
-  title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command, which
-  was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to
-  indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy;
-  that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital,
-  of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when
-  necessary, but not to expect command, unless they are personally
-  competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true
-  of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as
-  of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private
-  property against communism. But the rich man’s property is an
-  appreciable item to the state, individually taken; moreover, he
-  is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power,
-  so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really
-  entitled to.
-
-  [279] Thucyd. vi, 39. Ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς
-  πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ’ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ
-  καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφελομένη ἔχει· ~ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι
-  προθυμοῦνται~, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.
-
-Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the
-stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no
-one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these
-few words: “We generals deprecate this interchange of personal
-vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer
-themselves to be biased by it. Let us rather take care, in reference
-to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a
-condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not
-arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with
-horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. _We_ generals shall
-take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters,
-as well as of the missions to neighboring cities, for procuring
-information and for other objects. We have, indeed, already busied
-ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we
-learn.”
-
-The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party
-feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among
-the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon
-at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means
-the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of
-public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly
-to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras.
-Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress
-of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming
-period almost constantly in the same position; while the political
-rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a
-leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing
-danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse,
-the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of
-the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical
-sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable
-necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen
-to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always
-liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of
-the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue,
-such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so
-constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever
-disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in
-reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all
-its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side
-of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield
-personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics,—some
-better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or
-rhetoric,—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable
-importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that
-of the authorized magistrate or general.
-
-We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push
-the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond reasonable limit;
-and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party.
-This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on
-the part of the persons called demagogues, to involve their city
-in unnecessary wars: a charge which has been frequently advanced
-against them, because it so happens that Kleon, in the first half
-of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace
-between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras
-that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war: a fact
-which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in
-most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more
-conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the
-ascendency of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the
-Athenians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was
-egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of
-Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political
-interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always
-pursue their true political interest, where present temptations
-of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this
-instance a surer guide than speculations _à priori_ founded upon
-the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by
-Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military
-organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not
-visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or
-three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more
-warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and
-train the select regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the
-oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the
-democratical constitution.[280] Now the persons, respecting whose
-designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the
-class at Syracuse corresponding to the select thousand at Argos.
-
-  [280] See above, in this volume, chap. lvi.
-
-The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are
-deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without
-having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is
-democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but
-the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence,
-and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of
-Aristotle.
-
-Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals
-had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those
-of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the
-danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament
-was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations
-with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys
-among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was
-mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.[281] The halt
-of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such
-equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the
-first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the
-Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they
-awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they
-had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.
-
-  [281] Thucyd. vi, 45.
-
-The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of
-the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that
-town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian
-operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than
-thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the
-elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners
-on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on
-returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the
-mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe
-taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from
-whence they had calculated on obtaining money,—for it appears that
-both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary
-resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful,—the
-generals now discussed their plan of action.
-
-Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of
-the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe his
-range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the
-Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against
-Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the
-means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining
-those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this
-requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to
-obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation
-with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along,
-to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval
-force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which
-accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new
-alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island
-for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.[282]
-
-  [282] Thucyd. vi, 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14.
-
-Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow, timid, and
-disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been
-intrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all
-the other Sicilian Greeks,—especially Messênê, convenient both as
-harbor for their fleet and as base of their military operations,—to
-prevail upon them to coöperate against Syracuse and Selinus. With
-the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels
-of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects
-of Syracuse, as well as to insure supplies of provisions. As soon
-as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be
-looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse
-and Selinus; unless, indeed, the former should consent to reëstablish
-Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.[283]
-
-  [283] Thucyd. vi, 48. Οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι
-  ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους
-  ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν.
-
-Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his
-colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without
-any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its
-walls. The Syracusans, he urged, were now in terror and only
-half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much
-property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighboring
-lands, not yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized
-for the subsistence of their army;[284] while the deserted town and
-harbor of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea,
-might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing
-and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real
-efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival.
-If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an
-instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found
-destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but
-the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression
-of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment
-of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament
-was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian
-cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate
-adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.[285]
-
-  [284] Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis by
-  Brasidas.
-
-  [285] Thucyd. vi, 49.
-
-But Lamachus found no favor with either of the other two, and being
-thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias,
-gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean term
-of the three. There can be no doubt—as far as it is becoming to
-pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that the plan
-of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first sight,
-indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and
-speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and
-capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable towards the
-promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced,
-the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were
-in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary
-precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay
-tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed,
-of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to
-strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point on which we
-shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike
-soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably have been approved and
-executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenês; while the dilatory
-policy still advocated by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of
-Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in
-military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to
-the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse,
-_unless_ the Syracusans would consent to the reëstablishment of
-Leontini, it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind
-peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at
-variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported
-as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have
-thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of
-Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for
-carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition
-of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately, the
-latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of
-no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had
-he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy,
-the wealth and family ascendency of either of his colleagues, the
-achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have
-been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse
-not as prisoners but as conquerors.
-
-Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the
-approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme
-from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city,
-and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce
-them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything
-beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly
-returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues
-immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians
-cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along
-the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men
-and the general sentiment were at this time favorable to Syracuse,
-so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled
-to sail farther southward and take their night-station at the mouth
-of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their
-ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself,
-while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into
-the Great Harbor, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on
-this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the
-farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the
-herald: “The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come
-forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors,
-the Athenians.” After this empty display, they returned back to
-Katana.[286]
-
-  [286] Thucyd. vi, 50.
-
-We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with
-the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarize
-the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any
-instant action, and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking
-impression of its first arrival.
-
-At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, and
-allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had
-been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point,
-for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most
-of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse,
-some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly
-guarded, broke it open and showed themselves in the market-place.
-The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading
-men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape
-in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting
-the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês.[287] The whole Athenian armament
-was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established
-as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party
-at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the
-armament showed itself: accordingly, the whole armament proceeded
-thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent
-up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and
-declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound
-them to receive at any time one single ship, but no more, unless they
-themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were therefore obliged
-to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning,
-they ascertained the falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were
-putting a naval force afloat; moreover, they landed near the city
-and ravaged some of the neighboring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and
-light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued,
-before the invaders retired to their ships,[288] the first blood shed
-in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of
-Lamachus.
-
-  [287] Polyænus (i, 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as
-  the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow
-  the account as given by Thucydidês.
-
-Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found
-the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived
-from Athens, the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly,
-requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand his trial for various
-alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. A
-few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along
-with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the Salaminian
-was especially directed to serve him only with the summons, without
-any guard or coercion, so that he might return home in his own
-trireme.[289]
-
-  [288] Thucyd. vi, 52.
-
-  [289] Thucyd. vi. 53-61.
-
-This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens and to
-her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, described a
-few pages back, and the inquiries instituted into the authorship
-of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The extensive
-and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing
-citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, had for
-the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege; but it
-speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out
-by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, one thousand
-and even ten thousand drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom
-others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus, before
-mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from Athens, immediately
-after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent intimation to the
-senate at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the
-recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of
-the mutilation of the Hermæ, and that, if impunity were guaranteed
-to him, he would come back and give full information. A vote of
-the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by
-name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself,
-in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and eighteen
-different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the
-Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês,—these names
-bespeak her great rank and family in the city,—deposed farther that
-Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody of
-the mysteries in a similar manner, in the house of Charmidês. And
-lastly Lydus, slave of a citizen named Phereklês, stated that the
-like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme
-Thêmakus, giving the names of the parties present, one of whom—though
-asleep, and unconscious of what was passing—he stated to be Leogoras,
-the father of Andokidês.[290] Of the parties named in these different
-depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at
-once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future
-trial.[291] Those informers received the promised rewards, after
-some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; for
-Pythonikus, the citizen who had produced the slave Andromachus,
-pretended to the first claim, while Androkles, one of the senators,
-contended that the senate collectively ought to receive[292] the
-money; a strange pretension, which we do not know how he justified.
-At last, however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival,
-Andromachus the slave received the first reward of ten thousand
-drachms; Teukrus the metic, the second reward of one thousand drachms.
-
-  [290] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 35. In reference to
-  the deposition of Agaristê, Andokidês again includes Alkibiadês
-  among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless
-  we are to suppose another Alkibiadês, not the general in Sicily,
-  this statement cannot be true. There was another Alkibiadês,
-  of the deme Phegus: but Andokidês in mentioning him afterwards
-  (sect. 65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of Alkibiadês, and
-  was in exile at the same time with him (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13).
-
-  [291] Andokidês (sects. 13-34) affirms that some of the persons,
-  accused by Teukrus as mutilators of the Hermæ, were put to death
-  upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point.
-  For Thucydidês recognizes no one as having been put to death
-  except those against whom Andokidês himself informed (see vi,
-  27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons,
-  and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion;
-  but he mentions none as having been put to death except those
-  against whom Andokidês gave testimony. He describes it as a
-  great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning
-  excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many
-  persons upon suspicion, on the evidence of informers not entitled
-  to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as
-  extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to
-  put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put
-  these men to death would have defeated their own object, the
-  full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators.
-  The ignorance in which they were of their internal enemies, was
-  among the most agonizing of all their sentiments; and to put any
-  prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves to
-  have arrived, at the knowledge of the whole, would tend so far
-  to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν
-  Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι
-  πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται, etc.
-
-  Wachsmuth says (p. 194): “The bloodthirsty dispositions of the
-  people had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the
-  number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people
-  pleased,” etc. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the
-  general spirit of his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly,
-  by the very words of Thucydidês which he transcribes in his note
-  108.
-
-  [292] Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 27-28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς ~ὑπὲρ~
-  τῆς βουλῆς.
-
-A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration
-in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into
-exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the public
-mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information
-hitherto received had been all partial, and, with the exception of
-Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not
-citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated
-anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not profess to
-be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.[293] The people
-had heard only a succession of disclosures, all attesting a frequency
-of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods
-who protected their country and constitution; all indicating that
-there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting such designs,
-interpreted as treasonable, yet none communicating any full or
-satisfactory idea of the Hermokopid plot, of the real conspirators,
-or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves,
-yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy
-terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their
-minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of
-the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again
-revived, and some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the
-point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators,
-was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm,
-for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable
-witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best
-character, until the truth could be ascertained.[294]
-
-  [293] Andokid. de Myster. sect. 36. It seems that Diognêtus, who
-  had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus
-  presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was
-  himself among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Mys.
-  sects. 14, 15).
-
-  [294] Thucyd. vi, 53-60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτὰς, ἀλλὰ
-  πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ
-  χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον
-  ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν, ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ
-  πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον
-  διαφυγεῖν....
-
-  ... δεινὸν ποιούμενοι, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ
-  εἴσονται....
-
-The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklês, who
-acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and unprincipled
-politicians,[295] at that time professing exaggerated attachment to
-the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them
-hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These
-men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of
-Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of
-speedily putting down the democracy; and they insisted on pressing
-their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And
-the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this
-stimulus; though individually, every man was so afraid of becoming
-himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the
-senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the
-market-place straightway dispersed.
-
-  [295] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36.
-
-It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer
-appeared, Diokleidês, who professed to communicate some material
-facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the
-authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that, on
-the night on which that incident occurred, he started from Athens
-to go to the mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on
-hire, on whose account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and
-the night was so bright that he began his journey mistaking it for
-daybreak.[296] On reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus,
-he saw a body of men about three hundred in number descending
-from the Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at this
-unexpected sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence
-he had leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some
-time conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and
-then dispersed: the moon was so bright that he could discern the
-faces of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued
-his walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day, and learned
-to his surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been mutilated;
-also, that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward
-of ten thousand drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at
-once with the belief that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were
-authors of the deed, he happened soon afterwards to see one of
-them, Euphêmus, sitting in the workshop of a brazier, and took him
-aside to the neighboring temple of Hephæstus, where he mentioned in
-confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce
-them, but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving
-information and incurring private enmities. Euphêmus thanked him for
-the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras
-and his son Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other
-parties concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under
-solemn covenant, the sum of two talents, or twelve thousand drachms,
-thus overbidding the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed by the
-senate to any truth-telling informer, with admission to a partnership
-in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should
-succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they
-desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês,
-brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place,
-and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and
-his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the
-beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But
-since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his
-information to the senate.[297]
-
-  [296] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii, 2) assert
-  that this testimony was glaringly false, since on the night in
-  question it was _new moon_. I presume, at least, that the remark
-  of Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidês, though he
-  never mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the
-  deposition referred to with many material variations as compared
-  with Andokidês. Plutarch’s observation certainly refers to
-  Diokleidês, whose deposition, he says, affirming that he had seen
-  and distinguished the persons in question by the light of the
-  moon, on a night when it was _new_ moon, shocked all sensible
-  men, but produced no effect upon the blind fury of the people.
-  Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii, ch. viii, p. 194) copies
-  this remark from Plutarch.
-
-  I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was _new moon_ on
-  that night. Andokidês gives in great detail the deposition of
-  Diokleidês, with a strong wish to show that it was false and
-  perfidiously got up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was
-  _new moon_ on the night in question; though if we read his report
-  and his comments upon the deposition of Diokleidês, we shall see
-  that he never could have omitted such a means of discrediting the
-  whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokid. de Myster. sects.
-  37-43). Besides, it requires very good positive evidence to make
-  us believe, that a suborned informer, giving his deposition not
-  long after one of the most memorable nights that ever passed at
-  Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular reference to the
-  circumstance that it was _full moon_ (εἶναι δὲ πανσέληνον), if it
-  had really been _new moon_.
-
-  [297] Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-42.
-
-Such—according to the report of Andokidês—was the story of this
-informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals,
-out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom
-he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators
-actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty,
-among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives, his
-father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law,
-Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kalias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus,
-Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily), and Kritias.
-But as there were a still greater number of names—assuming the
-total of three hundred to be correct—which Diokleidês was unable
-to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus
-and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to
-force them to disclose their accomplices; the psephism passed in
-the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply
-the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal,
-not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate at first
-received it with favor. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting
-themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded
-so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put
-in bail and stand trial before the dikastery, that this was at last
-granted.[298] No sooner had they provided their sureties, than they
-broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and deserted to the
-enemy, without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law
-to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the
-offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that
-a Bœotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated
-still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate
-at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the
-remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with
-the strategi, all the citizens were put under arms; those who dwelt
-in the city, mustering in the market-place; those in and near the
-long walls, in the Theseium; those in Peiræus, in the square called
-the Market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were
-convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion.
-The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the
-prytanes, or fifty senators of the presiding tribe, who passed the
-night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens
-felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of
-breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner,
-prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidês, who was hailed
-as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at
-the prytaneium.[299]
-
-  [298] Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the
-  Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors
-  among themselves whom yet they could not identify, it is to be
-  noted as remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their
-  commissioners for applying torture. We must recollect that the
-  Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode
-  of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions,—for they
-  applied it often to the testimony of slaves,—sometimes apparently
-  to that of metics. Their attachment to the established law, which
-  forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very
-  great, to enable them to resist the great special and immediate
-  temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion,
-  if only by way of exception.
-
-  The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons,
-  handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognized,
-  and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe
-  until the last century. I hope that the reader, after having gone
-  through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians
-  after the mutilation of the Hermæ, will take the trouble to
-  peruse by way of comparison the _Storia della Colonna Infame_, by
-  the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of “I Promessi Sposi.” This
-  little volume, including a republication of Verri’s “Osservazioni
-  sulla Tortura,” is full both of interest and instruction. It
-  lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630,
-  while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining
-  judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain
-  suspected persons called _Untori_; that is, men who were firmly
-  believed by the whole population, with very few exceptions, to
-  be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain
-  ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses.
-  Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail,
-  the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers at
-  Milan, under the authority of the senate, extorted, by force of
-  torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed
-  this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted
-  were executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them,
-  a barber named Mora, was pulled down, and a pillar with an
-  inscription erected upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This
-  pillar, the _Colonna Infame_, remained standing in Milan until
-  the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from
-  Manzoni’s narrative, the degree to which public excitement and
-  alarm can operate to poison and barbarize the course of justice
-  in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with
-  professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure
-  secretly, as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical,
-  where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral,
-  public, and multitudinous.
-
-  [299] Andokid. de Myst. sects. 41-46.
-
-Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more
-miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every
-way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know
-neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means
-or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female
-relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by
-permission along with them in the prison,[300] aggravating by their
-tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, one
-of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as his
-cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure of
-all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent
-persons, his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out
-of a feverish alarm not to be endured. “You know (he said) all that
-passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now
-bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father
-and upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an
-actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself
-and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city.” Such
-instances on the part of Charmidês,[301] aided by the supplications
-of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês
-to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the
-senate. “Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation
-of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was
-present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all
-compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head,
-by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed;
-when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest
-of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed
-to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs
-have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was
-incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that _I_
-would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see
-that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury.
-When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party,
-Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I
-observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own
-crime, which had brought them into danger.”
-
-  [300] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii,
-  cont. Agorat. sect. 42.
-
-  [301] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states that the person who thus
-  addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus.
-  From whom he got the latter name, we do not know.
-
-Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, Andokidês
-tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in
-order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and
-unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated.
-It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to
-the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves),
-and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what
-Andokidês affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as
-having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names,
-including Euphilêtus and Melêtus, had already been specified in the
-information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, Diakritus,
-Lysistratus, and Chæredêmus; all of whom fled, the instant their
-names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being seized.
-As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidês, they proceeded
-to question Diokleidês over again; who confessed that he had given
-a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadês
-the Phegusian—a relative of the commander in Sicily—and Amiantus,
-as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately
-on this revelation; but Diokleidês was detained, sent before the
-dikastery for trial, and put to death.[302]
-
-  [302] The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to
-  be found in Andokid. de Myst. sects. 48-66.
-
-The foregoing is the story which Andokidês, in the oration De
-Mysteriis, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards,
-represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this
-perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really
-did tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as
-having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or
-afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to
-have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief
-information of Thucydidês, who tells us that Andokidês impeached
-himself, along with others, as participant in the mutilation.[303]
-Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed
-that his own nearest relatives were included, though this latter
-statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the
-tale which Andokidês really told was something very different from
-what now stands in his oration. But what it really was we cannot make
-out; nor should we gain much even if it could be made out, since
-even at the time, neither Thucydidês nor other intelligent critics
-could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ
-remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted
-Andokidês the principal organizer.[304]
-
-  [303] Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ~αὐτός τε καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ’
-  ἄλλων~ μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc.
-
-  To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra
-  Andocidem, Or. vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidês himself, De
-  Mysteriis, sect. 71; De Reditu, sect. 7.
-
-  If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. x, Orator, p. 834),
-  Andokidês had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken
-  irregularity and damaging a statue.
-
-  [304] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται ~εἷς τῶν δεδεμένων,
-  ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι~, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς, εἴτε
-  ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὔ· ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται·
-  τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν
-  δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον.
-
-  If the statement of Andokidês in the Oratio de Mysteriis is
-  correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic
-  must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced
-  among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer
-  Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, Alkib. c. 20).
-
-  Thucydidês refuses even to mention the name of Andokidês, and
-  expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark
-  transaction, as if he were afraid of giving offence to great
-  Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at
-  Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations
-  of Lysias and of Andokidês. If the story of Didymus be true,
-  that Thucydidês after his return from exile to Athens died by a
-  violent death (see Biogr. Thucyd. p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would
-  seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against
-  private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.
-
-That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the
-effect produced by the revelations of Andokidês, true or false, on
-the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth
-in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes,—said
-to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus,—and invested on a
-previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the
-preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover, he was
-making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his
-communications with implicit confidence. They were delighted to
-have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery: and the public mind
-subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity.
-The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to
-resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites
-everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.[305] All
-the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom
-Andokidês informed were forthwith released: those who had fled out
-of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named
-as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as
-had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a
-reward offered for their heads.[306] And though discerning men were
-not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were
-pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have
-punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved
-from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well
-as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal
-of divine protection.[307] Andokidês himself was pardoned, and was
-for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, so
-that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties imprisoned,
-ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings
-towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the
-dikastery.[308] But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer
-could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidês was either
-banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or
-at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much
-obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for
-him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and
-seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this
-nefarious proceeding so well merited.[309]
-
-  [305] Thucyd. vi, 60. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς
-  ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, etc.: compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 67,
-  68.
-
-  [306] Andokid. de Myster. sect 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; Philochorus,
-  Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.
-
-  [307] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο:
-  compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8.
-
-  [308] See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several
-  circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφὴ
-  παρανόμων, which Andokidês alleges that his father Leogoras
-  brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of
-  six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out
-  of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes;
-  but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe
-  that it could have taken place until after the public mind was
-  tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidês, especially as
-  Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidês immediately
-  before those disclosures were given in.
-
-  [309] See for evidence of these general positions respecting the
-  circumstances of Andokidês, the three Orations: Andokidês de
-  Mysteriis, Andokidês de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem.
-
-But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the
-Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again
-disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of
-the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or
-brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed
-home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal,
-since the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his
-ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none
-more profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of
-Eleusis, originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in
-her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian
-patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in
-their families.[310] Celebrated annually in the month of August
-or September, under the special care of the basileus, or second
-archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens
-as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a
-solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still
-more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred,
-under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants.
-Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was
-exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the
-Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the
-actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial
-party. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred offices at
-Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or
-herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and
-other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally
-insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the
-same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name
-of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current
-among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by
-the hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgments which always
-overtook such impious men.[311]
-
-  [310] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in
-  Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.
-
-  [311] Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster.
-  sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias
-  against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii,
-  p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous
-  impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on
-  unlucky and forbidden days, “in derision of our gods and our
-  laws,”—ὡς καταλεγῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The
-  lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had
-  brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias
-  had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living
-  in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ’
-  οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν
-  ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις
-  προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅπερ οὗτος ἐξερματεκόσι.
-
-  The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias
-  among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem
-  particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill
-  health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke,
-  Fragm. Comic. Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.
-
-When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated
-by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we shall not
-wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by
-persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when
-their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so
-tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.[312] It was
-about this same time[313] that a prosecution was instituted against
-the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having
-left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a
-reward was offered for his life.
-
-  [312] Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib.
-  c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklês
-  (Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Œdip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of
-  the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, Legg.
-  ii, 14.
-
-  Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in
-  the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging
-  these mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.
-
-  The reader will find the fullest information about these
-  ceremonies in the _Eleusinia_, forming the first treatise in the
-  work of Lobeck called Aglaophamus; and in the Dissertation called
-  _Eleusinia_, in K. O. Müller’s Kleine Schriften. vol ii, p. 242,
-  _seqq._
-
-  [313] Diodor. xiii. 6
-
-  Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the
-  mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the
-  state to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and
-  for punishment on the delinquents.[314] And the enemies of
-  Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity
-  favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had
-  artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The
-  matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these
-  holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by
-  reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate
-  companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor
-  habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal
-  restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him
-  not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an
-  association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily
-  accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries
-  did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with
-  the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the
-  same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and
-  parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this
-  subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army
-  at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in
-  conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand,
-  and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile
-  designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the
-  Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole
-  night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed
-  appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only
-  been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent
-  inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected
-  with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for
-  the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther
-  aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the
-  Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the
-  oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few
-  months before,[315] in order that it might put these hostages to
-  death, whenever it thought fit.
-
-  [314] We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be
-  the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from
-  banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53).
-
-  [315] Thucyd. vi, 53-61.
-
-Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their
-unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among
-them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of
-Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical
-politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular
-orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the
-memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is
-recorded verbatim.
-
-“Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached
-Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of
-crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in
-mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in
-his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to
-himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to
-Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as
-mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of
-old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian
-priests.”[316]
-
-  [316] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης,
-  Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ
-  θεὼ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ
-  δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα
-  στολὴν οἵανπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα
-  αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δᾳδοῦχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον
-  Φηγεέα· τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ
-  ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ’ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ
-  κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος.
-
-Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other
-citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers
-moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take
-their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite
-distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable
-or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions
-were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the
-purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of
-the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was
-indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public
-was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme
-was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken,
-in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of prejudgment,
-or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his
-person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the
-Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the hazard of
-offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the
-army itself.[317]
-
-  [317] Thucyd. vi, 61.
-
-It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful
-attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that they
-found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this
-grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadês
-received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same
-trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, so that his
-resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in
-his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons
-accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but as soon as they
-arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and his companions
-quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the
-part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to
-return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the
-accused—one of whom[318] was his own cousin and namesake—were tried,
-condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated;
-while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred families
-pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the
-mysteries,[319] and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.
-
-  [318] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13.
-
-  [319] Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat.
-  vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42.
-
-  Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to
-  raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the
-  order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering
-  what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good
-  reason to believe that he _would_ have taken this step, had it
-  been practicable.
-
-Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies
-at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him;
-while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable,
-could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of
-the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people
-were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there
-was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal
-in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of
-the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very
-distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable
-or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally
-accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against
-the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety,
-by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving
-them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for
-legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian
-Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead
-of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to
-have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would
-involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge
-what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a
-person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of
-penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the
-last century it would have been visited with something sharper than
-the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have
-befallen Alkibiadês at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation
-and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766.
-The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,[320] down to a
-recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with
-excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the
-religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished
-for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various
-opportunities for remarking.
-
-  [320] To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens
-  by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the
-  mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous
-  acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic
-  penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French
-  Revolution.
-
-  I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on
-  French criminal jurisprudence—_Jousse_, Traité de la Justice
-  Criminelle, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672:—
-
-  “Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Leze Majesté
-  Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu’on doit
-  regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus
-  exécrables.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs
-  manières.—1. En niant l’existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de
-  ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on
-  profane ou qu’on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu’on
-  _frappe les Images de Dieu_ dans le dessein de l’insulter. C’est
-  ce qu’on appelle _Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au prémier Chef_.”
-
-  Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol.
-  iv, pp. 97-99:—
-
-  “_La profanation des Sacremens et des Mystères de la Réligion
-  est un sacrilège des plus exécrables._ Tel est le crime de
-  ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs
-  et mauvais, _en dérision des Mystères_; ceux qui _profanent
-  la sainte Eucharistie_, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière
-  que ce soit; ceux qui en mépris de la Réligion, profanent les
-  Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties,
-  ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes: _ceux qui,
-  en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs
-  débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images
-  consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints_, en
-  mépris de la Réligion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent
-  de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes _sont des crimes de
-  Leze-Majesté divine au prémier chef_, parce qu’ils s’attaquent
-  immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de
-  l’offenser.”
-
-  “... La peine du Sacrilège, par l’Ancien Testament, étoit celle
-  du feu, et d’être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables
-  étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches,
-  suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est
-  arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du
-  crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l’accusé.—Dans _le
-  sacrilège au prémier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte
-  Vierge, et les Saints_, v. g. à l’égard de ceux qui foulent aux
-  pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en
-  abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la
-  peine est le feu, l’amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en
-  est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; _ceux
-  qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s’en moquent et les contrefont
-  dans leurs débauches_: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale,
-  parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité.”
-
-  M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned
-  to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.
-
-Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês,
-we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which
-he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he
-really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even his
-enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely;
-though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to
-exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin
-with the mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled
-wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It
-was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent
-pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become
-known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by
-conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious
-mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to
-political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure
-who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special
-purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct
-purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies,
-even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon
-themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis
-of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme,
-which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition
-departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length
-effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the
-absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest
-chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of
-the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice
-towards Alkibiadês; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as
-well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance
-rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to
-the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by
-the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ,
-the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the
-deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps have
-been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty;
-and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind,
-but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of
-prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came
-to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his
-trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it,
-whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by
-perfidious means.[321]
-
-  [321] The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence
-  of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various
-  authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy
-  to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the
-  Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far
-  as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.
-
-  1. The “hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants,” (to
-  adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons,—see Dr.
-  Lingard’s History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88,—words, the
-  like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to
-  the Hermokopids,) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from
-  the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was
-  a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates,
-  Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.
-
-  At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were
-  real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that
-  they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the
-  Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor
-  who the conspirators themselves were.
-
-  If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had
-  pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated
-  plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found
-  no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that
-  terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give
-  credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not
-  put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They
-  contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they
-  got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated
-  in _that_ deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as
-  a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet it is
-  impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or
-  Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot
-  wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar
-  circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should
-  trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under
-  the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and
-  Diokleidês in presumptive credibility.
-
-  The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in
-  believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the
-  Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that,
-  looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connection
-  between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we
-  to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put
-  themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed
-  force was actually on their frontier?
-
-  As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning
-  and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a
-  moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the
-  Popish Plot. These were true charges, at least there is strong
-  presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons
-  were convicted and punished for having done acts which they
-  really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether
-  it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is
-  another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in
-  punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon
-  depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.
-
-  The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the
-  cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the
-  English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The
-  suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even
-  greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real,
-  and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in
-  England.
-
-  “I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl.
-  xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial
-  murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted
-  by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the
-  excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries
-  of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of
-  justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to
-  have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed
-  traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the
-  improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind,
-  a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few
-  individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the
-  imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared
-  not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the
-  innocent.”
-
-  It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a
-  legislative body, and in their judicial character when the
-  Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp.
-  231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite
-  equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.
-
-  Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese
-  judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were
-  more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning
-  prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this
-  affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.
-
-In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile
-Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been
-necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint
-against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death
-in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: “I shall show them that
-I am alive.” He fully redeemed his word.[322]
-
-  [322] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.
-
-The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to
-Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy’s camp an angry
-exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness
-of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of
-all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal
-in the cause.[323] And what was worst of all, it left the armament
-altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus,
-though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the
-command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have
-had no real influence except in the field.
-
-  [323] Thucyd. ii, 65. τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν,
-  etc.
-
-Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first
-suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the
-view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the
-financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along
-the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where
-admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime
-town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the
-celebrated courtezan Laïs, then a very young girl.[324] Having handed
-over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect
-their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the
-thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit
-of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara
-to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and
-twenty talents,[325] and conducted the Athenian land-force across the
-centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels
-to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town
-of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his
-naval force.
-
-  [324] The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear
-  involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad
-  Philisti, Fragment. v.
-
-  [325] Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα ~ἀπέδοσαν~,
-  καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word
-  ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to
-  their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for
-  their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had
-  Thucydidês said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put
-  up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at
-  least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that
-  proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.
-
-  If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker’s note, we
-  shall see that μεταπέμπειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in
-  the sense of μεταπέμπεσθαι. The case may perhaps be the same with
-  ἀπέδοσαν for ἀπέδοντο.
-
-It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three
-months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at
-Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the
-acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies—unless we are to reckon
-the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as
-Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias;
-together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great
-disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of
-the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing
-serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by
-Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried
-armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence
-was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the
-preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished;
-the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out
-both hesitating and timorous,[326] and when he had disappeared out
-of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in
-vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a
-reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan
-citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities,
-called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian
-position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach
-Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult
-the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to
-settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring
-the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on
-the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his
-inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of
-his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse
-in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry,
-informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles
-serving along with him.[327]
-
-  [326] Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42.
-
-  [327] Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii, 6.
-
-He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart attached
-to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other
-side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the
-friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the
-message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls,
-apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans
-by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared
-and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised
-to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and
-setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added,
-were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed.
-
-This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment
-when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive
-movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the
-messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise
-day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force
-was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the
-river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles
-of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated,
-choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with
-his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast,
-rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse.
-Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed
-south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great
-Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus
-Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the
-Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by
-various embarrassing obstacles,—houses, walls, trees, and standing
-water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his
-left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and
-was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of
-his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down
-the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by
-throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at
-the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive
-works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb
-him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on
-arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time
-in returning, the march back was a long one.[328] Such was the
-confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a
-march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his
-position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other
-side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by
-walls.
-
-  [328] Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c.
-  13.
-
-On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed
-his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep.
-His front division was intended to attack; his rear division—in
-hollow square, with the baggage in the middle—was held in reserve
-near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there
-was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than
-his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection;
-they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their
-Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen,
-the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in
-number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from
-Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites,
-though full of courage, had little training; and their array,
-never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by
-the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their
-families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already
-begun, and took rank wherever they could.[329]
-
-  [329] Thucyd. vi, 67-69.
-
-Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his
-practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the
-combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief
-harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to
-modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of
-professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause
-for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only
-one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the
-case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier’s mind at the eve
-of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence
-of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians, as compared to
-the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own
-superiority,—this is a striking confession of the deplorable change
-which had been wrought by his own delay,—but who would come short in
-actual conflict, from want of discipline.[330] Moreover, he reminded
-them that they were far away from home, and that defeat would render
-them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little
-thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity,
-serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens, since
-it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters
-which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.
-
-  [330] Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί
-  τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι
-  Σικελιώτας, οἳ ~ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς~, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὔ· διὰ τὸ
-  τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν.
-
-  This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb
-  πανδημεί. Compare πανδαμεὶ, πανομιλεὶ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.
-
-While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and
-bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the
-trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites
-to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging
-from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be
-the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the
-Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their
-own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The
-shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the
-battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened
-to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning,
-which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavorable
-augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed
-a mere phenomenon of the season,[331] so that they still farther
-astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence with which
-they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken,
-dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next,
-before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as
-was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the
-Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who
-pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety
-behind the Helôrine road.[332]
-
-  [331] Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ’ ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα,
-  καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, πολὺ μείζω
-  ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν.
-
-  The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally
-  unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be
-  seen in the next chapter but one.
-
-  [332] Thucyd. vi, 70.
-
-So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they
-did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate
-detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of
-the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which
-they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without
-approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the
-field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the
-dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred
-and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.[333]
-
-  [333] Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias
-  refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct,
-  though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.
-
-  Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became
-  masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x,
-  28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the
-  treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of
-  the Syracusan priests.
-
-  Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his
-  position before he returned to Katana. But the language of
-  Thucydidês indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after
-  the battle.
-
-On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies
-for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias
-reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former
-station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and
-a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or
-to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the
-winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters
-at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the
-danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change
-of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he
-proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry
-and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his
-Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the
-accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together
-magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the
-spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions,
-he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a
-favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a
-correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of
-Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing
-general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the
-philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching
-their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to
-death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the
-Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty
-supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos,
-where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into
-winter quarters.[334]
-
-  [334] Thucyd. vi, 71-74.
-
-The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the
-harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and
-executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army,
-as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and
-to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous
-inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other
-results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively
-mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served
-as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction
-which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the
-Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to
-account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during
-these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at
-Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most
-deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself.
-Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at
-present, we have only to turn back to his own predictions and
-recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted
-in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the
-Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking
-the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not
-allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their
-reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary
-to overcome them.[335] He had thus been allowed to bring with him
-a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and
-implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious
-to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to
-find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was
-the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was
-the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well
-as every man at Athens:[336] upon the formidable cavalry of the
-Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates.
-Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action
-so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of
-this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four
-months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all
-the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself
-with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger
-of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression
-of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their
-fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere
-against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy
-weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of
-every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity
-became imminent: the consequence of which was,—to use an expression
-of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring
-the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that never acting, yet always seeming
-about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single,
-at the moment of actual conflict.[337]
-
-  [335] Thucyd. vi, 21-26.
-
-  [336] Thucyd. vi, 20.
-
-  [337] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ
-  Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι,
-  καὶ μόνοι ~οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ
-  διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες~.
-
-Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athenians,
-when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition
-of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a
-despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little
-except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted
-anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry
-and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and
-provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent
-or disappointment against him.[338] And this is the more to be noted,
-since the removal of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even
-valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague
-in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at
-Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own
-soldiers in Sicily, though _their_ disappointment must have been
-yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering
-the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember
-that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable
-circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements
-actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in
-his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own
-army.[339] The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more
-instructive as we advance forward.
-
-  [338] Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ~ὕστερον
-  ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι~, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: “It is
-  disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to
-  _send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our
-  own fault in making bad calculations at first_.” (Thucyd. vi, 21.)
-
-  This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens,
-  prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed
-  a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of
-  force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover,
-  such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was
-  anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês
-  can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the
-  grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.
-
-  As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that
-  the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by
-  his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been
-  forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable
-  passage, ii, 65, of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ
-  πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς·
-  ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον ~οἱ
-  ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες~,
-  ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε
-  ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον
-  ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—
-
-  “Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in
-  two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian
-  power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, _had not
-  the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently
-  supplied by the government at home_. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα
-  τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify “_not voting afterwards
-  the needful supplies to their absent armament_:” for Nikias was
-  prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans
-  by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost
-  before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently
-  the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and
-  weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.”
-  Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.
-
-  Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of
-  the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that
-  these words do _not_ signify “_voting the needful supplies_.”
-
-  The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with
-  ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not
-  be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα,
-  etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ
-  πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive
-  word for these particulars, meaning “_supplies_.” The words
-  really mean: “_taking farther resolutions_ (after the expedition
-  was gone) _unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament_.”
-  Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα,
-  or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used
-  in the most general sense, for “what is suitable;” “what is
-  advantageous or convenient:” γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ
-  πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ηὔξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε
-  πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160,
-  B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.
-
-  Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests
-  which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other
-  irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament,
-  especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew
-  out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding
-  of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any
-  of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony
-  was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the
-  expedition.
-
-  Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note, that _one
-  of the causes_ of the failure of the Athenian expedition in
-  Sicily, was, that it was “insufficiently supplied by Athens.” Of
-  the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii,
-  42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting
-  forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says
-  nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling
-  upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.
-
-  After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and
-  collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they
-  expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the
-  autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the
-  supplies _were sent_, as soon as they could be, and as soon as
-  Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not
-  the fault of the Athenians.
-
-  Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, “that the armament
-  _was allowed_ to be reduced to great distress and weakness
-  before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The
-  second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known
-  his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress
-  coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful
-  appearances.
-
-  It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or
-  inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of
-  Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved
-  their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the
-  having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire
-  strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês
-  plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of
-  Nikias and that of Demosthenês.
-
-  Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias,
-  whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and
-  tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that
-  he conceived the mismanagement of the general as _the cause_
-  of the failure of the armament, not as “one of two causes,”
-  as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully
-  the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a
-  Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which
-  this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have
-  set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the
-  apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown
-  by Nikias (vii, 42).
-
-  [339] Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p.
-  464.
-
-Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their
-recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês
-addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition.
-He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics
-and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in
-this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good
-promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the
-precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to
-his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish
-the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto
-been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to
-three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than
-had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them
-unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon
-these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter,
-for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês
-himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command.
-Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose
-of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the
-Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;[340]
-so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther
-reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall
-of his army.
-
-  [340] Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.
-
-But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of
-the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications
-at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing an additional
-space and covering both their inner and their outer city to the
-westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great Harbor, across
-the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ,
-and stretching far enough westward to inclose the sacred precinct of
-Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that
-if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in
-the field and confine them to their walls, he might, nevertheless,
-be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea
-without covering a great additional extent of ground.[341] Besides
-this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of
-Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a
-regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of
-Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent
-battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct
-the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful
-to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification,
-inclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege,
-by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to
-construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished.
-But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted
-at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance,
-to occupy and fortify the Euryâlus, or the summit of the hill of
-Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never
-have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did
-not think of it until too late, as we shall presently see.
-
-  [341] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι
-  πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, ~τεῖχος
-  παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς~ ὁρῶν, ~ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος
-  εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν~, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.
-
-  I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse
-  for the next chapter, when the siege begins.
-
-Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the general
-scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had
-adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if he had
-begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the
-summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he
-actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C., he would have found none
-of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of
-circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and
-easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his
-winter’s inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that
-the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned
-the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time the
-neighboring fields.[342]
-
-  [342] Thucyd. vi, 75.
-
-Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope
-to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy
-Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that
-alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded
-ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his
-object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted
-to address the public assembly.
-
-Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history
-of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the
-Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against
-Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent
-battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength.
-What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of
-Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint
-resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was
-to subjugate all Sicily,—that Leontini and Egesta served merely
-as convenient pretences to put forward,—and that she could have no
-sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in
-slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was, in truth, nothing else but
-an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she
-had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched
-slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too
-speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred
-from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre
-of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this
-honorable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves.
-Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at
-Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and
-would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish,
-from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse
-humbled, but this could not happen without endangering their own
-existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to
-do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely
-nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with
-Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid
-her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words
-to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily
-single-handed, was as unjust as it was dishonorable. If she came off
-victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans
-should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so
-plain, that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but
-he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage.
-The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the
-Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother
-Dorians of Kamarina.[343]
-
-  [343] Thucyd. vi, 77-80.
-
-Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference
-to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês.
-Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his
-start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians
-were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling Athens, as
-an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against
-the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbors in Peloponnesus.
-Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head
-of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him,
-she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy
-to shake off the illegitimate ascendency of Sparta. Her empire was
-justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as
-by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of
-Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had
-good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made
-themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in
-his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to
-herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire,
-and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show
-that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those
-of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her
-Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies, to
-accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her.
-To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she
-did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans
-employed in their own island. Hence her desire to reëstablish the
-expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the
-Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted nothing but
-subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily, she required
-independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which
-Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the
-same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt
-differently with her different allies, according to the circumstances
-of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and
-maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus;
-and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in
-Sicily.
-
-No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other
-Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the
-acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she
-had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared
-to do when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under
-this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens
-into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to
-repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if
-they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter
-when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor,
-and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled
-the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the
-Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It
-was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with
-which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror
-of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece.
-He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against
-Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of
-her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on
-an equal footing, jointly with Athens.[344]
-
-  [344] Thucyd. vi, 83-87.
-
-In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing
-substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years
-before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at
-home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens;
-who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she
-reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of
-view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural,
-nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary
-Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the
-oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the
-Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens.
-His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not
-convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the
-opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in
-Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets
-by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and
-their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies
-of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the
-actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of
-this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were
-those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows
-how little likely such hopes were to be realized, and therefore how
-ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was,—that the
-Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain
-as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the
-expedition: “Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such
-the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory
-combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects,
-we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and
-powerful allies.”[345] What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his
-countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction, Euphêmus
-repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city;
-probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not
-on that account the less true and reasonable.
-
-  [345] Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ
-  μεθ’ ὑμῶν· εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι
-  κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων
-  καὶ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, etc.
-
-  This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the
-  Athenians. vi, 11.
-
-The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês
-and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians,
-yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove
-completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they
-entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of
-very ancient date; and even now their great fear was, of probable
-suffering, if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their
-coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an
-evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but
-refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach,
-whichever way the ultimate success might turn.[346]
-
-  [346] Thucyd. vi, 88.
-
-For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was
-perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, 415 B.C., no human
-being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and
-the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the
-Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme
-chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect,
-indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians
-first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then
-followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to
-succeed, if, indeed, they had not already become conquerors of
-Syracuse; so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained
-attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus
-had contended, was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to
-strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect
-of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic
-illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.[347]
-
-  [347] Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.
-
-Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing.
-He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the
-Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in
-the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in
-his favor,—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês,—sending
-provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some
-refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of
-compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to
-counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of
-Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached,
-Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing
-that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.[348]
-
-  [348] Thucyd. vi, 88.
-
-He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from
-that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the
-southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their
-services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their
-promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know;
-for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading
-Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such
-intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must
-have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the
-Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent
-orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the
-wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first
-burst of spring.
-
-While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of
-portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the
-battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias into winter
-quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to
-solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to notice the
-lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had
-he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be
-doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus
-at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce
-decisive effects.[349] After exerting what influence they could upon
-the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached
-Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises
-of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to
-accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian
-aid.
-
-  [349] Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.
-
-They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they
-could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed
-over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in
-a merchant-vessel,[350] and now appeared at Sparta on special
-invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was
-at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against
-them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much
-trouble before the battle of Mantineia. He now appeared, too, burning
-with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her
-all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to
-plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred
-venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her
-irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations,
-supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and
-inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors into comparative
-decision and activity.[351] His harangue in the Spartan congress is
-given to us by Thucydidês, who may possibly have heard it, as he was
-then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the
-mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree;
-and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed
-speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the
-substance, without professing to translate the words.
-
-  [350] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at
-  Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion
-  of Thucydidês (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred
-  grave suspicions of treason.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of
-  truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to
-  Thebes.
-
-  Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians
-  banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column,
-  and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that
-  Alkibiadês _was compelled_ to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians.
-  This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and
-  untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy
-  of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of
-  Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation
-  that the Athenians banished him out of _all Greece_ stands
-  prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of
-  Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have
-  already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied
-  the statement from this passage of Isokratês.
-
-  But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that
-  Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, _upon
-  compulsion_. The first act of his hostility to Athens, the
-  disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê, was committed
-  before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydidês represents him as
-  unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he
-  was afraid of the Spartans; in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct
-  and invitation from them. Thucydidês mentions nothing about his
-  going to Argos (vi, 88).
-
-  [351] Thucyd. vi, 88.
-
-“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices
-current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair
-hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public
-connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled
-with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your
-favor on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at
-Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took
-the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ
-my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening their hands, and
-dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite
-with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with
-me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some
-of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan
-of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Peisistratid
-despots; and as all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the name
-of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as
-leaders of the people.[352] Moreover, our established constitution
-was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey, though I did my
-best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst
-of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, who in
-former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses,
-those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not
-of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that
-constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom,
-and which I found already existing.[353] For as to democracy, all we
-Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally,
-I have better reason than any one else to rail against it, if one
-_could_ say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not
-think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as
-enemies.
-
-  [352] Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν,
-  πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ’
-  ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους.
-
-  It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always
-  opposed to τύραννοι, or despots, and had been particularly
-  opposed to the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put
-  down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this
-  source, Alkibiadês took the best means of excusing them before a
-  Lacedæmonian audience.
-
-  [353] Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν,
-  δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη
-  οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν
-  γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν
-  χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας
-  οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν
-  ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.
-
-“So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the
-business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet
-know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the
-Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italian Greeks; afterwards, to make an
-attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all
-or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus.
-We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the
-Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and
-other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes
-built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of
-treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round
-with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force;
-and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others
-as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the
-whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You
-thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows
-it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will
-execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can
-hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they
-might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as
-they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they
-are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all
-Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I
-have described will be soon upon you.
-
-“It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily,—it is for
-the safety of Peloponnesus,—that I now urge you to send across,
-forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I
-consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to
-take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared
-and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be
-encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to
-send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and
-permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:[354] that is the contingency
-which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which
-therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get
-into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the
-working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of
-their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue,
-and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.
-
-  [354] The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified
-  post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even
-  before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122).
-
-“None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this
-vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies,
-I who once passed for a patriot.[355] Nor ought you to mistrust
-my assurances, as coming from the reckless passion of an exile.
-The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like
-you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved
-my country,[356] while I was secure as a citizen; I love her no
-more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to
-be assailing a country still mine; I am rather trying to win back
-a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who, having
-unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience, but he whose ardor
-makes him try every means to regain her.
-
-  [355] Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι,
-  εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι,
-  νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.
-
-  [356] Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ’
-  ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν
-  ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις
-  οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ’
-  ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.
-
-“Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or
-suffering; the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more
-good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back
-from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so
-much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as
-well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will
-become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without
-force.”[357]
-
-  [357] Thucyd. vi, 89-92.
-
-Enormous consequences turned upon this speech, no less masterly
-in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an
-indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became
-known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadês
-would be supplied with a justification of their most violent
-political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much
-pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate
-expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious
-ceremonies of the state,[358]—that he detested the democracy in his
-heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the
-first safe opportunity of subverting it,—appears here in his own
-language as matter of avowal and boast. The sentence of condemnation
-against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who
-at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly
-persuaded than before of the reality of the association between
-irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the
-inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it
-represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those
-to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very
-selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy
-was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy.
-Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to
-his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for
-foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints
-and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more
-galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.[359]
-He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the
-standing license of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to
-extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened
-to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadês had never
-been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the
-democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect
-apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their
-empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the
-highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As
-against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies
-of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if
-they were authors or accomplices—as seems probable of some—in the
-mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to
-the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to
-strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês
-and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the
-simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter
-but one of this History.
-
-  [358] Thucyd. vi, 28.
-
-  [359] See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, ῥᾷον τὰ
-  ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει,
-  and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this
-  History, chap. lxii.
-
-If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein he
-touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not
-to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust
-the following portion in which he professes to describe the real
-purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast
-designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated
-even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that
-they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or
-by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements
-of the armament—during the first eight months after arriving at
-Rhegium—recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês,
-opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly
-censured when known at Athens, conspire to prove that their minds
-were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse;
-that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did
-not find; and that those who sailed from Athens with large hopes
-of brilliant and easy conquest were soon taught to see the reality
-with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens
-the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta,
-there can be no doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of
-Lamachus, or rather would have originated it himself. We find him,
-indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination
-to sail, holding out hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily,
-Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as
-an alternative and as a favorable possibility, is noticed only in
-one place, without expansion or amplification, and shows that the
-speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent
-among his hearers. Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise,
-in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked
-of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated,—Sicily, Italy,
-Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet
-large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.[360] Had he put forth such
-promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against
-him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at
-Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian
-history, is in truth little better than a gigantic romance dressed up
-to alarm his audience.[361]
-
-  [360] Thucyd. vi, 12-17.
-
-  [361] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.
-
-Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and
-effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the
-representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared
-to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out
-against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding
-it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been
-partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the
-contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would
-either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly.
-For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even
-in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the ephors could
-not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid.
-It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the
-deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them.
-His flaming picture of the danger impending,—brought home to their
-own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all
-witnesses,—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same
-time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would
-be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta
-thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending
-chiefs of Greece: “Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.”[362] He had
-not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find
-him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first
-achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.
-
-  [362] Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.
-
-The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force
-to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring,
-they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed
-thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians
-for operations as speedily as the case admitted.[363] We do not
-know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that
-consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called
-upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior
-acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian
-Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished
-from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war for taking
-Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.[364]
-Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for
-him to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, and to prepare as many others as
-their docks could furnish.
-
-  [363] Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7.
-
-  [364] Thucyd. vi, 104.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LIX.
-
-FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE
-SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF
-THE GENERAL WAR.
-
-
-The Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were
-put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the
-reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of
-Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently
-garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid
-waste the neighboring fields, they reëmbarked, landed again for
-similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an
-insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the
-interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel
-town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens,
-they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received
-from Athens two hundred and fifty horsemen fully equipped, for whom
-horses were to be procured in Sicily,[365] thirty horse-bowmen,
-and three hundred talents in money. He was not long in furnishing
-them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also
-received some farther cavalry, so that he was presently able to
-muster six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.[366]
-
-  [365] Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found
-  their way into Attica and Central Greece, Sophoklês, Œd. Kolon.
-  312:—
-
-                             γυναῖχ’ ὁρῶ
-    Στείχουσαν ἡμῖν, ἆσσον, Αἰτναίας ἐπὶ
-    Πῶλου βεβῶσαν.
-
-  If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of
-  unusually great size.
-
-  [366] Thucyd. vi, 95-98.
-
-Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first
-approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side,
-apprized of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware
-that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now
-thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding
-the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung
-their outer city.
-
-Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer
-city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original
-settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is
-at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known
-by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula
-north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or
-to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was
-defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting
-great difficulties of landing, and by a sea-wall; so that on these
-sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side,
-beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft
-now called Santa Bonagia, or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of
-south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and
-then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of
-the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep,
-that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high
-land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower
-ground, situated between it and the inner city, or Ortygia, seems at
-this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either,
-but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first
-settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games,
-and other multitudinous ceremonies; partly for the burial of the
-dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed
-without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark
-the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its
-purpose.
-
-To the northwest of the outer city wall, in the direction of the port
-called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards became
-enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of the southern
-part of the same outer city wall, nearly southwest of the outer city
-itself, stood another suburb, afterwards known and fortified as
-Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 B.C., from having
-within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês,[367]
-which stood a little way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ,
-and stretching from thence down southward in the direction of the
-Great Harbor. Between these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the
-ground rising in gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward,
-and diminishing in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it
-ended in a small conical mound, called in modern times the Belvedere.
-This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high
-ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of
-which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south,
-it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the
-sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite
-precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent.
-From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy
-and gradual—excepting two or three special mounds, or cliffs—towards
-the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.
-
-  [367] At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little without the
-  walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so much
-  sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their
-  invasion of the island, seven years after the siege of Syracuse
-  by Nikias, carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre
-  (Diodor. xiii, 108).
-
-According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take
-Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off
-its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea.
-Now looking at the inner and outer city as above described, at the
-moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that—after defeating
-the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be
-of course the first part of the process—he might have carried his
-blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost
-point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city wall and the
-Temenitês so as to reach the Great Harbor at a spot not far westward
-of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have
-landed in the Great Harbor, and executed the same wall, beginning
-from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two
-blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would
-have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a
-separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city,
-across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to
-end not in the Great Harbor, but in the coast of the Nekropolis
-opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the
-time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months
-of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both
-these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of
-his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering
-both their inner and their outer city,—stretching across the whole
-front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbor to
-the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia,—and expanding westward so as
-to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo
-Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name
-of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of
-lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their
-wall a good blockade.[368] After it was finished, Nikias could not
-begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbor, since he would
-have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ.
-He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of
-the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater
-space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbor
-at a point farther removed from Ortygia.
-
-  [368] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ
-  χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι,
-  ~τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος
-  εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν~, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.
-
-Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ,
-the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on
-the slope, gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance
-than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good
-local information by the exiles, seems to have made this discovery
-earlier than the Syracusan generals, who—having been occupied in
-augmenting their defences on another point, where they were yet more
-vulnerable—did not make it until immediately before the opening
-of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they
-proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the
-left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably
-final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen
-regiment of six hundred hoplites was placed under the orders of an
-Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ,
-as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be
-wanted.[369] These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on
-the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches
-to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.
-
-  [369] Thucyd. vi, 96.
-
-But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit,
-intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in
-possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board
-at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place
-not far from a place called Leon, or the Lion, which was only six or
-seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara
-and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and
-placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the
-narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had
-any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved
-forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from
-the northeast, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from
-Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryalus, near
-the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded
-the slope of Epipolæ beneath them, and the town of Syracuse to the
-eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke
-up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as
-the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryalus from the
-southwest, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles
-in length, they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians
-were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to
-retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the
-Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher
-ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss,
-Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians
-remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well as of the
-upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.[370]
-
-  [370] Thucyd. vi, 97.
-
-This was a most important advantage; indeed, seemingly essential to
-the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan
-both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the
-Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive
-the importance, and which in fact only acquired its preëminent
-importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in
-their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon
-a favorable accident which could not have been reasonably expected
-to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition
-that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the
-first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time
-for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay
-was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less
-upon this favorable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did
-a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and
-might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of
-the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the
-effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely
-difficult, if not completely frustrated.
-
-On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the
-slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle,
-which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian
-troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort
-on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the
-upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff,
-and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place
-of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited,
-so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian
-cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias
-descended from Labdalum to a new position called Sykê, lower down
-on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern
-cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible,
-a walled inclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from
-whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward
-towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbor. This
-Circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther
-protected by an outwork in front covering an area of one thousand
-square feet.[371] Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians
-executed this construction,[372] the Syracusans marched their forces
-out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But
-when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side
-in battle order, the Syracusan generals were so struck with their
-manifest superiority in soldier-like array, as compared with the
-disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers
-back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body
-of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain
-them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however,
-were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the
-aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan
-horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This
-is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being
-brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry
-the great reason for his prolonged inaction.
-
-  [371] Thucyd. vi, 98. ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ
-  καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.
-
-  [372] The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in
-  the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications:
-  see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18.
-
-Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading
-operations; first completing the Circle,[373] then beginning his
-wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle
-towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were
-employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper
-places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratês feel
-the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he
-discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a
-counter-wall, or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the
-Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued so as to
-impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could
-get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would
-completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias
-should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated
-on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel them, during the
-short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade, or front
-outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while
-they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it, and would,
-even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and
-employ his whole force to dislodge them.[374]
-
-  [373] Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the
-  Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydidês, as if it had
-  _never been completed_. I construe this one passage differently
-  from him (vii, 2, 4)—τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν
-  ἑτέραν θάλασσαν: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent
-  to ἑτέρωθι τοῦ κύκλου, as plainly appears from the accompanying
-  mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that
-  the Circle was finished; and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two
-  passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been
-  completed.
-
-  [374] Thucyd. vi, 99. ~Ὑποτειχίζειν~ δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι
-  (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ᾗ ἐκεῖνοι (the Athenians) ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ
-  τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλῄσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν
-  τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ
-  φθάνειν ἂν αὐτοὶ τοῖς σταυροῖς ~προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους~·
-  ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι.
-
-  The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βάσιμα;
-  adding ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματῶδες εἶναι
-  τὸ χωρίον. Though he is here followed by the best commentators,
-  I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently
-  supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was
-  built—as we shall see presently that the second counter-work
-  was—across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff
-  of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. “The ground being generally
-  marshy (τελματῶδες) there were only a few places where it could
-  be crossed.” But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The
-  first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems
-  to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian circle and
-  the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected
-  advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitês. This was all hard, firm
-  ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point:
-  there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they
-  would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground.
-
-  It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, “the attacks
-  of the Athenians,” without intending to denote any special
-  assailable points; προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους, means “to get
-  beforehand with the attacks,” (see Thucyd. i, 57, v, 30.) This is
-  in fact the more usual meaning of ἔφοδος (compare vii, 5; vii,
-  43; i, 6; v, 35; vi, 63), “attack, approach, visit,” etc. There
-  are doubtless other passages in which it means, “the way or road
-  through which the attack was made:” in one of these, however
-  (vii, 51), all the best editors now read ἐσόδου instead of ἐφόδου.
-
-  It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the
-  inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word
-  ἔφοδοι: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix
-  to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 271.
-
-Accordingly, they took their start from the postern-gate near the
-grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall, erected four or
-five months before, to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From
-this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the
-Athenian circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up
-the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line
-of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical
-population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since
-the city was still completely undisturbed by sea, and mistress of the
-great harbor, the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus.
-Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the
-Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such
-efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for
-traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come
-southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink
-of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the
-Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was
-defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for
-discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it,
-while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the
-work or on guard, returned back to the city.
-
-During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to
-interrupt them.[375] Employed as he seems to have been on the
-Circle, and on the wall branching out from his Circle northward,
-he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack
-them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack
-from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle only
-partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay, he was enabled to
-prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance,
-and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall
-with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time
-when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying
-the aqueducts, which supplied the city, partially at least, with
-water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with
-confidence, both by the completion of their counter-wall, which
-seemed an effective bar to the besiegers, and by his inaction. The
-tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance:
-instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to
-shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted
-themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls.
-Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently
-prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites,
-with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion,
-were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to
-attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force
-marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards
-the city walls, to prevent any succor from coming out of the gates,
-half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade
-and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen
-three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the
-stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards; who,
-taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their
-wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of
-them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred, and the
-Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially
-come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced
-their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the
-Temenite city wall. Here, however, the Syracusan strength within
-was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were
-thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians
-had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall,
-plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use
-of their own circumvallation.
-
-  [375] Thucyd. vi, 100.
-
-As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the brink
-of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank,
-Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff,
-so as to deprive them of this resource in future. Accordingly,
-without staying to finish his blockading wall, regularly and
-continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ,
-he left the Circle under a guard, and marched across at once to
-take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the
-blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern
-cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby
-he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans
-from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second
-counter-wall.[376] Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe
-and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ
-and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the
-Great Harbor, and across which the Athenian wall of circumvallation
-must necessarily be presently carried. As his troops would have to
-carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above,
-partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be
-separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent
-ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between the Circle
-and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an
-unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it, as was
-in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end
-completed. The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough for the
-time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.
-
-  [376] Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ~ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου~ ἐτείχιζον
-  οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν
-  ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον
-  ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμάλου καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ
-  περιτείχισμα.
-
-  I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this
-  sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have
-  been differently construed. Göller, in his first edition, had
-  construed them as if it stood ~ἀρξάμενοι~ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if
-  the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in
-  actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems
-  to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner
-  similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ
-  τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work
-  performed was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not
-  to have been the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply,
-  “starting from the Circle as a base of operations.” Agreeing with
-  Dr. Arnold in his conception of the event signified, I incline,
-  in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two
-  or three passages in Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64—Αἱ δὲ
-  παλαιαὶ πόλεις διὰ τὴν λῃστείαν ἐπιπολὺ ἀντισχοῦσαν ~ἀπὸ θαλάσσης
-  μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν~ ... Ἐστὶ δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ~κεῖται
-  ἀπὸ θαλάσσης~ ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρώτιδος, Ἐφύρη. In these
-  passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἄποθεν, iv,
-  125, signifying “apart from, at some distance from;” but not
-  implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from,
-  either literal or metaphorical.
-
-  “The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their
-  Circle, the cliff above the marsh,” etc.
-
-By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a
-second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy
-were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the
-slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh
-between the southern cliff of the Epipolæ and the Great Harbor;
-being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still
-at Thapsus. Across that marsh—and seemingly as far as the river
-Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade
-work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians
-must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their
-circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross
-palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city walls,
-and stretching in a southwesterly direction across the low ground
-as far as the river Anapus, that, by the time the new Athenian
-fortification on the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle
-was completed also, and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out
-the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbor.
-
-Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery.
-Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from his fort
-on the cliff of Epipolæ into the low ground beneath,—and providing
-his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh
-where it was scarcely passable,—he contrived to reach and surprise
-the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same
-time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into
-the Great Harbor, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and
-get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could
-arrive, the palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders
-driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain
-them, and retake it, so that a general action now ensued, in the
-low ground between the cliff of Epipolæ, the harbor, and the river
-Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful:
-the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that
-their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the
-larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks
-of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the
-Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen
-body of three hundred hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the
-bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into disorder, so
-that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight,
-and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the
-fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the
-battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus,
-who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian
-hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardor carried
-him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch with very few
-followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here
-attacked and slain,[377] in single combat with a horseman named
-Kallikratês: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers
-came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead
-body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the
-Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned
-with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing: a
-victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.[378]
-
-  [377] Thucyd. vi, 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus
-  erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain,
-  _after_ the arrival of Gylippus (xiii, 8).
-
-  [378] Thucyd. vi, 102.
-
-Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian
-right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce
-it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled
-into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest; while
-their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from
-the northwestern gates of the city to attack the Athenian circle on
-the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this Circle lay completely apart and
-at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the
-garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise.
-Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding.
-They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front,
-and the Circle itself, probably stripped of part of its garrison to
-reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the
-presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it.
-He directed the attendants immediately to set fire to a quantity of
-wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army, in
-front of the circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther
-advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat.
-The same flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in
-the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief
-of their general; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just
-arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbor. This
-last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their
-whole attention to the defence of their city, so that both their
-combatants from the field and their detachment from the Circle were
-brought back within the walls.[379]
-
-  [379] Thucyd. vi, 102.
-
-Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the
-death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus
-in the field on that same day, it would have greatly brightened the
-prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther
-progress of the siege, from the want of an authorized commander.
-But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the
-day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans
-more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their
-discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet
-into the Great Harbor, wherein it was henceforward permanently
-established, in coöperation with the army in a station near the left
-bank of the Anapus.
-
-Both the army and the fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously
-with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of
-circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified
-point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ, and stretching
-across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbor. The distance
-between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an
-English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers,
-at suitable intervals, inclosing a space of considerable breadth,
-doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the
-help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence
-for the whole Athenian army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this
-process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope
-of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they
-did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put
-into condition to defy a second surprise.
-
-But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering
-the blockading wall towards the Harbor. It was now, for the first
-time, that they began to taste the real restraints and privations
-of a siege.[380] Down to this moment, their communication with the
-Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great
-Harbor, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the
-Athenian fleet, and the change of position of the Athenian army, had
-cut them off from both,[381] so that little or no fresh supplies
-of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from
-the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern
-cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of
-ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and
-fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems even now to have been left
-at Thapsus: so that nothing now remained open, except a portion,
-especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this
-outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless
-availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing
-in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such
-purposes than the plain near the Great Harbor and the Helôrine road:
-moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus,
-and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever
-Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately
-for himself and his army, he omitted this easy but capital
-precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be
-approaching.
-
-  [380] Thucyd. vi, 103. οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ
-  μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, etc.
-
-  [381] Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that the
-  Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the polichnê,
-  or hamlet, surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These
-  posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the
-  whole war (Thucyd. vii, 4, 37).
-
-In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed
-by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having
-established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of
-Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any
-counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing
-in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the
-blockading line, they soon desist from this and turn their attention
-to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans
-carried their two first counter-works. In attacking the second
-counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus,
-they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from
-Thapsus into the Great Harbor, with a view to its coöperation. After
-clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in
-order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet,
-that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbor,
-should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther
-reason, that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and
-channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons
-assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from
-the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to
-the last, and was found open, at least the greater part of it, by
-Gylippus.
-
-While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the
-prospects of the Athenians were better than ever, promising certain
-and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the
-neighboring cities all represented them as in the full tide of
-success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to
-tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived
-from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover, abundant supplies were furnished
-from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander
-since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and
-discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation, a necessity
-which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself.
-The ill-success of Hermokratês and his colleagues had caused them
-to be recently displaced from their functions as generals, to which
-Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias, were appointed. But this change
-did not give them confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the
-temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was
-melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender,
-perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias,
-nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.[382] Had
-the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress
-would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could
-have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the
-government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.[383]
-
-  [382] Thucyd. vi, 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω
-  ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.
-
-  [383] Thucyd. vii, 55.
-
-We must take particular note of these propositions in order to
-understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical
-interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence
-with a party in Syracuse;[384] who, though neither numerous nor
-powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more
-influential than ever they had been before. From them he received
-constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the
-point of surrendering, and could not possibly hold out. And as the
-tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such
-an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed
-into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of
-the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death
-of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from
-Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished,—a
-period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June
-414 B.C.,—the operations of the siege had been conducted with great
-vigor as well as unremitting perseverance, and the building-work,
-especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans
-with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this
-vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy.
-The wall across the low ground near the harbor might have been
-expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position
-generally was much stronger, the chance of opposition from the
-Syracusans was much lessened, and the fleet had been brought into the
-Great Harbor to coöperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded
-more slowly; Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it
-would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade
-with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if
-necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially, instead of
-employing so much time in completing this one portion that Gylippus
-arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after
-the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now
-seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective
-interruption from within, still less from without; so that they may
-take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate
-consummation comes a month sooner or later.
-
-  [384] Thucyd. vii, 49-86.
-
-Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias
-could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations,
-had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto,
-we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the
-future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which
-possibly could happen. But a great part of what passes for caution in
-his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament,
-aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal
-complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his
-arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two
-months of triumphant position before Syracuse, both these mistakes
-arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the
-pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly, he was
-always behindhand with events; but when necessity became terrible,
-so as to subdue the energies of other men, then did he come forward
-and display unwonted vigor, as we shall see in the following chapter.
-But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled
-by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the
-town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his
-own armament, Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable,
-and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not
-merely sanguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the extreme.
-Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his destroying
-enemy, Gylippus.[385]
-
-  [385] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.
-
-That officer—named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at
-the winter-meeting which Alkibiadês had addressed at Sparta—had
-employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the
-expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the
-representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not
-forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the
-most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in
-the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament
-not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily, against
-the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet now acting there, was a
-service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring
-and devotion. Moreover, every vessel from Sicily, between March
-and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on
-the part of Nikias and Lamachus, thus rendering the prospects of
-Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.
-
-At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat
-of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important
-consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great
-as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by
-report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger,
-that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that
-Syracuse was now invested on all sides.[386] Both Gylippus and the
-Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the fact,
-and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective
-aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained
-hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus
-thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little
-squadron of four sail, two Lacedæmonians and two Corinthians, and
-the Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron
-to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in
-Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He
-first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence
-he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled
-from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit
-by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding
-nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came
-opposite to the Terinæan gulf near the southeastern cape of Italy.
-Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his
-vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him out to sea, until at
-length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to
-find shelter again at Tarentum.[387] But such was the damage which
-his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they
-were hauled ashore and refitted.[388]
-
-  [386] Thucyd. vi, 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ
-  πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι, ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ
-  Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν
-  ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, etc. Compare
-  Plutarch, Nikias. c. 18.
-
-  It will be seen from Thucydidês, that Gylippus heard this news
-  while he was yet at Leukas.
-
-  [387] Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ
-  ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ
-  μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν
-  χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει.
-
-  Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν
-  ἑστηκὼς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἄνεμος, I cannot but
-  think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is
-  overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing
-  southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria
-  Ultra: “setting his ship towards the north or _standing to the
-  north_ (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out
-  to sea, from whence, after great difficulties, he again gets
-  into Tarentum.” If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this
-  position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay
-  his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ Βορέαν
-  ἑστηκὼς, as applied _to the wind_, I confess I do not understand;
-  nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point
-  of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it
-  always seems to mean the point _from whence_ the wind blows.
-  Now, that κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς means “a wind which blows steadily
-  from the north,” as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe
-  without better authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus
-  could never have laid his course for Tarentum, if there had been
-  a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have
-  forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go.
-  The mention of the _Terinæan_ gulf is certainly embarrassing.
-  If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the
-  explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can
-  be offered. Perhaps, indeed,—for though improbable, this is
-  not wholly impossible,—Thucydidês may himself have committed a
-  geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan gulf to be
-  on the east side of Calabria.
-
-  [388] Thucyd. vi, 104.
-
-So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther
-progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit as well
-as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with
-contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful
-Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character,
-Nikias sympathized with the flattering tenor of the message, and
-overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus
-as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of
-sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept
-the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships
-at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition
-to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learned, to his great
-satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded but
-that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior,
-entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having
-deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships
-into the harbor of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet,
-or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at
-the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island
-and relieve Syracuse by land, he resolved on the latter course,
-and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether
-unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and Messênê, he arrived
-safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force;
-though Nikias had, indeed, sent thither four Athenian triremes, after
-he had been apprized that Gylippus had reached Lokri, rather from
-excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this
-Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already
-passed the strait; and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness,
-landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.
-
-The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were
-it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate his
-misjudgment fully, and to be sensible that we are not making him
-responsible for results which could not have been foreseen, we have
-only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the
-exile Alkibiadês at Sparta: “Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he
-exhorted the Lacedæmonians); _but send at the same time, what will
-be yet more valuable than an army, a Spartan to take the supreme
-command_.” It was in fulfilment of this recommendation, the wisdom of
-which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And
-had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of
-his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta, and full assurance
-of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal
-ability, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged.
-Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his
-approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his
-reaching the island—disdains even this most easy precaution, and
-neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is
-the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies
-of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue rather
-than undervalue the imposing ascendency of the Spartan name.
-
-Gylippus, on arriving at Himera, as commander named by Sparta, and
-announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met
-with a hearty welcome. The Himeræans agreed to aid him with a body
-of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels.
-On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the
-interior, he received equally favorable assurances; so that he was
-enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force.
-The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened
-by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince
-Archonidês, a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain
-more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He
-was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse
-at the head of seven hundred hoplites from his own vessels, seamen
-and epibatæ taken together; one thousand hoplites and light troops,
-with one hundred horse, from Himera, some horse and light troops
-from Selinus and Gela, and one thousand Sikels.[389] With these
-forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryâlus and
-the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse, assaulting and capturing the
-Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other
-opposition.
-
-  [389] Thucyd. vii, 1.
-
-His arrival was all but too late, and might have been actually too
-late, had not the Corinthian admiral Goggylus got to Syracuse a
-little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under
-Erasinidês—having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, but as
-soon as it was ready—was now on its way to Syracuse. But Goggylus
-had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not
-depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest;
-probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favored
-by weather. He got safely into the harbor of Syracuse, escaping the
-Athenian guardships, whose watch doubtless partook of the general
-negligence of the besieging operations.[390]
-
-  [390] Thucyd. vii, 2-7.
-
-The arrival of Goggylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable
-moment, and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city.
-Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none
-more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard
-of any relief approaching, or of any active intervention in their
-favor, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement increasing from day to
-day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more
-frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was
-just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation.[391]
-It was at this critical juncture that Goggylus arrived, apparently
-a little before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to
-announce that both the Corinthian fleet and a Spartan commander were
-now actually on their voyage, and might be expected immediately,
-intelligence which filled the Syracusans with enthusiasm and with
-renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation,
-and resolved to hold out to the last.
-
-  [391] Thucyd. vi, 103; vii, 2; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.
-
-It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had
-reached Himera, which Goggylus at his arrival could not know, and
-was raising an army to march across for their relief. After the
-interval necessary for his preparations and for his march, probably
-not less than between a fortnight and three weeks, they learned that
-he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryâlus and Epipolæ. He
-was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryâlus; the
-same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring,
-when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ,
-the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and
-accompany him into the city.[392]
-
-  [392] Thucyd. vii, 2.
-
-Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so
-unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of
-Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering
-the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on
-the part of Nikias. After this instant, the besiegers pass from
-incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of
-prospective capture of the city, to a state of inferiority, not
-only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking, step by step,
-into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and
-his hands tied, not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a
-consummation. After having despised Gylippus, in his voyage along
-the coast of Italy, as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises
-him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was
-taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,[393] the fault was
-altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call
-voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well known to
-him beforehand. He must have learned from the four ships which he
-sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing
-through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been
-well aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse
-by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel
-tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on
-at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that
-place without either troops or arms; that he had to obtain forces not
-merely from Himera, but also from Selinus and Gela, as well as to
-sound the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly; lastly, that he had
-to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory, it
-is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight or three weeks
-between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther,
-Nikias must have learned, through his intelligence in the interior of
-Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan
-opinion through the arrival of Goggylus, even before the landing of
-Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprized, from that moment, that
-he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility
-within the town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. Lastly,
-that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march
-he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated,[394] and could
-then approach Syracuse only by one road, over the high ground of
-Euryâlus in the Athenian rear, through passes few in number, easy to
-defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through
-which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias
-leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single
-new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a
-broad and free plain.
-
-  [393] Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ~αἰφνιδίως~ τοῦ τε Γυλίππου
-  καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, etc.
-
-  [394] Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, 32.
-  The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than
-  they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to
-  raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior
-  to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and
-  nearly destroyed in its march.
-
-If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness with which Nikias
-disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown
-approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed, what are
-we to say of that unaccountable blindness which led him to neglect
-the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to
-omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his
-future fate turned? Homer would have designated such neglect as a
-temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Atê: the
-historian has no such explanatory name to give, and can only note it
-as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at hand.
-
-At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus
-allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of
-circumvallation, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great
-Harbor, eight stadia long, was all but completed: a few yards only of
-the end close to the harbor were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to
-interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew,
-what Nikias, unhappily, never felt and never lived to learn, the
-immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression
-and full tide of confidence which his arrival had just infused into
-the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them,
-when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched
-up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck
-dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and
-awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds
-of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five
-days’ armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects
-and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply
-to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much _he_
-felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the
-Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly
-trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open
-ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he
-might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow
-him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.[395]
-This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field.
-It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse, a tacit
-admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end
-than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them.
-So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time
-forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians
-remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after
-the arrival of Demosthenês.
-
-  [395] Thucyd. vii, 3.
-
-After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that
-night on the Temenite cliff, seemingly within the added fortified
-inclosure of Syracuse, Gylippus brought them out again the next
-morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian lines, as if
-about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus
-engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which
-was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely
-successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword;
-while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during
-the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was
-watching their harbor. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by
-immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from
-the outer city wall in a northwesterly direction aslant up the slope
-of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian
-circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render
-blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones
-laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time
-alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall, between
-the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, which was now
-just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on
-the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker
-than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the
-Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This
-part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of
-it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.[396]
-
-  [396] Thucyd. vii, 4.
-
-These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended as
-diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the
-completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt
-vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the
-Syracusans in the field, unless he chose to relinquish all hope of
-ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And, indeed, he seems actually
-to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed
-certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether
-new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of
-policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium,—the rocky promontory
-which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbor,
-immediately south of the point of Ortygia,—and to make it a secure
-main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto
-stationed in close neighborhood of the land-force, in a fortified
-position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the
-southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. From such a station
-in the interior of the harbor, it was difficult for the Athenian
-triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them, of watching the two
-ports of Syracuse—one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia
-to the mainland—so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or
-ingress of ships from without, and of insuring the unobstructed
-admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these
-purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and
-Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most
-part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically
-acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the
-side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the
-blockade had become impossible.[397]
-
-  [397] Thucyd. vii, 4.
-
-Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were
-erected on the seaboard of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station
-for triremes as well as for ships of burden. Though the situation
-was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also
-serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water,
-such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island
-of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the
-crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to
-surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at
-the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in
-this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion,
-which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship’s crew.
-As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves and
-the numerous foreigners who served in their navy became disposed to
-steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been
-scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many
-months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity
-of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be
-called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found
-lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection in which it
-had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbor of Peiræus.
-
-The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing
-the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of
-his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest
-decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his
-Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines;
-but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he
-took advantage of what he thought a favorable opportunity to make
-the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various
-walls—the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front
-or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now
-in course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters
-had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having
-to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back
-with loss, the Corinthian Goggylus being among the slain.[398] On
-the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this
-defeat upon himself. It was all owing to his mistake, he publicly
-confessed, in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither
-cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another
-opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their
-inbred superiority, as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these
-Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly,
-after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle;
-taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity
-of the walls and fortifications.
-
-  [398] Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.
-
-On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but marched
-out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged
-by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and
-more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the
-Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the
-Athenian line of circumvallation, so that it was essential for Nikias
-to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther
-hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of
-altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope,
-without one struggle more. Both armies were therefore ranged in
-battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope
-of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of
-his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the
-action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right
-charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigor, that they
-completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough
-defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the
-course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed
-so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian
-blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern
-cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not
-only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong
-enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.[399]
-
-  [399] Thucyd. vii, 5, 6.
-
-Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the
-Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes,
-under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavored to intercept.
-He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the
-new-comers had had the good luck to avoid them.
-
-Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a
-work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus
-took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high
-ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from
-the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratês had not
-thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of
-at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a
-new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three
-fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear
-of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in
-case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this
-advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join
-the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall,
-already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation,
-became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred
-all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to
-the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The
-Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence;
-a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort
-upon the high ground of Epipolæ, at the other extremity, upon the
-city wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended, along
-its whole length, by the permanent detachments occupying the three
-several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of
-these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second, by
-Sicilian Greeks; a third, by other allies. Such was the improved
-and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus
-first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present
-moment:[400] a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated
-when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian
-armament under Demosthenês.
-
-  [400] Thucyd. vii, 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ
-  Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἦρχε
-  δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ~ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς
-  Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους~.
-
-  These words of Thucydidês are very obscure, and have been
-  explained by different commentators in different ways. The
-  explanation which I here give does not, so far as I know,
-  coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the
-  most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir
-  of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thucyd. vol. iii, p.
-  273), and the notes of Poppo and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so
-  little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself
-  to him that he thinks some words must have dropped out.
-
-Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of
-danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to
-infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had
-brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in
-the harbor, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of
-qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own
-element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various
-cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements,
-naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on
-his part would probably demand aid from Athens, envoys, Syracusan
-as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge
-the necessity of forwarding additional troops, even in merchant
-vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.[401] Should
-no reinforcements reach the Athenian camp, the Syracusans well knew
-that its efficiency must diminish by every month’s delay, while their
-own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with
-their increased prospects of success.
-
-  [401] Thucyd. vii, 7.
-
-If this double conviction was present to sustain, the ardor of the
-Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp,
-now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement
-except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw
-that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional
-force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful
-to resist, besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He
-became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin.
-As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully
-was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his
-position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and
-that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês
-would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such
-foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was
-afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at
-home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position
-without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an
-undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either
-reinforcements or instructions to return.
-
-It was now, indeed, the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could
-not even hope for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements,
-if such were to be sent, until the ensuing spring was far advanced.
-Nevertheless, he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to
-vigilant precautions for safety during the interval, precautions
-which, as the result will show, were within a hair’s breadth of
-proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to
-make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his
-position, he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting
-to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in
-courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress
-the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.[402] Accordingly he
-sent home a despatch, which seems to have reached Athens about the
-end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the
-secretary of the city. Preserved by Thucydidês verbatim, it stands as
-one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserves
-a literal translation.
-
-  [402] Thucyd. vii, 8.
-
-“Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you,
-Athenians, in many other despatches;[403] but the present crisis is
-such as to require your deliberation more than ever, when you shall
-have heard the situation in which we stand. After we had overcome in
-many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had
-built the fortified lines which we now occupy, there came upon us
-the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly
-Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second,
-we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to
-retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of our enemies
-has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive;
-indeed, we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we
-possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for
-the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a
-single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation,
-so that we can no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we
-have force enough to attack and storm their counter-wall. And things
-have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others,
-are ourselves rather the party besieged, by land at least, since the
-cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy
-have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while
-Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities, trying to
-stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from
-the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their
-determination, as I understand, not merely to assail our lines on
-shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their
-ships.
-
-  [403] Thucyd. vii, 9. ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. The word
-  _despatches_, which I use to translate ἐπιστολαῖς, is not
-  inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus
-  retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for ἐπιστολαῖς,
-  though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, _written_
-  communications.
-
-  The words of Thucydidês (vii, 8) _may_ certainly be construed
-  to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a
-  written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands
-  them, though not without hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol.
-  iii, p. 418). At the same time, I think them reconcilable with
-  the supposition that Nikias may previously have sent written
-  despatches, though much shorter than the present, leaving details
-  and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them.
-
-  Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall
-  understands: “Nicias had used the precaution of frequently
-  sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every
-  transaction.” (Ch. xviii, sect v, vol. iv, p. 100.)
-
-  Certainly, the statement of Thucydidês does not imply this.
-
-“Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become
-aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first
-in high condition, with dry ships[404] and excellent crews; but
-now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the
-crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore
-to refit, since the enemy’s fleet, equal or superior in numbers,
-always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant
-practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover,
-they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they
-are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who
-are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than
-prodigious superiority of number could insure the like facility. And
-were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer
-be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty
-close under their walls.
-
-  [404] It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned
-  wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the
-  proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. v, 7, 4).
-
-“Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various
-causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going
-to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by
-the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that
-our superiority is gone, and that we have come to equal chances with
-our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service,
-make off straight to some of the neighboring cities; and those who
-came, tempted by high pay, under the idea of enriching themselves
-by traffic rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in
-full competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go
-over to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst
-the wide area of Sicily.[405] Nay, there are even some, who, while
-trafficking here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to
-accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict
-discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew
-ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of
-seamen, who set the ship in motion, and maintain the uniformity of
-the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.
-
-  [405] Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες,
-  εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ
-  πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι,
-  ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναύτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἄλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων
-  ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ~ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται~, οἱ
-  δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται· πολλὴ δ’ ἡ Σικελία.
-
-  All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this
-  phrase ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think
-  that any of them are successful. There are even some who
-  despair of success so much, as to wish to change αὐτομολίας by
-  conjecture; see the citations in Poppo’s long note.
-
-  But surely the literal sense of the words is here both
-  defensible and instructive: “Some of them depart under pretence
-  (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy.” All the
-  commentators reject this meaning, because they say, it is absurd
-  to talk of a man’s announcing beforehand that he intends to
-  desert to the enemy, and giving _that_ as an excuse for quitting
-  the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the meaning of the word
-  προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man said _before_ he
-  quitted the Athenian camp, he would of course say nothing of
-  his intention to any one, but the color which he would put upon
-  his conduct _after he got within_ the Syracusan lines. He would
-  present himself to them as a deserter to their cause; he would
-  profess anxiety to take part in the defence; he would pretend
-  to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion; for it is to
-  be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men
-  belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over
-  to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves
-  by making profession of such dispositions, even though they
-  did not really feel any such; for their real reason was, that
-  the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and
-  dangerous; and the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to
-  pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.
-
-  Nikias distinguishes these men from others, “who got away, as
-  they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily.”
-  These latter also would of course keep their intention of
-  departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian
-  town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any
-  feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they
-  would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape
-  from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.
-
-  It appears to me that the words ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει will bear
-  this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of
-  Nikias.
-
-  Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian
-  envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon
-  their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned
-  with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ
-  Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία (Thucyd. i, 121). The statement
-  of Nikias proves that this remark was to a great extent well
-  founded.
-
-“Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as
-general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of
-your tempers to govern, nor can I provide supplementary recruits
-elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him.
-We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with
-us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxus and
-Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And
-if our enemy gain but one farther point,—if the Italian cities,
-from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under
-the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement
-arriving from you,—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war
-to triumphant close, even without a battle.
-
-“Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you;
-but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge
-of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations.
-Moreover, I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth
-without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that
-you never listen willingly to any but the most favorable assurances,
-yet are angry in the end if they turn to unfavorable results. Be
-thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you
-originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done
-themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against
-us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus,
-you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have
-not even strength to contend against our present difficulties. You
-must either send for us home, or you must send us a second army,
-land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here,
-together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a
-successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease
-in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at
-your hands, for while my health lasted I did you much good service
-in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the
-first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succors which
-the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here, and those
-which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be longer
-in arriving, yet, if you do not keep watch, will either elude or
-forestall you as they have already once done.”[406]
-
-  [406] Thucyd. vii, 11-15.
-
-Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias, which was read to the
-public assembly of Athens about the end of November, or beginning of
-December, 414 B.C., brought by officers who strengthened its effect
-by their own oral communications, and answered all such inquiries as
-were put to them.[407] We have much reason to regret that Thucydidês
-does not give us any idea of the debate which so gloomy a revelation
-called forth. He tells us merely the result: the Athenians resolved
-to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias;
-not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it
-by a second powerful armament, both of land and naval force, in
-prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal
-request, and insisted on continuing him in command; passing a vote,
-however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the
-army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to
-assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily,
-about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse,
-carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with
-assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to
-equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenês and Eurymedon,
-to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring.
-Demosthenês was directed to employ himself actively in getting this
-larger force ready.[408]
-
-  [407] Thucyd. vii, 10.
-
-  [408] Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading,
-  between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents.
-
-  I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that
-  the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger
-  sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to
-  deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon
-  took out with him one hundred and forty talents: his authority,
-  indeed, does not count for much, but it counts for something,
-  in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability
-  (Diodor. xiii, 8).
-
-  On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as
-  twenty talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the
-  armament.
-
-This letter of Nikias—so authentic, so full of matter, and so
-characteristic of the manners of the time—suggests several serious
-reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people.
-As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of
-condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in
-Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament,
-and treating the fact as notorious that even the best naval force
-could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time,
-what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months
-which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily,
-before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the
-arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made
-the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something
-bordering on ruin, the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he
-had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself
-taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the
-answer must be, that, so far from anticipating the arrival of new
-enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad
-by his delay, and that he had taken no precautions at all against
-them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal.
-The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but
-too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of
-this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that
-unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his
-difficulties. For it would be injustice to this unfortunate army
-not to recognize that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged
-inaction, because their general directed it, and next did their duty
-most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of
-Lamachus.
-
-If even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin complained
-of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own remissness and
-oversight, much more must this conviction have been felt by
-intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, as we shall
-see by the conduct of Demosthenês[409] hereafter to be related.
-Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias himself
-alludes, as having been transmitted home, from their commencement. We
-must recollect that the expedition was originally sent from Athens
-with hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness
-of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate
-triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose
-nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned,
-indeed, by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation
-that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be
-sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise.
-Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must
-have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition was complied
-with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of
-414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as
-proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as
-being on the point of coming to a triumphant close, in spite of a
-Spartan adventurer, named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian
-sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without
-any intermediate step to smooth the transition, comes a despatch
-announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the
-head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon
-the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is
-followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate
-communication above translated.
-
-  [409] Thucyd. vii, 42.
-
-When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly,
-but as falling in series with its antecedents, the natural effect
-which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians,
-would be a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias.
-Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing
-less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed
-by historians of Greece to the Athenian people, that they are
-represented as fickle, ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit;
-as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had
-once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent
-generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing
-better than demagogic excitements, we naturally expect that the
-blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due
-measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what
-is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after
-the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of
-blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been
-individual speakers who criticized him as he deserved. To suppose the
-contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly.
-But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even
-pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively
-refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it
-in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which
-they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain
-for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy
-opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.
-
-It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these
-remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The
-misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias, on more than one
-previous occasion, but especially on this, betrays an incapacity of
-appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness
-to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one
-of the least creditable manifestations of their political history.
-But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects
-of the Athenian character were very different from what historians
-commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them
-tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes
-once embarked upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually
-rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought
-to have rendered, but has not: instead of angry captiousness, we
-discover an indulgence not merely generous, but even culpable, in
-the midst of disappointment and humiliation: instead of a public
-assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative
-orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any
-unsuccessful general, however meritorious; we see that even grave
-and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in
-opposition to preëstablished personal esteem; and personal esteem
-for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the
-opposite of a demagogue: an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and
-position; who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere
-obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence in his private
-bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital
-blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have
-been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was _his_ hold upon his
-countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those
-causes which attracted confidence to Nikias; his great family and
-position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility
-against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition,
-his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his
-decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage
-of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen
-whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of
-Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than
-the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the
-dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent
-construction put upon all his shortcomings, and spread a fatal
-varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible
-command.
-
-The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all
-history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest
-causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy, and as
-a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to
-impute to the person called a demagogue. Happy would it have been
-for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue
-of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy
-resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias
-in the command! The case was one in which the accusatory eloquence
-of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past
-mismanagement of Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in
-his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or
-routine, to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much
-more he would do if continued.[410] Unluckily for Athens, she had
-now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this
-truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive
-resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.
-
-  [410] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had
-  been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before
-  the despatch of Nikias reached them: but that they had been
-  prevented by certain men who were envious (φθόνῳ) of the glory
-  and good fortune of Nikias.
-
-  No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case
-  than this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch
-  himself.
-
-What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it
-was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist
-in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad
-misjudgment; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly
-less than insanity. The first expedition, though even _that_ was
-rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes
-which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of
-impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that
-time a confusion,—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini
-and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the
-siege of Syracuse,—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate
-of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances
-of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had
-been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were
-seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and
-Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed
-the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian
-hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While
-perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances
-so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions
-at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in
-employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the
-addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenês was
-not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian
-people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them
-the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches
-against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite
-quality; from what may be called obtuseness, or inability to get
-clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their
-minds; ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.
-
-A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy escape from past
-associations and impressibility to actual circumstances—would have
-been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would
-then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening
-around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not
-yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even
-in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favorably
-to the recommendation of Alkibiadês[411] that they should establish
-a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed
-brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace
-between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still
-subsisted in name, and they hesitated to break it openly, partly
-because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at
-the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this fault
-their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.[412] Athens on her side
-had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian
-territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos.
-But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer,
-probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared
-certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian
-territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence,
-under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on
-the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiæ and committed devastations:
-which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding
-excursions of the garrison of Pylos, and to the refusal of pacific
-redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had
-been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they
-might with a safe conscience recommence the war.[413]
-
-  [411] Thucyd. vi, 93.
-
-  [412] Thucyd. vii, 18.
-
-  [413] Thucyd. vi, 105; vii, 18.
-
-Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of
-Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from
-Syracuse; envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and
-the Syracusans on the other; each urgently calling for farther
-support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their
-claims at Sparta; nor was Alkibiadês again wanting, to renew his
-instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of
-this impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that
-the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a
-second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigor. If there
-were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians,
-it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent
-resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity
-for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more
-vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force.
-Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally
-decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta.
-It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be
-immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to
-Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the
-post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately
-transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially
-requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the
-construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.[414]
-
-  [414] Thucyd. vii, 18.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LX.
-
-FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA,
-DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.
-
-
-The Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself,
-but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece.
-Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military
-preparations, as the winter of 414-413 B.C., the months immediately
-preceding that which Thucydidês terms the nineteenth spring of the
-Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of
-the Dekeleian war.[415] While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes
-to Syracuse, even in midwinter, Demosthenês exerted himself all the
-winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty
-other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to
-the station of Naupaktus, to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements
-from sailing out of the Corinthian gulf. Against these latter, the
-Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to
-serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.[416]
-In Corinth, Sikyôn, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of
-hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse, at the same time
-that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia.
-Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up
-all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year’s struggle.
-
-  [415] Diodor. xiii, 8.
-
-  [416] Thucyd. vii, 17.
-
-From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring,
-embarked a force of six hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites—Helots and
-Neodamodes—under the Spartan Ekkritus, and three hundred Bœotian
-hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian
-Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê
-in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast
-to Sicily. At the same time a body of seven hundred hoplites under
-Alexarchus, partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly
-Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbors,[417]
-departed from the northwest of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the
-Corinthian gulf for Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them
-until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.
-
-  [417] Thucyd. vii, 19-58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες.
-
-These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all
-was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force
-of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis son of
-Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the
-hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The
-plain in the neighborhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after
-which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting
-a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned
-among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means
-of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a
-garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving
-each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself.
-Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range
-called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens, near the
-termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view
-of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which
-it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls
-of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for
-excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while the
-road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed
-through the gorge immediately under it.[418]
-
-  [418] Thucyd. vii, 19-28, with Dr. Arnold’s note.
-
-We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet
-greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going
-on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its
-pressure with redoubled force upon Athens, at that very moment,[419]
-the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under
-Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great
-armament which they had resolved upon under Demosthenês, to push
-offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter
-general consisted of sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes; of
-twelve hundred Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the
-citizen muster-roll; with a considerable number of hoplites besides,
-from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged
-on hire fifteen hundred peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called
-Dii; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês
-set sail without them.[420] Chariklês having gone forward to take
-aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina,
-inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established
-a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage desertion
-among the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned with the Argeians,
-while Demosthenês conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to
-Korkyra.[421] On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying
-hoplites to Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore: from thence he
-proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some
-additional hoplites, and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters
-and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon
-with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the
-winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now
-returning to act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.[422] The
-news brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging.
-Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes
-from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not
-strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which
-watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution,
-Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from
-the Korkyræans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites,
-while Demosthenês was getting together the Akarnanian darters and
-slingers.[423]
-
-  [419] Thucyd. vii, 20. ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, etc.
-  Compare Isokratês, Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 102, p. 236, Bekk.
-
-  [420] Thucyd. vii, 20-27.
-
-  [421] Thucyd. vii, 26.
-
-  [422] Thucyd. vii, 31. Ὄντι δ’ αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περὶ ταῦτα
-  (Anaktorium) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος ~τὰ χρήματα
-  ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμφθη~, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, etc.
-
-  The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that
-  Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter, to carry the sum
-  of one hundred and twenty talents to Nikias, and was now on his
-  return (see Thucyd. vii, 11). Nor is it without some astonishment
-  that I read in Mr. Mitford: “At Anactorium, Demosthenês found
-  Eurymedon _collecting provisions_ for Sicily,” etc. Mr. Mitford
-  then says in a note (quoting the Scholiast, Ἤτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφὴν
-  χρήσιμα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.): “This is not
-  the only occasion on which Thucydidês uses the term χρήματα for
-  _necessaries in general_. Smith has translated accordingly:
-  but the Latin has _pecuniam_, which does not express the sense
-  intended here,” (ch. xviii, sect. vi, vol. iv, p. 118.)
-
-  There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right.
-  The definite article makes the point quite certain, even if it
-  were true (which I doubt) that Thucydidês sometimes uses the word
-  χρήματα to mean “necessaries in general.” I doubt still more
-  whether he ever uses ἄγων in the sense of “collecting.”
-
-  [423] Thucyd. vii, 31.
-
-Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition
-of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, but had also learned,
-during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of
-the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the
-spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when
-Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements
-from the interior, and with redoubled ardor for decisive operations
-against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first
-care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans
-with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the
-acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task
-of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendency of
-the two leaders: “The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen)
-have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once
-landsmen like you, and more than you, they were only forced on
-shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold
-men like them, is to show a front bolder still. _They_ have often by
-their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves,
-and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with
-them. Go right at them before they expect it; and you will gain more
-by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by
-their superior science.” Such lessons, addressed to men already in
-the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack
-was resolved.[424]
-
-  [424] Thucyd. vii, 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt
-  upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention of
-  that which the sequel proved to be the most important of all, the
-  confined space of the harbor, which rendered Athenian ships and
-  tactics unavailing.
-
-The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island
-of Ortygia. The lesser port—as it was called afterwards, the Portus
-Lakkius—lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low
-ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the
-opposite side of the isthmus of Ortygia within the Great Harbor. Both
-of them, it appears, were protected against attack from without,
-by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But
-the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal
-docks of the Syracusans were situated within it; the Syracusan
-fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The
-entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium,
-immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.
-
-Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the
-Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the
-naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force
-secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the
-Anapus, to the neighborhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first
-dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same
-signal, from both the ports; forty-five triremes out of the lesser
-port, thirty-five out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the
-southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at
-Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused,
-hastened to man sixty ships; with twenty-five of which, they met the
-thirty-five Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbor, while
-with the other thirty-five they encountered the forty-five from the
-lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbor. In
-the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors;
-in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their
-way into the mouth of the Great Harbor, and joined their comrades.
-But being little accustomed to naval warfare, they presently fell
-into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected
-success: so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock,
-attacked them anew and completely defeated them; sinking or disabling
-eleven ships, of three of which the crews were made prisoners, the
-rest being mostly slain.[425] Three Athenian triremes were destroyed
-also.
-
-  [425] Thucyd. vii, 23; Diod. xiii, 9; Plut. Nikias, c. 20.
-
-But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than
-counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the
-first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were
-in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both
-ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water’s edge to
-watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly
-guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the
-land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked
-the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise,
-and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest
-and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought
-safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden
-at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbor to the land-camp
-of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort,
-which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes,
-which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that
-the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its
-superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the
-crossing of the Great Harbor.
-
-This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors
-than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain,
-and many made prisoners, in the assault, but there were vast stores
-of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort;
-partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the
-trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as
-in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty
-triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been
-dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be
-pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.[426]
-
-  [426] Thucyd. vii, 23, 24.
-
-Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when
-their situation could ill bear it, the collateral damage and peril
-growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious,
-besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread among the
-army. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbor on
-both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a
-convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment, the Athenian
-fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of
-its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the
-innermost portion of the Great Harbor, between the city-wall and the
-river Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full
-communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian
-position both by sea and by land.
-
-To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent
-battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable
-acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself, which
-had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first
-to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own
-disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical
-superiority; while their position was so much improved by having
-acquired the command of the mouth of the harbor, that they began even
-to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve
-triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some
-merchant vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So
-little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to
-have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed
-by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the
-Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri, on their
-return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made
-their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough to
-escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie
-in wait for them near Megara, with the loss of one ship, however,
-including her crew.[427]
-
-  [427] Thucyd. vii, 25.
-
-One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with
-envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favorable news of the
-capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible,
-the operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements
-might be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went
-from Syracuse—not merely Syracusans, but also Corinthians and
-Lacedæmonians—to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They
-made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs
-arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant
-character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for
-farther aid to Syracuse without delay, since there were now the best
-hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbor completely,
-before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach
-them.[428]
-
-  [428] Thucyd. vii, 25.
-
-While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbor was
-the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive
-single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval
-station was in the northwest interior corner of that harbor,
-adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was
-inclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the
-bottom and standing out of the water.[429] The Syracusans on their
-side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of
-Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks
-within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched
-for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile
-weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place,
-in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage.
-They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the
-Syracusan dockyard, and burning the ships within. They brought up
-a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences,
-against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force
-the entrance, either by means of divers, who sawed them through at
-the bottom, or by boat-crews, who fastened ropes round them and thus
-unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the
-great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged
-showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the
-ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to
-interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many
-of the posts planted, even the most dangerous among them, those which
-did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a
-ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since
-the Syracusans were able to plant others in their room. On the
-whole, no serious damage was done, either to the dockyard or to the
-ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbor stood
-substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were
-absent on their Sicilian tour, probably three weeks or a month.[430]
-
-  [429] Thucyd. vii, 38.
-
-  [430] Thucyd. vii, 25.
-
-These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received.
-The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias
-with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought
-it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily,
-except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course
-except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause.
-From Kamarina came five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters,
-and three hundred bowmen; from Gela, five triremes, four hundred
-darters, and two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an additional force
-from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body
-across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys
-themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias,
-who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition
-of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of
-Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi,
-allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching
-enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and
-dispersed them with the loss of eight hundred men. All the envoys
-were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining
-force, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.[431]
-
-  [431] Thucyd. vii, 32, 33.
-
-This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when
-Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra, on the way to
-Syracuse—so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that
-Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he
-intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.[432]
-The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of
-the Athenian army.
-
-  [432] Thucyd. vii, 33.
-
-It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Rhegium within two or
-three days’ sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on
-without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been made for
-it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the
-naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth
-had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical
-manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended.
-The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for
-rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction:
-its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end,
-but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very
-strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact
-and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among
-the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against
-an enemy’s vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to
-pass by it, then, by the excellence and exactness of their rowing,
-turned swiftly round, altered their direction and came back before
-the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him, or
-backed their ship stern foremost, until the opportunity was found
-for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his,
-against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oarblades
-without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none
-such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room, which
-rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that
-could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a
-harbor of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies,
-and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of
-those enemies: so that they could not pull round from want of space,
-nor could they back water, because they durst not come near shore.
-In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by
-straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process which not
-only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the
-build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under
-the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the
-construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the
-case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon
-as good nautical manœuvring.[433] Instead of the long, thin, hollow,
-and sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above
-the water-level, and therefore doing less damage, they shortened
-the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid, and lowered the
-elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much
-calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the
-opposing part of the enemy’s ship, not far above the water. What
-were called the epôtids, “ear-caps,” or nozzles, projecting forwards
-to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick, and
-sustained by under-beams let in to the hull of the ship. In the Attic
-build, the beak stood forward very prominent, and the epôtids on
-each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are
-called catheads, in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended:
-but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less, and the epôtids
-more, so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having
-one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three
-nozzles.[434] The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space,
-for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to
-nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker
-vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered
-unmanageable.
-
-  [433] Thucyd. vii, 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν
-  δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρωρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ’ ἂν αὐτοὶ
-  χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν, etc.
-
-  Diodor. xiii, 10.
-
-  [434] Compare Thucyd. vii, 34-30; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph.
-  Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on
-  the passages of Thucydidês.
-
-  It appears as if the ἀντηρίδες or sustaining beams were something
-  new, now provided for the first time, in order to strengthen the
-  epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy.
-  The words which Thucydidês employs to describe the position of
-  these ἀντηρίδες, are to me very obscure, nor do I think that any
-  of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily.
-
-  It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the
-  level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water, which
-  Thucydidês does not mention.
-
-  A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being
-  deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii, p. 535). Lysander reserved
-  the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to
-  grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8).
-
-Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was marched
-out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while
-the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the
-other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to
-defend their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they
-saw the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, sailing out from
-its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first
-confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard,
-and went out of their palisaded station, seventy-five triremes in
-number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off, however, in
-desultory and indecisive skirmish, with trifling advantage to the
-Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried
-to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to
-force on a close and general action.[435]
-
-  [435] Thucyd. vii, 37, 38.
-
-It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action,
-at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into
-the harbor, by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês
-was now at hand, prudence counselled this reserve. Nikias himself,
-too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have
-been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and
-Euthydemus, who were anxious to show what they could do without
-Demosthenês, and took their stand upon Athenian maritime honor, which
-peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.[436]
-
-  [436] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii, 10) represents the
-  battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention
-  of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of
-  opinion among the commanders.
-
-Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias
-foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged
-by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every
-trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained, and even
-took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring
-merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade,
-about two hundred feet apart. The prows of these vessels were
-provided with dolphins, or beams lifted up on high and armed at
-the end with massive heads of iron, which could be so let fall as
-to crush any ship entering:[437] any Athenian trireme which might
-be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening
-where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing out
-again. Before night these arrangements were completed, and at the
-earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the same
-demonstrations both of land force and naval force as before. The
-Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were
-spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length
-the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city again without bringing
-on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing this
-retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness
-to fight,[438] and supposing the day’s duty at an end, retired on
-their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to
-get their dinners at leisure, having tasted no food that day.
-
-  [437] Thucyd. vii, 41. αἱ κεραῖαι δελφινοφόροι: compare Pollux,
-  i, 85, and Fragment vi, of the comedy of the poet Pherekratês,
-  entitled Ἄγριοι; Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 258,
-  and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759.
-
-  [438] Thucyd. vii, 40. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς
-  ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, etc.
-
-But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the
-Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle
-order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the
-ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan
-admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities,
-that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought
-down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no
-time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a
-hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet,
-after a short but sufficient interval allowed for refreshment thus
-close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy’s station.
-Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again
-on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst
-of murmurs and disorder.[439] On sailing out of their station, the
-indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some
-time, until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient
-of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin
-of themselves, and make the action close as well as general.
-Accordingly, the word of command was given, and they rowed forward
-to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans.
-By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better
-enabled to insure a straightforward collision of prow against prow,
-excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the
-enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realize this plan,
-and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the
-Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity
-on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as
-soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive;
-while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the
-Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts
-in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length
-the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time,
-found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to
-give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed
-merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in
-the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing
-Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory,
-pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy
-implements on board, one of them being captured with all her crew.
-The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven
-Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously
-damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.[440]
-
-  [439] Thucyd. vii, 40.
-
-  [440] Thucyd. vii, 41.
-
-Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been
-no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now
-felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and
-contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their
-enemies in the harbor. The generals were already concerting measures
-for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more
-would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging
-armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage
-of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth
-of the harbor, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if
-they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations
-were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time
-revived, by the entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the second
-armament into the Great Harbor; which seems to have taken place on
-the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.[441] So
-important were the consequences which turned upon that postponement
-of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their
-reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think,
-at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to
-Athens, if Demosthenês had _not_ arrived in time; if the ruin of the
-first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the
-second!
-
-  [441] Thucyd. vii, 42.
-
-Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra,
-had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Chœrades on the
-coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of one hundred and
-fifty Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native
-prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on
-farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there
-reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which
-addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially
-welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendency,
-having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed
-a sentence of banishment against their opponents.[442] They not only
-took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same
-enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of seven hundred
-hoplites and three hundred darters to accompany Demosthenês, who
-remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify
-the completeness of each division. After having held this review on
-the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through
-the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which divided
-it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the
-access to their territory: upon which he marched down the river to
-the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward
-along the coast of Italy, touching at the various towns, all except
-the hostile Lokri.[443]
-
-  [442] Thucyd. vii, 33-57.
-
-  [443] Thucyd. vii, 35.
-
-His entry into the harbor of Syracuse,[444] accomplished in the most
-ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments,
-was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force than critical
-in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary
-forces, together, he conducted seventy-three triremes, five
-thousand hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every
-description,—archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites
-for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not
-inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans
-lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were
-struck with dismay as well as wonder.[445] That Athens could be rash
-enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of
-Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia
-was in course of being fortified, was a fact out of all reasonable
-probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And
-probably the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his
-way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.
-
-  [444] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21.
-
-  [445] Thucyd. vii, 42.
-
-On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered
-Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They
-saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; and they
-displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines
-forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not
-venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the
-movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.
-
-But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power,
-so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs,
-and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the
-army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and
-disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible
-degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the
-low ground where they were encamped.[446]
-
-  [446] Thucyd. vii, 47-50.
-
-He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended
-fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general belief that
-theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position
-of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies
-within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with
-the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias,
-in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the
-first terror-striking impression of his splendid armament. All these
-considerations determined Demosthenês to act, without a moment’s
-delay and while the impression produced by his arrival was yet
-unimpaired, and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might,
-if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this
-should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return
-home with his armament forthwith.[447]
-
-  [447] Thucyd. vii, 42.
-
-By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost
-portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that slope from east
-to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position,
-stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; beginning at
-the city wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a
-northwesterly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort
-on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryalus
-down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans, as defenders, were on the
-north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians on the south
-side. It was a complete bar to his progress, nor could he stir a step
-without making himself master of it: towards which end there were
-only two possible means,—either to storm it in front, or to turn it
-from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryalus.
-He began by trying the first method; but the wall was abundantly
-manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt
-or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely
-repulsed.[448] There then remained only the second method, to turn
-the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryalus
-behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated.
-
-  [448] Thucyd. vii, 43.
-
-But the march necessary for this purpose, first, up the valley of
-the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending
-to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult,
-that even Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able
-to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the
-attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for
-which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly
-made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took
-the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being
-left to command within the lines),[449] conducting hoplites and light
-troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters
-necessary for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders
-that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.
-
-  [449] Thucyd. vii, 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês took
-  with him ten thousand hoplites, and ten thousand light troops,
-  numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii, 11).
-
-  Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to
-  the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydidês notices nothing of the kind,
-  and the assertion seems improbable.
-
-Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary
-arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without
-any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night,
-he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left
-bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable
-distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at
-the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself
-in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a
-year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior
-of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get
-to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being
-discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed
-it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance.
-Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part
-escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of
-Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind
-the long continuous wall,[450] on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well
-as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under
-Hermokratês,[451] who formed a night-watch, or bivouac. This regiment
-hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard
-charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the
-fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus and the Syracusan
-troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first
-carried back by the same retreating movement.
-
-  [450] Thucyd. vii, 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenês) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα
-  τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους,
-  ἁπλοῦν τε ὂν, καί εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως,
-  καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ
-  γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα) ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ.
-
-  vii, 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας
-  καὶ ἀναβάντας, etc.
-
-  Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of
-  Thucydidês (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold’s
-  Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan
-  counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his
-  circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down
-  exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of
-  the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxvi, pp. 432-434).
-
-  This appears to me unauthorized and incorrect. What conceivable
-  motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy
-  so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope
-  of Epipolæ, to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern
-  cliff, Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care
-  that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could
-  he ever have got near to the παρατείχισμα. The moment when the
-  Athenians did at last abandon their fortifications on the slope
-  of Epipolæ (τὰ ἀνω τείχη) is specially marked by Thucydidês
-  afterwards, vii, 60: it was at the last moment of desperation,
-  when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle
-  in the Great Harbor. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this
-  passage, in my judgment, evading the direct sense of it.
-
-  The words of Thucydidês, vii, 42—εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε
-  Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου—are
-  more correctly conceived by M. Firmin Didot, in the note to
-  his translation, than by Arnold and Göller. The στρατόπεδον
-  here indicated does _not_ mean the Athenian circle, and their
-  partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of
-  Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they
-  had partially occupied at first while building the fort of
-  Labdalum, and of which they had been substantially masters until
-  the arrival of Gylippus who had now converted it into a camp or
-  στρατόπεδον of the Syracusans.
-
-  [451] Diodor. xiii, 11.
-
-So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond
-all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort
-of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their
-counter-wall which rested upon that fort; the counter-wall was no
-longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan
-side of it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the
-fort, made no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even
-began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the
-counter-wall, an operation of extreme importance, since it would
-have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side
-of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines
-on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was
-already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his
-actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could
-have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity
-of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible
-for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day
-broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we
-cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success
-to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory,
-and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a
-firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit—as it
-constantly happened with Grecian hoplites—disturbed the regularity
-of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the
-shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and
-marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action.
-The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them
-completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van
-were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind,
-still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed
-in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in
-their rear.
-
-In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor
-and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience,
-nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon
-rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being
-sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians,
-thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for
-enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and
-pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost
-Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only
-distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This
-test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the
-watchword of the other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom
-the confusion was the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans,
-who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the
-pæan or war-shout on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the
-Athenian army—from Argos, Korkyra, and other places—raised a pæan not
-distinguishable from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout
-struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they
-had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic
-presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by
-the same roads which they had ascended; but these roads were found
-too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their
-arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of
-them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into
-the plain below, many—especially the new-comers belonging to the
-armament of Demosthenês—lost their way through ignorance, and were
-cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of
-numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter
-within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than
-that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who
-leaped the cliff.[452]
-
-  [452] Thucyd. vii, 44, 45.
-
-The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road
-to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the
-Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this
-unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored
-to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the
-arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again
-indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying
-the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to
-obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with
-this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with
-fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be
-wavering, and in a political crisis.[453]
-
-  [453] Thucyd. vii, 46. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) states that
-  the number of slain was two thousand. Diodorus gives it at two
-  thousand five hundred (xiii, 11). Thucydidês does not state it at
-  all.
-
-  These two authors probably both copied from some common
-  authority, not Thucydidês; perhaps Philistus.
-
-During this absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to
-mourn the recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their
-untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement
-and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily
-thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but
-dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only
-made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which
-he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to
-strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against
-him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted
-on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith.
-The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been
-the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as
-yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was
-idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry
-on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue,
-especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against
-the garrison of Dekeleia.[454]
-
-  [454] Thucyd. vi, 47.
-
-This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was
-peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their
-present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though
-he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to
-be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in
-the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to
-the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and
-secrecy,[455] as such a resolution ought to be. But farthermore, he
-(Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would
-never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority
-from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never
-tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at
-home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons
-who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by
-hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches
-of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving, though
-now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would
-alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and
-would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to
-bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too
-well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger
-of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful.
-Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.[456] It
-must be recollected too, he added, that if _their_ affairs were now
-bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a
-year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost,
-in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying
-posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents, besides
-heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in
-this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at
-once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of
-the war—to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning
-home—could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther
-pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias)
-therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the
-siege;[457] the more so, as their fleet had now become unquestionably
-the superior.
-
-  [455] Thucyd. vii, 48. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ
-  σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ
-  ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ’ ~ἐμφανῶς~ σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους ~μετὰ πολλῶν~ τὴν
-  ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι· λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν,
-  ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧττον.
-
-  It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs
-  were present at this deliberation, as we find in another case
-  afterwards, c. 60. Possibly, Demosthenês might even desire that
-  they _should_ be present, as witnesses respecting the feeling of
-  the army; and also as supporters, if the matter came afterwards
-  to be debated in the public assembly at Athens. It is to this
-  fact that the words ἐμφανῶς μετὰ πολλῶν seem to allude.
-
-  [456] Thucyd. vii, 48. Οὐκοῦν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε, ἐπιστάμενος
-  τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχρᾷ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων
-  ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο
-  παθεῖν, ~ἰδίᾳ~.
-
-  The situation of the last word ἰδίᾳ in this sentence is
-  perplexing, because it can hardly be construed except either with
-  ἀπολέσθαι or with αὐτός γε: for Nikias could not run any risk of
-  perishing _separately_ by the hands of the enemy, unless we are
-  to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to his
-  character. Compare Plutarch Nikias, c. 22.
-
-  [457] Thucyd. vii, 48. τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους, etc.
-
-Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language
-against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan
-of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted,
-at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment’s
-delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against
-abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home,
-they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great
-Harbor to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could
-prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a
-wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above
-all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval
-tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned
-them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events
-to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, such was
-the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.[458]
-
-  [458] Thucyd. vii, 49. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ ~προσκαθῆσθαι
-  οὐδ’ ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο~—τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, ~οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη
-  ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν~, ἀλλ’ ~ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη καὶ μὴ
-  μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι~. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν.
-
-But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position
-to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted
-on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and
-Euthydemus[459]—colleagues named by the assembly at home, before
-the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the
-influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side.
-Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced
-Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent
-importance.
-
-  [459] Thucyd. vii, 69; Diodor. xiii, 12.
-
-It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the
-harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot
-have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus
-returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army,
-hope of success appears to have vanished, while anxiety for return
-had become general. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were
-doubtless well known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never
-came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of
-this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin,
-instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.
-
-So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons
-gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even
-Thucydidês thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse with
-whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, seemingly apart
-from his colleagues, and who still urged him, by special messages,
-not to go away; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on
-longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring
-himself to act against them; and he therefore hung back from day to
-day, and refused to pronounce the decisive word.[460]
-
-  [460] Thucyd. vii, 48. ~Ἃ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ’
-  ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ’ ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ
-  ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.~
-
-  The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded
-  with Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii, 55. It
-  consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated
-  into the Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii, 18).
-
-  Polyænus (i, 43, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves
-  or villeins (οἰκέται) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege,
-  under a leader named Sosikratês, a revolt suppressed by the
-  stratagem of Hermokratês. That various attempts of this sort
-  took place at Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no
-  means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to understand how
-  the numerous predial slaves were kept in order during the great
-  pressure and danger, prior to the coming of Gylippus.
-
-Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as
-his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing that
-it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with
-himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him
-to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide
-of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional
-forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish
-as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it
-as real, to such an extent as to counterbalance all the pressing
-motives for departure, motives enforced by discerning colleagues as
-well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own
-observation by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate,
-it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which
-made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective
-calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was
-driven to act by imminent necessity.
-
-But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts
-for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with
-satisfaction of going back to their country and rescuing the force
-which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment
-and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which
-he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him.
-Avowedly, indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against
-the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground
-of bringing away the army without orders from home; adding some
-harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and
-the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may
-remark, that Demosthenês and Eurymedon, though as much responsible
-as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice;
-or, if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was
-here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little
-reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes
-of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence,
-over-esteem, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that
-he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact
-of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could
-not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had
-originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with
-the miserable sequel and ignominious close, even if the account had
-been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more
-or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and
-under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms and
-scrutiny of his fellow-citizens—even putting aside the chance of
-judicial trial—must have been insupportably humiliating. To Nikias,—a
-perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an incurable
-disease,—life at Athens had neither charm nor honor left. Hence, as
-much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order
-for departure; clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of
-fortune might yet turn up, and yielding to the idlest delusions from
-correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.[461]
-
-  [461] Thucyd. vii, 49. Ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὄκνος τις
-  καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ
-  Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται.
-
-  The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and
-  discriminating: “Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu
-  destitutæ spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit.”
-  (Justin, iv, 5.)
-
-Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,[462] Gylippus and
-Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been unsuccessful
-at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent
-into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with
-him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those
-Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early
-spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast
-of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength
-immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive both
-by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies
-marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined
-with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of
-departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês
-first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction
-with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength,
-and Demosthenês now again pressed the resolution for immediate
-departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan
-embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did
-he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition, though
-even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.[463]
-He however insisted, with good reason, that no formal or public
-vote should be taken on the occasion, but that the order should be
-circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready
-for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that
-the armament was on the point of coming away, with orders to forward
-no farther supplies.[464]
-
-  [462] This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd.
-  vii, 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of
-  Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.
-
-  [463] Thucyd. vii, 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ~ἔτι ὁμοίως
-  ἠναντιοῦτο~, etc. Diodor. xiii, 12. Ὁ Νικίας ἠναγκάσθη
-  συγχωρῆσαι, etc.
-
-  [464] Thucyd. vii, 60.
-
-This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready,
-much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard
-without awakening the suspicion of the enemy, the signal would have
-been hoisted on the ensuing morning, and within a few hours this
-fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbor, with
-comparatively small loss,[465] when the gods themselves—I speak
-in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp—interfered to
-forbid its departure. On the very night before, the 27th August, 413
-B.C., which was full moon, the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent,
-impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their
-present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine
-prohibition against departure until a certain time should have
-elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made
-known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues;
-but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was
-more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets,
-who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine
-days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.[466] And
-Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the interval
-indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or
-proposition on the subject.
-
-  [465] Diodor. xiii, 12. Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐνετίθεντο, etc.
-  Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.
-
-  [466] The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413
-  B.C., from twenty-seven minutes past nine to thirty-four minutes
-  past ten P.M. (Wurm, De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv, p. 184),
-  speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.
-
-  Thucydidês states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the
-  prophets, to tarry _thrice nine_ days (vii, 50). Diodorus says
-  _three_ days. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the
-  injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on _three_ days,
-  while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period
-  (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).
-
-  I follow the statement of Thucydidês: there is no reason to
-  believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the
-  prophets prescribed.
-
-  The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so
-  respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising
-  (Polyb. ix, 19).
-
-The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, was a
-sentence of death to the Athenian army, yet it went along with the
-general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês,
-though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule
-it, found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus,
-himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious
-meaning of events, it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong
-according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning
-escape, or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an
-eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was, he
-affirmed, an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians
-even more willing and forward in quitting the harbor. We are told,
-too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest
-prophet in his service, and that he was thus forced to have recourse
-to prophets of inferior ability.[467] His piety left no means
-untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory
-ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict
-arrived.[468]
-
-  [467] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii, 12; Thucyd. vii,
-  50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see
-  Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and
-  Philochorus in the Scholia.
-
-  Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of
-  the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of
-  Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31).
-
-  [468] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.
-
-The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the
-Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended, consequence
-of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however,
-that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign
-confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered,
-and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the
-proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians
-who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of
-calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that
-belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy
-army.
-
-What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious,
-put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to
-interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the
-Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only
-been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an
-unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans
-yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbor, and never to
-permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly,
-Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several
-days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of
-no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he
-brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former
-of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, seventy-six
-triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval
-station. The Athenian fleet, eighty-six triremes strong, sailed out
-to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place.
-The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre
-division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon,
-who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy’s left, forgot
-those narrow limits of the harbor which were at every turn the ruin
-of the Athenian mariner, neared the land too much, and was pinned
-up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of
-the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed:
-successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.
-
-Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of
-them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits;
-upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water’s edge,
-in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist
-the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march,
-however, was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops,
-on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against
-them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them
-away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan
-troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all
-things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater
-numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were
-victorious. Though they did not inflict much loss upon the enemy,
-yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven
-ashore, together with the crews, and carried them into the naval
-station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet
-would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete,
-and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This
-was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven
-ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian
-station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians were hauling
-in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to
-destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to
-be favorable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach,
-and to extinguish the flames.[469]
-
-  [469] Thucyd. vii, 52, 53; Diodor. xiii, 13.
-
-Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element,
-gained with inferior numbers, gained even over the fresh and yet
-formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenês. It told but
-too plainly on which side the superiority now lay, how well the
-Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties
-of their own harbor, how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in
-retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and
-unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their
-enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all
-their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of
-the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now
-became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear
-of no complaints against Nikias separately.[470] But repentance came
-too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their
-victory, sailed round the harbor in triumph as again their own,[471]
-and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They
-determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to
-Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.
-
-  [470] Thucyd. vii, 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν,
-  καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας
-  ὁ μετάμελος.
-
-  [471] Thucyd. vii, 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς
-  παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς, etc. This elate and visible manifestation of
-  feeling ought not to pass unnoticed, as an evidence of Grecian
-  character.
-
-Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest was
-now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was
-not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel
-and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It
-was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half
-of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to
-survive so terrific a loss as that of the entire double armament
-before Syracuse.[472] The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this
-great achievement would be theirs, that their city was the field,
-and their navy the chief instrument of victory: a lasting source of
-glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in
-those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the
-Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired,
-and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors
-who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus
-and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between
-Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants
-so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners.
-Greeks, continental and insular, Ionic, Doric, and Æolic, autonomous
-and dependent, volunteers and mercenaries, from Miletus and Chios in
-the east to Selinus in the west, were all here to be found; and not
-merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians,
-and Iapygians. If the Lacædemonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians were
-fighting on the side of Syracuse, the Argeians and Mantineians, not
-to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The
-jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as
-the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively
-antithesis by Thucydidês.[473] But amidst so vast an assembled
-number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre
-of combination, the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal
-aggrandizement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were
-about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the
-level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [472] Thucyd. vii, 56.
-
-  [473] Thucyd. vii, 57, 58.
-
-It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up
-the mouth of the Great Harbor, which was nearly one mile broad,
-with vessels of every description, triremes, traders, boats, etc.,
-anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together.[474] They at
-the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the
-desperate struggle which they knew to be coming. They then awaited
-the efforts of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with
-sadness and anxiety.
-
-  [474] Thucyd. vii, 59; Diodor. xiii, 14.
-
-Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to
-deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining,
-and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and
-desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was,
-whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make a
-fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbor. Such had been
-the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp
-leaned to the former scheme.[475] But the generals resolved upon
-first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give
-to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper
-portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and
-even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern
-cliff; confining themselves to a limited fortified space close to the
-shore, just adequate for their sick, their wounded, and their stores;
-in order to spare the necessity for a large garrison to defend them,
-and thus leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service.
-They then made ready every trireme in the station, which could be
-rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man
-to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country.
-The triremes were manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as
-well as bowmen and darters, the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the
-hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as
-quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain
-the enemy’s ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order
-that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all
-its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness
-of the Syracusan epôtids. The best consultation was held with the
-steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of every trireme, nor was
-any precaution omitted which the scanty means at hand allowed. In
-the well-known impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every
-man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.[476] But Nikias, as he
-mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but
-too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled
-them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime
-pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard, was extinct, or dimly
-and faintly burning.
-
-  [475] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.
-
-  [476] Thucyd. vii, 60.
-
-He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic
-and impressive. “Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than
-the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your
-country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any
-of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair
-like raw recruits after a first defeat; you, Athenians and allies,
-familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for
-the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the
-great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made
-effective provision against our two great disadvantages, the narrow
-circuit of the harbor, and the thickness of the enemy’s prows.[477]
-Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill
-and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced
-upon us by the enemy, a land-battle on shipboard.[478] It will be
-for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is
-no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on
-the deck, as soon as you have the enemy’s trireme in contact, keep
-him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and
-mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your
-courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion
-of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have
-more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you,
-as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable
-privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy
-of Athens. Though not really citizens, you have been reputed and
-treated as such; you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our
-habits, and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station,
-and the security, arising from our great empire.[479] Partaking as
-you do freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now betray it
-to these Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten.
-For such of you as _are_ Athenians, I again remind you that Athens
-has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those
-now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will
-find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to
-Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that
-you now going aboard here are the _all_ of Athens,—her hoplites, her
-ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.[480] Bear up
-then and conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last
-struggle, for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which
-will never return.”
-
-  [477] Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος
-  στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι, etc.
-
-  [478] Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε
-  πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μήτε
-  ἐκείνους ἐᾷν, ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται.
-
-  [479] Thucyd. vii, 63. Τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
-  τῷδε καὶ δέομαι, μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν ...
-  ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, ~οἱ
-  τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν~, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ
-  ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει, ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα,
-  καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔς
-  τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον,
-  μετείχετε, ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες,
-  δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, etc.
-
-  Dr. Arnold (together with Göller and Poppo), following the
-  Scholiast, explain these words as having particular reference
-  to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think
-  this correct. All persons in that service—who were freemen, but
-  yet not citizens of Athens—are here designated; partly metics,
-  doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent
-  allies,—the ξένοι ναυβάται alluded to by the Corinthians and by
-  Periklês at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i,
-  121-143) as the ὠνητὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία of Athens. Without
-  doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy
-  of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit
-  from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian
-  citizens when they really were not so.
-
-  [480] Thucyd. vii, 64. Ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι,
-  καὶ πέζοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις,
-  καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν....
-
-If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before by
-Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that
-the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his own
-previous policy as commander, so we are here carried back, when we
-find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined
-space of water which paralyzed the Athenian seamen, to his own
-obstinate improvidence in forbidding the egress of the fleet when
-insisted on by Demosthenês. His hearers probably were too much
-absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable
-mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching
-address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took
-their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the
-trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves
-about to enter and push off, the agony of Nikias was too great to be
-repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this
-last death-struggle, and the serious, but inevitable, shortcomings
-of the armament in its present condition, he still thought that he
-had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal
-personally to the trierarchs, all of them citizens of rank and wealth
-at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed
-himself to every man separately by his own name, his father’s name,
-and his tribe, adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives
-which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their
-own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious
-ancestors, imploring them not to dishonor or betray these precious
-titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country,
-with its full political freedom and its unconstrained license of
-individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names
-of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not
-for being suspected of trenching upon the common places of rhetoric:
-he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections,
-awaken the inbred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of
-the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture.
-He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in
-his anxiety that he ought to say more, and proceeded to marshal the
-land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore,
-where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as
-possible to the combatants on shipboard.[481]
-
-  [481] See the striking chapter of Thucyd. vii, 69. Even the tame
-  style of Diodorus (xiii, 15) becomes animated in describing this
-  scene.
-
-Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the
-burning words uttered, on the seaboard of the Syracusan station, as
-the leaders were mustering their men immediately before embarkation.
-They had been apprized of the grappling-irons now about to be
-employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by
-stretching hides along their bows, so that the “iron hand” might slip
-off without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within
-the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the
-fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on
-the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking
-down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.[482] He
-reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort
-of despair, seeking nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence
-in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their
-own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.[483]
-He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the
-invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with
-resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament,
-and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.[484]
-
-  [482] Thucyd. vii, 65.
-
-  [483] Thucyd. vii, 66, 67.
-
-  [484] Thucyd. vii, 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην ... ὀργῇ
-  προσμίξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς
-  ἐναντίους, οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν
-  ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι
-  ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενόν που) ἥδιστον εἶναι.
-
-  This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful
-  passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.
-
-The Syracusan fleet—seventy-six triremes strong, as in the last
-battle—was the first to put off from shore; Pythen with the
-Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A
-certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbor,
-in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed
-around the harbor in order to attack the Athenians from different
-sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover, the surface of the
-harbor swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of
-which embarked youthful volunteers, sons of the best families in
-the city;[485] boats of no mean service during the battle, saving
-or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as
-well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one
-sacred to Hêraklês at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the
-god would insure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on
-the defensive, and did not begin the attack.[486] Moreover, the
-entire shore round the harbor, except the Athenian station and its
-immediate neighborhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and
-spectators; while the walls of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the
-water, were lined with the feebler population of the city, the old
-men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came
-forth one hundred and ten triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and
-Euthydêmus, with the customary pæan, its tone probably partaking
-of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to
-the mouth of the harbor, beholding on all sides the armed enemies
-ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were
-imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for
-them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within
-their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than
-five English miles in circuit, one hundred and ninety-four ships
-of war, each manned with more than two hundred men, were about to
-join battle, in the presence of countless masses around, all with
-palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most
-picturesque battle—if we could abstract our minds from its terrible
-interest —probably in history, without smoke or other impediments
-to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily, a serious and
-magnified realization of those naumachiæ which the Roman emperors
-used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the
-recreation of the people.
-
-The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier
-where a narrow opening—perhaps closed by a movable chain—had been
-left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through
-the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting
-to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded
-in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became
-general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the
-harbor. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed,
-even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions.
-At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone
-conspicuous, well seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by
-their ready obedience to the voice of the keleustês. As the vessels
-neared, the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck, hurled clouds
-of missiles against the enemy; next, was heard the loud crash of the
-two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.[487]
-When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed
-to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites
-in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy’s deck.
-It was not always, however, that each trireme had its own single
-and special enemy: sometimes one ship had two or three enemies to
-contend with at once, sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and
-became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately
-continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the
-steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the keleustês was
-drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as
-well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured
-forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which
-appeared flinching from the contest; though factitious stimulus of
-this sort was indeed but little needed.
-
-  [485] Diodorus, xiii, 14. Plutarch has a similar statement,
-  in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have
-  confused one battle with the other, for his account can hardly be
-  made to harmonize with Thucydidês (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24).
-
-  It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had
-  probably read the description of the battles in the Great Harbor
-  of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we
-  had his account before us, even than Thucydidês; since he was
-  probably at this time in Syracuse and was perhaps actually
-  engaged.
-
-  [486] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of
-  Hêraklês as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan
-  victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god
-  was provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, Fragm. 104, ed.
-  Didot.
-
-  [487] The destructive impact of these metallic masses at the
-  head of the ships of war, as well as the periplus practised by
-  a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier,
-  is strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch’s Life of
-  Lucullus, where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and
-  Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. “Lucullus
-  was on board a Rhodian quinquerime, commanded by Damagoras, a
-  skilful Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching with a
-  ship much heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision:
-  upon which Damagoras evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and
-  struck the enemy in the stern.” ... δείσας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος
-  τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ ~τὴν τραχύτητα τοῦ χαλκώματος~, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε
-  συμπεσεῖν ἀντίπρωρος, ἀλλ’ ὀξέως ἐκ περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας
-  ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὤσασθαι· καὶ πιεσθείσης ἐνταῦθα τῆς νεώς
-  ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γενομένην, ἅτε δὴ τοῖς θαλαττεύουσι τῆς
-  νέως μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν.—Plutarch, Lucull. c. 3.
-
-Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time
-victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbor was a scene
-of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes
-Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so
-followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and
-the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed;
-according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated
-ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station above all,
-whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this
-emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the
-excitement even of the combatants themselves.[488] Those among them
-who looked towards a portion of the harbor where their friends seemed
-winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their
-neighbors who contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent
-to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group,
-with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed,
-were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in
-the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately
-predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided,
-the Athenians ashore were distracted by all these manifold varieties
-of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a
-long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favor of
-the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening,
-redoubled their shouts as well as their efforts, and pushed them all
-back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther
-resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked vessels in or near
-their own station; a few being even captured before they could arrive
-there. The diverse manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in
-the station itself were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of
-agony and despair. The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships
-and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of
-attack from land: many were even paralyzed at the sight, and absorbed
-with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls were
-doubtless still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy
-which burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around
-the harbor, in response to their own victorious comrades on shipboard.
-
-  [488] Thucyd. vii, 71.
-
-Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive
-combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression
-of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of
-Thucydidês. We find in his description of battles generally, and
-of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human
-emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks
-who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn
-from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long
-professional training, but citizens with all the passions, instincts,
-sympathies, joys, and sorrows of domestic as well as political
-life. Moreover, the non-military population in ancient times had an
-interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle;
-which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at
-least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong
-light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the
-tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this
-and other military descriptions of Thucydidês. When we read the few
-but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp
-under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only
-men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full
-of impressibility, sensitive and demonstrative Greeks; and, indeed,
-the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all
-manifestations of strong emotion was not considered in ancient times
-essential to the dignity of the human character.
-
-Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian has
-imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the
-causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the
-Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as one hundred
-and ten to seventy-six triremes, that they fought with courage not
-less heroic, and that the action was on their own element, we might
-have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle,
-with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe, 1. The number of
-one hundred and ten triremes was formed by including some hardly
-seaworthy.[489] 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to
-sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this
-reason unhandy with their missiles.[490] 3. Though the water had
-been hitherto the element favorable to Athens, yet her superiority
-in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to
-her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbor
-would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her
-even at great disadvantage,—without the means of twisting and turning
-her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the
-enemy,—compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of
-the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending,
-in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.[491]
-For the mere land-fight on shipboard, Athenians had not only no
-advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The
-Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole
-harbor lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from
-the force of encouraging sympathy, no mean auxiliary, but because
-any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian,
-found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at
-leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape.
-5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered
-great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding,
-though Thucydidês does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the
-Athenian and Syracusan characters, the pressure of necessity was less
-potent as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation,
-with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some
-other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these
-motives appears to be the other way.
-
-  [489] Thucyd. vii, 60. τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ ~καὶ
-  ἀπλοώτεραι~.
-
-  [490] Thucyd. vii, 60. πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες
-  πληρῶσαι—ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ~ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας
-  μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος~ εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus,
-  c. 67.
-
-  [491] The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic
-  contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is not
-  inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and seamen
-  when cramped up in this harbor (Idyll. xxii, 91):—
-
-    .................... ἐκ δ’ ἑτέρωθεν
-    Ἥρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεύκεα θαρσύνεσκον,
-    Δειδιότες μή πώς μιν ~ἐπιβρίσας δαμάσειεν,
-    Χώρῳ ἐνὶ στεινῷ~, Τιτύῳ ἐναλίγκιος ἀνήρ.
-
-  Compare Virgil’s picture of Entellus and Darês, Æneid, v, 430.
-
-About sixty Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet
-which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible
-conflict. The Syracusans on their part had suffered severely; only
-fifty triremes remaining out of seventy-six. The triumph with
-which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their
-trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds
-encircling the harbor, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its
-clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the
-neighboring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could
-increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralyzed the
-vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as
-well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred
-associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious
-Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a
-truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and
-imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded
-amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man for himself.
-
-Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals, to their
-honor be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat,
-Demosthenês proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning
-they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than
-the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbor.
-To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in
-getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of
-the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again
-on shipboard: they would hear of nothing but attempting to escape
-by land.[492] Preparations were therefore made for commencing their
-march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open,
-and, had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even
-yet have been saved.[493] But there occurred one more mistake, one
-farther postponement, which cut off the last hopes of this gallant
-and fated remnant.
-
-  [492] Thucyd. vii, 72.
-
-  [493] Diodor. xiii, 18.
-
-The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians
-would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat,
-because of the mischief which they might do if established in
-any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military
-authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal
-roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off.
-Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought
-it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy
-which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory,
-still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred
-to Hêraklês,—so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication,
-the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their
-recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the
-wounded,—that an order to arm and march out would have been as little
-listened to as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding
-Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next
-morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay
-the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when
-darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on
-horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to
-make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them
-as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse,
-who had sent to warn him, they affirmed, not to decamp during the
-night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the
-roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate
-preparation.[494]
-
-  [494] Thucyd. vii, 73; Diodor. xiii, 18.
-
-This fraud—the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two
-years before,[495] in order to tempt the Syracusans to march out
-against Katana—was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the
-information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenês
-been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so
-easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it
-was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being
-diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We
-have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally
-Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians
-at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his
-character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too
-happily with the temper of the army, now benumbed with depression and
-terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten
-Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on
-the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.[496]
-Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay
-the next day,—in order that the army might carry away with them as
-much of their baggage as possible,—sending forward a messenger to the
-Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and
-bring with them a supply of provisions.[497] Gylippus and Hermokratês
-had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and
-occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian
-march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the
-Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle,
-and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded,[498]
-seemingly even those within the station itself.
-
-  [495] Thucyd. vi, 64.
-
-  [496] Xenophon, Anab. iv, 5, 15, 19; v, 8, 15.
-
-  [497] Thucyd. vii, 77.
-
-  [498] Thucyd. vii, 74.
-
-It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias
-and Demosthenês put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The
-camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence
-of marsh fever; but since the recent battle the number of wounded
-men, and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more
-pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men—so prodigious was the total,
-including all ranks and functions—now set forth to quit it, on a
-march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth
-of the population of a large city starved out by blockade. Many
-had little or no provisions to carry, so low had the stock become
-reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own, even the
-horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left
-without slaves, by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be
-trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the
-number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A
-downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more
-intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from
-Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all
-the splendid dreams of conquest, set against the humiliation of the
-closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of
-two prodigious fleets.
-
-But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the
-full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then
-that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably
-spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied
-bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe which
-marked this hour passed endurance or description. The departing
-soldier sorrowed and shuddered with the sentiment of an unperformed
-duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far
-more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the
-living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony
-and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims
-of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled
-along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent
-dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears
-and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army
-could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in
-motion.
-
-After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of
-bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store, and the terrors
-of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past
-and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of
-order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing
-hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he
-had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest
-personal sufferers of all, from his incurable complaint, he was seen
-everywhere in the ranks marshalling the troops, heartening up their
-dejection, and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous,
-and more commanding than was his wont.
-
-“Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now:
-others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not
-too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present
-unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of you in
-strength,—nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by
-my disease,—and accustomed even to superior splendor and good fortune
-in private as well as public life, I too am plunged in the same peril
-with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my conduct has
-been constantly pious towards the gods as well as just and blameless
-towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is
-yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not
-appall me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.[499] Perhaps,
-indeed, they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have
-had their full swing of good fortune, and if, at the moment of our
-starting, we were under the jealous wrath of any of the gods, we
-have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people
-before us have invaded foreign lands, and after having done what was
-competent to human power, have suffered what was within the limit
-of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have
-the offended god dealing with us more mildly, for we are now objects
-fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.[500] Look, moreover,
-at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that
-guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that, wherever
-you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; nor is there
-any other city in Sicily that can either repulse your attack or
-expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your
-march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction, that
-whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country
-and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our
-provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike;
-and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who
-still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider
-yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprize them, and
-intreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect
-that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you, and
-that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if
-you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians
-will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as _are_
-Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen
-though it now be. _It is men that make a city; not walls, nor ships
-without men._”[501]
-
-  [499] Thucyd. vii, 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα
-  δεδιῄτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. ~Ἀνθ’
-  ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ
-  κατ’ ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι~. Τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς
-  τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν,
-  ἀρκούντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα.
-
-  I have translated the words οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν, and the sentence of
-  which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto
-  sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ’ ἀξίαν as
-  meaning “according to our desert,” understand the words αἱ
-  ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words
-  ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις some lines before; and likewise
-  construe οὐ, not with φοβοῦσι, but with κατ’ ἀξίαν, assigning to
-  φοβοῦσι an affirmative sense. They translate: “Quare, _quamvis
-  nostra fortuna, prorsus afflicta videatur_ (these words have
-  no parallel in the original) rerum tamen futurarum spes est
-  audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro merito accepimus, _nos_
-  jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt,” etc. M. Didot translates:
-  “Aussi j’ai un ferme espoir dans l’avenir, _malgré l’effroi_ que
-  des _malheurs non mérités_ nous causent.” Dr. Arnold passes the
-  sentence over without notice.
-
-  This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable
-  in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than
-  awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit
-  of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers
-  would hardly be much answered by repeating—what in fact had been
-  glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before—that “the
-  unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias or the soldiers.”
-  Then as to the words; the expressions ἀνθ’ ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and
-  δὲ, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the
-  sentence apply both of them to Nikias, but that the first half of
-  the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second.
-  Matthiæ (in my judgment, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) ὅμως
-  to some words which have preceded; I think that ὅμως contributes
-  to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the
-  sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the
-  sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the soldiers whom he
-  addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the
-  word _malgré_, for which there is nothing corresponding in the
-  Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.
-
-  I cannot but think that οὐ ought to be construed with φοβοῦσι,
-  and that the words κατ’ ἀξίαν do not bear the meaning assigned to
-  them by the translators. Ἀξίαν not only means, “_desert_, merit,
-  the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct,” as in
-  the previous phrase παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, but it also means, “price,
-  value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less
-  desire or aversion,” in which last sense it is predicated as
-  an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects
-  besides. Thus Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikom. iii, 11): ὁ γὰρ οὕτως
-  ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ~ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας~· ὁ δὲ σώφρων
-  οὐ τοιοῦτος, etc. Again, ibid. iii, 5. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὖ
-  ἕνεκα, ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
-  καὶ θαῤῥῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει
-  καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Again, ibid. iv, 2. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ
-  μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ
-  τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ τοῦ δαπανήματος.
-  Again, ibid. viii, 14. Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν·
-  λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~
-  τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. Compare also ib. viii, 13.
-
-  Xenophon, Cyrop. viii, 4, 32. τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν
-  μὴ ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεσθαι ὠφελοῦντα τοὺς φίλους,
-  ἀνελευθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιάπτειν. Compare Xenophon, Memorab.
-  ii, 5, 2. ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσὶν ~ἀξίαι~;
-  also ibid. i, 6, 11, and Isokratês, cont. Lochit. Or. xx, s. 8.
-
-  The words κατ’ ἀξίαν in Thucydidês appear to me to bear the
-  same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle,
-  “in proportion to their value,” or to their real magnitude. If
-  we so construe them, the words ἀνθ’ ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and δὲ, all
-  fall into their proper order: the whole sentence after ἀνθ’ ὧν
-  applies to Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had
-  asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for
-  encouraging his dispirited soldiers: “Look how _I_ bear up, who
-  have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I have behaved
-  well both towards gods and towards men: in return for which, I
-  am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the
-  present: as to the future, I have strong hopes; at the same time
-  that, as to the present, I am not overwhelmed by the present
-  misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity.”
-
-  This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so
-  terrible an occasion.
-
-  The particle δὴ has its appropriate meaning, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ
-  κατ’ ἀξίαν ~δὴ~ φοβοῦσι; “and the present distresses, though
-  they do appall me, do not appall me _assuredly_ in proportion
-  to their actual magnitude.” Lastly, the particle καὶ (in the
-  succeeding phrase, τάχα δ’ ἂν ~καὶ~ λωφήσειαν) does not fit on to
-  the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin
-  translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out, and translate: “At
-  fortasse cessabunt.” “Mais peut-être vont-ils cesser.” It ought
-  to be translated: “And perhaps they may _even_ abate,” which
-  implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is
-  here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward
-  and strengthened: see Kühner, Griech. Gramm. sects. 725-728. Such
-  would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed.
-
-  [500] Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ
-  εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα·
-  ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ’ ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια
-  δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ
-  ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἕξειν· οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν
-  ἢ φθόνου.
-
-  This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently
-  set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man
-  or any nation who was preëminently powerful, fortunate, or
-  prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and
-  promise with which his armament had started from Peiræus, now
-  believed that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods,
-  and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his
-  soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous
-  pinnacle of exaltation, whilst _they_ have exhausted the sad
-  effects of the divine jealousy.
-
-  Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratês in Herodotus (iii,
-  39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus
-  Æmilius by Plutarch (Vit. Paul. Æmil. c. 36).
-
-  [501] Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη, οὐδὲ νῆες
-  ἀνδρῶν κεναί.
-
-The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these
-strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the
-hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in
-the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by
-Demosthenês. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in
-the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank
-of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they
-found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage,
-however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a
-march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing
-of the enemy’s cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on
-an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and
-halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a
-plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses,
-and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some
-water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As
-their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans
-profited by this halt to get on before them, and to occupy in force
-a position on the road, called the Akræan cliff. Here the road,
-ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side
-by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across
-the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each
-side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the
-Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face
-of overwhelming attacks from the enemy’s cavalry and light troops.
-They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of
-the night before.[502]
-
-  [502] Thucyd. vii, 78.
-
-Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food
-was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main
-body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry.
-Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate
-effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting
-very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akræan
-cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with
-deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light
-troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous
-and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all
-their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the
-missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this
-repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and
-lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed
-as portents significant of their impending ruin.[503]
-
-  [503] Thucyd. vii, 79. ἀφ’ ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν, καὶ
-  ἐνόμιζον ~ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι~.
-
-This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last
-two years had wrought in the contending parties, and the degree to
-which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their
-efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first
-battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbor,
-some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had
-taken place: on that occasion the Athenian soldiers had continued
-the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging
-to the season, and such indifference on their part had still
-farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.[504] Now, both the
-self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides.
-
-  [504] Thucyd. vi, 70.
-
-Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short
-space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a
-detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, however,
-they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where
-they passed the night, and on the ensuing day attempted once more
-the hopeless march over the Akræan cliff. But they were not allowed
-even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were
-so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and
-rear, that, in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not
-accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by
-fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were
-compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain.
-
-As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp,
-Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route
-which they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff into the
-Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become
-impracticable, and that their unhappy troops would be still less in
-condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day
-preceding. Accordingly, they resolved to make off during the night,
-leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely
-to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast
-on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if
-they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south
-of Syracuse, on the southeastern coast of Sicily, or a river still
-farther on, called the Erineus,—they might march up the right bank
-of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly, they broke
-up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which, the
-front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and
-made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the
-southeastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse, and fell
-into the track of the Helôrine road, which they pursued until they
-arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan
-detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up
-the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through
-them. He marched straightforward to the Erineus, which he crossed
-on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the
-other side.[505]
-
-  [505] Thucyd. vii, 80-82.
-
-Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day
-unobstructed by the enemy; and he thought it wiser to push hid
-troops as fast as possible, in order to arrive at some place both
-of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the
-rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger half of
-the army, started both later and in great disorder. Unaccountable
-panics and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so
-that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them together, made
-little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by
-the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the
-Kakyparis,[506] and at a moment when the foremost division was
-nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.
-
-  [506] Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 280, copied by Göller,
-  ad vii, 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês reached
-  and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the
-  Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii, 80, 81,
-  do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of
-  Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally
-  during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it
-  was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the
-  most inconvenient: see c. 81—ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν,
-  etc. When Thucydidês, therefore, says, that “at daybreak _they_
-  arrived at the sea,” (ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν,
-  c. 80,) this cannot be true _both_ of Nikias and of Demosthenês.
-  If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have
-  come to the same point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must
-  have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the sea,
-  and considerably _more_ beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis:
-  moreover, we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his
-  colleague, that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as
-  possible with his own division.
-
-  It appears to me that the words ἀφικνοῦνται, etc. (c. 80), are
-  not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that
-  they refer back to the word αὐτοῖς, two or three lines behind:
-  “the _Athenians (taken generally)_ reached the sea,” no attention
-  being at that moment paid to the difference between the front
-  and the rear divisions. The _Athenians_ might be said, not
-  improperly, to reach the sea, at the time when the division of
-  Nikias reached it.
-
-When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off
-in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery
-in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however,
-were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit,
-until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began
-to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had been tardy
-before, and his division disorganized: but he was now compelled to
-turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently
-got before him and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous
-light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without
-intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking
-care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division
-were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if
-possible to get forward, they found themselves inclosed in a walled
-olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm
-bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzêlus,
-brother of the despot Gelon.[507] Entangled and huddled up in this
-inclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an
-enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile
-missiles from the walls on all sides.[508] Though unable to get at
-the enemy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair,
-they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day,
-without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded
-continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the
-unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition,
-Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all
-the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising
-them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet
-not many,—a fact much to their honor,—availed themselves of this
-offer and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation
-was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon
-terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged
-that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should
-be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by
-starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed
-away as prisoners to Syracuse, six thousand in number. It is a
-remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among
-these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they
-had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient
-to fill the concavities of four shields.[509] Disdaining either
-to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally,
-Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself with his own sword
-the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention
-was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner by the
-Syracusans.[510]
-
-  [507] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.
-
-  [508] Thucyd. vii, 81. Καὶ τότε γνοὺς (sc. Demosthenês) τοὺς
-  Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προὐχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο,
-  ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ
-  αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν· ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι
-  χωρίον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ~ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν~,
-  ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν.
-
-  I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν differently from Dr.
-  Arnold, from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly
-  understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered
-  by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words _might_
-  have that signification; but I think they also may have the
-  signification (compare ii, 76) which I have given in the text,
-  and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable
-  that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order
-  to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully
-  aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away.
-  If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the
-  word ἀνειληθέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which I do not
-  think that Dr. Arnold’s comment is satisfactory. The pressure of
-  the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those
-  in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would
-  naturally cause this crowd and _huddling_ inside. A road which
-  passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and
-  coming out at the other, might well be called ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε
-  καὶ ἔνθεν. Compare Dr. Arnold’s Remarks on the Map of Syracuse,
-  vol. iii, p. 281; as well as his note on vii, 81.
-
-  I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the
-  two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered
-  the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the
-  inclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented
-  any precautions from being taken, such as that of forbidding too
-  many troops from entering at once, etc.
-
-  [509] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii, 82.
-
-  [510] This statement depends upon the very good authority of
-  the contemporary Syracusan, Philistus: see Pausanias, i, 29, 9;
-  Philisti Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.
-
-On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook
-Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprized him of the
-capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He
-demanded leave to send a horseman for the purpose of verifying the
-statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition
-to Gylippus, that his army should be permitted to return home, on
-condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of
-the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made;
-one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were
-rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to
-the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly, the
-Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite
-of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It
-was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for
-the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans
-were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp,
-they raised the pæan, or war-shout; thus showing that they were on
-the lookout, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms
-which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of three hundred
-Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from
-the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These
-men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented
-them from escaping altogether.[511]
-
-  [511] Thucyd. vii, 83.
-
-During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed
-by Nikias was exemplary; his sick and feeble frame was made to bear
-up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of
-hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility.
-It was now the sixth day of the retreat,—six days[512] of constant
-privation, suffering, and endurance of attack,—yet Nikias early in
-the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river
-Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but
-is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty
-banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final
-escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished,
-in spite of renewed and incessant attacks all the way, from the
-Syracusan cavalry; who even got to the river before the Athenians,
-occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the
-resolution of the unhappy fugitives at length gave way; when they
-reached the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and
-their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging
-thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one
-compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at once, treading down
-and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many
-thus perished from being pushed down upon the points of the spears,
-or lost their footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and
-were thus borne down under water.[513] Meanwhile, the Syracusans
-from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while
-the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to
-close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent,
-nevertheless, was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other
-suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And even
-when dead and wounded were heaped in the river,—when the water was
-tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the mud trodden
-up,—still, the new-comers pushed their way in and swallowed it with
-voracity.[514]
-
-  [512] Plutarch (Nikias. c. 27) says _eight_ days, inaccurately.
-
-  [513] Thucyd. vii, 85. See Dr. Arnold’s note.
-
-  [514] Thucyd. vii, 84. ... ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους,
-  ~πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους~, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποτάμῳ
-  ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους.
-
-Wretched, helpless, and demoralized as the army now was, Nikias
-could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly surrendered
-himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that
-general and of the Lacedæmonians,[515] earnestly imploring that the
-slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. Accordingly,
-Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the
-rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before this
-order was understood; but of those who remained, almost all were
-made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of three
-hundred, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known
-whither to go, were captured, and brought in by troops sent forth
-for the purpose.[516] The triumph of the Syracusans was in every
-way complete, they hung the trees on the banks of the Asinarus with
-Athenian panoplies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in
-joyous procession to the city.
-
-  [515] Thucyd. vii, 85, 86; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot;
-  Pausanias, i. 29, 9.
-
-  [516] Thucyd. vii, 85; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.
-
-The number of prisoners thus made, is not positively specified by
-Thucydidês, as in the case of the division of Demosthenês, which
-had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls
-of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias,
-the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and
-fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for
-the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than one
-thousand.[517] The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these
-prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.
-
-  [517] Thucydidês states, roughly, and without pretending to
-  exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives
-  brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than
-  seven thousand—ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν
-  ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων (vii, 87). As the
-  number taken with Demosthenês was six thousand (vii, 82), this
-  leaves one thousand as having been obtained from the division of
-  Nikias.
-
-Not less than forty thousand persons in the aggregate had started
-from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of
-these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even
-when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and
-were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard
-fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops,
-with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was
-thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling,
-so that the six thousand taken with Demosthenês, and perhaps three
-thousand or four thousand captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy
-remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to
-learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to
-Katana, where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery
-under private masters, found a refuge.[518] These fugitive Athenians
-served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon
-Katana.[519]
-
-  [518] Thucyd. vii, 85. ~πολλοὶ~ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ
-  παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον.
-  The word παραυτίκα means, during the retreat.
-
-  [519] Lysias pro Polystrato. Orat. xx, sects. 26-28, c. 6, p. 686
-  R.
-
-It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again
-within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted
-forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who were
-carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have got home.
-They were placed for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in
-the stone-quarries of Syracuse,—of which there were several, partly
-on the southern descent of the outer city towards the Nekropolis,
-or from the higher level to the lower level of Achradina,—partly in
-the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under the southern cliff of
-Epipolæ. Into these quarries—deep hollows of confined space, with
-precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky—the miserable
-prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one upon another, without the
-smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence, they received
-each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread,—half the daily ration
-of a slave,—with no more than half a pint of water, so that they
-were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst.
-Moreover, the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the chill of
-the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and destructive; while the
-wants of life having all to be performed where they were, without
-relief, the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick
-and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily
-died; and happiest was he who died the first, leaving an unconscious
-corpse, which the Syracusans would not take the trouble to remove, to
-distress and infect the survivors. Under this condition and treatment
-they remained for seventy days; probably serving as a spectacle for
-the triumphant Syracusan population, with their wives and children,
-to come and look down upon, and to congratulate themselves on their
-own narrow escape from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not
-in degree. After that time the novelty of the spectacle had worn
-off, while the place must have become a den of abomination and a
-nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly,
-they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native
-Athenians and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All
-those so removed were sold for slaves;[520] while the dead bodies
-were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered
-somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners,
-we are not told; it may be presumed that those who could survive
-so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be
-allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may
-have obtained their release; as was the case, we are told, with
-several of those who had been sold to private masters, by the
-elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanor.
-The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular throughout all
-Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable
-portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even
-of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for
-themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during
-their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks
-of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to
-Athens.[521] I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I
-fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its
-pathos and interest.
-
-  [520] Thucyd. vii, 87. Diodorus (xiii, 20-32) gives two long
-  orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly,
-  in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old
-  citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is
-  made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is
-  introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.
-
-  From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole
-  account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.
-
-  One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the
-  prisoners received each two _chœnikes_ of barley-meal, instead of
-  two _kotylæ_; the chœnix being four times as much as the kotylê
-  (Diodor. xiii, 19).
-
-  [521] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii, 33. The reader will
-  see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they
-  took in Sicily, in Diodor. xiii, 111.
-
-Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the
-Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much
-difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply,
-without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated
-by Hermokratês.[522] But Gylippus, then in full ascendency and an
-object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a
-reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to
-Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honor in the
-eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenês, from his success at
-Pylos, was their hated enemy, Nikias had always shown himself their
-friend as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they
-owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had
-calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner
-to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.
-
-  [522] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii, 19.
-
-In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry
-this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him
-themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. They
-were afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him
-the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther
-injury, and they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those
-Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias
-during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of
-the way, being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political
-opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various
-influences prevailed, and Nikias as well as Demosthenês was ordered
-to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the
-discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratês vainly opposed the resolution,
-but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a
-private intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for
-them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own
-hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to
-the view of the Syracusan citizens;[523] while the day on which the
-final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be
-celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the Asinaria, on
-the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month Karneius.[524]
-
-  [523] Thucyd. vii, 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement
-  which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention
-  of Hermokratês, is not in any substantial contradiction with
-  Philistus and Thucydidês. The word κελευσθέντας seems decidedly
-  preferable to καταλευσθέντας, in the text of Plutarch.
-
-  [524] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the
-  month Karneius is “that which the Athenians call Metageitnion,”
-  yet it is not safe to affirm that the day of the slaughter of the
-  Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know
-  that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly
-  coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point, in his comment
-  on the valuable Inscriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No.
-  5640, part xxxii, sect 3, p. 640.
-
-  The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less
-  than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse, which
-  occurred on the 27th of August, that is, about Sept. 21. Mr.
-  Fynes Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress
-  too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat;
-  considering that that interval included two great battles, with a
-  certain delay before, between, and after.
-
-  The μετόπωρον noticed by Thucyd. vii, 79. suits with Sept. 21:
-  compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.
-
-Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two
-expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian
-history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full of
-promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history had
-ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected,
-been witnessed.[525] Its consequences were felt from one end of the
-Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters.
-
-  [525] Thucyd. vii, 87.
-
-The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been
-throughout lofty and unshaken; after his death it was exchanged
-for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague
-Demosthenês was engraved, on the funereal pillar erected to
-commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains
-by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as
-a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenês had
-disdained.[526]
-
-  [526] Pausan. i, 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.
-
-  Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill
-  himself, rather than submit to surrender, before the surrender of
-  Nikias; who, he says, did not choose to follow the example:—
-
-  “Demosthenês, amisso exercitu a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ
-  morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo,
-  ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore
-  captivitatis.” (Justin, iv, 5.)
-
-  Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an
-  excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so
-  good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those
-  facts.
-
-  It seems certain, even from Thucydidês, that Nikias, in
-  surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had
-  considerable chance of saving his life, Plutarch too so
-  interprets the proceeding, and condemns it as disgraceful, see
-  his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end. Demosthenês
-  could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his
-  attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of
-  Philistus, though Thucydidês does not notice it.
-
-The opinion of Thucydidês deserves special notice, in the face of
-this judgment of his countrymen. While he says not a word about
-Demosthenês, beyond the fact of his execution, he adds in reference
-to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. “Such, or
-nearly such, (he says,) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death;
-though _he_ assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved
-to come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact
-performance of established duties to the divinity.”[527]
-
-  [527] Thucyd. vii, 86. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων
-  αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς
-  τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, ~διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον
-  ἐπιτήδευσιν~.
-
-  So stood the text of Thucydidês, until various recent editors
-  changed the last words, on the authority of some MSS., to ~διὰ
-  τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν~.
-
-  Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt
-  the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former
-  is more suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more
-  conformable to truth about Nikias.
-
-  A man’s good or bad fortune, depending on the favorable or
-  unfavorable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood
-  to be determined more directly by his piety and religious
-  observances, rather than by his virtue, see passages in Isokratês
-  de Permutation. Orat. xv, sect. 301; Lysias, cont. Nikomach. c.
-  5, p. 854, though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain
-  extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias;
-  but his piety was an incontestable fact; and his “good fortune”
-  also, in times prior to the Sicilian expedition, was recognized
-  by men like Alkibiadês, who most probably had no very lofty
-  opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. vi, 17). The contrast between the
-  remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune
-  which marked the close of his life, was very likely to shock
-  Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the
-  historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the passage, πᾶσαν ἐς
-  ἀρετὴν, the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both less special and
-  more disproportionate, beyond what even Thucydidês (as far as we
-  can infer from other expressions, see v, 16) would be inclined to
-  bestow upon him—more, in fact, than he says in commendation even
-  of Periklês.
-
-If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his
-personal conduct in one scale against his personal suffering on the
-other, the remark of Thucydidês would be natural and intelligible.
-But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives
-of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests
-of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His
-private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with
-the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must
-stand or fall.
-
-Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of
-Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering
-could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in
-an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army
-and his country, it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall
-not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this
-view, and which have been set forth as they have occurred, in the
-preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias,
-and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last
-few days in Sicily, it is not the less incontestable, that, first,
-the failure of the enterprise, next, the destruction of the armament,
-is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes
-petty trifling, sometimes apathy and inaction, sometimes presumptuous
-neglect, sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious
-necessities, one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be
-found operative at every step, whereby this fated armament sinks down
-from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and
-individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed,
-not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own
-letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the
-expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with
-the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency
-brought such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments intrusted to
-his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon
-Athens herself, must appear on the tablets of history under the
-severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been
-loftier than those of Nikias.
-
-And yet our great historian, after devoting two immortal books to
-this expedition, after setting forth emphatically both the glory of
-its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius
-parallel to the Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês, when he comes to
-recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to
-spare for Demosthenês,—far the abler officer of the two, who perished
-by no fault of his own,—but reserves his flowers to strew on the
-grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—“What a pity! Such
-a respectable and religious man!”
-
-Thucydidês is here the more instructive, because he exactly
-represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards
-Nikias during his lifetime. They could not bear to condemn, to
-mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious
-a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to
-entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public
-shortcomings, but also insured to him credit for political and
-military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts.
-When we find Thucydidês, after narrating so much improvidence and
-mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on
-the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the
-main feature of his character, we can understand how the Athenian
-people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader,
-and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after
-glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history
-of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their
-confidence.
-
-In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are
-apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and
-demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light
-of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming,
-and decorating their rulers, whatever renders them more difficult
-to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices.
-Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause: clever
-criminative speakers often passed themselves off for something
-above their real worth; though useful and indispensable as a
-protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into
-measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause
-of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than
-history will fairly sanction, still, it is only one among others more
-mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic
-qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and so
-durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens,
-as the anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby
-manœuvre about the expedition against Sphakteria, and his improvident
-sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended
-by inflicting on his country that cruel wound which destroyed so
-many of her citizens as well as her maritime empire, was not a
-leather-seller of impudent and criminative eloquence, but a man of
-ancient family and hereditary wealth, munificent and affable, having
-credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but also for
-all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but
-did not commit,—free from all pecuniary corruption,—a brave man, and
-above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high
-in the favor of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem
-which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely
-personal and negative with eminent station, that they presumed the
-higher aptitudes of command,[528] and presumed them, unhappily,
-after proof that they did not exist,—after proof that what they
-had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No
-demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so
-deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias.
-Now it was against the overweening ascendency of such decorous and
-pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that
-the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural
-bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional
-opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure
-whereby blunders and shortcomings might be arrested in time. How
-insufficient was the check which it provided,—even at Athens, where
-every one denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess,—the
-history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.
-
-  [528] A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i,
-  49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias, much more than those
-  of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch
-  compares the latter:—
-
-  “Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium,
-  magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium,
-  et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut _quod segnitia fuit,
-  sapientia_ vocaretur. Dum vigebat ætas, militari laude apud
-  Germanias floruit: proconsul, Africam moderate; jam senior,
-  citeriorem Hispaniam, pari justitiâ continuit. _Major privato
-  visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi
-  imperasset._”
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXI.
-
-FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE
-OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.
-
-
-In the preceding chapter we followed to its melancholy close the
-united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbor and
-lastly in the neighborhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September,
-413 B.C.
-
-The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that
-narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned, chiefly
-for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished,
-partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before
-on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects
-of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than
-those within the island in which it occurred.
-
-I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês
-with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the
-hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself
-had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis
-ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying
-Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of
-completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of
-March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter
-its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished,
-and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states
-of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.
-
-And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated
-enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture
-of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the
-Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with full comprehension
-of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile
-Alkibiadês.[529] The earlier invasions of Attica had been all
-temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and
-leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the
-Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a
-hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience
-peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from
-the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. His
-excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure
-or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and
-cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable
-slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers;
-more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this way.
-So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and to
-employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost
-and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that
-island had previously come over land from Oropus, but as that road
-was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of
-necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous
-and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy’s
-privateers.[530] In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands
-on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond
-measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep
-watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising
-both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city
-relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were
-either on the battlements or at the various military stations in
-the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the
-condition of something like a military post.[531] Moreover, the rich
-citizens of the state, who served as horsemen, shared in the general
-hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at
-least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the
-garrison of Dekeleia, their efficiency was, however, soon impaired by
-the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.[532]
-
-  [529] Thucyd. i, 122-142; vi, 90.
-
-  [530] Thucyd. viii. 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the
-  Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or.
-  vii, De Oleâ Sacrâ, sects. 6, 7.
-
-  An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. (part ii,
-  No. 93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met
-  this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme
-  Æxôneis lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a
-  fixed rent of one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading
-  enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the deme is to
-  receive one half of the year’s produce, in place of the year’s
-  rent.
-
-  [531] Thucyd. vii, 28, 29.
-
-  [532] Thucyd. vii, 27.
-
-Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigencies
-pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the
-immense expense incurred in fitting out the two large armaments for
-Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury
-during the interval since the Peace of Nikias; so that the attacks
-from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the
-same time cutting up the means of paying, brought the finances of
-Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her
-revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had
-hitherto been assessed: instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she
-now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all
-imports and exports by sea.[533] How this new principle of assessment
-worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty and
-take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer
-must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to
-understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel,
-extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we
-come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her
-naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual
-year.[534]
-
-  [533] Thucyd. vii, 28.
-
-  [534] Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the
-  Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—
-
-  “Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves,
-  was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that
-  time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the
-  dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was
-  imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden
-  itself was comparatively a nothing.”
-
-  This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent
-  invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire
-  of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression
-  ruinous to the subject-allies.
-
-  I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this
-  was “the heaviest tax then known in the world;” and that “it
-  caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths.” The
-  latter assertion would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it
-  be true that the tax ever came into operation; but we are not
-  entitled to affirm it.
-
-  Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came
-  on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new
-  assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire.
-  And the fact that Thucydidês does not notice it as an additional
-  cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such
-  doubts.
-
-Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of
-Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against
-the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in
-number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with
-Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon
-as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command
-of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with
-instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might
-occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês,
-putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along
-the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near
-Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part
-of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian
-coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the
-neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen,
-lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell
-upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians,
-dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a
-considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less
-unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in
-some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even
-taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the
-barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest
-difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The
-scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to
-Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples
-plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst
-for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living
-thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle,
-etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been
-assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed
-by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of
-Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian
-communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of second-rate or
-third-rate magnitude.[535]
-
-  [535] Thucyd. vii, 29, 30, 31. I conceive that οὔσῃ ~οὐ~ μεγάλῃ
-  is the right reading, and not οὔσῃ μεγάλῃ, in reference to
-  Mykalêssus. The words ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει, in c. 31, refer to the size
-  of the city.
-
-  The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is evident
-  from the language of Thucydidês that the catastrophe at
-  Mykalêssus made a profound impression throughout Greece.
-
-The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived
-unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants.
-The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could
-carry away, when the bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them, both
-with cavalry and hoplites, after having put to death some greedy
-plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to
-relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore;
-not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a
-peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when
-they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it
-safe to approach very close, so that not less than two hundred and
-fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;[536] and the
-Athenian commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died
-shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.
-
-  [536] Thucyd. vii, 30; Pausanias. i, 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad
-  Aristophanis Fragment. Ἥρωες, vol. ii, p. 1069.
-
-Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of
-the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter.
-It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable
-victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year
-of the Peloponnesian war,[537] wherein the nautical superiority
-of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had
-been so transcendently manifested. In that respect matters had now
-considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since
-the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston,
-and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy
-Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and
-had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,[538] at
-Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with
-eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match
-for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year,
-Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that
-he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen
-triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a
-time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the
-Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume
-the offensive against him.[539]
-
-  [537] See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196 of this History.
-
-  [538] See the preceding chapter.
-
-  [539] Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. 88,
-  89.
-
-Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some
-fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes
-thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of
-the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite
-Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes.
-They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of
-the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting
-promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a
-friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both
-flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to
-sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it.
-Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus,
-it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither
-party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was
-destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and
-feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick
-epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After
-considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on
-their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the
-manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some
-time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three
-Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of
-all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian
-side, not one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven
-were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger
-bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got
-back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they
-maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to
-renew the fight: moreover, both the wind and the current set towards
-the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies
-came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself
-entitled to erect a trophy, but the real feeling of victory lay on
-the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The
-reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties
-to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been
-the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it.[540]
-
-  [540] Thucyd. vii, 34.
-
-This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out,
-a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about
-the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians
-most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account
-of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent
-him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at
-home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture
-of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. Their
-disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to
-receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches
-announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon
-Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse
-could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt
-whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would
-not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding,
-when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it.
-They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their
-resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid
-farther supplies of provisions, but this was the last practicable
-opportunity; for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and
-the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbor. The mere absence
-of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in
-Sicily were proceeding badly; but the closing series of calamities,
-down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge
-indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from
-Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual
-soldiers of their own armament who escaped.
-
-According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at
-Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a
-barber’s shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which
-must of course be uppermost in every one’s mind.
-
-The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful
-tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well
-as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being
-forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to
-produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger
-had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of
-uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity,
-and even put to the torture.[541] How much of this improbable tale
-may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that
-neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the
-earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês
-in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came
-individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the
-defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too
-fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring
-themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives,
-how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments,
-without even a feeble remnant left to console them.[542]
-
-  [541] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much
-  confidence, Ἀθηναίους δέ ~φασι~, etc.
-
-  [542] Thucyd. viii, 1.
-
-As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced
-upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest
-affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private
-mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread
-nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the public
-safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but
-Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty,
-her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of her hoplites
-as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their
-like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged;
-while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant
-confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession
-of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months—October,
-November, 413 B.C.—the Athenians expected nothing less than a
-vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and
-Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies, an
-attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.[543]
-
-  [543] Thucyd. viii, 1. Πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει, etc.
-
-Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them
-on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure
-on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous
-expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had
-promised them the divine blessing upon it.[544] After this first
-burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to look
-their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers
-would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them
-how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years
-before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers
-not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of
-despair revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as
-speedily as they could, both ships and money,—to keep watch over
-their allies, especially Eubœa,—and to defend themselves to the last.
-A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named
-to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies,
-and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to
-require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part
-adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in
-an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm of
-the moment which silenced all criticism.[545] Among other economies,
-the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric and
-liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison
-which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same
-time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and
-fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport
-ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.[546]
-
-  [544] Thucyd. viii, 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν
-  τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ~ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ
-  ψηφισάμενοι~, etc.
-
-  From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydidês considered
-  the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their
-  votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining
-  of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the
-  step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any
-  important measure always makes himself morally responsible for
-  its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly
-  incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns
-  out to present results totally contrary to those which he had
-  predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the
-  mover of a proposition not merely _moral_, but even _legal_,
-  responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other
-  circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.
-
-  It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers
-  of this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the
-  armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not
-  enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in
-  the execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the
-  Oration of Lysias—περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ (Or. xviii,
-  sect. 2)—attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias upon the
-  advisers of the expedition, a manifest injustice.
-
-  Demosthenês (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic
-  and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully
-  accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser;
-  responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the
-  premonitory signs of coming events, and giving his countrymen
-  warning beforehand: ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθέσθαι
-  καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. This is the just view of the subject;
-  and, applying the measure proposed by Demosthenês, the Athenians
-  had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.
-
-  [545] Thucyd. viii, 1. πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, ὅπερ
-  φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν; compare Xenoph. Mem.
-  iii, 5, 5.
-
-  [546] Thucyd. viii, 1-4. About the functions of this Board of
-  Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in
-  Thucydidês: τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ
-  ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων
-  ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσι. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα
-  περιδεὲς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν.
-
-  Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “That is, no measure was to be
-  submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by
-  this council of elders.” And such is the general view of the
-  commentators.
-
-  No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in
-  the word Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons
-  so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we
-  cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will
-  the passages in Aristotle’s Politics, wherein the word Πρόβουλοι
-  occurs, authorize any inference with respect to this Board in the
-  special case of Athens (Aristotel. Politic. iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8;
-  vi, 5, 10-13).
-
-  The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens,
-  being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar
-  pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling,
-  there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles
-  in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It
-  was rather of importance to _encourage_ the suggestion of new
-  measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined
-  merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous
-  instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.
-
-  The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred,
-  like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not
-  reconstituted after their deposition.
-
-  I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the
-  functions of this Board of Probûli now constituted, from the
-  proceedings of the Probûlus in Aristophanis Lysistrata, as is
-  done by Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i, 2, p. 198),
-  and by Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp.
-  17-21, Berlin 1842).
-
-  Schömann (Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor. v, xii, p. 181) says of these
-  Πρόβουλοι: “Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse.” I do
-  not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether
-  he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members
-  were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from
-  it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four
-  Hundred, which would be about a year and a half after its first
-  institution.
-
-While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her
-misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and
-aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction
-of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of
-Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities
-of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of
-Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity;
-it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral
-states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against
-Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing
-stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies,
-subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was
-sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier
-than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed
-to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for
-operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these
-allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort
-would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded.
-A fleet of one hundred triremes was directed to be prepared against
-the spring; fifty of these being imposed in equal proportion on
-the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth;
-fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; ten on the Arcadians, with
-Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê.
-It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built
-and launched during the interval between September and March.[547]
-The same large hopes, which had worked upon men’s minds at the
-beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the
-Peloponnesians;[548] the rather as that powerful force from Sicily,
-which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be
-anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.[549]
-
-  [547] Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς
-  πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν ~τῆς ναυπηγίας~ ἐποιοῦντο, etc.; compare also
-  c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν ~ναυπηγίαν~, etc.
-
-  [548] Thucyd. viii, 5. ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν
-  κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7.
-
-  [549] Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; iii, 86.
-
-From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the
-intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a
-portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he
-visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and levied large
-contributions on the neighboring Œtæans, in reprisal for the plunder
-which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot
-Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter
-vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.[550]
-
-  [550] Thucyd. viii, 3.
-
-It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants
-of Eubœa—probably of Chalkis and Eretria—applied to him, entreating
-his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily
-promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three hundred
-Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the
-island as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with
-full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was
-more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the
-disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to
-him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this
-purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians
-(their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten
-triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he
-was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct
-Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,[551] without at all
-consulting the authorities at Sparta.
-
-  [551] Thucyd. viii, 5.
-
-The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter,
-was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the
-worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with
-Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian
-allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of
-Chios,—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and
-caution in avoiding risks,—considering Athens to be now on the verge
-of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought
-itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking
-measures for achieving independence.[552]
-
-  [552] Thucyd. viii, 7-24.
-
-Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was
-sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being
-assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected, the two Persian
-satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. No
-sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court
-of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the
-tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they
-had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had
-never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the
-Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the
-satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens,
-and break up her empire;[553] for which purpose Tissaphernes sent
-an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and
-Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with
-the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in
-Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which
-they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man
-of the ship’s crews.[554] He farther hoped by means of this aid to
-reduce Amorgês the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who
-was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian
-mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance
-with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that
-Amorgês should be either brought prisoner to Susa or slain.
-
-  [553] Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ ~νεωστὶ~ ἐτύγχανε
-  πεπραγμένος (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς
-  δι’ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι
-  ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας
-  τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc.
-
-  I have already discussed this important passage at some length,
-  in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years
-  before this time between Athens and Persia. See the note to
-  volume v, chap. xlv, pp. 337-339, of this History.
-
-  [554] Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, ~ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν
-  τῇ Λακεδαίμονι~, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ
-  διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, etc.
-
-At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at
-Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the service
-of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from
-that satrap, whose government[555] comprehended the coast lands north
-of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the northeast corner of
-the Elæatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian
-fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and
-realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at
-the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernes as the medium of
-alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having
-thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose
-between them, one striving to attract the projected expedition to
-Chios, the other to the Hellespont:[556] for which latter purpose,
-Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a
-first payment in part.
-
-  [555] The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as
-  Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108).
-
-  [556] Thucyd. viii, 6.
-
-From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens
-in the hour of her distress, and the Lacedæmonians had only to
-choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much
-guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that his family
-friend Endius was at this moment one of the board of ephors; while
-his personal enemy king Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on
-an intrigue,[557] was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well
-the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously
-exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to
-that island. A periœkus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine
-whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming,
-brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less
-than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded
-an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of
-forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the
-Lacedæmonian ports—probably at Gythium—were directed immediately
-to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have
-been now midwinter; but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys,
-insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the
-Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just
-then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as an index of divine
-displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the
-same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede
-Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so
-as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger
-fleet from Corinth.[558]
-
-  [557] Thucyd. viii, 6-12; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 24;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 3.
-
-  [558] Thucyd. viii, 6.
-
-As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent
-to Corinth—in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian
-envoys—to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the
-Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of
-Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the
-same time, to Chios, even those which Agis had been equipping for the
-assistance of Lesbos; although Kalligeitus declined any concern with
-Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money
-which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies
-was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence
-of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus;
-next, to Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under
-Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring
-across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract
-the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low
-was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did
-not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic
-gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its
-numbers and of its movements.[559]
-
-  [559] Thucyd. viii, 8.
-
-Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across
-to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure.
-The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept
-especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would
-they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded,
-though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the
-intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus
-ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about
-Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of
-the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of
-revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence
-of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the
-aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were
-compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in
-general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they
-feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some
-manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much
-delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in
-their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept
-insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to
-open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were
-invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences
-of the plot which was going on, and resolved to keep strict watch
-on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting
-that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in
-Chios.[560]
-
-  [560] Thucyd. viii, 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ
-  Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον
-  αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη.
-
-  The language of Thucydidês in this passage deserves notice. The
-  Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore
-  remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks,
-  that they should be present with their theôry, or solemn
-  sacrifice, at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydidês, when
-  he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the
-  explanation—~ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ~—“for they had been invited;” “for
-  the festival truce had been formally signified to them.” That
-  the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it
-  to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something unusual, and
-  merited special notice: otherwise, Thucydidês would never have
-  thought it worth while to mention the proclamation, it being the
-  uniform practice.
-
-  We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival
-  which had taken place since the resumption of the war between
-  Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out
-  Athens from the Corinthian herald’s proclamation had not yet been
-  renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably
-  greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was
-  in its origin half Athenian; said to have been established, or
-  revived after interruption, by Theseus; and the Athenian theôry
-  enjoyed a προεδρία, or privileged place, at the games (Plutarch,
-  Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. Isthm. Schol.).
-
-Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started
-from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of
-Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and
-tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them.
-Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best
-to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus,
-mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed
-part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of
-thirty-seven triremes, they pursued Alkamenês, who had again begun
-his voyage along the shore southward, and attacked him near the
-uninhabited harbor called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and
-Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships,
-and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself
-was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the
-Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend
-them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert
-spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart.
-Nor was it without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the
-instances of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could
-be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which
-still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a
-neighboring islet.[561]
-
-  [561] Thucyd. viii, 11.
-
-The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his
-departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order
-that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave
-Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been
-actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the
-defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement
-arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia,
-the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a
-squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was
-for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to
-adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian
-exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to
-start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach
-Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed
-off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged
-himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities,
-through his personal connection with the leading men, who would
-repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as
-well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To
-these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity
-of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of
-liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance,
-instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.[562]
-
-  [562] Thucyd. viii, 12.
-
-By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence,
-since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had
-turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the
-Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five
-triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendency could
-have extorted from men both dull and backward, a determination
-apparently so rash, yet, in spite of such appearance, admirably
-conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for
-the fleet now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have
-been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the
-accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês
-was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and
-was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by
-distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled
-exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the
-dangerous wounds upon his country!
-
-There was, indeed, little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia,
-with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute
-condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached
-with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue
-Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he
-was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their
-voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met,
-and did not liberate them, until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor,
-the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by
-their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither
-at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly,
-they reached the town of Chios—on the eastern coast of the island,
-immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment
-and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had
-invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the council was
-found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without
-delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of
-the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost
-of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching,
-and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land,
-incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under
-these impressions, and while the population were yet under their
-first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical council took
-the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ,
-and soon afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from
-Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the
-continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called
-Polichnê, was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of
-attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the
-Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying
-their towns and preparing for war.[563]
-
-  [563] Thucyd. viii, 14.
-
-In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion
-to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other
-allies of Athens,—Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis,
-etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may
-observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to
-impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that
-the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief
-in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor
-the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general
-population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia;
-and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only
-prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of
-its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise
-arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly
-by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force
-approaching.[564] Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have
-determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now
-the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and her power
-to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.[565] The
-envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so
-that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens
-had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of
-their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them
-for the last fifty years. We may well doubt, therefore, whether
-this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole
-advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her
-misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with
-Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards
-Athens by her allies, as I have before observed, was more negative
-than positive. It was favorable rather than otherwise, in the minds
-of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship
-or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their
-leading men, since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love
-of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.
-
-  [564] Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἴτιον δ’ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν,
-  ~οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα~, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι
-  ξυνειδότες, ~τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν~,
-  πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι
-  προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.
-
-  Also viii, 14. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ...
-  προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ, καὶ κελευόντων
-  καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς
-  Χίοις. ~Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς δ’
-  ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο~ ὥστε βουλήν τε τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ
-  γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλαὶ
-  προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραίῳ νεῶν οὐ
-  δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι, καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναίων.
-
-  [565] See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 24, about the
-  calculations of the Chian government.
-
-The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens
-with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest
-aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every
-reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest
-among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians
-had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now
-felt the full importance of that reserve of one thousand talents,
-which Perikles had set aside in the first year of the war against
-the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The
-penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose
-to devote this fund to any other purpose; and, in spite of severe
-financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years.
-Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet
-arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance
-of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this
-money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal
-enactment, or standing order, against proposing any other mode of
-appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this
-money to present necessities.[566]
-
-  [566] Thucyd. viii, 15.
-
-By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and
-equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor,
-and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum;
-out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was
-despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval,
-by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven
-Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared
-of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated,
-while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal
-number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading
-fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready
-thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation,
-since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their
-efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first
-lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding
-Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his
-little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the
-continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ
-is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not
-been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three
-triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and
-Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a
-hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon
-this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy,
-the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the
-help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens
-to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the
-troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town
-was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came himself
-shortly afterwards to complete the work.[567]
-
-  [567] Thucyd. viii, 16.
-
-Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were
-prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in
-all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage
-of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus.
-He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all
-the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those
-of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order
-that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not
-to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of
-twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five
-which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had
-been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been
-armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting
-his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass
-unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had
-just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes
-from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he
-possessed established connections among the leading men, and had
-already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed
-on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês
-and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his
-movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and
-were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê.
-So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this
-enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the
-Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear
-the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus
-apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the
-Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an
-army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen
-in the way—off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon—and
-pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the
-command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at
-Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run
-ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite
-of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships
-and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back
-to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from
-Athens.[568]
-
-  [568] Thucyd. viii, 17-19.
-
-It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first
-treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and
-the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably
-the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the
-town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the
-neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an
-agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the
-Greeks:—
-
-“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the
-Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king
-shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his
-predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with
-their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either
-money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto
-furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against
-the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by
-joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated
-as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall
-revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an
-enemy by the king.”[569]
-
-  [569] Thucyd. viii, 18.
-
-As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed
-over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected
-and placed a garrison within it.[570] If fully carried out, indeed,
-the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not
-only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean,
-but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full ground which had
-once been covered by Xerxes.[571] Besides this monstrous stipulation,
-the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping
-enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it,
-on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for
-the payment of their armament, which was their great motive for
-courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities
-themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of
-its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of
-the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular
-Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up, the
-revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing
-had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens,
-first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and
-mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils
-Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is
-partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta
-realized her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian
-state.
-
-  [570] Thucyd. viii, 84-109.
-
-  [571] Thucyd. viii, 44.
-
-The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia
-and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had
-anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an
-easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and
-Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the
-remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to
-the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened,
-insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition
-indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.
-
-We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since
-its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we
-now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geômori,
-the proprietors of land, as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon.
-It cannot be doubted that these geômori were disposed to follow the
-example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the
-people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under
-this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves
-conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise
-into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like
-would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they
-profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their
-oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian
-triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were
-completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle;
-two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This
-revolution secured—and probably nothing less than a democratical
-revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic
-affairs—the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately
-recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of
-an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and
-divided among themselves the property of such of the geômori as
-were slain or banished:[572] the remainder were deprived of all
-political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with
-any of the families of the remaining citizens.[573] We may fairly
-suspect that this latter prohibition is only the retaliation of a
-similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to
-maintain the purity of their own blood. What they had enacted as a
-privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.
-
-  [572] Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ
-  ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ~ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς~, μετὰ
-  Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων
-  ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε,
-  τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ
-  οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ~ὡς
-  βεβαίοις ἤδη~ ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς
-  γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ’
-  ἀγαγέσθαι παρ’ ἐκείνων οὐδ’ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.
-
-  [573] Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the “higher
-  people” at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from
-  Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by
-  Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot
-  have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island
-  would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.
-
-  Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191):
-  “Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed
-  than all others since their reduction on their former revolt,
-  were _proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer
-  through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending
-  their condition_. The lower people, _having intelligence of their
-  design_, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of
-  three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them,” etc. etc.
-  etc.
-
-  “The _massacre and robbery_ were rewarded by a decree of the
-  Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent
-  administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the
-  last rebellion, had been kept _under the immediate control of the
-  Athenian government_.”
-
-  To call this a _massacre_ is perversion of language. It was an
-  insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the “higher people”
-  were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by
-  their conspiracy—which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact—to
-  introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that
-  the “lower people” were bound to sit still and see this done? And
-  what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection;
-  which inevitably became bloody, because the “higher people” were
-  a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with
-  great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants
-  is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell
-  on the followers of the geômori. Thucydidês specifies only the
-  number of the geômori themselves, who were persons of individual
-  importance.
-
-  I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to
-  himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to
-  conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control
-  from Athens, and that it kept the “higher people” in a state of
-  severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves
-  by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.
-
-  But if he means by the expression, “_under the immediate
-  control of the Athenian government_,” that there was any
-  Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here
-  given by Thucydidês distinctly refutes him. The conflict was
-  between two intestine parties, “the higher people and the lower
-  people.” The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews
-  of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (οἳ
-  ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an
-  indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally
-  of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of
-  Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the
-  Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr.
-  Mitford is pleased to call “rewarding massacre and robbery,” in
-  the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.
-
-  But was the government of Samos, immediately before this
-  intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language
-  of Thucydidês carries to my mind a full conviction that it was
-  oligarchical, under an exclusive aristocracy, called The Geômori.
-  Dr. Thirlwall, however (whose candid and equitable narrative of
-  this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is
-  of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical
-  government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when
-  it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the
-  government continued democratical during the first years of the
-  Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of
-  the Samian exiles at Anæa, whom he looks upon as oligarchical
-  refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford’s view of the
-  peculiarly depressed condition of the “higher people” at Samos
-  at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not
-  actually in possession of the government. “Still (he says), as
-  the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged
-  class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to
-  regain a part of the substance of power under different forms,
-  and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient
-  pretensions on the first opportunity. _That it had not yet
-  advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because
-  otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt
-  from Athens_: and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that
-  the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree
-  of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom
-  the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost
-  irreparable.” (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.)
-  Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion.
-
-  Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as
-  certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting
-  that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly
-  possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into
-  act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none
-  of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of
-  all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement
-  of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadês, after securing Chios, considered
-  Milêtus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover,
-  peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so
-  that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milêtus,
-  being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication
-  with Tissaphernês, for which reason he might naturally deem it
-  of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover,
-  not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several
-  Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidês, having come
-  across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of
-  central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with
-  the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are
-  surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not
-  yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that
-  no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr.
-  Thirlwall’s inference, that the government was _not_ oligarchical.
-
-  We have no information how or when the oligarchical government
-  at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively
-  hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the
-  Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a
-  democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself
-  improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of
-  Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if
-  it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a
-  body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid
-  of the enemies of Athens.
-
-  Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the
-  passages of Thucydidês, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible
-  without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon
-  them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now
-  in the hands of the oligarchy, or geômori, and that the Demos
-  rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The
-  natural sense of the words ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίσταμαι, is that
-  of _insurrection against an established government: it does
-  not mean, “a violent attack by one party upon another;” still
-  less does it mean, “an attack made by a party in possession of
-  the government:_” which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr.
-  Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was
-  now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian
-  revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydidês has stated
-  that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next
-  says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary
-  force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ~δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν~, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν
-  πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23—about the apprehended insurrection of
-  the Helots against the Spartans—ἢν δὲ ἡ δούλεια ~ἐπανίστηται~:
-  compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444;
-  Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also δυνατοὶ is among the words which
-  Thucydidês uses for an oligarchical party, either in government
-  or in what may be called _opposition_ (i, 24; v, 4). But it is
-  not conceivable to me that Thucydidês would have employed the
-  words ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had
-  at that time been actually in the government.
-
-  Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party
-  under Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὐτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε
-  πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ~ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς
-  ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται~. Here the motive of the previous
-  ἐπανάστασις is clearly noted; it was in order that they might
-  _not be under an oligarchical government_: for I agree with
-  Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear
-  meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense
-  prevents our construing it, “in order that their democratical
-  government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon
-  them,” which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall’s view were
-  just.
-
-  Lastly, viii, 73, we have οἱ γὰρ ~τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες
-  τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις~—ἐγένοντό
-  τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ~ὡς δήμῳ
-  ὄντι~ ἐπιθήσεσθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς
-  δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος—“those who having risen in arms against
-  the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy,”
-  must imply, _that the persons against whom the rising had taken
-  place had been a governing oligarchy_. Surely, also, the words
-  μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις, can mean nothing else except to point out
-  the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at
-  two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the
-  first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical
-  government, and constituted a democratical government. On the
-  second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very
-  democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute
-  themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on
-  the first occasion, the established government was already
-  democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not
-  conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely
-  persons making use of the powers of a democratical government
-  to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely
-  vanishes.
-
-  On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at
-  the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like
-  that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing
-  this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the
-  oligarchy became established there. So long as the island
-  performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere
-  with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely
-  to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between
-  the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her
-  apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally
-  with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to
-  have been much exaggerated.
-
-  The Samian oligarchy, or geômori, dispossessed of the government
-  on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious
-  close of the Peloponnesian war,—Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6—where
-  they are called οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται.
-
-On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and
-defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet
-at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit
-in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian
-ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum,
-in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian
-squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.[574] The Lacedæmonian admiral
-Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to
-Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could
-depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes,
-followed by six more afterwards.[575]
-
-  [574] Thucyd. viii, 13.
-
-  [575] Thucyd. viii, 20-23.
-
-Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the
-new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety
-in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the
-prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at
-Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen
-triremes under a Lacedæmonian periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure
-the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding
-afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of
-Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian,
-partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward
-towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at
-this time divided into at least five separate city governments;
-Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east,
-Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments
-were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian
-kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen
-years before, must have long ago disappeared.[576] The Chian fleet
-first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where
-four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed
-forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town
-also.[577]
-
-  [576] See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. l, pp.
-  257, 258.
-
-  [577] Thucyd. viii, 22.
-
-Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet
-at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been
-obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town,
-and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he
-had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.[578] But he had since
-been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos,
-partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from
-Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with
-twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê—the
-largest town in that island—very shortly after its revolt, they
-sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized
-the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful
-battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian
-admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from
-Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through
-the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and
-immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend
-what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and
-some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day
-to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the
-recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by
-three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend
-that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of
-their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither
-from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens,
-and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his
-own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that
-place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast.
-But in spite of all his endeavors, Methymna as well as Eresus and
-all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was
-obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which
-had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at
-the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective
-homes.[579]
-
-  [578] Thucyd. viii, 20.
-
-  [579] Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ
-  ~ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός~, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι.
-
-  Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been
-  carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island
-  from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative.
-  The land-force _marched along_ by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ
-  πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων
-  ~παρῄει~ ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydidês does not say
-  that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê,
-  prepared to march forward, after that island should have been
-  conquered, to the Hellespont.
-
-  Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν
-  νεῶν πεζός to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadês
-  and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five
-  triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian
-  seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard
-  fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this
-  exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor
-  and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with
-  Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These
-  foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as
-  those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν
-  παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ... ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός.
-
-  Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ
-  Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks
-  of them in his note incorrectly. He says: “The Peloponnesians
-  who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any
-  effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians,
-  being only _the epibatæ_ of five ships.” The fact is that they
-  were not merely the epibatæ, but the _entire crews_, of five
-  ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand
-  men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν ~ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες~ ἐν
-  Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five
-  hundred left of them, after some months’ operations and a serious
-  defeat (viii, 32).
-
-The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better
-posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested
-for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their
-fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ,
-which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore;
-the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of
-being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself.
-The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went
-farther up the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional
-success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were
-blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer
-was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to
-begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy
-in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with
-epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were thêtes
-armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were
-impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.[580]
-They occupied the little islets called Œnussæ, near Chios on the
-northeast, as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the
-territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of
-harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island
-at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighborhood,
-but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two
-farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer
-dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left
-to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time
-masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.
-
-  [580] Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. Arnold’s note.
-
-The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which
-Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt,
-inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been
-seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece and the
-organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years
-before. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,[581] its
-commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece.
-In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked
-and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his astonishment
-at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government,
-in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into
-extravagance. “Except Sparta (he says),[582] Chios is the only state
-that I know, which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career
-of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security,
-in proportion as it advanced in power.” He adds, that the step of
-revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it
-to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it
-was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece,
-and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse,
-that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and
-undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient
-to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless
-includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her
-prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not
-undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it
-counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of
-the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply
-to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.
-
-  [581] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; Athenæus, vi, p. 265.
-
-  [582] Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι
-  ἐπεξῄσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τὴν χώραν, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ
-  ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ
-  μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην, εὐδαιμονήσαντας ἅμα
-  καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον,
-  τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.
-
-  viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι ... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
-
-The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected
-renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to
-declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were
-forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from
-Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by
-seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other
-precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the
-Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival
-of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and
-Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them
-employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there
-were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians.
-Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms,
-were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived
-armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected
-a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been
-before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians
-marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of
-their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the
-five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops,
-chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap
-Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians
-were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood
-opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great
-neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an
-entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians
-on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians
-and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and
-even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the
-Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the
-town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch
-as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.[583]
-
-  [583] Thucyd. viii, 25, 26.
-
-For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls
-of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade,
-by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent.
-But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, on the very
-evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian
-fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of
-these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse and
-two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, and
-under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at
-Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C.
-The remaining thirty-three triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole
-fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenês, until he
-could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenês, halting first at the
-island of Lerus,—off the coast, towards the southward of Milêtus,—was
-there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so
-that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the
-neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came
-on horseback, in all haste, from Milêtus to the Milesian town of
-Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend
-immediate aid to the Milêsians, so as to prevent the construction
-of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city
-were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would
-be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next
-morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to
-abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their
-wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês
-with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to
-the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders,
-indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting
-that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring
-before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much
-emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his
-colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for
-fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations
-against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians
-were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing
-circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows
-much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was
-forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from
-which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat,
-demanded to be conveyed home.[584]
-
-  [584] Thucyd. viii, 26, 27.
-
-On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf
-of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and
-leaving their masts, sails, and rigging—as was usual when going into
-action—at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy,
-they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce themselves with
-the twenty-five triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought
-thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at
-Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there
-deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês,
-Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with
-his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the
-Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be
-Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by
-surprise;[585] though strong in situation and fortifications, and
-defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of
-Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of
-signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed
-among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably
-containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of
-Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the
-prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or
-twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been
-taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa.
-The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the
-service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ,
-in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.[586]
-
-  [585] Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced
-  by the Athenians,—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time
-  when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical
-  conspirators,—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed
-  Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus
-  (Thucyd. viii, 54).
-
-  Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave
-  omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden
-  retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance
-  of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the
-  Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.
-
-  [586] Thucyd. viii, 28.
-
-The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets,
-and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or
-the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being
-assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the
-crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he
-had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave
-notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of
-which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so high a rate
-of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa;
-and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a
-drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim,
-until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at
-which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, which marks the low
-character of many of these Spartan officers,—but the Syracusan
-Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he
-obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above
-the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire
-drachma continued.[587] For the present, however, the seamen were in
-good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay,
-but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;[588] while
-Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival
-of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were
-also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos
-under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet
-from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered
-their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior
-operations.
-
-  [587] Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by
-  what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter
-  which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us to make out. None
-  of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some
-  alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations
-  given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to
-  consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and
-  Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or
-  of Poppo and Hermann.
-
-  [588] Thucyd. viii, 36.
-
-Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately
-after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less
-scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with
-amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and
-four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides
-some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed,
-the total number which she had sent out, putting together the
-separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.[589] So
-energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from
-the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state
-except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had
-she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years
-before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.
-
-  [589] Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. Arnold’s note.
-
-The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing,
-and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn
-among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to
-the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of
-the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke
-the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before
-Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being
-engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left
-comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general
-muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes,—ten Peloponnesian
-and ten Chian,—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian
-fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed
-to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the
-neighboring islet. He here—in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian
-general of the district—enjoined the Klazomenians again to break
-with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence
-inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them
-still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being
-rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town
-was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm,
-from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships
-sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near
-to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days,
-destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then
-rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt
-on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from
-Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to
-the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to
-Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by
-the storms, frequent in the month of November.[590]
-
-  [590] Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.
-
-Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus,—at the head
-of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five
-hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the
-sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites,—had reached
-Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to
-the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to
-Lesbos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the
-Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had
-been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition.
-Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian
-triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a
-Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus
-resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus,
-carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling
-the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look
-in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted
-with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in
-the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he
-received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means
-of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead
-of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned on the
-next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to
-be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their
-liberation.[591]
-
-  [591] Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.
-
-The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing
-his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For
-it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under
-Strombichidês—thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying
-hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland.
-Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone
-forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the
-superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm,
-which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going
-northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the
-storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty
-in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships
-were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing
-or becoming prisoners.[592] The rest of the Athenian fleet found
-shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the
-lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.
-
-  [592] Thucyd. viii, 33, 34.
-
-As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos,
-from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios
-and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported
-their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime
-site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a
-sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.[593]
-They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on
-the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely
-interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his
-garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of
-the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now
-reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced
-itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and
-put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that
-the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and
-to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust.
-In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, intreating succor,
-and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all
-the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his
-parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent
-to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile
-the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion,
-that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from
-Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea.
-The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by
-purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except
-Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured
-position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising,
-not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and
-aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.[594] The distress of
-the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except
-succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld.
-
-  [593] Thucyd. viii, 34-38. Δελφίνιον—~λιμένας~ ἔχον, etc.
-
-  That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the
-  base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last
-  preparations, against Chios,—was only repeating what they had
-  once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c.
-  100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr.
-  Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of
-  Chios.
-
-  [594] Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the
-  extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in Athenæus, vi, p. 265.
-
-  That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local
-  legend, connected with the Chapel of the _Kind-hearted Hero_
-  (Ἥρωος εὐμένους) at Chios.
-
-  Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was
-  universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the
-  buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.
-
-That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on
-the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve
-triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a
-political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was
-now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the
-chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.[595] Dorieus
-and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude,
-had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by
-Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.[596]
-Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived
-squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half
-should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels
-from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival
-of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured
-all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped
-ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was
-very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side.
-On the morrow the attack was renewed,—but additional defences
-had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships
-captured near Triopium had come in to help,—so that the Athenians
-were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than
-that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to
-intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the
-sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his
-fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty
-acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milêsians were zealous in
-the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to
-be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate
-mentioned a little above.[597]
-
-  [595] See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of
-  Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x,
-  Orat. p. 835.
-
-  [596] Thucyd. viii, 35-109.
-
-  [597] Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ~ἀρκούντως~,
-  etc.
-
-Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint—such as they
-soon came to have—against the satrap for irregularity of payment,
-still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders
-with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the
-stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when
-first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted.
-Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and
-even before the departure of Theramenês,—whose functions had expired
-when he had handed over the fleet,—insisted on a fresh treaty with
-Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect:—
-
-“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions,
-between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king Darius, his
-sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not
-attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius,
-or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any
-tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his
-subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies.
-Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the
-king, or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or
-their allies, let each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed
-by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and
-her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without
-mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may
-have sent for, and which may be employed in his territory. If any
-of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king’s
-territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king
-with their best power. And if any one within the king’s territory,
-or within the territory subject to him,[598] shall attack the
-Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend
-his best defensive aid.”
-
-  [598] Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ~ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ, ἢ
-  ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει~, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων,
-  βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.
-
-  The distinction here drawn between _the king’s territory_, and
-  the territory _over which the king holds empire_, deserves
-  notice. By the former phrase, is understood, I presume, the
-  continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together
-  with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and
-  peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap
-  should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had
-  once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the
-  plenitude of their power.
-
-Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second
-treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the
-first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all
-those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his
-ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did
-it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of
-them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by
-implication, the same undiminished extent of the king’s dominion, as
-it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same
-undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the
-same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of
-Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by
-Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage
-home, in a small boat, no one knew how.[599]
-
-  [599] Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται.
-
-Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent
-solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in spite of
-his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend
-an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave him at least
-a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian
-squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of Antisthenês,
-having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of
-412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed
-ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them; then afterwards,
-from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known
-its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and
-thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the southeastern extremity of
-Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras
-had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a
-year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was
-instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with
-the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or
-another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the Hellespont,
-for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian
-dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was
-Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as
-advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians.
-These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at
-Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus, but even
-empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon
-whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and
-to appoint Antisthenês in his place.[600]
-
-  [600] Thucyd. viii, 39. Καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους
-  ~τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι~, ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, etc.
-
-No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês
-at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and
-sailed immediately to secure his junction with the twenty-seven new
-triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage
-southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half-ruined
-by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the
-inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even
-without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an
-Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under Charmînus; which had been
-despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order
-to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charmînus, having
-his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast,
-to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian
-fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the
-far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did
-not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed
-it, that Charmînus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the
-rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking
-the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage,
-disabling three and damaging several others. But presently the
-dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round
-him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping,
-first to the island called Teutlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He
-did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the
-victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island
-of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including
-the twenty-seven triremes newly arrived, was now united.[601] The
-Athenians in Samos—whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes
-which will be explained in the ensuing chapter—had kept no watch on
-the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem
-to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprized of
-the defeat of Charmînus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the
-sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there
-deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their
-whole fleet, probably including the remnant of the squadron of
-Charmînus, to Samos.[602]
-
-  [601] Thucyd. viii, 42.
-
-  [602] Thucyd. viii, 43. This defeat of Charmînus is made the
-  subject of a jest by Aristophanês, Thesmophor. 810, with the note
-  of Paulmier.
-
-Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of
-ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it
-did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and
-his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with
-Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they
-found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That
-satrap—now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which
-also more in the coming chapter—had of late become slack in the
-Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen,
-during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same
-time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances
-that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but
-in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong
-the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the
-midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the
-future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed displeasure
-at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions
-concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one
-and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms
-of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely
-all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were
-acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned
-such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian
-sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be
-struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all
-prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed
-to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a
-proposition which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as
-to depart without settling anything.[603]
-
-  [603] Thucyd. viii, 43.
-
-His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors.
-Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in
-Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on
-being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and
-an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful
-men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of
-Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as
-well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided
-between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch
-of the Homeric Catalogue,—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the
-city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three,
-dates only from two or three years after the period which we have
-now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island,
-the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of
-which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and altogether
-uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no
-defences, and fled to the mountains.[604] All the three Rhodian
-towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly
-frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying
-themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose
-commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep
-due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and
-presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at
-Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.
-
-  [604] Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ’ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ
-  τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, etc.
-
-  ... Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι
-  καὶ ἐνενήκοντα, ~ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ
-  πρασσόμενα~, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς
-  πόλεως, etc.
-
-  We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among
-  the dependent allies of Athens, that the general population
-  of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any
-  spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the
-  island—those who, if the government was democratical, formed the
-  oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself,
-  if oligarchical—conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force,
-  unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter
-  no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of
-  the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with
-  little attachment on the one hand, yet no hatred, or sense of
-  practical suffering, on the other.
-
-The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of
-thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station for
-their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place
-by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their
-desire to be more out of his reach.[605] But what we cannot so easily
-explain, is, that they remained on the island without any movement
-or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for
-the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle
-of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet
-of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was
-thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering
-severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:[606]
-moreover, the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus
-against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained
-unperformed.[607] We may impute such extreme military slackness
-mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double
-game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with
-the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, paralyzed their energies by assurances
-that the Phenician fleet was actually on its way to aid them,
-and insured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed
-personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus,
-the general-in-chief, took his share in this corrupt bargain, against
-which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.[608] Such
-prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest
-force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the
-tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded from the dishonesty and
-personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.
-
-  [605] Thucyd. viii, 44: compare c. 57.
-
-  [606] Thucyd. viii, 40-55.
-
-  [607] Thucyd. viii, 39.
-
-  [608] Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to
-  Tissaphernês—Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων
-  ἐδίδασκεν ~ὥστε δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι~, ὥστε ~ξυγχωρῆσαι
-  ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ~, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης
-  ἠναντιοῦτο ~μόνος~ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ξυμμαχικοῦ.
-
-  About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.
-
-I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many
-evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even
-in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks
-of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the
-incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this
-general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question
-between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world.
-The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical
-Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private,—and the quiet
-repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory
-epithets implying such assumed virtue,—are so far from being borne
-out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as
-statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray
-the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money
-themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of
-them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a
-contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the
-leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission
-of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be
-disguised even from themselves, far less would they be above the
-vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride,
-power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And
-if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such
-abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against
-delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in
-interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities
-which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to
-provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual,
-but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and
-prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of
-Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions
-taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical
-ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose
-initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up
-to scorn as demagogues and _sycophants_. Had these Peloponnesian
-generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two
-important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been
-some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens
-the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political
-clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought
-to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however
-often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial
-condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided
-at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the
-evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, both in the scheme and in
-the working, but certainly neither uncalled for nor over-severe.
-
-
-
-
-
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